The Politics of Corporate Responsibility and Child Labour in the Bangladeshi Garment Industry

Author(s): Michael E. Nielsen

Source: International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 81, No. 3,
Critical Perspectives on Corporate Social Responsibility (May, 2005), pp. 559-580
Published by: Wiley on behalf of the Royal Institute of International Affairs
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3569634
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ofcorporate
Thepolitics
responsibility
and childlabourintheBangladeshi
industry
garment
MICHAELE. NIELSEN*

On 4 July 1995-after more than two and a half years of controversy-a

memorandumof understanding
(MoU) concerningchildlabourin theBanglaand
was signedby theBangladeshGarmentManufacturers
deshigarmentindustry
ExportersAssociation(BGMEA), UNICEF Bangladeshand the International
Labour Office(ILO) Bangladesh.' Looking back at the I990s, it becomes clear
thattheBangladesh'case' was quite a prominentone in thewider,re-emerging
in relationto child labour and labour
politicizationof corporateresponsibility
rightsmore broadly.Arguably,it was a uniquely importantone as well. To
such as an entire
'firsts',
beginwith,theMoU embodied some rathersignificant
into
a
with
two
organizations
inter-governmental
industryentering
partnership
(IGOs) to eliminatechild labour, the acceptance of externalmonitoringand
and the involvementof the ILO-IPEC (the ILO's International
verification,
on
Furthermore,
Programme theEliminationofChild Labour)in thisenterprise.
the importance of the lessons subsequentlydrawn from the Bangladeshi
experience cannot be overstated.A dominanttheme in the process was the
negativeconsequences for the child workersof the so-called Harkin Bill (a
proposal to ban the importationinto the United Statesof goods made with
child labour) and the laterboycott threat.The pressureon the Bangladeshi
garmentindustrywas widely seen as misplaced,and the applicationof the
in disguiseor
protectionism
pressurewas characterizedas eitherself-interested
as well-intended,but uninformedand misguided.There are clear links to
broader debates about boycotts,trade sanctions,social clauses and the 'real'
motives of industrycritics;more specifically,the lessons from Bangladesh
subsequentlyinfluenced-and have often served as the explicit basis for
sustaining-some of the views and actionsof key playersin the field,such as
UNICEF, ILO and Save the Children,and also more widelysharedelements
* For helpfuldiscussions,the authorwould like to thankthe other contributorsto thisissue of International
as well as Morten Ougaard and other colleagues at the Departmentof Intercultural
Affairs,
Communication and Management, Copenhagen Business School.
Memorandum of Understandingbetween BGMEA, UNICEF and ILO Bangladesh regardingthe
I
placement of child workersin school programmesand the eliminationof child labour, 4 JulyI995. This
and other documents referredto are on filewith the author.

International
Affairs
8I, 3 (2005) 559-580

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MichaelE. Nielsen
of 'common sense' concerning child labour.2 The analysisbelow offersa
fundamentalchallengeto some of thesebeliefs.
This articlesetsout to explore a questionwhich remainsvirtuallyunasked:
why did the MoU come into existenceand take thatparticularform?To be
of the Bangladeshcase give answersto thisquestion,but
sure,mosttreatments
these tend to be providedin passing,as backgroundinformationon journeys
otherterrain-for
questionsand traversing
departingfromsomewhatdifferent
example, the positive/negativeconsequences of the MoU for the children,
new approachesto childlabour and best corporatepractice,the pros and cons
of linking trade and labour standards,or of boycotts.While these are all
one effectof the emphasison themis that-in spite
importantconsiderations,
of all thathas been said and writtenabout thiscase-the questionas formulated
at thebeginningof thisparagraphhas not yetbeen explicitlyaddressed.3There
is a point here of wider application:beyond the Bangladeshcase, thisinferring
is to some extent
answersto questionsratherthanaddressingthemspecifically
of a CSR literaturedominatedby a rangeof
also more generallycharacteristic
intellectualagendas.4

Theagreement
In essence, the MoU stipulatedthatall underageworkers-defined as those
who had not attained I4 years of age-in the garmentindustryshould be
moved fromwork and into school programmeson or before31 October 1995.
The MoU consistedof fourkey components:
*
*

an initialfact-finding
to identifythe childworkers;
survey
a specialeducation
to be arrangedby UNICEF in cooperationwith
component
local NGOs and in consultationwithBangladeshiauthorities;
an income
maintenance
which-primarilythroughregularpayments
component,
of what was thenapproximately
US$7 per month-was to compensate(in
for
the
of
the
lost
income
child workerswho were to taken out of
part)
employment;

ofGabrielaStoikov,manager
ofILO-IPEC, in US Department
See e.g. testimony
ofLabor,Bureauof
LaborAffairs,
Public
onInternational
ChildLabor,12 AprilI994,Official
Record
International
Hearings
ofLabor,BureauofInternational
LaborAffairs,
DC: Department
I994); RachelMarcus
(Washington
intheworking
world,
andCarolineHarper,Smallhands:children
WorkingPaperno. I6 (London:Save the
andeducation
Children,I997 [OctoberI996]); SusanBissellandBabarSobhan,Childlabour
programming
inthegarment
andissues(Dhaka:UNICEF Bangladesh,
I996). See also
industry
ofBangladesh:
experiences
theConventionon theRightsoftheChild-who decidesabout
implementing
JoBoyden,'Postscript:
children's
in AllisonJamesandAlanProut,eds,Constructing
childhood:
andreconstructing
welfare?',
issuesinthesociological
2ndedn (London:RoutledgeFalmer,
study
ofchildhood,
contemporary
2003), and
NailaKabeer,Thepower
tochoose:
women
andlabour
andDhaka
market
decisions
inLondon
Bangladeshi
(London:Verso,2000).
3 Thereis one quiteelaborate
texton thebackground:
SusanBissellwas
BissellandSobhan,Childlabour.
oftheMoU.
UNICEF's dailypointpersonin thenegotiations
4 Morten
in MetteMorsing
OugaardwithMichaelE. Nielsen,'TeachingCSR: agendasandinquiries',
andChristina
valuesandresponsibility:
thecaseofDenmark
eds,Corporate
Thyssen,
(Copenhagen:
Samfundslitteratur, 2003).

560
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and childlabourin theBangladeshi

industry
garment
responsibility
Corporate
*

led by the ILO; the agreementstated

and verification
a monitoring
component
that verification'may involve unannounced factoryvisits',but did not
mentionviolationsor sanctions.

In relationto the organizationalset-up,the absence of tradeunionsand labour

rightsorganizationsis noteworthy(and a featureof many other 'new' social
However, the MoU representedthe firstoccasion on which an
partnerships).
with two IGOs to eliminatechild
entireindustryenteredinto a partnership
forthe displacedchildren.5UNICEF and the
labour and provide alternatives
ILO subsequentlybegan to cooperate more, and a number of similar
involvingthe two were formed-replicating,with modifications,
partnerships
the Bangladeshprogrammein othercontexts.6
The focus of the MoU and similarinitiativeshas been mainly on the
enforcementgap, i.e. the gap between the standardsset on paper and the
reality.This has not renderedthe 'traditional'approachto child labour meanis
ingless,7but has introduceda normativechange in the way responsibility
it
from
the
nation-state
to
other
societal
distributed,
actors,
essentiallyshifting
mostnotablycorporations.Here the agreementfocusedon the local industry,
ratherthan extendingthe responsibilityof the internationalbuyers of the
garmentindustry'sproducts.8The MoU actuallywent beyond international
law in termsof not allowingolder childrento performlightwork. More than
anything,however, the MoU entailed a normativeshiftfrom condoning
activitiesthatare illegal(undernationaland international
laws) towardsemphaThis
move
from
towards
sizingcompliance.
illegality
complianceis perhapsthe
most significant
featureof many CSR initiatives,and yet CSR is very often
definedand characterized-or glossed over-as somethingmoving or being
'beyond the law'.
Monitoringand verificationwere key componentsof the MoU, and this
involved some significant
change: it actuallypreceded some of the 'groundbreaking'independentmonitoringagreementsand subsequentdebate and it
was the firsttimethatthe ILO decided to become involvedin monitoring.As
for the scope of the MoU, it was quite comprehensivein the sense of
incorporatingcomponentsaimed at addressingthe underlyingcauses of child
labouras well as the consequencesof eliminatingit. In anothersense,however,
itsscope was verylimited,coveringonlytheBangladeshigarmentindustry
and
onlythe formalsector,thatis to saymembersof theBGMEA-thus excluding
not only thousandsof clothingworkshopsin Bangladesh but also the vast
5 ILO-IPEC, 'I 5 examplesofselectedsuccessful
actionprogrammes',
availableatwww.ilo.org,
accessed8
6

Sept. 2001.

in football-making
e.g. ILO-IPEC, 'Pakistan-IPEC successfully
appliesmodelprogramme
industry',
availableatwww.ilo.org,
accessed8 Sept.2001.
7 Putbriefly,
thetraditional
on international
approachwas characterized
byan emphasis
standard-setting
andtechnical
assistance
theILO andlegislation
andenforcement
through
bynationalgovernments.
The processarguably
rolein relation
to a numberofspecific
did,however,playan important
as wellas morebroadlyin relation
to theemerging
waveofcodesofconduct.
companies,

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MichaelE. Nielsen
majorityof childlabourersin the country,manyofwhom were in much worse
situations.Nor did the MoU did not include any of the basic labour rights.9

Thebackground
TheBangladeshi
industry
garment
From the earlyi98os the Bangladeshigarmentindustrywent througha period
of 'phenomenal growth',and by the earlyI99os it had become the nation's
primaryearnerofforeignexchange-accountingfor52 per centoftotalnational
exportsin 1992/3.I? This entaileda high degree of dependencyon overseas
markets,with North America and westernEurope accountingformore than
about 95 per cent of the industry'sexports,and the world'slargestimporterof
apparel, the United States,alone accounting for approximatelyhalf of the
total." In spiteof therapidgrowth,however,theBangladeshigarmentindustry
shareof all US apparelimports.I2
nonethelessaccountedfora quite insignificant
Production was predominantlyorganized throughinternationalsubcontracting,involvingabout 250 buyinghouses. These internationalbuyersnot
only provided designsand specifications,but also undertookthe supply of
imported fabricsand quality monitoring.'3In a global commodity chain
dominated by US and European buyers,the Bangladeshi garmentindustry
occupied a subordinaterole.'4 The growthof the industrywas spurredin part
by thelargepool of low-costlabour,the low entrybarriersassociatedwiththe
productionprocessescarriedout in Bangladesh,and the varietyof economic
concessionsofferedby theBangladeshistate,associatedwiththe country'sshift
The rise of garment
in the earlyI98os towardsan export-orientedstrategy.I5
a
much
of
of
in Bangladeshwas, course,part
broader,fundamanufacturing
of globalgarmentproduction
mentaland continuingchangein the territoriality
and trade,which in the I98os primarilyinvolved a migrationof production
9 Fora critique,
behind
thelabel
thesocialreality
'MadeinBangladesh':
see e.g. SamuelGrumiau,Garments
in kindto a
theMoU-for betterandforworse-is similar
ICFTU, 2000). In theserespects,
(Brussels:
frome.g. codesof
numberof'focused'initiatives
(andservedto inform
manyofthese),butdifferent
andexclusions.
inclusions
conduct,whichtendto operatewithdifferent
10The
quotationis fromMojibulH. BhuiyanandHarveyShaw,'Profileofthetextileandclothing
is fromWorldBank,
in Bangladesh',
TextileOutlook
International,
May 1994,p. 9I; thefigure
industry
DC: WorldBank,1995),p. 27.
stabilization
togrowth
(Washington
Bangladesh:from
'GATT tradepolicyreview:Bangladesh',
p. 76; GATT Secretariat,
World
i WorldBank,Bangladesh,
TradeMaterials
industry
4: 4,JulyI992, p. 6; AnisulM. IslamandMunirQuddus,'The exportgarment
in Abu N. M. WahidandCharlesE. Weis,eds,
in Bangladesh:
a potential
forbreakthrough',
catalyst
andprospects
CT: Praeger,I996), p. 187.
Theeconomy
(Westport,
ofBangladesh:
problems
for1993was2.18%, according
tradeandindustrial
I2 The figure
to GaryGereffi,
'International
upgrading
Economics
in theapparelcommodity
48, I999,p. 50.
chain',Journal
ofInternational
I3 See WorldBank,Bangladesh.
chains:how US retailers
ofbuyer-driven
'The organization
i4 See GaryGereffi,
shape
globalcommodity
eds,Commodity
chains
and
andMiguelKorzeniewicz,
in GaryGereffi
overseasproduction
networks',
CT: Greenwood,I994).
(Westport,
globalcapitalism
15 The New Industrial
to an
shift
froman import-substituting
Policyof I982 involveda fundamental
in theRevisedIndustrial
whichwasreinforced
industrialization
Policy
strategy-ashift
export-oriented
shifts
in manyother
similar
of I986 andin theIndustrial
Policyof I991, andwhich,ofcourse,mirrored
countries
at thattime.

562

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and childlabourin theBangladeshi

Corporate
industry
garment
responsibility
fromthe 'Big Three' Asian countries(Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Korea)
to mainlandChina and a numberof South-Eastand South Asian countries.'6
This shiftwas to a considerableextentdrivenby the changingglobal sourcing
and the dynamics
patternsof the dominant retailersand 'manufacturers',I7
generatedby the internationaltraderegime,in particularthe GATT MultiFibre Arrangement(MFA): 'Internationalbuyerswere initiallyattractedto
Bangladeshby its favorablesituationunder the Multi Fibre Agreement.As a
least developed countryit could benefitfrom the quotas which otherwise
limited the supply frommore traditionalgarmentproducerssuch as Hong
Kong and the Republic of Korea.'I8 In spite of quotas being imposed on
certainitemsin the mid-I980s, the industrysustaineditsrapidgrowth,and in
of thelikelyphasingoutoftheMFA (and not the
1992 it was the negativeeffects
impositionof new quotas) thatwere a cause of concern forthe Bangladeshi
19
manufacturers.
and largelyagriculturaleconomy, in which the more
In a poverty-ridden
traditionalexportswere stagnant,the garmentindustryhad become extremely
to the new private
importantby the early1990s, both by virtueof itscentrality
and
sector,export-oriented
developmentideology
correspondinginstitutional
frameworkand, of course,because of its materialcontributionto the nation's
exports. So importanthad the sector become, in fact, that the industry
association,theBGMEA, was now a centralpoliticalplayer:'The specialstatus
which the industryearned by its impressiveearly contributionto exports
enabled the emergenceof BGMEA as a strongindustryassociationthatcould
command the directattentionof the political establishment.'20
Indeed, key
manufacturerswere members of the 'political establishment'-Redwan
Ahmed,who became presidentof theBGMEA in 1993,was not onlya garment
manufacturerbut also a member of parliamentfor the ruling right-wing
BangladeshNationalistParty(BNP).2' The BGMEA also had a considerable
controlover theindustry,
sinceit admindegreeof politicaland administrative
isteredthe exportquotas, and only its membershad the legal rightto export
clothing.22
and faceda numberof uncertainties
The industryalso had itsvulnerabilities,
relevantto the process analysedbelow. To begin with, the growthof the
industrywas based on productionprocessesand workingconditionsdirectly
'International
trade',p. 49.
Gereffi,
suchas theretailrevolution
andthedoublesqueeze
These-and theunderlying
competitive
pressures,
in Gereffi,
'The organization'.
beenanalysed
on 'manufacturers'-have
elsewhere,
including
extensively
8 WorldBank,Bangladesh.
The MFA was a multilateral
of'voluntary
system
exportrestraint'
agreements
D. Underhill,
crisis
andtheopen
see Geoffrey
Industrial
first
analysis,
signedin I973. Foran in-depth
economies
intheadvanced
andthetextile
industry
(London:Macmillan,I998).
globaltrade
economy:
politics,
19Negotiations
to phaseouttheMFA hadbeenunderwaysincethemid-I98osas partoftheGATT
wasreachedin lateI993.
UruguayRound,andan agreement
20 WorldBank,Bangladesh,
p. 78.
no childlabourin anygarment
2I See e.g. 'US teamcallson BGMEA president:
factory',
Telegraph
(Dhaka),14 Oct. 1993.
22
FreeLaborInstitute
onchildlaborin
p. 3; Asian-American
Grumiau,Garments,
(AAFLI),Report
theUS Department
ofLabor(n.p.:AAFLI,I994),p. 22.
Bangladesh,
preparedfor
I6
I7

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MichaelE. Nielsen
and clearlylinkedto consumptionin Europe and NorthAmerica-marketson
which the industryhad become highlydependentand where most consumers
arguablyfounditsproductionprocessesand conditionsunacceptable.Indeed,
the 'returnof the sweatshop'was increasinglyon the agenda in the United
States, where several groups were conducting campaigns to oppose child
labour and promotelabour rights.The Child Labor DeterrenceAct-which
set out to ban the importationinto the United Statesof productsmade using
childlabour-had alreadybeen introducedin Congress,and itsreintroduction
in 1992 was importantin thiscase (as will be examinedin more detailbelow).
In Bangladeshitself,the characteristics
of the garmentindustry-itsprominence and visibility,including many formal-sector,large-scale enterprises
locatedin Dhaka and Chittagong-weregenerally
favourable
to labourorganizing.
The Asian-AmericanFree Labor Institute(AAFLI, partof the AFL-CIO) was
alreadyengagedin labourorganizingin thegarmentsectorin Bangladeshwhen
the process describedbelow started.23What is more, therewere some very
close linksbetween AAFLI and the otherUS NGO involved in the process,
the Child Labor Coalition (CLC). AAFLI's countrydirector,TerryCollingsworth,was also legal counsel to the US-based InternationalLabour Rights
Fund (ILRF). The ILRF, in turn,was a memberof the Child Labor Coalition,
whose co-chairwas the ILRF's executivedirector,PharisHarvey.

Theframework
ofgovernance:
law and practice
Brieflyput, childlabour in Bangladeshwas regulatedby a numberof laws and
ordinances-'a confusing maze of conflictingprovisions relating to the
regulationof childlabour'.24However confusing,thenationallegal framework
was 'generallyin agreementwith similarprovisions'of ILO Convention I38
(concerning minimum age for admission to employment, 1973).25 There was

one notable difference,

though,which played into the processbelow: unlike
ILO C 138, Bangladeshilaws on childlabour did notallow forlightwork to be
done by older children.26Althoughthisregulatoryframeworkwas in place, it
was not enforced.27
The BangladeshDepartmentofLabour and Inspectorateof
Garment-Workers'
Union (BIGU)', inJane
MarilynRock, 'The riseoftheBangladesh
Independent
HutchisonandAndrewBrown,eds,Organising
labour
inglobalising
Asia(London,Routledge,2001).
24
hadnotratified
theILO Convention138,concerning
minimum
AAFLI,Report.
Bangladesh
age for
admission
to employment
on 22 June
29, 87,98, I05 and I I I wereratified
(1973);ILO Conventions
ConventionI00 was ratified
in I998, andConventionI82 in 200I (International
Labour
I972;
ratifications
oftheILO fundamental
as of25 Sept.2003,availableat
conventions,
Organization,
accessed25 Sept.2003).Bangladesh
theUN Conventionon the
had,however,ratified
www.ilo.org,
forHuman
RightsoftheChildon 2 Sept.I990 (OfficeoftheUnitedNationsHighCommissioner
oftheprincipal
international
humanrights
as of7 July2003,
treaties,
Rights,statusofratifications
availableat www.unhchr.ch,
accessed25 Sept.2003).
25EmbassyofBangladesh
to theUnitedStates,'Written
in US Department
ofLabor,Bureau
testimony',
ofInternational
LaborAffairs,
PublicHearings
onInternational
ChildLabor,12 April1994(Washington
DC: US Department
ofLabor,BureauofInternational
LaborAffairs,
1994).
26
BissellandSobhan,Childlabour,
p. I4.
27 A situation
see AssefaBequeleandJoBoyden,eds,Combating
childlabour
hardly
uniqueto Bangladesh:
(Geneva:ILO, I988).
23

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and childlabourin theBangladeshi

Corporate
industry
garment
responsibility
and logisticalsupport
Factorieswas said to be lacking'sufficient
resources,staff
to adequatelyperformthe taskof monitoringchildlabour laws'.28
and thestateof selfAs faras the dominantnormsof corporateresponsibility
are
the
'second
wave'
of
recent
developments
regulatoryinitiatives concerned,
in thisarea was only emergingin the earlyI99os, and when the processstarted
rollingin 1992 therewere veryfewsignsof anychangesin thisarea.29Thus, to
a considerable extent, norms and practices of corporate responsibilityin
relationto child labour may be characterizedin termsof a more or less tacit
acceptancethat'that'sjust theway thingswere done over there'.3?Along with
Reebok, Levi Straussclaimsto have been a firstmoverin takinga new standon
child labour and other labour practices,and in relationto the Bangladeshi
garmentindustrydeveloped a programmeof its own thatwas quite similarto
the eventualMoU.31

Childlabourinthegarment
industry
The numberof childrenworkingin the Bangladeshigarmentindustryin I992
is difficult
to ascertainwith any degreeof precision,32but reasonableestimates
range between 50,000 and 100,000 (the government of Bangladesh being the

sourceof thehigherfigure).This was onlya tinyfractionofthe totalnumberof

working children in Bangladesh; the children's work was generallynot
hazardous,and theAAFLI surveyfoundno incidencesofbonded labourin the
industry.As Naila Kabeer has forcefullyargued (mainlyfocusingon adult
in some
workers),in spiteof the workingconditionsin the garmentindustry,
in
this
sector
a
offered
social
for
respectsemployment
potential women
positive
workersbothat themicroleveland at themacrolevel,in termsofgenderrelations
and traditionsin Bangladesh.33In a contextof deeplypatriarchal
traditions
and
a generalundervaluingof the girlchild,workingin thegarmentindustry
might
even be seen as preferableby the childrenand theirparent(s).Moreover, the
28 US

ofLabor,BureauofInternational
LaborAffairs,
vol. i:
Department
Bythesweatandtoilofchildren,
Theuseofchildlaborin US manufactured
andmined
DC: US Department
ofLabor,
imports
(Washington
BureauofInternational
LaborAffairs,
p. i6.
I994), pp. 32-3; Grumiau,Garments,
29 See e.g.
RuthPearsonandGillSeyfang,
inJenkins,
PearsonandSeyfang,
'Introduction',
RhysJenkins,
andlabour
codesofconduct
intheglobaleconomy
eds,Corporate
rights:
(London:Earthscan,
responsibility
2002).
30MerylDavids,'Globalstandards,
localproblems',
Journal
Jan.-Feb.1999.
Strategy,
ofBusiness
31 WilliamMaroni
forgovernment
affairs
andpublicpolicyat Levi Strauss),
in US
(responsible
testimony,
ofLabor,BureauofInternational
LaborAffairs,
Public
onInternational
ChildLabor,
Department
Hearings
28JuneI996 (Washington
DC: US Department
ofLabor,BureauofInternational
LaborAffairs,
I996);
KarlSchoenberger,
Levi'schildren:
toterms
withhuman
intheglobalmarketplace
coming
rights
(New York:

Grove, 2000).
32 Not onlyarestatistics
on childlabourgenerally
difficult
to establish
notoriously
(see e.g. Alec Fyfeand

M. Jankanish,
Tradeunions
andchildlabour:
a guidetoaction
[Geneva:ILO, 1997], pp. 13-14),butthe
in thisparticular
casebythefactthattheBangladeshi
manufacturers
hadalready
problemis aggravated
started
to layoffchildren
beforethespotlight
reallyfocusedon theproblemin late1992.Whatis more,
thefigures
atthetimeshouldbe approached
withmorethana littlecautionas theyalso
reported
reflected
thenarrowinterests
ofthosereporting
them.Statistics
on childlabourin theBangladeshi
in otherwords,werepartandparcelofthepoliticsofchildlabourandcorporate
garment
industry,
below.
analysed
responsibility
33 Kabeer,Thepower
tochoose.

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MichaelE. Nielsen
prevalenceof child labour in the industrymustbe seen withinthe contextof
deep and widespreadpoverty,the poor stateof the education systemand the
general absence of day-care options (relatedboth to the absence of social
servicesand to changesin the social and geographicalfoundationsof kinship
resultingfrommigrationflows).34The industryworkforceconsistedpredominantlyof women: femalechildworkerswere foundto accountforroughly60
per cent of the child workers,a common explanationforthe latterbeing that
'mothersbringtheirchildrento work in the garmentfactoryand the owner
kindlyallows the childrento earnsome moneyby helpingout'.35
This picture of child labour in the garmentindustryis problematicon a
numberof counts.The work of underagechildrenin the industrywas clearly
entailedwidespreadviolationsof
illegal,and productionin thegarmentindustry
basic labour rights.36Working conditionsin the industryhave been characterized as generallyinvolvingworking days of I0-I4 hours, oftenwithout
breaksand with only halfa day offin a week; paymentmade late (sometimes
no paymentat all); overtimebeing frequentlyrequired and rarelyentailing
such as being given
extrapay; frequentviolationsof employmentformalities,
no employmentletter(enabling employersto dismissworkerswithout the
statutoryterminationbenefits);physicalworkingenvironmentscharacterized
by poor lightingand ventilationand oftenhot, crowded and locked factory
buildings;and the 'impositionof harshformsof disciplineand supervision'.37
Furthermore,the above account characterizeschild labour in the garment
industryas a 'lesser'problem,when-on a numberof counts-it was precisely
of childlabourin Bangladeshwas thatit was
the opposite.A key characteristic
in
the
country's leading and most importantexport industry,
prevalent
suggestingthat the potentialfor forcingchange in this 'limitedsphere' was
perhapsquite considerable;the problemwas certainlymuch more visible;and
factorywork has tended to be seen as more exploitative.In addition, the
explosivegrowthof the industryhad been accompaniedby an equallymarked
numericalincreasein the incidenceof childlabour in it.38
the linkbetween childlabour and povertymaybe said to cut
Furthermore,
both ways (thatis, while children'searningsmaybe importantin poor households,childlabour,in turn,perpetuatespoverty),thereis no naturallaw related
to stages of economic development and poverty (that is, the persistence/
eradicationof childlabouris also a matterof social forcesforand againstit),and
34

Primaryeducation in Bangladesh was both freeand compulsory,but the education systemwas of a very
poor quality,school accessoriesstillhad to be paid for,and formaleducation was often(perceived to be)
of littleuse forthe future.See e.g. US Departmentof Labor, Bureau of InternationalLabor Affairs,By
thesweatand toilofchildren,
vol. I, p. 33; AAFLI, Report,p. I4.
35 AAFLI, Report,p. 13-14.
36 See e.g. US Department of State, Bangladesheconomic
(WashingtonDC: US
policyand tradepractices
Department of Labor, Bureau of InternationalLabor Affairs,I994).
37 Rock, 'The rise'; AAFLI,
Report,pp. I2-14; US Departmentof Labor, Bureau of InternationalLabor
vol. I, p. 30.
Affairs,By thesweatand toilofchildren,
38 This is not to argue thatthe childrenemployed in the industrywould otherwisehave been attending
school, but it is importantto point out thattherewas a change in the real social relationsof production
and not merelyin the discursivepoliticsof child labour.

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and childlabourin theBangladeshi

industry
garment
responsibility
Corporate
thelogic of householdpovertyand the absence of day-careoptionsmaynot be
as sometimessuggested.A survey conducted by AAFLI
as straightforward
foundthatin Bangladeshadultunemploymentin theimmediatefamilyof child
workerswas quite common, and that 'Very few (less than 15%) of the child
workers interviewed had an immediate familymember (father,mother,
In relationto day-careoptions,
brother,sister)workingin the same factory.'39
section47 of the FactoriesAct of I965 requires
the surveynotes: 'Interestingly,
thatin any factorywith more than 50 women workers,the owner is required
to provide a child care room for the childrenof the workers.None of the
workersinterviewedfor this reportwas aware of any factorythat met this
requirement.'40As for the financialmotivationfor using child labourers,
childrenwere generallypaid less than adults in the industry,but this wage
differential
was 'primarily
because of thejobs held by the children,who tendto
be given the less skilledjobs ... In cases in which a child workeris able to
obtainpromotionto a job as a sewingmachineoperatoror ironer,theyare paid
the same wages as adultworkers.'41While the directlabour cost advantagesof
using child labour were thusratherlimitedin the sense of being confinedto
certaintypesof tasks,otherfacetsof childlabour-for example,childworkers
Moreover,in
being more easilydisciplined-were claimed to be important.42
competitivelabour marketsystems,child labour may serve as a substitutefor
adultworkers,puttinga downwardpressureon adultwages and enablinglocal
manufacturers
to increasetheirsometimesmeagreprofits,not onlyin termsof
adultunemploymentbut also by servingto obstructlabour organizing.As the
following comment of a garmentmanufacturerillustrates,not all garment
manufacturers
were keen supportersof tradeunions: 'If it is necessaryto kill
workers,theywillbe killed,but therewill notbe a tradeunionin thisfactory.'43
As faras rationalitiesare concerned,clearly'local' gendervalues and traditionsplayeda role in shapingthe characteristics
of childlabourin the garment
but
the
of
the
industry,
growth
garmentindustryand its entryinto a transnational production chain also involved some profound changes in the
rationalitiesof Bangladeshi politiciansand manufacturers
alike. Thus, child
labour in the garmentindustrycoexisted with some significantchanges in
values accompanyingthe widespreadacceptance of 'new' and 'alien' values
associatedwith global capitalismand a neo-liberalworld order.

39AAFLI,Report,
p. I3.
in original);
BissellandSobhan,Childlabour,
Report,
p. I3 (emphasis
pp. 8-9; Grumiau,

40 AAFLI,

Garments,
p. I4.

4I AAFLI,Report,
p. 12.
42 See
ofLabor,BureauofInternational
LaborAffairs,
Bythesweatandtoilofchildren,
e.g. US Department
vol. I, p. 3 I.

43CitedfromRock, 'The rise',p. 40.

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MichaelE. Nielsen

Theprocess
ofevents
A chronology
In late I992 the spotlightwas turnedon the use of childlabour in the BanglaTwo eventsplayed crucialroles in the earlyformdeshi garmentindustry.44
was theintroduction-or,moreprecisely,theuse
ationof theagenda. The first
of thisin Bangladesh-in theUS Congressin August1992 ofthe Child Labour
to as the HarkinBill) to ban the importationinto
DeterrenceAct (also referred
the United Statesof productsmanufactured
using child labour.45In October
the chief of the Economic Commercial Section of the US Embassy in
Bangladesh,Phillip Carter III, wrote to-and later met with representatives
of-the BGMEA. The then BGMEA president,Mohammad Mosharraf
Carter's
Hossain, subsequentlysenta letterto BGMEA members,transmitting
view
Bill
and
the
US
the
serious
Harkin
the
about
Congress
warnings
pending
was inclinedto take on the matter,and urgingthemto 'take note of the above
developmentsfor informationand appropriatenecessaryaction to maintain
smoothflow of our exportsto the United States'.46
The second eventwas thebroadcastingon 22 December ofan itemon NBC
televisionwhich charged Wal-Mart with buying clothingfromBangladesh
made by illegal child labour.47 In the run-up to the programme,on I2
December, the BGMEA had writtento Wal-Mart,assuringthe companythat
'all necessarystepshad been takento ensurethatBGMEA garmentswould be
child free.The BGMEA also indicatedto Mr Emmanuel thatit was going to
open some schools forthe workingchildrenin areas where therewas a high
concentrationof garmentfactories.'48TerryCollingsworthfromAAFLI was
alreadyin Bangladesh,where he had met with Carterfromthe US Embassyto
discusschild labour and the garmentindustry,and on 26 December 1992 he
met with the presidentof the BGMEA and proposed a collaborativeeffortto
combat the problem. The proposal involved the establishmentof a central
organizationto coordinatethe work of other NGOs and the governmentin
settingup schools forthe child workers.The BGMEA would provide 'access
to theworkersto informthemof theprogram,physicalspace forthe classrooms
44 Child labour in the
Bangladeshi garmentindustryhad not gone entirelyunnoticed,and therehad been

See e.g. Denis Campbell,

skirmishesbetween American tradeunions and the local manufacturers.
'Young Guardian: slaves to our appetites-the exploitationof child workersaround the world',
Guardian(London), 2I June I989; Robert A. Senser, 'On theirknees', AmericaI67: 7, Sept. 1992.
45 The bill had actuallybeen introducedearlier,but had not yet been passed. See Congressional Record,
'Statementson introducedbills and joint resolutions(Senate, August 5, 1992)'; CongressionalRecord,
'The introductionof the Child Labor Deterrence Act of I989' (House of Representatives,24 May
I989); Congressional Record, 'Statementson introducedbills and joint resolutions'(Senate, 24 May
Hon. Donald
I99o)'; Congressional Record, 'Introductionof the Child Labor Deterrence Act of I99I
J. Pease' (Extension of Remarks, House of Representatives,I5 Nov. I99I).
46 Mohammad MosharrafHossain (BGMEA
president),letterto BGMEA members,14 Nov. 1992.
47 It also made
allegationsthatChinese clothinghad been mislabelledto avoid importquota restrictions.
See Don Longo, 'Wal-Mart must addresssome "press"ingissues', DiscountStoreNews 32: I, 4 Jan. 1993,
p. I4; 'Wal-Mart stock fallsahead of TV show's reporton imports', Wall Street
Journal,22 Dec. 1992.
48 AAFLI,
Report,p. 21.

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and childlabourin theBangladeshi

industry
garment
responsibility
Corporate
where possible,and some degreeof financialsupport';would 'permitaccess to
the adult workersfor AAFLI to provide education and training.Again, the
BGMEA would providephysicalspace and some degreeoffinancialsupport,as
well as cooperation in arrangingtimes when the workerscould attend our
programs';and would meet regularlywith an AAFLI representativeto be
about labourlaw violationson thepartofBGMEA
presentedwithinformation
members,at which point the BGMEA would have an opportunityto correct
the problems'beforeAAFLI used all availablemeansto forcecompliancewith
the law'.49
A fewdaysbeforetheNBC programmewas broadcast,PharisHarveyof the
ILRF had writtento Wal-Mart's president,requestingfurtherinformation
about the company'sbuyingpracticesand policies. 'Reeling fromthe negative
exposurefromtheDateline program,Mr Glassrespondedwitha detailedletter
which included commitmentby Wal-Mart to establish"a fundfor factories
and/or garmentassociationsin orderto help educate the childrenof Banglawere already
desh".'5? At this point, however, the garmentmanufacturers
'contemplatingto clean up low-age workers from their factories'andaccordingto Rosaline Costa, a Bangladeshihuman rightsactivist-as manyas
5,000 childrenhad alreadybeen dismissedin December I992.5' This 'cleaning
or any
up', however,did not involve the provisionof educationalalternatives
substituteincome forthe children,and thisbecame an importantconcern as
the debate continued.Representativesof the BGMEA and the governmentof
Bangladeshengaged in talkswith a numberof different
parties,includingthe
US embassyand AAFLI. Wal-Mart,Levi Straussand otherinternational
buyers
of Bangladeshi garmentssent representatives
to 'visit' the countryearly in
1993 52 Neither Wal-Mart nor Levi Strausschose to pull out of Bangladesh.
Instead,Wal-Mart actuallyincreaseditsbuyingin the countryand announced
a new set of sourcingstandards,and Levi Straussdeveloped a new 'model'
programmeof its own.53 In March the Child Labor Deterrence Act was
reintroducedin Congress,givingrise to furtherdebate, and in late springan
informalworkinggroupwas formedwithrepresentatives
fromthe government
of Bangladesh,the BGMEA, UNICEF and the ILO, AAFLI and severallocal

49QuotesfromTerryCollingsworth,
telefax
to PharisHarvey,23 MarchI993. See also'US labourbody
offers
to traingarment
workers'and 'Garment
manufacturers
to protect
likelyto cleanlow-ageworkers
US market:
BGMEA warnsmembers
ofdireconsequences
ofemploying
children',
(Dhaka),
Telegraph
ofchildlabour',Bangladesh
Times,
3I Dec. 1992.
3I Dec. I992; 'AAFLI,BGMEA to solveproblems
50 AAFLI,

Report,p. 2I.

5' 'Garment
manufacturers',
telefax
to Harvey,23 March1993.
(Dhaka);Collingsworth,
Telegraph
52'Malpublicity
in UnitedStatesagainstreadymade
ofBangladesh',
garments
Morning
Paper(Dhaka),6 Jan.
UnitedStatesInformation
Agency(Dhaka),Memorandum
1993(AAFLItranslation);
0340,'Bangladesh
atmosphericsfor I /13/93: child labor in the garmentindustry',13 Jan. I993; 'Unwanted garment

workers',
DailyStar(Dhaka),i8 Jan.1993;AAFLI,Report.
53'US companiesstarttakingactionsagainst
contractors',
Bangladeshi
DailyStar(Dhaka),I5 MarchI993;
LouiseKehoe,'Bold fashion
statement:
Levi Strauss's
decisionnotto investin China',
AAFLI,Report;
Financial
8 May 1993;JoannaRamey,'Wal-Martsetssourcing
rulesto monitor
laborconditions',
Times,
Women'sWearDaily, Io June 1993.

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MichaelE. Nielsen
NGOs.54 The workinggroup had a mandateon child labour more broadly,
not just in the garmentindustry,but it did have periodic meetingson the
garmentindustryspecifically(althoughthese did not entailnegotiationof an
MoU). The group's work, however, was made difficultby, among other
things,polarized views and discussionson the Harkin Bill, and time passed
withoutmuch progressbeing made.55
In earlyJuly I994, the Child Labor Deterrence Act was introducedinto
Congress once more. The BGMEA announced that factoryowners would
cease to employall childworkersby 31 October and thereafter
provideschooling forthem.56However, neitherschoolingnor alternativeemploymentfor
and concernsover the potentiallynegative
the childworkerswas forthcoming,
effectson the childrenwere raisedagain. When October came, an appeal on
behalfof a numberof child workerswas directedto UNICEF and the ILO
(and the broaderpublic), and the lay-offswere postponed. Subsequently,the
negotiationsthat eventuallyled to the MoU began in a group consistingof
of the BGMEA, the ILO, UNICEF, the US embassyand
representatives
AAFLI.57 The negotiations,conductedundercontinuedmedia attentionto the
and theywere
involveda numberof thornyissuesand disagreements,
industry,
furtherslowed down by the sweepingvictoryof the Republicans in the US
versionsof an agreemid-termelectionsas well as by thefactthattwo different
mentwere in play.58On 31January1995,PharisHarveyand Linda Golodner,59
co-chairs of the Child Labour Coalition, which representedmore than io
millionmembers,wrote to Redwan Ahmed,presidentof the BGMEA:
hasbeenmadesincelastOctowe haverecently
learnedthatverylittleifanyprogress
to allowindependent
reluctance
ber,and thattheBGMEA hasexpressed
monitoring
withtheprogram.
... IftheBGMEA doesnotintend
ofcompliance
Thisis disturbing
in theprogram
as designed,
suchas
thenit can expectthatorganizations
to participate
54See e.g. 'US companies',
on introduced
billsand
Record,'Statements
DailyStar(Dhaka);Congressional
UnitedStatesInformation
(Senate,I8 March1993)';AAFLI,Report;
jointresolutions
Agency(Dhaka),
media
Memorandum
02432, 'Bangladesh
02339,'TPC on childlabor',29 MarchI993; Memorandum
mediareaction-March3I', 2
reaction-March3I', 3I March1993;Memorandum
02523,'Bangladesh
Harkinbill',7 AprilI993; Memorandum
02622,'TPC on childlabor/the
April1993;Memorandum
mediareaction-April7', 8 AprilI993.
02705,Bangladesh
55 See BissellandSobhan,Childlabour;
'BGMEA canhelpavertadverseeffect
ofHarkin
AAFLI,Report;
Bill',DailyStar(Dhaka),3 Aug. I993; 'HarkinBill "won'thitlocalindustries"',
Sun,3 Aug.
Morning
ofprotectionism',
Sun(Dhaka),9 Aug. I993; 'HarkinBillto
Morning
1993;'HarkinBill a reflection
in Bangladesh',
industry
(Dhaka),IO Aug. I993; 'AAFLIworkingagainst
damagegarment
Telegraph
interest
ofworkers',
NewNation(Dhaka),IO Aug. I993; NurKhanLiton,'Fairdealforthekids:
10 Sept.
Harkin'sLaw willdo moreharmthangood to Bangladesh's
DhakaCourier,
workingchildren',
(Dhaka),I4 Oct. I993.
I993; 'No childlabour',Telegraph
56 Congressional
oftheChildLaborDeterrence
Actof I994-Hon. GeorgeE.
Record,'Introduction
I JulyI994); AgenceFrancePresse
ofRemarks,House ofRepresentatives,
Brown,Jr.'(Extension
to enduse ofchildlabour',5July1994;RahmanJahangir,
'US
(AFP), 'Bangladesh's
garment
industry
forcesDhaka to free36,ooochildlabourers',
SaudiGazette,
6 July1994;AFP, 'Bangladesh
pressure
ban childlabour',24JulyI994.
garment
exporters
57 ILO-IPEC, Action
andstrategic
childlabour:
lessons
(Geneva:ILO, 1997),pp.
against
priorities
future
forthe
childlabourlay-offs
postponed',
23-4; AFP, 'Bangladeshi
3I Oct. I994.
58E.g. NickNuckleyandNickFielding,
'WhyI'llneverbuya pairofLevi'sagain:just3p on thepriceofjeans
woulddoublethewagesofthesesweatshop
MailonSunday
(London),27 Nov. I994.
girlsin Bangladesh',
59President
oftheNationalConsumers
League.

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and childlabourin theBangladeshi

Corporate
industry
garment
responsibility
the Child LabourCoalitionwill be forcedto publicizethe continueduse of child
in Bangladesh.60
labourin themakingofgarments
The BGMEA did not reply,and at the Annual General Meeting of the
BGMEA on I I March a decision on the agreementwas postponed.6I
More communicationensued fromDC to Dhaka, the tone increasingly
sharp,and a boycottwas threatenedif the agreementwas not formalizedin
General Meeting ended with a
May.62 On I7 May a BGMEA Extraordinary
of
of
the
agreement(by 311 352 members)-and the BGMEA again
rejection
announced that all child workers would be out of the factoriesby 3I
October.63 The Child Labour Coalition called for the boycott, and the
For a couple of
BGMEA came under heavy pressurefromvariousquarters.64
a 'counter-campaign'abroad,
daysit stood firm,at one point even threatening
but soon-at an emergencyexecutive committee meeting on 24 Maydecided to returnto the negotiatingtable.65Ironically,thisdecisioncoincided
with an announcementfromUNICEF headquartersthat it would not buy
from companies that exploited children.66The talks continued throughout
June,and eventuallythe agreementwas signedand presentedon 4 July.67
60 LindaGolodnerandPharisHarvey,telefax
to RedwanAhmed(BGMEA president),
30Jan.I995.
6i The BGMEA hada tremendous
PR opportunity
to signan agreement
aroundthetimeofthe
visitoftheUS FirstLady,HillaryClinton,to Bangladesh.
to theBGMEA,
According
forthcoming
RedwanAhmed,
however,an agreement
generalmeeting:
requiredtheapprovalofan extraordinary
telefax
to PharisHarvey,25 AprilI995; HumayunKabir(Bangladesh
to
ambassador
to theUS), telefax
2
childlabortakesspotlight',
'Bangladeshi
Harvey,25 AprilI995; UPI (UnitedPressInternational),
AprilI995.
62 PharisHarvey,telefaxes
to RedwanAhmed,I3 March,I4 April,I9 April,20 AprilI995; 'Bangladesh,
Guatemalaunderfire',Women's
WearDaily,25 April1995;'Bangladesh
makers:
we'll try',Women's

WearDaily, 26 April I995.

63 TabibulIslam,'Bangladesh-child
labor:Bangladesh,
US clashoverchildlabor',Dhaka,InterPress

Service/Global
Information
Network,7 JuneI995.
64 LindaGolodnerandPharisHarvey,telefax
to members
oftheChildLaborCoalition,i8 May I995;
PharisHarvey,telefax
to TerryCollingsworth
andLydiaSigelakis(AAFLI-Bangladesh),
I9 May I995;
PharisHarvey,telefax
to RedwanAhmed,20 May I995;JackSheinkman
andCarolynKazdin
andlegislative
oftheAmalgamated
director,
(president
respectively,
ClothingandTextileWorkers
to RedwanAhmed,25 May I995; PharisHarvey,telefax
to Redwan
Union,ACTWU), telefax
andvice-president/legislative
Ahmed,26 May I995;JayMazurandEvelynDubrow(president
director,
oftheInternational
Ladies'Garment
Workers'Union,ILGWU), telefax
to Redwan
respectively,
Ahmed, 26 May 1995; Linda Golodner, telefaxto Redwan Ahmed, 31 May I995; Nadeem Qadir,
'Bangladesh
garment
byrowoverchildlabour',AFP,Dhaka,20 May I995;
exportsto US threatened
WearDaily,22 May 1995;Joyce
apparelseenfacingboycott',Women's
JoannaRamey,'Bangladesh
WearDaily,23 May 1995.
Barrett,
'Boycottofapparelmadein Bangladesh
planned',Women's
65 AFP, 'Bangladeshi
clothestradehitsat US protest
againstchildlabour',22 May I995; UPI, 'Bangladeshi
manufacturers
to protest
boycott',23 May 1995;AFP, 'US welcomescallfortalkson childlabourby
to LindaGolodner,
Bangladeshi
garment
exporters',
25 May I995;RedwanAhmed,telefax
3 June1995.
66 Thismovefolloweda CBS exposeofchildlabourin theproduction
ofsurgical
in Sialkot,
instruments

whichwasincidentally
alsothefirst
overchildlabourin
Pakistan,
majorstepin theensuingcontroversy
thesoccerballindustry,
in whichUNICEF andtheILO-IPEC againpartnered
up. See MaggieJackson,
'ChildrenmakeUS soccerballs,UNICEF toolsin Pakistan',
Associated
Press(AM cycle),5 AprilI995;
BarbaraCrossette,
'Unicefvowsnotto buyfromcompaniesthatexploitchildren',
NewYorkTimes,
25
international
worker
or
initiatives:
relations
May 1995;ElliottSchrage,
Promoting
rights
through
private
voluntary
public
A report
totheUS Department
Human
public
policy?
ofStateonbehalf
oftheUniversity
ofIowaCenterfor
ofIowa CenterforHumanRights,2004, availableatwww.uichr.org),
ch. 2.
(Iowa: University
Rights
67 RedwanAhmed,telefaxto LindaGolodner,3 JuneI995; LydiaSigelakis(AAFLIBangladesh),
telefaxes
to PharisHarvey,5 and 7 JuneI995; PharisHarvey,telefax
to David N. Merrill(US ambassador
to
to PharisHarveyandTerryCollingsworth,
telefax
21 June
Bangladesh),
9 JuneI995; LydiaSigelakis,

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MichaelE. Nielsen

theproblem
Defining
One of the mostsignificant
aspectsof thiscase is that,throughoutthe process,
theproblemwas definedalmostexclusivelyin termsof childlabour. Of course,
childlabour wasused, and thiswaslargelyacknowledged;but why thisnarrow
definition,when otherbasic labour rightsissuescould also have been on the
agenda?68AAFLI, at least,had an interestin definingtheproblemmore widely
to includeotherlabour concerns-and it did bringtheseup. 9 For a numberof
reasons,however, therewas no concertedor sustainedeffortto broaden the
agenda in thisway. To beginwith,the NBC expose focusedon Wal-Martand
illegal child labour in Bangladesh; and most of the ensuingmedia attention
likewise focusedon child labour only. It was to some degree a coincidence,
however,thatthe focusended up being on Bangladeshand childlabour,since
the initial interestof the NBC crew was in Wal-Mart's 'Buy America'
campaign: 'So this reporterwith a televisioncrew goes into a Wal-Mart.
and he starts
Underneaththebanner"Buy America"there'stheseshirts,
looking
at them,and theyall say "Made in Bangladesh"-"Made in Bangladesh"! ... if
they had said "Made in Mexico," he would have gone to Mexico.'70 The
Dateline segmentwas undoubtedlyimportantin raisingchild labour in the
Bangladeshigarmentindustryas a matterof public debate,and it therebyalso
contributedto definingthe problem as one of child labour. As far as the
Bangladeshimedia were concerned,the treatmentof the issue was verymuch
drivenby the threatof the HarkinBill-a threatrelatedto childlabour.
Indeed, the potentialenactmentof the Harkin Bill played a key role in
relationto the narrowdefinitionof the issue. For one thing,it constituteda
source of leverage-a leverage that was tied directlyand narrowlyto child
labour-over the Bangladeshi garmentindustryon labour issues, both for
Carterfromthe US embassyand forAAFLI's TerryCollingsworth:'He's in
there,tryingto talkto people about organizing,and what does he see? It's full
of children!Now, Terryis a verygood labour rightsactivist,and he said,"We
can't have this." He also sees thatthisis a wedge.'7' More importantly,
the
Harkin Bill led to a sharplypolarized debate, in which the negative consequences of the eliminationof child labour quickly became a dominant
theme.72This was a point on which UNICEF, IPEC, the majorityof thelocal
1995; Joanna Ramey, 'Bangladesh apparel agreementmay be inked as soon as today', Daily News Record

25: 123, 27 June 1995; 'Pact nearlyset on child labor in Bangladesh', Women'sWearDaily, 27 June 1995;

AFP, 'Bangladesh garmentmanufacturers

sign child labour agreement',4 July1995.
The existence of the problem-i.e. the actual use of illegal child labour-was not seriouslydisputed.
There were some occasional denials by the BGMEA, but overall therewas 'littleroom forany credible
denial thatthereare significantnumbersof child workersin the Bangladesh garmentindustry':AAFLI,
Report,p. 4.
69 Indeed, as Pharis Harvey recollects,the AFL-CIO were not 'thathappy with child labor being a
major
partof Terry'swork'. Interviewwith PharisHarvey, Corralitos(CA), 6 May 2003.
70 Interviewwith Terry
Collingsworth,WashingtonDC, 20 March 2003.
71 Interviewwith a formersenior officialof the US
Departmentof Labor, Bureau of InternationalLabor
Affairs,
Washington DC, 15 April 2003; see also Rock, 'The rise'.
72
Bissell and Sobhan, Child labour,p. 3.
68

572

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and childlabourin theBangladeshi

Corporate
garment
industry
responsibility
NGOs involved and the local manufacturers
agreed, focusingthe debate on
depth (causes of child labour and consequences of eliminatingit) ratherthan
breadth (relatedlabour rights),and it also had a significantimpact on the
discussionsof the size of theproblem,thatis, how manychildrenwere actually
workingin the industry.Thus, the figuresreportedduringthe processvaried
widely, fromthe occasional denials that child labour existed to claims that
250,000 childrenwere involved-and the logic of thisnumbergame or 'stat
war' was in a senseturnedupside down:73'Those who want to emphasizethat
the Harkinbill will resultin the displacementof largenumbersof childrencite
very high figures.'74More significantly,
perhaps,the problem came to be
redefinedas a consequence of the HarkinBill, the negativeconsequences for
children,and malicious critics (as opposed to one of the exploitationof
childrenand the responsibility
of the manufacturers,
i.e. the industryitself).
This was used not only to criticizethe Harkin Bill, but simultaneouslyto
delegitimizeAAFLI and otherlabour rightsactivists,chargingthem with an
internationalconspiracy against the Bangladeshi garment industry,US
and workingagainstthe interestsof the childrenin question.75
protectionism,
All of thisenabled the BGMEA to approachthe controversy
in the way it did,
and constitutedthe backgroundto the industry's
repeatedthreatsto dismissall
the child workers at short notice. Would this have occurred, one might
wonder,ifthe two international
organizations-UNICEF and IPEC-had not
been 'specialized' (workingfroma mandatenarrowlyfocusedon children),or
iftheyhad playeda different
role in the debate?
Finally,the critiqueof the industry'slabour practiceswas largely'northern
driven', coming primarilyfromAAFLI and the CLC. This observationis
in some
frequentlyused in the discourseon corporatesocial responsibility,
cases pointingto an exclusion of key 'stakeholders'by powerfulinterests,in
othercases delegitimizing-rightly
or wrongly-the criticsas not actingin the
best interestsof the intendedbeneficiaries.The latterallegationwas made in
theBangladeshprocess:AAFLI and CLC were chargedwithbeinguninformed
about the realitiesin Bangladesh and with not listeningto the childrenand
theirfamilies(thispointis discussedfurther
below). Beyond this,however,the
Rosaline
in
Costa
this
repercussionsagainst
processalso point to anotherfacet
of 'northerndriven' criticismwhich is less often discussed: namely, the
intimidation,repressionand physicalviolence which local criticsoftenface,
which maybe partof the reasonwhy 'northern'criticsare not alwaystoo keen
on namingtheir'southern'partners.76

73 On statisticalwarfare,see Joel Best, Damned liesand statistics:

numbers
untangling
fromthemedia,politicians,
and activists
(Berkeley: Universityof CaliforniaPress,2001).
74 AAFLI, Report,p. 6.
75 See
e.g. Telegraph (Dhaka),

31 Dec.

1992; Morning Paper, 6 Jan. 1993; Daily Star, 23 Jan. I994.

76 E.g. MorningPaper,6 Jan.

I993; 'Harkin's bill is going to be passed in the currentmonth', Daily
Janakantea,4 May 1994; Costa had aided the NBC crew back in I992 and had been active fromearly
on, cf. p. 569.

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MichaelE. Nielsen

Targeting
A key aspectof targetingin thisprocesswas thatwhile Wal-Mart was a target
in the initialphase of agenda formation,thatcompanyand otherinternational
buyerswere not centraltargetslateron. The HarkinBill constitutedno serious
threatto Wal-Mart and similarcompanies, and the BGMEA was a more
'suitable'targetfora numberof reasons.As describedabove, theBGMEA was
targeteddirectlyby the US embassyand AAFLI in 1992, and theBGMEA and
the local manufacturers
showed signsof being susceptibleto pressurefromthe
theBGMEA represented
theentirelocal industry,
verybeginning.Furthermore,
whereas targetinga few specificinternationalbuyers would affectonly a
fractionof the industry;the BGMEA, moreover,exercisedconsiderablecontrol over the (formalsector) garmentindustryin Bangladesh throughits
of exportlicences. In otherwords,it was an organizationthat
administration
could serveas the locus forovercomingpotentialcollectiveactionproblems.
It is worth noting that the governmentof Bangladesh was not targeted.
Certainly,the Harkin Bill constituteda threatnotjust to the garmentmanufacturers
but also to the nationaleconomy. As in so many othercases where
have been raised,however, the government
issuesof corporateresponsibility
lacked both the resourcesand thepoliticalwill to act effectively,
and had been
ineffective
formanyyearsin enforcing
itsown laws. Furthermore,
theBGMEA
and attemptsto change
had verystronglinkswith the politicalestablishment,
the practicesof its membersindirectlythroughthe government-even if it
could be argued that this would make 'good businesssense' and would be
compatiblewith (perhapseven assist)the export-oriented
policyof the government-would mostlikelynot have led anywhere.As AAFLI put it: 'The result
of theseclose connectionsis thattheBGMEA is not gettingsignificant
pressure
from the governmentto act. Instead there are spectacleslike Ministerof
Information
Huda's speechthattheHarkinbillis an "international
conspiracy".'77
Economic coercion
It should be clear by now that the threatof US trade sanctionsagainstthe
undertheChild Labor DeterrenceAct was a keydriverin thisprocess:
industry
'The entirepublic debate [in Bangladesh]seems to centeron whetheror not
the [Harkin]Bill will be passed,and acceptsas a foregoneconclusionthatifthe
law is passed, the garment industry will not be able to meet the
requirements.'7As noted above, thebill was used fromtheverybeginningby
theUS embassyand by AAFLI to put pressureon theBGMEA, and each of the
caused not only debate but also renewed uncersubsequentreintroductions
taintiesfortheBGMEA, and gave AAFLI renewedleverage.At the same time,
the potentialnegativeconsequencesof the bill were used by the BGMEA as a
77 AAFLI,Report,
p. 17.
78 AAFLI,Report,
p. 15.

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intheBangladeshi
andchildlabour
Corporate
industry
garment
responsibility
power resource:in late 1992, 1993 and againinJuly1994 the threatof thebill's
passagewas followedby announcementsfromthe BGMEA thatit would start
Moreover,each timethebill failed
ejectingall childworkersfromtheindustry.
to gain passage the uncertaintiesdiminished,and the threatbecame less
effective:'The possibilityof the Harkin bill's passage has been virtuallythe
exclusiveforcein focusingattentionon the problemof child labour,but now
the momentumis stalledalong with the Harkinbill.'79In late 1994, just after
the MoU negotiationshad begun, the Republicans took Capitol Hill, and the
Child Labor Deterrence Act ceased to constitutea driving force in the
Bangladesh process. A few monthslater,the CLC became involved in the
processand-after fourmonthsof steppingup thepressure,and theBGMEA's
postponementand thenrejectionoftheMoU-eventually calledfora boycott.
Thus, in the end, it was the use of thissecond typeof economic coercion that
forcedthe BGMEA back to the negotiatingtablewithina few days.
The use of economic coercionwas highlycontested(it stillis, of course,and
it is not uncommon forargumentsagainstthisto be based on the 'lessons' of
Bangladesh).Bisselland Sobhan, forexample,have arguedthatit was the softer
tacticsinvolved in the 'formationof trust'thatwere centralin the process:
'Perhaps the most importantinvestmentof time during the course of the
projectwas in the developmentof a rapportwith industryrepresentatives.'8?
This view is illustrative
of a more generaldichotomybetween the use of softer
tactics(trust-building,
dialogue,learning,etc.) and blunterones (tradesanctions,
boycotts,lawsuits,etc.). At its centreis the question of what it takesto make
'global capitalmore responsible'8I and whethertherewould be any 'inside',
or 'dialogue' at all withoutthe 'outsiders'employingmore
any 'trust-building'
'radical' means. As a senior officialof the US Labor Departmentduringthe
process put it:

It'snotthatthecompanies
didn'tknowit.It'snotthatanybody
didn'tknow.Andthey
werenotinterested
in responding.
In anyway,shape,orform... Andtheyknewwhat
was happening.
to changetheir
Theywerebeingapproached.
Theyhadno incentive
It seemsto me thatthisdayand
wayofworking.None at all. So, whatis incentive?
age, thereis onlyone incentive:money.And iftheirpurseis threatened,
theywill
come to thetableand begintalking.
Andthat'swhatwe did. Nothingelsegotthose
table.82
peopleto thenegotiating
but
Or, as PharisHarveyput it, 'tradesanctionsare a verybluntinstrument,
we were dealingwith some verybluntpeople, and we got theirattention.'83
Or again,in the words of TerryCollingsworth:

79AAFLI,Report,
p. 23.
80 Bissell andSobhan,Childlabour,
p. IO.
8I Pharis
an interview
withPharisHarvey',Multinational
Monitor,
Harvey,in 'Workingforlaborrights:
82

Dec. I993.

Interview
withformer
LaborDepartment
official,
15 April 2003.
83 Interview
withHarvey,6 May 2003.

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MichaelE. Nielsen
I mean,we weretheactivists
and we werethere
My rolewas to scaretheindustry.
talkingaboutwhatwe woulddo iftheydidn'tcleanup theiract ... UNICEF was a
terrible
becausetheydidnotacceptthebadfaithoftheindustry.
negotiator,
Theytook
whattheindustry
said at facevalue,and I'd be sitting
there,just shakingmyhead,
saying,'You're kidding!Do you believethat?'I wouldsaybackto UNICEF-and I
is!' Because theyseem so
have-'Well, fine.Please tell me whatyouralternative
in
to
their
the
...
head
and
trust
that
the
willing put
saysthey'regoingto
government
fixtheproblem.They'vebeensayingthatfor20, 50 years!84
Softv. tough tactics,then,is a falsedichotomy,and in thiscase the BGMEA
was 'led' to compromiseby both. Withoutthe threatof the HarkinBill, however,negotiationsof the MoU mightneverhave got underway, and without
the boycottit would probablynot have been finalized.
Of course, the use of economic coercion in this case and the negative
consequences forthe childrenhave been identifiedas among the 'lessons' of
Bangladesh, of which many people are aware and which continue to be
'taught'.Very often,thisinvolves-as it did duringthe process-claims that
this campaignwas simplyself-interested
US labour protectionismin disguise
and/orthatthe CLC was, at best,naYveand uninformed:
to the abolitionof child
While not wantingto questionthe CLC's commitment
abouttheprevailing
economic
labour,it was clearthattheywerepoorlyinformed
in Bangladesh,
workandthestepsthatneedto be
conditions
thereasonswhychildren
thechild.Withoutthisbasic
takento addressthisissuein a waythattrulysafeguards
fortheCLC.85
one couldarguethatitwasinappropriate
information,
one which resultsfrom-at best-unawareThat chargeis an unsubstantiated
nessofthe close linksbetweenthe CLC, AAFLI and theUS embassyin Dhaka.
As forprotectionismin disguise,is any kind of trade-labourlinkageautomaticallyto be assumed protectionist?Should one not consider the fact that
AAFLI was working to establishthe Bangladesh Independent GarmentWorkers' Union, that child labour was seen as a problem and a point of
leveragewhich could provide AAFLI with access to the factories?Bissell and
Sobhan acknowledge that 'AAFLI had been tryingto open a field officein
Bangladesh for some time ... AAFLI sought to work (and head) the monitoringcell of the CLWG [Child Labour Working Group] which would have
Furthermore,
it
providedthemwith immediateaccess to garmentfactories.'86
is worth noting thatAAFLI's December 1992 proposal to the BGMEA did
include the provision of educational alternatives,but this is hardly ever
mentioned-in spiteof the local media coverageafterthe meeting.
and the emphasison negative
Finally,this critiqueof blunterinstruments
forboth theprevious
consequencesservedto misplacethe moralresponsibility
exploitationand the displacementof childrenintoworse situations:whatabout
thegarmentmanufacturers,
theinternational
theBangladeshigovernment,
buyers?
84
85
86

Interviewwith Collingsworth,20 March 2003.

Quote fromBissell and Sobhan, Child labour,p. I4; see also Kabeer, The powertochoose.
Bissell and Sobhan, Child labour,p. I4; see also Rock, 'The rise'.

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and childlabourin theBangladeshi

industry
garment
responsibility
Corporate

thesolution
Modelling
To begin with, the definitionof the problem implied that some particulars
were more or less 'given'-the agreementwas on child labour; it included
and income compensationforthe childworkers,and a
educationalalternatives
made it a
The
to
find
them.
targetingof the BGMEA furthermore
survey
the
The
critical
for
the
of
'natural'partner(withimplications
scope
agreement).
issues relatedto a choice between two different
agreements,monitoringand
funding.
When the negotiationsrestartedfollowingthe boycottin May I995, two
versionsof an agreementwere stillon thetable.Brieflyput,one version(which
became theMoU) would move all underagechildworkersto school; theother
versionwould move the youngerchildrento school, but introducea combination of work and education for those above the age of eleven. The US
embassyand Departmentof Labor, CLC, ILRF and AAFLI were willingto
oversight
accept eitherversion, 'as long as eitheroption provides sufficient
in
in
frominternational
the
and
agencies
survey
monitoringcompliance,and is
carriedout in a way thatprovidesschoolingforall retrenched
childlabourers'.87
While consistentwith international
law, the combinationof school and work
forolder childrenversionwould not have been consistentwith Bangladeshi
law. Furthermore,the BGMEA expressed concern at this point that this
versionwould not be acceptableto theinternational
buyers.Thus theBGMEA
and the governmentof Bangladeshopted forthe 'educationonly' version.
The issue of monitoringwas also a conflictpoint. By I995 independent
monitoringhad become a fundamentaldemand of AAFLI, the CLC, and the
US embassyand Departmentof Labor. The BGMEA, on the otherhand,was
reluctantto acceptthisintrusion,in particularifit was to be headed by AAFLI,
which had offeredto monitortheprogramme,and was suggestedas an obvious
candidate for the role by the CLC.88 Indeed, the delaying tactics of the
BGMEA were closelyrelatedto thisreluctance.In the MoU rejectedin May
I995, however,the BGMEA had alreadyachieved importantconcessions:
At BGMEA's insistence,
theMOU providedthatAAFLI and theotherinternational
not
would
be permitted
to do the inspections
themselves.
Instead,a
organizations
whichincludedBGMEA, wouldhirea staff
BoardofDirectors,
ofinspectors
to do the
and
the
MOU
that
the
information
verification,
expressly
provided
gatheredcould
be
used
for
the
of
the
MOU.89
only
purpose implementing
AAFLI was excluded fromthe negotiations,and the BGMEA
Furthermore,
indicated that only UNICEF and the ILO would be acceptable as external
monitors,in spiteof thefactthat-until then-the ILO had not been willingto
accepttherole.90In thefinalstages,however,theUS embassyand Department
9 June1995;Sigelakis,
to Merrill,
telefaxes
to Harvey,5 and7 June1995.
Harvey,telefax
See e.g. Golodnerand Harvey,telefax
to Ahmed,30Jan.I995.
89 Collingsworth,
telefax
to Harvey,I9 May 1995.
90Harvey,telefax
to Ahmed,20 May I995.
87
88

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MichaelE. Nielsen
of Labor played an importantrole in pushing not only for independent
monitoringbut forthe involvementof the ILO in this.9I
The eventualinclusionof ILO-IPEC was relatedto, among otherthings,the
question of funding.Until quite late in the process,crucialaspectsof funding
had not yet been decided upon. Shortlyafterthe negotiationswere reopened
in May I995, the ILO decided to become involvedin monitoring,althoughit
was stilluncertainwhetherit would be a formalpartnerto theagreement:'The
ILO, of all people, has agreed to do the monitoring... Currentlythe MOU
would be signedby BGMEA and UNICEF. ILO is checkingwith Geneva to
see iftheycan sign.'92There were severalreasonsforthislate entry,including
the tripartite
natureof the ILO, but the involvementof the US Departmentof
Labor played a crucialrole. The departmentwas much concernedat the time
with independentmonitoring,and senior officialstherehad strongties with
and sympathies
forthe ILO. Moreover,thewiderpoliticalbackingforsome of
the Labor Department'swork restrictedthis to child labour, and the ILOIPEC, in turn,'was also a place you could put your money and have the
discussions'.93
At the same time,the BGMEA's contributionto the earnings-substitution
paymentsfor childrenhad not yet been determined.The US ambassadorto
Bangladesh was 'working on increasingthe original amount' of the US
contributionto the programme.94During the final stages of negotiations,
however, the BGMEA was forced to contributeto this: 'UNICEF will
contributeUS$ 75,000 in I995, and additionalsupportlater,and BGMEA will
contributeto the UNICEF sponsoredschool-programme
US$50o,oooper year,
towards the costs of educating underaged workers.'95 Furthermore,the
BGMEA would contribute50 per cent of the cost of income-maintenance
paymentsfor displaced child workerssent to school, up to a maximum of
US$250,000 per yearforthreeyears.ReportsindicatedthatBGMEA members
startedto firechildrenas soon as the negotiationswere reopened in late May
1995, and continuedto do so; stillthe numberof childrenfoundby the survey
went above the commitmentsof the BGMEA to fundpayments,and more
money was needed.96 Thus, in spite of programmecomponentssuch as the
ofBangladesh,
alsoplayeda
andtheUS embassy,
The LaborDepartment
alongwiththegovernment
rolein theexclusionofAAFLI: 'Atsomepoint. . . [TerryCollingsworth's]
was
personalinfluence
he wasjustbecominga lightning
rod... Andso we talkedto himaboutitand
becominga hindrance;
said,"We'll continueto talkto you,letyou knowwhat'sgoingon, andyou can continueto workon
thesidelines,
butrightnow you'rethelightning
with
rod,andso, canyoustepback?"'Interview
former
LaborDepartment
I 5 April2003.
official,
92
to
telefax
to Harvey,5JuneI995; Harvey,telefax
to Ahmed,20 May I995; Harvey,telefax
Sigelakis,
LauraE. Jones,USAITA, 31 May I995.
93Interview
I 5 April2003.
ofLaborofficial,
withformer
Department
94Sigelakis,
to Harvey,5JuneI995. Fromearlyon, theBGMEA soughtto linka possible
telefax
to development
fundsfromtheUS, butthiswas rejectedat thetime:see United
assistance
programme
StatesInformation
02622, 7 AprilI993.
Agency,Memorandum
95MoU; Sigelakis,
telefax
to Harvey,5JuneI995.
96 See
telefax
to Harvey,5JuneI995; Harvey,telefax
to Merrill,
Sigelakis,
9 JuneI995; Collingsworth,
to Harvey,28 JulyI995; Sigelakis,
to Harvey,I 3 Sept.I995.
telefax
telefax
9I

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and childlabourin theBangladeshi

Corporate
responsibility
garment
industry
surveyand monitoring(intended to counteractnegative consequences and
of the solution),the fundingresponsibilities
of the
enhance the effectiveness
BGMEA (as well as the outlook and actions of its members)appear to have
worked againstthis.

remarks
Concluding
This article set out to explore the question of why the MoU came into
existenceand took the particularformit did. In broad terms,therewere signs
of an emergingpoliticizationof corporateresponsibility
in the early I99os.
in relationto Bangladesh,the reintroductions
More specifically
of the Harkin
Bill were of fundamentalimportance.The bill was a tool by which leverage
could be exertedon the industryin Bangladesh,used in particularby AAFLI,
which was alreadyengaged in labour organizingin the industry.(Accusations
of 'protectionismin disguise'seem misplacedhere,in particularin the lightof
AAFLI's earlyengagementswith the BGMEA.) It was also a significant
threat,
which led to a polarized debate with profoundimplicationsforthe way the
problemwas defined.When negotiationslostmomentum,and the HarkinBill
had ceased to be an effectivedriver,the Child Labour Coalition enteredthe
processto keep up the pressure,and arguablythe close linksbetween AAFLI,
the ILRF and the CLC were significant
in this.The BGMEA, in turn,constitutedan obvious target:itwas vulnerableand susceptibleto pressure,and it was
a potentialway to overcome collective action problems. The analysisalso
foundthatthe choice between the two versionsof the agreementwas determined by Bangladeshilaws on child labour being stricterthan international
law, and by the industry'sconcernswith losing internationalbuyers.Finally,
the exclusion of AAFLI and the entryof the ILO resultedto a considerable
extentfromthedelayingtacticsand reluctanceoftheBGMEA, in combination
withthespecificpoliticalpreferences
of theUS DepartmentofLabor,as well as
fundingpracticalities.
Above all,thisarticlerepresents
a call formore in-depthanalyses-including
clear, detailed and documented chronologies of events-of why concrete
in the governance
changesthatinvolve a shifttowardscorporateresponsibility
of socialjustice have occurredand taken on particularforms.By focusingon
the strugglesbetween conflictingforces and the selective inclusion and
exclusion of issues,groupsor organizations,such specifichistoriescould be a
significant
counterforce
in (and outside)a CSR discoursewhich is increasingly
glossy,highlydominatedby managerialneeds and concerns,businesscases and
bestpractices,'partnerships'
and 'dialogues'.
The analysisofthiscase has also shownthatwhile it maybe relevantto speak
of CSR as going 'beyond the law' in termsof increasingthe responsibility
of
dominantretailersand branded marketers,makingthe leap fromillegalityto
The analysishas also been critical
compliancewiththe law isjust as significant.
ofsome of themore or lessestablished'truths'about theBangladeshcase,many

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MichaelE. Nielsen
of which are held to be of much wider relevance and use. To begin with,
consideringthe durationof the processand thepushingand shovingit took to
move the industry(the BGMEA in this case)-a problem that is far from
unique-the praise of softertactics and the criticismand/or rejection of
tougherones is as naive as tradesanctionsare blunt.Reaching a compromise
oftentakesmoderatecompromisersand more radicalcritics,and it is oftenthe
sharpercriticismthatsetsthe wheels turning-and keeps themgoing. If more
moderateswould explicitlyaccept this,perhapsbusinessesand governments
could be made to stretchjust a littlefurther.
Warningsagainsttoughertactics
sometimescome in the formof a mantra:'Do not rushinto a boycott!'When
based on theBangladeshcase, such a mantrabecomes problematic-claimsthat
the Child Labour Coalition did so in Bangladesh are simply historically
incorrect.Moreover, the mantraignoresthe issue of what to do ifthe 'target'
refusesto talk in the firstplace, or if the talksbegin to seem endless (and
hopeless).
Finally,while it is certainlyimportantto be attentiveto the negativeconsequences of eliminatingchildlabour (and otherproblems),the above analysis
also pointedto some negativeconsequencesofbeingso: it mayserveto redefine
moral culpabilityfrom
the problem,to narrowthe agenda and/orto transfer

to critics.
corporations

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