Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
HELD:
LABOR LAW
An amicable settlement between the parties was set but the same proved to
be futile.
where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking
the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of
the engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be
performed is seasonal in nature and employment is for the duration of the
season.
An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the
preceding paragraph: Provided, That, any employee who has rendered at
least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall
be considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is
employed and his employment shall continue while such activity actually
exist.
On the other hand, the activities of project employees may or may not be
usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer.
The term "project" could also refer to, secondly, a particular job or
undertaking that is not within the regular business of the corporation. Such a
job or undertaking must also be identifiably separate and distinct from the
ordinary or regular business operations of the employer. The job or
undertaking also begins and ends at determined or determinable times. ALUTUCP v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 109902, August 2,
1994
The jobs and undertakings are clearly within the regular or usual business of
the employer company and are not identifiably distinct or separate from the
other undertakings of the company. There is no denying that the manning of
the operations center to air commercials, acting as transmitter/VTR men,
maintaining the equipment, and acting as cameramen are not undertakings
separate or distinct from the business of a broadcasting company.
In sum, we affirm the findings of the NLRC and the Court of Appeals that
respondents are regular employees of petitioner. As regular employees, they
are entitled to security of tenure and therefore their services may be
terminated only for just or authorized causes. Since petitioner failed to prove
any just or authorized cause for their termination, we are constrained to
affirm the findings of the NLRC and the Court of Appeals that they were
illegally dismissed.
Since the respondents were illegally dismissed, they entitled to separation
pay in lieu of reinstatement.
2
DECISION
As regards night shift differential, the Labor Code provides that every
employee shall be paid not less than ten percent (10%) of his regular wage
for each hour of work performed between ten o'clock in the evening and six
o'clock in the morning. LABOR CODE, Article 86
NACHURA, J.:
This petition seeks a review of the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
dated July 24, 2001 and Resolution dated December 20, 2001, which
affirmed the finding of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
that the petitioners' transfer to another workplace did not amount to a
constructive dismissal and an unfair labor practice.
The matter of attorney's fees cannot be touched once and only in the fallo of
the decision, else, the award should be thrown out for being speculative and
conjectural. In the absence of a stipulation, attorney's fees are ordinarily not
recoverable; otherwise a premium shall be placed on the right to litigate.
They are not awarded every time a party wins a suit.
In the case at bar, the factual basis for the award of attorney's fees was not
discussed in the text of NLRC Decision. Thus, the Court constrained to
delete the same.
G.R. No. 151309
waives the right to claim overtime pay for work rendered after 5:00 p.m.
until 6:12 p.m. from Monday to Friday considering that the compressed
workweek schedule is adopted in lieu of the regular workweek schedule
which also consists of 46 hours. However, should an employee be permitted
or required to work beyond 6:12 p.m., such employee shall be entitled to
overtime pay.
In January 1997, BMT and Tryco negotiated for the renewal of their
collective bargaining agreement (CBA) but failed to arrive at a new
agreement.
Meantime, Tryco received the Letter dated March 26, 1997 from the Bureau
of Animal Industry of the Department of Agriculture reminding it that its
production should be conducted in San Rafael, Bulacan, not in Caloocan
City:
EDNA
ZENAIDA
V.
Chief, Animal Feeds Standard Division4
MR.
WILFREDO
President,
Tryco
San Rafael, Bulacan
C.
Pharma
Thank you.
(sgd.)
VILLACORTE,
D.V.M.
RIVERA
Corporation
BMT opposed the transfer of its members to San Rafael, Bulacan, contending
that it constitutes unfair labor practice. In protest, BMT declared a strike on
May 26, 1997.
paralyze or render the union ineffective for the following reasons: (1)
complainants are not members of the negotiating panel; and (2) the transfer
was made pursuant to the directive of the Department of Agriculture.
The Labor Arbiter also denied the money claims, ratiocinating that the
nonpayment of wages was justified because the petitioners did not render
work from May 26 to 31, 1997; overtime pay is not due because of the
compressed workweek agreement between the union and management; and
service incentive leave pay cannot be claimed by the complainants because
they are already enjoying vacation leave with pay for at least five days. As
for the claim of noncompliance with Wage Order No. 4, the Labor Arbiter
held that the issue should be left to the grievance machinery or voluntary
arbitrator.
In their defense, respondents averred that the petitioners were not dismissed
but they refused to comply with the management's directive for them to
report to the company's plant in San Rafael, Bulacan. They denied the
allegation that they negotiated in bad faith, stating that, in fact, they sent the
Executive Vice-President and Legal Counsel as the company's
representatives to the CBA negotiations. They claim that the failure to arrive
at an agreement was due to the stubbornness of the union panel.
On October 29, 1999, the NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter's Decision,
dismissing the case, thus:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Decision of February 27, 1998 is hereby
AFFIRMED and complainants' appeal therefrom DISMISSED for lack of
merit. Complainants Joselito Lario, Vivencio Barte, Saturnino Egera and
Simplicio Aya-ay are directed to report to work at respondents' San Rafael
Plant, Bulacan but without backwages. Respondents are directed to accept
the complainants back to work.
Respondents further averred that, long before the start of the negotiations, the
company had already been planning to decongest the Caloocan office to
comply with the government policy to shift the concentration of
manufacturing activities from the metropolis to the countryside. The decision
to transfer the company's production activities to San Rafael, Bulacan was
precipitated by the letter-reminder of the Bureau of Animal Industry.
SO ORDERED.11
On December 22, 1999, the NLRC denied the petitioners' motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit.12
On February 27, 1998, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the case for lack of
merit.10 The Labor Arbiter held that the transfer of the petitioners would not
5
Left with no recourse, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the CA.
-B-
On July 24, 2001, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari and ruled that
the transfer order was a management prerogative not amounting to a
constructive dismissal or an unfair labor practice. The CA further sustained
the enforceability of the MOA, particularly the waiver of overtime pay in
light of this Court's rulings upholding a waiver of benefits in exchange of
other valuable privileges. The dispositive portion of the said CA decision
reads:
SO ORDERED.13
The CA denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration on December 20,
2001.14
Dissatisfied, petitioners filed this petition for review raising the following
issues:
-ATHE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
PATENTLY ERRONEOUS RULING OF THE LABOR ARBITER AND
THE COMMISSION THAT THERE WAS NO DISMISSAL, MUCH LESS
ILLEGAL DISMISSAL, OF THE INDIVIDUAL PETITIONERS.
6
We do not agree.
We refuse to accept the petitioners' wild and reckless imputation that the
Bureau of Animal Industry conspired with the respondents just to effect the
transfer of the petitioners. There is not an iota of proof to support this
outlandish claim. Absent any evidence, the allegation is not only highly
irresponsible but is grossly unfair to the government agency concerned. Even
as this Court has given litigants and counsel a relatively wide latitude to
present arguments in support of their cause, we will not tolerate outright
misrepresentation or baseless accusation. Let this be fair warning to counsel
for the petitioners.
The Court has previously declared that mere incidental inconvenience is not
sufficient to warrant a claim of constructive dismissal.23 Objection to a
transfer that is grounded solely upon the personal inconvenience or hardship
7
that will be caused to the employee by reason of the transfer is not a valid
reason to disobey an order of transfer.24
organization and to the observance of a CBA. Without that element, the acts,
no matter how unfair, are not unfair labor practices.26
Incidentally, petitioners cite Escobin v. NLRC25 where the Court held that the
transfer of the employees therein was unreasonable. However, the distance of
the workplace to which the employees were being transferred can hardly
compare to that of the present case. In that case, the employees were being
transferred from Basilan to Manila; hence, the Court noted that the transfer
would have entailed the separation of the employees from their families who
were residing in Basilan and accrual of additional expenses for living
accommodations in Manila. In contrast, the distance from Caloocan to San
Rafael, Bulacan is not considerably great so as to compel petitioners to seek
living accommodations in the area and prevent them from commuting to
Metro Manila daily to be with their families.
Finally, we do not agree with the petitioners' assertion that the MOA is not
enforceable as it is contrary to law. The MOA is enforceable and binding
against the petitioners. Where it is shown that the person making the waiver
did so voluntarily, with full understanding of what he was doing, and the
consideration for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the transaction
must be recognized as a valid and binding undertaking.27
D.O. No. 21 sanctions the waiver of overtime pay in consideration of the
benefits that the employees will derive from the adoption of a compressed
workweek scheme, thus:
The compressed workweek scheme was originally conceived for
establishments wishing to save on energy costs, promote greater work
efficiency and lower the rate of employee absenteeism, among others.
Workers favor the scheme considering that it would mean savings on the
increasing cost of transportation fares for at least one (1) day a week; savings
on meal and snack expenses; longer weekends, or an additional 52 off-days a
year, that can be devoted to rest, leisure, family responsibilities, studies and
other personal matters, and that it will spare them for at least another day in a
week from certain inconveniences that are the normal incidents of
employment, such as commuting to and from the workplace, travel time
spent, exposure to dust and motor vehicle fumes, dressing up for work, etc.
Thus, under this scheme, the generally observed workweek of six (6) days is
shortened to five (5) days but prolonging the working hours from Monday to
Friday without the employer being obliged for pay overtime premium
Petitioners, however, went further and argued that the transfer orders
amounted to unfair labor practice because it would paralyze and render the
union ineffective.
To begin with, we cannot see how the mere transfer of its members can
paralyze the union. The union was not deprived of the membership of the
petitioners whose work assignments were only transferred to another
location.
More importantly, there was no showing or any indication that the transfer
orders were motivated by an intention to interfere with the petitioners' right
to organize. Unfair labor practice refers to acts that violate the workers' right
to organize. With the exception of Article 248(f) of the Labor Code of the
Philippines, the prohibited acts are related to the workers' right to self8
Considering that the MOA clearly states that the employee waives the
payment of overtime pay in exchange of a five-day workweek, there is no
room for interpretation and its terms should be implemented as they are
written.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9. NLRC: Both parties appealed to the ruling of the LA. NLRC affirmed
LAs ruling with regard the payment of holiday pay and attorneys
fees but vacated the awards of salary differential, 13th month pays
and service incentive leaves. Moreover, NLRC allowed the
respondents to present pieces of evidence for the first time on appeal
on the ground that they have been deprived of due process. It also
ruled that petitioners were legally dismissed due to gross misconduct.
10. CA: Ruling of the NLRC was affirmed.
Issue: Whether the respondents perfected their appeal before the NLRC
Held:
1. YES.
2. Pursuant to Article 223 of the Labor Code, an appeal by the
employer may be perfected, only upon the posting of a cash or surety
bond issued by a reputable bonding company, duly accredited by the
Commission, in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the
judgment appealed from.
3. In the present case, the respondents filed a surety bond issued by
Security Pacific Assurance Corporation (Security Pacific) on June 28,
2002.
4. At that time, Security Pacific was still an accredited bonding
company.
5. However, the NLRC revoked its accreditation on February 16, 2003.
6. Nonetheless, this subsequent revocation should not prejudice the
respondents who relied on its then subsisting accreditation in good
faith.
7. In Del Rosario v. Philippine Journalists, Inc., we ruled that a bonding
companys revocation of authority is prospective in application.
8. However, the respondents should post a new bond issued by an
10
because he uses extra time to get to the project site from his home and from
the project site to his home everyday in total, he spends an average of 3
hours OT every day.
not so much for the convenience of the employees, but primarily for the
benefit of Philnor. As embodied in Philnors memorandum, they allowed
their drivers to bring home their transport vehicles in order for them to
provide a timely transport service and to avoid delay not really so that the
drivers could enjoy the benefits of the company vehicles nor for them to save
on fair.
Facts
In April 1996, Rusel was employed as seaman by PCL Shipping Philippines
for and in behalf of its foreign principal, U-Ming Marine. Rusel thereby
joined the vessel MV Cemtex for 12 months with a basic monthly salary of
US$400.00, living allowance of US$140.00, fixed overtime rate of
US$120.00 per month, vacation leave with pay of US$40.00 per month and
special allowance of US$175.00.
Project employees are not entitled to termination pay if they are terminated
as a result of the completion of the project or any phase thereof in which they
are employed, regardless of the number of projects in which they have been
employed by a particular construction company. Moreover, the company is
not required to obtain clearance from the Secretary of Labor in connection
with such termination.
On July 16, 1996, while Rusel was cleaning the vessel's kitchen, he slipped,
and as a consequence thereof, he suffered a broken/sprained ankle on his left
foot. A request for medical examination was flatly denied by the captain of
the vessel. On August 13, 1996, feeling an unbearable pain in his ankle,
Rusel jumped off the vessel using a life jacket and swam to shore. He was
brought to a hospital where he was confined for 8 days. On August 22, 1996,
a vessel's agent fetched Rusel from the hospital and was required to board a
plane bound for the Philippines. On September 26, 1996, Rusel filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal, non-payment of wages, overtime pay, claim
OT Pay
Rada is entitled to OT pay. The fact that he picks up employees of Philnor at
certain specified points along EDSA in going to the project site and drops
them off at the same points on his way back from the field office going home
to Marikina, Metro Manila is not merely incidental to Radas job as a
driver. On the contrary, said transportation arrangement had been adopted,
13
for medical benefits, sick leave pay and damages against PCL Shipping and
U-Ming Marine before the arbitration branch of the NLRC. In their answer,
the latter alleged that Rusel deserted his employment by jumping off the
vessel.
abroad.
Held: Yes, it does.
Petitioners admit that they did not inform private respondent in writing of the
charges against him and that they failed to conduct a formal investigation to
give him opportunity to air his side. However, petitioners contend that the
twin requirements of notice and hearing applies strictly only when the
employment is within the Philippines and that these need not be strictly
observed in cases of international maritime or overseas employment.
Labor Arbiter held that respondent is liable for the unjust repatriation of the
complainant. NLRC affirmed the finding of the Labor Arbiter.
The Court does not agree. The provisions of the Constitution as well as the
Labor Code which afford protection to labor apply to Filipino employees
whether working within the Philippines or abroad. Moreover, the principle of
lex loci contractus (the law of the place where the contract is made) governs
in this jurisdiction. In the present case, it is not disputed that the Contract of
Employment entered into by and between petitioners and private respondent
was executed here in the Philippines with the approval of the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). Hence, the Labor Code
together with its implementing rules and regulations and other laws affecting
labor apply in this case. Accordingly, as to the requirement of notice and
hearing in the case of a seafarer, the Court has already ruled in a number of
cases that before a seaman can be dismissed and discharged from the vessel,
it is required that he be given a written notice regarding the charges against
him and that he be afforded a formal investigation where he could defend
himself personally or through a representative. Hence, the employer should
strictly comply with the twin requirements of notice and hearing without
regard to the nature and situs of employment or the nationality of the
employer. Petitioners failed to comply with these twin requirements.
Held: No
For a seaman to be considered as guilty of desertion, it is essential that there
be evidence to prove that if he leaves the ship or vessel in which he had
engaged to perform a voyage, he has the clear intention of abandoning his
duty and of not returning to the ship or vessel. In the present case, however,
petitioners failed to present clear and convincing proof to show that when
private respondent jumped ship, he no longer had the intention of returning.
The fact alone that he jumped off the ship where he was stationed, swam to
shore and sought medical assistance for the injury he sustained is not a
sufficient basis for petitioners to conclude that he had the intention of
deserting his post.
Issue: Whether or not the provisions of the Constitution as well as the Labor
Code which afford protection to labor apply to Filipino employees working
14
terminal) along Ayala Avenue, Makati. His driver's license was confiscated
by a Metro Manila Development Authority (MMDA) enforcer and a
corresponding traffic violation receipt (TVR) was issued to him, which was
valid as a temporary driver's license for seven days from date of
apprehension. Before the expiration of the TVR, petitioner allegedly gave the
same to respondent's Operations Manager Arnel Hegina3 (Hegina) and
requested the latter to redeem his license from the MMDA. Respondent was
not able to redeem the license from the MMDA but merely secured a twomonth extension for the validity of the TVR. Sometime in May 1996,
petitioner was again apprehended along Shoemart, Makati by highway patrol
operatives who demanded petitioner's driver's license. The record does not
specify the violation. When petitioner presented his TVR, the operatives
ordered him to drive the bus directly to the garage. After the incident,
petitioner was not able to work for respondent again.4
On March 14, 1997, petitioner filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA), a complaint
for illegal dismissal with damages against respondent, alleging that he was
dismissed from the service on May 19, 1996; that as a bus driver, he worked
for five days a week and from six in the morning up to eleven in the evening
with a gross fare receipts average of P6,500.00; that from the amount
of P6,500.00, he was entitled to a 9% commission and P50.00 incentive; that
in cases of apprehension of respondent's driver due to violations involving
illegal terminal or being "out of line," respondent was in charge of getting the
driver's license from the MMDA; that when he was apprehended in March
1996 for illegal terminal, he gave the TVR to Hegina and requested the latter
to redeem the license from the MMDA; that petitioners license was not
redeemed and respondent secured only two extensions of the TVR's validity
for two months; that when he was again apprehended in May 1996 and upon
arrival at the respondent's garage, he gave the extended TVR to Hegina and
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court seeking to annul the Decision 1 dated November 28, 2003 and
the Resolution2 dated July 19, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA- G.R. SP
No. 67666.
P.V. Pajarillo Liner Inc. (respondent), a corporation engaged in the business
of land transportation, employed Bernardino V. Navarro (petitioner) as a bus
driver on April 20, 1995. Sometime in March 1996, petitioner, while on duty,
was apprehended for picking up passengers in a non-loading zone (illegal
15
requested the latter to redeem his license from the MMDA; that Hegina
informed him that his license would be redeemed the following day, but
when petitioner tried to get his license from Hegina, the latter told him that
he failed to get it because of heavy workload; that petitioner was asked to
come back after one week with the assurance that his license would already
be available, but no license was released; that he was constantly following up
his license with respondent's office but was only given promises that his
license was due for release; that respondent's refusal to redeem his license
constituted constructive dismissal because he was deprived of his source of
livelihood, as he was not able to perform his work as a bus driver without his
license.
In its position paper, respondent claimed that petitioner abandoned his job as
shown by the former's letter dated July 28, 1996 addressed to petitioner
requiring the latter to explain why he should not be dismissed for neglecting
his duty through prolonged absence; that after petitioner submitted his reply
to respondent's letter, nothing was heard from him until he filed his
complaint with the LA; that it was petitioner's obligation to redeem the
driver's license; that petitioner's inaction to get back his license showed his
lack of interest in resuming his job; and that respondent could not give back
petitioner's work without his driver's license.
Petitioner filed his reply, arguing that in his August 8, 1996 letter to
respondent's letter dated July 28, 1996, he had already brought to its attention
that it should redeem his license for having been caught for illegal terminal,
to wit:
as a driver due to his alleged prolonged absences had been well explained by
petitioner; that said absences could never be attributed to petitioner's fault,
since he could not perform his usual duties as a driver without his license;
that he was not remiss in following up the release of his license from
respondent, which did not do its job.
which did not connote any obligation on Hegina's part; that as respondent
failed to heed such request, it was incumbent upon petitioner to redeem his
license, as it was necessary in the pursuit of his occupation as a bus driver.
The NLRC did not believe petitioner's claim that he submitted the original
TVR to respondent, because he could not have driven with only a photocopy
of said document.1awphi1.zw+
The LA did not sustain respondent's claim that it was not the latter's policy to
redeem the license of its drivers who were caught for illegal terminal, as
respondent did not deny petitioner's allegation that he submitted the TVR to
Hegina and that the office of respondent worked for the renewal of the period
of its validity pending the release of petitioner's license; and respondent's
policy of redeeming driver's license was further established by the affidavit
of Marcelino Ibaez, one of respondent's drivers and the Chairman of the
Board of the Kilusang Manggagawa sa PVP Liner. The LA then concluded
that respondent's failure to redeem petitioner's license deprived him of the
source of his livelihood without just and valid cause.
On the issue of constructive dismissal, the NLRC found that the evidence
showed that respondent sent a notice to petitioner requiring him to explain
his prolonged absences, to which petitioner submitted an explanation that he
could not report for work, as his license was with the authorities and was
waiting to be redeemed by respondent; and that no action was taken by the
latter on the matter. Thus, the NLRC agreed with the LA that there was
constructive dismissal; and petitioner should be reinstated upon presentation
of his driver's license, but without backwages considering that he was equally
at fault, as he did not bother to take proper steps to redeem his license.
Respondent filed its appeal with the NLRC. The NLRC rendered its
decision8 dated August 17, 2000, the dispositive portion of which reads:
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. Respondent filed its
Comment and petitioner his Reply thereto.
On November 28, 2003, the CA rendered herein assailed decision dismissing
the petition for lack of merit.
On the question of who should redeem petitioner's driver's license, the NLRC
ruled that petitioner as the holder of the license should be the one to redeem
the same; that considering petitioners allegation in his position paper, that
he gave the TVR to Hegina and requested the latter to redeem his license, it
was clear that petitioner was merely requesting him to redeem his license,
Petitioner was using the extended TVR when he was again caught sometime
in May 1996 by highway patrol operatives and was ordered to drive directly
to the garage.
(2) the findings of the Court of Appeals that petitioner should be the one who
should redeem his driver's license are grounded on speculations, surmises or
conjectures;15 and
Petitioner claimed that he gave the extended TVR to respondent for the latter
to redeem the same. However, such claim was belied by petitioner's letterreply dated August 8, 1996 to respondent's letter dated July 28, 1996, asking
him to explain his prolonged absence. Petitioner wrote that the extended
TVR was stolen from him. Such admission shows that the extended TVR had
been in petitioner's possession in May 1996 until it was stolen from him, the
date of which petitioner did not specify, wittingly or unwittingly. There is no
18
showing that petitioner ever reported the loss of the extended TVR to
respondent before he was asked to explain his prolonged absence in July
1996; or that he reported the loss to the MMDA. Thus, how could petitioner
expect respondent to redeem his driver's license when the extended TVR was
not in respondent's possession? Respondent could not be reasonably expected
to redeem petitioners driver's license while he, as owner of the license, did
not take the proper steps to report the loss of the TVR to respondent or to the
MMDA to get back his license. These circumstances show that petitioner was
not at all faultless, as his violation caused the confiscation of his license.
Consequently, the Court agrees with the NLRC's conclusion that petitioner is
not entitled to backwages.
He never bothered to redeem his license at the soonest possible time when
there was no showing that he was unlawfully prevented by respondent from
doing so. Thus, petitioner should not be paid for the time he was not
working. The Court has held that where the failure of employees to work was
not due to the employer's fault, the burden of economic loss suffered by the
employees should not be shifted to the employer. Each party must bear his
own loss.17 It would be unfair to allow petitioner to recover something he has
not earned and could not have earned, since he could not discharge his work
as a driver without his driver's license. Respondent should be exempted from
the burden of paying backwages.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
ALLAN VILLAR, DANILO INDITA, ARTURO MANIMTIM, GERSON
DATALIO, GERRY VILLARALBO, ALFONSO PIPINO, NOEL ANGAY
and EXEQUIEL MANIMTIM, in this petition for certiorari, assail for
having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion the 30 May 1997
Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) vacating and
setting aside the Decision of the Labor Arbiter, as well as its 31 July 1997
Resolution
denying
1
reconsideration.
The age-old rule governing the relation between labor and capital, or
management and employee, of a "fair day's wage for a fair day's labor"
remains as the basic factor in determining employees' wages. If there is no
work performed by the employee, there can be no wage or pay -- unless, of
course, the laborer was able, willing and ready to work but was illegally
19
paid for the overtime. Neither were they paid their service incentive leave
pay and 13th month pay.
2. That I hereby state that I was not dismissed by the company or its officials,
the truth of the matter being that I did not report for work anymore after the
certification election on July 31, 1994, when our Union lost in the said
election; that I wanted to resign from the company, as I am hereby resigning
voluntarily from my job with HI-TECH MANUFACTURING
CORPORATION;
3. That it is not likewise true that I was underpaid, or that I was paid salary
below the minimum fixed by law; that I was receiving my daily salary in
accordance with law; and that I received all the benefits due me as employee
20
like holiday pay, service incentive leave and 13th month pay for 1994 that I
have no claims whatsoever against the company or its officials in connection
with or arising from my employment with the company, and that the
complaint I filed against the company was due to misunderstanding and
misconception of what I perceived I am entitled to; that now I realize that I
have nothing or I do not have any valid complaint or claim against the HITECH MANUFACTURING . . . .
Their motion for reconsideration having been denied by the NLRC in its
Resolution dated 31 July 1997, petitioners are now before us imputing grave
abuse of discretion to the NLRC: (a) in ruling that petitioners voluntarily
resigned from their jobs and were not illegally dismissed; (b) in refusing to
correctly apply the law and jurisprudence relative to burden of proof in
termination cases and money claims of workers, abandonment of work and
offers made by a party in the course of litigation; and, (c) in ruling that
petitioners did not state their respective specific basic pay and the basis of
their claim that they were underpaid.
We have pored (over) the records and we find no proof to support the [labor
arbiter's] contention that soon after the union to which complainants belong
lost in the certification election, said complainants were summarily dismissed
without even the benefit of due process. There was no record that the
complainants were terminated from their employment. What is very
revealing is that the day after they lost in the certification election, they
refused to report to work for no justifiable reason which makes us believe
that they voluntarily resigned . . . . the finding of the Labor Arbiter that the
mere fact that they (complainants) filed the complaint for illegal dismissal
negates a notion of abandonment is so speculative and conjectural to be
sustained. The filing of their complaint for illegal dismissal indicates that it
was nothing but an attempt on their part to give verisimilitude to their desire
to get even with respondents.
In view of all the foregoing, the finding of the Labor Arbiter for illegal
dismissal against respondents, the award of backwages in favor of
complainants is without any factual or legal basis. However, complainants in
their own free will and volition may return to work with respondents who are
directed to accept them without loss of seniority rights and benefits but
without backwages based on the principle of a fair day's work for a fair day's
pay . . . . the allegation of complainants that they were underpaid without
stating their respective specific basic pay and the basis of their claim that
they were underpaid cannot be given credence. Mere allegations without
supporting proofs are not evidence in themselves.
We find sufficient cause to deviate from the findings of the NLRC. It is clear
from the records that sometime in August 1994, immediately after petitioners
supposedly "refused to work" having lost earlier in the certification election,
several complaints for illegal dismissal against HI-TECH were filed by
petitioners. These are sufficient proofs that they were never guilty of leaving
their jobs. The concept of abandonment of work is inconsistent with the
22
On the second issue, the NLRC held that petitioners' claims for
underpayment of wages, 13th month pay and service incentive leave pay are
without basis.
We conclude that petitioners did not abandon their jobs but were illegally
dismissed therefrom by private respondent. As a consequence, they are
entitled to reinstatement with full back wages, undiminished by earnings
elsewhere, to be computed from their illegal dismissal to their actual
reinstatement.9
basis of the Labor Arbiter's computation of the monetary awards. Second, all
that the NLRC needed to do was to refer to the prevailing minimum wage to
ascertain the correctness of petitioners' claims. Third, and most importantly,
the burden of proving payment of monetary claims rests on the
employer. 11 InJimenez v. National Labor Relations Commission 12 we held
As a general rule, one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it.
Even where the plaintiff must allege non-payment, the general rule is that the
burden rests on the defendant to prove payment, rather than on the plaintiff to
prove non-payment. The debtor has the burden of showing with legal
certainty that the obligation has been discharged with payment.
The reason for the rule is that the pertinent personnel files, payrolls, records,
remittances and other similar documents which will show that overtime,
differentials, service incentive leave and other claims of workers have been
paid are not in the possession of the worker but in the custody and
absolute control of the employer. Thus, in choosing not to present evidence
to prove that it had paid all the monetary claims of petitioners, HI-TECH
failed once again to discharge the onus probandi. Consequently, we have no
choice but to award those claims to petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Lagatic v NLRC
Chester Cabalza recommends his visitors to please read the original & full
text
of
the
case
cited.
Xie
xie!
Finally, we note that the handwritten letters and affidavits executed by Arturo
Manimtim and Exequiel Manimtim partake of the nature of quitclaims.
Nevertheless, a deed of release or quitclaim cannot bar employees from
demanding benefits to which they are legally entitled, or stop them from
contesting the legality of their dismissal. The acceptance of these benefits
does not amount to an estoppel. 1 However, it is but just that the amounts
RIGHT
TO
PRESCRIBE
RULES
ROMEO
LAGATIC,
petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, CITYLAND
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, STEPHEN ROXAS, JESUS GO,
24
GRACE
G.R.
January
LIUSON,
and
ANDREW
No.
28,
LIUSON,
respondents
similar
121004
1998
warning.
Facts:
Petitioner Romeo Lagatic was employed in May 1986 by Cityland, first as a
probationary sales agent, and later on as a marketing specialist. He was
tasked with soliciting sales for the company, with the corresponding duties of
accepting call-ins, referrals, and making client calls and cold calls. Cold calls
refer to the practice of prospecting for clients through the telephone
directory. Cityland, believing that the same is an effective and cost-efficient
method of finding clients, requires all its marketing specialists to make cold
calls. The number of cold calls depends on the sales generated by each: more
sales mean less cold calls. Likewise, in order to assess cold calls made by the
sales staff, as well as to determine the results thereof, Cityland requires the
submission
of
daily
progress
reports
on
the
same.
illegally
dismissed?
SO ORDERED
Held:
The
petition
lacks
merit.