4.4 IEEE 802.

11 MAC Layer
4.4.1
4.4.2
4.4.3
4.4.4

Introduction
Medium Access Control
MAC Management
Extensions

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4.4.3 802.11 - MAC management

Synchronization
try to find a LAN, try to stay within a LAN
timer etc.

Power management
Periodic sleep without missing a message by negotiated sleep
periods and buffering frames during such periods
Implemented, but rarely used

Association/Reassociation
integration into a LAN
roaming, i.e. change networks by changing access points
scanning, i.e. active search for a network

MIB Management Information Base

managing, read, write
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Synchronisation
Each station has an internal clock;
802.11 specifies Timing Synchronisation Function (TSF) to
synchronise all these clocks
Exact synchronised clocks are important for
Power saving, PCF coordination, synchronisation of frequency
hopping of FHSS

In a BSS (Basic Service Set) synchronisation is supported

by a beacon periodically transmitted
Beacon contains time stamp + info on power saving and roaming
(BSSID)
Beacon is used to adjust clocks
Exact periodic transmission of beacon is not possible as medium is
shared by all stations

In infrastructure networks beacon is transmitted by Access

Point
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Synchronization (infrastructure)

beacon interval

access
point
medium

B
busy

busy

busy

B
busy
t

value of the timestamp

beacon frame

Beacon Interval: 20ms 1s

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802.11 Roaming (1)

No or bad connection? Then perform:
Scanning
scan the environment, i.e.,
listen into the medium for beacon signals (passive scanning)
send probes into medium and wait for an answer (active scanning)
Reassociation Request
station sends a request to one or several AP(s)
Reassociation Response
success: AP has answered, station can now participate
failure: continue scanning
AP accepts Reassociation Request
signal the new station to the distribution system
the distribution system updates its data base (i.e., location
information)
typically, the distribution system now informs the old AP so it can
release resources

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802.11 Roaming (2)

Roaming implementation is often not compatible between different

hardware manufacturers
Therefore 802.11F (Inter Access Point Protocol, IAPP) had been
standardised:
Also enables load balancing between Access Points
Generation of new keys for security algorithms based on 802.1x
Was however only published as recommended practice,
meanwhile abandoned
Nowadays roaming solutions vendor specific

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MAC Services
802.11 requires provisioning of 9 services:

5 Distribution Services, 4 Station Services

Distribution Services

Association: register with exactly one AP

Disassociation: deregister from AP

Re-Association: reregister with new AP after roaming

Distribution: deliver packets across the distribution system

Integration: cooperation with LANs

Station Services

Authentication: with AP

De-Authentication: from AP

Privacy: e.g., encryption

Data Delivery: deliver packets to another phyiscally connected station

www.intelligraphics.com/introduction-ieee-80211
and Tanenbaum

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4.4.4 IEEE802.11e: Motivation

802.11 almost only used as best-effort networks
No priorisation between different traffic types
Limited support of time-critical applications
No consideration of certain throughput and delay demands
Works if load is low (cf. 802.3 load curve)

Precise control of the channel needed in any situation

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IEEE802.11e: EDCA
Enhanced Distributed Channel Access
Extends DCF of legacy 802.11
Up to 8 queues / traffic classes (TC) for different
application types, each with individual backoff
Transmission parameters configurable for each TC:
CWmin, CWmax, arbitrary IFS (AIFS) with configurable
duration, min. duration = DIFS duration
Virtual collisions (inside the station's protocol stack)
If two queues decide to send packet at same time
queue with higher priority sends first
queue with lower priority retransmits, but CW is not
increased, because no physical collision
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IEEE802.11e: HCCA
Hybrid Coordination Function Controlled Channel Access
Extends PCF of legacy 802.11
Up to 8 queues / traffic classes (TC) for different
application types
Channel access determined by scheduler
Determines order of data packets (downlink) and polling packets
(uplink)
Algorithm out of the scope of standard, vendor-specific

Like in PCF, mixing of contention-free periods and

contention periods possible

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IEEE802.11n: Frame Aggregation

On the MAC: frame aggregation / packet trains
Multiple packets are sent consecutively and acknowledged by one
single Block ACK

BACK

AP
Station 1

DIFS

AD1

DIFS

SIFS

AD2
SIFS

BACK

Station 2
AD
BACK

Aggregated Data Frame

Contention

Block Acknowledgement

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802.11n Aggregated Frame Format

PHY

Subframe 1

Subframe 2

...

Subframe n

Reserved

length

CRC

Delimiter

MAC Frame

Pad

12

variable

0-3

bits

Delimiter: signature to support recovery in case of

transmission errors

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802.11s Mesh Networks: Motivation

AP: Access Point

AP
AP

wired network

AP

In the infrastructure mode

Access points in infrastructure networks are connected by wires
Mobile stations can only communicate via the access point

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802.11s Mesh Networks: Architecture

BSS
AP

AP: Access Point

MG: Mesh Gate
Distribution System (Wireless backhaul)

MG

MG

Mesh BSS

Mesh BSS

MGs and APs can be connected by wireless backhaul

Mobile stations can communicate directly or via intermediate
hops
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802.11s Mesh Networks: Usage

W. Conner et al.: IEEE 802.11s Tutorial, IEEE 802 Plenary, November 2006

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4.5 WLAN Security

4.5.1
4.5.2
4.5.3
4.5.4
4.5.5

WEP
WPA, EAP, 802.1X
WAP2/802.11i
WPS
other security layers

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Objectives of Security

Authorisation
Only authorised terminals can access BSS
Terminal is accessing authorised AP and not rogue AP
Certificates or passwords for authorisation

Privacy/Encryption
Generally anyone can listen to wireless channel with appropriate
tools
Authentication
Authenticate the originator or the message
Integrity
Data manipulation, can be prevented by encryption and checksums

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Security a problem?
Sender, Receiver and Intruder (Alice, Bob and Trudy)
Data

Data

Control and data messages

Secure
Receiver

Secure
Sender
Channel

Packet sniffing
IP spoofing
Denial-of-service attack

Kurose/Ross

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Security Overview in legacy 802.11

MAC layer (OSI Layer 2) access control and encryption
mechanisms:
ESSID (WLAN Service Area ID) is required knowledge for a
station to associate with an AP
ESSIDs can be easily sniffed

Access Control List: a table of MAC addresses restricting

access to clients whose MAC addresses are on the list
Not feasible for large environments with changing users
MAC addresses can be easily forged

Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP)

http://www.pulsewan.com/data101/802_11_b_basics.htm
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4.5.1 WEP: encryption

A. Arnold, Jenseits von WEP,
Heise, ct 21/2004, p. 214ff

40/104 Bit

Data

PRNG sequence

WEP key

Data+CRC

Current IV

Data+CRC (encrypted)

Weaknesses: IV too short, static shared key

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WEP: Shared Key Authentication

Uses private key authentication scheme shown on
previous slide
STA

AP
identity assertion

Encrypted using
shared WEP
key

identity assertion/
challenge text

128-bit
one-time
nonce

encrypted text
success/failure
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Decrypted
using shared
WEP key
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WEP weaknesses
All users share the same key
Keys are not regularly changed, but stay constant
until changed by the user
IV is recommended to be changed with every
packets, but many manufacturers do not do it
IV too short
Known attacks since several years
AP does not have to authenticate against client
wild APs can attack client

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4.5.2 WPA: Security Improvements

Design Objectives:
no new chip design
backwards compatible to old hardware

Therefore
No fixed WEP key, but dynamic assignment of keys
for each connection set-up and during ongoing connections

User-specific keys

Introduced 1999; intermediate step towards 802.11i

marketed as WPA

For key exchange: 802.1X carries EAP (Extensible Authentication

Protocol) messages counterpart for RADIUS on the wired side
For encrypted connection: Algorithms TKIP and Michael replacing WEP

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EAP and 802.1X (1)

EAP (Extensible Authentication Protocol)

Primary objective: Authentication for secure access to (fixed) Network
Client and Server have to authenticate no wild AP
Secure tunnel between client and server for Access
At the end Server sends Master Secret to AP
AP manages tunnel and sends encryption key to client via tunnel
regular update of key via tunnel (e.g. 5 min)

Disadvantage: RADIUS server infrastructure difficult to install &

maintain
For SOHO usage: pre-shared key
Passphrase 8 to 64 characters is used with SSID to calculate Master Secret
via Hash

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EAP and 802.1X (2)

A. Arnold, Jenseits von WEP, Heise,
ct 21/2004, p. 214ff

WLAN login

Only EAP traffic allowed

before this point

EAP/802.1x negotiation
Announce Master Secret
Key

time

Normal data traffic

New key

Further normal data traffic

Only EAP traffic

allowed beyond this point

logoff

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Signalling in WPA
For Broadcast packets encryption needs to be supported by all
clients of BSS
If mixed WEP/WPA clients are allowed, the weaker WEP encryption
has to be used for broadcasts

Info broadcasted via beacon

Encryption modes for pairwise keys: WEP is included/excluded
Authentication: EAP/802.1x or PSK

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Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP)(1)

Should be implementable on existing WEP/RC4 HW with minimum

additional efforts, SW encryption too slow for 802.11g and up
Initialisation Vector
No direct connection to RC4 key, IV
48 instead of 24 bits long
to reduce processing time split IV into hi and lo part
recalculate phase 1 only all 65536 packets
MAC address is part of IV key, i.e. key is different for different
devices and same IV
IV is increased by 1 for each packets; repeated IVs (replay) are
discarded

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Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (2)

Michael Message
Integrity Check
(64 bits, 40
effective)

Michael key
Data

added to each
packet before
encryption

keykey
TKIP

Data + Michael

Data + Michael + CRC

prevents attacker
to falsify packets

If > 2 Michael
errors per minute
Abort
communication

Data + Michael + CRC (encrypted)

renegotiate keys
after 1 min.
A. Arnold, Jenseits von
WEP, Heise, ct 21/2004,
p. 214ff

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WPA Key Exchange

Handshake
Modern WLAN chip sets allow for 4
group keys for broadcasts and one
individual session key per user
Phase I: Pairwise Key Handshake
Nonce (Random Seq.) for key
negotiation

Phase II: Group Key Handshake

Group Key needed for
broadcasts
Group Key is distributed from
AP to Client using secure
connection
During Transmission AP and Client
can initiate key renogiation
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A. Arnold, Jenseits
von WEP, Heise, ct
21/2004, p. 214ff

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4.5.3 802.11i/WPA2: AES

WPA2
802.11i was finalised in 2004; mandatory for WiFi devices since 2006
Marketed as WPA2
Predecessor WPA meanwhile also broken
AES Encryption
The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is published by NIST as the
successor to Data Encryption Standard (DES)
Operation
128-byte blocks of data (cleartext)
128-, 192-, or 256-bit symmetric keys
NIST estimates that a machine that can break 56-bit DES key in 1
second would take about 149 trillion years to crack a 128-bit AES key
(unless someone is very lucky)
Replaces RC4 new hardware needed
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802.11i/WPA2: AES-CCM

AES-CCM Advanced Encryption Standard Counter with CBC-MAC

Replaces RC4/TKIP
Mandatory for 802.11n
AES only needs one 128 bit key for ciphering & protection against
falsification, i.e. no extra scheme like Michael required
CCM is symmetric both stations have same key
Initialisation Vector (IV) 48 bits, increased with each packet
Supports fast roaming by PMK (Pairwise Master Key) Caching
if station roams within limited number of APs, keys are cached to decrease
delay caused by authentication

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4.5.4 WPS: Wi-Fi Protected Setup

introduced to simplify the process of key configuration between
AP and mobile station in case of home use
Simplify configuration for unexperienced users
PIN available on a label on AP's enclosure is entered into mobile
device
WPA2 encryption key is generated from PIN
Implemented as a series of EAP messages
Broken since December 2011; PIN can be recovered within a few
hours using brute-force attacks

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4.5.5 Other encryption layers

End-to-end encryption
VPN Tunnel
Link Security

VPN
Server

WLAN encryption only secures the wireless link

Using a VPN (e.g., IPsec, OpenVPN) above the WLAN provides the
security present in the environment of the VPN server

End-to-end encryption provides encryption until the terminal nodes

(e.g., https)
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