Crim Cases Arts. 1-6

FIRST DIVISION
ESMERALDO RIVERA, ISMAEL G.R. No. 166326

RIVERA, EDGARDO RIVERA,
Petitioners, Present:
PANGANIBAN, C.J., Chairperson,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
- versus - CALLEJO, SR., and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
Promulgated:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. January 25, 2006
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. CR No. 27215 affirming, with modification, the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Cavite, Branch 90, in Criminal Case No. 6962-99, entitled People of the
Philippines. v. Esmeraldo Rivera, et al.
On April 12, 1999, an Information was filed in the RTC of Imus, Cavite, charging
Esmeraldo, Ismael and Edgardo, all surnamed Rivera, of attempted murder. The accusatory
portion of the Information reads:
That on or about the 3rd day of May 1998, in the Municipality of Dasmarias,
Province of Cavite, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with
intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault and hit with a piece of hollow block, one RUBEN
RODIL who thereby sustained a non-mortal injury on his head and on the different parts of
his body, the accused thus commenced the commission of the felony directly by overt acts,
but failed to perform all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of Murder by
reason of some causes other than their own spontaneous desistance, that is, the said Ruben
Rodil was able to ran (sic) away and the timely response of the policemen, to his damage
and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
Ruben Rodil testified that he used to work as a taxi driver. He stopped driving in
April 1998 after a would-be rapist threatened his life. He was even given a citation as a
Bayaning Pilipino by the television network ABS-CBN for saving the would-be victim. His
wife eked out a living as a manicurist. They and their three children resided in Barangay San
Isidro Labrador II, Dasmarias, Cavite, near the house of Esmeraldo Rivera and his brothers
Ismael and Edgardo.
At noon of May 2, 1998, Ruben went to a nearby store to buy food. Edgardo
mocked him for being jobless and dependent on his wife for support. Ruben resented the
rebuke and hurled invectives at Edgardo. A heated exchange of words ensued.
At about 7:30 p.m. the next day, a Sunday, Ruben went to the store to buy food and
to look for his wife. His three-year-old daughter was with him. Momentarily, Esmeraldo and
his two brothers, Ismael and Edgardo, emerged from their house and ganged up on Ruben.
Esmeraldo and Ismael mauled Ruben with fist blows and he fell to the ground. In that
helpless position, Edgardo hit Ruben three times with a hollow block on the parietal area.
Esmeraldo and Ismael continued mauling Ruben. People who saw the incident shouted:
Awatin sila! Awatin sila! Ruben felt dizzy but managed to stand up. Ismael threw a stone at
him, hitting him at the back. When policemen on board a mobile car arrived, Esmeraldo,
Ismael and Edgardo fled to their house.
Ruben was brought to the hospital. His attending physician, Dr. Lamberto
Cagingin, Jr., signed a medical certificate in which he declared that Ruben sustained
lacerated wounds on the parietal area, cerebral concussion or contusion, hematoma on the
left upper buttocks, multiple abrasions on the left shoulder and hematoma periorbital left.[4]
The doctor declared that the lacerated wound in the parietal area was slight and superficial
and would heal from one to seven days.[5] The doctor prescribed medicine for Rubens back
pain, which he had to take for one month.[6]
Esmeraldo testified that at around 1:00 p.m. on May 3, 1998, Ruben arrived at his
house and banged the gate. Ruben challenged him and his brothers to come out and fight.
When he went out of the house and talked to Ruben, the latter punched him. They wrestled
with each other. He fell to the ground. Edgardo arrived and pushed Ruben aside. His wife
arrived, and he was pulled away and brought to their house.
For his part, Ismael testified that he tried to pacify Ruben and his brother
Esmeraldo, but Ruben grabbed him by the hair. He managed to free himself from Ruben and
the latter fled. He went home afterwards. He did not see his brother Edgardo at the scene.
Edgardo declared that at about 1:00 p.m. on May 3, 1998, he was throwing
garbage in front of their house. Ruben arrived and he went inside the house to avoid a
confrontation. Ruben banged the gate and ordered him to get out of their house and even
threatened to shoot him. His brother Esmeraldo went out of their house and asked Ruben
what the problem was.
A fist fight ensued. Edgardo rushed out of the house and pushed Ruben aside. Ruben fell to
the ground. When he stood up, he pulled at Edgardos shirt and hair, and, in the process,
Rubens head hit the lamp post.[7]
On August 30, 2002, the trial court rendered judgment finding all the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of frustrated murder. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, all the accused are found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt and are sentenced to an imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day to eight (8)
years of prision mayor as the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt the
culpability of the accused. Likewise, the accused are to pay, jointly and severally, civil
indemnity to the private complainant in the amount of P30,000.00.
SO ORDERED.[8]
The trial court gave no credence to the collective testimonies of the accused and their
witnesses. The accused appealed to the CA, which rendered judgment on June 8, 2004
affirming, with modification, the appealed decision. The dispositive portion of the CA
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 90, is
MODIFIED in that the appellants are convicted of ATTEMPTED MURDER and sentenced
to an indeterminate penalty of 2 years of prision correccional as minimum to 6 years and 1
day of prision mayor as maximum. In all other respects, the decision appealed from is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.[9]
The accused, now petitioners, filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, alleging that
the CA erred in affirming the RTC decision. They insist that the prosecution failed to prove
that they had the intention to kill Ruben when they mauled and hit him with a hollow block.
Petitioners aver that, based on the testimony of Dr. Cagingin, Ruben sustained only a
superficial wound in the parietal area; hence, they should be held criminally liable for
physical injuries only. Even if petitioners had the intent to kill Ruben, the prosecution failed
to prove treachery; hence, they should be held guilty only of attempted homicide.
On the other hand, the CA held that the prosecution was able to prove petitioners intent to
kill Ruben:
On the first assigned error, intent to kill may be deduced from the nature of the wound
inflicted and the kind of weapon used. Intent to kill was established by victim Ruben Rodil
in his testimony as follows:
Q: And while you were being boxed by Esmeraldo and Bong, what happened next?
A: When I was already lying [down] xxx, Dagol Rivera showed up with a piece of hollow
block xxx and hit me thrice on the head, Sir.
Q: And what about the two (2), what were they doing when you were hit with a hollow
block by Dagol?
A: I was already lying on the ground and they kept on boxing me while Dagol was hitting,
Sir.
As earlier stated by Dr. Cagingin, appellants could have killed the victim had the hollow
block directly hit his head, and had the police not promptly intervened so that the brothers
scampered away. When a wound is not sufficient to cause death, but intent to kill is evident,
the crime is attempted. Intent to kill was shown by the fact that the (3) brothers helped each
other maul the defenseless victim, and even after he had already fallen to the ground; that
one of them even picked up a cement hollow block and proceeded to hit the victim on the
head with it three times; and that it was only the arrival of the policemen that made the
appellants desist from their concerted act of trying to kill Ruben Rodil.[10]
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), for its part, asserts that the decision of the CA is
correct, thus:
The evidence and testimonies of the prosecution witnesses defeat the presumption of
innocence raised by petitioners. The crime has been clearly established with petitioners as
the perpetrators. Their intent to kill is very evident and was established beyond reasonable
doubt.
Eyewitnesses to the crime, Alicia Vera Cruz and Lucita Villejo clearly and categorically
declared that the victim Ruben Rodil was walking along St. Peter Avenue when he was
suddenly boxed by Esmeraldo Baby Rivera. They further narrated that, soon thereafter, his
two brothers Ismael and Edgardo Dagul Rivera, coming from St. Peter
II, ganged up on the victim. Both Alicia Vera Cruz and Lucita Villejo recounted that they
saw Edgardo Dagul Rivera pick up a hollow block and hit Ruben Rodil with it three (3)
times. A careful review of their testimonies revealed the suddenness and unexpectedness of
the attack of petitioners. In this case, the victim did not even have the slightest warning of
the danger that lay ahead as he was carrying his three-year old daughter. He was caught offguard by the assault of Esmeraldo Baby Rivera and the simultaneous attack of the two other
petitioners. It was also established that the victim was hit by Edgardo Dagul Rivera, while
he was lying on the ground and being mauled by the other petitioners. Petitioners could
have killed the victim had he not managed to escape and had the police not promptly
intervened.
Petitioners also draw attention to the fact that the injury sustained by the victim was
superficial and, thus, not life threatening. The nature of the injury does not negate the intent
to kill. The Court of Appeals held:
As earlier stated by Dr. Cagingin, appellants could have killed the victim had the hollow
block directly hit his head, and had the police not promptly intervened so that the brothers
scampered away. When a wound is not sufficient to cause death, but intent to kill is evident,
the crime is attempted. Intent to kill was shown by the fact that the three (3) brothers helped
each other maul the defenseless victim, and even after he had already fallen to the ground;
that one of them picked up a cement hollow block and proceeded to hit the victim on the
head with it three times; and that it was only the arrival of the policemen that made the
appellants desist from their concerted act of trying to kill Ruben Rodil.[11]
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
An essential element of murder and homicide, whether in their consummated, frustrated or
attempted stage, is intent of the offenders to kill the victim immediately before or
simultaneously with the infliction of injuries. Intent to kill is a specific intent which the
prosecution must prove by direct or circumstantial evidence, while general criminal intent is
presumed from the commission of a felony by dolo.
In People v. Delim,[12] the Court declared that evidence to prove intent to kill in
crimes against persons may consist, inter alia, in the means used by the malefactors, the
nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the
victim, the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time, or immediately after the killing of
the victim, the circumstances under which the crime was committed and the motives of the
accused. If the victim dies as a result of a deliberate act of the malefactors, intent to kill is
presumed.
In the present case, the prosecution mustered the requisite quantum of evidence to prove the
intent of petitioners to kill Ruben. Esmeraldo and Ismael pummeled the victim with fist
blows. Even as Ruben fell to the ground, unable to defend himself against the sudden and
sustained assault of petitioners, Edgardo hit him three times with a hollow block. Edgardo
tried to hit Ruben on the head, missed, but still managed to hit the victim only in the parietal
area, resulting in a lacerated wound and cerebral contusions.
That the head wounds sustained by the victim were merely superficial and could not have
produced his death does not negate petitioners criminal liability for attempted murder. Even
if Edgardo did not hit the victim squarely on the head, petitioners are still criminally liable
for attempted murder.
The last paragraph of Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code defines an attempt to commit a
felony, thus:
There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by
overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony
by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.
The essential elements of an attempted felony are as follows:
1. The offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt acts;
2. He does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony;
3. The offenders act be not stopped by his own spontaneous desistance;
4. The non-performance of all acts of execution was due to cause or accident other than his
spontaneous desistance.[13]
The first requisite of an attempted felony consists of two elements, namely:
(1) That there be external acts;
(2) Such external acts have direct connection with the crime intended to be committed.[14]
The Court in People v. Lizada[15] elaborated on the concept of an overt or external act, thus:
An overt or external act is defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the intention
to commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation, which if carried out
to its complete termination following its natural course, without being frustrated by external
obstacles nor by the spontaneous desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily
ripen into a concrete offense. The raison detre for the law requiring a direct overt act is that,
in a majority of cases, the conduct of the accused consisting merely of acts of preparation
has never ceased to be equivocal; and this is necessarily so, irrespective of his declared
intent. It is that quality of being equivocal that must be lacking before the act becomes one
which may be said to be a commencement of the commission of the crime, or an overt act or
before any fragment of the crime itself has been committed, and this is so for the reason that
so long as the equivocal quality remains, no one can say with certainty what the intent of the
accused is. It is necessary that the overt act should have been the ultimate step towards the
consummation of the design. It is sufficient if it was the first or some subsequent step in a
direct movement towards the commission of the offense after the preparations are made.
The act done need not constitute the last proximate one for completion. It is necessary,
however, that the attempt must have a causal relation to the intended crime. In the words of
Viada, the overt acts must have an immediate and necessary relation to the offense.[16]
In the case at bar, petitioners, who acted in concert, commenced the felony of murder by
mauling the victim and hitting him three times with a hollow block; they narrowly missed
hitting the middle portion of his head. If Edgardo had done so, Ruben would surely have
died.
We reject petitioners contention that the prosecution failed to prove treachery in the
commission of the felony. Petitioners attacked the victim in a sudden and unexpected
manner as Ruben was walking with his three-year-old daughter, impervious of the imminent
peril to his life. He had no chance to defend himself and retaliate. He was overwhelmed by
the synchronized assault of the three siblings. The essence of treachery is the sudden and
unexpected attack on the victim.[17] Even if the attack is frontal but is sudden and
unexpected, giving no opportunity for the victim to repel it or defend himself, there would
be treachery.[18] Obviously, petitioners assaulted the victim because of the altercation
between him and petitioner Edgardo Rivera a day before. There being conspiracy by and
among petitioners, treachery is considered against all of them.[19]
The appellate court sentenced petitioners to suffer an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years
of prision correccional in its minimum period, as minimum, to six years and one day of
prision mayor in its maximum period, as maximum. This is erroneous. Under Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, the penalty for murder is
reclusion perpetua to death. Since petitioners are guilty only of attempted murder, the
penalty should be reduced by two degrees, conformably to Article 51 of the Revised Penal
Code. Under paragraph 2 of Article 61, in relation to Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code,
such a penalty is prision mayor. In the absence of any modifying circumstance in the
commission of the felony (other than the qualifying circumstance of treachery), the
maximum of the indeterminate penalty shall be taken from the medium period of prision
mayor which has a range of from eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years. To
determine the minimum of the indeterminate penalty, the penalty of prision mayor should be
reduced by one degree, prision correccional, which has a range of six (6) months and one
(1) day to six (6) years.
Hence, petitioners should be sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of from two (2)
years of prision correccional in its minimum period, as minimum, to nine (9) years and four
(4) months of prision mayor in its medium period, as maximum.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED WITH THE MODIFICATION that
petitioners are sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of from two (2) years of prision
correccional in its minimum period, as minimum, to nine (9) years and four (4) months of
prision mayor in its medium period, as maximum. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I CAT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
Chief Justice
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Portia Alio-Hormachuelos (Chairman), with Associate

Justices Danilo B. Pine and Fernanda Lampas Peralta, concurring; rollo, pp. 17-29.
[2] Penned by Judge Dolores L. Espaol; CA rollo, pp. 15-19.
[3] Records, p. 1.
[4] Exhibits B and B-1, records, p. 9.
[5] Id.
[6] TSN, June 19, 2000, p. 29.
[7]
TSN, September 24, 2001, pp. 2-18.

Records, p. 257.
[9] CA rollo, p. 136.
[10] Rollo, pp. 25-26.
[11] Id. at 70-71.
[12] G.R. No. 142773, January 28, 2003, 444 Phil. 430, 450 (2003).
[13] People v. Lizada, G.R. No. 143468-71, January 24, 2003, 444 Phil. 67 (2003).
[14] Reyes, Revised Penal Code, 1981, Vol. I, p. 98.
[15] Supra at note 13.
[16] Id. at 98-99.
[17] People v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 142905, March 18, 2002, 429 Phil. 124, 126 (2002).
[18] People v. Coscos, G.R. No. 132321, January 21, 2002, 424 Phil. 886, 903 (2002).
[19] People v. Sullano, G.R. No. 125896, May 11, 2000, 387 Phil. 668, 682 (2000).
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
[8]
SECOND DIVISION
ARTEMIO VILLAREAL,
Petitioner,
- versus -

Respondent.
x-------------------------x
Petitioner,
- versus -
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ANTONIO MARIANO ALMEDA,

DALMACIO LIM, JR., JUNEL ANTHONY AMA, ERNESTO JOSE MONTECILLO,
VINCENT TECSON, ANTONIO GENERAL, SANTIAGO RANADA III, NELSON
VICTORINO, JAIME MARIA FLORES II, ZOSIMO MENDOZA, MICHAEL MUSNGI,
VICENTE VERDADERO, ETIENNE GUERRERO, JUDE FERNANDEZ, AMANTE
PURISIMA II, EULOGIO SABBAN, PERCIVAL BRIGOLA, PAUL ANGELO SANTOS,
JONAS KARL B. PEREZ, RENATO BANTUG, JR., ADEL ABAS, JOSEPH LLEDO, and
RONAN DE GUZMAN,
Respondents.
x-------------------------x
FIDELITO DIZON,
Petitioner,
- versus -

Respondent.
x-------------------------x
GERARDA H. VILLA,
Petitioner,
- versus -
MANUEL LORENZO ESCALONA II, MARCUS JOEL CAPELLAN RAMOS,

CRISANTO CRUZ SARUCA, JR., and ANSELMO ADRIANO,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 151258
G.R. No. 154954
G.R. No. 155101
G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080

Present:
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
BRION,
PEREZ,
SERENO, and
REYES, JJ.
Promulgated:
February 1, 2012
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x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
The public outrage over the death of Leonardo Lenny Villa the victim in this case on 10
February 1991 led to a very strong clamor to put an end to hazing.[if !supportFootnotes][1][endif] Due
in large part to the brave efforts of his mother, petitioner Gerarda Villa, groups were
organized, condemning his senseless and tragic death. This widespread condemnation
prompted Congress to enact a special law, which became effective in 1995, that would
criminalize hazing.[if !supportFootnotes][2][endif] The intent of the law was to discourage members
from making hazing a requirement for joining their sorority, fraternity, organization, or
association.[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif] Moreover, the law was meant to counteract the
exculpatory implications of consent and initial innocent act in the conduct of initiation rites
by making the mere act of hazing punishable or mala prohibita.[if !supportFootnotes][4][endif]
Sadly, the Lenny Villa tragedy did not discourage hazing activities in the country.[if !
supportFootnotes][5][endif] Within a year of his death, six more cases of hazing-related deaths
emerged those of Frederick Cahiyang of the University of Visayas in Cebu; Raul Camaligan
of San Beda College; Felipe Narne of Pamantasan ng Araullo in Cabanatuan City; Dennis
Cenedoza of the Cavite Naval Training Center; Joselito Mangga of the Philippine Merchant
Marine Institute; and Joselito Hernandez of the University of the Philippines in Baguio City.
[if !supportFootnotes][6][endif]
Although courts must not remain indifferent to public sentiments, in this case the
general condemnation of a hazing-related death, they are still bound to observe a
fundamental principle in our criminal justice system [N]o act constitutes a crime unless it is
made so by law.[if !supportFootnotes][7][endif] Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege. Even if an act
is viewed by a large section of the populace as immoral or injurious, it cannot be considered
a crime, absent any law prohibiting its commission. As interpreters of the law, judges are
called upon to set aside emotion, to resist being swayed by strong public sentiments, and to
rule strictly based on the elements of the offense and the facts allowed in evidence.
Before the Court are the consolidated cases docketed as G.R. No. 151258
(Villareal v. People), G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals), G.R. No. 155101
(Dizon v. People), and G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 (Villa v. Escalona).
FACTS
The pertinent facts, as determined by the Court of Appeals (CA)[if !supportFootnotes][8]
[endif] and the trial court,[if !supportFootnotes][9][endif] are as follows:
In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila University
School of Law signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila
Fraternity). They were Caesar Bogs Asuncion, Samuel Sam Belleza, Bienvenido Bien
Marquez III, Roberto Francis Bert Navera, Geronimo Randy Recinto, Felix Sy, Jr., and
Leonardo Lenny Villa (neophytes).
On the night of 8 February 1991, the neophytes were met by some members of the
Aquila Fraternity (Aquilans) at the lobby of the Ateneo Law School. They all proceeded to
Rufos Restaurant to have dinner. Afterwards, they went to the house of Michael Musngi,
also an Aquilan, who briefed the neophytes on what to expect during the initiation rites. The
latter were informed that there would be physical beatings, and that they could quit at any
time. Their initiation rites were scheduled to last for three days. After their briefing, they
were brought to the Almeda Compound in Caloocan City for the commencement of their
initiation.
Even before the neophytes got off the van, they had already received threats and
insults from the Aquilans. As soon as the neophytes alighted from the van and walked
towards the pelota court of the Almeda compound, some of the Aquilans delivered physical
blows to them. The neophytes were then subjected to traditional forms of Aquilan initiation
rites. These rites included the Indian Run, which required the neophytes to run a gauntlet of
two parallel rows of Aquilans, each row delivering blows to the neophytes; the Bicol
Express, which obliged the neophytes to sit on the floor with their backs against the wall
and their legs outstretched while the Aquilans walked, jumped, or ran over their legs; the
Rounds, in which the neophytes were held at the back of their pants by the auxiliaries (the
Aquilans charged with the duty of lending assistance to neophytes during initiation rites),
while the latter were being hit with fist blows on their arms or with knee blows on their
thighs by two Aquilans; and the Auxies Privilege Round, in which the auxiliaries were given
the opportunity to inflict physical pain on the neophytes. During this time, the neophytes
were also indoctrinated with the fraternity principles. They survived their first day of
initiation.
On the morning of their second day 9 February 1991 the neophytes were made to
present comic plays and to play rough basketball. They were also required to memorize and
recite the Aquila Fraternitys principles. Whenever they would give a wrong answer, they
would be hit on their arms or legs. Late in the afternoon, the Aquilans revived the initiation
rites proper and proceeded to torment them physically and psychologically. The neophytes
were subjected to the same manner of hazing that they endured on the first day of initiation.
After a few hours, the initiation for the day officially ended.
After a while, accused non-resident or alumni fraternity members[if !supportFootnotes][10]
[endif] Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) and Artemio Villareal (Villareal) demanded that the rites be
reopened. The head of initiation rites, Nelson Victorino (Victorino), initially refused. Upon
the insistence of Dizon and Villareal, however, he reopened the initiation rites. The
fraternity members, including Dizon and Villareal, then subjected the neophytes to paddling
and to additional rounds of physical pain. Lenny received several paddle blows, one of
which was so strong it sent him sprawling to the ground. The neophytes heard him
complaining of intense pain and difficulty in breathing. After their last session of physical
beatings, Lenny could no longer walk. He had to be carried by the auxiliaries to the carport.
Again, the initiation for the day was officially ended, and the neophytes started eating
dinner. They then slept at the carport.
After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lennys shivering
and incoherent mumblings. Initially, Villareal and Dizon dismissed these rumblings, as they
thought he was just overacting. When they realized, though, that Lenny was really feeling
cold, some of the Aquilans started helping him. They removed his clothes and helped him
through a sleeping bag to keep him warm. When his condition worsened, the Aquilans
rushed him to the hospital. Lenny was pronounced dead on arrival.
Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against the following 35
Aquilans:
In Criminal Case No. C-38340(91)
[if !supportLists]1.
[endif]Fidelito Dizon (Dizon)
[endif]Artemio Villareal (Villareal)
[endif]Efren de Leon (De Leon)
[endif]Vincent Tecson (Tecson)
[endif]Junel Anthony Ama (Ama)
[endif]Antonio Mariano Almeda (Almeda)
[endif]Renato Bantug, Jr. (Bantug)
[endif]Nelson Victorino (Victorino)
[endif]Eulogio Sabban (Sabban)
[endif]Joseph Lledo (Lledo)
[endif]Etienne Guerrero (Guerrero)
[endif]Michael Musngi (Musngi)
[endif]Jonas Karl Perez (Perez)
[endif]Paul Angelo Santos (Santos)
[endif]Ronan de Guzman (De Guzman)
[endif]Antonio General (General)
[endif]Jaime Maria Flores II (Flores)

[endif]Dalmacio Lim, Jr. (Lim)
[endif]Ernesto Jose Montecillo (Montecillo)
[endif]Santiago Ranada III (Ranada)
[endif]Zosimo Mendoza (Mendoza)
[endif]Vicente Verdadero (Verdadero)
[endif]Amante Purisima II (Purisima)
[endif]Jude Fernandez (J. Fernandez)
[endif]Adel Abas (Abas)
[endif]Percival Brigola (Brigola)
In Criminal Case No. C-38340

[endif]Manuel Escalona II (Escalona)
[endif]Crisanto Saruca, Jr. (Saruca)
[endif]Anselmo Adriano (Adriano)
[endif]Marcus Joel Ramos (Ramos)
[endif]Reynaldo Concepcion (Concepcion)
[endif]Florentino Ampil (Ampil)
[endif]Enrico de Vera III (De Vera)
[endif]Stanley Fernandez (S. Fernandez)
[endif]Noel Cabangon (Cabangon)
Twenty-six of the accused Aquilans in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) were jointly
On the other hand, the trial against the remaining nine accused
in Criminal Case No. C-38340 was held in abeyance due to certain matters that had to be
resolved first.[if !supportFootnotes][12][endif]
On 8 November 1993, the trial court rendered judgment in Criminal Case No.
C-38340(91), holding the 26 accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
homicide, penalized with reclusion temporal under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.
[if !supportFootnotes][13][endif] A few weeks after the trial court rendered its judgment, or on 29
November 1993, Criminal Case No. C-38340 against the remaining nine accused
commenced anew.[if !supportFootnotes][14][endif]
On 10 January 2002, the CA in (CA-G.R. No. 15520)[if !supportFootnotes][15][endif] set aside the
finding of conspiracy by the trial court in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) and modified the
criminal liability of each of the accused according to individual participation. Accused De
Leon had by then passed away, so the following Decision applied only to the remaining 25
accused, viz:
[endif]Nineteen of the accused-appellants Victorino, Sabban,
Lledo, Guerrero, Musngi, Perez, De Guzman, Santos, General, Flores, Lim, Montecillo,
Ranada, Mendoza, Verdadero, Purisima, Fernandez, Abas, and Brigola (Victorino et al.)
were acquitted, as their individual guilt was not established by proof beyond reasonable
doubt.
tried.[if !supportFootnotes][11][endif]
[endif]Four of the accused-appellants Vincent Tecson, Junel
Anthony Ama, Antonio Mariano Almeda, and Renato Bantug, Jr. (Tecson et al.) were found
guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries and sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor.
They were also ordered to jointly pay the heirs of the victim the sum of 30,000 as
indemnity.
[endif]Two of the accused-appellants Fidelito Dizon and Artemio
Villareal were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide under Article
249 of the Revised Penal Code. Having found no mitigating or aggravating circumstance,
the CA sentenced them to an indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor to 17
years of reclusion temporal. They were also ordered to indemnify, jointly and severally, the
heirs of Lenny Villa in the sum of 50,000 and to pay the additional amount of 1,000,000
by way of moral damages.
On 5 August 2002, the trial court in Criminal Case No. 38340 dismissed the charge
against accused Concepcion on the ground of violation of his right to speedy trial.[if !
supportFootnotes][16][endif] Meanwhile, on different dates between the years 2003 and 2005, the
trial court denied the respective Motions to Dismiss of accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca,
and Adriano.[if !supportFootnotes][17][endif] On 25 October 2006, the CA in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 89060
& 90153[if !supportFootnotes][18][endif] reversed the trial courts Orders and dismissed the criminal
case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of violation of their right to
speedy trial.[if !supportFootnotes][19][endif]
From the aforementioned Decisions, the five (5) consolidated Petitions were
individually brought before this Court.
G.R. No. 151258 Villareal v. People
The instant case refers to accused Villareals Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45. The Petition raises two reversible errors allegedly committed by the CA in
its Decision dated 10 January 2002 in CA-G.R. No. 15520 first, denial of due process; and,
second, conviction absent proof beyond reasonable doubt.[if !supportFootnotes][20][endif]
While the Petition was pending before this Court, counsel for petitioner Villareal
filed a Notice of Death of Party on 10 August 2011. According to the Notice, petitioner
Villareal died on 13 March 2011. Counsel thus asserts that the subject matter of the Petition
previously filed by petitioner does not survive the death of the accused.
G.R. No. 155101 Dizon v. People
Accused Dizon filed a Rule 45 Petition for Review on Certiorari, questioning the
CAs Decision dated 10 January 2002 and Resolution dated 30 August 2002 in CA-G.R. No.
15520.[if !supportFootnotes][21][endif] Petitioner sets forth two main issues first, that he was denied
due process when the CA sustained the trial courts forfeiture of his right to present
evidence; and, second, that he was deprived of due process when the CA did not apply to
him the same ratio decidendi that served as basis of acquittal of the other accused.[if !
supportFootnotes][22][endif]
As regards the first issue, the trial court made a ruling, which forfeited Dizons
right to present evidence during trial. The trial court expected Dizon to present evidence on
an earlier date since a co-accused, Antonio General, no longer presented separate evidence
during trial. According to Dizon, his right should not have been considered as waived
because he was justified in asking for a postponement. He argues that he did not ask for a
resetting of any of the hearing dates and in fact insisted that he was ready to present
evidence on the original pre-assigned schedule, and not on an earlier hearing date.
Regarding the second issue, petitioner contends that he should have likewise been
acquitted, like the other accused, since his acts were also part of the traditional initiation
rites and were not tainted by evil motives.[if !supportFootnotes][23][endif] He claims that the
additional paddling session was part of the official activity of the fraternity. He also points
out that one of the neophytes admitted that the chairperson of the initiation rites decided that
[Lenny] was fit enough to undergo the initiation so Mr. Villareal proceeded to do the
paddling.[if !supportFootnotes][24][endif] Further, petitioner echoes the argument of the Solicitor
General that the individual blows inflicted by Dizon and Villareal could not have resulted in
Lennys death.[if !supportFootnotes][25][endif] The Solicitor General purportedly averred that, on the
contrary, Dr. Arizala testified that the injuries suffered by Lenny could not be considered
fatal if taken individually, but if taken collectively, the result is the violent death of the
victim.[if !supportFootnotes][26][endif]
Petitioner then counters the finding of the CA that he was motivated by ill will. He
claims that Lennys father could not have stolen the parking space of Dizons father, since the
latter did not have a car, and their fathers did not work in the same place or office. Revenge
for the loss of the parking space was the alleged ill motive of Dizon. According to petitioner,
his utterances regarding a stolen parking space were only part of the psychological
initiation. He then cites the testimony of Lennys co-neophyte witness Marquez who
admitted knowing it was not true and that he was just making it up.[if !supportFootnotes][27][endif]
Further, petitioner argues that his alleged motivation of ill will was negated by his
show of concern for Villa after the initiation rites. Dizon alludes to the testimony of one of
the neophytes, who mentioned that the former had kicked the leg of the neophyte and told
him to switch places with Lenny to prevent the latters chills. When the chills did not stop,
Dizon, together with Victorino, helped Lenny through a sleeping bag and made him sit on a
chair. According to petitioner, his alleged ill motivation is contradicted by his manifestation
of compassion and concern for the victims well-being.
G.R. No. 154954 People v. Court of Appeals
This Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 seeks the reversal of the CAs Decision dated 10
January 2002 and Resolution dated 30 August 2002 in CA-G.R. No. 15520, insofar as it
acquitted 19 (Victorino et al.) and convicted 4 (Tecson et al.) of the accused Aquilans of the
lesser crime of slight physical injuries.[if !supportFootnotes][28][endif] According to the Solicitor
General, the CA erred in holding that there could have been no conspiracy to commit
hazing, as hazing or fraternity initiation had not yet been criminalized at the time Lenny
died.
In the alternative, petitioner claims that the ruling of the trial court should have
been upheld, inasmuch as it found that there was conspiracy to inflict physical injuries on
Lenny. Since the injuries led to the victims death, petitioner posits that the accused Aquilans
are criminally liable for the resulting crime of homicide, pursuant to Article 4 of the Revised
Penal Code.[if !supportFootnotes][29][endif] The said article provides: Criminal liability shall be
incurred [b]y any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended.
Petitioner also argues that the rule on double jeopardy is inapplicable. According to
the Solicitor General, the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, in setting aside the trial courts finding of conspiracy and in ruling that
the criminal liability of
all the accused must be based on their individual participation in the commission of the
crime.
G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 Villa v. Escalona
Petitioner Villa filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari, praying for the
reversal of the CAs Decision dated 25 October 2006 and Resolution dated 17 May 2007 in
CA-G.R. S.P. Nos. 89060 and 90153.[if !supportFootnotes][30][endif] The Petition involves the
dismissal of the criminal charge filed against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano.
Due to several pending incidents, the trial court ordered a separate trial for accused
Escalona, Saruca, Adriano, Ramos, Ampil, Concepcion, De Vera, S. Fernandez, and
Cabangon (Criminal Case No. C-38340) to commence after proceedings against the 26
other accused in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) shall have terminated. On 8 November
1993, the trial court found the 26 accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt. As a result, the
proceedings in Criminal Case No. C-38340 involving the nine other co-accused
recommenced on 29 November 1993. For various reasons, the initial trial of the case did not
commence until 28 March 2005, or almost 12 years after the arraignment of the nine
accused.
Petitioner Villa assails the CAs dismissal of the criminal case involving 4 of the 9 accused,
namely, Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano. She argues that the accused failed to assert
their right to speedy trial within a reasonable period of time. She also points out that the
prosecution cannot be faulted for the delay, as the original records and the required evidence
were not at its disposal, but were still in the appellate court.
We resolve herein the various issues that we group into five.
ISSUES
[if !supportLists]1. [endif]Whether the forfeiture of petitioner Dizons right to present
evidence constitutes denial of due process;
[if !supportLists]2. [endif]Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it dismissed the case against Escalona,
Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano for violation of the right of the accused to speedy trial;
[if !supportLists]3. [endif]Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, when it set aside the finding of conspiracy by
the trial court and adjudicated the liability of each accused according to individual
participation;
[if !supportLists]4. [endif]Whether accused Dizon is guilty of homicide; and
[if !supportLists]5. [endif]Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it
pronounced Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug guilty only of slight physical injuries.
DISCUSSION
Resolution on Preliminary Matters
G.R. No. 151258 Villareal v. People

In a Notice dated 26 September 2011 and while the Petition was pending
resolution, this Court took note of counsel for petitioners Notice of Death of Party.
According to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability for
personal penalties is totally extinguished by the death of the convict. In contrast, criminal
liability for pecuniary penalties is extinguished if the offender dies prior to final judgment.
The term personal penalties refers to the service of personal or imprisonment penalties,[if !
supportFootnotes][31][endif] while the term pecuniary penalties (las pecuniarias) refers to fines and
costs,[if !supportFootnotes][32][endif] including civil liability predicated on the criminal offense
complained of (i.e., civil liability ex delicto).[if !supportFootnotes][33][endif] However, civil liability
based on a source of obligation other than the delict survives the death of the accused and is
recoverable through a separate civil action.[if !supportFootnotes][34][endif]
Thus, we hold that the death of petitioner Villareal extinguished his criminal
liability for both personal and pecuniary penalties, including his civil liability directly
arising from the delict complained of. Consequently, his Petition is hereby dismissed, and
the criminal case against him deemed closed and terminated.
G.R. No. 155101 (Dizon v. People)
In an Order dated 28 July 1993, the trial court set the dates for the reception of
evidence for accused-petitioner Dizon on the 8th, 15th, and 22nd of September; and the 5th
and 12 of October 1993.[if !supportFootnotes][35][endif] The Order likewise stated that it will not
entertain any postponement and that all the accused who have not yet presented their
respective evidence should be ready at all times down the line, with their evidence on all
said dates. Failure on their part to present evidence when required shall therefore be
construed as waiver to present evidence.[if !supportFootnotes][36][endif]
However, on 19 August 1993, counsel for another accused manifested in open
court that his client Antonio General would no longer present separate evidence. Instead, the
counsel would adopt the testimonial evidence of the other accused who had already
testified.[if !supportFootnotes][37][endif] Because of this development and pursuant to the trial courts
Order that the parties should be ready at all times down the line, the trial court expected
Dizon to present evidence on the next trial date 25 August 1993 instead of his originally
assigned dates. The original dates were supposed to start two weeks later, or on 8 September
1993.[if !supportFootnotes][38][endif] Counsel for accused Dizon was not able to present evidence on
the accelerated date. To address the situation, counsel filed a Constancia on 25 August 1993,
alleging that he had to appear in a previously scheduled case, and that he would be ready to
present evidence on the dates originally assigned to his clients.[if !supportFootnotes][39][endif] The
trial court denied the Manifestation on the same date and treated the Constancia as a motion
for postponement, in violation of the three-day-notice rule under the Rules of Court.[if !
supportFootnotes][40][endif] Consequently, the trial court ruled that the failure of Dizon to present
evidence amounted to a waiver of that right.[if !supportFootnotes][41][endif]
Accused-petitioner Dizon thus argues that he was deprived of due process of law
when the trial court forfeited his right to present evidence. According to him, the
postponement of the 25 August 1993 hearing should have been considered justified, since
his original pre-assigned trial dates were not supposed to start until 8 September 1993, when
he was scheduled to present evidence. He posits that he was ready to present evidence on
the dates assigned to him. He also points out that he did not ask for a resetting of any of the
said hearing dates; that he in fact insisted on being allowed to present evidence on the dates
fixed by the trial court. Thus, he contends that the trial court erred in accelerating the
schedule of presentation of evidence, thereby invalidating the finding of his guilt.
The right of the accused to present evidence is guaranteed by no less than the
Constitution itself.[if !supportFootnotes][42][endif] Article III, Section 14(2) thereof, provides that in
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and
counsel This constitutional right includes the right to present evidence in ones defense,[if !
supportFootnotes][43][endif] as well as the right to be present and defend oneself in person at every
stage of the proceedings.[if !supportFootnotes][44][endif]
In Crisostomo v. Sandiganbayan,[if !supportFootnotes][45][endif] the Sandiganbayan set the
hearing of the defenses presentation of evidence for 21, 22 and 23 June 1995. The 21 June
1995 hearing was cancelled due to lack of quorum in the regular membership of the
Sandiganbayans Second Division and upon the agreement of the parties. The hearing was
reset for the next day, 22 June 1995, but Crisostomo and his counsel failed to attend. The
Sandiganbayan, on the very same day, issued an Order directing the issuance of a warrant
for the arrest of Crisostomo and the confiscation of his surety bond. The Order further
declared that he had waived his right to present evidence because of his nonappearance at
yesterdays and todays scheduled hearings. In ruling against the Order, we held thus:
Under Section 2(c), Rule 114 and Section 1(c), Rule 115
of the Rules of Court, Crisostomos non-appearance during the 22
June 1995 trial was merely a waiver of his right to be present for
trial on such date only and not for the succeeding trial dates
xxxxxxxxx
Moreover, Crisostomos absence on the 22 June 1995

hearing should not have been deemed as a waiver of his right to
present evidence. While constitutional rights may be waived, such
waiver must be clear and must be coupled with an actual intention
to relinquish the right. Crisostomo did not voluntarily waive in
person or even through his counsel the right to present evidence.
The Sandiganbayan imposed the waiver due to the agreement of
the prosecution, Calingayan, and Calingayan's counsel.
In criminal cases where the imposable penalty may be

death, as in the present case, the court is called upon to see to it
that the accused is personally made aware of the consequences of a

waiver of the right to present evidence. In fact, it is not enough that
the accused is simply warned of the consequences of another
failure to attend the succeeding hearings. The court must first
explain to the accused personally in clear terms the exact nature
and consequences of a waiver. Crisostomo was not even
forewarned. The Sandiganbayan simply went ahead to deprive
Crisostomo of his right to present evidence without even allowing
Crisostomo to explain his absence on the 22 June 1995 hearing.
Clearly, the waiver of the right to present evidence in a

criminal case involving a grave penalty is not assumed and taken
lightly. The presence of the accused and his counsel is
indispensable so that the court could personally conduct a
searching inquiry into the waiver x x x.[if !supportFootnotes][46][endif]
(Emphasis supplied)
The trial court should not have deemed the failure of petitioner to present evidence
on 25 August 1993 as a waiver of his right to present evidence. On the contrary, it should
have considered the excuse of counsel justified, especially since counsel for another accused
General had made a last-minute adoption of testimonial evidence that freed up the
succeeding trial dates; and since Dizon was not scheduled to testify until two weeks later. At
any rate, the trial court pre-assigned five hearing dates for the reception of evidence. If it
really wanted to impose its Order strictly, the most it could have done was to forfeit one out
of the five days set for Dizons testimonial evidence. Stripping the accused of all his preassigned trial dates constitutes a patent denial of the constitutionally guaranteed right to due
process.
Nevertheless, as in the case of an improvident guilty plea, an invalid waiver of the
right to present evidence and be heard does not per se work to vacate a finding of guilt in
the criminal case or to enforce an automatic remand of the case to the trial court.[if !
supportFootnotes][47][endif] In People v. Bodoso, we ruled that where facts have adequately been
represented in a criminal case, and no procedural unfairness or irregularity has prejudiced
either the prosecution or the defense as a result of the invalid waiver, the rule is that a guilty
verdict may nevertheless be upheld if the judgment is supported beyond reasonable doubt
by the evidence on record.[if !supportFootnotes][48][endif]
We do not see any material inadequacy in the relevant facts on record to resolve
the case at bar. Neither can we see any procedural unfairness or irregularity that would
substantially prejudice either the prosecution or the defense as a result of the invalid waiver.
In fact, the arguments set forth by accused Dizon in his Petition corroborate the material
facts relevant to decide the matter. Instead, what he is really contesting in his Petition is the
application of the law to the facts by the trial court and the CA. Petitioner Dizon admits
direct participation in the hazing of Lenny Villa by alleging in his Petition that all actions of
the petitioner were part of the traditional rites, and that the alleged extension of the initiation
rites was not outside the official activity of the fraternity.[if !supportFootnotes][49][endif] He even
argues that Dizon did not request for the extension and he participated only after the activity
was sanctioned.[if !supportFootnotes][50][endif]
For one reason or another, the case has been passed or turned over from one judge
or justice to another at the trial court, at the CA, and even at the Supreme Court. Remanding
the case for the reception of the evidence of petitioner Dizon would only inflict further
injustice on the parties. This case has been going on for almost two decades. Its resolution is
long overdue. Since the key facts necessary to decide the case have already been
determined, we shall proceed to decide it.
G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 (Villa v. Escalona)
Petitioner Villa argues that the case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano should
not have been dismissed, since they failed to assert their right to speedy trial within a
reasonable period of time. She points out that the accused failed to raise a protest during the
dormancy of the criminal case against them, and that they asserted their right only after the
trial court had dismissed the case against their co-accused Concepcion. Petitioner also
emphasizes that the trial court denied the respective Motions to Dismiss filed by Saruca,
Escalona, Ramos, and Adriano, because it found that the prosecution could not be faulted
for the delay in the movement of this case when the original records and the evidence it may
require were not at its disposal as these were in the Court of Appeals.[if !supportFootnotes][51][endif]
The right of the accused to a speedy trial has been enshrined in Sections 14(2) and
16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.[if !supportFootnotes][52][endif] This right requires that there
be a trial free from vexatious, capricious or oppressive delays.[if !supportFootnotes][53][endif] The
right is deemed violated when the proceeding is attended with unjustified postponements of
trial, or when a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the case being tried and for
no cause or justifiable motive.[if !supportFootnotes][54][endif] In determining the right of the accused
to speedy trial, courts should do more than a mathematical computation of the number of
postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case.[if !supportFootnotes][55][endif] The conduct of
both the prosecution and the defense must be weighed.[if !supportFootnotes][56][endif] Also to be
considered are factors such as the length of delay, the assertion or non-assertion of the right,
and the prejudice wrought upon the defendant.[if !supportFootnotes][57][endif]
We have consistently ruled in a long line of cases that a dismissal of the case
pursuant to the right of the accused to speedy trial is tantamount to acquittal.[if !supportFootnotes]
[58][endif] As a consequence, an appeal or a reconsideration of the dismissal would amount to a
violation of the principle of double jeopardy.[if !supportFootnotes][59][endif] As we have previously
discussed, however, where the dismissal of the case is capricious, certiorari lies.[if !
supportFootnotes][60][endif] The rule on double jeopardy is not triggered when a petition challenges
the validity of the order of dismissal instead of the correctness thereof.[if !supportFootnotes][61][endif]
Rather, grave abuse of discretion amounts to lack of jurisdiction, and lack of jurisdiction
prevents double jeopardy from attaching.[if !supportFootnotes][62][endif]
We do not see grave abuse of discretion in the CAs dismissal of the case against
accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of the violation of their right to
speedy trial. The court held thus:
An examination of the procedural history of this case
would reveal that the following factors contributed to the slow
progress of the proceedings in the case below:
xxxxxxxxx
5) The fact that the records of the case were elevated to the Court of
Appeals and the prosecutions failure to comply with
the order of the court a quo requiring them to secure
certified true copies of the same.
xxxxxxxxx
While we are prepared to concede that some of the

foregoing factors that contributed to the delay of the trial of the
petitioners are justifiable, We nonetheless hold that their right to
speedy trial has been utterly violated in this case x x x.
xxxxxxxxx
[T]he absence of the records in the trial court [was] due to the fact that the
records of the case were elevated to the Court of Appeals, and the
prosecutions failure to comply with the order of the court a quo
requiring it to secure certified true copies of the same. What is
glaring from the records is the fact that as early as September 21,
1995, the court a quo already issued an Order requiring the
prosecution, through the Department of Justice, to secure the

complete records of the case from the Court of Appeals. The
prosecution did not comply with the said Order as in fact, the same
directive was repeated by the court a quo in an Order dated
December 27, 1995. Still, there was no compliance on the part of
the prosecution. It is not stated when such order was complied
with. It appears, however, that even until August 5, 2002, the said
records were still not at the disposal of the trial court because the
lack of it was made the basis of the said court in granting the
motion to dismiss filed by co-accused Concepcion x x x.
xxxxxxxxx
It is likewise noticeable that from December 27, 1995,

until August 5, 2002, or for a period of almost seven years, there
was no action at all on the part of the court a quo. Except for the
pleadings filed by both the prosecution and the petitioners, the
latest of which was on January 29, 1996, followed by petitioner
Sarucas motion to set case for trial on August 17, 1998 which the
court did not act upon, the case remained dormant for a
considerable length of time. This prolonged inactivity whatsoever
is precisely the kind of delay that the constitution frowns upon x x
x.[if !supportFootnotes][63][endif] (Emphasis supplied)
This Court points out that on 10 January 1992, the final amended Information was filed
against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, Ampil, S. Fernandez, Adriano, Cabangon, Concepcion,
and De Vera.[if !supportFootnotes][64][endif] On 29 November 1993, they were all arraigned.[if !
supportFootnotes][65][endif] Unfortunately, the initial trial of the case did not commence until 28
March 2005 or almost 12 years after arraignment.[if !supportFootnotes][66][endif]
As illustrated in our ruling in Abardo v. Sandiganbayan, the unexplained interval or
inactivity of the Sandiganbayan for close to five years since the arraignment of the accused
amounts to an unreasonable delay in the disposition of cases a clear violation of the right of
the accused to a speedy disposition of cases.[if !supportFootnotes][67][endif] Thus, we held:
The delay in this case measures up to the
unreasonableness of the delay in the disposition of cases in
Angchangco, Jr. vs. Ombudsman, where the Court found the delay
of six years by the Ombudsman in resolving the criminal
complaints to be violative of the constitutionally guaranteed right
to a speedy disposition of cases; similarly, in Roque vs. Office of

the Ombudsman, where the Court held that the delay of almost six
years disregarded the Ombudsman's duty to act promptly on
complaints before him; and in Cervantes vs. Sandiganbayan,
where the Court held that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its
discretion in not quashing the information which was filed six
years after the initiatory complaint was filed and thereby depriving
petitioner of his right to a speedy disposition of the case. So it
must be in the instant case, where the reinvestigation by the
Ombudsman has dragged on for a decade already.[if !supportFootnotes][68]
[endif] (Emphasis supplied)
From the foregoing principles, we affirm the ruling of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No.
89060 that accused Escalona et al.s right to speedy trial was violated. Since there is nothing
in the records that would show that the subject of this Petition includes accused Ampil, S.
Fernandez, Cabangon, and De Vera, the effects of this ruling shall be limited to accused
Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano.
G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals)
The rule on double jeopardy is one of the pillars of our criminal justice system. It dictates
that when a person is charged with an offense, and the case is terminated either by acquittal
or conviction or in any other manner without the consent of the accused the accused cannot
again be charged with the same or an identical offense.[if !supportFootnotes][69][endif] This principle
is founded upon the law of reason, justice and conscience.[if !supportFootnotes][70][endif] It is
embodied in the civil law maxim non bis in idem found in the common law of England and
undoubtedly in every system of jurisprudence.[if !supportFootnotes][71][endif] It found expression in
the Spanish Law, in the Constitution of the United States, and in our own Constitution as
one of the fundamental rights of the citizen,[if !supportFootnotes][72][endif] viz:
Article III Bill of Rights
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If
an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall
constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.
Rule 117, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, which implements this particular
constitutional right, provides as follows:[if !supportFootnotes][73][endif]
SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. When an accused has
been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or
information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction
and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or
the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for
any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily
includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or
information.
The rule on double jeopardy thus prohibits the state from appealing the judgment
in order to reverse the acquittal or to increase the penalty imposed either through a regular
appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court or through an appeal by certiorari on pure
questions of law under Rule 45 of the same Rules.[if !supportFootnotes][74][endif] The requisites for
invoking double jeopardy are the following: (a) there is a valid complaint or information;
(b) it is filed before a competent court; (c) the defendant pleaded to the charge; and (d) the
defendant was acquitted or convicted, or the case against him or her was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without the defendants express consent.[if !supportFootnotes][75][endif]
As we have reiterated in People v. Court of Appeals and Galicia, [a] verdict of
acquittal is immediately final and a reexamination of the merits of such acquittal, even in
the appellate courts, will put the accused in jeopardy for the same offense. The finality-ofacquittal doctrine has several avowed purposes. Primarily, it prevents the State from using
its criminal processes as an instrument of harassment to wear out the accused by a multitude
of cases with accumulated trials. It also serves the additional purpose of precluding the
State, following an acquittal, from successively retrying the defendant in the hope of
securing a conviction. And finally, it prevents the State, following conviction, from retrying
the defendant again in the hope of securing a greater penalty.[if !supportFootnotes][76][endif] We
further stressed that an acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of repose as a direct
consequence of the finality of his acquittal.[if !supportFootnotes][77][endif]
This prohibition, however, is not absolute. The state may challenge the lower
courts acquittal of the accused or the imposition of a lower penalty on the latter in the
following recognized exceptions: (1) where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity
to prosecute and prove its case, tantamount to a deprivation of due process;[if !supportFootnotes][78]
[endif] (2) where there is a finding of mistrial;[if !supportFootnotes][79][endif] or (3) where there has
been a grave abuse of discretion.[if !supportFootnotes][80][endif]
The third instance refers to this Courts judicial power under Rule 65 to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.[if !supportFootnotes][81]
[endif] Here, the party asking for the review must show the presence of a whimsical or
capricious exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; a patent and gross abuse
of discretion amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a
duty imposed by law or to act in contemplation of law; an exercise of power in an arbitrary
and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility;[if !supportFootnotes][82][endif] or a blatant
abuse of authority to a point so grave and so severe as to deprive the court of its very power
to dispense justice.[if !supportFootnotes][83][endif] In such an event, the accused cannot be considered
to be at risk of double jeopardy.[if !supportFootnotes][84][endif]
The Solicitor General filed a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari, which seeks the
reversal of (1) the acquittal of Victorino et al. and (2) the conviction of Tecson et al. for the
lesser crime of slight physical injuries, both on the basis of a misappreciation of facts and
evidence. According to the Petition, the decision of the Court of Appeals is not in
accordance with law because private complainant and petitioner were denied due process of
law when the public respondent completely ignored the a) Position Paper x x x b) the
Motion for Partial Reconsideration x x x and c) the petitioners Comment x x x.[if !
supportFootnotes][85][endif] Allegedly, the CA ignored evidence when it adopted the theory of
individual responsibility; set aside the finding of conspiracy by the trial court; and failed to
apply Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code.[if !supportFootnotes][86][endif] The Solicitor General also
assails the finding that the physical blows were inflicted only by Dizon and Villareal, as
well as the appreciation of Lenny Villas consent to hazing.[if !supportFootnotes][87][endif]
In our view, what the Petition seeks is that we reexamine, reassess, and reweigh the
probative value of the evidence presented by the parties.[if !supportFootnotes][88][endif] In People v.
Maquiling, we held that grave abuse of discretion cannot be attributed to a court simply
because it allegedly misappreciated the facts and the evidence.[if !supportFootnotes][89][endif] Mere
errors of judgment are correctible by an appeal or a petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, and not by an application for a writ of certiorari.[if !supportFootnotes][90][endif]
Therefore, pursuant to the rule on double jeopardy, we are constrained to deny the Petition
contra Victorino et al. the 19 acquitted fraternity members.
We, however, modify the assailed judgment as regards Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and
Bantug the four fraternity members convicted of slight physical injuries.
Indeed, we have ruled in a line of cases that the rule on double jeopardy similarly
applies when the state seeks the imposition of a higher penalty against the accused.[if !
supportFootnotes][91][endif] We have also recognized, however, that certiorari may be used to
correct an abusive judgment upon a clear demonstration that the lower court blatantly
abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice.
[if !supportFootnotes][92][endif] The present case is one of those instances of grave abuse of
discretion.
In imposing the penalty of slight physical injuries on Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and
Bantug, the CA reasoned thus:
Based on the medical findings, it would appear that with the exclusion of the fatal
wounds inflicted by the accused Dizon and Villareal, the injuries sustained by the victim as
a result of the physical punishment heaped on him were serious in nature. However, by
reason of the death of the victim, there can be no precise means to determine the duration of
the incapacity or the medical attendance required. To do so, at this stage would be merely
speculative. In a prosecution for this crime where the category of the offense and the
severity of the penalty depend on the period of illness or incapacity for labor, the length of
this period must likewise be proved beyond reasonable doubt in much the same manner as
the same act charged [People v. Codilla, CA-G.R. No. 4079-R, June 26, 1950]. And when
proof of the said period is absent, the crime committed should be deemed only as slight
physical injuries [People v. De los Santos, CA, 59 O.G. 4393, citing People v. Penesa, 81
Phil. 398]. As such, this Court is constrained to rule that the injuries inflicted by the
appellants, Tecson, Ama, Almeda and Bantug, Jr., are only slight and not serious, in nature.[if
!supportFootnotes][93][endif] (Emphasis supplied and citations included)
The appellate court relied on our ruling in People v. Penesa[if !supportFootnotes][94][endif]
in finding that the four accused should be held guilty only of slight physical injuries.
According to the CA, because of the death of the victim, there can be no precise means to
determine the duration of the incapacity or medical attendance required.[if !supportFootnotes][95]
[endif] The reliance on Penesa was utterly misplaced. A review of that case would reveal that
the accused therein was guilty merely of slight physical injuries, because the victims injuries
neither caused incapacity for labor nor required medical attendance.[if !supportFootnotes][96][endif]
Furthermore, he did not die.[if !supportFootnotes][97][endif] His injuries were not even serious.[if !
Since Penesa involved a case in which the victim allegedly suffered

physical injuries and not death, the ruling cited by the CA was patently inapplicable.
On the contrary, the CAs ultimate conclusion that Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and
Bantug were liable merely for slight physical injuries grossly contradicts its own findings of
fact. According to the court, the four accused were found to have inflicted more than the
usual punishment undertaken during such initiation rites on the person of Villa.[if !
supportFootnotes][99][endif] It then adopted the NBI medico-legal officers findings that the
antecedent cause of Lenny Villas death was the multiple traumatic injuries he suffered from
the initiation rites.[if !supportFootnotes][100][endif] Considering that the CA found that the physical
punishment heaped on [Lenny Villa was] serious in nature,[if !supportFootnotes][101][endif] it was
patently erroneous for the court to limit the criminal liability to slight physical injuries,
which is a light felony.
Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code dictates that the perpetrator shall be liable
for the consequences of an act, even if its result is different from that intended. Thus, once a
person is found to have committed an initial felonious act, such as the unlawful infliction of
physical injuries that results in the death of the victim, courts are required to automatically
apply the legal framework governing the destruction of life. This rule is mandatory, and not
subject to discretion.
The CAs application of the legal framework governing physical injuries punished
under Articles 262 to 266 for intentional felonies and Article 365 for culpable felonies is
therefore tantamount to a whimsical, capricious, and abusive exercise of judgment
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. According to the Revised Penal Code, the mandatory and
legally imposable penalty in case the victim dies should be based on the framework
governing the destruction of the life of a person, punished under Articles 246 to 261 for
intentional felonies and Article 365 for culpable felonies, and not under the aforementioned
provisions. We emphasize that these two types of felonies are distinct from and legally
inconsistent with each other, in that the accused cannot be held criminally liable for physical
injuries when actual death occurs.[if !supportFootnotes][102][endif]
Attributing criminal liability solely to Villareal and Dizon as if only their acts, in
and of themselves, caused the death of Lenny Villa is contrary to the CAs own findings.
From proof that the death of the victim was the cumulative effect of the multiple injuries he
suffered,[if !supportFootnotes][103][endif] the only logical conclusion is that criminal responsibility
should redound to all those who have been proven to have directly participated in the
infliction of physical injuries on Lenny. The accumulation of bruising on his body caused
him to suffer cardiac arrest. Accordingly, we find that the CA committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in finding Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and
Bantug criminally liable for slight physical injuries. As an allowable exception to the rule on
double jeopardy, we therefore give due course to the Petition in G.R. No. 154954.
Resolution on Ultimate Findings
According to the trial court, although hazing was not (at the time) punishable as a crime, the
intentional infliction of physical injuries on Villa was nonetheless a felonious act under
Articles 263 to 266 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, in ruling against the accused, the court
a quo found that pursuant to Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code, the accused fraternity
members were guilty of homicide, as it was the direct, natural and logical consequence of
the physical injuries they had intentionally inflicted.[if !supportFootnotes][104][endif]
The CA modified the trial courts finding of criminal liability. It ruled that there
could have been no conspiracy since the neophytes, including Lenny Villa, had knowingly
consented to the conduct of hazing during their initiation rites. The accused fraternity
members, therefore, were liable only for the consequences of their individual acts.
Accordingly, 19 of the accused Victorino et al. were acquitted; 4 of them Tecson et al. were
found guilty of slight physical injuries; and the remaining 2 Dizon and Villareal were found
guilty of homicide.
The issue at hand does not concern a typical criminal case wherein the perpetrator
clearly commits a felony in order to take revenge upon, to gain advantage over, to harm
maliciously, or to get even with, the victim. Rather, the case involves an ex ante situation in
which a man driven by his own desire to join a society of men pledged to go through
physically and psychologically strenuous admission rituals, just so he could enter the
fraternity. Thus, in order to understand how our criminal laws apply to such situation absent
the Anti-Hazing Law, we deem it necessary to make a brief exposition on the underlying
concepts shaping intentional felonies, as well as on the nature of physical and psychological
initiations widely known as hazing.
Intentional Felony and Conspiracy
Our Revised Penal Code belongs to the classical school of thought.[if !supportFootnotes]
[105][endif] The classical theory posits that a human person is essentially a moral creature with
an absolute free will to choose between good and evil.[if !supportFootnotes][106][endif] It asserts that
one should only be adjudged or held accountable for wrongful acts so long as free will
appears unimpaired.[if !supportFootnotes][107][endif] The basic postulate of the classical penal system
is that humans are rational and calculating beings who guide their actions with reference to
the principles of pleasure and pain.[if !supportFootnotes][108][endif] They refrain from criminal acts if
threatened with punishment sufficient to cancel the hope of possible gain or advantage in
committing the crime.[if !supportFootnotes][109][endif] Here, criminal liability is thus based on the
free will and moral blame of the actor.[if !supportFootnotes][110][endif] The identity of mens rea
defined as a guilty mind, a guilty or wrongful purpose or criminal intent is the predominant
consideration.[if !supportFootnotes][111][endif] Thus, it is not enough to do what the law prohibits.[if !
supportFootnotes][112][endif] In order for an intentional felony to exist, it is necessary that the act be
committed by means of dolo or malice.[if !supportFootnotes][113][endif]
The term dolo or malice is a complex idea involving the elements of freedom,
intelligence, and intent.[if !supportFootnotes][114][endif] The first element, freedom, refers to an act
done with deliberation and with power to choose between two things.[if !supportFootnotes][115][endif]
The second element, intelligence, concerns the ability to determine the morality of human
acts, as well as the capacity to distinguish between a licit and an illicit act.[if !supportFootnotes][116]
[endif] The last element, intent, involves an aim or a determination to do a certain act.[if !
The element of intent on which this Court shall focus is described as the state of
mind accompanying an act, especially a forbidden act.[if !supportFootnotes][118][endif] It refers to the
purpose of the mind and the resolve with which a person proceeds.[if !supportFootnotes][119][endif] It
does not refer to mere will, for the latter pertains to the act, while intent concerns the result
of the act.[if !supportFootnotes][120][endif] While motive is the moving power that impels one to
action for a definite result, intent is the purpose of using a particular means to produce the
result.[if !supportFootnotes][121][endif] On the other hand, the term felonious means, inter alia,
malicious, villainous, and/or proceeding from an evil heart or purpose.[if !supportFootnotes][122]

[endif] With these elements taken together, the requirement of intent in intentional felony must
refer to malicious intent, which is a vicious and malevolent state of mind accompanying a
forbidden act. Stated otherwise, intentional felony requires the existence of dolus malus that
the act or omission be done willfully, maliciously, with deliberate evil intent, and with
malice aforethought.[if !supportFootnotes][123][endif] The maxim is actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit
rea a crime is not committed if the mind of the person performing the act complained of is
innocent.[if !supportFootnotes][124][endif] As is required of the other elements of a felony, the
existence of malicious intent must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.[if !supportFootnotes][125]
[endif]
In turn, the existence of malicious intent is necessary in order for conspiracy to

attach. Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that conspiracy exists when two
or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it is to be interpreted to refer only to felonies committed by means of dolo or
malice. The phrase coming to an agreement connotes the existence of a prefaced intent to
cause injury to another, an element present only in intentional felonies. In culpable felonies
or criminal negligence, the injury inflicted on another is unintentional, the wrong done
being simply the result of an act performed without malice or criminal design.[if !
supportFootnotes][126][endif] Here, a person performs an initial lawful deed; however, due to
negligence, imprudence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill, the deed results in a wrongful act.
[if !supportFootnotes][127][endif] Verily, a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act, which is a requisite
in conspiracy, is inconsistent with the idea of a felony committed by means of culpa.[if !
The presence of an initial malicious intent to commit a felony is thus a vital

ingredient in establishing the commission of the intentional felony of homicide.[if !
supportFootnotes][129][endif] Being mala in se, the felony of homicide requires the existence of
malice or dolo[if !supportFootnotes][130][endif] immediately before or simultaneously with the
infliction of injuries.[if !supportFootnotes][131][endif] Intent to kill or animus interficendi cannot and
should not be inferred, unless there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of such intent.[if !
supportFootnotes][132][endif] Furthermore, the victims death must not have been the product of
accident, natural cause, or suicide.[if !supportFootnotes][133][endif] If death resulted from an act
executed without malice or criminal intent but with lack of foresight, carelessness, or
negligence the act must be qualified as reckless or simple negligence or imprudence
resulting in homicide.[if !supportFootnotes][134][endif]
Hazing and other forms of initiation rites

The notion of hazing is not a recent development in our society.[if !supportFootnotes][135]
[endif] It is said that, throughout history, hazing in some form or another has been associated
with organizations ranging from military groups to indigenous tribes.[if !supportFootnotes][136][endif]
Some say that elements of hazing can be traced back to the Middle Ages, during which new
students who enrolled in European universities worked as servants for upperclassmen.[if !
supportFootnotes][137][endif] It is believed that the concept of hazing is rooted in ancient Greece,[if !
supportFootnotes][138][endif] where young men recruited into the military were tested with pain or
challenged to demonstrate the limits of their loyalty and to prepare the recruits for battle.[if !
Modern fraternities and sororities espouse some connection to these

values of ancient Greek civilization.[if !supportFootnotes][140][endif] According to a scholar, this
concept lends historical legitimacy to a tradition or ritual whereby prospective members are
asked to prove their worthiness and loyalty to the organization in which they seek to attain
membership through hazing.[if !supportFootnotes][141][endif]
Thus, it is said that in the Greek fraternity system, custom requires a student
wishing to join an organization to receive an invitation in order to be a neophyte for a
particular chapter.[if !supportFootnotes][142][endif] The neophyte period is usually one to two
semesters long.[if !supportFootnotes][143][endif] During the program, neophytes are required to
interview and to get to know the active members of the chapter; to learn chapter history; to
understand the principles of the organization; to maintain a specified grade point average; to
participate in the organizations activities; and to show dignity and respect for their fellow
neophytes, the organization, and its active and alumni members.[if !supportFootnotes][144][endif]
Some chapters require the initiation activities for a recruit to involve hazing acts during the
entire neophyte stage.[if !supportFootnotes][145][endif]
Hazing, as commonly understood, involves an initiation rite or ritual that serves as
prerequisite for admission to an organization.[if !supportFootnotes][146][endif] In hazing, the recruit,
pledge, neophyte, initiate, applicant or any other term by which the organization may refer
to such a person is generally placed in embarrassing or humiliating situations, like being
forced to do menial, silly, foolish, or other similar tasks or activities.[if !supportFootnotes][147][endif]
It encompasses different forms of conduct that humiliate, degrade, abuse, or physically
endanger those who desire membership in the organization.[if !supportFootnotes][148][endif] These
acts usually involve physical or psychological suffering or injury.[if !supportFootnotes][149][endif]
The concept of initiation rites in the country is nothing new. In fact, more than a
century ago, our national hero Andres Bonifacio organized a secret society named
Kataastaasan Kagalanggalangang Katipunan ng mga Anak ng Bayan (The Highest and Most
Venerable Association of the Sons and Daughters of the Nation).[if !supportFootnotes][150][endif] The
Katipunan, or KKK, started as a small confraternity believed to be inspired by European
Freemasonry, as well as by confraternities or sodalities approved by the Catholic Church.[if !
supportFootnotes][151][endif] The Katipunans ideology was brought home to each member through
the societys initiation ritual.[if !supportFootnotes][152][endif] It is said that initiates were brought to a
dark room, lit by a single point of illumination, and were asked a series of
questions to determine their fitness, loyalty, courage, and resolve.[if !supportFootnotes][153][endif]
They were made to go through vigorous trials such as pagsuot sa isang lungga or [pagtalon]
sa balon.[if !supportFootnotes][154][endif] It would seem that they were also made to withstand the
blow of pangherong bakal sa pisngi and to endure a matalas na punyal.[if !supportFootnotes][155]
[endif] As a final step in the ritual, the neophyte Katipunero was made to sign membership
papers with the his own blood.[if !supportFootnotes][156][endif]
It is believed that the Greek fraternity system was transported by the Americans to
the Philippines in the late 19th century. As can be seen in the following instances, the manner
of hazing in the United States was jarringly similar to that inflicted by the Aquila Fraternity
on Lenny Villa.
Early in 1865, upperclassmen at West Point Academy forced the fourth classmen to
do exhausting physical exercises that sometimes resulted in permanent physical damage; to
eat or drink unpalatable foods; and in various ways to humiliate themselves.[if !supportFootnotes]
[157][endif]
In 1901, General Douglas MacArthur got involved in a congressional investigation

of hazing at the academy during his second year at West Point.[if !supportFootnotes][158][endif]
In Easler v. Hejaz Temple of Greenville, decided in 1985, the candidate-victim was
injured during the shriners hazing event, which was part of the initiation ceremonies for
Hejaz membership.[if !supportFootnotes][159][endif] The ritual involved what was known as the
mattress-rotating barrel trick.[if !supportFootnotes][160][endif] It required each candidate to slide down
an eight to nine-foot-high metal board onto connected mattresses leading to a barrel, over
which the candidate was required to climb.[if !supportFootnotes][161][endif] Members of Hejaz would
stand on each side of the mattresses and barrel and fun-paddle candidates en route to the
barrel.[if !supportFootnotes][162][endif]
In a video footage taken in 1991, U.S. Marine paratroopers in Camp Lejeune,
North Carolina, were seen performing a ceremony in which they pinned paratrooper jump
wings directly onto the neophyte paratroopers chests.[if !supportFootnotes][163][endif] The victims
were shown writhing and crying out in pain as others pounded the spiked medals through
the shirts and into the chests of the victims.[if !supportFootnotes][164][endif]
In State v. Allen, decided in 1995, the Southeast Missouri State University chapter
of Kappa Alpha Psi invited male students to enter into a pledgeship program.[if !supportFootnotes]
[165][endif] The fraternity members subjected the pledges to repeated physical abuse including
repeated, open-hand strikes at the nape, the chest, and the back; caning of the bare soles of
the feet and buttocks; blows to the back with the use of a heavy book and a cookie sheet
while the pledges were on their hands and knees; various kicks and punches to the body;
and body slamming, an activity in which active members of the fraternity lifted pledges up
in the air and dropped them to the ground.[if !supportFootnotes][166][endif] The fraternity members
then put the pledges through a seven-station circle of physical abuse.[if !supportFootnotes][167][endif]
In Ex Parte Barran, decided in 1998, the pledge-victim went through hazing by
fraternity members of the Kappa Alpha Order at the Auburn University in Alabama.[if !
supportFootnotes][168][endif] The hazing included the following: (1) having to dig a ditch and jump
into it after it had been filled with water, urine, feces, dinner leftovers, and vomit; (2)
receiving paddlings on the buttocks; (3) being pushed and kicked, often onto walls or into
pits and trash cans; (4) eating foods like peppers, hot sauce, butter, and yerks (a mixture of
hot sauce, mayonnaise, butter, beans, and other items); (5) doing chores for the fraternity
and its members, such as cleaning the fraternity house and yard, being designated as driver,
and running errands; (6) appearing regularly at 2 a.m. meetings, during which the pledges
would be hazed for a couple of hours; and (7) running the gauntlet, during which the
pledges were pushed, kicked, and hit as they ran down a hallway and descended down a
flight of stairs.[if !supportFootnotes][169][endif]
In Lloyd v. Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity, decided in 1999, the victim Sylvester
Lloyd was accepted to pledge at the Cornell University chapter of the Alpha Phi Alpha
Fraternity.[if !supportFootnotes][170][endif] He participated in initiation activities, which included
various forms of physical beatings and torture, psychological coercion and embarrassment.[if
!supportFootnotes][171][endif]
In Kenner v. Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity, decided in 2002, the initiate-victim

suffered injuries from hazing activities during the fraternitys initiation rites.[if !supportFootnotes]
[172][endif] Kenner and the other initiates went through psychological and physical hazing,
including being paddled on the buttocks for more than 200 times.[if !supportFootnotes][173][endif]
In Morton v. State, Marcus Jones a university student in Florida sought initiation

into the campus chapter of the Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity during the 2005-06 academic
year.[if !supportFootnotes][174][endif] The pledges efforts to join the fraternity culminated in a series
of initiation rituals conducted in four nights. Jones, together with other candidates, was
blindfolded, verbally harassed, and caned on his face and buttocks.[if !supportFootnotes][175][endif] In
these rituals described as preliminaries, which lasted for two evenings, he received
approximately 60 canings on his buttocks.[if !supportFootnotes][176][endif] During the last two days
of the hazing, the rituals intensified.[if !supportFootnotes][177][endif] The pledges sustained roughly
210 cane strikes during the four-night initiation.[if !supportFootnotes][178][endif] Jones and several
other candidates passed out.[if !supportFootnotes][179][endif]
The purported raison dtre behind hazing practices is the proverbial birth by fire,
through which the pledge who has successfully withstood the hazing proves his or her
worth.[if !supportFootnotes][180][endif] Some organizations even believe that hazing is the path to
enlightenment. It is said that this process enables the organization to establish unity among
the pledges and, hence, reinforces and ensures the future of the organization.[if !supportFootnotes]
[181][endif] Alleged benefits of joining include leadership opportunities; improved academic
performance; higher self-esteem; professional networking opportunities; and the esprit
dcorp associated with close, almost filial, friendship and common cause.[if !supportFootnotes][182]
[endif]
Anti-Hazing laws in the U.S.

The first hazing statute in the U.S. appeared in 1874 in response to hazing in the military.[if !
supportFootnotes][183][endif] The hazing of recruits and plebes in the armed services was so
prevalent that Congress prohibited all forms of military hazing, harmful or not.[if !
supportFootnotes][184][endif] It was not until 1901 that Illinois passed the first state anti-hazing law,
criminalizing conduct whereby any one sustains an injury to his [or her] person therefrom.
However, it was not until the 1980s and 1990s, due in large part to the efforts of the
Committee to Halt Useless College Killings and other similar organizations, that states
increasingly began to enact legislation prohibiting and/or criminalizing hazing.[if !
supportFootnotes][186][endif] As of 2008, all but six states had enacted criminal or civil statutes
proscribing hazing.[if !supportFootnotes][187][endif] Most anti-hazing laws in the U.S. treat hazing as
a misdemeanor and carry relatively light consequences for even the most severe situations.[if
!supportFootnotes][188][endif] Only a few states with anti-hazing laws consider hazing as a felony in
case death or great bodily harm occurs.[if !supportFootnotes][189][endif]
Under the laws of Illinois, hazing is a Class A misdemeanor, except hazing that results in
death or great bodily harm, which is a Class 4 felony.[if !supportFootnotes][190][endif] In a Class 4
felony, a sentence of imprisonment shall be for a term of not less than one year and not more
than three years.[if !supportFootnotes][191][endif] Indiana criminal law provides that a person who
recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally
performs hazing that results in serious bodily injury to a person commits criminal
recklessness, a Class D felony.[if !supportFootnotes][192][endif]
The offense becomes a Class C felony if committed by means of a deadly weapon.
[if !supportFootnotes][193][endif] As an element of a Class C felony criminal recklessness resulting in
serious bodily injury, death falls under the category of serious bodily injury.[if !supportFootnotes]
[194][endif]
A person who commits a Class C felony is imprisoned for a fixed term of between
two (2) and eight (8) years, with the advisory sentence being four (4) years.[if !supportFootnotes]
[195][endif] Pursuant to Missouri law, hazing is a Class A misdemeanor, unless the act creates a
substantial risk to the life of the student or prospective member, in which case it becomes a
Class C felony.[if !supportFootnotes][196][endif] A Class C felony provides for an imprisonment term
not to exceed seven years.[if !supportFootnotes][197][endif]
In Texas, hazing that causes the death of another is a state jail felony.[if !supportFootnotes][198][endif]
An individual adjudged guilty of a state jail felony is punished by confinement in a state jail
for any term of not more than two years or not less than 180 days.[if !supportFootnotes][199][endif]
Under Utah law, if hazing results in serious bodily injury, the hazer is guilty of a thirddegree felony.[if !supportFootnotes][200][endif] A person who has been convicted of a third-degree
felony may be sentenced to imprisonment for a term not to exceed five years.[if !supportFootnotes]
[201][endif] West Virginia law provides that if the act of hazing would otherwise be deemed a
felony, the hazer may be found guilty thereof and subject to penalties provided therefor.[if !
supportFootnotes][202][endif] In Wisconsin, a person is guilty of a Class G felony if hazing results in
the death of another.[if !supportFootnotes][203][endif] A
Class G felony carries a fine not to exceed $25,000 or imprisonment not to exceed 10 years,
or both.[if !supportFootnotes][204][endif]
In certain states in the U.S., victims of hazing were left with limited remedies, as there was
no hazing statute.[if !supportFootnotes][205][endif] This situation was exemplified in Ballou v. Sigma
Nu General Fraternity, wherein Barry Ballous family resorted to a civil action for wrongful
death, since there was no anti-hazing statute in South Carolina until 1994.[if !supportFootnotes][206]
[endif]
The existence of animus interficendi or intent to kill not proven beyond reasonable doubt
The presence of an ex ante situation in this case, fraternity initiation rites does not
automatically amount to the absence of malicious intent or dolus malus. If it is proven
beyond reasonable doubt that the perpetrators were equipped with a guilty mind whether or
not there is a contextual background or factual premise they are still criminally liable for
intentional felony.
The trial court, the CA, and the Solicitor General are all in agreement that with the
exception of Villareal and Dizon accused Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug did not have
the animus interficendi or intent to kill Lenny Villa or the other neophytes. We shall no
longer disturb this finding.
As regards Villareal and Dizon, the CA modified the Decision of the trial court and
found that the two accused had the animus interficendi or intent to kill Lenny Villa, not
merely to inflict physical injuries on him. It justified its finding of homicide against Dizon
by holding that he had apparently been motivated by ill will while beating up Villa. Dizon
kept repeating that his fathers parking space had been stolen by the victims father.[if !
supportFootnotes][207][endif] As to Villareal, the court said that the accused suspected the family of
Bienvenido Marquez, one of the neophytes, to have had a hand in the death of Villareals
brother.[if !supportFootnotes][208][endif] The CA then ruled as follows:
The two had their own axes to grind against Villa and Marquez. It was very
clear that they acted with evil and criminal intent. The evidence on
this matter is unrebutted and so for the death of Villa, appellants
Dizon and Villareal must and should face the consequence of their
acts, that is, to be held liable for the crime of homicide.[if

supportFootnotes][209][endif] (Emphasis supplied)
We cannot subscribe to this conclusion.

The appellate court relied mainly on the testimony of Bienvenido Marquez to
determine the existence of animus interficendi. For a full appreciation of the context in
which the supposed utterances were made, the Court deems it necessary to reproduce the
relevant portions of witness Marquezs testimony:
Witness We were brought up into [Michael Musngis] room and we were
briefed as to what to expect during the next
three days and we were told the members of
the fraternity and their batch and we were
also told about the fraternity song, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Witness We were escorted out of [Michael Musngis] house and we were

made to ride a van and we were brought to
another place in Kalookan City which I
later found to be the place of Mariano
Almeda, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Witness Upon arrival, we were instructed to bow our head down and to link
our arms and then the driver of the van and
other members of the Aquilans who were
inside left us inside the van, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Witness We heard voices shouted outside the van to the effect, Villa akin ka,
Asuncion Patay ka and the people outside
pound the van, rock the van, sir.
Atty. Tadiar Will you please recall in what tone of voice and how strong a
voice these remarks uttered upon your
arrival?
Witness Some were almost shouting, you could feel the sense of excitement
in their voices, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Atty. Tadiar During all these times that the van was being rocked through
and through, what were the voices or
utterances that you heard?
Witness Villa akin ka, Asuncion patay ka, Recinto patay ka sa amin, etc., sir.
Atty. Tadiar And those utterances and threats, how long did they continue
during the rocking of the van which lasted
for 5 minutes?
xxxxxxxxx
Witness Even after they rocked the van, we still kept on hearing voices, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Atty. Tadiar During the time that this rounds [of physical beating] were
being inflicted, was there any utterances by
anybody?
Witness Yes sir. Some were piercing, some were discouraging, and some
were encouraging others who were
pounding and beating us, it was just like a
fiesta atmosphere, actually some of them
enjoyed looking us being pounded, sir.
Atty. Tadiar Do you recall what were those voices that you heard?
Witness One particular utterance always said was, they asked us whether
matigas pa yan, kayang-kaya pa niyan.
Atty. Tadiar Do you know who in particular uttered those particular words
that you quote?
Witness I cannot particularly point to because there were utterances

simultaneously, I could not really pin point
who uttered those words, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Atty. Tadiar Were there any utterances that you heard during the conduct of
this Bicol Express?
Witness Yes, sir I heard utterances.
Atty. Tadiar Will you please recall to this Honorable Court what were the
utterances that you remember?
Witness For example, one person particularly Boyet Dizon stepped on my

thigh, he would say that and I quote ito,
yung pamilya nito ay pinapatay yung
kapatid ko, so that would in turn sort of
justifying him in inflicting more serious
pain on me. So instead of just walking, he
would jump on my thighs and then after on
was Lenny Villa. He was saying to the
effect that this guy, his father stole the
parking space of my father, sir. So, thats

why he inflicted more pain on Villa and that
went on, sir.
Atty. Tadiar And you were referring to which particular accused?
Witness Boyet Dizon, sir.
Atty. Tadiar When Boyet Dizon at that particular time was accusing you of
having your family have his brother killed,
what was your response?
Witness Of course, I knew sir that it was not true and that he was just
making it up sir. So he said that I knew
nothing of that incident. However, he just in
fact after the Bicol Express, he kept on
uttering those words/statements so that it
would in turn justify him and to give me
harder blows, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Atty. Tadiar You mentioned about Dizon in particular mentioning that

Lenny Villas father stole the parking space
allotted for his father, do you recall who
were within hearing distance when that
utterance was made?
Witness Yes, sir. All of the neophytes heard that utterance, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Witness There were different times made this accusation so there were
different people who heard from time to
time, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Atty. Tadiar Can you tell the Honorable Court when was the next accusation
against Lenny Villas father was made?
Witness When we were line up against the wall, Boyet Dizon came near to
us and when Lenny Villas turn, I heard him
uttered those statements, sir.
Atty. Tadiar What happened after he made this accusation to Lenny Villas
father?
Witness He continued to inflict blows on Lenny Villa.
Atty. Tadiar How were those blows inflicted?
Witness There were slaps and he knelt on Lenny Villas thighs and sometime
he stand up and he kicked his thighs and
sometimes jumped at it, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Atty. Tadiar We would go on to the second day but not right now. You
mentioned also that accusations made by
Dizon you or your family had his brother
killed, can you inform this Honorable Court
what exactly were the accusations that were
charged against you while inflicting blows
upon you in particular?
Witness While he was inflicting blows upon me, he told me in particular if I

knew that his family who had his brother
killed, and he said that his brother was an
NPA, sir so I knew that it was just a story
that he made up and I said that I knew
nothing about it and he continued inflicting
blows on me, sir. And another incident was
when a talk was being given, Dizon was on
another part of the pelota court and I was
sort of looking and we saw that he was
drinking beer, and he said and I quote:
Marquez, Marquez, ano ang tinitingintingin mo diyan, ikaw yung pamilya mo
ang nagpapatay sa aking kapatid, yari ka sa
akin, sir.
Atty. Tadiar What else?
Witness Thats all, sir.
Atty. Tadiar And on that first night of February 8, 1991, did ever a doctor or
a physician came around as promised to
you earlier?
Witness No, sir.[if !supportFootnotes][210][endif] (Emphasis supplied)
On cross-examination, witness Bienvenido Marquez testified thus:

Judge Purisima When you testified on direct examination Mr. Marquez,
have you stated that there was a briefing
that was conducted immediately before
your initiation as regards to what to expect
during the initiation, did I hear you right?
Witness Yes, sir.
Judge Purisima Who did the briefing?
Witness Mr. Michael Musngi, sir and Nelson Victorino.
Judge Purisima Will you kindly tell the Honorable Court what they told you
to expect during the initiation?
Witness They told us at the time we would be brought to a particular place,

we would be mocked at, sir.
Judge Purisima So, you expected to be mocked at, ridiculed, humiliated etc.,
and the likes?
Witness Yes, sir.
Judge Purisima You were also told beforehand that there would be physical
contact?
Witness Yes, sir at the briefing.
xxxxxxxxx
Witness Yes, sir, because they informed that we could immediately go back
to school. All the bruises would be limited
to our arms and legs, sir. So, if we wear the
regular school uniforms like long sleeves, it
would be covered actually so we have no
thinking that our face would be slapped, sir.
Judge Purisima So, you mean to say that beforehand that you would have
bruises on your body but that will be
covered?
Witness Yes, sir.
JudgePurisima So, what kind of physical contact or implements that you

expect that would create bruises to your
body?
Witness At that point I am already sure that there would be hitting by a

paddling or paddle, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Judge Purisima Now, will you admit Mr. Marquez that much of the
initiation procedures is psychological in
nature?
Witness Combination, sir.[if !supportFootnotes][211][endif] (Emphasis supplied)
xxxxxxxxx
Atty. Jimenez The initiation that was conducted did not consist only of
physical initiation, meaning body contact,
is that correct?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez Part of the initiation was the so-called psychological

initiation, correct?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez And this consisted of making you believe of things calculated
to terrify you, scare you, correct?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez In other words, the initiating masters made belief situation
intended to, I repeat, terrify you, frighten
you, scare you into perhaps quitting the
initiation, is this correct?
Witness Sometimes sir, yes.
Atty. Jimenez You said on direct that while Mr. Dizon was initiating you, he
said or he was supposed to have said
according to you that your family were
responsible for the killing of his brother
who was an NPA, do you remember saying
that?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez You also said in connection with that statement said to you by
Dizon that you did not believe him because
that is not true, correct?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez In other words, he was only psychologizing you perhaps, the
purpose as I have mentioned before,
terrifying you, scaring you or frightening
you into quitting the initiation, this is
correct?
Witness No, sir, perhaps it is one but the main reason, I think, why he was
saying those things was because he wanted
to inflict injury.
Atty. Jimenez He did not tell that to you. That is your only perception,
correct?
Witness No, sir, because at one point, while he was telling this to Villareal,
he was hitting me.
Atty. Jimenez But did you not say earlier that you [were] subjected to the
same forms of initiation by all the initiating
masters? You said that earlier, right?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez Are you saying also that the others who jumped on you or
kicked you said something similar as was
told to you by Mr. Dizon?
Witness No, sir.
Atty. Jimenez But the fact remains that in the Bicol Express for instance, the
masters would run on your thighs, right?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez This was the regular procedure that was followed by the
initiating masters not only on you but also
on the other neophytes?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez In other words, it is fair to say that whatever forms of

initiation was administered by one master,
was also administered by one master on a
neophyte, was also administered by another
master on the other neophyte, this is
correct?
Witness Yes, sir.[if !supportFootnotes][212][endif] (Emphasis supplied)
According to the Solicitor General himself, the ill motives attributed by the CA to
Dizon and Villareal were baseless,[if !supportFootnotes][213][endif] since the statements of the
accused were just part of the psychological initiation calculated to instill fear on the part of
the neophytes; that [t]here is no element of truth in it as testified by Bienvenido Marquez;
and that the harsh words uttered by Petitioner and Villareal are part of tradition concurred
and accepted by all the fraternity members during their initiation rites.[if !supportFootnotes][214]
[endif]
We agree with the Solicitor General.

The foregoing testimony of witness Marquez reveals a glaring mistake of
substantial proportion on the part of the CA it mistook the utterances of Dizon for those of
Villareal. Such inaccuracy cannot be tolerated, especially because it was the CAs primary
basis for finding that Villarreal had the intent to kill Lenny Villa, thereby making Villareal
guilty of the intentional felony of homicide. To repeat, according to Bienvenido Marquezs
testimony, as reproduced above, it was Dizon who uttered both accusations against Villa and
Marquez; Villareal had no participation whatsoever in the specific threats referred to by the
CA. It was Boyet Dizon [who] stepped on [Marquezs] thigh; and who told witness Marquez,
[I]to, yung pamilya nito ay pinapatay yung kapatid ko. It was also Dizon who jumped on
Villas thighs while saying, [T]his guy, his father stole the parking space of my father. With
the testimony clarified, we find that the CA had no basis for concluding the existence of
intent to kill based solely thereon.
As to the existence of animus interficendi on the part of Dizon, we refer to the
entire factual milieu and contextual premise of the incident to fully appreciate and
understand the testimony of witness Marquez. At the outset, the neophytes were briefed that
they would be subjected to psychological pressure in order to scare them. They knew that
they would be mocked, ridiculed, and intimidated. They heard fraternity members shout,
Patay ka, Recinto, Yari ka, Recinto, Villa, akin ka, Asuncion, gulpi ka, Putang ina mo,
Asuncion, Putang ina nyo, patay kayo sa amin, or some other words to that effect.[if !
supportFootnotes][215][endif] While beating the neophytes, Dizon accused Marquez of the death of
the formers purported NPA brother, and then blamed Lenny Villas father for stealing the
parking space of Dizons father. According to the Solicitor General, these statements,
including those of the accused Dizon, were all part of the psychological initiation employed
by the Aquila Fraternity.[if !supportFootnotes][216][endif]
Thus, to our understanding, accused Dizons way of inflicting psychological
pressure was through hurling make-believe accusations at the initiates. He concocted the
fictitious stories, so that he could justify giving the neophytes harder blows, all in the
context of fraternity initiation and role playing. Even one of the neophytes admitted that the
accusations were untrue and made-up.
The infliction of psychological pressure is not unusual in the conduct of hazing. In
fact, during the Senate deliberations on the then proposed Anti-Hazing Law, former Senator
Lina spoke as follows:
Senator Lina. -- so as to capture the intent that we conveyed during the
period of interpellations on why we included the phrase or
psychological pain and suffering.
xxxxxxxxx
So that if no direct physical harm is inflicted upon the neophyte or the

recruit but the recruit or neophyte is made to undergo certain acts
which I already described yesterday, like playing the Russian
roulette extensively to test the readiness and the willingness of the
neophyte or recruit to continue his desire to be a member of the
fraternity, sorority or similar organization or playing and putting a
noose on the neck of the neophyte or recruit, making the recruit or
neophyte stand on the ledge of the fourth floor of the building
facing outside, asking him to jump outside after making him turn
around several times but the reality is that he will be made to jump
towards the inside portion of the building these are the mental or
psychological tests that are resorted to by these organizations,
sororities or fraternities. The doctors who appeared during the

public hearing testified that such acts can result in some mental
aberration, that they can even lead to psychosis, neurosis or
insanity. This is what we want to prevent.[if !supportFootnotes][217][endif]
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, without proof beyond reasonable doubt, Dizons behavior must not be
automatically viewed as evidence of a genuine, evil motivation to kill Lenny Villa. Rather, it
must be taken within the context of the fraternitys psychological initiation. This Court
points out that it was not even established whether the fathers of Dizon and Villa really had
any familiarity with each other as would lend credence to the veracity of Dizons threats. The
testimony of Lennys co-neophyte, Marquez, only confirmed this view. According to
Marquez, he knew it was not true and that [Dizon] was just making it up.[if !supportFootnotes][218]
[endif] Even the trial court did not give weight to the utterances of Dizon as constituting intent
to kill: [T]he cumulative acts of all the accused were not directed toward killing Villa, but
merely to inflict physical harm as part of the fraternity initiation rites x x x.[if !supportFootnotes]
[219][endif] The Solicitor General shares the same view.
Verily, we cannot sustain the CA in finding the accused Dizon guilty of homicide
under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code on the basis of the existence of intent to kill.
Animus interficendi cannot and should not be inferred unless there is proof beyond
reasonable doubt of such intent.[if !supportFootnotes][220][endif] Instead, we adopt and reinstate the
finding of the trial court in part, insofar as it ruled that none of the fraternity members had
the specific intent to kill Lenny Villa.[if !supportFootnotes][221][endif]
The existence of animus iniuriandi or malicious intent to injure not proven beyond
reasonable doubt
The Solicitor General argues, instead, that there was an intent to inflict physical
injuries on Lenny Villa. Echoing the Decision of the trial court, the Solicitor General then
posits that since all of the accused fraternity members conspired to inflict physical injuries
on Lenny Villa and death ensued, all of them should be liable for the crime of homicide
pursuant to Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code.
In order to be found guilty of any of the felonious acts under Articles 262 to 266 of
the Revised Penal Code,[if !supportFootnotes][222][endif] the employment of physical injuries must be
coupled with dolus malus. As an act that is mala in se, the existence of malicious intent is
fundamental, since injury arises from the mental state of the wrongdoer iniuria ex affectu
facientis consistat. If there is no criminal intent, the accused cannot be found guilty of an
intentional felony. Thus, in case of physical injuries under the Revised Penal Code, there
must be a specific animus iniuriandi or malicious intention to do wrong against the physical
integrity or well-being of a person, so as to incapacitate and deprive the victim of certain
bodily functions. Without proof beyond reasonable doubt of the required animus iniuriandi,
the overt act of inflicting physical injuries per se merely satisfies the elements of freedom
and intelligence in an intentional felony. The commission of the act does not, in itself, make
a man guilty unless his intentions are.[if !supportFootnotes][223][endif]
Thus, we have ruled in a number of instances[if !supportFootnotes][224][endif] that the mere

infliction of physical injuries, absent malicious intent, does not make a person automatically
liable for an intentional felony. In Bagajo v. People,[if !supportFootnotes][225][endif] the accused
teacher, using a bamboo stick, whipped one of her students behind her legs and thighs as a
form of discipline. The student suffered lesions and bruises from the corporal punishment.
In reversing the trial courts finding of criminal liability for slight physical injuries, this
Court stated thus: Independently of any civil or administrative responsibility [w]e are
persuaded that she did not do what she had done with criminal intent the means she actually
used was moderate and that she was not motivated by ill-will, hatred or any malevolent
intent. Considering the applicable laws, we then ruled that as a matter of law, petitioner did
not incur any criminal liability for her act of whipping her pupil. In People v. Carmen,[if !
supportFootnotes][226][endif] the accused members of the religious group known as the Missionaries
of Our Lady of Fatima under the guise of a ritual or treatment plunged the head of the
victim into a barrel of water, banged his head against a bench, pounded his chest with fists,
and stabbed him on the side with a kitchen knife, in order to cure him of nervous breakdown
by expelling through those means the bad spirits possessing him. The collective acts of the
group caused the death of the victim. Since malicious intent was not proven, we reversed
the trial courts finding of liability for murder under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code and
instead ruled that the accused should be held criminally liable for reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide under Article 365 thereof.
Indeed, the threshold question is whether the accuseds initial acts of inflicting
physical pain on the neophytes were attended by animus iniuriandi amounting to a felonious
act punishable under the Revised Penal Code, thereby making it subject to Article 4(1)
thereof. In People v. Regato, we ruled that malicious intent must be judged by the action,
conduct, and external acts of the accused.[if !supportFootnotes][227][endif] What persons do is the best
index of their intention.[if !supportFootnotes][228][endif] We have also ruled that the method
employed, the kind of weapon used, and the parts of the body on which the injury was
inflicted may be determinative of the intent of the perpetrator.[if !supportFootnotes][229][endif] The
Court shall thus examine the whole contextual background surrounding the death of Lenny
Villa.
Lenny died during Aquilas fraternity initiation rites. The night before the
commencement of the rites, they were briefed on what to expect. They were told that there
would be physical beatings, that the whole event would last for three days, and that they
could quit anytime. On their first night, they were subjected to traditional initiation rites,
including the Indian Run, Bicol Express, Rounds, and the Auxies Privilege Round. The
beatings were predominantly directed at the neophytes arms and legs.
In the morning of their second day of initiation, they were made to present comic
plays and to play rough basketball. They were also required to memorize and recite the
Aquila Fraternitys principles. Late in the afternoon, they were once again subjected to
traditional initiation rituals. When the rituals were officially reopened on the insistence of
Dizon and Villareal, the neophytes were subjected to another traditional ritual paddling by
the fraternity.
During the whole initiation rites, auxiliaries were assigned to the neophytes. The
auxiliaries protected the neophytes by functioning as human barriers and shielding them
from those who were designated to inflict physical and psychological pain on the initiates.
It was their regular duty to stop foul or excessive physical blows; to

help the neophytes to pump their legs in order that their blood would circulate; to facilitate a
rest interval after every physical activity or round; to serve food and water; to tell jokes; to
coach the initiates; and to give them whatever they needed.
These rituals were performed with Lennys consent.[if !supportFootnotes][231][endif] A few
days before the rites, he asked both his parents for permission to join the Aquila Fraternity.[if
!supportFootnotes][232][endif] His father knew that Lenny would go through an initiation process and
would be gone for three days.[if !supportFootnotes][233][endif] The CA found as follows:
It is worth pointing out that the neophytes willingly and voluntarily
consented to undergo physical initiation and hazing. As can be
gleaned from the narration of facts, they voluntarily agreed to join
the initiation rites to become members of the Aquila Legis
Fraternity. Prior to the initiation, they were given briefings on what
to expect. It is of common knowledge that before admission in a
fraternity, the neophytes will undergo a rite of passage. Thus, they
were made aware that traditional methods such as mocking,
psychological tests and physical punishment would take place.
They knew that the initiation would involve beatings and other
forms of hazing. They were also told of their right and opportunity
to quit at any time they wanted to. In fact, prosecution witness
Navera testified that accused Tecson told him that after a week,
you can already play basketball. Prosecution witness Marquez for
his part, admitted that he knew that the initiates would be hit in the
arms and legs, that a wooden paddle would be used to hit them and
that he expected bruises on his arms and legs. Indeed, there can be
no fraternity initiation without consenting neophytes. [if !
supportFootnotes][234][endif] (Emphasis supplied)
Even after going through Aquilas grueling traditional rituals during the first day,
Lenny continued his participation and finished the second day of initiation.
Based on the foregoing contextual background, and absent further proof showing clear
malicious intent, we are constrained to rule that the specific animus iniuriandi was not
present in this case. Even if the specific acts of punching, kicking, paddling, and other
modes of inflicting physical pain were done voluntarily, freely, and with intelligence,
thereby satisfying the elements of freedom and intelligence in the felony of physical
injuries, the fundamental ingredient of criminal intent was not proven beyond reasonable
doubt. On the contrary, all that was proven was that the acts were done pursuant to tradition.
Although the additional rounds on the second night were held upon the insistence of
Villareal and Dizon, the initiations were officially reopened with the consent of the head of
the initiation rites; and the accused fraternity members still participated in the rituals,
including the paddling, which were performed pursuant to tradition. Other than the paddle,
no other weapon was used to inflict injuries on Lenny. The targeted body parts were
predominantly the legs and the arms. The designation of roles, including the role of
auxiliaries, which were assigned for the specific purpose of lending assistance to and taking
care of the neophytes during the initiation rites, further belied the presence of malicious
intent. All those who wished to join the fraternity went through the same process of
traditional initiation; there is no proof that Lenny Villa was specifically targeted or given a
different treatment. We stress that Congress itself recognized that hazing is uniquely
different from common crimes.[if !supportFootnotes][235][endif] The totality of the circumstances
must therefore be taken into consideration.
The underlying context and motive in which the infliction of physical injuries was
rooted may also be determined by Lennys continued participation in the initiation and
consent to the method used even after the first day. The following discussion of the framers
of the 1995 Anti-Hazing Law is enlightening:
SENATOR GUINGONA. Most of these acts, if not all,
are already punished under the Revised Penal Code.
SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President.
SENATOR GUINGONA. If hazing is done at present and

it results in death, the charge would be murder or homicide.
SENATOR GUINGONA. If it does not result in death, it

may be frustrated homicide or serious physical injuries.
SENATOR GUINGONA. Or, if the person who commits

sexual abuse does so it can be penalized under rape or acts of
lasciviousness.
SENATOR GUINGONA. So, what is the rationale for

making a new offense under this definition of the crime of hazing?
SENATOR LINA. To discourage persons or group of

persons either composing a sorority, fraternity or any association
from making this requirement of initiation that has already resulted
in these specific acts or results, Mr. President.
That is the main rationale. We want to send a strong

signal across the land that no group or association can require the
act of physical initiation before a person can become a member
without being held criminally liable.
xxxxxxxxx
SENATOR GUINGONA. Yes, but what would be the

rationale for that imposition? Because the distinguished Sponsor
has said that he is not punishing a mere organization, he is not
seeking the punishment of an initiation into a club or organization,
he is seeking the punishment of certain acts that resulted in death,
et cetera as a result of hazing which are already covered crimes.
The penalty is increased in one, because we would like to

discourage hazing, abusive hazing, but it may be a legitimate
defense for invoking two or more charges or offenses, because
these very same acts are already punishable under the Revised
Penal Code.
That is my difficulty, Mr. President.
SENATOR LINA. x x x
Another point, Mr. President, is this, and this is a very

telling difference: When a person or group of persons resort to
hazing as a requirement for gaining entry into an organization, the
intent to commit a wrong is not visible or is not present, Mr.
President. Whereas, in these specific crimes, Mr. President, let us
say there is death or there is homicide, mutilation, if one files a
case, then the intention to commit a wrong has to be proven. But if
the crime of hazing is the basis, what is important is the result
from the act of hazing.
To me, that is the basic difference and that is what will

prevent or deter the sororities or fraternities; that they should really
shun this activity called hazing. Because, initially, these fraternities
or sororities do not even consider having a neophyte killed or
maimed or that acts of lasciviousness are even committed initially,
Mr. President.
So, what we want to discourage is the so-called initial

innocent act. That is why there is need to institute this kind of
hazing. Ganiyan po ang nangyari. Ang fraternity o ang sorority ay

magre-recruit. Wala talaga silang intensiyong makamatay. Hindi
ko na babanggitin at buhay pa iyong kaso. Pero dito sa anim o pito
na namatay nitong nakaraang taon, walang intensiyong patayin
talaga iyong neophyte. So, kung maghihintay pa tayo, na saka
lamang natin isasakdal ng murder kung namatay na, ay after the
fact ho iyon. Pero, kung sasabihin natin sa mga kabataan na:
Huwag ninyong gagawin iyong hazing. Iyan ay kasalanan at kung
mamatay diyan, mataas ang penalty sa inyo.
xxxxxxxxx
SENATOR GUINGONA. I join the lofty motives, Mr.

President, of the distinguished Sponsor. But I am again disturbed
by his statement that the prosecution does not have to prove the
intent that resulted in the death, that resulted in the serious
physical injuries, that resulted in the acts of lasciviousness or
deranged mind. We do not have to prove the willful intent of the
accused in proving or establishing the crime of hazing. This seems,
to me, a novel situation where we create the special crime without
having to go into the intent, which is one of the basic elements of
any crime.
If there is no intent, there is no crime. If the intent were merely to initiate, then there is no
offense. And even the distinguished Sponsor admits that the organization, the intent to
initiate, the intent to have a new society or a new club is, per se, not punishable at all. What
are punishable are the acts that lead to the result. But if these results are not going to be
proven by intent, but just because there was hazing, I am afraid that it will disturb the basic
concepts of the Revised Penal Code, Mr. President.
SENATOR LINA. Mr. President, the act of hazing,
precisely, is being criminalized because in the context of what is
happening in the sororities and fraternities, when they conduct
hazing, no one will admit that their intention is to maim or to kill.
So, we are already criminalizing the fact of inflicting physical
pain. Mr. President, it is a criminal act and we want it stopped,

deterred, discouraged.
If that occurs, under this law, there is no necessity to

prove that the masters intended to kill or the masters intended to
maim. What is important is the result of the act of hazing.
Otherwise, the masters or those who inflict the physical pain can
easily escape responsibility and say, We did not have the intention
to kill. This is part of our initiation rites. This is normal. We do not
have any intention to kill or maim.
This is the lusot, Mr. President. They might as well have been charged therefore with the
ordinary crime of homicide, mutilation, et cetera, where the prosecution will have a
difficulty proving the elements if they are separate offenses.
xxxxxxxxx
SENATOR GUINGONA. Mr. President, assuming there

was a group that initiated and a person died. The charge is murder.
My question is: Under this bill if it becomes a law, would the
prosecution have to prove conspiracy or not anymore?
SENATOR LINA. Mr. President, if the person is present

during hazing x x x
SENATOR GUINGONA. The persons are present. First,

would the prosecution have to prove conspiracy? Second, would
the prosecution have to prove intent to kill or not?
SENATOR LINA. No more. As to the second question,

Mr. President, if that occurs, there is no need to prove intent to kill.
SENATOR GUINGONA. But the charge is murder.
SENATOR LINA. That is why I said that it should not be

murder. It should be hazing, Mr. President. [if !supportFootnotes][236][endif]
(Emphasis supplied)
During a discussion between Senator Biazon and Senator Lina on the issue of
whether to include sodomy as a punishable act under the Anti-Hazing Law, Senator Lina
further clarified thus:
SENATOR BIAZON. Mr. President, this Representation
has no objection to the inclusion of sodomy as one of the
conditions resulting from hazing as necessary to be punished.
However, the act of sodomy can be committed by two persons
with or without consent.
To make it clearer, what is being punished here is the

commission of sodomy forced into another individual by another
individual. I move, Mr. President, that sodomy be modified by the
phrase without consent for purposes of this section.
SENATOR LINA. I am afraid, Mr. President, that if we

qualify sodomy with the concept that it is only going to aggravate
the crime of hazing if it is done without consent will change a lot
of concepts here. Because the results from hazing aggravate the
offense with or without consent. In fact, when a person joins a
fraternity, sorority, or any association for that matter, it can be with
or without the consent of the intended victim. The fact that a

person joins a sorority or fraternity with his consent does not
negate the crime of hazing.
This is a proposed law intended to protect the citizens

from the malpractices that attend initiation which may have been
announced with or without physical infliction of pain or injury, Mr.
President. Regardless of whether there is announcement that there
will be physical hazing or whether there is none, and therefore, the
neophyte is duped into joining a fraternity is of no moment. What
is important is that there is an infliction of physical pain.
The bottom line of this law is that a citizen even has to be

protected from himself if he joins a fraternity, so that at a certain
point in time, the State, the individual, or the parents of the victim
can run after the perpetrators of the crime, regardless of whether or
not there was consent on the part of the victim.
xxxxxxxxx
SENATOR LINA. Mr. President, I understand the

position taken by the distinguished Gentleman from Cavite and
Metro Manila. It is correct that society sometimes adopts new
mores, traditions, and practices.
In this bill, we are not going to encroach into the private

proclivities of some individuals when they do their acts in private
as we do not take a peek into the private rooms of couples. They
can do their thing if they want to make love in ways that are not
considered acceptable by the mainstream of society. That is not
something that the State should prohibit.
But sodomy in this case is connected with hazing, Mr.

President. Such that the act may even be entered into with consent.
It is not only sodomy. The infliction of pain may be done with the
consent of the neophyte. If the law is passed, that does not make
the act of hazing not punishable because the neophyte accepted the
infliction of pain upon himself.
If the victim suffers from serious physical injuries, but the initiator said, Well, he allowed it
upon himself. He consented to it. So, if we allow that reasoning that sodomy was done with
the consent of the victim, then we would not have passed any law at all. There will be no
significance if we pass this bill, because it will always be a defense that the victim allowed
the infliction of pain or suffering. He accepted it as part of the initiation rites.
But precisely, Mr. President that is one thing that we
would want to prohibit. That the defense of consent will not apply
because the very act of inflicting physical pain or psychological
suffering is, by itself, a punishable act. The result of the act of
hazing, like death or physical injuries merely aggravates the act
with higher penalties. But the defense of consent is not going to
nullify the criminal nature of the act.
So, if we accept the amendment that sodomy can only aggravate the offense if it is
committed without consent of the victim, then the whole foundation of this proposed law
will collapse.
SENATOR BIAZON. Thank you, Mr. President.
SENATOR LINA. Thank you very much.
THE PRESIDENT. Is there any objection to the

committee amendment? (Silence.) The Chair hears none; the same
is approved.[if !supportFootnotes][237][endif]
(Emphasis supplied)
Realizing the implication of removing the states burden to prove intent, Senator
Lina, the principal author of the Senate Bill, said:
I am very happy that the distinguished Minority Leader
brought out the idea of intent or whether there it is mala in se or
mala prohibita. There can be a radical amendment if that is the
point that he wants to go to.
If we agree on the concept, then, maybe, we can just make this a special law on hazing. We
will not include this anymore under the Revised Penal Code. That is a possibility. I will not
foreclose that suggestion, Mr. President.[if !supportFootnotes][238][endif](Emphasis supplied)
Thus, having in mind the potential conflict between the proposed law and the core
principle of mala in se adhered to under the Revised Penal Code, Congress did not simply
enact an amendment thereto. Instead, it created a special law on hazing, founded upon the
principle of mala prohibita. This dilemma faced by Congress is further proof of how the
nature of hazing unique as against typical crimes cast a cloud of doubt on whether society
considered the act as an inherently wrong conduct or mala in se at the time. It is safe to
presume that Lennys parents would not have consented[if !supportFootnotes][239][endif] to his
participation in Aquila Fraternitys initiation rites if the practice of hazing were considered
by them as mala in se.
Furthermore, in Vedaa v. Valencia (1998), we noted through Associate Justice (now
retired Chief Justice) Hilario Davide that in our nations very recent history, the people have
spoken, through Congress, to deem conduct constitutive of hazing, [an] act[] previously
considered harmless by custom, as criminal.[if !supportFootnotes][240][endif] Although it may be
regarded as a simple obiter dictum, the statement nonetheless shows recognition that hazing
or the conduct of initiation rites through physical and/or psychological suffering has not
been traditionally criminalized. Prior to the 1995 Anti-Hazing Law, there was to some extent
a lacuna in the law; hazing was not clearly considered an intentional felony. And when there
is doubt on the interpretation of criminal laws, all must be resolved in favor of the accused.
In dubio pro reo.
For the foregoing reasons, and as a matter of law, the Court is constrained to rule
against the trial courts finding of malicious intent to inflict physical injuries on Lenny Villa,
there being no proof beyond reasonable doubt of the existence of malicious intent to inflict
physical injuries or animus iniuriandi as required in mala in se cases, considering the
contextual background of his death, the unique nature of hazing, and absent a law
prohibiting hazing.
The accused fraternity members guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
The absence of malicious intent does not automatically mean, however, that the
accused fraternity members are ultimately devoid of criminal liability. The Revised Penal
Code also punishes felonies that are committed by means of fault (culpa). According to
Article 3 thereof, there is fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence,
lack of foresight, or lack of skill.
Reckless imprudence or negligence consists of a voluntary act done without malice, from
which an immediate personal harm, injury or material damage results by reason of an
inexcusable lack of precaution or advertence on the part of the person committing it.[if !
supportFootnotes][241][endif] In this case, the danger is visible and consciously appreciated by the
actor.[if !supportFootnotes][242][endif] In contrast, simple imprudence or negligence comprises an act
done without grave fault, from which an injury or material damage ensues by reason of a
mere lack of foresight or skill.[if !supportFootnotes][243][endif] Here, the threatened harm is not
immediate, and the danger is not openly visible. [if !supportFootnotes][244][endif]
The test[if !supportFootnotes][245][endif] for determining whether or not a person is
negligent in doing an act is as follows: Would a prudent man in the position of the person to
whom negligence is attributed foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable
consequence of the course about to be pursued? If so, the law imposes on the doer the duty
to take precaution against the mischievous results of the act. Failure to do so constitutes
negligence.[if !supportFootnotes][246][endif]
As we held in Gaid v. People, for a person to avoid being charged with
recklessness, the degree of precaution and diligence required varies with the degree of the
danger involved.[if !supportFootnotes][247][endif] If, on account of a certain line of conduct, the
danger of causing harm to another person is great, the individual who chooses to follow that
particular course of conduct is bound to be very careful, in order to prevent or avoid damage
or injury.[if !supportFootnotes][248][endif] In contrast, if the danger is minor, not much care is
required.[if !supportFootnotes][249][endif] It is thus possible that there are countless degrees of
precaution or diligence that may be required of an individual, from a transitory glance of
care to the most vigilant effort.[if !supportFootnotes][250][endif] The duty of the person to employ
more or less degree of care will depend upon the circumstances of each particular case.[if !
There was patent recklessness in the hazing of Lenny Villa.

According to the NBI medico-legal officer, Lenny died of cardiac failure
secondary to multiple traumatic injuries.[if !supportFootnotes][252][endif] The officer explained that
cardiac failure refers to the failure of the heart to work as a pump and as part of the
circulatory system due to the lack of blood.[if !supportFootnotes][253][endif] In the present case, the
victims heart could no longer work as a pumping organ, because it was deprived of its
requisite blood and oxygen.[if !supportFootnotes][254][endif] The deprivation was due to the
channeling of the blood supply from the entire circulatory system including the heart,
arteries, veins, venules, and capillaries to the thigh, leg, and arm areas of Lenny, thus
causing the formation of multiple hematomas or blood clots.[if !supportFootnotes][255][endif] The
multiple hematomas were wide, thick, and deep,[if !supportFootnotes][256][endif] indicating that these
could have resulted mainly from injuries sustained by the victim from fist blows, knee
blows, paddles, or the like.[if !supportFootnotes][257][endif] Repeated blows to those areas caused the
blood to gradually ooze out of the capillaries until the circulating blood became so markedly
diminished as to produce death. [if !supportFootnotes][258][endif] The officer also found that the brain,
liver, kidney, pancreas, intestines, and all other organs seen in the abdominals, as well as the
thoracic organ in the lungs, were pale due to the lack of blood, which was redirected to the
thighs and forearms.[if !supportFootnotes][259][endif] It was concluded that there was nothing in the
heart that would indicate that the victim suffered from a previous cardiac arrest or disease.
The multiple hematomas or bruises found in Lenny Villas arms and thighs,
resulting from repeated blows to those areas, caused the loss of blood from his vital organs
and led to his eventual death. These hematomas must be taken in the light of the hazing
activities performed on him by the Aquila Fraternity. According to the testimonies of the coneophytes of Lenny, they were punched, kicked, elbowed, kneed, stamped on; and hit with
different objects on their arms, legs, and thighs.[if !supportFootnotes][261][endif] They were also
paddled at the back of their thighs or legs;[if !supportFootnotes][262][endif] and slapped on their faces.
[if !supportFootnotes][263][endif] They were made to play rough basketball.[if !supportFootnotes][264][endif]
Witness Marquez testified on Lenny, saying: [T]inamaan daw sya sa spine.[if !supportFootnotes]
[265][endif] The NBI medico-legal officer explained that the death of the victim was the
cumulative effect of the multiple injuries suffered by the latter.[if !supportFootnotes][266][endif] The
relevant portion of the testimony is as follows:
Atty. Tadiar Doctor, there was, rather, it was your testimony on various
cross examinations of defense counsels that
the injuries that you have enumerated on
the body of the deceased Lenny Villa
previously marked as Exhibit G-1 to G-14
individually by themselves would not cause
the death of the victim. The question I am
going to propound to you is what is the
cumulative effect of all of these injuries
marked from Exhibit G-1 to G-14?
Witness All together nothing in concert to cause to the demise of the victim.
So, it is not fair for us to isolate such
injuries here because we are talking of the
whole body. At the same manner that as a
car would not run minus one (1) wheel. No,
the more humane in human approach is to
interpret all those injuries in whole and not
in part.[if !supportFootnotes][267][endif]
There is also evidence to show that some of the accused fraternity members were
drinking during the initiation rites.[if !supportFootnotes][268][endif]
Consequently, the collective acts of the fraternity members were tantamount to
recklessness, which made the resulting death of Lenny a culpable felony. It must be
remembered that organizations owe to their initiates a duty of care not to cause them injury
in the process.[if !supportFootnotes][269][endif] With the foregoing facts, we rule that the accused are
guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. Since the NBI medico-legal officer
found that the victims death was the cumulative effect of the injuries suffered, criminal
responsibility redounds to all those who directly participated in and contributed to the
infliction of physical injuries.
It appears from the aforementioned facts that the incident may have been
prevented, or at least mitigated, had the alumni of Aquila Fraternity accused Dizon and
Villareal restrained themselves from insisting on reopening the initiation rites. Although this
point did not matter in the end,
as records would show that the other fraternity members participated in the reopened
initiation rites having in mind the concept of seniority in fraternities the implication of the
presence of alumni should be seen as a point of review in future legislation. We further note
that some of the fraternity members were intoxicated during Lennys initiation rites. In this
light, the Court submits to Congress, for legislative consideration, the amendment of the
Anti-Hazing Law to include the fact of intoxication and the presence of non-resident or
alumni fraternity members during hazing as aggravating circumstances that would increase
the applicable penalties.
It is truly astonishing how men would wittingly or unwittingly impose the misery
of hazing and employ appalling rituals in the name of brotherhood. There must be a better
way to establish kinship. A neophyte admitted that he joined the fraternity to have more
friends and to avail himself of the benefits it offered, such as tips during bar examinations.
[if !supportFootnotes][270][endif] Another initiate did not give up, because he feared being looked
down upon as a quitter, and because he felt he did not have a choice.[if !supportFootnotes][271][endif]
Thus, for Lenny Villa and the other neophytes, joining the Aquila Fraternity entailed a leap
in the dark. By giving consent under the circumstances, they left their fates in the hands of
the fraternity members. Unfortunately, the hands to which lives were entrusted were
barbaric as they were reckless.
Our finding of criminal liability for the felony of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide shall cover only accused Tecson, Ama, Almeda, Bantug, and Dizon. Had the AntiHazing Law been in effect then, these five accused fraternity members would have all been
convicted of the crime of hazing punishable by reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment).[if !
supportFootnotes][272][endif] Since there was no law prohibiting the act of hazing when Lenny died,
we are constrained to rule according to existing laws at the time of his death. The CA found
that the prosecution failed to prove, beyond reasonable doubt,
Victorino et al.s individual participation in the infliction of physical injuries upon Lenny
Villa.[if !supportFootnotes][273][endif] As to accused Villareal, his criminal liability was totally
extinguished by the fact of his death, pursuant to Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code.
Furthermore, our ruling herein shall be interpreted without prejudice to the
applicability of the Anti-Hazing Law to subsequent cases. Furthermore, the modification of
criminal liability from slight physical injuries to reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
shall apply only with respect to accused Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson.
The accused liable to pay damages
The CA awarded damages in favor of the heirs of Lenny Villa in the amounts of
50,000 as civil indemnity ex delicto and 1,000,000 as moral damages, to be jointly and
severally paid by accused Dizon and Villareal. It also awarded the amount of 30,000 as
indemnity to be jointly and severally paid by accused Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson.
Civil indemnity ex delicto is automatically awarded for the sole fact of death of the
[if
victim. !supportFootnotes][274][endif] In accordance with prevailing jurisprudence,[if !supportFootnotes]
[275][endif] we sustain the CAs award of indemnity in the amount of 50,000.
The heirs of the victim are entitled to actual or compensatory damages, including
expenses incurred in connection with the death of the victim, so long as the claim is
supported by tangible documents.[if !supportFootnotes][276][endif] Though we are prepared to award
actual damages, the Court is prevented from granting them, since the records are bereft of
any evidence to show that actual expenses were incurred or proven during trial.
Furthermore, in the appeal, the Solicitor General does not interpose any claim for actual
damages.[if !supportFootnotes][277][endif]
The heirs of the deceased may recover moral damages for the grief suffered on
account of the victims death.[if !supportFootnotes][278][endif] This penalty is pursuant to Article
2206(3) of the Civil Code, which provides that the spouse, legitimate and illegitimate
descendants and the ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for mental
anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.[if !supportFootnotes][279][endif] Thus, we hereby we
affirm the CAs award of moral damages in the amount of 1,000,000.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 155101 finding petitioner Fidelito
Dizon guilty of homicide is hereby MODIFIED and SET ASIDE IN PART. The appealed
Judgment in G.R. No. 154954 finding Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama,
Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries is also
MODIFIED and SET ASIDE IN PART. Instead, Fidelito Dizon, Antonio Mariano Almeda,
Junel Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson are found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide defined and penalized under
Article 365 in relation to Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. They are hereby sentenced
to suffer an indeterminate prison term of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor,
as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum. In
addition, accused are ORDERED jointly and severally to pay the heirs of Lenny Villa civil
indemnity ex delicto in the amount of 50,000, and moral damages in the amount of
1,000,000, plus legal interest on all damages awarded at the rate of 12% from the date of
the finality of this Decision until satisfaction.[if !supportFootnotes][280][endif] Costs de oficio.
The appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954, acquitting Victorino et al., is hereby
AFFIRMED. The appealed Judgments in G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080, dismissing the
criminal case filed against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano, are likewise AFFIRMED.
Finally, pursuant to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, the Petition in G.R. No.
151258 is hereby dismissed, and the criminal case against Artemio Villareal deemed
CLOSED and TERMINATED.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Senate President and the Speaker of
the House of Representatives for possible consideration of the amendment of the Anti-
Hazing Law to include the fact of intoxication and the presence of non-resident or alumni
fraternity members during hazing as aggravating circumstances that would increase the
applicable penalties.
SO ORDERED.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the Opinion of the Courts
Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
G.R. No. L-5272
March 19, 1910
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AH CHONG, defendant-appellant.
Gibb & Gale, for appellant.
Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.
CARSON, J.:
The evidence as to many of the essential and vital facts in this case is limited to the
testimony of the accused himself, because from the very nature of these facts and from the
circumstances surrounding the incident upon which these proceedings rest, no other
evidence as to these facts was available either to the prosecution or to the defense. We think,
however, that, giving the accused the benefit of the doubt as to the weight of the evidence
touching those details of the incident as to which there can be said to be any doubt, the
following statement of the material facts disclose by the record may be taken to be
substantially correct:
The defendant, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook at "Officers' quarters, No. 27," Fort Mc
Kinley, Rizal Province, and at the same place Pascual Gualberto, deceased, was employed
as a house boy or muchacho. "Officers' quarters No. 27" as a detached house situates some
40 meters from the nearest building, and in August, 19087, was occupied solely as an
officers' mess or club. No one slept in the house except the two servants, who jointly
occupied a small room toward the rear of the building, the door of which opened upon a
narrow porch running along the side of the building, by which communication was had with
the other part of the house. This porch was covered by a heavy growth of vines for its entire
length and height. The door of the room was not furnished with a permanent bolt or lock,
and occupants, as a measure of security, had attached a small hook or catch on the inside of
the door, and were in the habit of reinforcing this somewhat insecure means of fastening the
door by placing against it a chair. In the room there was but one small window, which, like
the door, opened on the porch. Aside from the door and window, there were no other
openings of any kind in the room.
On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10 o'clock, the defendant, who had received for
the night, was suddenly awakened by some trying to force open the door of the room. He sat
up in bed and called out twice, "Who is there?" He heard no answer and was convinced by
the noise at the door that it was being pushed open by someone bent upon forcing his way
into the room. Due to the heavy growth of vines along the front of the porch, the room was
very dark, and the defendant, fearing that the intruder was a robber or a thief, leaped to his
feet and called out. "If you enter the room, I will kill you." At that moment he was struck
just above the knee by the edge of the chair which had been placed against the door. In the
darkness and confusion the defendant thought that the blow had been inflicted by the person
who had forced the door open, whom he supposed to be a burglar, though in the light of
after events, it is probable that the chair was merely thrown back into the room by the
sudden opening of the door against which it rested. Seizing a common kitchen knife which
he kept under his pillow, the defendant struck out wildly at the intruder who, it afterwards
turned out, was his roommate, Pascual. Pascual ran out upon the porch and fell down on the
steps in a desperately wounded condition, followed by the defendant, who immediately
recognized him in the moonlight. Seeing that Pascual was wounded, he called to his
employers who slept in the next house, No. 28, and ran back to his room to secure bandages
to bind up Pascual's wounds.
There had been several robberies in Fort McKinley not long prior to the date of the incident
just described, one of which took place in a house in which the defendant was employed as
cook; and as defendant alleges, it was because of these repeated robberies he kept a knife
under his pillow for his personal protection.
The deceased and the accused, who roomed together and who appear to have on friendly
and amicable terms prior to the fatal incident, had an understanding that when either
returned at night, he should knock at the door and acquiant his companion with his identity.
Pascual had left the house early in the evening and gone for a walk with his friends,
Celestino Quiambao and Mariano Ibaez, servants employed at officers' quarters No. 28, the
nearest house to the mess hall. The three returned from their walk at about 10 o'clock, and
Celestino and Mariano stopped at their room at No. 28, Pascual going on to his room at No.
27. A few moments after the party separated, Celestino and Mariano heard cries for
assistance and upon returning to No. 27 found Pascual sitting on the back steps fatally
wounded in the stomach, whereupon one of them ran back to No. 28 and called Liuetenants
Jacobs and Healy, who immediately went to the aid of the wounded man.
The defendant then and there admitted that he had stabbed his roommate, but said that he
did it under the impression that Pascual was "a ladron" because he forced open the door of
their sleeping room, despite defendant's warnings.
No reasonable explanation of the remarkable conduct on the part of Pascuals suggests itself,
unless it be that the boy in a spirit of mischief was playing a trick on his Chinese roommate,
and sought to frightened him by forcing his way into the room, refusing to give his name or
say who he was, in order to make Ah Chong believe that he was being attacked by a robber.
Defendant was placed under arrest forthwith, and Pascual was conveyed to the military
hospital, where he died from the effects of the wound on the following day.
The defendant was charged with the crime of assassination, tried, and found guilty by the
trial court of simple homicide, with extenuating circumstances, and sentenced to six years
and one day presidio mayor, the minimum penalty prescribed by law.
At the trial in the court below the defendant admitted that he killed his roommate, Pascual
Gualberto, but insisted that he struck the fatal blow without any intent to do a wrongful act,
in the exercise of his lawful right of self-defense.
Article 8 of the Penal Code provides that
The following are not delinquent and are therefore exempt from criminal liability:
xxx
xxx
xxx
4 He who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided there are the following attendant
circumstances:
(1) Illegal aggression.
(2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it.
(3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
Under these provisions we think that there can be no doubt that defendant would be entitle
to complete exception from criminal liability for the death of the victim of his fatal blow, if
the intruder who forced open the door of his room had been in fact a dangerous thief or
"ladron," as the defendant believed him to be. No one, under such circumstances, would
doubt the right of the defendant to resist and repel such an intrusion, and the thief having
forced open the door notwithstanding defendant's thrice-repeated warning to desist, and his
threat that he would kill the intruder if he persisted in his attempt, it will not be questioned
that in the darkness of the night, in a small room, with no means of escape, with the thief
advancing upon him despite his warnings defendant would have been wholly justified in
using any available weapon to defend himself from such an assault, and in striking
promptly, without waiting for the thief to discover his whereabouts and deliver the first
blow.
But the evidence clearly discloses that the intruder was not a thief or a "ladron." That neither
the defendant nor his property nor any of the property under his charge was in real danger at
the time when he struck the fatal blow. That there was no such "unlawful aggression" on the
part of a thief or "ladron" as defendant believed he was repelling and resisting, and that
there was no real "necessity" for the use of the knife to defend his person or his property or
the property under his charge.
The question then squarely presents it self, whether in this jurisdiction one can be held
criminally responsible who, by reason of a mistake as to the facts, does an act for which he
would be exempt from criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed them to be, but
which would constitute the crime of homicide or assassination if the actor had known the
true state of the facts at the time when he committed the act. To this question we think there
can be but one answer, and we hold that under such circumstances there is no criminal
liability, provided always that the alleged ignorance or mistake or fact was not due to
negligence or bad faith.
In broader terms, ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance or mistake of fact is
sufficient to negative a particular intent which under the law is a necessary ingredient of the
offense charged (e.g., in larcerny, animus furendi; in murder, malice; in crimes intent)
"cancels the presumption of intent," and works an acquittal; except in those cases where the
circumstances demand a conviction under the penal provisions touching criminal
negligence; and in cases where, under the provisions of article 1 of the Penal Code one
voluntarily committing a crime or misdeamor incurs criminal liability for any wrongful act
committed by him, even though it be different from that which he intended to commit.
(Wharton's Criminal Law, sec. 87 and cases cited; McClain's Crim. Law, sec. 133 and cases
cited; Pettit vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 240; Commonwealth vs. Power, 7 Met., 596; Yates vs.
People, 32 N.Y., 509; Isham vs. State, 38 Ala., 213; Commonwealth vs. Rogers, 7 Met.,
500.)
The general proposition thus stated hardly admits of discussion, and the only question
worthy of consideration is whether malice or criminal intent is an essential element or
ingredient of the crimes of homicide and assassination as defined and penalized in the Penal
Code. It has been said that since the definitions there given of these as well as most other
crimes and offense therein defined, do not specifically and expressly declare that the acts
constituting the crime or offense must be committed with malice or with criminal intent in
order that the actor may be held criminally liable, the commission of the acts set out in the
various definitions subjects the actor to the penalties described therein, unless it appears that
he is exempted from liability under one or other of the express provisions of article 8 of the
code, which treats of exemption. But while it is true that contrary to the general rule of
legislative enactment in the United States, the definitions of crimes and offenses as set out
in the Penal Code rarely contain provisions expressly declaring that malice or criminal
intent is an essential ingredient of the crime, nevertheless, the general provisions of article 1
of the code clearly indicate that malice, or criminal intent in some form, is an essential
requisite of all crimes and offense therein defined, in the absence of express provisions
modifying the general rule, such as are those touching liability resulting from acts
negligently or imprudently committed, and acts done by one voluntarily committing a crime
or misdemeanor, where the act committed is different from that which he intended to
commit. And it is to be observed that even these exceptions are more apparent than real, for
"There is little distinction, except in degree, between a will to do a wrongful thing and
indifference whether it is done or not. Therefore carelessness is criminal, and within limits
supplies the place of the affirmative criminal intent" (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, s.
313); and, again, "There is so little difference between a disposition to do a great harm and a
disposition to do harm that one of them may very well be looked upon as the measure of the
other. Since, therefore, the guilt of a crime consists in the disposition to do harm, which the
criminal shows by committing it, and since this disposition is greater or less in proportion to
the harm which is done by the crime, the consequence is that the guilt of the crime follows
the same proportion; it is greater or less according as the crime in its own nature does
greater or less harm" (Ruth. Ints. C. 18, p. 11); or, as it has been otherwise stated, the thing
done, having proceeded from a corrupt mid, is to be viewed the same whether the corruption
was of one particular form or another.
Article 1 of the Penal Code is as follows:
Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and ommissions punished by law.
Acts and omissions punished by law are always presumed to be voluntarily unless the
contrary shall appear.
An person voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor shall incur criminal liability,
even though the wrongful act committed be different from that which he had intended to
commit.
The celebrated Spanish jurist Pacheco, discussing the meaning of the word "voluntary" as
used in this article, say that a voluntary act is a free, intelligent, and intentional act, and
roundly asserts that without intention (intention to do wrong or criminal intention) there can
be no crime; and that the word "voluntary" implies and includes the words "con malicia,"
which were expressly set out in the definition of the word "crime" in the code of 1822, but
omitted from the code of 1870, because, as Pacheco insists, their use in the former code was
redundant, being implied and included in the word "voluntary." (Pacheco, Codigo Penal,
vol. 1, p. 74.)
Viada, while insisting that the absence of intention to commit the crime can only be said to
exempt from criminal responsibility when the act which was actually intended to be done
was in itself a lawful one, and in the absence of negligence or imprudence, nevertheless
admits and recognizes in his discussion of the provisions of this article of the code that in
general without intention there can be no crime. (Viada, vol. 1, p. 16.) And, as we have
shown above, the exceptions insisted upon by Viada are more apparent than real.
Silvela, in discussing the doctrine herein laid down, says:
In fact, it is sufficient to remember the first article, which declared that where there is no
intention there is no crime . . . in order to affirm, without fear of mistake, that under our
code there can be no crime if there is no act, an act which must fall within the sphere of
ethics if there is no moral injury. (Vol. 2, the Criminal Law, folio 169.)
And to the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, as, for example
in its sentence of May 31, 1882, in which it made use of the following language:
It is necessary that this act, in order to constitute a crime, involve all the malice which is
supposed from the operation of the will and an intent to cause the injury which may be the
object of the crime.
And again in its sentence of March 16, 1892, wherein it held that "considering that,
whatever may be the civil effects of the inscription of his three sons, made by the appellant
in the civil registry and in the parochial church, there can be no crime because of the lack of
the necessary element or criminal intention, which characterizes every action or ommission
punished by law; nor is he guilty of criminal negligence."
And to the same effect in its sentence of December 30, 1896, it made use of the following
language:
. . . Considering that the moral element of the crime, that is, intent or malice or their absence
in the commission of an act defined and punished by law as criminal, is not a necessary
question of fact submitted to the exclusive judgment and decision of the trial court.
That the author of the Penal Code deemed criminal intent or malice to be an essential
element of the various crimes and misdemeanors therein defined becomes clear also from an
examination of the provisions of article 568, which are as follows:
He who shall execute through reckless negligence an act that, if done with malice, would
constitute a grave crime, shall be punished with the penalty of arresto mayor in its
maximum degree, to prision correccional in its minimum degrees if it shall constitute a less
grave crime.
He who in violation of the regulations shall commit a crime through simple imprudence or
negligence shall incur the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum degrees.
In the application of these penalties the courts shall proceed according to their discretion,
without being subject to the rules prescribed in article 81.
The provisions of this article shall not be applicable if the penalty prescribed for the crime is
equal to or less than those contained in the first paragraph thereof, in which case the courts
shall apply the next one thereto in the degree which they may consider proper.
The word "malice" in this article is manifestly substantially equivalent to the words
"criminal intent," and the direct inference from its provisions is that the commission of the
acts contemplated therein, in the absence of malice (criminal intent), negligence, and
imprudence, does not impose any criminal liability on the actor.
The word "voluntary" as used in article 1 of the Penal Code would seem to approximate in
meaning the word "willful" as used in English and American statute to designate a form of
criminal intent. It has been said that while the word "willful" sometimes means little more
than intentionally or designedly, yet it is more frequently understood to extent a little further
and approximate the idea of the milder kind of legal malice; that is, it signifies an evil intent
without justifiable excuse. In one case it was said to mean, as employed in a statute in
contemplation, "wantonly" or "causelessly;" in another, "without reasonable grounds to
believe the thing lawful." And Shaw, C. J., once said that ordinarily in a statute it means
"not merely `voluntarily' but with a bad purpose; in other words, corruptly." In English and
the American statutes defining crimes "malice," "malicious," "maliciously," and "malice
aforethought" are words indicating intent, more purely technical than "willful" or willfully,"
but "the difference between them is not great;" the word "malice" not often being
understood to require general malevolence toward a particular individual, and signifying
rather the intent from our legal justification. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs. 428
and 429, and cases cited.)
But even in the absence of express words in a statute, setting out a condition in the
definition of a crime that it be committed "voluntarily," willfully," "maliciously" "with
malice aforethought," or in one of the various modes generally construed to imply a
criminal intent, we think that reasoning from general principles it will always be found that
with the rare exceptions hereinafter mentioned, to constitute a crime evil intent must
combine with an act. Mr. Bishop, who supports his position with numerous citations from
the decided cases, thus forcely present this doctrine:
In no one thing does criminal jurisprudence differ more from civil than in the rule as to the
intent. In controversies between private parties the quo animo with which a thing was done
is sometimes important, not always; but crime proceeds only from a criminal mind. So that
There can be no crime, large or small, without an evil mind. In other words, punishment is
the sentence of wickedness, without which it can not be. And neither in philosophical
speculation nor in religious or mortal sentiment would any people in any age allow that a
man should be deemed guilty unless his mind was so. It is therefore a principle of our legal
system, as probably it is of every other, that the essence of an offense is the wrongful intent,
without which it can not exists. We find this doctrine confirmed by
Legal maxims. The ancient wisdom of the law, equally with the modern, is distinct on
this subject. It consequently has supplied to us such maxims as Actus non facit reum nisi
mens sit rea, "the act itself does not make man guilty unless his intention were so;" Actus
me incito factus non est meus actus, "an act done by me against my will is not my act;" and
others of the like sort. In this, as just said, criminal jurisprudence differs from civil. So also
Moral science and moral sentiment teach the same thing. "By reference to the intention, we
inculpate or exculpate others or ourselves without any respect to the happiness or misery
actually produced. Let the result of an action be what it may, we hold a man guilty simply
on the ground of intention; or, on the dame ground, we hold him innocent." The calm
judgment of mankind keeps this doctrine among its jewels. In times of excitement, when
vengeance takes the place of justice, every guard around the innocent is cast down. But with
the return of reason comes the public voice that where the mind is pure, he who differs in
act from his neighbors does not offend. And
In the spontaneous judgment which springs from the nature given by God to man, no one
deems another to deserve punishment for what he did from an upright mind, destitute of
every form of evil. And whenever a person is made to suffer a punishment which the
community deems not his due, so far from its placing an evil mark upon him, it elevates him
to the seat of the martyr. Even infancy itself spontaneously pleads the want of bad intent in
justification of what has the appearance of wrong, with the utmost confidence that the plea,
if its truth is credited, will be accepted as good. Now these facts are only the voice of nature
uttering one of her immutable truths. It is, then, the doctrine of the law, superior to all other
doctrines, because first in nature from which the law itself proceeds, that no man is to be
punished as a criminal unless his intent is wrong. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs.
286 to 290.)
Compelled by necessity, "the great master of all things," an apparent departure from this
doctrine of abstract justice result from the adoption of the arbitrary rule that Ignorantia juris
non excusat ("Ignorance of the law excuses no man"), without which justice could not be
administered in our tribunals; and compelled also by the same doctrine of necessity, the
courts have recognized the power of the legislature to forbid, in a limited class of cases, the
doing of certain acts, and to make their commission criminal without regard to the intent of
the doer. Without discussing these exceptional cases at length, it is sufficient here to say that
the courts have always held that unless the intention of the lawmaker to make the
commission of certain acts criminal without regard to the intent of the doer is clear and
beyond question the statute will not be so construed (cases cited in Cyc., vol. 12, p. 158,
notes 76 and 77); and the rule that ignorance of the law excuses no man has been said not to
be a real departure from the law's fundamental principle that crime exists only where the
mind is at fault, because "the evil purpose need not be to break the law, and if suffices if it is
simply to do the thing which the law in fact forbids." (Bishop's New Criminal Law, sec.
300, and cases cited.)
But, however this may be, there is no technical rule, and no pressing necessity therefore,
requiring mistake in fact to be dealt with otherwise that in strict accord with the principles
of abstract justice. On the contrary, the maxim here is Ignorantia facti excusat ("Ignorance
or mistake in point of fact is, in all cases of supposed offense, a sufficient excuse").
(Brown's Leg. Max., 2d ed., 190.)
Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any such mistake of
fact as shows the act committed to have proceeded from no sort of evil in the mind
necessarily relieves the actor from criminal liability provided always there is no fault or
negligence on his part; and as laid down by Baron Parke, "The guilt of the accused must
depend on the circumstances as they appear to him." (Reg. vs. Thurborn, 1 Den. C., 387; P.
vs. Anderson, 44 Cal.., 65; P. vs. Lamb, 54 Barb., 342; Yates vs. P., 32 N. Y., 509; Patterson
vs. P., 46 Barb., 625; Reg. vs. Cohen, 8 Cox C. C., 41; P. vs. Miles, 55 Cal., 207, 209;
Nalley vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 387.) That is to say, the question as to whether he honestly, in
good faith, and without fault or negligence fell into the mistake is to be determined by the
circumstances as they appeared to him at the time when the mistake was made, and the
effect which the surrounding circumstances might reasonably be expected to have on his
mind, in forming the intent, criminal or other wise, upon which he acted.
If, in language not uncommon in the cases, one has reasonable cause to believe the
existence of facts which will justify a killing or, in terms more nicely in accord with the
principles on which the rule is founded, if without fault or carelessness he does believe them
he is legally guiltless of the homicide; though he mistook the facts, and so the life of an
innocent person is unfortunately extinguished. In other words, and with reference to the
right of self-defense and the not quite harmonious authorities, it is the doctrine of reason and
sufficiently sustained in adjudication, that notwithstanding some decisions apparently
adverse, whenever a man undertakes self-defense, he is justified in acting on the facts as
they appear to him. If, without fault or carelessness, he is misled concerning them, and
defends himself correctly according to what he thus supposes the facts to be the law will not
punish him though they are in truth otherwise, and he was really no occassion for the
extreme measures. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, sec. 305, and large array of cases there
cited.)
The common illustration in the American and English textbooks of the application of this
rule is the case where a man, masked and disguised as a footpad, at night and on a lonely
road, "holds up" his friends in a spirit of mischief, and with leveled pistol demands his
money or his life, but is killed by his friend under the mistaken belief that the attack is a real
one, that the pistol leveled at his head is loaded, and that his life and property are in
imminent danger at the hands of the aggressor. No one will doubt that if the facts were such
as the slayer believed them to be he would be innocent of the commission of any crime and
wholly exempt from criminal liability, although if he knew the real state of the facts when
he took the life of his friend he would undoubtedly be guilty of the crime of homicide or
assassination. Under such circumstances, proof of his innocent mistake of the facts
overcomes the presumption of malice or criminal intent, and (since malice or criminal intent
is a necessary ingredient of the "act punished by law" in cases of homicide or assassination)
overcomes at the same time the presumption established in article 1 of the code, that the "act
punished by law" was committed "voluntarily."
Parson, C.J., in the Massachusetts court, once said:
If the party killing had reasonable grounds for believing that the person slain had a felonious
design against him, and under that supposition killed him, although it should afterwards
appear that there was no such design, it will not be murder, but it will be either
manslaughter or excusable homicide, according to the degree of caution used and the
probable grounds of such belief. (Charge to the grand jury in Selfridge's case, Whart, Hom.,
417, 418, Lloyd's report of the case, p.7.)
In this case, Parker, J., charging the petit jury, enforced the doctrine as follows:
A, in the peaceable pursuit of his affairs, sees B rushing rapidly toward him, with an
outstretched arms and a pistol in his hand, and using violent menaces against his life as he
advances. Having approached near enough in the same attitude, A, who has a club in his
hand, strikes B over the head before or at the instant the pistol is discharged; and of the
wound B dies. It turns out the pistol was loaded with powder only, and that the real design
of B was only to terrify A. Will any reasonable man say that A is more criminal that he
would have been if there had been a bullet in the pistol? Those who hold such doctrine must
require that a man so attacked must, before he strikes the assailant, stop and ascertain how
the pistol is loaded a doctrine which would entirely take away the essential right of selfdefense. And when it is considered that the jury who try the cause, and not the party killing,
are to judge of the reasonable grounds of his apprehension, no danger can be supposed to
flow from this principle. (Lloyd's Rep., p. 160.)
To the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, cited by Viada, a few
of which are here set out in full because the facts are somewhat analogous to those in the
case at bar.
QUESTION III. When it is shown that the accused was sitting at his hearth, at night, in
company only of his wife, without other light than reflected from the fire, and that the man
with his back to the door was attending to the fire, there suddenly entered a person whom he
did not see or know, who struck him one or two blows, producing a contusion on the
shoulder, because of which he turned, seized the person and took from his the stick with
which he had undoubtedly been struck, and gave the unknown person a blow, knocking him
to the floor, and afterwards striking him another blow on the head, leaving the unknown
lying on the floor, and left the house. It turned out the unknown person was his father-inlaw, to whom he rendered assistance as soon as he learned his identity, and who died in
about six days in consequence of cerebral congestion resulting from the blow. The accused,
who confessed the facts, had always sustained pleasant relations with his father-in-law,
whom he visited during his sickness, demonstrating great grief over the occurrence. Shall he
be considered free from criminal responsibility, as having acted in self-defense, with all the
circumstances related in paragraph 4, article 8, of the Penal Code? The criminal branch of
the Audiencia of Valladolid found that he was an illegal aggressor, without sufficient
provocation, and that there did not exists rational necessity for the employment of the force
used, and in accordance with articles 419 and 87 of the Penal Code condemned him to
twenty months of imprisonment, with accessory penalty and costs. Upon appeal by the
accused, he was acquitted by the supreme court, under the following sentence:
"Considering, from the facts found by the sentence to have been proven, that the accused
was surprised from behind, at night, in his house beside his wife who was nursing her child,
was attacked, struck, and beaten, without being able to distinguish with which they might
have executed their criminal intent, because of the there was no other than fire light in the
room, and considering that in such a situation and when the acts executed demonstrated that
they might endanger his existence, and possibly that of his wife and child, more especially
because his assailant was unknown, he should have defended himself, and in doing so with
the same stick with which he was attacked, he did not exceed the limits of self-defense, nor
did he use means which were not rationally necessary, particularly because the instrument
with which he killed was the one which he took from his assailant, and was capable of
producing death, and in the darkness of the house and the consteration which naturally
resulted from such strong aggression, it was not given him to known or distinguish whether
there was one or more assailants, nor the arms which they might bear, not that which they
might accomplish, and considering that the lower court did not find from the accepted facts
that there existed rational necessity for the means employed, and that it did not apply
paragraph 4 of article 8 of the Penal Code, it erred, etc." (Sentence of supreme court of
Spain, February 28, 1876.) (Viada, Vol. I, p. 266.) .
QUESTION XIX. A person returning, at night, to his house, which was situated in a retired
part of the city, upon arriving at a point where there was no light, heard the voice of a man,
at a distance of some 8 paces, saying: "Face down, hand over you money!" because of
which, and almost at the same money, he fired two shots from his pistol, distinguishing
immediately the voice of one of his friends (who had before simulated a different voice)
saying, "Oh! they have killed me," and hastening to his assistance, finding the body lying
upon the ground, he cried, "Miguel, Miguel, speak, for God's sake, or I am ruined," realizing
that he had been the victim of a joke, and not receiving a reply, and observing that his friend
was a corpse, he retired from the place. Shall he be declared exempt in toto from
responsibility as the author of this homicide, as having acted in just self-defense under the
circumstances defined in paragraph 4, article 8, Penal Code? The criminal branch of the
Audiencia of Malaga did not so find, but only found in favor of the accused two of the
requisites of said article, but not that of the reasonableness of the means employed to repel
the attack, and, therefore, condemned the accused to eight years and one day of prison
mayor, etc. The supreme court acquitted the accused on his appeal from this sentence,
holding that the accused was acting under a justifiable and excusable mistake of fact as to
the identity of the person calling to him, and that under the circumstances, the darkness and
remoteness, etc., the means employed were rational and the shooting justifiable. (Sentence
supreme court, March 17, 1885.) (Viada, Vol. I, p. 136.)
QUESTION VI. The owner of a mill, situated in a remote spot, is awakened, at night, by a
large stone thrown against his window at this, he puts his head out of the window and
inquires what is wanted, and is answered "the delivery of all of his money, otherwise his
house would be burned" because of which, and observing in an alley adjacent to the mill
four individuals, one of whom addressed him with blasphemy, he fired his pistol at one the
men, who, on the next morning was found dead on the same spot. Shall this man be declared
exempt from criminal responsibility as having acted in just self-defense with all of the
requisites of law? The criminal branch of the requisites of law? The criminal branch of the
Audiencia of Zaragoza finds that there existed in favor of the accused a majority of the
requisites to exempt him from criminal responsibility, but not that of reasonable necessity
for the means, employed, and condemned the accused to twelve months of prision
correctional for the homicide committed. Upon appeal, the supreme court acquitted the
condemned, finding that the accused, in firing at the malefactors, who attack his mill at
night in a remote spot by threatening robbery and incendiarism, was acting in just selfdefense of his person, property, and family. (Sentence of May 23, 1877). (I Viada, p. 128.)
A careful examination of the facts as disclosed in the case at bar convinces us that the
defendant Chinaman struck the fatal blow alleged in the information in the firm belief that
the intruder who forced open the door of his sleeping room was a thief, from whose assault
he was in imminent peril, both of his life and of his property and of the property committed
to his charge; that in view of all the circumstances, as they must have presented themselves
to the defendant at the time, he acted in good faith, without malice, or criminal intent, in the
belief that he was doing no more than exercising his legitimate right of self-defense; that
had the facts been as he believed them to be he would have been wholly exempt from
criminal liability on account of his act; and that he can not be said to have been guilty of
negligence or recklessness or even carelessness in falling into his mistake as to the facts, or
in the means adopted by him to defend himself from the imminent danger which he believe
threatened his person and his property and the property under his charge.
The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should be reversed,
and the defendant acquitted of the crime with which he is charged and his bail bond
exonerated, with the costs of both instance de oficio. So ordered.
Johnson Moreland and Elliott, JJ., concur.

Arellano, C.J., and Mapa, J., dissent.
Separate Opinions
TORRES, J., dissenting:
The writer, with due respect to the opinion of the majority of the court, believes that,
according to the merits of the case, the crime of homicide by reckless negligence, defined
and punishes in article 568 of the Penal Code, was committed, inasmuch as the victim was
wilfully (voluntariomente) killed, and while the act was done without malice or criminal
intent it was, however, executed with real negligence, for the acts committed by the
deceased could not warrant the aggression by the defendant under the erroneous belief on
the part of the accused that the person who assaulted him was a malefactor; the defendant
therefore incurred responsibility in attacking with a knife the person who was accustomed to
enter said room, without any justifiable motive.
By reason of the nature of the crime committed, in the opinion of the undersigned the
accused should be sentenced to the penalty of one year and one month of prision
correctional, to suffer the accessory penalties provided in article 61, and to pay an
indemnify of P1,000 to the heirs of the deceased, with the costs of both instances, thereby
reversing the judgment appealed from.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 152644
February 10, 2006
JOHN ERIC LONEY, STEVEN PAUL REID and PEDRO B. HERNANDEZ, Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
1
This is a petition for review of the Decision2 dated 5 November 2001 and the Resolution
dated 14 March 2002 of the Court of Appeals. The 5 November 2001 Decision affirmed the
ruling of the Regional Trial Court, Boac, Marinduque, Branch 94, in a suit to quash
Informations filed against petitioners John Eric Loney, Steven Paul Reid, and Pedro B.
Hernandez ("petitioners"). The 14 March 2002 Resolution denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
The Facts
Petitioners John Eric Loney, Steven Paul Reid, and Pedro B. Hernandez are the President
and Chief Executive Officer, Senior Manager, and Resident Manager for Mining
Operations, respectively, of Marcopper Mining Corporation ("Marcopper"), a corporation
engaged in mining in the province of Marinduque.
Marcopper had been storing tailings3 from its operations in a pit in Mt. Tapian, Marinduque.
At the base of the pit ran a drainage tunnel leading to the Boac and Makalupnit rivers. It
appears that Marcopper had placed a concrete plug at the tunnels end. On 24 March 1994,
tailings gushed out of or near the tunnels end. In a few days, the Mt. Tapian pit had
discharged millions of tons of tailings into the Boac and Makalupnit rivers.
In August 1996, the Department of Justice separately charged petitioners in the Municipal
Trial Court of Boac, Marinduque ("MTC") with violation of Article 91(B),4 sub-paragraphs
5 and 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1067 or the Water Code of the Philippines ("PD 1067"),5
Section 86 of Presidential Decree No. 984 or the National Pollution Control Decree of 1976
("PD 984"),7 Section 1088 of Republic Act No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995
("RA 7942"),9 and Article 36510 of the Revised Penal Code ("RPC") for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property.11
Petitioners moved to quash the Informations on the following grounds: (1) the Informations
were "duplicitous" as the Department of Justice charged more than one offense for a single
act; (2) petitioners John Eric Loney and Steven Paul Reid were not yet officers of
Marcopper when the incident subject of the Informations took place; and (3) the
Informations contain allegations which constitute legal excuse or justification.
The Ruling of the MTC
In its Joint Order of 16 January 1997 ("Joint Order"), the MTC12 initially deferred ruling on
petitioners motion for lack of "indubitable ground for the quashing of the [I]nformations x
x x." The MTC scheduled petitioners arraignment in February 1997. However, on
petitioners motion, the MTC issued a Consolidated Order on 28 April 1997 ("Consolidated
Order"), granting partial reconsideration to its Joint Order and quashing the Informations for
violation of PD 1067 and PD 984. The MTC maintained the Informations for violation of
RA 7942 and Article 365 of the RPC. The MTC held:
[T]he 12 Informations have common allegations of pollutants pointing to "mine tailings"
which were precipitately discharged into the Makulapnit and Boac Rivers due to breach
caused on the Tapian drainage/tunnel due to negligence or failure to institute adequate
measures to prevent pollution and siltation of the Makulapnit and Boac River systems, the
very term and condition required to be undertaken under the Environmental Compliance
Certificate issued on April 1, 1990.
The allegations in the informations point to same set [sic] of evidence required to prove the
single fact of pollution constituting violation of the Water Code and the Pollution Law
which are the same set of evidence necessary to prove the same single fact of pollution, in
proving the elements constituting violation of the conditions of ECC, issued pursuant to the
Philippine Mining Act. In both instances, the terms and conditions of the Environmental
Compliance Certificate were allegedly violated. In other words, the same set of evidence is
required in proving violations of the three (3) special laws.
After carefully analyzing and weighing the contending arguments of the parties and after
taking into consideration the applicable laws and jurisprudence, the Court is convinced that
as far as the three (3) aforesaid laws are concerned, only the Information for [v]iolation of
Philippine Mining Act should be maintained. In other words, the Informations for
[v]iolation of Anti-Pollution Law (PD 984) and the Water Code (PD 1067) should be
dismissed/quashed because the elements constituting the aforesaid violations are absorbed
by the same elements which constitute violation of the Philippine Mining Act (RA 7942).
Therefore, x x x Criminal Case[] Nos. 96-44, 96-45 and 96-46 for [v]iolation of the Water
Code; and Criminal Case[] Nos. 96-47, 96-48 and 96-49 for [v]iolation of the Anti-Pollution
Law x x x are hereby DISMISSED or QUASHED and Criminal Case[] Nos. 96-50, 96-51
and 96-52 for [v]iolation of the Philippine Mining Act are hereby retained to be tried on the
merits.
The Information for [v]iolation of Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code should also be
maintained and heard in a full blown trial because the common accusation therein is
reckless imprudence resulting to [sic] damage to property. It is the damage to property
which the law punishes not the negligent act of polluting the water system. The prosecution
for the [v]iolation of Philippine Mining Act is not a bar to the prosecution for reckless
imprudence resulting to [sic] damage to property.13
The MTC re-scheduled petitioners arraignment on the remaining charges on 28 and 29 May
1997. In the hearing of 28 May 1997, petitioners manifested that they were willing to be
arraigned on the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC but not on the charge for
violation of RA 7942 as they intended to appeal the Consolidated Order in so far as it
maintained the Informations for that offense. After making of record petitioners
manifestation, the MTC proceeded with the arraignment and ordered the entry of "not
guilty" pleas on the charges for violation of RA 7942 and Article 365 of the RPC.
Petitioners subsequently filed a petition for certiorari with the Regional Trial Court, Boac,
Marinduque, assailing that portion of the Consolidated Order maintaining the Informations
for violation of RA 7942. Petitioners petition was raffled to Branch 94. For its part, public
respondent filed an ordinary appeal with the same court assailing that portion of the
Consolidated Order quashing the Informations for violation of PD 1067 and PD 984. Public
respondents appeal was raffled to Branch 38. On public respondents motion, Branch 38
ordered public respondents appeal consolidated with petitioners petition in Branch 94.
The Ruling of Branch 94
14
In its Resolution of 20 March 1998, Branch 94 granted public respondents appeal but
denied petitioners petition. Branch 94 set aside the Consolidated Order in so far as it
quashed the Informations for violation of PD 1067 and PD 984 and ordered those charges
reinstated. Branch 94 affirmed the Consolidated Order in all other respects. Branch 94 held:
After a careful perusal of the laws concerned, this court is of the opinion that there can be
no absorption by one offense of the three other offenses, as [the] acts penalized by these
laws are separate and distinct from each other. The elements of proving each violation are
not the same with each other. Concededly, the single act of dumping mine tailings which
resulted in the pollution of the Makulapnit and Boac rivers was the basis for the
information[s] filed against the accused each charging a distinct offense. But it is also a
well-established rule in this jurisdiction that
"A single act may offend against two or more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of
law, and if one provision requires proof of an additional fact or element which the other
does not, an acquittal or conviction or a dismissal of the information under one does not bar
prosecution under the other. x x x."
xxxx
[T]he different laws involve cannot absorb one another as the elements of each crime are
different from one another. Each of these laws require [sic] proof of an additional fact or
element which the other does not although they stemmed from a single act.15
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals alleging that Branch 94
acted with grave abuse of discretion because (1) the Informations for violation of PD 1067,
PD 984, RA 7942 and the Article 365 of the RPC "proceed from and are based on a single
act or incident of polluting the Boac and Makalupnit rivers thru dumping of mine tailings"
and (2) the duplicitous nature of the Informations contravenes the ruling in People v.
Relova.16 Petitioners further contended that since the acts complained of in the charges for
violation of PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942 are "the very same acts complained of" in the
charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC, the latter absorbs the former. Hence,
petitioners should only be prosecuted for violation of Article 365 of the RPC.17
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its Decision of 5 November 2001, the Court of Appeals affirmed Branch 94s ruling. The
appellate court held:
The records of the case disclose that petitioners filed a motion to quash the aforementioned
Informations for being duplicitous in nature. Section 3 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of
Court specifically provides the grounds upon which an information may be quashed. x x x
xxxx
[D]uplicity of Informations is not among those included in x x x [Section 3, Rule 117].
xxxx
We now go to petitioners claim that the resolution of the public respondent contravened the
doctrine laid down in People vs. Relova for being violative of their right against multiple
prosecutions.
In the said case, the Supreme Court found the Peoples argument with respect to the
variances in the mens rea of the two offenses being charged to be correct. The Court,
however, decided the case in the context of the second sentence of Article IV (22) of the
1973 Constitution (now under Section 21 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution), rather than
the first sentence of the same section. x x x
xxxx
[T]he doctrine laid down in the Relova case does not squarely apply to the case at Bench
since the Informations filed against the petitioners are for violation of four separate and
distinct laws which are national in character.
xxxx
This Court firmly agrees in the public respondents understanding that the laws by which the
petitioners have been [charged] could not possibly absorb one another as the elements of
each crime are different. Each of these laws require [sic] proof of an additional fact or
element which the other does not, although they stemmed from a single act. x x x
xxxx
[T]his Court finds that there is not even the slightest indicia of evidence that would give rise
to any suspicion that public respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction in reversing the Municipal Trial Courts quashal of the
Informations against the petitioners for violation of P.D. 1067 and P.D. 984. This Court
equally finds no error in the trial courts denial of the petitioners motion to quash R.A.
7942 and Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.18
Petitioners sought reconsideration but the Court of Appeals denied their motion in its
Resolution of 14 March 2002.
Petitioners raise the following alleged errors of the Court of Appeals:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A R[E]VERSIBLE ERROR IN
MAINTAINING THE CHARGES FOR VIOLATION OF THE PHILIPPINE MINING
ACT (R.A. 7942) AND REINSTATING THE CHARGES FOR VIOLATION OF THE
WATER CODE (P.D. 1067) AND POLLUTION CONTROL LAW (P.D. 984),
CONSIDERING THAT:
A. THE INFORMATIONS FOR VIOLATION OF THE WATER CODE (P.D. 1067), THE
POLLUTION CONTROL LAW (P.D. 984), THE PHILIPPINE MINING ACT (R.A. 7942)
AND ARTICLE 365 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE PROCEED FROM AND ARE
BASED ON A SINGLE ACT OR INCIDENT OF POLLUTING THE BOAC AND
MAKULAPNIT RIVERS THRU DUMPING OF MINE TAILINGS.
B. THE PROSECUTION OF PETITIONERS FOR DUPLICITOUS AND MULTIPLE
CHARGES CONTRAVENES THE DOCTRINE LAID DOWN IN PEOPLE VS. RELOVA,
148 SCRA 292 [1986 THAT "AN ACCUSED SHOULD NOT BE HARASSED BY
MULTIPLE PROSECUTIONS FOR OFFENSES WHICH THOUGH DIFFERENT FROM
ONE ANOTHER ARE NONETHELESS EACH CONSTITUTED BY A COMMON SET
OR OVERLAPPING SETS OF TECHNICAL ELEMENTS."
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING
THAT THE ELEMENT OF LACK OF NECESSARY OR ADEQUATE PRECAUTION,
NEGLIGENCE, RECKLESSNESS AND IMPRUDENCE UNDER ARTICLE 356 [sic] OF
THE REVISED PENAL CODE DOES NOT FALL WITHIN THE AMBIT OF ANY OF
THE ELEMENTS OF THE PERTINENT PROVISIONS OF THE WATER CODE,
POLLUTION CONTROL LAW AND PHILIPPINE MINING ACT CHARGED AGAINST
PETITIONERS[.]19
The Issues
The petition raises these issues:
(1) Whether all the charges filed against petitioners except one should be quashed for
duplicity of charges and only the charge for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to
Property should stand; and
(2) Whether Branch 94s ruling, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, contravenes People v.
Relova.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
No Duplicity of Charges in the Present Case
Duplicity of charges simply means a single complaint or information charges more than one
offense, as Section 13 of Rule 11020 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure clearly states:
Duplicity of offense. A complaint or information must charge but one offense, except only
in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various offenses.
In short, there is duplicity (or multiplicity) of charges when a single Information charges
more than one offense.21
Under Section 3(e), Rule 11722 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, duplicity of
offenses in a single information is a ground to quash the Information. The Rules prohibit the
filing of such Information to avoid confusing the accused in preparing his defense.23 Here,
however, the prosecution charged each petitioner with four offenses, with each Information
charging only one offense. Thus, petitioners erroneously invoke duplicity of charges as a
ground to quash the Informations. On this score alone, the petition deserves outright denial.
The Filing of Several Charges is Proper
Petitioners contend that they should be charged with one offense only Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property because (1) all the charges filed against
them "proceed from and are based on a single act or incident of polluting the Boac and
Makalupnit rivers thru dumping of mine tailings" and (2) the charge for violation of Article
365 of the RPC "absorbs" the other charges since the element of "lack of necessary or
adequate protection, negligence, recklessness and imprudence" is common among them.
The contention has no merit.
As early as the start of the last century, this Court had ruled that a single act or incident
might offend against two or more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law thus
justifying the prosecution of the accused for more than one offense.24 The only limit to this
rule is the Constitutional prohibition that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for "the same offense."25 In People v. Doriquez,26 we held that two (or more)
offenses arising from the same act are not "the same"
x x x if one provision [of law] requires proof of an additional fact or element which the
other does not, x x x. Phrased elsewise, where two different laws (or articles of the same
code) define two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of
the other, although both offenses arise from the same facts, if each crime involves some
important act which is not an essential element of the other.27 (Emphasis supplied)
Here, double jeopardy is not at issue because not all of its elements are present.28 However,
for the limited purpose of controverting petitioners claim that they should be charged with
one offense only, we quote with approval Branch 94s comparative analysis of PD 1067, PD
984, RA 7942, and Article 365 of the RPC showing that in each of these laws on which
petitioners were charged, there is one essential element not required of the others, thus:
In P.D. 1067 (Philippines Water Code), the additional element to be established is the
dumping of mine tailings into the Makulapnit River and the entire Boac River System
without prior permit from the authorities concerned. The gravamen of the offense here is the
absence of the proper permit to dump said mine tailings. This element is not indispensable
in the prosecution for violation of PD 984 (Anti-Pollution Law), [RA] 7942 (Philippine
Mining Act) and Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code. One can be validly prosecuted for
violating the Water Code even in the absence of actual pollution, or even [if] it has complied
with the terms of its Environmental Compliance Certificate, or further, even [if] it did take
the necessary precautions to prevent damage to property.
In P.D. 984 (Anti-Pollution Law), the additional fact that must be proved is the existence of
actual pollution. The gravamen is the pollution itself. In the absence of any pollution, the
accused must be exonerated under this law although there was unauthorized dumping of
mine tailings or lack of precaution on its part to prevent damage to property.
In R.A. 7942 (Philippine Mining Act), the additional fact that must be established is the
willful violation and gross neglect on the part of the accused to abide by the terms and
conditions of the Environmental Compliance Certificate, particularly that the Marcopper
should ensure the containment of run-off and silt materials from reaching the Mogpog and
Boac Rivers. If there was no violation or neglect, and that the accused satisfactorily proved
[sic] that Marcopper had done everything to ensure containment of the run-off and silt
materials, they will not be liable. It does not follow, however, that they cannot be prosecuted
under the Water Code, Anti-Pollution Law and the Revised Penal Code because violation of
the Environmental Compliance Certificate is not an essential element of these laws.
On the other hand, the additional element that must be established in Art. 365 of the Revised
Penal Code is the lack of necessary or adequate precaution, negligence, recklessness and
imprudence on the part of the accused to prevent damage to property. This element is not
required under the previous laws. Unquestionably, it is different from dumping of mine
tailings without permit, or causing pollution to the Boac river system, much more from
violation or neglect to abide by the terms of the Environmental Compliance Certificate.
Moreover, the offenses punished by special law are mal[a] prohibita in contrast with those
punished by the Revised Penal Code which are mala in se.29
Consequently, the filing of the multiple charges against petitioners, although based on the
same incident, is consistent with settled doctrine.
On petitioners claim that the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC "absorbs" the
charges for violation of PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942, suffice it to say that a mala in se
felony (such as Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property) cannot absorb mala
prohibita crimes (such as those violating PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942). What makes the
former a felony is criminal intent (dolo) or negligence (culpa); what makes the latter crimes
are the special laws enacting them.
People v. Relova not in Point
Petitioners reiterate their contention in the Court of Appeals that their prosecution
contravenes this Courts ruling in People v. Relova. In particular, petitioners cite the Courts
statement in Relova that the law seeks to prevent harassment of the accused by "multiple
prosecutions for offenses which though different from one another are nonetheless each
constituted by a common set or overlapping sets of technical elements."
This contention is also without merit.1avvphil.net
The issue in Relova is whether the act of the Batangas Acting City Fiscal in charging one
Manuel Opulencia ("Opulencia") with theft of electric power under the RPC, after the latter
had been acquitted of violating a City Ordinance penalizing the unauthorized installation of
electrical wiring, violated Opulencias right against double jeopardy. We held that it did, not
because the offenses punished by those two laws were the same but because the act giving
rise to the charges was punished by an ordinance and a national statute, thus falling within
the proscription against multiple prosecutions for the same act under the second sentence in
Section 22, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, now Section 21, Article III of the 1987
Constitution. We held:
The petitioner concludes that:
"The unauthorized installation punished by the ordinance [of Batangas City] is not the same
as theft of electricity [under the Revised Penal Code]; that the second offense is not an
attempt to commit the first or a frustration thereof and that the second offense is not
necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information."
The above argument[ ] made by the petitioner [is] of course correct. This is clear both from
the express terms of the constitutional provision involved which reads as follows:
"No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is
punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a
bar to another prosecution for the same act." x x x
and from our case law on this point. The basic difficulty with the petitioners position is that
it must be examined, not under the terms of the first sentence of Article IV (22) of the 1973
Constitution, but rather under the second sentence of the same section. The first sentence of
Article IV (22) sets forth the general rule: the constitutional protection against double
jeopardy is not available where the second prosecution is for an offense that is different
from the offense charged in the first or prior prosecution, although both the first and second
offenses may be based upon the same act or set of acts. The second sentence of Article IV
(22) embodies an exception to the general proposition: the constitutional protection, against
double jeopardy is available although the prior offense charged under an ordinance be
different from the offense charged subsequently under a national statute such as the Revised
Penal Code, provided that both offenses spring from the same act or set of acts. x x x30
(Italicization in the original; boldfacing supplied)
Thus, Relova is no authority for petitioners claim against multiple prosecutions based on a
single act not only because the question of double jeopardy is not at issue here, but also
because, as the Court of Appeals held, petitioners are being prosecuted for an act or incident
punished by four national statutes and not by an ordinance and a national statute. In short,
petitioners, if ever, fall under the first sentence of Section 21, Article III which prohibits
multiple prosecution for the same offense, and not, as in Relova, for offenses arising from
the same incident.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 5 November 2001
and the Resolution dated 14 March 2002 of the Court of Appeals.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice
DANTE O. TINGA
Asscociate Justice
ATT E S TAT I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1 Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
2 Penned by Associate Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis with Associate Justices Ramon A.
Barcelona and Perlita J. Tria Tirona, concurring.
3 Mine tailings or mine waste refer to "soil and/or rock materials from surface or
underground mining operations with no present economic value to the generator of the
same" (Department of Environment and Natural Resources Administrative Order No. 96-40
(1996) ("DENR DAO No. 96-40"), Section 5[be]). Waste from milling operations or mill
tailings is defined as "materials whether solid, liquid or both[,] segregated from the ores
during concentration/milling operations which have no present economic value to the
generator of the same" (DENR DAO No. 96-40, Section 5 [au]).
4 This provision states: "A fine exceeding Three Thousand Pesos (P3,000.00) but not more
than Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00) or imprisonment exceeding three (3) years but not
more than six (6) years, or both such fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the Court,
shall be imposed on any person who commits any of the following acts:
xxxx
5. Constructing, without prior permission of the government agency concerned, works that
produce dangerous or noxious substances, or performing acts that result in the introduction
of sewage, industrial waste, or any substance that pollutes a source of water supply.
6. Dumping mine tailings and sediments into rivers or waterways without permission."
5 The Informations charging this offense were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 96-44, 96-45,
and 96-46. Except for the names of the accused and their respective designations at
Marcopper, the Informations uniformly alleged (rollo, pp. 54-62):
That on or about March 24, 1996, and for sometime prior and subsequent thereto, in the
municipality of Boac, province of Marinduque, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, x x x, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously dispose, discharge or introduce industrial waste,
particularly mine tailings, without permission into the Makulapnit River and the entire Boac
River system which is a source of water supply and/or dump or cause, permit, suffer to be
dumped, without permission, mine tailings or other waste matters discharged due to breach
caused on its Tapian drainage pit/tunnel, thus causing pollution and siltation in the
Makulapnit River and the entire Boac River system which became a dead river, resulting to
damage and/or destruction of living organisms, like fish or other aquatic life in the vicinity,
and to health and property in the same vicinity.
6 This provision states: "Prohibitions. No person shall throw, run, drain, or otherwise
dispose into any of the water, air and/or land resources of the Philippines, or cause, permit,
suffer to be thrown, run, drain, allow to seep or otherwise dispose thereto any organic or
inorganic matter or any substance in gaseous or liquid form that shall cause pollution
thereof.
No person shall perform any of the following activities without first securing a permit from
the [National Pollution Control] Commission for the discharge of all industrial wastes and
other wastes which could cause pollution:
(1) the construction, installation, modification or operation of any sewage works or any
extension or addition thereto;
(2) the increase in volume or strength of any wastes in excess of the permissive discharge
specified under any existing permit;
(3) the construction, installation or operation of any industrial or commercial establishments
or any extension or modification thereof or addition thereto, the operation of which would
cause an increase in the discharge of waste directly into the water, air and/or land resources
of the Philippines or would otherwise alter their physical, chemical or biological properties
in any manner not already lawfully authorized."
The Informations charging this offense were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 96-47, 96-48,
municipality of Boac, province of Marinduque, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, x x x, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously drain or otherwise dispose/discharge into the Makulapnit River
and the entire Boac River system and/or cause, permit, suffer to be drained or allow to seep
into such river/waterway, mine tailings or other waste matters discharged due to breach
caused on its Tapian drainage pit/tunnel for his failure to institute adequate measures as a
managing head thereof, thus causing pollution of such rivers/waterways due to exceedances
[sic] in the criterion level for cadmium, copper, and lead, as found by the Pollution
Adjudication Board, which rendered such water resources harmful, detrimental or injurious
to public health, safety or welfare or which adversely affected their utilization for domestic,
agricultural, and/or recreational purposes.
8 This provision states: "Violation of the Terms and Conditions of the [E]nvironmental
Compliance Certificate. Any person who willfully violates or grossly neglects to abide
by the terms and conditions of the environmental compliance certificate issued to said
person and which causes environmental damage through pollution shall suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of six (6) months to six (6) years or a fine of Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) to Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00), or both at the discretion of the
court."
9 The Informations charging this offense were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 96-50, 96-51,
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, x x x, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously drain or otherwise dispose/discharge into the Makulapnit River
and the entire Boac River system and/or cause, permit, suffer to be drained or allow to seep
into such river system, mine tailings or other waste matters discharged due to breach caused
on its Tapian drainage tunnel for his failure to institute adequate measures, thus causing
pollution and siltation in the entire Boac River System thus, willfully violating or grossly
neglecting to abide by the terms and conditions of the Environmental Compliance
Certificate (ECC) issued to [Marcopper Mining C]orporation x x x, particularly that the
Marcopper Mining Corporation should ensure the containment of run-off and silt materials
from reaching the Magpog and Boac Rivers, resulting to damage and/or destruction of
living organisms, like fish and other aquatic life in the vicinity, and to health and property in
the same vicinity.
10 This provision states, in part: "Imprudence and negligence. Any person who, by
reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a
grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the
penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; if it would
have constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period shall be
imposed.
xxxx
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to
the property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount
equal to the value of said damages to three times such value, but which shall in no case be
less than twenty-five pesos.
xxxx
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an
act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the
part of the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his
employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other
circumstances regarding persons, time and place."
11 The Informations under this charge were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 96-53, 96-54,
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, x x x, did then and there negligently,
imprudently, unlawfully and feloniously drain or otherwise dispose/discharge into the
Makulapnit River or Boac River system and/or cause, permit, suffer to be drained or allow
to seep into such river system/waterway, its mine tailings due to breach caused on the
Tapian drainage pit/tunnel of the [Marcopper Mining C]orporation so managed and operated
by said accused, in a negligent, reckless and imprudent manner, without due regard and in
gross violation of the conditions set forth in the Environmental Compliance Certificate
issued by the Environmental Management Bureau to the said corporation on April 6, 1996,
and the accused, x x x, did not take the necessary or adequate precaution to prevent damage
to property thus causing by such carelessness and imprudence said corporation operated by
him to discharge mine tailings into the Makulapnit River at the rate of 5 to 10 cubic meters
per second then resulting to damage and/or destruction of living organisms, like fish or other
aquatic life in the said river system and which also affected agricultural products, the
rehabilitation and restoration of which will cost the government the approximate sum of not
less than P50,000,000.00.
G.R. No. 157171

March 14, 2006
ARSENIA B. GARCIA, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition seeks the review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
245471that affirmed the conviction of petitioner by the Regional Trial Court2of Alaminos
City, Pangasinan, Branch 54, for violation of Section 27(b) of Republic Act No. 6646.3
Based on the complaint-affidavit of Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., who ran in the 1995 senatorial
elections, an information dated March 30, 1998, was filed in the Regional Trial Court of
Alaminos, charging Herminio R. Romero, Renato R. Viray, Rachel Palisoc and Francisca de
Vera, and petitioner, with violation of Section 27(b). The information reads:
That on or about May 11, 1995, which was within the canvassing period during the May 8,
1995 elections, in the Municipality of Alaminos, Province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Election Officer
Arsenia B. Garcia, Municipal Treasurer Herminio R. Romero, Public School District
Supervisor Renato R. Viray, Chairman, Vice-Chairman, and Member-Secretary,
respectively, of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Alaminos, Pangasinan, tabulators
Rachel Palisoc and Francisca de Vera, conspiring with, confederating together and mutually
helping each other, did, then and there, willfully, and unlawfully decrease[d] the votes
received by senatorial candidate Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. from six thousand nine hundred
ninety-eight (6,998) votes, as clearly disclosed in the total number of votes in the one
hundred fifty-nine (159) precincts of the Statement of Votes by Precincts of said
municipality, with Serial Nos. 008417, 008418, 008419, 008420, 008421, 008422 and
008423 to one thousand nine hundred twenty-one (1,921) votes as reflected in the Statement
of Votes by Precincts with Serial No. 008423 and Certificate of Canvass with Serial No.
436156 with a difference of five thousand seventy-seven (5,077) votes.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
In a Decision dated September 11, 2000, the RTC acquitted all the accused for insufficiency
of evidence, except petitioner who was convicted as follows:
xxx
5. And finally, on the person of Arsenia B. Garcia, the Court pronounces her GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime defined under Republic Act 6646, Section 27 (b) for
decreasing the votes of Senator Pimentel in the total of 5,034 and in relation to BP Blg. 881,
considering that this finding is a violation of Election Offense, she is thus sentenced to
suffer an imprisonment of SIX (6) YEARS as maximum, but applying the
INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW, the minimum penalty is the next degree lower
which is SIX (6) MONTHS; however, accused Arsenia B. Garcia is not entitled to
probation; further, she is sentenced to suffer disqualification to hold public office and she is
also deprived of her right of suffrage.
The bailbond posted by her is hereby ordered cancelled, and the Provincial Warden is
ordered to commit her person to the Bureau of Correctional Institution for Women, at Metro
Manila, until further orders from the court.
No pronouncement as to costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.5
Petitioner appealed before the Court of Appeals which affirmed with modification the RTC
Decision, thus,
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed with
modification, increasing the minimum penalty imposed by the trial court from six (6)
months to one (1) year.
SO ORDERED.6
The Court of Appeals likewise denied the motion for reconsideration. Hence, this appeal
assigning the following as errors of the appellate court:
I
ON THE FIRST AND SECOND GROUNDS RELIED UPON BY THE RESPONDENT
COURT, NAMELY, THAT IT COULD NOT HAVE BEEN SECRETARY VIRAY WHO
DECREASED THE VOTES OF COMPLAINANT PIMENTEL SINCE HE MERELY
RELIED ON WHAT THE PETITIONER DICTATED, AND THAT IT COULD NOT HAVE
ALSO BEEN THE TABULATORS BECAUSE PETITIONER WAS THE ONE WHO
READ THE ADDING [MACHINE] TAPE.
II
ON THE THIRD GROUND, NAMELY, THAT PETITIONER DID NOT PRODUCE THE
TAPES DURING THE TRIAL BECAUSE IF PRODUCED, IT IS GOING TO BE
ADVERSE TO HER.
III
ON THE FOURTH GROUND, NAMELY, THAT THE PETITIONER WAS THE ONE
WHO ENTERED THE REDUCED FIGURE OF 1,921 IN THE CERTIFICATE OF
CANVASS (COC), Exh. "7", WHEN THE DUTY WAS THAT OF THE SECRETARY OF
THE BOARD.
IV
THE REDUCTION OF THE VOTES OF CANDIDATE PIMENTEL WAS CLEARLY
NOT WILLFUL OR INTENTIONAL.7
Petitioner contends that (1) the Court of Appeals judgment is erroneous, based on
speculations, surmises and conjectures, instead of substantial evidence; and (2) there was no
motive on her part to reduce the votes of private complainant.
Respondent on the other hand contends that good faith is not a defense in the violation of an
election law, which falls under the class of mala prohibita.
The main issue is, Is a violation of Section 27(b) of Rep. Act No. 6646, classified under
mala in se or mala prohibita? Could good faith and lack of criminal intent be valid defenses?
Generally, mala in se felonies are defined and penalized in the Revised Penal Code. When
the acts complained of are inherently immoral, they are deemed mala in se, even if they are
punished by a special law.8Accordingly, criminal intent must be clearly established with the
other elements of the crime; otherwise, no crime is committed. On the other hand, in crimes
that are mala prohibita, the criminal acts are not inherently immoral but become punishable
only because the law says they are forbidden. With these crimes, the sole issue is whether
the law has been violated.9Criminal intent is not necessary where the acts are prohibited for
reasons of public policy.10
Section 27(b) of Republic Act No. 664611provides:
SEC. 27. Election Offenses.- In addition to the prohibited acts and election offenses
enumerated in Sections 261 and 262 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, as amended, the
following shall be guilty of an election offense:
xxx
(b) Any member of the board of election inspectors or board of canvassers who tampers,
increases, or decreases the votes received by a candidate in any election or any member of
the board who refuses, after proper verification and hearing, to credit the correct votes or
deduct such tampered votes.
xxx
Clearly, the acts prohibited in Section 27(b) are mala in se.12For otherwise, even errors and
mistakes committed due to overwork and fatigue would be punishable. Given the volume of
votes to be counted and canvassed within a limited amount of time, errors and
miscalculations are bound to happen. And it could not be the intent of the law to punish
unintentional election canvass errors. However, intentionally increasing or decreasing the
number of votes received by a candidate is inherently immoral, since it is done with malice
and intent to injure another.
Criminal intent is presumed to exist on the part of the person who executes an act which the
law punishes, unless the contrary shall appear.13Thus, whoever invokes good faith as a
defense has the burden of proving its existence.
Records show that the canvassing of votes on May 11, 1995 before the Board of Canvassers
of the Municipality of Alaminos, Pangasinan was conducted as follows:
1. After the votes in the 159 precincts of the municipality of Alaminos were tallied, the
results thereof were sealed and forwarded to the Municipal Board of Canvassers for
canvassing;
2. The number of votes received by each candidate in each precinct was then recorded in the
Statement of Votes with appellant, in her capacity as Chairman, reading the figures
appearing in the results from the precincts and accused Viray, in his capacity as secretary of
the Board, entering the number in the Statements of Votes as read by the appellant. Six
Statements of Votes were filled up to reflect the votes received by each candidate in the 159
precincts of the Municipality of Alaminos, Pangasinan.
3. After the number of votes received by each candidate for each precincts were entered by
accused Viray in the Statements of Votes, these votes were added by the accused Palisoc and
de Vera with the use of electrical adding machines.
4. After the tabulation by accused Palisoc and de Vera, the corresponding machine tapes
were handed to appellant who reads the subtotal of votes received by each candidate in the
precincts listed in each Statement of Votes. Accused Viray [then] records the subtotal in the
proper column in the Statement of Votes.
5. After the subtotals had been entered by accused Viray, tabulators accused Palisoc and de
Vera added all the subtotals appearing in all Statement of Votes.
6. After the computation, the corresponding machine tape on which the grand total was
reflected was handed to appellant who reads the same and accused Viray enters the figure
read by appellant in the column for grand total in the Statement of Votes.14
Neither the correctness of the number of votes entered in the Statement of Votes (SOV) for
each precinct, nor of the number of votes entered as subtotals of votes received in the
precincts listed in SOV Nos. 008417 to 008422 was raised as an issue.
At first glance, however, there is a noticeable discrepancy in the addition of the subtotals to
arrive at the grand total of votes received by each candidate for all 159 precincts in SOV
No. 008423.15The grand total of the votes for private complainant, Senator Aquilino
Pimentel, was only 1,921 instead of 6,921, or 5,000 votes less than the number of votes
private complainant actually received. This error is also evident in the Certificate of
Canvass (COC) No. 436156 signed by petitioner, Viray and Romero.16
During trial of this case, petitioner admitted that she was indeed the one who announced the
figure of 1,921, which was subsequently entered by then accused Viray in his capacity as
secretary of the board.17Petitioner likewise admitted that she was the one who prepared the
COC (Exhibit A-7), though it was not her duty. To our mind, preparing the COC even if it
was not her task, manifests an intention to perpetuate the erroneous entry in the COC.18
Neither can this Court accept petitioners explanation that the Board of Canvassers had no
idea how the SOV (Exhibit "6") and the COC reflected that private complainant had only
1,921 votes instead of 6,921 votes. As chairman of the Municipal Board of Canvassers,
petitioners concern was to assure accurate, correct and authentic entry of the votes. Her
failure to exercise maximum efficiency and fidelity to her trust deserves not only censure
but also the concomitant sanctions as a matter of criminal responsibility pursuant to the
dictates of the law.19
The fact that the number of votes deducted from the actual votes received by private
complainant, Sen. Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. was not added to any senatorial candidate does not
relieve petitioner of liability under Section 27(b) of Rep. Act No. 6646. The mere decreasing
of the votes received by a candidate in an election is already punishable under the said
provision.20
At this point, we see no valid reason to disturb the factual conclusions of the appellate court.
The Court has consistently held that factual findings of the trial court, as well as of the
Court of Appeals are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal, particularly
where the findings of both the trial court and the appellate court on the matter coincide.21
Public policy dictates that extraordinary diligence should be exercised by the members of
the board of canvassers in canvassing the results of the elections. Any error on their part
would result in the disenfranchisement of the voters. The Certificate of Canvass for
senatorial candidates and its supporting statements of votes prepared by the municipal board
of canvassers are sensitive election documents whose entries must be thoroughly
scrutinized.22
In our review, the votes in the SOV should total 6,998.23
As between the grand total of votes alleged to have been received by private complainant of
6,921 votes and statement of his actual votes received of 6,998 is a difference of 77 votes.
The discrepancy may be validly attributed to mistake or error due to fatigue. However, a
decrease of 5,000 votes as reflected in the Statement of Votes and Certificate of Canvass is
substantial, it cannot be allowed to remain on record unchallenged, especially when the
error results from the mere transfer of totals from one document to another.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals sustaining petitioners conviction but increasing the minimum penalty in her
sentence to one year instead of six months is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
DANTE O. TINGA
Asscociate Justice
ATT E S TAT I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.
Chief Justice
G.R. No. 171951

August 28, 2009
AMADO ALVARADO GARCIA, Petitioner,
vs.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review on certiorari is the Decision1 dated December 20, 2005 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R.-CR No. 27544 affirming the Decision2 dated July 2, 2003 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 9, Aparri, Cagayan, which found petitioner Amado Garcia guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of homicide. Contested as well is the appellate courts Resolution3
dated March 13, 2006 denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.4
On February 10, 2000, petitioner was charged with murder in an Information that alleges as
follows:
The undersigned, Provincial Prosecutor accuses AMADO GARCIA @ Manding of the
crime of Murder, defined and penalized under Article [248] of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, committed as follows:
That on or about September 29, 1999, in the municipality of Aparri, province of Cagayan,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a
bottle, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and with treachery, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack, box, club and maul one Manuel K. Chy,
inflicting upon the latter fatal injuries which caused his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
Upon arraignment, petitioner entered a not guilty plea. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
At approximately 11:00 a.m. on September 26, 1999, petitioner, Fidel Foz, Jr. and Armando
Foz had a drinking spree at the apartment unit of Bogie Tacuboy, which was adjacent to the
house of Manuel K. Chy. At around 7:00 p.m., Chy appealed for the group to quiet down as
the noise from the videoke machine was blaring. It was not until Chy requested a second
time that the group acceded. Unknown to Chy, this left petitioner irate and petitioner was
heard to have said in the Ilocano vernacular, "Dayta a Manny napangas makaala caniac
dayta." (This Manny is arrogant, I will lay a hand on him.)6
On September 28, 1999, the group met again to celebrate the marriage of Ador Tacuboy not
far from Chys apartment. Maya Mabbun advised the group to stop singing lest they be told
off again. This further infuriated petitioner who remarked, "Talaga a napangas ni Manny
saan ko a pagbayagen daytoy," meaning, "This Manny is really arrogant, I will not let him
live long."7
Yet again, at around 12:00 p.m. on September 29, 1999, the group convened at the house of
Foz and Garcia. There, petitioner, Foz, Jr. and Fred Rillon mused over the drinking session
on the 26th and 28th of September and the confrontation with Chy. Enraged at the memory,
petitioner blurted out "Talaga a napangas dayta a day[t]oy a Manny ikabbut ko ita." (This
Manny is really arrogant, I will finish him off today.)8 Later that afternoon, the group
headed to the store of Adela dela Cruz where they drank until petitioner proposed that they
move to Punta. On their way to Punta, the group passed by the store of Aurelia Esquibel,
Chys sister, and there, decided to have some drinks.
At this juncture, petitioner ordered Esquibel to call on Chy who, incidentally, was coming
out of his house at the time. Upon being summoned, the latter approached petitioner who
suddenly punched him in the face. Chy cried out, "Bakit mo ako sinuntok hindi ka naman
[inaano]?" (Why did you box me[?] Im not doing anything to you.)9 But petitioner kept on
assaulting him. Foz attempted to pacify petitioner but was himself hit on the nose while Chy
continued to parry the blows. Petitioner reached for a bottle of beer, and with it, struck the
lower back portion of Chys head. Then, Foz shoved Chy causing the latter to fall.
When Chy found an opportunity to escape, he ran towards his house and phoned his wife
Josefina to call the police. Chy told Josefina about the mauling and complained of difficulty
in breathing. Upon reaching Chys house, the policemen knocked five times but nobody
answered. Josefina arrived minutes later, unlocked the door and found Chy lying
unconscious on the kitchen floor, salivating. He was pronounced dead on arrival at the
hospital. The autopsy confirmed that Chy died of myocardial infarction.
After trial in due course, the RTC of Aparri, Cagayan (Branch 9) found petitioner guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of homicide. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court renders judgment:
1) Finding AMADO GARCIA guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of HOMICIDE
defined and penalized by Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code and after applying in his
favor the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, hereby sentences him to suffer an
indeterminate prison term of TEN (10) YEARS OF PRISION MAYOR, as minimum, to
FOURTEEN (14) YEARS and EIGHT (8) MONTHS of RECLUSION TEMPORAL as
maximum;
2) Ordering him to pay the heirs of Manuel Chy the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND
(P50,000.00) PESOS, as death indemnity; TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND (P200,000.00)
PESOS, representing expenses for the wake and burial; THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND
(P300,000.00) PESOS, as moral damages; and THREE HUNDRED THIRTY[-]TWO
THOUSAND (P332,000.00] PESOS, as loss of earning, plus the cost of this suit.
SO ORDERED.10
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction in a Decision dated December 20,
2005, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, appeal is hereby [DENIED] and the July 2, 2003
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch [9], in Criminal Case No.
08-1185, is hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
SO ORDERED.11
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but his motion was denied in a Resolution dated March
13, 2006.
Hence, the instant appeal of petitioner on the following grounds:
I.
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE RULING OF THE TRIAL
COURT THAT PETITIONER IS THE ONE RESPONSIBLE FOR INFLICTING THE
SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES SUSTAINED BY THE DECEASED MANUEL CHY.
II.
COURT FINDING PETITIONER LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF MANUEL CHY
DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE CAUSE OF DEATH IS MYOCARDIAL INFARCTION,
A NON-VIOLENT RELATED CAUSE OF DEATH.
III.
COURT WHICH CONCLUDED THAT THE HEART FAILURE OF MANUEL CHY WAS
DUE TO "FRIGHT OR SHOCK CAUSED BY THE MALTREATMENT."
IV.
BOTH THE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL AND THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT
ACQUITTING THE PETITIONER ON THE GROUND OF REASONABLE DOUBT.12
In essence, the issue is whether or not petitioner is liable for the death of Manuel Chy.
In his undated Memorandum,13 petitioner insists on a review of the factual findings of the
trial court because the judge who penned the decision was not the same judge who heard the
prosecution evidence. He adds that the Court of Appeals had wrongly inferred from,
misread and overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts, which, if properly considered,
would justify a different conclusion.14
At the onset, petitioner denies laying a hand on Manuel Chy. Instead, he implicates
Armando Foz as the author of the victims injuries. Corollarily, he challenges the credibility
of Armandos brother, Fidel, who testified concerning his sole culpability. Basically,
petitioner disowns responsibility for Chys demise since the latter was found to have died of
myocardial infarction. In support, he amplifies the testimony of Dr. Cleofas C. Antonio15
that Chys medical condition could have resulted in his death anytime. Petitioner asserts
that, at most, he could be held liable for slight physical injuries because none of the blows
he inflicted on Chy was fatal.
The Office of the Solicitor General reiterates the trial courts assessment of the witnesses
and its conclusion that the beating of Chy was the proximate cause of his death.
Upon careful consideration of the evidence presented by the prosecution as well as the
defense in this case, we are unable to consider the petitioners appeal with favor.
The present petition was brought under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, yet, petitioner raises
questions of fact. Indeed, it is opportune to reiterate that this Court is not the proper forum
from which to secure a re-evaluation of factual issues, save where the factual findings of the
trial court do not find support in the evidence on record or where the judgment appealed
from was based on a misapprehension of facts.16 Neither exception applies in the instant
case as would justify a departure from the established rule.
Further, petitioner invokes a recognized exception to the rule on non-interference with the
determination of the credibility of witnesses. He points out that the judge who penned the
decision is not the judge who received the evidence and heard the witnesses. But while the
situation obtains in this case, the exception does not. The records reveal that Judge Conrado
F. Manauis inhibited from the proceedings upon motion of no less than the petitioner
himself. Consequently, petitioner cannot seek protection from the alleged adverse
consequence his own doing might have caused. For us to allow petitioner relief based on
this argument would be to sanction a travesty of the Rules which was designed to further,
rather than subdue, the ends of justice.
We reiterate, the efficacy of a decision is not necessarily impaired by the fact that the
ponente only took over from a colleague who had earlier presided over the trial. It does not
follow that the judge who was not present during the trial, or a fraction thereof, cannot
render a valid and just decision.17 Here, Judge Andres Q. Cipriano took over the case after
Judge Manauis recused himself from the proceedings. Even so, Judge Cipriano not only
heard the evidence for the defense, he also had an opportunity to observe Dr. Cleofas
Antonio who was recalled to clarify certain points in his testimony. Worth mentioning, too,
is the fact that Judge Cipriano presided during the taking of the testimonies of Fidel Foz, Jr.
and Alvin Pascua on rebuttal.
In any case, it is not unusual for a judge who did not try a case in its entirety to decide it on
the basis of the records on hand.18 He can rely on the transcripts of stenographic notes and
calibrate the testimonies of witnesses in accordance with their conformity to common
experience, knowledge and observation of ordinary men. Such reliance does not violate
substantive and procedural due process of law.19
The Autopsy Report on the body of Manuel Chy disclosed the following injuries:
POSTMORTEM FINDINGS
Body embalmed, well preserved.
Cyanotic lips and nailbeds.
Contusions, dark bluish red: 4.5 x 3.0 cms., lower portion of the left ear; 4.0 x 2.8 cms., left
inferior mastoid region; 2.5 x 1.1 cms., upper lip; 2.7 x 1.0 cms., lower lip; 5.8 x 5.5 cms.,
dorsum of left hand.
Lacerated wound, 0.8 cm., involving mucosal surface of the upper lip on the right side.
No fractures noted.
Brain with tortuous vessels. Cut sections show congestion. No hemorrhage noted.
Heart, with abundant fat adherent on its epicardial surface. Cut sections show a reddish
brown myocardium with an area of hyperemia on the whole posterior wall, the lower
portion of the anterior wall and the inferior portion of the septum. Coronary arteries, gritty,
with the caliber of the lumen reduced by approximately thirty (30%) percent.
Histopathological findings show mild fibrosis of the myocardium.
Lungs, pleural surfaces, shiny; with color ranging from dark red to dark purple. Cut sections
show a gray periphery with reddish brown central portion with fluid oozing on pressure with
some reddish frothy materials noted. Histopathological examinations show pulmonary

edema and hemorrhages.
Kidneys, purplish with glistening capsule. Cut sections show congestion. Histopathological
examinations show mild lymphocytic infiltration.1avvphi1
Stomach, one-half (1/2) full with brownish and whitish materials and other partially
digested food particles.
CAUSE OF DEATH: - Myocardial Infarction. (Emphasis supplied.)20
At first, petitioner denied employing violence against Chy. In his undated Memorandum,
however, he admitted inflicting injuries on the deceased, albeit, limited his liability to slight
physical injuries. He argues that the superficial wounds sustained by Chy did not cause his
death.21 Quite the opposite, however, a conscientious analysis of the records would acquaint
us with the causal connection between the death of the victim and the mauling that preceded
it. In open court, Dr. Antonio identified the immediate cause of Chys myocardial infarction:
ATTY. TUMARU:
Q: You diagnose[d] the cause of death to be myocardial infarction that is because there was
an occlusion in the artery that prevented the flowing of blood into the heart?
A: That was not exactly seen at the autopsy table but it changes, the hyperemic changes [in]
the heart muscle were the one[s] that made us [think] or gave strong conclusion that it was
myocardial infarction, and most likely the cause is occlusion of the blood vessels itself.
(Emphasis supplied.)22
By definition, coronary occlusion23 is the complete obstruction of an artery of the heart,
usually from progressive arteriosclerosis24 or the thickening and loss of elasticity of the
arterial walls. This can result from sudden emotion in a person with an existing
arteriosclerosis; otherwise, a heart attack will not occur.25 Dr. Jessica Romero testified on
direct examination relative to this point:
ATTY. CALASAN:
Q: Could an excitement trigger a myocardial infarction?
A: Excitement, I cannot say that if the patient is normal[;] that is[,] considering that the
patient [does] not have any previous [illness] of hypertension, no previous history of
myocardial [ischemia], no previous [arteriosis] or hardening of the arteries, then excitement
[cannot] cause myocardial infarction. (Emphasis supplied.)26
The Autopsy Report bears out that Chy has a mild fibrosis of the myocardium27 caused by a
previous heart attack. Said fibrosis28 or formation of fibrous tissue or scar tissue rendered
the middle and thickest layer of the victims heart less elastic and vulnerable to coronary
occlusion from sudden emotion. This causation is elucidated by the testimony of Dr.
Antonio:
ATTY. CALASAN:
Q: You said that the physical injuries will cause no crisis on the part of the victim, Doctor?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And [these] physical injuries [were] caused by the [boxing] on the mouth and[/]or hitting
on the nape by a bottle?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: On the part of the deceased, that [was] caused definitely by emotional crisis, Doctor?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And because of this emotional crisis the heart palpitated so fast, so much so, that there
was less oxygen being pumped by the heart?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And definitely that caused his death, Doctor?
A: Yes, sir, it could be.29
In concurrence, Dr. Antonio A. Paguirigan also testified as follows:
ATTY. CALASAN:
Q: I will repeat the question Dr. Antonio testified that the deceased died because of the
blow that was inflicted, it triggered the death of the deceased, do you agree with his
findings, Doctor?
A: Not probably the blow but the reaction sir.
Q: So you agree with him, Doctor?
A: It could be, sir.
Q: You agree with him on that point, Doctor?
A: Yes, sir.30
It can be reasonably inferred from the foregoing statements that the emotional strain from
the beating aggravated Chys delicate constitution and led to his death. The inevitable
conclusion then surfaces that the myocardial infarction suffered by the victim was the direct,
natural and logical consequence of the felony that petitioner had intended to commit.
Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code states that criminal liability shall be incurred "by any
person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that
which he intended." The essential requisites for the application of this provision are: (a) the
intended act is felonious; (b) the resulting act is likewise a felony; and (c) the unintended
albeit graver wrong was primarily caused by the actors wrongful acts.31lawph!l
In this case, petitioner was committing a felony when he boxed the victim and hit him with
a bottle. Hence, the fact that Chy was previously afflicted with a heart ailment does not alter
petitioners liability for his death. Ingrained in our jurisprudence is the doctrine laid down in
the case of United States v. Brobst32 that:
x x x where death results as a direct consequence of the use of illegal violence, the mere fact
that the diseased or weakened condition of the injured person contributed to his death, does
not relieve the illegal aggressor of criminal responsibility.33
In the same vein, United States v. Rodriguez34 enunciates that:
x x x although the assaulted party was previously affected by some internal malady, if,
because of a blow given with the hand or the foot, his death was hastened, beyond
peradventure he is responsible therefor who produced the cause for such acceleration as the
result of a voluntary and unlawfully inflicted injury. (Emphasis supplied.)35
In this jurisdiction, a person committing a felony is responsible for all the natural and
logical consequences resulting from it although the unlawful act performed is different from
the one he intended;36 "el que es causa de la causa es causa del mal causado" (he who is the
cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused).37 Thus, the circumstance that petitioner
did not intend so grave an evil as the death of the victim does not exempt him from criminal
liability. Since he deliberately committed an act prohibited by law, said condition simply
mitigates his guilt in accordance with Article 13(3)38 of the Revised Penal Code.39
Nevertheless, we must appreciate as mitigating circumstance in favor of petitioner the fact
that the physical injuries he inflicted on the victim, could not have resulted naturally and
logically, in the actual death of the victim, if the latters heart was in good condition.
Considering that the petitioner has in his favor the mitigating circumstance of lack of
intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed without any aggravating
circumstance to offset it, the imposable penalty should be in the minimum period, that is,
reclusion temporal in its minimum period,40or anywhere from twelve (12) years and one (1)
day to fourteen years (14) years and eight (8) months. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law,41 the trial court properly imposed upon petitioner an indeterminate penalty of ten (10)
years of prisin mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of
reclusion temporal as maximum.
We shall, however, modify the award of damages to the heirs of Manuel Chy for his loss of
earning capacity in the amount of P332,000. In fixing the indemnity, the victims actual
income at the time of death and probable life expectancy are taken into account. For this
purpose, the Court adopts the formula used in People v. Malinao:42
Net earning capacity = 2/3 x (80-age of x a reasonable portion of the the victim at the annual
net income which time of this death) would have been received
by the heirs for support.43
Branch 9 of the Aparri, Cagayan RTC took judicial notice of the salary which Manuel Chy
was receiving as a sheriff of the court. At the time of his death, Chy was 51 years old and
was earning a gross monthly income of P10,600 or a gross annual income of P127,200. But,
in view of the victims delicate condition, the trial court reduced his life expectancy to 10
years. It also deducted P7,000 from Chys salary as reasonable living expense. However, the
records are bereft of showing that the heirs of Chy submitted evidence to substantiate actual
living expenses. And in the absence of proof of living expenses, jurisprudence44
approximates net income to be 50% of the gross income. Accordingly, by reason of his
death, the heirs of Manuel Chy should be awarded P1,229,600 as loss of earning capacity,
computed as follows:
Net earning capacity
=
2/3 x (80-51) x [P127,200 - 1/2 (P127,200)]
=
2/3 x (29) x P63,600
=
19 1/3 x P63,600
=
P1,229,600
We sustain the trial courts grant of funerary expense of P200,000 as stipulated by the
parties45 and civil indemnity of P50,000.46 Anent moral damages, the same is mandatory in
cases of murder and homicide, without need of allegation and proof other than the death of
the victim.47 However, in obedience to the controlling case law, the amount of moral
damages should be reduced to P50,000.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated December 20, 2005 and the Resolution dated March 13,
2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.-CR No. 27544 are AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION in that the award of moral damages is reduced to P50,000. Petitioner is
further ordered to indemnify the heirs of Manuel K. Chy P50,000 as civil indemnity;
P200,000, representing expenses for the wake and burial; and P1,229,600 as loss of earning
capacity.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
ATT E S TAT I O N
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairpersons
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
G.R. No. 72964 January 7, 1988
FILOMENO URBANO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition to review the decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court which
affirmed the decision of the then Circuit Criminal Court of Dagupan City finding petitioner
Filomeno Urban guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide.
The records disclose the following facts of the case.
At about 8:00 o'clock in the morning of October 23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno Urbano went
to his ricefield at Barangay Anonang, San Fabian, Pangasinan located at about 100 meters
from the tobacco seedbed of Marcelo Javier. He found the place where he stored his palay
flooded with water coming from the irrigation canal nearby which had overflowed. Urbano
went to the elevated portion of the canal to see what happened and there he saw Marcelo
Javier and Emilio Erfe cutting grass. He asked them who was responsible for the opening of
the irrigation canal and Javier admitted that he was the one. Urbano then got angry and
demanded that Javier pay for his soaked palay. A quarrel between them ensued. Urbano
unsheathed his bolo (about 2 feet long, including the handle, by 2 inches wide) and hacked
Javier hitting him on the right palm of his hand, which was used in parrying the bolo hack.
Javier who was then unarmed ran away from Urbano but was overtaken by Urbano who
hacked him again hitting Javier on the left leg with the back portion of said bolo, causing a
swelling on said leg. When Urbano tried to hack and inflict further injury, his daughter
embraced and prevented him from hacking Javier.
Immediately thereafter, Antonio Erfe, Emilio Erfe, and Felipe Erfe brought Javier to his
house about 50 meters away from where the incident happened. Emilio then went to the
house of Barangay Captain Menardo Soliven but not finding him there, Emilio looked for
barrio councilman Felipe Solis instead. Upon the advice of Solis, the Erfes together with
Javier went to the police station of San Fabian to report the incident. As suggested by
Corporal Torio, Javier was brought to a physician. The group went to Dr. Guillermo Padilla,
rural health physician of San Fabian, who did not attend to Javier but instead suggested that
they go to Dr. Mario Meneses because Padilla had no available medicine.
After Javier was treated by Dr. Meneses, he and his companions returned to Dr. Guillermo
Padilla who conducted a medico-legal examination. Dr. Padilla issued a medico-legal
certificate (Exhibit "C" dated September 28, 1981) which reads:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that I have examined the wound of Marcelo Javier, 20 years of age,
married, residing at Barangay Anonang, San Fabian, Pangasinan on October 23, 1980 and
found the following:
1 -Incised wound 2 inches in length at the upper portion of the lesser palmar prominence,
right.
As to my observation the incapacitation is from (7-9) days period. This wound was
presented to me only for medico-legal examination, as it was already treated by the other
doctor. (p. 88, Original Records)
Upon the intercession of Councilman Solis, Urbano and Javier agreed to settle their
differences. Urbano promised to pay P700.00 for the medical expenses of Javier. Hence, on
October 27, 1980, the two accompanied by Solis appeared before the San Fabian Police to
formalize their amicable settlement. Patrolman Torio recorded the event in the police blotter
(Exhibit A), to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
Entry Nr 599/27 Oct '80/103OH/ Re entry Nr 592 on page 257 both parties appeared before
this Station accompanied by brgy. councilman Felipe Solis and settled their case amicably,
for they are neighbors and close relatives to each other. Marcelo Javier accepted and granted
forgiveness to Filomeno Urbano who shoulder (sic) all the expenses in his medical
treatment, and promising to him and to this Office that this will never be repeated anymore
and not to harbour any grudge against each other. (p. 87, Original Records.)
Urbano advanced P400.00 to Javier at the police station. On November 3, 1980, the
additional P300.00 was given to Javier at Urbano's house in the presence of barangay
captain Soliven.
At about 1:30 a.m. on November 14, 1980, Javier was rushed to the Nazareth General
Hospital in a very serious condition. When admitted to the hospital, Javier had lockjaw and
was having convulsions. Dr. Edmundo Exconde who personally attended to Javier found
that the latter's serious condition was caused by tetanus toxin. He noticed the presence of a
healing wound in Javier's palm which could have been infected by tetanus.
On November 15, 1980 at exactly 4:18 p.m., Javier died in the hospital. The medical
findings of Dr. Exconde are as follows:
Date Diagnosis
11-14-80 ADMITTED due to trismus
adm. at DX TETANUS
1:30 AM Still having frequent muscle spasm. With diffi#35, 421 culty opening his mouth. Restless at times. Febrile
11-15-80 Referred. Novaldin 1 amp. inj. IM. Sudden cessation of respiration and HR after muscular spasm.
02 inhalation administered. Ambo bag resuscitation and cardiac massage done but to no avail.
Pronounced dead by Dra. Cabugao at 4:18 P.M.
PMC done and cadaver brought home by relatives. (p. 100, Original Records)
In an information dated April 10, 1981, Filomeno Urbano was charged with the crime of
homicide before the then Circuit Criminal Court of Dagupan City, Third Judicial District.
Upon arraignment, Urbano pleaded "not guilty." After trial, the trial court found Urbano
guilty as charged. He was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of from
TWELVE (12) YEARS of prision mayor, as minimum to SEVENTEEN (17) years, FOUR
(4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal, as maximum, together with the
accessories of the law, to indemnify the heirs of the victim, Marcelo Javier, in the amount of
P12,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. He
was ordered confined at the New Bilibid Prison, in Muntinlupa, Rizal upon finality of the
decision, in view of the nature of his penalty.
The then Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the conviction of Urbano on appeal but
raised the award of indemnity to the heirs of the deceased to P30,000.00 with costs against
the appellant.
The appellant filed a motion for reconsideration and/or new trial. The motion for new trial
was based on an affidavit of Barangay Captain Menardo Soliven (Annex "A") which states:
That in 1980, I was the barrio captain of Barrio Anonang, San Fabian, Pangasinan, and up to
the present having been re-elected to such position in the last barangay elections on May 17,
1982;
That sometime in the first week of November, 1980, there was a typhoon that swept
Pangasinan and other places of Central Luzon including San Fabian, a town of said
province;
That during the typhoon, the sluice or control gates of the Bued irrigation dam which
irrigates the ricefields of San Fabian were closed and/or controlled so much so that water
and its flow to the canals and ditches were regulated and reduced;
That due to the locking of the sluice or control gates of the dam leading to the canals and
ditches which will bring water to the ricefields, the water in said canals and ditches became
shallow which was suitable for catching mudfishes;
That after the storm, I conducted a personal survey in the area affected, with my secretary
Perfecto Jaravata;
That on November 5, 1980, while I was conducting survey, I saw the late Marcelo Javier
catching fish in the shallow irrigation canals with some companions;
That few days there after,or on November l5, l980, I came to know that said Marcelo Javier
died of tetanus. (p. 33, Rollo)
The motion was denied. Hence, this petition.
In a resolution dated July 16, 1986, we gave due course to the petition.
The case involves the application of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code which provides
that "Criminal liability shall be incurred: (1) By any person committing a felony (delito)
although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended ..." Pursuant to this
provision "an accused is criminally responsible for acts committed by him in violation of
law and for all the natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom." (People v.
Cardenas, 56 SCRA 631).
The record is clear that Marcelo Javier was hacked by the petitioner who used a bolo as a
result of which Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm; that on November
14, 1981 which was the 22nd day after the incident, Javier was rushed to the hospital in a
very serious condition and that on the following day, November 15, 1981, he died from
tetanus.
Under these circumstances, the lower courts ruled that Javier's death was the natural and
logical consequence of Urbano's unlawful act. Hence, he was declared responsible for
Javier's death. Thus, the appellate court said:
The claim of appellant that there was an efficient cause which supervened from the time the
deceased was wounded to the time of his death, which covers a period of 23 days does not
deserve serious consideration. True, that the deceased did not die right away from his
wound, but the cause of his death was due to said wound which was inflicted by the
appellant. Said wound which was in the process of healing got infected with tetanus which
ultimately caused his death.
Dr. Edmundo Exconde of the Nazareth General Hospital testified that the victim suffered
lockjaw because of the infection of the wound with tetanus. And there is no other way by
which he could be infected with tetanus except through the wound in his palm (tsn., p. 78,
Oct. 5, 1981). Consequently, the proximate cause of the victim's death was the wound which
got infected with tetanus. And the settled rule in this jurisdiction is that an accused is liable
for all the consequences of his unlawful act. (Article 4, par. 1, R.P.C. People v. Red, CA 43
O.G. 5072; People v. Cornel 78 Phil. 418).
Appellant's allegation that the proximate cause of the victim's death was due to his own
negligence in going back to work without his wound being properly healed, and lately, that
he went to catch fish in dirty irrigation canals in the first week of November, 1980, is an
afterthought, and a desperate attempt by appellant to wiggle out of the predicament he found
himself in. If the wound had not yet healed, it is impossible to conceive that the deceased
would be reckless enough to work with a disabled hand. (pp. 20-21, Rollo)
The petitioner reiterates his position that the proximate cause of the death of Marcelo Javier
was due to his own negligence, that Dr. Mario Meneses found no tetanus in the injury, and
that Javier got infected with tetanus when after two weeks he returned to his farm and
tended his tobacco plants with his bare hands exposing the wound to harmful elements like
tetanus germs.
The evidence on record does not clearly show that the wound inflicted by Urbano was
infected with tetanus at the time of the infliction of the wound. The evidence merely
confirms that the wound, which was already healing at the time Javier suffered the
symptoms of the fatal ailment, somehow got infected with tetanus However, as to when the
wound was infected is not clear from the record.
In Vda. de Bataclan, et al. v. Medina (102 Phil. 1181), we adopted the following definition
of proximate cause:
xxx xxx xxx
... A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is found in Volume 38, pages 695-696 of
American Jurisprudence, cited by plaintiffs-appellants in their brief. It is as follows:
... "that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred."And more comprehensively, "the proximate legal cause is that acting first and
producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting
a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its
immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a
natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the
person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person,
have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some
person might probably result therefrom." (at pp. 185-186)
The issue, therefore, hinges on whether or not there was an efficient intervening cause from
the time Javier was wounded until his death which would exculpate Urbano from any
liability for Javier's death.
We look into the nature of tetanusThe incubation period of tetanus, i.e., the time between injury and the appearance of
unmistakable symptoms, ranges from 2 to 56 days. However, over 80 percent of patients
become symptomatic within 14 days. A short incubation period indicates severe disease, and
when symptoms occur within 2 or 3 days of injury the mortality rate approaches 100
percent.
Non-specific premonitory symptoms such as restlessness, irritability, and headache are
encountered occasionally, but the commonest presenting complaints are pain and stiffness in
the jaw, abdomen, or back and difficulty swallowing. As the progresses, stiffness gives way
to rigidity, and patients often complain of difficulty opening their mouths. In fact, trismus in
the commonest manifestation of tetanus and is responsible for the familiar descriptive name
of lockjaw. As more muscles are involved, rigidity becomes generalized, and sustained
contractions called risus sardonicus. The intensity and sequence of muscle involvement is
quite variable. In a small proportion of patients, only local signs and symptoms develop in
the region of the injury. In the vast majority, however, most muscles are involved to some
degree, and the signs and symptoms encountered depend upon the major muscle groups
affected.
Reflex spasm usually occur within 24 to 72 hours of the first symptom, an interval referred
to as the onset time. As in the case of the incubation period, a short onset time is associated
with a poor prognosis. Spasms are caused by sudden intensification of afferent stimuli
arising in the periphery, which increases rigidity and causes simultaneous and excessive
contraction of muscles and their antagonists. Spasms may be both painful and dangerous. As
the disease progresses, minimal or inapparent stimuli produce more intense and longer
lasting spasms with increasing frequency. Respiration may be impaired by laryngospasm or
tonic contraction of respiratory muscles which prevent adequate ventilation. Hypoxia may
then lead to irreversible central nervous system damage and death.
Mild tetanus is characterized by an incubation period of at least 14 days and an onset time
of more than 6 days. Trismus is usually present, but dysphagia is absent and generalized
spasms are brief and mild. Moderately severe tetanus has a somewhat shorter incubation
period and onset time; trismus is marked, dysphagia and generalized rigidity are present, but
ventilation remains adequate even during spasms. The criteria for severe tetanus include a
short incubation time, and an onset time of 72 hrs., or less, severe trismus, dysphagia and
rigidity and frequent prolonged, generalized convulsive spasms. (Harrison's Principle of
Internal Medicine, 1983 Edition, pp. 1004-1005; Emphasis supplied)
Therefore, medically speaking, the reaction to tetanus found inside a man's body depends on
the incubation period of the disease.
In the case at bar, Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm when he parried
the bolo which Urbano used in hacking him. This incident took place on October 23, 1980.
After 22 days, or on November 14, 1980, he suffered the symptoms of tetanus, like lockjaw
and muscle spasms. The following day, November 15, 1980, he died.
If, therefore, the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by tetanus
germs at the time, it is more medically probable that Javier should have been infected with
only a mild cause of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd day
after the hacking incident or more than 14 days after the infliction of the wound. Therefore,
the onset time should have been more than six days. Javier, however, died on the second day
from the onset time. The more credible conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound was
inflicted by the appellant, the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present.
Consequently, Javier's wound could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking
incident. Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his wound could have
been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died.
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence
of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. (People v. Cardenas, supra) And since we
are dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim's death
must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however,
lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient
intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The
infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime. (People v. Rellin, 77 Phil. 1038).
Doubts are present. There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its
subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus may have been
the proximate cause of Javier's death with which the petitioner had nothing to do. As we
ruled in Manila Electric Co. v. Remoquillo, et al. (99 Phil. 118).
"A prior and remote cause cannot be made the be of an action if such remote cause did
nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was
made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a
distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury
would not have happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the
condition except because of the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate
cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the
instances which result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act
or condition is the proximate cause." (45 C.J. pp. 931-932). (at p. 125)
It strains the judicial mind to allow a clear aggressor to go scot free of criminal liability. At
the very least, the records show he is guilty of inflicting slight physical injuries. However,
the petitioner's criminal liability in this respect was wiped out by the victim's own act. After
the hacking incident, Urbano and Javier used the facilities of barangay mediators to effect a
compromise agreement where Javier forgave Urbano while Urbano defrayed the medical
expenses of Javier. This settlement of minor offenses is allowed under the express
provisions of Presidential Decree G.R. No. 1508, Section 2(3). (See also People v.
Caruncho, 127 SCRA 16).
We must stress, however, that our discussion of proximate cause and remote cause is limited
to the criminal aspects of this rather unusual case. It does not necessarily follow that the
petitioner is also free of civil liability. The well-settled doctrine is that a person, while not
criminally liable, may still be civilly liable. Thus, in the recent case of People v. Rogelio
Ligon y Tria, et al. (G.R. No. 74041, July 29, 1987), we said:
xxx xxx xxx
... While the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution must be established beyond
reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is required in a civil action for
damages. (Article 29, Civil Code). The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability
of the accused only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil liability
might arise did not exist. (Padilla v. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 559).
The reason for the provisions of article 29 of the Civil Code, which provides that the
acquittal of the accused on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable
doubt does not necessarily exempt him from civil liability for the same act or omission, has
been explained by the Code Commission as follows:
The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases him from civil
liability is one of the most serious flaws in the Philippine legal system. It has given use to
numberless instances of miscarriage of justice, where the acquittal was due to a reasonable
doubt in the mind of the court as to the guilt of the accused. The reasoning followed is that
inasmuch as the civil responsibility is derived from the criminal offense, when the latter is
not proved, civil liability cannot be demanded.
This is one of those causes where confused thinking leads to unfortunate and deplorable
consequences. Such reasoning fails to draw a clear line of demarcation between criminal
liability and civil responsibility, and to determine the logical result of the distinction. The
two liabilities are separate and distinct from each other. One affects the social order and the
other, private rights. One is for the punishment or correction of the offender while the other
is for reparation of damages suffered by the aggrieved party. The two responsibilities are so
different from each other that article 1813 of the present (Spanish) Civil Code reads thus:
"There may be a compromise upon the civil action arising from a crime; but the public
action for the imposition of the legal penalty shall not thereby be extinguished." It is just
and proper that, for the purposes of the imprisonment of or fine upon the accused, the
offense should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. But for the purpose of indemnity the
complaining party, why should the offense also be proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is not
the invasion or violation of every private right to be proved only by a preponderance of
evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved person any less private because the wrongful act is
also punishable by the criminal law?
"For these reasons, the Commission recommends the adoption of the reform under
discussion. It will correct a serious defect in our law. It will close up an inexhaustible source
of injustice-a cause for disillusionment on the part of the innumerable persons injured or
wronged."
The respondent court increased the P12,000.00 indemnification imposed by the trial court to
P30,000.00. However, since the indemnification was based solely on the finding of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt in the homicide case, the civil liability of the petitioner was not
thoroughly examined. This aspect of the case calls for fuller development if the heirs of the
victim are so minded.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned decision of the
then Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime of homicide. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin and,Cortes, JJ., concur.

Plaintiff-Appellee,
- versus -
ORLITO VILLACORTA,
Accused-Appellant.
G.R. No. 186412

Present:
CORONA, C.J.,
Chairperson,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
Promulgated:
September 7, 2011
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
On appeal is the Decision[if !supportFootnotes][1][endif] dated July 30, 2008 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02550, which affirmed the Decision[if !supportFootnotes][2][endif]
dated September 22, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 170, of Malabon, in
Criminal Case No. 27039-MN, finding accused-appellant Orlito Villacorta (Villacorta)
guilty of murder, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay
the heirs of Danilo Cruz (Cruz) the sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, plus the costs of
suit.
On June 21, 2002, an Information[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif] was filed against Villacorta
charging him with the crime of murder, as follows:
That on or about 23rd day of January 2002, in Navotas,
Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, armed with a sharpened bamboo stick,
with intent to kill, treachery and evident premeditation, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
stab with the said weapon one DANILO SALVADOR CRUZ,
thereby inflicting upon the victim serious wounds which caused
his immediate death.
When arraigned on September 9, 2002, Villacorta pleaded not guilty.[if
During trial, the prosecution presented as witnesses Cristina Mendeja (Mendeja)

and Dr. Domingo Belandres, Jr. (Dr. Belandres).
Mendeja narrated that on January 23, 2002, she was tending her sari-sari store
located at C-4 Road, Bagumbayan, Navotas. Both Cruz and Villacorta were regular
customers at Mendejas store. At around two oclock in the morning, while Cruz was ordering
bread at Mendejas store, Villacorta suddenly appeared and, without uttering a word, stabbed
Cruz on the left side of Cruzs body using a sharpened bamboo stick. The bamboo stick
broke and was left in Cruzs body. Immediately after the stabbing incident, Villacorta fled.
Mendeja gave chase but failed to catch Villacorta. When Mendeja returned to her store, she
saw her neighbor Aron removing the broken bamboo stick from Cruzs body.[if !supportFootnotes]
[5][endif] Mendeja and Aron then brought Cruz to Tondo Medical Center.[if !supportFootnotes][6][endif]
Dr. Belandres was Head of the Tetanus Department at the San Lazaro Hospital.
When Cruz sustained the stab wound on January 23, 2002, he was taken to the Tondo
Medical Center, where he was treated as an out-patient. Cruz was only brought to the San
Lazaro Hospital on February 14, 2002, where he died the following day, on February 15,
2002. While admitting that he did not personally treat Cruz, Dr. Belandres was able to
determine, using Cruzs medical chart and diagnosis, that Cruz died of tetanus infection
secondary to stab wound.[if !supportFootnotes][7][endif] Dr. Belandres specifically described the
cause of Cruzs death in the following manner:
The wound was exposed x x spurs concerted, the patient developed
difficulty of opening the mouth, spastivity of the body and
abdominal pain and the cause of death is hypoxic encephalopathy
neuro transmitted due to upper G.I. bleeding x x x. Diagnosed of
Tetanus, Stage III.[if !supportFootnotes][8][endif]
The prosecution also intended to present Dr. Deverni Matias (Dr. Matias), who attended to
Cruz at the San Lazaro Hospital, but the prosecution and defense agreed to dispense with
Dr. Matias testimony based on the stipulation that it would only corroborate Dr. Belandres
testimony on Cruz dying of tetanus.
For its part, the defense presented Villacorta himself, who denied stabbing Cruz. Villacorta
recounted that he was on his way home from work at around two oclock in the morning of
January 21, 2002. Upon arriving home, Villacorta drank coffee then went outside to buy
cigarettes at a nearby store. When Villacorta was about to leave the store, Cruz put his arm
around Villacortas shoulder. This prompted Villacorta to box Cruz, after which, Villacorta
went home. Villacorta did not notice that Cruz got hurt. Villacorta only found out about
Cruzs death upon his arrest on July 31, 2002.[if !supportFootnotes][9][endif]
On September 22, 2006, the RTC rendered a Decision finding Villacorta guilty of
murder, qualified by treachery. The dispositive portion of said Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Court
finds accused Orlito Villacorta guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Murder and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of Danilo Cruz the sum
of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of said victim plus
the costs of suit.[if !supportFootnotes][10][endif]
Villacorta, through his counsel from the Public Attorneys Office (PAO), filed a
notice of appeal to assail his conviction by the RTC.[if !supportFootnotes][11][endif] The Court of
Appeals directed the PAO to file Villacortas brief, within thirty days from receipt of notice.
Villacorta filed his Appellants Brief[if !supportFootnotes][12][endif] on May 30, 2007; while
the People, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed its Appellee's Brief[if !
supportFootnotes][13][endif] on October 2, 2007.
On July 30, 2008, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision affirming in toto
the RTC judgment of conviction against Villacorta.
Hence, Villacorta comes before this Court via the instant appeal.
Villacorta manifested that he would no longer file a supplemental brief, as he was
adopting the Appellant's Brief he filed before the Court of Appeals.[if !supportFootnotes][14][endif]
The OSG, likewise, manifested that it was no longer filing a supplemental brief. [if !
In his Appellants Brief, Villacorta raised the following assignment of errors:
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE
THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS
GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE

QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY.
III
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE ACCUSED COMMITTED A

CRIME, HE COULD ONLY BE HELD LIABLE FOR SLIGHT
PHYSICAL INJURIES.[if !supportFootnotes][16][endif]
Villacorta assails the credibility of Mendeja, an eyewitness to the stabbing

incident. It was Mendeja who positively identified Villacorta as the one who stabbed Cruz in
the early morning of January 23, 2002. Villacorta asserts that Mendejas account of the
stabbing incident is replete with inconsistencies and incredulities, and is contrary to normal
human experience, such as: (1) instead of shouting or calling for help when Villacorta
allegedly stabbed Cruz, Mendeja attempted to run after and catch Villacorta; (2) while, by
Mendejas own account, there were other people who witnessed the stabbing and could have
chased after Villacorta, yet, oddly, only Mendeja did; (3) if Cruz was stabbed so swiftly and
suddenly as Mendeja described, then it would have been physically improbable for Mendeja
to have vividly recognized the perpetrator, who immediately ran away after the stabbing; (4)
after the stabbing, both Villacorta and Cruz ran in opposite directions; and (5) Mendeja had
said that the bamboo stick, the alleged murder weapon, was left at her store, although she
had also stated that the said bamboo stick was left embedded in Cruzs body. Villacorta
maintains that the aforementioned inconsistencies are neither trivial nor inconsequential,
and should engender some doubt as to his guilt.
We are not persuaded.
To begin with, it is fundamental that the determination by the trial court of the
credibility of witnesses, when affirmed by the appellate court, is accorded full weight and
credit as well as great respect, if not conclusive effect. Such determination made by the trial
court proceeds from its first-hand opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses,
their conduct and attitude under grilling examination, thereby placing the trial court in the
unique position to assess the witnesses' credibility and to appreciate their truthfulness,
honesty and candor.[if !supportFootnotes][17][endif]
In this case, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals gave full faith and credence to
the testimony of prosecution witness Mendeja. The Court of Appeals rejected Villacortas
attempts to impugn Mendejas testimony, thus:
Appellants reason for concluding that witness Mendejas testimony is
incredible because she did not shout or call for help and instead
run after the appellant, fails to impress the Court because persons
who witness crimes react in different ways.
x x x the makings of a human mind are

unpredictable; people react differently and there
is no standard form of behavior when one is
confronted by a shocking incident.
Equally lacking in merit is appellants second reason which is, other persons
could have run after the appellant after the stabbing incident. As
explained by witness Mendeja, the other person whom she
identified as Aron was left to assist the appellant who was

wounded. Further, the stabbing occurred at 2:00 oclock in the
morning, a time when persons are expected to be asleep in their
house, not roaming the streets.
His [Villacortas] other argument that the swiftness of the stabbing incident
rendered impossible or incredible the identification of the assailant
cannot likewise prosper in view of his admission that he was in the
store of witness Mendeja on January 23, 2002 at 2:00 oclock in the
morning and that he assaulted the victim by boxing him.
Even if his admission is disregarded still the evidence of record cannot

support appellants argument. Appellant and the victim were known
to witness Mendeja, both being her friends and regular customers.
There was light in front of the store. An opening in the store
measuring 1 and meters enables the person inside to see persons
outside, particularly those buying articles from the store. The
victim was in front of the store buying bread when attacked.
Further, immediately after the stabbing, witness Mendeja ran after
the appellant giving her additional opportunity to identify the
malefactor. Thus, authorship of the attack can be credibly
ascertained.[if !supportFootnotes][18][endif]
Moreover, Villacorta was unable to present any reason or motivation for Mendeja
to fabricate such a lie and falsely accuse Villacorta of stabbing Cruz on January 23, 2002.
We have ruled time and again that where the prosecution eyewitness was familiar with both
the victim and accused, and where the locus criminis afforded good visibility, and where no
improper motive can be attributed to the witness for testifying against the accused, then her
version of the story deserves much weight.[if !supportFootnotes][19][endif]
The purported inconsistencies in Mendejas testimony pointed out by Villacorta are
on matters that have no bearing on the fundamental fact which Mendeja testified on: that
Villacorta stabbed Cruz in the early morning of January 23, 2002, right in front of Mendejas
store.
In the face of Mendejas positive identification of Villacorta as Cruzs stabber,

Villacorta could only muster an uncorroborated denial. Denial, like alibi, as an exonerating
justification, is inherently weak and if uncorroborated, regresses to blatant impotence. Like
alibi, it also constitutes self-serving negative evidence which cannot be accorded greater
evidentiary weight than the declaration of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative
matters.[if !supportFootnotes][20][endif]
Hence, we do not deviate from the foregoing factual findings of the RTC, as
affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Nevertheless, there is merit in the argument proffered by Villacorta that in the event he is
found to have indeed stabbed Cruz, he should only be held liable for slight physical injuries
for the stab wound he inflicted upon Cruz. The proximate cause of Cruzs death is the tetanus
infection, and not the stab wound.
Proximate cause has been defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without
which the result would not have occurred.[if !supportFootnotes][21][endif]
In this case, immediately after he was stabbed by Villacorta in the early morning of
January 23, 2002, Cruz was rushed to and treated as an out-patient at the Tondo Medical
Center. On February 14, 2002, Cruz was admitted to the San Lazaro Hospital for symptoms
of severe tetanus infection, where he died the following day, on February 15, 2002. The
prosecution did not present evidence of the emergency medical treatment Cruz received at
the Tondo Medical Center, subsequent visits by Cruz to Tondo Medical Center or any other
hospital for follow-up medical treatment of his stab wound, or Cruzs activities between
January 23 to February 14, 2002.
In Urbano v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[if !supportFootnotes][22][endif] the Court was
confronted with a case of very similar factual background as the one at bar. During an
altercation on October 23, 1980, Urbano hacked Javier with a bolo, inflicting an incised
wound on Javiers hand. Javier was treated by Dr. Meneses. On November 14, 1980, Javier
was rushed to the hospital with lockjaw and convulsions. Dr. Exconde, who attended to
Javier, found that Javiers serious condition was caused by tetanus infection. The next day,
on November 15, 1980, Javier died. An Information was filed against Urbano for homicide.
Both the Circuit Criminal Court and the Intermediate Appellate Court found Urbano guilty
of homicide, because Javier's death was the natural and logical consequence of Urbano's
unlawful act. Urbano appealed before this Court, arguing that Javiers own negligence was
the proximate cause of his death. Urbano alleged that when Dr. Meneses examined Javiers
wound, he did not find any tetanus infection and that Javier could have acquired the tetanus
germs when he returned to work on his farm only two (2) weeks after sustaining his injury.
The Court granted Urbanos appeal.
We quote extensively from the ratiocination of the Court in Urbano:
The issue, therefore, hinges on whether or not there was

an efficient intervening cause from the time Javier was wounded
until his death which would exculpate Urbano from any liability
for Javier's death.
We look into the nature of tetanus-
The incubation period of tetanus, i.e.,

the time between injury and the appearance of
unmistakable symptoms, ranges from 2 to 56
days. However, over 80 percent of patients
become symptomatic within 14 days. A short
incubation period indicates severe disease, and
when symptoms occur within 2 or 3 days of
injury the mortality rate approaches 100 percent.
Non-specific premonitory symptoms

such as restlessness, irritability, and headache
are encountered occasionally, but the
commonest presenting complaints are pain and
stiffness in the jaw, abdomen, or back and
difficulty swallowing. As the disease progresses,

stiffness gives way to rigidity, and patients often
complain of difficulty opening their mouths. In
fact, trismus is the commonest manifestation of
tetanus and is responsible for the familiar
descriptive name of lockjaw. As more muscles
are involved, rigidity becomes generalized, and
sustained contractions called risus sardonicus.
The intensity and sequence of muscle
involvement is quite variable. In a small
proportion of patients, only local signs and
symptoms develop in the region of the injury. In
the vast majority, however, most muscles are
involved to some degree, and the signs and
symptoms encountered depend upon the major
muscle groups affected.
Reflex spasm usually occur within 24 to 72 hours of the first symptoms, an interval referred
to as the onset time. As in the case of the incubation period, a short onset time is associated
with a poor prognosis. Spasms are caused by sudden intensification of afferent stimuli
arising in the periphery, which increases rigidity and causes simultaneous and excessive
contraction of muscles and their antagonists. Spasms may be both painful and dangerous. As
the disease progresses, minimal or inapparent stimuli produce more intense and longer
lasting spasms with increasing frequency. Respiration may be impaired by laryngospasm or
tonic contraction of respiratory muscles which prevent adequate ventilation. Hypoxia may
then lead to irreversible central nervous system damage and death.
Mild tetanus is characterized by an incubation period of at least 14 days and an onset time
of more than 6 days. Trismus is usually present, but dysphagia is absent and generalized
spasms are brief and mild. Moderately severe tetanus has a somewhat shorter incubation
period and onset time; trismus is marked, dysphagia and generalized rigidity are present, but
ventilation remains adequate even during spasms. The criteria for severe tetanus include a
short incubation time, and an onset time of 72 hrs., or less, severe trismus, dysphagia and
rigidity and frequent prolonged, generalized convulsive spasms. (Harrison's Principle of

Internal Medicine, 1983 Edition, pp. 1004-1005; Emphasis supplied)
Therefore, medically speaking, the reaction to tetanus found inside a man's
body depends on the incubation period of the disease.
In the case at bar, Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound

on his right palm when he parried the bolo which Urbano used in
hacking him. This incident took place on October 23, 1980. After
22 days, or on November 14, 1980, he suffered the symptoms of
tetanus, like lockjaw and muscle spasms. The following day,
November 15, 1980, he died.
If, therefore, the wound of Javier inflicted by the

appellant was already infected by tetanus germs at the time, it is
more medically probable that Javier should have been infected
with only a mild case of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus
appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking incident or more than
14 days after the infliction of the wound. Therefore, the onset time
should have been more than six days. Javier, however, died on the
second day from the onset time. The more credible conclusion is
that at the time Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant, the
severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present.
Consequently, Javier's wound could have been infected with
tetanus after the hacking incident. Considering the circumstance
surrounding Javier's death, his wound could have been infected by
tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died.[if !
The incubation period for tetanus infection and the length of time between the
hacking incident and the manifestation of severe tetanus infection created doubts in the
mind of the Court that Javier acquired the severe tetanus infection from the hacking
incident. We explained in Urbano that:
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct,
natural, and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him
by the accused. (People v. Cardenas, supra) And since we are
dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused
caused the victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond
reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a
distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was
an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier was
wounded to the time of his death. The infection was, therefore,
distinct and foreign to the crime. (People v. Rellin, 77 Phil. 1038).
Doubts are present. There is a likelihood that the wound

was but the remote cause and its subsequent infection, for failure
to take necessary precautions, with tetanus may have been the
proximate cause of Javier's death with which the petitioner had
nothing to do. As we ruled in Manila Electric Co. v. Remoquillo, et
al. (99 Phil. 118).
"A prior and remote cause cannot be

made the basis of an action if such remote cause
did nothing more than furnish the condition or
give rise to the occasion by which the injury was
made possible, if there intervened between such
prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct,
successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the

injury, even though such injury would not have
happened but for such condition or occasion. If
no danger existed in the condition except
because of the independent cause, such
condition was not the proximate cause. And if
an independent negligent act or defective
condition sets into operation the instances,
which result in injury because of the prior
defective condition, such subsequent act or
condition is the proximate cause." (45 C.J. pp.
931-932). (at p. 125)[if !supportFootnotes][24][endif]
We face the very same doubts in the instant case that compel us to set aside the
conviction of Villacorta for murder. There had been an interval of 22 days between the date
of the stabbing and the date when Cruz was rushed to San Lazaro Hospital, exhibiting
symptoms of severe tetanus infection. If Cruz acquired severe tetanus infection from the
stabbing, then the symptoms would have appeared a lot sooner than 22 days later. As the
Court noted in Urbano, severe tetanus infection has a short incubation period, less than 14
days; and those that exhibit symptoms with two to three days from the injury, have one
hundred percent (100%) mortality. Ultimately, we can only deduce that Cruzs stab wound
was merely the remote cause, and its subsequent infection with tetanus might have been the
proximate cause of Cruz's death. The infection of Cruzs stab wound by tetanus was an
efficient intervening cause later or between the time Cruz was stabbed to the time of his
death.
However, Villacorta is not totally without criminal liability. Villacorta is guilty of
slight physical injuries under Article 266(1) of the Revised Penal Code for the stab wound
he inflicted upon Cruz. Although the charge in the instant case is for murder, a finding of
guilt for the lesser offense of slight physical injuries may be made considering that the latter
offense is necessarily included in the former since the essential ingredients of slight physical
injuries constitute and form part of those constituting the offense of murder.[if !supportFootnotes]
[25][endif]
We cannot hold Villacorta criminally liable for attempted or frustrated murder

because the prosecution was not able to establish Villacortas intent to kill. In fact, the Court
of Appeals expressly observed the lack of evidence to prove such an intent beyond
reasonable doubt, to wit:
Appellant stabbed the victim only once using a

sharpened bamboo stick, hitting him on the left side of the body
and then immediately fled. The instrument used is not as lethal
as those made of metallic material. The part of the body hit is
not delicate in the sense that instant death can ensue by reason
of a single stab wound. The assault was done only once. Thus,
there is doubt as to whether appellant had an intent to kill the
victim, which should be resolved in favor of the appellant. x x x.
The intent must be proved in a clear and evident manner to exclude every possible
doubt as to the homicidal (or murderous) intent of the aggressor. The onus probandi lies not
on accused-appellant but on the prosecution. The inference that the intent to kill existed
should not be drawn in the absence of circumstances sufficient to prove this fact beyond
reasonable doubt. When such intent is lacking but wounds were inflicted, the crime is not
frustrated murder but physical injuries only.[if !supportFootnotes][27][endif]
Evidence on record shows that Cruz was brought to Tondo Medical Center for
medical treatment immediately after the stabbing incident. Right after receiving medical
treatment, Cruz was then released by the Tondo Medical Center as an out-patient. There was
no other evidence to establish that Cruz was incapacitated for labor and/or required medical
attendance for more than nine days. Without such evidence, the offense is only slight
physical injuries.[if !supportFootnotes][28][endif]
We still appreciate treachery as an aggravating circumstance, it being sufficiently
alleged in the Information and proved during trial.
The Information specified that accused, armed with a sharpened bamboo stick,
with intent to kill, treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with the said weapon one DANILO
SALVADOR CRUZ x x x.
Treachery exists when an offender commits any of the crimes against persons,
employing means, methods or forms which tend directly or especially to ensure its
execution, without risk to the offender, arising from the defense that the offended party
might make. This definition sets out what must be shown by evidence to conclude that
treachery existed, namely: (1) the employment of such means of execution as would give
the person attacked no opportunity for self-defense or retaliation; and (2) the deliberate and
conscious adoption of the means of execution. To reiterate, the essence of qualifying
circumstance is the suddenness, surprise and the lack of expectation that the attack will take
place, thus, depriving the victim of any real opportunity for self-defense while ensuring the
commission of the crime without risk to the aggressor.[if !supportFootnotes][29][endif] Likewise, even
when the victim was forewarned of the danger to his person, treachery may still be
appreciated since what is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for
the victim to defend himself or to retaliate.[if !supportFootnotes][30][endif]
Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that treachery was duly proven in
this case, and we sustain such finding. Cruz, the victim, was attacked so suddenly,
unexpectedly, and without provocation. It was two oclock in the morning of January 23,
2002, and Cruz, who was out buying bread at Mendejas store, was unarmed. Cruz had his
guard down and was totally unprepared for an attack on his person. Villacorta suddenly
appeared from nowhere, armed with a sharpened bamboo stick, and without uttering a word,
stabbed Cruz at the left side of his body, then swiftly ran away. Villacortas treacherous mode
of attack left Cruz with no opportunity at all to defend himself or retaliate.
Article 266(1) of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 266. Slight physical injuries and maltreatment. The
crime of slight physical injuries shall be punished:
1. By arresto menor when the offender has inflicted

physical injuries which shall incapacitate the offended party from
labor from one to nine days, or shall require medical attendance
during the same period.
The penalty of arresto menor spans from one (1) day to thirty (30) days.
The Indeterminate Sentence Law does not apply since said
law excludes from its coverage cases where the penalty imposed does not exceed
one (1) year.[if !supportFootnotes][32][endif] With the aggravating circumstance of treachery,
we can sentence Villacorta with imprisonment anywhere within arresto menor in
the maximum period, i.e., twenty-one (21) to thirty (30) days. Consequently, we
impose upon Villacorta a straight sentence of thirty (30) days of arresto menor; but
given that Villacorta has been in jail since July 31, 2002 until present time, already
way beyond his imposed sentence, we order his immediate release.
Under paragraph (1), Article 2219 of the Civil Code, moral damages may
be recovered in a criminal offense resulting in physical injuries. Moral damages
compensate for the mental anguish, serious anxiety, and moral shock suffered by
the victim and his family as being a proximate result of the wrongful act. An award
requires no proof of pecuniary loss. Pursuant to previous jurisprudence, an award
of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) moral damages is appropriate for less serious,
as well as slight physical injuries.[if !supportFootnotes][33][endif]
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 30, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.H.C. No. 02550, affirming the Decision dated September 22, 2006 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 170, of Malabon, in Criminal Case No. 27039-MN, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. A new judgment is entered finding Villacorta GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of slight physical injuries, as defined and punished by Article 266 of the Revised
Penal Code, and sentenced to suffer the penalty of thirty (30) days arresto menor.
Considering that Villacorta has been incarcerated well beyond the period of the penalty
herein imposed, the Director of the Bureau of Prisons is ordered to cause Villacortas
immediate release, unless Villacorta is being lawfully held for another cause, and to inform
this Court, within five (5) days from receipt of this Decision, of the compliance with such
order. Villacorta is ordered to pay the heirs of the late Danilo Cruz moral damages in the
sum of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00).
SO ORDERED.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 177218
Appellee,
Present:
CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,

- versus LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
NOEL T. SALES,
Promulgated:
Appellant.
October 3, 2011
x------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
A father ought to discipline his children for committing a misdeed. However, he may not
employ sadistic beatings and inflict fatal injuries under the guise of disciplining them.
This appeal seeks the reversal of the December 4, 2006 Decision[if !supportFootnotes][1][endif] of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01627 that affirmed the August 3, 2005
Joint Decision[if !supportFootnotes][2][endif] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 63 of
Calabanga, Camarines Sur in Criminal Case Nos. RTC03-782 and RTC03-789, convicting
appellant Noel T. Sales (appellant) of the crimes of parricide and slight physical injuries,
respectively. The Information[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif] for parricide contained the following
allegations:
That on or about the 20th day of September, 2002, at around or past 8:00
oclock in the evening at Brgy. San Vicente, Tinambac, Camarines
Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused with evident premeditation and
[in] a fit of anger, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously hit [several] times, the different parts of the body of his
legitimate eldest son, Noemar Sales, a 9-year old minor, with a
[piece of] wood, measuring more or less one meter in length and
one [and] a half inches in diameter, [thereby] inflicting upon the
latter mortal wounds, which cause[d] the death of the said victim,
to the damage and prejudice of the latters heirs in such amount as
may be proven in court.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.[if !supportFootnotes][4][endif]
On the other hand, the Information[if !supportFootnotes][5][endif] in Criminal Case No. RTC03-789
alleges that appellant inflicted slight physical injuries in the following manner:
That on or about the 20th day of September, 2002, at around or past 8:00
oclock in the evening, at Brgy. San Vicente, Tinambac, Camarines
Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named [accused] assault[ed] and hit with a piece
of wood, one Noel Sales, Jr., an 8-year old minor, his second
legitimate son, thereby inflicting upon him physical injuries which
have required medical attendance for a period of five (5) days to
the damage and prejudice of the victims heirs in such amount as
may be proven in court.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.[if !supportFootnotes][6][endif]
When arraigned on April 11, 2003 and July 1, 2003, appellant pleaded not guilty
for the charges of parricide[if !supportFootnotes][7][endif] and slight physical injuries[if !supportFootnotes][8]
[endif] respectively. The cases were then consolidated upon manifestation of the prosecution
which was not objected to by the defense.[if !supportFootnotes][9][endif] During the pre-trial
conference, the parties agreed to stipulate that appellant is the father of the victims, Noemar
Sales (Noemar) and Noel Sales, Jr. (Junior); that at the time of the incident, appellants
family was living in the conjugal home located in Barangay San Vicente, Tinambac,
Camarines Sur; and, that appellant voluntarily surrendered to the police.[if !supportFootnotes][10]
[endif]
Thereafter, trial ensued.

The Version of the Prosecution
On September 19, 2002, brothers Noemar and Junior, then nine and eight years old,
respectively, left their home to attend the fluvial procession of Our Lady of Peafrancia
without the permission of their parents. They did not return home that night. When their
mother, Maria Litan Sales (Maria), looked for them the next day, she found them in the
nearby Barangay of Magsaysay. Afraid of their fathers rage, Noemar and Junior initially
refused to return home but their mother prevailed upon them. When the two kids reached
home at around 8 oclock in the evening of September 20, 2002, a furious appellant
confronted them. Appellant then whipped them with a stick which was later broken so that
he brought his kids outside their house. With Noemars and Juniors hands and feet tied to a
coconut tree, appellant continued beating them with a thick piece of wood. During the
beating Maria stayed inside the house and did not do anything as she feared for her life.
When the beating finally stopped, the three walked back to the house with appellant
assisting Noemar as the latter was staggering, while Junior fearfully followed. Maria noticed
a crack in Noemars head and injuries in his legs. She also saw injuries in the right portion of
the head, the left cheek, and legs of Junior. Shortly thereafter, Noemar collapsed and lost
consciousness. Maria tried to revive him and when Noemar remained motionless despite her
efforts, she told appellant that their son was already dead. However, appellant refused to
believe her. Maria then told appellant to call a quack doctor. He left and returned with one,
who told them that they have to bring Noemar to a hospital. Appellant thus proceeded to
take the unconscious Noemar to the junction and waited for a vehicle to take them to a
hospital. As there was no vehicle and because another quack doctor they met at the junction
told them that Noemar is already dead, appellant brought his son back to their house.
Noemars wake lasted only for a night and he was immediately buried the following day. His
body was never examined by a doctor.
The Version of the Defense
Prior to the incident, Noemar and Junior had already left their residence on three separate
occasions without the permission of their parents. Each time, appellant merely scolded them
and told them not to repeat the misdeed since something untoward might happen to them.
During those times, Noemar and Junior were never physically harmed by their father.
However, Noemar and Junior again left their home without their parents permission on
September 16, 2002 and failed to return for several days. Worse, appellant received
information that his sons stole a pedicab. As they are broke, appellant had to borrow money
so that his wife could search for Noemar and Junior. When his sons finally arrived home at
8 oclock in the evening of September 20, 2002, appellant scolded and hit them with a piece
of wood as thick as his index finger. He hit Noemar and Junior simultaneously since they
were side by side. After whipping his sons in their buttocks three times, he noticed that
Noemar was chilling and frothing. When Noemar lost consciousness, appellant decided to
bring him to a hospital in Naga City by waiting for a vehicle at the crossroad which was
seven kilometers away from their house.
Appellant held Noemar while on their way to the crossroad and observed his difficulty in
breathing. The pupils of Noemars eyes were also moving up and down. Appellant heard him
say that he wanted to sleep and saw him pointing to his chest in pain. However, they waited
in vain since a vehicle never came. It was then that Noemar died. Appellant thus decided to
just bring Noemar back to their house.
Appellant denied that his son died from his beating since no parent could kill his or her
child. He claimed that Noemar died as a result of difficulty in breathing. In fact, he never
complained of the whipping done to him. Besides, appellant recalled that Noemar was
brought to a hospital more than a year before September 2002 and diagnosed with having a
weak heart.
On the other hand, Maria testified that Noemar suffered from epilepsy. Whenever he suffers
from epileptic seizures, Noemar froths and passes out. But he would regain consciousness
after 15 minutes. His seizures normally occur whenever he gets hungry or when scolded.
The death of Noemar was reported to the police by the barangay captain.[if !supportFootnotes][11]
[endif] Thereafter, appellant surrendered voluntarily.[if !supportFootnotes][12][endif]
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In a Joint Decision,[if !supportFootnotes][13][endif] the trial court held that the evidence presented by
the prosecution was sufficient to prove that appellant was guilty of committing the crimes of
parricide and slight physical injuries in the manner described in the Informations. In the
crime of parricide, the trial court did not consider the aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation against appellant since there is no proof that he planned to kill Noemar. But
the trial court appreciated in his favor the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender
and lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong. The dispositive portion of said Joint
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the prosecution
having proven the guilt of Noel Sales, beyond reasonable doubt, he
is found guilty of parricide in Crim. Case No. RTC03-782 and
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is
likewise ordered to pay the heirs of Noemar Sales, the amount of
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; P50,000.00 as moral damages;
P25,000,00 as exemplary damages and to pay the costs.
Furthermore, accused Noel Sales is also found guilty

beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of slight physical injuries in
Crim. Case No. RTC03-789 and sentenced to suffer the penalty of
twenty (20) days of Arresto Menor in its medium period.
Accused Noel Sales is likewise meted the accessory

penalties as provided under the Revised Penal Code. Considering
that herein accused has undergone preventive imprisonment, he
shall be credited in the service of his sentence with the time he has
undergone preventive imprisonment in accordance with and
subject to the conditions provided for in Article 29 of the Revised
Penal Code.
SO ORDERED.[if !supportFootnotes][14][endif]
Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal[if !supportFootnotes][15][endif] which was given due

course in an Order[if !supportFootnotes][16][endif] dated September 21, 2005.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
However, the appellate court denied the appeal and affirmed the ruling of the trial court. The
dispositive portion of its Decision[if !supportFootnotes][17][endif] reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The assailed decision dated
August 3, 2005 in Criminal Case Nos. RTC03-782 and RTC03-789 for Parricide and Slight
Physical Injuries, respectively, is AFFIRMED.
Pursuant to Section 13(c), Rule 124 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure, appellant may appeal this case to the
Supreme Court via a Notice of Appeal filed before this Court.
Issues
Hence, appellant is now before this Court with the following two-fold issues:
I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF
THE CRIMES CHARGED.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT TO

THE TESTIMONIES OF THE DEFENSE WITNESSES.[if !
Our Ruling
The appeal is without merit.
The Charge of Parricide
Appellant admits beating his sons on September 20, 2002 as a disciplinary measure, but
denies battering Noemar to death. He believes that no father could kill his own son.
According to him, Noemar had a weak heart that resulted in attacks consisting of loss of
consciousness and froth in his mouth. He claims that Noemar was conscious as they
traveled to the junction where they would take a vehicle in going to a hospital. However,
Noemar had difficulty in breathing and complained of chest pain. He contends that it was at
this moment that Noemar died, not during his whipping. To substantiate his claim, appellant
presented his wife, Maria, who testified that Noemar indeed suffered seizures, but this was
due to epilepsy.
The contentions of appellant fail to persuade. The imposition of parental discipline on
children of tender years must always be with the view of correcting their erroneous
behavior. A parent or guardian must exercise restraint and caution in administering the
proper punishment. They must not exceed the parameters of their parental duty to discipline
their minor children. It is incumbent upon them to remain rational and refrain from being
motivated by anger in enforcing the intended punishment. A deviation will undoubtedly
result in sadism.
Prior to whipping his sons, appellant was already furious with them because they left the
family dwelling without permission and that was already preceded by three other similar
incidents. This was further aggravated by a report that his sons stole a pedicab thereby
putting him in disgrace. Moreover, they have no money so much so that he still had to
borrow so that his wife could look for the children and bring them home. From these, it is
therefore clear that appellant was motivated not by an honest desire to discipline the
children for their misdeeds but by an evil intent of venting his anger. This can reasonably be
concluded from the injuries of Noemar in his head, face and legs. It was only when
Noemars body slipped from the coconut tree to which he was tied and lost consciousness
that appellant stopped the beating. Had not Noemar lost consciousness, appellant would
most likely not have ceased from his sadistic act. His subsequent attempt to seek medical
attention for Noemar as an act of repentance was nevertheless too late to save the childs life.
It bears stressing that a decent and responsible parent would never subject a minor child to
sadistic punishment in the guise of discipline.
Appellant attempts to evade criminal culpability by arguing that he merely
intended to discipline Noemar and not to kill him. However, the relevant portion of Article 4
of the Revised Penal Code states:
Art. 4. Criminal liability. Criminal liability shall be
incurred:
[endif]By any person
committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended.
xxxx
In order that a person may be criminally liable for a felony different from that
which he intended to commit, it is indispensible (a) that a felony was committed and (b) that
the wrong done to the aggrieved person be the direct consequence of the crime committed
by the perpetrator.[if !supportFootnotes][20][endif] Here, there is no doubt appellant in beating his son
Noemar and inflicting upon him physical injuries, committed a felony. As a direct
consequence of the beating suffered by the child, he expired. Appellants criminal liability
for the death of his son, Noemar, is thus clear.
Appellants claim that it was Noemars heart ailment that caused his death deserves
no merit. This declaration is self-serving and uncorroborated since it is not substantiated by
evidence. While Dr. Salvador Betito, a Municipal Health Officer of Tinambac, Camarines
Sur issued a death certificate indicating that Noemar died due to cardio-pulmonary arrest,
the same is not sufficient to prove that his death was due mainly to his poor health. It is
worth emphasizing that Noemars cadaver was never examined. Also, even if appellant
presented his wife, Maria, to lend credence to his contention, the latters testimony did not
help as same was even in conflict with his testimony. Appellant testified that Noemar
suffered from a weak heart which resulted in his death while Maria declared that Noemar
was suffering from epilepsy. Interestingly, Marias testimony was also unsubstantiated by
evidence.
Moreover, as will be discussed below, all the elements of the crime of parricide are
present in this case.
All the Elements of Parricide are present in the case at bench.
We find no error in the ruling of the trial court, as affirmed by the appellate court,
that appellant committed the crime of parricide.
Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code defines parricide as follows:
Art. 246. Parricide. Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child,
whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or
descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and shall be
punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by
the accused; (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of
accused.[if !supportFootnotes][21][endif]
In the case at bench, there is overwhelming evidence to prove the first element, that is, a
person was killed. Maria testified that her son Noemar did not regain consciousness after the
severe beating he suffered from the hands of his father. Thereafter, a quack doctor declared
Noemar dead. Afterwards, as testified to by Maria, they held a wake for Noemar the next
day and then buried him the day after. Noemars Death Certificate[if !supportFootnotes][22][endif] was
also presented in evidence.
There is likewise no doubt as to the existence of the second element that the appellant killed
the deceased. Same is sufficiently established by the positive testimonies of Maria and
Junior. Maria testified that on September 20, 2002, Noemar and his younger brother, Junior,
were whipped by appellant, their father, inside their house. The whipping continued even
outside the house but this time, the brothers were tied side by side to a coconut tree while
appellant delivered the lashes indiscriminately. For his part, Junior testified that Noemar,
while tied to a tree, was beaten by their father in the head. Because the savagery of the
attack was too much for Noemars frail body to endure, he lost consciousness and died from
his injuries immediately after the incident.
As to the third element, appellant himself admitted that the deceased is his child.
While Noemars birth certificate was not presented, oral evidence of filial relationship may
be considered.[if !supportFootnotes][23][endif] As earlier stated, appellant stipulated to the fact that he
is the father of Noemar during the pre-trial conference and likewise made the same
declaration while under oath.[if !supportFootnotes][24][endif] Maria also testified that Noemar and
Junior are her sons with appellant, her husband. These testimonies are sufficient to establish
the relationship between appellant and Noemar.
Clearly, all the elements of the crime of parricide are obtaining in this case.
There is Mitigating Circumstance of Voluntary Surrender but not Lack of Intention to
Commit so Grave a Wrong
The trial court correctly appreciated the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in
favor of appellant since the evidence shows that he went to the police station a day after the
barangay captain reported the death of Noemar. The presentation by appellant of himself to
the police officer on duty in a spontaneous manner is a manifestation of his intent to save
the authorities the trouble and expense that may be incurred for his search and capture[if !
supportFootnotes][25][endif] which is the essence of voluntary surrender.
However, there was error in appreciating the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to
commit so grave a wrong. Appellant adopted means to ensure the success of the savage
battering of his sons. He tied their wrists to a coconut tree to prevent their escape while they
were battered with a stick to inflict as much pain as possible. Noemar suffered injuries in his
face, head and legs that immediately caused his death. The mitigating circumstance of lack
of intent to commit so grave a wrong as that actually perpetrated cannot be appreciated
where the acts employed by the accused were reasonably sufficient to produce and did
actually produce the death of the victim.[if !supportFootnotes][26][endif]
The Award of Damages and Penalty for Parricide
We find proper the trial courts award to the heirs of Noemar of the sums of
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and P50,000.00 as moral damages. However, the award of
exemplary damages of P25,000.00 should be increased to P30,000.00 in accordance with
prevailing jurisprudence.[if !supportFootnotes][27][endif] In addition, and in conformity with current
policy, we also impose on all the monetary awards for damages an interest at the legal rate
of 6% from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.[if !supportFootnotes][28][endif]
As regards the penalty, parricide is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. The trial court
imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua when it considered the presence of the mitigating
circumstances of voluntary surrender and lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong.
However, even if we earlier ruled that the trial court erred in considering the mitigating
circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong, we maintain the penalty
imposed. This is because the exclusion of said mitigating circumstance does not result to a
different penalty since the presence of only one mitigating circumstance, which is, voluntary
surrender, with no aggravating circumstance, is sufficient for the imposition of reclusion
perpetua as the proper prison term. Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code provides in part as
follows:
Art. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. - x x x
In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two

indivisible penalties, the following rules shall be observed in the
application thereof:
xxxx
3. When the commission of the act is attended by some

mitigating circumstance and there is no aggravating circumstance,
the lesser penalty shall be applied.
xxxx
The crime of parricide is punishable by the indivisible penalties of reclusion

perpetua to death. With one mitigating circumstance, which is voluntary surrender, and no
aggravating circumstance, the imposition of the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua and not
the penalty of death on appellant was thus proper.[if !supportFootnotes][29][endif]
The Charge of Slight Physical Injuries
The victim himself, Junior testified that he, together with his brother Noemar, were
beaten by their father, herein appellant, while they were tied to a coconut tree. He recalled to
have been hit on his right eye and right leg and to have been examined by a physician
thereafter.[if !supportFootnotes][30][endif] Maria corroborated her sons testimony.[if !supportFootnotes][31]
[endif]
Juniors testimony was likewise supported by Dr. Ursolino Primavera, Jr. (Dr. Primavera) of
Tinambac Community Hospital who examined him for physical injuries. He issued a
Medical Certificate for his findings and testified on the same. His findings were (1)
muscular contusions with hematoma on the right side of Juniors face just below the eye and
on both legs, which could have been caused by hitting said area with a hard object such as a
wooden stick and, (2) abrasions of brownish color circling both wrist with crust formation
which could have been sustained by the patient due to struggling while his hands were tied.
When asked how long does he think the injuries would heal, Dr. Primavera answered one to
two weeks.[if !supportFootnotes][32][endif] But if applied with medication, the injuries would heal in
a week.[if !supportFootnotes][33][endif]
We give full faith and credence to the categorical and positive testimony of Junior that he
was beaten by his father and that by reason thereof he sustained injuries. His testimony
deserves credence especially since the same is corroborated by the testimony of his mother,
Maria, and supported by medical examination. We thus find that the RTC correctly held
appellant guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries.
Penalty for Slight Physical Injuries
We likewise affirm the penalty imposed by the RTC. Dr. Primavera testified that
the injuries sustained by Junior should heal in one week upon medication. Hence, the trial
court correctly meted upon appellant the penalty under paragraph 1, Article 266 of the
Revised Penal Code which provides:
ART. 266. Slight Physical Injuries and maltreatment. The crime of slight
physical injuries shall be punished:
[endif]By arresto menor when the offender has
inflicted physical injuries which shall incapacitate the offended
party for labor from one to nine days or shall require medical
attendance during the same period.
xxxx
There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance present in the commission of the

crime, the penalty shall be in its medium period. The RTC was thus correct in imposing
upon appellant the penalty of twenty (20) days of arresto menor in its medium period.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 01627 that affirmed the Joint Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 63
of Calabanga, Camarines Sur in Criminal Case Nos. RTC03-782 and RTC03-789,
convicting Noel T. Sales of the crimes of parricide and slight physical injuries is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS that the award of exemplary damages is increased to
P30,000.00. In addition, an interest of 6% is imposed on all monetary awards from date of
finality of this Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson

Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that
the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
G.R. No. 103119 October 21, 1992
SULPICIO INTOD, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
CAMPOS, JR., J.:
Petitioner, Sulpicio Intod, filed this petition for review of the decision of the Court of
Appeals 1 affirming in toto the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XIV, Oroquieta
City, finding him guilty of the crime of attempted murder.
From the records, we gathered the following facts.
In the morning of February 4, 1979, Sulpicio Intod, Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio and
Avelino Daligdig went to Salvador Mandaya's house in Katugasan, Lopez Jaena, Misamis
Occidental and asked him to go with them to the house of Bernardina Palangpangan.
Thereafter, Mandaya and Intod, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig had a meeting with Aniceto
Dumalagan. He told Mandaya that he wanted Palangpangan to be killed because of a land
dispute between them and that Mandaya should accompany the four (4) men, otherwise, he
would also be killed.
At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day, Petitioner, Mandaya, Pangasian,
Tubio and Daligdig, all armed with firearms, arrived at Palangpangan's house in Katugasan,
Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental. At the instance of his companions, Mandaya pointed the
location of Palangpangan's bedroom. Thereafter, Petitioner, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig
fired at said room. It turned out, however, that Palangpangan was in another City and her
home was then occupied by her son-in-law and his family. No one was in the room when the
accused fired the shots. No one was hit by the gun fire.
Petitioner and his companions were positively identified by witnesses. One witness testified
that before the five men left the premises, they shouted: "We will kill you (the witness) and
especially Bernardina Palangpangan and we will come back if (sic) you were not injured". 2
After trial, the Regional Trial Court convicted Intod of attempted murder. The court (RTC),
as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, holding that Petitioner was guilty of attempted murder.
Petitioner seeks from this Court a modification of the judgment by holding him liable only
for an impossible crime, citing Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code which provides:
Art. 4(2). CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY. Criminal Responsibility shall be incurred:
xxx xxx xxx
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property,
were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the
employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.
Petitioner contends that, Palangpangan's absence from her room on the night he and his
companions riddled it with bullets made the crime inherently impossible.
On the other hand, Respondent People of the Philippines argues that the crime was not
impossible. Instead, the facts were sufficient to constitute an attempt and to convict Intod
for attempted murder. Respondent alleged that there was intent. Further, in its Comment to
the Petition, respondent pointed out that:
. . . The crime of murder was not consummated, not because of the inherent impossibility of
its accomplishment (Art. 4(2), Revised Penal Code), but due to a cause or accident other
than petitioner's and his accused's own spontaneous desistance (Art. 3., Ibid.) Palangpangan
did not sleep at her house at that time. Had it not been for this fact, the crime is possible, not
impossible. 3
Article 4, paragraph 2 is an innovation 4 of the Revised Penal Code. This seeks to remedy
the void in the Old Penal Code where:
. . . it was necessary that the execution of the act has been commenced, that the person
conceiving the idea should have set about doing the deed, employing appropriate means in
order that his intent might become a reality, and finally, that the result or end contemplated
shall have been physically possible. So long as these conditions were not present, the law
and the courts did not hold him criminally liable. 5
This legal doctrine left social interests entirely unprotected. 6 The Revised Penal Code,
inspired by the Positivist School, recognizes in the offender his formidability, 7 and now
penalizes an act which were it not aimed at something quite impossible or carried out with
means which prove inadequate, would constitute a felony against person or against property.
8 The rationale of Article 4(2) is to punish such criminal tendencies. 9
Under this article, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an offense against
person or property because: (1) the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of
accomplishment: or (2) the means employed is either (a) inadequate or (b) ineffectual. 10
That the offense cannot be produced because the commission of the offense is inherently
impossible of accomplishment is the focus of this petition. To be impossible under this
clause, the act intended by the offender must be by its nature one impossible of
accomplishment. 11 There must be either impossibility of accomplishing the intended act 12
in order to qualify the act an impossible crime.
Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to
a crime. 13 Thus:
Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where (1) the motive, desire and
expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law; (2) there is intention to perform the
physical act; (3) there is a performance of the intended physical act; and (4) the consequence
resulting from the intended act does not amount to a crime. 14
The impossibility of killing a person already dead 15 falls in this category.
On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to
the actor or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime. 16 One
example is the man who puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to
steal the latter's wallet and finds the pocket empty. 17
The case at bar belongs to this category. Petitioner shoots the place where he thought his
victim would be, although in reality, the victim was not present in said place and thus, the
petitioner failed to accomplish his end.
One American case had facts almost exactly the same as this one. In People vs. Lee Kong, 18
the accused, with intent to kill, aimed and fired at the spot where he thought the police
officer would be. It turned out, however, that the latter was in a different place. The accused
failed to hit him and to achieve his intent. The Court convicted the accused of an attempt to
kill. It held that:
The fact that the officer was not at the spot where the attacking party imagined where he
was, and where the bullet pierced the roof, renders it no less an attempt to kill. It is well
settled principle of criminal law in this country that where the criminal result of an attempt
is not accomplished simply because of an obstruction in the way of the thing to be operated
upon, and these facts are unknown to the aggressor at the time, the criminal attempt is
committed.
19
In the case of Strokes vs. State, where the accused failed to accomplish his intent to kill
the victim because the latter did not pass by the place where he was lying-in wait, the court
held him liable for attempted murder. The court explained that:
It was no fault of Strokes that the crime was not committed. . . . It only became impossible
by reason of the extraneous circumstance that Lane did not go that way; and further, that he
was arrested and prevented from committing the murder. This rule of the law has application
only where it is inherently impossible to commit the crime. It has no application to a case
where it becomes impossible for the crime to be committed, either by outside interference or
because of miscalculation as to a supposed opportunity to commit the crime which fails to
materialize; in short it has no application to the case when the impossibility grows out of
extraneous acts not within the control of the party.
In the case of Clark vs. State, 20 the court held defendant liable for attempted robbery even if
there was nothing to rob. In disposing of the case, the court quoted Mr. Justice Bishop, to
wit:
It being an accepted truth that defendant deserves punishment by reason of his criminal
intent, no one can seriously doubt that the protection of the public requires the punishment
to be administered, equally whether in the unseen depths of the pocket, etc., what was
supposed to exist was really present or not. The community suffers from the mere alarm of
crime. Again: Where the thing intended (attempted) as a crime and what is done is a sort to
create alarm, in other words, excite apprehension that the evil; intention will be carried out,
the incipient act which the law of attempt takes cognizance of is in reason committed.
In State vs. Mitchell, 21 defendant, with intent to kill, fired at the window of victim's room
thinking that the latter was inside. However, at that moment, the victim was in another part
of the house. The court convicted the accused of attempted murder.
The aforecited cases are the same cases which have been relied upon by Respondent to
make this Court sustain the judgment of attempted murder against Petitioner. However, we
cannot rely upon these decisions to resolve the issue at hand. There is a difference between
the Philippine and the American laws regarding the concept and appreciation of impossible
crimes.
In the Philippines, the Revised Penal Code, in Article 4(2), expressly provided for
impossible crimes and made the punishable. Whereas, in the United States, the Code of
Crimes and Criminal Procedure is silent regarding this matter. What it provided for were
attempts of the crimes enumerated in the said Code. Furthermore, in said jurisdiction, the
impossibility of committing the offense is merely a defense to an attempt charge. In this
regard, commentators and the cases generally divide the impossibility defense into two
categories: legal versus factual impossibility. 22 In U.S. vs. Wilson 23 the Court held that:
. . . factual impossibility of the commission of the crime is not a defense. If the crime could
have been committed had the circumstances been as the defendant believed them to be, it is
no defense that in reality the crime was impossible of commission.
Legal impossibility, on the other hand, is a defense which can be invoked to avoid criminal
liability for an attempt. In U.S. vs. Berrigan, 24 the accused was indicated for attempting to
smuggle letters into and out of prison. The law governing the matter made the act criminal if
done without knowledge and consent of the warden. In this case, the offender intended to
send a letter without the latter's knowledge and consent and the act was performed.
However, unknown to him, the transmittal was achieved with the warden's knowledge and
consent. The lower court held the accused liable for attempt but the appellate court reversed.
It held unacceptable the contention of the state that "elimination of impossibility as a
defense to a charge of criminal attempt, as suggested by the Model Penal Code and the
proposed federal legislation, is consistent with the overwhelming modern view". In
disposing of this contention, the Court held that the federal statutes did not contain such
provision, and thus, following the principle of legality, no person could be criminally liable
for an act which was not made criminal by law. Further, it said:
Congress has not yet enacted a law that provides that intent plus act plus conduct constitutes
the offense of attempt irrespective of legal impossibility until such time as such legislative
changes in the law take place, this court will not fashion a new non-statutory law of criminal
attempt.
To restate, in the United States, where the offense sought to be committed is factually
impossible or accomplishment, the offender cannot escape criminal liability. He can be
convicted of an attempt to commit the substantive crime where the elements of attempt are
satisfied. It appears, therefore, that the act is penalized, not as an impossible crime, but as an
attempt to commit a crime. On the other hand, where the offense is legally impossible of
accomplishment, the actor cannot be held liable for any crime neither for an attempt not
for an impossible crime. The only reason for this is that in American law, there is no such
thing as an impossible crime. Instead, it only recognizes impossibility as a defense to a
crime charge that is, attempt.
This is not true in the Philippines. In our jurisdiction, impossible crimes are recognized. The
impossibility of accomplishing the criminal intent is not merely a defense, but an act
penalized by itself. Furthermore, the phrase "inherent impossibility" that is found in Article
4(2) of the Revised Penal Code makes no distinction between factual or physical
impossibility and legal impossibility. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos.
The factual situation in the case at bar present a physical impossibility which rendered the
intended crime impossible of accomplishment. And under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the
Revised Penal Code, such is sufficient to make the act an impossible crime.
To uphold the contention of respondent that the offense was Attempted Murder because the
absence of Palangpangan was a supervening cause independent of the actor's will, will
render useless the provision in Article 4, which makes a person criminally liable for an act
"which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent
impossibility of its accomplishment . . ." In that case all circumstances which prevented the
consummation of the offense will be treated as an accident independent of the actor's will
which is an element of attempted and frustrated felonies.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED. the petition is hereby GRANTED, the
decision of respondent Court of Appeals holding Petitioner guilty of Attempted Murder is
hereby MODIFIED. We hereby hold Petitioner guilty of an impossible crime as defined and
penalized in Articles 4, paragraph 2, and 59 of the Revised Penal Code, respectively. Having
in mind the social danger and degree of criminality shown by Petitioner, this Court
sentences him to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, together with the
accessory penalties provided by the law, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Regalado and Nocon, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., is on leave.
THIRD DIVISION
GEMMA T. JACINTO,
Petitioner,
G.R. No. 162540
Present:
- versus -
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.

Promulgated:
Respondent.
July 13, 2009

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Gemma T. Jacinto
seeking the reversal of the Decision[if !supportFootnotes][1][endif] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR No. 23761 dated December 16, 2003, affirming petitioner's conviction of the
crime of Qualified Theft, and its Resolution[if !supportFootnotes][2][endif] dated March 5, 2004
denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner, along with two other women, namely, Anita Busog de Valencia y Rivera
and Jacqueline Capitle, was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan
City, Branch 131, with the crime of Qualified Theft, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about and sometime in the month of July 1997,
in Kalookan City, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together
and mutually helping one another, being then all employees of
MEGA FOAM INTERNATIONAL INC., herein represented by
JOSEPH DYHENGCO Y CO, and as such had free access inside
the aforesaid establishment, with grave abuse of trust and
confidence reposed upon them with intent to gain and without the
knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and deposited in
their own account, Banco De Oro Check No. 0132649 dated July
14, 1997 in the sum of P10,000.00, representing payment made by
customer Baby Aquino to the Mega Foam Int'l. Inc. to the damage
and prejudice of the latter in the aforesaid stated amount of
P10,000.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif]
The prosecution's evidence, which both the RTC and the CA found to be more credible,
reveals the events that transpired to be as follows.
In the month of June 1997, Isabelita Aquino Milabo, also known as Baby Aquino, handed
petitioner Banco De Oro (BDO) Check Number 0132649 postdated July 14, 1997 in the
amount of P10,000.00. The check was payment for Baby Aquino's purchases from Mega
Foam Int'l., Inc., and petitioner was then the collector of Mega Foam. Somehow, the check
was deposited in the Land Bank account of Generoso Capitle, the husband of Jacqueline
Capitle; the latter is the sister of petitioner and the former pricing, merchandising and
inventory clerk of Mega Foam.
Meanwhile, Rowena Ricablanca, another employee of Mega Foam, received a phone call
sometime in the middle of July from one of their customers, Jennifer Sanalila. The customer
wanted to know if she could issue checks payable to the account of Mega Foam, instead of
issuing the checks payable to CASH. Said customer had apparently been instructed by
Jacqueline Capitle to make check payments to Mega Foam payable to CASH. Around that
time, Ricablanca also received a phone call from an employee of Land Bank, Valenzuela
Branch, who was looking for Generoso Capitle. The reason for the call was to inform
Capitle that the subject BDO check deposited in his account had been dishonored.
Ricablanca then phoned accused Anita Valencia, a former employee/collector of Mega
Foam, asking the latter to inform Jacqueline Capitle about the phone call from Land Bank
regarding the bounced check. Ricablanca explained that she had to call and relay the
message through Valencia, because the Capitles did not have a phone; but they could be
reached through Valencia, a neighbor and former co-employee of Jacqueline Capitle at
Mega Foam.
Valencia then told Ricablanca that the check came from Baby Aquino, and instructed
Ricablanca to ask Baby Aquino to replace the check with cash. Valencia also told
Ricablanca of a plan to take the cash and divide it equally into four: for herself, Ricablanca,
petitioner Jacinto and Jacqueline Capitle. Ricablanca, upon the advise of Mega Foam's
accountant, reported the matter to the owner of Mega Foam, Joseph Dyhengco.
Thereafter, Joseph Dyhengco talked to Baby Aquino and was able to confirm that the latter
indeed handed petitioner a BDO check for P10,000.00 sometime in June 1997 as payment
for her purchases from Mega Foam.[if !supportFootnotes][4][endif] Baby Aquino further testified that,
sometime in July 1997, petitioner also called her on the phone to tell her that the BDO
check bounced.[if !supportFootnotes][5][endif] Verification from company records showed that
petitioner never remitted the subject check to Mega Foam. However, Baby Aquino said that
she had already paid Mega Foam P10,000.00 cash in August 1997 as replacement for the
dishonored check.[if !supportFootnotes][6][endif]
Generoso Capitle, presented as a hostile witness, admitted depositing the subject BDO
check in his bank account, but explained that the check came into his possession when some
unknown woman arrived at his house around the first week of July 1997 to have the check
rediscounted. He parted with his cash in exchange for the check without even bothering to
inquire into the identity of the woman or her address. When he was informed by the bank
that the check bounced, he merely disregarded it as he didnt know where to find the woman
who rediscounted the check.
Meanwhile, Dyhengco filed a Complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
and worked out an entrapment operation with its agents. Ten pieces of P1,000.00 bills
provided by Dyhengco were marked and dusted with fluorescent powder by the NBI.
Thereafter, the bills were given to Ricablanca, who was tasked to pretend that she was going
along with Valencia's plan.
On August 15, 2007, Ricablanca and petitioner met at the latter's house. Petitioner, who was
then holding the bounced BDO check, handed over said check to Ricablanca. They
originally intended to proceed to Baby Aquino's place to have the check replaced with cash,
but the plan did not push through. However, they agreed to meet again on August 21, 2007.
On the agreed date, Ricablanca again went to petitioners house, where she met petitioner
and Jacqueline Capitle. Petitioner, her husband, and Ricablanca went to the house of Anita
Valencia; Jacqueline Capitle decided not to go with the group because she decided to go
shopping. It was only petitioner, her husband, Ricablanca and Valencia who then boarded
petitioner's jeep and went on to Baby Aquino's factory. Only Ricablanca alighted from the
jeep and entered the premises of Baby Aquino, pretending that she was getting cash from
Baby Aquino. However, the cash she actually brought out from the premises was the
P10,000.00 marked money previously given to her by Dyhengco. Ricablanca divided the
money and upon returning to the jeep, gave P5,000.00 each to Valencia and petitioner.
Thereafter, petitioner and Valencia were arrested by NBI agents, who had been watching the
whole time.
Petitioner and Valencia were brought to the NBI office where the Forensic Chemist found
fluorescent powder on the palmar and dorsal aspects of both of their hands. This showed
that petitioner and Valencia handled the marked money. The NBI filed a criminal case for
qualified theft against the two and one Jane Doe who was later identified as Jacqueline
Capitle, the wife of Generoso Capitle.
The defense, on the other hand, denied having taken the subject check and presented the
following scenario.
Petitioner admitted that she was a collector for Mega Foam until she resigned on June 30,
1997, but claimed that she had stopped collecting payments from Baby Aquino for quite
some time before her resignation from the company. She further testified that, on the day of
the arrest, Ricablanca came to her mothers house, where she was staying at that time, and
asked that she accompany her (Ricablanca) to Baby Aquino's house. Since petitioner was
going for a pre-natal check-up at the Chinese General Hospital, Ricablanca decided to hitch
a ride with the former and her husband in their jeep going to Baby Aquino's place in
Caloocan City. She allegedly had no idea why Ricablanca asked them to wait in their jeep,
which they parked outside the house of Baby Aquino, and was very surprised when
Ricablanca placed the money on her lap and the NBI agents arrested them.
Anita Valencia also admitted that she was the cashier of Mega Foam until she resigned on
June 30, 1997. It was never part of her job to collect payments from customers. According
to her, on the morning of August 21, 1997, Ricablanca called her up on the phone, asking if
she (Valencia) could accompany her (Ricablanca) to the house of Baby Aquino. Valencia
claims that she agreed to do so, despite her admission during cross-examination that she did
not know where Baby Aquino resided, as she had never been to said house. They then met at
the house of petitioner's mother, rode the jeep of petitioner and her husband, and proceeded
to Baby Aquino's place. When they arrived at said place, Ricablanca alighted, but requested
them to wait for her in the jeep. After ten minutes, Ricablanca came out and, to her surprise,
Ricablanca gave her money and so she even asked, What is this? Then, the NBI agents
arrested them.
The trial of the three accused went its usual course and, on October 4, 1999, the RTC
rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds accused Gemma
Tubale De Jacinto y Latosa, Anita Busog De Valencia y Rivera
and Jacqueline Capitle GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of QUALIFIED THEFT and each of them is hereby
sentenced to suffer imprisonment of FIVE (5) YEARS, FIVE (5)
MONTHS AND ELEVEN (11) DAYS, as minimum, to SIX (6)
YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS AND TWENTY (20) DAYS, as
maximum.
The three appealed to the CA and, on December 16, 2003, a Decision was promulgated, the
dispositive portion of which reads, thus:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the trial court is MODIFIED, in that:
(a) the sentence against accused Gemma Jacinto stands;
(b) the sentence against accused Anita Valencia is reduced to 4

months arresto mayor medium.
(c) The accused Jacqueline Capitle is acquitted.
SO ORDERED.
A Partial Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing CA Decision was filed only
for petitioner Gemma Tubale Jacinto, but the same was denied per Resolution dated March
5, 2004.
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner alone, assailing the
Decision and Resolution of the CA. The issues raised in the petition are as follows:
[endif]Whether or not petitioner can be convicted of a crime not
charged in the information;
and
[endif]Whether or not a worthless check can be the object of theft;
3. Whether or not the prosecution has proved petitioner's guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.[if !supportFootnotes][8][endif]
The petition deserves considerable thought.

The prosecution tried to establish the following pieces of evidence to constitute the elements
of the crime of qualified theft defined under Article 308, in relation to Article 310, both of
the Revised Penal Code: (1) the taking of personal property - as shown by the fact that
petitioner, as collector for Mega Foam, did not remit the customer's check payment to her
employer and, instead, appropriated it for herself; (2) said property belonged to another
the check belonged to Baby Aquino, as it was her payment for purchases she made; (3) the
taking was done with intent to gain this is presumed from the act of unlawful taking and
further shown by the fact that the check was deposited to the bank account of petitioner's
brother-in-law; (4) it was done without the owners consent petitioner hid the fact that she
had received the check payment from her employer's customer by not remitting the check to
the company; (5) it was accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against
persons, nor of force upon things the check was voluntarily handed to petitioner by the
customer, as she was known to be a collector for the company; and (6) it was done with
grave abuse of confidence petitioner is admittedly entrusted with the collection of payments
from customers.
However, as may be gleaned from the aforementioned Articles of the Revised Penal Code,
the personal property subject of the theft must have some value, as the intention of the
accused is to gain from the thing stolen. This is further bolstered by Article 309, where the
law provides that the penalty to be imposed on the accused is dependent on the value of the
thing stolen.
In this case, petitioner unlawfully took the postdated check belonging to Mega Foam, but
the same was apparently without value, as it was subsequently dishonored. Thus, the
question arises on whether the crime of qualified theft was actually produced.
The Court must resolve the issue in the negative.
Intod v. Court of Appeals[if !supportFootnotes][9][endif] is highly instructive and applicable to the
present case. In Intod, the accused, intending to kill a person, peppered the latters bedroom
with bullets, but since the intended victim was not home at the time, no harm came to him.
The trial court and the CA held Intod guilty of attempted murder. But upon review by this
Court, he was adjudged guilty only of an impossible crime as defined and penalized in
paragraph 2, Article 4, in relation to Article 59, both of the Revised Penal Code, because of
the factual impossibility of producing the crime. Pertinent portions of said provisions read
as follows:
Article 4(2). Criminal Responsibility. - Criminal responsibility shall be
incurred:
xxxx
[endif]By any person performing an act which would be an
offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its
accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate to ineffectual means.
(emphasis supplied)
Article 59. Penalty to be imposed in case of failure to commit the crime
because the means employed or the aims sought are impossible. When the person intending to commit an offense has already
performed the acts for the execution of the same but nevertheless
the crime was not produced by reason of the fact that the act
intended was by its nature one of impossible accomplishment or
because the means employed by such person are essentially
inadequate to produce the result desired by him, the court, having
in mind the social danger and the degree of criminality shown by
the offender, shall impose upon him the penalty of arresto mayor or
a fine ranging from 200 to 500 pesos.
Thus, the requisites of an impossible crime are: (1) that the act performed would be an
offense against persons or property; (2) that the act was done with evil intent; and (3) that its
accomplishment was inherently impossible, or the means employed was either inadequate or
ineffectual. The aspect of the inherent impossibility of accomplishing the intended crime
under Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code was further explained by the Court in Intod[if !
supportFootnotes][10][endif] in this wise:
Under this article, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an
offense against persons or property because: (1) the commission of
the offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment; or (2) the
means employed is either (a) inadequate or (b) ineffectual.
That the offense cannot be produced because the commission of the offense
is inherently impossible of accomplishment is the focus of this
petition. To be impossible under this clause, the act intended by the
offender must be by its nature one impossible of accomplishment.
There must be either (1) legal impossibility, or (2) physical
impossibility of accomplishing the intended act in order to qualify

the act as an impossible crime.
Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed,

would not amount to a crime.
xxxx
The impossibility of killing a person already dead falls in this category.
On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous

circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent
the consummation of the intended crime. x x x [if !supportFootnotes][11]
[endif]
In Intod, the Court went on to give an example of an offense that involved factual
impossibility, i.e., a man puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to
steal the latter's wallet, but gets nothing since the pocket is empty.
Herein petitioner's case is closely akin to the above example of factual impossibility given
in Intod. In this case, petitioner performed all the acts to consummate the crime of qualified
theft, which is a crime against property. Petitioner's evil intent cannot be denied, as the mere
act of unlawfully taking the check meant for Mega Foam showed her intent to gain or be
unjustly enriched. Were it not for the fact that the check bounced, she would have received
the face value thereof, which was not rightfully hers. Therefore, it was only due to the
extraneous circumstance of the check being unfunded, a fact unknown to petitioner at the
time, that prevented the crime from being produced. The thing unlawfully taken by
petitioner turned out to be absolutely worthless, because the check was eventually
dishonored, and Mega Foam had received the cash to replace the value of said dishonored
check.
The fact that petitioner was later entrapped receiving the P5,000.00 marked money, which
she thought was the cash replacement for the dishonored check, is of no moment. The Court
held in Valenzuela v. People[if !supportFootnotes][12][endif] that under the definition of theft in
Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, there is only one operative act of execution by the
actor involved in theft the taking of personal property of another. Elucidating further, the
Court held, thus:
x x x Parsing through the statutory definition of theft under Article 308,
there is one apparent answer provided in the language of the law
that theft is already produced upon the tak[ing of] personal
property of another without the latters consent.
xxxx
x x x when is the crime of theft produced? There would be all but certain
unanimity in the position that theft is produced when there is
deprivation of personal property due to its taking by one with
intent to gain. Viewed from that perspective, it is immaterial to the
product of the felony that the offender, once having committed all
the acts of execution for theft, is able or unable to freely dispose of
the property stolen since the deprivation from the owner alone has
already ensued from such acts of execution. x x x
xxxx
x x x we have, after all, held that unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is

deemed complete from the moment the offender gains possession
of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same. x
xx
x x x Unlawful taking, which is the deprivation of ones personal property, is

the element which produces the felony in its consummated stage. x
x x [if !supportFootnotes][13][endif]
From the above discussion, there can be no question that as of the time that petitioner took
possession of the check meant for Mega Foam, she had performed all the acts to
consummate the crime of theft, had it not been impossible of accomplishment in this case.
The circumstance of petitioner receiving the P5,000.00 cash as supposed replacement for
the dishonored check was no longer necessary for the consummation of the crime of
qualified theft. Obviously, the plan to convince Baby Aquino to give cash as replacement for
the check was hatched only after the check had been dishonored by the drawee bank. Since
the crime of theft is not a continuing offense, petitioner's act of receiving the cash
replacement should not be considered as a continuation of the theft. At most, the fact that
petitioner was caught receiving the marked money was merely corroborating evidence to
strengthen proof of her intent to gain.
Moreover, the fact that petitioner further planned to have the dishonored check replaced
with cash by its issuer is a different and separate fraudulent scheme. Unfortunately, since
said scheme was not included or covered by the allegations in the Information, the Court
cannot pronounce judgment on the accused; otherwise, it would violate the due process
clause of the Constitution. If at all, that fraudulent scheme could have been another possible
source of criminal liability.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals, dated December 16, 2003, and its Resolution dated March 5, 2004, are
MODIFIED. Petitioner Gemma T. Jacinto is found GUILTY of an IMPOSSIBLE CRIME as
defined and penalized in Articles 4, paragraph 2, and 59 of the Revised Penal Code,
respectively. Petitioner is sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arrresto mayor,
and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
Associate Justice
Third Division, Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairpersons
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 143468-71. January 24, 2003]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FREEDIE LIZADA @
FREDIE LIZADA, accused-appellant.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is an automatic review of the Decision[if !supportFootnotes][1][endif] of the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, Branch 54, finding accused-appellant Freedie Lizada guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of four (4) counts of qualified rape and meting on him the death penalty for each
count.
I. The Charges
Accused-appellant[if !supportFootnotes][2][endif] was charged with four (4) counts of qualified rape
under four separate Informations. The accusatory portion of each of the four Informations
reads:
That sometime in August 1998 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, with
lewd designs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force,
violence and intimidation upon the person of one ANALIA ORILLOSA y AGOO, by then
and there embracing her, kissing and touching her private parts, thereafter removing her
skirt and panty, placing himself on top of her and trying to insert his penis into her vagina
and succeeded in having carnal knowledge with the said ANALIA ORILLOSA y AGOO,
against her will and consent.
Contrary to law.
XXX
That on or about November 5, 1998, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
with lewd designs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of
force, violence and intimidation upon the person of one ANALIA ORILLOSA Y AGOO, by
then and there embracing her, kissing and touching her private parts, thereafter removing
her skirt and panty, placing himself on top of her and trying to insert his penis into her
vagina and succeeded in having carnal knowledge with the said ANALIA ORILLOSA Y
AGOO, against her will and consent.
Contrary to law.
XXX
That on or about October 22, 1998, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, with
lewd designs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force,
violence and intimidation upon the person of one ANALIA ORILLOSA Y AGOO, by then
and there embracing her, kissing and touching her private parts, thereafter removing her
skirt and panty, placing himself on top of her and trying to insert his penis into her vagina
and succeeded in having carnal knowledge with the said ANALIA ORILLOSA Y AGOO,
Contrary to law.
XXX
That on or about September 15, 1998, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
with lewd designs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of
force, violence and intimidation upon the person of one ANALIA ORILLOSA Y AGOO, by
then and there embracing her, kissing and touching her private parts, thereafter removing
her skirt and panty, placing himself on top of her and trying to insert his penis into her
vagina and succeeded in having carnal knowledge with the said ANALIA ORILLOSA Y
AGOO, against her will and consent.
Contrary to law.[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif]
The four (4) Informations were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 99-171390, 99-171391,
99-171392 and 99-171393, respectively.
Accused-appellant was arraigned on April 15, 1999, assisted by counsel de parte and
entered a plea of not guilty to each of the charges.[if !supportFootnotes][4][endif] A joint trial then
ensued.
II. Evidence of the Prosecution[if !supportFootnotes][5][endif]
Ricardo Orillosa and his wife, Rose Orillosa, natives of San Isidro, Bohol, had three (3)
children, namely: Analia, who was born on December 18, 1985;[if !supportFootnotes][6][endif] Jepsy,
who was 11 years old, and Rossel, who was nine years old. However, the couple decided to
part ways and live separately. Rose left Bohol and settled in Manila with her young children.
She worked as a waitress to make both ends meet.
In 1994, Rose met accused-appellant. They decided to live together as husband and wife at
No. 1252 Jose Abad Santos Street, Moriones, Tondo, Manila. In 1996, Rose resigned from
her job as a waitress. She secured a loan, bought a truck and used it for her business.
In the meantime, Rose secured a loan anew and used the proceeds thereof to put up a video
shop in her house. She sold Avon products from house to house to augment her income.
Whenever she was out of their house, Rossel and Analia took turns in tending the video
shop and attending to customers.
Sometime in 1996, Analia was in her room when accused-appellant entered. He laid on top
of her, removed her T-shirt and underwear. He then inserted his finger in her vagina. He
removed his finger and inserted his penis in her vagina. Momentarily, she felt a sticky
substance coming out from his penis. She also felt pain in her sex organ. Satiated, accusedappellant dismounted but threatened to kill her if she divulged to anyone what he did to her.
Accused-appellant then returned to his room. The incident lasted less than one hour.
Petrified by the threats on her life, Analia kept to herself what happened to her.[if !
Sometime in August 1997, accused-appellant entered again the room of Analia, placed
himself on top of her and held her legs and arms. He then inserted his finger into her sex
organ (fininger niya ako). Satiated, accused-appellant left the room. During the period from
1996 to 1998, accused-appellant sexually abused private complainant two times a week.
On November 5, 1998, at about 3:00 p.m., Analia was in the sala of their house studying her
assignments. Accused-appellant was also in the sala. Rossel tended the video shop while his
mother was away. Analia went into her room and lay down in bed. She did not lock the door
of the room because her brother might enter any time. She wanted to sleep but found it
difficult to do so. Accused-appellant went to his room next to the room of Analia. He,
however, entered the room of Analia. He was wearing a pair of short pants and was naked
from waist up. Analia did not mind accused-appellant entering her room because she knew
that her brother, Rossel was around. However, accused-appellant sat on the side of her bed,
placed himself on top of her, held her hands and legs and fondled her breasts. She struggled
to extricate herself. Accused-appellant removed her panty and touched her sex organ.
Accused-appellant inserted his finger into her vagina, extricated it and then inserted his
penis into her vagina. Accused-appellant ejaculated. Analia felt pain in her sex organ.
Momentarily, Rossel passed by the room of Analia after drinking water from the
refrigerator, and peeped through the door. He saw accused-appellant on top of Analia.
Accused-appellant saw Rossel and dismounted. Accused-appellant berated Rossel and
ordered him to go to his room and sleep. Rossel did. Accused-appellant then left the room.
Analia likewise left the room, went out of the house and stayed outside for one hour. Rose
arrived home at 6:00 p.m. However, Analia did not divulge to her mother what accusedappellant had just done to her.
On November 9, 1998, at about 3:00 p.m., Rose left the house. Accused-appellant was in the
sala of the house watching television. Analia tended the video shop. However, accusedappellant told Analia to go to the sala. She refused, as nobody would tend the video shop.
This infuriated accused-appellant who threatened to slap and kick her.
Analia ignored the invectives and threats of accused-appellant and stayed in the video shop.
When Rose returned, a heated argument ensued between accused-appellant and Analia.
Rose sided with her paramour and hit Analia. This prompted Analia to shout. Ayoko na,
ayoko na. Shortly thereafter, Rose and Analia left the house on board the motorcycle driven
by her mother in going to Don Bosco Street, Moriones, Tondo, Manila, to retrieve some
tapes which had not yet been returned. When Rose inquired from her daughter what she
meant by her statement, ayoko na, ayoko na, she told her mother that accused-appellant had
been touching the sensitive parts of her body and that he had been on top of her. Rose was
shocked and incensed. The two proceeded to Kagawad Danilo Santos to have accusedappellant placed under arrest. On November 10, 1998, the two proceeded to the Western
Police District where Analia gave her Affidavit-Complaint to PO1 Carmelita Nocum in the
presence of SPO2 Fe H. Avindante. She related to the police investigator that accusedappellant had touched her breasts and arms in August, 1998, September 15, 1998, October
22, 1998 and on November 5, 1998, at 3:00 p.m. Analia then submitted herself to genitalia
examination by Dr. Armie Umil, a medico-legal officer of the NBI. The medico-legal officer
interviewed Analia, told him that she was raped in May, 1997 at 3:00 p.m. and November 5,
1998 at 3:00 p.m.[if !supportFootnotes][8][endif]
Dr. Umil prepared and signed a report on Living Case No. MO-98-1265 which contained
her findings during her examination on Analia, thus:
xxx
Fairly nourished, conscious, coherent, cooperative, ambulatory subject. Breasts, developed,

hemispherical, firm. ----, brown, 3.0 cms. in diameter. Nipples brown, protruding, 0.7 cms.
in diameter.
No extragenital physical injuries noted.
GENITAL EXAMINATION:
Pubic hair, fully grown, moderate. Labia majora and minora, coaptated. Fourchette, tense.
Vetibular mucosa, pinkish. Hymen, tall, thick, intact. Hymenal orifice measures, 1.5 cms. in
diameter. Vaginal walls, tight. Rugosities, prominent.
CONCLUSIONS:
1). No evident sign of extragenital physical injuries noted on the body of the subject at the
time of examination.
2). Hymen, intact and its orifice small (1.5 cms. in diameter) as to preclude complete
penetration by an average-sized adult Filipino male organ in full erection without producing
any genital injury.[if !supportFootnotes][9][endif]
Subsequently, Analia told her mother that mabuti na lang iyong panghihipo lang ang sinabi
ko. When Rose inquired from her daughter what she meant by her statement, Analia
revealed to her mother that accused-appellant had sexually abused her. On December 15,
1998, Analia executed a Dagdag na Salaysay ng Paghahabla and charged accused-appellant
with rape.[if !supportFootnotes][10][endif]
III. The Defenses and Evidence of Accused-Appellant
Accused-appellant testified in his defense. He declared that after a month of courtship, he
and Rose agreed in 1994 to live together as husband and wife. He was then a utility worker
with the Navotas Branch of the Philippine Banking Corporation. Rose, on the other hand,
was a waitress at the Golden Bird beer house at Rizal Avenue, Manila.
Accused-appellant denied having raped Analia. He claimed that he loved the children of
Rose as if they were his own children. He took care of them, as in fact he cooked and
prepared their food before they arrived home from school. At times, he ironed their school
uniforms and bathed them, except Analia who was already big. Analia was hard-headed
because she disobeyed him whenever he ordered her to do some errands. Because of Analias
misbehavior, accused-appellant and Rose oftentimes quarreled. Rose even demanded that
accused-appellant leave their house. Another irritant in his and Roses lives were the frequent
visits of the relatives of her husband.
Sometime in 1997, accused-appellant was retrenched from his employment and received a
separation pay of P9,000.00 which he used to put up the VHS Rental and Karaoke from
which he earned a monthly income of P25,000.00. While living together, accused-appellant
and Rose acquired two colored television sets, two VHS Hi-fi recorders, one VHS player,
one washing machine, one scooter motor, two VHS rewinders, one sala set, one compact
disc player and many other properties.
Accused-appellant ventured that Rose coached her children Analia and Rossel to testify
against him and used them to fabricate charges against him because Rose wanted to manage
their business and take control of all the properties they acquired during their coverture.
Also, Rose was so exasperated because he had no job.
IV. The Verdict
On May 29, 2000, the trial court rendered judgment against accused-appellant finding him
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of four (4) counts of rape, defined and penalized in the
seventh paragraph, no. 1, Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, and meted on him the death
penalty for each count. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
From all the evidence submitted by the prosecution, the Court concludes that the accused is
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged against him in these four (4) cases,
convicts him thereof, and sentences him to DEATH PENALTY in each and every case as
provided for in the seventh paragraph, no. 1, Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code.
V. Assigned Errors of the Trial Court

Accused-appellant assailed the decision of the court a quo and averred in his brief that:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT MAKING A FINDING OF FACT IN
ITS DECISION AND SUCH FAILURE IS A REVERSIBLE ERROR.[if !supportFootnotes][12][endif]
XXX
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT
OF FOUR (4) COUNTS OF RAPE DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO
PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.[if !supportFootnotes][13][endif]
VI. Findings of the Court
On the first assignment of error, accused-appellant contends that the decision of the trial
court is null and void as it failed to comply with the requirements of Section 14, Article VIII
of the 1987 Constitution and Section 1, Rule 36 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended. He avers that the court a quo made no findings of facts in its decision. The trial
court merely summarized the testimonies of the witnesses of the prosecution and those of
accused-appellant and his witnesses, and forthwith set forth the decretal portion of said
decision. The trial court even failed to state in said decision the factual and legal basis for
the imposition of the supreme penalty of death on him. The Solicitor General, on the other
hand, argues that there should be no mechanical reliance on the constitutional provision.
Trial courts may well-nigh synthesize and simplify their decisions considering that courts
are harassed by crowded dockets and time constraints. Even if the trial court did not
elucidate the grounds as the legal basis for the penalties imposed, nevertheless the decision
is valid. In any event, the Solicitor General contends that despite the infirmity of the
decision, there is no need to remand the case to the trial court for compliance with the
constitutional requirement as the Court may resolve the case on its merits to avoid delay in
the final disposition of the case and afford accused-appellant his right to a speedy trial.
The contention of accused-appellant is well-taken. Article VIII, paragraph 14 of the 1987
Constitution provides that no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing
therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. This requirement is
reiterated and implemented by Rule 120, Section 2 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, as amended, which reads:
SEC. 2. Form and contents of judgment.The judgment must be written in the official
language, personally and directly prepared by the judge and signed by him and shall contain
clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts proved or admitted by the accused and the law
upon which the judgment is based.
If it is of conviction, the judgment shall state (a) the legal qualification of the offense
constituted by the acts committed by the accused, and the aggravating or mitigating
circumstances attending the commission thereof, if there are any; (b) the participation of the
accused in the commission of the offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory
after the fact; (c) the penalty imposed upon the accused; and (d) the civil liability or
damages caused by the wrongful act to be recovered from the accused by the offended party,
if there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate action has been
reserved or waived.[if !supportFootnotes][14][endif]
The purpose of the provision is to inform the parties and the person reading the decision on
how it was reached by the court after consideration of the evidence of the parties and the
relevant facts, of the opinion it has formed on the issues, and of the applicable laws. The
parties must be assured from a reading of the decision of the trial court that they were
accorded their rights to be heard by an impartial and responsible judge.[if !supportFootnotes][15]
[endif] More substantial reasons for the requirement are:
For one thing, the losing party must be given an opportunity to analyze the decision so that,
if permitted, he may elevate what he may consider its errors for review by a higher tribunal.
For another, the decision if well-presented and reasoned, may convince the losing party of
its merits and persuade it to accept the verdict in good grace instead of prolonging the
litigation with a useless appeal. A third reason is that decisions with a full exposition of the
facts and the law on which they are based, especially those coming from the Supreme Court,
will constitute a valuable body of case law that can serve as useful references and even as
precedents in the resolution of future controversies.[if !supportFootnotes][16][endif]
The trial court is mandated to set out in its decision the facts which had been proved and its
conclusions culled therefrom, as well as its resolution on the issues and the factual and legal
basis for its resolution.[if !supportFootnotes][17][endif] Trial courts should not merely reproduce the
respective testimonies of witnesses of both parties and come out with its decretal
conclusion.
In this case, the trial court failed to comply with the requirements under the Constitution and
the Rules on Criminal Procedure. It merely summarized the testimonies of the witnesses of
the prosecution and of accused-appellant on direct and cross examinations and merely made
referral to the documentary evidence of the parties then concluded that, on the basis of the
evidence of the prosecution, accused-appellant is guilty of four (4) counts of rape and
sentenced him to death, on each count.
The trial court even failed to specifically state the facts proven by the prosecution based on
their evidence, the issues raised by the parties and its resolution of the factual and legal
issues, as well as the legal and factual bases for convicting accused-appellant of each of the
crimes charged. The trial court rendered judgment against accused-appellant with the curt
declaration in the decretal portion of its decision that it did so based on the evidence of the
prosecution. The trial court swallowed hook, line and sinker the evidence of the prosecution.
It failed to explain in its decision why it believed and gave probative weight to the evidence
of the prosecution. Reading the decision of the trial court, one is apt to conclude that the
trial court ignored the evidence of accused-appellant. The trial court did not even bother
specifying the factual and legal bases for its imposition of the supreme penalty of death on
accused-appellant for each count of rape. The trial court merely cited seventh paragraph, no.
1, Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. The decision of the trial court is a good example
of what a decision, envisaged in the Constitution and the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, should not be.
The Court would normally remand the case to the trial court because of the infirmity of the
decision of the trial court, for compliance with the constitutional provision. However, to
avert further delay in the disposition of the cases, the Court decided to resolve the cases on
their merits considering that all the records as well as the evidence adduced during the trial
had been elevated to the Court.[if !supportFootnotes][18][endif] The parties filed their respective briefs
articulating their respective stances on the factual and legal issues.
In reviewing rape cases, this Court is guided by the following principles: (1) to accuse a
man of rape is easy but to disprove it is difficult though the accused may be innocent; (2)
considering the nature of things, and only two persons are usually involved in the crime of
rape, the testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with great caution; (3) the
evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and not be allowed to draw
strength from the weakness of the evidence of the defense.[if !supportFootnotes][19][endif] By the
very nature of the crime of rape, conviction or acquittal depends almost entirely on the
credibility of the complainants testimony because of the fact that usually only the
participants can testify as to its occurrence. However, if the accused raises a sufficient doubt
as to any material element of the crime, and the prosecution is unable to overcome it with its
evidence, the prosecution has failed to discharge its burden of proving the guilt of the
accused beyond cavil of doubt and hence, the accused is entitled to an acquittal.
Anent the second assignment of error, we will resolve the same for convenience, as follows:
Re: CRIMINAL CASES NOS. 99-171392 and 99-171393 (covering the crime of rape
committed on or about October 22, 1998 and on or about September 15, 1998)
Accused-appellant avers that the prosecution failed to adduce the requisite quantum of
evidence that he raped the private complainant precisely on September 15, 1998 and
October 22, 1998. Moreover, the medical findings of Dr. Armie Umil show that the hymen
of the private complainant was intact and its orifice so small as to preclude complete
penetration by an average size adult Filipino male organ in full erection without producing
any genital injury. The physical evidence belies private complainants claim of having been
deflowered by accused-appellant on four different occasions. The Office of the Solicitor
General, for its part, contends that the prosecution through the private complainant proved
the guilt of accused-appellant for the crime charged on both counts.
The contention of accused-appellant does not persuade the Court. The private complainant
testified that since 1996, when she was only eleven years old, until 1998, for two times a
week, accused-appellant used to place himself on top of her and despite her tenacious
resistance, touched her arms, legs and sex organ and inserted his finger and penis into her
vagina. In the process, he ejaculated. Accused-appellant threatened to kill her if she
divulged to anyone what he did to her.[if !supportFootnotes][20][endif] Although private complainant
did not testify that she was raped on September 15, 1998 and October 22, 1998, nevertheless
accused-appellant may be convicted for two counts of rape, in light of the testimony of
private complainant.
It bears stressing that under the two Informations, the rape incidents are alleged to have
been committed on or about September 15, 1998 and on or about October 22, 1998. The
words on or about envisage a period, months or even two or four years before September
15, 1998 or October 22, 1998. The prosecution may prove that the crime charged was
committed on or about September 15, 1998 and on or about October 22, 1998.
In People vs. Gianan,[if !supportFootnotes][21][endif] this Court affirmed the conviction of accusedappellant of five (5) counts of rape, four of which were committed in December 1992 (two
counts) and one each in March and April, 1993 and in November, 1995 and one count of
acts of lasciviousness committed in December 1992, on a criminal complaint for multiple

rape, viz:
That sometime in November 1995, and some occasions prior and/or subsequent thereto, in
the Municipality of Dasmarias, Province of Cavite, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd designs, taking advantage of his
superior strength over the person of his own twelve (12) year old daughter, and by means of
force, violence and intimidation, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
have repeated carnal knowledge of Myra M. Gianan, against her will and consent, to her
damage and prejudice.[if !supportFootnotes][22][endif]
On the contention of accused-appellant in said case that his conviction for rape in December
1992 was so remote from the date (November 1995) alleged in the Information, so that the
latter could no longer be considered as being as near to the actual date at which the offense
was committed as provided under Section 11, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure,
as amended, this Court held:
Accused-appellant nevertheless argues that his conviction for rape in December 1992 is so
remote from the date (November 1995) alleged in the information, so that the latter could no
longer be considered as being as near to the actual date at which the offense was committed
as provided under Rule 110, 11.
This contention is also untenable. In People v. Garcia, this Court upheld a conviction for ten
counts of rape based on an information which alleged that the accused committed multiple
rape from November 1990 up to July 21, 1994, a time difference of almost four years which
is longer than that involved in the case at bar. In any case, as earlier stated, accusedappellants failure to raise a timely objection based on this ground constitutes a waiver of his
right to object.[if !supportFootnotes][23][endif]
Moreover, when the private complainant testified on how accused-appellant defiled her two
times a week from 1996 until 1998, accused-appellant raised nary a whimper of protest.
Accused-appellant even rigorously cross-examined the private complainant on her
testimony on direct examination. The presentation by the prosecution, without objection on
the part of accused-appellant, of evidence of rape committed two times a week from 1996
until 1998 (which includes September 15, 1998 and October 22, 1998) to prove the charges
lodged against him constituted a waiver by accused-appellant of his right to object to any
perceived infirmity in, and in the amendment of, the aforesaid Informations to conform to
the evidence adduced by the prosecution.
The barefaced fact that private complainant remained a virgin up to 1998 does not preclude
her having been repeatedly sexually abused by accused-appellant. The private complainant
being of tender age, it is possible that the penetration of the male organ went only as deep as
her labia. Whether or not the hymen of private complainant was still intact has no
substantial bearing on accused-appellants commission of the crime.[if !supportFootnotes][24][endif]
Even the slightest penetration of the labia by the male organ or the mere entry of the penis
into the aperture constitutes consummated rape. It is sufficient that there be entrance of the
male organ within the labia of the pudendum.[if !supportFootnotes][25][endif] In People vs. Baculi,
cited in People vs. Gabayron,[if !supportFootnotes][26][endif] we held that there could be a finding of
rape even if despite repeated intercourse over a period of four years, the complainant still
retained an intact hymen without injury. In these cases, the private complainant testified that
the penis of accused-appellant gained entry into her vagina:
Fiscal Carisma
(continuing)
After your underwear was removed by the accused, what happened next?
Witness:
He laid himself on top of me, sir.
Q What did he do while he was on top of you?
A He inserted his finger (Finenger nya ako, ipinatong nya yong ano nya)
Q Can you please describe more specifically what is this and I quote Pinatong nya yong ano
nya and where did he place it?
A His organ, sir.
Q Where did he place his organ?
A In my organ, sir. (sa ari ko po.)
Q At this very juncture madam witness, what did you feel?
A I felt pain, sir, and I also felt that there was a sticky substance that was coming out, sir.[if !
supportFootnotes][27][endif] (Underlining supplied)
We agree with accused-appellant that he is guilty only of two counts of simple rape, instead
of qualified rape. The evidence on record shows that accused-appellant is the common-law
husband of Rose, the mother of private complainant. The private complainant, as of October
1998, was still 13 years old, and under Article 335 as amended by Republic Act 7659, the
minority of the private complainant, concurring with the fact that accused-appellant is the
common-law husband of the victims mother, is a special qualifying circumstance warranting
the imposition of the death penalty.[if !supportFootnotes][28][endif] However, said circumstance was
not alleged in the Informations as required by Section 8, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure which was given retroactive effect by this Court because it is favorable
to the accused.[if !supportFootnotes][29][endif] Hence, even if the prosecution proved the special
qualifying circumstance of minority of private complainant and relationship, the accusedappellant being the common-law husband of her mother, accused-appellant is guilty only of
simple rape. Under the given law, the penalty for simple rape is reclusion perpetua.
Conformably with current jurisprudence, accused-appellant is liable to private complainant
for civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 and moral damages in the amount of
P50,000.00 for each count of rape, or a total of P200,000.00.
Re: Criminal Cases Nos. 99-171390 and 99-171391 (covering the crime committed on or
about August 1998 and November 5, 1998)
Accused-appellant avers that (a) the Information in Criminal Case No. 99-171390 is
defective because the date of the offense on or about August 1998 alleged therein is too
indefinite, in violation of Rule 110, Section 11 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
which reads:
Sec. 11. Date of commission of the offense.It is not necessary to state in the complaint or
information the precise date the offense was committed except when it is a material
ingredient of the offense. The offense may be alleged to have been committed on a date as
near as possible to the actual date of its commission. (11a)[if !supportFootnotes][30][endif]
Accused-appellant further asserts that the prosecution failed to prove that he raped private
complainant in August 1998. Hence, he argues, he should be acquitted of said charge. The
Office of the Solicitor General, for its part, argued that the date on or about August 1998 is
sufficiently definite. After all, the date of the commission of the crime of rape is not an
essential element of the crime. The prosecution adduced conclusive proof that accusedappellant raped private complainant on or about August 1998, as gleaned from her
testimony during the trial.
The Court does not agree with accused-appellant. It bears stressing that the precise date of
the commission of the crime of rape is not an essential element of the crime. Failure to
specify the exact date when the rape was committed does not render the Information
defective. The reason for this is that the gravamen of the crime of rape is carnal knowledge
of the private complainant under any of the circumstances enumerated under Article 335 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Significantly, accused-appellant did not even bother to
file a motion for a bill of particulars under Rule 116, Section 9 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure before he was arraigned. Indeed, accused-appellant was duly arraigned
under the Information and entered a plea of not guilty to the charge without any plaint on
the sufficiency of the Information. Accused-appellant even adduced his evidence after the
prosecution had rested its case. It was only on appeal to this Court that accused-appellant
questioned for the first time the sufficiency of the Information filed against him. It is now
too late in the day for him to do so. Moreover, in People vs. Salalima,[if !supportFootnotes][31][endif]
this Court held that:
Failure to specify the exact dates or time when the rapes occurred does not ipso facto make
the information defective on its face. The reason is obvious. The precise date or time when
the victim was raped is not an element of the offense. The gravamen of the crime is the fact
of carnal knowledge under any of the circumstances enumerated under Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code. As long as it is alleged that the offense was committed at any time as
near to the actual date when the offense was committed an information is sufficient. In
previous cases, we ruled that allegations that rapes were committed before and until October
15, 1994, sometime in the year 1991 and the days thereafter, sometime in November 1995
and some occasions prior and/or subsequent thereto and on or about and sometime in the
year 1988 constitute sufficient compliance with Section 11, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedure.
In this case, although the indictments did not state with particularity the dates when the
sexual assaults took place, we believe that the allegations therein that the acts were
committed sometime during the month of March 1996 or thereabout, sometime during the
month of April 1996 or thereabout, sometime during the month of May 1996 or thereabout
substantially apprised appellant of the crimes he was charged with since all the elements of
rape were stated in the informations. As such, appellant cannot complain that he was
deprived of the right to be informed of the nature of the cases filed against him.
Accordingly, appellants assertion that he was deprived of the opportunity to prepare for his
defense has no leg to stand on.
The prosecution proved through the testimony of private complainant that accused-appellant
raped her two times a week in 1998. As in Criminal Cases Nos. 99-171392 and 99-171393,
accused-appellant is guilty only of simple rape.
As to the crime of rape subject of Criminal Case No. 99-171391, accused-appellant avers
that he is not criminally liable of rape. We agree with accused-appellant. The collective
testimony of private complainant and her younger brother Rossel was that on November 5,
1998, accused-appellant who was wearing a pair of short pants but naked from waist up,
entered the bedroom of private complainant, went on top of her, held her hands, removed
her panty, mashed her breasts and touched her sex organ. However, accused-appellant saw
Rossel peeping through the door and dismounted. He berated Rossel for peeping and
ordered him to go back to his room and to sleep. Accused-appellant then left the room of the
private complainant. The testimony of private complainant on direct examination reads:
Fiscal Carisma:
Q In between 1996 and August 1997?
A Yes, sir, sometimes two (2) times a week.
Q In November of 1998, do you recall of any unusual experience that happened to you
again?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was this unusual experience of yours?
A He laid himself on top of me, sir.
Q You said he whom are you referring to?
A Freedie Lizada Jakosalem, sir.
Q The same person you pointed to earlier?
A Yes, sir.
Q You said he placed himself on top of you in November, 1998, what did he do while he
was on top of you?
A Hes smashing my breast and he was also touching my arms and my legs, sir.
Q What else if any madam witness?
A He was also touching my sex organ, sir.
Q What else, if any?
Atty. Estorco:
May we take note of the same objection your honor, the prosecution - - Court:
Same ruling. Let the complainant continue considering that she is crying and still young.
Witness:
None else, sir.
Fiscal Carisma:
With what part of his body did he touch your sex organ?
Atty. Estorco:
Your Honor, that is - - Court:
May answer.
Fiscal Carisma:
I will re-propound the question, your honor.
You said that he touched your sex organ, will you tell the court with what part of his body,
did he touch your sex organ?
Witness:
With his hands, sir.
Q What about after November 1998 - - -was this the last incident, this unusual thing that
you experienced from the hands of the accused was this that last time, the one you narrated
in November 1998?
A Yes, sir.[if !supportFootnotes][32][endif]
On cross-examination, the private complainant testified, thus:
Atty. Balaba:
Q Who was that somebody who entered the room?
A My stepfather Freedie Lizada, sir.
Q He was fully dressed at that time, during the time, is that correct?
A Yes, sir, he was dressed then, sir.
Q And he had his pants on, is that correct?
A He was wearing a short pants, sir.
Q Was it a T-shirt that he had, at that time or a polo shirt?
A He was not wearing any shirt then, sir, he was naked.
Q When you realized that somebody was entering the room were you not afraid?
A No, sir, I was not afraid.
Q What happened when you realized that somebody entered the room, and the one who
entered was your stepfather, Freedie Lizada?
A I did not mind him entering the room because I know that my brother was around but
suddenly I felt that somebody was holding me.
Q He was holding you, where were you when he held you?
A I was in the bed, sir, lying down.
Q You were lying down?
A Yes, sir.
Q What part of the body did the accused Freedie Lizada touched you?
A My two arms, my legs and my breast, sir.
Q Do you mean to tell us that he was holding your two arms and at the same time your legs,
is that what you are trying to tell us?
A He held me first in my arms and then my legs, sir.
Q He held you first by your arms, is that what you are trying to tell us?
Fiscal Carisma:
Already answered your honor, he held the arms and then the legs.
Court:
Already answered.
Atty. Balaba:
Q Your honor, I am just trying to - Court:
Proceed.
Atty. Balaba:
Q He held your arms with his two hands?
A Only with one hand, sir.
Q Which hand were you touched?
A I do not know which hand, sir.
Q Which arm of yours was held by Freedie Lizada?
A I could not recall, sir.
Q Which side of your body was Freedie Lizada at that time?
A I cannot recall, sir.
Q What was the position of Freedie Lizada when he held your arms?
A He was sitting on our bed, sir.
Q Which side of your bed was Freedie Lizada sitting on?
A I do not know, sir. I cannot recall.

Atty. Balaba:
Can we take a recess your honor?
Court:
How long will it take you to finish your cross?
Atty. Balaba:
We will confront the witness with so many things your honor.
Court:
Yes, thats why I am asking you how long will it take you to finish your cross?
Atty. Balaba:
About another hour, sir.
Court:
So we will be finished by 11:15, proceed.
Atty. Balaba:
You cannot also remember which leg was held by Freedie Lizada?
A I cannot recall, sir.
Q When this happened, did you not shout for help?
A I did not ask for help, I was motioning to resist him, so that he would go out, sir. I was
struggling to free myself from him, sir.
Q And you were not able to extricate yourself from him?
A I was not able to extricate myself, sir.
Q You were struggling with one arm of Lizada holding your arm, and the other hand was
holding your leg, is that what you are trying to tell us?
A No, sir, its not like that.
Q Could you tell us, what happened, you did not shout for help and you were trying to
extricate yourself, what happened?
A He suddenly went out of the room, sir.
Q Now, he went - - Court:
You did not shout during that time?
A No, your honor.[if !supportFootnotes][33][endif]
Rossel, the nine-year old brother of the private complainant corroborated in part his sisters
testimony. He testified on direct examination, thus:
Fiscal Carisma: (continuing)
Q Now, on November 2, 1998 do you recall where you were at about 3:00 oclock?
A I was outside our house, sir.
Q Where was your house again, Mr. witness, at that time? Where was your house at that
date, time and place? At that date and time?
A 1252 Jose Abad Santos, Tondo, Manila, sir.
Court:
Q The same address?
A Yes, sir.
Fiscal Carisma:
Q On that date, time and place, do your recall where your sister Anna Lea Orillosa was?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where was she?

A She was sleeping, sir.
Q Now, on that date, time and place you said you were outside your house, did you stay the
whole afternoon outside your house?
A No, sir.
Q Where did you go next?
A Inside, sir.
Q For what purpose did you get inside your house?
A Because I was thirsty, sir.
Q So you went to the fridge to get some water?
A Yes, sir.
Q And what happened as you went inside your house to get some water?
A I saw my stepfather removing the panty of my sister and he touched her and then he laid
on top of her, sir.
Q Do you see your stepfather inside the courtroom now?
A Yes, sir.
Q Will you point to him?
A He is the one, sir.
Court Interpreter:
Witness pointing to a male person who when asked answers to the name Freedie Lizada.
Fiscal Carisma:
Q This thing that your father was that your stepfather did to your elder sister, did you see
this before or after you went to the fridge to get some water?
A I already got water then, sir.
Q What did you do as you saw this thing being done by your stepfather to your elder sister?
A I was just looking at them when he saw me, sir.
Q Who, you saw who? You are referring to the accused Freedie Lizada?
A Yes, sir.
Q So, what did you do as you were seen by your stepfather?
A He scolded me, he shouted at me, he told me something and after that he went to the other
room and slept, sir.[if !supportFootnotes][34][endif]
Rossel testified on cross-examination, thus:
Q So you got thirsty, is that correct, and went inside the house?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you took a glass of water from the refrigerator?
A Yes, sir.
Q And it was at this time that you saw the accused Freedie Lizada touching your sister?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where was this refrigerator located?
A In front of the room where my sister sleeps, sir.
Q So the door of your sisters room was open?
A Yes, sir.
Q And --- okay, you said your sister was sleeping. What was the position of your sister when
you said the accused removed her panty?
A She was lying straight, but she was resisting, sir.
Q Were you noticed by your sister at that time?

A No, sir.
Q And your sister did not call for help at that time?
A No, sir.
Q And all this time you saw the accused doing this, from the refrigerator where you were
taking a glass of water?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you not say something to the accused?
A No, sir, I was just looking.
Q So your sister was lying down when the accused removed her panty, is that what you are
trying to tell us?
A Yes, sir.
Q And where was the - - - and the accused saw you when he was removing the panty of
your sister?
A Not yet, sir, but after a while he looked at the refrigerator because he might be thirsty.
Q So---you said the accused was touching your sister. What part of her body was touched by
the accused?
A Here, sir.
Court Interpreter:
Witness pointing at the lower portion of the body.
Atty. Balaba:
Q You saw with what hand was the accused touching your sister?
A Yes, sir.
Q What hand was he touching your sister?
A This hand, sir.
Court Interpreter:
Witness raising his right hand.
Atty. Balaba:
Q And which part of your sisters body was the accused touching with his right hand? Your
sisters body was the accused touching with his right hand?
A Her right leg, sir.
Q How about his left hand, what was the accused doing with his left hand?
A Removing her panty, sir.
Q Removing her?
A Panty, sir.
Q Which hand of your sister was being removed with the left hand of the accused?
Court:
Which?
Atty. Balaba:
Which hand, which hand?
Fiscal Carisma:
The question is vague, your honor.
Atty. Balaba:
Because he said that removing the hand --Fiscal Carisma:
He said removing the panty.

Atty. Balaba:
Is that panty? Im sorry.
Q So, the accused was touching with his right hand the left thigh of your sister --Fiscal Carisma:
The right thigh.
Atty. Balaba:
Q Rather the right thigh of your sister and with his left hand removing the panty, is that what
you are telling to tell us?
A Yes, sir.
Q And your sister all the time was trying to ---was struggling to get free, is that not correct?
A Yes, sir, she was resisting. (witness demonstrating)
Q She was struggling --- was the accused able to remove the panty?
A Yes, sir.
Q And all the time you were there looking with the glass of water in your hand?
A Yes, sir.[if !supportFootnotes][35][endif]
In light of the evidence of the prosecution, there was no introduction of the penis of
accused-appellant into the aperture or within the pudendum of the vagina of private
complainant. Hence, accused-appellant is not criminally liable for consummated rape.[if !
The issue that now comes to fore is whether or not accused-appellant is guilty of
consummated acts of lasciviousness defined in Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code or
attempted rape under Article 335 of the said Code, as amended in relation to the last
paragraph of Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code. In light of the evidence on record, we
believe that accused-appellant is guilty of attempted rape and not of acts of lasciviousness.
Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code reads:
Art. 336. Acts of Lasciviousness.Any person who shall commit any act of lasciviousness
upon other persons of either sex, under any of the circumstances mentioned in the preceding
article, shall be punished by prision correccional.[if !supportFootnotes][37][endif]
For an accused to be convicted of acts of lasciviousness, the prosecution is burdened to
prove the confluence of the following essential elements:
1. That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness.
2. That it is done under any of the following circumstances:
a. By using force or intimidation; or
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or
c. When the offended party is under 12 years of age.[if !supportFootnotes][38][endif]
Lewd is defined as obscene, lustful, indecent, lecherous. It signifies that form of immorality
which has relation to moral impurity; or that which is carried on a wanton manner.[if !
The last paragraph of Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code reads:

The essential elements of an attempted felony are as follows:
1. The offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt acts;
2. He does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony;
3. The offenders act be not stopped by his own spontaneous desistance;
4. The non-performance of all acts of execution was due to cause or accident other than his
spontaneous desistance.[if !supportFootnotes][40][endif]
The first requisite of an attempted felony consists of two elements, namely:
(1) That there be external acts;
(2) Such external acts have direct connection with the crime intended to be committed.[if !
ripen into a concrete offense.[if !supportFootnotes][42][endif] The raison detre for the law requiring a
direct overt act is that, in a majority of cases, the conduct of the accused consisting merely
of acts of preparation has never ceased to be equivocal; and this is necessarily so,
irrespective of his declared intent. It is that quality of being equivocal that must be lacking
before the act becomes one which may be said to be a commencement of the commission of
the crime, or an overt act or before any fragment of the crime itself has been committed, and
this is so for the reason that so long as the equivocal quality remains, no one can say with
certainty what the intent of the accused is.[if !supportFootnotes][43][endif] It is necessary that the overt
act should have been the ultimate step towards the consummation of the design. It is
sufficient if it was the first or some subsequent step in a direct movement towards the
commission of the offense after the preparations are made.[if !supportFootnotes][44][endif] The act
done need not constitute the last proximate one for completion. It is necessary, however, that
the attempt must have a causal relation to the intended crime.[if !supportFootnotes][45][endif] In the
words of Viada, the overt acts must have an immediate and necessary relation to the offense.
Acts constitutive of an attempt to commit a felony should be distinguished from preparatory

acts which consist of devising means or measures necessary for accomplishment of a
desired object or end.One perpetrating preparatory acts is not guilty of an attempt to commit
a felony. However, if the preparatory acts constitute a consummated felony under the law,
the malefactor is guilty of such consummated offense. The Supreme Court of Spain, in its
decision of March 21, 1892, declared that for overt acts to constitute an attempted offense, it
is necessary that their objective be known and established or such that acts be of such nature
that they themselves should obviously disclose the criminal objective necessarily intended,
said objective and finality to serve as ground for designation of the offense.[if !There is
persuasive authority that in offenses not consummated as the material damage is wanting,
the nature of the action intended (accion fin) cannot exactly be ascertained but the same
must be inferred from the nature of the acts executed (accion medio).[if !Hence, it is
necessary that the acts of the accused must be such that, by their nature, by the facts to
which they are related, by circumstances of the persons performing the same, and by the
things connected therewith, that they are aimed at the consummation of the offense. This
Court emphasized in People vs. Lamahang that:
The relation existing between the facts submitted for appreciation and the offense which
said facts are supposed to produce must be direct; the intention must be ascertained from the
facts and therefore it is necessary, in order to avoid regrettable instances of injustice, that the
mind be able to cause a particular injury.If the malefactor does not perform all the acts of
execution by reason of his spontaneous desistance, he is not guilty of an attempted felony.
The law does not punish him for his attempt to commit a felony.The rationale of the law, as
explained by Viada:
La Ley, en efecto, no hiere sino a pesar suyo; prefiere impedir el crimen que castigarlo. Si el
autor de la tentativa, despues de haber comenzado a ejecutar el delito por actos exteriores, se
detiene, por un sentimiento libre y espontaneo, en el borde del abismo, salvo esta. Es un
llamamiento al remordimiento, a la conciencia, una gracia un perdon que concede la Ley al
arrepentimiento voluntario.As aptly elaborated on by Wharton:
First, the character of an attempt is lost when its execution is voluntarily abandoned. There
is no conceivable overt act to which the abandoned purpose could be attached. Secondly, the
policy of the law requires that the offender, so long as he is capable of arresting an evil plan,
should be encouraged to do so, by saving him harmless in case of such retreat before it is
possible for any evil consequences to ensue. Neither society, nor any private person, has
been injured by his act. There is no damage, therefore, to redress. To punish him after retreat
and abandonment would be to destroy the motive for retreat and abandonment.It must be
borne in mind, however, that the spontaneous desistance of a malefactor exempts him from
criminal liability for the intended crime but it does not exempt him from the crime
committed by him before his desistance. In light of the facts established by the prosecution,
we believe that accused-appellant intended to have carnal knowledge of private
complainant. The overt acts of accused-appellant proven by the prosecution were not mere
preparatory acts. By the series of his overt acts, accused-appellant had commenced the
execution of rape which, if not for his spontaneous desistance, will ripen into the crime of
rape. Although accused-appellant desisted from performing all the acts of execution
however his desistance was not spontaneous as he was impelled to do so only because of the
sudden and unexpected arrival of Rossel. Hence, accused-appellant is guilty only of
attempted rape.[if !supportFootnotes][58][endif] In a case of similar factual backdrop as this case, we
held:
Applying the foregoing jurisprudence and taking into account Article 6 of the Revised Penal
Code, the appellant can only be convicted of attempted rape. He commenced the
commission of rape by removing his clothes, undressing and kissing his victim and lying on
top of her. However, he failed to perform all the acts of execution which should produce the
crime of rape by reason of a cause other than his own spontaneous desistance, i.e., by the
timely arrival of the victims brother. Thus, his penis merely touched Mary Joys private
organ. Accordingly, as the crime committed by the appellant is attempted rape, the penalty
to be imposed on him should be an indeterminate prison term of six (6) years of prision
correccional as minimum to twelve (12) years of prision mayor as maximum.
The penalty for attempted rape is prision mayor which is two degrees lower than reclusion
perpetua.[if !supportFootnotes][59][endif] Accused-appellant should be meted an indeterminate penalty
the minimum of which should be taken from prision correccional which has a range of from
six months and one day to six years and the maximum of which shall be taken from the
medium period of prision mayor which has a range of from eight years and one day to ten
years, without any modifying circumstance. Accused-appellant is also liable to private
complainant for moral damages in the amount of P25,000.00.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 54, is SET ASIDE. Another judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 99-171390, accused-appellant is hereby found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of simple rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended
and is hereby meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant is also hereby
ordered to pay private complainant Analia Orillosa the amounts of P50,000.00 by way of
civil indemnity and P50,000.00 by way of moral damages;
2. In Criminal Case No. 99-171391, accused-appellant is hereby found guilty of
attempted rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended in relation to
Article 6 of the said Code and is hereby meted an indeterminate penalty of from six years of
prision correccional in its maximum period, as minimum to ten years of prision mayor in its
medium period, as maximum. Accused-appellant is hereby ordered to pay private
complainant Analia Orillosa the amount of P25,000.00 by way of moral damages; and,
3. In Criminal Cases Nos. 99-171392 and 99-171393, accused-appellant is hereby
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of simple rape, defined in Article 335
of the Revised Penal Code as amended and is hereby meted the penalty of reclusion
perpetua for each count. Accused-appellant is hereby ordered to pay to private complainant
Analia Orillosa the amount of P50,000.00 by way of civil indemnity and the amount of
P50,000.00 by way of moral damages for each count, or a total amount of P200,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, and Azcuna, JJ.,
concur.
Bellosillo, J., on leave.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 138033
February 22, 2006
RENATO BALEROS, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner Renato Baleros, Jr. assails and seeks the
reversal of the January 13, 1999 decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No.
17271 as reiterated in its March 31, 1999 resolution2 denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
The assailed decision affirmed an earlier decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, Branch 2, in Criminal Case No. 91-101642 finding petitioner Renato Baleros, Jr. y
David (CHITO) guilty of attempted rape.3
The accusatory portion of the information4 dated December 17, 1991 charging petitioner
with attempted rape reads as follow:
That about 1:50 in the morning or sometime thereafter of 13 December 1991 in Manila and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by forcefully
covering the face of Martina Lourdes T. Albano with a piece of cloth soaked in chemical
with dizzying effects, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commenced
the commission of rape by lying on top of her with the intention to have carnal knowledge
with her but was unable to perform all the acts of execution by reason of some cause or
accident other than his own spontaneous desistance, said acts being committed against her
will and consent to her damage and prejudice.
Upon arraignment on February 5, 1992, petitioner, assisted by counsel, pleaded "Not
Guilty."5 Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
To prove its case, the prosecution presented thirteen (13) witnesses. Among them were
private complainant Martina Lourdes Albano (Malou), and her classmates, Joseph Bernard
Africa, Rommel Montes, Renato Alagadan and Christian Alcala. Their testimonies, as
narrated in some detail in the decision of the CA, established the following facts:
Like most of the tenants of the Celestial Marie Building (hereafter "Building", ) along
A.H. Lacson Street, Sampaloc, Manila, MALOU, occupying Room 307 with her maid,
Marvilou Bebania (Marvilou), was a medical student of the University of Sto. Tomas [UST]
in 1991.
In the evening of December 12, inside Unit 307, MALOU retired at around 10:30. Outside,
right in front of her bedroom door, her maid, Marvilou, slept on a folding bed.
Early morning of the following day, MALOU was awakened by the smell of chemical on a
piece of cloth pressed on her face. She struggled but could not move. Somebody was
pinning her down on the bed, holding her tightly. She wanted to scream for help but the
hands covering her mouth with cloth wet with chemicals were very tight (TSN, July 5,
1993, p. 33). Still, MALOU continued fighting off her attacker by kicking him until at last
her right hand got free. With this the opportunity presented itself when she was able to
grab hold of his sex organ which she then squeezed.
The man let her go and MALOU went straight to the bedroom door and roused Marvilou.
xxx. Over the intercom, MALOU told S/G Ferolin that: "may pumasok sa kuarto ko
pinagtangkaan ako" (Ibid., p. 8). Who it was she did not, however, know. The only thing she
had made out during their struggle was the feel of her attackers clothes and weight. His
upper garment was of cotton material while that at the lower portion felt smooth and satinlike (Ibid, p. 17). He was wearing a t-shirt and shorts Original Records, p. 355).
To Room 310 of the Building where her classmates Christian Alcala, Bernard Baptista,
Lutgardo Acosta and Rommel Montes were staying, MALOU then proceeded to seek help.
xxx.
It was then when MALOU saw her bed topsy-turvy. Her nightdress was stained with blue
(TSN, July 5, 1993, pp. 13-14). Aside from the window with grills which she had
originally left opened, another window inside her bedroom was now open. Her attacker had
fled from her room going through the left bedroom window (Ibid, Answers to Question
number 5; Id), the one without iron grills which leads to Room 306 of the Building (TSN,
July 5, 1993, p.6).
xxx xxx xxx
Further, MALOU testified that her relation with CHITO, who was her classmate , was
friendly until a week prior to the attack. CHITO confided his feelings for her, telling her:
"Gusto kita, mahal kita" (TSN, July 5, 1993, p. 22) and she rejected him. . (TSN, July 5,
1993, p. 22).
Meanwhile, according to S/G Ferolin, while he was on duty, CHITO arrived at the Building
at 1:30 in the early morning of December 13, 1991, wearing a white t-shirt with a
marking on the front of the T-shirt T M and a Greek letter (sic) and below the quoted
letters the word 1946 UST Medicine and Surgery (TSN, October 9, 1992, p. 9) and
black shorts with the brand name Adidas (TSN, October 16, 1992, p.7) and requested
permission to go up to Room 306. This Unit was being leased by Ansbert Co and at that
time when CHITO was asking permission to enter, only Joseph Bernard Africa was in the
room.
He asked CHITO to produce the required written authorization and when CHITO could not,
S/G Ferolin initially refused [but later, relented] . S/G Ferolin made the following entry in
the security guards logbook :
"0130H Baleros Renato Jr. is a visitor of Ansbert Co who has not have (sic) a Request letter
from our tenant of Unit #-306 Ansbert, but still I let him inter (sic) for the reason that he will
be our tenant this coming summer break as he said so I let him sign it here
(Sgd.) Baleros Renato Jr."
(Exhibit "A-2")
That CHITO arrived at Room 306 at 1:30 A.M. of December 13, 1991 was corroborated by
Joseph Bernard Africa (Joseph), .
xxx xxx xxx
Joseph was already inside Room 306 at 9 oclock in the evening of December 12, 1991. xxx
by the time CHITOs knocking on the door woke him up, . He was able to fix the time of
CHITOs arrival at 1:30 A.M. because he glanced at the alarm clock beside the bed when he
was awakened by the knock at the door .
Joseph noticed that CHITO was wearing dark-colored shorts and white T-shirt (Ibid., p. 23)
when he let the latter in. . It was at around 3 oclock in the morning of December 13,
1991 when he woke up again later to the sound of knocking at the door, this time, by
Bernard Baptista (Bernard), .
xxx. With Bernard, Joseph then went to MALOUs room and thereat was shown by Bernard
the open window through which the intruder supposedly passed.
xxx xxx xxx
Later, at about 6 to 6:30 in the morning of December 13, 1991, Joseph was finally able to
talk to CHITO . He mentioned to the latter that something had happened and that they
were not being allowed to get out of the building. Joseph also told CHITO to follow him to
Room 310.
CHITO did just that. He followed after Joseph to Unit 310, carrying his gray bag. xxx. None
was in Room 310 so Joseph went to their yet another classmate, Renato Alagadan at Room
401 to see if the others were there. xxx.
People from the CIS came by before 8 oclock that same morning . They likewise invited
CHITO and Joseph to go with them to Camp Crame where the two (2) were questioned .
An occupant of Room 310 Christian Alcala (Christian) recalled in Court that in the
afternoon of December 13, 1991, after their 3:30 class, he and his roommates, Bernard
Baptista and Lutgardo Acosta (Gary) were called to the Building and were asked by the CIS
people to look for anything not belonging to them in their Unit. While they were outside
Room 310 talking with the authorities, Rommel Montes (Loyloy), another roommate of his,
went inside to search the Unit. Loyloy found (TSN, January 12, 1993, p. 6) a gray
"Khumbella" bag cloth type (Ibid, pp. 44-45) from inside their unit which they did not know
was there and surrender the same to the investigators. When he saw the gray bag, Christian
knew right away that it belonged to CHITO (Ibid, p. 55) as he had seen the latter usually
bringing it to school inside the classroom (Ibid, p. 45).
In their presence, the CIS opened the bag and pulled out its contents, among others, a white
t-shirt with a Taunu (sic) Sigma Phi sign (Ibid, p. 7), a Black Adidas short pants, a
handkerchief , three (3) white T-shirts, an underwear, and socks (Ibid).
Christian recognized the t-shirt (Exhibit "D-4"), the Adidas short pants (Exhibit "D-5"), and
the handkerchief (Exhibit "D-3) to be CHITOs because CHITO had lent the very same one
to him . The t-shirt with CHITOs fraternity symbol, CHITO used to wear on weekends,
and the handkerchief he saw CHITO used at least once in December.
That CHITO left his bag inside Room 310 in the morning of December 13, 1991, was what
consisted mainly of Renato R. Alagadans testimony.
xxx xxx xxx.
The colored gray bag had a handle and a strap, was elongated to about 11/4 feet and
appeared to be full but was closed with a zipper when Renato saw it then (Ibid, pp. 19-20).
At that time Christian, Gary, Bernard, and Renato went back to Room 310 at around 3 to 4
oclock that afternoon along with some CIS agents, they saw the bag at the same place
inside the bedroom where Renato had seen CHITO leave it. Not until later that night at past
9 oclock in Camp Crame, however, did Renato know what the contents of the bag were.
xxx xxx xxx.
The forensic Chemist, Leslie Chambers, of the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory
in Camp Crame, having acted in response to the written request of PNP Superintendent
Lucas M. Managuelod dated December 13, 1991, (Exhibit "C"; Original Records, p. 109.)
conducted laboratory examination on the specimen collated and submitted. Her
Chemistry Report No. C-487-91 (Exhibit "E"; Ibid., p. 112) reads in part, thus:
"SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:
xxx xxx xxx:
1) One (1) small white plastic bag marked UNIMART with the following:
xxx xxx xxx
Exh C One (1) night dress colored salmon pink.
2) One (1) small white pl astic bag marked JONAS with the following:
Exh. D One (1) printed handkerchief.
Exh. E One (1) white T-shirt marked TMZI.
Exh. F One (1) black short (sic) marked ADIDAS.
PURPOSE OF LABORATORY EXAMINATION:
To determine the presence of volatime (sic), non-volatile and/or metallic poison on the
above stated specimens.
FINDINGS:
Toxicological examination conducted on the above stated specimens gave the following
results:
Exhs. C and D POSITIVE to the test for chloroform, a volatile poison.
Exhs. A, B, E and F are insufficient for further analysis.
CONCLUSION:
Exhs. C and D contain chloroform, a volatile poison."6 (Words in bracket added)
For its part, the defense presented, as its main witness, the petitioner himself. He denied
committing the crime imputed to him or making at any time amorous advances on Malou.
Unfolding a different version of the incident, the defense sought to establish the following,
as culled from the same decision of the appellate court:
In December of 1991, CHITO was a medical student of (UST). With Robert Chan and
Alberto Leonardo, he was likewise a member of the Tau Sigma Phi Fraternity . MALOU,
, was known to him being also a medical student at the UST at the time.
From Room 306 of the Celestial Marie Building , CHITO, wearing the prescribed barong
tagalog over dark pants and leather shoes, arrived at their Fraternity house located at Dos
Castillas, Sampaloc, Manila at about 7 oclock in the evening of December 12, 1991. He
was included in the entourage of some fifty (50) fraternity members scheduled for a
Christmas gathering at the house of their senior fraternity brother, Dr. Jose Duran, at No. 3
John Street, North Greenhills, San Juan. xxx.
The party was conducted at the garden beside [the] swimming pool . Soon after, the
four (4) presidential nominees of the Fraternity, CHITO included, were being dunked one by
one into the pool. xxx.
xxx CHITO had anticipated his turn and was thus wearing his t-shirt and long pants
when he was dunked. Perla Duran, , offered each dry clothes to change into and
CHITO put on the white t-shirt with the Fraternitys symbol and a pair of black shorts with
stripes. xxx .
Again riding on Albertos car and wearing "barong tagalog over a white t-shirt with the
symbol TAU Sigma Phi, black short pants with stripe, socks and shoes" (TSN, April 25,
1994, p. 15), CHITO left the party with Robert Chan and Alberto at more or less past 1 A.M.
of December 13, 1991 and proceeded to the Building which they reached at about 1:30 A.M.
(Ibid., p. 19). He had left his gray traveling bag containing "white t-shirt, sando, underwear,
socks, and toothbrush (Ibid., pp. 17-18) at room 306 in the afternoon of the previous day .
At the gate of the Building, CHITO knocked and , S/G Ferolin, looking at his watch,
approached. Because of this, CHITO also looked at his own watch and saw that the time
was 1:30 (Ibid., p. 26). S/G Ferolin initially refused CHITO entry . xxx.
S/G Ferolin called Unit 306 . xxx. When S/G Ferolin finally let him in, already about ten
(10) minutes had lapsed since CHITO first arrived (Ibid., p. 25).
CHITO went up the floor, found the key left for him by Joseph behind the opened jalousie
window and for five (5) minutes vainly tried to open the door until Rommel Montes,
approached him and even commented: "Okey ang suot mo ha, di mo mabuksan ang pinto
(Ibid., pp. 26-29). Rommel tried to open the door of Unit 306 but was likewise
unsuccessful. CHITO then decided to just call out to Joseph while knocking at the door.
It took another (5) minutes of calling out and knocking before Joseph, , at last answered
the door. Telling him, "Ikaw na ang bahala diyan" Joseph immediately turned his back on
CHITO and went inside the bedroom. CHITO , changed to a thinner shirt and went to
bed. He still had on the same short pants given by Perla Duran from the fraternity party
(TSN, June 16, 1994, p. 20).
At 6 oclock in the morning of December 13, 1991, CHITO woke up . He was already in
his school uniform when, around 6:30 A.M, Joseph came to the room not yet dressed up. He
asked the latter why this was so and, without elaborating on it, Joseph told him that
something had happened and to just go to Room 310 which CHITO did.
At Room 310, CHITO was told by Rommel Montes that somebody, whom MALOU was
not able to identify, went to the room of MALOU and tried to rape her (TSN, April 25,
1994, p. 36). xxx.
Joseph told him that the security guard was not letting anybody out of the Building .
When two (2) CIS men came to the unit asking for Renato Baleros, CHITO presented
himself. Congressman Rodolfo B. Albano, father of MALOU, then asked him for the key to
Room 306.
xxx xxx xxx
The CIS men looked inside the bedroom and on the windows. Joseph was told to dress up
and the two (2) of them, CHITO and Joseph, were brought to Camp Crame.
When they arrived at Camp Crame , Col. Managuelod asked Joseph inside his room and
talked to him for 30 minutes. xxx. No one interviewed CHITO to ask his side.
xxx xxx xxx
Both CHITO and Joseph were taken to Prosecutor Abesamis who later instructed them to
undergo physical examination at the Camp Crame Hospital .. At the hospital, CHITO
and Joseph were physically examined by a certain Dr. de Guzman who told them to strip .
xxx xxx xxx
CHITO had left his gray bag containing, among others, the black striped short pants lent to
him by Perla Duran (Exhibit "8-A", Original Records, p. 345), inside Room 310 at more/
less 6:30 to 7 oclock in the morning of December 13, 1991. The next time that he saw it
was between 8 to 9 P.M. when he and Joseph were brought before Fiscal Abesamis for
inquest. One of the CIS agents had taken it there and it was not opened up in his presence
but the contents of the bag were already laid out on the table of Fiscal Abesamis who,
however, made no effort to ask CHITO if the items thereat were his.
The black Adidas short pants purportedly found in the bag, CHITO denied putting in his
gray bag which he had left at Room 306 in the early evening of December 12, 1991 before
going to the fraternity house. He likewise disavowed placing said black Adidas short pants
in his gray bag when he returned to the apartment at past 1:00 oclock in the early morning
of December 13, 1991 (TSN, June 16, 1994, p. 24), nor when he dressed up at about 6
oclock in the morning to go to school and brought his gray bag to Room 310 (Ibid. 25). In
fact, at any time on December 13, 1991, he was not aware that his gray bag ever contained
any black short Adidas pants (Ibid). He only found out for the first time that the black
Adidas short pants was alluded to be among the items inside his gray bag late in the
afternoon, when he was in Camp Crame.
Also taking the witness stand for the defense were petitioners fraternity brothers, Alberto
Leonardo and Robert Chan, who both testified being with CHITO in the December 12, 1991
party held in Dr. Durans place at Greenhills, riding on the same car going to and coming
from the party and dropping the petitioner off the Celestial Marie building after the party.
Both were one in saying that CHITO was wearing a barong tagalog, with t-shirt inside, with
short pants and leather shoes at the time they parted after the party.7 Rommel Montes, a
tenant of Room 310 of the said building, also testified seeing CHITO between the hours of
1:30 and 2:00 A.M. of December 13, 1991 trying to open the door of Room 306 while clad
in dark short pants and white barong tagalog.
On the other hand, Perla Duran confirmed lending the petitioner the pair of short pants with
stripes after the dunking party held in her fathers house.8 Presented as defense expert
witness was Carmelita Vargas, a forensic chemistry instructor whose actual demonstration in
open court showed that chloroform, being volatile, evaporates in thirty (30) seconds without
tearing nor staining the cloth on which it is applied.9
On December 14, 1994, the trial court rendered its decision10 convicting petitioner of
attempted rape and accordingly sentencing him, thus:
WHEREFORE, under cool reflection and prescinding from the foregoing, the Court finds
the accused Renato D. Baleros, Jr., alias "Chito", guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of attempted rape as principal and as charged in the information and hereby sentences
him to suffer an imprisonment ranging from FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS AND
ONE (1) DAY of Prision Correctional, as Minimum to TEN (10) YEARS of Prision Mayor
as Maximum, with all the accessory penalties provided by law, and for the accused to pay
the offended party Martina Lourdes T. Albano, the sum of P50,000.00 by way of Moral and
exemplary damages, plus reasonable Attorneys fees of P30,000.00, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, petitioner went to the CA whereat his appellate recourse was docketed as CAG.R. CR No. 17271.
As stated at the threshold hereof, the CA, in its assailed Decision dated January 13, 1999,
affirmed the trial courts judgment of conviction, to wit:
WHEREFORE, finding no basis in fact and in law to deviate from the findings of the court
a quo, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.11
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the CA in its equally
assailed resolution of March 31, 1999.12
Petitioner is now with this Court, on the contention that the CA erred 1. In not finding that it is improbable for petitioner to have committed the attempted rape
imputed to him, absent sufficient, competent and convincing evidence to prove the offense
charged.
2. In convicting petitioner of attempted rape on the basis merely of circumstantial evidence
since the prosecution failed to satisfy all the requisites for conviction based thereon.
3. In not finding that the circumstances it relied on to convict the petitioner are unreliable,
inconclusive and contradictory.
4. In not finding that proof of motive is miserably wanting in his case.
5. In awarding damages in favor of the complainant despite the fact that the award was
improper and unjustified absent any evidence to prove the same.
6. In failing to appreciate in his favor the constitutional presumption of innocence and that
moral certainty has not been met, hence, he should be acquitted on the ground that the
offense charged against him has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Otherwise stated, the basic issue in this case turns on the question on whether or not the CA
erred in affirming the ruling of the RTC finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of attempted rape.
After a careful review of the facts and evidence on record in the light of applicable
jurisprudence, the Court is disposed to rule for petitioners acquittal, but not necessarily
because there is no direct evidence pointing to him as the intruder holding a chemical-
soaked cloth who pinned Malou down on the bed in the early morning of December 13,
1991.
Positive identification pertains essentially to proof of identity and not per se to that of being
an eyewitness to the very act of commission of the crime. There are two types of positive
identification. A witness may identify a suspect or accused as the offender as an eyewitness
to the very act of the commission of the crime. This constitutes direct evidence. There may,
however, be instances where, although a witness may not have actually witnessed the very
act of commission of a crime, he may still be able to positively identify a suspect or accused
as the perpetrator of a crime as when, for instance, the latter is the person or one of the
persons last seen with the victim immediately before and right after the commission of the
crime. This is the second type of positive identification, which forms part of circumstantial
evidence.13 In the absence of direct evidence, the prosecution may resort to adducing
circumstantial evidence to discharge its burden. Crimes are usually committed in secret and
under condition where concealment is highly probable. If direct evidence is insisted under
all circumstances, the prosecution of vicious felons who committed heinous crimes in secret
or secluded places will be hard, if not well-nigh impossible, to prove.14
Section 4 of Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides the conditions when circumstantial
evidence may be sufficient for conviction. The provision reads:
Sec. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for
conviction if
a) There is more than one circumstance;
b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
In the present case, the positive identification of the petitioner forms part of circumstantial
evidence, which, when taken together with the other pieces of evidence constituting an
unbroken chain, leads to only fair and reasonable conclusion, which is that petitioner was
the intruder in question.
We quote with approval the CAs finding of the circumstantial evidence that led to the
identity of the petitioner as such intruder:
Chito was in the Building when the attack on MALOU took place. He had access to the
room of MALOU as Room 307 where he slept the night over had a window which allowed
ingress and egress to Room 306 where MALOU stayed. Not only the Building security
guard, S/G Ferolin, but Joseph Bernard Africa as well confirmed that CHITO was wearing a
black "Adidas" shorts and fraternity T-shirt when he arrived at the Building/Unit 307 at 1:30
in the morning of December 13, 1991. Though it was dark during their struggle, MALOU
had made out the feel of her intruders apparel to be something made of cotton material on
top and shorts that felt satin-smooth on the bottom.
From CHITOs bag which was found inside Room 310 at the very spot where witness
Renato Alagadan saw CHITO leave it, were discovered the most incriminating evidence: the
handkerchief stained with blue and wet with some kind of chemicals; a black "Adidas" satin
short pants; and a white fraternity T-shirt, also stained with blue. A different witness, this
time, Christian Alcala, identified these garments as belonging to CHITO. As it turned out,
laboratory examination on these items and on the beddings and clothes worn by MALOU
during the incident revealed that the handkerchief and MALOUs night dress both contained
chloroform, a volatile poison which causes first degree burn exactly like what MALOU
sustained on that part of her face where the chemical-soaked cloth had been pressed.
This brings the Court to the issue on whether the evidence adduced by the prosecution has
established beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the petitioner for the crime of attempted
rape.
The Solicitor General maintained that petitioner, by pressing on Malous face the piece of
cloth soaked in chemical while holding her body tightly under the weight of his own, had
commenced the performance of an act indicative of an intent or attempt to rape the victim. It
is argued that petitioners actuation thus described is an overt act contemplated under the
law, for there can not be any other logical conclusion other than that the petitioner intended
to ravish Malou after he attempted to put her to an induced sleep. The Solicitor General,
echoing what the CA said, adds that if petitioners intention was otherwise, he would not
have lain on top of the victim.15
Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, rape is committed by a man who has carnal
knowledge or intercourse with a woman under any of the following circumstances: (1) By
using force or intimidation; (2) When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious; and (3) When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented. Under
Article 6, in relation to the aforementioned article of the same code, rape is attempted when
the offender commences the commission of rape directly by overt acts and does not perform
all the acts of execution which should produce the crime of rape by reason of some cause or
accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.16
Expounding on the nature of an attempted felony, the Court, speaking thru Justice Claro M.
Recto in People vs. Lamahang,17 stated that "the attempt which the Penal Code punishes is
that which has a logical connection to a particular, concrete offense; that which is the
beginning of the execution of the offense by overt acts of the perpetrator, leading directly to
its realization and consummation." Absent the unavoidable connection, like the logical and
natural relation of the cause and its effect, as where the purpose of the offender in
performing an act is not certain, meaning the nature of the act in relation to its objective is
ambiguous, then what obtains is an attempt to commit an indeterminate offense, which is
not a juridical fact from the standpoint of the Penal Code.18
There is absolutely no dispute about the absence of sexual intercourse or carnal knowledge
in the present case. The next question that thus comes to the fore is whether or not the act of
the petitioner, i.e., the pressing of a chemical-soaked cloth while on top of Malou,
constitutes an overt act of rape.1avvphil.net
Overt or external act has been defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the
intention to commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation, which if
carried out to its complete termination following its natural course, without being frustrated
by external obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and
necessarily ripen into a concrete offense.19
Harmonizing the above definition to the facts of this case, it would be too strained to
construe petitioner's act of pressing a chemical-soaked cloth in the mouth of Malou which
would induce her to sleep as an overt act that will logically and necessarily ripen into rape.
As it were, petitioner did not commence at all the performance of any act indicative of an
intent or attempt to rape Malou. It cannot be overemphasized that petitioner was fully
clothed and that there was no attempt on his part to undress Malou, let alone touch her
private part. For what reason petitioner wanted the complainant unconscious, if that was
really his immediate intention, is anybodys guess. The CA maintained that if the petitioner
had no intention to rape, he would not have lain on top of the complainant. Plodding on, the
appellate court even anticipated the next step that the petitioner would have taken if the
victim had been rendered unconscious. Wrote the CA:
The shedding of the clothes, both of the attacker and his victim, will have to come later. His
sexual organ is not yet exposed because his intended victim is still struggling. Where the
intended victim is an educated woman already mature in age, it is very unlikely that a rapist
would be in his naked glory before even starting his attack on her. He has to make her lose
her guard first, or as in this case, her unconsciousness.20
At bottom then, the appellate court indulges in plain speculation, a practice disfavored under
the rule on evidence in criminal cases. For, mere speculations and probabilities cannot
substitute for proof required to establish the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt.21
In Perez vs. Court of Appeals,22 the Court acquitted therein petitioner of the crime of
attempted rape, pointing out that:
xxx. In the crime of rape, penetration is an essential act of execution to produce the felony.
Thus, for there to be an attempted rape, the accused must have commenced the act of
penetrating his sexual organ to the vagina of the victim but for some cause or accident other
than his own spontaneous desistance, the penetration, however, slight, is not completed.
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioners act of lying on top of the complainant, embracing and kissing her, mashing her
breasts, inserting his hand inside her panty and touching her sexual organ, while admittedly
obscene and detestable acts, do not constitute attempted rape absent any showing that
petitioner actually commenced to force his penis into the complainants sexual organ. xxx.
Likewise in People vs. Pancho,23 the Court held:
xxx, appellant was merely holding complainants feet when his Tito Onio arrived at the
alleged locus criminis. Thus, it would be stretching to the extreme our credulity if we were
to conclude that mere holding of the feet is attempted rape.
Lest it be misunderstood, the Court is not saying that petitioner is innocent, under the
premises, of any wrongdoing whatsoever. The information filed against petitioner contained
an allegation that he forcefully covered the face of Malou with a piece of cloth soaked in
chemical. And during the trial, Malou testified about the pressing against her face of the
chemical-soaked cloth and having struggled after petitioner held her tightly and pinned her
down. Verily, while the series of acts committed by the petitioner do not determine
attempted rape, as earlier discussed, they constitute unjust vexation punishable as light
coercion under the second paragraph of Article 287 of the Revised Penal Code. In the
context of the constitutional provision assuring an accused of a crime the right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation,24 it cannot be said that petitioner was
kept in the dark of the inculpatory acts for which he was proceeded against. To be sure, the
information against petitioner contains sufficient details to enable him to make his defense.
As aptly observed by then Justice Ramon C. Aquino, there is no need to allege malice,
restraint or compulsion in an information for unjust vexation. As it were, unjust vexation
exists even without the element of restraint or compulsion for the reason that this term is
broad enough to include any human conduct which, although not productive of some
physical or material harm, would unjustly annoy or irritate an innocent person.25 The
paramount question is whether the offenders act causes annoyance, irritation, torment,
distress or disturbance to the mind of the person to whom it is directed.26 That Malou, after
the incident in question, cried while relating to her classmates what she perceived to be a
sexual attack and the fact that she filed a case for attempted rape proved beyond cavil that
she was disturbed, if not distressed by the acts of petitioner.
The penalty for coercion falling under the second paragraph of Article 287 of the Revised
Penal Code is arresto menor or a fine ranging from P5.00 to P200.00 or both.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered
ACQUITTING petitioner Renato D. Baleros, Jr. of the charge for attempted rape. Petitioner,
however, is adjudged GUILTY of light coercion and is accordingly sentenced to 30 days of
arresto menor and to pay a fine of P200.00, with the accessory penalties thereof and to pay
the costs.
SO ORDERED.
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
( On Leave )
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ*
Associate Justice
RENATO C. CORONA
Asscociate Justice
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
ATT E S TAT I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S .PUNO
Associate Justice
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairman's
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
Chief Justice
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 202867
July 15, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
REGIE LABIAGA, Appellant.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is an appeal assailing the Decision1 dated 18 October 2011 of the Court of
Appeals-Cebu (CA-Cebu) in CA-G.R. CEB CR-HC No. 01000. The CA-Cebu affirmed
with modification the Joint Decision2 dated 10 March 2008 of the Regional Trial Court of
Barotac Viejo, Iloilo, Branch 66 (RTC), in Criminal Case No. 2001-155) convicting Regie
Labiaga alias "Banok" (appellant) of murder and Criminal Case No. 2002-1777 convicting
appellant of frustrated murder.
The Facts
In Criminal Case No. 2001-1555, appellant, together with a certain Alias Balatong Barcenas
and Cristy Demapanag (Demapanag), was charged with Murder with the Use of Unlicensed
Firearm under an Information3 which reads:
That on or about December 23, 2000 in the Municipality of Ajuy, Province of Iloilo,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and helping one another, armed with unlicensed firearm, with
deliberate intent and decided purpose to kill, by means of treachery and with evident
premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
shoot JUDY CONDE alias JOJO with said unlicensed firearm, hitting her and inflicting
gunshot wounds on the different parts of her breast which caused her death thereafter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The same individuals were charged with Frustrated Murder with the Use of Unlicensed
Firearm in Criminal Case No. 2002-1777, under an Information4 which states:
That on or about December 23, 2000 in the Municipality of Ajuy, Province of Iloilo,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and helping one another, armed with unlicensed firearm, with
deliberate intent and decided purpose to kill, by means of treachery and with evident
premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
shoot Gregorio Conde with said unlicensed firearm, hitting him on the posterior aspect,
middle third right forearm 1 cm. In diameter; thereby performing all the acts of execution
which would produce the crime of Murder as a consequence, but nevertheless did not
produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the accused; that is by the timely
and able medical assistance rendered to said Gregorio Conde which prevented his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Alias Balatong Barcenas remained at large. Both appellant and Demapanag pled not guilty
in both cases and joint trial ensued thereafter. The prosecution presented four witnesses:
Gregorio Conde, the victim in Criminal Case No. 2002-1777; Glenelyn Conde, his
daughter; and Dr. Jeremiah Obaana and Dr. Edwin Jose Figura, the physicians at the Sara
District Hospital where the victims were admitted. The defense, on the other hand,
presented appellant, Demapanag, and the latters brother, Frederick.
Version of the prosecution
The prosecutions version of the facts is as follows: At around 7:00 p.m. on 23 December
2000, Gregorio Conde, and his two daughters, Judy and Glenelyn Conde, were in their
home at Barangay Malayu-an, Ajuy, Iloilo. Thereafter, Gregorio stepped outside. Glenelyn
was in their store, which was part of their house.
Shortly thereafter, appellant, who was approximately five meters away from Gregorio, shot
the latter. Gregorio called Judy for help. When Judy and Glenelyn rushed to Gregorios aid,
appellant shot Judy in the abdomen. The two other accused were standing behind the
appellant. Appellant said, "she is already dead," and the three fled the crime scene.
Gregorio and Judy were rushed to the Sara District Hospital. Judy was pronounced dead on
arrival while Gregorio made a full recovery after treatment of his gunshot wound.
Dr. Jeremiah Obaana conducted the autopsy of Judy. His report stated that her death was
caused by "cardiopulmonary arrest secondary to Cardiac Tamponade due to gunshot
wound."5
Dr. Jose Edwin Figura, on the other hand, examined Gregorio after the incident. He found
that Gregorio sustained a gunshot wound measuring one centimeter in diameter in his right
forearm and "abrasion wounds hematoma formation" in his right shoulder.6
Version of the defense
Appellant admitted that he was present during the shooting incident on 23 December 2000.
He claimed, however, that he acted in self-defense. Gregorio, armed with a shotgun,
challenged him to a fight. He attempted to shoot appellant, but the shotgun jammed.
Appellant tried to wrest the shotgun from Gregorio, and during the struggle, the shotgun
fired. He claimed that he did not know if anyone was hit by that gunshot.
Demapanag claimed that at the time of the shooting, he was in D&D Ricemill, which is
approximately 14 kilometers away from the crime scene. This was corroborated by
Frederick, Demapanags brother.
The Ruling of the RTC
In its Joint Decision, the RTC acquitted Demapanag due to insufficiency of evidence.
Appellant, however, was convicted of murder and frustrated murder. The dispositive portion
of the Joint Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the court hereby finds the accused Regie Labiaga
@ "Banok" GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the Crime of Murder in Crim. Case No.
2001-1555 and hereby sentences the said accused to reclusion perpetua together with
accessory penalty provided by law, to pay the heirs of Judy Conde P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
In Crim. Case No. 2002-1777, the court finds accused Regie Labiaga @ "Banok" GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated Murder and hereby sentences the said
accused to a prison term ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
minimum to ten (10) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum, together
with the necessary penalty provided by law and without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency and to pay the costs.
Accuseds entire period of detention shall be deducted from the penalty herein imposed
when the accused serves his sentence.
For lack of sufficient evidence, accused Cristy Demapanag is acquitted of the crimes
charged in both cases. The Provincial Warden, Iloilo Rehabilitation Center, Pototan, Iloilo is
hereby directed to release accused Cristy Demapanag from custody unless he is being held
for some other valid or lawful cause.
SO ORDERED.7
The Ruling of the CA-Cebu

Appellant impugned the RTCs Joint Decision, claiming that "the RTC gravely erred in
convicting the appellant of the crime charged despite failure of the prosecution to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt."8 The CA-Cebu, however, upheld the conviction for murder
and frustrated murder.
The CA-Cebu also modified the Joint Decision by imposing the payment of moral and
exemplary damages in both criminal cases. The CA-Cebu made a distinction between the
civil indemnity awarded by the RTC in Criminal Case No. 2001-1555 and the moral
damages. The CA-Cebu pointed out that:
The trial court granted the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity in Criminal Case No.
2001-1555. It did not award moral damages. Nonetheless, the trial court should have
awarded both, considering that they are two different kinds of damages. For death
indemnity, the amount of P50,000.00 is fixed "pursuant to the current judicial policy on the
matter, without need of any evidence or proof of damages. Likewise, the mental anguish of
the surviving family should be assuaged by the award of appropriate and reasonable moral
damages."9
The dispositive portion of the Decision of the CA-Cebu reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The Joint Decision dated
March 10, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, in Barotac Viejo, Iloilo is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. The dispositive portion of the said Joint Decision
should now read as follows:
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the court hereby finds the accused Regie Labiaga
@ "Banok" GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder in Crim. Case No.
2001-1555 and hereby sentences the said accused to reclusion perpetua together with the
accessory penalty provided by law, to pay the heirs of Judy Conde P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
In Crim. Case No. 2002-1777 the court finds accused Regie Labiaga @ "Banok" GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated Murder and hereby sentences the said
accused to suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, together with the accessory penalty provided by law, to pay Gregorio Conde
P25,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs Accused(s) entire period of
detention shall be deducted from the penalty herein imposed when the accused serves his
sentence.
For lack of sufficient evidence, accused Cristy Demapanag is acquitted of the crime(s)
charged in both cases. The Provincial Warden, Iloilo Rehabilitation Center, Pototan, Iloilo is
hereby directed to release accused Cristy Demapanag from custody unless he is being held
for some other valid or lawful cause.
SO ORDERED.
SO ORDERED.10
Hence, this appeal.
The Ruling of the Court
Our review of the records of Criminal Case No. 2002-1777 convinces us that appellant is
guilty of attempted murder and not frustrated murder. We uphold appellants conviction in
Criminal Case No. 2001-1555 for murder, but modify the civil indemnity awarded in
Criminal Case No. 2001-1555, as well as the award of moral and exemplary damages in
both cases.
Justifying circumstance of self-defense
Appellants feeble attempt to invoke self-defense in both cases was correctly rejected by the
RTC and the CA-Cebu. This Court, in People v. Damitan,11 explained that:
When the accused admits killing a person but pleads self-defense, the burden of evidence
shifts to him to prove by clear and convincing evidence the elements of his defense.
However, appellants version of the incident was uncorroborated. His bare and self-serving
assertions cannot prevail over the positive identification of the two (2) principal witnesses
of the prosecution.12
Appellants failure to present any other eyewitness to corroborate his testimony and his
unconvincing demonstration of the struggle between him and Gregorio before the RTC lead
us to reject his claim of self-defense. Also, as correctly pointed out by the CA-Cebu,
appellants theory of self-defense is belied by the fact that:
x x x The appellant did not even bother to report to the police Gregorios alleged unlawful
aggression and that it was Gregorio who owned the gun, as appellant claimed. And, when
appellant was arrested the following morning, he did not also inform the police that what
happened to Gregorio was merely accidental.13
Appellants claim that he did not know whether Gregorio was hit when the shotgun
accidentally fired is also implausible.
In contrast, we find that the Condes account of the incident is persuasive. Both the CACebu and the RTC found that the testimonies of the Condes were credible and presented in a
clear and convincing manner. This Court has consistently put much weight on the trial
courts assessment of the credibility of witnesses, especially when affirmed by the appellate
court.14 In People v. Mangune,15 we stated that:
It is well settled that the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a
matter best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe the
witnesses first hand and to note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grilling
examination. These are important in determining the truthfulness of witnesses and in
unearthing the truth, especially in the face of conflicting testimonies. For, indeed, the
emphasis, gesture, and inflection of the voice are potent aids in ascertaining the witness
credibility, and the trial court has the opportunity to take advantage of these aids.16
Since the conclusions made by the RTC regarding the credibility of the witnesses were not
tainted with arbitrariness or oversight or misapprehension of relevant facts, the same must
be sustained by this Court.
Attempted and Frustrated Murder
Treachery was correctly appreciated by the RTC and CA-Cebu. A treacherous attack is one
in which the victim was not afforded any opportunity to defend himself or resist the attack.17
The existence of treachery is not solely determined by the type of weapon used. If it appears
that the weapon was deliberately chosen to insure the execution of the crime, and to render
the victim defenseless, then treachery may be properly appreciated against the accused.18
In the instant case, the Condes were unarmed when they were shot by appellant. The use of
a 12-gauge shotgun against two unarmed victims is undoubtedly treacherous, as it denies the
victims the chance to fend off the offender.
We note, however, that appellant should be convicted of attempted murder, and not
frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. 2002-1777.
Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code defines the stages in the commission of felonies:
Art. 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies. Consummated felonies as well
as those which are frustrated and attempted, are punishable.
A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and
accomplishment are present; and it is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of
execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not
produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.
In Serrano v. People,19 we distinguished a frustrated felony from an attempted felony in this
manner:
1.) In a frustrated felony, the offender has performed all the acts of execution which should
produce the felony as a consequence; whereas in an attempted felony, the offender merely
commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts and does not perform all the
acts of execution.
2.) In a frustrated felony, the reason for the non-accomplishment of the crime is some cause
independent of the will of the perpetrator; on the other hand, in an attempted felony, the
reason for the non-fulfillment of the crime is a cause or accident other than the offenders
own spontaneous desistance.20
In frustrated murder, there must be evidence showing that the wound would have been fatal
were it not for timely medical intervention.21 If the evidence fails to convince the court that
the wound sustained would have caused the victims death without timely medical attention,
the accused should be convicted of attempted murder and not frustrated murder.
In the instant case, it does not appear that the wound sustained by Gregorio Conde was
mortal. This was admitted by Dr. Edwin Figura, who examined Gregorio after the shooting
incident:
Prosecutor Con-El:
Q: When you examined the person of Gregorio Conde, can you tell the court what was the
situation of the patient when you examined him?
A: He has a gunshot wound, but the patient was actually ambulatory and not in distress.
xxxx
Court (to the witness)
Q: The nature of these injuries, not serious?
A: Yes, Your Honor, not serious. He has also abrasion wounds hematoma formation at the
anterior aspect right shoulder.22
Since Gregorios gunshot wound was not mortal, we hold that appellant should be convicted
of attempted murder and not frustrated murder. Under Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code,
the corresponding penalty for attempted murder shall be two degrees lower than that
prescribed for consummated murder under Article 248, that is, prision correccional in its
maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period. Section 1 of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law provides:
x x x the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term
of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly
imposed under the rules of the Revised Penal Code, and the minimum which shall be within
the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense.1wphi1
Thus, appellant should serve an indeterminate sentence ranging from two (2) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional in its medium period to eight (8) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor in its medium period.
Award of damages
In light of recent jurisprudence, we deem it proper to increase the amount of damages
imposed by the lower court in both cases. In Criminal Case No. 2001-1555, this Court
hereby awards P75,000.00 as civil indemnity23 and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.24
The award of P50,000.00 as moral damages in the foregoing case is sustained. Appellant is
also liable to pay P40,000.00 as moral damages and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, in
relation to Criminal Case No. 2002-1777.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the 18 October 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals-Cebu in
CA-G.R. CEB CR-HC No. 01000 with MODIFICATIONS. In Criminal Case No.
2002-1777, we find that appellant Regie Labiaga is GUILTY of Attempted Murder and shall
suffer an indeterminate sentence ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1)
day of prision correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor
as maximum, and pay P40,000.00 as moral damages and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
In Criminal Case No. 2001-1555, appellant shall pay P75,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Associate Justice
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
JOSE C. MENDOZA*
Associate Justice
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
ATT E S TAT I O N
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's
Division.
Chief Justice
EN BANC
ARISTOTEL VALENZUELA y G. R. No. 160188

NATIVIDAD,
Petitioner, Present:
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
SANTIAGO,
[if !supportLists][endif]versus - GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
GARCIA,
VELASCO, and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES NACHURA, JJ.
and HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
Respondents.
Promulgated:
June 21, 2007

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This case aims for prime space in the firmament of our criminal law jurisprudence.
Petitioner effectively concedes having performed the felonious acts imputed against him,
but instead insists that as a result, he should be adjudged guilty of frustrated theft only, not
the felony in its consummated stage of which he was convicted. The proposition rests on a
common theory expounded in two well-known decisions[if !supportFootnotes][1][endif] rendered
decades ago by the Court of Appeals, upholding the existence of frustrated theft of which
the accused in both cases were found guilty. However, the rationale behind the rulings has
never been affirmed by this Court.
As far as can be told,[if !supportFootnotes][2][endif] the last time this Court extensively
considered whether an accused was guilty of frustrated or consummated theft was in 1918,
in People v. Adiao.[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif] A more cursory
treatment of the question was followed in 1929, in People v. Sobrevilla,[if !supportFootnotes][4]

[endif] and in 1984, in Empelis v. IAC.[if !supportFootnotes][5][endif] This petition now gives occasion
for us to finally and fully measure if or how frustrated theft is susceptible to commission
under the Revised Penal Code.
I.
The basic facts are no longer disputed before us. The case stems from an Information[if !
supportFootnotes][6][endif] charging petitioner Aristotel Valenzuela (petitioner) and Jovy Calderon
(Calderon) with the crime of theft. On 19 May 1994, at around 4:30 p.m., petitioner and
Calderon were sighted outside the Super Sale Club, a supermarket within the ShoeMart
(SM) complex along North EDSA, by Lorenzo Lago (Lago), a security guard who was then
manning his post at the open parking area of the supermarket. Lago saw petitioner, who was
wearing an identification card with the mark Receiving Dispatching Unit (RDU), hauling a
push cart with cases of detergent of the well-known Tide brand. Petitioner unloaded these
cases in an open parking space, where Calderon was waiting. Petitioner then returned inside
the supermarket, and after five (5) minutes, emerged with more cartons of Tide Ultramatic
and again unloaded these boxes to the same area in the open parking space.[if !supportFootnotes][7]
[endif]
Thereafter, petitioner left the parking area and haled a taxi. He boarded the cab and
directed it towards the parking space where Calderon was waiting. Calderon loaded the
cartons of Tide Ultramatic inside the taxi, then boarded the vehicle. All these acts were eyed
by Lago, who proceeded to stop the taxi as it was leaving the open parking area. When Lago
asked petitioner for a receipt of the merchandise, petitioner and Calderon reacted by fleeing
on foot, but Lago fired a warning shot to alert his fellow security guards of the incident.
Petitioner and Calderon were apprehended at the scene, and the stolen merchandise
recovered.[if !supportFootnotes][8][endif] The filched items seized from the duo were four (4) cases of
Tide Ultramatic, one (1) case of Ultra 25 grams, and three (3) additional cases of detergent,
the goods with an aggregate value of P12,090.00.[if !supportFootnotes][9][endif]
Petitioner and Calderon were first brought to the SM security office before they were
transferred on the same day to the Baler Station II of the Philippine National Police, Quezon
City, for investigation. It appears from the police investigation records that apart from
petitioner and Calderon, four (4) other persons were apprehended by the security guards at
the scene and delivered to police custody at the Baler PNP Station in connection with the
incident. However, after the matter was referred to the Office of the Quezon City
Prosecutor, only petitioner and Calderon were charged with theft by the Assistant City
Prosecutor, in Informations prepared on 20 May 1994, the day after the incident.[if !
After pleading not guilty on arraignment, at the trial, petitioner and Calderon both claimed
having been innocent bystanders within the vicinity of the Super Sale Club on the afternoon
of 19 May 1994 when they were haled by Lago and his fellow security guards after a
commotion and brought to the Baler PNP Station. Calderon alleged that on the afternoon of
the incident, he was at the Super Sale Club to withdraw from his ATM account,
accompanied by his neighbor, Leoncio Rosulada.[if !supportFootnotes][11][endif] As the queue for the
ATM was long, Calderon and Rosulada decided to buy snacks inside the supermarket. It was
while they were eating that they heard the gunshot fired by Lago, leading them to head out
of the building to check what was
transpiring. As they were outside, they were suddenly grabbed by a security guard, thus
commencing their detention.[if !supportFootnotes][12][endif] Meanwhile, petitioner testified during
trial that he and his cousin, a Gregorio Valenzuela,[if !supportFootnotes][13][endif] had been at the
parking lot, walking beside the nearby BLISS complex and headed to ride a tricycle going
to Pag-asa, when they saw the security guard Lago fire a shot. The gunshot caused him and
the other people at the scene to start running, at which point he was apprehended by Lago
and brought to the security office. Petitioner claimed he was detained at the security office
until around 9:00 p.m., at which time he and the others were brought to the Baler Police
Station. At the station, petitioner denied having stolen the cartons of detergent, but he was
detained overnight, and eventually brought to the prosecutors office where he was charged
with theft.[if !supportFootnotes][14][endif] During petitioners cross-examination, he admitted that he
had been employed as a bundler of GMS Marketing, assigned at the supermarket though not
at SM.[if !supportFootnotes][15][endif]
In a Decision[if !supportFootnotes][16][endif] promulgated on 1 February 2000, the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 90, convicted both petitioner and Calderon of the
crime of consummated theft. They were sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of two
(2) years of prision correccional as minimum to seven (7) years of prision mayor as
maximum.[if !supportFootnotes][17][endif] The RTC found credible the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses and established the convictions on the positive identification of the accused as
perpetrators of the crime.
Both accused filed their respective Notices of Appeal,[if !supportFootnotes][18][endif] but

only petitioner filed a brief[if !supportFootnotes][19][endif] with the Court of Appeals, causing the
appellate court to deem Calderons appeal as abandoned and consequently dismissed. Before
the Court of Appeals, petitioner argued that he should only be convicted of frustrated theft
since at the time he was apprehended, he was never placed in a position to freely dispose of
the articles stolen.[if !supportFootnotes][20][endif] However, in its Decision dated 19 June 2003,[if !
supportFootnotes][21][endif] the Court of Appeals rejected this contention and affirmed petitioners
conviction.[if !supportFootnotes][22][endif] Hence the present Petition for Review,[if !supportFootnotes][23]
[endif] which expressly seeks that petitioners conviction be modified to only of Frustrated
Theft.[if !supportFootnotes][24][endif]
Even in his appeal before the Court of Appeals, petitioner effectively conceded both his
felonious intent and his actual participation in the theft of several cases of detergent with a
total value of P12,090.00 of which he was charged.[if !supportFootnotes][25][endif] As such, there is
no cause for the Court to consider a factual scenario other than that presented by the
prosecution, as affirmed by the RTC and the Court of Appeals. The only question to
consider is whether under the given facts, the theft should be deemed as consummated or
merely frustrated.
II.
In arguing that he should only be convicted of frustrated theft, petitioner cites[if !supportFootnotes]
[26][endif] two decisions rendered many years ago by the Court of Appeals: People v. Dio[if !
supportFootnotes][27][endif] and People v. Flores.[if !supportFootnotes][28][endif] Both decisions elicit the
interest of this Court, as they modified trial court convictions from consummated to
frustrated theft and involve a factual milieu that bears similarity to the present case.
Petitioner invoked the same rulings in his appeal to the Court of Appeals, yet the appellate
court did not expressly consider the import of the rulings when it affirmed the conviction.
It is not necessary to fault the Court of Appeals for giving short shrift to the Dio
and Flores rulings since they have not yet been expressly adopted as precedents by this
Court. For whatever reasons,
the occasion to define or debunk the crime of frustrated theft has not come to pass before us.
Yet despite the silence on our part, Dio and Flores have attained a level of renown reached
by very few other appellate court rulings. They are comprehensively discussed in the most
popular of our criminal law annotations,[if !supportFootnotes][29][endif] and studied in criminal law
classes as textbook examples of frustrated crimes or even as definitive of frustrated theft.
More critically, the factual milieu in those cases is hardly akin to the fanciful
scenarios that populate criminal law exams more than they actually occur in real life.
Indeed, if we finally say that Dio and Flores are doctrinal, such conclusion could profoundly
influence a multitude of routine theft prosecutions, including commonplace shoplifting. Any
scenario that involves the thief having to exit with the stolen property through a supervised
egress, such as a supermarket checkout counter or a parking area pay booth, may easily call
for the application of Dio and Flores. The fact that lower courts have not hesitated to lay
down convictions for frustrated theft further validates that Dio and Flores and the theories
offered therein on frustrated theft have borne some weight in our jurisprudential system. The
time is thus ripe for us to examine whether those theories are correct and should continue to
influence prosecutors and judges in the future.
III.
To delve into any extended analysis of Dio and Flores, as well as the specific
issues relative to frustrated theft, it is necessary to first refer to the basic rules on the three
stages of crimes under our Revised Penal Code.[if !supportFootnotes][30][endif]
Article 6 defines those three stages, namely the consummated, frustrated and attempted
felonies. A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and
accomplishment are present. It is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of
execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not
produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator. Finally, it is
attempted when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts,
and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of
some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.
Each felony under the Revised Penal Code has a subjective phase, or that portion of the acts
constituting the crime included between the act which begins the commission of the crime
and the last act performed by the offender which, with prior acts, should result in the
consummated crime.[if !supportFootnotes][31][endif] After that point has been breached, the
subjective phase ends and the objective phase begins.[if !supportFootnotes][32][endif] It has been held
that if the offender never passes the subjective phase of the offense, the crime is merely
attempted.[if !supportFootnotes][33][endif] On the other hand, the subjective phase is completely
passed in case of frustrated crimes, for in such instances, [s]ubjectively the crime is
complete.[if !supportFootnotes][34][endif]
Truly, an easy distinction lies between consummated and frustrated felonies on one
hand, and attempted felonies on the other. So long as the offender fails to complete all the
acts of execution despite commencing the commission of a felony, the crime is undoubtedly
in the attempted stage. Since the specific acts of execution that define each crime under the
Revised Penal Code are generally enumerated in the code itself, the task of ascertaining
whether a crime is attempted only would need to compare the acts actually performed by the
accused as against the acts that constitute the felony under the Revised Penal Code.
In contrast, the determination of whether a crime is frustrated or consummated necessitates
an initial concession that all of the acts of execution have been performed by the offender.
The critical distinction instead is whether the felony itself was actually produced by the acts
of execution. The determination of whether the felony was produced after all the acts of
execution had been performed hinges on the particular statutory definition of the felony. It is
the statutory definition that generally furnishes the elements of each crime under the
Revised Penal Code, while the elements in turn unravel the particular requisite acts of
execution and accompanying criminal intent.
The long-standing Latin maxim actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea supplies an important
characteristic of a crime, that ordinarily, evil intent must unite with an unlawful act for there
to be a crime, and accordingly, there can be no crime when the criminal mind is wanting.[if !
supportFootnotes][35][endif] Accepted in this jurisdiction as material in crimes mala in se,[if !
supportFootnotes][36][endif] mens rea has been defined before as a guilty mind, a guilty or wrongful
purpose or criminal intent,[if !supportFootnotes][37][endif] and essential for criminal liability.[if !
supportFootnotes][38][endif] It follows that the statutory definition of our mala in se crimes must be
able to supply what the mens rea of the crime is, and indeed the U.S. Supreme Court has
comfortably held that a criminal law that contains no mens rea requirement infringes on
constitutionally protected rights.[if !supportFootnotes][39][endif] The criminal statute must also
provide for the overt acts that constitute the crime. For a crime to exist in our legal law, it is
not enough that mens rea be shown; there must also be an actus reus.[if !supportFootnotes][40][endif]
It is from the actus reus and the mens rea, as they find expression in the criminal
statute, that the felony is produced. As a postulate in the craftsmanship of constitutionally
sound laws, it is extremely preferable that the language of the law expressly provide when
the felony is produced. Without such provision, disputes would inevitably ensue on the
elemental question whether or not a crime was committed, thereby presaging the
undesirable and legally dubious set-up under which the judiciary is assigned the legislative
role of defining crimes. Fortunately, our Revised Penal Code does not suffer from such
infirmity. From the statutory definition of any felony, a decisive passage or term is
embedded which attests when the felony is produced by the acts of execution. For example,
the statutory definition of murder or homicide expressly uses the phrase shall kill another,
thus making it clear that the felony is produced by the death of the victim, and conversely, it
is not produced if the victim survives.
We next turn to the statutory definition of theft. Under Article 308 of the Revised Penal
Code, its elements are spelled out as follows:
Art. 308. Who are liable for theft. Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain
but without violence against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take
personal property of another without the latters consent.
Theft is likewise committed by:
1. Any person who, having found lost property, shall fail to deliver the
same to the local authorities or to its owner;
2. Any person who, after having maliciously damaged the property of

another, shall remove or make use of the fruits
or object of the damage caused by him; and
3. Any person who shall enter an inclosed estate or a field where

trespass is forbidden or which belongs to
another and without the consent of its owner,
shall hunt or fish upon the same or shall gather
cereals, or other forest or farm products.
Article 308 provides for a general definition of theft, and three alternative and highly
idiosyncratic means by which theft may be committed.[if !supportFootnotes][41][endif] In the present
discussion, we need to concern ourselves only with the general definition since it was under
it that the prosecution of the accused was undertaken and sustained. On the face of the
definition, there is only one operative act of execution by the actor involved in theft the
taking of personal property of another. It is also clear from the provision that in order that
such taking may be qualified as theft, there must further be present the descriptive
circumstances that the taking was with intent to gain; without force upon things or violence
against or intimidation of persons; and it was without the consent of the owner of the
property.
Indeed, we have long recognized the following elements of theft as provided for in
Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, namely: (1) that there be taking of personal
property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to
gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking be
accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon
things.[if !supportFootnotes][42][endif]
In his commentaries, Judge Guevarra traces the history of the definition of theft,
which under early Roman law as defined by Gaius, was so broad enough as to encompass
any kind of physical handling of property belonging to another against the will of the owner,
a definition similar to that by Paulus that a thief handles (touches,

moves) the property of another.[if !supportFootnotes][44][endif] However, with the Institutes of
Justinian, the idea had taken hold that more than mere physical handling, there must further
be an intent of acquiring gain from the object, thus: [f]urtum est contrectatio rei fraudulosa,
lucri faciendi causa vel ipsius rei, vel etiam usus ejus possessinisve.[if !supportFootnotes][45][endif]
This requirement of animo lucrandi, or intent to gain, was maintained in both the Spanish
and Filipino penal laws, even as it has since been abandoned in Great Britain.[if !supportFootnotes]
[46][endif]
In Spanish law, animo lucrandi was compounded with apoderamiento, or unlawful

taking, to characterize theft. Justice Regalado notes that the concept of apoderamiento once
had a controversial interpretation and application. Spanish law had already discounted the
belief that mere physical taking was constitutive of apoderamiento, finding that it had to be
coupled with the intent to appropriate the object in order to constitute apoderamiento; and to
appropriate means to deprive the lawful owner of the thing.[if !supportFootnotes][47][endif] However,
a conflicting line of cases decided by the Court of Appeals ruled, alternatively, that there
must be permanency in the taking[if !supportFootnotes][48][endif] or an intent to permanently deprive
the owner of the stolen property;[if !supportFootnotes][49][endif] or that there was no need for
permanency in the taking or in its intent, as the mere temporary possession by the offender
or disturbance of the proprietary rights of the owner already constituted apoderamiento.[if !
supportFootnotes][50][endif] Ultimately, as Justice Regalado notes, the Court adopted the latter
thought that there was no need of an intent to permanently deprive the owner of his property
to constitute an unlawful taking.[if !supportFootnotes][51][endif]
So long as the descriptive circumstances that qualify the taking are present, including animo
lucrandi and apoderamiento, the completion of the operative act that is the taking of
personal property of another establishes, at least, that the transgression went beyond the
attempted stage. As applied to the present case, the moment petitioner obtained physical
possession of the cases of detergent and loaded them in the pushcart, such seizure motivated
by intent to gain, completed without need to inflict violence or intimidation against persons
nor force upon things, and accomplished without the consent of the SM Super Sales Club,
petitioner forfeited the extenuating benefit a conviction for only attempted theft would have
afforded him.
On the critical question of whether it was consummated or frustrated theft, we are obliged to
apply Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code to ascertain the answer. Following that provision,
the theft would have been frustrated only, once the acts committed by petitioner, if
ordinarily sufficient to produce theft as a consequence, do not produce [such theft] by
reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator. There are clearly two
determinative factors to consider: that the felony is not produced, and that such failure is
due to causes independent of the will of the perpetrator. The second factor ultimately
depends on the evidence at hand in each particular case. The first, however, relies primarily
on a doctrinal definition attaching to the individual felonies in the Revised Penal Code[if !
supportFootnotes][52][endif] as to when a particular felony is not produced, despite the commission
of all the acts of execution.
So, in order to ascertain whether the theft is consummated or frustrated, it is necessary to
inquire as to how exactly is the felony of theft produced. Parsing through the statutory
definition of theft under Article 308, there is one apparent answer provided in the language
of the law that theft is already produced upon the tak[ing of] personal property of another
without the latters consent.
U.S. v. Adiao[if !supportFootnotes][53][endif] apparently supports that notion. Therein, a customs
inspector was charged with theft after he abstracted a leather belt from the baggage of a
foreign national and secreted the item in his desk at the Custom House. At no time was the
accused able to get the merchandise out of the Custom House, and it appears that he was
under observation during the entire transaction.[if !supportFootnotes][54][endif] Based apparently on
those two circumstances, the trial court had found him guilty, instead, of frustrated theft.
The Court reversed, saying that neither circumstance was decisive, and holding instead that
the accused was guilty of consummated theft, finding that all the elements of the completed
crime of theft are present.[if !supportFootnotes][55][endif] In support of its conclusion that the theft
was consummated, the Court cited three (3) decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, the
discussion of which we replicate below:
The defendant was charged with the theft of some fruit from the land of another. As he was
in the act of taking the fruit[,] he was seen by a policeman, yet it did not appear that he was
at that moment caught by the policeman but sometime later. The court said: "[x x x] The
trial court did not err [x x x ] in considering the crime as that of consummated theft instead
of frustrated theft inasmuch as nothing appears in the record showing that the policemen
who saw the accused take the fruit from the adjoining land arrested him in the act and thus
prevented him from taking full possession of the thing stolen and even its utilization by him
for an interval of time." (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, October 14, 1898.)
Defendant picked the pocket of the offended party while the latter was
hearing mass in a church. The latter on account of the
solemnity of the act, although noticing the theft, did not do
anything to prevent it. Subsequently, however, while the
defendant was still inside the church, the offended party got
back the money from the defendant. The court said that the
defendant had performed all the acts of execution and
considered the theft as consummated. (Decision of the

Supreme Court of Spain, December 1, 1897.)
The defendant penetrated into a room of a certain house

and by means of a key opened up a case, and from the case took a
small box, which was also opened with a key, from which in turn
he took a purse containing 461 reales and 20 centimos, and then he
placed the money over the cover of the case; just at this moment he
was caught by two guards who were stationed in another room
near-by. The court considered this as consummated robbery, and
said: "[x x x] The accused [x x x] having materially taken
possession of the money from the moment he took it from the
place where it had been, and having taken it with his hands with
intent to appropriate the same, he executed all the acts necessary to
constitute the crime which was thereby produced; only the act of
making use of the thing having been frustrated, which, however,
does not go to make the elements of the consummated
crime." (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, June 13, 1882.)[if
!supportFootnotes][56][endif]
It is clear from the facts of Adiao itself, and the three (3) Spanish decisions cited therein,
that the criminal actors in all these cases had been able to obtain full possession of the
personal property prior to their apprehension. The interval between the commission of the
acts of theft and the apprehension of the thieves did vary, from sometime later in the 1898
decision; to the very moment the thief had just extracted the money in a purse which had
been stored as it was in the 1882 decision; and before the thief had been able to spirit the
item stolen from the building where the theft took place, as had happened in Adiao and the
1897 decision. Still, such intervals proved of no consequence in those cases, as it was ruled
that the thefts in each of those cases was consummated by the actual possession of the
property belonging to another.
In 1929, the Court was again confronted by a claim that an accused was guilty only of
frustrated rather than consummated theft. The case is People v. Sobrevilla,[if !supportFootnotes][57]
[endif] where the accused, while in the midst of a crowd in a public market, was already able
to abstract a pocketbook from the trousers of the victim when the latter, perceiving the theft,
caught hold of the [accused]s shirt-front, at the same time shouting for a policeman; after a
struggle, he recovered his pocket-book and let go of the defendant, who was afterwards
caught by a policeman.[if !supportFootnotes][58][endif] In rejecting the contention that only frustrated
theft was established, the Court simply said, without further comment or elaboration:
We believe that such a contention is groundless. The [accused] succeeded in taking the
pocket-book, and that determines the crime of theft. If the pocket-book was afterwards
recovered, such recovery does not affect the [accuseds] criminal liability, which arose from
the [accused] having succeeded in taking the pocket-book.[if !supportFootnotes][59][endif]
If anything, Sobrevilla is consistent with Adiao and the Spanish Supreme Court cases cited
in the latter, in that the fact that the offender was able to succeed in obtaining physical
possession of the stolen item, no matter how momentary, was able to consummate the theft.
Adiao, Sobrevilla and the Spanish Supreme Court decisions cited therein contradict the
position of petitioner in this case. Yet to simply affirm without further comment would be
disingenuous, as there is another school of thought on when theft is consummated, as
reflected in the Dio and Flores decisions.
Dio was decided by the Court of Appeals in 1949, some 31 years after Adiao and 15 years
before Flores. The accused therein, a driver employed by the United States Army, had
driven his truck into the port area of the South Harbor, to unload a truckload of materials to
waiting U.S. Army personnel. After he had finished unloading, accused drove away his
truck from the Port, but as he was approaching a checkpoint of the Military Police, he was
stopped by an M.P. who inspected the truck and found therein three boxes of army rifles.
The accused later contended that he had been stopped by four men who had loaded the
boxes with the agreement that they were to meet him and retrieve the rifles after he had
passed the checkpoint. The trial court convicted accused of consummated theft, but the
Court of Appeals modified the conviction, holding instead that only frustrated theft had been
committed.
In doing so, the appellate court pointed out that the evident intent of the accused
was to let the boxes of rifles pass through the checkpoint, perhaps in the belief that as the
truck had already unloaded its cargo inside the depot, it would be allowed to pass through
the check point without further investigation or checking.[if !supportFootnotes][60][endif] This point
was deemed material and indicative that the theft had not been fully produced, for the Court
of Appeals pronounced that the fact determinative of consummation is the ability of the thief
to dispose freely of the articles stolen, even if it were more or less momentary.[if !
supportFootnotes][61][endif] Support for this proposition was drawn from a decision of the Supreme
Court of Spain dated 24 January 1888 (1888 decision), which was quoted as follows:
Considerando que para que el apoderamiento de la cosa
sustraida sea determinate de la consumacion del delito de hurto es
preciso que so haga en circunstancias tales que permitan al sustractor la
libre disposicion de aquella, siquiera sea mas o menos

momentaneamente, pues de otra suerte, dado el concepto del delito de
hurto, no puede decirse en realidad que se haya producido en toda su
extension, sin materializar demasiado el acto de tomar la cosa ajena.[if !
Integrating these considerations, the Court of Appeals then concluded:
This court is of the opinion that in the case at bar, in order to make the booty subject to the
control and disposal of the culprits, the articles stolen must first be passed through the M.P.
check point, but since the offense was opportunely discovered and the articles seized after
all the acts of execution had been performed, but before the loot came under the final
control and disposal of the looters, the offense can not be said to have been fully
consummated, as it was frustrated by the timely intervention of the guard. The offense
committed, therefore, is that of frustrated theft.[if !supportFootnotes][63][endif]
Dio thus laid down the theory that the ability of the actor to freely dispose of the items
stolen at the time of apprehension is determinative as to whether the theft is consummated
or frustrated. This theory was applied again by the Court of Appeals some 15 years later, in
Flores, a case which according to the division of the court that decided it, bore no
substantial variance between the circumstances [herein] and in [Dio].[if !supportFootnotes][64][endif]
Such conclusion is borne out by the facts in Flores. The accused therein, a checker
employed by the Luzon Stevedoring Company, issued a delivery receipt for one empty sea
van to the truck driver who had loaded the purportedly empty sea van onto his truck at the
terminal of the stevedoring company. The truck driver proceeded to show the delivery
receipt to the guard on duty at the gate of the terminal. However, the guards insisted on
inspecting the van, and discovered that the empty sea van had actually contained other
merchandise as well.[if !supportFootnotes][65][endif] The accused was prosecuted for theft qualified
by abuse of confidence, and found himself convicted of the consummated crime. Before the
Court of Appeals, accused argued in the alternative that he was guilty only of attempted
theft, but the appellate court pointed out that there was no intervening act of spontaneous
desistance on the part of the accused that literally frustrated the theft. However, the Court of
Appeals, explicitly relying on Dio, did find that the accused was guilty only of frustrated,
and not consummated, theft.
As noted earlier, the appellate court admitted it found no substantial variance
between Dio and Flores then before it. The prosecution in Flores had sought to distinguish
that case from Dio, citing a traditional ruling which unfortunately was not identified in the
decision itself. However, the Court of Appeals pointed out that the said traditional ruling
was qualified by the words is placed in a situation where [the actor] could dispose of its
contents at once.[if !supportFootnotes][66][endif] Pouncing on this qualification, the appellate court
noted that [o]bviously, while the truck and the van were still within the compound, the
petitioner could not have disposed of the goods at once. At the same time, the Court of
Appeals conceded that [t]his is entirely different from the case where a much less bulk and
more common thing as money was the object of the crime, where freedom to dispose of or
make use of it is palpably less restricted,[if !supportFootnotes][67][endif] though no further
qualification was offered what the effect would have been had that alternative circumstance
been present instead.
Synthesis of the Dio and Flores rulings is in order. The determinative characteristic
as to whether the crime of theft was produced is the ability of the actor to freely dispose of
the articles stolen, even if it were only momentary. Such conclusion was drawn from an
1888 decision of the Supreme Court of Spain which had pronounced that in determining
whether theft had been consummated, es preciso que so haga en circunstancias tales que
permitan al sustractor de aquella, siquiera sea mas o menos momentaneamente. The
qualifier siquiera sea mas o menos momentaneamente proves another important
consideration, as it implies that if the actor was in a capacity to freely dispose of the stolen
items before apprehension, then the theft could be deemed consummated. Such
circumstance was not present in either Dio or Flores, as the stolen items in both cases were
retrieved from the actor before they could be physically extracted from the guarded
compounds from which the items were filched. However, as implied in Flores, the character
of the item stolen could lead to a different conclusion as to whether there could have been
free disposition, as in the case where the chattel involved was of much less bulk and more
common x x x, [such] as money x x x.[if !supportFootnotes][68][endif]
In his commentaries, Chief Justice Aquino makes the following pointed
observation on the import of the Dio ruling:
There is a ruling of the Court of Appeals that theft is consummated when the thief is able to
freely dispose of the stolen articles even if it were more or less momentary. Or as stated in
another case[[if !supportFootnotes][69][endif]], theft is consummated upon the voluntary and
malicious taking of property belonging to another which is realized by the material
occupation of the thing whereby the thief places it under his control and in such a situation
that he could dispose of it at once. This ruling seems to have been based on Viadas opinion
that in order the theft may be consummated, es preciso que se haga en circumstancias x x x
[[if !supportFootnotes][70][endif]][if !supportFootnotes][71][endif]
In the same commentaries, Chief Justice Aquino, concluding from Adiao and other
cases, also states that [i]n theft or robbery the crime is consummated after the accused had
material possession of the thing with intent to appropriate the same, although his act of
making use of the thing was frustrated.[if !supportFootnotes][72][endif]
There are at least two other Court of Appeals rulings that are at seeming variance
with the Dio and Flores rulings. People v. Batoon[if !supportFootnotes][73][endif] involved an accused
who filled a container with gasoline from a petrol pump within view of a police detective,
who followed the accused onto a passenger truck where the arrest was made. While the trial
court found the accused guilty of frustrated qualified theft, the Court of Appeals held that
the accused was guilty of consummated qualified theft, finding that [t]he facts of the cases
of U.S. [v.] Adiao x x x and U.S. v. Sobrevilla x x x indicate that actual taking with intent to
gain is enough to consummate the crime of theft.[if !supportFootnotes][74][endif]
In People v. Espiritu,[if !supportFootnotes][75][endif] the accused had removed nine pieces of
hospital linen from a supply depot and loaded them onto a truck. However, as the truck
passed through the checkpoint, the stolen items were discovered by the Military Police
running the checkpoint. Even though those facts clearly admit to similarity with those in
Dio, the Court of Appeals held that the accused were guilty of consummated theft, as the
accused were able to take or get hold of the hospital linen and that the only thing that was
frustrated, which does not constitute any element of theft, is the use or benefit that the
thieves expected from the commission of the offense.[if !supportFootnotes][76][endif]
In pointing out the distinction between Dio and Espiritu, Reyes wryly observes that
[w]hen the meaning of an element of a felony is controversial, there is bound to arise
different rulings as to the stage of execution of that felony.[if !supportFootnotes][77][endif] Indeed, we
can discern from this survey of jurisprudence that the state of the law insofar as frustrated
theft is concerned is muddled. It fact, given the disputed foundational basis of the concept of
frustrated theft itself, the question can even be asked whether there is really such a crime in
the first place.
IV.
The Court in 1984 did finally rule directly that an accused was guilty of frustrated,
and not consummated, theft. As we undertake this inquiry, we have to reckon with the
import of this Courts 1984 decision in Empelis v. IAC.[if !supportFootnotes][78][endif]
As narrated in Empelis, the owner of a coconut plantation had espied four (4)
persons in the premises of his plantation, in the act of gathering and tying some coconuts.
The accused were surprised by the owner within the plantation as they were carrying with
them the coconuts they had gathered. The accused fled the scene, dropping the coconuts
they had seized, and were subsequently arrested after the owner reported the incident to the
police. After trial, the accused were convicted of qualified theft, and the issue they raised on
appeal was that they were guilty only of simple theft. The Court affirmed that the theft was
qualified, following Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code,[if !supportFootnotes][79][endif] but further
held that the accused were guilty only of frustrated qualified theft.
It does not appear from the Empelis decision that the issue of whether the theft was
consummated or frustrated was raised by any of the parties. What does appear, though, is
that the disposition of that issue was contained in only two sentences, which we reproduce
in full:
However, the crime committed is only frustrated qualified theft because petitioners were not
able to perform all the acts of execution which should have produced the felony as a
consequence. They were not able to carry the coconuts away from the plantation due to the
timely arrival of the owner.[if !supportFootnotes][80][endif]
No legal reference or citation was offered for this averment, whether Dio, Flores or the
Spanish authorities who may have bolstered the conclusion. There are indeed evident
problems with this formulation in Empelis.
Empelis held that the crime was only frustrated because the actors were not able to perform
all the acts of execution which should have produced the felon as a consequence.[if !
supportFootnotes][81][endif] However, per Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime is
frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution, though not producing the
felony as a result. If the offender was not able to perform all the acts of execution, the crime
is attempted, provided that the non-performance was by reason of some cause or accident
other than spontaneous desistance. Empelis concludes that the crime was
frustrated because not all of the acts of execution were performed due to the timely arrival
of the owner. However, following Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, these facts should
elicit the conclusion that the crime was only attempted, especially given that the acts were
not performed because of the timely arrival of the owner, and not because of spontaneous
desistance by the offenders.
For these reasons, we cannot attribute weight to Empelis as we consider the present petition.
Even if the two sentences we had cited actually aligned with the definitions provided in
Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, such passage bears no reflection that it is the product
of the considered evaluation of the relevant legal or jurisprudential thought. Instead, the
passage is offered as if it were sourced from an indubitable legal premise so settled it
required no further explication.
Notably, Empelis has not since been reaffirmed by the Court, or even cited as authority on
theft. Indeed, we cannot see how Empelis can contribute to our present debate, except for
the bare fact that it proves that the Court had once deliberately found an accused guilty of
frustrated theft. Even if Empelis were considered as a precedent for frustrated theft, its
doctrinal value is extremely compromised by the erroneous legal premises that inform it,
and also by the fact that it has not been entrenched by subsequent reliance.
Thus, Empelis does not compel us that it is an insurmountable given that frustrated theft is
viable in this jurisdiction. Considering the flawed reasoning behind its conclusion of
frustrated theft, it cannot present any efficacious argument to persuade us in this case.
Insofar as Empelis may imply that convictions for frustrated theft are beyond cavil in this
jurisdiction, that decision is subject to reassessment.
V.
At the time our Revised Penal Code was enacted in 1930, the 1870 Codigo Penal de Espaa
was then in place. The definition of the crime of theft, as provided then, read as follows:
Son reos de hurto:
1. Los que con nimo de lucrarse, y sin volencia o intimidacin en las

personas ni fuerza en las cosas, toman las cosas muebles
ajenas sin la voluntad de su dueo.
[endif]Los que encontrndose una cosa perdida y sabiendo quin es su
dueo se la apropriaren co intencin de lucro.
[endif]Los daadores que sustrajeren o utilizaren los frutos u objeto
del dao causado, salvo los casos previstos en los artculos 606, nm. 1.0; 607, nms, 1.0, 2.0 y
3.0; 608, nm. 1.0; 611; 613; Segundo prrafo del 617 y 618.
It was under the ambit of the 1870 Codigo Penal that the aforecited Spanish
Supreme Court decisions were handed down. However, the said code would be revised
again in 1932, and several times thereafter. In fact, under the Codigo Penal Espaol de 1995,
the crime of theft is now simply defined as [e]l que, con nimo de lucro,
tomare las cosas muebles ajenas sin la voluntad de su dueo ser castigado[if !supportFootnotes][82]
[endif]
Notice that in the 1870 and 1995 definition of theft in the penal code of Spain, la
libre disposicion of the property is not an element or a statutory characteristic of the crime.
It does appear that the principle originated and perhaps was fostered in the realm of Spanish
jurisprudence.
The oft-cited Salvador Viada adopted a question-answer form in his 1926
commentaries on the 1870 Codigo Penal de Espaa. Therein, he raised at least three
questions for the reader whether the crime of frustrated or consummated theft had occurred.
The passage cited in Dio was actually utilized by Viada to answer the question whether
frustrated or consummated theft was committed [e]l que en el momento mismo de
apoderarse de la cosa ajena, vindose sorprendido, la arroja al suelo.[if !supportFootnotes][83][endif]
Even as the answer was as stated in Dio, and was indeed derived from the 1888 decision of
the Supreme Court of Spain, that decisions factual predicate occasioning the statement was
apparently very different from Dio, for it appears that the 1888 decision involved an accused
who was surprised by the employees of a haberdashery as he was abstracting a layer of
clothing off a mannequin, and who then proceeded to throw away the garment as he fled.[if !
Nonetheless, Viada does not contest the notion of frustrated theft, and willingly
recites decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain that have held to that effect.[if !supportFootnotes]
[85][endif] A few decades later, the esteemed Eugenio Cuello Caln pointed out the inconsistent
application by the Spanish Supreme Court with respect to frustrated theft.
Hay frustracin cuando los reos fueron sorprendidos por
las guardias cuando llevaban los sacos de harino del carro que los
conducia a otro que tenan preparado, 22 febrero 1913; cuando el
resultado no tuvo efecto por la intervencin de la policia situada en
el local donde se realiz la sustraccin que impidi pudieran los reos
disponer de lo sustrado, 30 de octubre 1950. Hay "por lo menos"
frustracin, si existe apoderamiento, pero el culpale no llega a
disponer de la cosa, 12 abril 1930; hay frustracin "muy prxima"
cuando el culpable es detenido por el perjudicado acto seguido de
cometer la sustraccin, 28 febrero 1931. Algunos fallos han
considerado la existencia de frustracin cuando, perseguido el
culpable o sorprendido en el momento de llevar los efectos
hurtados, los abandona, 29 mayo 1889, 22 febrero 1913, 11 marzo
1921; esta doctrina no es admissible, stos, conforme a lo antes
expuesto, son hurtos consumados.[if !supportFootnotes][86][endif]
Ultimately, Cuello Caln attacked the very idea that frustrated theft is actually
possible:
La doctrina hoy generalmente sustentada considera que el
hurto se consuma cuando la cosa queda de hecho a la disposicin
del agente. Con este criterio coincide la doctrina sentada
ltimamente porla jurisprudencia espaola que generalmente
considera consumado el hurto cuando el culpable coge o
aprehende la cosa y sta quede por tiempo ms o menos duradero
bajo su poder. El hecho de que ste pueda aprovecharse o no de lo
hurtado es indiferente. El delito no pierde su carcter de consumado
aunque la cosa hurtada sea devuelta por el culpable o fuere
recuperada. No se concibe la frustracin, pues es muy dificil que el
que hace cuanto es necesario para la consumacin del hurto no lo
consume efectivamente, los raros casos que nuestra jurisprudencia,
muy vacilante, declara hurtos frustrados son verdaderos delitos
consumados.[if !supportFootnotes][87][endif] (Emphasis supplied)
Cuello Calns submissions cannot be lightly ignored. Unlike Viada, who was
content with replicating the Spanish Supreme Court decisions on the matter, Cuello Caln
actually set forth his own thought that questioned whether theft could truly be frustrated,
since pues es muy dificil que el que hace cuanto es necesario para la consumacin del hurto
no lo consume efectivamente. Otherwise put, it would be difficult to foresee how the
execution of all the acts necessary for the completion of the crime would not produce the
effect of theft.
This divergence of opinion convinces us, at least, that there is no weighted force in
scholarly thought that obliges us to accept frustrated theft, as proposed in Dio and Flores. A
final ruling by the Court that there is no crime of frustrated theft in this jurisdiction will not
lead to scholastic pariah, for such a submission is hardly heretical in light of Cuello Calns
position.
Accordingly, it would not be intellectually disingenuous for the Court to look at the
question from a fresh perspective, as we are not bound by the opinions of the respected
Spanish commentators, conflicting as they are, to accept that theft is capable of commission
in its frustrated stage. Further, if we ask the question whether there is a mandate of statute or
precedent that must compel us to adopt the Dio and Flores doctrines, the answer has to be in
the negative. If we did so, it would arise not out of obeisance to an inexorably higher
command, but from the exercise of the function of statutory interpretation that comes as part
and parcel of judicial review, and a function that allows breathing room for a variety of
theorems in competition until one is ultimately adopted by this Court.
V.
The foremost predicate that guides us as we explore the matter is that it lies in the
province of the legislature, through statute, to define what constitutes a particular crime in
this jurisdiction. It is the legislature, as representatives of the sovereign people, which
determines which acts or combination of acts are criminal in nature. Judicial interpretation
of penal laws should be aligned with what was the evident legislative intent, as expressed
primarily in the language of the law as it defines the crime. It is Congress, not the courts,
which is to define a crime, and ordain its punishment.[if !supportFootnotes][88][endif] The courts
cannot arrogate the power to introduce a new element of a crime which was unintended by
the legislature, or redefine a crime in a manner that does not hew to the statutory language.
Due respect for the prerogative of Congress in defining crimes/felonies constrains the Court
to refrain from a broad interpretation of penal laws where a narrow interpretation is
appropriate. The Court must take heed of language, legislative history and purpose, in order
to strictly determine the wrath and breath of the conduct the law forbids.[if !supportFootnotes][89]
[endif]
With that in mind, a problem clearly emerges with the Dio/Flores dictum. The
ability of the offender to freely dispose of the property stolen is not a constitutive element of
the crime of theft. It finds no support or extension in Article 308, whether as a descriptive or
operative element of theft or as the mens rea or actus reus of the felony. To restate what this
Court has repeatedly held: the elements of the crime of theft as provided for in Article 308
of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) that there be taking of personal property; (2) that said
property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the
taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished
without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things.[if !
Such factor runs immaterial to the statutory definition of theft, which is the taking,
with intent to gain, of personal property of another without the latters consent. While the
Dio/Flores dictum is considerate to the mindset of the offender, the statutory definition of
theft considers only the perspective of intent to gain on the part of the offender,
compounded by the deprivation of property on the part of the victim.
For the purpose of ascertaining whether theft is susceptible of commission in the
frustrated stage, the question is again, when is the crime of theft produced? There would be
all but certain unanimity in the position that theft is produced when there is deprivation of
personal property due to its taking by one with intent to gain. Viewed from that perspective,
it is immaterial to the product of the felony that the offender, once having committed all the
acts of execution for theft, is able or unable to freely dispose of the property stolen since the
deprivation from the owner alone has already ensued from such acts of execution. This
conclusion is reflected in Chief Justice Aquinos commentaries, as earlier cited, that [i]n theft
or robbery the crime is consummated after the accused had material possession of the thing
with intent to appropriate the same, although his act of making use of the thing was
frustrated.[if !supportFootnotes][91][endif]
It might be argued, that the ability of the offender to freely dispose of the property
stolen delves into the concept of taking itself, in that there could be no true taking until the
actor obtains such degree of control over the stolen item. But even if this were correct, the
effect would be to downgrade the crime to its attempted, and not frustrated stage, for it
would mean that not all the acts of execution have not been completed, the taking not
having been accomplished. Perhaps this point could serve as fertile ground for future
discussion, but our concern now is whether there is indeed a crime of frustrated theft, and
such consideration proves ultimately immaterial to that question. Moreover, such issue will
not apply to the facts of this particular case. We are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that
the taking by the petitioner was completed in this case. With intent to gain, he acquired
physical possession of the stolen cases of detergent for a considerable period of time that he
was able to drop these off at a spot in the parking lot, and long enough to load these onto a
taxicab.
Indeed, we have, after all, held that unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is deemed
complete from the moment the offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has no
opportunity to dispose of the same.[if !supportFootnotes][92][endif] And long ago, we asserted in
People v. Avila:[if !supportFootnotes][93][endif]
x x x [T]he most fundamental notion in the crime of theft is the taking of the thing to be
appropriated into the physical power of the thief, which idea is qualified by other
conditions, such as that the taking must be effected animo lucrandi and without the consent
of the owner; and it will be here noted that the definition does not require that the taking
should be effected against the will of the owner but merely that it should be without his
consent, a distinction of no slight importance.[if !supportFootnotes][94][endif]
Insofar as we consider the present question, unlawful taking is most material in
this respect. Unlawful taking, which is the deprivation of ones personal property, is the
element which produces the felony in its consummated stage. At the same time, without
unlawful taking as an act of execution, the offense could only be attempted theft, if at all.
With these considerations, we can only conclude that under Article 308 of the
Revised Penal Code, theft cannot have a frustrated stage. Theft can only be attempted or
consummated.
Neither Dio nor Flores can convince us otherwise. Both fail to consider that once
the offenders therein obtained possession over the stolen items, the effect of the felony has
been produced as there has been deprivation of property. The presumed inability of the
offenders to freely dispose of the stolen property does not negate the fact that the owners
have already been deprived of their right to possession upon the completion of the taking.
Moreover, as is evident in this case, the adoption of the rule that the inability of the
offender to freely dispose of the stolen property frustrates the theft would introduce a
convenient defense for the accused which does not reflect any legislated intent,[if !
supportFootnotes][95][endif] since the Court would have carved a viable means for offenders to seek
a mitigated penalty under applied circumstances that do not admit of easy classification. It is
difficult to formulate definite standards as to when a stolen item is susceptible to free
disposal by the thief. Would this depend on the psychological belief of the offender at the
time of the commission of the crime, as implied in Dio?
Or, more likely, the appreciation of several classes of factual circumstances such as
the size and weight of the property, the location of the property, the number and identity of
people present at the scene of the crime, the number and identity of people whom the
offender is expected to encounter upon fleeing with the stolen property, the manner in which
the stolen item had been housed or stored; and quite frankly, a whole lot more. Even the
fungibility or edibility of the stolen item would come into account, relevant as that would be
on whether such property is capable of free disposal at any stage, even after the taking has
been consummated.
All these complications will make us lose sight of the fact that beneath all the
colorful detail, the owner was indeed deprived of property by one who intended to produce
such deprivation for reasons of gain. For such will remain the presumed fact if frustrated
theft were recognized, for therein, all of the acts of execution, including the taking, have
been completed. If the facts establish the non-completion of the taking due to these peculiar
circumstances, the effect could be to downgrade the crime to the attempted stage, as not all
of the acts of execution have been performed. But once all these acts have been executed,
the taking has been completed, causing the unlawful deprivation of property, and ultimately
the consummation of the theft.
Maybe the Dio/Flores rulings are, in some degree, grounded in common sense. Yet
they do not align with the legislated framework of the crime of theft. The Revised Penal
Code provisions on theft have not been designed in such fashion as to accommodate said
rulings. Again, there is no language in Article 308 that expressly or impliedly allows that the
free disposition of the items stolen is in any way determinative of whether the crime of theft
has been produced. Dio itself did not rely on Philippine laws or jurisprudence to bolster its
conclusion, and the later Flores was ultimately content in relying on Dio alone for legal
support. These cases do not enjoy the weight of stare decisis, and even if they did, their
erroneous appreciation of our law on theft leave them susceptible to reversal. The same
holds true of Empilis, a regrettably stray decision which has not since found favor from this
Court.
We thus conclude that under the Revised Penal Code, there is no crime of
frustrated theft. As petitioner has latched the success of his appeal on our acceptance of the
Dio and Flores rulings, his petition must be denied, for we decline to adopt said rulings in
our jurisdiction. That it has taken all these years for us to recognize that there can be no
frustrated theft under the Revised Penal Code does not detract from the correctness of this
conclusion. It will take considerable amendments to our Revised Penal Code in order that
frustrated theft may be recognized. Our deference to Viada yields to the higher reverence for
legislative intent.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

Associate Justice
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 126148. May 5, 1999]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. AGAPITO QUIANOLA y
ESCUADRO and EDUARDO ESCUADRO y FLORO, accused-appellants.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
In People vs. Orita,[if !supportFootnotes][1][endif] this Court has declared that the crime of
frustrated rape is non-existent. The pronouncement, notwithstanding, on 01 March 1996,
more than six years after the promulgation of the decision in Orita, the Regional Trial Court
("RTC") of Cebu City, Branch 14, has convicted accused Agapito Quianola y Escuadro and
Eduardo Escuadro y Floro, herein appellants, of the crime of frustrated rape, principally on
the strength of People vs. Eriia[if !supportFootnotes][2][endif] which this Court, in the Orita decision,
has considered to be a stray decision. The 1st March 1996 decision of the RTC of Cebu City
imposing upon each of the accused the penalty of reclusion perpetua of Forty (40) Years,
has been brought up by them to this Court. The appeal opens up the whole case for review.
The information, dated 06 April 1994, charging the two accused with the crime of rape
reads:
That on or about the 5th day of March, 1994, at about 11:30 oclock in the evening, more or
less, at Barangay Tangil, Municipality of Dumanjug, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, with lewd design and by means of force
and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie and succeed in
having carnal knowledge of the offended party Catalina Carciller, fifteen (15) years of age,
"CONTRARY TO LAW.[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif]
Already in force and effect at the time of the averred commission of the crime are the
provisions of Republic Act No. 7659, amending the Revised Penal Code, which define and
penalize rape, as follows:
ART. 335. When and how rape is committed. Rape is committed by having carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
"1. By using force or intimidation;
"2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
"3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
"The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
"Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or
more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
"When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty
shall be death.
"When the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is committed by reason or on the
occasion thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
"When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall
be death.
"The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
following attendant circumstances:
"1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil
degree, or the common-law-spouse of the parent of the victim.
"2. when the victim is under the custody of the police or military authorities.
"3. when the rape is committed in full view of the husband, parent, any of the children or
other relatives within the third degree of consanguinity.
"4. when the victim is a religious or a child below seven (7) years old.
"5. when the offender knows that he is afflicted with Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome (AIDS) disease.
"6. when committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the
Philippine National Police or any law enforcement agency.
"7. when by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered permanent
physical mutilation.
Duly assisted by counsel, the two accused pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
During the trial that ensued, the prosecution and the defense presented their respective
versions of the case.
The story of prosecution was the first to be told.
Catalina Carciller, her cousin 15-year-old Rufo Ginto and another male companion
named Richard Diaz, went to attend a dance at around ten oclock in the evening of 05
March 1994 in Sitio Bangag, Tangil, Dumanjug, Cebu. Catalina, born on 09 November
1978,[if !supportFootnotes][4][endif] was just then fifteen (15) years and four (4) months old. She was
a student at the Bito-on National Vocational School at Dumanjug, Cebu. About an hour later,
they left the party and were soon on their way home. The three unsuspecting youngsters
stopped momentarily to rest at a waiting shed beside the Tangil Elementary School. Accused
Agapito Quianola, a.k.a. Petoy, and accused Eduardo Escuadro, a.k.a. Botiquil, who were
both armed with guns, suddenly turned up. Quianola, beaming his flashlight at the trio while
Escuadro stood by, focused his attention on Catalina. Quianola announced that he and
Escuadro were members of the New Peoples Army ("NPA"). Quianola instructed Escuadro
to take care of the male companions of Catalina while he (Quianola) held the latter at
gunpoint.
Escuadro brought Diaz and Ginto outside the waiting shed area. He ordered the duo to
lie face down on the ground and then urinated at them. While Escuadro was fixing the
zipper of his pants, Diaz and Ginto were able to escape and ran away. Meanwhile, Quianola,
with his gun pointed at Catalina, forcibly brought her towards the nearby school. Catalina
heard a gunfire but Quianola assured her that it was only an exploding firecracker. When
Escuadro again showed up, Catalina asked about her two friends. Quianola replied that he
had ordered them to go home. Catalina begged that she herself be allowed to leave.
Pretending to agree, they walked the path towards the road behind the school. Then,
unsuspectingly, Quianola forced Catalina to sit on the ground. She resisted but Quianola,
pointing his gun at her, warned her that if she would not accede to what he wanted, he
would kill her. Catalina started to cry. Quianola told Escuadro to remove her denim pants.
Catalina struggled to free herself from Escuadro's hold but to no avail. Escuadro ultimately
succeeded in undressing her. Quianola unzipped his pants and laid on top of her while
Escuadro held her legs. Quianola started to pump, to push and pull[if !supportFootnotes][5][endif]
even as Catalina still tried desperately to free herself from him. She felt his organ "on the
lips of (her) genitalia.[if !supportFootnotes][6][endif] When Quianola had satisfied his lust, Escuadro
took his turn by placing himself on top of Catalina. Catalina could feel the sex organ of
Escuadro on the lips of (her) vulva[if !supportFootnotes][7][endif] while he made a push and pull
movement. Quianola, who stood by, kept on smoking a cigarette.
Escuadro and Quianola scampered immediately after Catalina's ordeal. Failing to find
her pair of pants and panty, Catalina was left wearing only her T-shirt and brassieres.
Catalina just then sat down, not knowing what to do, until she finally started to run home
fearing that she might be followed. Upon reaching home, Catalina went upstairs and, afraid
that the culprits would still come after her, hid herself behind the door. Baffled by Catalina's
strange behavior, her mother and her elder sister took turns in interrogating her. Catalina
finally said that she was raped but she would not reveal the names of the persons who had
committed the dastardly act because of their threat.
Guillermo Zozobrado learned from his wife, Catalinas sister, that Catalina had been
raped. He promptly repaired to the municipal hall of Dumanjug to report the crime.
Policemen were immediately dispatched to the Carcillers residence. Still in a state of shock,
Catalina initially kept mum about it; later, when the police officers returned at daytime, she
was able to respond to questions and to disclose that Petoy, referring to Agapito Quianola,
and Botiquil, the other accused Eduardo Escuadro, were the persons who ravished her. The
officers later invited her to the police station to identify a suspect whom she positively
identified to be Botiquil or Eduardo Escuadro.
Living Case Report No. 94-MI-7,[if !supportFootnotes][8][endif] prepared by Dr. Tomas P. Refe,
medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation ("NBI") of Region 7, Central
Visayas, who conducted the physical examination of Catalina on 07 March 1994, showed
that there was no evidence of extragenital physical injury noted on the body of the Subject.[if
!supportFootnotes][9][endif] The genital examination yielded the following findings on the victim:
Pubic hairs, fully grown, moderately dense. Labiae mejora and minora, both coaptated.
Fourchette, tense. Vestibular mucosa, pinkish. Hymen, moderately thick, wide, intact.
Hymenal orifice, annular, admits a tube 1.8 cms. in diameter with moderate resistance.
Vaginal walls, tight and rogusities, prominent.[if !supportFootnotes][10][endif] (Italics supplied.)
The report concluded that the hymenal orifice, about 1.8 cms. in diameter, was so small as
to preclude complete penetration of an average-size adult penis in erection without
producing laceration.[if !supportFootnotes][11][endif]
Against the evidence submitted by the prosecution, the accused, in their defense,
interposed alibi, ill motive on the part of an "uncle" of the complainant, and insufficient
identification.
Accused Agapito Quianola, a member of the Philippine National Police stationed at
Naga, Cebu, testified that it was his day-off on 05 March 1994. At about 8:30 a.m., he and
his wife, Leticia, who had just arrived in Naga from Cebu City, proceeded to the house of
his parents in Panla-an, Dumanjug, to attend to the construction of their unfinished house.
Quianola helped Vidal Laojan and Nicasio Arnaiz in cementing the kitchen floor of their
house. The work was finished at around 11:00 oclock in the evening. After Vidal and
Nicasio had gone home, Quianola went to bed with his wife around midnight until the
following morning of 06 March 1994. He denied having been in the company of his coaccused, Escuadro a.k.a. Botiquil, at any time during the whole day and night of 05 March
1994. According to him, Guillermo Zozobrado, Catalinas brother-in-law, concocted the rape
charge to get even with him because of an incident in August 1993 at a fiesta dance in upper
Tangil, Panla-an, when George Camaso, the husband of his sister Jinga, got into trouble
with Samuel Escuadro.
Quianola tried to pacify George Camaso who was then drunk but Camaso suddenly hit
him. He parried the blow and slapped Camaso on the face. Zozobrado joined the fray and
tried to hit Quianola but because Zozobrado was drunk, he stumbled when Quianola had
pushed him.[if !supportFootnotes][12][endif] He admitted that he had no misunderstanding of any kind
with the complainant and her parents themselves.
Leticia Quianola, the wife of accused Agapito Quianola, testified to attest to her
husband's good moral character and to corroborate his testimony. Leticia said that after the
workers had left their house at around midnight, she and appellant talked for a while and
then made love. Vidal Laojan, the carpenter, was presented to state that Quianola was at
home helping the carpenters until past 11:00 oclock on the night of the incident. Nicasio
Arnaiz, a farmer and stone cutter, added that work in the Quianola house had started late in
the morning of 05 March 1994 since they still waited for Quianola and his wife Pritsy to
arrive. Work in the house, he said, had stopped at about past 11:00 oclock that night.
Accused Eduardo Escuadro, a.k.a. Botiquil, declared that at about seven oclock in the
evening of 05 March 1994, he and Pablito Cuizon, Jr., went fishing in Tangil, Dumanjug,
Cebu, until about ten oclock that evening. After partaking of supper at around 11:30 p.m.,
they had a drinking spree and went to bed at 12:00 midnight, waking up at 6:30 a.m. the
following day. He denied having been in the company of Quianola and insisted that the rape
charge had been the result of a mere mistaken identity. Pablito Cuizon, Jr., corroborated
Escuadros story about their being together up until they parted company after a drinking
spree.
The defense also presented the two police officers, PO2 William Beltran and SPO2
Liberato Mascarinas, Jr., who took part in the investigation of the crime, and Margarito
Villaluna, a suspect at the early stages of the police investigation who was in the frequent
company of the accused. According to PO2 Beltran, barangay tanods Gilly and George
Zozobrado reported the rape incident to him at midnight of 05 March 1994. He entered the
report in the temporary blotter because the suspect was unknown then.[if !supportFootnotes][13][endif]
Accompanied by the two tanods, he went to the residence of the victim and when he asked
Catalina if she was able to recognize the malefactors, she kept silent and continued crying.
SPO2 Liberato Mascarinas, Jr., asserted that, in the early morning of 06 March 1994, Gilly
and George Zozobrado went to the police station and named Pitoy Quianola, Margarito
Villaluna and Batiquil or Escuadro as being the suspects in the rape incident. While on their
way to the latter's respective residences, the team met Catalina Carciller and party who were
themselves about to repair to the police headquarters. Mascarinas asked Catalina about the
identities of the rapists. She named "Pitoy Quianola but said she did not know the names of
the other persons although she could recognize them by face. Botiquil was later brought to
the police station. Pitoy Quianola by that time had already gone to Naga. Margarito
Villaluna declared that he had been in Panla-an, Negros Oriental, from 05 March 1994 until
09 March 1994, harvesting corn. His sister, Mercy Villaluna, testified that, in the morning of
06 March 1994, policemen in the company of barangay tanods, including Gilly Zozobrado
and his son Marcelo, came to their house looking for her brother Margarito. Shortly after the
group had left, another policeman, in the company of one Erwin Quirante also came looking
for her brother. The arrival of the policemen prompted her to verify from the Coast Guard
whether her brother had indeed left for Negros Oriental. She was told that her brother was in
the boat that departed for Negros in early dawn of 02 March 1994. Still unsatisfied with the
result of her queries, Mercy went to Guinholngan where she met Margarito.
Following the trial and submission of the case for decision, the court a quo,[if !
supportFootnotes][14][endif] on 01 March 1996, found the two accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of "frustrated rape" and sentenced them accordingly; thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby finds guilty beyond reasonable doubt
the two accused Agapito `Petoy Quianola and Eduardo Escuadro, alias `Batiquil, as
principals by direct participation and indispensable cooperation of the frustrated rape of the
complaining witness Catalina 'Cathy' Carciller, and considering the attendance in the
commission of the crime of the six (6) aggravating circumstances aforementioned, not offset
by any mitigating circumstance, hereby sentences these two accused individually to
Reclusion Perpetua of Forty (40) Years, plus all the accessory penalties prescribed by law,
and to pay the offended party civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 each.
"The Court also hereby recommends that under no circumstance should the two accused be
granted parole or conditional or absolute pardon, in view of the extreme moral turpitude and
perversity which they exhibited in the commission of the crime not until they shall have
served at least thirty (30) years of the full range of forty (40) years of reclusion perpetua
meted out against them in this case. They should be interdicted for that length of time from
the usual and normal liasons (sic) and dealings with their fellowmen and their community so
as to protect the latter from their pernicious and insidious examples. This is the most
generous and charitable recommendation that the Court can make for these two malefactors,
short of imposing upon them the supreme penalty of death, which the Court in other times
and conditions might have been compelled, as a matter of inexorable duty, to mete out
against them, in obedience to the implacable and peremptory demands and dictates of
retributive justice.
"Costs shall also be taxed against the two accused.
"SO ORDERED.[if !supportFootnotes][15][endif]
The trial court ruled that the accused were liable for the crime of frustrated rape with
an eye to extending to the two accused the benefit of the principle that in case of doubt
criminal justice naturally leans in favor of the milder form of penalty[if !supportFootnotes][16][endif]
but that, because of the existence of at least six (6) aggravating circumstances,[if !
supportFootnotes][17][endif] not offset by any mitigating circumstance,[if !supportFootnotes][18][endif] the
accused should each be meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua. It explained:
Now, the crime of rape had it been consummated and had it been committed with the
attendance of the above-mentioned aggravating circumstances, with absolutely no offsetting
mitigating circumstances, ought to be punished with the mandatory penalty of death under
the pertinent provisions of Section 11 and 23 of Republic Act No. 7659, which amended
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, and further amplified the aggravating circumstances
enumerated in Article 14 of the same code. But because the crime committed here is
'merely' frustrated rape for the reasons heretofore discussed, attended by the aforementioned
six aggravating circumstances, not offset by even one mitigating circumstance, the proper
penalty to be imposed upon the two principals, the two accused herein, both co-conspirators,
by direct participation and indispensable cooperation, of the frustrated rape, should be one
degree lower than the indivisible afflictive penalty of death, which is also the indivisible
afflictive penalty of reclusion perpetua which, under Section 21 of the amendatory statute,
shall range from twenty years and one day to forty years.[if !supportFootnotes][19][endif]
In their appeal to this court, the two convicted accused interposed the following
assignment of errors:
"I. THE COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE INCONSISTENCIES OF THE
PROSECUTION WITNESSES WHICH IF THOROUGHLY CONSIDERED COULD
HAVE ALTERED THE DECISION IN FAVOR OF THE ACCUSED.
"II. THE COURT ERRED IN BELIEVING THE TESTIMONY OF COMPLAINING
WITNESS CARCILLER EVEN IF THE SAME WERE CLOUDED WITH GRAVE
INCONSISTENCIES.
"III. THE COURT ERRED BY DISREGARDING THE TESTIMONIES OF ACCUSED
AND BY DISMISSING IT AS WEAK ALIBIS.
"IV. THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO CONSIDER THE REBUTTAL EVIDENCE
OF DEFENSE WITNESSES EVEN IF THE SAME WERE NOT CONTROVERTED.
"V. THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE WEIGHT TO THE TESTIMONIES OF
THE POLICEMEN WHICH WERE UNCONTROVERTED AND WITH PRESUMPTION
OF REGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES.
"VI. THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF FRUSTRATED
RAPE AND OF SENTENCING THEM TO 40 YEARS OF RECLUSION PERPETUA."[if !
In reviewing rape cases, this Court must again say that it has been continually guided
by the principles (a) that an accusation of rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to
prove, but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; (b) that in
view of the intrinsic nature of the crime which usually involves only two persons, the
testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (c) that the
evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to
draw strength from the weakness of the evidence of the defense.[if !supportFootnotes][21][endif]
Expectedly, courts would scrupulously examine the testimony of the complainant with the
thought always in mind that the conviction of the accused would have to depend heavily on
the credibility of the offended woman. It is not much different in this instance for, at bottom,
appellants assail the credibility of the prosecution witnesses, particularly that of the
complainant, in seeking a reversal of the judgment of conviction.
The doctrine, then again, is that the findings of the trial court on credibility are entitled
to highest respect and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any clear showing
that the trial court has overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied facts or circumstances of
weight and substance that could have consequential effects. The stringency with which
appellate tribunals have observed this rule is predicated on the undisputed vantage of the
trial court in the evaluation and appreciation of testimonial evidence.[if !supportFootnotes][22][endif]
In assailing Catalinas credibility, as against the assessment made by the trial court
which has described the victim's testimony to be impressed with candor, spontaneity and
naturalness, appellants theorize that the sexual intercourse, if indeed true, could have only
been committed against Catalina in a sitting position, contrary to her declaration of having
been made to lie on the ground, because her T-shirt, marked Exhibit E, is not tainted with
mud at all especially the back if she were made to lie down.[if !supportFootnotes][23][endif] The Court
finds this so-called incongruity committed by the complainant to be a feeble attempt to
discredit her testimony. The Court is convinced of the sexual assault made against her. Here
follows the testimony of Catalina on this score.
Q You said that you were forced by Agapito Quianola to sit down, where were you forced to
sit down, in what particular place or area?
"A Just behind the back of the school.
"Q You were forced to sit down on the ground?
"A Yes.
"Q In effect did you sit down as ordered by him?
"A I resisted.
"COURT:
"Q How did you resist?
"A I said I will not sit down.
"TRIAL PROS. NAZARENO:
"Q What did Agapito Quianola do, if any, when you resisted?
"A He pointed his gun to me.
"Q When he pointed a gun at you, referring to Agapito Quianola, what did he say?
"A He said that if I will not accede to what he wanted me to do and if I will shout, he will
kill me.
"Q What did you do when you heard those words coming from Agapito Quianola?
"A I cried.
"Q When you cried what did Agapito Quianola do, if any?
"A He ordered Eduardo Escuadro to remove my pants and panty.
"COURT:
"Q Why what were you wearing at that time?
"A Pants.
"Q What kind of pants?
"A Denim.
"Q Now, after Agapito Quianola ordered Eduardo Escuadro to remove your pants and panty
what did Eduardo Escuadro do, if any?
"A He did what Agapito Quianola commanded him.
"COURT:
"Q How about you, what what (sic) were you doing at that time?
"A I cried and tried to free myself.
"Q Now, when Eduardo Escuadro removed your pants and panty where was Agapito
Quianola and what did Agapito Quianola do?
"A He unzipped his pants.
"Q After that what happened?

In effect, were your pants and panty removed by Eduardo Escuadro?
"A Yes.
"Q Now, you said Agapito Quianola opened his fly or unzipped his pants, when Agapito
Quianola already unzipped his pants, what did he do?
"A He approached me and lay on top of me.
"Q When Agapito Quianola approached you and laid on top of you, what did Eduardo
Escuadro do?
"A He was holding on to my legs.
"Q Then what happened after that?
"A Agapito Quianola started to pump, to push and pull.
"Q What did you do when Agapito Quianola was already on top of you and made a push and
pull on you?
"A I struggled to free myself.
"Q After that what happened when Agapito Quianola was already on top of you and kept on
making a push and pull?
"A Eduardo Escuadro took his turn.
"Q What do you mean by took his turn, please specify what did Escuadro do? He did what
Agapito had just done to you?
"COURT:
"Q What did Agapito Quianola do to you actually?
"A He lay on top of me and did a push and pull movement.
"Q When Agapito Quianola lay on top of you and made a push and pull movement, do you
mean to say that he inserted his penis into your vagina?
"A I felt something hard on the lips of my genitals.
"Q What is this something hard that you felt that touched the lips of your vagina or vulva?
"A His organ or penis.
"Q When Agapito Quianola unzipped his pants, did you see his penis?
"A Yes.
"Q You also said that Eduardo Escuadro took his turn and laid on top of you and made a
push and pull on you, specifically what did Eduardo Escuadro do?
"A The same as Agapito did, he was doing the push and pull movement.
"Q What did you feel when Eduardo Escuadro was already on top of you and made a push
and pull on you?
"A I held my breath.
"Q Did you see the penis of Eduardo Escuadro?
"A No.
"Q Now, did you feel that the penis of Escuadro was inserted into your vagina?
"A I felt it on the lips of my vulva.[if !supportFootnotes][24][endif]
The fact that she must have been lying down when violated has even more been made clear
by the defense on cross-examination. Thus:
Q Did you say any testimony in the direct that you were made to lie on the ground at the
time when you were raped by these two accused?
"A They pointed a gun at me and ordered me to lie down.
"Q Lie on the ground?

"A Yes.[if !supportFootnotes][25][endif]
And on why her T-shirt was no longer soiled with mud when presented in court,
Catalina creditably explained that when it was offered in evidence, she had already dusted
and rid it of grass particles. At all events, whether appellants spent their lust on Catalina in a
sitting position or lying down would not be of any real moment for what remained clear,
established rather convincingly by the prosecution, was that appellants had forced carnal
knowledge of the victim.
The reliance being made by appellants on the affidavit of Catalina in order to discredit
her is likewise futile. The Court has consistently ruled that discrepancies between the
statement of an affiant in an affidavit and those made on the witness stand do not necessarily
downgrade testimonial evidence. Ex parte affidavits are usually incomplete and frequently
prepared by an administering officer and cast in the latters language and understanding of
what the affiant has said. Quite frequently, the affiant would simply sign the affidavit after it
has been read to him or to her.[if !supportFootnotes][26][endif]
Not much differently could be said of Catalinas identification of appellants as being
her ravishers. On the witness stand, Catalina explained that while she gave appellant
Escuadros nickname Botiquil to the investigating police officer, the latter did not mention
that name in the affidavit because, according to the officer, the affidavit was merely a
shortcut.[if !supportFootnotes][27][endif] In her testimony, she was categorical that she had known
appellants even before the rape incident. She knew that appellant Quianola was a policeman
and a "popular maldito (nasty) in the locality.[if !supportFootnotes][28][endif] Catalina knew that
appellant Escuadro, a resident of Punla-an not far from her own abode, was commonly
known as Batiquil (Botiquil). She could not have been mistaken in the identification of the
culprits since appellants themselves held a flashlight which they used that added to the
illumination shed by a fluorescent lamp and two bulbs on the side of a house only some
meters away.
As regards the allegation of appellants that the testimony of Catalina contradicted in
certain respects that of prosecution witness Rufo Ginto, suffice it to say that the testimony
of Rufo Ginto (who was noted by the trial court not to be an intelligent witness[if !
supportFootnotes][29][endif]) was merely corroborative in nature and neither dealt with the actual
commission of the crime nor delved on material points.
Catalinas candid and straightforward narration of the two sexual assaults perpetrated
on her on the night of the incident unmistakably deserves credence. It is unbelievable that a
young barrio lass would concoct a tale of defloration, publicly admit having been ravished
and her honor tainted, allow the examination of her private parts, and undergo all the trouble
and inconvenience, not to mention the trauma and scandal of a public trial, had she not in
fact been raped and truly moved to protect and preserve her honor, as well as to obtain
justice, for the wicked acts committed against her.[if !supportFootnotes][30][endif] There is no
plausible reason why Catalina should testify against appellants, imputing upon them so
grave a crime as rape if it did not happen. This Court has consistently held that where there
is no evidence to show any dubious reason or improper motive why a prosecution witness
should testify falsely against the accused or implicate him in a serious offense, the testimony
deserves faith and credit.[if !supportFootnotes][31][endif] So, also, the Court has repeatedly said that
the lone testimony of the victim in a rape case, if credible, is enough to sustain a conviction.
The positive identification of appellants as being the perpetrators of the crime

effectively effaces their alibi.[if !supportFootnotes][33][endif] The rule is that affirmative testimony is
far weightier than a mere denial, especially when it comes from the mouth of a credible
witness.[if !supportFootnotes][34][endif] Moreover, alibi might be aptly considered only when an
accused has been shown to be in some other place at the crucial time and that it would have
been physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis or its immediate vicinity at
the time of the commission of the crime.[if !supportFootnotes][35][endif]
In the context it is used in the Revised Penal Code, carnal knowledge, unlike its
ordinary connotation of sexual intercourse, does not necessarily require that the vagina be
penetrated or that the hymen be ruptured.[if !supportFootnotes][36][endif] The crime of rape is deemed
consummated even when the mans penis merely enters the labia or lips of the female
organ[if !supportFootnotes][37][endif] or, as once so said in a case, by the mere touching of the
external genitalia by a penis capable of consummating the sexual act.[if !supportFootnotes][38][endif]
In People vs. Escober,[if !supportFootnotes][39][endif] in convicting a father of having raped twice his
11-year-old daughter, the Court has said:
While the evidence may not show full penetration on both occasions of rape, the slightest
penetration is enough to consummate the offense. In fact, there was vulva penetration in
both cases. The fact that the hymen was intact upon examination does not belie rape for a
broken hymen is not an essential element of rape; nor does the fact that the victim has
remained a virgin negate the crime. What is fundamental is that the entrance, or at least the
introduction, of the male organ into the labia of the pudendum is proved. As in the case at
bar, it can be said that there was penetration, although incomplete, and it was sufficient to
prove carnal knowledge of a child under twelve years of age. A medical examination is not
an indispensable element in a prosecution for rape. The accused may be convicted on the
sole basis of complainants testimony, if credible, and the findings of the medico-legal
officer do not disprove the commission of rape.
"There are no half measures or even quarter measures nor is their gravity graduated by the
inches of entry. Partial penile penetration is as serious as full penetration. The rape is
deemed consummated in either case. In a manner of speaking, bombardment of the
drawbridge is invasion enough even if the troops do not succeed in entering the castle.[if !
supportFootnotes][40][endif] (Italics supplied.)
In another case, People vs. Gabayron,[if !supportFootnotes][41][endif] where the accused has been
found guilty of raping his daughter, then less than twelve years old, the Court has observed:
Accused-appellant draws attention to the fact that based on the medico-legal findings, there
is no showing that his daughters hymen was penetrated, nor was there any evidence of
injuries inflicted. However, jurisprudence is well-settled to the effect that for rape to be
consummated, rupture of the hymen is not necessary, nor is it necessary that the vagina
sustained a laceration especially if the complainant is a young girl. The medical examination
merely stated that the smallness of the vaginal orifice only precludes COMPLETE
penetration. This does not mean that rape has not been committed. The fact that there was
no deep penetration of the victims vagina and that her hymen was intact does not negate
rape, since this crime is committed even with the slightest penetration of a womans sex
organ. Presence of a laceration in the vagina is not an essential prerequisite to prove that a
victim has been raped. Research in medicine even points out that negative findings are of no
significance, since the hymen may not be torn despite repeated coitus. In fact, many cases of
pregnancy have been reported in women with unruptured hymen. Entry of the labia or lips
of the female organ merely, without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina, is
sufficient to warrant conviction. What must be proven in the crime of rape is merely the
introduction of the male organ into the labia of the pudendum and not the full penetration of
the complainants private part. As we held in Baculi: 'there could still be a finding of rape
even if despite the repeated intercourse over a period of four years the complainant still
retained an intact hymen without signs of injury.' In the case at bench, Summers testimony
has established without a doubt that accused-appellants organ managed to come into contact
with her vagina, enough to cause her pain.[if !supportFootnotes][42][endif] (Italics supplied.)
In its recent holding in People vs. Echegaray,[if !supportFootnotes][43][endif] the Court has declared
that a mere knocking at the doors of the pudenda, so to speak, by the accused's penis
suffices to constitute the crime of rape as full entry into the victims vagina is not required to
sustain a conviction.
The trial court, in convicting appellants only of frustrated rape, ruled that there was no
"conclusive evidence of penetration of the genital organ of the offended party,[if !supportFootnotes]
[44][endif] in that: (a) Catalina had admitted that she did not spread her legs and (b) the
medico-legal officers findings showed she did not sustain any extragenital injuries and her
hymenal orifice was so small that an erect average-size penis would not have completely
penetrated it without causing laceration. It would seem that the trial court failed to consider
Catalinas testimony in its entirety; she testified:
Q And when he mounted on top of you Escuadro was holding on to your two feet and all the
time that he (Quianola) was making a push and pull on you, Escuadro was holding on to
your two feet?
"A. Yes.
"COURT:
"Q Your two feet?
"A Yes.
"ATTY. CREER:
"Q Now, in other words, since your two feet were held and Eduardo Escuadro was waving
(sic [moving]) slightly to your left, as you demonstrated, your two feet became closer to
each other, it could not be spread?
"A I was still struggling at that time to free myself and I do not know whether my legs were
spread out or not.
"Q Did you spread your legs?
"A No.
"Q Since you did not spread your legs and Quianola was on top of you, did you not bother
to pull your legs, kick the one holding it and pushed Quianola or do any harm to him?
"A No, because I was already frightened considering that there were two of them and they
were armed.[if !supportFootnotes][45][endif]
This testimony would indicate that Catalina, considering her struggle to free herself,
understandably failed to notice whether her legs were spread apart or close together during
her ordeal. What she did distinctly recall, however, was that Escuadro had kept holding both
her legs when Quianola took her. Thus -
Q At that time when he unzipped and your hands were free, did you not attempt to hold his
penis forcibly so that he will refrain from raping you?
"A I was not able to think of that because of my fear, and besides that Eduardo Escuadro
was holding on to both my legs.
"Q Now, if Eduardo Escuadro was holding on both your two legs how was Quianola able to
place himself on top of you?
"A It was because Eduardo Escuadro had already released my hands and Quianola was the
one holding on to it already, afterwards Eduardo Escuadro transferred to hold both my legs.
Let it be said once again that, as the Revised Penal Code presently so stands, there is
no such crime as frustrated rape. In People vs. Orita,[if !supportFootnotes][47][endif] the Court has
explicitly pronounced:
Clearly, in the crime of rape, from the moment the offender has carnal knowledge of his
victim, he actually attains his purpose and, from that moment also all the essential elements
of the offense have been accomplished. Nothing more is left to be done by the offender,
because he has performed the last act necessary to produce the crime. Thus, the felony is
consummated. In a long line of cases (People vs. Oscar, 48 Phil. 527; People vs. Hernandez,
49 Phil. 980; People vs. Royeras, G.R. No. L-31886, April 29, 1974, 56 SCRA 666; People
vs. Amores, G.R. No. L-32996, August 21, 1974, 58 SCRA 505), We have set the uniform
rule that for the consummation of rape, perfect penetration is not essential. Any penetration
of the female organ by the male organ is sufficient. Entry of the labia or lips of the female
organ, without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina is sufficient to warrant
conviction. Necessarily, rape is attempted if there is no penetration of the female organ
(People vs. Tayaba, 62 Phil. 559; People vs. Rabadan, et al., 53 Phil. 694; United States vs.
Garcia, 9 Phil. 434) because not all acts of execution was performed. The offender merely
commenced the commission of a felony directly by overt acts. Taking into account the
nature, elements and manner of execution of the crime of rape and jurisprudence on the
matter, it is hardly conceivable how the frustrated stage in rape can ever be committed.
"Of course, We are aware of our earlier pronouncement in the case of People vs. Eriia, 50
Phil. 998 [1927] where We found the offender guilty of frustrated rape there being no
conclusive evidence of penetration of the genital organ of the offended party. However, it
appears that this is a 'stray' decision inasmuch as it has not been reiterated in Our subsequent
decisions. Likewise, We are aware of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 2632 (dated September 12, 1960) and Republic Act No. 4111 (dated
March 29, 1965) which provides, in its penultimate paragraph, for the penalty of death when
the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion
thereof. We are of the opinion that this particular provision on frustrated rape is a dead
provision. The Eriia case, supra, might have prompted the law-making body to include the
crime of frustrated rape in the amendments introduced by said laws.[if !supportFootnotes][48][endif]
The Court is not unaware that Republic Act No. 7659, amending Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, has retained the provision penalizing with reclusion perpetua to death
an accused who commits homicide by reason or on the occasion of an attempted or
frustrated rape. Until Congress sees it fit to define the term frustrated rape and thereby
penalize it, the Court will see its continued usage in the statute book as being merely a
persistent lapse in language.
Each appellant is liable for two counts of consummated rape on account of a clear
conspiracy between them shown by their obvious concerted efforts to perpetrate, one after
the other, the crime. Each of them, therefore, is responsible not only for the rape committed
personally by him but also for the rape committed by the other as well.[if !supportFootnotes][49]
[endif]
Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 7659,
when rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two persons, the crime is
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Even while the information has failed to allege
the use of a deadly weapon in the commission of the rape, appellants can, nonetheless, be
held accountable under that provision since the information has likewise averred that the
above-named accused, referring to the two appellants, have conspiratorially committed the
crime.
Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code,[if !supportFootnotes][50][endif] includes among its
enumeration of generic aggravating circumstances the fact that the crime is committed with
the aid of armed men or persons who insure or afford impunity. The fact alone, then, that a
malefactor has sported a firearm does not, by itself, militate to aggravate the crime. As
regards appellant Quianola, the aggravating circumstance of his being a member of the
Philippine National Police would have exposed him to the penalty of death[if !supportFootnotes][51]
[endif] under the amendatory provisions of Article 335 by Republic Act No. 7659, had this
circumstance been properly alleged in the information. The description by the trial court of
appellants as being powerfully, built, brawny and mean-looking as against the short, slender,
easily cowed 15-year-old victim would not here warrant a finding that abuse of superior
strength has aggravated the commission of the crime. The law should be deemed to have
already considered this circumstance in qualifying the crime to its "heinous" character,
rendering, in that context, abuse of superior strength as an inherent element thereof. Neither
may nighttime be considered an aggravating circumstance in the absence of proof of its
having been deliberately sought out by appellants to facilitate the commission of the
offense.[if !supportFootnotes][52][endif] Craft, fraud or disguise[if !supportFootnotes][53][endif] is a species of
aggravating circumstance that denotes intellectual trickery or cunning resorted to by an
accused to aid in the execution of his criminal design or to lure the victim into a trap and to
conceal the identity of the accused. The fact that one of the appellants has pretended to be a
member of the New Peoples Army does not necessarily imply the use of craft, fraud or
disguise, in the commission of the crime. Finally, the Court does not subscribe to the view
of the trial court that accused-appellants have employed means which added ignominy to
the natural effects of the crime, particularly in stripp(ing) the victim of her denim pants and
panties and then sending her home in this humiliating and distressing condition.[if !
supportFootnotes][54][endif] There is nothing on record that even remotely suggests that accusedappellants so deliberately sought to leave Catalina with bottoms bare that she might be left
alone in shame with only her T-shirt and brassieres on.
The absence of any aggravating circumstance in the commission of a crime punishable
by two (2) indivisible penalties, such as reclusion perpetua to death, would justify, even
without any mitigating circumstance, the imposition of the lesser penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
The trial court has ordered appellants to each pay the offended party civil indemnity in
the amount of P50,000.00. Prevailing jurisprudence[if !supportFootnotes][55][endif] likewise allows
the victim to have an award of moral damages for having evidently undergone "mental,
physical and psychological sufferings. The civil liability of appellants, being predicated on
delict, is solidary.[if !supportFootnotes][56][endif]
WHEREFORE, appellants Agapito Quianola y Escuadro and Eduardo Escuadro y Floro are
each found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of consummated rape and,
accordingly, sentenced to the penalty of reclusion perpetua in each case. Said appellants are
ordered to pay, jointly and severally, Catalina Carciller the sum of P100,000.00 by way of
indemnity ex delictu for the two counts of consummated rape plus P60,000.00 moral
damages. Costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Romero (Chairman), Panganiban, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 176070
October 2, 2009
vs.
ANTON MADEO, Appellant.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Rape is nothing more or less than a conscious process of intimidation by which a man keeps
a woman in a state of fear and humiliation. Thus, it is not even impossible for a victim of
rape not to make an outcry against an unarmed assailant.1 Physical resistance is immaterial
in a rape case when the victim is sufficiently intimidated by her assailant and she submits
against her will because of fear for her personal safety.2
Assailed before us is the 16 October 2006 Decision3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 01551 which affirmed the Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta
City, Branch 46 in Criminal Case No. U-10600 finding appellant Anton Madeo guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and to pay the victim the sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages and
P20,000.00 as exemplary damages, with modification that appellant is further ordered to
pay the sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.
On 4 April 2000, an Amended Information was filed charging appellant Anton Madeo with
the crime of Rape committed as follows:
That on or about December 7, 1999, in the afternoon, at Labit West, Urdaneta City and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, knowing fully
well of the mental disability, emotional disorder and/or physical handicap of the offended
party, "AAA"5 at the time of the commission of the rape, and by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual
intercourse with said "AAA," against her will and without her consent, to her damage and
prejudice.
Contrary to Art. 266-A, par. 1(a), Revised Penal Code, as amended by Rep. Acts 7659 and
8353.6
During arraignment, appellant entered a plea of "not guilty."7 Trial on the merits thereafter
ensued.
The prosecution presented Dr. Noel U. Obedoza who testified that he examined AAA on 5
January 2000. According to Dr. Obedoza, the victim was conscious and coherent during the
interview.8 However, the physical examination results indicated that she had a ruptured
hymen and healed hymenal lacerations9 about three weeks old.10 On the other hand, Dr.
Bernadette M. Quitoriano testified that she conducted psychological and mental
examinations on the person of AAA whom she found to have a mental age of a 5 year old.
11
AAA's mother also testified that on 5 January 2000, she noticed that her daughter was pale
and trembling; that when asked if she has any problem, AAA answered "none;"12 that when
further asked if somebody touched her private parts, AAA cried and told her that appellant
touched her private parts and warned her not to tell anyone or he would kill her family;13
that she and her husband immediately brought AAA to a hospital for examination and to the
NBI to report the crime.14
Complaining witness, AAA, also took the witness stand. She testified that on 7 December
1999 at about 3 o'clock in the afternoon, she was on her way to her grandmother's house
when her classmate, Jovelyn Fortuna (Jovelyn), invited her to the house of her uncle, herein
appellant Madeo;15 that soon thereafter Jovelyn left AAA alone with appellant16 who
summoned AAA to his room; that when she did not comply, appellant forcibly pulled her
inside the room,17 undressed her and thereafter touched her private parts;18 that appellant
likewise undressed, ordered AAA to lie down, went on top of her and proceeded to have
carnal knowledge of her;19 that she felt pain in her private parts;20 that thereafter, appellant
warned AAA not to reveal to anyone what happened or he would kill her and her family;
that after the sexual assault, appellant put on his pants; that AAA also put on her shorts and
was told to go home;21 that after some time she narrated the incident to her mother who
brought her to the hospital for medical examination and to the NBI to report the incident.22
The defense presented Jovelyn as its first witness. She testified that she was staying at her
grandmother's house at Labit West, Urdaneta City, Pangasinan;23 that her uncle, appellant
herein, also stays in the said house;24 that on 7 December 1999 she was sick25 and did not
see her uncle or AAA.26
Melanie Andrada also testified for the defense. She claimed that Jovelyn is her niece while
appellant is her cousin;27 that on 7 December 1999, she visited Jovelyn who was sick;28 and
that during her visit, she did not see AAA or appellant.29
The defense also presented Olimpia Yesa who testified that on 7 December 1999, from 3 to
7 p.m., she was at the house of Epifania Madeo, appellant's mother, as she was treating
Jovelyn who was sick.30
To establish the whereabouts of appellant, the defense presented Virgilio Jacob who testified
that on 7 December 1999, he and appellant were working in a mobile rice mill owned by
Roger Madolid at Labit West, Urdaneta City.31
Finally, the defense presented appellant who denied the charges against him. He claimed
that on 7 December 1999, he was working at the rolling rice mill together with Berting
Jacob, Etong, Rommel, Roger Madolid who owned the rice mill and another person whose
name he forgot;32 that from 6 o'clock in the morning up to 6 o'clock in the afternoon, they
traveled to several barangays in Urdaneta City to mill rice; and that he did not see the victim
on said date.33 On cross-examination, appellant averred that he did not have any quarrel
with the victim and that he could not understand why the latter would file the charges
against him.34
On rebuttal, the prosecution presented Roger Madolid who denied hiring Virgilio Jacob and
appellant as workers in his rolling rice mill. He testified that on 7 December 1999, his
rolling rice mill was under repair at the Andrada Repair Shop in Nancamaliran, Urdaneta
City.35
On 24 August 2000, the Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta City, Branch 46, rendered its
Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered, CONVICTING ANTON MADEO
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of SIMPLE RAPE and the Court sentences him to
suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua; Anton Madeo is hereby ordered to indemnify
"AAA" the sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages and P20,000.00 as exemplary damages.
The Branch Clerk of Court of this Court is hereby ordered to prepare the mitimus
immediately.
The Jail Warden, Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP) Urdaneta District Jail,
Urdaneta City, is hereby ordered to deliver the living person of Anton Madeo to the National
Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City, immediately upon receipt of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.36
The trial court held that although Dr. Quitoriano testified that AAA has a mental age of 5
years old, the latter is only simple-minded as she was able to finish grade school and has a
mental age of more than seven years old. The court below found the testimony of the victim
credible and straightforward and corroborated by the medical findings. Likewise, the age of
the healed hymenal lacerations coincided with the date of the commission of the crime. On
the other hand, the court below disregarded appellant's alibi for being self-serving.
Appellant filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals. In his Brief,37 he alleged that the trial
court erred in finding that he employed force and intimidation in consummating the rape.38
He also argued that the victim's actuations did not show the kind of resistance expected of a
woman defending her virtue. In particular, appellant asserted that AAA voluntarily accepted
the invitation to enter appellant's room; that she did not make any outcry or sought the help
of the neighbors despite the lack of danger to her life; that she was not rendered unconscious
during the intercourse; that she only used her hands but not her feet in warding off
appellant's advances; and that the medical report did not indicate that AAA suffered any
physical injury.39
Appellant likewise argued that the trial court erred in finding that the victim was mentally
deficient.40 He alleged that when AAA was presented on the witness stand, she was 22 years
old and was in 2nd year high school.41 Finally, appellant alleged that the victim may have
been coerced by her mother to testify falsely against him in order to have the sole
management of the land which she jointly tills with the appellant.42
In the Appellee's Brief,43 the Office of the Solicitor General countered that appellant's
argument of consensual congress should be dismissed because it was clearly established that
appellant employed force, threats and intimidation. It was also shown that AAA was
deceived to join Jovelyn inside the house of appellant; that the victim's failure to shout
could not yield the inference that no rape was committed; and that the mental retardation of
AAA was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
On 16 October 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision affirming with
modification the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED, and the
Decision appealed from rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta City, Branch 46,
dated August 24, 2000, in Criminal Case No. U-10600 is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that accused-appellant is hereby ORDERED to pay private complainant
an additional Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as and by way of civil indemnity.
SO ORDERED.44
The appellate court noted that the issues raised by appellant deal with the victim's credibility
and appreciation of facts, both of which lie in the province of the trial court. At any rate, the
Court of Appeals found that the trial court did not overlook or mis-appreciate any material
fact that warrants a reversal of its findings.45
The appellate court likewise found that the victim testified in a spontaneous and
straightforward manner; that there was nothing in her testimony that detracts from her claim
that she was indeed raped; that her failure to make an outcry did not mean that she was not
raped; that the fact that she did not shout could be attributed to the warning she received
from the appellant; that it is not true that the victim did not resist the advances of the
appellant; and that AAA's failure to offer tenacious resistance does not make her submission
to the criminal acts of the appellant voluntary.46
Anent the award of damages, the Court of Appeals held that AAA is entitled to an additional
amount of P50,000.00 by way of indemnity ex delicto.47
On 7 March 2007, the Court resolved to notify the parties to file, if they so desire, their
respective supplemental briefs.48 Both parties manifested that they were no longer
submitting their supplemental briefs since they have already extensively discussed their
arguments in their respective briefs.49
Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. - Rape is committed 1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a. Through force, threat or intimidation;
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;
c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though
none of the circumstances mentioned above is present;
x x x x.
Thus, in the instant case, the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that appellant
had carnal knowledge of AAA through the use of force, threats or intimidation.
We have carefully examined the records of the case and we find that both the trial court and
the Court of Appeals correctly held that appellant is guilty of the crime of simple rape. The
testimony of the victim clearly established that appellant had sexual intercourse with her
without her consent and against her will by employing force, threats and intimidation. Her
narration of her harrowing experience is enlightening, thus:
Q On December 7, 1999 at 3:00 0clock in the afternoon, do you remember where you
were?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where were you?
A I was walking going to the house of my grandmother, sir.
Q Were you able to reach the house of your grandmother on that date and time?
A No, sir.
Q Why were you not able to reach the house of your grandmother?
A That was the time when Anton Madeo raped me, sir.
Q Will you kindly tell this Honorable Court how this incident happened and started?
A I was walking going to the house of my grandmother, Jovelyn called me, sir.
Q What is the family name of this Jovelyn?
A I only know her to be Jovelyn, sir.
COURT Is he a man or a woman?
A A woman, sir.
ATTY. BONGOLAN Do you know if this Jovelyn who called you has any relationship with
Anton Madeo?
A Yes, sir.
Q How are they related?
A Jovelyn is the niece of Anton Madeo, sir.
Q Where was Jovelyn when she called you?
A She was in the yard of Madeo, sir.
COURT So, you were walking and called by Jovelyn in the yard of Madeo?
A Yes, sir.
ATTY. BONGOLAN What did she say when she called you?
A Jovelyn told me, "come AAA I have something to tell you".
COURT Is that your nickname AAA?
A Yes, sir.
ATTY BOLONGAN What did you do?
A I responded to the call of Jovelyn, sir.
Q What happened when you got near Jovelyn?
A We greeted each other, sir.
Q What else?
A She invited me to get inside the house, sir.
Q Do you know where Anton Madeo was at the time?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where was he?
A Inside their house, sir.
Q Did you go inside the house as invited by Jovelyn?
A Yes, sir.
Q When you got inside the house did you notice any other person aside from the three of
you?
A No more, sir.
COURT
By the way, the place where you were walking is it a pathway, barrio road or municipal
road?
A It is a road, sir.
Q The place where Jovelyn was at the time, was it divided by a wall or barb wire or nothing
was placed in between the road?
A None, sir.
Q When you were already inside the house of Anton Madeo and Jovelyn, what did Jovelyn
do?
A She went out laughing, sir.
Q After she left what happened?
A (No answer yet, a question was raised by the Court).
COURT Did you find out why she was laughing?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was the reason why she went out laughing?
A Because she told, "come AAA inside the house".
Q Do you know the reason why she went out x x x and why she went out laughing?
A Because Anton Madeo pulled me inside his room, sir.
Q Did you comply?
A No, sir, I did not?
Q What is your understanding when Jovelyn went out laughing?
A She was laughing, sir.
Q Is it because you were left alone with Anton Madeo and she went out laughing?
A Yes, sir.
ATTY BOLONGAN Before Anton Madeo pulled you to his room, what did he do then?
A He warned me and he said: "if you shout I will kill you".
COURT Where did he pull you?
A In his room, sir.
Q Otherwise what?
A He will kill me, sir.
ATTY BOLONGAN After he pulled you to his room and warned if you will scream or shout
what did he do next if any?
A He suddenly undressed me, sir.
Q Will you tell us how he undressed you?
A He held my two hands and then he undressed me, sir.
Q What part of your dress was removed first?
A My shorts, sir.
Q While he was removing your shorts what did you do if you did anything?
A I was pushing him but he was heavy I cannot push him away, sir.
Q After that what did he do if any?
A And then he removed my panty, sir.
Q What did he do to you when your panty was being removed?
A He touched my vagina, sir.
COURT The touching of your vagina, is it actual touching or inserting his penis or some
other way?
A After touching my vagina he undressed himself, sir.
ATTY. BOLONGAN After undressing himself what did he do next if any?
A I was made to lie down and then he went on top of me, sir.
Q When he went on top of you what did you do?
A I was struggling but I cannot push him because he was heavy, sir.
Q When he was on top of you and you were trying to free yourself struggling what
happened next?
A He forced his organ to insert in my vagina, sir.
COURT When you said, "he forced his organ in my vagina" what do you mean by his
organ?
A His penis, sir.
COURT She is not a retarded.
ATTY BOLONGAN That is according to the findings of the Doctor, Your Honor.
Q When he forcibly inserted his penis into your private parts what did you feel?
A My vagina is painful, sir.
Q How long was he on top of you after inserting his penis in your vagina?
A A little bit long, sir.
Q Can you estimate how long he was on top of you?
COURT If I were you I will not ask that question that is dangerous.
ATTY BOLONGAN I will withdraw the question, Your Honor.
ATTY BOLONGAN After that what happened?
A He said, "if you will not give what I want, I will kill you together with your father and
mother".
Q I am asking what he did if any after he was already on top of you and after he inserted his
penis into your organ?
A The penis was inserted in my vagina, sir.
Q After that what did he do?
A After that he warned me and he said, "if you shout I will kill you and your parents".
Q Did he finally get off from you?
A Yes, sir.
Q What did he do after he got off from you?
A He put on his pants, sir.
Q How about you?
A I also put on my shorts and stood up, sir.
Q When you stood up, did you notice something in your person?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was that?
A My vagina was bleeding, sir.
Q Before that incident were you already touched by a man?
A None except him, sir.
Q Did he tell you anything as you put on your dress?
A Yes, sir.
Q What did he tell you?
A I was sent home, sir.
Q Did he not tell you anything more?
A If you report I will kill you and your father and mother.
Q But inspite of that threat did you report this matter to anyone?
A Yes, sir.
Q To whom did you report?
A My mother, sir.
Q What did your mother do when you reported to her?
A My mother reported the same to my father, sir.
Q What did your parents do if they did anything?
A I was examined at the Center, sir.
Q You are referring to the Rural Health Unit of Urdaneta City?
A Yes, sir.
Q Were you brought to any hospital for further examination?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where were you brought, what hospital?
A At the Center, sir.
Q Aside from the Center where were you brought?
A Emergency hospital, sir.
Q Are you referring to Don Amadeo Perez Memorial General Hospital?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who was with you when you were brought there?
A My mother, sir.
Q What happened first in the hospital?
A We were asked questions, sir.
Q When you said "we" who were your companions?
A My mother, sir.
Q Do you know who interviewed you at the hospital?
A I forgot the name, sir.
Q After you were interviewed what happened next?
A I was submitted for examination to determine pregnancy test, sir.
Q Do you remember having been examined by a Doctor?
A Yes, sir.
Q Do you know the Doctor who examined you in the hospital?
A I forgot the name, sir.
Q After you were examined in the hospital do you know if this matter was brought to the
authorities?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where, what Police station or authorities?
A At the NBI, sir.
Q Where is that office of the NBI where you were brought?
A Urdaneta City, sir.
Q What happened at the NBI Office?
A We were asked questions, sir.50
We find no merit in appellants contention that the victims actuations did not show the kind
of resistance expected of a woman defending her virtue. Time and again, we have held that
"the behavior and reaction of every person cannot be predicted with accuracy. It is a timehonored precept that different people react differently to a given situation or type of
situation and there is no standard form of behavioral response when one is confronted with a
strange or startling or frightful experience. Not every rape victim can be expected to act
conformably to the usual expectations of everyone. Some may shout; some may faint; and
some may be shocked into insensibility; while other may openly welcome the
intrusion."511avvphi1
Besides, AAAs failure to cry for help during the incident in question, did not make her
testimony improbable inasmuch as it is not uncommon for a woman to be easily intimidated
into silence and conceal for sometime the violation of her honor, even by the mildest threat
to her life.52 In her testimony, AAA explained that she did not shout because she was
intimidated by the appellant, who repeatedly warned that she and her family would be killed
if she would refuse to give in to his demands, thus:
Q Why did you not tell your mother immediately on that date, December 7, 1999, when you
arrived home from the place where you were allegedly raped?
A I did not report immediately because I was afraid because Anton threatened me.53
xxxx
Q Since you did not like to be alone with Madeo, why did you allow Jovelyn to leave
without you?
A She just left.
Q Why did you not follow her since you were alone in a house with another man?
A Because Madeo threatened me if I shout he will kill my father and mother.
Q That is correct when Jovelyn left, but before Jovelyn left, why did you not follow her
immediately?
A I was scared that is why I was not able to follow.
xxxx
Q Since you were already scared and afraid, why did you not leave the house when Jovelyn
was still there?
A I was threatened, sir.54
xxxx
Q On questions of this Honorable Court, you testified that your mouth was not covered, you
were conscious all through out that process did you shout or scream for help?
A No, sir.
Q Why not?
A Because I was threatened.55
Our ruling in People v. Silvano56 is instructive, to wit:
For his defense, appellant claims among others, that the victim offered only a token
resistance when the alleged sexual acts were being done. Be that as it may, the failure to
shout or offer tenacious resistance cannot be construed as a voluntary submission to
appellants desires. It is enough if the prosecution had proven that force or intimidation
concurred in the commission of the crime, as in this case. The law does not impose upon a
rape victim the burden of proving resistance. Moreover, physical resistance need not be
established in rape when intimidation is exercised upon the victim and she submits herself
against her will to the rapists lust because of fear for her life or personal safety. The force,
violence, or intimidation in rape is a relative term, depending not only on the age, size, and
strength of the parties but also on their relationship with each other.
The imputation that AAA was coerced by her mother to file the charges against appellant in
order to have exclusive rights to the land they presently jointly cultivate, is unbelievable. It
is outrageous even to suggest that a mother would subject her daughter to a public trial,
ridicule and embarrassment and to all the rigors that go with it, just for the purpose of
increasing ones harvest. Besides, this imputation is totally lacking in any factual basis.
From AAAs and her mothers testimony, we could only discern an honest and sincere desire
"to solely seek justice and obtain redress for the unforgivable and wicked acts committed
upon her."
Anent AAAs state of mind, we find that we cannot subscribe to the findings that AAAs
mental age is that of a 5 years old, or even a seven year-old. The basic postulate in
criminal prosecution anchored on the constitution is that the prosecution is burdened to
prove the guilt of the accused for the crime charged beyond cavil of doubt. The prosecution
is burdened to prove conclusively and indubitably not only that appellant had carnal
knowledge of AAA but also that she was a mental retardate.57 The conviction of an accused
of rape based on the mental retardation of AAA must be anchored on proof beyond
reasonable doubt of her mental retardation.58 We examined closely the testimony of AAA
and we find the same to be coherent and categorical. In assessing her level of intelligence
and capacity to comprehend, the trial court propounded several questions which were all
satisfactorily answered by AAA, thus:
Q Do you recognize the people around the bench, do you know them?
A Not yet, sir.
Q You dont know their names, can you tell us their occupation or calling are they Doctors,
Police or what?
A Lawyers, sir.
Q Who are your parents?
A BBB and CCC, sir.
Q What does your father do for a living?
A He is a farmer, sir.
Q About your mother?
A Housekeeper, sir
Q Do you wear bra?
A No, sir.
Q Do you understand bra?
A Yes, sir.
Q You dont have any bra?
A I have, sir.
Q Do you have panty?
A Yes, sir.
Q Do you go to school?
A Yes, sir.
Q What grade?
A Second year high school, sir.
Q What school?
A Catablan, sir.
Q What municipality is Catablan?
A Urdaneta, sir.
Q What are your subjects in second year high school?
A English, Pilipino, Hekasi, sir.
Q What is your favorite subject aside from recess?
A Pilipino, sir.
Q Do you know who is your teacher in Pilipino?
A Mercedita, sir.
Q You comb your hair personally or with the assistance of your mother?
A Me, sir.
Q Do you take a bath alone?
A Yes, sir.
Q Without the assistance of your mother?
A Yes, sir.
Q Do you dress up alone?
A Yes, sir.
Q Do you put your bra alone?
A Yes, sir.
Q Do you put your panty alone?
A Yes, sir.
Q About your shoes?
A Yes, sir.
Q Do you use shampoo in your hair?
A Yes, sir.
Q Do you use soap?
A Yes, sir.
Q What kind of soap?
A Safeguard, sir.59
Based on the testimony of AAA, we are convinced that she is not a mental retardate.60
In addition, we find that although it was specifically alleged in the Information that
appellant knew of AAAs "mental disability, emotional disorder and/or physical handicap,"
still, no proof was presented that appellant indeed knew AAAs alleged mental deficiency. In
People v. Limio,61 we held that:
By itself, the fact that the offended party in a rape case is a mental retardate does not call for
an imposition of the death penalty, unless knowledge by the offender of such mental
disability is specifically alleged and adequately proved by the prosecution.
For the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, now embodied in Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC), expressly provides that the death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is
committed with the qualifying circumstance of "(10) when the offender knew of the mental
disability, emotional disorder and/or physical handicap of the offended party at the time of
the commission of the crime." Said knowledge, in our view, qualifies rape as a heinous
offense. Absent said circumstance, which must be proved by the prosecution beyond
reasonable doubt, the conviction of appellant for qualified rape under Art. 266-B (10), RPC,
could not be sustained, although the offender may be held liable for simple rape and
sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly disregarded appellants denial and
alibi. These two defenses are inherently the weakest as they are negative defenses. Mere
denials of involvement in a crime cannot take precedence over the positive testimony of the
offended party. For alibi to prosper, it is not enough for the defendant to prove that he was
somewhere else when the crime was committed; he must likewise demonstrate that it is
physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time.62
In the instant case, AAA positively identified appellant as the author of the crime. It should
be noted that affirmative testimony, like that of the victims, is stronger than appellants bare
denial, which is a negative assertion. As regards appellants alibi, we find that he failed to
prove that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time it
was committed.
In view of the foregoing, we find that appellant was correctly found guilty of the crime of
simple rape; i.e., by having carnal knowledge of a woman committed through the use of
force, threats or intimidation. Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty
therefor is reclusion perpetua.
Anent the award of damages, we find that the award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and
another P50,000.00 as moral damages is proper and in line with prevailing jurisprudence.63
Civil indemnity is mandatory upon a finding of the fact of rape. As to moral damages, the
same is automatically granted without need of further proof, it being assumed that a rape
victim has actually suffered moral damages entitling her to such award. However, the award
of exemplary damages must be deleted. Article 2230 of the Civil Code provides that "in
criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of civil liability may be imposed when the
crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances." There being no
aggravating circumstance in the instant case, the award of exemplary damages therefore has
no basis. In People v. Marcos,64 we held that the award of exemplary damages is in order
when the crime was committed with an aggravating circumstance pursuant to Article 2230
of the Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, the 16 October 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 01551 finding appellant Anton Madeo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the victim the
sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION that the award of P20,000.00 as exemplary damages is DELETED.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO*
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA**
Associate Justice
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
ATT E S TAT I O N
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, Second Division

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Acting
Chairpersons attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 188979
September 5, 2012
vs.
CHRISTOPHER PAREJA y VELASCO, Appellant.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
This is an appeal from the June 15, 2009 decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR HC No. 02759. TheCA affirmed the February 22, 2007 decision2
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 209, Mandaluyong City, finding appellant
Christopher Pareja guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentencing him
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
THE CASE
The prosecution charged the appellant before the RTC with the crime of rape under an
Amended Information that reads:
That on or about the 16th day of June 2003, in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie and have carnal knowledge of AAA,3 13 years
of age, sister of the common law spouse of accused, against her will and consent, thus
debasing and/or demeaning the intrinsic worth and dignity of the victim thereby prejudicing
her normal development as a child.4
The evidence for the prosecution disclosed that at around 3:30 a.m. of June 16, 2003, AAA
was sleeping beside her two-year old nephew, BBB, on the floor of her sisters room, when
the appellant hugged her and kissed her nape and neck.5 AAA cried, but the appellant
covered her and BBB with a blanket.6 The appellant removed AAAs clothes, short pants,
and underwear; he then took off his short pants and briefs.7 The appellant went on top of
AAA, and held her hands. AAA resisted, but the appellant parted her legs using his own
legs, and then tried to insert his penis into her vagina.8 The appellant stopped when AAAs
cry got louder; AAA kicked the appellants upper thigh as the latter was about to stand up.
The appellant put his clothes back on, and threatened to kill AAA if she disclosed the
incident to anyone. Immediately after, the appellant left the room.9 AAA covered herself
with a blanket and cried.10
At around 6:00 a.m. of the same day, AAAs brother, CCC, went to her room and asked her
why she was lying on the floor and crying. AAA did not answer, and instead hurled
invectives at CCC.11 AAA went to the house of her other brother, but the latter was not in
his house. AAA proceeded to the house of her older sister, DDD, at Block 19, Welfareville
Compound, and narrated to her what had happened. Afterwards, AAA and her two (2)
siblings went to the Women and Childrens Desk of the Mandaluyong City Police Station
and reported the incident.12
For his defense, the appellant declared on the witness stand that he hauled "filling materials"
at his house, located at Block 38, Fabella Compound, on the evening of June 15, 2003. At
around 10:00 p.m., he went to his room and slept.13 On the next day, the appellant,
accompanied by his mother and brother-in-law, went to the municipal hall to ask for
financial assistance for his wife who was confined in the hospital. Upon arrival at the
hospital, the doctor told him that his wife needed blood. Immediately after, the appellant and
his companions went to Pasig City to find blood donors.14
On the evening of June 16, 2003, and while the appellant was folding the clothes of his son,
two policemen entered his house and informed him that a complaint for attempted rape had
been filed against him. The police brought him to the Criminal Investigation and Detection
Group, forced him to admit the crime, mauled him, and then placed him in a detention cell.
15 The appellant added that he filed a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman against
the police officers who beat him up.16
The RTC convicted the appellant of rape in its decision of February 22, 2007, under the
following terms:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused CHRISTOPHER PAREJA y VELASCO GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE and hereby sentences him as he is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua; and to indemnify the victim, AAA, the
amount of P 50,000.00 as moral damages and P 50,000.00 as civil indemnity.17
The CA, in its decision dated June 15, 2009, affirmed the RTC decision. It explained that a
slight penetration of the labia by the male organ is sufficient to constitute rape, and held that
a slight penetration took place when the appellants penis touched AAAs vagina as he was
trying to insert it.
The appellate court further ruled that the presence of people in the other room did not make
it impossible for the appellant to have raped the victim, because lust is no respecter of time
and place. It also held that the victims lack of tenacity in resisting the appellants sexual
aggression did not amount to consent or voluntary submission to the criminal act.18
In his brief,19 the appellant argued that the lower courts erred in convicting him for the
crime of rape, as the prosecution failed to prove even the slightest penetration of his penis
into the victims vagina. He added that the victims testimony was incredible and contrary to
human experience.
THE COURTS RULING
We find that the prosecution failed to prove the appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of consummated rape. We convict him instead of attempted rape, as the evidence
on record shows the presence of all the elements of this crime.
Carnal Knowledge Not Proven With
Moral Certainty
By definition, rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman with the use of
force, threat or intimidation, or when she is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or
when she is under 12 years of age or is demented.20 "Carnal knowledge is defined as the act
of a man having sexual intercourse or sexual bodily connections with a woman."21 Carnal
knowledge of the victim by the accused must be proven beyond reasonable doubt,
considering that it is the central element in the crime of rape.22
In her testimony of February 9, 2004, AAA recounted the alleged rape, as follows:
FISCAL TRONCO:
Q: You said that the three of you then was (sic) sleeping on the floor, what is it that
happened on that particular day and time that is unusual?
A: It was like somebody was embracing me or hugging me, maam.
Q: When you felt that some (sic) is embracing and hugging you, what did you do?
A: I didnt mind it because I thought that the person beside me just moved and when he
made the movement, its like that I was embraced, maam.
Q: Whom are you referring to?
A: My brother-in-law, maam.
Q: And after that, what else happened, if any, AAA?
A: Before that happened, my nephew cried and so I picked him up and put him on my
chest and after a while, I slept again and brought him down again and then "dumapa po ako"
and I felt that somebody was kissing my nape, maam.
Q: Were you able to see who was that somebody kissing your nape?
A: When I tried to evade, I looked on my side where the room was not that dark that I
could not see the person and so, I saw that it was my brother-in-law, maam.
xxxx
Q: When you saw that it was your brother-in-law kissing your nape while you were on a
prone position, what else happened, if any?
A: He kissed my neck, maam.
Q: What was your position while he was kissing your neck?
A: I was on my side at that time and I was also crying, maam.
xxxx
Q: Why were you crying at that time while he was kissing your neck?
A: I was afraid of what will happen next, maam.
Q: Aside from that incident that he was kissing your neck, was there any other previous
incident that happened?
A: Yes, maam.
xxxx
Q: What incident was that?
A: At that time, my brother-in-law covered me and my nephew with a blanket and he tried
to get my clothes off, maam.
Q: When did this happen, AAA?
A: Also on said date, maam.
Q: You said that he covered you and your nephew with a blanket and then taking (sic) off
your clothes?
A: Yes, maam.
xxxx
Q: Was he able to take off your clothes?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: What particular clothing was he able to take off?
A: My short pants and underwear, maam.

Q: While he was taking off your short pants and your underwear, what did you do, if any?
A: I tried to fight him off, maam.
xxxx
Q: You said that he was trying to take off your clothes and undergarments, what was your
position at that time?
A: I was lying down, maam.
Q: What about him?
A: He was on my lap, maam.
xxxx
Q: You said that you saw him take off his short pants?
A: Yes, maam.
xxxx
Q: Did he also take off his brief?
A: Yes, maam.
xxxx
Q: And after that what happened, AAA?
A: After removing his undergarments, he suddenly brought his body on top of me and he
held my hands. At that time I was crying and still resisting and then he was trying to get my
legs apart. I was still resisting at that time, and at some point in time I felt weak and he was
able to part my legs, maam.
Q: Could you please tell us how did (sic) he able to part your legs?
A: He did that with his legs while he was holding my hands, maam.
Q: And when he was able to part your legs, what happened next?
A: He tried to insert his sexual organ but he was not able to do so, maam.
Q: How did you know that he was trying to insert his sexual organ?
A: "Naidikit po niya sa ari ko."
Q: Which part of your body was he able to touch his sexual organ? (sic)
A: On my sexual organ, maam.
xxxx
Q: You mentioned earlier that he was not able to penetrate your private part, AAA?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: So, what happened after that?
A: I cried and then while I was resisting, I hit my wrist on the wall and my wrist was
"nagasgas," maam.
xxxx
Q: And were you able to successfully resist?
A: Yes, maam, I was able to kicked (sic) his upper thigh, maam.23 (italics supplied;
emphasis ours)
From the foregoing, we find it clear that the appellants penis did not penetrate, but merely
touched (i.e., "naidikit"), AAAs private part. In fact, the victim confirmed on crossexamination that the appellant did not succeed in inserting his penis into her vagina.
Significantly, AAAs Sinumpaang Salaysay24 also disclosed that the appellant was holding
the victims hand when he was trying to insert his penis in her vagina. This circumstance
coupled with the victims declaration that she was resisting the appellants attempt to insert
his penis into her vagina makes penile penetration highly difficult, if not improbable.
Significantly, nothing in the records supports the CAs conclusion that the appellants penis
penetrated, however slightly, the victims female organ.
Did the touching by the appellants penis of the victims private part amount to carnal
knowledge such that the appellant should be held guilty of consummated rape?
In People v. Campuhan,25 the Court laid down the parameters of genital contact in rape
cases, thus:
Thus, touching when applied to rape cases does not simply mean mere epidermal contact,
stroking or grazing of organs, a slight brush or a scrape of the penis on the external layer of
the victim's vagina, or the mons pubis, as in this case. There must be sufficient and
convincing proof that the penis indeed touched the labias or slid into the female organ, and
not merely stroked the external surface thereof, for an accused to be convicted of
consummated rape. As the labias, which are required to be "touched" by the penis, are by
their natural situs or location beneath the mons pubis or the vaginal surface, to touch them
with the penis is to attain some degree of penetration beneath the surface, hence, the
conclusion that touching the labia majora or the labia minora of the pudendum constitutes
consummated rape.
The pudendum or vulva is the collective term for the female genital organs that are visible
in the perineal area, e.g., mons pubis, labia majora, labia minora, the hymen, the clitoris, the
vaginal orifice, etc. The mons pubis is the rounded eminence that becomes hairy after
puberty, and is instantly visible within the surface. The next layer is the labia majora or the
outer lips of the female organ composed of the outer convex surface and the inner surface.
The skin of the outer convex surface is covered with hair follicles and is pigmented, while
the inner surface is a thin skin which does not have any hair but has many sebaceous glands.
Directly beneath the labia majora is the labia minora. Jurisprudence dictates that the labia
majora must be entered for rape to be consummated, and not merely for the penis to stroke
the surface of the female organ. Thus, a grazing of the surface of the female organ or
touching the mons pubis of the pudendum is not sufficient to constitute consummated rape.
Absent any showing of the slightest penetration of the female organ, i.e., touching of either
labia of the pudendum by the penis, there can be no consummated rape; at most, it can only
be attempted rape, if not acts of lasciviousness.26 (italics supplied)
Simply put, "rape is consummated by the slightest penile penetration of the labia majora or
pudendum of the female organ."27 Without any showing of such penetration, there can be no
consummated rape; at most, it can only be attempted rape [or] acts of lasciviousness."28
As earlier discussed, the prosecution failed to present sufficient and convincing evidence to
establish the required penile penetration. AAAs testimony did not establish that the
appellants penis touched the labias or slid into her private part. Aside from AAAs
testimony, no other evidence on record, such as a medico-legal report, could confirm
whether there indeed had been penetration, however slight, of the victims labias. In the
absence of testimonial or physical evidence to establish penile penetration, the appellant
cannot be convicted of consummated rape.
Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, states that there is an attempt when the
offender commenced the commission of the crime directly by overt acts but does not
perform all the acts of execution by reason of some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance. In People v. Publico,29 we ruled that when the "touching" of the
vagina by the penis is coupled with the intent to penetrate, attempted rape is committed;
otherwise, the crime committed is merely acts of lasciviousness.
In the present case, the appellant commenced the commission of rape by the following overt
acts: kissing AAAs nape and neck; undressing her; removing his clothes and briefs; lying
on top of her; holding her hands and parting her legs; and trying to insert his penis into her
vagina. The appellant, however, failed to perform all the acts of execution which should
produce the crime of rape by reason of a cause other than his own spontaneous desistance,
i.e., the victim's loud cries and resistance. The totality of the appellants acts demonstrated
the unmistakable objective to insert his penis into the victims private parts.
A review of jurisprudence reveals that the Court has not hesitated to strike down convictions
for consummated rape when the evidence failed to show that penetration, however slight, of
the victims vagina took place. In People v. Bon,30 the Court found the appellant guilty of
attempted rape only, as there was no indication that the appellants penis even touched the
labia of the pudendum of the victim. We further held that the appellant could not be
convicted of consummated rape by presuming carnal knowledge out of pain.
The Court had a similar ruling in People v. Miranda,31 where the accused tried to insert his
penis into the victims private parts, but was unsuccessful, so he inserted his fingers instead.
We convicted the accused of attempted rape only due to lack of evidence to establish that
there was even a slight penile penetration. We noted, however, that the appellants act of
inserting his fingers would have constituted rape through sexual assault had the offense
occurred after the effectivity of the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.
In People v. Alibuyog,32 the victim declared that the accused placed his penis on her vagina;
and claimed that it touched her private parts. The Court set aside the accuseds conviction
for rape, and convicted him of attempted rape only, because we found the victims testimony
too ambiguous to prove the vital element of penile penetration. We added that the victims
testimony was "replete with repeated denial of penile insertion."33
Similarly, in People v. Quarre,34 the evidence for the prosecution consisted only of the
victims testimony that the accused tried, but failed, to insert his penis into her vagina, and
she felt pain in the process. No medico-legal examination report was presented in evidence.
Accordingly, the Court reversed the accuseds conviction for rape, and found him guilty of
attempted rape only.
In People v. Ocomen,35 the Court also set aside the appellants conviction for rape because
no proof was adduced of even the slightest penetration of the female organ, aside from a
general statement of the victim that she had been "raped."
People v. Monteron36 is another noteworthy case where the Court set aside the appellants
conviction for rape. In this case, the victim testified that the accused placed his penis on top
of her vagina, and that she felt pain. In finding the accused guilty of attempted rape only, we
held that there was no showing that the accuseds penis entered the victims vagina. We
added that the pain that the victim felt might have been caused by the accuseds failed
attempts to insert his organ into her vagina.
In People v. Mariano,37 the accused tried to insert his penis into the victims vagina, but
failed to secure penetration. The Court set aside the accuseds conviction for three (3) counts
of rape and found him guilty of attempted rape only. We explained the necessity of carefully
ascertaining whether the penis of the accused in reality entered the labial threshold of the
female organ to accurately conclude that rape had been consummated.
In People v. Arce, Jr.,38 the Court found the accused guilty of attempted rape only, because
the victim did not declare that there was the slightest penetration, which was necessary to
consummate rape. On the contrary, she categorically stated that the accused was not able to
insert his penis into her private parts because she was moving her hips away. We further
ruled that the victims attempt to demonstrate what she meant by "idinidikit ang ari" was
unavailing to prove that rape had been consummated.
In People v. Francisco,39 the victim testified that the accused "poked" her vagina. The Court
set aside the accuseds conviction for qualified rape, and convicted him instead only of
attempted rape after failing to discern from the victim's testimony that the accused attained
some degree of penile penetration, which was necessary to consummate rape.1wphi1
In People v. Dimapilis,40 the Court refused to convict the accused for consummated rape on
the basis of the victim's testimony that she felt the accused's penis pressed against her
vagina as he tried to insert it. We explained that in order to constitute consummated rape,
there must be entry into the vagina of the victim, even if only in the slightest degree.
Finally, in People v. Tolentino,41 the Court reversed the accuseds conviction for rape and
convicted him of attempted rape only, as there was paucity of evidence that the slightest
penetration ever took place. We reasoned out that the victims statements that the accused
was "trying to force his sex organ into mine" and "binundol-undol ang kanyang ari" did not
prove that the accuseds penis reached the labia of the pudendum of the victims vagina.
"In rape cases, the prosecution bears the primary duty to present its case with clarity and
persuasion, to the end that conviction becomes the only logical and inevitable conclusion."42
We emphasize that a conviction cannot be made to rest on possibilities; strongest suspicion
must not be permitted to sway judgment. In the present case, the prosecution failed to
discharge its burden of proving all the elements of consummated rape.
The Proper Penalty and Indemnities
Under Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, the imposable penalty for attempted rape is
two degrees lower than the prescribed penalty of reclusion perpetua for consummated rape.
Two degrees lower from reclusion perpetua is prision mayor whose range is six (6) years
and one (1) day to 12 years. Without any attendant aggravating or mitigating circumstances
and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum of the penalty to be imposed
upon the appellant is prision mayor in its medium period, while the minimum shall be taken
from the penalty next lower in degree, which is prision correccional whose range is six (6)
months and one (1) day to six (6) years, in any of its periods. Accordingly, we sentence the
appellant to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years of prision correccional, as
minimum, to 10 years of prision mayor, as maximum.
In addition, we order the appellant to pay the victim P 30,000.00 as civil indemnity, P
25,000.00 as moral damages and P 10,000.00 as exemplary damages, in accordance with
prevailing jurisprudence on attempted rape cases.43
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the June 15, 2009 decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR HC No. 02759 is MODIFIED, as follows:
The appellant's conviction for the crime of rape is VACATED, and
(1) we find appellant Christopher Pareja y Velasco GUILTY of the crime of ATTEMPTED
RAPE;
(2) we SENTENCE him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six ( 6) years of prision
correccional, as minimum, to 10 years of prision mayor, as maximum; and
(3) we ORDER him to PAY the victim the amounts of P 30,000.00 as civil indemnity; P
25,000.00 as moral damages; and P 10,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
ATT E S TAT I O N
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's
Division.
Chief Justice
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 166441
October 8, 2014
NORBERTO CRUZ y BARTOLOME, Petitioner,
vs.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The intent of the offender to lie with the female defines the distinction between attempted
rape and acts of lasciviousness. The felony of attempted rape requires such intent; the felony
of acts of lasciviousness does not. Only the direct overt acts of the offender establish the
intent to lie with the female. However, merely climbing on top of a naked female does not
constitute attempted rape without proof of his erectile penis being in a position to penetrate
the female's vagina.
The Case
This appeal examines the decision promulgated on July 26, 2004,1 whereby the Court of
Appeals (CA) affirmed the conviction for attempted rape of the petitioner by the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 34, in Balaoan, La Union (RTC), and imposing on him the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum, and ordering
him to pay moral damages of P20,000.00 to AAA,2 the victim.
Antecedents
The petitioner was charged in the RTC with attempted rape and acts of lasciviousness
involving different victims. At arraignment, he pleaded not guiltyto the respective
informations, to wit: Criminal Case No. 2388
Attempted Rape
That on or about the 21st day of December 1993, at about 2:00 o'clock in the morning,
along the Bangar-Luna Road, Barangay Central West No. 2, Municipality of
Bangar,Province of La Union, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and by means
of force and intimidation commenced the commission ofrape directly byovert acts, to wit:
While private complainant AAA, an unmarried woman, fifteen (15) yearsold, was sleeping
inside the tentalong Bangar-Luna Road, the said accused remove her panty and underwear
and lay on top of said AAA embracing and touching her vagina and breast with intent of
having carnal knowledge of her by means of force, and if the accused did not accomplish
his purpose that is to have carnal knowledge of the said AAA it was not because of his
voluntary desistance but because the said offended party succeeded in resisting the criminal
attempt of said accused to the damage and prejudice of said offended party.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
Criminal Case No. 2389
Acts of Lasciviousness
That on or about the 21st day of December 1993, at about 3:00 oclock in the morning,
along the Bangar-Luna Road, Barangay Central West No. 2, Municipality of Bangar,
Province of La Union, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused with lewd design, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously touch the vagina of [BBB]4 against the latters will and with no other purpose
but to satisfy his lascivious desire to the damage and prejudice of said offended party.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
Version of the Prosecution
The CA summarized the version of the Prosecution as follows:6
x x x [Petitioner] Norberto Bartolome and [his wife] Belinda Cruz were engaged in the
selling of plastic wares and glass wares in different municipalities around the country. On
December 20, 1993, Norberto and Belinda employed AAA and BBB to help them in selling
their wares in Bangar, La Union which was then celebrating its fiesta. From Libsong East,
Lingayen, Pangasinan to Bangar, La Union, AAA and BBB boarded a passenger jeepney
owned by Norberto. The young girls were accompanied by Norberto, Belinda, Ruben
Rodriguez (driver) and a sales boy by the name of "Jess".
Upon reaching Bangar, La Union, at around 8:00 in the evening of December 20, 1993, they
parked in front of Maroon enterprises. They brought out all the goods and wares for display.
Two tents were fixed in order that they will have a place to sleep. Belinda and the driver
proceeded to Manila in order to get more goods to be sold.
On December 21, 1993, at around 1:00 oclock in the morning, AAA and BBB went to
sleep. Less thanan hour later, AAA was awakened when she felt that somebody was on top
of her. Norberto was mashing her breast and touching her private part. AAA realized that
she was divested of her clothing and that she was totally naked. Norberto ordered her not to
scream or shell be killed. AAA tried to push Norberto away and pleaded to have pity on her
but her pleas fell on deaf ears. She fought back and kicked Norberto twice.
Norberto was not able to pursue his lustful desires. Norberto offered her money and told her
not totell the incident to her mother otherwise, she will be killed. AAA went out of the tent
to seek help from Jess (the house boy) but she failed to wake him up.
Thirty minutes later, when AAA returned to their tent, she saw Norberto touching the private
parts of BBB. AAA saw her companion awake but her hands wereshaking. When she finally
entered the tent, Norberto left and went outside.
Later that day, AAA and BBB narrated to Jess the incident that took place that early
morning. Later still, while they were on their way to fetch water, AAA and BBB asked the
people around where they can find the municipal building. An old woman pointed to them
the place.
In the evening of December 21, 1993, AAA and BBB went straight to the municipal hall
where they met a policeman by the name of "Sabas".
They told Sabas the sexual advances made to them by Norberto. Norberto was summoned to
the police station where he personally confronted his accusers. When Norbertos wife,
Belinda, arrived at the police station, an argument ensued between them.
On December 22, 1993, at around 2:20 oclock in the morning, the police investigator
ordered the complainants to return at6:00 oclock in the morning. Norberto and Belinda
were still able to bring AAA and BBB home with them and worked for them until December
30, 1994, after which they were sent back to Lingayen, Pangasinan.
On January 10, 1994, AAA and BBB went back to La Union and executed their respective
sworn statements against Norberto.
Version of the Defense
The petitioner denied the criminal acts imputed to him. His version was presented in the
assailed decision of the CA,7 as follows:
In a bid to exculpate himself, accused-appellant presents a totally different version of the
story. The accused maintains that it was not possible for him to commit the crimes hurled
against him. On the date of the alleged incident, there were many people around who were
preparing for the "simbang gabi". Considering the location of the tents, which were near the
road and the municipal hall, he could not possibly do the dastardly acts out in the open, not
to mention the fact that once AAA and BBB would scream, the policemen in the municipal
hall could hear them. He believes that the reason why the complainants filed these cases
against him was solely for the purpose of extorting money from him.
Judgment of the RTC
After the joint trial of the two criminal cases, the RTC rendered its judgment on April 6,
2000 finding the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of attempted rape in Criminal
Case No. 2388 and acts of lasciviousness in Criminal Case No. 2389,8 to wit:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Court hereby renders judgment declaring
the accused NORBERTO CRUZ Y BARTOLOME guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crimes of ATTEMPTED RAPE and ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS as defined and
penalized in Article 335 in relation with (sic) Article 6, par. 3 and Article 336 of the Revised
Penal Code respectively. With respect to the crime of ATTEMPTED RAPE, the Court
hereby sentences the accused to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from
FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS PRISION CORRECCIONAL as Minimum to
TEN (10) YEARS PRISION MAYOR as Maximum and the accessory penalties provided
for by law and to pay the victim AAA the amount of P20,000.00 as moral damages.
With regard to the crime ofACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS, the Court hereby sentences the
accused to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from FOUR (4) MONTHS
ARRESTO MAYOR as Minimum to FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS PRISION
CORRECCIONAL as Maximum and the accessory penalties provided for by law, and to
pay the victim BBBthe amount of P10,000.00 as moral damages.
The preventive imprisonment suffered by the accused by reason of the two cases is counted
in his favor.
SO ORDERED.9
Decision of the CA
On appeal, the petitioner contended that the RTC gravely erred in convicting him of
attempted rape despite the dubious credibility of AAA, and of acts of lasciviousness despite
the fact that BBB did not testify.
On July 26, 2004, the CA promulgated its decision affirming the conviction of the petitioner
for attempted rape in Criminal Case No. 2388, but acquitting him of the acts of
lasciviousness charged in Criminal Case No. 2389 due to the insufficiency of the evidence,10
holding thusly:
In sum, the arguments of the accused-appellant are too puerile and inconsequential as to
dent, even slightly, the overall integrity and probative value of the prosecution's evidence
insofar as AAA is concerned.
Under Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for an attempted felony is the
"penalty lower by two (2) degrees" prescribed by law for the consummated felony. In this
case, the penalty for rape if it had been consummated would have been reclusion
perpetuapursuant to Article 335 of the Revised Penalty Code, as amended by Republic Act
No. 7659. The penalty two degrees lower than reclusion perpetuais prision mayor.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the penalty shall be the
medium period of prision mayorin the absence of any mitigating or aggravating
circumstance and the minimum shall be within the range of the penalty nextlower to that
prescribed for the offense which in this case is prision correccionalin any of its periods.
We also find that the trial court correctly assessed the amount of P20,000.00 by way of
moral damages against the accused-appellant. In a rape case, moral damages may be
awarded without the need of proof or pleading since it is assumed that the private
complainant suffered moral injuries, more so, when the victim is aged 13 to 19.
Insofar as the crime of acts of lasciviousness committed against BBB, the accused argues
that there is not enough evidence to support such accusation. BBB did not testify and neither
her sworn statement was formally offered in evidence to support the charge for acts of
lasciviousness.
In this case, the evidence adducedby the prosecution is insufficient to substantiate the charge
of acts of lasciviousness against the accusedappellant. The basis of the complaint for acts of
lasciviousness is the sworn statement of BBB to the effectthat the accused-appellant
likewise molested her by mashing her breast and touching her private part. However, she
was not presented to testify. While AAA claims that she personally saw the accused
touching the private parts of BBB, there was no testimony to the effect that suchlascivious
acts were without the consent or against the will of BBB.11
Issues
In this appeal, the petitioner posits that the CAs decision was not in accord with law or with
jurisprudence, particularly:
I. In giving credence to the incredulous and unbelievable testimony of the alleged victim;
and
II. In convicting the accused notwithstanding the failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt
of the petitioner beyond reasonable doubt.
Anent the first issue, the petitioner assails the behavior and credibility of AAA. He argues
that AAA still continued working for him and his wife until December 30, 1994 despite the
alleged attempted rape in the early morning of December 21, 1994, thereby belying his
commission of the crime against her; that he could not have undressed her without rousing
her if she had gone to sleep only an hour before, because her bra was locked at her back;
that her testimony about his having been on top of her for nearly an hour while they
struggled was also inconceivable unless she either consented to his act and yielded to his
lust, or the incident did not happen at all, being the product only of her fertileimagination;
that the record does not indicate if he himself was also naked, or that his penis was poised to
penetrate her; and that she and her mother demanded from him P80,000.00 as settlement,
under threat that she would file a case against him.12
On the second issue, the petitioner assails the glaring inconsistencies in the testimony of
AAA that cast doubt on her veracity.
Ruling of the Court
The appeal is partly meritorious.
In an appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,13 the Court reviews only questions of law.
No review of the findings of fact by the CA is involved. As a consequence of thisrule, the
Court accords the highest respect for the factual findings of the trial court, its assessment of
the credibility of witnesses and the probative weight of their testimonies and the conclusions
drawn from its factual findings, particularly when they are affirmed by the CA. Judicial
experience has shown, indeed, that the trial courts are in the best position to decideissues of
credibility of witnesses, having themselves heard and seen the witnesses and observed
firsthand their demeanor and deportment and the manner of testifying under exacting
examination. As such, the contentionsof the petitioner on the credibility of AAA as a witness
for the State cannot beentertained. He thereby raises questions of fact that are outside the
scope of this appeal. Moreover, he thereby proposes to have the Court, which is not a trier of
facts, review the entire evidence adduced by the Prosecution and the Defense.
Conformably with this limitation, our review focuses only on determining the question of
law of whether or not the petitioners climbing on top of the undressed AAA such thatthey
faced each other, with him mashing her breasts and touching her genitalia with his hands,
constituted attempted rape, the crime for which the RTC and the CA convicted and punished
him. Based on the information, supra, he committed such acts "with intent of having carnal
knowledge ofher by means of force, and if the accused did not accomplish his purpose that
is to have carnal knowledge of the said AAA it was not because of his voluntary desistance
but because the said offended party succeeded in resisting the criminal attempt of said
accused to the damage and prejudice of said offended party."
There is an attempt, according to Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, when the offender
commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the
acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident
other than this own spontaneous desistance. In People v. Lamahang,14 the Court, speaking
through the eminent Justice Claro M.Recto, eruditely expounded on what overt acts would
constitute anattempted felony, to wit:
It is our opinion that the attempt to commit an offense which the Penal Code punishes is that
which has a logical relation to a particular, concrete offense; that, which is the beginning of
the execution of the offense by overt acts of the perpetrator, leading directly to its realization
and consummation. The attempt to commit an indeterminate offense, inasmuch as its nature
in relation to its objective is ambiguous, is not a juridical fact from the standpoint of the
Penal Code. xxxx But it is not sufficient, for the purpose of imposing penal sanction, that an
act objectively performed constitute a mere beginning of execution; it is necessary to
establish its unavoidable connection, like the logical and natural relation of the cause and its
effect, with the deed which, upon its consummation, will develop into one of the offenses
defined and punished by the Code; it is necessary to prove that said beginning of execution,
if carried to its complete termination following its natural course, without being frustrated
by external obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and
necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. x x x x.
"It must be borne in mind (I Groizard, p. 99) that in offenses not consummated, as the
material damage iswanting, the nature of the action intended (accion fin) cannot exactly be
ascertained, but the same must be inferred from the nature of the acts of execution (accion
medio). Hence, the necessity that these acts be such that by their very nature, by the facts to
which they are related, by the circumstances of the persons performing the same, and by the
things connected therewith, they must show without any doubt, that they are aimed at the
consummation of a crime. Acts susceptible of double interpretation, that is, in favor as well
as against the culprit, and which show an innocent aswell as a punishable act, must not and
cannot furnish grounds by themselves for attempted or frustrated crimes. The relation
existing between the facts submitted for appreciation and the offense of which said facts are
supposed to produce must be direct; the intention must be ascertainedfrom the facts and
therefore it is necessary, in order to avoid regrettable instance of injustice, that the mind be
able to directly infer from them the intention of the perpetrator to cause a particular injury.
This must have been the intention of the legislator in requiring that in order for an attempt to
exist, the offender must commence the commission of the felony directly by overt acts, that
is to say, that the acts performed must be such that, withoutthe intent to commit an offense,
they would be meaningless."15
To ascertain whether the acts performed by the petitioner constituted attempted rape, we
have to determine the law on rape in effect on December 21, 1993, when the petitioner
committed the crime he was convicted of. That law was Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code, which pertinently provided as follows:
Article335. When and how rape is committed. Rape is committed by having carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived ofreason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age, even though neither of the circumstances
mentioned in the two next preceding paragraphs shall be present.
xxxx
The basic element of rape then and now is carnal knowledge of a female. Carnal knowledge
isdefined simply as "theact of a man having sexual bodily connections with a woman,"16
which explains why the slightest penetration of the female genitalia consummates the rape.
In other words, rape is consummated once the peniscapable of consummating the sexual act
touches the external genitalia of the female.17 In People v. Campuhan,18 the Court has
defined the extent of "touching" by the penis in rape in the following terms:
[T]ouching when applied to rape cases does not simply mean mere epidermal contact,
stroking or grazing of organs, a slight brush or a scrape of the penis on the external layer of
the victims vagina, or the mons pubis, as in this case. There must be sufficient and
convincing proof that the penis indeedtouched the labias or slid into the female organ, and
not merely stroked the external surface thereof, for an accused to be convicted of
consummated rape. As the labias, which are required to be "touched" bythe penis, are by
their natural situsor location beneath the mons pubisor the vaginal surface, to touch them
with the penis is to attain some degree of penetration beneath the surface, hence, the
conclusion that touching the labia majora or the labia minora of the pudendum constitutes
consummated rape.
The pudendumor vulvais the collective term for the female genital organs that are visible in
the perineal area, e.g., mons pubis, labia majora, labia minora, the hymen, the clitoris, the
vaginal orifice, etc. The mons pubisis the rounded eminence that becomes hairy after
puberty, and is instantly visible within the surface. The next layer is the labia majoraor the
outer lips of the female organ composed of the outer convex surface and the inner surface.
The skin of the outer convex surface is covered with hair follicles and is pigmented, while
the inner surface is a thin skin which does not have any hair but has many sebaceous glands.
Directly beneath the labia majorais the labia minora. Jurisprudence dictates that the labia
majoramust be entered for rape to be consummated, and not merely for the penis to stroke
the surface of the female organ. xxxx Thus, a grazing of the surface of the female organ or
touching the mons pubisof the pudendum is not sufficient to constitute consummated rape.
Absent any showing of the slightest penetration of the female organ, i.e., touching of either
labia of the pudendumby the penis, there can be no consummated rape; at most, it can only
be attempted rape, if not acts of lasciviousness. [Bold emphasis supplied]
It is noteworthy that in People v. Orita,19 the Court clarified that the ruling in People v.
Eriia20 whereby the offender was declared guilty of frustrated rapebecause of lack of
conclusive evidence of penetration of the genital organ of the offended party, was a stray
decisionfor not having been reiterated in subsequent cases. As the evolving case law on rape
stands, therefore, rape in its frustrated stage is a physical impossibility, considering that the
requisites of a frustrated felony under Article 6 of the Revised Penal Codeare that: (1) the
offender has performed all the acts of execution which would produce the felony; and (2)
that the felony is not produced due to causes independent of the perpetrators will.
Obviously, the offender attains his purpose from the moment he has carnal knowledge of his
victim, because from that moment all the essential elements of the offense have been
accomplished, leaving nothing more to be done by him.21
Nonetheless, rape admits of an attempted stage. In this connection, the character of the overt
actsfor purposes of the attempted stage has been explained in People v. Lizada:22
ripen into a concrete offense. The raison detrefor the law requiring a direct overtact is that,
in a majority of cases, the conduct of the accused consisting merely of acts of preparation
has never ceased to be equivocal; and this is necessarily so, irrespective of his declared
intent. It is that quality of being equivocal that must be lacking before the act becomes one
which may be said to be a commencement of the commission of the crime, or an overt act or
before any fragment of the crime itself has been committed, and this is so for the reason that
so long as the equivocal quality remains, no one can say with certainty what the intent of the
accused is.It is necessary that the overt act should have been the ultimate step towards the
consummation of the design. It is sufficient if it was the "first or some subsequent step in a
direct movement towards the commission of the offense after the preparations are made."
The act done need not constitute the last proximate one for completion. It is necessary,
however, that the attempt must have a causal relation to the intended crime. In the words of
Viada, the overt acts must have an immediate and necessary relation to the offense. (Bold
emphasis supplied)
In attempted rape, therefore, the concrete felony is rape, but the offender does not perform
all the acts of execution of having carnal knowledge. If the slightest penetration of the
female genitalia consummates rape, and rape in its attempted stage requires the
commencement of the commission of the felony directly by overt actswithout the offender
performing all the acts of execution that should produce the felony, the only means by
which the overt acts performed by the accused can be shown to have a causal relation to
rape as the intended crime is to make a clear showing of his intent to lie with the female.
Accepting that intent, being a mental act, is beyond the sphere of criminal law,23 that
showing must be through his overt acts directly connected with rape. He cannot be held
liable for attempted rape withoutsuch overt acts demonstrating the intent to lie with the
female. In short, the State, to establish attempted rape, must show that his overt acts, should
his criminalintent be carried to its complete termination without being thwarted by
extraneous matters, would ripen into rape,24 for, as succinctly put in People v. Dominguez,
Jr.:25 "The gauge in determining whether the crime of attempted rape had been committed is
the commencement of the act of sexual intercourse, i.e., penetration of the penis into the
vagina, before the interruption."
The petitioner climbed on top of the naked victim, and was already touching her genitalia
with his hands and mashing her breasts when she freed herself from his clutches and
effectively ended his designs on her. Yet, inferring from such circumstances thatrape, and no
other,was his intended felony would be highly unwarranted. This was so, despite his lust for
and lewd designs towards her being fully manifest. Such circumstances remained equivocal,
or "susceptible of double interpretation," as Justice Recto put in People v. Lamahang, supra,
such that it was not permissible to directly infer from them the intention to cause rape as the
particular injury. Verily, his felony would not exclusively be rapehad he been allowed by her
to continue, and to have sexual congress with her, for some other felony like simple
seduction (if he should employ deceit to have her yield to him)26 could also be ultimate
felony.
We clarify that the direct overt acts of the petitioner that would have produced attempted
rape did not include equivocal preparatory acts. The former would have related to his acts
directly connected to rape as the intended crime, but the latter, whether external or internal,
had no connection with rape as the intended crime. Perforce, his perpetration of the
preparatory acts would not render him guilty of an attempt to commit such felony.27 His
preparatory acts could include his putting up of the separate tents, with one being for the use
of AAA and BBB, and the other for himself and his assistant, and his allowing his wife to
leave for Manila earlier that evening to buy more wares. Such acts, being equivocal, had no
direct connection to rape. As a rule, preparatory acts are not punishable under the Revised
Penal Codefor as long as they remained equivocal or of uncertain significance, because by
their equivocality no one could determine with certainty what the perpetrators intent really
was.28
If the acts of the petitioner did not constitute attempted rape, did they constitute acts of
lasciviousness?
It is obvious that the fundamental difference between attempted rape and acts of
lasciviousness is the offendersintent to lie with the female. In rape, intent to lie with the
female is indispensable, but this element is not required in acts of lasciviousness.29
Attempted rape is committed, therefore, when the "touching" of the vagina by the penis is
coupled with the intent to penetrate. The intent to penetrate is manifest only through the
showing of the penis capable of consummating the sexual act touching the external genitalia
of the female.30 Without such showing, only the felony of acts of lasciviousness is
committed.31
Based on Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, the felony of acts of lasciviousness is
consummated whenthe following essential elements concur, namely: (a) the offender
commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness upon another person of either sex; and (b)
the act of lasciviousness or lewdness is committed either (i) by using force or intimidation;
or (ii) when the offended party is deprived ofreason or is otherwise unconscious; or (iii)
when the offended party is under 12 years of age.32 In that regard, lewdis defined as
obscene, lustful, indecent, lecherous; it signifies that form of immorality that has relation to
moral impurity; or that which is carried on a wanton manner.33
The information charged that the petitioner "remove[d] her panty and underwear and la[id]
on top of said AAA embracing and touching her vagina and breast." With such allegation of
the information being competently and satisfactorily proven beyond a reasonable doubt, he
was guilty only of acts of lasciviousness, not attempted rape. His embracing her and
touching her vagina and breasts did not directly manifest his intent to lie with her. The lack
of evidence showing his erectile penis being in the position to penetrate her when he was on
top of her deterred any inference about his intent to lie with her. At most, his acts reflected
lewdness and lust for her.
The intent to commit rape should not easily be inferred against the petitioner, even from his
own declaration of it, if any, unless he committed overt acts directly leading to rape. A good
illustration of this can be seen in People v. Bugarin,34 where the accused was charged with
attempted rape through an information alleging that he, by means of force and intimidation,
"did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commence the commission of the
crime of Rape directly by overt acts, by then and there kissing the nipples and the vagina of
the undersigned [complainant], a minor, and about to lay on top of her, all against her will,
however, [he] did not perform all the acts of execution which would have produced the
crime of Rape by reason of some causes other than his own spontaneous desistance, that is,
undersigned complainant push[ed] him away." The accused was held liable only for acts of
lasciviousness because the intent to commit rape "is not apparent from the actdescribed,"
and the intent to have sexual intercourse with her was not inferable from the act of licking
her genitalia. The Court also pointed out that the "act imputed to him cannot be considered a
preparatory act to sexual intercourse."35
Pursuant to Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, the petitioner, being guilty of acts of
lasciviousness, is punished with prision correccional. In the absence of modifying
circumstances, prision correccional is imposed in its medium period, which ranges from two
(2) years, four (4) months and one day to four (4) years and two (2) months. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the penalty should come from arresto mayor,
the penalty next lower than prision correccionalwhich ranges from one (1) month to six (6)
months. Accordingly, the Court fixes the indeterminate sentence of three (3) months of
arresto mayor, as the minimum, to two (2) years, four (4) months and one day of prision
correccional, as the maximum.
In acts of lasciviousness, the victim suffers moral injuries because the offender violates her
chastity by his lewdness.1wphi1 "Moral damages include physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock,
social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral
damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act
for omission."36 Indeed, Article 2219, (3), of the Civil Code expressly recognizes the right
of the victim in acts of lasciviousness to recover moral damages.37 Towards that end, the
Court, upon its appreciation of the record, decrees that P30,000.00 is a reasonable award of
moral damages.38 In addition, AAA was entitled to recover civil indemnity of P20,000.00.39
Under Article 2211 of the Civil Code, the courts are vested with the discretion to impose
interest as a part of the damages in crimes and quasidelicts. In that regard, the moral
damages of P20,000.00 shall earn interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the finality of
this decision until full payment.40
WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and PRONOUNCES petitioner NORBERTO CRUZ y
BARTOLOME guilty of ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS, and, ACCORDINGLY,
PENALIZES him with the indeterminate sentence of three (3) months of arresto mayor, as
the minimum, to two (2) years, four (4) months and one day of prision correccional, as the
maximum; ORDERS him to pay moral damages of P30,000.00 and civil indemnity of
P20,000.00 to the complainant, with interest of 6% per annum on such awards reckoned
from the finality of this decision until full payment; and DIRECTS him to pay the costs of
suit.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Associate Justice
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Court's Division.
Chief Justice

Crim Cases Arts. 1-6

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FIRST DIVISION

ESMERALDO RIVERA, ISMAEL G.R. No. 166326

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Penned by Associate Justice Portia Alio-Hormachuelos (Chairman), with Associate

TSN, September 24, 2001, pp. 2-18.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ANTONIO MARIANO ALMEDA,

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

MANUEL LORENZO ESCALONA II, MARCUS JOEL CAPELLAN RAMOS,

G.R. No. 154954

G.R. No. 155101

G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080

[endif]Jaime Maria Flores II (Flores)

[endif]Percival Brigola (Brigola)

In Criminal Case No. C-38340

G.R. No. 151258 Villareal v. People

Moreover, Crisostomos absence on the 22 June 1995

In criminal cases where the imposable penalty may be

that the accused is personally made aware of the consequences of a

Clearly, the waiver of the right to present evidence in a

While we are prepared to concede that some of the

prosecution, through the Department of Justice, to secure the

It is likewise noticeable that from December 27, 1995,

to a speedy disposition of cases; similarly, in Roque vs. Office of

Since Penesa involved a case in which the victim allegedly suffered

malicious, villainous, and/or proceeding from an evil heart or purpose.[if !supportFootnotes][122]

In turn, the existence of malicious intent is necessary in order for conspiracy to

The presence of an initial malicious intent to commit a felony is thus a vital

Hazing and other forms of initiation rites

Modern fraternities and sororities espouse some connection to these

In 1901, General Douglas MacArthur got involved in a congressional investigation

In Kenner v. Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity, decided in 2002, the initiate-victim

In Morton v. State, Marcus Jones a university student in Florida sought initiation

Anti-Hazing laws in the U.S.

acts, that is, to be held liable for the crime of homicide.[if

We cannot subscribe to this conclusion.

Witness We were escorted out of [Michael Musngis] house and we were

Witness I cannot particularly point to because there were utterances

Witness Yes, sir I heard utterances.

Witness For example, one person particularly Boyet Dizon stepped on my

parking space of my father, sir. So, thats

Atty. Tadiar And you were referring to which particular accused?

Witness Boyet Dizon, sir.

Atty. Tadiar You mentioned about Dizon in particular mentioning that

Witness He continued to inflict blows on Lenny Villa.

Atty. Tadiar How were those blows inflicted?

Witness While he was inflicting blows upon me, he told me in particular if I

Atty. Tadiar What else?

Witness Thats all, sir.

Witness No, sir.[if !supportFootnotes][210][endif] (Emphasis supplied)

On cross-examination, witness Bienvenido Marquez testified thus:

Witness Yes, sir.

Judge Purisima Who did the briefing?

Witness Mr. Michael Musngi, sir and Nelson Victorino.

Witness They told us at the time we would be brought to a particular place,

Witness Yes, sir.

Witness Yes, sir at the briefing.

Witness Yes, sir.

JudgePurisima So, what kind of physical contact or implements that you

Witness At that point I am already sure that there would be hitting by a

Witness Combination, sir.[if !supportFootnotes][211][endif] (Emphasis supplied)