Enviro Security

WSA 11-12
Environment
PAK
Environmental Security
Environmental Security........................................................................................................................................ 1
1NC Shell.............................................................................................................................................................. 3
1NC Shell.............................................................................................................................................................. 4
1NC Shell.............................................................................................................................................................. 5
2NC Overview....................................................................................................................................................... 7
Link- Dualism...................................................................................................................................................... 8
Link- Disease........................................................................................................................................................ 9
Link- Climate Refugees...................................................................................................................................... 10
Link- Feminism................................................................................................................................................... 11
Water Wars......................................................................................................................................................... 12
Water Wars......................................................................................................................................................... 13
Water Wars......................................................................................................................................................... 14
Warming Good................................................................................................................................................... 15
Warming Good................................................................................................................................................... 16
A2: Climate Change War................................................................................................................................ 17
A2: Must Consider Climate in Defense..............................................................................................................18
Warming Good................................................................................................................................................... 19
Natural Disaster Good....................................................................................................................................... 20
Link Resource Wars........................................................................................................................................ 21
If there are resource shortages, theyre good coop instead of war
Impacts-Case Turn............................................................................................................................................. 22
Impacts-Colonialism.......................................................................................................................................... 23
a2 Perm.............................................................................................................................................................. 25
WSA 11-12
Environment
PAK
WSA 11-12
Environment
PAK
1NC Shell
The affirmatives framing of the environment as a threat is part of a performative speech act of
securitization. This speech act necessitates specific responses from the State which replicate
the harms prescribed in the 1AC
Dalby 2009 (Simon, Professor at Carleton University Canada, Security and Environmental Change, pg. 4647)
The term security is highly contested in both scholarly and political usage (Dalby 1997, 2002; Steve Smith 2005).
Linking it to environment complicated matters even further, and there is no commonly agreed understanding
of how these terms might be linked or even whether they should be. Nonetheless this is repeatedly done when
alarms about environment are turned into questions of supposedly high political priority (Hartmann et al. 2005). The
politics of security thus is a crucial part of any analysis that links environment with discussions of security.
Who invokes an emergency situation requiring a security response is part of the matter; but so too is the
specification of who or what is endangered in these circumstances. All this is what is meant by securitization;
the active processes of invoking security and setting in motion policies and actions on the basis of presenting
matters as threatening. This has been done repeatedly in the last few decades in discussions of environment, but not usually with much success.
Securitization is a mode of analysis most closely associated with the so-called Copenhagen school of security studies that drew on the critical literature in
linguistics and elsewhere to point out that security was in part a speech act, a performance of the invocation of danger as requiring extraordinary action
(Buzan et al. 1998) Security is in this mode of thinking, not a simple term nor an objectively agreed upon condition . When used in discussions
of politics it is a powerful word, invoking a desired state as well as a threat to that state that requires protective
measures. When something is securitized, made the referent object of those measures and constructed in
policy discourse as in need of being secured, it then becomes the focus of state actions. Resources are
mobilized, troops may be deployed, surveillance under-taken. Emergency measures may be called for that necessitate the
suspension of normal rules of law, and the granting of additional powers to police or military agencies. In the process, who and what precisely is secured
becomes important.
Claims by rulers to be acting in the common good are frequent in these circumstances, but frequently such claims turn out to be misleading at best, and
at worst a strategy to stay in power by using violence and fear as tools of rule (Fierke 2007). Insofar as environment is portrayed as a
threat, and international stability is upset by migration or conflicts over resources, these long-established
patterns my recur. But they may not do much to deal with either the threats or their causes. As much of the rest of
this book suggests, this is in part because the attribution of the source of danger to external causes, rather than construing it as a consequence of
metropolitan patterns of consumptions, turns out not to deal with many environmental matters very effectively.
WSA 11-12
Environment
PAK
1NC Shell
This tying of environmental concerns to security approaches causes a militaristic response at

national levels, further destroying the environment and extending practices of colonialism
Barnett 2001 (Australian Research Council Fellow, The meaning of environmental security Pg. 47-49)
The most important critique of expanded conceptions of security, of which environmental considerations are
part, concerns the possibility of militarized responses . Because the prevailing approach to security is still mired in
ideological straightjackets, and carries with it an array of sentiments and a narrow problem-solving mindset , its utility for
comprehending and responding to non-military issues is questionable (Dalby 1991: 29 ). When examining discourses of the war on
drugs, war wars, Third World turbulence and so on, it becomes increasingly apparent that this post-Cold War
security agenda is still basically the same realist agenda that prevailed throughout the Cold War, although now
exhibiting previously secondary concerns brought forth in the sudden absence of the mobilizing West-East
threat. Campbell argues that the Western response to the current era of world politics is characterised by the
representation of novel challenges in terms of traditional analytics, and the varied attempts to replace one
enemy with (an)other (Campbell 1992: 8). This is borne out in the 1998 US National Security Strategy which states that the current
international security environment presents a diverse set of threats to our enduring goals and hence to our security, including transnational threats such
as terrorism, international crime, drug trafficking, illicit arms trafficking, uncontrolled refugee migrations and environmental damage which threaten
US interests, citizens and the US homeland itself (Clinton 1998: 10). A key part of the US response is to maintain superior
military forces at the level of readiness necessary to effectively deter aggression, conduct a wide range of peacetime activities and
This
holds true for environmental security as well, as Smil argues: In thinking about the new horse of environmental
degradation, it is really the old gibbons heart of national security that many of the new securitarians want to preserve .
They alter, dilute, and extend the meaning of security beyond any classical recognition, but they never give up
on its original idea which embodies conflict and violence. This is because the idea carries them to the heart of
existential anguish and moral peril, fears without which their message would not merit such an anxious hearing by politicians, the military,
or the mass media. (Smil 1997: 108) Thus the hidden goal of security- that of maintaining power within the state- remains
unchallenged so long as security is projected as an absolute imperative . In short, the effect of broadening national
security to include social, political and environmental issues- without changing the nation-state as the referent- is the further
colonization of domestic society by realisms ultimately violent logic. For as long as security remains tied up in
the state-centric realist paradigm, introducing new issues will be conceptually counterintuitive and practically
counterproductive to these issues, and to the broader goal of justice. In most of the account discussed in this chapter, the logical
confines of conventional security reasoning are not broken, and the state remains the site of politics . So, adding new
smaller-scale contingencies, and, preferably in concert with regional friends and allies, win two overlapping major theater wars (Clinton 1998: 11).
issues to the agenda of security studies does not necessarily equate to a modification of the conceptual base, and may lead to a bolstering of the statecentred approach (Shaw 1993). Expanding the security agenda without seriously contesting the meaning of security
perpetuates the failure of the security concept to take into account the needs of the people. In this broader (but not
deeper) agenda, security is still the preserve of states acting in their own interests- interests which for the most part do not correspond to the needs of the
people. Yet the expansion of the concept of security is only malignant for as long as security equates with national security attained through military
strategy. There are a range of other definitions of security that identify alternative referents (discussed in chapters 8 and 9). These do more than expand
the meaning of security; they seek to reclaim it by deepening the concept until it speaks to the security needs of people (not nations), and by addressing
risk and uncertainty in accommodating and adaptive ways. Even given these radical approaches, it remains an open and ongoing question as to whether
the notion of security is too thoroughly contaminated with associations of power and violence to warrant further use. This issue is taken up again in
Chapter 9, where the advantages and disadvantages of securitizing environmental problems are considered. Despite some good intentions, the search
for new security issues has led to the discursive reinvigoration of the state and its self-appointed protectors via
the continued construction of Others and discourses of danger. In this context it is not surprising that we read
that environmental degradation is becoming (along with extreme nationalism, religious radicalism, and economic conflict) a prime
threat for the 21st century (Winnefeld and Morris 1994: 2). The origination of this discourse of environment as a threat can be attributed largely
to Ullman and Myers, who presented environmental insecurity in terms of conflict and danger to the nation. This issue of conflict and the environment is
discuss in the following chapter.
WSA 11-12
Environment
PAK
1NC Shell
Our alternative is to reject the affirmatives environmental securitization discourse in favor of a

recognition of ecological complexity. The alternative is a precondition to effective action
Cudworth and Hobden 2010 (Erika and Stephen, Paper presented to European Consortium for Political
Research 5th Pan European Conference on the EU, University of Oporto, Porto, Portugal, 24-26th June 2010.,
Securing what for whom? Multiple complex Inequalities and the politics of environmental security in Europe,
University of East London)
A full discussion of the concepts that underlie the notion of complex ecology is developed in our forthcoming book on the environment and/in
international relations (Cudworth and Hobden, 2011). Here, we point to the main features of such an approach. A complexity-inspired
approach to environmental issues in international relations would constitute a distinct form of analysis
compared to environmental conflict and environmental security approaches. Such an approach gives priority to
developing an understanding of social, political and economic relations as impacting beyond the human. While human and non-human systems have
distinct features, ultimately they are co-constitutive, overlapping and intersected. Rather than seeing a separation between the
human and the non-human, complex ecologism sees the human world as embedded within the natural world ,
with the variety of human social systems intersecting with those of other natural systems. Varied social systems
overlap and intersect with resulting implications for a range of other natural systems (species, scapes, and the wider
biosphere). The notion of panarchy, described in the previous section, provides an effective depiction of the sets of inter-relating systems. There are a few
attempts to deploy complexity in ecological security approaches. Harrison, for example, identifies four principle concepts of
complexity adapted to ecological systems: adaptive agency, self-organizing emergence, authority and
openness (2006: 55). There are two major difficulties with Harrisons application of complexity concepts: dualism and the eliding of power relations.
Harrison discusses the concept of agency entirely in relation to the subjectivity and adaptation strategies of human beings, in the context of
environmental change. Second, in his discussions of self-organisation and emergence, he stresses the bottom-up interconnections and processes for
example, in environmental policy making. In Harrisons interconnected, non-linear systems, natural and social systems are analytically separate and
politics is lost there is no understanding of power in the social world here, or its impact on non-human systems. Whilst ecological security
firmly places the analysis of political, social and economic relations within the global environmental system,
and pays attention to regional differences, it does not account for the full range of complex social inequalities
that shape human relations with, and within, environments. The contribution of a complex ecology approach is
the potential to analyse intersectionality and multiple power relations. As discussed above, a variety of different sets of power
relations have been analysed by political ecologists. These represent the operation of different sets of systems, such as patriarchal, capitalist,
ethnocentrist and so on, which can have an impact on each other, and have implications for the environment. We would argue that, while these can be
considered as distinct systems, the development path of each has implications for other systems. This allows for the development of multiple levels of
analysis, drawing the focus away from the state, to supra-state levels (including the biosphere) and sub-state levels. Environmental issues can therefore
be analysed operating at a variety of levels.
Complex ecologism provides a means of overcoming the weaknesses in the range of environmental
securitization approaches as discussed in the first section of this paper. By moving away from a state focussed framework, and
considering a panarchy of inter-linked systems, environmental problems can be considered at global, regional
and local levels. The biosphere itself is a system co-constitutive with other human and non-human systems. Envisioning human systems embedded
within a wider range of systems overcomes the duality inherent in the majority of approaches to understanding environmental issues within
international relations. The environment is not out there, but instead constitutive of, and reactive to, human systems. Human systems are embedded
within a number of nonhuman systems, with the consequence that developments in one system may have implications elsewhere in the panarchy. Thus,
as a simple example, increased carbon dioxide levels as a result of increased industrialisation can be linked to species
migration in local ecological systems. Likewise global temperature rises can increase energy use, for example to run cooling systems,
impacting across economic (oil prices), political (inter-state relations), and ethnic systems (relations with Islamic European populations) The
interlinking of complex systems also allows the analysis to shift from a focus on security to one of insecurity. Complex ecologism understands
interactions and changes in complex human/natural systems as resulting in multiple risks, hazards and uncertainties, which international politics must
navigate. A significant feature of current global environmental issues is that many of those most in a situation of risk are not the authors of the causes of
that risk. Environmental risk situations faced by individuals, communities, and societies are frequently the
consequences of complex power interrelationships . More developed societies have been effective at exporting their environmental
degradation, gaining the benefits of industrial production without the inherent costs.
Finally, by focussing on the intersection of power relations operating
in and between different systems, and the

creation of risk that is associated with relations between systems, the possibilities for a mitigation of risk
throughout the panarchy become the key issue. The move from security to risk alleviation implies that the focus of attention is on the
re-structuring of risk-creating activities, rather than attempts to secure protection for specific groups. By breaking the link between this as
a state-focussed issue, and instead a concentration on an analysis focussed on intersecting systems, removes
the focus on particular social groups, and re-orientates the analysis towards both a concern for the wider
biosphere and social justice. As many others have pointed out, work on environmental change in international relations theory has tended to
modify existing approaches by including the environment in pre-existing frameworks, such as securitization. Perspectives such as ecological
security which attempt a radical questioning and transformation of that framework are still shaped by it. We
WSA 11-12
Environment
PAK
need to move beyond securitization , but in policy terms it seems the notion of security has been attractive, and it frames environmental
policies alongside initiatives for mitigation of and adaptation to environmental problems.
WSA 11-12
Environment
PAK
2NC Overview
The affirmatives call to action in the face of potential environmental and ecological destruction
is both inaccurate and harmful. While climate change and environmental events are certainly
important issues that should be dealt with, their choice to justify their plan based on
environmental impacts places the 1AC firmly in the tradition of environmental security
discourse. Their depiction of the status quo is a fiction- securitization discourse ensures that
they only view the environment through a lens of its effects on us which problematizes all of
their impact scenarios. Extend our Dalby 09 link card which makes several important points:
It indicates that security is a speech act which entails responses in very specific ways. How one
frames policy drastically alters the way it is implemented; when an issue is framed as a security
matter, it relegates it strictly to the control of the State and the military, two of the very sources
of environmental damage. This turns the solvency on the case. Extend Barnett 2001, which
says that environmental securitization discourse guarantees violence and reactionary effects by
ensuring the dominance of ecologically harmful state institutions. The Cudworth and Hobden
2010 alternative indicates that rejecting this security discourse in favor of a complex ecology is
a precondition to finding effective solutions. A focus away from the state towards the ways in
which international actors, individuals, groups, and the environment are all mutually
connected and co-dependent is the first step towards devising effective solutions.
Link- State
Link- State action

Cudworth and Hobden 2010 (Erika and Stephen, Paper presented to European Consortium for Political Research 5th Pan European Conference on the EU,
University of Oporto, Porto, Portugal, 24-26th June 2010., Securing what for whom? Multiple complex Inequalities and the politics of environmental security in Europe,
University of East London)
The organization most often able to act to implement an environmental security agenda is the (nation) state and international political organizations which are themselves,
composed of individual states. Yet ironically, territorial
states are in many ways foundational for securitisation approaches, but as Dalby
charging states with responsibility for the environment may well be a case of foxes guarding chickens.
States have been drivers for modernisation, putting in place the infrastructure that so depends on carbon fuels and high levels of resource use, in large part,
by establishing a capitalist system of property relations (Latouche 1993). Increasing resource extraction and utilisation is at the
core of a system reliant on the constant expansion of profit (Clack and York 2005).
Resources, including natural scapes and various species of plant and animal life become part of the modern political order and reconstructed
as elements of monetary exchange and subjects of property rights enforced by states (Latour 2004). The fundamental question is whether
(2002c: 5) notes,
states, and the international organizations of which they are members, can construct new physical and institutional infrastructures which move us away from an ever
expanding use of resources. Much of what we have seen in terms of the internationalization of environmental policy involves an assumption that economic growth can be
compatible with ecological sustainability and there is a techno- institutional fix for the present problems (Hajer 1995: 32). The politics of ecologism however, implies radical
departures from our current economic, political and social practices in wealthy Western/Northern states, and most writers from this perspective have been extremely
pessimistic concerning the ability of states to deliver change (Sachs et al. 1998). Eckersley (2004: 241) is confident that a decline in territorially based governance
accompanying globalization, coupled with a radical institutional reform, will make possible the consideration of ecological concern. She suggests a move from liberal
democracies to ecological democracies, where those collectivities subject to ecological risk must be involved in or represented in decision making which may involve or
reforms undertaken by states and

supranational institutions tend to be processes in which environmental questions are subsumed under a bureaucratic
rationality of resource managerialism (Luke 1999). The logic of capitalist development, albeit linked with sustainability is
foundational for environmental policy initiatives.
generate ecological risk. Yet it is most uncertain that globalization has actually reduced the power of states, and
WSA 11-12
Environment
PAK
Link- Dualism
Link- dualism
Cudworth and Hobden 2010 (Erika and Stephen, Paper presented to European Consortium for Political Research 5th
Pan European Conference on the EU, University of Oporto, Porto, Portugal, 24-26th June 2010., Securing what for whom?
Multiple complex Inequalities and the politics of environmental security in Europe, University of East London)
Finally, the environmental security literature tends to reproduce a dualistic understanding of human relations to the
environment in which we humans are either threatened by or pose a threat to nature (Barnett 2001: 67). Such a dualism
becomes apparent in the typology advocated by Detraz, wherein either the environment is a threat to the state
(environmental conflict) or the individual (environmental security), or is itself under threat (ecological security). A variety
of writers have addressed this dualism. For Latour (2004: 53) the terms nature and society do not designate domains
of reality: instead they refer to a quite specific form of public organization. Latour argues that we need to adapt current
institutions to give a voice to single collective of humans and non-humans. Likewise Walker (2006: 189) argues that
politics itself is constituted by a profound rupture between man and nature. In other words there is an ontological issue
which the environmental security literature highlights most profoundly. Dualism underestimates the complex interlinkages in the biosphere, by focusing on the security of one referent rather than allowing an analysis which permits the
examination of the complex and overlapping processes that constitute environmental problems. The term environment
itself, is a catch all category which homogenizes the diversity of non-human life and encompasses a multiplicity of
incredibly varied non-human plant and animal species. Such an understanding of the environment and the distinction of
the human species from it is a product of Western histories and sensibilities (Soper 1995), and there have been diverse
historical formations of society-environment relations (McNeill 2000). Human modifications of our habitat(s) are shaped
by histories of social relations, economic practices and formations of political power.
WSA 11-12
Environment
PAK
Link- Disease
Link- Disease
Pereira 2008 (Richard, PhD candidate in International Politics and Conflict Resolution at the Centre for Social Studies,
University of Coimbra, Portugal, Processes of Securitization of Infectious Diseases and Western Hegemonic Power: A
Historical-Political Analysis, GHG, VII, N. 1 (S2008) GLOBAL EALTH OVERNANCE VOLUME 2 NUMBER 1 SPRING
2008)
The adoption of a historical-political lens vis--vis a juridical-institutional one allows us to come to, not only denser, but
also, perhaps, surprising conclusions about the intimate function of disease in the whole Western global security project.
First, the historical-political approach takes governances constitution as an assemblage of dispersed, though hierarchized,
liberal powers. Second, it permits an appreciation of the power role played by a larger range of actors, namely INGOs,
apart from the states and multilateral organizations. As the HIV-security nexus case shows, INGOs played an essential
role in the early politicization of the issue of HIV. Third, this approach emphasizes the idea of structure as the major
securitization driver. Even though context remains important (e.g. September 11, 2003 SARS outbreaks, etc.), structural
governance elements, i.e. surveillance mechanisms of epidemic control, preparedness and response, strongly contributed
to Western security. They helped in the expansion and consolidation of the world system of dominance over the colonial
world in function of a rising global liberal economy. Post-September 11 new order in global health and the security
agenda emerging from it unfolds continuities of the colonial legacy. Such continuities appear as tantamount to the postCold War reduction of state sovereignty in the international arena, proportionately to the hegemonization of the
assemblage of dispersed, multifaceted liberal powers. Table 1 summarizes the main characteristics.
WSA 11-12
Environment
PAK
Link- Climate Refugees
No climate refugees (Link to a K)

Tertrais 2011 (Bruno, Senior Research Fellow at the Fondation pour la recherche strategique
(Foundation for Strategic Research), and a TWQ editorial board member, The Climate Wars Myth, The Washington
Quarterly, 34:3 pg. 17-29, 2011)
What about climate refugees? Dire evaluations already existed in the middle of the 1990s: British environmentalist
Norman Myers claimed at the time that such refugees already numbered 25 million, and that their number might double
15 years later, to reach perhaps 200 million by the middle of the century. This number has been used by many
publications since then.36 Another widely quoted prevision-which claims to be an update of Myers own- is that of the
non-governmental organization Christian Aid, which foresees 250 million climate refugees between 2007 and 2050 (out
of a total of one billion environmental refugees).37 Lord Stern himself reportedly stated that a five degree Celsius rise in
average global temperature would lead to billions having to move.38
But the idea of massive waves of refugees triggered by climate change does not square well with the reality of migration.
There is no doubt that environmental change can lead to massive displacements of populations. Such displacements have
always existed, including in industrialized countries. Remember the Dust Bowl, which led to the migration of two to three
million from the Great Plains to the West in the United States. But such movements are slow (we are more accurately
talking about migrants as opposed to refugees), very much dependent on economic opportunities existing elsewhere (the
pull factor is as important as the push), and generally of a limited geographical scope (most people want to stay in the
same country or region).39 They are sometimes due to non-climate related factors: desertification or degradation of the
soils is often due to urbanization or intensive agriculture. The same reasoning can be applied to the rise in sea levels. First,
the hypothesis of a future constant rise in average sea levels due to global warming is not the likeliest one and is being
seriously challenged.40 Second, even if one accepts the scenario of a constant rise, is it inconceivable that mankind would
be able to adjust and adapt to a rise of a few millimeters per year, as it has done for many decades? Catastrophist analyses
evoking massive floods of refugees do not square well with an average rise of two to six millimeters a year (the range of
IPCC scenarios). And given such a slow pace, some countries will balance the rise of sea level mass by sedimentation. Take
the example of Bangladesh, a poster child of the possible consequences of climate change. The idea that the densely
populated coastal regions of that country could be flooded by the rise in sea levels does not take into account the parallel
accumulation of sediments brought by the great South Asian rivers, which amount to about one billion metric tons a
year.41
Such are the reasons why experts of environmental migrations generally agree that climate change in itself is rarely a root
cause of migration.42 Major population displacements due to environmental and/or climatic factors will remain
exceptional except in the case of a sudden natural disaster.43 And most importantly for the sake of this analysis, they are
rarely a cause of violent conflict.44
It is not even certain that the very concept of climate refugees is relevant.45 Atmospheric or hydrological catastrophes
can create massive- and most of the time temporary- population displacements. But such catastrophes have always
existed. Why then attempt to create a separate category for their victims, which would distinguish them from those of
geological catastrophes (earthquakes, tsunamis, volcanic eruptions) for which human activities bear no responsibility?
The concept of climate refugees says more about Western fears of barbarians at the gates than it does about the
foreseeable reality of the consequences of climate change.46
1
0
WSA 11-12
Environment
PAK
Link- Feminism
Discourse of environmental security promotes patriarchal views of the environment

Cudworth and Hobden 2010 (Erika and Stephen, Paper presented to European Consortium for Political Research 5th
Pan European Conference on the EU, University of Oporto, Porto, Portugal, 24-26th June 2010., Securing what for whom?
Multiple complex Inequalities and the politics of environmental security in Europe, University of East London)
International Relations with its tradition of state-based analysis, has difficulties in dealing with the global character of
many environmental issues. Both the globalised character of some environmental problems needs to be fully appreciated,
whilst also being cognisant of the differential impact of problem effects in the context of profound and persistent
inequities. Global warming is the clearest and most pressing example of a global environmental problem. Other
environmental issues may not be so global in impact. Land pollution is often localized; humans pollute land where they
bury industrial and consumer waste, or locate industrial processing. However, the international trade in commercial and
industrial waste, and the practices of dumping waste in international waters and on other countries, adds a global
dimension. The pollution of seas is global, as almost all seawater is connected; as is air pollution, carried over considerable
distances by prevailing winds (Yearley 1996: 33-34). The loss of species biodiversity has also come to be defined as an
environmental problem for the maintenance of healthy ecosystems, and the widespread character of this collapse of
species diversity has been labelled the sixth extinction (Leakey and Lewin 1996). This said, most authors argue that the
impacts of global climate change will have greater impact on the South. Devereux and Edwards argue that the effects of
global warming will be globally stratifying. Those countries where drought is already a problem are likely to become
drier. These same countries are more dependent on agriculture where the possibilities for diversification are more limited.
It is likely, they argue, that the prevalence and depth of hunger will deteriorate in those countries and population groups
where food security is already significant Devereux and Edwards 2004: 28). Furthermore, as Rogers (2004: 99-100)
points out, extreme weather events tend to have a much more drastic impact on countries of the South compared to the
North. Goldblatt (1996) argues that the exploitation of the Souths environment commenced during the colonial period
and has continued since the end of the European empires. In this sense the North has exported much of its
environmentally damaging industrialisation, making the notion of environmental security on a national basis nonsensical.
In addition, the extent to which gender inequalities differentiates human causes of environmental changes and their
effects, is absent from most accounts in the environmental security literature. Salleh argues that the impact of gender
inequalities is absent from the notion of ecological footprint that has been used in an essentialist way, as it differentiates
humanity only in terms of Northern or Southern location (Salleh, 2009: 11). This ignores the gendered qualities of paid
and unpaid work and of transport and energy use and the feminisation of poverty. Collectively, as Spitzner notes, these
inequalities mean that both the causes and consequences of global warming are gendered (2009: 218-222).
1
1
WSA 11-12
Environment
PAK
Water Wars
No water wars- threats never acted on

Kats 2011 (David, prof. at MIT, Global Environmental Politics 11:1, February 2011, Hydro-Political Hyperbole:
Examining Incentives for Overemphasizing the Risks of Water Wars)
A number critiques have been leveled against both the theory and the empirical evidence behind the water wars
hypothesis. One critique of the environmental security literature, of which much of the published material on water wars
is guilty, is that warnings and threats of future violence are often considered as evidence. 28 Statements from the 1980s
that the next war in the Middle East will be over water have already proven false. Research has shown, however, that even
the more general predictions of imminent water wars that are based on comments by officials may be suspect. Leng, for
instance, found no correlation between the frequency of threats of war and the onset of war.29 Examining conflict and
cooperation over water resources, Yoffe and colleagues noted over 400 incidents of water-related verbal exchanges by
political figures between 1948 and 1999 that were conflictual in nature, but only 37 instances of violent conflict of varying
levels of intensity. Thirty of these were from the Middle East, none were more recent than 1970, none were all-out wars,
and in none was water the central cause of conflict.30
Proponents of water war scenarios often premise their dire conclusions on the fact that water is essential for life and nonsubstitutable.31 Yet water for basic needs represents a small share of total water use, even in arid countries.32 Economists
and others point out that over 80 percent of world freshwater withdrawals are for the agricultural sector, a relatively lowvalue use and one in which large gains in efficiency could be made by changes in irrigation techniques and choice of crops.
Thus, economic critiques of the water war hypothesis stress that the value of water that would be gained from military
conflict is unlikely to outweigh the economic costs of military preparation and battle, much less the loss of life.33
Some authors have even questioned the empirical basis for the conclusion that freshwater is increasingly scarce,34 an
assumption on which the water war hypothesis relies. Such a cornucopian view claims that people adapt to scarcity
through improvements in technology, pricing, and efficiencyrendering water less scarce, not more so.
1
2
WSA 11-12
Environment
PAK
Water Wars
No water wars
Quarterly, 34:3 pg. 17-29, 2011)
And water crises do not mean water wars. The issue of access to water resources is undoubtedly a major dimension of
numerous regional crises, in particular in the Greater Middle East, as testified by decades-old disputes between Turkey
and Syria, or Egypt and Sudan. The value of strategic locations such as the Golan Heights or Kashmir is not a small part of
tensions between Syria and Israel, or India and Pakistan. And water sharing can be the cause of local disputes sometimes
degenerating into small-scale collective violence in Africa or Asia. However, experts from the University of Oregon, who
maintain the most complete database on this topic, state that there has never been a war over water (that is, large-scale
collective violence for the sake of a water resource) in the past 4,500 years.35 The last war over water opposed two
Sumerian cities in the middle of the third millennium B.C.E., about sharing the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates. There
are good reasons for such a scant record. Any country seeking to control the upstream of a river would need to ensure
complete and permanent domination over it, which would be an ambitious goal. In the modern era, resorting to arms over
water (like resorting to arms over oil) is just not worth the cost. Especially for those whose geographical location and
budget can afford to build desalination plants- which is the case for some of the most water-stressed countries, those
located on the Arabian Peninsula.
One should therefore not be surprised that access to water has always generated more cooperation than conflict. Since
antiquity, thousands of agreements and treaties have been signed for water-sharing. And cooperation between adversaries
has stood the test of wartime, as was seen during the 20th century in the Middle East, South Asia, or Southeast Asia.
1
3
WSA 11-12
Environment
PAK
Water Wars
No Water wars- empirics

Perhaps the strongest case against the likelihood of water wars is the lack of empirical evidence of precedents. Wolf found
only one documented case of war explicitly over water, and this took place over 4500 years ago.35 Moreover, he could
document only seven cases of acute conflict over water. Yoffe and colleagues also find that armed conflict over water
resources has been uncommon. 36 They found that cooperation was much more common than conflict, both globally and in
all world regions except the Middle East/North Africa. This pattern may explain why only a limited number of case studies
of water conflict are presented in the water wars literature.
Analysts have criticized environmental security arguments that are based on case studies because such works tend to have
no variation in the dependent variable.37 Many large sample statistical studies have attempted to address such
shortcomings, however, in several cases these studies too have come under fire. For instance, a number of large-sample
statistical studies find correlations between water-related variables and conflict, however, few, if any, provide convincing
support for causal relationships. Moreover, several studies found that water availability had no impact on the likelihood of
either domestic or international conflict,38 including at least one study that attempted to replicate earlier studies that
claimed to have found such correlations.39 Moreover, the results of several studies that do find correlations between water
and conflict are either not robust or are contrasted by other findings. For instance, Raleigh and Urdal found that the
statistical significance of water scarcity variables is highly dependent on one or two observations, leading them to
conclude that actual effects of water scarcity are weak, negligible or insignificant.40 Jensen and Gleditsch found that the
results of Miguel and colleagues are less robust when using a recoding of the original dataset. 41 Gleditsch and colleagues
found that shared basins do predict an increased propensity for conflict, but found no correlation between conflict and
drought, the number of river crossings, or the share of the basin upstream, leading them to state that support for a
scarcity theory of water conflict is somewhat ambiguous. 42
Water wars discourse bad- encourages conflict

The efficacy of such rhetorical strategies remains unclear. Overstating risks of water wars or oversimplifying causal links
may be detrimental to intended objectives. For instance, raising the specter of war to raise attention to, or mobilize action
on, related environmental or development issues may ultimately result in redirecting resources away from development
and towards conflict prevention. Moreover, there is a risk that policy-makers and other decision-makers may feel that as
long as violent conflict is avoided, they have been successful. Alternatively, by focusing on water as a cause of violent
conflict, attention may be drawn away from more important or proximate causes of such conflict.
1
4
WSA 11-12
Environment
PAK
Warming Good
Warmer periods are more peaceful than colder periods

Quarterly, 34:3 pg. 17-29, 2011)
Since the dawn of civilization, warmer eras have meant fewer wars. The reason is simple: all things being equal, a colder
climate meant reduced crops, more famine and instability.4 Research by climate historians shows a clear correlation
between increased warfare and cold periods.5 They are particularly clear in Asia and Europe, as well as in Africa.6
Interestingly, the correlation has been diminishing since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution: as societies
modernize, they become less dependent on local agricultural output.7
Moreover, if there was any significant link between warfare and warming, the number of conflicts should have been rising
in the past two decades. It has not- quite the contrary. Since the end of the Cold War, the total number of wars, after
having steadily increased since 1945, has diminished. Statistics published by the Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute (SIPRI), which come from work done at the Uppsala University, clearly show such a decrease. Today, there are
half as many wars as two decades ago (17 in 2009 versus 35 in 1989).8 This result is mainly due to the rapid decrease in
the number of internal conflicts.9 As with the number of interstate conflicts, civil wars began to decline from the end of
the 1970s onwards. Classic international war has, statistically speaking, disappeared from the modern world. According to
the SIPRI/Uppsala University data, in 2009, for the sixth year in a row, there was no ongoing interstate war. (Iraq and
Afghanistan do not belong to that category.) Such conflicts represented, in the 2000s, three out of a total of 30 wars, thus
10 percent of the total- in a world where the number of states has tripled since the end of the Second World War.
There is even a reverse correlation. The average global temperature diminished between 1940 and 1975: during that
period, the total number of conflicts was on the rise. Correlation is not causation. (It may be tempting to argue that the
modernization of societies leads to two separate, parallel outcomes: global warming and global peace.) But the existence of
these data points should contribute to extreme caution about the hypothetical equation according to which a warmer
world would be a war-prone world. In 2007, the Nobel Peace Prize was attributed jointly to the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change (IPCC) and to former U.S. Vice President Al Gore. Rarely was the attribution of a Nobel Peace Prize so
blatantly out of sync with geopolitical realities.
1
5
WSA 11-12
Environment
PAK
Warming Good
Damage done by climate change is mitigated by the increase in stability

Gartzke 2010 (Erik, Professor at UC San Diego, Does Climate change whether, when, or where nations fight?,
http://climsec.prio.no/papers/climate_for_conflict_06202010.pdf)
Most students of global warming will probably agree with the view that the effects of climate change cannot be considered independent of its causes.
Discussions of what to do about rising sea levels, or changing crop yields cannot be pursued without considering what to do about industrial pollution, or
carbon emissions from automobiles. Similarly, analysis of climate change and conflict is somewhat artificial if researchers
fail to examine whether the causes of global warming have any impact on conflict. Since climate change results from other
processes, we need to examine the conjunction of these forces to determine whether climate change harms or helps world peace.
It is here that the plot thickens, since even if global warming makes the world more violent, the putative
causes of global
warming can serve as countervailing forces. Even if global warming causes more conflict in some places on the
globe, it is fairly easy to show that the precipitants of climate change have already contributed to peace in other
regions. Industrial and post-industrial societies are much less prone to use war against one another. Some argue that industrialization has led to trade
that makes war more costly or less efficient (Polachek 1980, Oneal & Russett 1997).3 Others focus on how economic development creates economies that
are difficult to profitably coerce through force (Angell 1933, Rosecrance 1985). Still others claim that it is the globalization of production networks that is
critical (Brooks 2005). A final set of arguments focuses on the effect of prosperity on factor endowments; wealthy societies that resort to war must use
expensive labor to capture cheap inputs to production (Gartzke 2006, Gartzke & Rohner 2010b, Gartzke & Rohner 2010a).
While explanations vary, it seems necessary to include the possibility that global climate change is associated with
both increases or decreases in conflict propensity . The presence of \zones of peace" in the northern hemisphere | the very regions
associated with global warming | suggests the need to contemplate both positive and negative impacts on interstate conflict. While it is appropriate to
identify where climate change has, or is likely to exacerbate conflict, it is also important to identify where it may be associated with less harmful, even
helpful effects. Broad claims about the doom destined to be imposed by global warming may need to be tempered
by the realization that economic development can discourage warfare in some places, while causing further harm in others.
1
6
WSA 11-12
Environment
PAK
A2: Climate Change War
Climate Change does not lead to war

There are a number of ways in which the impact of climate is likely to be diminished or diluted. We know, for example,
that warfare is strongly zero sum. If climate change makes fighting inopportune for one side in a dispute, this enhances the
appeal of an attack from the perspective of an opponent.
Conversely, forces that facilitate the attack for a potential combatant also enhance the actor's leverage in bargaining, so
that advantages can often be converted to advantageous settlements without the need to resort to war. Nations will fight
(or not) despite the climate, just as they do with other natural, social, or economic barriers. This is not to say that climate
will have no impact on whether states fight, only that it is unlikely to be a substantively primary determinant of force. To
the degree that changes in the costs or benefits of warfare are not subsumed by strategic interaction, there will be mutual
incentives for competitors to adjust conflict behavior to avoid certain mutually undesirable outcomes. For example,
variation in climate should tend to impact when and where nations fight, more than whether contests occur. The logic of
contests sketched above implies that, where force is possible, it will be used to adjudicate important differences. The
question of the timing of contests, and their location is more mutable, and thus more likely to be affected by questions of
climate and weather. Nations can be expected to fight at different times or places in response to temperature and weather,
more than we should expect climate to affect the fundamental decision to use force. Thus, contests may occur at different
times or places in response to climactic change, rather than conflict following sui generis from the process of global
warming.
Time and place may also serve as substitutes. Nations could either adjust their conflict patterns to the climate or fight in
regions less affected by climate variation. To the degree that climate conflict pessimism is correct, nations will be forced to
do the former, fighting more (or less) as the world becomes warmer. To the degree that strategic states and other actors
engage in substitution, force may be displaced geographically, rather than becoming more (or less) common globally.
1
7
WSA 11-12
Environment
PAK
A2: Must Consider Climate in Defense
Climate Change is not relevant for defense

Quarterly, 34:3 pg. 17-29, 2011)
So much for climate wars. But the idea according to which climate change is nevertheless a new, important factor to be
taken into account in defense and security planning is itself questionable. Of course, nothing precludes us from including
it in the growing list of non-military issues that may have a bearing on global security. But this has to be done in a realistic
way. It is not unreasonable to state that climate change may be a threat multiplier, for instance.47 However, stating this
says nothing about the probability of increased violence or instability either at the global level or for a given crisis, or about
the likelihood of state failure. Such consequences depend primarily on the reaction of governments and societies- a factor
which is impossible to calculate in advance. There are no data to support the vague idea that climate change can have a key
role in triggering collective violence- that is, be the proverbial straw that breaks the camels back, as argued by an alarmist
study (citing once again the example of Darfur).48 Climate is one of myriad factors in a complex causal web underlying
conflict, and the environment is just one of manifold and nonessential causal factors which may lead to war.49 The
main causes of contemporary conflict are societal, not natural (in the broadest sense of the term, i.e., including manmade).50 Conflicts are borne out of human choices and mistakes.
Could regional previsions of the impact of climate change at least inform policymakers and planners about the areas of the
world which are more likely- all things being equal- to suffer from them? The answer is no. Regional effects are extremely
difficult to predict with the degree of probability which can be useful for planning.51 The IPCC itself underscores that
current models do not have the ability to deliver useful previsions at a higher scale than the continental one.52 Nobody
knows, for instance, whether African monsoons will move northwards (with positive effects on agriculture) or southwards
(with negative effects). Here, as noted by a contributor to the IPCC, there is complete disagreement between the various
models.53 And when the IPCC attempts to give regional previsions on the evolution of agricultural output, for instance, it
is in a way which does not buttress the case for alarmism. Its 2007 report mentions a possible reduction by 50 percent of
rain-fed agricultural output in some African countries in 2020. But the sole source it cites to support this claim is a report
produced for a Canadian non-governmental organization in which it is mentioned that (unpublished) studies evoke this
scenario for three Maghreb countries.54
There are indeed, it seems, some causal links between climate and warfare. But they are of a seasonal nature: nations
address seasonal climate change in terms of where they fight, rather than through when or whether disputes occur. . . .
Fighting moves to higher latitudes in the summer, and lower latitudes during the cooler months of the year.55 The stakes
of climate change are important- and that is why this area should not be the object of intellectual fantasies or fashions. It is
appropriate for defense and security planners to monitor the evolution of the scientific and political debate on its possible
consequences. But there is no objective reason today to list climate change as a key issue for defense and security
planning.
1
8
WSA 11-12
Environment
PAK
Warming Good
Warming reduces global conflict

Since earliest recorded history, civilizations have been plagued by, and preoccupied with, warfare. In
recent decades, developed portions

of the globe have been blessed with a distinct absence of interstate dispute behavior , while conflict continues in less
developed regions, most notably within international borders. There are many possible explanations for this pattern of war and peace, but the causes are
clearly geographically concentrated, as zones of peace appear in Europe, North America, and portions of Asia. How will climate change affect whether,
where or when nations fight? While any answer must be tentative, it is possible to use historical climate data, the location of militarized disputes, and
existing theoretical and statistical models of interstate conflict to draw some conclusions about how climate change is likely to affect evolving patterns of
war and peace. One way to link climate and conflict is to seek to extrapolate from existing temporal trends. The earth is already warmer, even as patterns
The very \zones of peace" that

distinguish the developed world are also \zones of pollution." Industrialization | the consensus culprit in global warming | is
of conflict have changed considerably. Yet, linkages between climate and conflict are not linear or uni-causal.
arguably the major determinant of democratization and economic development, which in turn have close links to interstate peace. Democracies seldom
fight each other, while the democratic community has been credited with making the world less warlike. Developed states cluster together peacefully,
while at the same time projecting force to distant places. Since
the indirect effects of global warming on conflict are much more

substantial than the direct effects, the overall impact of climate change is actually to reduce the incidences of
interstate conflict.
Attributing wars to climate changes proliferates conflict
Quarterly, 34:3 pg. 17-29, 2011)
Most experts of the links between the environment and conflict refrain from adhering to dire predictions about
impending climate wars. They show extreme caution about what the historical record shows regarding those links, which are
deemed to be at best highly speculative.15 A careful review of the issue concludes that the concept of environmentally
induced conflict is itself fundamentally flawed.16 More precisely, as explained by two researchers, the suggested causal
chains from climate change to social consequences like conflict are long and fraught with uncertainties. One could
ask whether it is indeed conceptually fruitful to be talking about climate change and conflict at all.17
Talking about climate wars is not only unsubstantiated- it may be harmful . When United Nations SecretaryGeneral Ban Ki-moon, along with others, claims that climate change is probably one of the key causes of the Darfur
conflict, those who perpetrated the massacres should applaud, for it partly absolves them of their own
responsibilities. Environmental security expert Geoffrey Dabelko argues Characterizing climate change as producing a new
type of conflict is both wrong and counterproductive. For instance, simply labeling the genocide in Darfur a
climate war ignores political and economic motivations for the fighting- and unintentionally could let the
criminal regime in Khartoum off the hook.18
1
9
WSA 11-12
Environment
PAK
Natural Disaster Good
Increases in natural disasters reduce wars

Quarterly, 34:3 pg. 17-29, 2011)
Finally, the argument according to which global warming will lead to an increase in the number of natural catastrophes,
with grave humanitarian consequences, should be taken with a heavy pinch of (marine) salt. The only available evidence
that global warming will lead to more extreme weather events relies on modeling. Data do not really sustain this
hypothesis so far. There has not been any increase in global precipitation in recent decades.21 Neither have
droughts\become more frequent or severe.22 Hurricane activity is not stronger, and its variation remains within the range
of natural variation.23 The number of hurricane events has tended to evolve downwards since 1970; in accumulated
intensity, 2010 was its lowest in 30 years.24
The Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT) maintained at the Leuwen University in Belgium- one of the most widely used
databases for natural disasters- shows a clear rise in the number of weather-related catastrophes over the last 30 years.
However, this rise can easily be explained by demographic, economic, sociological, and political factors. EM-DAT only
takes into account events that have caused a significant number of victims (which is rising due to population increase and
the growing number of humans living on exposed areas), for which a state of emergency has been declared, and a call to
international help has been made (the frequency of which is rising for political and media reasons).25 Furthermore, the
number of reported catastrophes has also increased- as compared to what it was say, a century ago due to improved
detection and attention. There is every reason to believe that the human, social, and economic consequences of natural
catastrophes will be increasingly severe, but this has little to do with climate change. It should also be noted that natural
disasters do not necessarily have only negative consequences on national and international security. Quite the contrary:
disasters appear to prevent rather than promote civil conflict.26 A case in point is the 2004 Asian tsunami, which
indirectly contributed to the stabilization of the decades-old secessionist conflict in the Indonesian province of Aceh (a
peace agreement was signed in August 2005).
2
0
WSA 11-12
Environment
PAK
Link Resource Wars
If there are resource shortages, theyre good coop instead of war

Van Vugt 2, Mark (Department of Psychology, University of Southampon), "Central, Individual, or Collective Control?
Social Dilemma Strategies for

Natural Resource Management," American Behavioral Scientist, vol. 45.
But is a tragedy inevitable? In Hardins example, will the herdsmen really allow their common pasturage to be destroyed in the pursuit of narrow selfinterest or are they able to devise long-term solutions to use the land in a more sustainable way so that everyone benefits in the long run? There is
substantial evidence against the self-interest model from applied and experimental social dilemma research, showing that
users do restrain themselves in consuming valuable resources. There are numerous case reports of communities all over
the world which have been found to successfully manage common water, fishing, and agriculture
resources for many centuries (Ostrom, 1990; Schlager, 2000). These findings converge with evidence from experimental social
dilemma research which show that restraint is common when users manage a collective resource simulated
in a laboratory environment (Messick et al., 1983; Samuelson et al., 1984; Wilke, 1991). These lines of research (and many others)
suggest that users are sensitive to other aspects of the decision situation than self-interest. From the socialpsychological literature stems a set of
complimentary motives, which can be 7summarized as belongingness and identity needs (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). It is believed
that human beings have a basic desire to develop and foster meaningful social relationships and, via this, build up a shared social identity. When these
needs are unfulfilled, for example when people are forced to leave a social group, our mental and physical well-being suffers (Baumeister & Leary, 1995).
The importance of these social needs, which possibly stem from an evolutionary adaptive preference for living in groups (Caporeal et al., 1989), may help
to understand why cooperation emerges relatively easily and spontaneously between people who live in the same community. Note that cooperation
within a community is not the same as altruism. During a resource crisis, some residents may show restraint out of a genuine concern with the welfare of
other people to whom they feel connected. Yet it is equally possible that they cooperate because they feel the social pressure to conform. Or, they
cooperate because they wish to gain some respect within the community. Regardless of the underlying motives for cooperation, I believe that this
community model offers quite a different perspective on natural resource management than the self-interest model. Centralization as Solution to
Resource Dilemmas Following the self-interest model efficient resource management can only be achieved by changing the interdependence structure
underlying the dilemma so that it becomes in peoples self-interest to conserve. There are two generic structural strategies to achieve this, either by
increasing central control over a resource (centralization) or by increasing individual control (individualization). Centralization is basically a political
solution as it involves taking away, or drastically limiting, the freedom of users and replace the open access resource with a central authority who
regulates access. The implementation of a central authority is what theorists, like Hobbes and Hardin, perceived to be the only viable strategy to cope
with resource dilemmas. In the extreme, the authority (or group leader within a 8small group) completely controls resource access, and divides the
resource between users. These autocratic authority regimes are quite rare in reality, and only emerge when there is an acute disaster, like a war. In
resource crises authorities often choose to increase their control over a resource when it is collectively desired. For example, in a study on a
water shortage in the US it was found that citizens were willing to empower local water
authorities to enforce restraint when they perceived the shortage to be severe (Tyler & Degoey, 1995).
Regulating access to a resource through a central authority can be effective in dealing with resource problems because it effectively solves the dilemma.
Yet, there are two important drawbacks associated with the centralization of resource control. First, users do not like to give up their freedom in the
commons to an authority who completely regulates resource access. This can be concluded from the results of laboratory research on resource dilemmas.
Although an autocratic authority is generally more acceptable to users if there is an acute resource crisis (Messick et al., 1983), the support is not
overwhelming. It makes a difference what users perceive to be the cause of the crisis (Samuelson, 1991). When
the cause of a water shortage is attributed to the greed of other users, people are less accepting of a
central authority than when they believe the shortage has a non-human cause , such as a climate change. In
the first case individuals either do not believe that an authority system can actually stop selfish people from overusing the resource or they fear that the
authority is corrupt and exploitative.
2
1
WSA 11-12
Environment
PAK
Impacts-Case Turn
Impact- turns case

Page 2010 (Edward, Department of Politics and International Studies at University of Warwick, Whats the Point of Environmental Security? , Paper for the SGIR 7th
Pan-European International Relations Conference , Stockholm, 9-11 September 2010)
Another clarification is that
the two forms of environmental security are subject to deep rooted conflicts which suggest that they
will not be successful in terms of solving the environmental problems on which they are premised. The problem here is that global
environmental change poses dispersed, and uneven, affects amongst key referent objects that securitizing the environment will result in international division rather than
unity as the GECHS/HSN conceptions assume. The result is that, although not strictly speaking nonsense as Deudney claims, human/environmental
security is at best utopian and at worst positively harmful to global justice in magnifying
conflicts by security concepts inherently conflictual roots . The logic of securitizing the climate problem,
for example, is that civilization will itself have to change (in order to transition to a post-carbon economy) but this will create conflicts
between social groups and national states. The ultimate conflict here is between the global poor and the global rich, not between these two sets of actors and
the natural environment (De Wilde, 2008: 599-600). The effects will be spread unevenly and the security actors will act
accordingly in the way the threats are constructed : the referent objects will not feel the existential threats to the same degree. As
Buzan, Wverand De Wilde (1998:92) write: Global warming has worldwide causes, but its likely effects are not global Some states, such as those in Northern latitudes, may
benefit due to the agricultural impact of longer summers and shorter winters; while other states (such as the Small Island states of the Pacific) risk disappearance.
undermines the global pretensions of environmental security conceptions proposed by GECHs and HSR. But it also undermines
This
the progressive
pretensions of these conceptions since securitising the climate problem in the instances where impacts are
internationalized (due to climate migration; energy security conflicts; and trans-boundary extreme weather events) threatens to transform
complex ethical and political problem into a struggle of existential and national interests.16 Such a
struggle - which constructivist scholars note is an integral not incidental component of discourses of security - is unlikely to work
in favour of the interests of the most vulnerable states or citizens. In short, though solutions to global
environmental problems requires politicization, discourses of equity, justice and international cooperation can provide
this role without posing many of the conflictual risks of securitization (OBrien et al, 2010: 170; Buzan, Wverand De Wilde, 1998: 87-9).
2
2
WSA 11-12
Environment
PAK
Impacts-Colonialism
Environmental Security discourse guarantees violent colonialism and resource domination by States
Dalby 2002 (Simon, Phd and co-editor of Geopolitics, Environmental Security, Pg. 156-157, 2002)
Understanding the question of threats and insecurities in this framework complicates even more the conventional
assumptions that environmental degradation presents a threat to the security of Western states. First of all, risks and
threats are not purely objective phenomena, but socially mediated political constructs. This is where identity is connected
to security and endangerment; risks relate to social institutions, albeit now at the largest of geopolitical scales. That which
can be credibly articulated as being threatened is an identity in need of being secured. But the identity of modernity has,
until recently, simply been taken for granted in nearly all of the literature on security. If security is not sustainable
without ever-growing efforts to expand state control and ever-increasing abuses of local resources toward supplying an
ever-expanding production system, then the resulting disruptions and displacements render numerous constituencies
insecure. This is especially the case where military establishments take part in resource extraction processes and hence
escalate the potential for direct violence against opposition to displacement.
Second, such disruption affects transstate politics by way of an emergent sphere of political activity linking human rights,
environment, gender, and development issues. Discussions of global security are premised on the modern assumptions
that the state is the provider of security, that legal systems uphold individual human rights, that the latter have been
universalized to provide a benchmark for political conduct globally, and that- implicit to much of the conventional security
discourse- modernity has to be extended to the poor and backward parts of the world for the greater benefit of all. There
remain grounds for dismissing such formulations as ethnocentric despite the semblance of inclusivity conveyed by
numerous appeals to global governance. But if impoverishment and disruption is the unintended consequence for certain
localities in the global economic system that is necessary for worldwide modernity, the contradictions become palpably
painful.
Their econ scenario is a lie- prescriptive policy making in economics is impossible

For instance, Lao Tzu and Marx allow one to come to a different epistemological starting point than the one taken by most
of the economic-development literature, which has to cope with a wide range of facts that undermine the existence of
knowable development processes.
Most economic theory, as it is officially presented, is linked to policy recommendations. This is because its propositions
are put in terms of theories qua models that imply- through the distinction between exogenous and endogenous variables,
and this inclusion of a time variable- knowable (and by strong implication known) relations between cause and effect.
Thus, economists like to argue If this, then that. This is a form of prediction: If the facts are x, policy y will produce
effect z. This type of rhetoric is due to economists belief that we can know what works and why. Such knowledge would
supply the transition from facts to policy consequences. But the facts may suggest that we dont know what works, or why.
Against this background, the cross-country growth regression literature is extremely interesting. It should, if one reads
mainstream economics, show what works. One should therefore expect to find, as one does in natural science areas such
as silviculture, consistent accounts of what does work. But one does not.
Seminally, Levine and Zervos 1993 showed that there were almost no robust relations between policy and outcomes
globally. Fforde 2005 examined citations and showed that these results were not technically challenged. A majority of
scholars simply cited the Levine and Zervos article and ignored its implications; a minority started to realize that the lack
of robust correlations had important consequences for economic- development thought. Kenny and Williams 2001, for
instance, argued that the reason scholars missed the disconnect between the desired outcome of a given policy and the
actual outcome was due to underlying assumptions of ontological and epistemological universalism: The analysis assumed
that is objects were the same, and could be analyzed using the same theory, regardless of context.
Take, for instance, the assumption that a given sample comes from a single population: violate this, and the results will be
spurious. The literature will reflect, at the level of the research project, proper levels of statistical significance, but at the
2
3
WSA 11-12
Environment
PAK
level of the overall cross-country growth regression literature (the research program) it will reflect a series of
inconsistent results.
Hoover and Perez 2005 try to rescue the edifice of cross-country regression yet actually kill it by reducing the significance
levels required to generate robustness. This, naturally, permits one (despite increasingly levels of absurdity) to say that a
certain proportion of outcomes are explained. But if the authors had conversely increased the required significance
levels, then even the very limited results reported by Levine and Zervos 1993 would have vanished.
The point is that one cannot escape from the puzzles posed by Lao Tzu and Marx by playing with a subjectively determined
criterion: Economic data contains, as we all know, many correlations, but these tells us little, as they appear to generate
inconsistent facts if used to estimate models that assume ontological and epistemological universalism. This is the grave
empirical problem with modern mainstream development economics: Its most basic assumption, drawing as it does upon
deep humanistic roots, leads it to generate inconsistent results. Assume that the inflation rate in Botswana and
Madagascar is identical; assume that a farmer is a farmer is a farmer; assume common behavioral logics; and this is what
happens- as Marx predicted.
Do this, and that will happen. This reliance on classic policy logic is not unique to mainstream economics. Stalinism
relies on it, as does the blind belief in participatory methods. But does x really lead to y? Compare Levine and Zervos
1993 and Easterly et al. 1997 and easterly 2001. Easterly is a serious economist whose belief in the predictive power of his
knowledge has had to confront his data, which contradicted those beliefs.
From a Daoist perspective, the fact that economists deal with chimeras is obvious; from a Marxist perspective, locating
such chimera is trickier. Yet, in a world subject to a powerful and globalizing capitalism, Marxs position may very well
lead to noticing such chimeras, as the data required for predicting economic events may be obscured by the very nature of
capitalism itself. According to Marx, capitalist commodities, to put it simply, appear as they are not. Analysis may
demonstrate what they are, but it cannot, necessarily, obtain the data needed to predict outcomes. Therefore, one traffics
in illusions if one uses classic economic policy logic, where levers are pulled and predicted outcomes follow. This logic
entails the view that economic knowledge contains valid analytical frameworks comparable in power to those of the
natural sciences. Perhaps one can adduce the fact of the financial crisis, unpredicted in any form by most economists or
in the particular form it took by any economist, as only the latest instance in which the facts contradict the tacit economic
epistemology of knowledge.
2
4
WSA 11-12
Environment
PAK
a2 Perm
Any risk of a link kills the perminclusions of security discourse only confuse and obscure the
message of sustainable ecological movements
Deudney 99, Assistant Professor of Political Science at JHU, 1999
(Daniel, Security and Conflict in the New Environmental Politics SUNY Series in International Environmental Policy and Theory p.50)
First, to provide a robust analysis of the impact of natural factors and human-nature interaction, social science
must
supplement its concentration on social causes of social outcomes by returning to the natural-social scientific approach of
the geopolitical tradition. Simply injecting natural variables into existing social scientific models is not likely to be very fruitful
Rather, a far-reaching reconceptualization of the role of nature in social practice is needed . Both logic and past efforts demonstrate
that analogic naturalism is a perennially seductive but inevitably fruitless avenue, and that functional structural approaches promise better results
Unfortunately, the recent turn of social theory away from structuralism to an emphasis on the socially constructed nature of
reality, while offering many insights and correctives to mechanistic structural arguments, could exacerbate the incapacity of social science
to deal with environmental issues. Social structures are constructed by humans rather than themselves
being natural. But social practices rise and fall and are valued or rejected not solelyor even primarily
because of socially constructed criteria, but rather because of their ability to function
successfully in meeting enduring human needs in material contexts that are both diverse and shifting. Social constructions
inevitably shape how nature is perceived and acted upon. but nature itself is not socially
constructed, and any social science that assumes so will inevitably be blind to important
aspects of human life. Nature constitutes a structuring reality for human beings that is not socially constructed. In short, a return to
functional-materialist theory is the key to bringing nature back into social theory.
Crisis overload: while ecological fear may have worked in the past, people are tired of it
applying a crisis discourse to new fields like fossil fuels engenders psychological backlash
devastates the credibility of environmentalism
Schneider 94 * He is a nationally known journalist, online communications specialist and environmental policy expert. Keith was a New York
Times national correspondent for over a decade, where he continues to report as a special writer on energy, real estate, business, and technology New
York Times, 11/6/1994, By KEITH SCHNEIDER http://www.nytimes.com/1994/11/06/weekinreview/the-nation-for-the-environment-compassionfatigue.html?scp=33&sq=11/6/94&st=cse ZM
But midway through, the decade is shaping up as a period of turmoil for the environmental movement. Membership and budgets have dropped for most
of the national groups. A well-organized counter-movement of landowners, city officials and industrial executives steamed into Washington and halted
Congressional work this year on strengthening environmental laws. They argued that environmentalists were exaggerating and using
inconclusive data to frighten people and influence lawmakers . Those criticisms, and its own frustration, have brought the
movement to a state of self-doubt it never faced before. The Problem With Congress In Washington, environmental leaders blamed
poisonous partisanship for what Blakeman Early, a Sierra Club lobbyist, called "the worst environmental Congress in two decades." Another
Capitol Hill veteran, Representative Mike Synar, Democrat of Oklahoma, who was one of the strongest environmental voices in Congress for eight terms,
was defeated in the primary in part because of his steadfast support for tougher rules on a range of environmental issues. But Mr. Synar said something
more basic than politics and legislative strategy is at work, and that is the environmental movement's message that every
problem is a crisis, an emergency worthy of public alarm. "If I could give the environmental community one piece of
advice, it is to do
outreach to people who have not traditionally been part of their movement ," he said. "They need to establish
relationships with cities, with rural water districts, with county commissioners . They are not going to be able to
do what they want by sowing fear." Since Earth Day in 1970, environmentalists have built a movement and achieved legislative and
judicial successes by showing that industrial development produced polluted water and air, nuclear radiation, abandoned toxic waste dumps, destruction
of forests, loss of species and erosion of farmland. By the 1990's, though , a web of statutes written in part and advocated by
environmental groups had sharply reduced air and water pollution and alleviated other problems . The vocabulary of
devastation was applied to new issues -- electromagnetic radiation, genetic engineering, global warming and overpopulation -that were said to be even more threatening. The language of emergency that suffused debate
about the environment has become institutionalized in large part because it was effective in
reaching the public and Congress. But now some observers are noting psychological and political problems with the
message itself. "I agree with the urgency of the issues, but my judgment is that the environmental movement got grounded
in a one-dimensional psychology," said Theodore Roszak, a history professor at California State University in Hayward and author of "The
Voice of the Earth -- An Exploration of Ecopsychology" (Simon & Schuster, 1992). "The movement wants a lot of change very rapidly and
tries to get this by scaring people and shaming people. It's bad psychology . People resent being talked to that
way, and if you continue to talk that way without helping them understand and make the
changes, they stop listening. That's what is happening. My concern is that they need a better way to talk to the public." Martin W. Lewis,
who teaches environmental conservation at the University of Wisconsin, reached a similar conclusion in "Green Delusions -- An Environmentalist
Critique of Radical Environmentalism" (Duke, 1992). He said that mainstream environmental organizations were adopting some of the tactics of groups
like Earth First! and that the entire movement was coming to be perceived by the public as hostile to capitalism, new
technology, industry, even modern civilization itself. "Radical environmentalism is dismissive of modern life, but it seemed to
2
5
WSA 11-12
Environment
PAK
be growing more prominent and risked discrediting the mainstream environmental movement," said Professor Lewis. " Any
philosophy that says

economic growth must end, that technology needs to be dismantled, and that we must turn away from science -- most
people find that threatening." Jim Maddy, president of League of Conservation Voters in Washington, said most groups did not adopt a radical
position. He also said that environmental leaders have by no means accepted the premise that they are exaggerating
the concept of the Anthropocene and the mode of analysis from earth-system science function to destabilize the verities of
modern dualistic thinking. The Anthropocene indicates the importance of understanding the scale of human activity as a growing
part of the biosphere, an entity that is essential to human existence, whose functioning we know little about, but which we are already changing.
The assumption that "we are somehow external to a nature that we have to monitor and administer is no longer tenable
in the face of both Understandings of globalization and global environmental change , which are, of course, but two sides of the same coin
even if they are Rarely yet understood in quite this manner. The necessary shift in mentality requires that politics and
administration, not to mention the cultural categories of consuming scientists and administrators, move from
adaptation and regulation after the fact to thinking seriously about the design and construction of
artifacts that minimize ecological throughpu t. To put the matter directly: successful ecological engineering is a
matter of building useful things that do not need to be regulated . the technical dimensions of all this may actually easier to
tackle than the social dimensions, not least because of the powerful persistence of all sorts of social hierarchies that are
marked and perpetuated by consumption practices. Status is about a flashy automobile, ones sold to all of us by their capabilities to go
Understanding the
ecological consequences of our actions suggests the extreme folly of such heroic individualism
fostered in contemporary commodity culture . The greatest challenge for both the physical and social sciences is to
anywhere And conquer, literally in the slogans of advertisers, the most forbidding landscapes (Paterson and Dalby 2006).
change simultaneously the managerial mentality and the con assumption culture that celebrates human domination of nature
as a virtue. Both are premised on ontological assumptions of separation that ecological sciences, as well as the so-called postmodern
turn in social thinking, recognize as untenable. The most pressing theoretical and practical matters related to the Kyoto protocol and its successor
agreements, and recent events in the Middle East, all involve very large conceptual themes. These include political questions of who we now are, and
how we might usefully change our identities, and our actions, given the sheer scale of recent anthropogenically induced changes within the biosphere.
This is especially important because of the newly recognized importance of the interconnections between parts of that
biosphere. Understanding ourselves primarily as citizen consumers within the boundaries of nation states
is a fundamentally misleading conception. Earth-system science and the novel predicament that humanity faces suggest that
political assumptions of autonomy at the scale of either the individual or the state are no longer tenable . The liberal
assumptions of economic rationality and autonomous consumers on the one hand, and of the imperial conquest of nature to provide the resources for
this mode of existence on the other, are precisely what has structured the unsustainability of contemporary civilization.
The designation civilization also suggests the crucial shift in human activities at the beginning of the Anthropocene: that of
urbanization. The consumer identities of SUV drivers and tourists are those of urbanites playing in the rural recreational
spaces and using resources from all over the planet to do so. Rather than being rendered insecure by environmental change, this mode of
consumption is the environ mental change that generates many insecurities among the poor and marginal peoples.
2
6

Enviro Security

Încărcat de

Informații document

Drepturi de autor

Formate disponibile

Partajați acest document

Partajați sau inserați document

Opțiuni de partajare

Vi se pare util acest document?

Este necorespunzător acest conținut?

Drepturi de autor:

Formate disponibile

Enviro Security

Încărcat de

Drepturi de autor:

Formate disponibile

WSA 11-12

This tying of environmental concerns to security approaches causes a militaristic response at

Our alternative is to reject the affirmatives environmental securitization discourse in favor of a

in and between different systems, and the

Link- State action

reforms undertaken by states and

Link- Climate Refugees

No climate refugees (Link to a K)

Discourse of environmental security promotes patriarchal views of the environment

No water wars- threats never acted on

No Water wars- empirics

Water wars discourse bad- encourages conflict

Warmer periods are more peaceful than colder periods

Damage done by climate change is mitigated by the increase in stability

A2: Climate Change War

Climate Change does not lead to war

A2: Must Consider Climate in Defense

Climate Change is not relevant for defense

Warming reduces global conflict

recent decades, developed portions

The very \zones of peace" that

the indirect effects of global warming on conflict are much more

Natural Disaster Good

Increases in natural disasters reduce wars

Link Resource Wars

If there are resource shortages, theyre good coop instead of war

Social Dilemma Strategies for

Impact- turns case

Their econ scenario is a lie- prescriptive policy making in economics is impossible

philosophy that says

S-ar putea să vă placă și