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MENDOZA, J.:p
This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals
dated July 15, 1992, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the present petition is partially
granted. The questioned Orders and writs
directing (1) "reinstatement" of respondent
Isabelo T. Crisostomo to the position of
"President of the Polytechnic University of the
Philippines", and (2) payment of "salaries and
benefits" which said respondent failed to
receive during his suspension insofar as such
payment includes those accruing after the
abolition of the PCC and its transfer to the
PUP, are hereby set aside. Accordingly, further
proceedings consistent with this decision may
be taken by the court a quo to determine the
correct amounts due and payable to said
respondent by the said university.
The background of this case is as follows:
Petitioner Isabelo Crisostomo was President of the Philippine
College of Commerce (PCC), having been appointed to that
position by the President of the Philippines on July 17, 1974.
During his incumbency as president of the PCC, two
administrative cases were filed against petitioner for illegal use
of government vehicles, misappropriation of construction
materials belonging to the college, oppression and harassment,
grave misconduct, nepotism and dishonesty. The administrative
cases, which were filed with the Office of the President, were
subsequently referred to the Office of the Solicitor General for
investigation.
Charges of violations of R.A. No. 3019, 3(e) and R.A. No.
992, 20-21 and R.A. No. 733, 14 were likewise filed against
him with the Office of Tanodbayan.
Hence this petition. Petitioner argues that P.D. No. 1341, which
converted the PCC into the PUP, did not abolish the PCC. He
contends that if the law had intended the PCC to lose its
existence, it would have specified that the PCC was being
"abolished" rather than "converted" and that if the PUP was
intended to be a new institution, the law would have said it was
being "created." Petitioner claims that the PUP is merely a
continuation of the existence of the PCC, and, hence, he could
be reinstated to his former position as president.
In part the contention is well taken, but, as will presently be
explained, reinstatement is no longer possible because of the
promulgation of P.D. No. 1437 by the President of the
Philippines on June 10, 1978.
P.D. No. 1341 did not abolish, but only changed, the former
Philippine College of Commerce into what is now the
On April 24, 1992, the Regional Trial Court, through respondent Polytechnic University of the Philippines, in the same way that
earlier in 1952, R.A. No. 778 had converted what was then the
Judge Teresita Dy-Liaco Flores, issued another order,
reiterating her earlier order for the reinstatement of petitioner to Philippine School of Commerce into the Philippine College of
the position of PUP president. A writ of execution, ordering the Commerce. What took place was a change in academic status
of the educational institution, not in its corporate life. Hence the
sheriff to implement the order of reinstatement, was issued.
change in its name, the expansion of its curricular offerings,
In his return dated April 28, 1992, the sheriff stated that he had and the changes in its structure and organization.
executed the writ by installing petitioner as President of the
PUP, although Dr. Gellor did not vacate the office as he wanted As petitioner correctly points out, when the purpose is to
to consult with the President of the Philippines first. This led to abolish a department or an office or an organization and to
replace it with another one, the lawmaking authority says so.
a contempt citation against Dr. Gellor. A hearing was set on
He cites the following examples:
May 7, 1992. On May 5, 1992, petitioner also moved to cite
Department of Education, Culture and Sports Secretary Isidro
Cario in contempt of court. Petitioner assumed the office of
E.O. No. 709:
president of the PUP.
1. There is hereby created a Ministry of Trade
On May 18, 1992, therefore, the People of the Philippines filed
and Industry, hereinafter referred to as the
a petition for certiorari and prohibition (CA G.R. No. 27931),
Ministry. The existing Ministry of Trade
assailing the two orders and the writs of execution issued by
established pursuant to Presidential Decree
the trial court. It also asked for a temporary restraining order.
No. 721 as amended, and the existing Ministry
established pursuant to Presidential Decree
No. 488 as amended, are abolished together
On June 25, 1992, the Court of Appeals issued a temporary
with their services, bureaus and similar
restraining order, enjoining petitioner to cease and desist from
agencies, regional offices, and all other entities
acting as president of the PUP pursuant to the reinstatement
under their supervision and control.
orders of the trial court, and enjoining further proceedings in
Criminal Cases Nos. VI-2329-2331.
E.O. No. 710:
On July 15, 1992, the Seventh Division of the Court of Appeals
rendered a decision, 2 the dispositive portion of which is set
1. There is hereby created a Ministry of Public
forth at the beginning of this opinion. Said decision set aside
Works and Highways, hereinafter referred to
the orders and writ of reinstatement issued by the trial court.
as the Ministry. The existing Ministry of Public
The payment of salaries and benefits to petitioner accruing
Works established pursuant to Executive Order
after the conversion of the PCC to the PUP was disallowed.
No. 546 as amended, and the existing Ministry
Recovery of salaries and benefits was limited to those accruing
of Public Highways established pursuant to
from the time of petitioner's suspension until the conversion of
Presidential Decree No. 458 as amended, are
the PCC to the PUP. The case was remanded to the trial court
abolished together with their services, bureaus
for a determination of the amounts due and payable to
and similar agencies, regional offices, and all
petitioner.
other entities within their supervision and
control. . . .
six (6) years, renewable for another term of six (6) years, and
authorizing the President of the Philippines to terminate the
terms of incumbents who were not reappointed. P.D. No. 1437
provides:
6. The head of the university or college shall
be known as the President of the university or
college. He shall be qualified for the position
and appointed for a term of six (6) years by the
President of the Philippines upon
recommendation of the Secretary of Education
and Culture after consulting with the Board
which may be renewed for another term upon
recommendation of the Secretary of Education
and Culture after consulting the Board. In case
of vacancy by reason of death, absence or
resignation, the Secretary of Education and
Culture shall have the authority to designate
an officer in charge of the college or university
pending the appointment of the President.
The powers and duties of the President of the
university or college, in addition to those
specifically provided for in this Decree shall be
those usually pertaining to the office of the
president of a university or college.
7. The incumbent president of a chartered
state college or university whose term may be
terminated according to this Decree, shall be
entitled to full retirement benefits: provided that
he has served the government for at least
twenty (20) years; and provided, further that in
case the number of years served is less than
20 years, he shall be entitled to one month pay
for every year of service.
In this case, Dr. Pablo T. Mateo Jr., who had been acting
president of the university since April 3, 1979, was appointed
president of PUP for a term of six (6) years on March 28, 1980,
with the result that petitioner's term was cut short. In
accordance with 7 of the law, therefore, petitioner became
entitled only to retirement benefits or the payment of separation
pay. Petitioner must have recognized this fact, that is why in
1992 he asked then President Aquino to consider him for
appointment to the same position after it had become vacant in
consequence of the retirement of Dr. Prudente.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
MODIFIED by SETTING ASIDE the questioned orders of the
Regional Trial Court directing the reinstatement of the petitioner
Isabelo T. Crisostomo to the position of president of the
Polytechnic University of the Philippines and the payment to
him of salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during
his suspension in so far as such payment would include
salaries accruing after March 28, 1980 when petitioner
Batasan to make, not for this Court, which deals only with the
question of power. It bears mentioning that in Brillo v.
Eage 56 this Court, in an unanimous opinion penned by the
late Justice Diokno, citing Zandueta v. De la Costa, ruled: "La
segunda question que el recurrrido plantea es que la Carta de
Tacloban ha abolido el puesto. Si efectivamente ha sido
abolido el cargo, entonces ha quedado extinguido el derecho
de recurente a ocuparlo y a cobrar el salario
correspodiente. Mc Culley vs. State, 46 LRA, 567. El derecho
de un juez de desempenarlo hasta los 70 aos de edad o se
incapacite no priva al Congreso de su facultad de abolir,
fusionar o reorganizar juzgados no
constitucionales." 57 Nonetheless, such well-established
principle was not held applicable to the situation there
obtaining, the Charter of Tacloban City creating a city court in
place of the former justice of the peace court. Thus: "Pero en el
caso de autos el Juzgado de Tacloban no ha sido abolido. Solo
se le ha cambiado el nombre con el cambio de forma del
gobierno local." 58 The present case is anything but that.
Petitioners did not and could not prove that the challenged
statute was not within the bounds of legislative authority.
7. This opinion then could very well stop at this point. The
implementation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, concededly a
task incumbent on the Executive, may give rise, however, to
questions affecting a judiciary that should be kept independent.
The all-embracing scope of the assailed legislation as far as all
inferior courts from the Courts of Appeals to municipal courts
are concerned, with the exception solely of the Sandiganbayan
and the Court of Tax Appeals 59 gave rise, and understandably
so, to misgivings as to its effect on such cherished Ideal. The
first paragraph of the section on the transitory provision reads:
"The provisions of this Act shall be immediately carried out in
accordance with an Executive Order to be issued by the
President. The Court of Appeals, the Courts of First Instance,
the Circuit Criminal Courts, the Juvenile and Domestic
6. A few more words on the question of abolition. In the above- Relations Courts, the Courts of Agrarian Relations, the City
cited opinion of Justice Laurel in Zandueta, reference was
Courts, the Municipal Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Courts
made to Act No. 2347 46 on the reorganization of the Courts of
shall continue to function as presently constituted and
First Instance and to Act No. 4007 47 on the reorganization of all organized, until the completion of the reorganization provided
branches of the government, including the courts of first
in this Act as declared by the President. Upon such declaration,
instance. In both of them, the then Courts of First Instance
the said courts shall be deemed automatically abolished and
were replaced by new courts with the same appellation. As
the incumbents thereof shall cease to hold the office." 60 There
Justice Laurel pointed out, there was no question as to the fact is all the more reason then why this Court has no choice but to
of abolition. He was equally categorical as to Commonwealth
inquire further into the allegation by petitioners that the security
Act No. 145, where also the system of the courts of first
of tenure provision, an assurance of a judiciary free from
instance was provided for expressly. It was pointed out by
extraneous influences, is thereby reduced to a barren form of
Justice Laurel that the mere creation of an entirely new district words. The amended Constitution adheres even more clearly
of the same court is valid and constitutional. such conclusion
to the long-established tradition of a strong executive that
flowing "from the fundamental proposition that the legislature
antedated the 1935 Charter. As noted in the work of former
may abolish courts inferior to the Supreme Court and therefore Vice-Governor Hayden, a noted political scientist, President
may reorganize them territorially or otherwise thereby
Claro M. Recto of the 1934 Convention, in his closing address,
necessitating new appointments and commissions." 48 The
in stressing such a concept, categorically spoke of providing
challenged statute creates an intermediate appellate
"an executive power which, subject to the fiscalization of the
court, 49 regional trial courts, 50 metropolitan trial courts of the
Assembly, and of public opinion, will not only know how to
national capital region, 51 and other metropolitan trial
govern, but will actually govern, with a firm and steady hand,
courts, 52 municipal trial courts in cities, 53 as well as in
unembarrassed by vexatious interferences by other
municipalities, 54 and municipal circuit trial courts. 55 There is
departments, or by unholy alliances with this and that social
even less reason then to doubt the fact that existing inferior
group." 61 The above excerpt was cited with approval by Justice
courts were abolished. For the Batasang Pambansa, the
Laurel in Planas v. Gil. 62 Moreover, under the 1981
establishment of such new inferior courts was the appropriate
Amendments, it may be affirmed that once again the principle
response to the grave and urgent problems that pressed for
of separation of powers, to quote from the same jurist
solution. Certainly, there could be differences of opinion as to
as ponente in Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 "obtains not
the appropriate remedy. The choice, however, was for the
through express provision but by actual division." 64 The
president, under Article VII, shall be the head of state and chief
executive of the Republic of the Philippines." 65 Moreover, it is
equally therein expressly provided that all the powers he
possessed under the 1935 Constitution are once again vested
in him unless the Batasang Pambansa provides
otherwise." 66 Article VII of the 1935 Constitution speaks
categorically: "The Executive power shall be vested in a
President of the Philippines." 67 As originally framed, the 1973
Constitution created the position of President as the "symbolic
head of state." 68 In addition, there was a provision for a Prime
Minister as the head of government exercising the executive
power with the assistance of the Cabinet 69 Clearly, a modified
parliamentary system was established. In the light of the 1981
amendments though, this Court in Free Telephone Workers
Union v. Minister of Labor 70 could state: "The adoption of
certain aspects of a parliamentary system in the amended
Constitution does not alter its essentially presidential
character." 71 The retention, however, of the position of the
Prime Minister with the Cabinet, a majority of the members of
which shall come from the regional representatives of the
Batasang Pambansa and the creation of an Executive
Committee composed of the Prime Minister as Chairman and
not more than fourteen other members at least half of whom
shall be members of the Batasang Pambansa, clearly indicate
the evolving nature of the system of government that is now
operative. 72 What is equally apparent is that the strongest ties
bind the executive and legislative departments. It is likewise
undeniable that the Batasang Pambansa retains its full
authority to enact whatever legislation may be necessary to
carry out national policy as usually formulated in a caucus of
the majority party. It is understandable then why in Fortun v.
Labang 73 it was stressed that with the provision transferring to
the Supreme Court administrative supervision over the
Judiciary, there is a greater need "to preserve unimpaired the
independence of the judiciary, especially so at present, where
to all intents and purposes, there is a fusion between the
executive and the legislative branches." 74
8. To be more specific, petitioners contend that the abolition of
the existing inferior courts collides with the security of tenure
enjoyed by incumbent Justices and judges under Article X,
Section 7 of the Constitution. There was a similar provision in
the 1935 Constitution. It did not, however, go as far as
conferring on this Tribunal the power to supervise
administratively inferior courts. 75 Moreover, this Court is em
powered "to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of
at least eight members, order their dismissal." 76 Thus it
possesses the competence to remove judges. Under the
Judiciary Act, it was the President who was vested with such
power. 77 Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from
termination by virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be
no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in
law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an
occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that
sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any
impairment of security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless,
for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one
of separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists between
removal and the abolition of the office. Realistically, it is devoid
of significance. He ceases to be a member of the judiciary. In
the implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it
would be in accordance with accepted principles of
constitutional construction that as far as incumbent justices and
judges are concerned, this Court be consulted and that its view
10. There are other objections raised but they pose no difficulty.
Petitioners would characterize as an undue delegation of
legislative power to the President the grant of authority to fix
the compensation and the allowances of the Justices and
judges thereafter appointed. A more careful reading of the
challenged Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 ought to have cautioned
them against raising such an issue. The language of the statute
is quite clear. The questioned provisions reads as follows:
"Intermediate Appellate Justices, Regional Trial Judges,
Metropolitan Trial Judges, municipal Trial Judges, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Judges shall receive such receive such
compensation and allowances as may be authorized by the
President along the guidelines set forth in Letter of
Implementation No. 93 pursuant to Presidential Decree No.
985, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1597." 87 The
existence of a standard is thus clear. The basic postulate that
underlies the doctrine of non-delegation is that it is the
legislative body which is entrusted with the competence to
make laws and to alter and repeal them, the test being the
completeness of the statue in all its terms and provisions when
enacted. As pointed out in Edu v. Ericta: 88 "To avoid the taint of
unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at
the very least that the legislature itself determines matters of
principle and lays down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the
charge of complete abdication may be hard to repel. A standard
thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its
boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It
indicates the circumstances under which the legislative
command is to be effected. It is the criterion by which
legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the
11. On the morning of the hearing of this petition on September
executive or administrative office designated may in pursuance 8, 1981, petitioners sought to have the writer of this opinion
of the above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and
and Justices Ramon C. Aquino and Ameurfina Melencio-
One notable change between the old and the new set up is that
Judges of these Courts will now be Presidential appointees
unlike presently where the incumbent Judges are merely
designated by the Supreme Court in an Administrative Order to
sit in existing Municipal Courts and Municipal Circuit Courts.
incidence of "undue" delegation of legislative power, as to avert conceded that otherwise he would go with the majority that
the abdication thereof.
"Congress may not, as a general rule, abolish a judicial post
without allowing the incumbent to finish his term of office."
In times of war or other national emergency,
the Batasang Pambansa may by law authorize 2. As then Associate, later Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon
the President for a limited period and subject
remarked in his separate opinion "(T)he [adverse] outcome
to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to
of this litigation [sanctioning the ouster from office of the ten
exercise powers necessary and proper to carry petitioners who were presiding different Courts of First
out a declared national policy. Unless sooner
Instance, some as judges-at-large, others as cadastral judges,
withdrawn by resolution of the Batasang
upon the enactment on June 19, 1954 of R.A. 1186 abolishing
Pambansa, such powers shall cease upon its
the positions of judges-at large and cadastral judges] is apt to
next adjournment. (Art. VIII, Sec. 15.)
revive the speculation whether wittingly or unwittingly the
Constitution has further weakened the usually weak judicial
department because of its 'innovative' requirement of a 2/3
The Batasang Pambansa may by law
majority vote of the Supreme Court to declare a statute
authorize the President to fix within specified
unconstitutional, and 'never in our history has such a number of
this and subject to such stations and
judges of first instance [totalling 33 positions] been ousted
restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates,
through judicial reorganization.
import and export quotas, tonnage and
wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts.
[Ibid, Sec. 17(2).]
His rationale that the express constitutional guaranty of security
of tenure of judges "during good behavior until they reach the
age of seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the
duties of their office" 4 must prevail over the implied
constitutional authority to abolish courts and to oust the judges
TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:
despite their constitutionally-secured tenure bears repeating
thus:
Undoubtedly, no more crucial and transcendental issue of such
magnitude has confronted the Philippine judiciary than in the
A careful analysis will perceive that whereas
present case. The challenged Act, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129
petitioners invoke an express guaranty
by its title would reorganize all existing courts (except the nineor positivedefinition of their term of office, the
1
member Sandiganbayan and the three- member Court of Tax
respondents rely on implied authority to
Appeals) and upon declaration by the President of the
abolish courts and the positions of the
completion of the reorganization would unprecedentedly deem
respective judges. Accurately stated,
all the said courts "automatically abolished en masse and "the
respondents' defense rests on
2
incumbents thereof shall cease to hold office." The total
a secondinference deduced from
abolition involves a total of 1,663 judicial positions with 1,180
such implied power, because they reason out
incumbent judges and 483 vacancies) as of January 26, 1982
thusly: Congress has express power to
and the Act would effect an increase of 230 judicial positions
establish courts; therefore it has implicit power
raising the total of judicial positions to be filled by new
to abolish courts and the positions of judges of
appointments to 1,893. Notwithstanding the great deference
such abolished courts (first inference); and
due to enactments of the Batasan, I regretably find myself
therefore (second inference) Congress
unable to join the ranks of my esteemed colleagues in the
likewise has power to eject the judges holding
majority who uphold the constitutionality of the Act and have
such positions.
voted to dismiss the petition, for the following main
considerations and reasons:
Resulting juridical situation.
The implied authority invoked by respondents
1. I go by the ruling of the numerical majority of seven Justices
collides with the expressguaranty of tenure
(namely, Pablo, Cesar Bengzon, Montemayor, Jugo, Bautista,
protecting the petitioners. Which shall prevail
Roberto Concepcion and J.B.L. Reyes, JJ.) in the leading 1955
Obviously the express guaranty must override
3
case of Ocampo who fell short by one vote to reach the
the implied authority. "Implications can never
constitutionally required 2/3 majority (at the time 8 out of an 11be permitted to contradict the expressed intent
member Supreme Court) to declare unconstitutional and invalid
or to defeat its purpose."
section 3 of Republic Act 1186 abolishing the positions of 18
judges-at-large and 15 cadastral judges and removing or
legislating out the incumbent judges from office as against the
contrary vote of a minority of 4 Justices (namely, then Chief
Justice Paras and Padilla, Alex Reyes and Labrador, JJ.) with
the paradoxical situation that the last three named Justices
voted for the validity of the Act as a remedial measure that
abolished said positions without permanent station which
subjected them to a rigodon de jueces without the consent of
the Supreme Court, which they considered as "repulsive to an
independent judiciary" and violative of an express prohibitory
provision of the 1935 Constitution while Justice Alex Reyes
10. The Chief Justice, in his opinion for the Court, equally
stressed that "what is equally apparent is that the strongest ties
bind the executive and legislative departments. It is likewise
undeniable that the Batasang Pambansa retains its full
authority to enact whatever legislation may be necessary to
carry out national policy as usually formulated in a caucus of
the majority party. It is understandable then why in Fortun vs.
Labang 18 it as stressed that with the provision transferring to
the Supreme Court administrative supervision over the
Judiciary, there is a greater need 'to preserve unimpaired the
independence of the judiciary, especially so at present, where
9. The judges' security of tenure was rendered nugatory by the to all intends and purposes, there is a fusion between the
Transitory Provisions of the 1973 Constitution which granted
executive and the legislative branches,'" 19 with the further
the incumbent President the unlimited power to remove and
observation that "many are the ways by which such
replace all judges and officials 16 (as against the limited oneindependence could be eroded." In the cited case of Judge
year period for the exercise of such power granted President
Fortun (likewise penned by the Chief Justice for the Court), the
Quezon in the 1935 Constitution upon establishment of the
Court issued a writ of prohibition and certiorari ordering the
Philippine Commonwealth Upon the declaration of martial law
dismissal of the criminal complaint filed with respondent fiscal
in September, 1972, justices and judges of all courts, except
Labang by "disgruntled members of the bar with a record of
the Supreme Court, had been required to hand in their
losing cases" in the judge's court and imposed the penalty of
resignations. There is listed a total of 53 judges who were
censure on each and everyone of the private respondentsreplaced or whose resignations were accepted by the
lawyers for the "unseemly haste" with which they filed the
President during the period from September, 1972 to April,
criminal complaint, abetted by "the appearance of sheer
1976. The power to replace even the judges
vindictiveness or oppressive exercise of state authority." The
appointed after the effectivity on January 17, 1973 of the 1973 Court marked the "violation of the cardinal principles of fairness
Constitution is yet invoked on behalf of the President in the
and due process that underlie the Rule of Law. Petitionerpending case of Tapucar vs. Famador 17notwithstanding the
Judge was not heard; he was denied the opportunity to defend
generally held view that such post-1973 Constitution appointed himself against the accusation. There was, on the part of
judges are not subject to the Replacement Clause of the cited
private respondents then, a failure to abide by a Resolution of
Transitory Provision. (In this case, petitioner judge appointed
the Integrated Bar stressing that precisely integration could
on January 30, 1976 as judge of the Court of First Instance of
shield 'the judiciary which traditionally cannot defend itself
Agusan del Norte and Butuan City, Branch 1, invoked his
except within its own forum, from the assaults that politics and
constitutional security of tenure and questioned the
self-interest may level at it, and assist it to maintain its integrity,
appointment extended on February 26, 1980 to respondent to
impartiality and independence,' " and that such subjection of a
replace him, although he had not been removed or otherwise
judge to public "harassment and humiliation . . . can diminish
dismissed from his position nor had be resigned therefrom. The public confidence in the courts."
Court per its March 27, 1980 resolution ordered both to refrain
from discharging the functions of the questioned office And now 11. This brings us to the allegedly underlying need for B.P. Blg.
comes this total abolition of 1,663 judicial positions (and
129 discussed in the course of committee hearings of Cabinet
thousands of personnel positions) unprecedented in its sweep Bill No. 42 and the deliberation on second reading in the
and scope. The urgent need is to strengthen the judiciary with
Batasang Pambansa to rid the judiciary of incompetent and
the restoration of the security of tenure of judges, which is
corrupt judges and to restore confidence in the integrity of the
essential for a free and independent judiciary as mandated by
courts. The purge has been the constant subject of headlines
the Constitution, not to make more enfeebled an already feeble and editorials, with the Ministry of Justice's Integrity Council
judiciary, possessed neither of the power of the sword nor the
reportedly screening and conducting "integrity tests as to new
purse, as decried by former Chief Justice Bengzon in
applicants and the incumbent judges 20 and seeking
hisOcampo majority opinion:
"confidential information on corrupt and incompetent judges to
help the government purge the judiciary." 21 Prime Minister
Cesar Virata was quoted as saying that "there will be a purge
Separate Opinions
BARREDO, J., concurring:
courts Why legislate out the judges Why not amend the Rules
of Court only Is abolition of all courts the proper remedy to
weed out corrupt and misfits in our Judiciary? may not be
inquired into by Us. "It is not the province of the courts to
supervise legislation and keep it within the bounds of propriety
and common sense. That is primarily and exclusively a
legislative concern." 16 The Courts "are not supposed to
override legitimate policy and ... never inquire into the wisdom
of the law." 17 Chief Justice Fernando who penned
the Morfe decision, writes that while "(i)t is thus settled, to
paraphrase Chief Justice Concepcion in Gonzales v.
Commission on Elections, that only congressional power or
competence, not the wisdom of the action taken, may be the
basis for declaring a statute invalid," 18 he adds that it is "useful
to recall what was so clearly stated by Laurel that 'the Judiciary
in the determination of actual cases and controversies must
reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed
through their representatives in the executive and legislative
departments of the government.'" 19 In any case, petitioners
have not shown an iota of proof of bad faith. There is no factual
foundation of bad faith on record. And I do not consider the
statement in the sponsorship speech for Cabinet Bill No. 42 of
Minister of Justice Ricardo J. Puno that the Bill would be a
more efficient vehicle of "eliminating incompetent and unfit
Judges as indicative of impermissible legislative motive. 20
It may be true that while the remedy or solution formulated by
the legislation will eradicate hopefully or at least minimize the
evils and ills that infect and pester the judicial body, it will result
in the actual removal of the Justices of the Court of Appeals
and Judges of the lower courts. It is also true that whether it is
termed abolition of office or removal from office, the end-result
is the same termination of the services of these incumbents.
Indeed, the law may be harsh, but that is the law. Dura lex sed
lex.
The Justices and Judges directly affected by the law, being
lawyers, should know or are expected to know the nature and
concept of a public office. It is created for the purpose of
effecting the ends for which government has been instituted,
which are for the common good, and not the profit, honor or
private interest of any one man, family or class of men. In our
form of government, it is fundamental that public offices are
public trust, and that the person to be appointed should be
selected solely with a view to the public welfare. 21 In the last
analysis, a public office is a privilege in the gift of the State. 22
There is no such thing as a vested interest or an estate in an
office, or even an absolute right to hold office. Excepting
constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as
regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any
vested right in an office or its salary. When an office is created
by the Constitution, it cannot be abolished by the legislature,
but when created by the State under the authority of the
Constitution, it may be abolished by statute and the incumbent
deprived of his office. 23 Acceptance of a judicial appointment
must be deemed as adherence to the rule that "when the court
is abolished, any unexpired term is abolished also. The Judge
of such a court takes office with that encumbrance and
knowledge." 24 "The Judge's right to his full term and his full
salary are not dependent alone upon his good conduct, but
also upon the contingency that the legislature may for the
public good, in ordaining and establishing the courts, from time
to time consider his office unnecessary and abolish it." 25
One notable change between the old and the new set up is that
Judges of these Courts will now be Presidential appointees
unlike presently where the incumbent Judges are merely
designated by the Supreme Court in an Administrative Order to
sit in existing Municipal Courts and Municipal Circuit Courts.
incidence of "undue" delegation of legislative power, as to avert conceded that otherwise he would go with the majority that
the abdication thereof.
"Congress may not, as a general rule, abolish a judicial post
without allowing the incumbent to finish his term of office."
In times of war or other national emergency,
the Batasang Pambansa may by law authorize 2. As then Associate, later Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon
the President for a limited period and subject
remarked in his separate opinion "(T)he [adverse] outcome
to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to
of this litigation [sanctioning the ouster from office of the ten
exercise powers necessary and proper to carry petitioners who were presiding different Courts of First
out a declared national policy. Unless sooner
Instance, some as judges-at-large, others as cadastral judges,
withdrawn by resolution of the Batasang
upon the enactment on June 19, 1954 of R.A. 1186 abolishing
Pambansa, such powers shall cease upon its
the positions of judges-at large and cadastral judges] is apt to
next adjournment. (Art. VIII, Sec. 15.)
revive the speculation whether wittingly or unwittingly the
Constitution has further weakened the usually weak judicial
department because of its 'innovative' requirement of a 2/3
The Batasang Pambansa may by law
majority vote of the Supreme Court to declare a statute
authorize the President to fix within specified
unconstitutional, and 'never in our history has such a number of
this and subject to such stations and
judges of first instance [totalling 33 positions] been ousted
restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates,
through judicial reorganization.
import and export quotas, tonnage and
wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts.
[Ibid, Sec. 17(2).]
His rationale that the express constitutional guaranty of security
of tenure of judges "during good behavior until they reach the
age of seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the
duties of their office" 4 must prevail over the implied
constitutional authority to abolish courts and to oust the judges
TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:
despite their constitutionally-secured tenure bears repeating
thus:
Undoubtedly, no more crucial and transcendental issue of such
magnitude has confronted the Philippine judiciary than in the
A careful analysis will perceive that whereas
present case. The challenged Act, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129
petitioners invoke an express guaranty
by its title would reorganize all existing courts (except the nineor positivedefinition of their term of office, the
1
member Sandiganbayan and the three- member Court of Tax
respondents rely on implied authority to
Appeals) and upon declaration by the President of the
abolish courts and the positions of the
completion of the reorganization would unprecedentedly deem
respective judges. Accurately stated,
all the said courts "automatically abolished en masse and "the
respondents' defense rests on
2
incumbents thereof shall cease to hold office." The total
a secondinference deduced from
abolition involves a total of 1,663 judicial positions with 1,180
such implied power, because they reason out
incumbent judges and 483 vacancies) as of January 26, 1982
thusly: Congress has express power to
and the Act would effect an increase of 230 judicial positions
establish courts; therefore it has implicit power
raising the total of judicial positions to be filled by new
to abolish courts and the positions of judges of
appointments to 1,893. Notwithstanding the great deference
such abolished courts (first inference); and
due to enactments of the Batasan, I regretably find myself
therefore (second inference) Congress
unable to join the ranks of my esteemed colleagues in the
likewise has power to eject the judges holding
majority who uphold the constitutionality of the Act and have
such positions.
voted to dismiss the petition, for the following main
considerations and reasons:
Resulting juridical situation.
The implied authority invoked by respondents
1. I go by the ruling of the numerical majority of seven Justices
collides with the expressguaranty of tenure
(namely, Pablo, Cesar Bengzon, Montemayor, Jugo, Bautista,
protecting the petitioners. Which shall prevail
Roberto Concepcion and J.B.L. Reyes, JJ.) in the leading 1955
Obviously the express guaranty must override
3
case of Ocampo who fell short by one vote to reach the
the implied authority. "Implications can never
constitutionally required 2/3 majority (at the time 8 out of an 11be permitted to contradict the expressed intent
member Supreme Court) to declare unconstitutional and invalid
or to defeat its purpose."
section 3 of Republic Act 1186 abolishing the positions of 18
judges-at-large and 15 cadastral judges and removing or
legislating out the incumbent judges from office as against the
contrary vote of a minority of 4 Justices (namely, then Chief
Justice Paras and Padilla, Alex Reyes and Labrador, JJ.) with
the paradoxical situation that the last three named Justices
voted for the validity of the Act as a remedial measure that
abolished said positions without permanent station which
subjected them to a rigodon de jueces without the consent of
the Supreme Court, which they considered as "repulsive to an
independent judiciary" and violative of an express prohibitory
provision of the 1935 Constitution while Justice Alex Reyes
10. The Chief Justice, in his opinion for the Court, equally
stressed that "what is equally apparent is that the strongest ties
bind the executive and legislative departments. It is likewise
undeniable that the Batasang Pambansa retains its full
authority to enact whatever legislation may be necessary to
carry out national policy as usually formulated in a caucus of
the majority party. It is understandable then why in Fortun vs.
Labang 18 it as stressed that with the provision transferring to
the Supreme Court administrative supervision over the
Judiciary, there is a greater need 'to preserve unimpaired the
independence of the judiciary, especially so at present, where
9. The judges' security of tenure was rendered nugatory by the to all intends and purposes, there is a fusion between the
Transitory Provisions of the 1973 Constitution which granted
executive and the legislative branches,'" 19 with the further
the incumbent President the unlimited power to remove and
observation that "many are the ways by which such
replace all judges and officials 16 (as against the limited oneindependence could be eroded." In the cited case of Judge
year period for the exercise of such power granted President
Fortun (likewise penned by the Chief Justice for the Court), the
Quezon in the 1935 Constitution upon establishment of the
Court issued a writ of prohibition and certiorari ordering the
Philippine Commonwealth Upon the declaration of martial law
dismissal of the criminal complaint filed with respondent fiscal
in September, 1972, justices and judges of all courts, except
Labang by "disgruntled members of the bar with a record of
the Supreme Court, had been required to hand in their
losing cases" in the judge's court and imposed the penalty of
resignations. There is listed a total of 53 judges who were
censure on each and everyone of the private respondentsreplaced or whose resignations were accepted by the
lawyers for the "unseemly haste" with which they filed the
President during the period from September, 1972 to April,
criminal complaint, abetted by "the appearance of sheer
1976. The power to replace even the judges
vindictiveness or oppressive exercise of state authority." The
appointed after the effectivity on January 17, 1973 of the 1973 Court marked the "violation of the cardinal principles of fairness
Constitution is yet invoked on behalf of the President in the
and due process that underlie the Rule of Law. Petitionerpending case of Tapucar vs. Famador 17notwithstanding the
Judge was not heard; he was denied the opportunity to defend
generally held view that such post-1973 Constitution appointed himself against the accusation. There was, on the part of
judges are not subject to the Replacement Clause of the cited
private respondents then, a failure to abide by a Resolution of
Transitory Provision. (In this case, petitioner judge appointed
the Integrated Bar stressing that precisely integration could
on January 30, 1976 as judge of the Court of First Instance of
shield 'the judiciary which traditionally cannot defend itself
Agusan del Norte and Butuan City, Branch 1, invoked his
except within its own forum, from the assaults that politics and
constitutional security of tenure and questioned the
self-interest may level at it, and assist it to maintain its integrity,
appointment extended on February 26, 1980 to respondent to
impartiality and independence,' " and that such subjection of a
replace him, although he had not been removed or otherwise
judge to public "harassment and humiliation . . . can diminish
dismissed from his position nor had be resigned therefrom. The public confidence in the courts."
Court per its March 27, 1980 resolution ordered both to refrain
from discharging the functions of the questioned office And now 11. This brings us to the allegedly underlying need for B.P. Blg.
comes this total abolition of 1,663 judicial positions (and
129 discussed in the course of committee hearings of Cabinet
thousands of personnel positions) unprecedented in its sweep Bill No. 42 and the deliberation on second reading in the
and scope. The urgent need is to strengthen the judiciary with
Batasang Pambansa to rid the judiciary of incompetent and
the restoration of the security of tenure of judges, which is
corrupt judges and to restore confidence in the integrity of the
essential for a free and independent judiciary as mandated by
courts. The purge has been the constant subject of headlines
the Constitution, not to make more enfeebled an already feeble and editorials, with the Ministry of Justice's Integrity Council
judiciary, possessed neither of the power of the sword nor the
reportedly screening and conducting "integrity tests as to new
purse, as decried by former Chief Justice Bengzon in
applicants and the incumbent judges 20 and seeking
hisOcampo majority opinion:
"confidential information on corrupt and incompetent judges to
help the government purge the judiciary." 21 Prime Minister
Cesar Virata was quoted as saying that "there will be a purge
Although the elections are now over, the issues raised in this
case are likely to arise again in future elections of officers of
the Liga ng mga Barangay. For one thing, doubt may be cast
on the validity of the acts of those elected. For another, this
comes within the rule that courts will decide a question which is
otherwise moot and academic if it is "capable of repetition, yet
evading review." 1
1.6 Auditor
ARTICLE VI
OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS
Sec. 1. Organization of Board of Directors of
Local Chapters. The chapters shall directly
elect their respective officers, namely, a
president; executive vice president; first,
second, and third vice presidents; auditor; and
create such
other
positions as it
may deem
necessary for
the
management
of the chapter.
Pending
election of
presidents of
the municipal,
city,
provincial, and
metropolitan
chapters of
the liga, the
incumbent
presidents of
the
association of
barangay
councils in the
municipality,
city, province,
and
Metropolitan
Manila shall
continue to
act as
presidents of
the
corresponding
chapters
under this
Rule.
(Emphasis
supplied).
(2) A
secretarygeneral shall
be elected
from among
the members
(3) The board
of the national
of directors
liga who shall
shall
be
coordinate the
responsible
activities of
for the overall
the various
operation of
chapters of
the liga.
the liga.
Pending
election of a
It may readily be observed that Section 493 of the LGC and
secretaryArticle 211(f) of the Implementing Rules are clear that the
general under officers of the national liga and its local chapters are: (1) the
President, (2) Vice President and (3) five (5) members of the
Board of Directors. In turn, it is the Board of Directors which
appoints the secretary and treasurer and is empowered to
"create such other positions as it may deem necessary for the
management of the chapter concerned." It is, therefore,
unequivocally clear that only the Board of Directors and not
any other body which is vested with the power to create
other positions as may be necessary for the management of
the chapter.
The ponencia maintains that since the questioned positions
were provided for in the Constitution and By-Laws of the Liga
ng Mga Barangay adopted during its First Barangay National
Assembly on 11 January 1994, then such additional positions
"were as much the creations of the local chapters as of the
national league. The barangay themselves, through the
constitution and by-laws of their liga, created the additional
positions without precluding the boards of directors of the
chapters as well as that of the national liga from creating other
positions."
I beg to differ. In the first place, I am unable to find any
provision of the LGC creating or establishing the Barangay
National Assembly. What the LGC has created is the Liga ng
Mga Barangay (Sec. 491) with local chapters at the municipal,
city, provincial and metropolitan subdivision levels (Sec. 492).
Under the Implementing Rules of the LGC (Art. 211[e][4]), the
National Liga Ng Mga Barangay is composed of the duly
elected presidents of highly urbanized city chapters, provincial
chapters and metropolitan chapters.
Pursuant to Article 211[f][2] of the Implementing Rules, the
members of the Board of the Pambansang Katipunan ng Mga
Barangay, headed by the Secretary-General, were constituted
into a committee to exercise the powers and duties of the
national liga and draft or amend the Constitution and By-Laws
of the Liga. There is at all no showing that this committee was
the so-called First Barangay National Assembly which
convened on 11 January 1994.
Second, even assuming that the committee was the so-called
First Barangay National Assembly of 11 January 1994, said
committee was not authorized to create, by virtue of the
Constitution and By-Laws it enacted additional positions for the
national liga and the liga at the local levels. The
aforementioned Article 211(g), limits the power of this
committee, as follows:
(g) Constitution and By-Laws of the Liga
(1) All other
matters not
provided
under this
Rule affecting
the internal
organization
of the liga
shall be
governed by
its constitution
and by-laws,
unless
inconsistent
with the
Constitution
and applicable
laws, rules
and
regulations.
(2) The
committee
created in this
Article shall
formulate
uniform
constitution
and by-laws
applicable to
the national
liga and all
local chapters.
The
committee
shall convene
the national
liga to ratify
the
constitution
and by-laws
within six (6)
months from
issuance of
these Rules.
Note that the constitution and by-laws which the committee
may enact must not be inconsistent with . . . "applicable laws,
rules and regulations." Of course, one of the laws that come to
mind is the LGC of 1991 and the rules and regulations could
nothing be than the Rules Implementing the Local Government
Code of 1991. It goes without saying that the LGC and its
Implementing Rules must perforce be heeded. It bears
repeating that as they stand, Section 493 of the LGC and
Article 211 (f) of the Implementing Rules limit the officers to the:
President, Vice President and the board of directors composed
of five (5) members. The latter then appoints a secretary and
a treasurer and may create such other positions as it may
deem necessary for the management of the chapter. Plainly,
neither the LGC nor the Implementing Rules authorizes any
person or entity, other than the Board of Directors, to create
additional positions.
Separate Opinions
DAVIDE, JR., J., dissenting;
In light of the disclosure in the revised ponencia that the
creation of the questioned additional positions of Executive
Vice-President, First, Second and Third Vice-Presidents, and
Auditor, embodied in Article III of the Revised Implementing
Rules and Guidelines for the General Elections of Liga ng Mga
Barangay Officers was made by way of the Constitution and By
Laws adopted by the First Barangay National Assembly on 11
January 1994, the ultimate issue then to be resolved is whether
or not the Barangay Assembly is empowered to create said
additional positions.
1.6 Auditor
1.7 Five (5) Directors
2. National Liga. The National Liga shall
directly elect the following officers and
directors to constitute the National Liga Board
of Directors namely:
2.1 President
2.2 Executive Vice-President
2.3 First Vice-President
2.4 Second Vice-President
2.5 Third Vice-President
2.6 Secretary General
2.7 Auditor
2.8 Five (5) Directors
To implement Section 493 of the Local Government Code,
Article 211(f) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the
Local Government Code of 1991 provides:
(f) Organizational Structure
(1) The
national liga
and its local
chapters shall
directly elect
their
respective
officers,
namely: a
president,
vice
president, and
five (5)
members of
the board of
directors. The
board shall
appoint its
secretary and
treasurer and
create such
other
positions as it
may deem
necessary for
the
management
of the chapter.
Pending
election of
presidents of
the municipal,
city,
provincial, and
metropolitan
chapters of
the liga, the
incumbent
presidents of
the
association of
barangay
councils in the
municipality,
city, province,
and
Metropolitan
Manila shall
continue to
act as
presidents of
the
corresponding
chapters
under this
Rule.
(Emphasis
supplied).
(2) A
secretarygeneral shall
be elected
from among
the members
of the national
liga who shall
be
responsible
for the overall
operation of
the liga.
Pending
election of a
secretarygeneral under
this rule, the
incumbent
president of
the
pambansang
katipunan ng
mga barangay
shall act as
the secretarygeneral. This
incumbent
members of
the board of
the
pambansang
katipunan ng
mga
barangay,
headed by the
secretarygeneral, who
continue to be
presidents of
the respective
chapters of
the liga to
which they
belong, shall
constitute a
committee to
exercise the
powers and
duties of the
national liga
and draft or
amend the
constitution
and by-laws of
the national
liga to
conform to the
provisions of
this Rule.
(3) The board
of directors
shall
coordinate the
activities of
the various
chapters of
the liga.
It may readily be observed that Section 493 of the LGC and
Article 211(f) of the Implementing Rules are clear that the
officers of the national liga and its local chapters are: (1) the
President, (2) Vice President and (3) five (5) members of the
Board of Directors. In turn, it is the Board of Directors which
appoints the secretary and treasurer and is empowered to
"create such other positions as it may deem necessary for the
management of the chapter concerned." It is, therefore,
and by-laws,
unless
inconsistent
with the
Constitution
and applicable
laws, rules
and
regulations.
(2) The
committee
created in this
Article shall
formulate
uniform
constitution
and by-laws
applicable to
the national
liga and all
local chapters.
The
committee
shall convene
the national
liga to ratify
the
constitution
and by-laws
within six (6)
months from
issuance of
these Rules.
Note that the constitution and by-laws which the committee
may enact must not be inconsistent with . . . "applicable laws,
rules and regulations." Of course, one of the laws that come to
mind is the LGC of 1991 and the rules and regulations could
nothing be than the Rules Implementing the Local Government
Code of 1991. It goes without saying that the LGC and its
Implementing Rules must perforce be heeded. It bears
repeating that as they stand, Section 493 of the LGC and
Article 211 (f) of the Implementing Rules limit the officers to the:
President, Vice President and the board of directors composed
of five (5) members. The latter then appoints a secretary and
a treasurer and may create such other positions as it may
deem necessary for the management of the chapter. Plainly,
neither the LGC nor the Implementing Rules authorizes any
person or entity, other than the Board of Directors, to create
additional positions.
Third, it would be a clear case of judicial legislation to declare
that since the additional positions were created in the
Constitution and By-Laws of the Liga ng Mga Barangay, then
they "were as much as the creations of the local chapters as of
the national league." This runs afoul of Section 493 of the LGC
which vests the power to create additional positions only in the
Board of Director of the chapter.
The claim in the ponencia that the creation of additional
positions in the Constitution and By-Laws does not preclude
the board of directors of the chapter as well as that of the
national liga from creating other positions, is inconsistent with
the earlier proposition that such new positions, "were as much
the creations of the local chapters and the league" and the
further justification proferred that the creation of the national
positions "was intended to provide uniform officers for the
various chapters and the national liga was in line with the
mandate of the assembly to "formulate uniform constitution and
by-laws applicable to the national liga and all local chapters." If
this were so, then the chapters are barred from creating
additional positions other than those created in the Constitution
and By-Laws of the Liga ng Mga Barangay.
Finally, it may likewise be observed that Section 493 merely
allows the creation of other appointive positions "as it may
deem necessary for the management of the chapter." I lay
stress on the term "appointive," in light of the clause preceding
the grant of the power, which reads: "The board shall appoint
its secretary and treasurer. Following the rule of ejusdem
generis in statutory construction, the "other positions" which
may be created must be of the same category, viz.,
APPOINTIVE, as that of secretary and treasurer. These other
positions may then be that of an assistant secretary, assistant
treasurer, auditor, public relations officer, or information officer,
or even a sergeant-at-arms. Further, under Section 493, the
new positions which may be created are those "deemed
necessary for the management of the chapter," which may only
pertain to the day-to-day business and affairs of the liga
chapter, and not to policy formulation which may be exercised
the executive officers and Board of Directors. In short, the
section does not empower the local liga to create elective
positions other than that of President, Vice-President and
Board of Directors.
For the foregoing reasons, I vote to declare void, for lack of
legislative authority Sections 1 and 2 of Article III of the
Implementing Rules and Guidelines for the General Elections
of the Liga ng Mga Barangay Officers, and Sections 1 and 2 of
Article VI of the Constitution and By-Laws of the Liga ng Mga
Barangay, insofar as they relate to the creation of the positions
of executive vice president, first, second and third vicepresidents, and auditor.
Romero, Vitug and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
December 7, 2010
The second case, G.R. No. 193036, is a special civil action for
certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioners Edcel C. Lagman,
Rodolfo B. Albano Jr., Simeon A. Datumanong, and Orlando B.
Fua, Sr. (petitioners-legislators) as incumbent members of the
House of Representatives.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
When the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional
boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other
departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of
the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred
obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine
conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to
establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights
which that instrument secures and guarantees to them.
--- Justice Jose P. Laurel1
The role of the Constitution cannot be overlooked. It is through
the Constitution that the fundamental powers of government
are established, limited and defined, and by which these
powers are distributed among the several departments. 2 The
Constitution is the basic and paramount law to which all other
laws must conform and to which all persons, including the
highest officials of the land, must defer.3 Constitutional
doctrines must remain steadfast no matter what may be the
tides of time. It cannot be simply made to sway and
accommodate the call of situations and much more tailor itself
to the whims and caprices of government and the people who
run it.4
For consideration before the Court are two consolidated
cases5 both of which essentially assail the validity and
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1, dated July 30, 2010,
entitled "Creating the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010."
To accomplish its task, the PTC shall have all the powers of an
investigative body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the
Administrative Code of 1987. It is not, however, a quasi-judicial
body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render
awards in disputes between contending parties. All it can do is
gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption and
make recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it
has no power to cite people in contempt, much less order their
arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine
from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing
of an information in our courts of law. Needless to state, it
cannot impose criminal, civil or administrative penalties or
sanctions.
The PTC is different from the truth commissions in other
countries which have been created as official, transitory and
non-judicial fact-finding bodies "to establish the facts and
context of serious violations of human rights or of international
humanitarian law in a countrys past."9 They are usually
established by states emerging from periods of internal unrest,
civil strife or authoritarianism to serve as mechanisms for
transitional justice.
In the same vein, the creation of the PTC is not justified by the
Presidents power of control. Control is essentially the power to
alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer
had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former with that of the latter.47 Clearly, the
power of control is entirely different from the power to create
public offices. The former is inherent in the Executive, while the
latter finds basis from either a valid delegation from Congress,
or his inherent duty to faithfully execute the laws.
The same holds true with respect to the DOJ. Its authority
under Section 3 (2), Chapter 1, Title III, Book IV in the Revised
Administrative Code is by no means exclusive and, thus, can
be shared with a body likewise tasked to investigate the
commission of crimes.
the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act
assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the
sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause. 74
"According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply
requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed."75 It "requires public bodies and institutions to treat
similarly situated individuals in a similar manner."76 "The
purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every
person within a states jurisdiction against intentional and
arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express
terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the
states duly constituted authorities."77 "In other words, the
concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to
govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between
individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a
legitimate governmental objective."78
Footnotes
1
Id.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
CONCHITA CARPIO
MORALES
Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J.
VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO
B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
TERESITA J.
LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO
Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M.
PERALTA
Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
MARIANO C. DEL
CASTILLO
Associate Justice
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
MARTIN S.
VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
JOSE PORTUGAL
PEREZ
Associate Justice
<http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/inquirerheadlines/
nation/view/20100802-284444/Truth-body-toldTake-no prisoners> visited November 9, 2010.
C E R TI F I CATI O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify
that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
13
14
15
17
36
18
37
38
19
39
40
21
24
41
45
46
25
27
47
48
49
28
30
32
33
51
52
53
Id. at 691.
54
55
56
34
35
60
Id. at 492.
61
82
83
62
84
63
85
64
Id.
65
67
69
70
71
72
73
74
88
89
90
91
92
118 US
357, http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?
court=us&vol=118&invol=35 <accessed on December
4, 2010>.
93
95
Id. at 632.
96
101
104
105
106
Notably, Pres. Corazon C. Aquino created not one but two truth
commissions.9 Aside from the PCHR, which was created to
address human rights violations, the Presidential Commission
on Good Government or PCGG was also established. The
PCGG was tasked with assisting the President in the "recovery
of all in-gotten wealth accumulated by former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives,
subordinates and close associates, whether located in the
Philippines or abroad, including the takeover or sequestration
of all business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by
them, during his administration, directly or through nominees,
by taking undue advantage of their public office and/or using
their powers, authority, influence, connections or relationship,"
among others.10 Unlike the present embattled and controversial
Truth Commission, however, the PCGG was created by Pres.
Corazon C. Aquino pursuant to her legislative powers under
Executive Order No. 1,11which in turn, was sanctioned by
Proclamation No. 3.12
107
109
Id.
110
SEPARATE OPINION
CORONA, C.J.:
Of Truth and Truth Commissions
The fundamental base upon which a truth commission is
created is the right to the truth.1 While the right to the truth is
yet to be established as a right under customary law2 or as a
general principle of international law,3 it has nevertheless
emerged as a "legal concept at the national, regional and
All four requisites must be complied with for the classification to mandate may be so extended accordingly by way of
be valid and constitutional.
supplemental Executive Order." (Emphasis supplied),
The constitutionality of E. O. No. 1 is being attacked on the
ground that it violates the equal protection clause.
Petitioners argue that E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection
clause as it deliberately vests the Truth Commission with
jurisdiction and authority to solely target officials and
employees of the Arroyo Administration.26Moreover, they claim
that there is no substantial distinction of graft reportedly
committed under the Arroyo administration and graft committed
under previous administrations to warrant the creation of a
Truth Commission which will investigate for prosecution
officials and employees of the past administration.27
Respondents, on the other hand, argue that the creation of the
Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause.
According to them, while E.O. No. 1 names the previous
administration as the initial subject of the investigation, it does
not confine itself to cases of graft and corruption committed
solely during the past administration. Section 17 of E.O. No. 1
clearly speaks of the Presidents power to expand its coverage
to previous administrations. Moreover, respondents argue that
the segregation of the transactions of public officers during the
previous administration as possible subjects of investigation is
a valid classification based on substantial distinctions and is
germane to the evils which the executive order seeks to
correct.28
On its face, E.O. No. 1 clearly singles out the previous
administration as the Truth Commissions sole subject of
investigation.
Section 1. Creation of a Commission There is hereby created
the PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION, hereinafter referred to
as the "COMMISSION", which shall primarily seek and find the
truth on, and toward this end, investigate reports of graft and
corruption of such scale and magnitude that shock and offend
the moral and ethical sensibilities of the people committed by
public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices
and accessories from the private sector, if any during the
previous administration; and thereafter recommend the
appropriate action to be taken to ensure that the full measure
of justice shall be served without fear or favor.
Section 2. Powers and Functions. The Commission, which
shall have the powers of an investigative body under Section
37, Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, is
primarily tasked to conduct a thorough fact-finding investigation
of reported cases of graft and corruption referred to in Section
1, involving third level public officers and higher, their coprincipals, accomplices and accessories from the private
sector, if any during the previous administration and thereafter
submit its findings and recommendations to the President,
Congress and the Ombudsman. x x x" (Emphasis supplied)
Notwithstanding Section 17, which provides:
xxx
Section 1. Creating of a Commission. There is hereby
created the PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION, hereinafter
referred to as the "COMMISSION", which shall primarily seek
and find the truth on, and toward this end investigate reports of
graft and corruption, x x x if any, during the previous
administration; xxx
Section 2. Power and Functions. Powers and Functions. The
Commission, which shall have all the powers of an
investigative body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the
Administrative Code of 1987, is primarily tasked to conduct a
thorough fact-finding investigation of reported cases of graft
and corruption x x x, if any, during the previous administration
and thereafter submit its findings and recommendations to the
President, Congress and the Ombudsman. x x x
Footnotes
1
Ibid., 268.
Ibid., 245.
20
23
Ibid., 604.
24
25
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/POL30/009/2
007/en/7988f852-d38a-11dd-a329-2f46302a8cc6/
pol300092007en.html, viewed on 9 November 2010.
26
27
28
29
30
Id.
33
16
17
18
Ibid.
35
19
37
Article XI states:
52
40
SEPARATE OPINION
BRION, J.:
43
I base my conclusion:
(1) On due process grounds;
(2) On the unconstitutional impact of the EO on the
established legal framework of the criminal justice
system;
45
47
48
49
A. THE TITLE "TRUTH COMMISSION" + THE TRUTHTELLING FUNCTION = VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS
A.1. The Impact of the Commissions "Truth"
The first problem of the EO is its use of the title "Truth
Commission" and its objective of truth-telling; these assume
that what the Truth Commission speaks of is the "truth"
because of its title and of its truth-telling function; thus,
anything other than what the Commission reports would either
be a distortion of the truth, or may even be an "untruth."
This problem surfaced during the oral arguments on queries
about the effect of the title "Truth Commission" on the authority
of the duly constituted tribunals that may thereafter rule on the
matters that the Commission shall report on.46 Since the
Commissions report will constitute the "truth," any subsequent
contrary finding by the Ombudsman47 would necessarily be
suspect as an "untruth;" it is up then to the Ombudsman to
convince the public that its findings are true.
To appreciate the extent of this problem, it must be considered
that the hearings or proceedings, where charges of graft and
corruption shall be aired, shall be open to the public. The
Commissions report shall likewise be published.48 These
features cannot but mean full media coverage.
Based on common and usual Philippine experience with its
very active media exemplified by the recent taking of Chinese
and Canadian hostages at the Luneta, a full opening to the
media of the Commissions hearings, proceedings and reports
means a veritable media feast that, in the case of the Truth
Commission, shall occur on small but detailed daily doses,
from the naming of all the persons under investigation all the
way up to the Commissions final report. By the time the
Commission report is issued, or even before then, the public
shall have been saturated with the details of the charges made
through the publicly-aired written and testimonial submissions
To fully appreciate the potential prejudicial effects of truthtelling on the judicial system, the effects of media exposure
from the point of view of what transpires and the circumstances
present under truth-telling and under the present justice system While EO 1 may, therefore, serve a laudable anti-graft and
deserve examination.
corruption purpose and may have been launched by the
President in good faith and with all sincerity, its truth-telling
function, undertaken in the manner outlined in the EO and its
Under the present justice system, the media may fully report,
implementing rules, is not a means that this Court can hold as
as they do report, all the details of a reported crime and may
even give the suspects detailed focus. These reports, however, reasonable and valid, when viewed from the prism of due
process. From this vantage point, the Commission is not only a
are not branded as the "truth" but as matters that will soon be
mislabelled body but one whose potential outputs must as well
brought to the appropriate public authorities for proper
investigation and prosecution, if warranted. In the courts, cases be discarded for being unacceptable under the norms of the
are handled on the basis of the rules of evidence and with due Constitution.
respect for the constitutional rights of the accused, and are
reported based on actual developments, subject only to judicial B. DISTORTION OF EXISTING LEGAL FRAMEWORK
requirements to ensure orderly proceedings and the
observance of the rights of the accused. Only after the courts
The EO and its truth-telling function must also be struck down
have finally spoken shall there be any conclusive narrative
as they distort the constitutional and statutory plan of the
report of what actually transpired and how accused individuals criminal justice system without the authority of law and with an
may have participated in committing the offense charged. At
unconstitutional impact on the system.
this point, any public report and analysis of the findings can no
longer adversely affect the constitutional rights of the accused
B.1. The Existing Legal Framework
as they had been given all the opportunities to tell their side in
court under the protective guarantees of the Constitution.
The Constitution has given the country a well-laid out and
balanced division of powers, distributed among the legislative,
In contrast, the circumstances that underlie Commission
executive and judicial branches, with specially established
reports are different. The "truth" that the Commission shall
offices geared to accomplish specific objectives to strengthen
publicize shall be based on "facts" that have not been tested
the whole constitutional structure.
and admitted according to the rules of evidence; by its own
express rules, the technical rules of evidence do not apply to
The Legislature is provided, in relation with the dispensation of
the Commission.59 The reported facts may have also been
justice, the authority to create courts with defined jurisdictions
secured under circumstances violative of the rights of the
Court;60 to define the required
persons investigated under the guarantees of the Constitution. below the level of the Supreme
61
qualifications for judges; to define what acts are criminal and
Thus, what the Commission reports might not at all pass the
what penalties they shall carry;62 and to provide the budgets for
tests of guilt that apply under the present justice system, yet
63
they will be reported with the full support of the government as the courts.
the "truth" to the public. As fully discussed below, these
The Executive branch is tasked with the enforcement of the
circumstances all work to the active prejudice of the
laws that the Legislature shall pass. In the dispensation of
investigated persons whose reputations, at the very least, are
justice, the Executive has the prerogative of appointing justices
blackened once they are reported by the Commission as
and judges,64 and the authority to investigate and prosecute
participants in graft and corruption, even if the courts
crimes through a Department of Justice constituted in
subsequently find them innocent of these charges.
accordance the Administrative Code.65 Specifically provided
and established by the Constitution, for a task that would
A.5. Truth-telling: an unreasonable means to a reasonable
otherwise fall under the Executives investigatory and
objective.
the Revised Administrative Code of the Philippines, which gives Commission was created; what the President "created" was a
the President the
new office that does not trace its roots to any existing office or
function from the Office of the President or from the executive
departments and agencies he controls.
continuing authority to reorganize the Office of the President.
The Solicitor General, of course, did not steadfastly hold on to
this view; in the course of the oral arguments and in his
Thus, the President cannot legally invoke Section 31 to create
Memorandum, he invoked other bases for the Presidents
the Truth Commission. The requirements for the application of
authority to issue EO 1. In the process, he likewise made
this Section are simply not present; any insistence on the use
various claims, not all of them consistent with one another, on
of this Section can only lead to the invalidity of EO 1.
the nature of the Truth Commission that EO 1 created.
D.2. The PD 1416 and Residual Powers Argument
Section 31 shows that it is a very potent presidential power, as
it empowers him to (1) to re-organize his own internal office; (2) Independently of the EOs express legal basis, the Solicitortransfer any function or office from the Office of the President to General introduced a new basis of authority, theorizing that "the
the various executive departments; and (3) transfer any
power of the President to reorganize the executive branch" is
function or office from the various executive departments to the justifiable under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1416, as
Office of the President.
amended by PD No. 1772, based on the Presidents residual
powers under Section 20, Title I, Book III of E.O. No. 292." He
To reorganize presupposes that an office is or offices are
cites in this regard the case of Larin v. Executive
already existing and that (1) a reduction is effected, either of
Secretary96 and according to him:
staff or of its functions, for transfer to another or for abolition
because of redundancy; (2) offices are merged resulting in the x x x This provision speaks of such other powers vested in the
retention of one as the dominant office; (3) two offices are
President under the law. What law then which gives him the
abolished resulting in the emergence of a new office carrying
power to reorganize? It is Presidential Decree No. 1772 which
the attributes of its predecessors as well as their
amended Presidential Decree No. 1416. These decrees
responsibilities; or (4) a new office is created by dividing the
expressly grant the President of the Philippines the continuing
functions and staff of an existing office. Buklod ng Kawaning
authority to reorganize the national government, which includes
EIIB v. Hon. Executive Secretary addresses this point when it
the power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to
said:
abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create and classify
functions, services and activities and to standardize salaries
[R]eorganization involves the reduction of personnel,
and materials. The validity of these two decrees are
consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of
unquestionable. The 1987 Constitution clearly provides that "all
economy or redundancy of functions. It takes place when there laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of
is an alteration of the existing structure of government offices
instructions and other executive issuances not inconsistent with
or units therein, including the lines of control, authority and
this Constitution shall remain operative until amended,
responsibility between them.93
repealed or revoked." So far, there is yet no law amending or
repealing said decrees.97 [Emphasis supplied]
These traditional concepts of reorganization do not appear to
have taken place in the establishment of the Truth
Unfortunately, even the invocation of the transitory clause of
Commission. As heretofore mentioned, by its plain terms, it
the 1987 Constitution (regarding the validity of laws and
was "created" and did not simply emerge from the functions or decrees not inconsistent with the Constitution) cannot save EO
the personality of another office, whether within or outside the
1, as PD 1416 is a legislation that has long lost its potency.
Office of the President. Thus, it is a completely new body that
the President constituted, not a body that appropriated the
Contemporary history teaches us that PD 1416 was passed
powers of, or derived its powers from, the investigatory and
under completely different factual and legal milieus that are not
prosecutory powers of the Department of Justice or any other
present today, thus rendering this presidential decree an
investigatory body within the Executive branch.
anachronism that can no longer be invoked.
From the Solicitor Generals Memorandum, it appears that the
inspiration for the EO came from the use and experiences of
truth commissions in other countries that were coming from
"determinate periods of abusive rule or conflict" for purposes of
making "recommendations for [the] redress and future
prevention"94 of similar abusive rule or conflict. It is a body to
establish the "truth of what abuses actually happened in the
past;" the Solicitor General even suggests that the "doctrine of
separation of powers and the extent of the powers of co-equal
branches of government should not be so construed as to
restrain the Executive from uncovering the truth about
betrayals of public trust, from addressing their enabling
conditions, and from preventing their recurrence." 95 By these
perorations, the Solicitor General unwittingly strengthens the
view that no reorganization ever took place when the Truth
and even this Court can avoid the cloud of "untruth" and a
doubtful taint in their integrity after the government has
publicized the Commissions findings as the truth. If the rulings
of these constitutional bodies themselves can be suspect,
individual defenses for sure cannot rise any higher.
In this same cited case, the Court categorically ruled that "the
burden is upon the government to prove that the classification
is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and that it
is the least restrictive means to protect such interest."130
TSN, September 28, 2010, pp. 23, 39-40, 52, 60, 7375, 123-126.
25
Id. at 182.
Id. at 58-60.
EO 1, Section 1, par. 2.
10
11
Id., Sections 2 (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), (i) and 6.
12
Id., Section 6.
13
Id., Section 2.
14
15
Id., Section 7.
16
Id., Section 8.
17
19
20
21
EO 1, Section 8.
22
Rules, Rule 5.
23
46
47
EO 1, Section 16.
49
51
52
53
54
34
36
Id. at 175-176.
57
39
59
40
60
41
38
42
43
44
45
63
64
65
69
70
71
72
74
75
76
77
78
86
92
93
95
Id. at 324.
96
97
80
98
79
81
83
84
85
99
101
102
103
EO 1, Section 1.
EO 1, Sections 3 and 5.
EO 1, Section 1.
TSN, September 28, 2010, p. 166.
104
Id. at 41.
107
108
109
114
110
117
118
112
119
68 Phil. 12 (1939).
120
124
126
EO 1, Section 2.
127
128
129
130
132
133
BERSAMIN, J.:
I register my full concurrence with the Majoritys well reasoned
conclusion to strike down Executive Order No. 1 (E.O. No. 1)
for its incurable unconstitutionality.
I share and adopt the perspectives of my colleagues in the
Majority on why the issuance has to be struck down. I render
this Separate Opinion only to express some thoughts on a few
matters.
I
Locus Standi of Petitioners
I hold that the petitioners have locus standi.
In particular reference to the petitioners in G.R. No. 193036, I
think that their being incumbent Members of the House of
Representatives gave them the requisite legal standing to
challenge E. O. No. 1 as an impermissible intrusion of the
Executive into the domain of the Legislature. Indeed, to the
extent that the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the
power of each Member, whose office confers a right to
participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution;
consequently, an act of the Executive that injures the institution
of Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless substantial
injury that a Member of Congress can assail.1 Moreover, any
intrusion of one Department in the domain of another
Department diminishes the enduring idea underlying the
incorporation in the Fundamental Law of the time-honored
republican concept of separation of powers.
Justice Mendozas main opinion, which well explains why the
petitioners have locus standi, is congruent with my view on the
matter that I expressed in De Castro v. Judicial and Bar
Council, et al.,2 viz:
Yet, if any doubt still lingers about the locus standi of any
petitioner, we dispel the doubt now in order to remove any
obstacle or obstruction to the resolution of the essential issue
squarely presented herein. We are not to shirk from
Yet, the Court has also held that the requirement of locus
discharging our solemn duty by reason alone of an obstacle
standi, being a mere procedural technicality, can be waived by more technical than otherwise. In Agan, Jr. v. Philippine
the Court in the exercise of its discretion. For instance, in 1949, International Air Terminals Co., Inc., we pointed out: "Standing
in Araneta v. Dinglasan, the Court liberalized the approach
is a peculiar concept in constitutional law because in some
when the cases had "transcendental importance." Some
cases, suits are not brought by parties who have been
notable controversies whose petitioners did not pass the direct personally injured by the operation of a law or any other
injury test were allowed to be treated in the same way as
government act but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters
in Araneta v. Dinglasan.
who actually sue in the public interest." But even if, strictly
speaking, the petitioners "are not covered by the definition, it is
In the 1975 decision in Aquino v. Commission on Elections, this still within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the
Court decided to resolve the issues raised by the petition due
requirement and so remove the impediment to its addressing
to their "far-reaching implications," even if the petitioner had no and resolving the serious constitutional questions raised."
personality to file the suit. The liberal approach of Aquino v.
Commission on Elections has been adopted in several notable
II
cases, permitting ordinary citizens, legislators, and civic
The President Has No Power to Create A Public Office
organizations to bring their suits involving the constitutionality
or validity of laws, regulations, and rulings.
A public office may be created only through any of the following
However, the assertion of a public right as a predicate for
challenging a supposedly illegal or unconstitutional executive
or legislative action rests on the theory that the petitioner
represents the public in general. Although such petitioner may
not be as adversely affected by the action complained against
as are others, it is enough that he sufficiently demonstrates in
his petition that he is entitled to protection or relief from the
Court in the vindication of a public right.
Quite often, as here, the petitioner in a public action sues as a
citizen or taxpayer to gain locus standi. That is not surprising,
for even if the issue may appear to concern only the public in
general, such capacities nonetheless equip the petitioner with
adequate interest to sue. In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, the
Court aptly explains why:
xxx
Id., at 265-266.
Id., at 267.
SEPARATE OPINION
PEREZ, J.:
Clear then from the chronicle, that, as it was at the time of its
constitutionalization in 1973, the power of the Ombudsman
2. Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any
"shall not be limited to receiving complaints and making
public official or employee of the Government, or any
recommendations, but shall also include the filing and
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well
prosecution of criminal xxx cases before the appropriate body
as of any government-owned or controlled corporation xxx." More importantly, the grant of political independence to
with original charter, to perform and expedite any act or the Ombudsman which was the spirit behind the 1973
duty required by law, or to stop, prevent and correct
provisions was specifically statedin the 1987 Constitution.
any abuse or impropriety in the performance of duties. Thus:
3. Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate
action against a public official or employee at fault, and
recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine,
censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance
therewith.
4. Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate
case, and subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law, to furnish it with copies of documents
relating to contracts or transactions entered into by his
office involving the disbursements or use of public
funds or properties, and report any irregularity to the
Commission on Audit for appropriate action.
5. Request any government agency for assistance and
information necessary in the discharge of its
responsibilities, and to examine, if necessary, pertinent
records and documents.
Footnotes
1
Id. at 664-665.
Id. at 660-661.
10
11
12
13
14
Id., Section 9.
15
18
Id. at 74.
19
Id. at 77-78.
20
Id. at 86.
21
Id. at 92.
22
23
24
25
DISSENTING OPINION
CARPIO, J.:
The two petitions before this Court seek to declare void
Executive Order No. 1, Creating the Philippine Truth
Commission of 2010 (EO 1), for being unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 192935, petitioner Louis C. Biraogo (Biraogo), as a
Filipino citizen and as a taxpayer, filed a petition under Rule 65
for prohibition and injunction. Biraogo prays for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order
to declare EO 1 unconstitutional, and to direct the Philippine
Truth Commission (Truth Commission) to desist from
proceeding under the authority of EO 1.
In G.R. No. 193036, petitioners Edcel C. Lagman, Rodolfo B.
Albano, Jr., Simeon A. Datumanong, and Orlando B. Fua, Sr.
(Lagman, et al.), as Members of the House of Representatives,
filed a petition under Rule 65 for certiorari and prohibition.
Petitioners Lagman, et al. pray for the issuance of a temporary After all, the Office of the President is the command post of the
restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction to declare void President. This is the rationale behind the Presidents
EO 1 for being unconstitutional.
continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure
of the Office of the President.2 (Emphasis supplied)
The Powers of the President
The Power To Execute Faithfully the Laws
Petitioners Biraogo and Lagman, et al. (collectively petitioners)
assail the creation of the Truth Commission. They claim that
Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution states that "[t]he
President Benigno S. Aquino III (President Aquino) has no
executive power is vested in the President of the Philippines."
power to create the Commission. Petitioners objections are
Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution states that "[t]he
mere sound bites, devoid of sound legal reasoning.
President shall have control of all the executive departments,
bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed."3 Before he enters office, the President
On 30 July 2010, President Aquino issued EO 1 pursuant to
Section 31, Chapter 10, Title III, Book III of Executive Order No. takes the following oath prescribed in Section 5, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution: "I do solemnly swear that I will faithfully
292 (EO 292).1 Section 31 reads:
and conscientiously fulfill my duties as President of the
Philippines, preserve and defend its Constitution, execute its
Section 31. Continuing Authority of the President to
laws, do justice to every man, and consecrate myself to the
Reorganize his Office. The President, subject to the policy in
service of the Nation. So help me God."4
the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity,
economy and efficiency, shall have continuing authority to
reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the
President. For this purpose, he may take any of the following
actions:
(1) Restructure the internal organization of the
Office of the President Proper, including the
immediate Offices, the Presidential Special
Assistants/Advisers System and the Common Staff
Support System, by abolishing, consolidating or
merging units thereof or transferring functions
from one unit to another;
CONGRESSMAN LAGMAN:
If the Ombudsman has the power to take-over purely factfinding investigations from the President or his subordinates,
then the President will become inutile. The President will be
In criminal fact-finding investigations, the law expressly
wholly dependent on the Ombudsman, waiting for the
Ombudsman to establish the facts before the President can act vests in the Philippine National Police (PNP) and the National
merit because the public can easily read and understand what
EO 1 expressly says that the findings of the Truth
Commission are not final or binding but merely
recommendatory.
Third, the Filipino people are familiar with the Agrava Board, 42 a
fact-finding body that investigated the assassination of former
Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. The people know that the
findings of the Agrava Board were not binding on the then
Tanodbayan or the Sandiganbayan. The Agrava Board
recommended for prosecution 26 named individuals 43 but the
Tanodbayan charged 40 named individuals44 before the
Sandiganbayan. On the other hand, the Sandiganbayan
convicted only 16 of those charged by the Tanodbayan and
acquitted 20 of the accused.45
Fourth, as most Filipinos know, many persons who undergo
preliminary investigation and are charged for commission of
crimes are eventually acquitted by the trial courts, and even by
the appellate courts. In short, the fear that the public will be
misled that the findings of the Truth Commission is the unerring
gospel truth is more imagined than real.
EO 1 Does Not Violate
The Equal Protection Clause
Petitioners Lagman, et al. argue that EO 1 violates the equal
protection clause because the investigation of the Truth
Commission is limited to alleged acts of graft and corruption
during the Arroyo administration.
A reading of Section 17 of EO 1 readily shows that the Truth
Commissions investigation is not limited to the Arroyo
administration. Section 17 of EO 1 provides:
Section 17. Special Provision Concerning Mandate. If and
when in the judgment of the President there is a need to
expand the mandate of the Commission as defined in Section 1
hereof to include the investigation of cases and instances of
graft and corruption during the prior administrations, such
mandate may be extended accordingly by way of a
supplemental Executive Order. (Emphasis supplied)
The President can expand the mandate of the Truth
Commission to investigate alleged graft and corruption cases
of other past administrations even as its primary task is to
investigate the Arroyo administration. EO 1 does not confine
the mandate of the Truth Commission solely to alleged acts of
graft and corruption during the Arroyo Administration.
Section 17 of EO 1 is the same as Section 2(b) of Executive
Order No. 1 dated 28 February 1986 issued by President
Corazon Aquino creating the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG Charter). Section 2(b) of the PCGG
Charter provides:
Fourth, the more recent the alleged acts of graft and corruption,
the more readily available will be the witnesses, and the more
easily the witnesses can recall with accuracy the relevant
events. Inaction over time means the loss not only of witnesses
but also of material documents, not to mention the loss of
public interest.
x x x x . (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, under Section 2(b) of the PCGG Charter, the President
can expand the investigation of the PCCG even as its primary
task is to recover the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses and their
cronies. Both EO 1 and the PCGG Charter have the same
provisions on the scope of their investigations. Both the Truth
Commission and the PCGG are primarily tasked to conduct
specific investigations, with their mandates subject to
expansion by the President from time to time. This Court has
consistently upheld the constitutionality of the PCGG Charter.46
Like Section 2(b) of the PCGG Charter, Section 17 of EO 1
merely prioritizes the investigation of acts of graft and
corruption that may have taken place during the Arroyo
administration. If time allows, the President may extend the
mandate of the Truth Commission to investigate other
administrations prior to the Arroyo administration. The
prioritization of such work or assignment does not violate the
equal protection clause because the prioritization is based on
reasonable grounds.
First, the prescriptive period for the most serious acts of graft
and corruption under the Revised Penal Code is 20 years, 47 15
years for offenses punishable under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act,48 and 12 years for offenses punishable under
special penal laws that do not expressly provide for prescriptive
periods.49 Any investigation will have to focus on alleged acts of
graft and corruption within the last 20 years, almost half of
which or 9 years is under the Arroyo administration.
The prosecution of one guilty person while others equally guilty A fact-finding investigation in the Executive or Judicial branch,
even if limited to specific government officials whether
are not prosecuted, however, is not, by itself, a denial of the
incumbent, resigned or retired does not violate the equal
equal protection of the laws. x x x
protection clause. If an anomaly is reported in a government
transaction and a fact-finding investigation is conducted, the
x x x The mere allegation that appellant, a Cebuana, was
investigation by necessity must focus on the public officials
charged with the commission of a crime, while a
involved in the transaction. It is ridiculous for anyone to ask this
Zamboanguea, the guilty party in appellants eyes, was not, is Court to stop the investigation of such public officials on the
insufficient to support a conclusion that the prosecution officers ground that past public officials of the same rank, who may
denied appellant equal protection of the laws.
have been involved in similar anomalous transactions in the
past, are not being investigated by the same fact-finding body.
There is also common sense practicality in sustaining
To uphold such a laughable claim is to grant immunity to all
appellants prosecution.
criminals, throwing out of the window the constitutional
principle that "[p]ublic office is a public trust"75 and that "[p]ublic
While all persons accused of crime are to be treated on a basis officials and employees must at all times be accountable to the
of equality before the law, it does not follow that they are to be people."76
protected in the commission of crime. It would be
unconscionable, for instance, to excuse a defendant guilty of
When the Constitution states that public officials are "at all
murder because others have murdered with impunity. The
times" accountable to the people, it means at any time public
remedy for unequal enforcement of the law in such instances
officials can be held to account by the people. Nonsensical
does not lie in the exoneration of the guilty at the expense of
claims, like the selective prosecution invoked in People v. dela
society . . . . Protection of the law will be extended to all
Piedra, are unavailing. Impossible conditions, like requiring the
persons equally in the pursuit of their lawful occupations, but
investigation of "earlier past administrations," are disallowed.
no person has the right to demand protection of the law in the
All these flimsy and dilatory excuses violate the clear command
commission of a crime. (People v. Montgomery, 117 P.2d 437
of the Constitution that public officials are accountable to the
[1941])
people "at all times."
Likewise,
[i]f the failure of prosecutors to enforce the criminal laws as to
some persons should be converted into a defense for others
charged with crime, the result would be that the trial of the
district attorney for nonfeasance would become an issue in the
trial of many persons charged with heinous crimes and the
The majority opinion will also mean that the PCGG Charter
which tasked the PCGG to recover the ill-gotten wealth of the
Marcoses and their cronies violates the equal protection
clause because the PCCG Charter specifically mentions the
Marcoses and their cronies. The majority opinion reverses
several decisions77 of this Court upholding the constitutionality
of the PCCG Charter, endangering over two decades of hard
work in recovering ill-gotten wealth.
Before the President executes the law, he has the right, and
even the duty, to know the facts to assure himself and the
public that he is correctly executing the law. This Court has no
power to prevent the President from knowing the facts to
understand certain government transactions in the Executive
branch, transactions that may need to be reviewed, revived,
corrected, terminated or completed. If this Court can do so,
then it can also prevent the House of Representatives or the
Senate from conducting an investigation, in aid of legislation,
on the financial transactions of the Arroyo administration, on
the ground of violation of the equal protection clause. Unless,
of course, the House or the Senate attempts to do the
impossible conduct an investigation on the financial
transactions of earlier past administrations" since the
Presidency of General Emilio Aguinaldo. Indeed, under the
majority opinion, neither the House nor the Senate can conduct
any investigation on any administration, past or present, if
"earlier past administrations" are not included in the legislative
investigation.
In short, the majority opinions requirements that EO 1 should
also include "earlier past administrations," with the Truth
Commission empowered "to investigate all past
administrations," to comply with the equal protection clause,
is a requirement that is not only illogical and impossible to
comply, it also allows the impunity to commit graft and
corruption and other crimes under our penal laws. The majority
opinion completely ignores the constitutional principle that
public office is a public trust and that public officials are at all
times accountable to the people.
A Final Word
Footnotes
Emphasis supplied.
11
12
19
21
20
22
Id. at 570-571.
24
14
25
http://www.mb.com.ph/node/270641/ombud,
accessed on 19 November 2010.
26
27
30
31
Id. at 70.
32
Id.
33
15
17
34
35
45
(1) x x x
46
37
38
47
49
50
Section 2, EO 1.
51
Section 2(b), EO 1.
52
Id.
39
53
55
58
59
60
61
62
40
63
64
80
82
Id.
DISSENTING OPINION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
65
67
Id. at 464.
68
69
Id. at 832.
70
72
Id. at 54-56.
73
74
75
76
Id.
77
78
already
judicially
ascertained,
at
that
are
contained
in public
accountability. This sweeping directive of the ponencia to
records.
include all past administrations in the probe tramples upon the
prerogative of a co-equal branch of government.
The Executive Departments determination of the futility or
The group or class, from which to elicit the needed information, redundancy of investigating other administrations should be
accorded respect. Respondents having manifested that
rests on substantial distinction that sets the class apart.
pertinent and credible data are already in their hands or in the
archives, petitioners idea of an all-encompassing de
Proximity and magnitude of incidents
novo inquiry becomes tenuous as it goes beyond what the
Executive Department needs.
Fairly recent events like the exigencies of transition and the
reported large-scale corruption explain the determined need to The exclusion of other past administrations from the scope of
focus on no other period but the tenure of the previous
investigation by the Truth Commission is justified by the
administration.
substantial distinction that complete and definitive reports
covering their respective periods have already been rendered.
The proximity and magnitude of particular contemporary events The same is not true with the immediate past administration.
like the Oakwood mutiny and Maguindanao massacre similarly There is thus no undue favor or unwarranted partiality. To
justified the defined scope of the Feliciano Commission and the include everybody all over again is to insist on a useless act.
Sad to state, this conclusion conveniently ignores the longstanding rule that to remedy an injustice, the Legislature need
not address every manifestation of the evil at once; it may
proceed "one step at a time." In addressing a societal concern,
To knowingly classify per se is not synonymous to intentional
it must invariably draw lines and make choices, thereby
discrimination, which brings me to the next point that the
creating some inequity as to those included or excluded.
classification is germane to the purpose of the law.
Nevertheless, as long as "the bounds of reasonable choice"
are not exceeded, the courts must defer to the legislative
The classification is germane
judgment. We may not strike down a law merely because the
to the purpose of the law
legislative aim would have been more fully achieved by
expanding the class. Stated differently, the fact that a legislative
I entertain no doubt that respondents consciously and
classification, by itself, is underinclusive will not render it
deliberately decided to focus on the corrupt activities reportedly unconstitutionally arbitrary or invidious. There is no
committed during the previous administration. For respondents constitutional requirement that regulation must reach each and
to admit that the selection was inadvertent is worse.
every class to which it might be applied; that the Legislature
The ponencia, however, is quick to ascribe intentional
must be held rigidly to the choice of regulating all or none.
discrimination from the mere fact that the classification was
intentional.
Thus, any person who poses an equal protection challenge
must convincingly show that the law creates a classification
that is "palpably arbitrary or capricious." He must refute all
possible rational bases for the differing treatment, whether or
not the Legislature cited those bases as reasons for the
enactment, such that the constitutionality of the law must be
Most enlightening as to how the classification is germane to the The Truth Commission is an ad hoc body formed under the
purpose of the law is knowing first what is the purpose of the
Office of the President. The nature of an ad hoc body is that it
law.
is limited in scope. Ad hoc means for the particular end or case
at hand without consideration of wider application.35 An ad
According to the ponencia, the objective of E.O. No. 1 is the
hoc body is inherently temporary. E.O. No. 1 provides that the
"stamping out [of] acts of graft and corruption." 33
Truth Commission "shall accomplish its mission on or before
December 31, 2012."36
I differ.
That the classification should not be limited to existing
conditions only, as applied in the present case, does not mean
The purpose of E.O. No. 1 is the gathering of needed
information to aid the President in the implementation of public the inclusion of future administrations. Laws that are limited in
duration (e.g., general appropriations act) do not circumvent
accountability laws. Briefly stated, E.O. No. 1 aims to provide
the guarantee of equal protection by not embracing all that
data for the President.
may, in the years to come, be in similar conditions even beyond
the effectivity of the law.
The ponencia, in fact, has earlier explained: "It should be
stressed that the purpose of allowing ad hocinvestigating
bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the
President is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised
and guided in the performance of his duties relative to the
execution and enforcement of the laws of the land." 34
The long-term goal of the present administration must not be
confused with what E.O. No. 1 intends to achieve within its
short life. The opening clauses and provisions of E.O No. 1 are
replete with phrases like "an urgent
call for the determination of the truth," "dedicated solely to
investigating and finding out the truth," and "primarily seek and
find the truth."
Footnotes
1
Ponencia, p. 41.
12
14
Ponencia, p. 36.
19
21
Id. at 37.
22
Ponencia, p. 16.
Ponencia, p. 36.
25
Id. at 29.
26
27
Id. at 8.
28
Ponencia, p. 39.
30
31
33
Ponencia, p. 37.
34
Id. at 24.
17
35
36
37
Ponencia, p. 33.
38
Id. at 26.
39
Id. at 29.
40
DISSENTING OPINION
Sir, I say that justice is truth in action.
Benjamin Disraeli, in a speech delivered before the British
House of Commons, February 11, 1851
SERENO, J:
The majority Decision defeats the constitutional mandate on
public accountability; it effectively tolerates impunity for graft
and corruption. Its invocation of the constitutional clause on
equal protection of the laws is an unwarranted misuse of the
same and is a disservice to those classes of people for whom
the constitutional guarantee was created as a succor. The
majority Decision accomplished this by completely disregarding
"reasonableness" and all its jurisprudential history as
constitutional justification for classification and by replacing the
analytical test of reasonableness with mere recitations of
general case doctrines to arrive at its forced conclusion. By
denying the right of the President to classify persons in
Executive Order No. (EO) 1 even if the classification is founded
on reason, the Decision has impermissibly infringed on the
With all due respect, it is bad enough that the Decision upsets
the long line of precedents on equal protection and displays
self-contradiction. But the most unacceptable effect of the
majority Decision is that a court of unelected people which
recognizes that the President "need(s) to create a special body
to investigate reports of graft and corruption allegedly
committed during the previous administration" to "transform his
campaign promise" "to stamp out graft and corruption" 9
proposes to supplant the will of the more than 15 million voters
who voted for President Aquino and the more than 80% of
Filipinos who now trust him, by imposing unreasonable
restrictions on and impossible, unknowable standards for
presidential action. The Decision thereby prevents the
fulfillment of the political contract that exists between the
Philippine President and the Filipino people. In so doing, the
Court has arrogated unto itself a power never imagined for it
Findings and Dispositive Conclusion of the Majority
since the days of Marbury v. Madison10 when the doctrine of
judicial review was first laid down by the U.S. Supreme Court.
The dispositive conclusion of the majority Decision contradicts The majority does not only violate the separation of powers
doctrine by its gratuitous intrusion into the powers of the
its own understanding of both the Constitution and the legal
implication of recent political events. It finds that: (1) the Filipino President which violation the Decision seeks to deny. Nay,
people convinced in the sincerity and ability of Benigno Simeon the majority created a situation far worse the usurpation by
Aquino III to carry out the noble objective of stamping out graft the judiciary of the sovereign power of the people to determine
the priorities of Government.
and corruption, "catapulted the good senator to the
Presidency"3; (2) to transform his campaign slogan into reality,
"President Aquino found a need for a special body to
The Majority Decisions Expansive Views of the Powers of the
investigate reported cases of graft and corruption allegedly
Presidency and the Mandate of the Aquino Government
committed during the administration of his predecessor" 4; (3)
the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) is an ad hoc committee The majority Decision starts with an expansive view of the
that flows from the Presidents constitutional duty to ensure that powers of the Philippine presidency and what this presidency is
the laws are faithfully executed, and thus it can conduct
supposed to accomplish for the Filipino people:
investigations under the authority of the President to determine
whether the laws were faithfully executed in the past and to
The genesis of the foregoing cases can be traced to the events
recommend measures for the future to ensure that the laws will prior to the historic May 2010 elections, when then Senator
be faithfully executed;5 (4) the PTC is constitutional as to its
Benigno Simeon Aquino III declared his staunch condemnation
manner of creation and the scope of its powers;6 (5) that it is
of graft and corruption with his slogan, "Kung walang corrupt,
similar to valid investigative bodies like the PCAC, PCAPE,
walang mahirap." The Filipino people convinced in his sincerity
PARGO, the Feliciano Commission, the Melo Commission and and in his ability to carry out this noble objective catapulted the
7
the Zearosa Commission. Nevertheless, the majority
good senator to the Presidency.11
Decision concluded that the PTC should be struck down as
unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause for the
reason that the PTCs clear mandate is to "investigate and find Here we have the majority affirming that there exists a political
contract between the incumbent President and the Filipino
out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and
people that he must stamp out graft and corruption. It must
8
corruption during the previous administration only."
be remembered that the presidency does not exist for its own
sake; it is but the instrument of the will of the people, and this
There is a disjoint between the premises and the conclusion of relationship is embodied in a political contract between the
the Decision caused by its discard of the elementary rules of
President and the people. This political contract creates many
logic and legal precedents. It suffers from internal contradiction, of the same kinds of legal and constitutional imperatives under
engages in semantic smoke-and-mirrors and blatantly
the social contract theory as organic charters do. It also
disregards what must be done in evaluating equal protection
undergirds the moral legitimacy of political administrations. This
claims, i.e., a judge must ask whether there was indeed a
political contract between President Aquino and the Filipino
classification; the purpose of the law or executive action;
people is a potent force that must be viewed with the same
whether that purpose achieves a legitimate state objective; the seriousness as the 1987 Constitution, whose authority is only
reason for the classification; and the relationship between the
maintained by the continuing assent thereto of the same
means and the end. Within those layers of analysis, the judge
Filipino people.
must compare the claimed reason for classification with cases
of like or unlike reasoning. He knows the real world, he looks at
Then the Decision proceeds to affirm the power of the
its limitations, he applies his common sense, and the judge
President to conduct investigations as a necessary offshoot of
knows in his judicial heart whether the claimed reason makes
duty to ensure that the laws are
sense or not. And because he is a practical man, who believes his express constitutional
12
faithfully
executed.
It
then
proceeds to explain that fact-finding
as Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes did that the life of the law is
... that said Act does not violate the constitutional provision of
equal protection, for the classification of workers under the Act
depending on their religious tenets is based on substantial
distinction, is germane to the purpose of the law, and applies to
all the members of a given class...
... In Aglipay v. Ruiz, this Court had occasion to state that the
government should not be precluded from pursuing valid
objectives secular in character even if the incidental result
would be favorable to a religion or sect...
The primary effects of the exemption from closed shop
agreements in favor of members of religious sects that prohibit
their members from affiliating with a labor organization, is the
protection of said employees against the aggregate force
of the collective bargaining agreement, and relieving
certain citizens of a burden on their religious beliefs; and
by eliminating to a certain extent economic insecurity due to
unemployment, which is a serious menace to the health,
morals, and welfare of the people of the State, the Act also
promotes the well-being of society. It is our view that the
exemption from the effects of closed shop agreement does
not directly advance, or diminish, the interests of any
particular religion. Although the exemption may benefit
those who are members of religious sects that prohibit
their members from joining labor unions, the benefit upon
the religious sects is merely incidental and indirect. The
"establishment clause" (of religion) does not ban regulation on
conduct whose reason or effect merely happens to coincide or
harmonize with the tents of some or all religions. The free
exercise clause of the Constitution has been interpreted to
require that religious exercise be preferentially aided.
discovery, but creation; and that the doubts and misgivings, the
hopes and fears, are part of the travail of mind, the pangs of
death and the pangs of birth, in which principles that have
served their day expire, and new principles are born." 85
Justice Cardozo was also conscious of the close intertwining
between a judge's philosophy and the judicial process, in his
analysis of Roosevelt's statement on the philosophy of judges,
the timeliness of their philosophy, and the impact of the same
on the decisions of the courts.86 It is due to the limits of human
nature, Justice Cardozo conceded, that the ideal of "eternal
verities" is beyond the reach of a judge; thus it is impossible to
completely eliminate the "personal measure of the [judicial]
interpreter." Of such personal measures and the signs of the
times he wrote: "My duty as judge may be to objectify in law,
not my own aspirations and convictions and philosophies, but
the aspirations and convictions and philosophies of the men
and women of my time. Hardly shall I do this well if my own
sympathies and beliefs and passionate devotions are with a
time that is past."87
Id. at p. 25.
Decision at p. 35.
Id. at 3.
10
11
Decision at p. 3.
12
Decision at p. 24.
13
27
29
14
Decision at p. 37.
30
15
Decision at p. 43.
31
16
17
Decision at p. 36.
21
34
35
36
37
23
Decision at p. 36.
41
42
43
26
45
25
44
46
64
47
65
48
66
Id.
49
67
Id. at p. 22
50
68
51
69
Id.
70
71
Id. at p. 15
72
Id. at p. 27
73
53
74
54
57
77
59
61
98
Brion, supra at p. 6.
100
Id. at p. 20
101
Id. at p. 33
102
81
105
82
84
107
85
86
108
87
109
88
110
89
90
91
Id. at p. 176.
92
Id. at p. 177.
93
94
Id. at p. 179.
95
112
96
Id. at p. 6.
113
97
III.
I.
PETITIONERS HAVE NOT AND WILL NOT SUFFER DIRECT
PERSONAL INJURY WITH THE ISSUANCE OF EXECUTIVE
ORDER NO. 1. PETITIONERS DO NOT HAVE LEGAL
STANDING TO ASSAIL THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 1.
II.
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 1 IS CONSTITUTIONAL AND
VALID. EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 1 DOES NOT ARROGATE
THE POWERS OF CONGRESS TO CREATE A PUBLIC
OFFICE AND TO APPROPRIATE FUNDS FOR ITS
OPERATIONS.
III.
THE EXECUTIVE CREATED THE TRUTH COMMISSION
PRIMARILY AS A TOOL FOR NATION-BUILDING TO
INDEPENDENTLY DETERMINE THE PRINCIPAL CAUSES
AND CONSEQUENCES OF CORRUPTION AND TO MAKE
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THEIR REDRESS AND
FUTURE PREVENTION. ALTHOUGH ITS INVESTIGATION
MAY CONTRIBUTE TO SUBSEQUENT PROSECUTORIAL
EFFORTS, THE COMMISSION WILL NOT ENCROACH BUT
COMPLEMENT THE POWERS OF THE OMBUDSMAN AND
THE DOJ IN INVESTIGATING CORRUPTION.
IV.
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 1 IS VALID AND
CONSTITUTIONAL. IT DOES NOT VIOLATE THE EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE. THE TRUTH COMMISSION HAS
LEGITIMATE AND LAUDABLE PURPOSES.
In resolving these issues, the ponencia, penned by the learned
Justice Jose Catral Mendoza, concludes that:
1. Petitioners have legal standing to file the instant
petitions; petitioner Biraogo only because of the
transcendental importance of the issues involved, while
petitioner Members of the House of Representatives
have standing to question the validity of any official
action which allegedly infringes on their prerogatives
as legislators;
xxx
et. al., this Court has had occasion to also delve on the
Presidents power to reorganize the Office of the President
under Section 31 (2) and (3) of Executive Order No. 292 and
the power to reorganize the Office of the President Proper. The
Court has there observed:
practical purposes, an act subject to strict scrutiny is assured of violation of the equal protection clause, precisely because
being held unconstitutional. (Citations omitted.)
perfection in classification is not required.41
that, in a host of cases, this Court has recognized the
applicability of the foregoing tests. Among them are City of
Manila v. Laguio, Jr.,32 Central Bank Employees Association v.
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas,33 and British American Tobacco v.
Camacho, et al.,34 in all of which the Court applied the
minimum level of scrutiny, or the rational basis test.
It is important to remember that when this Court resolves an
equal protection challenge against a legislative or executive
act, "[w]e do not inquire whether the [challenged act] is wise or
desirable xxx. Misguided laws may nevertheless be
constitutional. Our task is merely to determine whether there is
some rationality in the nature of the class singled out." 35
Laws classify in order to achieve objectives, but the
classification may not perfectly achieve the objective.36 Thus, in
Michael M. v. Supreme Court of Sonoma County,37 the U.S.
Supreme Court said that the relevant inquiry is not whether the
statute is drawn as precisely as it might have been, but
whether the line chosen [by the legislature] is within
constitutional limitations. The equal protection clause does not
require the legislature to enact a statute so broad that it may
well be incapable of enforcement.38
It is equally significant to bear in mind that when a
governmental act draws up a classification, it actually creates
two classes: one consists of the people in the "statutory class"
and the other consists precisely of those people necessary to
achieve the objective of the governmental action (the "objective
class").39 It could happen that
The "statutory class" may include "more" than is necessary in
the classification to achieve the objective. If so, the law is
"over-inclusive." The classification may also include "less" than
is necessary to achieve the objective. If so, the statute is
"under-inclusive."
A curfew law, requiring all persons under age eighteen to be off
the streets between the hours of midnight and 6 a.m.,
presumably has as its objective the prevention of street crime
by minors; this is "over-inclusive" since the class of criminal
minors (the objective class) is completely included in the class
of people under age eighteen (the statutory class), but many
people under age eighteen are not part of the class of criminal
minors.
3. Section 2
SECTION 2. Powers and Functions. The Commission, which
shall have all the powers of an investigative body under
Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of
1987, is primarily tasked to conduct a thorough fact-finding
investigation of reported cases of graft and corruption referred
to in Section 1, involving third level public officers and higher,
their co-principals, accomplices and accessories from the
private sector, if any, during the previous administration and
thereafter submit its finding and recommendation to the
President, Congress and the Ombudsman.
Second, petitioners do not even attempt to overthrow the
presumption of constitutionality of executive acts. They simply
hurl pastiche arguments hoping that at least one will stick.
11
12
13
15
17
22
23
24
25
26
27
10
Id. at 216.
31
32
33
34
CONCURRING OPINION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
35
Id.
39
Id. at 302-302.
41
Id. at 303.
42
Id.
43
Id. at 299.
44
45
46
47
48
49
52
55
xxxx
Footnotes
1
Section 1, EO No. 1.
Section 15 of EO No. 1.
10
11
Id. at 974.
12
13
Id. at 913-914.
14
15
Id. at 896-897.
16
17
Id. at 776.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Indeed, the equal protection clause of the Constitution allows
Associate Justice
classification.45 If the classification is reasonable, the law may
operate only on some and not all of the people without violating
the equal protection clause.46 To be valid, it must conform to
the following requirements: (1) It must be based on substantial
distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law; Footnotes
(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it
must apply equally to all members of the class.47
1
See David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396,
May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 160.
Peralta v. Commission on Elections 48 held:
2
Emphasis supplied.
10
11
Id. at 73.
13
14
Id.
15
Supra note 5.
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
Emphasis supplied.
26
27
28
30
31
32
33
34
35
Id.
41
Emphasis supplied.
44
Memorandum, p. 89.
45
36
Emphasis supplied.
Id. at 348-349.
48
49
50
Id.
39
40
SEPARATE
DISSENTING OPINION
ABAD, J.:
Brief Background
As the opinion written for the majority by Justice Jose Catral
Mendoza says, President Benigno Simeon Aquino III
(President P-Noy to distinguish him from former President
That is the first point. The second point is that the Court needs
to stand within the limits of its power to review the actions of a
co-equal branch, like those of the President, within the sphere
of its constitutional authority. Since, as the majority concedes,
the creation of the Truth Commission is within the constitutional
powers of President P-Noy to undertake, then to him, not to the
Court, belongs the discretion to define the limits of the
investigation as he deems fit. The Court cannot pit its judgment
against the judgment of the President in such matter.
And when can the Supreme Court interfere with the exercise of
that discretion? The answer is, as provided in Section 1, Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution, only when the President gravely
abuses his exercise of such discretion. This means that, in
restricting the Truth Commissions investigation only to
corruptions committed during the previous administration, he
acted capriciously and whimsically or in an arbitrary or despotic
manner.7
To act capriciously and whimsically is to act freakishly, abruptly,
or erratically, like laughing one moment and crying the next
without apparent reason. Does this characterize the Presidents
action in this case, considering that he merely acted to set a
feasible target, neutralize political bias, assign the Commission
a task suitable to its limited capacity, and observe correct
housekeeping procedures? Did he act arbitrarily in the manner
of little children changing the rules of the game in the middle of
the play or despotically in the manner of a dictator? Unless he
did, the Court must rein in its horses. It cannot itself exceed the
limits of its power of review under the Constitution.
KERB asserts that there was no valid abolition of the ERB but
The Board shall, upon proper notice and hearing, exercise the
there was merely a reorganization done in bad faith. Evidences following, among other powers and functions:
of bad faith are enumerated in Section 2 of Republic Act No.
6656 (RA 6656),12 Section 2 of RA 6656 reads:
(a) Fix and regulate the prices of petroleum products;
No officer or employee in the career service shall be removed
except for a valid cause and after due notice and hearing. A
valid cause for removal exists when, pursuant to a bona
fide reorganization, a position has been abolished or rendered
redundant or there is a need to merge, divide, or consolidate
positions in order to meet the exigencies of the service, or
other lawful causes allowed by the Civil Service Law. The
existence of any or some of the following circumstances may
be considered as evidence of bad faith in the removals made
as a result of reorganization, giving rise to a claim for
reinstatement or reappointment by an aggrieved party:
(a) Where there is a significant increase in the number of
positions in the new staffing pattern of the department or
agency concerned;
(b) Fix and regulate the rate schedule or prices of piped gas to
be charged by duly franchised gas companies which distribute
gas by means of underground pipe system;
(c) Fix and regulate the rates of pipeline concessionaires under
the provisions of Republic Act No. 387, as amended, otherwise
known as the "Petroleum Act of 1949," as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1700;
(d) Regulate the capacities of new refineries or additional
capacities of existing refineries and license refineries that may
be organized after the issuance of this Executive Order, under
such terms and conditions as are consistent with the national
interest;
(u) The ERC shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction
over all cases contesting rates, fees, fines and penalties
imposed by the ERC in the exercise of the abovementioned
powers, functions and responsibilities and over all cases
involving disputes between and among participants or players
in the energy sector.
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
The ERC shall, motu proprio, monitor and penalize any market
9. SEC. 34. Universal Charge. Within one (1) year from the power abuse or anticompetitive or discriminatory act or
effectivity of this Act, a universal charge to be determined, fixed behavior by any participant in the electric power industry.
and approved by the ERC, shall be imposed on all electricity
end-users x x x x
15. SEC. 51. Powers. The PSALM Corp. shall, in the
performance of its functions and for the attainment of its
10. SEC. 35. Royalties, Returns and Tax Rates for Indigenous objective, have the following powers: x x x
Energy Resources. x x x
(e) To liquidate the NPC stranded contract costs utilizing
To ensure lower rates for end-users, the ERC shall forthwith
proceeds from sales and other property contributed to it,
reduce the rates of power from all indigenous sources of
including the proceeds from the universal charge;
energy.
xxxx
11. SEC. 36. Unbundling of Rates and Functions. x x x
16. SEC. 60. Debts of Electric Cooperatives. x x x The ERC
each distribution utility shall file its revised rates for the
shall ensure a reduction in the rates of electric cooperatives
approval by the ERC. x x x x
commensurate with the resulting savings due to the removal of
the amortization payments of their loans. x x x x
12. SEC. 40. Enhancement of Technical Competence. The
ERC shall establish rigorous training programs for its staff for
17. SEC. 62. Joint Congressional Power Commission. x x x
the purpose of enhancing the technical competence of the ERC
in the following areas: evaluation of technical performance and x x x the Power Commission is hereby empowered to require
monitoring of compliance with service and performance
the DOE, ERC, NEA, TRANSCO, generation companies,
standards, performance-based rate-setting reform,
distribution utilities, suppliers and other electric power industry
environmental standards and such other areas as will enable
participants to submit reports and all pertinent data and
the ERC to adequately perform its duties and functions.
information relating to the performance of their respective
functions in the industry. xxx
13. SEC. 41. Promotion of Consumer Interests. The ERC
shall handle consumer complaints and ensure the adequate
xxxx
promotion of consumer interests.
18. SEC. 65. Environmental Protection. Participants in the
14. SEC. 45. Cross Ownership, Market Power Abuse and Anti- generation, distribution and transmission sub-sectors of the
Competitive Behavior. No participant in the electricity
industry shall comply with all environmental laws, rules,
industry may engage in any anti-competitive behavior
regulations and standards promulgated by the Department of
including, but not limited to, cross-subsidization, price or
Environment and Natural Resources including, in appropriate
market manipulation, or other unfair trade practices detrimental cases, the establishment of an environmental guarantee fund.
to the encouragement and protection of contestable markets.
19. SEC. 67. NPC Offer of Transition Supply Contracts.
xxxx
Within six (6) months from the effectivity of this Act, NPC shall
file with the ERC for its approval a transition supply contract
(c) x x x The ERC shall, within one (1) year from the effectivity duly negotiated with the distribution utilities containing the
of this Act, promulgate rules and regulations to promote
terms and conditions of supply and a corresponding schedule
competition, encourage market development and customer
of rates, consistent with the provisions hereof, including
choice and discourage/penalize abuse of market power,
adjustments and/or indexation formulas which shall apply to the
cartelization and any anticompetitive or discriminatory behavior, term of such contracts.
in order to further the intent of this Act and protect the public
interest. Such rules and regulations shall define the following:
xxxx
After comparing the functions of the ERB and the ERC, we find
that the ERC indeed assumed the functions of the ERB.
However, the overlap in the functions of the ERB and of the
ERC does not mean that there is no valid abolition of the ERB.
The ERC has new and expanded functions which are
intended to meet the specific needs of a deregulated power
industry. Indeed, National Land Titles and Deeds Registration
Administration v. Civil Service Commission stated that:
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Can the Commission on Human Rights lawfully implement an
upgrading and reclassification of personnel positions without
the prior approval of the Department of Budget and
Management?
Before this Court is a petition for review filed by petitioner
Commission on Human Rights Employees' Association
(CHREA) challenging the Decision1 dated 29 November 2001
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59678 affirming the
Resolutions2 dated 16 December 1999 and 09 June 2000 of
the Civil Service Commission (CSC), which sustained the
validity of the upgrading and reclassification of certain
personnel positions in the Commission on Human Rights
(CHR) despite the disapproval thereof by the Department of
Budget and Management (DBM). Also assailed is the resolution
dated 11 September 2002 of the Court of Appeals denying the
motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner.
The antecedent facts which spawned the present controversy
are as follows:
On 14 February 1998, Congress passed Republic Act No.
8522, otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act of
1998. It provided for Special Provisions Applicable to All
Constitutional Offices Enjoying Fiscal Autonomy. The last
portion of Article XXXIII covers the appropriations of the CHR.
These special provisions state:
1. Organizational Structure. Any provision of law to the
contrary notwithstanding and within the limits of their
respective appropriations as authorized in this Act, the
Constitutional Commissions and Offices enjoying fiscal
autonomy are authorized to formulate and implement
the organizational structures of their respective offices,
to fix and determine the salaries, allowances, and other
benefits of their personnel, and whenever public
interest so requires, make adjustments in their
personal services itemization including, but not limited
to, the transfer of item or creation of new positions in
their respective offices: PROVIDED, That officers and
employees whose positions are affected by such
reorganization or adjustments shall be granted
retirement gratuities and separation pay in accordance
Information
Officer V
24
28
36,744.006
A. Creation
Annexed to said resolution is the proposed creation of ten
additional plantilla positions, namely: one Director IV position,
with Salary Grade 28 for the Caraga Regional Office, four
Number of Positions
Position Title
Security Officer II with Salary Grade 15, and five Process
Servers, with Salary Grade 5 under the Office of the
Commissioners. 4
On 19 October 1998, CHR issued Resolution No. A980555 providing for the upgrading or raising of salary grades of
the following positions in the Commission:
Director
IV
Salary Grade
Security Officer II
(Coterminous)
Total Salary
Requirements
15
684,780.00
B. Upgrading
Number of
Positions
Position
Salary Grade
Title
From
To
From
Total Salary
Requireme
nts
Number of
Positions
Position Title
To
From
12
Attorney VI
(In the
Regional
Field
Offices)
Director
IV
26
28
P229,104.0
0
Director III
Director
IV
27
28
38,928.00
24
28
36,744.00
Budget
Officer III
Budget
Officer IV
18
24
51,756.00
Accountant
III
Chief
Accounta
nt
18
24
51,756.00
Cashier III
Cashier V
18
Salary Grade
To
From
To
1 Attorney V
Director IV
25
28
2 Security
Officer I
Security
Officer II
11
15
Total 3
24
51,756.00