1. An ejectment case filed by a co- owner need not be joined by the other co- owners. It is a representative suit as the other co- owners are deemd included as plaintiffs (Sunga v. de Guzman 90 SCRA 618) As to the alleged error of the Court for not dismissing the case for the non-inclusion of indispensable parties, appellees contend that this question was never raised in the Motion to Dismiss filed by petitioners with the trial court (pp. 6-10, Record on Appeal), nor in their brief in the Court of Appeals, and, therefore may not be raised, nor given consideration. for the first time in this Court. This is a valid proposition We have to uphold. Even by virtue of express provisions of law, representative suits that need not be joined by an parties in the same status or condition, and linked together with a common interest, are permissible. Thus anyone of the co-owners may bring an action for ejectment (Article 487, Civil Code), while prescription obtained by a co-proprietor or a coowner shall benefit the others (Article 111 Civil Code). Moreover, non-joinder of parties, is not a ground to dismiss an action. 2. The Article abandoned the old rule that an action for ejectment cannot be maintained by a coowner without the joinder of the other co- owners (Spouses Mendoza v. Coronel, G.R. No. 156402, February 13, 2006). Article 487 is a departure from the rule laid down in the case of Palarca v. Baguisi which held that an action for ejectment must be brought by all
the co-owners. As explained by Tolentino, the law
now allows a co-owner to bring an action for ejectment, which covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession, including forcible entry and unlawful detainer, without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs, because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all. 3. Any co- owner may file an action under Article 487 not only against a third person but also against another co- owner who takes exclusive possession of and asserts exclusive ownership over the property. (De Guia v. Court of Appeals) 4. An ejectment suit filed by a co- owner will benefit the other co- owner. (Baloloy v. Hular, G.R. No. 157767, September 9, 2004) Under Article 487 of the New Civil Code, any of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment. This article covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession, including an accion publiciana and a reinvidicatory action. A co-owner may bring such an action without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as coplaintiffs because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all. Any judgment of the court in favor of the co-owner will benefit the others but if such judgment is adverse, the same cannot prejudice the rights of the unimpleaded co-owners. Forcible Entry 1. In order to successfully file an action for forcible entry, the complainant must be in prior
possession of the property (Abad v. Farrales, G.R.
No. 178635, April 11, 2011). There is no question that Abad made an allegation in his complaint that Oscar and Daisy forcibly entered the subject property. The only issue is with respect to his allegation, citing such property as one "of which they have complete physical and material possession of the same until deprived thereof." Abad argues that this substantially alleges plaintiffs prior physical possession of the property before the dispossession, sufficient to confer on the MeTC jurisdiction over the action. The Court agrees. The plaintiff in a forcible entry suit is not required to use in his allegations the exact terminology employed by the rules. It is enough that the facts set up in the complaint show that dispossession took place under the required conditions. It is of course not enough that the allegations of the complaint make out a case for forcible entry. The plaintiff must also be able to prove his allegations. He has to prove that he had prior physical possession for this gives him the security that entitles him to remain in the property until a person with a better right lawfully ejects him. 2. Unlawfully entering the subject property, erecting a structure thereon and excluding the lawful possessor therefrom would necessarily imply the use of force (Antazo v. Doblada, 611 SCRA 586, February 4, 2010) Petitioners argument is misplaced, considering that this is a forcible entry case. They are apparently referring to possession flowing from ownership of the property, as opposed to actual possession. In ejectment cases, possession means nothing more than actual physical possession, not legal possession in the sense
contemplated in civil law.
Prior physical possession is the primary consideration in a forcible entry case. A party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his possession, if he has in his favor prior possession in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until a person with a better right lawfully ejects him. The party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be thrown out by a strong hand, violence or terror. We are convinced that respondents were in prior possession of the property and that petitioners deprived them of such possession by means of force. In the Letter dated May 26, 2003, Atty. Jimmy R. Panganiban of Panganiban Law Office, on behalf of petitioners, wrote to respondents: Accordingly, FINAL DEMAND is hereby made upon all of you to remove the bamboo fence and to restore my clients possession within five (5) days from receipt of this letter. We also note that petitioners did not deny in their Answer respondents allegation that they constructed a concrete fence on the subject property. Failure to specifically deny the allegation amounts to a judicial admission. Unlawfully entering the subject property, erecting a structure thereon and excluding therefrom the prior possessor would necessarily imply the use of force. In order to constitute force, the trespasser does not have to institute a
state of war. No other proof is necessary.
3. The acts of going to the property and excluding the lawful possessor therefrom necessarily implyexertion of force. (Spouses Baes v. Lutheran Church in the Philippines, GR 142308, November 15, 2005) There is forcible entry or desahucio when one is deprived of physical possession of land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. In such cases, the possession is illegal from the beginning and the basic inquiry centers on who has the prior possession de facto. In filing forcible entry cases, the law tells us that two allegations are mandatory for the municipal court to acquire jurisdiction: first, the plaintiff must allege prior physical possession of the property, and second, he must also allege that he was deprived of his possession by any of the means provided for in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court i.e., by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. It is also settled that in the resolution thereof, what is important is determining who is entitled to the physical possession of the property. Indeed, any of the parties who can prove prior possession de facto may recover such possession even from the owner himself since such cases proceed independently of any claim of ownership and the plaintiff needs merely to prove prior possession de facto and undue deprivation thereof. In order to constitute force that would justify a forcible entry case, the trespasser does not have to institute a state of war. The act of going to the property and excluding the lawful possessor therefrom necessarily implies the exertion of force over the property which is all that is necessary and sufficient to show that the action is based on the provisions of Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.
As expressly stated in David vs. Cordova, the
words by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth include every situation or condition under which one person can wrongfully enter upon real property and exclude another, who has had prior possession therefrom. If a trespasser enters upon land in open daylight, under the very eyes of the person already clothed with lawful possession, but without the consent of the latter, and there plants himself and excludes such prior possessor from the property, the action of forcible entry and detainer can unquestionably be maintained, even though no force is used by the trespasser other than such as is necessarily implied from the mere acts of planting himself on the ground and excluding the other party.