Peace of Nicias (421 BC): Doomed From the Start David G.

Terrell 4 August 2009 In 421 BC1, Athens and Sparta signed a 50-year peace treaty and a separate defensive alliance. It is evident that the agreement did not achieve its aims. Several coalition members failed to endorse the treaty and most of the treatys provisions went unfulfilled. Three years later, Spartan and Athenian troops faced each other at Mantinea. This paper is based on Thucydides and several prominent secondary sources; performed to educate myself as to the conditions that created the Peace of Nicias, the conditions and implications of the treaty, its effects upon the combatants, and the forces leading to its failure to keep the peace. I will briefly address these points. The Peloponnesian War was no conventional Grecian fight but rather a civil war.2 Sparta and her allies intended to weaken Athens hegemony.3 Sparta was less ready than her allies to fight over purely commercial interests and would likely have been content with expressions of Athenian degradation short of war.4 However, once Athens began to demonstrate ideological support for democracy in other states, Sparta became convinced that Athens represented a danger5 6 Athenian objectives, as defined by Pericles, seem less ambitious.7 Athens wanted to bring Sparta to the negotiating table, diplomatically eliminating her military superiority on land. Pericles directed a defensive plan of exhaustion8, being content to rely on Athens strength at sea while striving to demonstrate an invulnerability to Spartas conventional strength on land.9

1 2

All dates are BC. Paul Cartledge, The Spartans: The World of the Warrior-Heroes of Ancient Greece, from Utopia to Crisis and Collapse, (Woodstock, New York: Overlook Press, 2002), 181. 3 (1.81), (1.122), (1.139), (2.8), (2.72). (References in parentheses, without indication of author are to Thucydides.) 4 Ronald P Legon, "The Peace of Nicias," Journal of Peace Research (6, no. 4 (1969): 323-334), 324-5. 5 Hanson, 13. 6 Hanson, 12. 7 (1.140-3), (2.65). 8 Hanson, 29. 9 Legon, 325-6. K D F Kitto, The Greeks, (New York: Pelican Books, 1951), 136.

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Sparta marched on Attica, intent on drawing the Athenians into the classic hoplite battle, 10 confident that, according to long-established norms, the Athenians would either yield or they would come out, fight and be defeated. Regardless, the Spartans felt certain they would win.11 Pericles did not cooperate and by retreating behind the walls and relying on sea lines of communication. Pericles felt that Athens could hold out while Spartas land forces expended Spartas wealth in useless efforts.12 As Spartan operations proceeded, Pericles responded asymmetrically, sending maritime forces far around the Peloponnese to conduct raids against coastal towns, ravaging the land and populaceand causing a significant political impact by violating the Spartan homeland.13 Raiding the Peloponnese disrupted Spartan land and sea commerce; demoralized the home front; destroyed war materials; and demonstrated that Sparta could not (or would not) protect her allies.14 Though the Athenian economy suffered, Pericles tactics did allow the Athenians to survive the first years of the war without serious military setback. However, the strategy Pericles advanced did have flaws that came to haunt the Athenians. He assumed Athens could accommodate the refugees within the walls safely;15 that he had the rhetorical talent, political experience and moral authority to rein everyone in until the Spartans gave up;16 and, the Athenians would quietly wait within the defensive perimeter in the face of claims of cowardice.17

Donald Kagan, The Peloponnesian War, (New York: Penguin Books, 2003), 48-9. Cartledge, 182. 10 Cartledge, 181. 11 Kagan, Peloponnesian War, 59. 12 Kagan, Peloponnesian War, 59-61. 13 Kagan Peloponnesian War, 71. 14 Hanson, 94. 15 Hanson. 45. 16 Hanson, 47. 17 Hanson, 46.

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The first assumption, accommodating the refugees safely, was shattered by the effects of a pandemic that killed 25 to 30 percent of the population.18 The Athenians, suffering such severe losses, sued for peace. The Spartans rejected the proposal, probably because they believed the Athenians would be easier to defeat.19 Pericles died in the Athenian pandemic, a few years after the death of the Spartan king, Archidamus. Pericles took his rhetorical, organization and strategic planning talents with him; Archidamus, his predilection for negotiated solutions. The war continued. Neither power experienced significant, consistent success. The ideals of war began to degenerate away from ritualized hoplite combat based on oaths and covenants made sacred through religious strictures. War took its toll on the humanity of the participants. The Spartans, from the outset, killed all persons captured at seanot granting them the sacred status normally granted captured combatants on land. Some small states allied with Athens broke their sacred oaths with Athens and defected. Rather than relatively bloodless trials by combat on agreed battlefields, sieges began to end in the desolation, if not extinction, of entire poleis. In Kagans succinct words, Oaths lost their meaning and became tools of duplicity.20 In 425, the Athenians sent a fleet of forty ships to relieve Corcyra, an allied island/city on the north east coast of the Peloponnese blockaded and then captured by the Spartans. Demosthenes, one of the fleets leaders wished the fleet to pause and raid Pylos, a city in the far southwest Peloponnese. Demosthenes argued attacking Pylos would compel the Spartans to abandon Corcyra in response. His proposal was overruled, but the vagaries of wind brought the fleet to Pylos. While weather-bound there,

18

Kagan, Peloponnesian War, 75-9. Hanson, 123. 19 Kagan, Peloponnesian War, 81. Hanson, 81. 20 Kagan, Peloponnesian War, 84, 100, 109, 113-20.

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Demosthenes persuaded the construction and manning of a small fortification before sailing on to Corcyra.21 The Athenian incursion at Pylos had an enormous effect. The Spartan commander at Corcyra immediately sailed to eject the Athenians. Spartan land forces, having returned from Attica, also departed for Pylos. They invested the Athenians beachhead and placed troops on an adjacent island, Spacteria, but hesitated to attack, having learned that the Athenian fleet reaching Corcyra was returning to Pylos.22 The Athenians arrived in time and defeated the Peloponnesian naval force, cutting off the Spartan troops on Spacteria.23 Sparta asked for an immediate armistice,
24

proposing exchanging the Spartans on

Spacteria for a complete military alliance. The Athenians, convinced that the Spartans could not be trusted, rejected the proposal.25 The prisoners represented hostages Athens could use against the Spartans, and Athens used them, realizing that the Spartans could restart the war anytime after regaining them.26 Pylos and Spacterias effect on the course of the war is tremendous. Spartas confidence was shattered by the loss and the entire psychology of the war changed.27 Before Spacteria, talk of peace was considered treasonous. 28 As Hanson asserts, Spacteria was hardly Stalingrad but it did damage the reputation (the Spartan mirage) which rested on the appearance of invulnerability. Thus, even a small

21

Kagan, Peloponnesian War, 139. Cartledge, 184. 22 Kagan, Peloponnesian War, 140. 23 Kagan, Peloponnesian War, 142. 24 Alfred S Bradford, With Arrow, Sword, and Spear: A History of Warfare in the Ancient World, (New York: Fall River Press, 2001), 82-3. Andrew R Burn, The Pelican History of Greece, (London: Penguin Books, 1966), 270. Kagan, Peloponnesian War, 143, 152. 25 Bradford, 82-3. Burn, 269-270. 26 Kagan, Peloponnesian War, 144. 27 Hanson ,114, 151. 28 Kagan, Peloponnesian War, 146.

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loss near home territoryor worsethe annihilation of an entire forcehad a seismic effect across Sparta.29 The war continued until 421. Drawing on success, the Athenians established bases all along the Peloponnesian coast that cut Peloponnesian trade; encouraged helot rebellion and provoked dissent among Spartas allies.30 Nevertheless, Athens was weary of war and the Spartans were still anxious to redeem the Spacteria captives.31 Athens experienced several serious reverses in these subsequent years: the loss of almost a thousand troops at Delius;32 Brasidas expedition to Chalcidice and Thrace, which caused several Athenian allies to defect;33 and, an abortive attempt to retake Amphipolis.34 Both parties reconsidered the idea of a peace. 35 Pleistoanax and Nicias worked out the terms.36 Hanson describes the situation thus: After the Spartan failure of annual ravaging (431-425), after the Athenian toll from the plague (430-426), after the Spartans had lost at Spacteria (425), and some of their best warriorsamong them high-ranking officershad shamefully surrendered and been taken hostage (425-421), after the Spartans became terrified that their helots might revolt en masse, after the defeat of the Athenians at Boeotia (424), and after Cleon and Brasidas both perished at Amphipolis (422), both sides acknowledged that the war had degenerated into a messy calamity that neither could win outright.37

29 30

Hanson, 113-4. Hanson, 117-8. 31 Michael M Sage, Warfare in Ancient Greece: A Sourcebook. (New York: Routledge, 1996), 130. 32 (4.91-101). 33 (5.1-10). Legon, 329. Cartledge, 189. 34 (5.14). Thomas R Martin, Ancient Greece: From Prehistoric to Hellenistic Times. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), 156. 35 Legon, 324, 326-7. 36 Bradford, 85. 37 Hanson, 151.

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Sparta proposed terms, tacitly acknowledging Athens superior position but also reminding them that Sparta was not defeated.38 After the peace, each side feared that showing mercy would be interpreted as weakness.39 In spite of the trepidation on both sides, the peace was made.40 Thucydides, departing from his usual practice of paraphrasing documents, provides the complete text of the treaty and the subsequent defensive alliance. The terms specified that the oaths associated with the peace were to be formally renewed each yeardemonstrating that hostile relationships were the new norm.41 The general provisions of the peace were: To commit no acts of war against each other or each others allies. To submit disagreements to arbitration. To allow unfettered access to religious shrines. To acknowledge and insure the independence of Delphi. To liberate and return all prisoners of war. To return specifically named cities seized in war and to remove the garrisons occupying others. To allow changes when jointly approved.42

In great measure, Athens achieved, in theory, the accommodations envisioned by Pericles.43 Sparta signed on to the treaty over the objections of other coalition members.44 Corinth, Megara, and Elis rejected the treaty, effectively leaving the Peloponnesian League. Corinth was likely upset over Sparta's refusal to address the loss of Corinths northwestern possessions. Thucydides contrasts this motive with her later assertion, attributing their opposition to a noble inability to abandon her allies in the vicinity of Thrace.45 Seager felt that this dichotomy was oversimplified and believed that although the northwestern territorial losses may have smarted most, Sparta's readiness to leave Chalcidice to Athens'
38 39

Kagan, Peloponnesian War, 144. Hanson, 101. 40 Cartledge, 190-1. 41 Sage, 129. 42 Bradford, 87. 43 Hanson, 117. 44 Hanson, 151. 45 (5.30).

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particularly disappointed them. Now, with Spartas 30-year peace with Argos about to expire in 421; and Argos declining to renew it without addressing old border claims, 46 the obvious threat to Sparta was Argos. Kagan observed that Corinth, to restart hostilities, resolved to divide Sparta and Argos even if it resulted in an Argive-Athenian alliance.47 Corinthian interests were thus damaged by the peace and her only hope of regaining lost territory would occur Athens suffered a serious setback.48 Megaras principle goal was recovering Nisaea, lost to Athens and not addressed by the peace. Sparta was indifferent about Nisaea, probably realizing Athens would keep it until Thebes returned what was left of Plataea. Interestingly, Megara did not voice consternation with Sparta,49 and was apparently willing to cooperate with Thebes.50 Given these events, Seager attributed Megaras rejection to implacable hostility to Athens, which reinforced her dissatisfaction with the terms of the peace. But if she did think that a renewal of the war would serve her ends, she seems to have made no effort to bring it about.51 Elis would have likely objected to any ending of the war that left her domineering neighbor, Sparta, a threat; since an unoccupied Sparta would be free to bully them.52 Elis would desire any solution that would keep Sparta focused elsewhere, including renewal of the war.53 Kagan argues that the Athenians were mistaken in agreeing to the Peace of Nicias, which brought disadvantages to Athens and benefits to Sparta.54 He also held that the peace was bound to break down. "There was little, if any, goodwill on which to build an enduring peace".55

46 47

Burn, 270. Donald Kagan, "Corinthian Diplomacy after the Peace of Nicias." The American Journal of Philology (81, no. 3 (July 1960): 291-310), 303 48 Robin Seager, "After the Peace of Nicias: Diplomacy and Policy, 421-416 B.C." Classical Quartely ((Cambridge University Press) 26, no. 2 (1976): 249-269), 250. 49 (5.31). 50 (5.31). 51 Seager, 250. 52 (5.31). 53 Seager, 250.

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As the peace began to take effect, the Athenians began to see the possibilities inherent in a strategy that fomented rebellion among the helots in Messeniapossibly initiating a domino effect that might eventually liberate the helots and Peloponnesian city states.56 In the summer of 420, Alcibiades successfully facilitated the Athenians enlistment in a coalition that included Argos, Mantinea and Elis. The alliance threatened Sparta with the ability to cut them off from Attica and promoted Thebes and Corinth to break with Sparta.57 But Athens was not ready to risk direct, unilateral conflict with Sparta so soon and, in spite of Alcibiades influence; the Athenian assembly rejected his candidacy for the generalship and elected the conservative Nicias and his protgs. This turn towards conservatism ensured that no real fighting would ensue.58 The political landscape in Athens was divided between those favoring the peace, led by Nicias, and those willing to resume the war, led by Alcibiades.59 60 The cold war continued between 420 and 418. The Spartans brought Megara and Corinth back into their sphere and intimidated Elis into silence. Hostilities threatened when a Spartan force cornered an opposing force near Tegea and forced them to return to Argos without a fight.61 In response to the renewed threat, Spartan King Agis, in the early summer of 418, took a force north to Mantinea to protect a Spartan outpost at Tegea, and reopen land communications with Attica.62 After several unsuccessful attempts by the Spartans to engage the coalition forces, they came unexpectedly upon a prepared coalition battle frontand nevertheless succeeded in

54 55

Cartledge, 191. Donald Kagan, The Peace of Nicias and the Sicilian Expedition. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981), 30. 56 Hanson, 152. 57 Hanson, 33, 152. (5.43-4, 49). 58 Hanson, 152. 59 Cartledge, 191. 60 Kagan, Corinthian Diplomacy, 306. 61 Hanson, 152. 62 Bradford, 87.

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winning the day.63 The Spartan victory at Mantinea restored their confidence and dismayed the ArgiveAthenian coalition.64 So, by 417 BC, the Spartans had confirmed Athens worst fears about the capabilities of Spartan hoplites. Athens would never again fight the Spartans in pitched battle. However, Athens power was unaffected and Alcibiades, though somewhat tarnished in reputation, continued to agitate against Sparta.65 The reasons cited for the treatys failure included the rise of militant factions in both Athens and Sparta and the actions of lesser powers, who manipulated the resumption of the war to satisfy local political and geographic goals.66 However, Sparta was unable to get their nominal allies to adhere to the treaty and a major factor in its failure rests on provisions that would not be carried out.67 The Spartan victory at Mantinea did change the calculus. A coalition win would have most certainly increased the resolve of Argos, Elis and Mantinea to continue down a democratically-oriented path and may have encouraged an overall revolt by the Helots.68 Seager, among others, believes that the treaty was doomed to failure from the outset69 as Athens and Sparta had the only solid reasons for seeking ending the war. Athens, shaken and drained by the defeats at Delium and Amphipolis, feared that demonstrating any weakness might lead to further defections in the empire.70 Sparta was made ready for peace by a war prolonged beyond expectation; the failure of their strategy of annual invasion; the events
63

Hanson, 152. (5.57). Kagan, Peloponnesian War, 235. 64 Kagan Peloponnesian War, 241. (5.75). Cartledge, 193. 65 Kagan, Peloponnesian War, 243. Hanson 153, 160. 66 Legon 324. Hanson 151. 67 Sage, 130-1. 68 Kagan, Peloponnesian War, 241. (5.75). 69 Seager 249 70 (5.14).

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of Spacteria, Pylos and Cythera; and, the expiring peace with Argos. The realization that Argos and other malcontented states might join forces with Athens brought her to negotiate the best possible peace essentially a return to pre-war conditions.71 Before several weeks of peace had passed, it was clear that Sparta's allies were not cooperating in carrying out the terms of the treaty. Athens attempted to help Sparta force compliance by signing a defensive alliance with Sparta.72 Legon points out the irony in Athens, having fought a war to weaken Sparta's hegemony, now needed to strengthen her in the interests of enforcing the treaty.73 The SpartanAthenian alliance failed to obtain the cooperation of Sparta's allies. Sparta was, after all, weakened and unlikely to use any more force against her allies than she was capable of sending against Athens. Athens, faced with a power vacuum in the Peloponnese, continued to garrison Pylos. To forestall Corinth, Athens began to consider another hegemon for the Peloponnese in supporting Argos bid for power. The mistrust and hostility spawned by betrayals and unlimited warfare grew on both sides, and fear stimulated a reflex to resume the war. Spartas disaffected allies successfully undermined the treaty by setting Argos at odds with Sparta and dividing Sparta and Athens; thus giving new life to the Peloponnesian League.74 The Peace of Nicias demonstrates the fundamental difficulties in ending hostilities through negotiation when there is no decisive military victory, or when the belligerents are loose coalitions with varying interests.75 David G Terrell Herndon, VA

71

(5.14). Martin, 156. Seager, 249. 72 (5,22-4). 73 Legon, 330. 74 Legon, 330. 75 Legon, 323-4.

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Works Cited
Bradford, Alfred S. With Arrow, Sword, and Spear: A History of Warfare in the Ancient World. New York: Fall River Press, 2001. Burn, Andrew R. The Pelican History of Greece. London: Penguin Books, 1966. Cartledge, Paul. The Spartans: The World of the Warrior-Heroes of Ancient Greece, from Utopia to Crisis and Collapse. Woodstock, New York: Overlook Press, 2002. Hanson, Victor Davis. A war like no other: how the Athenians and Spartans fought the Peloponnesian War. New York: Random House, 2006. Kagan, Donald. "Corinthian Diplomacy after the Peace of Nicias." The American Journal of Philology 81, no. 3 (July 1960): 291-310. . The Peace of Nicias and the Sicilian Expedition. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981. . The Peloponnesian War. New York: Penguin Books, 2003. Kitto, K D F. The Greeks. New York: Pelican Books, 1951. Legon, Ronald P. "The Peace of Nicias." Journal of Peace Research 6, no. 4 (1969): 323-334. Martin, Thomas R. Ancient Greece: From Prehistoric to Hellenistic Times. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996. Sage, Michael M. Warfare in Ancient Greece: A Sourcebook. New York: Routledge, 1996. Seager, Robin. "After the Peace of Nicias: Diplomacy and Policy, 421-416 B.C." Classical Quartely (Cambridge University Press) 26, no. 2 (1976): 249-269. Thucycides. The History of the Peloponnesian War. Translated by Richard Crawley and Donald Lateiner. New York: Barnes & Noble Books, 2006.

David G. Terrell, 2009-2010, except where otherwise noted, content is licensed under a Creative Commons AttributionNoncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 Unported License. For permission to reprint under terms outside the license, contact davidterrell80@hotmail.com.