De Jesus v.

Syquia
58 Phil 866
November 28, 1933
Facts:
Antonia Loanco, a likely unmarried
girl 20 years of age was a cashier in
a barber shop owned by the
defendants brother in law Vicente
Mendoza. Cesar Syquia, the
defendant, 23 years of age and an
unmarried scion of a prominent
family in Manila was accustomed to
have his haircut in the said barber
shop. He got acquainted with
Antonio and had an amorous
relationship. As a consequence,
Antonia got pregnant and a baby boy
was born on June 17, 1931.
In the early months of Antonias
pregnancy, defendant was a
constant visitor. On February 1931,
he even wrote a letter to a rev father
confirming that the child is his and
he wanted his name to be given to
the child. Though he was out of the
country, he continuously wrote
letters to Antonia reminding her to
eat on time for her and juniors
sake. The defendant ask his friend
Dr. Talavera to attend at the birth
and hospital arrangements at St.
Joseph Hospital in Manila.
After giving birth, Syquia brought
Antonia and his child at a House in
Camarines Street Manila where they
lived together for about a year.
When Antonia showed signs of
second pregnancy, defendant
suddenly departed and he was
married with another woman at this
time.
It should be noted that during the
christening of the child, the
defendant who was in charge of the
arrangement of the ceremony
caused the name Ismael Loanco to

be given instead of Cesar Syquia Jr.

that was first planned.
Issue: Whether or not Syquia is
compelled to recognize Ismael
Loanco as his natural child.
Held: The letter written by Syquia to
Rev. Father serves as admission of
paternity and the other letters are
sufficient to connect the admission
with the child carried by Antonia.
The mere requirement is that the
writing shall be indubitable.
The law fixes no period during
which a child must be in the
continuous possession of the status
of a natural child; and the period in
this case was long enough to reveal
the father's resolution to admit the
status.
Continental Steel v. Montano
GR 182836, October 13, 2009
Facts:
In January 2006, the wife of Rolando
Hortillano had a miscarriage which
caused the death of their unborn
child. Hortillano, in accordance with
the collective bargaining agreement,
then filed death benefits claim from
his employer, the Continental Steel
Manufacturing Corporation which
denied the claim. Eventually, the
issue was submitted for arbitration
and both parties agreed to have Atty.
Allan Montao act as the
arbitrator. Montao ruled that
Hortillano is entitled to his claims.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of Montao.
On appeal, Continental Steel insisted
that Hortillano is not entitled
because under the CBA, death
benefits are awarded if an
employees legitimate dependent
has died; but that in this case, no
death has occurred because the

fetus died inside the womb of the

mother, that a fetus has no juridical
personality because it was never
born pursuant to Article 40 of the
Civil Code which provides a
conceived child acquires personality
only when it is born; that the fetus
was not born hence it is not a
legitimate dependent as
contemplated by the CBA nor did it
suffer death as contemplated under
civil laws.

Issue:
1. Whether or not the fetus is a
legitimate dependent?
2. Whether or not a person has to
be born before it could die?
Held:
1. Yes. In the first place, the fact of
marriage between Hortillano and his
wife was never put in question,
hence they are presumed to be
married. Second, childrenconceived
or born during the marriage of the
parents are legitimate. Hence, the
unborn child (fetus) is already a
legitimate dependent the moment it
was conceived (meeting of the
sperm and egg cell).
2. No. Death is defined as cessation
of life. Certainly, a child in the
womb has life. There is no need to
discuss whether or not the unborn
child acquired juridical personality
that is not the issue here. But
nevertheless, life should not be
equated to civil
personality. Moreover, while the Civil
Code expressly provides that civil
personality may be extinguished by
death, it does not explicitly state that
only those who have acquired
juridical personality could die. In this
case, Hortillanos fetus had had life

inside the womb as evidenced by the

fact that it clung to life for 38 weeks
before the unfortunate miscarriage.
Thus, death occurred on a dependent
hence Hortillano as an employee is
entitled to death benefit claims as
provided for in their CBA.
Limjoco v. Intestate Estate of
Pedro Fragante
80 Phil 776
Facts:
Pedro Fragante, a Filipino citizen at
the time of his death, applied for a
certificate of public convenience to
install and maintain an ice plant in
San Juan, Rizal. His intestate estate
is financially capable of maintaining
the proposed service. The Public
Service Commission issued a
certificate of public convenience to
Intestate Estate of the deceased
through its special or judicial
administrator appointed by the
proper court of competent
jurisdiction to maintain and operate
the said plant. Petitioner claims that
the granting of certificate applied to
the estate is a contravention of law.
Issue:
Whether or not the estate of
Fragante may be extended an
artificial judicial personality
Held:
The estate of Fragrante must be
extended an artificial judicial
personality. If Fragrante had lived, in
view of the evidence of record, would
have obtained from the commission
the certificate for which he was
applying. The situation has not
changed except for his death, and
the economic ability of his estate to
appropriately and adequately
operate and maintain the service of
an ice plant was the same that it
received from the decedent himself.

It has been the constant doctrine

that the estate or the mass of
property, rights and assets left by
the decedent, directly becomes
vested and charged with his rights
and obligations which survive after
his demise. The reason for this legal
fiction, that the estate of the
deceased person is considered a
"person", as deemed to include
artificial or juridical persons, is the
avoidance of injustice or prejudice
resulting from the impossibility of
exercising such legal rights and
fulfilling such legal obligations of the
decedent as survived after his death
unless the fiction is indulged.
The estate of Fragrante should be
considered an artificial or juridical
person for the purposes of the
settlement and distribution of his
estate which, include the exercise
during the judicial administration of
those rights and the fulfilment of
those obligations of his estate which
survived after his death.
The decedent's rights which by their
nature are not extinguished by death
go to make up a part and parcel of
the assets of his estate for the
benefit of the creditors, devisees or
legatees, if any, and the heirs of the
decedent. It includes those rights
and fulfilment of obligation of
Fragante which survived after his
death like his pending application at
the commission.
Dumlao v. Quality Plastics
70 SCRA 472, April 30, 1976
Facts:
Judgement for Civil Case T-662 was
rendered on February 28, 1962
ordering defendants Soliven, Pedro
Oria, Laurencio, Sumalbag and
Darang to pay solidarity Quality

Plastics the sum of P3,667.03 plus

legal rate of interest from November
1958 before its decision became final
or else Quality Plastics is hereby
authorized to foreclose the bond.
Defendants failed to pay the amount
before the limit given. Oria's land,
which was covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 28732 and has
an area of nine and six-tenths
hectares, was levied upon and sold
by the sheriff at public auction on
September 24, 1962 which he has
given as security under the bond.
Apparently, Oria died on April 23,
1959 or long before June 13, 1960.
Quality Plastics was not aware on
Orias death. The summons and
copies of complaint was personally
served on June 24, 1960 by a deputy
sheriff to Soliven which the latter
acknowledged and signed in his own
behalf and his co-defendants.
Dionisio, Fausta, Amado and
Benjamin, all surnamed Dumlao and
all testamentary heirs in Oria's duly
probated will, sued Quality Plastic
Products, Inc on March 1, 1963 for
the annulment of the judgment
against Oria and the execution
against his land (T-873). Dionisio
also sued in his capacity as
administrator of Orias testate
estate.
Issue:
W/N the judgment against Oria and
his land are valid
Held:
The Quality Plastics only learned
about Orias death upon receipt of
the summons of Orias heirs. They
acted in good faith in including Oria
as a co-defendant. However, no
jurisdiction was acquired over Oria.
Hence, the judgment against him is
patent nullity. Oria, upon his death,

had no more civil personality and his

juridical capacity which made him
capable of legal relations was lost
through death. However, Dumlaos
(heirs) are not entitled to claim
attorneys fee for the corporation.
Eugenio v. Velez
185 SCRA 425, May 17, 1990
Facts:
Vitaliana Vargas brothers and sisters
unaware of the formers death on
August 28, 1988 filed a petition for
Habeas Corpus on September 27,
1988 before the RTC of Misamis
Oriental alleging that she was
forcible taken from her residence
sometime in 1987 and was confined
by the herein petitioner, Tomas
Eugenio in his palacial residence in
Jasaan, Misamis Oriental. The court
then issued a writ of habeas corpus
but petitioner refused to surrender
the Vitalianas body to the sheriff on
the ground that a corpse cannot be
subjected to habeas corpus
proceedings. Vitaliana, 25 year old
single, died of heart failure due to
toxemia of pregnancy in Eugenios
residence. The court ordered that
the body should be delivered to a
funeral parlor for autopsy but
Eugenio assailed the lack of
jurisdiction of the court.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner can
claim custody of the deceased.

Held:
The court held that the custody of
the dead body of Vitaliana was
correctly awarded to the surviving
brothers and sisters pursuant to
Section 1103 of the Revised
Administrative Code which provides:
Persons charged with duty of burialif the deceased was an unmarried
man or woman or a child and left any
kin; the duty of the burial shall
devolve upon the nearest kin of the
deceased.
Albeit, petitioner claims he is the
spouse as contemplated under Art.
294 of the Civil Code, Philippine law
does not recognize common law
marriages where a man and a
woman not legally married who
cohabit for many years as husband
and wife, who represent themselves
to the public as husband and wife,
and who are reputed to be husband
and wife in the community where
they live may be considered legally
mauled in common law
jurisdictions. In addition, it requires
that the man and woman living
together must not in any way be
incapacitated to contract marriage.
Whereas, the petitioner has a
subsisting marriage with another
woman, legal impediment that
disqualified him from even legally
marrying Vitaliana.