Javellana vs.

The Executive Secretary

The Facts:
Sequence of events that lead to the filing of the Plebiscite then Ratification Cases.
The Plebiscite Case
On March 16, 1967, Congress of the Philippines passed Resolution No. 2, which was amended by
Resolution No. 4 of said body, adopted on June 17, 1969, calling a Convention to propose
amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines.
Said Resolution No. 2, as amended, was implemented by Republic Act No. 6132, approved on
August 24, 1970, pursuant to the provisions of which the election of delegates to the said
Convention was held on November 10, 1970, and the 1971 Constitutional Convention began to
perform its functions on June 1, 1971.
While the Convention was in session on September 21, 1972, the President issued Proclamation
No. 1081 placing the entire Philippines under Martial Law.
On November 29, 1972, the Convention approved its Proposed Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines. The next day, November 30, 1972, the President of the Philippines issued Presidential
Decree No. 73, "submitting to the Filipino people for ratification or rejection the Constitution of
the Republic of the Philippines proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention, and
appropriating funds therefor," as well as setting the plebiscite for said ratification or rejection of
the Proposed Constitution on January 15, 1973.
On December 7, 1972, Charito Planas filed a case against the Commission on Elections, the
Treasurer of the Philippines and the Auditor General, to enjoin said "respondents or their agents
from implementing Presidential Decree No. 73, in any manner, until further orders of the Court,"
upon the grounds, inter alia, that said Presidential Decree "has no force and effect as law
because the calling ... of such plebiscite, the setting of guidelines for the conduct of the same,
the prescription of the ballots to be used and the question to be answered by the voters, and the
appropriation of public funds for the purpose, are, by the Constitution, lodged exclusively in
Congress ...," and "there is no proper submission to the people of said Proposed Constitution set
for January 15, 1973, there being no freedom of speech, press and assembly, and there being no
sufficient time to inform the people of the contents thereof."
On December 17, 1972, the President had issued an order temporarily suspending the effects of
Proclamation No. 1081, for the purpose of free and open debate on the Proposed Constitution.
On December 23, the President announced the postponement of the plebiscite for the ratification
or rejection of the Proposed Constitution. No formal action to this effect was taken until January
7, 1973, when General Order No. 20 was issued, directing "that the plebiscite scheduled to be
held on January 15, 1978, be postponed until further notice." Said General Order No. 20,
moreover, "suspended in the meantime" the "order of December 17, 1972, temporarily
suspending the effects of Proclamation No. 1081 for purposes of free and open debate on the
proposed Constitution."
Because of these events relative to the postponement of the aforementioned plebiscite, the
Court deemed it fit to refrain, for the time being, from deciding the aforementioned cases, for
neither the date nor the conditions under which said plebiscite would be held were known or
announced officially. Then, again, Congress was, pursuant to the 1935 Constitution, scheduled to
meet in regular session on January 22, 1973, and since the main objection to Presidential Decree
No. 73 was that the President does not have the legislative authority to call a plebiscite and
appropriate funds therefor, which Congress unquestionably could do, particularly in view of the
formal postponement of the plebiscite by the President reportedly after consultation with, among
others, the leaders of Congress and the Commission on Elections the Court deemed it more
imperative to defer its final action on these cases.

"In the afternoon of January 12, 1973, the petitioners in Case G.R. No. L-35948 filed an "urgent
motion," praying that said case be decided "as soon as possible, preferably not later than
January 15, 1973."
The next day, January 13, 1973, which was a Saturday, the Court issued a resolution requiring
the respondents in said three (3) cases to comment on said "urgent motion" and "manifestation,"
"not later than Tuesday noon, January 16, 1973." Prior thereto, or on January 15, 1973, shortly
before noon, the petitioners in said Case G.R. No. L-35948 riled a "supplemental motion for
issuance of restraining order and inclusion of additional respondents," praying:
"... that a restraining order be issued enjoining and restraining respondent Commission on
Elections, as well as the Department of Local Governments and its head, Secretary Jose Roo;
the Department of Agrarian Reforms and its head, Secretary Conrado Estrella; the National
Ratification Coordinating Committee and its Chairman, Guillermo de Vega; their deputies,
subordinates and substitutes, and all other officials and persons who may be assigned such task,
from collecting, certifying, and announcing and reporting to the President or other officials
concerned, the so-called Citizens' Assemblies referendum results allegedly obtained when they
were supposed to have met during the period comprised between January 10 and January 15,
1973, on the two questions quoted in paragraph 1 of this Supplemental Urgent Motion."
On the same date January 15, 1973 the Court passed a resolution requiring the respondents in
said case G.R. No. L-35948 to file "file an answer to the said motion not later than 4 P.M.,
Tuesday, January 16, 1973," and setting the motion for hearing "on January 17, 1973, at 9:30
a.m." While the case was being heard, on the date last mentioned, at noontime, the Secretary of
Justice called on the writer of this opinion and said that, upon instructions of the President, he
(the Secretary of Justice) was delivering to him (the writer) a copy of Proclamation No. 1102,
which had just been signed by the President. Thereupon, the writer returned to the Session Hall
and announced to the Court, the parties in G.R. No. L-35948 inasmuch as the hearing in
connection therewith was still going on and the public there present that the President had,
according to information conveyed by the Secretary of Justice, signed said Proclamation No.
1102, earlier that morning.
Thereupon, the writer read Proclamation No. 1102 which is of the following tenor:
____________________________
"BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES
"PROCLAMATION NO. 1102
"ANNOUNCING THE RATIFICATION BY THE FILIPINO PEOPLE OF THE CONSTITUTION
PROPOSED BY THE 1971 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION.
"WHEREAS, the Constitution proposed by the nineteen hundred seventy-one Constitutional
Convention is subject to ratification by the Filipino people;
"WHEREAS, Citizens Assemblies were created in barrios, in municipalities and in districts/wards in
chartered cities pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 86, dated December 31, 1972, composed of
all persons who are residents of the barrio, district or ward for at least six months, fifteen years
of age or over, citizens of the Philippines and who are registered in the list of Citizen Assembly
members kept by the barrio, district or ward secretary;
"WHEREAS, the said Citizens Assemblies were established precisely to broaden the base of
citizen participation in the democratic process and to afford ample opportunity for the citizenry
to express their views on important national issues;
"WHEREAS, responding to the clamor of the people and pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 86-A,
dated January 5, 1973, the following questions were posed before the Citizens Assemblies or
Barangays: Do you approve of the New Constitution? Do you still want a plebiscite to be called to
ratify the new Constitution?
"WHEREAS, fourteen million nine hundred seventy-six thousand five hundred sixty-one
(14,976,561) members of all the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) voted for the adoption of the
proposed Constitution, as against seven hundred forty-three thousand eight hundred sixty-nine
(743,869) who voted for its rejection; while on the question as to whether or not the people

would still like a plebiscite to be called to ratify the new Constitution, fourteen million two
hundred ninety-eight thousand eight hundred fourteen (14,298,814) answered that there was no
need for a plebiscite and that the vote of the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) should be
considered as a vote in a plebiscite;
"WHEREAS, since the referendum results show that more than ninety-five (95) per cent of the
members of the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) are in favor of the new Constitution, the
Katipunan ng Mga Barangay has strongly recommended that the new Constitution should already
be deemed ratified by the Filipino people;
"NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the
powers in me vested by the Constitution, do hereby certify and proclaim that the Constitution
proposed by the nineteen hundred and seventy-one (1971) Constitutional Convention has been
ratified by an overwhelming majority of all of the votes cast by the members of all the Barangays
(Citizens Assemblies) throughout the Philippines, and has thereby come into effect.
"IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the Republic of the
Philippines to be affixed.
"Done in the City of Manila, this 17th day of January, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred
and seventy-three.
(Sgd.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS"President of the Philippines
"By the President:
"ALEJANDRO MELCHOR"Executive Secretary"
_________________________________
The Ratification Case
On January 20, 1973, Josue Javellana filed Case G.R. No. L-36142 against the Executive Secretary
and the Secretaries of National Defense, Justice and Finance, to restrain said respondents "and
their subordinates or agents from implementing any of the provisions of the propose Constitution
not found in the present Constitution" referring to that of 1935. The petition therein, filed by
Josue Javellana, as a "Filipino citizen, and a qualified and registered voter" and as "a class suit,
for himself, and in behalf of all citizens and voters similarly situated," was amended on or about
January 24, 1973. After reciting in substance the facts set forth in the decision in the plebiscite
cases, Javellana alleged that the President had announced "the immediate implementation of the
New Constitution, thru his Cabinet, respondents including," and that the latter "are acting
without, or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing the said proposed Constitution" upon the
ground: "that the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, is
without authority to create the Citizens Assemblies"; that the same "are without power to
approve the proposed Constitution ..."; "that the President is without power to proclaim the
ratification by the Filipino people of the proposed Constitution"; and "that the election held to
ratify the proposed Constitution was not a free election, hence null and void."
The Issue:
1. Is the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 a justiciable, or political and therefore nonjusticiable, question?
2. Has the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention been ratified validly
(with substantial, if not strict, compliance) conformably to the applicable constitutional and
statutory provisions?
3. Has the aforementioned proposed Constitution acquiesced in (with or without valid ratification)
by the people? (acquiesced - "permission" given by silence or passiveness. Acceptance or
agreement by keeping quiet or by not making objections.)
4. Are petitioners entitled to relief?
5. Is the aforementioned proposed Constitution in force?

The Resolution:
Summary:
The court was severely divided on the following issues raised in the petition: but when the crucial
question of whether the petitioners are entitled to relief, six members of the court (Justices
Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra) voted to dismiss the petition.
Concepcion, together Justices Zaldivar, Fernando and Teehankee, voted to grant the relief being
sought, thus upholding the 1973 Constitution.
Details:
1. Is the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 a justiciable, or political and therefore nonjusticiable, question?
On the first issue involving the political-question doctrine Justices Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro,
Fernando, Teehankee and myself, or six (6) members of the Court, hold that the issue of the
validity of Proclamation No. 1102 presents a justiciable and non-political question. Justices
Makalintal and Castro did not vote squarely on this question, but, only inferentially, in their
discussion of the second question. Justice Barredo qualified his vote, stating that "inasmuch as it
is claimed there has been approval by the people, the Court may inquire into the question of
whether or not there has actually been such an approval, and, in the affirmative, the Court
should keep hands-off out of respect to the people's will, but, in negative, the Court may
determine from both factual and legal angles whether or not Article XV of the 1935 Constitution
been complied with." Justices Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, or three (3) members of the Court
hold that the issue is political and "beyond the ambit of judicial inquiry."
2. Has the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention been ratified validly
(with substantial, if not strict, compliance) conformably to the applicable constitutional and
statutory provisions?
On the second question of validity of the ratification, Justices Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro,
Fernando, Teehankee and myself, or six (6) members of the Court also hold that the Constitution
proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention was not validly ratified in accordance with
Article XV, section 1 of the 1935 Constitution, which provides only one way for ratification, i.e.,
"in an election or plebiscite held in accordance with law and participated in only by qualified and
duly registered voters.
Justice Barredo qualified his vote, stating that "(A)s to whether or not the 1973 Constitution has
been validly ratified pursuant to Article XV, I still maintain that in the light of traditional concepts
regarding the meaning and intent of said Article, the referendum in the Citizens' Assemblies,
specially in the manner the votes therein were cast, reported and canvassed, falls short of the
requirements thereof. In view, however, of the fact that I have no means of refusing to recognize
as a judge that factually there was voting and that the majority of the votes were for considering
as approved the 1973 Constitution without the necessity of the usual form of plebiscite followed
in past ratifications, I am constrained to hold that, in the political sense, if not in the orthodox
legal sense, the people may be deemed to have cast their favorable votes in the belief that in
doing so they did the part required of them by Article XV, hence, it may be said that in its
political aspect, which is what counts most, after all, said Article has been substantially complied
with, and, in effect, the 1973 Constitution has been constitutionally ratified."
Justices Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, or three (3) members of the Court hold that under their
view there has been in effect substantial compliance with the constitutional requirements for
valid ratification.
3. Has the aforementioned proposed Constitution acquiesced in (with or without valid ratification)
by the people?

On the third question of acquiescence by the Filipino people in the aforementioned proposed
Constitution, no majority vote has been reached by the Court.
Four (4) of its members, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold that "the
people have already accepted the 1973 Constitution."
Two (2) members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself hold that there can be no free
expression, and there has even been no expression, by the people qualified to vote all over the
Philippines, of their acceptance or repudiation of the proposed Constitution under Martial Law.
Justice Fernando states that "(I)f it is conceded that the doctrine stated in some American
decisions to the effect that independently of the validity of the ratification, a new Constitution
once accepted acquiesced in by the people must be accorded recognition by the Court, I am not
at this stage prepared to state that such doctrine calls for application in view of the shortness of
time that has elapsed and the difficulty of ascertaining what is the mind of the people in the
absence of the freedom of debate that is a concomitant feature of martial law." 88
Three (3) members of the Court express their lack of knowledge and/or competence to rule on
the question. Justices Makalintal and Castro are joined by Justice Teehankee in their statement
that "Under a regime of martial law, with the free expression of opinions through the usual media
vehicle restricted, (they) have no means of knowing, to the point of judicial certainty, whether
the people have accepted the Constitution."
4. Are petitioners entitled to relief?
On the fourth question of relief, six (6) members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro,
Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra voted to DISMISS the petition. Justice Makalintal and
Castro so voted on the strength of their view that "(T)he effectivity of the said Constitution, in the
final analysis, is the basic and ultimate question posed by these cases to resolve which
considerations other than judicial, an therefore beyond the competence of this Court, 90 are
relevant and unavoidable." 91
Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee and myself voted
to deny respondents' motion to dismiss and to give due course to the petitions.
5. Is the aforementioned proposed Constitution in force?
On the fifth question of whether the new Constitution of 1973 is in force:
Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold
that it is in force by virtue of the people's acceptance thereof;
Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando and Teehankee cast
no vote thereon on the premise stated in their votes on the third question that they could not
state with judicial certainty whether the people have accepted or not accepted the Constitution;
and
Two (2) members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself voted that the Constitution
proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention is not in force; with the result that there are not
enough votes to declare that the new Constitution is not in force.
ACCORDINGLY, by virtue of the majority of six (6) votes of Justices Makalintal, Castro, Barredo,
Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra with the four (4) dissenting votes of the Chief Justice and Justices
Zaldivar, Fernando and Teehankee, all the aforementioned cases are hereby dismissed. This
being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being
considered in force and effect.
It is so ordered.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-44640 October 12, 1976
PABLO C. SANIDAD and PABLITO V. SANIDAD, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HONORABLE NATIONAL TREASURER, respondents.
G.R. No. L-44684. October 12,1976
VICENTE M. GUZMAN, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ELECTIONS, respondent.
G.R. No. L-44714. October 12,1976
RAUL M. GONZALES, RAUL T. GONZALES, JR., and ALFREDO SALAPANTAN, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COMMISSION ON SELECTIONS and HONORABLE NATIONAL TREASURER, respondents.
On 2 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 991 calling for a national referendum on 16 Oct 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies
(barangays) to resolve, among other things, the issues of martial law, the interim assembly, its replacement, the powers
of such replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for the exercise by the President of his present
powers. Twenty days after, the President issued another related decree, PD No. 1031, amending the previous PD No.
991, by declaring the provisions of PD No. 229 providing for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in barangays
applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of Oct 16, 1976. Quite relevantly, PD No. 1031 repealed inter alia, Sec 4,
of PD No. 991. On the same date of 22 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 1033, stating the questions to he submitted to
the people in the referendum-plebiscite on October 16, 1976. The Decree recites in its whereas clauses that the peoples
continued opposition to the convening of the interim National Assembly evinces their desire to have such body abolished
and replaced thru a constitutional amendment, providing for a new interim legislative body, which will be submitted directly
to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16.
On September 27, 1976, Sanidad filed a Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Commission on
Elections from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect
Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as Presidential
Decree No. 1031, insofar as it directs the Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the
Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on October 16, 1976.Petitioners contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions
there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new
Constitution. As a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or legal basis. The SocGen contended that the question is political in nature hence the court cannot take cognizance of it.
ISSUE: Whether or not Marcos can validly propose amendments to the Constitution.
HELD: Yes. The President can propose amendments to the Constitution and he was able to present those proposals to
the people in sufficient time. The President at that time also sits as the legislature. The amending process both as to
proposal and ratification raises a judicial question. This is especially true in cases where the power of the Presidency to
initiate the amending process by proposals of amendments, a function normally exercised by the legislature, is seriously

doubted. Under the terms of the 1973 Constitution, the power to propose amendments to the Constitution resides in the
interim National Assembly during the period of transition (Sec. 15, Transitory Provisions). After that period, and the regular
National Assembly in its active session, the power to propose amendments becomes ipso facto the prerogative of the
regular National Assembly (Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973 Constitution). The normal course has not been
followed. Rather than calling the interim National Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent assembly, the incumbent
President undertook the proposal of amendments and submitted the proposed amendments thru Presidential Decree
1033 to the people in a Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16. Unavoidably, the regularity of the procedure for
amendments, written in lambent words in the very Constitution sought to be amended, raises a contestable issue. The
implementing Presidential Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033, which commonly purport to have the force and effect of
legislation are assailed as invalid, thus the issue of the validity of said Decrees is plainly a justiciable one, within the
competence of this Court to pass upon. Section 2 (2) Article X of the new Constitution provides: All cases involving the
constitutionality of a treaty, executive agreement, or law shall be heard and decided by the Supreme Court en banc and
no treaty, executive agreement, or law may be declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of at least ten
Members. . . .. The Supreme Court has the last word in the construction not only of treaties and statutes, but also of the
Constitution itself. The amending, like all other powers organized in the Constitution, is in form a delegated and hence a
limited power, so that the Supreme Court is vested with that authority to determine whether that power has been
discharged within its limits.
The three issues are
1. Is the question of the constitutionality of Presidential Decrees Nos. 991, 1031 and 1033 political or justiciable?
2. During the present stage of the transition period, and under, the environmental circumstances now obtaining, does the
President possess power to propose amendments to the Constitution as well as set up the required machinery and
prescribe the procedure for the ratification of his proposals by the people?
3. Is the submission to the people of the proposed amendments within the time frame allowed therefor a sufficient and
proper submission?
Upon the first issue, Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro and Associate Justices Enrique M. Fernando, Claudio Teehankee,
Antonio P. Barredo, Cecilia Munoz Palma, Hermogenes Concepcion Jr. and Ruperto G. Martin are of the view that the
question posed is justiciable, while Associate Justices Felix V. Makasiar, Felix Q. Antonio and Ramon C. Aquino hold the
view that the question is political.
Upon the second issue, Chief Justice Castro and Associate Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion Jr.
and Martin voted in the affirmative, while Associate Justices Teehankee and Munoz Palma voted in the negative.
Associate Justice Fernando, conformably to his concurring and dissenting opinion in Aquino vs. Enrile (59 SCRA 183),
specifically dissents from the proposition that there is concentration of powers in the Executive during periods of crisis,
thus raising serious doubts as to the power of the President to propose amendments.
Upon the third issue, Chief Justice Castro and Associate Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion Jr. and Martin
are of the view that there is a sufficient and proper submission of the proposed amendments for ratification by the people.
Associate Justices Barredo and Makasiar expressed the hope, however that the period of time may be extended.
Associate Justices Fernando, Makasiar and Antonio are of the view that the question is political and therefore beyond the
competence and cognizance of this Court, Associate Justice Fernando adheres to his concurrence in the opinion of Chief
Justice Concepcion in Gonzales vs. COMELEC (21 SCRA 774).Associate Justices Teehankee and MUNOZ Palma hold
that prescinding from the President's lack of authority to exercise the constituent power to propose the amendments, etc.,
as above stated, there is no fair and proper submission with sufficient information and time to assure intelligent consent or

rejection under the standards set by this Court in the controlling cases of Gonzales, supra, and Tolentino vs. COMELEC
(41 SCRA 702).
Chief Justice Castro and Associate Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion Jr. and Martin voted to
dismiss the three petitions at bar. For reasons as expressed in his separate opinion, Associate Justice Fernando concurs
in the result. Associate Justices Teehankee and Munoz Palma voted to grant the petitions.
ACCORDINGLY, the vote being 8 to 2 to dismiss, the said petitions are hereby dismissed. This decision is immediately
executory..

III

The more compelling question, however is: Has this Court the authority to nullify an entire
Constitution that is already effective as it has been accepted and acquiesced in by the people as
shown by their compliance with the decree promulgated thereunder, their cooperation in its
implementation, and is now maintained by the Government that is in undisputed authority and
dominance?
Of course it is argued that acquiescence by the people cannot be deduced from their acts of
conformity, because under a regime of martial law the people are hound to obey and act in
conformity with the orders of the President, and have absolutely no other choice. The flaw of this
argument lies in its application of a mere theoretical assumption based on the experiences of
other nations on an entirely different factual setting. Such an assumption flounders on the rock of
reality. It is true that as a general rule martial law is the use of military forces to perform the
functions of civil government. Some courts have viewed it as a military regime which can be
imposed in emergency situations. In other words, martial rule exists when the military rises
superior to the civil power in the exercise of some or all the functions of government. Such is not
the case in this country. The government functions thru its civilian officials. The supremacy of the
civil over the military authority is manifest. Except for the imposition of curfew hours and other
restrictions required for the security of the State, the people are free to pursue their ordinary
concerns.
In short, the existing regime in this country, does not contain the oppressive features, generally
associated with a regime of martial law in other countries. "Upon the other hand the masses of
our people have accepted it, because of its manifold blessings. The once downtrodden rice
tenant has at long last, been emancipated a consummation devoutly wished by every
Philippine President since the 1930s. The laborer now holds his head high because his rights are
amply protected and respected." * A new sense of discipline has swiftly spread beyond the
corridors of government into the social order. Responding to the challenges of the New Society,
the people have turned in half a million loose firearms, paid their taxes on undeclared goods and
income in unprecedented numbers and amount, lent their labors in massive cooperation in
land reform, in the repair of dikes, irrigation ditches, roads and bridges, in reforestation, in the
physical transformation of the environment to make ours a cleaner and greener land. "The entire
country is turning into one vast garden growing food for the body, for thought and for the soul." *
More important the common man has at long last been freed from the incubus of fear.

"Martial law has paved the way for a re-ordering of the basic social structure of the Philippines"
reported Frank Valeo to the United States Senate. "President Marcos has been prompt and surefooted in using the power of presidential decree under martial law for this purpose. He has
zeroed in on areas which have been widely recognized as prime sources of the nations
difficulties land tenancy, official corruption, tax evasion and abuse of oligarchic economic
power. Clearly he knows his targets . . . there is marked public support for his leadership . . ."
(Bulletin Today, March 3 and 4, 1973).
In a similar vein, C.L. Sulzberger, a foreign affairs columnist wrote, in the April 11 issue of The
New York Times:
chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

During his first Presidential term (1965-1969), Mr. Marcos was discouraged by the failure of
legislators to approve urgently needed reforms. He found his second term further frustrated by
spreading riots, a Maoist uprising in Luzon and a much more serious Moslem insurrection in the
southern islands from Mindanao across the Sulu archipelago to the frontier regions of Malaysia
and Indonesia. Manila claims this war is Maoist-coordinated.
Mr. Marcos has now in effect taken all the reins of power and makes no promise as to when he
will relinquish them. But, while fettering a free press, terminating Congress and locking up some
opponents (many of whom were later amnestied), he has hauled the Philippines out of
stagnation.
Sharecropping is being ended as more than three million acres of arable land are redistributed
with state funds. New roads have been started. The educational system is undergoing revision,
and corruption is diminished. In non-communist Asia it is virtually impossible to wholly end it and
this disagreeable phenomenon still reaches very high.
Mr. Marcos, an imaginative, gifted man, hopes to reshape society by creating an agrarian middleclass to replace the archaic sharecropper-absentee landlord relationship. He is even pushing a
birth control program with the tacit acceptance of the Catholic Church. He has started labor
reforms and increased wages." (Daily Express, April 15, 1973)
As explained in this writers opinion of April 24, 1973 on the "Constancia" and "Manifestation" of
counsel for petitioners:
chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

The new Constitution is considered effective "if the norms created in conformity with it are by
and large applied and obeyed. As soon as the old Constitution loses its effectiveness and the new
Constitution has become effective, the acts that appear with the subjective meaning of creating
or applying legal norms are no longer interpreted by presupposing the old basic norm, but by
presupposing the new one. The statutes issued under the old Constitution and not taken over are
no longer regarded as valid, and the organs authorized by the old Constitution no longer
competent." (Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law, [1967].)
The essentially political nature of the question is at once made manifest by understanding that in
the final analysis, what is assailed is not merely the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 of the
President, which is merely declaratory of the fact of approval or ratification, but the legitimacy of
the government. It is addressed more to the framework and political character of this
Government which now functions under the new Charter. It seeks to nullify a Constitution that is
already effective.

In such a situation, We do not see how the question posed by petitioners could be judicially
decided. "Judicial power presupposes an established government capable of enacting laws and
enforcing their execution, and of appointing judges to expound and administer them. If it decides
at all as a court, it necessarily affirms the existence and authority of the government under
which it is exercising judicial power." (Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. [7 How.] 1, 12 L. Ed. 598.)
In other words, where a complete change in the fundamental law has been effected through
political action, the Court whose existence is affected by such change is, in the words of Mr.
Melville Fuller Weston, "precluded from passing upon the fact of change by a logical difficulty
which is not to be surmounted." 5 Such change in the organic law relates to the existence of a
prior point in the Courts "chain of title" to its authority and "does not relate merely to a question
of the horizontal distribution of powers." 6 It involves in essence a matter which "the sovereign
has entrusted to the so-called political departments of government or has reserved to be settled
by its own extra governmental action." 7
The non-judicial character of such a question has been recognized in American law. "From its
earliest opinions this Court has consistently recognized," said Justice Frankfurter, in his
illuminating dissent in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 7 L. Ed. 2d 633, 722, 726, 727), "a class of
controversies which do not lend themselves to judicial standards and judicial remedies. To
classify the various instances as political questions is rather a form of stating this conclusion
than revealing of analysis . . . The crux of the matter is that courts are not fit instruments of
decision where what is essentially at stake is the composition of those large contests of policy
traditionally fought out in non-judicial forums, by which governments and the actions of
governments are made and unmade."
cralaw virtua1aw library

The diversity of views contained in the opinions of the members of this Court, in the cases at bar,
cannot be a case of "right" or "wrong" views of the Constitution. It is one of attitudes and values.
For there is scarcely any principle, authority or interpretation which has not been countered by
the opposite. At bottom it is the degree of ones faith in the nations leadership and in the
maturity of judgment of our people.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the dismissal of these five cases, and the conclusion of this Court in
its judgment of March 31, 1973 are fully justified.
Barredo, Makasiar and Esguerra, JJ., concur.

Gonzales v. COMELEC, 21 SCRA 774,797 (1967)

Note: This case is composed of consolidated cases filed separately by Petitioner
Gonzales and PHILCONSA. However, itd be noted that G.R. No. L-28196 (Gonzales v.
COMELEC) is an original action for prohibition, and with preliminary injunction.
G.R. No. L-28196

Petitioner: Ramon A. Gonzales - a Filipino citizen, a taxpayer, and a voter. He claims to have instituted case
L-28196 as a class unit, for and in behalf of all citizens, taxpayers, and voters similarly situated.
Respondent: Commission on Elections, Director of Printing and Auditor General
G.R. No. L-28224
Petitioner: Philippine Constitution Commission (PHILCONSA) - a corporation duly organized and
existing under the laws of the Philippines, and a civic, non-profit and nonpartisan organization the objective of
which is to uphold the rule of law in the Philippines and to defend its Constitution against erosions or
onslaughts from whatever source.
Respondent: Commission on Elections

FACTS:
On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed the following
resolutions:

1.

R. B. H. (Resolution of Both Houses) No. 1, proposing that Section 5, Article VI, of the
Constitution of the Philippines, be amended so as to increase the membership of the House of
Representatives from a maximum of 120, as provided in the present Constitution, to a maximum
of 180, to be apportioned among the several provinces as nearly as may be according to the
number of their respective inhabitants, although each province shall have, at least, one (1)
member;

2.

R. B. H. No. 2, calling a convention to propose amendments to said Constitution, the

convention to be composed of two (2) elective delegates from each representative district, to be
"elected in the general elections to be held on the second Tuesday of November, 1971;" and

3.

R. B. H. No. 3, proposing that Section 16, Article VI, of the same Constitution, be amended
so as to authorize Senators and members of the House of Representatives to become delegates
to the aforementioned constitutional convention, without forfeiting their respective seats in
Congress.

Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which, upon approval by the President, on June
17, 1967, became Republic Act No. 4913, providing that the amendments to the Constitution
proposed in the aforementioned Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be submitted, for approval by the
people, at the general elections which shall be held on November 14, 1967.
Petitioners (Gonzales and PHILCONSA) assailed the validity/constitutionality of RA No. 4913. They
prayed to restrain COMELEC from implementing or complying with the said law. PHILCONSA also
assailed R.B.H No. 1 and 3.
Their arguments as to the validity/constitutionality of RA No. 4912 are as follows:

(1)

The Members of Congress, which approved the proposed amendments, as well as the
resolution calling a convention to propose amendments, are, at best, de facto Congressmen;

(2)

Congress may adopt either one of two alternatives propose amendments or call a
convention therefore but may not avail of both that is to say, propose amendment and call a
convention at the same time;

(3)

The election, in which proposals for amendment to the Constitution shall be submitted for
ratification, must be a special election, not a general election, in which officers of the national and
local governments such as the elections scheduled to be held on November 14, 1967 will be
chosen; and

(4)

The spirit of the Constitution demands that the election, in which proposals for
amendment shall be submitted to the people for ratification, must be held under such conditions
which, allegedly, do not exist as to give the people a reasonable opportunity to have a fair
grasp of the nature and implications of said amendments.

ISSUE:
Whether or not R.A. No. 4912 is unconstitutional

ARGUMENTS:
PETITIONERS CLAIMED THAT:

(1)The Members of Congress, which

approved the proposed amendments,
as well as the resolution calling a
convention to propose amendments,
are, at best, de facto Congressmen;

RESPONDENT COUNTERED THAT BY:

De facto officers cannot be assailed
collaterally. It is unlikely how said
Members of the House of Representatives
can be regarded as de facto officers owing
to the failure of their predecessors in
office to make a reapportionment within
the period aforementioned. In fact, the
main reasons for the existence of the de
facto doctrine is that public interest
demands that acts of persons holding,
under color of title, an office created by a
valid statute be, likewise, deemed valid
insofar as the public as distinguished
from the officer in question is
concerned. One can imagine this great
inconvenience, hardships and evils that
would result in the absence of the de facto
doctrine

(2)Congress may adopt either one of

two alternatives propose
amendments or call a convention
therefore but may not avail of both
that is to say, propose amendment
and call a convention at the same
time;

In any event, we do not find, either in the

Constitution, or in the history thereof
anything that would negate the authority
of different Congresses to approve the
contested Resolutions, or of the same
Congress to pass the same in, different
sessions or different days of the same
congressional session. And, neither has
any plausible reason been advanced to
justify the denial of authority to adopt said
resolutions on the same day.

Article XV of the 1935 Constitution

provides:

(3)The election, in which proposals for

amendment to the Constitution shall be
submitted for ratification, must be a
special
election, not a general election, in which
officers of the national and local
governments such as the elections
scheduled to be held on November 14,
1967 will be chosen; and

(4) The spirit of the Constitution demands

that the election, in which proposals for
amendment shall be submitted to the
people for ratification, must be held
under
such conditions which, allegedly, do
not exist as to give the people a
reasonable opportunity to have a fair
grasp of the nature and implications of
said amendments.

. . The Congress in joint session

assembled, by a vote of three-fourths of
all the Members of the Senate and of the
House of Representatives [] Such
amendments shall be valid as part of this
Constitution when approved by a
majority of the votes cast at an election
at which the amendments are submitted
to the people for their ratification. []
There is no prohibition to the effect that
an election must only be held on a
special election. SC held that there is
nothing in this provision of the [1935]
Constitution to indicate that the election
therein referred to is a special, not a
general election.

The legislation cannot be nullified by

reason of failure of certain sectors of the
community to discuss the amendments
sufficiently. Its constitutionality or
unconstitutionality depends upon no
other factor than those existing at the
time of the enactment thereof,
unaffected by the acts or omissions of
law enforcing to agencies, particularly
those that take place subsequently to
the passage or approval of the law.

HELD:
No. Petition is DENIED. R.A. No. 4912 is NOT unconstitutional.

Planas
vs.
Commission
on
Elections
[GR L-35925, 22 January 1973]; also Sanidad vs. Comelec [GR L-35929], Roxas vs.
Comelec [GR L-35940], Monteclaro vs. Comelec [GR L-35941], Ordonez vs. National
Treasurer of the Philippines [GR L-35942], Tan vs. Comelec [GR L-35948], Diokno vs.
Comelec [GR L-35953], Jimenez vs. Comelec [GR L-35961], Gonzales vs. Comelec [GR L35965],
and
Hidalgo
vs.
Comelec
[GR
L-35979]
Second Division, Concepcion (J): 3 concur, 3 concur in separate opinions, 1 concurs as
recapitulated, 1 dissents in separate opinion, 2 filed separate opinions
Facts: On 16 March 1967, Congress of the Philippines passed Resolution 2, which was
amended by Resolution 4 of said body, adopted on 17 June 1969, calling a Convention to
propose amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines. Said Resolution 2, as
amended, was implemented by RA 6132, approved on 24 August 1970, pursuant to the
provisions of which the election of delegates to said Convention was held on 10
November 1970, and the 1971 Constitutional Convention began to perform its functions
on 1 June 971. While the Convention was in session on 21 September 1972, the President
issued Proclamation 1081 placing the entire Philippines under Martial Law. On 29
November 1972, the Convention approved its Proposed Constitution of the Republic of
the Philippines. The next day, 30 November 1972, the President of the Philippines issued
Presidential Decree 73, "submitting to the Filipino people for ratification or rejection the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines proposed by the 1971 Constitutional
Convention, and appropriating funds therefor," as well as setting the plebiscite for said
ratification or rejection of the Proposed Constitution on 15 January 1973. Soon after, or
on 7 December 1972, Charito Planas filed, with the Supreme Court, Case GR L-35925,
against the Commission on Elections, the Treasurer of the Philippines and the Auditor
General, to enjoin said "respondents or their agents from implementing Presidential
Decree 73, in any manner, until further orders of the Court," upon the grounds, inter alia,
that said Presidential Decree "has no force and effect as law because the calling of such
plebiscite, the setting of guidelines for the conduct of the same, the prescription of the
ballots to be used and the question to be answered by the voters, and the appropriation
of public funds for the purpose, are, by the Constitution, lodged exclusively in Congress,"
and "there is no proper submission to the people of said Proposed Constitution set for 15
January 1973, there being no freedom of speech, press and assembly, and there being
no sufficient time to inform the people of the contents thereof." Substantially identical
actions were filed. Meanwhile, or on 17 December 1972, the President had issued an
order temporarily suspending the effects of Proclamation 1081, for the purpose of free
and open debate on the Proposed Constitution. On December 23, the President
announced the postponement of the plebiscite for the ratification or rejection of the
Proposed Constitution. No formal action to this effect was taken until 7 January 1973,
when General Order 20 was issued, directing "that the plebiscite scheduled to be held on
15 January 1973, be postponed until further notice." Said General Order 20, moreover,
"suspended in the meantime" the "order of 17 December 1972, temporarily suspending

the effects of Proclamation 1081 for purposes of free and open debate on the proposed
Constitution." In view of the events relative to the postponement of the plebiscite, the
Court deemed it fit to refrain, for the time being, from deciding the cases, for neither the
date nor the conditions under which said plebiscite would be held were known or
announced officially. Then, again, Congress was, pursuant to the 1935 Constitution,
scheduled to meet in regular session on 22 January 1973, and since the main objection
to Presidential Decree 73 was that the President does not have the legislative authority
to call a plebiscite and appropriate funds therefor, which Congress unquestionably could
do, particularly in view of the formal postponement of the plebiscite by the President
reportedly after consultation with, among others, the leaders of Congress and the
Commission on Elections the Court deemed it more imperative to defer its final action
on these cases. In the afternoon of 12 January 1973, Vidal Tan, et. al. [GR L-35948] filed
an "urgent motion," praying that said case be decided "as soon as possible, preferably
not later than 15 January 1973." It was alleged in said motion, "that the President
subsequently announced the issuance of Presidential Decree 86 organizing the so-called
Citizens Assemblies, to be consulted on certain public questions; and that thereafter it
was later announced that 'the Assemblies will be asked if they favor or oppose [1] The
New Society; [2] Reforms instituted under Martial Law; [3] The holding of a plebiscite on
the proposed new Constitution and when (the tentative new date given following the
postponement of the plebiscite from the original date of January 15 are February 19 and
March 5); [4] The opening of the regular session slated on January 22 in accordance with
the existing Constitution despite Martial Law."
Issue [1]: Whether the Court has authority to pass upon the validity of Presidential
Decree 73.
Held [1]: Presidential Decree 73 purports to have the force and effect of a legislation, so
that the issue on the validity thereof is manifestly a justiciable one, on the authority, not
only of a long list of cases in which the Court has passed upon the constitutionality of
statutes and/or acts of the Executive, 1 but, also, of no less than that of Subdivision (1)
of Section 2, Article VIII of the 1935 Constitution, which expressly provides for the
authority of the Supreme Court to review cases involving said issue.
Issue [2]: Whether the President has the authority to issue PD 73 to submit to the People
the Constitution proposed by the Convention.
Held [2]: As regards the authority of the President to issue Presidential Decree 73,
"submitting to the Filipino people (on January 15, 1973) for ratification or rejection the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines proposed by the 1971 Constitutional
Convention and appropriating funds therefor," it is unnecessary, for the time being, to
pass upon such question, because the plebiscite ordained in said Decree has been
postponed. In any event, should the plebiscite be scheduled to be held at any time later,
the proper parties may then file such action as the circumstances may justify.
Issue [3]: Whether martial law per se affects the validity of a submission to the people
for ratification of specific proposals for amendment of the Constitution.

Held [3]: The matter is one intimately and necessarily related to the validity of
Proclamation No. 1102 of the President of the Philippines. This question has not been
explicitly raised, however, in any of the cases under consideration, said cases having
been filed before the issuance of such Proclamation, although the petitioners in L-35948
maintain that the issue on the referral of the Proposed Constitution to the Citizens'
Assemblies may be deemed and was raised in their Supplemental Motion of January 15,
1973. At any rate, said question has not been adequately argued by the parties in any of
these cases, and it would not be proper to resolve such a transcendental question
without the most thorough discussion possible under the circumstances. In fairness to
the petitioners in L-35948 and considering the surrounding circumstances, that instead
of dismissing the case as moot and academic, said petitioners should be given a
reasonable period of time within which to move in the premises.
Held (totality): Recapitulating the views expressed by the Members of the Court, the
result is this: (1) There is unanimity on the justiciable nature of the issue on the legality
of Presidential Decree 73. (2) On the validity of the decree itself, Justices Makalintal,
Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Esguerra and Concepcion, or 6 Members of the Court, are
of the opinion that the issue has become moot and academic, whereas Justices Barredo,
Makasiar and Antonio voted to uphold the validity of said Decree. (3) On the authority of
the 1971 Constitutional Convention to pass the proposed Constitution or to incorporate
therein the provisions contested by the petitioners in L-35948, Justice Makalintal, Castro,
Teehankee and Esguerra opine that the issue has become moot and academic. Justice
Fernando, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Concepcion have voted to uphold the authority
of the Convention. (4) Justice Fernando, likewise, expressed the view that the 1971
Constitutional Convention had authority to continue in the performance of its functions
despite the proclamation of Martial Law. In effect, Justices Barredo, Makasiar and Antonio
hold the same view. (5) On the question whether the proclamation of Martial Law
affected the proper submission of the proposed Constitution to a plebiscite, insofar as
the freedom essential therefor is concerned, Justice Fernando is of the opinion that there
is a repugnancy between the election contemplated under Art. XV of the 1935
Constitution and the existence of Martial Law, and would, therefore, grant the petitions
were they not moot and academic. Justices Barredo, Antonio and Esguerra are of the
opinion that that issue involves question of fact which cannot be predetermined, and
that Martial Law per se does not necessarily preclude the factual possibility of adequate
freedom for the purposes contemplated.
(6) On Presidential Proclamation No. 1102, the following views were expressed: [a]
Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Makasiar, Esguerra and Concepcion are
of the opinion that question of validity of said Proclamation has not been properly raised
before the Court, which, accordingly, should not pass upon such question. [b] Justice
Barredo holds that the issue on the constitutionality of Proclamation No. 1102 has been
submitted to and should be determined by the Court, and that the "purported ratification
of the Proposed Constitution based on the referendum among Citizens' Assemblies falls
short of being in strict conformity with the requirements of Article XV of the 1935
Constitution," but that such unfortunate drawback notwithstanding, "considering all

other related relevant circumstances, the new Constitution is legally recognizable and
should he recognized as legitimately in force." [c] Justice Zaldivar maintains unqualifiedly
that the Proposed Constitution has not been ratified in accordance with Article XV of the
1935 Constitution, and that, accordingly, it has no force and effect whatsoever. [d]
Justice Antonio feels "that the Court is not competent to act" on the issue whether the
Proposed Constitution has been ratified by the people or not, "in the absence of any
judicially discoverable and manageable standards," since the issue "poses a question of
fact."

(7) On the question whether or not these cases should be dismissed, Justices Makalintal,
Castro Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra voted in the affirmative, for the reasons
set forth in their respective opinions. Justices Fernando, Teehankee and the writer
similarly voted, except as regards Case No. L-35948 as to which they voted to grant to
the petitioners therein a reasonable period of time within which to file appropriate
pleadings should they wish to contest the legality of Presidential Proclamation 1102.
Justice Zaldivar favors the granting of said period to the petitioners in said Case No. L35948 for the purpose, but he believes, in effect, that the Court should go farther and
decide on the merits everyone of the cases under consideration. Wherefore, all of the
cases are dismissed, without special pronouncement as to costs.

Santiago v COMELEC
On 6 December 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with COMELEC a Petition to Amend the Constitution to
Lift Term Limits of elective Officials by Peoples Initiative The COMELEC then, upon its approval, a.) set
the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country, b.) caused the necessary publication of the
said petition in papers of general circulation, and c.) instructed local election registrars to assist petitioners
and volunteers in establishing signing stations. On 18 Dec 1996, MD Santiago et al filed a special civil
action for prohibition against the Delfin Petition. Also, Raul Roco filed with the COMELEC a motion to
dismiss the Delfin petition, the petition having been untenable due to the foregoing. Santiago argues
among others that the Peoples Initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution NOT a revision
thereof. The extension or the lifting of the term limits of those in power (particularly the President)
constitutes revision and is therefore beyond the power of peoples initiative. The respondents argued that
the petition filed by Roco is pending under the COMELEC hence the Supreme Court cannot take
cognizance of it.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court can take cognizance of the case.
HELD: COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the Delfin
petition.Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under R.A. No. 6735 and COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300, it cannot be entertained or given cognizance of by the COMELEC. The respondent
Commission must have known that the petition does not fall under any of the actions or proceedings
under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure or under Resolution No. 2300, for which reason it did not assign
to the petition a docket number. Hence, the said petition was merely entered as UND, meaning,

undocketed. That petition was nothing more than a mere scrap of paper, which should not have been
dignified by the Order of 6 December 1996, the hearing on 12 December 1996, and the order directing
Delfin and the oppositors to file their memoranda or oppositions. In so dignifying it, the COMELEC acted
without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and merely wasted its time, energy, and resources.
Being so, the Supreme Court can then take cognizance of the petition for prohibition filed by Santiago
notwithstanding Rocos petition. COMELEC did not even act on Rocos petition. In the final analysis, when
the system of constitutional law is threatened by the political ambitions of man, only the Supreme Court
can save a nation in peril and uphold the paramount majesty of the Constitution. It must be recalled
that intervenor Roco filed with the COMELEC a motion to dismiss the Delfin Petition on the ground that
the COMELEC has no jurisdiction or authority to entertain the petition. The COMELEC made no ruling
thereon evidently because after having heard the arguments of Delfin and the oppositors at the hearing on
12 December 1996, it required them to submit within five days their memoranda or
oppositions/memoranda. Earlier, or specifically on 6 Dec 1996, it practically gave due course to the Delfin
Petition by ordering Delfin to cause the publication of the petition, together with the attached Petition for
Initiative, the signature form, and the notice of hearing; and by setting the case for hearing.

TOLENTINO VS. COMELEC

G.R. No. L-34150, October 16 1971, 41 SCRA 702
FACTS:
The 1971 Constitutional Convention came into being by virtue of two resolutions of the
Congress approved in its capacity as a constituent assembly convened for the purpose of
calling a convention to propose amendments to the Constitution. After election of
delegates held on November 10, 1970, the Convention held its inaugural session on June
1, 1971. In the morning of September 28, 1970, the Convention approved Organic
Resolution No. 1 which is entitled as, "A RESOLUTION AMENDING SECTION 1 OF ARTICLE
V OF THE CONSTITUTION SO AS TO LOWER THE VOTING AGE TO 18." On September 30,
1971, the COMELEC "resolved" to follow the mandate of the Convention, that it will hold
the said plebiscite together with the senatorial elections on November 8, 1971.
Petitioner, Arturo Tolentino, filed a petition for prohibition, its main thrust being that
Organic Resolution No. 1 and the necessary implementing resolutions subsequently
approved have no force and effect as laws in so far as they provide for the holding of a
plebiscite co-incident with the senatorial elections, on the ground that the calling and
holding of such a plebiscite is, by the Constitution, a power lodged exclusively in
Congress as a legislative body and may not be exercised by the Convention, and that,
under Article XV Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution, the proposed amendment in
question cannot be presented to the people for ratification separately from each and all
other amendments to be drafted and proposed by the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Organic Resolution No. 1 of the 1971 Constitutional Convention
violative to the Constitution.
HELD:

NO. All the amendments to be proposed by the same Convention must be submitted to
the people in a single "election" or plebiscite. In order that a plebiscite for the ratification
of a Constitutional amendment may be validly held, it must provide the voter not only
sufficient time but ample basis for an intelligent appraisal of the nature of the
amendment per se but as well as its relation to the other parts of the Constitution with
which it has to form a harmonious whole. In the present context, where the Convention
has hardly started considering the merits, if not thousands, of proposals to amend the
existing Constitution, to present to the people any single proposal or a few of them
cannot comply with this requirement.
LAMBINO V. COMELEC (2006)
Case Digest
Overview:
A move for Constitutional Change by the Lambino Group during the Presidency of GMA
FACTS:
-

Raul Lambino, Erico Aumentado, and other groups and individuals (a.k.a. the Lambino
Group), along with the signatures of 6.3million registered voters (at least 12% of the
total voters, as provided by Art. 17 Sec. 2 of the Constitution) petitioned to the
Supreme Court to reverse the ruling of the COMELEC
The petition was for a change of the 1987 Constitution under RA 6735 (Initiative and
Referendum Act) and it proposed for a shift from the current Bicameral-Presidential
System to the Unicameral-Parliamentary System
Thus, amending Article VI Sections 1-7 (the Legislative), Article VII Sections 1-4 (The
Executive), and providing a new Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of the Constitution
COMELEC denied the petition declaring RA 6735 as inadequate for such actions on the
basis of Santiago v. COMELEC (1997)

ISSUES:
1. W/N the Lambino Group complied with Art. XVII Sec. 2 of the Constitution
- W/N the Santiago v. COMELEC is essential in implementing a proposal to amend the
Constitution
- W/N the COMELEC committed a grave abuse of discretion
RULING:
- There is NO MERIT to the petition because the proposal for the Constitutional revision
does not comply with Article XVII Section 2 of the Constitution.
RATIO:
1) The acquisition of 6.3million signatures was questionable because:
a) The people were only shown the phrase,
PROPOSITION: "DO YOU APPROVE OF THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT
BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT, IN
ORDER TO ACHIEVE GREATER EFFICIENCY, SIMPLICITY AND ECONOMY IN GOVERNMENT; AND
PROVIDING AN ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM
ONE SYSTEM TO ANOTHER?";
and no draft for the changes of the provisions were shown to them.
b) The petitioners also failed to attach the ULAP (Union of Local Authorities of the
Philippines) Resolution No. 2006-02
c) Though Raul Lambino admits that he had printed 100,000 copies and assuming that all
10 spaces were filled, only a maximum of 1million people could have gotten hold of the
document and the remaining 5.3million could not.

2) The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. Thus, disallowing such a
revision through initiatives.
- Peoples Initiative is considered in amendments only and not on revisions.
- The proposed revision would alter the separation of three (3) co-equal branches of
government to two (2)
-

(Amendment was defined in 3 situations; changing the age for voting from 18 to 15,
requirement changed on owning of media by Filipinos from 100% to 60%, and adding
college degree to the qualification of a President.
Revision, on the other hand, alters the whole thought of the provisions which is evident
in the shift from a Bicameral-Presidential System to a Unicameral-Parliamentary.)

3) A revisit on Santiago vs COMELEC is not necessary but it affirmed that RA 6735 is

inadequate to propose such revisions
4) The COMELEC didnt commit a grave abuse of discretion
Ruling:
Therefore, the petition of the Lambino group is DENIED and the COMELEC ruling is
affirmed.

Sources:
SCRA and
Lawphil http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/oct2006/gr_174153_2006.html#rnt23