PEOPLE vs.

VICENTE, 405 SCRA 40

[G.R. No. 137296. June 26, 2003]

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

FACTS:
That on or about May 30,1998 in the evening thereof, at barangay Gueguesangen, Mangaldan,
Pangasinan, the accused, armed with a bladed weapon, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, attack and stab MANUEL C.
QUINTO, JR., causing his death shortly thereafter due to CARDIORESPIRATORY ARREST
SECONDARY TO HYPOVOLEMIC SHOCK DUE TO A STAB WOUND as per Certificate of Death
issued by Dr. Ophelia Rivera, M.D., Rural Health Officer, Mangaldan, Pangasinan, to the damage
and prejudice of the legal heirs of said deceased Manuel C. Quinto, Jr. and other consequential
damages relative thereto.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the accused is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense.
2. Whether or not treachery should be considered as a qualifying aggravating circumstance of the
incident.

FACTS:
In self-defense, the burden of proof rests upon the accused. His duty is to establish self-defense by
clear and convincing evidence, otherwise conviction would follow from his admission that he killed the
victim. Here, appellant miserably failed to discharge such burden.
The trial court also held that the crime committed by appellant is qualified by treachery. There is
treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or
forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to
himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
Treachery is present in this case. The fact that the attack is frontal does not negate the finding of
treachery. Even a frontal attack can be treacherous if sudden and unexpected and the victim is unarmed.
Here, the victim was suddenly stabbed when he was extending his hand to the appellant. With his
mindset, the victim could not have any inkling that there was danger to his life when he approached
appellant.
In People vs. Tobias we held that what is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it
impossible for the victim to defend himself or retaliate. In this case, the suddenness of the attack
deprived the victim of the opportunity to repel it or defend his person. There being treachery, appellants
conviction of murder is in order.

G.R. Nos. 147674-75, March 17, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ANACITO OPURAN, appellant.
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
Opuran (O) was charged with two counts of murder, with attendant qualifying circumstance
of treachery, for the deaths of Patrimonio (P) and Dacles (D) under separate informations, to
which O entered a plea of not guilty at his arraignment. According to the witnesses for the
prosecution, O stabbed D, who was lying on a bench, on the chest with a knife. D, despite
several stab wounds, was able to run inside a neighbors house, who helped bring him to the
hospital, but he died 15 minutes later. On the same day, O also stabbed P with a knife
several times while the latter was walking near the so-called lovers lane. P was brought to
the hospital where he died the next day. For his part, O denies being present at the place
and time of the stabbing incidents. He claims he was never out that night, but was resting in
his house when policemen came to arrest him.
Hearings were postponed due to the defenses failure to present other witnesses. Later, they
moved for suspension of the hearing because of an Order authorizing the psychiatric
examination of O. The court then granted the motion for psychiatric examination of O.
When the hearings resumed, a Dr. V testified that she examined O 3 times through
interviews, and learned that he had a history of inability to sleep and talking irrelevantly. She
confirmed her medical findings that O was psychotic before and during the commission of
the crime and even up to the present so that he could not stand trial. Her diagnosis was that
O was suffering from schizophrenia.
In its decision, the trial court found O guilty of murder for the death of P, and homicide for
the death of D.
O appealed, stating that the trial court failed to appreciate the exempting circumstance of
insanity. He contends that he was suffering from a psychotic disorder and was, therefore,
completely deprived of intelligence when he stabbed the victims. The OSG, however, avers
that O failed to establish with the required proof his defense of insanity or his claim of the
mitigating circumstance of diminished willpower. According to Dr. V, she was certain that O
was not grossly insane, but was uncertain that he was unconscious at the time of the
incident.
ISSUE: WON Opuran was insane.
RULING: Article 800 of the Civil Code presumes that everyone is sane. This presumption,
however, may be overthrown by evidence of insanity, which under Article 12(1) of the
Revised Penal Code exempts a person from criminal liability. He who pleads the exempting
circumstance of insanity bears the burden of proving it, for insanity as a defense is in the
nature of confession and avoidance. An accused invoking insanity admits to have committed
the crime but claims that he is not guilty because he is insane. The testimony or proof of an
accused's insanity must, however, relate to the time immediately preceding or coetaneous
with the commission of the offense with which he is charged. It is, therefore, incumbent upon

accuseds counsel to prove that his client was not in his right mind or was under the
influence of a sudden attack of insanity immediately before or at the time he executed the
act attributed to him.
Insanity is evinced by a deranged and perverted condition of the mental faculties which is
manifested in language and conduct. However, not every aberration of the mind or mental
deficiency constitutes insanity. As consistently held by the court, "A man may act crazy, but
it does not necessarily and conclusively prove that he is legally so."
Establishing the insanity of an accused often requires opinion testimony which may be given
by a witness who is intimately acquainted with the accused; has rational basis to conclude
that the accused was insane based on his own perception; or is qualified as an expert, such
as a psychiatrist. Thus, according to the defense, O was insane because he would wear a
Barong Tagalog and long pants even when there was no occasion requiring such attire. He
behaved oddly a few days prior to the stabbing incident; he would sometimes talk to
himself, laugh, shout and utter bad words, but at times, he was also just quiet.
A careful scrutiny of the records, however, indicates that Anacito failed to prove by clear and
convincing evidence the defense of insanity. For one thing, it was only Bambis personal
perception that there was no reason or occasion for Anacito to wear Barong Tagalog. Tested
against the stringent criterion for insanity to be exempting, such deportment of Anacito, his
occasional silence, and his acts of laughing, talking to himself, staring sharply, and stabbing
his victims within a 15-minute interval are not sufficient proof that he was insane
immediately before or at the time he committed the crimes. Such unusual behavior may be
considered as mere abnormality of the mental faculties, which will not exclude imputability.
Anacitos psychiatric history likewise fails to meet the stringent yardstick established by
case law, because it merely shows that O was prescribed medicine to remedy his lack of
sleep and noisiness. It was never shown that these drugs were for a mental illness that
deprived Anacito of reason.
Moreover, as found by the trial court, the results of Dr. Veronas examinations on Anacito
were based on incomplete or insufficient facts. Her conclusions have no supporting medical
bases, and failed to demonstrate how she arrived at her conclusions. She failed to show her
method of testing. The court could only conclude that her findings refer to the period after
the stabbing accident and, hence, would prove Os mental condition only for said time.
Interestingly, O failed to raise insanity at the earliest opportunity. He invoked it for the first
time only after he had already testified on his defenses of alibi and denial. It has been held
that the invocation of denial and alibi as defenses indicates that the accused was in full
control of his mental faculties. Additionally, the trial judge observed that, during the
hearings, O was attentive, well-behaved, and responsive to the questions propounded to
him. Thus, the shift in theory from denial and alibi to a plea of insanity, made apparently
after the appellant realized the futility of his earlier defenses, is a clear indication that
insanity is a mere concoction or an afterthought.
ISSUE: WON there was treachery.

RULING: We agree with the trial court that treachery cannot be appreciated as far as the
killing of Allan is concerned because the sole eyewitness did not see the commencement of
the assault. For treachery to be considered, it must be present and seen by the witness right
at the inception of the attack. Where no particulars are known as to how the killing began,
the perpetration with treachery cannot be supposed.
Treachery was correctly appreciated in the killing of Demetrio Jr. Anacito was lying in wait for
his victim in a dark place at the national highway. When Demetrio Jr. reached the "lovers
lane," Anacito emerged from his hiding place and stabbed the former several times.
Anacitos attack came without warning; it was deliberate and unexpected, affording the
hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no opportunity to resist or defend himself.
We do not find merit in appellants contention that he cannot be convicted of murder for the
death of Demetrio Jr. because treachery was not alleged with "specificity" as a qualifying
circumstance in the information. Such contention is belied by the information itself, which
alleged: "All contrary to law, and with the attendant qualifying circumstance of treachery." In
any event, even after the recent amendments to the Rules of Criminal Procedure, qualifying
circumstances need not be preceded by descriptive words such as qualifying or qualified by
to properly qualify an offense.

People vs. Dela Rosario

SYNOPSIS
Accused Joselito Del Rosario was found guilty as co-principal in the crime
of Robbery with Homicide and he was sentenced to suffer the death penalty
and to pay damages to the heirs of the victim.
Del Rosario alleged that he was just hired by Virgilio Santos to drive him to
a cockpit. He was not aware of the plan of Santos and his two companions to
rob and kill the victim. He was not able to seek assistance because Santos
threatened to shoot him if he did.

He also failed to inform the police

authorities about the incident because the culprits has threatened him and his
family. He claimed exemption from criminal liability as he allegedly acted
under the compulsion of an irresistible force.

The conviction of Del Rosario must be set aside and his claim for exemption
sustained. He was then unarmed and unable to protect himself when he was
prevented at gunpoint from leaving the crime scene during the commission of
the robbery and killing. He was also forced to help the culprits escape after the
commission of the crime. Further, Del Rosarios failure to disclose what he
knew about the incident to the authorities does not affect his credibility. The
natural hesitance of most people to get involved in a criminal case is of judicial
notice. Given his quite limited means, Del Rosario understandably did not
want to get involved in the case so he chose to keep his silence. Besides, he
was threatened with physical harm should he squeal.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES; WHERE PERSON ACTS
UNDER COMPULSION OF IRRESISTIBLE FORCE; ELUCIDATED. -- A
person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, like one who
acts under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury,
is

exempt

from

criminal

liability

because

he

does

not

act

with

freedom. Actus me invito factus non est meus actus. An act done by me
against my will is not my act.

The force contemplated must be so

formidable as to reduce the actor to a mere instrument who acts not only
without will but against his will. The duress, force, fear or intimidation
must be present, imminent and impending, and of such nature as to induce
a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be
done. A threat of future injury is not enough. The compulsion must be of
such a character as to leave no opportunity for the accused for escape or
self-defense in equal combat.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. -- As a rule, it is natural for
people to be seized by fear when threatened with weapons, even those less
powerful than a gun, such as knives and clubs. People will normally,
usually and probably do what an armed man asks them to do, nothing
more, nothing less. In the instant case, Del Rosario was threatened with a
gun. He could not therefore be expected to flee nor risk his life to help a
stranger. A person under the same cicumstances would be more concerned

with his personal welfare and security rather than the safety of a person
whom he only saw for the first time that day. There is no doubt that the
fear entertained by Del Rosario because of the gun directly pointed at him
was real and imminent. Such fear rendered him immobile and subject to
the will of Boy Santos, making him for the moment an automaton without a
will of his own. In other words, in effect, he could not be any more than a
mere instrument acting involuntarily and against his will. He is therefore
exempt from criminal liability since by reason of fear of bodily harm he was
compelled against his will to transport his co-accused away from the crime
scene.
3. ID.; CONSPIRACY; ELUCIDATED. -- A conspiracy in the statutory language
exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. The objective of the
conspirators is to perform an act or omission punishable by law. That must
be their intent. There is need for concurrence of wills or unity of action and
purpose or for common and joint purpose and design. Its manifestation
could be shown by united and concerted action.
4. ID.; ID.; IMPLIED CONSPIRACY; HOW ESTABLISHED. -- Admittedly, direct
proof is not essential to establish conspiracy.

Since by its nature

conspiracy is planned in utmost secrecy, it can rarely be proved by direct

evidence. Consequently, the presence of the concurrence of minds which is
involved

in

conspiracy

may

be

inferred

from

proof

of

facts

and

circumstances which, taken together, apparently indicate that they are

merely parts of some complete whole. If it is proved that two or more
persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same
unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though
apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating
a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment, a
conspiracy may be inferred though no actual meeting among them to
concert means is proved. That would be termed an implied conspiracy.
Nevertheless, mere knowledge, acquiescence or approval of the act, without
the cooperation or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one
a party to a conspiracy, but that there must be intentional participation in

the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and
purpose.

Conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but by

positive and conclusive evidence.

In fact, the same degree of proof

necessary to establish the crime is required to support a finding of the

presence of a criminal conspiracy, which is, proof beyond reasonable doubt.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. -- To convict the accused,
the presence of an implied conspiracy is required to be proved beyond
reasonable doubt. However, the fact that Del Rosario was with the other
accused when the crime was committed is insufficient proof to show cabal.
Mere companionship does not establish conspiracy. The only incriminating
evidence against Del Rosario is that he was at the scene of the crime but he
has amply explained the reason for his presence and the same has not been
successfully refuted by the prosecution. No complicity can be deduced
where there is absolutely no showing that the accused directly participated
in the overt act of robbing and shooting although he was with the person
who robbed and killed the victim.