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MANUEL
appellants.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A person who commits a felony is liable for the
direct, natural and logical consequences of his wrongful
act even where the resulting crime is more serious than
that intended. Hence, an accused who originally
intended to conceal and to bury what he thought was the
lifeless body of the victim can be held liable as a
principal, not simply as an accessory, where it is proven
that the said victim was actually alive but subsequently
died as a direct result of such concealment and
burial. Nonetheless, in the present case, Appellant
Garcia can not be held liable as a principal because the
prosecution failed to allege such death through drowning
in the Information. Neither may said appellant be held
liable as an accessory due to his relationship with the
principal killer, Appellant Ortega, who is his brother-inlaw.
Statement of the Case
This case springs from the joint appeal interposed
by Appellants Benjamin Ortega, Jr. and Manuel Garcia
from the Decision,[1] dated February 9, 1994 written by
Judge Adriano R. Osorio,[2] finding them guilty of murder.
Appellants were charged by State Prosecutor
Bernardo S. Razon in an Information [3] dated October 19,
1992, as follows:
That on or about October 17, 1992 in
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, conspiring together
and mutually helping one another, without any
justifiable cause, with treachery and evident
premeditation and with abuse of superior
strenght (sic) and with deliberate intent to kill,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and stab repeatedly
with a pointed weapon on the different parts of
the body one ANDRE MAR MASANGKAY y
ABLOLA, thereby inflicting upon the latter
serious physical injuries which directly caused
his death.
During arraignment, Appellants Ortega and Garcia,
assisted by counsel de oficio,[4] pleaded not guilty to the
charge.[5] Accused John Doe was then at large.[6] After
trial in due course, the court a quo promulgated the
questioned Decision. The dispositive portion reads:[7]
WHEREFORE, finding accused Benjamin
Ortega, Jr. y Conje and Manuel Garcia y Rivera
[g]uilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged, the Court hereby sentenced (sic)
them to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA and to pay the costs of suit.
(At
this
juncture,
demonstrating.)
the
witness
It should be noted that Victim Masangkay was a sixfooter, whereas Appellant Ortega, Jr. was only five feet
and five inches tall.[27] There was no testimony as to how
the attack was initiated. The accused and the victim
were already grappling when Quitlong arrived. Nothing in
the foregoing testimony and circumstances can be
interpreted as abuse of superior strength.Hence, Ortega
is liable only for homicide, not murder.
Second Issue: Liability of Appellant Manuel Garcia
Appellants argue that the finding of conspiracy by
the trial court is based on mere assumption and
conjecture x x x.[28] Allegedly, the medico-legal finding
that the large airway was filled with muddy particles
indicating that the victim was alive when the victim
inhaled the muddy particles did not necessarily mean
that such muddy particles entered the body of the victim
while he was still alive. The Sinumpaang Salaysay of
Quitlong stated, Nilubayan lang nang saksak nang
mapatay na si Andrew ni Benjamin Ortega, Jr. Thus, the
prosecution evidence shows Masangkay was already
dead when he was lifted and dumped into the
well. Hence, Garcia could be held liable only as an
accessory.[29]
We do not agree with the above contention. Article
4, par. 1, of the Revised Penal Code states that criminal
liability shall be incurred by any person committing a
felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended. The essential
requisites for the application of this provision are that (a)
the intended act is felonious; (b) the resulting act is
likewise a felony; and (c) the unintended albeit graver
wrong was primarily caused by the actors wrongful
acts. In assisting Appellant Ortega, Jr. carry the body of
Masangkay to the well, Appellant Garcia was committing
a felony. The offense was that of concealing the body of
ATTY. ALTUNA:
Q Will you please explain this in simple
language the last portion of Exhibit N,
beginning with tracheo-bronchial tree, that
is sentence immediately after paragraph
10, 2.5 cms. Will you please explain this?
A The trancheo-bronchial tree is filled with
muddy particles.
Q I ask you a question on this. Could the victim
have possibly get this particular material?
A No, sir.
Q What do you mean by no?
A A person should be alive so that the muddy
particles could be inhaled.
Q So, in short, you are telling or saying to us
that if there is no inhaling or the taking or
receiving of muddy particles at that time,
the person is still alive?
A Yes, sir.
Q Second point?
A The heart is pale with some multiple
petechial hemorrhages at the anterior
surface.
Q And this may [be] due to stab wounds or
asphyxia?
A These are the effects or due to asphyxia or
decreased amount of blood going to the
heart.
Q This asphyxia are you referring to is the
drowning?
A Yes, sir.
VITUG, J.:
An information, accusing Felix Nizurtado of having
committed the complex crime of malversation of public
funds through falsification of public document, reads:
That on or about August 25, 1983, and
for sometime prior or subsequent
thereto, in the City of Caloocan,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the abovenamed
accused, a public officer, being then the
Barangay Captain of Panghulo,
Malabon, Metro Manila, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
falsify and attest Resolution No. 17
Series of 1983 by making it appear that
on August 25, 1983 the Barangay
council of Panghulo met and identified
T-shirt manufacturing as its livelihood
project, when in truth and in fact, as the
accused fully well knew, no such
meeting was held, where T-shirt
manufacturing was identified and
Felix Nizurtado
Barangay Captain
Marcelo Sandel
Barangay Councilman
Alfredo Aguilar
Barangay Councilman
Santos Gomez
Barangay Councilman
Jose Bautista Barangay
Councilman
Alfredo Dalmacio
Barangay Councilman
Ceferino Roldan
Barangay Councilman
The word "none" was inserted in the
space intended for the names of the
Councilmen who did not attend. The
resolution was given the number "17"
series of "1983." Finally, the last line
before the names and signatures of the
Councilmen was completed by
typewriting the date so that it now reads:
UNANIMOUSLY
APPROVED
this 25th day of August,
1983.
The resolution as fully accomplished is
now marked Exhibit D.
Other supporting documents for the
encashment of the check of P10,000.00
were also prepared, signed, and filed by
Nizurtado. They were: Project
Identification (Exhibit B), Project
Application in which the borrower was
stated to be Samahang Kabuhayan ng
Panghulo (Exhibit C and C-1), Project
Location Map (Exhibit E), and
Promissory Note
(Exhibit F).
The application for loan having been
approved, the Promissory Note (Exhibit
F) was re-dated from August to October
18, 1983, placed in the name of the
Samahang Kabuhayan ng Panghulo
represented by Nizurtado, and made
payable in two equal yearly
amortizations of P5,000.00 each from its
date. The purpose of the loan was
stated to be
T-Shirt Manufacturing of round neck
shirts of various sizes and colors.
Nizurtado encashed the check on the
same day, October 18, 1983, and re-lent
the cash proceeds to himself, Sandel,
Aguilar, Bautista, Dalmacio, and Roldan
at P1,000.00, and to Manalang and Oro
Soledad, Barangay Court Secretary and
Barangay Secretary, respectively, at
P500.00 each.
With costs.
SO ORDERED. 4
His motion for reconsideration having been denied,
Nizurtado has filed the instant petition for review
on certiorari. Petitioner faults the Sandiganbayan in that
I.
THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
CONVICTING GEMOYA OF THE CRIME OF
MURDER.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER
IN FAVOR OF GEMOYA.
III.
THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
CONVICTING GEMOYA OF THE CRIME OF
FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE FOR THE WOUNDING
OF ROSALIE JIMENEZ.
IV.
THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
IMPOSING THE DEATH PENALTY OF GEMOYA.
After reviewing the evidence on record we found no
compelling reason to depart from the factual findings of
the trial court that accused-appellants, in conspiracy with
one another, committed the crime of murder qualified by
abuse of superior strength. In People vs. Patalin (G.R.
No. 125539, July 27, 1999) we reiterated the ruling on
this matter, thus:
Of primordial consideration in appellate matters is the
legal principle that the assessment of the credibility of
witnesses and their testimony is a matter best
undertaken by the trial court because of its unique
opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to
note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grilling
examination. We generally uphold and respect this
appraisal since as an appellate court, we do not deal
with live witnesses but only with the cold pages of a
written record.
(
p. 15)
Accused-appellant Gemoya claims that the uniform
narration of facts by prosecution witnesses is not
supported by the documentary and the expert's
testimony of the NBI Medico Legal Officer who
conducted the autopsy examination on the victim
Wilfredo Alferez. Dr. Ricardo M. Rodaje affirmed that he
found no other injury on the victim aside from the
puncture wound on his chest which was the sole cause
of death (TSN, July 3, 1996, p.46).
We are not persuaded by this argument.
It must be borne in mind that accused-appellant
Gemoya has not denied having executed the fatal act,
which caused the death of Wilfredo Alferez. He
12
in order
category.
On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when
extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his
control prevent the consummation of the intended
crime. 16 One example is the man who puts his hand in
held that:
. . . factual impossibility of the commission of
the crime is not a defense. If the crime could
have been committed had the circumstances
been as the defendant believed them to be,
(sgd.)
LUISABE
Deputy C