Perfecto Floresca vs Philex

Mining Corporation
136 SCRA 141 Political Law Separation of Powers SC Cannot Legislate; Exception
Statutory Construction Determining the Purpose of the Law
Perfecto Floresca et al are the heirs of the deceased employees of Philex Mining
Corporation who, while working at its copper mines underground operations in Tuba,
Benguet on June 28, 1967, died as a result of the cave-in that buried them in the tunnels of
the mine. Theircomplaint alleges that Philex, in violation of government rules and
regulations, negligently and deliberately failed to take the required precautions for the
protection of the lives of its men working underground. Floresca et al moved to claim their
benefits pursuant to the Workmens Compensation Act before the Workmens
Compensation Commission. They also filed a separate civil case against Philex for
damages.
Philex sought the dismissal of the civil case as it insisted that Floresca et al have already
claimed benefits under the Workmens Compensation Act.
ISSUE: Whether or not Philex is correct.
HELD: Yes. Under the law, Floresca et al could only do either one. If they filed for benefits
under the WCA then they will be estopped from proceeding with a civil case before the
regular courts. Conversely, if they sued before the civil courts then they would also be
estopped from claiming benefits under the WCA.
HOWEVER, the Supreme Court ruled that Floresca et al are excused from this deficiency
due to ignorance of the fact. Had they been aware of such then they may have not availed
of such a remedy. But, if in case theyll win in the lower court whatever award may be
granted, the amount given to them under the WCA should be deducted. The SC
emphasized that if they would go strictly by the book in this case then the purpose of the
law may be defeated. Idolatrous reverence for the letter of the law sacrifices the human
being. The spirit of the law insures mans survival and ennobles him. As Shakespeare said,
the letter of the law killeth but its spirit giveth life.

Justice Gutierrez dissenting

No civil suit should prosper after claiming benefits under the WCA. If employers are already
liable to pay benefits under the WCA they should not be compelled to bear the cost of
damage suits or get insurance for that purpose. The exclusion provided by the WCA can
only be properly removed by the legislature NOT the SC.

G.R. No. L-62051 March 18, 1985

RURAL BANK OF PARARAQUE, INC., petitioner,
vs.
ISIDRA REMOLADO and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

AQUINO, J.:
This case is about the repurchase of mortgage property after the period of redemption and had
expired. Isidra Remolado, 64, a widow, and resident of Makati, Rizal, owned a lot with an area of 308
square meters, with a bungalow thereon, which was leased to Beatriz Cabagnot (86-7, record on
Appeal).
The lot is located at 41 Molave Street, United Paraaque, Rizal. In 1966 she mortgaged it to the
Rural Bank of Paraaque, Inc. as security for a loan of P15,000. She paid the loan.
On April 17, 1971 she mortgaged it again to the bank. She eventually secured loans totalling
P18,000 (Exh. At D). the loans become overdue. The bank foreclosed the mortagage on July 21,
1972 and bought the property at the foreclosure sale for P22,192.70. The one-year period of
redemption was to expire on August 21, 1973.
On August 8, 1973 the bank advised Remolado that she had until August 23 to redeem the property
(Exh. U or 6; 53, Record on Appeal). On August 9, 1973 or 14 days before the expiration of the oneyear redemption period, the bank gave her a statement showing that she should pay P25,491.96 for
the redemption of the property on August 23 (Exh. F). No redemption was made on that date.
On September 3, 1973 the bank consolidated its ownership over the property (Exh. H). Remolado's
title was cancelled. A new title, TCT No. 418737, was issued to the bank on September 5 (Exh. 0).
On September 24, 1973, the bank gave Remolado up to ten o'clock in the morning of October 31,
1973, or 37 days, within which to repurchase (not redeem since the period of redemption had
expired) the property (Exh. I-1; 32, Record on Appeal). The bank did not specify the price.

On October 26, 1973 Remolado and her daughter, Patrocinio Gomez, promised to pay the bank
P33,000 on October 31 for the repurchase of the property (Exh. X or 9; 64, Record on Appeal).
Exhibits 1-1 and X do not evidence any perfected repurchase agreemi6nt. Even if it is assumed that
the bank's commitment to resell the property was accepted by Remolado, that option was
not supported by a consideration distinct from the price (Art. 1479, Civil Code). Lacking such
consideration, the option is void (Southwestern Sugar & Molasses Co. vs. Atlantic Gulf & Pacific
Company, 97 Phil. 249).
Contrary to her promise, Remolado did not repurchase the property on October 31, Five days later,
or on November 5, Remolado and her daughter delivered P33,000 rash to the bank's assistant
manager as repurchase price. The amount was returned to them the next day, November 6, 1973
(Exh. V, W and 11). The assistant manager had no intention of receiving the money. It was just left
with her by Remolado (Exh. 10; 42, Record on Appeal). At that time, the bank was no longer willing
to allow the repurchase.
On that day, November 6, Remolado filed an action to compel the bank to reconvey the property to
her for P25,491.96 plus interest and other charges and to pay P35,000 as damages. The repurchase
price was not consigned. A notice of lis pendens was registered.
On November 15, the bank sold the property to Pilar Aysip for P50,000. A new title was issued to
Aysip with an annotation of lis pendens (Exh. P and 12; 649, Record on Appeal).
The trial court ordered the bank to return the property to Remolado upon payment of the redemption
price of P25,491.96 plus interest and other bank charges and to pay her P15,000 as damages. The
Appellate Court affirmed the judgment. The bank appealed to this Court. It contends that Remolado
had no more right of redemption and, therefore, no cause of action against the bank.
We hold that the trial court and the Appellate Court erred in ordering the reconveyance of the
property, There was no binding agreement for its repurchase. Even on the assumption that the bank
should be bound by its commitment to allow repurchase on or before October 31, 1973, still
Remolado had no cause of action because she did not repurchase the property on that date.
Justice is done according to law. As a rule, equity follows the law. There may be a moral obligation,
often regarded as an equitable consideration (meaning compassion), but if there is no enforceable
legal duty, the action must fail although the disadvantaged party deserves commiseration or
sympathy.
The choice between what is legally just and what is morally just, when these two options do not
coincide, is explained by Justice Moreland in Vales vs. Villa, 35 Phfl. 769, 788 where he said:
Courts operate not because one person has been defeated or overcome by another,
but because he has been defeated or overcome illegally. Men may do foolish things,
make ridiculous contracts, use miserable judgment, and lose money by them-indeed,
all they have in the world; but not for that alone can the law intervene and restore.
There must be, in addition, a violation of law, the commission of what the law knows

as an actionable wrong before the courts are authorized to lay hold of the situation
and remedy it.
In the instant case, the bank acted within its legal rights when it refused to give Remolado any
extension to repurchase after October 31, 1973. It had given her about two years to liquidate her
obligation. She failed to do so.
WHEREFORE, the Appellate Court's judgment is reversed and set aside. The complaint and
counterclaim are dismissed. The notice of lis pendens is cancelled. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Concepcion, Jr., Abad Santos, Escolin and Cuevas, JJ., concur.
Makasiar (Chairman), J., took no part.
FERMIN Z. CARAM, JR. V. CLARO L. LAURETA G.R. No. L-28740. February 24, 1981
FERNANDEZ, J.
FACTS: On June 25, 1959, Claro L. Laureta filed in the Court of First Instance of Davao an action for
nullity, recovery of ownership and/or reconveyance with damages and attorney's fees against
Marcos Mata, Codidi Mata, Fermin Z. Caram Jr. and the Register of Deeds of Davao City. On June
10, 1945, Marcos Mata conveyed a large tract of agricultural land covered by Original Certificate of
Title No. 3019 in favor of Claro Laureta, plaintiff, the respondent herein. The deed of absolute sale in
favor of the plaintiff was not registered because it was not acknowledged before a notary public or
any other authorized officer. At the time the sale was executed, there was no authorized officer
before whom the sale could be acknowledged inasmuch as the civil government in Tagum, Davao
was not as yet organized. However, the defendant Marcos Mata delivered to Laureta the peaceful
and lawful possession of the premises of the land together with the pertinent papers thereof such as
the Owner's Duplicate Original Certificate of Title No. 3019, sketch plan, tax declaration, tax receipts
and other papers related thereto. Since June 10, 1945, the plaintiff Laureta had been and is still in
continuous, adverse and notorious occupation of said land, without being molested, disturbed or
stopped by any of the defendants or their representatives. In fact, Laureta had been paying realty
taxes due thereon and had introduced improvements worth not less than P20,000.00 at the time of
the filing of the complaint. However, the said property was sold to Fermin Caram, Jr., the petitioner,
by Marcos Mata on May 5, 1947. And was able to declare the ODOCT in the possession of Laureta
null and void, after Mata filed for an issuance of new ODOCT before the RD of Davao on the ground
of loss of the said title. The Trial Court ruled infavor of Laureta, stating that Caram, Jr. was not a
purchaser in good faith, and the Court of Appeals thenafter affirmed the decision of the lower court.
PETITIONERS CONTENTION:
The petitioner assails the finding of the trial court that the second sale of the property was made
through his representatives, Pedro Irespe and Atty. Abelardo Aportadera. He argues that Pedro
Irespe was acting merely as broker or intermediary with the specific task and duty to pay Marcos
Mata the sum of P1,000.00 for the latter's property and to see to it that the requisite deed of

salecovering the purchase was properly executed by Marcos Mata; that the identity of the property
to be bought and the price of the purchase had already been agreed upon by the parties; and that
the other alleged representative, Atty. Aportadera, merely acted as a notary public in the execution
of the deed of sale.
ISSUES: Whether petitioner have acted in bad faith through his agents action.

RULING: In the case at bar, the court found that the Attorneys Irespe and Aportadera had
knowledge of the circumstances, and knew that Mata's certificate of title together with other papers
pertaining to the land was taken by soldiers under the command of Col. Claro L. Laureta. Added to
this is the fact that at the time of the second sale Laureta was already in possession of the land.
Irespe and Aportadera should have investigated the nature of Laureta's possession. If they failed to
exercise the ordinary care expected of a buyer of real estate they must suffer the consequences.
The rule of caveat emptor requires the purchaser to be aware of the supposed title of the vendor
and one who buys without checking the vendor's title takes all the risks and losses consequent to
such failure. The principle that a person dealing with the owner of the registered land is not bound to
go behind the certificate and inquire into transactions the existence of which is not there intimated
18 should not apply in this case. It was of common knowledge that at the time the soldiers of
Laureta took the documents from Mata, the civil government of Tagum was not yet established and
that there were no officials to ratify contracts of sale and make them registrable. Obviously,
Aportadera and Irespe knew that even if Mata previously had sold the disputed property such sale
could not have been registered.cdrep There is no doubt then that Irespe and Aportadera, acting as
agents of Caram, purchased the property of Mata in bad faith. Applying the principle of agency,
Caram, as principal, should also be deemed to have acted in bad faith.
Article 1544 of the New Civil Code provides that: "Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold
to different vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to the person who may have first taken
possession thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property. "Should it be immovable property,
the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the
Registry of Property.
"Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was first
in the possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided
there is good faith. (1973)". Since Caram was a registrant in bad faith, the situation is as if there was
no registration at all

AGCAOILI VS. GSIS

No. L-30056, August 30, 1988
FACTS:
The appellant Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS) approved the application of the appellee
Marcelo Agcaoili for the purchase of the house and lot in
the GSIS Housing Project at Nangka, Marikina, Rizal, but
said application was subject to the condition that the latter

should forthwith occupy the house. Agcaoili lost no time in

occupying the house but he could not stay in it and had to
leave the very next day because the house was nothing
more than a shell, in such a state that civilized occupation
was not possible: ceiling, stairs, double walling, lighting
facilities, water connection, bathroom, toilet kitchen,
drainage, were inexistent. Agcaoili did however asked a
homeless friend, a certain Villanueva, to stay in the
premises as some sort of watchman, pending the
completion of the construction of the house. He thereafter
complained to the GSIS but to no avail.
Subsequently, the GSIS asked Agcaoili to pay the
monthly amortizations of P35.56 and other fees. He paid
the first monthly amortizations and incidental fees, but
refused to make further payments until and unless the
GSIS completed the housing unit. Thereafter, GSIS
cancelled the award and required Agcaoili to vacate the
premise. The house and lot was consequently awarded to
another applicant. Agcaoili reacted by instituting suit in
the Court of First Instance of Manila for specific
performance and damages. The judgment was rendered in
favor of Agcaoili. GSIS then appealed from that judgment.
ISSUE:
Was the cancellation by GSIS of the award in favor
of petitioner Agcaoili just and proper?
RULING:
No. It was the duty of the GSIS, as seller, to deliver
the thing sold in a condition suitable for its enjoyment by
the buyer for the purpose contemplated. There would be
no sense to require the awardee to immediately occupy and
live in a shell of a house, structure consisting only of four
walls with openings, and a roof. GSIS had an obligation to
deliver to Agcaoili a reasonably habitable dwelling in
return for his undertaking to pay the stipulated price.
Since GSIS did not fulfill that obligation, and was not
willing to put the house in habitable state, it cannot invoke
Agcaoilis suspension of payment of amortizations as cause
to cancel the contract between them. It is axiomatic that
In reciprocal obligations, neither party incurs in delay if
the other does not comply

Taada vs. Tuvera 136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985) 146

SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)
TAADA VS. TUVERA
136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985)
FACTS:
Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the principle that
laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette, petitioners filed for writ of
mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish and/or cause to publish various presidential
decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of
implementations and administrative orders.
The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the case, contending that
petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute becomes valid and
enforceable.
HELD:
Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the
law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to give the general
public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens.
Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim ignoratia
legis nominem excusat. It would be the height of injustive to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the
transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the Official Gazette. The
word shall therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if
the constitutional right of the people to be informed on matter of public concern is to be given substance
and validity.
The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a requirement of
due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and
specifically informed of its contents. The Court declared that presidential issuances of general application
which have not been published have no force and effect.

TAADA VS. TUVERA

146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)

FACTS:
This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985. Respondent argued
that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was otherwise as when the decrees
themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not as
to their publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation.
HELD:
The clause unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of
publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature
may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or in any other date, without its previous
publication.
Laws should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking, all laws
relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. A law without any
bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires
act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest eve if it might be directly
applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole.
All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their
effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the
legislature.
Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the public of the
content of the law.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and not
elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not called upon to rule upon the
wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it impractical.
The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible.
J. Cruz:
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their
dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding
unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure
and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot faint, parry or
cut unless the naked blade is drawn.

De Roy vs Court of Appeals 157 SCRA 757

Facts:

The firewall of a burned-out building owned by petitioner, Felisa Perdosa DeRoy, collapsed and
destroyed the tailoring shop of private respondents, Luis Bernal,Sr., et al., resulting in injuries to their
family and death of Marissa Bernal, adaughter. Private respondents had been warned by petitioners
to vacate their shopbut the former failed to do so.Given the facts, the First Judicial Region rendered
judgment finding petitionersguilty of gross negligence and awarding damages to private
respondents. Thisdecision was affirmed
in toto
by the Court of Appeals. On the last day of the 15-dayperiod to file an appeal, petitioners filed a
motion for extension of tie to file amotion for reconsideration, which was denied by the appellate
court. They againfiled for a motion for reconsideration but was subsequently denied.Petitioner filed
for a special civic action for certiorari to declare null and void theprevious decision and claimed that
the appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion. They contended that the rule enunciated in
the
Habaluyas
case shouldnot be made to apply to the case at bar owing to the non-publication of the
Habaluyas
decision in the Official Gazette. Also they argued that the petitioners hadthe last clear chance to
avoid the accident if only they heeded the warning tovacate the shop.
Issues:
Whether or not the rule in the
Habaluyas
decision, stating that the 15-dayperiod for appealing or filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be
extended,could be applied to the case at bar.
Held:
The ruling in the
Habaluyas
case should be made to apply to the case at bar,notwithstanding the non-publication of the
Habaluyas
decision in the OfficialGazette.

Ratio:

There is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decisions in theOfficial Gazette before
they can be binding and as a condition to theirbecoming effective. It is the duty of the counsel as
lawyer in active lawpractice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court, which arepublished
in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions (G.R.s) and inpubications as the Supreme Court
Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law journals.

The ruling in the

Habaluyas
case was that the 15-day period for appealing orfiling a motion for reconsideration cannot be
extended. Such motion may befiled only in cases pending in the Supreme Court as the court of last
resort,which in its discretion may grant or deny the extension requested. Suchdecision was given
prospective application to subsequent cases like
Lacsamana vs Second Special Cases Division of the Intermediate AppellateCourt
and
Bacaya vs Intermediate Appellate Court.

With regard to the contention on the last clear chance of privaterespondents to avoid the accident,
this should be disregarded, since the

Yaokasin v Commissioner Digest

GR No. 84111, December 22, 1989

Facts: The Philippine Coast Guard seized 9000 sacks of refined sugar owned by
petitioner Yaokasin, which were then being unloaded from the M/V Tacloban, and turned
them over to the custody of the Bureau of Customs. On June 7, 1988, the District
Collector of Customs ordered the release of the cargo to the petitioner but this order
was subsequently reversed on June 15, 1988. The reversal was by virtue ofCustoms
Memorandum Order (CMO) 20-87 in implementation of the Integrated Reorganization

Plan under P.D. 1, which provides that in protest and seizure cases where the decision is
adverse to the government, the Commissioner of Customs has the power of automatic
review.
Petitioner objected to the enforcement of Sec. 12 of the Plan and CMO 20-87 contending
that these were not published in the Official Gazette. The Plan which was part of P.D. 1
was however published in the Official Gazette.

Issue: W/n circular orders such as CMO 20-87 need to be published in the OG
to take effect

NO.
Article 2 of the Civil Code does not apply to circulars like CMO 20-87 which is an
administrative order of the Commissioner of Customs addressed to his subordinates, the
custom collectors. Said issuance requiring collectors of customs to comply strictly with
Section 12 of he Plan, is addressed only to particular persons or a class of persons (the
customs collectors), hence no general applicability. As held in Tanada v. Tuvera, It need
not be published, on the assumption that it has been circularized to all concerned.

Moreover, Commonwealth Act. 638 provides an enumeration of what shall be published

in the Official Gazette. It provides that besides legislative acts, resolutions of public
nature of Congress, executive, administrative orders and proclamations shall be
published except when these have no general applicability.