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CASE 98-M-1343
CASE 06-M-0647 -
CASE 98-M-0667
pay no more than the APP would have paid as a full service
utility customer.
In other
Id. at 5.
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Collaborative
May 20, 2016 that improved and enhanced the utility low-income
Id. at 78.
In sum, the
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PSL 66(5).
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Eligibility requirements
Based
ensure that the ratepayer and taxpayer supported utility low-income programs are not frustrated by ESCOs through a premium
charge to customers above the utilities rates that can exceed
the State subsidy provided pursuant to the utility low-income
program.
Compliant Products
As previously stated, the Commission directed that
when an ESCO serves an APP, it must either guarantee that the
customer will pay no more than the customer would have paid as a
full service utility customer, or the ESCO must provide the APP
with ERVA products or services, including fixed-price products,
in a manner that does not dilute the effectiveness of the
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Id.
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Opinion 97-5.
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APP more than the utility rate does not provide value to
customers and does not satisfy the intent of the February 2015
Order.
The NYOAG comments that none of the ERVA products or
services offered in the Collaborative Report are likely to save
APPs money over what the customer would pay under full utility
service.
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The Joint
The Commission
Absent both
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Nor
The
Direct Energy
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Implementation of
During the
Specifically, the
The ESCOs
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The
It directed that
are available that may benefit the APP, and that the customer
should contact their ESCO for more information.
The Utilities
Some
Simply providing
This communication
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the discussion above, inform any ESCO serving that customer that
the ESCO is no longer eligible to serve that account.
As
Other utilities
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(SIGNED)
KATHLEEN H. BURGESS
Secretary
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APPENDIX A
APPENDIX A
INITIAL COMMENTS
Given the
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Further, Direct
APPENDIX A
no greater than the utility rate cap for the commodity portion
of the offer, plus a regulated approach to cost recovery for the
value-added product included with the offer.
Direct states it
GEE
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APPENDIX A
To the contrary,
Further,
As ESCOs
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APPENDIX A
One significant reason is the utilitys
An
This suggests
that the utility price is the lowest price, without any other
costs or value built into it. If it could be guaranteed that
utility prices were in no way subsidized, then the comparison of
ESCO pricing would be valid.
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APPENDIX A
RESAs
This approach
Fixed-price
UIU is concerned
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APPENDIX A
may offer products that utilities do not, however they must cost
no more than the lower of (1) the lowest price otherwise
available to the customer, or (2) the ESCOs cost of providing
the product, plus a small adder that compensates the ESCO for
the value it adds in connecting the customer to the service.
UIU contends that any alternative methodology that results in
higher costs to APPs would allow excessive transfers of
ratepayer-funded low-income benefits to ESCOs bottom lines,
thereby diluting their effectiveness.
UIU supports Staffs proposal that the ESCO use the
upfront cost of the product its offering, which would include
any discounts it may have, when calculating the adder, however,
it is not clear how the expected costs of a service such as
home heating repair will be valued and stated in the all in
price.
establishing this adder, and the many costs that ESCOs bear
beyond the utilities, such as marketing and a higher cost of
capital, UIU believes that it is difficult to imagine a scenario
in which an ESCO could deliver APPs a product at a price that
does not dilute the effectiveness of low-income programs.
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APPENDIX A
Competitive Bidding
The NYOAG asserts that the competitive bidding
proposal submitted by the ESCO sub-work group would require
extensive study and analysis before any variation of it could be
considered.
NYC
NYC respectfully
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APPENDIX A
Even
smaller ESCOs will not have the financial wherewithal to win the
RFPs, thereby diminishing the number of competitive entities in
the marketplace.
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APPENDIX A
Specifically, ESCOs
UIU suggests,
ESCOs are
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APPENDIX A
The
The NYOAG
The NYOAG
The NYOAG
NYC is
very concerned with the ESCOs positions that would require the
disclosure of personal information to third parties without
customer consent.
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APPENDIX A
Moreover, allowing an ESCO, which
Direct is keenly
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APPENDIX A
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The
APPENDIX A
necessity.
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APPENDIX A
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APPENDIX A
APPENDIX A
Direct argues that the goals of the APP
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APPENDIX A
NEM
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APPENDIX A
As the
As all
Extending
NYSEMC claims a
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APPENDIX A
APPENDIX A
their ESCOs about compliant products and would also keep non-APP
ESCO customers apprised of their options should they become APPs
in the future.
In addition,
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APPENDIX A
ESCO sales to APPs while the proceeding continues until valueadded services, and protective methods/technologies for
identifying APPs, have been identified and defined.
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APPENDIX A
This
In
APPENDIX A
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