Mantinea 418 BC: Spartan Innovations or Fortunate Happenstance?

David G. Terrell
03 June 2009

The Battle of Mantinea in 418 BC, described by Thucydides, is notable because it reestablished

the military primacy of Sparta and showed a variation in the set form battles that characterized hoplite

warfare up to that point.1

In October 422 BC, two able generals, Cleon the Athenian and Brasidas the Spartan were killed at

Amphipolis, after which the Spartans and Athenians negotiated a 50-year peace treaty, the Peace of

Nicias. Spartan allies Corinth, Megara and Elis rejected the treaty and seceded from the Peloponnesian

League. Thebes and Beotia also rejected the treaty.2

Sparta and Athens thus ended hostilities and became nominal allies but, during the peace, Athens

began to discern the Spartans’ most fundamental weakness; the threat posed by Helot rebellion. Some

Athenian leaders began to consider the benefits accruing from surrounding Sparta with a buffer of

democratic poleis, perhaps putting Sparta at a disadvantage. During the same period, Beotia, Corinth, and

Argos began independent discussions about establishing a separate anti-Spartan coalition.3

In the summer of 420, a young, influential Athenian named Alcibiades successfully facilitated the

creation of an anti-Spartan, pro-democratic coalition that included Athens and several Peloponnesian

poleis bordering Sparta (Argos, Mantinea and Elis) spread in an arc to the north and east of the Spartan

homeland and straddling the isthmus connecting the Peloponnese to Attica and northern Greece. The

alliance essentially surrounded Sparta by land, threatening them through the ability to cut them off from

1
F.E. Adcock, The Greek and Macedonian Art of War, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1957), 88.
2
Victor Davis Hanson, A war like no other: how the Athenians and Spartans fought the Peloponnesian War, (New
York: Random House, 2006), 33.
Thucycides, The History of the Peloponnesian War, Translated by Richard Crawley and Donald Lateiner, (New
York: Barnes & Noble Books, 2006), 5:25, 48.
3
Thucycides, 5:23.
Hanson, 33, 152.
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David G. Terrell

Attica and by promoting other Spartan satellites, especially Thebes and Corinth—who were not happy

with the making of peace—to dissolve their alliances with Sparta.4

A cold war continued between 420 and 418 and the Spartans succeeded in bringing Megara and

Corinth back into their sphere and intimidating Elis into silence. The war almost turned hot when a

Spartan force cornered a combined opposing force and, imposing terms, forced them to return to Argos

without a fight. However, immediately upon returning to Argos, the city-states repudiated the terms and

renewed the threat to Sparta. The significance of the threat stemmed from the involvement of Argos, Elis

and Mantinea in the coalition. They were the most powerful states in the Peloponnese—outside of

Sparta—and they had good infantry.5

Spartan high command rebuked the commander who released the force and, in response to the

renewed threat, sent King Agis, in the early summer of 418 BC, to Mantinea with a sizeable force to

relieve the threat, to protect a Spartan outpost at Tegea, and reopen land communications with Attica.6

There were several abortive attempts by the Spartans to engage the coalition forces and, finally, in

August—the hottest, most humid time of the year—the Spartan forces, emerging from a forest after being

observed by coalition scouts, came unexpectedly upon a prepared coalition battle front.7

The Mantinean Plain is perfect terrain for hoplite warfare—fields surrounded by mountainous

terrain. Tactically, it was open, spacious, level, and accessible. Logistically, it had ready fertile land that

provided food and ample supplies of good water. Strategically, it was a chokepoint along the route of

4
Hanson 33, 152.
Thucycides, 5:43-4, 49.
5
Hanson, 152.
6
Alfred S. Bradford, With Arrow, Sword, and Spear, (New York: Fall River Press, 2001), 87.
7
Hanson, 152.
Thucycides, 5:57.
Donald Kagan, The Peloponnesian War, (New York: Penguin Books, 2003), 235.
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David G. Terrell

travel between Sparta and Attica and the nearby mountainous terrain provided a ready refuge to which a

vanquished force could flee so as to avoid capture.8

Spartan infantry forces: The Spartan battle line (Table 1) was hastily improvised after being

surprised by coalition forces. On the Spartan left, the Sciritae were placed. They were a mountain people

granted limited citizenship rights by the Spartans who usually acted as scouts. Also on the left were the

Brasidians, nationalized Helot troops loyal to the late general killed at Amphipolis and another class of

nationalized troops, neodamodians. In the center were the main Spartan units and some Arcadian allies.

The Spartan right was granted to local Tegeans troops and a division of Spartans.9

Coalition Infantry Forces: The coalition forces had already prepared their line of battle (Table

1). On the coalition right, opposite the Sciritae, were at least 2,000 skilled Mantinean troops, fighting for

their immediate homeland, plus about 1000 picked men and some mixed units. This wing was meant to

fight the decisive, offensive part of the battle. The rest of the Peloponnesians and smaller contingents

were placed in the middle. The Athenians manned the left of the coalition line, intending to hold firm.

The troops of the coalition center, facing an almost equal number of Spartiates, were screwed. Their only

hope was to hold until the superior numbers of Mantineans could push through on the coalition right and

turn upon the flank of the Spartan center.10

8
Hanson, 153-4.
9
Hanson, 155-6.
Thucycides, 5:67
Kagan, 235.
Paul Cartledge, The Spartans: The World of the Warrior-Heroes of Ancient Greece, from Utopia to Crisis and
Collapse, (Woodstock, New York: Overlook Press, 2002), 188.
10
Hanson, 155-6.
Thucycides, 5:67.
Kagan, 235.
Cartledge, 188.
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Table 1 – Order of Battle

<(right) Spartan Forces (left)>

Tegeans – 3000 men c. 3800 Spartiates 300 horse
c 1000 Spartiates Hippeis – 300 Spartan knights 600 Sciritae
300 horse Hereans – 500 men Brasidians
Maenalli – 500 men Neodamodians

Athenians – 1000 men Peloponnesian units – over 4000 men Mantineans – 2000 men
300 Athenian horse Cleonaeans & Orneate – 500 men Mixed Arcadians – 500 men
300 other horse Peloponnesian elite – 1000 men
<(left) Athenian Forces (right)>

As the two lines approached each other (Figure 1), their right wings shifted to the right, as men

worked to shield their unprotected sides with their neighbor’s shield. As the forces took their alignment

―to the right‖, the entire line gradually shifted as well.11

Figure 1.

The tendency for forces to drift caused the flank of the Mantineans, on the coalition right, to

extend beyond the left of the Spartan line of battle by time of contact (Figure 2). The Spartans were also

extended beyond the Athenians on their right. King Agis, observing the shift, worried that the coalition

might be able to turn his left flank. Just before contact, he attempted to correct the problem by first

11
Bradford, 88.
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David G. Terrell

ordering the Sciritae to shift left; forming a gap in his line, but refusing the flanking maneuver. He then

ordered two Spartan units on his far right to break off and redeploy to the left, into the gap. The

commanders of the units refused this unprecedented attempt at tactical redeployment, saying they were

already on the march. They were later convicted of cowardice and exiled. The two lines met with the gap

intact. 12

Figure 2.

The right wings of both sides pushed through their respective opponents. (Figure 3) The Spartan

right pushed the Athenians back and into the rough ground. The Spartan center shattered the units of the

coalition center, pushing a gap in the line. The Mantineans pushed the Sciritae and free Helots back and

acted as if they had won the war, pursing them relentlessly. Had they stopped at this point, while the

Sciritae were fleeing, and turned on the Spartan center, the result of the battle may have been different.

As each right wing succeeded, the advantage would go to the side that could pivot and take

advantage soonest. The Spartan discipline told. The Spartans on their right, facing the fleeing Athenians

12
Bradford, 88.
Kagan, 236-7.
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David G. Terrell

and Peloponnesian forces, allowed them to depart the scene, though the Athenian cavalry may have

contributed by screening the Athenian withdrawal. In addition to the pressing tactical need to turn the

coalition flank, the lack of pursuit may be due to two political considerations. The Athenians were,

technically, still at peace with Sparta and the other fleeing forces were from poleis Sparta was once, and

might be again, allies.13

Figure 3.

Regardless, the Spartans turned upon the coalition flanks. (Figure 4) Advancing on the

Mantineans, the Spartans destroyed them as a fighting force, rather than letting them flee. This

determined targeting probably arose from their democratic activism in the region. It worked, as Mantinea

would never again fight Sparta in pitched battle.14

13
Hanson, 156-7, 159, 228.
Kagan, 238.
Bradford, 88.
14
Hanson, 160.
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Figure 4

Spartan losses were about 300 men and the coalition force losses were about 1,100 men. After the

battle, Sparta and Argos concluded a 50-year peace treaty. By November, Argos and Mantinea return to

the Spartan alliance.15

Not long, after the battle, 3,000 coalition troops from Elis and another 1,000 from Athens arrived.

Had they been present to stiffen the coalition center, a different outcome may have occurred.16

There are several notable aspects to this battle, perhaps due to the hasty preparations after the

coalition forces achieved tactical surprise on the Spartans. This was the first time the Spartiates had

fought in a major action in mixed regiments alongside allied hoplites. This is the first mention, in the

literature, of the Sciritae, coming from a northern Laconian province. Cartledge conjectures that their

recruitment might indicate Sparta was becoming worried about their mountainous frontiers. This battle

also saw the first use of ex-Helot hoplites in regular line of battle.17

15
Hanson, 33, 152.
Bradford, 88.
16
Kagan, 241.
17
Cartledge, 195.
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David G. Terrell

The Spartan victory restored their confidence and erased some bad luck. A coalition win would

have most certainly increased the resolve of Argos, Elis and Mantinea to continue down a democratically-

oriented path and may have encouraged an overall revolt by the Helots.18

By March of 417 BC, the Spartans had shattered the coalition and adverted catastrophe. However,

Athens’ power was unaffected and Alcibiades, though somewhat tarnished in reputation, continued to

agitate against Sparta.19

David G. Terrell
Herndon, VA

18
Kagan, 241.
Thucycides, 5:75.
19
Kagan, 243.
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David G. Terrell

Works Cited
Adcock, F.E. The Greek and Macedonian Art of War. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1957.

Bradford, Alfred S. With Arrow, Sword, and Spear. New York: Fall River Press, 2001.

Cartledge, Paul. The Spartans: The World of the Warrior-Heroes of Ancient Greece, from Utopia to
Crisis and Collapse. Woodstock, New York: Overlook Press, 2002.

Hanson, Victor Davis. A war like no other: how the Athenians and Spartans fought the Peloponnesian
War. New York: Random House, 2006.

Kagan, Donald. The Peloponnesian War. New York: Penguin Books, 2003.

Martin, Thomas R. Ancient Greece: From Prehistoric to Hellenistic Times. New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1996.

Thucycides. The History of the Peloponnesian War. Translated by Richard Crawley and Donald Lateiner.
New York: Barnes & Noble Books, 2006.

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