QRA Lyse LNG Base Load Plant Train 1

STAVANGER
QRA
Lyse LNG Base Load Plant
Linde Project No:
Lyse Infra AS
Item No:
Lyse Contract No:
2110A11U
61-10156.05.01
Linde Job Code:
Lyse Project No:
STAVANGER
R100
Linde Doc. No:
Lyse Doc. No:
Page
&AA S-CS 1002
R100-LE-S-RS0003
1 of 133
Quantitative Risk Analysis (QRA)

Train 1
03
ISSUE
03
25.08.2008
Rath
Ralph
22.02.2008
28.12.2007
Revised acc. to Lyse Comments

Can
Revised acc. to the Comments in
Can
QRA presentation from 26.02.2008
Revised acc. to the Lyse Comments Can
Can
02
ISSUE
02
14.03.2008
01
Rev
ISSUE
DRAFT
Status
01
Issue
(Lyse)
(Linde)
(Linde)
Rath/Baumgartner
Buttinger
Ralph
Can
Date
Description
Reviewed
Approved
Prepared
Rath
Buttinger
STAVANGER
QRA
Linde Project No:
Lyse Contract No:
Lyse Infra AS
Item No:
2110A11U
61-10156.05.01
Linde Job Code:
Lyse Project No:
STAVANGER
R100
Linde Doc. No:
Lyse Doc. No:
Page
&AA S-CS 1002
R100-LE-S-RS0003
1 of 133
TableofContents
1.0
Executive Summary...................................................................... 3
2.0
2.1
2.2
Introduction .................................................................................................... 9
Objective of the Study ...................................................................................... 9
General Description of the Approach ............................................................... 9
3.0
General Description of Process and Facilities......................... 13
3.1
3.1.1
3.1.2
3.1.3
3.2
3.2.1
3.2.2
3.3
3.3.1
3.3.2
3.4
3.5
3.6
3.7
Natural Gas Treatment and Gas Liquefaction ................................................ 13

Feed Gas Reception ...................................................................................... 13
Natural Gas Pretreatment............................................................................... 13
NG Liquefaction.............................................................................................. 14
Refrigerant System......................................................................................... 14
Refrigerant Cycle............................................................................................ 15
Refrigerant Storage and Make-Up.................................................................. 15
LNG Storage / LNG Loading .......................................................................... 16
LNG Storage .................................................................................................. 16
LNG Loading .................................................................................................. 16
Fuel Gas System ............................................................................................ 17
Hot Oil System ............................................................................................... 17
Flare System .................................................................................................. 18
ESD and Blowdown System........................................................................... 18
4.0
Study Methodology..................................................................... 20
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
Risk Analysis Basics....................................................................................... 20

Definition and Types of Risk........................................................................... 20
Acceptance Criteria ........................................................................................ 21
Hazard Identification....................................................................................... 23
5.0
Data used for the Risk Assessment.......................................... 25
5.1
5.2
5.3
5.4
5.5
5.6
5.7
5.7.1
5.7.2
5.7.3
Scenarios ....................................................................................................... 25
Leak Frequencies ........................................................................................... 26
Release Duration............................................................................................ 27
Atmospheric Conditions.................................................................................. 28
Population Distribution.................................................................................... 28
Ignition Sources.............................................................................................. 29
Consequence Calculations............................................................................. 30
Discharge and Dispersion .............................................................................. 30
Instantaneous Releases ................................................................................. 31
Continuous Releases ..................................................................................... 31
STAVANGER
QRA
Linde Project No:
Lyse Contract No:
Lyse Infra AS
Item No:
2110A11U
61-10156.05.01
Linde Job Code:
Lyse Project No:
STAVANGER
R100
Linde Doc. No:
Lyse Doc. No:
Page
&AA S-CS 1002
R100-LE-S-RS0003
2 of 133
5.7.4
5.7.5
5.7.6
5.8
Release Duration............................................................................................ 31
Dispersion ...................................................................................................... 31
Thermal Radiation and Overpressure............................................................. 31
Mitigation Measures taken into Account ......................................................... 32
6.0
Results of the Risk Analysis...................................................... 34
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
Risk 1st and 2nd party ...................................................................................... 34

Risk 3rd party .................................................................................................. 39
Location Specific Risk .................................................................................... 45
Overpressure Risk.......................................................................................... 46
7.0
Sensitivity Evaluation................................................................. 50
7.1
7.1.1
7.1.2
7.2
7.2.1
7.2.2
7.3
Sensitivity 1: Pit on the jetty, LNG Storage Tank and

the
Pentane Tank ................................................................................................. 50
Discussion ...................................................................................................... 50
Comparison with Criteria ................................................................................ 53
Sensitivity 2: Rock Wall towards the public area on the peninsula ................. 53
Discussion ...................................................................................................... 53
Comparison with Criteria ................................................................................ 54
Sensitivity 3: Splitting of process vessels inside the refrigerant cycle into
smaller vessels and additional block valves to reduce
the volume of inventory loops......................................................................... 54
8.0
Conclusions ................................................................................ 55
9.0
Appendix A: Assumption Sheets .............................................. 56
10.0
Appendix B: Hazard Identification ............................................ 90
11.0
Appendix C: Equipment Count.................................................. 95
12.0
Appendix D: Results of LEAK 3.2 Calculations ....................... 99
13.0
Appendix E: Individual Risk Ranking Report......................... 104
14.0
Appendix F: Details on the Analysis Procedure .................... 127
15.0
References ................................................................................ 132
Quantitative Risk Analysis, Lyse LNG Base Load Plant, Train 1

Introduction
1.0
25.08.2008
Page 3
Executive Summary
Linde Engineering AG (Linde), on the behalf of Skangass AS (Skangass), has conducted a

Quantitative Risk Analysis (QRA) of the first train of the new Lyse LNG Base Load Plant, located near Stavanger, Norway. The objective of the study was to determine the level of risk
associated with the Lyse LNG Base Load Plant, which is currently being designed, and compare it with the acceptance criteria given by Lyse Infra AS (Lyse).
Approach
To achieve this objective, a thorough analysis was made of all hazardous substance inventories and streams within the plant. In particular, all equipment were counted and used as a basis
to calculate leakage frequencies. The determination of leakage frequencies was done using
the program "LEAK", a proprietary program from Det Norske Veritas (DNV). To achieve this,
the whole plant was segmented, four leak size categories were defined, and leakage frequency
calculations were performed for the segments based on the categories.
Meteorological data as well as population data provided by Lyse were used for study. The data
are important for DNV's risk assessment tool PHAST RISK (further SAFETI), which takes into
account (when applicable):
Pool fires,
Jet Fires,
Flash Fires and
Vapour Cloud Explosions.
For the scenarios defined for the Lyse LNG Base Load Plant, the population and the determined ignition source distribution were entered into PHAST RISK and analysed with respect to
their contribution to individual risk and to societal risk.
Results
PHAST RISK calculates both individual risk and societal risk. The individual risk for 1st, 2nd and
3rd parties are calculated based on these results which are then compared to the acceptance
criteria.
As expected, the main contribution to the overall risk is due to vapour cloud explosions and
flash fires.
Individual Risk, 1st and 2nd party
Individual risk is a measure of risk to which an individual person is exposed. The individual risk
criteria are divided in this analysis into Individual Specific Risk (ISR) and Average Individual
Risk (AVR).
The 1st party risk is defined as a fatality risk for the Lyse LNG Base Load Plant personnel.
Maintenance personnel and operators during supervision rounds are considered to be the most
exposed personnel.
Fatality risk for the LNG Carrier personnel (Truck, Ship Loading and external contractors) have
been considered as 2nd party and are also assumed to be within the most exposed personnel
group.

Introduction
25.08.2008
Page 4
The figures 1 and 2 show the calculated individual risk contour lines for the Lyse LNG Base
Load Plant. The calculated risk contours of individual risk for the most exposed person is illustrated in Figure 1. The figure shows the contours of the most exposed person to suffer a fatality
every 100 000 years (green line), every 1 000 000 years (dark blue line). The risk is illustrated
for the most exposed person present in the process plant area, 20 % of their working time per
year.
10-5 /yr
10-6 /yr
Figure 1: Most exposed person individual risk contour lines for the Lyse LNG Base Load Plant
The risk contours for the individual risk are also calculated and is illustrated in Figure 2.
The figure shows the contours of individual risk for a fatality every 10 000 years (green line),
every 100 000 years (dark blue line), etc. The risk is illustrated for 1 person present at any
point outside a building in the plant, continuously 8 hours a day, 5 days a week during a whole
year (45 weeks).

Introduction
25.08.2008
Page 5
10-4 /yr
10-5 /yr
10-6 /yr
10-7 /yr
10-8 /yr
Figure 2: Individual risk contour lines for the Lyse LNG Base Load Plant
The Individual Risk (IR) has been extracted from the PHAST RISK risk report: It is calculated
for 1 person and for each worker group present at any point in the plant, continuously 8760
hours per year.
The Individual Specific Risk (ISR) for 1st and 2nd party, which considers the individual working
hours for each group, is given below in Table 1.

Introduction
25.08.2008
Page 6
Table 1: Individual Specific Risk (ISR) for 1st and 2nd party
Buildings/Personnel Locations
Operator
ISR [year]
1.2 X 10-4
Process Area (Maintenance)
1.2 X 10-4
Truck Loading
6.7 X 10-5
Ship Loading (Jetty)
2.0 X 10-5
Ship Bridge
5.0 X 10-5
Ship Deck
4.8 X 10-5
ISR > 1 X 10-3
Not acceptable
1 X 10-3 < ISR < 1 X 10-6
ALARP
ISR < 1 X 10-6
Acceptable
The Average Individual Risk (AVR) of 5.0 X 10-5 per year for all personnel (1st and 2nd party) is
within the ALARP regime, i.e. As Low As Reasonably Practical, which means that the mitigation measures may be applied as long as the respective cost benefit ratio is reasonable.
Individual Risk, 3rd party
For the Lyse LNG Base Load Plant such mitigation measures have already been applied (e.g.
a rock wall "mound" around the LNG tank, the ESD and Blowdown system).
The Individual Specific Risk (ISR) for the 3rd party risk is given below in Table 2.
Table 2: Individual Specific Risk (ISR) for the 3rd party
Personnel Locations
Peninsula
ISR [year]
4.6 X 10-8
Hiking Track
2.2 X 10-6
Ferry Terminal_office workers
7.6 X 10-7
Ferry Terminal_industry workers
3.8 X 10-7
Ferry Terminal_passengers
4.0 X 10-7
Energiveien+Risavika_office workers
4.6 X 10-9
Energiveien+Risavika_industry workers
4.6 X 10-9
Container Area_office workers
3.2 X 10-9
Container Area_industry workers
3.2 X 10-9
Rest Companys_office workers
2.8 X 10-14
Rest Companys_industry workers
2.8 X 10-14
Living Quarters
3.5 X 10-10

Introduction
ISR > 1 X 10-5
Not acceptable
1 X 10-5 < ISR < 1 X 10-7
ALARP
ISR < 1 X 10-7
Acceptable
25.08.2008
Page 7
The Average Individual Risk (AVR) of 1.5 X 10-7 per year for people living, working or staying
outside the Lyse LNG base load plant does not exceed the acceptance criteria of 1 X 10-5 /
year and is within the ALARP regime.
Societal Risk, 3rd party
Societal risk (or 3rd party risk) is a measure of the collective risk to which a certain population is
subjected as a whole. It is usually depicted in form of a so-called FN curve, which shows the
frequency (F), that a given number, N people or more (hence N+) will be exposed to lethal
consequences.
The societal risk calculated for the Lyse LNG Base Load Plant is shown below in Figure 3.
Figure 3: Societal risk FN curve for the Lyse LNG Base Load Plant

Introduction
25.08.2008
Page 8
The minimum and maximum risk criteria are shown in Figure 3 as blue and green lines respectively. Calculations of the external societal risk (e.g. Hiking Track, Peninsula, Industry Area and
Ferry Terminal) have shown that this risk for the Lyse LNG Base Load Plant falls into the area
between the upper and lower limit line, i.e. the ALARP regime.
Conclusions
A careful risk analysis of the first train of the Lyse LNG Base Load Plant has been performed,
including a very detailed counting of all pieces of equipment (including all pipelines, vessels
and compressors etc.).
It has been found that the calculated levels of individual risk for the 1st, 2nd and 3rd parties are in
compliance with the criteria set by Lyse.
The individual specific risk for 1st and 2nd party for the most exposed person in each group,
maintenance and operators, is lower than 1 X 10-3 per year and within the acceptance criteria.
The average individual risk for personnel is 5.0 X 10-5 per year and therefore clearly below
the acceptance criteria of 1 X 10-4 / year.
The individual specific risk for 3rd party for the most exposed population (e.g. hiking track, ferry
terminal industry and office workers) is within the ALARP regime. The average individual risk
is 1.5 X 10-7 per year and therefore within the lower region of ALARP, close to acceptable in
general. The calculated risk for the Peninsula people is acceptable since the rock wall (mound)
is taken into account (refer to the Chapter 7.2).

Introduction
2.0
25.08.2008
Page 9
Introduction
Linde is currently performing the design of train 1 of the new Lyse LNG Base Load Plant, located near Stavanger, Norway, on behalf of Skangass. The design of the plant shall conform to
EN 1473:2007 "Installation and equipment for liquefied natural gas Design of onshore installations" [1]. To fulfil EN 1473 a hazard assessment shall be carried out during the design of the
plant. A part of this hazard assessment is a risk investigation, in this case using Quantitative
Risk Analysis (QRA). This document describes in detail the results and methodology used to
obtain the results of the QRA.
2.1
Objective of the Study
The objective of the study was to estimate the level of risk by QRA. The performed QRA covered all essential risks of the new Lyse LNG Base Load Plant as far as they are of relevance
and have been determined in the Hazard Identification (HAZID) [Appendix B].
The individual personnel risk and the 3rd party risk are evaluated in this study. The overpressure risk to the plant buildings and equipment (Central Control Room, LNG Tank etc.) and a
consequence modelling of worst case scenarios, e.g. hydrocarbon dispersion from the LNG
Tank, are included in the calculations.
2.2
General Description of the Approach
QRA is a well established methodology to assess the risks of industrial activities and to compare them with risks of normal activities. Linde has used a QRA methodology as shown in
Figure 4.
The QRA performed by Linde used the QRA Reports performed by Advantica [2] as a reference.
Data Collection
This study is based on the following documents:
Process Flow Diagrams (PFDs)

Heat and Material Balance
Process and Instrument Diagrams (P&IDs)
Process Description
General Plot Plan
Mechanical and Process Data Sheets
ESD and Blow-down System Concept
Lyse LNG Base Load Plant Site conditions
Manning Level Table [3].
Acceptance Risk Criteria for Lyse LNG Base Load Plant
Development Area Plan and Information from Lyse

Introduction
25.08.2008
Page 10
Figure 4: QRA Methodology
Collection and Analysis of Background Data

This was an internal Linde exercise to collect information relevant to the QRA study. The leak
frequencies for equipment, valves etc. are based on DNV database and included in DNV's
proprietary program LEAK.
Hazard Identification (HAZID)
The hazard identification process is important for any risk analysis. A HAZID was been performed prior to the QRA by Linde. A HAZOP study for the main plant has been completed.

Introduction
25.08.2008
Page 11
Frequency Analysis
Failure frequencies were determined for each event in order to perform a probabilistic risk assessment. Generally, a number of techniques are available to determine such frequencies. The
approach relies on generic data. This provides failure frequencies for equipment items where
data has been obtained from failure reports from a range of facilities. DNV has developed an
extensive generic failure frequency database for this purpose, which is compiled in DNV's proprietary LEAK 3.2 software. These leak frequencies are based on the "UK Health & Safety Executive" data for offshore facilities. To reflect the design of the Lyse LNG base load plant,
which is a onshore facility and has clean service, new leak frequencies for pipes and process
vessels based on the "Purple Book" [6] are implemented in the LEAK Program. The changes
are shown in Appendix D. This program was used to determine overall leakage frequencies
subsequently used in the risk assessment.
Consequence Analysis
For each hazard scenario PHAST RISK (Software for the Assessment of Flammable, Explosive and Toxic Impacts) and PHAST (Process Hazard Assessment Software Tool) software
was used to determine consequence effect zones for each hazard. The different possible outcomes could be:
Dispersing of Hydrocarbon Vapour Cloud

Explosion
Fireball
BLEVE
Flash Fire
Jet Fire
Pool Fire.
The CO2/H2S (sour gas) in CO2 wash unit is routed to the regenerative thermal oxidation and
then sent to atmosphere at safe location. Dispersion from a leak of CO2/H2S gas cloud due to
low operating pressure is not considered as the contribution to the risk is minor compared to
the above mentioned outcomes.
The particular outcomes modelled depend on source terms (conditions like fluid, temperature,
pressure etc.) and release phenomenology. The current understanding of the mechanisms
occurring during and after the release is included in state-of-the-art models in the PHAST RISK
and PHAST packages.
Risk Calculations
The outcome of the PHAST RISK analysis are risk terms presented in form of risk contours
and FN curves, where the former is a form of location specific individual risk measurement
while the latter is a measure for societal (group) risk.
The individual risk is the risk for a hypothetical individual assumed to be continuously present
at a specific location. The individual at that particular location is expected to sustain a given
level of harm from the realization of specified hazards. It is usually expressed in risk of death
per year. Individual risk is presented in form of risk contours.
Societal Risk is the risk posed to a local community or to the society as a whole from the hazardous activity. In particular it is used to measure the risk to every exposed person, even if they
are exposed on one brief occasion. It links the relationship between the frequency and the
number of people suffering a given level of harm from the realization of a specified hazard. It is
usually referred to a risk of death per year.

Introduction
25.08.2008
Page 12
Risk Criteria
Risk criteria for both individual risk and societal risk have been discussed with Lyse. These
criteria are compared to other risk criterion and to the results of the actual risk assessment for
the plant.
Risk Assessment
Once risks have been determined, they will be assessed against the criteria level and ranked
to determine the principal contributors. Ranking enables attention to be focused on the main
contributors. This is of particular significance when assessing the viability of different mitigation
measures.
Risk Mitigation
Risk reduction measures concentrate on the major risk contributors identified during risk ranking. Discussion is made on how different risk reduction measures will affect the overall risk
level in relation to the ALARP principle (As Low As Reasonably Practical).
Report structure
The safety studies are documented according to the following report structure:
Main report
The main report summarizes the study data, methodology, the risk results, conclusions
and sensitivities
Appendix A Assumptions
The main assumptions where the studies are based on are presented in this appendix.
Appendix B HAZID
This appendix documents the results of the HAZID workshop in Munich, October 2007.
Appendix C Equipment Count
This appendix documents the equipments with their dimensions and inventories used
to determine the leak size and frequency for the risk assessments
Appendix D Result of LEAK 3.2 Calculations
This appendix documents the risk leakage frequencies based on the UK HSE databank
[4] and the Dutch Purple Book [5]
Appendix E Individual Risk Ranking Report
This appendix documents the risk ranking points, for which the individual risk has been
calculated
Appendix F Details on the Analysis Procedure
This appendix gives details of the actual QRA methodology

General Description of Process and Facalities
3.0
25.08.2008
Page 13
General Description of Process and Facilities
The section briefly describes the process and facilities to ensure a common understanding.
The description only addresses those parts, which are of relevance to the QRA.
3.1
Natural Gas Treatment and Gas Liquefaction
3.1.1
Feed Gas Reception
Feed gas is received via a pipeline pressure let-down station from the Krst NG Plant with a
pressure of approx. 180 bara. The pressure is controlled at plant inlet to 111 bara. A Feed Gas
Fiscal Metering Station 15-XT-101 including a filtration device for the removal of particles is
installed.
3.1.2
Natural Gas Pretreatment
CO2 Wash Unit

For CO2 removal from natural gas with the present conditions a chemical wash is the most
favourable process. An aqueous amine solution (aMDEA) is utilised as solvent.
The CO2 wash unit is a Linde designed unit (contrary to a packaged unit). Material and
equipment within the unit are designed and supplied according to Linde Standards and
Specifications.
The feed gas is first heated in the Feed Gas Heater 20-HA-101 against warm lean solvent and
further heated in the Feed Gas Trim Heater 20-HA-103 A/B against warm sweet gas to avoid
cold temperatures and to allow for efficient CO2 removal. It enters the Amine Wash Column
20-VE-101 and flows from bottom to top through a random packing. Introduced lean amine
flows in the opposite direction extracting the acid gas. The CO2 forms a very weak bond with
the alkali. In the top of the column solvent traces are removed by water from the purified gas in
some additional trays. The wash water for these trays is recirculated by the Water Circulation
Pump 20-PA-101 A/B; a small quantity of water is introduced into the cycle by the Amine Make
Up Water Pump 20-PB-102 A/B as fresh water (demin. water) to fulfil the water balance of the
amine system.
The clean gas exits the wash tower with a CO2 content of max 50 vppm and a temperature of
approx. 40C. It is cooled in heat exchanger 20-HA-103 A/B against Feed Gas to approx. 25C
and leaves the section at a pressure of approx. 109 bara.
The loaded amine solution from 20-VE-101 passes via Amine MP Flash Drum 20-VA-102
through the Solvent Heat Exchanger 20-HB-101, where it is warmed up against regenerated
solvent and is further routed to the middle section of the Amine Strip Column 20-VE-102. In 20VE-102 the reflux water flows from the top through two packed beds. The CO2 is stripped in
hot oil heated Amine Strip Column Reboiler 20-HA-102. The regenerated solvent leaves the
column at the bottom via heat exchanger 20-HB-101 and is pumped by the Lean Solvent Pump
20-PA-103 A/B to the top of the Amine Wash Column 20-VE-101 via the Feed Gas Heater 20HA-101 and Lean Solvent Cooler
20-HC-101. Approximately 15 % of the flow is routed through the Cartridge Filter 20-LF-101 to
remove particles and then through the Activated Carbon Filter 20-LF-102 for removal of heavy
hydrocarbons to prevent foaming.

25.08.2008
Page 14
The acid gas leaves the top of column 20-VE-102 after having passed the water wash section,
installed for reduction of amine vapour in the acid gas fraction. After cooling in the Amine Strip
Column Condenser 20-HC-103 the gas is separated from the condensate in the Amine KO
Drum 20-VA-101. The Amine Strip Column Reflux Pump 20-PA-102 A/B delivers the
condensate back to the top of column 20-VE-102. The Amine KO Drum
20-VA-101 also allows for removal of heavy hydrocarbons. The sour gas is routed to the
Regenerative Thermal Oxidation 20-XT-101 and then sent to atmosphere.
The Solvent Storage Drum 20-VS-101 is designed to hold the complete liquid inventory of the
plant. In case of foaming anti foam agent can be injected into the solvent from the Anti Foam
Package 20-XU-101.
Dryer Station
The sweet, water oversaturated feed gas from the wash unit is fed to the Feed Gas Water KO
Drum 20-VL-111 to remove any free liquid upstream of the driers. The liquid from this vessel is
routed back to the Amine MP Flash Drum 20-VA-102 to reduce the water make-up of the CO2
wash unit.
The drier station is a two-bed molecular sieve adsorber station with a cycle time of 12 hrs. The
natural gas is flowing through one of the Feed Gas Driers 20-VK-111 A/B. The water contained
in the natural gas is reduced to a level near to zero where no freezing can occur in the
downstream liquefaction section. To reduce the temperature fluctuation of the dry gas, a
parallel step of 30 minutes is included, where both drier vessels are on adsorption. The dry
feed gas passes the Dry Gas Filter 20-LF-111 to remove mole sieve dust which could affect
the performance of the downstream cryogenic process section.
During this period the other feed gas drier is heated approx. 9 hrs and then cooled approx. 2
hrs by the regeneration gas stream. Dry feed gas at approx. 106 bara serves as regeneration
gas. Heating of the regeneration gas to 210C is provided in the Regeneration Gas Heater 20HA-111 against hot oil and cooling against ambient air in the Regeneration Gas Cooler 20-HC111, followed by the Regeneration Gas Water KO Drum 20-VL-112 where the water is
separated and routed to 20-VE-102. The water saturated regeneration gas is compressed by
Regeneration Gas Blower 20-KF-111 and routed back into the feed line upstream of the Feed
Gas Driers 20-VK-111 A/B.
3.1.3
NG Liquefaction
After CO2 and water removal the natural gas is routed to the cold part of the process, which
consists of three spiral-wound heat exchanger bundles integrated in one shell. Liquefaction
and subcooling of the feed gas at high pressure is possible because of absence of heavy
hydrocarbon components in the design feed gas.
The natural gas from the filter 20-LF-111 is first cooled down to approx. -26C in the Feed Gas
Precooler 25-HX-101. It is then further cooled down in the Feed Gas Liquefier 25-HX-102 and
throttled to a subcritical pressure of approx. 20 bara to get pure liquid. Finally the natural gas is
subcooled in the Feed Gas Subcooler 25-HX-103 to a temperature of approx. -159C which is
low enough to meet the flow limit of 2000 Sm/h tank return gas allowed for reinjection into the
tailgas pipeline.
3.2
Refrigerant System
The cooling duty required to produce the LNG is provided by a simple but efficient closed
mixed refrigerant cycle which consists of nitrogen, ethylene, propane, butane, pentane and a
portion of the compressed tank return gas (Linde patent).

25.08.2008
Page 15
A motor driven geared centrifugal compressor is applied to compress the refrigerant.

3.2.1
Refrigerant Cycle
The refrigerant is withdrawn from the shell side of the precooler 25-HX-101 at a temperature of
approx. 20C and a pressure of approx. 4 bara, i.e. approx. 10C overheated against saturated
conditions. The refrigerant passes the Cycle Compressor Suction Drum 25-VL-101 and is then
compressed in the first stage of Cycle Compressor 25-KA-101. After cooling to approx. 25C
and partly condensing against air in the Cycle Compressor Intercooler 25-HC-101 the liquid
and gas are separated in the Cycle Compressor Interstage Drum 25-VL-102. The gas is further
compressed in the 2nd stage of 25-KA-101 and partly condensed in Cycle Compressor
Aftercooler 25-HC-102 at a temperature of approx. 25C. Liquid formed in 25-HC-102 is
separated in the Cycle HP Separator 25-VA-101.
The liquid from 25-VA-101 is sent to 25-VL-102 which also serves as a buffer for the heavy
components of the MRC. The liquid hydrocarbon stream is routed to 25-HX-101 where it is
subcooled to approx. 26C and then, after being expanded in a Joule-Thomson valve, used
for the precooling of the natural gas.
The cycle gas from the separator 25-VA-101 is cooled in the precooler 25-HX-101 to the same
temperature, partly condensed and fed to the Cold MRC Separator 25-VA-102. The liquid from
this separator is subcooled in the liquefier 25-HX-102 to a temperature of approx. 114C and
used as refrigerant for 25-HX-102 after expansion in a Joule-Thompson valve. The vapour
from this separator is condensed in 25-HX-102 and subcooled in the subcooler 25-HX-103 to a
temperature of approx. 159C and provides the cooling duty for the subcooling of the natural
gas after expansion in a Joule-Thomson valve to approx. 4.7 bara. After expansion to shell
pressure the cycle gas streams are warmed up in the common shell side of the cryogenic spiral
wound heat exchangers and returned jointly to the suction side of the 1st stage of the Cycle
Compressor 25-KA-101 via the suction drum 25-VL-101.
3.2.2
Refrigerant Storage and Make-Up
The make-up for the refrigerant system is required mainly due to cycle gas losses via
the gas seals of 25-KA-101. The quantities required are adjusted according to the
composition readings and the temperatures in the cold part and are provided via flow
meters as follows:
Pure nitrogen is produced in the Backup Nitrogen Package 61-XT-101 and fed to the
make-up header by flow control.
The methane rich stream is withdrawn from the discharge of the Tank Return Gas
Compressor 59-KB-101 and is fed to the make-up header by flow control.
For first start-up, when 59-KB-101 is not in service, the gas is withdrawn downstream
of the filter 20-LF-111, expanded and routed to the make-up header.
Ethylene is stored in the Liquid Ethylene Tank 58-VS-104. The ethylene is vaporised
by the Ethylene Make-Up Heater 58-HE-101. Potential traces of water ant methanol
are removed in the Ethylene Drier 58-VK-104. To avoid particles in the refrigerant
cycle the ethylene is routed via the Ethylene Filter 58-LF-104 to the make-up header.

25.08.2008
Page 16
Commercial propane is stored in the Propane Tank 58-VS-101. To assure dry

propane, potential traces of water and methanol are removed in Liquid Propane
Drier 58-LF-101. To avoid particles in the refrigerant cycle the propane is routed via
the Liquid Propane Filter 58-LF-101 to the make-up header.
Commercial butane and commercial pentane are stored in the Butane Tank 58-VS103 and in the Pentane Tank 58-VS-102 respectively. To assure dry butane and dry
pentane, potential traces of water and methanol are removed in the Liquid
Butane/Pentane Drier 58-VK-102. To avoid particles in the refrigerant cycle the
butane is routed via Liquid Butane/Pentane Filter 58-LF-102 to the make-up
header.
3.3
LNG Storage / LNG Loading
Main Purpose of the LNG Storage (Unit 42) and LNG Loading (Unit 47) is the intermediate
storage of LNG prior to loading into LNG Carriers at the Jetty and/or to LNG Trucks at the
Truck Loading Bay.
The LNG Storage Tank is designed as full containment tank and stores LNG near atmospheric
pressure.
LNG vapour due to end flash, boil off and cooling of loading lines is routed via the LNG storage
tank to the Tank Return Gas Compressors. Warm vapour return from ship and truck loading is
routed via the LNG storage tank to the tank return gas compressor to protect the compressor
while cold vapour return is sent directly to the compressor. Excess vapours mainly during
loading of ships with increased tank temperatures at start of LNG Loading are sent to flare.
3.3.1 LNG Storage
Main Purpose of the LNG Storage (Unit 42) and LNG Loading (Unit 47) is the intermediate
storage of LNG prior to loading into LNG Carriers at the Jetty and/or to LNG Trucks at the
Truck Loading Bay.
The LNG Storage Tank is designed as full containment tank and stores LNG near atmospheric
pressure.
LNG vapour due to endflash, boil off and cooling of loading lines is routed via the LNG storage
tank to the Tank Return Gas Compressors. Warm vapour return from ship and truck loading is
routed via the LNG storage tank to the tank return gas compressor to protect the compressor
while cold vapour return is sent directly to the compressor. Excess vapours mainly during
loading of ships with increased tank temperatures at start of LNG Loading are sent to flare.
3.3.2
LNG Loading
There are two LNG Loading Stations foreseen: One for LNG Ship Loading at the Jetty and one
for LNG Truck Loading at the LNG Truck Loading bay. 100 % of the produced LNG can be
exported via LNG Carriers and approx. 10 % of the LNG production rate can be exported via
LNG Trucks.
LNG Ship Loading and Ship Vapour Return
During LNG Ship Loading the LNG is pumped to the LNG Carriers by means of the LNG Ship
Loading Pumps 42-PS-101 A/B, which are installed in the LNG Storage Tank 42-TR-101.

25.08.2008
Page 17
The LNG from the LNG Ship Loading Pump is routed via the LNG Ship Loading Line and the
LNG Ship Loading Arm 47-MU-101 to the manifold of the LNG Carrier at the Jetty.
The normal loading rate of the LNG Ship Loading Pump is 1000 m/h. The flow rate is controlled by the variable speed of the electric motor.
Vapour Return from the LNG Ship will be received at a pressure of approx. 1.1 bara at the
presentation flange of the ship's manifold and is routed via the LNG Ship Vapour Arm 47-MV101 and the LNG Vapour Return Line to the LNG Storage Tank 42-TR-101 or to the Tank Return Gas Compressor 59-KB-101 depending on the temperature. Warm Vapour Return is
cooled to tank operating temperature by injecting LNG into the Vapour Return Line.
During no ship loading operation, the LNG Ship Loading Line is kept cold by continuously circulating LNG by means of one LNG Truck Loading Pump 42-PS-102 A/B via the LNG Recirculation Line and the LNG Loading Line back to the LNG Storage Tank 42-TR-101. This is done
to keep the loading system cold and gas free at all times, to allow immediate start up of ship
loading after arrival of a LNG Carrier.
LNG Truck Loading and Truck Vapour Return
During LNG Truck Loading the LNG is pumped to the LNG Truck by means of the LNG Truck
Loading Pumps 42-PS-102 A/B, which are installed in the LNG Storage Tank 42-TR-101.
The LNG from the LNG Truck Loading Pumps is routed via the LNG Truck Loading Line and
the LNG Truck Loading Hose 47-MU-102 to the LNG Truck at the LNG Truck Loading Bay.
During loading of LNG Trucks (normal loading rate per pump: 65 m/h) both LNG Truck
Loading Pumps can be used.
Vapour Return from the LNG Trucks will be received at the connection point of the Truck
Vapour Return Hose 47-MV-102 and is routed via the Vapour Return Hose and the Vapour
Return Line to the LNG Storage Tank 42-TR-101 or to the Tank Return Gas Compressor 59KB-101 depending on the temperature. Warm Vapour Return is cooled to tank operating
temperature by injecting LNG into the Vapour Return Line.
During no truck loading operation, the LNG Truck Loading Line is kept cold by continuously
circulating LNG by means of one LNG Truck Loading Pump 42-PS-102 A/B via the LNG Truck
Loading Line and the LNG Recirculation Line back to the LNG Storage Tank 42-TR-101. This
is done to keep the loading system cold and gas free at all times, to allow immediate start up of
Truck loading after arrival of a Truck.
3.4
Fuel Gas System
LNG vapour due to endflash, heat input, cooling of loading lines, ship loading and truck loading
is compressed in the Tank Return Gas Compressor 59-KB-101. Part of the tank return gas is
routed to the fired Hot Oil Heater as fuel gas. Approx. 2000 Sm/h is sent to local grid as Sales
Gas. For initial start-up and for backup purpose gas from the grid can be used as fuel gas.
3.5
Hot Oil System
The hot oil system supplies the process heat for the plant at two temperature levels. Two
cycles are provided, a medium temperature cycle for regeneration of the amine and a high
temperature cycle for the heating of the regeneration gas.

25.08.2008
Page 18
The heat for both cycles is provided by the Fired Hot Oil Heater 52-FA-101, a direct fired
heater supplied by fuel gas. In this heater the hot oil is heated to approx. 260C to supply heat
for the Regeneration Gas Heater 20-HA-111. This high temperature cycle is pressurized by the
Hot Oil Cycle Pump I 52-PA-101 A/B. The required heat for the regeneration of the amine in
the Amine Strip Column Reboiler 20-HA-102 is withdrawn from the high temperature cycle
downstream of the Hot Oil Cycle Pump I 52-PA-101 and mixed with the cold hot oil
downstream of Hot Oil Cycle Pump II 52-PA-102 A/B to limit the maximum temperature to
190C to avoid degradation of the amine solvent. The hot oil leaves 20-HA-102 with a
temperature of approx. 145C and approx. A small fraction of the flow is pressurized by the Hot
Oil Cycle Pump II 52-PA-102 A/B. Most of the hot oil leaving the Amine Strip Column Reboiler
20-HA-102 enters the first hot oil cycle via the balancing line.
The balancing line between the two cycles is also used to provide sufficient suction pressure
for the two pumps via the Hot Oil Expansion Drum 52-VL-101.
The Hot Oil Surge Drum 52-VS-101 is provided to store the total inventory of the system in
case of filling or maintenance, and a small Hot Oil Filling Pump 52-PA-103 serves to ease
filling of the system. Blanketing for the Hot Oil Unit will be done with pure nitrogen.
3.6
Flare System
The Plant is equipped with two flare headers:
warm gas flare header which ties in directly at the Flare Stack 54-FC-101
cold gas and liquid flare header including the Blow Down Vessel 54-VD-101 for separation of cold liquid and vapour. The vapour is routed to the bottom of 54-FC-101. The liquid is vaporised in the uninsulated Blow Down Vessel 54-VD-101 by ambient heat. In
case a warm liquid remains, this liquid can be discharged manually to a barrel.
In addition the low pressure gas from tank and ship loading is routed to the top of the Flare
Stack 54-FC-101.
3.7
ESD and Blowdown System
The Emergency Shutdown, Isolation and Depressuring System is used to prevent escalation
and to minimise leakage of flammable fluids in case of major plant malfunctions, emergency
conditions or damage. The main purpose is to minimise damage by hazards such as fires, unconfined vapour cloud explosions (UVCE) or a boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion
(BLEVE) due to bursting vessels. Those hazards may follow on excessive leakage of flammable fluids.
After a leakage or fire is detected and localised by the fire and gas alarm system and indicated
in the central control room, the Emergency Shutdown, Isolation and Depressuring System will
be activated via push-buttons by the operator from CCR.
After activation, the plant will be blocked in automatically by means of remote-actuated valves
(e.g. Emergency Shutdown Valves - ESV) and selected rotating equipment (eg cycle compressor) will be shut-down.
Subsequently the Emergency blow-down System can be activated by the operator. The Emergency blow-down System is depressurising the whole plant (exclusive of LNG-Tank) to the
flare system by remote actuated Blow-down Valves (BDV).
The system can be operated from a separate control panel (ESD panel) in the central control
room (CCR) and allows remote actions from safe location in case of emergency.

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Page 19
Stop Feed, Energy Input and Export Streams

For the LNG process plant all feed streams and energy inputs into the depressurizing areas
can be shut off. Units transferring energy to a safe place are kept in operation for continuous
energy removal. All export streams (e.g. tail gas) will be shut-off.
Depressurizing Philosophy
According to contract and EN 1473, the isolated sections shall be depressurised to
50 % of design pressure in 15 minutes or to
7 barg in 30 minutes
The higher flow is counting.

Units and Equipment without Depressurizing Facilities
Basis for selection of depressurizing sections is the maximum operating or settle out pressure
and not the mechanical design pressure, which is for other reasons sometimes well above the
maximum operating pressure (compare API RP 521).
The following units and equipment have no depressurizing facilities:
MDEA regeneration; operates at low pressure (appr.1 barg)
Feed gas Liquefaction passage in 25-HZ-101 (mass of each passages is below 1000 kg
limit, the passage is well protected in the shell, the consequence is considerably low)
LNG storage; operates at low pressure (appr. 250 mbarg)
LNG Ship, LNG piping and LNG Truck Loading system (subcooled liquid at low
pressure)
Basis input to QRA

As basis for the QRA a reaction time from first fire&gas alarm until the operator initiates the
ESD and blowdown system is assumed to be 600 seconds. As an average value a
depressurisation time of 900 seconds shall be used in the QRA (refer to Assumption Sheet
RA-4 in Appendix A).

Study Methodology
4.0
4.1
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Page 20
Study Methodology
Risk Analysis Basics
Risks are commonly incurred and accepted in everyday life. There are many different types of
risk including risk to life and health, risk to the environment and economic risks, which may
impair the survival of a company.
The risk R is commonly described by its two dimensions, i.e. the consequence of an accidental
event C and the frequency of this event (F):
R=CxF
The actual risk values can be manifold due to the different types of consequences, which might
arise from an accident. It could be a financial loss due to downtime and damage in terms of
money per event, a certain number of fatalities or certain damage to the environment, which
may also lead to a certain financial loss due to the cost resulting from decontamination etc. The
economic loss is very often influenced by the fact that certain accidents will lead to damages in
the neighbouring parts of the plant.
The frequency of an event usually is a composite magnitude, e.g. for an ignited gas leak the
primary leak frequency will be multiplied by the conditional probability of igniting the gas cloud
resulting from the leak. Under certain conditions, even more conditional probabilities may factor
into this product to yield the total frequency of a certain event, e.g. the probability of in-time
detection of a flammable cloud or the conditional probability, that certain isolation measures
(e.g. ESD and Blowdown System) work, when required.
4.2
Definition and Types of Risk
It has become common in the process industries to quantify risk to people in terms of
1st party risk, i.e. the risk to onsite personal
2nd party risk, i.e. the risk to external contractors
3rd party risk, i.e. the risk, to which the site external population is exposed.
Further to this one differentiates individual risk, i.e. the risk, to which a single person is exposed, and societal or group risk, i.e. the risk to which a certain group of people are exposed.
Details are given in Table 3.
Table 3: Types of Risk
Type of Risk
1st party individual specific risk
Details
Risk to onsite personnel, based on the most exposed person at
risk, i.e. operators.
1st party average individual risk
Risk based on the individual specific risk and is calculated as

average risk to onsite personnel.
2nd party individual specific risk
Risk to external contractors, based on the most exposed person

at risk, i.e. LNG carrier, external maintenance personnel.
2nd party average individual risk
Risk based on the individual specific risk and is calculated as

average risk to external contractors.

Study Methodology
Type of Risk
3rd party individual specific risk
Societal (3rd party) risk
4.3
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Page 21
Details
Risk to offsite population expressed as the fatality risk per year.
Individual risk is calculated under the assumption that the exposed person is present unprotected at the same location for 24
hours per day over 365 days per year. In case of Individual Specific Risk the actual duration of the presence is taken into account.
Risk to a group of people outside of the plant. Societal risk usually is quantified in form of the so-called FN curve, specifying the
frequency F (per year), that N or more persons are affected by
lethal consequences.
Acceptance Criteria
The risk in this QRA study is discussed in terms of individual risk and societal risk. The Individual Specific Risk for 1st, 2nd and 3rd party has been defined by Lyse. The 3rd party risk is also
calculated as FN Curve and compared with the societal risk acceptance criteria based on UK
HSE Societal Risk Criteria. The acceptance criteria defines for the following personnel categories:
1st party, i.e. personnel working for the Lyse LNG Base Load Plant facility.
2nd party, i.e. LNG Carrier personnel (Truck, Ship Loading and external contractors) can
be affected by operation activities.
3rd person, i.e. offsite population.
Note: occupational accidents have been not included in the acceptance criteria and therefore
are not considered in the QRA.
1st and 2nd party
Individual specific risk (ISR) is specified as
ISR = (Effective Frequency x Occupancy x Vulnerability),
where "Occupancy" is a factor which relates the time for which a person is exposed to work
hazards (in hours) to the total number of hours within a year (8760). For sake of simplicity we
assumed, that a typical operator works in 8 hour shifts for 5 of 7 days per week, i.e. his annual
working hours are 45 weeks x 5 days x 8 hours = 1800 hours per year. He is 20% of his working time outside. The effective frequency is calculated 0.2 x outdoor frequency + (1-0.2) x indoor frequency. Hence the occupancy factor is 1800 / 8760 = 0.20. For the definition of vulnerability please refer the Appendix F.
The acceptance criterion for Individual Specific Risk (ISR) for the most exposed person for 1st
and 2nd party is expressed as the yearly probability for loss of life. The ISR is acceptable for
< 1 X 10-6 per year, the risk level above 1 X 10-3 per year becomes unacceptable. The region in
between is the ALARP area.
The Average Individual Risk (AVR) is specified as follows:
AVR = (ISR x Number of personnel) / Number of personnel
The AVR shall not exceed 1 X 10-4 per year, the risk level under 1 X 10-6 per year is acceptable. The region in between is the ALARP area.

Study Methodology
25.08.2008
Page 22
If no individual specific risk (ISR) is found to be above 1 X 10-4 per year, the AVR criteria is
fulfilled.
3rd party (Societal Risk)
Individual specific risk (ISR) is specified as
ISR = (Effective Frequency x Occupancy x Vulnerability),
where "Occupancy" is a factor which relates the time for which a person is exposed to hazards
(in hours) to the total number of hours within a year (8760). For sake of simplicity we assumed,
that a person on the peninsula stays for 4 hours 2 of the 7 days per week in the summer (4
month) and 2 hours at 2 days per week in the winter, i.e. his annual presence hours are (16
weeks x 2 days x 4 hours) + (32 X 2 days X 2 hours) = 256 hours per year. He is staying 100%
outside. The effective frequency is calculated with a location fraction of 1 outdoor frequency.
Hence the occupancy factor is 256 / 8760 = 0.03.
The acceptance criterion for Individual Specific Risk (ISR) for the most exposed person for 3rd
party is also expressed as the yearly probability for loss of life. The ISR is acceptable for < 1 X
10-7 per year, the risk level above 1 X 10-5 per year becomes unacceptable. The region in between is the ALARP area.
The Average Individual Risk (AVR) is specified as follows:
AVR = (ISR x Number of people) / Number of people
The AVR shall not exceed 1 X 10-5 per year, the risk level under 1 X 10-7 per year is acceptable. The region in between is the ALARP area.
Societal risk for 3rd party is presented as the probability or frequency of accidents of different
extent. The Figure 5 below states the acceptable and not-acceptable range of the yearly frequency (F) consequence (number of fatalities N or larger) diagram and shows the acceptance criterion based on UK HSE Societal Risk Criteria. It also indicates an area where the
company shall actively seek to reduce the risk based on the ALARP principle.
Figure 5: UK HSE Societal Risk Criteria

Study Methodology
4.4
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Page 23
Hazard Identification
The study has been based on identified major inventories of flammable and explosive materials
in the LNG Base Load Plant units, together with major lines connecting the inventories. Information on inventories, stream compositions, operating conditions and locations has been
based on the available drawings and further information. In addition the results of the hazard
identification of Hazard Study (HAZID) (Appendix B) were used. The investigations were verified on the basis of operating procedures, P&IDs and the knowledge provided by LINDE. In the
HAZID, only those hazards are identified, which might lead to a leakage of hydrocarbons and a
subsequent fire or explosion. Other hazards with operational consequences have been discussed in the normal HAZOP study.
The basic results of the HAZID are shown in Table 4 .
Table 4: HAZID Summary
Hazard
Hydrocarbon (gas / liquid or two
phase) leaks outdoors
Hydrocarbon (HC gas / liquid or two

phase) leaks in buildings
Non-hydrocarbon fire
Non hydrocarbon chemical leak or fire
Loss of power
Loss of instrument air
Loss of safety systems
Loss of control system
Treatment in QRA
Included in QRA in four event classes of very large,
large, medium and small leak at various locations in
the individual areas.
This hazard covers the majority of flammable leakage scenarios.
Not included in the QRA
Buildings containing HC:
- The buildings are specified with explosion group
zone 1; therefore the risk of internal explosion is
reduced.
- The protective effect of the building is not considered in the SAFETI calculation (conservative
consideration).
Buildings containing no HC:
- Gas entering in a building is presented by adequate gas detection and closing the air-intake.
Not included in the QRA as of minor importance.
Involved chemicals (e.g. MDEA etc.) have a minor
contribution to risk due to quantities; hence they are
not of relevance in this QRA.
Not included in the QRA since failure leads to fail
safe conditions.
safe conditions.
safe conditions.
safe conditions.
Occupational accidents
Not included in the QRA as this is identical to general petrochemical facilities and known to be marginal
Natural environmental impact (extreme

weather, earthquake, etc)
Pipeline rupture
Not included in the QRA due to low risk contribution.
Pipeline exposed/free span
Included as a potential cause for leaks.
Pipeline dented
Excessive pipeline expansion

Included in the QRA.

Study Methodology
Hazard
Reduced pipeline thickness
Treatment in QRA
25.08.2008
Page 24

Data used for the Risk Assessment
5.0
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Page 25
This section informs about the basic data and detailed assumptions which were used for the
calculations and the individual steps taken to arrive at the risk picture.
5.1
Scenarios
For the purpose of this QRA the plant was analysed with respect to its hydrocarbon content.
Units without relevant hydrocarbon content were excluded from the further analysis. These
scenarios consider releases of hydrocarbons from small, medium, large or very large leaks in
pipe work or equipments. This leaves the following units for further consideration as shown in
Table 5 and Figure 6:
Table 5: Units covered in this QRA
Unit
Inventory Loop
No. used in fig. 6
Designation
20
IL1
Feedgas Purification
20
IL2A
NG Liquefication Gas
25
IL2B1
NG Liquefication Liquid_103 bar System
25
IL2B2
59
IL3A
LNG Storage Return Gas
42
IL3B
LNG Storage
47
IL4
LNG Truck Loading
47
IL5A
LNG Ship Loading Tank Top
47
IL5B1/2/3
LNG Ship Loading Line
47
IL5C
LNG Ship Loading Jetty
25
IL6A1
Refrigeration Gas System_4 bar System
25
IL6A2
25
IL6A3
25
IL6B1
Refrigeration Liquid 25-HX-101/103 System
25
IL6B2
Refrigeration Liquid 25-VA-101 System
25
IL6B3
Refrigeration Liquid 25-VA-102/25-HX-102 System
25
IL6B4
Refrigeration Liquid 25-VL-102 System
58
IL7
Propane Storage
58
IL8
Pentane Storage
58
IL9
Butane Storage
58
IL10A
Ethylene Storage Gas System
58
IL10B
Ethylene Storage Liquid System
20/52
IL11
Hot Oil System
15
IL12
Feedgas Fiscal Metering
59
IL13
Tailgas Fiscal Metering

25.08.2008
Page 26
The solvent regeneration system has not been taken into account in this QRA due to its comparably small inventories. A leak of MDEA from process equipment or piping leads to a release
of CO2 loaded MDEA to dike area and pit, which does not impose a relevant hazard to people.
The units can be isolated by ESD and Blowdown system or are directly connected to another
area, which can be isolated.
Figure 6: Process Areas defined for this QRA (numbers see Table 5)
For these areas an equipment count was performed (refer to Assumption Sheet FA-1 in Appendix A) and considering:
Equipment (vessels, pumps, heat exchangers, compressors etc.)

Valves (actuated and non-actuated)
Pipelines
Small bore fittings, Flange connections (partly, based on the Dutch Purple Book [5])
All equipment has been listed with their respective operating characteristics. These data have
been used to calculate the overall leak rates for the individual areas. Details are contained Appendix C.
5.2
Leak Frequencies
The leak frequency modelling is based on DNVs leak frequency database LEAK 3.2 and Purple Book. The leak types and sizes are shown in Table 6:

25.08.2008
Page 27
Table 6: Leak types and sizes

Leak Type
Small
Medium
Large
Very Large (Full Bore Rupture)
Leak range [mm]

1 10
10-50
50-100
> 100
Leaks with equivalent diameter below 1 mm are not considered as they do not contribute substantially to the overall risk.
5.3
Release Duration
The duration of a release is closely linked to the type of detection and isolation. Table 7 lists
typical times involved for various alternatives:
Table 7: Typical Duration Times based on DNV database
Description
Duration for
Detection and
Isolation [s]
Gas detector which auto closes ESD/automatic valve (XSFV).
120
Gas detector with isolation by manual valve closure.
960
Gas detector with isolation by remotely operated closure of control valve.
660
Detection by operator and initiation of ESD & Blowdown System
600
Gas detector with isolation by remotely operated closure of ESD.
360
Process trip which auto closes ESD.
360
Process alarm with isolation by manual valve closure.
1200
Process alarm with isolation by remotely operated closure of control valve.
900
Process alarm with isolation of feed by remotely operated closure of control
max. 1800
valve. Duration determined by either inventory of material (max 1800s) or
valve closure time (900s).
Process alarm with isolation of feed by remotely operated closure of ESD.
max. 1800
Duration determined by either inventory of material (max 1800s) or valve closure time (600s).
Process alarm with isolation by remotely operated closure of ESD.
600
Detection by field operator, remote area, with manual isolation.
2700
Detection by field operator, remote area, with isolation by remotely operated
2400
control valve.
Detection by field operator, remote area,, with isolation by remotely operated
2100
ESD.
Detection by field operator routine patrol, with manual isolation.
1500
Detection by field operator routine patrol, with isolation by remotely operated
1200
control valve.
Detection by field operator routine patrol, with isolation by remotely operated
1200
control valve. Duration determined by either inventory of material (max 1800s)
or valve closure time.
Detection by field operator on routine patrol with isolation of feed by remotely
900
operated closure of ESD. Duration determined by either inventory of material
(max 1800s) or valve closure time.
Detection by field operator on routine patrol, with isolation by remotely operated
900
ESD.
The Lyse LNG Base Load Plant is equipped with a fire and gas detection system and remotely
operated ESD valves, control valves, compressor and pumps. The reaction time is 600 s for

25.08.2008
Page 28
detection and initiation of ESD & Blowdown System by the operator, e.g. shut-off of main feed
and product streams via ESD valves and tripping of main machines. An average blowdown
time of 900 s is used in the calculation (refer to Assumption Sheet HC-2 and RA-4 in Appendix
A).
5.4
Atmospheric Conditions
Weather data have been taken from the site conditions document [6]. For the wind rose data
for Sola, refer to Assumption Sheet MI-2 in Appendix A. Table 8 summarises the results, where
an angle of 0 degrees presents a wind originating from the North.
Table 8: Weather data for Lyse LNG Base Load Plant
Stability Class
Wind [m/s]
F - 1.5
D- 6
D - 12
Sum
Percentage
Wind direction [degrees]
292.5337.5 22.5337.5
-22.5
67.5
1.99
0.961 1.012
14.71
7.09
7.47
2.79
1.346 1.417
19.49
9.397 9.899
67.5112.5
1.633
12.04
2.293
15.966
112.5157.5
1.335
9.89
1.878
13.103
157.5202.5
0.501
3.69
0.702
4.893
202.5247.5
0.807
5.96
1.13
7.897
247.5292.5
1.977
14.57
2.76
19.307
Wind speed classes have been used ranging from 1.5 m/s to 12 m/s, whereas for atmospheric
stability Pasquill classes ranging from D (neutral) to F (stable) have been selected. The atmospheric stability is considered to be neutral during the day and stable during the night. For the
calculations 8 wind directions have been used.
5.5
Population Distribution
For the Lyse LNG Base Load Plant facility, a work day is divided into three shifts; a day shift,
an afternoon shift and a night shift, each lasting 8 hours (Assumption Sheet MI-3 in Appendix
A). The relevant figures listed in
Table 9 and Table 10:
Table 9: Onsite Population (1st and 2nd party)

Buildings / Areas
Administration Building
Maintenance
Truck Loading
Ship Deck
Ship Bridge
Personnel / People
Day (per Shift) Night
Total Number
3
1
7
2
1
5
4
2
10
1
1
3
2
2
6
8
8
24
The personnel in the administration building do the daily operation and supervision of the plant.
Table 10: Off-site Population (3rd party)
Areas
Peninsula
Hiking Track
Personnel / People
Day
Night
16 (in non-work day)
0
8 (in a non-work day)
0
100
2

Areas
Living Quarters
5.6
25.08.2008
Page 29
Personnel / People
Day
Night
10
0
1500
0
400
5
559
0
10
1
50
0
1139
10
715
0
60
60
Ignition Sources
Release of flammable fluid may have many event outcomes, depending on the timing and type
of ignition. For example, a release may ignite immediately at the point of release, or it may ignite after the cloud has been dispersing for two minutes, or after the cloud has been dispersing
for five minutes, or it may not ignite at all. If it ignites, it may give either explosion effects or
different types of fire effects depending on the type of release (e.g. jet fire, fireball, pool fire or
flash fire).
Each of the outcomes will have different risk effects because each produces an effect zone of
a different size and intensity, at a different location. The risk effects for a flammable release will
depend on the timing, location and nature of ignition. For example, if an instantaneous release
ignites immediately it will produce a hazard zone at the point of release, whereas if it ignites
after the cloud has started to disperse, it will produce a hazard zone at the point of ignition. If
the ignition produces a fireball, the intensity of the effects within the zone will be different from
those for an ignition which produces a flash fire, or for an ignition which produces an explosion.
The different outcomes are presented in the form of event trees (Assumption Sheet RA-1 in
Appendix A). Each outcome in an event tree can be assigned a probability, and the program
performs the risk calculations for all of the event tree outcomes that are relevant to a particular
flammable model.
The ignition probability within PHAST RISK is definable according to the respective site knowledge. The immediate ignition probability is directly specified. A default value of 0.3 is used,
which would only apply to very large flammable gas releases in a large industrial complex.
The delayed ignition probability for any failure case is a calculated value within PHAST RISK,
which is based on the defined ignition sources on site, with a unique value for each release
case and release direction. The calculation is based on the strength, location and presence
factor of all ignition sources specified, and the size and duration of the dispersing flammable
vapour cloud.
PHAST RISK assumes "diffuse ignition background" (which could be understood as e.g. traffic
illumination, cameras etc.), i.e. ignition may occur even if no specific ignition sources are given.
Plant specific ignition sources, which have been taken into account are listed in Table 11 and
their ignition probability have been discussed in Assumption Sheet RA-2 Appendix A.

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Table 11: Ignition Sources in Lyse LNG Base Load Plant

Ignition Source
Flare 54-FC-101
Fired Heater for Hot Oil 52-FA-101
Regenerative Thermal Oxidation (RTO) (Incinerator) 20-XT-101
Electrical Substation
Traffic (Truck Loading)
Parking
External Population
To model the conditional probabilities for the ignition resulting into different types of fires and
explosion, an event tree of the type shown in Figure 7 has been used:
Figure 7: Event tree used for fire and explosion modelling
For the probabilities in this event tree, standard setting as used normally in PHAST RISK have
been applied (most values taken from the Dutch Purple Book [5]).
5.7
Consequence Calculations
The analysis of potential consequences following loss of containment is carried out as the first
stage of the risk analysis. Consequence analysis involves the estimation of rates of release in
the event of loss of containment and prediction of the potential consequences.
5.7.1
Discharge and Dispersion
Material can be released to the atmosphere because of a failure in the containment system.
The magnitude of a release depends primarily on the size of the leak in the system, the phase
of the material and the operating pressure. For modelling purposes, releases are usually categorized as either instantaneous or continuous. As the analysis is concerned with major acci-

25.08.2008
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dent hazards, only releases from equipment and releases from holes giving an excess of a
release rate of 0.1 kg/s have been included.
5.7.2
Instantaneous Releases
If a catastrophic failure of the shell of a vessel occurs the contents would be released very
quickly (instantaneously). This type of failure has been modelled as a hemispherical cloud centred on the release location.
5.7.3
Continuous Releases
Releases of liquids and gases from pipes or equipment items were estimated using basic release rate calculations assuming a fixed value of discharge coefficient. The value of discharge
coefficient used (0.65) is taken from a range of values (typically 0.5 to 0.8) which represent
various pipe- and equipment configurations. The release rate calculations were performed using PHAST 6.53.1. The calculated release rate was assumed to be constant throughout the
release duration.
5.7.4
Release Duration
The release duration depends on the upstream inventory and the means for detection and
subsequent isolation of the release. The release duration has been assumed (refer to Assumption Sheet RA-4 in Appendix A) to be limited by the upstream inventory up to a maximum duration of 1500 s (600 s detection time and 900 s automatic or remotely activated ESD and Blowdown closure time) for small and medium sized leaks. For large and very large leaks an isolation time of 600 s has been used. By all size of leaks, the rest flow of fluids from the upstream
system, which will be released before the isolation valves closes (in 600 s), is also considered
in the PHAST calculation.
5.7.5
Dispersion
When a vapour cloud is generated, either instantaneously or continuously, there may be a

substantial degree of mixing of air with the released material. Dispersion was modelled using
PHAST version 6.53.1. To allow for destruction of momentum due to impingement of releases
or upwind and downwind releases, 50% of releases were modelled as free-field horizontal releases and 50% were modelled as impinged releases. The dimensions of impinged releases
were determined assuming that the clouds were cylindrical in shape, but with the same volume
as a horizontal release.
5.7.6
Thermal Radiation and Overpressure
On ignition of a flammable cloud, different types of combustion can occur depending on the
particular circumstances. It is normal to characterize the combustion in various ways and for
the purpose of this analysis, flash fires, jet fires, pool fires, fireballs and explosions have been
considered.
In the event of a flammable release from containment which is not ignited immediately, a hydrocarbon vapour/air mixture is formed. The concentration of hydrocarbon in the cloud, as progressive dilution with air takes place, is estimated using the dispersion model. The direction
and extent of drift of the cloud is influenced by the prevailing weather conditions. The cloud

25.08.2008
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remains capable of ignition providing the concentration is above the lower flammable limit
(LFL). On ignition, a flame front passes at slow speed throughout the flammable cloud and a
flame stabilizes near to the point of release as either a jet or pool fire. A flash fire does not
produce high levels of overpressure outside the cloud, but inside the cloud there can be isolated regions of overpressure which could lead to equipment or building damage. Levels of
thermal radiation which are potentially fatal, are produced within, and for a very small distance
outside the LFL envelope.
Jet fires are usually the consequence of a momentum dominated release resulting from an
immediately ignited release or from a flash fire that burns back to the point of release. This type
of fire has been included in the SAFETI calculations.
Under certain circumstances the flame travelling through a hydrocarbon/air cloud can accelerate and attain a significantly higher flame speed than that associated with a flash fire. This
high flame speed also generates an overpressure wave. This phenomenon is referred to as a
vapour cloud explosion (VCE). Experimental work and observations on incidents have confirmed that in order for a flame to accelerate from a low speed to a high speed, some form of
congestion is necessary, e.g. a gas cloud within a plant area. Flame acceleration does not occur if the cloud is in the open air, e.g. a cloud over open ground, and indeed if a high speed
flame exits from a congested region into an open region, flame deceleration occurs. Vapour
cloud explosions are characterized by the production of levels of overpressure which can
cause damage to equipment and destruction of buildings well beyond the flammable cloud
boundary. Although any person within the flammable cloud is likely to be fatally injured, direct
human fatalities from blast outside the flammable cloud are unlikely. Most casualties beyond
the cloud envelope arise indirectly, i.e. from crush injuries in collapsed buildings or injuries from
fragments.
PHAST RISK uses a modified version of the TNT equivalent model to describe the consequences of VCE. This model considers a typical congestion. As there is unconfined space between the process area and the administration building, the results for explosion overpressure
towards the administration building and installation outside battery limit can be considered conservative.
5.8
Mitigation Measures taken into Account
The present concept takes into account various mitigation measures, which are presented in
the Assumption Sheets as indicated in Table 12:
Table 12: Risk Reducing Measures

No.
Risk Reducing Measure
Loading frequency consideration
Assumption
Sheet No.
HC-9
Welded Pipes in Feed Gas and LNG service
FA-1
Full containment LNG Storage Tank
FA-3
Explosion Protection
RA-2
Design of the flare stack
RA-6
Fire and Gas Detection
RA-3
ESD/Blowdown System
RA-4

25.08.2008
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No.
Risk Reducing Measure
Appropriate measures
Assumption
Sheet No.
RA-2, RA-6
Active and Passive Fire Protection
RA-7
10
Escape Ways
RA-8
11
Safe Haven
RA-8
For further reduction of the risk to ALARP additional risk reduction measures are evaluated by
means of sensitivity calculations in Chapter 7.0.

6.0
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Results of the Risk Analysis
This section presents the results of the risk calculations using PHAST RISK with the assumption specified in the previous sections. Risk to people is described in terms of individual risk for
1st, 2nd, 3rd party and societal risk 3rd party.
6.1
Risk 1st and 2nd party
Individual Risk, 1st and 2nd party

The subsequent Figure 8 and Figure 9 show the calculated individual risk contour lines for the
Lyse LNG Base Load Plant.
The figures 8 and 9 show the calculated individual risk contour lines for the Lyse LNG Base
Load Plant. The calculated risk contours of individual risk for the most exposed person is illustrated in Figure 8. The figure shows the contours of the most exposed person to suffer a fatality
every 100 000 years (green line), every 1 000 000 years (dark blue line). The risk is illustrated
for the most exposed person present in the process plant area, 20 % of their working time per
year.

25.08.2008
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10-5 /yr
10-6 /yr
Figure 8: Most exposed person individual risk contour lines for the Lyse LNG Base Load Plant
The risk contours for the individual risk are also calculated and is illustrated in Figure 9.
every 100 000 years (dark blue line), etc. The risk is illustrated for 1 person present at any
point outside a building in the plant, continuously 8 hours a day, 5 days a week during a whole
year (45 weeks).

25.08.2008
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10-4 /yr
10-5 /yr
10-6 /yr
10-7 /yr
10-8 /yr
Figure 9: Individual risk contour lines for the Lyse LNG Base Load Plant
every 100 000 years (dark blue line) etc. The risk is illustrated for 1 person present at any point
outside a building in the plant, continuously 8 hours a day, 5 days a week during a whole year
(45 weeks).
The risk is higher closer to the process area and above 1 fatality every 10 000 years. The other
plant areas, e.g. LNG Tank is between the 1 fatality per 10 000 year and 100 000 year risk
contour.
The frequency of overpressure at the control room is calculated [refer Chapter 6.4]. The Central Control Room is designed for an explosion load of 200 mbar.
The risk contributions (pies) for 1st and 2nd party are illustrated in Figure 10, Figure 11,
Figure 12 and Figure 13 and based on calculated individual risk (IR) and include gas and
liquid leaks from all leak sizes of the various inventory loops, which are indicated in the risk
ranking report (ref. Appendix E) and reflect the indoor (respectively outdoor) risk that the exposed person is present unprotected at the same location for 24 hours per day over 365 days
per year.

25.08.2008
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IRindoor = 4.9 X 10-8 /yr

Other
1%

43%
Refrigerant System
56%
Figure 10: Risk contributors to personnel in administration building
Propane Storage
7%
Other
5%
IRoutdoor= 2.9 X 10-3 /yr
Ethylene Storage
6%
Pentane Storage
7%
Refrigeration System
47%
Butane Storage
6%
22%
Figure 11: Risk contributors to personnel in process area

Butane Storage
3%
Other
6%
25.08.2008
Page 38
Propane Storage
10%
47%
23%
Ethylene Storage
11%
Figure 12: Risk contributors to personnel at jetty
Other
9%
LNG Storage Tank Top

4%
Refrigerant System
11%
46%
Ethylene Storage
6%
Propane Storage
6%
Truck Loading
18%
Figure 13: Risk contributors to personnel at truck

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The main individual risk to onsite personnel comes from the refrigerant system and feedgas
purification.
Individual Specific Risk, 1st and 2nd party
The Individual Specific Risk (ISR) for 1st and 2nd party, which considers the individual working hours for each group, is given below in Table 13.
Table 13: Individual Specific Risk (ISR) for 1st and 2nd party
Buildings/Personnel Locations
Operator
ISR [year]
1.2 X 10-4
Process Area (Maintenance)
1.2 X 10-4
Truck Loading
6.7 X 10-5
2.0 X 10-5
Ship Bridge
5.0 X 10-5
Ship Deck
4.8 X 10-5
Criterion (ISR)
1 X 10-3
The most exposed 1st party person will be an operator. He is presumed to be 20% of his time in
the process area and exposed to a potential accident when he is at work, i.e. 1800 hours per
year. The indoor individual risk in administration building is 4.9 X 10-8 per year. The outdoor
individual risk in process area is 2.9 X 10-3 per year.
The Individual Specific Risk is calculated by the following equation,
(0.2 x 2.9 X 10-3) + (0.8 x 4.9 X 10-8 ) X 1800/8760 = 1.2 X 10-4 per year.
Hence the 1st party individual specific risks for the most exposed person lower than 1 X 10-3
per year and within the acceptance criteria.
The Average Individual Risk (AVR) of 5.0 X 10-5 per year for all personnel (1st and 2nd party)
is within the ALARP regime.
6.2
Risk 3rd party
Individual Risk, 3rd party

The distribution of the external population (3rd party) is shown in Figure 14:

Residential
Area
25.08.2008
Page 40
Living
Quarters
En
er
giv
eie
n+
Ri
sa
Co
vik
nt
a
Ar ain
ea er
Rest
Companys
Ferry
Terminal
Peninsula
Hiking
Track
Figure 14: Representative external population (Peninsula, Hiking Track, Ferry Terminal, Container Area,
Energiveien&Risavika, Rest Companys, Residential Area and Living Quarters)
Figure 15 shows the Lyse LNG Base Load Plant location.
LNG plant location
LNG plant location
Figure 15: The LNG Base Load Plant location

25.08.2008
Page 41
The risk contributions (pies) for 3rd party are illustrated in Figure 16, Figure 17 and Figure 18
and based on calculated individual risk (IR) and include gas and liquid leaks from all leak
sizes of the various inventory loops, which are indicated in the risk ranking report (ref. Appendix E) and reflect the indoor (respectively outdoor) risk that the exposed person is present unprotected at the same location for 24 hours per day over 365 days per year.
Propane Storage
38%
Other
6%
15%
Ship Loading Tank Top

22%
Butane Storage
2%
Pentane Storage
Ship Loading Jetty
4%
Ethylene Storage
2%
5%
6%
Figure 16: Risk contributors to people at Peninsula and Hiking Track

25.08.2008
Page 42
Other
9%
Truck Loading
6%
27%
Ship Loading Jetty

4%
9%
Ethylene Storage
9%
14%
Pentane Storage
6%
Propane Storage
16%
Figure 17: Risk contributors to other external population (Ferry Terminal, Container Area, Energiveien&Risavika, Rest Companys and Living Quarters)
The main individual risk to offsite personnel comes from the LNG storage tank top (ship loading
tank top), refrigerant system and propane storage.

25.08.2008
Page 43
IRoutdoor= 9.7 X 10-10/yr

49%
51%
Figure 18: Risk contributors to the Residential Area
Individual risk for people in residential area is negligible (9.7 X 10-10 per year). Worst case assessment shows, there is no credible scenario that a flammable gas cloud above LFL (lower
flammable limit) can reach the residential area.
Individual Specific Risk, 3rd party
The Individual Specific Risk (ISR) for the 3rd party risk is given below in Table 14.
Table 14: Individual Specific Risk (ISR) for the 3rd party
Personnel Locations
Peninsula
ISR [year]
4.6 X 10-8
Hiking Track
2.2 X 10-6
7.6 X 10-7
3.8 X 10-7
4.0 X 10-7
4.6 X 10-9
4.6 X 10-9
3.2 X 10-9
3.2 X 10-9
2.8 X 10-14
2.8 X 10-14

Personnel Locations
Living Quarters
ISR [year]
3.5 X 10-10
Criterion (ISR)
1 X 10-5
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The Average Individual Risk (AVR) of 1.5 X 10-7 per year for people living, working or staying
outside the Lyse LNG base load plant does not exceed the acceptance criteria of 1 X 10-5 /
year and is within the ALARP regime, close to acceptable in general.
Societal Risk, 3rd party
The societal risk calculated for the Lyse LNG Base Load Plant is shown in Figure 19.
Figure 19: Societal risk FN curve for the Lyse LNG Base Load Plant
The minimum and maximum risk criteria are shown in Figure 19 as blue and green lines respectively. Calculations of the external societal risk (e.g. Hiking Track, Peninsula, Industry Area
and Ferry Terminal) have shown that this risk for the Lyse LNG Base Load Plant falls into the

25.08.2008
Page 45
area between the upper and lower limit line, i.e. the ALARP regime. For the Lyse LNG Base
Load Plant such mitigation measures have already been applied (refer to Chapter 5.8 and 7.0).
6.3
Location Specific Risk
It has been suggested by Skangass, that the location of the 1 X 10-5 per year contour is a suitable measure to use for the outer extent of a safety zone around the site. Certain activities,
such as smoking, starting open fires and camping would not be allowed in this region. Such a
designation is consistent with the use of the 1 X 10-5 per year contour by the HSE in the UK to
mark the extent of the inner zone around a site where future residential developments would
be prohibited. Figure 20 shows in relation to the safety zone the 1 X 10-5 per year risk contour.
safety zone contour

10-5 /yr (individual risk contour)
Figure 20: Location of safety zone in relation to the calculated individual risk contour of 1 X 10-5 per year

6.4
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Overpressure Risk
To assess the effectiveness of mitigation measures, overpressure risk contours are calculated
for the potential overpressure design in the Lyse LNG Base Load Plant.
In view of the probabilistic nature of a QRA, also peak overpressure reached at a certain location will occur at this location with a certain frequency (per year), i.e. overpressure is of probabilistic nature itself. Therefore overpressure risk calculations have been performed using
PHAST RISK.
Peak overpressure is of relevance for the design of buildings, in which personnel will be protected against the consequences of pressure waves. Depending on the design and reinforcement of the building it will provide more or less protection for people. In Reference 7 and 8,
overpressure fatality probabilities for various peak overpressures have been determined for
various building types (so-called BEAST and CIA types). The selection of the respective pressure to be considered is motivated by the vulnerabilities of populations in various building types
as shown in Table 15 for some of the building types:
Table 15: Overpressure vulnerabilities in various building types [7, 8]

Overpressure Fatality Probabilities
Building
Type
Beast1
Beast2
Beast3
Beast5
Beast7
Beast10
Beast11
Beast12
CIA3
Description of Building Type
30 - 70
70 - 110
110 - 150
150 - 300
300 - 500
> 500
0.0001
0.01
0.065
0.279
0.488
0.488
0.0001
0.01
0.017
0.221
0.668
0.668
0.0001
0.02
0.282
0.282
0.788
0.788
0.00005
0.02
0.02
0.083
0.988
0.988
0.0001
0.0001
0.017
0.171
0.488
0.488
0.02
0.838
0.838
0.838
0.838
0.838
0.0001
0.025
0.322
0.322
0.988
0.988
0.00005
0.00005
0.02
0.322
0.988
0.988
0.010
0.036
0.081
0.267
0.575
0.740
mbar
Steel framed structure with metal
panels for roof and wall cladding
Steel framed structure with metal wall
panels and a reinforced concrete roof
Steel framed structure with unreinforced masonry (CMU or brick) infill
walls (non-load bearing) and a reinforced concrete or metal roof.
Steel framed building with reinforced
concrete walls panels and a reinforced concrete roof deck
Pre-engineered metal structure
Unreinforced masonry building with
load bearing walls and a reinforced
concrete roof.
Reinforced concrete frame structure
with unreinforced masonry infill walls
and a reinforced concrete roof.
Reinforced concrete frame structure
with reinforced masonry infill walls
and a reinforced concrete roof
Typical domestic building, 2 storey
brick walls timber floor
Whereas 30 mbar represents a threshold for fatalities, overpressures exceeding 500 mbar tend
to lead to 50 % and more fatalities in most building types. Table 15 may be used to select the
appropriate reinforcement method for a building to reduce the fatality rate and thus achieve risk
mitigation where required.
Figure 21 and Figure 22 show the various frequency contours for the different overpressure
values. Frequency values are shown for 50 and 70 mbar. Overpressure curves above 70 mbar
have not been found.

10-4 /yr
Figure 21: Frequency contours for 50 mbar
25.08.2008
Page 47

25.08.2008
Page 48
10-4 /yr
Figure 22: Frequency contours for 70 mbar
These results can be used to specify the Design Accidental Load (DAL) (refer to the Linde
Document &AA-S-SD-1002) in conjunction with the following content of Table 16.

25.08.2008
Page 49
Table 16: Building and Plant Effects at Specified Consequence Levels

Consequence
Flash Fire
Consequence Level
Lower flammable limit
Vapour cloud
explosion
and subsequent overpressure
500 mbar
300mbar
150 mbar
110mbar
70 mbar
Fireball
30 mbar
Within fireball
2 1.333
1000(kW/m )
Pool Fire/Jet Fire
20kW/m
12kW/m2
Effects on Building/Plant
Ignition of easily ignitable materials which are
exposed, e.g. flammable vapour vents, etc., plastics,
fabrics etc. Secondary fires are possible but
unlikely.
Process vessels and pipe work likely to be
damaged. Unstrengthened buildings likely to be
demolished.
Threshold of significant damage to process vessels
and pipe work. Unstrengthened buildings likely to be
significantly damaged/partly demolished.
Plant damage is insignificant except for inherently
weak structures e.g., empty atmospheric storage
tanks. Structural damage to domestic type buildings
could be anticipated. Superficial damage would be
expected with failure of unsupported walls and all
windows broken.
Onset of plant damage for inherently weak
structures. Virtually all windows broken. Superficial
damage to buildings.
Plant damage unlikely and only slight superficial
damage to buildings of brick construction. Most
windows broken and the glass is likely to cause
injury to some people within the buildings.
Glass broken, but no fatalities anticipated.
Building is likely to be ignited. People in the open air
would be killed.
The threshold of fatality for people exposed. People
inside buildings will not be fatally injured.
Carbonaceous material will not ignite spontaneously
but could be ignited with a pilot flame. Pain
experienced on unprotected skin within 2s. People
outdoors will be unlikely to be able to reach a place
of safety
No significant damage to buildings of conventional
constructions. People should be able to safely
remain in a building subject to this level of thermal
radiation. Pain experienced on unprotected skin
within a few seconds, but workers with protective
overalls and able to move in any direction will have a
good chance of reaching a place of safety.

Sensitivity Evaluation
7.0
25.08.2008
Page 50
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of further risk reduction measures the following sensitivity
calculations have been carried out.
Table 17: Sensitivity Cases
Case
No.
1
Pit on the jetty, LNG Storage Tank and the Pentane Tank
Assumption
Sheet No.
HC-6
Rock Wall around the LNG Storage Tank
RA-6
Splitting of cooling up medium tanks into smaller sections in order to reduce

inventory
7.1
Sensitivity 1: Pit on the jetty, LNG Storage Tank and the Pentane Tank
Sensitivity
In this sensitivity calculation a bound around the LNG Ship Loading Jetty, the LNG Storage
Tank and the Pentane Storage Tank is modelled. The design dimensions of pit are implemented as a bound around leaking equipment and shown in the table below:
Bound
LNG Storage
Pentane Storage Tank
7.1.1
Height [m]
0.25
1.8
0.9
Area [m2]
104
10.2
23.6
Discussion
This assumption affects the Pool Fire risk. This risk mitigation measure reduces the pool
spreading and thus the heat radiation.
Pit on the Jetty
Early Pool Fire without a bound

Early Pool Fire with a bound
Pit around the LNG Storage Tank

Early Pool Fire without a bund
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Early Pool Fire with a bund
Pit around the Pentane Storage Tank

Early Pool Fire without a bund
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Page 53
Early Pool Fire with a bund
7.1.2
Comparison with Criteria
As shown ich chapter 7.1.1 the flame heat radiation impact is significantly reduced by a bound.
As the contribution of pool fire from Jetty, LNG Storage- and Pentane Tank is small, this positive effect of the bounds is only marginally reflected by the calculated ISR (Individual Specific
Risk).
However, in order to reduce the risk to ALARP, it is decided to design the plant with a pit for
the LNG Ship Loading Jetty, the LNG Storage Tank and the Pentane Storage Tank. This
is considered in the risk results presented in Chapter 6.0.
7.2
Sensitivity 2: Rock Wall towards the public area on the peninsula
In this sensitivity calculation all fire vulnerabilities for the peninsula people have been reduced
for 80% due to expected radiation effect zone from fires. 80 % of release sources are at lower
than the rock wall.
7.2.1
Discussion
The heat radiation in case of fire at the LNG Tank will be reduced towards the public area on
the peninsula, thus reduced the risk.

7.2.2
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Comparison with Criteria
Table 18: ISR for people on the Peninsula
Criteria
1X10-7/year <ISR 3rd party< 1X10-5/ year
Base Case
Sensitivity
Peninsula people Peninsula people

ISR 5.7X10-6 year ISR 4.6X10-8/ year
Base
Case
99%
The positive effect of the rock wall on individual specific risk for peninsula people is significant.
It is decided to design the rock wall towards the public area. This is considered in the risk results presented in 6.0.
7.3
Sensitivity 3: Splitting of process vessels inside the refrigerant cycle into smaller vessels and additional block valves to reduce the volume of inventory loops
This measure would mainly lead to a shorter duration of jet fire and smaller pool fire scenarios.
The effect therefore is a lower risk to asset, but the personnel risk would not mainly change, as
this lethality occurs within the first minutes after a leakage due to good escape possibilities and
the fact, that vapor clouds have built up their maximum, static flammable mass a few minutes
after start of release.
In fact, splitting of vessels and subsequently the addition of valves and flanges would increase
the number of potential leak sources and therefore marginaly increase the risk. Furthermore
from the process point of view, it is very unfavorable to add additional valves and instrumentation in the mixed refrigerant cylce as this would reduce the availability and operability of the
plant. It would required also additional plot space.
In summary, the splitting of vessels1 inside the refrigerant cycle into smaller vessels and additional block valves to reduce the volume is assessed not to be a suggestive risk reduction
measure.
Splitting of vessels to reduce the risk is only reasonable for larger storage vessels but not for process vessels

Conclusions
8.0
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Conclusions
A careful risk analysis of the first train of the Lyse LNG Base Load Plant has been performed,
including a very detailed counting of all pieces of equipment (including all pipelines, vessels
and compressors etc.) and sensitivity evaluation for the risk reduction measures (refer to the
Chapter 7.0).
It has been found that the calculated levels of individual risk for the 1st, 2nd and 3rd parties are in
compliance with the criteria set by Lyse.
The individual specific risk for 1st and 2nd party for the most exposed person in each group,
maintenance and operators, is lower than 1 X 10-3 per year and within the acceptance criteria.
The average individual risk for personnel is 5.0 X 10-5 per year and therefore clearly below
the acceptance criteria of 1 X 10-4 / year.
The individual specific risk for 3rd party for the most exposed population (e.g. hiking track, ferry
terminal industry and office workers) is within the ALARP regime. The average individual risk
is 1.5 X 10-7 per year and therefore within the lower region of ALARP, close to acceptable in
general. The calculated risk for the Peninsula people is acceptable since the rock wall (mound)
is taken into account (refer to the Chapter 7.2).
Quantitative Risk Analysis for the LNG Plant Stavanger

Appendix A: Assumption Sheets
9.0
25.08.2008
Page 56
Appendix A documents the basis for the QRA of the Stavanger LNG Base Load Plant. The
actual Assumption Sheets are presented in Table 19.
Table 19: List of assumption sheets
Subject Area
Hazard
Identification /
Consequence
Analysis
Assumption
Sheet No.
HC-1
Main area definitions
HC-2
Release Rates
HC-3
Hydrocarbon Releases
HC-4
Gas Dispersion
HC-5
Gas Fire Modelling
HC-6
Liquid Fire Modelling
HC-7
HC-8
Vapour Clod Explosion

Modelling
Non-Process
HC-9
Loading Frequency
HC-10
Ship Transport Accidents

Occupational Risk
HC-11
Frequency
Analysis
Risk
Assessment
Assumption Sheet
Topic
FA-1
Inventory Count
FA-2
Frequency Database
FA-3
Leak Frequency
(LNG Storage Tank)
Event Tree
Probabilities
Ignition Sources
Probabilities
RA-1
RA-2
RA-3
RA-4
RA-5
RA-6
RA-7
RA-8
ESD/Blowdown
System-Duration Time
Vulnerabilities
Heat Radiation
Mitigation
Active and Passive Fire
Protection
Escape Ways and Safe
Haven
Revision
No. / Revision Date
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Remarks

Miscellaneous
MI-1
Acceptance Criteria
MI-2
Meteorological Data /
Parameters
Manning Levels /
Population Distribution
MI-3
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Stavanger LNG Base Load Plant
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HC-1
Hazard Identification/Consequence Analysis

Main area definitions
Assumption/Rule Set
The Stavanger LNG Base Load Plant has been divided into the following main areas:
Main area definition
Inventory Loop 1
Inventory Loop 2A
Inventory Loop 2B1
Inventory Loop 2B2
Inventory Loop 3A
Inventory Loop 3B
Inventory Loop 4
Inventory Loop 5A
Inventory Loop 5B1/2/3
Inventory Loop 5C
Inventory Loop 6A1
Inventory Loop 6A2
Inventory Loop 6A3
Inventory Loop 6B1
Inventory Loop 6B2
Inventory Loop 6B3
Inventory Loop 6B4
Inventory Loop 7
Inventory Loop 8
Inventory Loop 9
Inventory Loop 10A
Inventory Loop 10B
Inventory Loop 11
Inventory Loop 12
Inventory Loop 13
Description
NG Liquefication Gas
LNG Storage Return Gas
LNG Storage
LNG Truck Loading
Refrigeration Liquid 25-HX-101/103 System
Refrigeration Liquid 25-VA-101 System
Refrigeration Liquid 25-VA-102/25-HX-102 System
Refrigeration Liquid 25-VL-102 System
Propane Storage
Pentane Storage
Butane Storage
Ethylene Storage Gas System
Ethylene Storage Liquid System
Hot Oil System
Feedgas Fiscal Metering
Tailgas Fiscal Metering
Implication of assumption:
Impact on safety function impairment.
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HC-2

Release Rates
Assumption/Rule Set
Only releases of hydrocarbons are considered. A release of MDEA in the Solvent Regeneration system is not considered, as it is used in a not flammable aqueous solution. CO2/H2S
leaks from pipelines to Regenerative Thermal Oxidation (RTO) due to a low operating pressure are not considered, but discussed qualitatively (see Appendix B: Hazard Identification).
Releases have been analysed in terms of four characteristic hole sizes:
Small:
1-10 mm
Medium: 10-50 mm
Large:
50-100 mm
Very Large (Full bore): taken to be hole equivalent to the largest diameter pipework in that inventory ( > 100 mm)
Releases from pipelines, flanges, pumps etc. are modelled as liquid, gas, or two-phase releases. Where an inventory comprises significant liquid and gas sections, e.g. in a vessel,
then both are modelled.
The representative release height for all cases is taken 1 m; except for the LNG Tank, where
30 m are applied, since the leak sources (flanges) by the LNG Tank are expected on the tank
top.
Release rates are assumed to be constant throughout the release duration time and calculated with isolation (ESD System), and with blowdown (see Assumption Sheet RA-4). According to EN 1473, the isolated sections shall be depressurised to 50 % of design pressure in 15
minutes or to 7 barg in 30 minutes. Based on this, the calculated time to detect and initiate is
600 s. An average blowdown time of 900 s is used in the calculation. Release rates of gas
systems with small gas volume are limited by flow controlled gas supply. Liquid release rates
are limited by pump rates.
However, the times to detect will vary, depending on leak size, release rate, location of release, etc. In practice, some releases may be isolated much quicker, but it is assumed that
this represents a realistic worst case value.
Releases of hydrocarbons affect the fire and explosion risk.
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HC-3

Hydrocarbon Releases
Assumption/Rule Set
Outdoor Releases of hydrocarbons (gas/liquid or two phases) are considered from the counting equipment (see Assumption Sheet FA-1). Hole sizes are defined in Assumption Sheet
HC-2. Release duration time is based on the fire and gas detection and ESD&Blowdown System (see Assumption Sheets RA-3 and RA-4).
Hydrocarbon leaks in buildings, which contain Hydrocarbons, are defined as explosion group
zone 1 and are assumed to have a minor contribution to risk compared to outdoor releases
due to forced ventilation. Hydrocarbon entering in a building is prevented by adequate gas
detection and closing the air-intake. Therefore Hydrocarbon leaks in buildings are not analysed, but are discussed qualitatively (see Appendix B: Hazard Identification).
Outdoor hydrocarbon releases affect the fire and explosion risk.
The buildings are specified with explosion group zone 1. Gas entering in a building is prevented by adequate gas detection and closing the air-intake. Therefore the risk of internal
explosion is not considered.
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HC-4

Gas Dispersion
Assumption/Rule Set
The gas dispersion is calculated by the UDM model implemented in the PHAST / PHAST
RISK software. This model considers only free field dispersion, so that any local air stream
effects at equipment/ buildings are not included in the dispersion calculation. Dispersion generally is modelled as horizontal releases.
A representative gas cloud size to 50% of lower flammable limit (LFL fraction) has been used
to determine the magnitude / extent of flash fires / explosions.
Gas dispersion affects the consequence calculations associated with the fire and explosion
risk.
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HC-5

Gas Fire Modelling
Assumption/Rule Set
Gas fires resulting from ignited hydrocarbon releases are modelled as jet fire, flash fire and
fire ball for each release scenario.
For unimpinged gas releases the jet fire is calculated using the Shell model. The original Shell
model uses the Chamberlain correlation for calculation of the flame length as function of the
release rate, which was developed for near-vertical vapour-phase releases. This correlation
was modified by Cook et al. to describe the shape of jets that contain liquid. Therefore the
option DNV Recommended has been used, that means the PHAST / PHAST RISK program
will use the correlation that is most appropriate for the release-conditions.
For impinged releases the fireball diameter is calculated from the release rate using the correlation given in Dutch Yellow book.
For delayed ignition the flash fire limit is the distance to LFL.
This assumption affects the fire risk.
See also the assumption sheet RA-6.
Reference:
Methods for the calculation of physical effects (Yellow Book), CPR14E
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HC-6

Liquid Fire Modelling
Assumption/Rule Set
Fires resulting from ignited liquid releases are modelled as a pool or a jet fire.
Pool fire dimensions are modelled using the spill rate to compute pool development with allowance for burning (if ignited) or boil off. The maximum pool sizes are defined either by hitting a dike wall or by reaching a minimum thickness. The minimum thickness depends on surface and is set by the PHAST / PHAST RISK program to 5 mm for a concrete surface.
For pool fires the effects are calculated for an early and late ignition. The late pool fire is assumed to occur when the pool reaches its maximum radius. For early pool fires pool size evolution is based on ignition occurring at 10 sec.
Jet flame lengths and radiation effects distances are calculated as per gas fires (refer to HC5).
The bund around the pentane tank is implemented in the calculation. The effect of an LNG pit
at the storage tank and at the jetty is implemented in the LNG PLANT QRA calculations as a
bund around the tank (Inventory Loop 3B) and around the jetty (Inventory Loop 5C), since the
PHAST RISK program can not directly simulate such a pit. The bunds limit the pool spreading.
This assumption affects the fire risk.
The LNG pool fires around storage tank and around the jetty loading are limited by a pit in
each case (modelled as bund). This reduces the pool spreading and thus the heat radiation.
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HC-7

Vapour Cloud Explosion Modelling
Assumption/Rule Set
The TNT model is used to calculate vapour cloud explosion effects. The explosion efficiency
is set to 10 %. For gases lighter than air an air burst is assumed. For gases heavier than air a
ground burst is taken into account. Then the PHAST / PHAST RISK program multiplies the
explosion efficiency by factor two, to account for the effects of reflection on the overpressure.
The flammable mass is calculated as mass between LFL and UFL. The explosion location
criterion is the cloud front (1/2 LFL fraction). Vapour cloud explosion effects are calculated if
the minimum explosion energy of 5 x 10^6 kJ (DNV default value) is exceeded.
This assumption affects the explosion risk.
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HC-8

Non-Process
Assumption/Rule Set
Non-process events include: loss of utilities (failure leads to fail safe conditons), utilities releases, non-hydrocarbon fires (e.g. transformer fire in electrical/instrument room). They are
not included in the LNG PLANT QRA due to their low frequency and low consequence and
active and passive fire protection , but discussed qualitatively (see Appendix B: Hazard Identification).
This assumption has none impact on fire and explosion risk in the LNG PLANT QRA.
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HC-9

Loading Frequency
Assumption/Rule Set
Loading operations are assumed to be 1 cargo ship loading every 5th day (filling time 6h) and
truck loading 10 times in a day (filling time 1.2 h).
This assumption reduces the release and ignition probabilities.
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HC-10

Ship Transport Accidents
Assumption/Rule Set
Types of accidents are not a part of LNG PLANT QRA.
A ship collision risk assessment is recommended (important risk). As it has an impact on third
party population risk. A ship collision with jetty could be significant with respect to 1st risk.
This assumption could have impact on fire and explosion risk in the LNG Plant. Collision incidents per port visit - while mooted at jetties, berths etc or within locks, enclosed harbours etc.
is 3.7 X 10-5 [LMIS database]. Therefore, such accidents can be neglected.
Reference:
Lyods Maritime Information Services (LMIS).
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HC-11

Occupational Risk
Assumption/Rule Set
The occupational accidents have been not included in the acceptance criterion, and are therefore not considered in the LNG Plant QRA.
This assumption has none impact on harm/death risk in the LNG Plant QRA.
Reference:
OGP, Safety Performance Indicators 2006 data, Report no. 391, June 2007
Section 2.2 & 4.1
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FA-1
Frequency Analysis
Inventory Count
Assumption/Rule Set
For each inventory the leak frequencies are estimated using a full parts count of the equipment shown on the P&ID. Typically this includes:
Flanges (not to consider in welded pipelines)
Valves
Small bore fittings
Pipelines
Pressure vessels
Heat exchangers
Pumps
Compressors
Atmospheric Tanks
Equipment counts assumptions are detailed below:
Drums and other vessels that are primarily gas (e.g. cycle compressor
interstage drum) or liquid (e.g. cold MRC separator) are conservatively
treated as 100% gas or liquid, respectively
Relief valves to flare and blow down valves are counted as normal
valves and assumed to be closed in normal operation. Therefore downstream equipment are not considered
Flanges and small bore fittings in pipelines are not counted since the
failure of flanges is included in the failure frequency of the pipeline
[Purple Book]
For jetty, a double flange per valve connections and associated flanges
are counted
Flanges and small bore fittings at vessels and at the LNG Tank are not
counted since their failure frequencies are included in the failure frequency of the vessels and tanks [Purple Book]
Further details are given in Appendix C: Equipment Count.
The amount of inventories as leakage sources affects the release frequency.
Reference:
Guidelines Risk calculations (Purple Book) BEVI Module C, Version 3.0 Date 1 January 2008:
Modelling specific BEVI categories.
BEVI is the abbreviation of the decree implementing the SEVESO directive.
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FA-2
Frequencies Analysis
Frequency Database
Assumption/Rule Set
As Linde AG has not received a database from the Client, the leak sizes and- frequencies,
are calculated with DNV Software Leak 3.2. The generic failure data used as the basis of the
frequency analysis is the UK HSE Offshore Hydrocarbon Release Statistic 1992-2006, or
HCRD [Ref. A]. This is a DNV recommended database for Hydrocarbon releases. To reflect
the LNG plant, which is considered a clean service and an onshore facility, leak frequencies
for pipelines, vessels and the LNG Storage Tank are applied as given in the Purple Book
[Ref. B]. Accordingly, failures of flanges in pipelines or at vessels are included in the failure
frequency of the pipeline or of the vessel (see Assumption Sheet FA-1).
Further details are given in Appendix D: Results of Leak 3.2. Calculations.
Key influence on the risks (i.e. risk is directly proportional to frequency).
Reference:
A: HSE, 2000. Offshore Hydrocarbon Release Statistics, 1999, Offshore Technology Report
OTO 079, HSE Offshore Safety Division (OSD), January 2000.
B: Guidelines Risk calculations (Purple Book) BEVI Module C, Version 3.0 Date 1 January
2008: Modelling specific BEVI categories.
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FA-3
Frequencies Analysis
Leak Frequency (LNG Storage Tank)
Assumption/Rule Set
Acc. to EN 1473 roof collapse/tank collapse is considered negligible for full containment
tanks. Therefore, a very large leak (full rupture) associated with the full containment LNG tank
is not considered in Inventory Loop 3A LNG Storage Return Gas (refer to the Assumption
Sheet HC-1).
Further details are given in Appendix D: Results of Leak 3.2. Calculations.
The leak frequency is directly proportional to risk.
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RA-1
Risk Assessment
Event Tree Probabilities
Assumption/Rule Set
The development of a release is largely defined by the stage at which ignition occurs, where
the immediate and delayed ignition may give an explosion, or a flash fire, or a fireball. These
different developments are represented in a diagram called an event tree, and the probabilities for the developments are known as event tree probabilities or event tree parameters.
The sum of the probabilities for Fireball, Flash Fire, Explosion and Pool Fire alone is usually
100%. An example risk model event tree for a continuous release with rainout (with probability
of a pool fire) is shown in Figure 23.
Figure 23: Example Risk Model Event Tree Structure
1.0
0.6
1.0
0.3*
1.0
0.6
0.4
0.15
* The default probability of immediate ignition (0.3) has not been used to account the effects
of fluid properties (e.g. reactivity) and source strength on the ignition probability.
If no immediate ignition occurs, the program models the dispersion of the cloud through a
succession of time steps until it has diluted below a hazardous concentration. At each time
step the program models the effects of delayed ignition of the cloud, calculating the probability
of delayed ignition by considering the ignition sources (see the Assumption Sheet RA-2)
within the flammable area of the cloud during that time-step.

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The event tree is a key aspect of the QRA model and affects of fire and explosion risk depending on the timing and type of ignition.
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RA-2
Risk Assessment
Ignition Sources Probabilities
Assumption/Rule Set
The ignition sources are defined by ignition probability and time period. The ignition probability is the probability that the ignition source will ignite a flammable cloud if the cloud is exposed to the source for the specified time period, which is assumed 10 s (default value in
PHAST RISK).
The expected ignition sources and their probabilities are listed in following table:
Ignition Source
Speed
Flare 54-FC-101
Fired Heater for Hot Oil 52-FA-101
H2S Conventer (Incinerator) 20-XT-101
Electrical Substation
Traffic (Truck Loading)
Maintenance Traffic
Parking Area Traffic
Ignition Probability
Traffic Density
Average
[Fraction]
0.5
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
[day]
[kph]
10
1
20
30
30
20
It is assumed that all electrical equipment will be EX-safe (Explosion Protection). Due to fire
and gas detection, the Regenerative Thermal Oxidation (RTO) Incinerator and all the not exsafe units will be isolated by closing the damper at the air inlet. Therefore the ignition probabilities have been reduced to 0.1 expect for the flare.
The flare pilots will burn with a pilot flame continuously. Due to the fact that the flare pilots are
installed 70 m above ground and the assumption that only 50 % of flammable gas clouds will
disperse to this height, the flare ignition probability has been reduced from 1 to 0.5.
The reduced ignition fractions may reduce the delayed ignition probabilities on the event
trees, which are depends on the ignition fractions (e.g. Assumption Sheet RA-1).
The default value assigned within PHAST RISK for the ignition source associated with people
corresponds to 1.68 x 10-4 per person per second of cloud exposure. This value has been
derived to account for the probability of ignition associated with people in general, and includes an allowance for smoking and general human behaviour associated with residential
areas. The ignition probability of personal within the LNG Plant would be zero (except the
truck and maintenance traffic), with no smoking.
Immediate ignition for material properties of the released material have been taken into account and shown in table below:
Class (Material)
immediate
source-continuous
Average/high reactivity
<10 kg/s
e.g. Ethane,Propane/Hydrogen 10-100 kg/s
>100 kg/s
Low Reactivity
<10 kg/s
e.g. Methane
10-100 kg/s
>100 kg/s
source-instantaneous
<1000 kg/s
1000-10,000 kg/s
>10,000 kg/s
<1000 kg/s
1000-10,000 kg/s
>10,000 kg/s
probability of
ignition
0.2
0.5
0.7
0.02
0.04
0.09

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This assumption affects of fire and explosion risk depending on the timing and type of ignition.
The ignition probabilities due to ex-safe design and fire and gas detection reduce the fire and
explosion risk.
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RA-3
Risk Assessment
Assumption/Rule Set
The fire and gas detection depends on the location and magnitude of the event, the number,
location of detectors and their PFD (probability of failure on demand). However, the basis design of the LNG Plant considers a sufficient fire and gas detection (refer to the Linde Document &AA S-PC-1004 Fire Protection Concept and &AA S-ZA-1003 Fire & Gas Detection
Plan).
The F&G System is considered in the QRA by prevention / mitigation of Hazards either automatic or manual actions activated upon gas detection:
Automatic shutdown of the following ignition sources (refer to Assumption Sheet RA-2) :
o Regenerative Thermal Oxidation (RTO) (Incinerator) 20-XT-101
o fired heater (Hot-oil unit) 50-XT-101
Manual activation of the Emergency Shutdown, Isolation and Depressuring System via
push-buttons by the operator in the CCR. The F&G detection system is the basis of the
ESD- and Blowdown duration time (see the Assumption Sheet RA-4).
This assumption affects the release duration.
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RA-4
Risk Assessment
ESD/Blowdown System-Duration Time
Assumption/Rule Set
The initial release rate [in kg/s] is calculated within the PHAST RISK discharge model and set
constant during the representative release duration time. In reality, the internal pressure is
reduced and this reduces the release rate. If the initial release rate is very large, the release
duration time will be short. Low release rates will compensate with the representative release
duration time, which is typically of 1500 s and shown in Figure 2.
Figure 24: Refrigerant Depressurizing Calculation
pressure
P1
A1
A1 ~ A2
A2
900 s
time
Time used in QRA model as max. release duration at constant release
rate after initiation of ESD and Blowdown
According to EN 1473, the isolated sections shall be depressurised to 50 % of design pressure in 15 minutes or to 7 barg in 30 minutes. Based on this, the calculated time to detect and
initiate is 600 s followed by an average blowdown time of 900 s.
This assumption affects release the release rates and duration times.
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RA-5
Risk Assessment
Vulnerabilities
Assumption/Rule Set
A given accident may lead to fatalities both indoors and outdoors depending on each hazardous effect. The lethality factors are given for individual and socitial risk calculations and
shown in Figure 3.
Figure 25: Default values based on Purple Book set in General Risk Parameters in PHAST
RISK
Some of this default values have been changed based on the mitigation measures by the
assumption sheets RA-6 and RA-8.
The risks are directly influenced by the impact and fatality assumptions, which quantify the
severity of the consequences.
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RA-6
Risk Assessment
Heat Radiation Mitigation
Assumption/Rule Set
The impact of heat radiation from fires to the peninsula depends on the height of the release
sources. 80% of all release sources (vessels, pipework and the LNG Storage Tank) are at a
lower level than the rock wall. The heat radiation effect zones are simplified shown in figure
below. The heat radiation effects are expected at the rock wall top. It is confirmed by the Client that no people will enter the rock wall top, which will be ensured by appropriate measures.
Therefore all fire vulnerabilities for the peninsula people have been reduced in the General
Risk Parameters (default vulnerabilities in Assumption Sheet RA-5) for 80% (i.e. outdoor vulnerability factor for fire is reduced from 1 to 0.2).

25.08.2008
Page 81
For a more detailed evaluation of this effect, CFD calculations would be required.
This assumption reduces the risk to people on the peninsula.
(Refer to the Table 2 Individual Specific Risk (ISR) for the 3rd party)
Reference:
Prepared by:
Sign: CAN
Sign:
BAUMGARTNER/RATH
Date: 2008.06.02
Date: 2008.06.02
Sign:
Date:
Comment from Lyse:

Approved by Lyse:

25.08.2008
Page 82
Date: 2008.07.31
Assumption
No.:
Subject Area:
Topic:
Revision: 1
RA-7
Risk Assessment
Active and Passive Fire Protection
Assumption/Rule Set
Active Fire Protection:
All vessels and piping are protected by the water application like monitors, hydrants.
Passive Fire Protection:
Fireproof insulation for supporting steel structures shall be provided to protect the plant and
fire fighting personnel against the effect of support failure in case of fire. Fireproof insulation is
needed within fire hazardous areas. For details, refer to the Linde Document &AA S-PC-1004
Fire Protection Concept.
To consider the Stavanger LNG Base Load Plant being an onshore plant with clean service
etc. the leak frequencies for piping, the LNG storage tank and pressure vessels given in the
Dutch Purple Book have been applied. But additive to that no credit for active and passive fire
protection can be taken, as leakage failure rates given in the HSE database as well as failure
rates given in the purple book consider only initial leakages, but not secondary leakages due
to heat ingress caused by fire radiation.
This assumption prevents the escalation risk.
Reference:
Sign: CAN
Date: 2008.07.31
Prepared by:
Sign:
Date: 2008.07.31
BAUMGARTNER/RATH
Comment from Lyse:
Approved by Lyse:
Sign:
Date:

25.08.2008
Page 83
Date: 2008.08.25
Assumption
No.:
Subject Area:
Topic:
Revision: 2
RA-8
Risk Assessment
Escape Ways and Safe Haven
Assumption/Rule Set
Escape Ways:
Escape ways are considered to be state of the art in hydrocarbon processing plants Therefore
no credit is taken to account.
Safe Haven:
The probability of death within the building will depend on the vulnerabilty of the building in
the first instance and given a level of damage how vulnerable the occupants are to the combined hazards. The control room is designed for dynamic resistance pressure of 200 mbar
and may verify a overpressure vulnerabilty factor of 0.322. Therefore, the Heavy Explosion
Damage value in the General Risk Parameters (default vulnerabilities) has been changed
from 1 to 0.322 for the administrative personal (refer to the Assumption Sheet RA-5 and the
table in the QRA Issue 02).
This assumption affects the fire and explosion risk.
Reference:
Prepared by:
Sign: CAN
Sign:
BAUMGARTNER/RATH
Date: 2008.07.31
Date: 2008.07.31
Sign:
Date:
Comment from Lyse:

Approved by Lyse:

25.08.2008
Page 84
Date: 2008.07.31
Assumption
No.:
Subject Area:
Topic:
Revision: 0
MI-1
Miscellaneous
Acceptance Criteria
Assumption/Rule Set
The below tables and figures summarize the Acceptance Risk Criteria for Stavanger LNG
Base Load Plant given by the Client.
Acceptance Risk Criterion for Stavanger LNG Base Load Plant

Individual Risk (Pr r)
1st and 2nd party risk 3rd party risk
Individual specific risk
(ISR) for most exposed
person
Avarage individual risk
(AVR)
<1x10-3
<1x10-5
<1x10-4 (Note 1)
<1x10-5
Acceptance Risk Criterion for Stavanger LNG Base Load Plant

Individual Risk (Pr r)
st
nd
1 and 2 party risk
3rd party risk
(ISR/AVR)
Ikke akseptabelt
ALARP
Akseptabelt
>1x10-3 / >1x10-4
1x10-6 to 1x10-3 /
1x10-6 to 1x10-4 (Note 1)
<1x10-6
1x10-5
1x10-7 to 1x10-5
<1x10-7
Note 1: If no individual risk (ISR ) is found to be above 1 > 10-4 the average individual risk
(AIR) criteria is fulfilled.
Societal Fatal Risk
Figure above shows the Stavanger LNG Base Load Plant F-N Curve Societal Risk Criteria
(same std. as UK HSE F-N curve)

25.08.2008
Page 85
Impact on safety function impairment.
Reference:
Prepared by:
Sign: CAN
Sign:
BAUMGARTNER/RATH
Date: 2008.07.31
Date: 2008.07.31
Sign:
Date:
Comment from Lyse:

Approved by Lyse:

25.08.2008
Page 86
Date: 2008.07.31
Assumption
No.:
Subject Area:
Topic:
Revision: 0
MI-2
Miscellaneous
Meteorological Data/Parameters
Assumption/Rule Set
Data on distribution of wind speed and wind direction in the surroundings of Sola is presented
in the form of a wind-rose in Figure 26.
In combining the wind rose and stability data the eight representative weather categories have
been rationalised to three weather categories. The probability of each weather category (stability and speed) and each direction is shown in Table 20.
Figure 26: Wind Rose Data for Sola
Table 20: Rationalised Representative Weather Categories for Sola

Stability Class
Wind [m/s]
Wind direction [degrees]

292.5 337.5 22.5
67.5
337.5 22.5
67.5
112.5
112.5
157.5
157.5
202.5
202.5
247.5
247.5
292.5
DAY: D - 1.5
NIGHT: F-1.5
D- 6
D - 12
1.99
14.71
2.79
0.961
7.09
1.346
1.012
7.47
1.417
1.633
12.04
2.293
1.335
9.89
1.878
0.501
3.69
0.702
0.807
5.96
1.13
1.977
14.57
2.76
SUM
19.49
9.397
9.899
15.966
13.103
4.893
7.897
19.2307
In addition to the weather categories, certain meteorological constants are defined as inputs
to the consequence modelling. These values are summarised below.

25.08.2008
Page 87
The weather conditions have a key influence on flammable cloud dispersion and hence the
consequences associated with any release. The influence of any specific weather category
and direction will vary for each and every release, where on balance the resulting influence of
any changes in the meteorological assumptions will have a negligible influence on the risk
results.
The dispersion and consequences associated with LNG and other dense gas releases are
relatively sensitive to assumptions affecting the heat transfer to the cloud. Hence, the above
values are relatively conservative representative conditions, but will not necessarily correspond to the worst-case dispersion conditions that may occur.
Representative conditions used relevant to consequences, with relatively minor influence on
subsequent risks.
Reference:
Prepared by:
Sign: CAN
Sign:
BAUMGARTNER/RATH
Date: 2008.07.31
Date: 2008.07.31
Sign:
Date:
Comment from Lyse:

Approved by Lyse:

25.08.2008
Page 88
Date: 2008.08.25
Assumption
No.:
Subject Area:
Topic:
Revision: 0
MI-3
Miscellaneous
Manning Levels/Population Distribution
Assumption/Rule Set
Manning levels are defined for the following time periods:
Daytime: Normal working day is divided into 2 shifts; a morning shift (08:00 to 16:00) and
an afternoon shift (16:00 to 00:00).
Night: Night shift between 00:00 and 08:00.
The risk analysis is based on the onsite population (1st and 2nd party) and off-site population
(3rd party). It is assumed that 70% of release events relate to some form of manual intervention, which is therefore assumed to apply only to the daytime shifts. The remaining 30% of
events apply to the night shift.
The loading operations (truck and jetty loading), which are not to be present 24 hours a day,
all days throughout the year, are taken into account. Loading operations are planned to be 1
cargo ship loading every 5th day by a ship filling time of 10 h and truck loading 10 times in a
day by a truck loading time of 1.2 h.
A total number of 55 workers (1st and 2nd party) are present at the plant temporarily within 24
hours. This figure is used to calculate the average individual risk for onsite population. The
QRA calculation of the average individual risk is based on 4567 off-site people by day and 78
by night.
The distribution of onsite- and off-site people is summarised in Table 21 and Table 22.
Table 21: Onsite Population (1st and 2nd party)
Buildings / Areas
Administration Building
Maintenance
Truck Loading
Ship Deck
Ship Bridige
Personnel / People
Day (per Shift) Night
Total Number
3
1
7
2
1
5
4
2
10
1
1
3
2
2
6
8
8
24

25.08.2008
Page 89
Table 22: Off-site Population (3rd party)

Areas
Peninsula
Hiking Track
Living Quarters
Personnel / People
Day
Night
16 (in non-work day)
0
8 (in a non-work day)
0
100
2
10
0
1500
0
400
5
559
0
10
1
50
0
1139
10
715
0
60
60
Onsite and off-site are directly influenced by the numbers of people exposed to hazardous
events and hence the individual specific risk and the average individual risk are sensitive to
the manning assumptions.
Reference:
Sign: CAN
Date: 2008.07.31
Prepared by:
Sign:
Date: 2008.07.31
BAUMGARTNER/RATH
Comment from Lyse:
Approved by Lyse:
Sign:
Date:

Appendix B: Hazard Identification
10.0
25 08 2008
Page 90
HAZID Lyse LNG Base Load Plant, Munich 30th of October 2007
#
Hazard
Causes
Consequences
Safeguards
Further follow up/Comments
NG Leak from Process Equipment or

piping
Corrosion
Erosion
Gasket Failure
etc.
Regular Maintenance
ESD System
Emergency Blow Down System
Active/Passive Fire Protection
considered in Linde QRA
LNG Leak from Process Equipment or

piping
Corrosion
Erosion
Gasket Failure
etc.
Regular Maintenance
ESD System
LNG Leak from Tank
Corrosion
Erosion
Gasket Failure
etc.
Regular Maintenance
ESD System
Impoundment Pit
Mixed Refrigerant
Gas Leak from Process Equipment or
piping
Corrosion
Erosion
Gasket Failure
etc.
Atmospheric Dispersion
of Gas
Toxic Consequences
Potential Explosion
Flash Fire
Jet Fire
Flashing and Evaporation
of LNG
of Gas
Potential Explosion
Flash Fire
Jet Fire
Pool Fire
of LNG
of Gas
Potential Explosion
Flash Fire
Jet Fire
Pool Fire
of Gas
Potential Explosion
Flash Fire
Jet Fire
Regular Maintenance
ESD System

5
Mixed Refrigerant
Liquid Leak from
Process Equipment
or piping
Corrosion
Erosion
Gasket Failure
etc.
Mixed Refrigerant
Gas Leak from Compressor or piping in
Compressor Noise
Hood
Corrosion
Erosion
Gasket Failure
Seal Failure
etc.
LNG Leak at Truck

Loading
Corrosion
Erosion
Mechanical
Damage
Gasket Failure
etc.
LNG Leak at Jetty

Loading (Ship Loading)
Corrosion
Erosion
Mechanical
Damage
Gasket Failure
etc.
Transformer Oil Fire

in Electrical/Instrument Room
Gasket Failure
Oil Leakage
25 08 2008
Page 91

of LNG
of Gas
Potential Explosion
Flash Fire
Jet Fire
Pool Fire
Potential Explosion
Flash Fire
Jet Fire
Regular Maintenance
ESD System
Considered in Linde QRA
Regular Maintenance
ESD System
Active fire Protection

of LNG
of Gas
Potential Explosion
Flash Fire
Jet Fire
Pool Fire
of LNG
of Gas
Potential Explosion
Flash Fire
Jet Fire
Pool Fire
Regular Maintenance
ESD System
Regular Maintenance
ESD System
Oil Pool Fire
Regular Maintenance
ESD System
Not considered in Linde QRA

(minor contribution to risk)
Considered in Linde Document
&AA S-PC-1004 Fire Protection
Concept

10
MDEA Leak from

Process Equipment
or piping
Corrosion
Erosion
Gasket Failure
etc.
Release of CO2 loaded

MDEA to dike area and pit
11
CO2 leak from piping

to Regenerative
Thermal Oxidation
(RTO) Incinerator
Corrosion
Erosion
Gasket Failure
etc.
12
NG leakage in shell
side of 25-HZ-101
13
Failure of LNG Ship

Loading
Corrosion
Erosion
Mechanical
Stress
etc.
Corrosion
Erosion
Mechanical
Damage
Operator Failure
Gasket Failure
Coupling Failure
etc.
Release of CO2.
The CO2/H2S (sour gas) in
CO2 wash unit is routed
to the regenerative thermal oxidation and then
sent to atmosphere at
safe location. Dispersion
from a leak of CO2/H2S
gas cloud due to low operating pressure is not
considered as the contribution to the risk is minor
compared to the above
mentioned outcomes.
NG to refrigerant system

of LNG
of Gas
Potential Explosion
Flash Fire
Jet Fire
Pool Fire
25 08 2008
Page 92
Dike Area and Pit

Not a flammable medium

(no flammable Gas)
Refer to the Linde Document
S-RA 1001 Air Dispersion
Study of CO2 off gas
Safety Relief Valve to Flare

(only flaring)
25 SV 1002 is designed for this
case
Regular Maintenance
ESD System

25 08 2008
Page 93
14
Failure of Truck Loading
Corrosion
Erosion
Mechanical
Damage
Operator Failure
Failure of Coupling Failure
Gasket Failure
etc.

of LNG
of Gas
Potential Explosion
Flash Fire
Jet Fire
Pool Fire
Regular Maintenance
ESD System
15
Cable Fire in Electrical/Instrument Room
Overload
Mechanical
Damage
etc.
Local Fire
Regular Maintenance
Fire Detection
Active Fire Protection
16
Fuel Gas Leak from

Boil-off Compressor
or piping in Compressor Noise Hood
Corrosion
Erosion
Gasket Failure
Seal Failure
etc.
Potential Explosion
Flash Fire
Jet Fire
Regular Maintenance
ESD System
Active fire Protection

Refer to the Linde Document
&AA S-PC-1004 Fire Protection
Concept
17
Hot Oil Fire in 20-HA102 and 20-HA-111
Gasket Failure
Oil Leakage
Oil Pool Fire
Regular Maintenance
ESD System

18
Hydrocarbon (HC gas

/ liquid or two phase)
leaks in buildings
19
LNG release from

PSVs on the LNG
tank to the atmosphere
25 08 2008
Page 94
Buildings containing HC:
- The buildings are specified with
explosion group zone 1; therefore the risk of internal explosion is reduced.
- The protective effect of the
building is not considered in
the PHAST RISK calculation
(conservative consideration).
Buildings containing no HC:
- Gas entering in a building is
presented by adequate gas detection and closing the air-intake.

Refer to the Linde Document SPC-1009 Explosion Protection
Concept and S-ZA-1002 Hazardous Area Classification Plan

Refer to the Linde documents
SRS Specific Part - SIL Allocation &AA S-SD 1003 and Dispersion Calculation Safety
Valves LNG Tank &AA S-RA
1002

Appendix C: Equipment Count
11.0
25.08.2008
Page 95
To determine the leak size and -frequency, an equipment count was performed using the
P&IDs.
The equipment count for pipelines, valves and number all individual vessels, heat exchangers,
pumps, filters etc. have been compiled and transferred into the LEAK frequency calculation.
The resulting data is used in DNV's LEAK 3.2 software, to determine overall leak frequencies
and leak sizes.
Details are indicated in the subsequent tables.
Unit
Eq-ID
Name
Number
Diameter Diameter Length

inch
mm
mm
Operating Operating
Volumen
pressure tempeature
bara
C
m
Stream content
Inventory
Remarks
kg
Feedgas Purifiction (IL1)

IL1
20-HA-101
Tube Bundel Heat Exchanger
IL1
20-HA-103
Tube Bundel Heat Exchanger
IL1
20-VE-101
Amine Wash Column
IL1
IL1
20-VL-111
20-VK-111
Feed Gas Water KO Drum

Feed Gas Drier
IL1
20-LF-111
Dry Gas Filter
IL1
20-HA-102
Amine Strip Column Reboiler
500
5000
110
-10.44
520
5500
109.28
39.9
1
1
2
1150
800
1400
23800
1930
4225
110
107.8
109
32
25.29
25.25
500
107.8
28
1400
4000
109
25
5500
108.2
28
1400
107.1
105.6
180
25
IL1
20-HA-111
Regeneration Gas Heater
381.4
IL1
IL1
20 HC-111
20-VL-112
Regeneration Gas Cooler

Regeneration Gas KO Drum
2
1
2000
350
IL1
20-KF-111
0.98
Feed Gas
Feed Gas
24.72
0.97
6.5
Feed Gas
Feed Gas
Feed Gas
103
small
2365.5
93
1243
Feed Gas
small
Feed Gas
small
Regeneration Gas
0.13
Regeneration Gas
Regeneration Gas
small
12.2
Regeneration Gas
12.2
Regeneration Gas Blower
3000
105
24.97
IL1
IL1
IL1
Fittings
Flanges
Flanges
38
41
5
2"
1-6"
14-28"
150
600
109
109
109
60
60
60
Feed Gas
Feed Gas
Feed Gas
IL1
IL1
Pipelines <=3"
Pipelines 4-8"
50
200
<=3"
4-8"
80
150
109
109
60
60
Feed Gas
Feed Gas
IL1
IL1
Valves non-actuated
Values actuated
75
25
1-6"
1-6"
150
150
109
109
60
60
Feed Gas
Feed Gas
in IL11 as leak
source counted
in IL11 as leak
source counted
Total 4000
NG Liquefication Gas (IL2A)

IL2A
25-HX-101
Feed Gas Precooler
2100
8000
1.21
Feed Gas
107.19
28
107
107
-27
-27
Precooled Feed Gas

Precooled Feed Gas
IL2A
IL2A
Fittings
Flanges
1
16
2"
1-6"
IL2A
Pipelines 4-8"
50
4-8"
150
107
-27
Precooled Feed Gas
IL2A
Valves non-actuated
1-6"
150
107
-27
Precooled Feed Gas
190
in IL6A1 as leak
source counted
Total 190
NG Liquefication Liquid System (IL2B)

IL2B
IL2B
25-HX-102
25-HX-103
Feed Gas Liquefier
-113.92
1
1900
16000
102.5
1200
10000
102.5
Feed Gas Subcooler
Fittings
Flanges
2
4
2"
1-6"
IL2B
IL2B
Valves non-actuated
Values actuated
4
1
1-6"
1-6"
IL2B
Pipelines 4-8"
110
4-8"
Liquid Feed Gas

1098
-113.92
IL2B
IL2B
2.8
0.9
Liquid Feed Gas

406
150
103
103
-114
-114
Liquid Feed Gas

Liquid Feed Gas
150
150
103
103
-114
-114
Liquid Feed Gas

Liquid Feed Gas
150
103
-112
Liquid Feed Gas

Total 1504
in I6A1 as leak
source counted
(refer remarks
25-HX-101)
in I6A1 as leak
source counted
(refer remarks
25-HX-101)

Unit
Eq-ID
Name
Number
Diameter
Diameter Length
inch
mm
mm
25.08.2008
Page 96
Operating Operating
Volumen
pressure tempeature
bara
C
m
Stream content
Inventory
Remarks
kg
LNG Storage (IL3B)

IL3B
16 bara
LNG Rundown Line
IL3B
Fittings
150
1
2"
200000 16
-160
LNG
16
-160
LNG
50
IL3B
Pipelines 4-8"
200
4-8"
150
16
-160
LNG
IL3B
IL3B
Valves non-actuated
Values actated
9
1
1-6"
1-6"
150
150
16
16
-160
-160
LNG
LNG
IL3B
1 bara
Flanges
20
1-6"
150
-160
LNG
1600
Total 1600
LNG Truck Loading (IL4)

5 bara
IL4
LNG Truck Loading Line
100
250000 5
-161.5
IL4
IL4
Fittings
Flanges
5
24
IL4
IL4
Pipelines <=3"
Pipelines 4-8"
IL4
IL4
1.96
LNG
2"
1-6"
50
150
5
5
-161.5
-161.5
LNG
LNG
150
100
2"
4-8"
50
100
5
5
LNG
LNG
Valves non-actuated
Values actuated
36
9
1-6"
1-6"
150
150
5
5
-161.5
-161.5
-161.5
-161.5
-161.5
IL4
1 bara
Pipelines <=3"
10
<=3"
50
-160
LNG
IL4
Valves non-actuated
1-6"
150
-160
LNG
IL5A
IL5A
IL5A
IL5A
Fittings
Flanges
Flanges
2
20
10
2"
1-6"
8-12"
IL5A
IL5A
IL5A
IL5A
Valves non-actuated
Valves non-actuated
Valves actuated
Valves actuated
27
4
6
2
1-6"
8-12"
1-6"
8-12"
900
LNG
LNG
Total 900
LNG Ship Loading Tank Top (IL5A)

5
-161.5
LNG
50
150
300
5
5
5
-161.5
-161.5
-161.5
LNG
LNG
LNG
150
300
150
300
5
5
5
5
-161.5
-161.5
-161.5
-161.5
LNG
LNG
LNG
LNG
1500
Total
1500
LNG Ship Loading Line (IL5B1/B2/B3)

IL5B1/B2/B3
IL5B1/B2/B3
IL5B1/B2/B3
Pipelines <=3"
Pipelines 9-12"
110
110
3"
9-12"
325
340000 5
-161.5
80
300
5
5
-161.5
-161.5
28.21
LNG
127800
LNG
LNG
Total
127800
LNG Ship Loading Jetty (IL5C)

IL5C
IL5C
IL5C
Fittings
Flanges
2
10
2"
8-12"
IL5C
IL5C
Valves non-actuated
Values actuated
2
1
8-12"
8-12"
-161.5
LNG
50
300
5
5
-161.5
-161.5
LNG
LNG
300
300
5
5
-161.5
-161.5
LNG
LNG
127800
Total
127800
Refrigeration Gas_4 bar System (IL6A1)

IL6A1
25-VL-101
Cycle compressor Suction Drum
IL6A1
25-HX-101
Feedgas Precooler
2600
7960
3.79
19.42
53.7
Mixed LP Refrigerant 1128
Mixed LP Refrigerant
1
2100
20
20
4
4
20
20
500
750
4
4
20
20
50
150
300
750
150
4
4
4
4
4
20
20
20
20
20
IL6A1
IL6A1
IL6A1
IL6A1
Fittings
Flanges
Flanges
Flanges
2
15
7
10
2"
1-6"
1-6"
30"
50
50
150
750
IL6A1
IL6A1
Pipelines 18-28"
Pipelines 30"
20
40
20"
30"
IL6A1
IL6A1
IL6A1
IL6A1
IL6A1
Valves non-actuated
Valves non-actuated
Valves non-actuated
Valves non-actuated
Values actuated
4
2
1
2
2
1-6"
1-6"
8-12"
30"
1-6"
8000
27.71
158
Total 1286
25-HX101/102/103 in
this inventory
loop as Vessel in
leak counted

Unit
Eq-ID
Name
Number

inch
mm
mm
25.08.2008
Page 97
Operating Operating
Volumen
pressure tempeature
bara
C
m
Stream content
Inventory
Remarks
kg

IL6A2
IL6A2
25-VL-102 Cycle Compressor Interstage Drum 1

2
25-KA-101
Cycle Compressor
IL6A2
25-HC-101
Cycle Compressor Intercooler
2600
3500
7320
17.6
17.6
20.95
20.95
38.86

17.6
4000
small
IL6A2
IL6A2
IL6A2
IL6A2
IL6A2
Fittings
Flanges
Flanges
Flanges
Flanges
2
12
9
5
9
2"
1-6"
8-12"
14-28"
14-28"
50
150
300
400
500
18
18
18
18
18
20
20
20
20
20
IL6A2
IL6A2
Pipelines 13-18"
Pipelines 18-28"
20
50
16"
20"
400
500
18
18
20
20
IL6A2
IL6A2
IL6A2
IL6A2
IL6A2
IL6A2
Valves non-actuated
Valves non-actuated
Valves non-actuated
Values actuated
Values actuated
Values actuated
4
1
2
2
1
1
1-6"
14-28"
14-28"
1-6"
8-12"
14-28"
150
400
500
150
300
450
18
18
18
18
18
18
20
20
20
20
20
20
Total 2061

IL6A3
25-HC-102
Cycle Compressor Aftercooler
IL6A3
25-VA-101
Cycle HP Separator
IL6A3
25-VA-102
Cold MRC Separator
41.03
6000
2000
3860
2000
8470
IL6A3
IL6A3
Fittings
Flanges
3
18
2"
8-12"
50
IL6A3
IL6A3
Pipelines 4-8"
Pipelines 9-12"
20
60
8"
12"
200
300
IL6A3
IL6A3
Valves non-actuated
Values actuated
4
2
8-12"
8-12"
12"
12"
12"
40.53
76.56
25
-26.5
40
Light HP Refrigerant
small
12.13
703.5
12.1
40
40
-26.5
-26.5
40
40
-26.5
-26.5
40
40
-26.5
-26.5
642
in IL6B as leak
source counted
Total
1345.5
Refrigeration Liquid 25-HX-101/25-HX-103 System (IL6B1)

IL6B1
25-HX-101
Feed Gas Precooler
40.2
1
IL6B1
25-HX-103
2100
1
Fittings
Flanges
Flanges
3
14
4
IL6B1
IL6B1
IL6B1
Pipelines 4-8"
Pipelines 9-12"
Pipelines 9-12"
25
10
5
IL6B1
IL6B1
Valves non-actuated
Values actuated
2
1
1200
10
1.6
33.2
-25.6
5.5
962
in I6A1 as leak
source counted
(refer remarks
25-HX-101)
3086
in I6A1 as leak
source counted
(refer remarks
25-HX-101)
Mixed Refrigerant
8000
Feed Gas Subcooler
IL6B1
IL6B1
IL6B1
-25.6
Mixed Refrigerant
10000
2"
1-6"
8-12"
50
150
300
40.2
40.2
40.2
-25.6
-25.6
-25.6
Mixed Refrigerant
Mixed Refrigerant
Mixed Refrigerant
4-8"
9-12"
9-12"
150
250
300
40.2
40.2
40.2
-25.6
-25.6
-25.6
Mixed Refrigerant
Mixed Refrigerant
Mixed Refrigerant
1-6"
1-6"
150
150
40.2
40.2
-25.6
-25.6
Mixed Refrigerant
Mixed Refrigerant
Total 4050
Refrigeration Liquid 25-VA-101 System (IL6B2)

IL6B2
25-VA-101
Cycle HP Separator
40.53
1
2000
Propane Tank
Liquid Propane Drier
Liquid Propane Filter
1
1
1
Fittings
Flanges
Flanges
7
36
1
IL7
Pipelines <=3"
15
2"
50
IL7
IL7
Valves non-actuated
Values actuated
12
3
1-6"
1-6"
50
50
1-6"
12.13
Mixed Refrigerant
25
100
Flanges
IL6B2
3860
40.2
5700
25
Propane Storage (IL7)

IL7
IL7
IL7
58-VS-101
58-VK-101
58-LF-101
IL7
IL7
IL7
2100
390
500
2"
1-6"
14-28"
7500
1240
50
50
600
8
8
8
15
15
15
26
8
8
8
15
15
15
Propane
Propane
Propane
15
Propane
8
8
15
15
Propane
Propane
0.15
0.2
Propane
Propane
Propane
18395
106
100
Total
18600
Pentane Storage (IL8)

Pentane Tank
Liquid Butane/Pentane Drier
Liquid Butane/Pentane Filter
1
1
1
IL8
IL8
IL8
Fittings
Flanges
Flanges
11
74
1
2"
1-6"
14-28"
IL8
Pipelines <=3"
15
IL8
IL8
Valves non-actuated
Values actuated
20
4
IL8
IL8
IL8
58-VS-102
58-VK-102
58-LF-102
1800
390
500
5400
1240
8
8
8
14.84
14.84
14.84
13.74
0.15
50
150
600
14.84
Pentane
Pentane
Pentane
3"
80
14.84
Pentane
1-6"
1-6"
150
150
8
8
14.84
14.84
Pentane
Pentane
Pentane
Pentane
Pentane
8656
87
small
Total 8743
in IL6A1 as leak
source counted

Unit
Eq-ID
Name
Number

inch
mm
mm
25.08.2008
Page 98
Operating Operating
Volumen
pressure tempeature
bara
C
m
Stream content
Inventory
Remarks
kg
Butane Storage (IL9)

IL9
58-VS-103
Butane Tank
IL9
IL9
58-VK-103
58-LF-103
Liquid Batane Drier

Liquid Batane Filter
1
1
1
Fittings
Flanges
Flanges
4
45
1
IL9
IL9
IL9
1750
390
500
2"
1-6"
14-28"
1240
150
600
8
8
8
14.84
14.84
14.84
14.84
9.5
0.15
Butane
Butane
5482
86
small
Butane
Butane
Butane
IL9
Pipelines <=3"
15
3"
80
14.84
Butane
IL9
IL9
Valves non-actuated
Values actuated
15
3
1-6"
1-6"
150
150
8
8
14.84
14.84
Butane
Butane
Total 5568
Ethylene Storage Gas System (IL10A)

IL10A
IL10A
58-VK-104
58-LF-104
Liquid Ethylene Drier

Liquid Ethylene Filter
IL10A
58-VS-104
Ethylene Tank
1
1
390
500
1240
1000
8
8
4900
2800
Fittings
Flanges
2
16
IL10A
Pipelines <=3"
IL10A
Valves non-actuated
IL10A
IL10A
2"
1-6"
50
150
30
3"
1-6"
-3
-3
0.15
0.2
-58.4
Ethylene
Ethylene
Ethylene
8
8
-58.4
-58.4
Ethylene
Ethylene
80
-58.4
Ethylene
150
-58.4
Ethylene
1
1
16
Total 18
Ethylene Storage Liquid System (IL10B)

Ethylene Tank
Fittings
Flanges
Flanges
10
55
1
IL10B
Pipelines <=3"
IL10B
IL10B
Valves non-actuated
Values actuated
IL10B
58-VS-104
IL10B
IL10B
IL10B
4900
-58.4
8
8
8
-58.4
-58.4
-58.4
Ethylene
Ethylene
Ethylene
80
-58.4
Ethylene
150
150
8
8
-58.4
-58.4
Ethylene
Ethylene
2"
1-6"
14-28"
50
150
600
50
3"
19
4
1-6"
1-6"
2800
25
Ethylene
8350
Total 8350
Hot Oil Systemes (IL11)

Amine Strip Column Reboiler
Regenaration Gas Heater
1
1
IL11
IL11
Fittings
Flanges
10
60
2"
1-6"
IL11
Pipelines <=3"
Pipelines 4-8"
100
100
3"
6"
IL11
IL11
Valves non-actuated
Values actuated
17
4
1-6"
IL12
Feedgas Fiscal Metering Package
IL12
IL12
Fittings
Flanges
IL11
IL11
20-HA-102
20-HA-111
4
4
185
185
50
150
6
6
192
192
Hot Oil
Hot Oil
80
150
6
6
192
192
Hot Oil
Hot Oil
6
6
192
192
Hot Oil
Hot Oil
110
20
Feed Gas
381.4
150
6"
5500
6.2
0.63
Hot Oil
Hot Oil
2060
446
Total 2500
Feedgas Fiscal Metering (IL12)

5
8
2"
8"
50
200
110
110
20
20
Feed Gas
Feed Gas
IL12
Pipelines 4-8"
40
8"
200
110
20
Feed Gas
IL12
Valves non-actuated
8"
200
110
20
Feed Gas
150
Total 150
Tailgas Fiscal Metering (IL13)

IL13
Tailgas Fiscal Metering Package
IL13
Fittings
10
20
Tailgas
2"
50
10
20
Tailgas
IL13
Pipelines <=3"
20
3"
80
10
20
Tailgas
IL13
Valves non-actuated
3"
80
10
20
Tailgas
Total 2
in IL10B as leak
source counted

Appendix D: Results of LEAK 3.2 Calculations
12.0
The resulting leakage frequencies shown in the subsequent tables:
25.08.2008
Page 99

IL1: Feedgas Purification
Total Leaks
Repr. Size
Category
Gas [ / year] Liquid [ / year]
[mm]
small
0.0429422
0.000E+00
3.432
medium
6.211E-03
0.000E+00
23.376
large
1.082E-03
0.000E+00
62.175
very large (Rupture) 2.038E-03
0.000E+00
206.271
Total
0.05227254
IL2A: NG Liquefication Gas
Total Leaks
Repr. Size
Category
[mm]
small
2.985E-04
0.000E+00
3.375
medium
4.878E-05
0.000E+00
23.152
large
8.937E-06
0.000E+00
62.775
0.000E+00
123.736
Total
3.896E-04
IL2B1: NG Liquefication Liquid_103 bar System
Total Leaks
Repr. Size
Category
[mm]
small
0.000E+00
1.134E-03
3.381
medium
0.000E+00
1.658E-04
23.138
large
0.000E+00
2.848E-05
53.878
very large (Rupture) 0.000E+00
9.344E-05
123.720
Total
1.422E-03
IL3A: LNG Storage Return Gas
Category
Total Leaks
Repr. Size
[mm]
small
1.373E-02
0.000E+00
3.356
medium
1.686E-03
0.000E+00
23.095
large
3.108E-04
0.000E+00
62.622
very large (Rupture)
---Total
1.600E-02
IL3B: LNG Storage
Category
Total Leaks
Repr. Size
[mm]
small
0.000E+00
2.312E-03
3.414
medium
0.000E+00
3.441E-04
23.320
large
0.000E+00
7.302E-05
66.635
1.648E-04
123.796
Total
2.894E-03
IL4: LNG Truck Loading
Category
Total Leaks
Repr. Size
[mm]
small
0.000E+00
9.266E-03
3.441
medium
0.000E+00
1.379E-03
23.409
large
0.000E+00
3.043E-04
62.462
5.388E-04
122.702
Total
1.149E-02
IL5A: LNG Ship Loading Tank Top
Category
Total Leaks
Repr. Size
[mm]
small
0.000E+00
7.257E-03
3,438
medium
0.000E+00
1.097E-03
23,405
large
0.000E+00
1.923E-04
68025.000
4.363E-04
137,182
Total
8.983E-03
IL5B1/2/3: LNG Ship Loading Line
Category
Total Leaks
Repr. Size
[mm]
small
0.000E+00
3.558E-04
3.383
medium
0.000E+00
4.512E-05
23.142
large
0.000E+00
4.773E-05
62.063
1.222E-05
177.546
Total
4.609E-04
25.08.2008
Page 100
IL6B1:Refrigerant Liquid 25-HX-101/103 System

Total Leaks
Repr. Size
Category
[mm]
small
0.000E+00
7.756E-04
3.378
medium
0.000E+00
1.094E-04
23.147
large
0.000E+00
1.837E-05
59.031
5.000E-05
133.517
Total
9.535E-04
IL6B2:Refrigerant Liquid 25-VA-101 System
Total Leaks
Repr. Size
Category
[mm]
small
0.000E+00
7.594E-04
3.376
medium
0.000E+00
1.059E-04
23.159
large
0.000E+00
1.763E-05
71.205
4.516E-05
120.198
Total
9.281E-04
IL6B3:Refrigerant Liquid 25-VA-102/25-HX-102 System
Total Leaks
Category
Repr. Size
[mm]
small
0.000E+00
5.999E-05
3.336
medium
0.000E+00
8.342E-06
22.981
large
0.000E+00
1.404E-06
71.086
1.161E-05
135.931
Total
8.135E-05
IL6B4:Refrigerant Liquid 25-VL-102 System
Total Leaks
Category
Repr. Size
[mm]
small
0.000E+00
1.660E-03
3.386
medium
0.000E+00
2.401E-04
23.200
large
0.000E+00
7.110E-05
57.373
7.833E-05
124.105
Total
2.049E-03
IL7_: Propane Storage
Total Leaks
Category
Repr. Size
[mm]
small
0.000E+00
5.668E-03
3.448
medium
0.000E+00
9.057E-04
23.430
large
0.000E+00
3.172E-04
53.278
1.632E-04
242.147
Total
7.054E-03
IL8: Pentane Storage
Total Leaks
Category
Repr. Size
[mm]
small
0.000E+00
7.112E-03
3.426
medium
0.000E+00
1.154E-03
23.354
large
0.000E+00
2.156E-04
62.170
4.152E-04
145.496
Total
8.897E-03
IL9: Butane Storage
Total Leaks
Category
Repr. Size
[mm]
small
0.000E+00
6.094E-03
3.447
medium
0.000E+00
9.974E-04
23.440
large
0.000E+00
1.879E-04
65.711
3.522E-04
154.000
Total
7.632E-03
IL10A: Ethylene Storage Gas System
Total Leaks
Category
Repr. Size
[mm]
small
3.576E-03
0.000E+00
3.497
medium
6.222E-04
0.000E+00
23.604
large
1.282E-04
0.000E+00
65.953
0.000E+00
183.126
Total
4.528E-03

IL5C: LNG Ship Loading Jetty
Total Leaks
Repr. Size
[mm]
small
0.000E+00
3.082E-03
3.386
medium
0.000E+00
3.952E-04
23.186
large
0.000E+00
8.889E-05
60.189
1.196E-04
177.616
Total
3.686E-03
IL6A1:Refrigerant Gas_4 bar System
Category
Total Leaks
Repr. Size
[mm]
small
2.031E-03
0.000E+00
3.389
medium
3.115E-04
0.000E+00
23.216
large
7.922E-05
0.000E+00
57.637
0.000E+00
218.910
Total
2.528E-03
Category
Total Leaks
Repr. Size
[mm]
small
2.750E-02
0.000E+00
3.355
medium
3.394E-03
0.000E+00
23.104
large
5.271E-04
0.000E+00
69.693
0.000E+00
489.209
Total
3.218E-02
Repr. Size
Total Leaks
[mm]
Category
small
4.531E-03
0.000E+00
3.440
medium
7.034E-04
0.000E+00
23.390
large
1.241E-04
0.000E+00
65.120
0.000E+00
494.431
Total
5.583E-03
Category
25.08.2008
Page 101
IL10B: Ethyleme Storage Liquid System

Category
Repr. Size
Total Leaks
[mm]
small
0.000E+00
4.118E-03
3.402
medium
0.000E+00
6.274E-04
23.253
large
0.000E+00
1.290E-04
60.076
2.452E-04
127.720
Total
5.120E-03
IL11: Hot Oil System
Category
Repr. Size
Total Leaks
[mm]
small
0.000E+00
3.982E-03
3.398
medium
0.000E+00
6.000E-04
23.236
large
0.000E+00
1.050E-04
60.093
2.655E-04
124.629
Total
4.953E-03
IL12: Feedgas Fiscal Metering
Category
Repr. Size
Total Leaks
[mm]
small
3.089E-03
0.000E+00
3.431
medium
4.402E-04
0.000E+00
23.365
large
7.439E-05
0.000E+00
56.344
0.000E+00
143.970
Total
3.928E-03
IL13: Tailgas Fiscal Metering
Repr. Size
Total Leaks
[mm]
Category
small
2.285E-03
0.000E+00
3.435
medium
3.239E-04
0.000E+00
23.382
large
2.496E-04
0.000E+00
58.160
very large (Rupture)
---Total
2.859E-03
Category
These names resemble the respective hole size categories are listed in Assumption Sheet
HC-2.
Total Leak Freq.
The leak frequency calculated for the category. This is the frequency of leaks in the hole size
range defined for the category.
Repr. Size
This column will gives the weighted mean value for the range of hole sizes in the category.
The database in LEAK is used for unclean services and offshore facilities which result in high
leak frequencies. To reflect the Lyse LNG Base Load Plant, which is considered a clean service and an onshore facility, leak frequencies for pipelines, vessels and the LNG Storage Tank
have been changed to the leak frequencies in given in the Purple Book. Accordingly, failures of
flanges are assumed to be included in the failure frequency of the pipeline. A pressure vessel
(VESSEL_PROC) leak frequency for small leaks (10mm) of 1E-5 / year consists of the vessel
wall and the welded nozzles, mounting plates and instrumentation pipes.
This reduces the leak frequency by deleting the flanges on pipelines and vessels (tanks).
A comparison between the LEAK and the Purple Book leak frequencies for pipes and process
vessel are included below in Table 23.

25.08.2008
Page 102
Table 23: LEAK Database used for the QRA

DNV LEAK Program Database
LINDE LEAK Program Modification [Purple Book]
Equipment
Description
1 mm
Failure Rate
[ /year]
Full Rupture
Failure Rate
[ /year]
COMP_CENTR
Centrifugal
compressor.
0.0106109
COMP_RECIPR
Reciprocating
compressor.
FILTER
Description
Remarks
1 mm
Failure Rate
[ /year]
Full Rupture
Failure Rate
[ /year]
0.0106109
No changes
0.0710059
0.0710059
No changes
Solid from liquid

filter.
0.0037615
0.0037615
No changes
FLANGE
Flanged joint, all

diameters.
5.15E-5
5E-6
5.15E-5
5E-6
No changes
HEATEX_FINFAN
Heat exchanger finfan cooler.
0.00187091
0.00187091
No changes
HEATEX_PLATE
Heat exchanger
plate.
0.0104712
0.0104712
No changes
HEATEX_SH&T_
HCinshell
Heat exchanger
shell and tube,
hydrocarbon in
shell.
0.00413223
0.00413223
No changes
HEATEX_SH&T_
HCintube
Heat exchanger
shell and tube,
hydrocarbon in
tube.
0.00340633
4E-5
0.00340633
4E-5
No changes
PIGTRAP
Pig trap (launcher

and receiver).
0.00701052
0.00701052
No changes
PIPE_PROC
Process pipe (1m),

all diameters.
5.95E-5
5E-6
Process pipe (1m),

< 75 mm,
outflow is from a leak
with an effective of
10% of the nominal
, a max. of 50 mm
5E-6
1E-6
to PIPE_PROC_LINDE
<75 mm changed
Process pipe (1m),

75 mm <= <= 150
mm,
10% of the nominal
, a max. of 50 mm
2E-6
3E-7
to PIPE_PROC_LINDE
75mm<D<150mm
changed
Process pipe (1m),

> 150 mm,
10% of the nominal
, a max. of 50 mm
5E-7
1E-7
to PIPE_PROC_LINDE
>150 mm changed
PUMP_CENTR
Centrifugal pump,
singel and double
seal.
0.00755287
0.00755287
No changes
PUMP_RECIPR
Reciprocating
pump, singel and
double seal.
0.0071644
0.0071644
No changes
SMALL_BORE_F
IT
Small bore fitting.
5.9E-4
5.9E-4
No changes
VALVE_MAN
Non-actuated
valve, all
diameters.
2E-8
2E-6
2E-8
2E-6
No changes

DNV LEAK Program Database
25.08.2008
Page 103
LINDE LEAK Program Modification [Purple Book]
Remarks
Equipment
Description
1 mm
Failure Rate
[ /year]
Full Rupture
Failure Rate
[ /year]
Description
1 mm
Failure Rate
[ /year]
Full Rupture
Failure Rate
[ /year]
VESSEL_PROC
Process pressure
vessel incl. reactors
and columns.
0.00211501
4E-5
Pressure vessel,
Frup: instantaneous
release of the
complete inventory
1E-5
5E-7
to
VESSEL_PRES_LINDE
changed
VALVE_ACT_NO
N_P/L
Actuated nonpipeline valve, all

diameters.
0.00109165
1E-5
0.00109165
1E-5
No changes
VESSEL_STOR_
ATM
Atmospheric
storage vessel.
0.00535818
1E-4
5E-6
to
VESSEL_STOR_ATM_
LINDE changed
A single-containment
atmospheric tank
consists of a primary
container for the
liquid. An outer shell
is either present, or
not, but when
present, primarily for
the retention and
protection of
insulation.

Appendix E: Individual Risk Ranking Report
13.0
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This is the risk ranking report produced by PHAST RISK for Individual Risk and illustrates the
risk for 1 person, present at 1 point continously, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week during a whole
year (52 weeks).
It provides the contribution of the individual scenarios. These scenarios are specified as
ILXXYZ, where "IL" stands for "Inventory Loop", XX for the respective inventory loop number
(1-13) and Y for gas or liquid and Z, if there, a divided part in each inventory loop, respectively.
For example "IL5B1" is for ship loading inventory (IL5) a liquid line (B), which is divided in 3
parts (1 part describes a 110 m).
The risk ranking points, for which the individual risk has been calculated, are shown in the subsequent figures (blue dots).
Figure 27: Individual Risk Ranking Points (Administration Building, Peninsula, Hiking Track, LNG Ship
Bridge, Process Area, Substation, Offsite Ferry, Offsite Companys, Offsite Living Quarters)

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Appendix F: Details on the Analysis Procedure
14.0
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Until now, the discussion on the QRA methodology has been very generic. The following discussion is intended to provide more insight into the actual QRA methodology.
An electronic database of approximately 1200 materials is available to the PHAST / PHAST
RISK software, with the material properties regularly reviewed.
The PHAST RISK risk modelling software requires the following inputs to be able to produce risk results:
Import an electronic map of the study area, on which individual fatality risk contour results may be produced
The electronic map may be programmed in PHAST RISK to:
Superimpose all on-site and off-site populations within the study area by location, and
specifying the day / night number of people for each location
Superimpose all potential ignition sources within the study area, which may cause delayed ignition of a flammable release
Delayed ignition sources may be specified as point sources (e.g. flares and fired
heaters etc.), area sources (e.g. parking area etc.) or line sources (e.g. traffic roads
etc.). Each ignition source carries additional specification in terms of presence factor
and ignition source strength (probability of ignition per unit time, when in contact with
a flammable vapour cloud between LFL and UFL. The actual delayed ignition probability of any release is calculated by PHAST RISK, based on the dispersion modelling results and event duration
The immediate ignition probability associated with each failure case of flammable fluid
is a risk analyst programmed value, based on historical ignition data, which varies
with leak size and release phase (gas / liquid / 2-phase) (the larger the leak vapour
flow rate, the higher the ignition probability, typically varying from 1% to 30%, unless
above auto ignition, then 100%)
Prepare and import weather class, wind speed and wind direction probability data for the
study area. For day and night due to lack of data the same weather class, wind speed
and wind directional probability are used in PHAST RISK
Enter all identified failure cases, which are defined in terms of: Location, Material released, Quantity released (or release duration), Temperature, Pressure, Leak size, Leak
direction (e.g. horizontal, vertical), Leak elevation, Leak frequency and Immediate ignition probability
Each failure case calculation in PHAST RISK starts with discharge modelling. Based on
release duration and release phase (gas, liquid, 2-phase), PHAST RISK directs the dispersion and consequence calculations to one of 4 alternate, built-in consequence outcome event trees (continuous vapour release, continuous release with rain-out, instantaneous vapour release, instantaneous release with rain-out), where each event tree
branch probability carries default values, which may be re-programmed by the risk analyst.
PHAST RISK will then calculate all alternate consequence outcomes (e.g. jet fire, explosion) of the event tree selected, in terms of hazard range and event duration (where applicable), for each weather class / wind speed combination
So far the calculations performed in PHAST RISK only relate to the alternate consequence outcomes and the consequence hazard ranges, for each specified failure case.
To produce risk results, PHAST RISK will perform impact frequency calculations, using

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the failure case specified leak frequency as starting point. Frequency aspects of the risk
calculations relate to the:
Defined failure case leak frequency
Weather class, wind speed and wind directional probability, for each of the 8 wind
directions
Specified immediate ignition probability and PHAST RISK calculated delayed ignition probability. The delayed ignition probability calculation is based on the strength
and location of all specified ignition sources and the failure case dispersion hazard
range, combined with vapour cloud persistence (duration).
Selected event tree branch probabilities, for each alternate consequence out come.
Impact probability for each alternate consequence outcome. This is based on the
PHAST RISK calculated magnitude of each consequence and the PHAST RISK default impact probability criteria or risk analyst specified impact criteria for that type of
consequence.
Location and number of people (or equipment) within hazard area for societal risk
results, with separate calculations for day and night, indoors and outdoors.
PHAST RISK performs its individual and societal risk calculations based on a 200 x 200
grid (40,000 points), with the grid point spacing automatically varied, based on the consequence hazard range results.
For each release case, PHAST RISK takes the failure case release frequency as initial
input, multiplies this by the first weather class / wind speed probability, for the first of 8
wind directions.
PHAST RISK takes this result and multiplies it by the immediate ignition probability,
while also separately multiplying this result by the PHAST RISK calculated delayed ignition probability.
These 2 results are multiplied by the first of the event tree consequence branch probabilities, relating to immediate or delayed ignition branch path.
PHAST RISK takes the PHAST calculated consequence hazard range and verifies which
grid points are within the consequence hazard area. For each grid point within range
PHAST RISK then calculates the magnitude of the consequence at each grid point (e.g.
explosion overpressure at a particular grid point may be 3 psi (200 mbar)).
The calculated consequence magnitude at each grid point is then compared to the
PHAST RISK programmed impact criteria level, and the likelihood of fatality or damage
calculated, based on the impact probability criteria specified in PHAST RISK, for the type
of consequence and the magnitude of the consequence.
This calculation is repeated for each event tree alternate consequence outcome at each
grid point, for that weather class / wind speed and wind direction, and the result added to
the previous risk level, at each grid point.
The above calculations are then repeated for each of the 8 wind directions, cumulatively
adding to the risk level at each grid point.
The above calculations are repeated for all day / night weather classes, wind speeds and
wind directions, cumulatively adding these risk results at each grid point.
Once all risk calculations at these grid points have been completed for the first failure
case, the next failure case will be calculated, again adding all results cumulatively at
each grid point. This is repeated until all failure cases have been calculated, while

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PHAST RISK also tracks the risk contribution made by each failure case at each grid
point.
Once completed, PHAST RISK produces individual risk contour results by linking points
of equal risk, based on the pre-specified individual fatality risk (or equipment damage)
criteria levels, and using linear interpolation between relevant grid points. The risk contour results are super imposed on the electronic site map, entered in the PHAST RISK
software.
PHAST RISK can also produce societal risk results by comparing the calculated level of
individual risk at all 40,000 grid points, and combining this with the number of people indoors and outdoors, entered by the risk analyst by location.
The above discussion demonstrates that the meteorological data, ignition data and population
data entered into the PHAST RISK software are critical to the risk results.
Note that by default the risk modelling within PHAST RISK aims to produce offsite fatality risk
results. This is achieved by the build-in but programmable parameter settings, which include:
Indoor & outdoor people fatality impact criteria levels, for each alternate consequence
outcome. For flammable releases the alternate consequences would be spill fires, fire
balls, jet fires, flash fires and vapour cloud explosions (VCEs), each with pre-defined
values for the impact levels that will affect people. For fire ball exposure this is based on
the Eisenberg Probit equation. For spill fires and jet fires a single criterion flammable
dose of 250 KJ is used, with the radiation impact level set at 9.8 kW/m2, corresponding
to 1 % lethality in 20 seconds. For flash fires the 0.5 LFL envelope is used and for VCE
overpressure two impact criteria levels are used, 1.5 psi (0.1 barg) and 5 psi (0.34 barg).
4 built-in event trees (Continuous No Rain Out; Continuous With Rain Out; Instantaneous No Rain Out; Instantaneous With Rain Out) that are automatically selected based on
the type of material and the release conditions. Each event-tree assigns a split between alternate consequence outcomes (spill fires, fire balls, jet fires, flash fires, VCEs
and no hazard), based on the immediate ignition, delayed ignition and no ignition probabilities.
People vulnerability criteria, which pre-determines the fraction of fatalities resulting indoor & outdoor from being exposed to specific consequence outcomes for a specified
duration, or to one or more specified criteria levels. Most of these values go back to data
provided in the Dutch "Purple Book" [5].

Appendix E: Details on the Analysis Procedure
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Figure 28: SAFETI Default Vulnerability Parameters
By default PHAST RISK uses (programmable) blast overpressure levels of 1.5 psi (110 mbar)
and 5 psi (approx. 345 mbar) for assessing indoor and outdoor offsite fatality impact. These
overpressure levels correspond to light damage and total destruction of ordinary brick (residential) housing. The default blast criteria levels need to be modified for assessing the impact
of overpressure on prefabs, brick and concrete buildings. In particular, it is known:
Wood or corrugated asbestos panels shatter at 1 2 psi (0.07 0.14 barg) overpressure,
Partial collapse brick housing at 2 psi (0.14 barg) overpressure,
Concrete walls (non-reinforced) shatter at 2 3 psi (0.14 0.21 barg),
Complete destruction of houses at 5 7 psi (0.34 0.48 barg),
Blast proof concrete control buildings fail at 10 psi (0.68 barg) overpressure.
Consistent with these data, Linde (expert knowledge from DNV) set the PHAST RISK explosion parameters to achieve the following overpressure risk results:
1.5 psi (0.1 barg) - Prefabs severely damaged by overpressure,
3 psi (0.2 barg) Brick buildings severely damaged by overpressure,
5 psi (0.34 barg) Reinforced concrete buildings (non blast proof) severely damaged
by overpressure.
The default PHAST RISK hydrocarbon vapour cloud explosion efficiency is set to 10 percent,
consistent with the objective to produce conservative offsite fatality risk estimates. This is an
overestimation compared to historical data. The Dutch Government Coloured Book Risk Assessment Guidelines reports historical Hydrocarbon Explosion Efficiencies ranging from 2 percent to 5 percent. To be less conservative than the PHAST RISK defaults, DNV has used the
upper estimate of 5 percent explosion efficiency in the PHAST RISK Explosion Parameters.

Appendix E: Details on the Analysis Procedure
25.08.2008
Page 131
Early ignition vapour cloud explosions are modelled in PHAST RISK at the centre of release.
For delayed ignition the PHAST RISK explosion modelling results are (conservatively) based
on locating the centre of the explosion at the maximum (theoretical) displacement distance.
For delayed ignition the PHAST RISK explosion modelling takes into account the defined ignition sources. PHAST RISK will first perform discharge calculations and dispersion modelling.
Where a dispersing vapour cloud contacts one or more of the defined ignition sources, PHAST
RISK will then calculate the time varying ignition probability at that time. The explosion mass
is calculated based on the mass of vapour between UFL and LFL at that time.
PHAST RISK allows to choose the location for the epicentre of a delayed explosion, where the
location is defined in relation to the dimensions of the cloud. If Cloud Front (LFL Fraction) is
chosen, the epicentre will be located at the furthest location downwind at which the concentration is equal to the LFL fraction to finish, set in PHAST RISK's Flammable Parameters. If one
chooses Cloud Centroid, the epicentre will be located at the centre of the cloud for an instantaneous release, and at the cloud centroid for a continuous release, where the downwind (x) location of the centroid is obtained by taking a weighted average of the centre point of each release segment. If one chooses Cloud Front (LFL), the epicentre will be located at the furthest
location downwind at which the concentration is equal to the LFL.
All three options are very conservative when compared to historical explosion incidents, where
explosion damage is most often reported around the area of the release. If PHAST RISK default options are used, the explosion centres would (most often) be modelled as located outside the process units in open areas, which are very unlikely to give rise to explosions. To obtain more accurate and realistic explosion modelling results for this QRA, ignition location was
set to the cloud centroid.

References
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Page 132
15.0
References
Installation and equipment for liquefied natural gasDesign of onshore installations;

BS EN 1473:2007.
QRA of the Proposed Lyse Gass LNG Base Load Export Terminal;
ADVANTICA, 11.04.2007.
Maning Level Table is developed by Skangass and Linde Engineering during

meeting on November 2007.
HSE, 2000. Offshore Hydrocarbon Release Statistics, 1999, Offshore Technology Report OTO 079, HSE Offshore Safety Division (OSD), January 2000.
Guidelines Risk calculations (Purple Book) BEVI Module C, Version 3.0 Date 1 January
2008: Modelling specific BEVI categories.
Lyse LNG Base Load Plant Site conditions; Document No. R100-PB-A-DS0004,
20.03.07.
BEAST (Building Evaluation and Screening Tool); Wilfred Baker Engineering Inc, v 2.0,
July 2001.
Chemical Industries Association. Guidance for the Location and Design of Occupied
Buildings on Chemical Manufacturing Sites, February 1998.

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STAVANGER

Lyse Contract No:

Linde Job Code:

Lyse Project No:

Linde Doc. No:

Lyse Doc. No:

&AA S-CS 1002

Quantitative Risk Analysis (QRA)

Revised acc. to Lyse Comments

Lyse Contract No:

Linde Job Code:

Lyse Project No:

Linde Doc. No:

Lyse Doc. No:

&AA S-CS 1002

General Description of Process and Facilities......................... 13

Natural Gas Treatment and Gas Liquefaction ................................................ 13

Risk Analysis Basics....................................................................................... 20

Data used for the Risk Assessment.......................................... 25

Lyse Contract No:

Linde Job Code:

Lyse Project No:

Linde Doc. No:

Lyse Doc. No:

&AA S-CS 1002

Results of the Risk Analysis...................................................... 34

Risk 1st and 2nd party ...................................................................................... 34

Sensitivity 1: Pit on the jetty, LNG Storage Tank and

Appendix A: Assumption Sheets .............................................. 56

Appendix B: Hazard Identification ............................................ 90

Appendix C: Equipment Count.................................................. 95

Appendix D: Results of LEAK 3.2 Calculations ....................... 99

Appendix E: Individual Risk Ranking Report......................... 104

Appendix F: Details on the Analysis Procedure .................... 127

References ................................................................................ 132

Quantitative Risk Analysis, Lyse LNG Base Load Plant, Train 1

Linde Engineering AG (Linde), on the behalf of Skangass AS (Skangass), has conducted a

Quantitative Risk Analysis, Lyse LNG Base Load Plant, Train 1

Quantitative Risk Analysis, Lyse LNG Base Load Plant, Train 1

Quantitative Risk Analysis, Lyse LNG Base Load Plant, Train 1

Process Area (Maintenance)

Ship Loading (Jetty)

ISR > 1 X 10-3

1 X 10-3 < ISR < 1 X 10-6

ISR < 1 X 10-6

Ferry Terminal_office workers

Ferry Terminal_industry workers

Container Area_office workers

Container Area_industry workers

Rest Companys_office workers

Rest Companys_industry workers

Quantitative Risk Analysis, Lyse LNG Base Load Plant, Train 1

ISR > 1 X 10-5

1 X 10-5 < ISR < 1 X 10-7

ISR < 1 X 10-7

Quantitative Risk Analysis, Lyse LNG Base Load Plant, Train 1

Quantitative Risk Analysis, Lyse LNG Base Load Plant, Train 1

Objective of the Study

General Description of the Approach

Process Flow Diagrams (PFDs)

Quantitative Risk Analysis, Lyse LNG Base Load Plant, Train 1

Figure 4: QRA Methodology