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ConstitutionMidtermElmanFall2015

1.0
FoundationsofCanadianConstitutionalLaw

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2
1.2BroadPrinciplesofConstitutionalism...............................................................................2
ReferenceReSecessionofQuebec[1998]...............................................................................2
1.3LivingTreeDoctrine............................................................................................................5
ConstitutionalSupremacy.........................................................................................................5
Edwardsv.AttorneyGeneralForCanada[1930](J.C.P.C.)...................................................6
1.4RuleofLaw...........................................................................................................................7
Roncarelliv.Duplessis[1959]S.C.R.121...............................................................................8
REManitobaLanguageRights1985SCC...............................................................................9
BritishColumbiav.ImperialTobaccoCanadaLtd.2005SCC................................................9
2.0ThresholdIssues

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13
2.1Standing...............................................................................................................................13
2.1.1PublicInterest:Litigantisnotnecessarilydirectlyaffectedbythelegislation.........14
Ministerofjustice(Can.)v.Borowski....................................................................................14
HyandZelsInc.v.Ontario(A.G.)........................................................................................16
CanagaAttorneyGeneralv.DowntownEastsideSexWorkers.............................................17
2.1.2PrivateInterestStandingofCorporations:...............................................................17
R.v.WholesaleTravelGroupInc..........................................................................................18
CanadianEggMarketingAgencyv.Richardson....................................................................18
2.2Mootness..............................................................................................................................19
Borowskiv.Canada(AttorneyGeneral).................................................................................19
DoucetBoudreauv.NovaScotia(MinisterofEducation).....................................................20
R.v.Smith..............................................................................................................................20
JaneDoe..................................................................................................................................21
2.3Justiciability........................................................................................................................21
ReferenceReSecessionofQuebec.........................................................................................22
SameSexReference................................................................................................................22
Chaoulliv.Quebec(AttorneyGeneral)..................................................................................23
HarvardCollegev.Canada(CommissionerofPatents).........................................................23
3.0ConstitutionalInterpretation:theMeaningandValidityofLegislation

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23
3.1ContextualInterpretation..................................................................................................24
R.v.Blais................................................................................................................................24
ReferencereSameSexMarriage............................................................................................25
3.2 PithandSubstance...........................................................................................................25
UnionCollieryCompanyofBritishColumbiav.BrydenP130.............................................26
R.v.BigM.DrugMartLtd....................................................................................................26
CanadianWesternBankv.Alberta.........................................................................................27
3.3 NecessarilyIncidental(AncillaryDoctrine)..................................................................28
GeneralMotorsOfCanadaLtd.v.CityNationalLeasing.....................................................29
ReferenceReGoodsandServicesTax...................................................................................30

NoteonAncillaryDoctrine:

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30
4.0ConstitutionalInterpretation:ApplicabilityandOperabilityofLegislation

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31
CanadianWesternBankv.Alberta.........................................................................................32
4.1DoubleAspectDoctrine.....................................................................................................32
Hodgev.TheQueen(LeadingCase)......................................................................................33
MultipleAccessLtd.v.McCutcheon.....................................................................................33
4.3InterjurisdictionalImmunity(OnlyAppliestoApplicability).......................................35
CanadianWesternBankv.Alberta.........................................................................................36
4.4Paramountcy.......................................................................................................................38
MultipleAccessLtd.v.McCutcheon.....................................................................................38
Rothmans,Benson&HedgesInc.v.Saskatchewan...............................................................38
CanadianWesternBankv.Alberta.........................................................................................39
CanadianWesternBankv.Alberta.........................................................................................40
BritishColumbia(AttorneyGeneral)v.LafargeCanadaInc.................................................41
5.0Delegation

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42
5.1DelegatusNonPotestDelegare..........................................................................................42
5.2LegislativeInterDelegation..............................................................................................43
A.G.ForN.S.v.A.G.ForCan(NovaScotiaInterDelegation)..........................................43
5.3AdministrativeInterDelegation.......................................................................................43
PrinceEdwardislandPotatoMarketingBoardv.H.B.Willis...............................................43
5.4IncorporationbyReference...............................................................................................44
Coughlinv.OntarioHighwayTransportBoardEtAl............................................................44
5.5ConditionalDelegation.......................................................................................................44
LordsDayAllianceandBritishColumbia..............................................................................45
Generalnoteondelegation(alltypes)

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45

1.0 FoundationsofCanadianConstitutionalLaw
Constitution is the blueprint of nation and is the basic framework for the operation of the
state
Represents social and political values
Chief overriding principles inform and sustain the constitutional text (vital
assumptions)
o 1. Federalism
o 2. Democracy
o 3. The Rule of Law and Constitutionality
o 4. Respect for Minorities
Constitution is a Living Tree, capable of evolution and growth. Allows evolution of
constitution with legitimate needs of state and citizen. [Edwards v. A.G.]
Confederationwasaresponsetopoliticalandculturalrealitiesthatexisttoday.Diversity
wasreconciledwithunitythroughtheconstitution.
1.2BroadPrinciplesofConstitutionalism
ReferenceReSecessionofQuebec[1998]
SCCLandmarkJudgment
TheimportanceoftheSecessioninConstitutionallawisthatittellsusalotaboutthestructureofour
constitutionallaw.
Function
Demonstratestheimportanceoftheunwrittenprinciples(seeprinciplesbelow)
1. Impossibletoconceiveofourconstitutionalstructurewithoutthem
2. Assistintheinterpretationoftextanddelineationofpowers,scopeofrightsand
obligationsandroleofourpoliticalinstitutions
3. Principlesareessentialtoconstitutionaldevelopmentandlivingtreedoctrine
Issue
Threequestionsasked:
1. CouldQuebecseparateunilaterallyundertheCanadianConstitution
2. CouldQuebecseparateunilaterallyunderInternationalLawthroughself
determination
3. WoulddomesticorinternationallawgovernseparationbyQuebec
Holding
Seebelow.Courtsoutlined4unwrittenconstitutionalprinciplesthatmustguide
constitutionalinterpretation.
UnwrittenConstitutionalPrinciples(GuidetheCourtinConstitutionalInterpretation)
AnalysisofConstitutionalPrinciples
Emergefromconstitutionitself,historicalcontext,judicialinterpretation

Nosingleprinciplecanbedefinedinisolationfromtheothers,nordoesanyoneprinciple
trumporexcludetheoperationofanyother.

(a) NatureofthePrinciples
Underlyingprinciples:federalism,democracy,constitutionalismandtheruleoflaw,and
respectforminorityrightsfunctioninsymbiosisandnonecanbedefinedinisolation
andnonetrumpsothers
ElementsoftheconstitutionmustbeinterpretedbyreferencetotheConstitutionasa
whole,principlesassisttheinterpretationofthetext
Courtmayhaveregardfortheseunwrittenprincipleswhichformthefoundationofthe
Constitution
TheseprinciplesfillgapsthatareintheConstitution
(b) Federalism
Thegovernmentisdividedintocentralandregionalauthoritiesandnoneissubservient
totheother
Theprincipleoffederalismrecognizesthediversityofthecomponentpartsof
Confederation,andtheautonomyofprovincialgovernmentstodeveloptheirsocieties
withintheirrespectivespheresofjurisdiction.Thefederalstructureofourcountryalso
facilitatesdemocraticparticipationbydistributingpowertothegovernmentthoughttobe
mostsuitedtoachievingtheparticularsocietalobjectivehavingregardtothisdiversity.
Principleoffederalismfacilitatespursuitofcollectivegoalsbyculturalandlinguistic
minoritiesenabledFrenchspeakingCanadianstoformamajorityinQuebecand
exerciseprovincialpowerstopromotetheirlanguageandculture
Peace,order,andgoodgovernmentisaresidualpoweranythingthatdoesnotfallunder
s.91fallsunderpeace,order,andgoodgovernment
Allprovincessoughttoachievesimilarobjectivesthroughfederalism
Evidencethatintentionwasactuallytohaveastrongcentralauthority
(c) Democracy
Fundamentalvalueinourconstitutionallaw,informeddesignofconstitution
Democracycommonlyunderstoodasbeingapoliticalsystemofmajorityrule
promotionofselfgovernment,sovereignpeopleexercisesitsrighttoselfgovernment
throughdemocraticprocess
Electedbypopularfranchise
Historicallycourtinterpreteddemocracytomeantheprocessofrepresentativeand
responsiblegovernmentandtherightofcitizenstoparticipateinthepoliticalprocessas
votersandcandidates.
s.4oftheCharterholdregularelectionsandpermitcitizenstoelectrepstotheir
politicalinstitutions(s.4notsubjecttonotwithstandingclause)
relationshipbetweendemocracyandfederalismmeansex.InCanadatheremaybe
differentandequallylegitimatemajoritiesindifferentprovincesandterritoriesandatthe
federallevel.Afederalsystemenablesprovincestopursuepoliciesresponsiveto

interestsofpeopleandatthesametime.Canadaasawholeisalsoademocratic
communityinwhichcitizensconstructandachievegoalsonanationalscale.
Relationshipwithfederalismanddemocracymeansthatnoonemajorityismoreorless
legitimateanddemocracycannotexistwithouttheruleoflaw.
systemmustbecapableofreflectingtheaspirationsofthepeople,andrequiresa
continuousprocessofdiscussionandenablecitizenstoparticipateconcurrentlyin
differentcollectivitiesandtopursuegoalsatbothaprovincialandfederallevel.
Desireforchangemustengageinconstitutionaldiscussionsinorderfordemocratic
expressionstobefullyacknowledged.
democracyrequiresdiscussionandobligationtoheardissentingopinions

(d) ConstitutionalismandtheRuleofLaw
Principlesofconstitutionalismandruleoflawaresimilarbutnotidentical
EssenceofconstitutionalisminCanadaisembodiedins.52(1)oftheConstitutionAct,
1982whichprovidesthattheConstitutionofCanadaisthesupremelawofCanada,and
anylawthatisinconsistentwiththeprovisionsoftheConstitutionis,totheextentofthe
inconsistency,ofnoforceoreffect....simplyputallgovernmentactionmustcomply
withtheConstitutionwhereastheruleoflawrequiresthatallgovernmentactionmust
complywiththelaw,includingtheConstitution
Constitutionalismcreatesaframeworkwhichwithindemocracycanfunction
Ruleoflawprovidesastable,predictableandorderlysocietyandprotectsindividuals
fromarbitrarystateactions,oneruleforall.
RuleofLawhas3aspects
o 1.Lawforall(state/person)ManitobaLanguagecase
o 2.Creation/maintenanceofactualorderofpositivelawManitobalanguage
o 3.Relationshipwithstate/individualregulatedbylawjudgereference
Constitutionismorethanmajorityrule,itprotectsindividualrightsandthe
distinctivenessofminoritiesanditpreventsonelevelofgovernmentfromunilaterally
increasingitspowerattheexpenseofanother
Theconstitutionisentrenchedbeyondasimplemajorityvote/rulefor3overlapping
reasons
o 1.Aconstitutionprovidesaddedsafeguardsforfundamentalhuman
rights/individualfreedoms.Thereareoccasionswhereamajoritymaysometimes
overridecertainrightsforcollectivegoodofthemajority.Constitutionality
protectsagainstthisbygivingdueregardandprotection.SafeGuard.
o 2.Constitutionalismmayseektoensurevenerablegroupsareendowedwithrights
necessarytomaintainandpromoteidentitiesagainstassimilativepressuresofa
majority
o 3.Providesadivisionofpowerallocatingdifferentaspectstodifferentlevelsof
government.Nounsurprisingpowerthroughlegislativeinitiative.Thispurpose
wouldbedefeatediflegislaturescouldsimplyallocatepoliticalpowertoitself
unilaterally.

Democracyisharmonizedwithconstitutionalismandtheruleoflaw.Constitution
facilitatesdemocracyandruleoflawgovernsconduct.Theyarebothessentialfor
democracy.

(e)

ProtectionofMinorities
Intheabsenceofprotection,minoritieswouldbesubmergedandassimilated
Manyprovisionsprotectcultureandlanguageandreligiousrightsofminorities
Threeotherprinciplesprotectandupholdtheserights.Charterfurtherupholdsthese
rights.
Concerntoprotectminoritieshasbeenespeciallyprominentsincetheenactmentofthe
charter,andwasessentialinthedesignofourconstitutionalstructure
BymakingFrenchanofficiallanguageintheconstitutionreaffirmedthiselement
ConstitutionAct,1982includedins.35explicitprotectionforexistingaboriginaland
treatyrightsandins.25anonderogationclauseinfavouroftherightsofaboriginal
peoples

(f) Operationof4principleswithSuccession
Successionrequiresaconstitutionalamendment.Negotiationwithallprovinces.Itwould
alterthegovernanceofCanadascurrentconstitutionalarrangements.
Unilateralsuccession
o Referendumcouldshowdesirebutitalonecouldnotbringunilateralsuccession
Democracy/constitutionality
o Allpartiestoconfederationwouldhavetoagree
Wouldhavetobedoneinthecontextofthe4principles(unilateralnotpossible).Self
determinationwouldnotbenegotiation.
Democracyprinciples(e.g.ifQuebecgotamajorityvote)couldnottrumpother
principles.Noprinciplesareatabsoluteexclusiontotheother.
Clearquestion,clearmajoritybutwontdecidewhatclearmajorityis.Politicians.(pg
17para93)
Refusalof1partytoadheretotheseprincipleswouldputrisktosecessionslegitimacy
Conclusion:Nounilateralsuccessionwithoutprinciplednegotiationwithallotherparties
ofconfederationwithintheconstitutionalframework.
1.3LivingTreeDoctrine
ConstitutionalSupremacy
Constitutioniseitherasuperior,paramountlawunchangeablebyordinarymeansoritisona
levelwithordinarylegislativeacts,andlikeotheracts,isalterablewhenthelegislatureshall
pleasetoalterit.Writtenlaws,whetherordinarystatutesorconstitutions,mustnecessarilybe
draftedinbroadtermstocontemplateawidevarietyofpotentialcircumstances.[Marburyv.
MadisonUSA]
Actsthatareunconstitutionalmaybeseveredinpart.Notentirelegislationhastobestruck

down.
Cannotbeeasilyamendedsomustbeabletoevolvesoitremainsrelevanttosociopoliticaland
technologicalnorms.
TheConstitutionasaLivingTree
Notintendedtobeastaticdocument,overtimesocietalvaluesoftenchangeandsince
constitutionsarenoteasilyamendedtheyarenecessarilywritteningeneraltermsleaving
theirprovisionsopentointerpretation
Constitutionwithitsbroadlanguageiscapabletoevolveandgrowovertime
Processofinterpretationpertainsnotonlytowhatwasintendedatthetimeitwaswritten
butitsapplicationtoissuesinlightofthesocialandpoliticalvaluesofthetime

Issue

Reasons

Edwardsv.AttorneyGeneralForCanada[1930](J.C.P.C.)
AreWomenConsideredasPersonsCase(senateappointment)
Edwardschallengedtheinterpretationofthesection24oftheBritishNorth
AmericaAct,1867,nowtheConstitutionAct1867whichreferredonlytopersons
aspertainingonlytomen
DoesthetermqualifiedpersonsintheBNAActrequirementforsenatorsinclude
women,consequentlywhetherwomenareeligibletobesummonedtothesenate
IncomingtothedeterminationofthemeaningofaparticularwordinanAct
ofparliamentthecourtconsidersthe1)externalevidencefromextraneous
circumstancessuchaspreviouslegislationand2)decidedcases,andthe
internalevidencefromtheactitself
Wordpersonisambiguousandwouldembracemembersofeithersexinoriginal
meaningontheotherhandcenturiesagowhenenacteditwouldhavebeen
understoodthatthewordonlyreferredtomalesnotbecausethewordpersoncould
notincludefemalesbutbecauseatcommonlawawomanwasincapableofserving
publicofficedecisionscannotbeappliedthesamewayunderdifferent
circumstancesanddifferenttimes.
Constitutionissubjecttodevelopmentthroughusageandshouldbegivenalarge
andliberalinterpretationratherthananarrowandtechnicalone
Burdenisuponthosewhodenyitincludeswomentoproves.24itistothe
exclusionofwomen
Whateffectdoeswordqualifiedbeforepersonshave?Qualificationofa
senatorshallbethattheyareanaturalbornsubjectoftheQueenornaturalizedby
anActofParliament.ChiefJusticestatesthatitdoesnotincludethosewhobecome
subjectsbymarriage,ifitintendedtoincludewomentherewouldbeaprovision
statingso,howeverAliensAct1844statesawomanwhomarriesanaturalbornis
naturalizedherself.qualifiedpersonsarenaturalborncitizens/subjectsofthe
Queen.
JusticeDuffpointtoqualificationofasenatorshallbethathecanownland,states
thispointtotheexclusionofmarriedwomenandthatitwouldhavebeenexpressed
differentlyifitintendedtoincludewomenMarriedWomensPropertyActsstates

Function

LivingTree
Interpretation

thatamarriedwomancanpossessproperty
Basedonabove2pointscourtunabletocometotheconclusionthatwomenareto
beexcludedfromsenate.S.21MembersNotexclusive.S.24personsnot
exclusive.
useofthewordinotherlegislationothersectionsoftheActs.41&s.48showsa
distinctionbetweenpersonsandmales,ifpersonsexcludedfemalesthanboth
termswouldnotneedtobeused.S.133providedthateithertheEnglishorFrench
languagemaybeusedbyanyperson,surelythiswasnotintendedtorefertoonly
malesasfemalesmightalsousebothlanguages.
Ifparliamenthadintendedtolimitthewordpersonsins.24tomalepersonsitwould
haveexpressedsoasintheabovestatedsections
JudgesarenottoapplyrigidlytoCanadaoftodaythedecisionsandreasoning
whichcommendedthemselvestothosewhohadtoapplythelawindifferent
circumstances,centuries,countrieswithdifferentstagesofdevelopment.
TheBNAActplantedalivingtreecapableofgrowthandexpansionwithinits
naturallimits
ThereforetheBoarddoesnothavethedutytocutdowntheprovisionsoftheActby
anarrowandtechnicalconstructionrathertogiveitalargeandliberal
interpretation,sothattheDominiontoagreatextentmaybemistressinherown
houseastheprovincestoagreatextentaremistressesintheirs.
Havingregardto1.TheobjectoftheBNAActistoprovideaconstitutionfor
Canada,aresponsibleanddevelopingstate,2.Thewordpersonisambiguousand
mayincludemembersofbothsex,3.Therearesectionsintheactthatshowthatthe
wordpersonshouldincludefemales,4.Thatsomesectionsthewordsmale
personsisexpresslyusedwhendesiredtoconfineto1sex,5.Totheprovisionsof
theInterpretationAct.Thecourtfounditdidincludethefemalesex.
EstablishedtheLivingTreeDoctrine:
TheBritishNorthAmericaActplantedinCanadaalivingtreecapableof
growthandexpansionwithinitsnaturallimits.TheobjectoftheActwasto
grantaConstitutiontoCanada
Thelivingtreeapproachtointerpretingaconstitutionallowsforflexibilityand
adaptation.
Thisapproachtakesintoaccountthecontemporarycontextoftheconstitutionin
question.

Notes
Thelivingtreeconceptwasnotalwaysacceptedmanyinsistedthatitisnotthefunction
ofthejudgetochangetheBritishNorthAmericaAct,1867tobringitintoaccordwith
moderndemands
IdeaofconstitutionasanorganicdocumentisnotuniquetoCanada
Constitutioniscapableofevolutiontofacilitatetechnologiesthatwerenotcontemplated
atthetimeitwaswritten.Writtenbroadenoughex.Althoughphonesdidnotexist,their
interprovincialcharacterfitsitintothedivisionofpowerslaidoutinConstitution.
Appliesequallytosocialissuesex.Samesexmarriage.Theprocessinvolves

determiningwhethersamesexmarriagewaswithinthedefinitionofmarriage,notin
determiningwhethersamesexmarriageswereconsideredwhentheConstitutionwas
drafted.
1.4RuleofLaw
ProfessorDiceysetoutthefollowingelementsconstitutinghisdefinitionofruleoflaw:
(1)
thesupremacyofregularlawasopposedtotheinfluenceofarbitrarypower,
excludingtheexistenceofarbitrariness,prerogative,orevenofwidediscretionary
authorityonthepartofthegovernment;
(2)
equalitybeforethelaw,excludingtheideaofanyexemptionofofficialsorothers
fromthedutyofobediencetothelawwhichgovernsothercitizens;
(3)
thelawoftheconstitutionisnotthesourcebuttheconsequenceoftherightsof
individualsasdefinedandenforcedbythecourts.(youcannotjusthaveastatement
ofprinciple,butalsoaremedy)
ElementsofruleoflawhavebeenrestatedintermsofamoderncontextbyProfessorH.W.
Jones:
(1)
inadecentsocietyitisunthinkablethatgovernment,oranyofficerofgovernment,
possessesarbitrarypoweroverthepersonortheinterestsoftheindividual:
(2)
allmembersofsociety,privatepersonsandgovernmentofficialsalike,mustbe
equallyresponsiblebeforethelaw;and
(3)
effectivejudicialremediesaremoreimportantthanabstractconstitutional
declarationsinsecuringtherightsoftheindividualagainstencroachmentbythe
state.14

Ruleoflawliesattherootofoursystemofgovernment,vouchsafestothecitizensofthe
countryastable,predictableandorderedsocietyinwhichtoconducttheiraffairs.Re
Sucessionatparagraph70highlightsthevouchsafenatureoftheconstitution.

Roncarelliv.Duplessis[1959]S.C.R.121
ArbitraryrevocationofalcohollicensebecauseofbailingoutJahovaWitnesses(380,couldbemore).It
wasareligiouscontroversy
ClassicexampleofArbitraryuseofpower
Function
EstablishedThreePrincipledfortheRuleofLaw:
1. Recognizedthatthelawissupremeoverofficialsofthegovernmentsas
wellasprivateindividualsandtherebypreclusiveoftheinfluenceof
arbitrarypower(Requiresthatlegislationbeappliedtoallincluding
government)
2. Requiresthecreationandmaintenanceofanactualorderofpositive
lawswhichpreservesandembodiesthemoregeneralprincipleof
normativeorder(Legislationmustexist)
3. Therelationshipbetweenthestateandtheindividualberegulatedby

law(Overlapssomewhatwiththefirstandsecondprinciplesandrequires
thatstateofficialsactionsbelegallyfounded)

Issue
Reasoning

Inthesecircumstances,canRoncarellihavelegalredressagainstbeingstrippedof
licensedestroyinghisvitalbusinessinterestsforsupportingJehovahs.(important
distinction:notphysicallyhandingoutmaterials.)
s.35ofactallowsthecancellingofanypermit,ands.34canrefusetorenew.
Defendantwasnotactingwithintheambitofhispublicserviceroleandactionswent
beyondthescopeofthestatute.Toallowarbitrarylikesanddislikeswouldsignalize
disintegrationoftheruleoflawasafundamentalpostulateofconstitutionalstructure
Publicregulationcannotincludeanabsoluteanduntrammelleddiscretion,contraryto
theruleoflaw.Ifthiswasalloweditwouldsignalthebeginningofdisintegrationofthe
ruleoflawasfundamentaltoourConstitution.

REManitobaLanguageRights1985SCC
Lawsnotbilingual/unconstitutional.1890onlyproducingunilingualdocuments.
Function
DiscussedRuleofLawPrinciples:
1. Constitutionissupremeoverofficialoverthegovernmentaswellasindividuals.
2. Preventsexerciseofarbitrarypower
3. Relationshipbetweenthestateandtheindividualmustberegulatedbylaw
Courtsstatedthattheruleoflawisfundamentaltoconstitution,andmustmeanatleast
2things.
1. Thelawissupremeoverofficialsofthegovernment,aswellasprivate
individualsandtherebypreclusiveoftheinfluenceofarbitrarypower.
2. Theruleoflawrequiresthecreationandmaintenanceofanactualorderof
positivelawwhichpreservesandembodiesthemoregeneralprincipleof
normativeorder(systemofrulesandsharedexpectations)
HowRuleof
AppliesB/Ccourtsrecognizedthatstrikingdownallthelawswouldgoagainsttherule
LawApplies
oflawthereforebeingunconstitutionalbecausethatwouldleavenolaws;Socourt
renderedalllawstemporarilyvaliduntilManitobafixedthebilingualproblem
Remediesfor
TemporaryValiditycourtcansaythatalawisinvalidbutcansuspendthe
Unconstitution
declarationtemporarily
alLaws
Nullificationifinconsistentwithconstitutioncanstrikeitdown.
Severtheycanseveraportionofthelegislationifthatportionisunconstitutional
ReadDowninterpretastatutesoitisconsistentwithconstitution
ReadingInmoreinchartercases,addwordstothestatutetomakeitmoreconsistent

10

Exemptionmightbeinconsistentbutwillallowanyway.i.e.s.1charterjustification.
BritishColumbiav.ImperialTobaccoCanadaLtd.2005SCC
Tobaccocompanyusesruleoflawtoarguethatprovinciallegislationforcingthemtopayforsmoke
relatedhealthcarewasunconstitutional
TheRuleofLawCanMeanDifferentThingsinDifferentContexts
SmokeROL
Legislationshouldbestruckdown,becausegoesagainsttheRuleofLaw:(1)Lawshad
Arguments
tobeprospectiveinnature(2)GeneralinCharacter(3)Couldnotconferspecial
privilegeontogovernment,exceptwherenecessaryforeffectivegovernance(4)to
ensureafairciviltrial
CourtHeld
Althoughmostofuswouldagreethatthose4elementsarepartofthejusticesystem,
theyarenotpartoftheruleoflawitself.
Ratio:
1) Ruleoflawalonecannotstrikedownlegislation.
2) TheRuleofLawis\atoolbywhichwecaninterpretwhetherapieceof
legislationisconstitutionalornot
3) Ruleoflawisnotaninvitationtotrivializetheconstitution
Function
ThreeRulesofLawCameFromthisCase:
1. Rulesoflawcannotbeusedtostrikedownlegislation;youmustfindsomething
intheconstitutiontostrikedownlaws(donotuseruleoflawtovalidateor
invalidatelegislation)
2. Ruleoflawisatooltointerpretifapieceoflegislationisconstitutionalor
unconstitutionalbutcannotbeusedtolabelthelawconstitutional.
3.Ruleoflawisnotaninvitationtotrivializeorsupplanttheconstitutionofits
writtenprinciples
PrinciplesoftheRuleofLaw:
LawisSupremeoverOfficialsofGovernmentandCitizens(noarbitraryuseof
power)
Creation&Maintenanceofanactualorderofpositivelawsthatpreservesand
embodiesthemoregeneralprincipleofnormativeorder.
Lawmustregulaterelationshipbetweenthestateandtheindividual.
Lawshouldreflectthevaluesofsociety.
RuleofLaw:
There cannot be rule of law without access to justice
Access to justice has significant financial barriers, and without financial means, rule of
law is replaced by rule of men and women who decide who shall and who shall not have
access to justice Dickson BCGEU v. BC AG.
In Trial Lawyers Association of BC v. BC AG
o Hearing fees levied against litigants in superior court were unconstitutional on the
basis that despite the Province having legislative authority to impose hearing fees,
the scheme caused undue financial hardship that effectively denied access to the
courts for individuals beyond just the impoverished the scheme contained an
exemption for indigent (poor) persons. Such an effect was inconsistent with the

11

rule of law and the inherent jurisdiction of the superior courts pursuant to s 96 of
the Constitution Act, 1982.
o Found that s.96 judicial function and rule of law are inextricably intertwined the
provincial and superior courts are the foundation of rule of law itself. Rule of law
is maintained through the protection of the judicial role and the rule of law is
fostered by the continued existence of s.96 courts, it is only natural that s.96
provide some degree of constitutional protection.
o If people cannot challenge government actions in court, individuals cannot hold
the state to account and the government will be seen as to be above the law.
o If legitimate issues cannot be brought to court, the creation and maintenance of
positive law will be hampered as laws will not be given affect and therefore the
balance between states power to make and enforce laws and the courts
responsibility to rule on citizen challenges may be skewed.
1.5StructureofourConstitutionalInstitutions
ReferencereSupremeCourtAct
FederalgovernmentappointedJusticeNadon,aFederaljudge,andnotjudgeinQuebecora
memberoftheQuebecbar.
Function
Supremecourtisprotectedbytheconstitutionfromunilateralamendments,
andupheldthisstatus.
Issue/Question
1. Canapersonwhowas,atanytime,anadvocateofatleast10years
standingattheBarreauduQubecbeappointedtotheSupremeCourt
ofCanadaasamemberoftheSupremeCourtfromQuebecpursuantto
sections5and6oftheSupremeCourtAct?[NO]
2. CanParliamentenactlegislationthatrequiresthatapersonbeorhas
previouslybeenabarristeroradvocateofatleast10yearsstandingat
thebarofaprovinceasaconditionofappointmentasajudgeofthe
SupremeCourtofCanadaorenacttheannexeddeclaratoryprovisions
assetoutinclauses471and472oftheBillentitledEconomicAction
Plan2013Act,No.2?[NOargumentisunsustainable]
Reasoning
Question1:
s.5oftheactstatesthatAnypersonmaybeappointedajudgewhoisorhas
beenajudgeofasuperiorcourtofaprovinceorabarristeroradvocateof
atleast10yearsstandingatthebarofaprovince
s.6Atleastthreeofthejudgesshallbeappointedfromamongthejudgesof
theCourtofAppealoroftheSuperiorCourtoftheProvinceofQuebecor
fromamongtheadvocatesofthatProvince.
Question2:
AGarguingtheSCActisnotentrenchedintheconstitution,sotheycan
unilaterallyamendtheeligibilitycriteriaandthatthementioninthe
constitutionhasnolegalforce,entrenchmenthaspreviouslyfailed.Empty
vesseltheory
Theframersdidnotintendtodiminishtheconstitutionalprotection
accordedtothecourtwhileatthesametimeenhancingitsconstitutional
roleundertheConstitutionAct.Parliamentcanenactamendments
12

necessaryforthecontinuedmaintenanceoftheSCbutonlyifthosedonot
changetheconstitutionallyprotectedfeaturesofthecourt.Theunilateral
powerhasbeenovertakenbythecourtsevolutioninstructureasrecognized
intheConstitutionAct.Parliamentmustmaintainandprotecttheessence
ofwhatenablestheSCtopreformitscurrentrole.
Holding

CourtslookedatpurposeandcontextoftheSCAct
Question1:
s.6hasalwaysexcludedformeradvocates.Alwaysbeenconsistently
interpretedsince1875.Thisinterpretationadvancesthedualproposeof
ensuringcivillawexpertiseandQuebecslegaltraditionandsocialvalues
arerepresentedonthecourtsothatQuebecsconfidenceinthecourtis
maintained.Theinterpretationisconsistentwiththebroaderschemeofthe
supremecourtactfortheappointmentofadhocjudges.
s.5&6mustbereadtogether,andtheremustbea10yearsstandingthat
appliestotheappointmentsfromQuebec.S.6doesnotdisplaces.5,it
makesadditionalspecificationsinrespectofthethreejudgesfromQuebec.
OnebeingtheymustcurrentlybeamemberoftheQuebecBar.S.5is
minimumrequirementsforgeneraleligibility.S.6istoenshrinethe
historicalcomprisesthatledtothecreationofthecourt.
Question2:
Argumentisunsustainable.

ReferencereSenateReform
Mr.Harperhadtheideathatthesenateshouldbereformed.Asked6questions.
Function
Outlinesdegreeofconsentfromprovincestoabolishinstitutionsthatare
entrenchedintheconstitution,andessentialaspectsofCanadaslegislature.
Amendingformulasetc.
Issue/Question
Asked6questions(lookatprintedslidesformoreindepth)
(1)CanParliamentunilaterallyimplementaframeworkforconsultative
electionsforappointmentstotheSenate?
(2)CanParliamentunilaterallysetfixedtermsforSenators?
(3)CanParliamentunilaterallyremovefromtheConstitutionAct,1867the
requirementthatSenatorsmustownlandworth$4,000intheprovincefor
whichtheyareappointedandhaveanetworthofatleast$4,000?and
(4)WhatdegreeofprovincialconsentisrequiredtoabolishtheSenate?
Reasoning
Wouldneedtoamendtheconstitution,whichcanbedone4ways:
1.Thegeneralamendingprocedurerequiringasubstantialdegreeof
consensusbetweenParliamentandtheprovinciallegislatures(s.38,
complementedbys.42);[resolutionbyhouseandsenate(obvious
problems),orresolutionofatleast2/3rdsoftheprovincesthathave
accordingtothegeneralconsensusatleast50%ofthepopulationofall
provinces]

13

2.Unanimousconsentwhichappliestocertainchangesdeemed
fundamentalbytheframers(s.41);
3.Specialarrangementsprocedurewhichappliestoamendmentsinrelation
toprovisionsoftheConstitutionthatapplytosome,butnotall,ofthe
provinces(s.43);and
4.Theunilateralfederalandprovincialprocedures,whichallowunilateral
amendmentofaspectsofgovernmentinstitutionsthatengagepurelyfederal
orprovincialinterests(ss.44and45).

Holding

Senatehasessentialfeatures:servesthatourconstitutionissimilartothat
oftheUK.SoberSecondThought.Providesregionalrepresentation.
Representsvariousethnicgroupsetc.
Abolishingthesenate(question6)wouldfundamentallyalterour
constitutionalarchitecture,byremovingthebicameralformofgovernment
thatgaveshapetotheConstitutionAct1982.Wouldneedunanimous
consentofparliamentandtheprovinces(s.41(e))
Senatewouldneedtopassabolition,cantusegeneralamendingformula,
mustuseunanimousconsent.Thiscreatesobviousproblems,senatewould
havetoconsenttotheirdeath.
Question1NOQuestion2NOQuestion3NOQuestion4YES
withrespecttos.23(4).Afullrepealofs.23(3)requiresaresolutionofthe
legislativeassemblyofQuebec,pursuanttos.43oftheConstitutionAct,
1982.Question5NOQuestion6YES

2.0ThresholdIssues
Thesocalledthresholdissuesarepreliminaryquestionsthatacourtmustaddressbefore
itwillevenconsiderthesubstantiveissuesinagivencase.
Thesepotentialbarrierspreventagivencasefromfurtherconsiderationbyacourt;thatis
fromcrossingthethresholdofthecourt.
Althoughtherearejurisprudentiallyestablishedtests;generally,allthresholdissuesareat
thediscretionofthecourtonacasebycasebasis
Judgeshavediscretiontousethesethresholdissuestoprecludethemfromdealingwith
substantivemattersinagivencase
Waysofprotectingthecourtsfromhavingtodecideissuesthattheyshouldnothaveto
decide,anotherwaytolookatitisthattheserulesprotectthepublicfromthecourts
becausetheylimitwhatthecourtscandecidejudgeswhowanttomakedecisionsin
contextswheretheyshouldntbe
MAINPOINTFORTHISCHAPTERCourtshaveverywidediscretioninthe
Standing,Mootness,Justifiability,LeavetoAppeal
2.1Standing
TheCourthastherighttodecideWHOhastherighttobringacasetoCourt.

14

Standingusedtopreventinterlopersfromabusingthejudicialsystemforinterestsake
onparticularissues.
Courtrequiresstandingtoavoidopeningthefloodgatestounnecessarylitigation
Alsorequiresstandingtorationscarcejudicialresourcesbyapplyingthemtorealrather
thanhypotheticaldisputestryingtouseourresourcesinthebestwaypossible
Avoidprejudicetopersonswhomightbeaffectedbythedecisionbutarenotpresentin
theCourtensurethatinterestsofthoseeffectedhaveasay
Avoidriskthatcaseswillbeinadequatelypresentedbypartieswhohavenorealinterest
intheoutcome
Avoidriskthatacourtwillreachanunwisedecisionbecausethedisputebeforethecourt
isabstractorhypotheticalandhasnotrealfactualcontext
HowAPartyCanbeGrantedStandingTests:
Arighttostanding
BigMStanding
PublicIntereststanding(BorowskiTest)
ByDiscretionofthecourt

StandingasofRight:ExceptionalPrejudice
Classicruleifanindividualisexceptionallyprejudicedbylegislation,thatis,the
statuteappliestohimorherdifferentlyfromthepublicgenerally,thentheindividualhas
standingtobringadeclaratoryactiontochallengethevalidityofthestatute.SeeSmith
v.S.G.Ontario[1924]S.C.R.331
Note:ItisassumedthattheAttorneyGeneralcanbecountedtoguardthepublicinterest.
Ifthereisnoindividualwhoisexceptionallyprejudiced,theAttorneyGeneralcanbring
anactionfordeclaratoryrelief.HowevertheAttorneyGeneralistheheadofthe
departmentwhowritesthelawssoitwouldnotbeinhisinterestorbepolitically
acceptabletochallengethelaws.
2.1.1PublicInterest:Litigantisnotnecessarilydirectlyaffectedbythelegislation
RationalesForStandings
1. Theproperallocationofjudicialresources(floodgatesargument);
2. Thepreventionofvexatioussuitsbroughtattherequestofmere
busybodies;
3. Andtheparticularrequirementsoftheadversarysystem.
ThreePartTestfromaCaseCanadianUnitedChurches:
1. Isthereaseriousissueraisedastotheinvalidityofthelegislation?
2. Hastheplaintiffbeendirectlyaffected,andifnotdoestheplaintiffhavea
generalinterest?
3. Isthereanotherreasonableandeffectivewaytobringtheissuebeforethe
court(thisiswherepeoplegenerallyfail,thisisbecauseifsomeoneelseis
moredirectlyeffectedtheyshouldbetheonetoraisetheissue)?

15

Function

Reasoning

Held

Dissent

Ministerofjustice(Can.)v.Borowski
Thisisacaseofdiscretionarypublicintereststanding
ManchallengingabortionLawsasunconstitutional
IllustratesPost1970sTestForStanding(Trilogy:Thorson,McNeil,Borowski)
1)Validity:IsthereaseriousissueastotheActsvalidity?
2)DirectAffectorGenuineinterestinValidity:istheapplicantaffected/an
intervenerwithgenuineinteresti.e.advocategroup?
3)NoOtherEffectiveMeans(peopleormethod)toBringIssueBeforeCourts:is
theapplicantthebestperson?
ThorsonCase
Astaxpayer,onbehalfofalltaxpayerswaschallengingtheOfficialLanguages
Act,inrelationtheAppropriationAct.Onappealfoundthatnopersonorclass
ofpersonswasparticularlyaggrievedwhomightraisetheissue.Itwasfound
thattohavestanding,dontneedtobeespeciallyaffectedorexceptionally
prejudiced.
Actsinquestionweredeclaratory,notregularly
MacNeil
Challengingregulatoryactforconstitutionalvalidity
Individualsweredirectlyaffectedi.e.theaterowners,filmexchangesetc.
Hewasgrantedstanding.ThiswentbeyondThorson,byrecognizingthe
possibilityofapersonhavingstatustoattackthevalidityoflegislationeven
thoughtheirexistedclassesofpersonswhowerespeciallyaffectedandwho
mightbeexceptionallyprejudicedbyit.
EventhoughthiscasewasabouttheBillofRights,thereisnodistinctionbetween
constitutionality.
Thisactisexculpatoryinnature.Doesnotimposeduties,butprovidesexceptionfrom
criminalliability.
Natureofcase(abortion)makesitdifficulttofindanyclassofpersondirectlyaffected
orexceptionallyprejudicedbyit.Doctorsareprotected,andhavenoreasontoattackit,
samewithhospitals.Pregnantladies,orhusbandsareofnousebecausefinaljudgment
wouldtakelongerthenapregnancy(oratleastasafetimetoabort)
Onlywayforthistomakeittocourtisthroughaninterestedcitizen.
Toestablishstatusaplaintiffinasuitseekingdeclarationthatlegislationisinvalid:
1) ifthereisaseriousissueastoitsinvalidity
2) showtheyaredirectlyaffectedbyit,orthathehasagenuineinterestasacitizen
inthevalidityofthelegislation
3) nootherreasonableandeffectivemannerinwhichtheissuemaybebroughtto
thecourt
Legislationunderattackisexculpatory,notregulatoryordeclaratory.Borowskimay
notbethebestpersontobringthisclaimbuthemaybetheonlypersontobringthe
claim;standinggranted.Doctorswhodonotperformhavenointeresttoattack,
pregnantwomandesiringabortionwouldntattack,husbandmightbutlengthof
proceedingsproblematic.
Asageneralruleapplicantshouldbedirectlyaffectedbythelegislationorthreatenedby
16

itssanctionstohavestandinginthecourt.
Bfailedtoestablishanyjudiciallycognizableinterestinthematter;thediscretionofthe
courtshouldbeexercisedtodenyhimstanding.Thereareotherpartieswhohavea
clearerinterestintheoperationofthelegislation.
Thorsonv.AttorneyGeneralofCanada[1975]S.C.R
PurposeofproceedingstoobtaindeclarationthatOfficialLanguagesActwas
unconstitutional.
Thorsonwasataxpayer,theactwasdeclaratoryandnotregulatory.Therewasaserious
constitutionalissue,ThorsonbroughtthemattertoAttorneyGeneralandherefusedto
bringaction
ActionforDeclaration
Issueoflawwasraisedastothelegalstandingtobringaction
Wheremembersofthepublicareaffectedandthereisajusticiableissuerespectingthe
validityofthelegislationthecourtmaychoosetohearthecase
Plaintiffsstandingrecognizedcasewasdecidedonthebasesthatthevalidityofthe
legislationraisedaseriousconstitutionalissueandtherewasnowaytohaveitsvalidity
testedunlessanindividualcouldproceedinthemannersoughtbytheplaintiff
Importantdecisionbecauseitrecognizedthatalthoughonemaynotbespecifically
affectedbythelegislationhemaybeabletoseekadeclaratoryjudgement
o Canthaveunconstitutionallegislationinoperationmustliberalizethetesta
littlebit
NovaScotiaBoardofCensorsv.McNeil,[1976]S.C.R.
PlaintiffsoughttochallengetheconstitutionalvalidityofsectionsoftheTheatresand
AmusementsAct
PlaintiffconcernedaboutthepowersofcensorshipintheAct
RegulatoryLegislation
Thereareanumberofotherswhocouldhavebroughtactionbeforethecourtandwould
havehadbetterstandingtheatreowners,operatorshowevertheymaynotwantto
becausetheywouldnotwanttohaveproblemswiththeNovaScotiaBoardofCensors
Courtruledthereisanarguablecaseunderthetermsofthechallengedlegislationthat
membersoftheNovaScotiapublicaredirectlyaffectedinwhattheymayviewinaNova
Scotiatheatre
Importantdecisionbecauseitrecognizedthepossibilityofapersonhavingstatusto
attachthevalidityoflegislationeventhoughthereexistedclassesofpersonswhowere
speciallyaffected(theatreownersetc.)
HyandZelsInc.v.Ontario(A.G.)

Relatestoissueofstandinganddiscretionarypublicintereststandingaswellasenforcingotherpeoplesrights
ApplicantswanttobringcivilactionfordeclaratoryrelieffromSundayshoppinglaws
ApplicantsbeartheburdenofestablishingtheirstandingtoraiseCharterissuesinacivilsuit

Function

AppliesThreeProngTestfromBorowski
1. Validity

17

Held

Dissent

o Numerousamendmentshavealteredactsincepreviouslitigation,so
validitynolongeraforgoneissue.
2. DirectAffect/GenuineInterest
o Appellantsareeithercorporateretailersorretailemployeesandsection2
oftheActtargetsboththesegroupsmakingthemliabletoprosecution
3. Noothereffectivemeans(ppl/method)tobringtheissuebeforecourts
o AppellantsallegetheActviolatesbothfreedomofreligionandequality
rightsbuthavenotpresentedanyoriginalevidencetosupportclaim.
Relyonevidencefrompastcases,andthereforeitsuggeststhatthere
maybeamorereasonableandeffectivemannerofbriningthismatter
beforeacourt.
IntroducesPre1970sStandingTestfromSmith
1. Establishthattheeffectofthelegislationontheapplicantwasgreateror
differentthanitseffectonthepublicatlarge.
2. Establishajudiciallycognizableinterestinthelegislation,which,atthetime,
meantaninterestaffectingthepersonal,proprietaryorpecuniaryrightsofthe
plaintiff.
3. AstohowtheythemselveshavesufferedexceptionalprejudiceundertheSmith
test.[courtfoundtheyfailedthistest]
ApplicantmustsatisfyallthreeelementsoftheBorowskitest.TheSmithtestis
immaterialtoissuesofstandingpost1970.
Corporationfailedonthelastprongofthetestsinceemployeesandcustomers
morereasonableandeffectivemeanstobringtheissuebeforethecourt
(Corporationsdonothavereligiousbeliefs)
ApplicantswhodonotpasstheBorowskitestbutwouldotherwisepasstheSmith
Test(asinthiscase)shouldbegrantedstanding.
3partpublicinteresttestisanadditionnotareplacementtothegeneralrulefrom
Smith(ifyouareexceptionallyprejudicedyouaregrantedstanding).
PerversetosaysomeonewhowouldhavepreviouslysucceededunderSmithcannot
proceedunderthenewtestthatwasdesignedtocreateadditionalmeanstobringmatters
beforecourt.ELMANAGREES.Neverintendedthatwewouldcloseoff/limit
standingbasedonBrowski,weshouldliberalize,notcloseoff/immunizelawsfrom
constitutionchallenge.
Largenumberofoutstandingchargesfacingappellantsinlowercourtswhichraisethe
sameconstitutionalissueappropriatecaseforcourttoexerciseitsdiscretiontogrant
standingbecauseofthegoalsofefficiencyinadminofjusticeandthecoststosociety
CanagaAttorneyGeneralv.DowntownEastsideSexWorkers
LiberalizedBorowskiTest

Facts
Function

FormersexworkerinVancouverEastsidewishedtochallengesectionsofthecriminal
coderelatingtoprostitution,bawdyhouses,procurementandsolicitation.
CourtusedamoreflexibleapproachtoapplythestandingtestasoutlineinBorowski
anddevelopedthereafter.Courtinterpretedthe3rdfactorofthetest(noothereffective
means.Isthispersontheonlyreasonableandeffectiveway)totheproposedlitigation

18

Issue
Reasoning

Holding

neededtobeareasonableandeffectivewaytoaddresstheissue.
Doesrespondenthavesufficientpublicintereststandingtochallengethelaw.
Thethirdfactorhasoftenbeenexpressedasastrickrequiremente.g.borowskithe
personhadtoshowthatthatthereisnootherreasonableandeffectivemannerinwhich
theissuecanbebroughtbeforethecourt
Thirdfactorrequiringconsiderationofwhethertheproposedsuitis,inallofthe
circumstancesandinlightofanumberofconsideration,areasonableand
effectivemeanstobringthechallengetocourt.
Indeterminingthereasonablenessshouldlookat:isthisactioneconomicuseof
judicialresources,whethertheissuesarepresentedinacontextsuitablefor
judicialdeterminationinanadversarialsettingandwhetherpermittingthe
proposedactiontogoforwardwillservetheproposeofupholdingtheprinciple
oflegality.Thesemustbeconsideredinlightofrealisticalternativesinallofthe
circumstances.
Thepresentlitigationconstitutesaneffectivemeansofbriningtheissuetocourtinthat
itwillbepresentedinacontextsuitableforadversarialdetermination.

2.1.2PrivateInterestStandingofCorporations:
InlawCorpareartificialpersonscandosamethingsasnaturalbornpersonsi.e.born,
die,rights,cansueorbesued;BUTcertaininalienablecharacteristicofnaturalborn
personsdonotpertaintoCorpi.e.cannotbelefthanded,cannotholdreligious
beliefs
BigMDrugMartAdefendantevenacorporationmaychallengetheconstitutional
validityofthelawunderwhichthechargewaslaid
InRv.BigMDrugMartLtd.CorporationbenefitedfromtheholdingthattheLordsDay
Actwasconstitutionallyinvalidbecauseitviolatedanindividualsrighttofreedomof
religion.Doesnotnecessarilymeanthecorporationwillbenefitwhenacorporations
constitutionalchallengegivesrisetoafindingthattheprovisionviolatesahumanbeings
Charterrights,theappropriateremedyunders.52(1)oftheConstitutionAct,1982isthat
theprovisionisofnoforceoreffectwithrespecttohumanbeingsbuttheprovision
remainsofforceandeffectwithrespecttocorporations(becausetheprovisionasapplied
tocorporationsisnotinconsistentwiththeConstitution)
InwholesaletravelthesameruleappliestoaprosecutionundertheCompetitionAct
forfalseandmisleadingadvertising
InCEMAv.Richardson,wherethecorporationswerenotfacingcriminalcharges,the
rulewasextendedtocorporationsfacingothercoerciveremediesatthehandsofthe
state.

Function

R.v.WholesaleTravelGroupInc.
Travelcompanywaschargedwithmisleadingtravelpackagesandfacedfines
AsadefensetheTravelCompanychallengedtheconstitutionalityofthecharge
Caseaffirmsthecorporationsabilitytohavestandingtochallengetheconstitutionality
oflegislationwhentheyarefacingpenalsanctionsincriminallaw

19

Issue
Held

Key

Issue
Held

CanCorporationsbenefitfromcharterprotections,giventhattheythemselvescannot
hold?
Ifcorporationbroughttocourtinvoluntarilyitisopenforcorporationschargedwithan
offencetochargetheconstitutionalityofthatoffence(thisprinciplecomesfromR.v.
BigMDrugMart).Sincethesectionoftheactviolateanindividualcharterrights,they
aretobestruckdownunders.52(1)oftheconstitutionact,theycantapplytoany
accused,corporationorindividual.Thisisforoverinclusivelegislationonlyitwas
bothindividualandcorporation.Underinclusivelegislation,judgedidnotcomment
e.g.onlypersons.

CanadianEggMarketingAgencyv.Richardson
CivilActionbroughtagainstRichardsonforsellingeggsw/olicense
Asageneralrulecorporationsarenotprotectedbythecharter,however,caselawhas
establishedthatindividualsaspartofcorporationshaveusedthecharterforprotection
incriminalcases,andthereisnoreasonwhybyextensionthiscanbedoneincivil
cases
ExpandedBigMDrugbyallowingcorporationtoinvokethecharterwhentheyare
defendantsincivilproceedingsinstigatedbythestateorastateorganpursuanttoa
regulatoryscheme.
Allowedcorporationstodefendthemselvesagainstcivilactionsbroughtagainstthem
inregulatorysetting.Nottobeusedasanewtoolforlitigation,onlyadefense.
Canacorporationbringchallengeundertheconstitutionwhenitisbeingcivilly
charged?
Entitledtostandingbecauseinvoluntarilybroughttocourt,anddefensewastosayit
wasunconstitutional.Wouldgoagainstruleoflawtonotletthemdefendthemselfs
onthegroundofconstitutionalbasisjustbecauseacorporation,whyshouldtheybe
guiltyofanoffencethatisunconstitutional.Initiatedbyorganofaregulatoryscheme
(regulatorybody).Doesnotneedtoshowpublicintereststandingtoinvoke
constitutionaldefense.

2.2Mootness
Mootnessisawaythatthecourtcanhavediscretion,allowscourtstorefrainfromhearinga
caseifthefactsunderlyingthedisputehavedisappearedorifthereisnofactualsituation,or
factuallitigantsituation,however,likewesayintheissueofpublicintereststandingthecourt
hasdiscretiontodeviatetheserules
Mootnessreferstothesituationwherethefactsofacasehavelittleornopracticalmeaningor
applicationinthecircumstancesathand
TestForDeterminingMootness:
1. Courtneedstodeterminewhetherthereisarequisite,tangibleandconcrete
disputehasdisappearedrenderingtheissuesacademic
2. Determineifdiscretionisappropriate
AppealisMootWhen:Thereisnolongerlivecontroversyorconcretedispute.E.G.(1)
Deathofparties(2)Appellantagreedtopaytherespondentdamagei.e.issueresolved(3)
20

Inapplicabilityofstatutetothepartychallengingthelegislationi.e.accusedfulfilled
sentence
Borowskiv.Canada(AttorneyGeneral)
Liveissuemustexistnotonlywhentheissueisfirstbroughtbutalsowhenthecourthearsit.
Function
Ifsubsequenttotheinitiationoftheactionorproceeding,eventsoccurwhichaffectthe
relationshipofthepartiessothatnopresentlivecontroversyexistswhichaffectsthe
rightsoftheparties,thecaseissaidtobemoot.
EstablishedTwoStepTest:
1.Determinewhethertherequiredtangibleandconcretedisputehas
disappearedandtheissueshavebecomeacademic.Anappealismootwhen
thereisnolivecontroversy.
2.IftheresponsetothefirstQisaffirmative,itisnecessarytodecideifthe
courtshouldexerciseitsdiscretiontohearthecase.
EstablishedtheExerciseDiscretionCriteriaforCourts(whichwasa3parttestforthe
2ndfactorindeterminingmootness):
1. Thepresenceofanadversarialcontext(courtsbuiltonadversarialsystem);
Althoughthelitigantbringingtheactionmaynolongerhaveadirectinterest
intheoutcome,theremaybecollateralconsequencesoftheoutcomethat
willprovidethenecessaryadversarialcontext.ex.VicRestaurantInc.v.
CityofMontrealtherestauranthadalreadybeensoldandthusnolicense
couldbegivenbuttherewereprosecutionsoutstandingagainsttheappellant
forviolationofthemunicipalbylawthatwasthesubjectofthelegal
challenge.
2. Theconcernforjudicialeconomy(limitedresourcesavailabletothecourt);
Doesthecasehavespecialcircumstancesmakingitworthwhiletoapply
scarcejudicialresources?And;
3. TheneedfortheCourttobesensitivetoitsroleastheadjudicativebranch
inourpoliticalframework(courtnottakingondifferentrolethanthenormal
roleofthecourt).Pronouncingjudgmentintheabsenceofadispute
affectingtherightsofthepartiesmaybeviewedasintrudingintotheroleof
thelegislativebranch.
Notamechanicalprocess,presenceofoneortwofactorsmaybe
overcomebytheabsenceofthethirdandviceversa
Issue
WastheissuemootbecauserelevantlegislationalreadystruckdownbyMorgentaler
Held
Issuewasmoot.DiscretionCriterianotmet.
Failedon3rdaspectoftheexercisedoctrine.Courtssuggestedthattheissuebedealt
withbythelegislatureratherthanjudiciary,whichitwas.

21

DoucetBoudreauv.NovaScotia(MinisterofEducation)
ProvincesRepealingJudgesRetentionofjurisdictionoverresolvedFrenchLanguageRightsfor
Schooling
Function
TwoparttestinBorowskiwasmet.
1) Therewasnolivecontroversy
2) Courtsdecidedthattheyshouldexercisetheirdiscretion(below)toheartohere
case
Lookedatthe3criteriafordiscretion(above)tohearcase:
1. AdversarialcontextYesadversarialcontextpersists
2. Judicialeconomyappealraisesimportantquestionsaboutjurisdictionof
superiorcourtstoorderwhatmaybeaneffectiveremedyinsomeclassesof
cases.
3. Courtsroletheappellantsarenotturningthisappealintoaprivate
reference.
Issue
CanaJudgehavingresolvedanissueretainjurisdictiontohearreportsonprogressof
theeffortstoremedy
Held
Eveniflargeportionsofacasecanberenderedmootthecourtcanstillhearacase
becausetheissuecouldarisewithfutureparties;Theyheardthiscasebecausetherewas
moreofadangerofnothearingthiscasebecauseitwouldcauseamisapprehensionof
thetoolsavailableforutilizingcharterprotections.Para21.
DifferentforBorowskibecausetheappellantsarenotseekingananswertoanabstract
questionontheinterpretationofthecharter.
R.v.Smith
DeadMansConvictionApplyingforAppeal
Whenanaccusedpersondiesitisuptothecourttodeclarethecaseasmootortoexercisetheir
discretion
Function
GeneralTestiswhetherthereexistsspecialcircumstancesthatmakesitinthe
interestofjusticetoproceedwhenthereisadeathoftheappellant.Intendedtobe
helpfulandnotexhaustive.Allmustbeweighedtogether.
Thisquestioncanbeapproachedwithreferenceto:
1. Whethertheappealwillproceedinproperadversarialcontext;
2. Thestrengthofthegroundsoftheappeal
3. Whethertherearespecialcircumstancesthattranscendthedeathofthe
individualappellant/respondent,including:
i. Legalissueofgeneralpublicimportance
ii. Systemicissuerelatedtotheadministrationofjustice
iii. Collateralconsequencestothefamilyofthedeceasedortoother
interestspersonsortothepublic
4. Whetherthenatureoftherenderwhichcouldbemadebytheappellatecourt
justifiestheexpenditureoflimitedjudicialresourcestoresoleamootappeal
5. Whethercontinuingtheappealwouldgobeyondthejudicialfunctionof

22

Issue
Held

resolvingconcretedisputesandinvolvetheCourtinfreestanding,
legislativetypepronouncementsmoreproperlylefttothelegislatureitself.
NotAllFactorswillbenecessarilypresentinaparticularcase;therestrengthwill
varyaccordingtotheircircumstances.Theendgoalisdeterminingifcontinuing
withthecaseisintheinterestofjustice
Canadeadmansconvictionbeappealed?IstheAppealofadeadindividualmoot?
Mootbecausetherewasnorelieffortheaccused.Specialcircumstances,judicial
economynotmet.

JaneDoe
GayMalebarredfromdonatingspermtoLesbianFriendunderfederalregulations
Bythetimeherlegislativechallengecamebeforethecourts,shehadalreadyconceivedandgivenbirth
toachildasaresultofselfinseminationusingherfriendssemen.
Function
Thegeneralruleisthatcourtsshoulddeclinetodecidecasesthathavebecomemoot
Exceptionstothegeneralrulemaybedemonstratedthroughatwoparttestfoundin
Borowski:
1. Thecourtmustdeterminewhethertheyrequiretangibleandconcretedispute
betweenthepartieshasdisappearedandtheissueshavebecomeacademic
(CourtAgrees);
2. Iftheresponsetothefirstquestionisaffirmative,thecourtmustdeicideifit
shouldneverthelessexerciseitsdiscretiontohearthecase.(Court
Disagrees)
3parttestforexercisingdiscretion:
1. Adversarialcontext
2. JudicialEconomy
3. Courtsrole
Differencebetweenthiscaseandthecasesitreliedupon(Borowski).Thecasesrelied
upontheappellantwereadjudicatedandbecamemootaftertrial.Thiscurrentcase,the
constitutionalissuesarguedhaveyettobedeterminedandtheappellantschallengeof
theregulationswasmoorpriortotheargumentofherapplication.
Issue
IsJaneDoescasemoot,ornotbecauseitisaliveissue?
Held
Courtcannotsayissueismootbecauseoffuturegrievances(SusanDoebroughtinto
reasoningbecausesimilarcase).Therecouldbemoreinthefuture.
2.3Justiciability
Permitsacourttodeclinetohearthecaseifthereisnorealissueoflawthatthecourtshould
decidethatismeritoriousordeservingofjudicialattention
Usedtoavoidissuesofpoliticalquestions
Noabsolutetest,however,forknowingwhenyoucanproceed,thereisdiscretiononacase
bycasebasis.

23

Function

Issue
Held

ReferenceReSecessionofQuebec
QuebecaskstosecedeunilaterallyfromCanada
Thesetypesofquestionsarenotjusticiableevenifincourtsjurisdiction:
1. Questionsthataretheoreticalorspeculative(beyondscopeofcourt)
2. Questionsthatarepoliticalinnature
3. Questionsnotripeforjudicialconsideration
ThecircumstancesinwhichtheCourtmaydeclinetoanswerareferencequestionon
thebasisofnonJusticiabilityinclude:
1. Iftodosowouldtakethecourtbeyonditsownassessmentofitsproperrole
inconstitutionalframeworkofourdemocraticformofgovernmentor
2. Ifthecourtcouldnotgiveananswerthatlieswithinitsareaorexpertise:the
interpretationofthelaw
i. Ifthecourtisoftheopinionthatitisbeingaskedaquestionwith
asignificantextralegalcomponent,itmayinterpretthequestion
soastoansweronlyitslegalaspects;
ii. Ifthisisnotpossible,thecourtmaydeclinetoanswerthe
question.
Arethequestionsposedinthisreferencejusticiable?
Shouldthecourtsexerciseitsdiscretiontorefusetoanswerthequestionsona
pragmaticbasis?
Inthiscasequestionoflegalsecessionisnotambiguoustopermitalegalanswernordo
theyhaveinsufficientinformation.Inthiscasethecourtisdulyboundtoprovidean
answer.Thecourtcanonlyanswerthelegalrelatedquestions.

SameSexReference
ReferenceifGayMarriageValidunderLawPosed4questionstothecourt
ExampleofrareoccasionwhencourtswillrefrainfromhearingreferencequestionB/Citlacks
Justiciability
Function
AppliesTestFromSecession
Hogg5PartTest:
1. Questionhasnotyetgivenrisetoanyrealorpresentcontroversy
2. Ithasbecomemoot
3. Itisnotalegalquestion
4. Itistoovaguetoadmitofasatisfactoryanswer
5. Itisnotaccompaniedbyenoughinformationtoprovideacompleteanswer
Issue
Arethequestionsposedinthisreferencejusticiable?Shouldthecourtexerciseits
discretionnottoanswertheyiftheyarejusticiable?
Held
QuestionnotJusticiable
1. Governmentplanningtolegalizesamesexregardlessofcourtsoutcomethusno
legalpurposeandmayhaveseriousdeleteriouseffects.
2. Thepartiestopreviouslitigationhavenowrelieduponthefinalityofthejudgments.
Theirrightsoutweighanybenefitaccruingformananswerthequestionfour
3. Answeringthisquestionhasthepotentialtounderminethegovernmentsstatedgoal
ofachievinguniformityinrespectofcivilmarriageacrossCanada.

24

Itwasoutsidetheirscopeanditwouldbeunwisetoanswerthequestion.Answering
question4wouldaffectthefinalityoftheirotherjudgments.Courtsaidthattheycan
usetheirdiscretionnottoanswerwhereitwouldbeappropriatebecausethequestion
lackssufficientlegalcontentorthenatureofthequestiondoesnotpermitthecourtto
giveacompleteoraccurateanswer.
Chaoulliv.Quebec(AttorneyGeneral)
Quebecoisarguedwaitlistswereeffectingpeopleshealthandthatbeinglimitedfromhavingaccessto
privatehealthcareinfringedtheirrightsunders.7ofthecharter
Function
Whenthecourtsaregiventhetoolstheyneedtomakeadecision;theyshouldnot
hesitatetoassumetheirresponsibilities.Deferencecannotleadthejudicialbranchto
abdicateitsroleinfavorofthelegislativebranchortheexecutivebranch
Courtshaveadutytoriseabovepoliticaldebates.Theyleaveittothelegislatures
todevelopsocialpolicy.BUTwhensuchsocialpoliciesinfringerightsthatare
protectedbythecharters(CanadaandQuebeccharters),thecourtscannotshyaway
fromconsideringthem.P.107
Courtsreasonsforshowingdeferencemustalwaysreflectthetwoguidingprinciples
ofjustification:1)themeasuremustbeconsistentwithdemocraticvalues,2)itmust
benecessaryinordertomaintainpublicorderandthegeneralwellbeingofcitizens.
Thecourtmustshowdeferencewherethegovernmenthasassignedproperweightto
eachofthecompetinginterests.
Courtscanstepinaslastlineofdefenseforcitizen.
Issue
Isthisissuejusticiable?
Held
Issueisjusticiable.Courtsmustaddressissue.Ifthepoliticalissueaffectsindividual
rights,thenthecourtmustaddressitifthereisevidencethatthegovernmenthasnot
assignedproperweighttoeachofthecompetinginterests.
HarvardCollegev.Canada(CommissionerofPatents)
Respondenthadcreatedgeneticallymodifiedmiceparticularlysuitableforuseincancerresearch;It
soughttopatentthesemiceandtheprocessbywhichtheywerecreated;
Function
Matterbeyondthescopeofthecourtssonotjusticiable(PartOneOfTestFailed)
Issue
Istheissuesoimportantthatparliamentshouldaddressitratherthanthecourts
Held
Courtssayitisnotastrictlylegalissue;theydonotwanttodealwithit;itisanissue
forparliament,beyondtheroleofthecourts
3.0ConstitutionalInterpretation:theMeaningandValidityofLegislation
Inviewofthefreightednatureofmuchconstitutionallanguage,itiseasyto
understandwhylitigantssooftenseektohaveitinterpreted,anditisdifficult,inmost
cases,toseehowthecourtscoulddeclinetherequest.
Itisdifficultforlegislativedrafterstofindthepreciselanguage
Interpretationsectionsinlegislationareattemptstomakethelanguageaspreciseas
possible,butitsimpossibletogetitexactlyprecisesointerpretationmustexist.
25

Judgesarerequiredtomakedecisionsandinterpretationsoflegislation.
Presumptionofconstitutionality:Courtsshouldalwaysassumethatlegislationthat
hasbeenchallengedfromtheoutsetisvalid;CourtsneedtoassumethatParliament
gotitrightwhenmakingthispieceoflaw(ReferenceReFireArmsAct)
Thepresumptionofconstitutionalitystandsforthepropositionthatlawenactedby
thefederaloraprovincialgovernmentistoberegardedasvalidunlessanduntilitis
challengedandfoundtobeultravires(beyondthepowers)theenactinggovernment
undertheConstitutionAct1867

3.1ContextualInterpretation
Theprocessofinterpretationisnotafixedone;ratheritdependsonavarietyoffactors.
Whenconsideringthepurposeorvalidityoflegislation,itisaxiomaticthatthistask
cannotbeappropriatelyundertakenwithoutaccountingforthecontextwithinwhichthe
legislationappears.
Thereisnoestablishedorwidelyacceptedformulafordefinitivelydiscoveringlegislative
orconstitutionalpurpose
Thereisawiderangeofindiciaincluding:
1. Preamblesandlegislativestatementsofintent;
2. Thelanguageandinternalorganizationoftheenactmentitself;
3. Legislativedebates,committeeproceedings,andsimilarevidenceof
legislativehistory;
4. Theoveralllegislativecontextinwhichtheparticularenactmentoccurs;
5. Unwrittenconstitutionalnorms,and;
6. Historical,social,orpoliticalbackground,aboutwhichthejudgesareeither
informedbyexpertevidence,orinthecaseofverywellknownandwidely
acceptedfacts,takejudicialnotice
Thefollowingcasesdemonstratehowjudgescan,andhave,approachedthetaskof
interpretinglegislationbyplacingitwithinanappropriatecontext.
R.v.Blais
Metishuntingcontrarytohuntingregulations;arguesthathuntinglawsdonotapplytoMetisbyvirtueof
theNRTAprotectionsforIndians
Function
Onthebasisofthelivingtreeyoudonotneedtoovershootthebasisofthelegislation;
noteverypieceoflegislationneedstobeexpandedandyouneedtolookathistory,
legislativeintent,andpurposeoflegislationtoknowhowitshouldbeinterpreted.
Livingtreedoctrinecannotbeusedtochangetheintentoflegislation.[page117para40
DicksonJquoteaboutcharter]
Distinction
EdwardswasaquestionofwhoSHOULDbeincludedinthetermpersonsnotwho
FromEdwards SHOULDNOTbeincludedinthetermIndian.Theframersoftheconstitutiondrewa
distinctionbetweenIndiansandMetisthatiswhylivingtreedoesnotapply.
Issue
1.WhethertheMtisareconsideredIndiansunderthehuntingrightsprovisionsofthe
ManitobaNaturalResourcesTransferAgreement(NRTA)incorporatedasschedule1to
theConstitutionAct1930?

26

2.IsBlaisimmunetoFederalhuntingregulationsbyvirtueofbeinganIndian?
Parties
Arguments

Held

1.AsMetis,hadconstitutionalrightunders.35onConstitutionAct1982
2.Hadconstitutionalrighttohuntonunoccupiedcrownlandsbyvirtueofpara13of
NRTA
3.CounterarguedContinuityoflanguage,theambiguityprincipleandthelivingtree
doctrinetonoavail.
Courtslookedtothehistoricalcontext,languageoftheNRTA,andtheobjectivesof
theNRTAtodeterminethatMetiswerenotconsideredIndiansundertheNRTAand
werethereforenotimmunetofederalhuntingregulations.LanguageindicatesthatMetis
andIndiansweretwodistinctgroups.

ReferencereSameSexMarriage
ReferenceAskingCourtstointerprets.91(26)toseeifitispossibleofinvokinglivingtreeastoinclude
samesex
Function
Needtogivealargeandliberalinterpretationtoensuretheconstitutionremainsrelevant
today;Livingtreedoctrineispossibleofgrowthwithinitsnaturallimits;Theliving
treeapproachtointerpretingaconstitutionallowsforflexibilityandadaptation.;This
approachtakesintoaccountthecontemporarycontextoftheconstitutioninquestion.
Reasoning
LikeinEdwards(thepersonscase)inthepast,marriagemighthavebeenseenthat
marriagecouldonlybebetweenmanandwoman,inEdwards,couldhavebeenseenthat
personsonlyincludedmen.Assertionisnottruetoday.
Naturallimitsargumentdoesnotwork.Theonlynaturallimitisthatitisauniontothe
exclusionofothers.
Distinguish
DistinguishfromBlaisb/ccourtsgenerallynotwillingtoamendconstitutionb/clikea
contractbutwillinterpretlegislationbroadlyw/LivingTree.Legislationmust
continuallyadapttocovernewrealities.DistinguishedfromBlais.
Issue
Doess.91(26)oftheConstitutionactexcludesamesexmarriage?
Held
No.
3.2 PithandSubstance
First step in a division of powers (ss.91/92) analysis determine the matter of the law in
question
The pith and substance doctrine looks at the central focus or thrust of legislation
Synonymsare:dominantmatter,dominantfeature,essence,leadingfeature,corepurpose
Processofconstitutionalinterpretationhasrecognizedthatmanypiecesoflegislation
promulgatedundertheauthorityofonelevelofgovernmentpursuanttoitsheadsof
powermayoverlapwithjurisdictionbelongingtotheotherlevelofgovernment
contemplatedinsections91and92.Generallyspeakingtheprovincescannotlegislate
withrespecttoas.91powerandsameforfederal.Thus,ithasdevelopedaprinciple,
describedaspithandsubstance,whichattemptstounveilthedominantmatterorfeature
oflegislationforthepurposesofascertainingitsconstitutionalvalidity.
PithandSubstanceresultsinalawbeingupheldifitsdominantcharacteristicfallswithin
theclassesofsubjectmatterallocatedtothejurisdictionoftheenactinggovernment

27

This means that a law may have an impact on matters outside the enacting legislatures
jurisdiction, so long as these effects remain secondary or incidental features of the
legislation rather than its most important features.
PresumptionofConstitutionalityPresumptionthatthelegislatureonlyintendstocreate
legislationthatisconstitutionalsolawsshouldnotbestruckdownsoeasily.Severance
andReadingDownarewaystokeeplegislationconstitutionalwithoutstrikingitdown.
Doctrineofcolourabilitysaysthattheformdoesnotgovernthepithandsubstancethe
mostcommonformofcolourabilityiswhencriminallawisusedtoaddresssomething
else.
Exampleofcolourability.Colourabilityistotakealawandportrayitassomethingelse.
Thepurposeofpithandsubstanceistoseethroughcolourability.Whatisthetrue
purposeofthelegislation?
Bewareofcolourabilityagovernmentwilltrytomakeitslawlooklikeitspithand
substanceiswithinisjurisdictionbutreallyitsnot.
o A big area where colourability is criminal law, federal government can make
many things look like a criminal offence.
Todeterminewhetherornotthestatuteisintraviresorultravires
o IdentifytheMatterofthelegislationPITHANDSUBSTANCE
o Identifythepotentialclassesofsubjects
o Scopeofthepotentialclasses
o Assignthemattertoaclassofsubjects
Todeterminepithandsubstance
o Lookatthedominantmatterofthelegislation
o Legislativehistory,preamble,text
o Isthelegislativepurposethetruepurpose?

UnionCollieryCompanyofBritishColumbiav.BrydenP130
OwnerofCompanychallengesconstitutionalityofprovinciallegislationthatbanschinamenfrom
workingincoalmines
Function
Abalanceofthetruepurposeandintentofapieceoflegislationiswhatdeterminesifit
isultravirestheenactingjurisdiction
Issue
IsbanontheemploymentofChinamenundertheprovincialCoalMinesRegulation
Actultraviresprovincialjurisdiction?
Held
Ifs.92stoodalone,couldhavepowertodosounder,s.92(10)ands.92(13).Butitdoes
notstandalone.
Under9210provincesaregivenpoweroflocalworksandundertakings,butusingthe
wordChinamentheycannotbemeaningChinesewhoareCanadiancitizens.
Unders.91(25)parliamenthastherighttolegislatenaturalizationandaliens.
Restrictiononchinamenwasthecentralfocus(pithandsubstance)ofs.4oftheCoal
MinesRegulationAct(BC)andthereforeisultravirestheprovinciallegislaturesinceit
attemptstoregulatealienswhichisafederalpowerunders.91(25).Severanceusedto
takeoutchinamenandupholdthelegislationratherthanstrikingdownwholething.

28

R.v.BigM.DrugMartLtd
BigMchallengingconstitutionalityofSundayshoppinglegislationsayingitviolatescharterb/citspith
andsubstanceistheregulationofreligiousobservance
Function
Demonstratesthatsometimesitisdifficulttogetatthetruepithandsubstance(religion
v.secular)
SetouttheTestforPithandSubstance:
1.Isthepurposeconstitutional?(Alwaysaskfirst)
2.Istheeffectconstitutional?
Ifsomethingunconstitutionalinpurposeitwillbeunconstitutionalineffect
Looktoeffectafterwelookatthepurpose.Ifpassespurpose,canstillbe
unconstitutionalifeffectsareunconstitutional.Ifitfailspurpose,thenwedonotneed
tolookateffects.
Issue
IstheLordsDayActunconstitutionalintermsofthedivisionofpowers;Doesitgo
againstCharterrighttoreligion?
Reasoning
UntilHamiltonStreetRailway,itwasheldthatSundayobservancelegislationfell
withinprovincialpurview,s.92(13)Propertyandcivilrightsors.92(16)amatterof
merelylocalorprivatenature.ButinHamiltonfounditwasapartofs.91(27)allowing
parliamentthelegislativeauthoritytoenactcriminallawbecausetherewerepenalties
imposedbythebreachoftheobservance,thusconstitutedpartofthecriminallaw.
Held
Doesthelawdealwithlaborasunder91(13)or91(16)?
Courtruledtheactwasenactedpursuanttothecriminallawpowerunders.91(27)of
theConstitutionAct,andthereforeisunconstitutionalasitviolatess.2(a)oftheCharter
byvirtueofitsmandatingthecompulsoryobservanceofthereligiousinstitutionofthe
Sabbath;ThelegislationwasreligiousinitsP&Sthedominantfeatureisabout
religion,thefactthatithassomeeffectsthatareaboutlabordoesnotmeanthe
legislationcanbesaved.
FallsunderthepurviewofCriminallaw,becausepenaltiesareattached.
ShiftingPurpose:
Youcannotshiftthepurpose.Allowingtheshiftofpurposewouldhavepractical
difficultiesandwouldcauseuncertaintyinthelaw,wouldallowrelitigationonsame
issuesandprovidecourtswithmeanstoarriveataresultdictatedbythingsotherthen
legalconsiderations(endingStareDecisis)
Standsinstarkcontrasttolegislativeintent.
Shiftingpurposedoesnotgoagainstthelivingtree,becauselivingtreeappliesonlyto
interpretationofconstitution,notlegislationitself.
CanadianWesternBankv.Alberta
8bankssoughtadeclarationthatthebankssaleofinsurancewasultraviresprovince.Expandedonpith
andsubstanceasoutlinedinBigMDrugMart.Showedwhereoverlappingjurisdictioncanoccur.
Function
Eventhoughthelawrespectinginsurancesaledidencroachsomewhaton91because
insurancewasminorlyconnectedtobanking,itwasvalidunderthepropertyandcivil
rightsoftheprovince;TheDOMINANTcharacteristicfortheprovinceswasthe
regulationofinsuranceandnotcontrollingbanking.
LOOKAT:Context,Intent,Effects;
29

Issue
Reasoning

Held

Canprovincesincidentallyregulateamatteroffederaljurisdiction;Canprovinces
regulatebankssellinginsurance?
InDeterminingPithandSubstance,mustlookatPurposeandEffectstest
1. Purposemustconsiderintrinsicevidence:legislationspreambleorpurpose
clause,andextrinsicevidence,suchashandstandminutesofparliamentary
debates.Thisisdonetoascertainthetrueproposeofthelegislationasopposed
tothemerestatedorapparentpurpose
2. Effectsaretheeffectssuchthatthetruepurseisdifferentthenintent?
Thelegislationwhosepithandsubstancefallswithinthejurisdictionofthelegislature
thatenacteditmayaffectmattersbeyondthelegislaturesjurisdictionwithoutitbeing
necessarilyunconstitutional.TheDominatePurposeofthelegislationisstilldecisive.
Itssecondaryobjectiveandeffectshavenoimpactonitsconstitutionality,merely
incidentaleffectswillnotdisturbtheconstitutionalityofintravireslaw.incidental
meanseffectsthatmaybeofsignificantpracticalimportance,butarecollateraland
secondarytothemandateoftheenactinglegislatures,suchintrusionsintootherlevels
ofgovernmentaretobeexpected.[pg137/138para28/27]
Parliamentdoesnotappeartoconsiderthepromotionofinsurancetobethebusinessof
banking.Banksdonotconsiderinsurancetobevitaltobusiness.
Provinceallowedtoencroachonfederalspoweroverbankingbecausesellinginsurance
wasnotavitalpartofthefederalpower,itwaslooselyrelatedtobankingandnotthe
mainpurpose.Insurancewasincidentaltowhatthebanksdo,itisnotmandatoryfor
bankstosellit,itisonlylooselyconnectedtowhattheydoasbanks,thusprovinces
wereintravires;thepithandsubstanceofthelegislationwastoregulateinsurancenot
banking
Justbecauseparliamentcancreateinnovativeformsforfinancingdoesnotmeanthat
s.91(15)grantsparliamentexclusiveauthoritytoregulatetheirpromotion.
Pg.140[paragraph9196]6reasonswhyitcanberegulatedprovincially.

3.3 NecessarilyIncidental(AncillaryDoctrine)
If a government validly acts with respects to one of its heads of power there may be some
spill over into other areas, some of which may be within the competency of another level
of government. So long as the main purpose is intra vires some spill over is permissible.
This is called incidental effect. Incidental means effect that may have some practical
significance but are collateral and secondary.
An extension of the idea of incidental effects is the necessarily incidental doctrine
(ancillary doctrine). The doctrine is used in cases where the provision being challenged is
part of a larger scheme of legislation. When the impugned provision is examined in
isolation, it appears to intrude into the jurisdiction of the other level of government.
However, if the larger scheme of which the impugned provision is part of is
constitutionally valid, the impugned provision may also be found valid because of its
relationship to the larger scheme. This will depend on how well the offending provisions
are integrated into the valid legislative scheme. If they are not closely related, they will
be severed and declared invalid. If they are closely related, they will be deemed
necessarily incidental to the valid scheme and the law as a whole will be upheld.
30

In this way, the necessarily incidental doctrine, like pith and substance doctrine,
permits governments to intrude substantially on the other level of governments
jurisdiction, so long as the most important features of their laws remain within their
jurisdiction.
Recognizes the idea that when either level of government creates law not always does
every aspect of that law remain within the confines of jurisdiction
Governmentsmaylegislateoutsidetheirareasofcompetencyiftheinclusionis
necessarilyincidentalunderoneofitsheadsofpowersunlesstheinclusionsare
secondaryandcannotbesaidtoreflectthepurposeoftheimpugnedlawthenthelaw
maybevalid.Thesecondaryeffectsmustmerelyensuretheachievementoftheprimary
aim.Smallintrusionsneedonlybefunctionallyconnected,largeintrusionsmustbe
functional.

GeneralMotorsOfCanadaLtd.v.CityNationalLeasing
CNBroughtaclaimunderfederallegislationb/cGMgivingpreferentialinterestthelegislationcreateda
civilcauseofaction(civilareunderprovincial)GMargueslawwouldfitmoreappropriatelyunder92(13)
Veryimportantcase2testsfromthiscaseandgeneraltradeandcommercepower
Function NecessarilyIncidentalTest[Pg.144/151]
1. Determinewhethertheimpugnedprovisioncanbeviewedasintrudingontofederal
powers,andifsotowhatextend?(ifyes,nextquestion)
IntheGMreasoningthecourtconsidered:isitaremedialprovision?Orforma
substantialpartoftheact?Istherealimitedscopeofaction?Thefederal
governmentisnotconstitutionallyprecludedfromcreatingrightsthatthefederal
governmentisnotconstitutionallyprecludedfromcreatingcivilrightsofaction
whereitisshowntobewarranted.
2. Isthelegislationinquestionpursuanttosomevalidfederalheadofpower?(Ifyesnext
question).Ifno,unconstitutional.
3. Whethertheimpugnedprovisionsaresufficientlyintegratedwiththeschemethattheycan
beupheldbyvirtueofthatrelationship[integrationtest].(ifyes,nextquestion)[pg146]if
no,unconstitutional.
4. Ifyes,theschemeisasupportableexerciseoffederalpower/jurisdictionnotwithstanding
thattheyaffectmattersfallingwithinthejurisdictionoftheprovinces.Ifno,thentheactis
ultravires,andcannotbesustainedundertheancillarypower.
Whatthenecessarylinkagewillbewilldependontheextentoftheintrusionthegreaterthe
intrusionthehigherstandardoffitisreqd.Determinedonafactcasebasis.
Issue
Issueisnotwhethertheactasawholeisultravires,ratherifaspecificultraviresprovisionis
soentrenchedthatitisintravires?
1.NodisputeabouttheviresoftheCombinesInvestigationAct,thequestionis
whetherthecivilcauseofactionprovisionoftheCombinesInvestigationActActgoes
ultraviresthefederaljurisdiction?(NO)
2.Isthecivilcauseofaction(federalnormallycannotcreatecivilcausesofaction)
provisionnecessaryincidentaltothelegislativescheme?(YES)
Held
CombinesInvestigationActisvalidunderthefederalTradeandCommercepower;s.31.1

31

isanintegralpartoftheCombinesInvestigationActandisintraviresParliamentbyvirtue
ofitsrelationshiptotheschemeofeconomicregulationfoundintheCombines
InvestigationAct.
Thecorrectapproachinthiscase,todeterminevalidityistoask:whethertheprovisionis
functionallyrelatedtothegeneralobjectiveofthelegislationandtothestructureand
thecontentofthescheme.
Courtsaiditdidencroachonprovincialpowers,butencroachmentwaslimited,andthe
legislationwaswellorchestrated,andnationalinscope,anditwouldbeunreasonableto
expectalltheprovincestoadoptalegislationofthistype.Ifoneprovincedidnotpass
sufficientcompetitionslegislationtheyyouwouldhaveissueswiththat.Thepithand
substanceistradeandnotpropertyandcivil.
ReferenceReGoodsandServicesTax
DoesthesystemofcollectionundertheGSTActConstituteaninfringementofthejurisdictionofthe
LegislatureofAlbertawithrespecttotheregulationofpropertyandcivilrightspursuanttos.92(13)?
Function NecessarilyIncidentalTest(SamebutelaboratedfromAbove)
1. Decidewhethertheimpugnedschemeinfacttouchesmatterswithinprovincial/federal
jurisdiction
2. Ifitdoesitisnecessarytoaskwhetherthelegislationinquestionisenactedpursuantto
somevalidfederal/provincialheadofpower
3. Ifitisenactedpursuanttoavalidfederalpurpose,thenitisnecessarytodeterminewhat
theimpugnedprovisionsaresufficientlyintegratedwiththeschemethat[they]canbe
upheldbyvirtueofthatrelationship
4. Ifthetestofintegrationispassed,thentheprovisionsaresupportableasanexerciseof
federaljurisdictionnotwithstandingthattheyaffectmattersfallingwithinthejurisdiction
oftheprovinces.
Encroachmentonanotherheadofpowerisvalidifthepurposeofthelegislationiswithin
theproperhead,andtheeffectsareincidentalonthecompetinghead.
Issue
IstheincursionintoprovincialjurisdictionoftheGSTActjustified?(mustlookat2Qto
answerthis)
1. IstheGSTActavalidexerciseofanyfederalheadofjurisdictionunders.91(3)?
2. IstheeffecttheGSTschemehasonmatterstraditionallywithintheprovincesjurisdiction
saidtobenecessarilyincidentaltotheexerciseofthisfederalpower?
Held
Isintraviresparliamentunderitstaxingpower,courtsacknowledgethespilloverinto
propertyandcivilrights,butthemainthrustofthelegislationwasfederalandtheeffectsof
thelegislationonprovincialjurisdictionweremerelyincidental
LaForest:theactfallswithinthepithandsubstanceofthefederalgovernment,sonotneedto
justifynecessaryincidental.
NoteonAncillaryDoctrine:
Applies to provision that are in pith and substance ultra vires. Only saved if they play
an important part in the larger legislative scheme. Unconstitutional acts can be saved,
by this doctrine, but the question is how closely related the provision are to the
broader scheme.
32

Sliding scale test: More serious the intrusion, stricter the test.
o A rational functional connection is needed for minor intrusions, while
necessity test is for serious intrusions.
o Ultra vires provision must further the purpose of the valid scheme.

Quebec(AttorneyGeneral)v.Lacombe
Municipalityregulatingwhereaerodromescanbelocated.NuanceonGMtest.
Function
NuanceofGM.Mustshouldthatthereissomereasonthatisconnectedtothevalid
legislativescheme.Notjustsupplementary,butcomplementary.i.e.fillagap,enhance,avoid
inconsistentapplicationoruncertainty.Enhances/expandsGMFunctionallyrelatedaspect.
Intrusionintofederalschemeisminor,butthereisnothingthatfurthersthelargerzoning
plan.Thecoreofthepowerofthefederalgovernmentwasimpaired.
Issue
Doesthecity/municipality(provinceinessence)havethepowertomakethisbylawand
restrictplacementofaerodromes?
Cityarguingbylaw260isancillaryto260.
Reasoning Impugnedprovisionmustbothrationallyandinitsfunctionfurthertheproposeofthevalid
legislativescheme.
Mustaskisthereafunctionalrelationship,doesitfillagapinthelegislativescheme,doesit
serveanotherpurposerelatedtothescheme(avoidinginconsistencyoruncertaintyin
application)
Regardlessofexactworkingofthetest,thebasicpurposeofinquiryisto
determineiftheimpugnedmeasurenotonlysupplementsbutcomplementsthe
legislativescheme.
Holding
Bylaw260doesnotfill,enhance,avoidinconsistentoruncertainty,notanintegratedfeature
ofthescheme.Noevidencethebylawisintegrated,hardtosayitisevensupplementary.
Notcloselyrelatedenoughtothebroaderscheme.
Notthekindofconnectiononefindsincaseswhereancillarypowersdoctrineisused.
4.0ConstitutionalInterpretation:ApplicabilityandOperabilityofLegislation
Presumptionofconstitutionalityitistobepresumedthatlegislationpromulgatedby
federalorprovincialauthorityisconstitutionallyvalid
Courtsshouldonlystrikedownlegislationwheretheyareclearlyinconsistentwith,or
offendthejurisdictionalrestrictionsimposedbytheconstitution.If2possible
characterizationsexist,oneconstitutionalandoneunconstitutionalthenthecourtmust
choosetheonewhichbestsupportsthelawsconstitutionalvalidity.
Lawdeemedconstitutionaluntilithasbeenchallengedandstruckdownasultraviresthe
enactingpower.
Elmanthinksthatflexiblefederalismhasitsdownsides,weshouldnotnecessarilybe
turningourselvesinknotstoachieveflexiblefederalismthisrestsongovernment
accountability,ifweallowformoreandmoreflexibilitytokeepmoreandmorelawalive
thenwewillrisknotknowingwhoisresponsibleforwhatanddemocraticresponsibility
thatisnotviable.
Notalwaysflexible,LordAtkincoinedwatertightcompartments(intheCanadian
constitutionsense)meaningthatthedivisionofpowersintheconstitutionindicated
33

thepresenceofwatertightcompartmentsthatdidnotcontemplatethepossibilityof
jurisdictionaloverlap.
SummaryofApplicabilityandOperability
Therearethreedistinctwaysinwhichlawsthatpurportedlyapplytomattersbeyondthe
jurisdictionofthegovernmentmaybeattackedasultravires:
1. Thevalidityofthelaw
Questioningthepithandsubstanceofthelawandwhetheritfitsinthe
jurisdictionoftheenactinggovernment.Whereitisultraviresitwillbe
declarednoforceandeffect.
2. Theapplicabilityofthelaw
Challengingtheapplicabilityispremisedupontheassertionthatthelawis
validinmostcircumstances,butnotintheparticularcircumstancein
question.Wherethelawisinvalidinthesituationunderconsideration,the
lawisrenderedinapplicableratherthaninvalid.Interjurisdictional
Immunity.DoesntCareabouttheDoubleAspectDoctrinelooksat
singlejurisdictionandwatertightcompartments.
3. Theoperabilityofthelaw
Inconsideringtheoperabilityoflegislation,anirreconcilable
inconsistencybetweenfederalandprovinciallegislationbywayofthe
doctrineofparamountcymaybefoundtoexist.Insuchcircumstances,
thelawisrenderedinoperative,butonlytotheextentoftheinconsistence.
DependentontheacceptanceoftheDoubleAspectDoctrine

Function

Issue
Held

CanadianWesternBankv.Alberta
Foreshadowsdiscussionofthedoubleaspectdoctrine
Theconstitutionaldoctrinespermitanappropriatebalancetobestruckintherecognition
andmanagementoftheinevitableoverlapsinrulesmadeatthetwolevelsoflegislative
power,whilerecognizingtheneedtopreservesufficientpredictabilityintheoperationof
thedivisionofpowers.
Thedoubleaspectdoctrinerecognizesthatbothparliamentandtheprovincial
legislaturescanadoptvalidlegislationonasinglesubjectdependingontheperspective
fromwhichthelegislationisconsideredthatisdependingonthevariousaspectsofthe
matterinquestion.
Considerationandapplicationofimportantconstitutionaldoctrinesgoverningthe
operationofCanadianFederalism.
Canlegislationfallundertwoheadsofpowerandbeintraviresboth?
Yes.

4.1DoubleAspectDoctrine
DoubleAspectdealswiththeinevitableoverlapoffederalandprovincialjurisdictions
(notwatertightcompartments)aspectsthatfallwithinonejurisdictionandotheraspects
thatfallwithintheother.

34

Ithadbeenrecognizedthatanysubjectmattercontemplatedbys.91ands.92mayhave
differentaspectspurposesormatterssomeofwhichfallwithins.91otherwithins.
92BUTthereisalsosubjectmatterthatcontainsaspectsthatproperlyfitwithinboths.
91ands.92thetestforthiswasdevelopedintheHodgecasebelow.
DoubleAspectDoctrinediffersfrompithandsubstancebecauseitisnotadoctrineper
sayitisamethodofinterpretationandnotapremise.
Whenthecourtconsidersthatthefederalandprovincialfeaturesofthechallengedrule
areofroughlyequivalentimportancesothatneithershouldbeignoredrespectingthe
divisionoflegislativepowers,thedecisionismadethatthechallengedrulecouldbe
enactedbyeitherthefederalParliamentoraprovinciallegislature.
Insituationswherebothfederalandprovinciallegislationoccursanditisnotconflicting
bothmayremain.
Bothlevelsofgovernmentcanlegislateinessentiallythesameareatotrytoachieve
differentresultsaslongasthepithandsubstanceofthepowerbeingexercisedis
basicallywithinagovernmentspower,thedoubleaspectistolerable.
Whenthelegislationisconflicting,thefederallegislationistoprevailandtheprovincial
lawisinoperativetotheextentthatitconflicts.Thesuspensionoftheprovinciallaw
continuessolongasthereisafederallawinconsistentinthesenseexplained.

Hodgev.TheQueen(LeadingCase)
Guyownstavernsellsliquorandprovidesbilliards;liquorlicenseamendedtoincluderestrictionson
liquorconsumptioninconjunctionwithbilliardplay
Function
Hodgecreatesthattherearenofirmlinesbetweenjurisdictionsofs.91and92andthat
Legislationcanhavemultipleaspectsthatoverlapjurisdictions;Althoughtheliquor
trafficisafederalheadofpowerthisprovinciallegislationwasaimedatcontrolling
publicorder,whichwaswithinitsjurisdiction.Thisisanexampleofhowliquor
controlcanhavemultipleaspectstheprovinciallegislationwasnotaimedatthesaleof
alcoholitwasaimedatadifferentaspectofalcohol(publicorder)
Issue
DidtheprovinceofOntariohavethepower(jurisdiction)toimposeauthorityoverthe
saleanddistributionofliquor?
Dothelicensesinterfere/conflictwiththeregulationsoftradeandcommerceunders.
91(federaljurisdiction)?
Parties
Ontariohadnopowertopassanyacttoregulatetheliquortraffic.Onlyparliamenthad
Arguments
thispower,didnotcomewithinanyclassofsubjectunders.92oftheconstitution.
Russellv.theQueenwasconclusivethatthewholesubjectoftheliquortrafficwas
giventoparliamentandnotwithinthepoweroftheprovinces.
Reasoning
CitizensInsuranceCompanytheJCPCillustratedthatsubjectedwheninone
aspectandforonepurposefallwithinsection92,mayinanotheraspectandfor
anotherpurposefallwithinsection91.
ThenatureinwhichtheLicenseCommissionersoperatedwaspurelyprovincialin
nature.
Held
TheLordshipsareoftheopinionthatSections4and5oftheActinquestion,the
legislatureofOntarioactedwithinthepowersconferredonitbytheImperialActof
1867,andthatinthisrespectthereisnoconflictwiththepowersoftheDominion
35

Parliament.Courtsaysthereisnoencroachmentonfederallawandrefertothe
doubleaspectdoctrineanysubjectmattercontemplatedbys.91ands92mayhave
differentaspects,purposesormatterssomeofwhichfallwithins.91andotherswithin
s.92.Thisresultsinaconcurrencyoffederalandprovincialjurisdictionswherethe
subjectmattercontainsaspectsthatfitwithinbothsections.Thelegislationisintravires
theOntariolegislature,subjectwhichinoneaspectandforonepurposefallwithin
section92mayinanotheraspectandforanotherpurposefallwithinsection91.
MultipleAccessLtd.v.McCutcheon
OntarioGovernmentandtheFederalgovernmentbothhadinsidertradinglawstheywereverysimilarthe
onlydifferencewasthestatutorylimitationstimebarredunderthefederallegislation,thatiswhythey
wantedtoproceedunderOntariolaw.
Function
Bothfederalandprovincialgovernmentsmaylegislateinthesamepolicyareas,provided
thattheyarebothvalidlawsanddistinctinpithandsubstance.
Issue
Doesthematteroftheinsidertradingprovisionsofthedeferralactfallwithinaclassof
subjectallocatedtoparliament?
1.AreSections100.4and100.5oftheCanadaCorporationsActultraviresthe
ParliamentofCanadainwholeorinpart?(No)
2.Aresections113and114oftheSecuritiesActultravirestheLegislatureofOntarioin
wholeorinpart?(No)
Reasoning
Theinsidertradingprovisionhavebothasecuritieslawandcompanieslawaspectand
wouldadoptthetestforapplyingthedoubleaspectdoctrinetovalidatebothsetsof
legislativeprovisions:
Test:whenthecourtconsidersthatthefederalandprovincialfeaturesofthe
challengedruleareofroughlyequivalentimportancesothatneithershouldbe
ignoredrespectingthedivisionofpower,thedecisionsismadethatthe
challengedrulecouldbeenactedbyeitherthefederalorprovincialgovernment.
subjectswhichinoneaspectandforonepurposefallwithinsection92mayin
anotheraspectandforanotherpurposefallwithinsection91.
Applicablewhenthecontrastbetweentherelativeimportanceofthetwofeatures
isnotsosharp.
Inthiscase,thecorporatesecurityfederalandprovincialcharacteristicsofinsider
tradinglegislationareroughlyequalinimportancetherewouldseemlittlereason,
tokilloneandlettheotherlive.
Held
Courtsaysthatbecauseofdoubleaspectthetwolegislativeschemescancoexistifthere
isnoconflict.Meresubstantialduplicationoflegislativeprovisionsdoesnotinvokethe
doctrineofparamountcy(onlyanexpressconflictorcontradictionofonestatute
requiringwhattheotherprohibitswouldcallfortheapplicationofthedoctrine).
FederalAct:Rational,functionalconnectionwithcompanylaw,andareintravires
parliamentofCanada.
ProvincialAct:validlegislativeprovisionsinrelationtothesubjectmatterofproperty
andcivilrights.Thesesectionsdonotsterilizethefunctionsandactivitiesofafederal
company,norimpairitsessentialstatusorpowers.

36

Ourcountryisincreasinglymovingawayfromtheolderclassicalfederalismofwatertight
compartmentswithprovinciallegislaturesandfederalparliamentcarefullykeepingclearof
oneanother.Weseemtobemovingtowardsacooperativefederalism.Thecoordinate
governmentsnolongerworkinsplendidisolationfromoneanotherbutareincreasingly
engagedincooperativeventuresinwhicheachreliesheavilyontheother(Dr.Corry)
DoubleAspectDoctrineNote
DeschampsJ.describesDoubleAspectashavingthreelevels:

1)facts,
2)legalperspectivesintheformofrules,and
3)thepowertoadoptrule.

DoubleAspecthappenswhentwodifferentlegalperspectives(atlevel2)bothapplyto
thesamefacts(atlevel1).Thepithandsubstanceoftheoneoftheperspectivesmight
primarilyconnecttopowersofthefederalgovernmentandtheothertoprovincialpowers
(atlevel3).Insuchasituation,boththefederalandprovincialgovernmentswouldbe
abletoenactvalidlegislationregardingthesamefacts,simplyfromdifferent
perspectives.
Indissent,Deschampshighlightedtheapplicationofthisrationale

Quebecv.Lacombe:(1)abroaderperspective,thatofzoningintheexerciseofthe
exclusiveprovincialpowertomakelawsinrelationtomunicipalinstitutions;and
(2)anarrowerperspective,thatofregulatingaerodromesintheexerciseofthe
exclusivefederalaeronauticspower. Aslongasalegislatureoramunicipality
doesnotcrossthelinebetweenadoptingruleswhosepithandsubstanceiszoning
andadoptingrulesrelatingtoaeronautics,itsruleswillbevalid.
4.3InterjurisdictionalImmunity(OnlyAppliestoApplicability)
Exceptiontoparamountcyanddoubleaspectdoctrinesandisinsteadadoctrinethat
emphasizesexclusivityofjurisdiction(aboriginalrights,RCMP,politicalrights).It
comesintoplayinsituationswhereaprovinciallawisclearlyvalidinmostofits
applications,butinsomeofitsapplicationsitarguablyoverreaches,impairingamatter
fallingwithinfederaljurisdiction.
Theeffectofthisdoctrineisthedenialofjurisdictionbythefederalortheprovincial
governmentoveramatterthroughadeterminationthatthematterexistswithinthe
jurisdictionoftheotherlevel.
ThisiscontrastedwiththedoctrineofParamountcy,whichnecessarilyassumesthe
validityofjurisdictiononthepartofbothlevelsofgovernmentalbeitbasedondifferent
aspectsandonlyinvalidatesprovinciallegislationtotheextentofanyinconsistency
betweenitandthefederalstateinquestion.
Inpractice,interjurisdictionalimmunityisonlyappliedtopreventprovinciallawsfrom
intrudingintomattersdeemedtobeofexclusivejurisdiction.Itflowsbothwaysin
theory,butnotinpractice.

37

o Threedistinctareasthatalawappliestomattersbeyonditsjurisdiction,andmay
beattackedasultravires
1.Validityofthelaw
pithandsubstancetest(effectandpurpose)
2.Applicabilityofthelaw
lawisvalidinmostcircumstances,butnotthecircumstancein
question.Thedoctrineofinterjurisdictionalimmunity.
3.Operabilityofthelaw
Paramountcy
Interjurisdictionalimmunityappliesonlyinrespectoftheapplicabilityofthelaw.
Entailsthatthelawmaybevalidlyappliedtoallmattersotherthanthosewhichgiverise
totheapplicationofinterjurisdictionalimmunity.
Paulv.BritishColumbiaDefinition:interjurisdictionalimmunityisengagedwhena
provincialstatuetrenches,eitherinitsentiretyorinitsapplicationtospecificfactual
contexts,uponaheadofexclusivefederalpower.Thedoctrineprovidesthat,wherethe
generallanguageofaprovincialstatuecanbereadtotrenchupon(MUSTIMPAIRnot
justaffect)exclusivefederalpowerinitsapplicationtospecificfactualcontextsthe
statuemustbereaddownsoasnottoapplytothosesituations.
o ReadingDownisatechniqueofinterpretationusedtosavestatutesfrom
constitutionalchallenge:thewordsofthestatuteareinterpretedsoasto
applyonlytomatterswithintheenactingbodysjurisdiction.Itisoften,butnot
exclusively,usedinconjunctionwiththedoctrineofinterjurisdictional
immunity.

CanadianWesternBankv.Alberta
Albertaenactedlegislationandregulationsoninsurancethataffectedbankingfederalgovernmentclaimed
thatthelegislationandregulationsshouldberenderedinoperativeandorinapplicabletothebanks
insuranceschemes
Function
InterjurisdictionalImmunitymustbeappliedrestrictivelyandincaseswherethevital
andessentialcoreoflegislationischallengednotwhenitisaffectedCourtssaypith
andsubstancetestorparamountcyistobepreferredovertheuseofinterjurisdictional
immunity
InordertodetermineifthereisInterjurisdictionalimmunityyouneedtoconsider:
1. Doesimpairorjustaffectthelegislationoftheotherheadofgovernment.
Mustimpair,notjustaffectlegislation.Forlawtobesubjectto
Interjurisdictionalimmunityitmustimpairthefederalundertaking.Inthe
absenceofimpairmentinterjurisdictionalimmunitydoesnotapply.
2. Doesithitthecoreofthepower?Interjurisdictionalimmunityonlyapplies
whenyouarehittingthecore,notaperipheralmatter.
3. Itmustbeoveranareathatisvitalandessentialtofederalgovernment.Isit
anareathatisvitalandessentialtothefederalgovernment?
Issue
Aretheprovincialandfederallawsinconflictwitheachother,thusinvoking
interjurisdictionalimmunitydoctrine?(NO)

38

Reasoning

Held

ModernformulationofthedoctrineofinterjurisdictionalimmunityisfoundinBell
Canada(1988)[pg171para33].Courtsaidaffectstandardtobroad,needstoimpair.
DoctrineisrootedinreferencestoexclusivityoftheConstitutionAct1982.
Seekstoavoidsituationofconcurrencyofpowers
Goesagainstpithansubstance,doubleaspect,paramountcyessentiallyabroad
applicationwouldgoagainstflexiblefederalism.Excessiverelianceofthedoctrine
wouldcreateseriousuncertaintybecausethecoreofaheadofpowerisdifficulttodefine
andtherequirementtodevelopandabstractdefinitionofcoregoesagainstthe
constitutionwhichfavorsaincrementalapproach.Couldcreatelegalvacuums,whichare
notdesirable[pg174para43/44].3problemswithoveruseofit,1.Createuncertainty2.
Createlegalvacuums3.Runsriskofcreatingunintentionalcentralizingtendency,4.
Parliamentcouldmakesufficientlypreciselanguagethatwouldnullifyprovinciallaws
[174paras4346].
Inthiscase,thereisnoimpairment,soInterjurisdictionalimmunitydoesnotapply.
Thepromotionofinsurance/peaceofmindcanhardlybeconsideredabsolutely
indispensableornecessarytobankingactivitiesunlesssuchwordsareemptiedoftheir
ordinarymeaning.
Banksareimmunetoprovinciallawsbecauseoffederalpoweroverbanking,generally
thatwouldbetruebutthecourtssaidtheytrytointerpretlegislationinawaytomake
bothpiecesoflegislationvalid(presumptionofconstitutionality).Theysaidinabsence
ofconflict/impairmentthecourtswillavoidstrikingdownonelawovertheother.
Interjurisdictionalimmunitybeappliedwithrestraint.

InterjurisdictionalimmunityNote
InterjurisdictionalImmunityprotectsthecoreofcertainenumerated,exclusivepowers
fromimpairment.
LikeParamountcy,InterjurisdictionalImmunityapplieswhenthereisaconflict.
However,whileParamountcyinvolvesaconflictoflaws,InterjurisdictionalImmunity
involvesconflictbetweenavalidlawatonelevelofgovernmentandcertainexclusive
powersattheotherlevel.Itisnotadirectconflictoflawsbut,rather,aconflictbetween
alawandapower.
Cooperativefederalismfavorsflexibleinterpretationswhichmayrequirefinding
overlappingpowers.Consequently,InterjurisdictionalImmunityappearstoberestricted
topowerscoveredbyprecedent.TheFederalpoweroverAeronauticsorNavigationand
Shippingareexamplesofsuchpowers.PrecedentsindicatethattheFederalgovernment
hasexclusivepoweroverthesesubjects.Thetestiswhethertheimpugnedlawimpairs
thecoreofthepower.
QuebecAGv.CanadianOwnersandPilots
o Impairmentisahigherstandardthanaffects,suggestsanimpactinaseriousor
significantway.
o Inaneraofcooperative,flexiblefederalism,applicationofthedoctrineof
interjurisdictionalimmunityrequiresasignificantorseriousintrusiononthe
exerciseofthefederalpower.Itneednotparalyzeit,butitmustbeserious.

39

o Impairmentinthecontextofthedoctrineofinterjurisdictionalimmunity
involvesarulethatconstrainstheactivitiesinquestionand,therefore,apractical
effectonthepowerthatisreal,althoughonlyindirect.Thisistheonlyapproach
thatgivesmeaningtotheimpairmentconcept.
MarineServicesv.RyanEstate
o Provinciallawregulatingmaritimenegligencedidnotaltertheuniformityor
restrictparliamentsabilitytodeterminewhomaypossessacauseofaction.
BMOv.Marcotte
o Courtreiterateditsrestraintinemployingtheinterjurisdictionalimmunity
doctrineandfoundtherewasnoimpairmentofactivitiesvitaltothefederalpower
overbanking.
o Moderncooperativefederalismfavorswherepossibletheapplicationofstatutes
enactedbybothlevelsofgovernment.
o Interjurisdictionalimmunityshouldbeappliedwithrestraintandshouldbe
reservedforsituationalreadycoveredbyprecedent.
o Ifthereisnoimpairment,theninterjurisdictionalimmunityisnotengaged
Carterv.Canada
o Federalprohibitiononassistedsuicidewasvalidexerciseofcriminallawpower,
despitetheprovincialjurisdictionoverhealth
o Didnotestablishthatthecoreofprovincialhealthcarejurisdictionwasimpaired.
Physicianassisteddyingmaybesubjectofvalidlegislationonbothlevelsof
government.
o Thiswasargued(unsuccessfully)thatQuebechasinterjurisdictionalimmunity.
Didnotpasstheargument.
Intheoryitgoesbothways,butthisshowsthatithasonlybeenoneway
sofarfedprov.Notprovfed

4.4Paramountcy
Doctrineofparamountcyisdependentontheacceptanceofdoubleaspectdoctrine
Thepreconditionforthedoctrineofparamountcyarisingintwovalidlawsthatcoverthe
sameareaandareinconflictbothregulatethesameactivity,botharevalid,bothapplyand
areincompatible
Wherethereisaninconsistencybetweenfederalandprovinciallaw,thefederallawwill
prevailovertheprovinciallawtotheextentoftheinconsistency.
TheTestforParamountcy
1. Isthelegislationvalid(pithandsubstanceanalyses)
2. Isthereinfactaconflictorinconsistencythatpreventsyoufromhavingbothlawsin
bothjurisdictions
3. IfconflictorinconsistencyexistsdoesInterjurisdictionalimmunitynotapply
4. Ifitdoesnotapply,thengotoparamountcyanalyses
Courtsaysthatmereduplicationwithoutactualconflictorcontradictionisnotsufficient
toinvokethedoctrineofparamountcyandrenderotherwisevalidlegislationinvalid.It
mustbeimpossibletocomplywithbothschemes(Elmandrivingexample)

40

Thetestiswhetherapersoncansimultaneouslycomplywithbothprovincialandfederal
law.Ifyesthendoublecompliance,ifnodidtheprovinciallawfrustratefederalpurpose
inenactingthelaw.

Function

Issue

Held

MultipleAccessLtd.v.McCutcheon
Federalandprovinciallegislatureshavethesamesecuritieslaws
Lawscanlivetogethersolongasthereisharmonyduplicationwithoutconflictisnota
problem;Itmustbeimpossibletocomplywithbothstatutestorenderoneinoperative;
Justificationofallowingtwononconflictinglawstocoexistisbecauseifone
jurisdictionwereevertowithdrawtheirlegislationtherewouldstillbenogap;Courts
avoidinglegislativegaps
Mereduplicationwithoutactualconflictorcontradictionisnotsufficienttoinvokethe
doctrineofparamountcyandrenderotherwisevalidprovinciallegislationinoperative.
Onlyuseparamountcywherethereisanactualconflictintheoperation:oneenactment
saysyestheothersaysno.Inthatcaseparamountcycouldbeused(compliancewith
oneisdefianceoftheother)
3.Assumingsection100.4and100.5oftheCanadaCorporationsActareintraviresthe
ParliamentofCanadaandassumingsection113and114oftheSecuritiesActareintra
virestheLegislatureofOntario,aresections113and114oftheSecuritiesActsuspended
andrenderedinoperativeinrespectofcorporationsincorporatedunderthelawsof
Canada?(No)
Thereisnoconflictbothlegislativeschemescanlivetogetherandoperateconcurrently

Rothmans,Benson&HedgesInc.v.Saskatchewan
Provinciallegislationplacesregulationsontobaccoadvertising;Federallegislationhastobaccolegislation
butnorestrictionsonadvertising
Function
Aconflictorinconsistencyisaprerequisitetothedoctrineofparamountcy.
TwoPartTest(OnusisonthePartyTryingtoDemonstratethatParamountcyApplies
CWBv.Alberta):
1.Couldapersonsimultaneouslycomplywithbothsetsoflegislation
2.Doestheprovinciallawfrustratethepurposeofthefederallaws
Issue
IstheSaskatchewanlegislations.6oftheTobaccoControlActinconsistentwiths.30of
thefederalTobaccoAct?
Reasoning
Indicationthatimpossibilityofdualcomplianceisnotthesolemarkofinconsistency.
Provinciallegislationthatdisplacesoffrustratesparliamentslegislativepurposeisalso
inconsistentforthepurposeofthedoctrine.(BMOv.Hall1990)
Impossibilityofdualcomplianceissufficientbutnottheonlytestforinconsistency.
Held
Itwaspossibleforaretailertocomplywithboth,therewasnoinconsistency,therefore
paramountcydoesnotapply.
Theprovinciallegislationallowsdualcompliancewiththefederallegislation.Itdoesnot
requireretailerstodowhatthefederallawprohibits.Itdoesnotfrustratethelegislative
purpose,bothgeneralpurpose(prov.Fed.)aretoprohibitthepromotionoftobacco
products.

41

Function

Discuss
Doctrines

CanadianWesternBankv.Alberta
Whatorderdoyouapplythedoctrines(usethisone)
OnusisonthePartyTryingtoDemonstratethatParamountcyAppliesCWBv.Alberta
Federalparamountcyispreferredtointerjurisdictionalimmunity.
Mereexistenceofduplicationofnormsatthedeferralandprovinciallevelsdoesnotin
itselfconstituteadegreeofincompatibilitycapableoftriggeringtheapplicationofthe
doctrine.Lawscanapplyconcurrentlyandifcitizenscancomplywitheitherwithout
violatingtheother,paramountcydoesnotneedtostepin.
FederalParamountcydoesnotrendertheprovinciallawinvalidorinapplicable,but
simplyinoperative.
Colloquiallyonemightsaytheprovinciallawistrumpedbythefederallawtothe
extentoftheinconsistency.Theprovinciallawessentiallygoesintoasuspendedstate
ofbeingandifthefederallaweverchangedtheprovinciallawmaythenberendered
valid.
Whenprovinciallegislationisincompatiblewithfederallegislationthefederal
legislationmustprevailatleasttotheextenttotheinconsistency.Anythingthatisnot
inconsistentwiththefederallawwillremaininforce.Youmustdeterminehowmuch
conflictthereactualis.
RothmanAffirmed:Youmustbeunabletocomplywithbothpieceslegislationand
whetherparliamentspurposehasbeenfrustrated.Cantgivethistoobroadascope.

Note:
Paramountcysuspendsprovinciallegislationthatisincompatible.Iffederallegislationis
repealed,theincompatibleaspectisreanimated.Provinciallawisnotinvalidor
inapplicable,justsuspended.
InterjurisdictionalimmunityandparamountcyareinconsistentasInterjurisdictional
immunityinvalidatesjurisdictionwhileparamountcysuspendsitwilefederallawremains
inoperations.
o Sometimestheycanreachthesameconclusione.gCanadaElectionsActinR.v.
Lewis(notepage188para3)
There are two basic forms of conflict (rules that cannot be complied with simultaneously)
o 1. Two laws require opposing things (one says yes other says no- satisfying both
is impossible)
must be between a prohibition and a requirement. One can adhere to a
prohibition and a prohibition (can comply simultaneously)
o 2. When provincial legislation frustrates a federal purpose (burden of proof lies
with the party trying to prove there is a conflict)
there must be more precisely a right positively provided for in a rule, as
opposed to a simple freedom.
party must show frustration of one of the federal purposes and meet a very
high standard.
Not every right under federal positive law will be paramount over
provincial rule.

42

The provincial prohibition must be similar in nature to the


prohibition under the federal positive right can only form an
exception.
E.g Quebec AG v. Canadian Owners and Pilots.
Federal authorization of construction of aerodromes on land zoned
for agricultural use, deferral propose was not to encourage the
spread of aerodromes so provincial law limiting that spreading was
not in clear conflict of the purpose.
invocation of federal paramountcy on the basis of frustration of
purpose, as opposed to operational conflict, requires clear proof of
purpose; mere permissive federal legislation does not suffice. That
proof is lacking here. Accordingly, this branch of the paramountcy
argument cannot succeed
Bank of Montreal v. Marcotte
The silence of the Bank Act on civil remedies cannot be taken to
mean that civil remedies are inconsistent with the Bank Act, absent
a conflict with ss. 16 and 988.
There is no such conflict as the Plaintiffs are not seeking to
invalidate their contracts. As this Court stated in Canadian Western
Bank, at para. 24: . . . constitutional doctrine must facilitate, not
undermine what this Court has called co-operative federalism.
Concluded that ss. 12 and 272 of the CPA is not inconsistent with
ss. 16 and 988 of the Bank Act and do not frustrate any federal
purpose. As such, paramountcy was not engaged.

4.5Theorderofapplyingtheconstitutionaldoctrines
Whatisthelogicalorderinwhichthesedoctrinesshouldbeapplied?

Function

Reasoning

CanadianWesternBankv.Alberta
Whatorderdoyouapplythedoctrines(usethisone)
WhatordertoApplythemthiscasediscussesthetest:
1. Validity:PithandSubstanceanalysis(purposeandeffect),lookat
necessarilyincidental&doubleaspectdoctrine(ancillarydoctrine)
2. Operability:Paramountcy
3. Applicability:interjurisdictionalimmunity:courtsaystypically
youdonotwanttouseInterjurisdictionalimmunity,usuallyonly
usedonareasthatarestrictlyfederali.e.RCMP
Notappropriatetobeginwithconsideringinterjurisdictionalimmunity,todosowould
leadtoanabstractdiscussionofthecoresandvitalandessentialpartstolittle
practicaleffect.Interjurisdictionalimmunityisoflimitedapplicationandshouldin
generalreservedforsituationsalreadycoveredbyprecedent.[pg189para77]

43

Function

BritishColumbia(AttorneyGeneral)v.LafargeCanadaInc.
DissentDecisionChangesorderofdoctrineapplication
WhatordertoApplythemthiscasediscussesthetest:
1.Validity:ThePithandSubstanceAnalysis
2.Applicability:TheInterjurisdictionalImmunityAnalysis
Shouldthelegislationbereaddownastobeinapplicabletothefederal
matterbecausethatmatterenjoysimmunityfromtheapplicationof
provinciallegislationderivingfrotheparliamentsexclusivelegislative
authorityotherthematteroroveracorrespondingheadofpowerunder
s.91oftheConstitutionAct1982.
Ifanswerisyes,thenafindingwouldmaketheprovinciallawin
questionneverapplicabletothatfederalmatterorundertaking
regardlessofwhetheranyfederallegislativeexecutiveactionhasbeen
taken.
Thiscourtviewedtheeffectoftheapplicationofaprovinciallawonthe
coreofafederalheadofpowermustbesufficientlysevertojustify
findingimmunity.Sterilized/impairmenttonarrow.Affectstobroad.
InterpretBellCanadasdeterminationofaffectedtomeanAttacked,
hinderedorrestrainedbeforeimmunitycanbeattached.
3.Operability:TheFederalParamountcyDoctrine
Ifthereisanoverlapthatconstitutesaconflict(federalpurpose
frustratedoranimpossibilityofdualcompliance,)thenparamountcy
willapply.

ApplyingtheDoctrinesNote
MarineServicesv.Internationalv.Ryan
o Caseaddressestheconstitutionalityofaprovincialprovisionwhichbarredfederal
maritimenegligenceclaimsbypartiessubjecttoNewfoundlandWHSCAct.
Courtfoundstatutorybarwasapplicableandoperative.
o Held:Interjurisdictionalimmunitydidnotapply.Althoughthelawtrenchedon
federalpoweroverNavigationandShipping,itdidnotimpairtheexerciseofthe
federalpower.
o Reasoning:
Pithandsubstance(Validitypurposeandeffecttest)Infringementdoes
notaltertheuniformityofCanadamaritimelaw,norrestrictsparliaments
abilitytodeterminewhomaypossessacauseofactionunderthefederal
power(MaritimeLawAct)
Levelofinfringementintofederalsphereinsufficienttotrigger
Interjurisdictionalimmunity.Didnotimpair.Possiblyaffected.
FederalParamountcywasnotapplicable,becausethefederaland
provinciallawswerenotinconflict.Nodirectconflictoflaws.Andno
frustrationofafederalpower/purpose

44

HighstandardofapplyingParamountcynotmet.(i.e.frustrationof
afederalpurpose,conflictoflaws)
FavoringFederalGovernmentNote
Deschampshighlightingindissentthatthereisamorecentralizedformoffederalism
whichthecourts/countryismoving
Modificationofthedoctrineofinterjurisdictionalimmunity,aquestioningofthedouble
aspectandancillarypowersdoctrinesandaninvitationtoapplythedoctrineof
paramountcyincasesthatdonotinvolveconflict,despitethefactthatallthesedoctrines
werereviewedonlyafewyearsago.Thishasanimpactonlegalcertainty.Allthese
changespointinthesamedirection,thatofamoredualisticorevenamorecentralized
formoffederalism
[thisisinterestingforfederalismanddivisionofpowerquestions]
5.0Delegation
Delegationofconstitutionaljurisdictionconcernstheabilityofthefederalandprovincial
governmentstotransferauthorityovermattersassignedtothemundertheConstitutionAct,
1867totheotherlevelofgovernment.Oneofthethorniestissues.
Constitutioncontinuallyfacesthepressuresofchangingsocial,economic,andpolitical
realities.Canadaeventuallyfounditselfinaconstitutionalstraightjacketwithadivisionof
legislativeauthoritywhichisnotresponsivetotheregulatoryneedsofthecommunity.
Delegationwouldpermitthefederalandprovincialgovernmentstomixandmatchtheheads
ofpowerundersection91and92oftheConstitutiontoavoidthelimitationsinherentinthe
divisionofthepowers
RemainsproblematicsincethereisnoexpresspowerintheConstitutionpermittingeither
Parliamentortheprovincestodelegatetheirpowersortoacceptdelegatedpowers
delegationwouldbeindirectamendmenttotheconstitutionalprovisionsthatdividepowers.
Thereisnotextualsupportfordelegation.
Thoseopposedtointerdelegationfeelthatpoliticalaccountabilitywouldbejeopardized
whengovernmentscanfreelyignorethedivisionofpowersandwhenthepowerscanbe
altered,swappedortraded
SupremeCourthaspermittedlegislators(parliamentandprovinces)todoindirectlywhat
theycannotdodirectlyinthreeways
o Administrativedelegation
o Referentiallegislation(Incorporationbyreference)
o Conditionallegislation
NoexpressprovisionintheConstitutionfordelegation
5.1DelegatusNonPotestDelegare
Meansadelegatecannotsubdelegate
InHodgev.theQueenitwasestablishedthatParliament&theprovinciallegislatureswere
andarepermittedtodelegateauthoritytosubordinatebodies
CanadianPacificRailwayv.CorporationoftheParishofNotreDamedeBonsecours
establishedthattheDominionParliamentcannotgivelegislativejurisdictiontothe
provinciallegislature

45

5.2LegislativeInterDelegation
Legislativeinterdelegationrelinquishesthecontrolofonejurisdictiontotheother,thisis
NOTallowed
Legislativeinterdelegationisthetransferofauthorityformonelevelofgovernmentto
anotherthroughonelegislativebodytotheother.
IfCanadaalloweddirectinterdelegationtobecomeanacceptedmeansofdealingwith
impassesbetweenthefederalandprovincialgovernments,politicalaccountabilityand
responsibilitywouldbeunderminedtothedetrimentofthecountry.MPselectedfederally
aredonesotodealwithfederalpowers(s.91),MPPsareelectedprovinciallytodealwith
provincialpowers(s.92).
A.G.ForN.S.v.A.G.ForCan(NovaScotiaInterDelegation)
NSattempttosetupoldagepensionplanbutfederalhastaxpowerandprovhaspoweroveremployment
somadeschemewheretheycouldsharepowers.
Ratio
onelegislativebodycannotenlargethepowersofanotherbyauthorizingthelatterto
enactlawswhichwouldhavenosignificanceorvalidityindependentofthedelegation;
NeitherParliamentnorthelegislaturescandelegatepowerstoeachothersoastochange
thedistributionofpowersprovidedforinss.91and92oftheBNAAct.Ifithadbeen
theintentiontogivesuchpowersitwouldhavebeenexpresseditinclearand
unequivocallanguage.Jurisdictioncannotbeconferredbyconsent.Noneofthese
bodiescanbevesteddirectlyorindirectlywithpowerswhichhavebeendeniedbythe
BNAActandarenotwithintheirconstitutionaljurisdiction.
Issue
Isbillnumber136valid?Canprovincedelegatetofederalpowersunders.92
(employmentandindustry)andcanparliamentdelegatepowersins.91toprovince
(taxation)
Held
No.Lawsneedtobepassedbytheproperjurisdiction;Constitutionwasamendeds.94a
wasaddedsothatparliamentcouldmakelegislationforoldagepensions.Amendedin
(1951).Butitwasnotamendedsoprovincescouldmakeamendmentstotaxation
schemes.
5.3AdministrativeInterDelegation
Doingindirectlywhatyoucannotdodirectly
Parliamentandtheprovincegivessomeofitspowerstothesameadministrativeboard
ratherthandirectlytothelegislaturethisISallowed
Administrativeinterdelegationpowerisdelegatedformonelegislativebodythroughits
executivebranchtoanadministrativebodyestablishedbyadifferentlevelofgovernment.
PrinceEdwardislandPotatoMarketingBoardv.H.B.Willis
PEIsetupaboardandparliamentalsosetupthesameboard(samemembersect)adoptingthesame
members;Bydoingthatparliamentwasabletogivesomeofitsfederalpowerstotheboardsothe
provincecouldregulateinterprovincialtradeofPEIpotatos.
Ratio
Administrativeinterdelagationhasbeenacceptedbythecourts.Herethecaseis
differentfromNovaScotiabecausetheFederallegislationdoesnotconferanyadditional
46

Issue
Held

powerstothelegislaturebutvestsinagroupofpersonscertainpowerstobeexercisedin
theinterprovincialandexportfield.Administrativeinterdelegationtreatsthemarketing
boardasifitwereafederalboardwiththesamemembersoftheprovincialboard.
Powerisnottransferredfromonelegislativebodytoanother,butpowerisdelegated
fromonelegislativebodythroughitsexecutivebranchtoanotherlegislativebody
establishedbyanotherlevelofgovernment.
Hasthefederalgovernmentimpermissiblydelegatedpowerstotheprovince?
No.

5.4IncorporationbyReference
Adoptingthelawsorrulesofanotherjurisdiction
Referentialincorporationeliminatestheneedtocreatenewrulesorcopyverbatimthelaws
ofanotherjurisdiction.
IncorporationbyreferencewasputtothetestinA.G.forOntariov.Scottwhereitwas
arguedthatanOntariolaw,theReciprocalEnforcementofMaintenanceOrdersActwasan
invaliddelegationofpowertotheUKtomakelawsfortheProvinceofOntario
SupremeCourtinScottheldthatincorporationbyreferencewasaconstitutionally
validtechniquedistinguishablefromtheformofdelegationemployedinNovaScotia
Interdelegation
Eliminatestheneedforlawmakerstodraftnewrules
Coughlinv.OntarioHighwayTransportBoardEtAl
Federalgovernmentcangivetheprovincialgovernmentauthoritytoadoptandapplyitslaw;thelawmust
existunderthefederallawalready,theprovinceisnotmakinganewlaw,justadoptinganexistinglaw.
Function Delegationcanoccursolongaseachjurisdictionretainscontrolandpowerovertheirlawsi.e.
provincescanadoptfederallawssolongastheydonotgiveawaytheircontroloverprovincial
matters.Theprovincesarecontrollingthefederallawnottheparliament.
Bothadministrativeinterdelegationandreferentialincorporationweredeemedconstitutional
becauseneitherviolatedtheconstitutionalbaronlegislativeinterdelegation.
Issue
Isthetransportboardactingoutsideofitsjurisdictionalauthority?
Held
Becausetheprovincehasincorporatedthefederalschemeithaspowertoactoutsideits
jurisdiction.Thefederalgovernmentcanterminatetheactionatanytimeandfromtimetotime
alterthemannerinwhichintraprovincialtradeisdone.FollowsScottjudgment,becauseno
delegationoflawmakingpowerisdone.Actionisconstitutionallyattainable.
Parliamentmaintainsultimateauthorityastowhatpowerswouldbeconferredandexercised.
General Byincorporatinglegislationfromfeds,Ontarioboardhaddelegatedpowers,butOntarios
powersingeneralwerenotenlarged.EvadedwhatmadeNSfatal.
5.5ConditionalDelegation
TwoTypes:
o ConditionalAdministrativeInterdelegation(allowed,lawpassedbygovernment
thatwillonlycomeinforceupontheproclamationofaprovincesgovernment)
o ConditionalLegislativeInterdelegation(usuallynotpermitted,verycloseto
legislativeinterdelegation)

47

Facts

Issue
Held

LordsDayAllianceandBritishColumbia
dealtwithSundayshoppingandobservance.Sundayobservancelawswerefederallaws
b/cwithincriminallawpower.Federallegislationprohibitedarangeofactivitieson
Sundaysbutalsoprovidedanoptoutclause.Legislationpermittedlocalgovernmentsto
optoutsotheycoulddealwiththeparticularrequirementsoflocalities.
BClegislaturewantedtoexemptVancouverfromtheobservationofthelordsdayactfor
baseball.IsexemptionclauseinLordsdayactultraviresforprovincetouse(exclusive
poweroffederalgovernment?)
Courtssaidthiswasacceptableb/ctheBClegislaturewasnotattemptingtolegislate
overcriminallawmatters.InsteadtheBCgovernmentwasdealingwiththeoptout
clausethatdiddealwithcriminallaw,andtheoptoutwasvalidunder92(13)property
andcivilrightsor92(16)mattersmerelylocalinnature.
Lawwasadministrativeconditionaldelegationbecauselawpassedbyparliaments.6(1)
wasconditionalonproclamationbytheprovincesthisallowedprovincestodealwith
particularlocalitiesandgeosocialrequirements(localinnature).

Generalnoteondelegation(alltypes)
Abandonment of powers by provinces could make/create all powered federal
government. on other hand the federation could be reduced to a loose confederacy
where federal government delegates to may powers to provinces. Courts balance the
scope of delegation to ensure that this does not happen.

48

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