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4S Conference, San Diego 2013

Galit Wellner, Bar Ilan University

The Mechanization of Perception


Introduction
Technologies that affect sight, like eyeglasses, microscopes and telescopes,
have been in use for hundreds of years. Hearing improvement technologies such as
hearing aids, cochlear implant and microphones are part of many people's lives.
With these technologies we maintain embodiment relations in which they become
part of our "body schema" while amplifying and reducing certain aspects of reality.
Recently, however, newer technologies aim at "seeing" or "hearing" like humans.
They are comprised of a digital detection of a certain stimulus and deciphering of
that stimulus. In this paper I examine the new "flavors" of the embodiment relations
created with such technologies.
Think of Shazam, a mobile application that can "hear" a song via the
cellphone's microphone and recognize the performer and the song's name. It mimics
human listening.
There are also examples of mimicking human sight. Today's cellphones can
detect a face through the camera and recognize who the person is, now a debatable
feature of GoogleGlass.
An even more recent example identifies movement. On August 26, 2013,
Technology blog GigaOM reported that "Intel has designed depth-sensing 3D
cameras and software for computing devices that not only track motion and identify
objects, but also determine what the movement of those objects actually mean."i
The sensor can trace the contours and physical characteristics of an object and use
that information to identify what those objects are. When applied in an autonomous
driving system, such sensors could not only detect the objects around the car, but
also could identify what those objects are whether another car, truck, deer, person
or construction cone and what their potential behaviors might be. Another
application is to understand the human face, like a smile. GigaOm's post quotes Intel
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director of perceptual products and solutions Anil Nanduri who says: Youll add the
ability to sense your excitement, emotion whether you are happy or smiling. The
algorithms and technologies are there, but they are getting more refined...

Perception
What unites Intel's sensor and Shazam's music recognition is the intention to
imitate human perception by technological means. Let's analyze this imitation with
the postphenomenological notions of micro- and macro-perception. These two are
the intertwined components of human perception. Micro-perception is the
immediate and focused bodily impression; macro-perception encapsulates the
sociological, cultural and political aspects.
On the micro-perception level these contemporary technologies might be
regarded as simply mimicking human perception. But when the macro-perceptive
elements are added, they exceed the human. They exceed because they operate on
mass scale: who can identify millions of songs like Shazam? Who can see 360
degrees? The 360 degree view is achieved in a certain configuration, in which the
sensors can detect movement that is on the side and behind, that is on the fringes
and even outside the user's visual field.
Examining the micro-perception, another common denominator for the sensor
and the music recognition app arises. It is their ability to detect from a distance,
obviously a characteristic of vision and audition. The other sensory modalities
olfaction, gustation, and tactilitycannot be detected in today's commercially
available technologies. These other modalities are sometimes termed "intimate
senses" because they require chemical contact and a certain proximity to the target
object. Seeing and hearing technologies usually remain sterile and at a certain
distance.
The examples I found can also be characterized by their "isomorphism", that is
the retention of "some obvious semblance between referent and image" (Ihde
2011, 115). The way they imitate micro-perceptions is isomorphic they see, they
listen supposedly like humans. Some technologies, mostly found in the high-end
scientific fields, are "non isomorphic." Ihde brings the examples of DNA and RNA's
scientific representations that do not resemble their "real life" visualization, and
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spectrographic images that "show" invisible radiation. I claim that in everyday


technologies, the non-isomorphic representation is usually applicable to the macroperceptions: After a song is micro-perceived, it is analyzed and the name of the
performer is presented; when the sensor detects movement, it is translated into a
symbol that can represent a smile or a moving track, depending on the context in
which the sensor is used.
All this leads me to think that the mere mimicking of the micro-perception may
be a technological challenge for developers but is of little or no value for most users.
The major benefits are in the macro-perceptive arena. In order to enjoy the benefits
of the mechanized macro-perceptions, the user has to maintain embodiment and
hermeneutic relations with the technology in order to make the perception her own.

Embodiment
When a technology is embodied, it becomes part of the body schema so that it
"functions as [a] direct extension of ourselves, as an integral part of our body" (Brey
2000).ii Postphenomenological embodiment relations are not limited to the microperceptual aspects. Ihde maintains that embodiment relations should be widely
construed. He writes, "Embodiment, however, as I conceive it, is not merely
physiologicalalthough it is also that. It is as Donna Haraway would put it, it is
natureculture or culturenature and includes at the least the differing perceptualbodily skills we can learn" (Ihde 2011, 117). For Ihde, embodiment includes both
micro- and macro-perceptions.
Philip Brey reads in Merleau-Ponty two types of embodiment, referring to two
ways in which an artifact becomes part of the body schema. One is concerned with
motoric capabilities (like those involved in the operations of a car or a keyboard) and
the other is concerned with perceptual capabilities. In the context of contemporary
mechanized perception technologies, perceptual embodiment is more relevant. Such
an embodiment refers, according to Brey, to the ability "to discern color or pitch, to
identify spatial relations and to detect motion." Brey's examples for perceptual
embodiment relations cover vision, audition and tactility: Eyeglasses, telescopes,
microscopes; hearing aids, stethoscopes; dentist's probe and the blind man's cane
(the latter set also exemplify how an artifact can mediate both motoric and
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perceptual skills). But the way Intel's sensor detects motion while being embodied is
more than this simple notion of embodiment. The sensor technology provides the
user with more explicit input. Not only the user understands that there is motion but
also the technological artifact "understands" that. This "technological
understanding" is achieved through the translation of micro-perceived reality to
digital, and the presentation of a macro-perceptual indication as per what kind of
motion was detected.

Hermeneutic Embodiment
My examples of mechanized perceptionShazam, face recognition, Intel's
movement sensorscan be analyzed with the notion of embodiment relations as I
showed up to this point. However, the classical notion of embodiment is not
sufficient to describe the complex relations that these technologies have with their
users. There is a significant element of reading and the researcher needs to add
hermeneutic relations into the analysis. In other words, the technologies of
mechanized perception add a hermeneutic aspect to embodiment relations.
It is a hermeneutic process similar to the one performed by a thermometer
that turns the tactile sense of cold/warm into scaled numbers. Likewise, Intel's
movement sensor can locate the smiling face on a range going from very sad to
laughing.
Hermeneutics and embodiment were already combined in the
postphenomenological analysis of scientific instruments, like contemporary
telescopes that detect infrared and other non-visible radiation. In (Stretching the Inbetween: Embodiment and Beyond), Ihde differentiates between "standard"
embodiment relations and hermeneutic embodiment relations. The former involves
what he terms "analog mediation" and the latter "translation mediation." In analog
mediation, the technology remains within the limits of the human sensorium. In this
category he includes Galileo's telescope, Heidegger's hammer and Merleau-Ponty's
cane of the blind person.
Translation mediation, also titled as "beyond embodiment," has several
characteristics for the scientific investigation, according to Ihde:

1. The phenomenon detected is something that "lie[s] beyond the bodilyperceptual horizons of the human."
2. In order to perceive the phenomenon, the human has to embody the
technological meditative device.
3. It is a digital technology that is capable of converting data into image and image
into data.
4. The output is presented by the instrument and can be perceived by embodied
humans.
5. The result needs to be read and interpreted, and it is open to manipulations and
constructions.
6. The common scientific practice is to triangulate the results, that is, merge several
perspectives, each detected by a different method or technology, and see if the
results are consistent (like dating measurements in archeology).
Except for the first and the last characteristics, the remaining four are
applicable to both scientific and technological translation mediation, as the following
table depicts:

1
2
3
4
5

Scientific "Translation
Mediation"
Transcends human sensorium
The user has to embody the
meditative device
Digital technology
Output is presented by the
instrument
Result requires reading and is
open to manipulations and
constructions

Triangulation of the results

Technological "Translation Mediation"


Mostly mimic, with the exception of GPS location
detection that exceed human capabilities
V
V
V
(visually presented or vocally expressed)
V
Results may appear as a list of possible outcomes
(possible routes in navigation software, possible
songs in music detection app), but in practice usually
one result is presented as the only outcome.
-

In everyday technologies, like in scientific instruments, the human has to


embody the technological meditative device in order to perceive the phenomenon;
these technologies are digital in the sense that they convert a phenomenon into data
and vice versa; the output is presented by the instrument and can be perceived by
embodied humans, either visually or vocally. When Intel's sensor detects a smile,
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there is a reading of reality by the artifact, translation of reality into data, and the
data is then converted into readable text or sign. The user embodies and reads this
output. Lastly, the results require reading, and may appear as a list of possible
outcomes (like possible routes in navigation software, or possible songs in a music
detection app), although in practice usually one result is presented as the only
outcome.
The differences between everyday technologies and scientific instruments are
the first and the last characteristics: Technological translation mediation only rarely
detects beyond the bodily-perceptual horizons. Instead, it mostly mimics, with the
exception of GPS location detection that can exceed human capabilities (like in the
case of detecting a traffic jam several kilometers away). And triangulation is
sporadically exercised in technological translation mediation. With more than half of
the characteristics applicable not only for scientific instruments but also for
technologies, translation mediation becomes an important analytical tool for
contemporary technologies.
Translation mediation calls for the conceptualization of a new kind of
embodiment relations that involve the body in a new way. As noted before, Brey
(2000) classifies embodiment relations as motoric (i.e. a car or a cane) or perceptual
(i.e. eyeglasses). Translation mediation encompasses motoric and sensory aspects, as
well as an additional element. This element can be found in Helena De Presteer's
exploration into the notion of prosthesis/extension (2011), a notion that is obviously
related to embodiment relations. De Presteer adds to the motoric-perceptual
classification also the cognitive category.
The mechanized perceptions of early 21st century can be analyzed for their
motoric impacts, as in the case of navigation app. They can also be studied for their
sensory impact, as they see and hear. But the most interesting category in this
context, I think, is the cognitive one. These technologies effect our desires, our
memories, our macro-perception of the environment: I don't have to remember
names of students if I have a face recognition app; and I can think of an app that
would recommend how big my smile should be in response to the smile of the
person I just met, taking into account the other person's depth of smile, the social

relations we have, those that I want to have, and the culture that "rules" the
situation.
In postphenomenology it is difficult to find any explicit reference to the
cognitive aspects of embodiment. This is probably imputed to Ihde who stresses the
materiality of the human-world relations. He maintains that in postphenomenology,
"The notion of embodiment effectively replaces that of consciousness" (2011 116).
The addition of cognitive elements to embodiment relations can be based on
cognitive phenomenology, defined by Tim Bayne and Michelle Montague "as a kind
of phenomenology over and above sensory phenomenology. . . . it sees the domain
of phenomenology as extending beyond the sensory " (2011).iii In a nut shell, this
new phenomenology seeks to examine thoughts and memories and its supporters
claim that these should be subject to phenomenological investigation, in addition to
senses and perceptions. De Presteer's study of cognitive prosthesis can fit into
cognitive phenomenology. My research on the cellphone as a memory prosthesis led
me to take a position that supports such an expansion.
With this in mind, I find in postphenomenology traces of cognition in the
notion of macro-perception and in the analysis of hermeneutic relations, where
meaning is an important ingredient. As Ihde writes, "in the broader sense
interpretation pervades both embodiment and hermeneutic action" (Ihde 1990, 93).

Conclusions
I showed here how contemporary technologies go from embodiment relations
to hermeneutic embodiment relations that involve translation mediation. I also
showed how these technologies should not be limitedly construed from motoric and
sensory perspectives and the important role of the cognitive aspects in embodiment.
I would like to conclude this talk with some possible directions of future
technological developments as were hinted during the last 15 minutes:
1) Mimicking the human micro-perception has made some important steps in the
last years but should be further developed in several directions: one is the
improvement of existing technologies to the human level, like discerning
background noise from a conversation and vice versa; or like seeing to varying

distances (for examples most sensors today can hardly capture the beautiful
sight of fireworks far in the dark skies).
2) The other direction is the development of simple-to-operate, reliable,
miniaturized and cheap technologies imitating the intimate senses. When I look
for a restaurant I want to know the taste of the food, not just reading other
people's opinion and see pictures of certain dishes. When I buy a perfume online, I want to be able to smell it, instead of reading about roses and seeing the
bottle.
3) A third direction may be what Ihde calls "multidimensionality" (Ihde, Stretching
the In-between: Embodiment and Beyond 2011), that is multi-sensorium
combining input from several senses. This may resemble the triangulation that is
common in scientific practices.
4) Fourth, the development of non-isomorphic capabilities: the GPS is currently the
single example I could find for technology that does not imitate the human
sensorium or capabilities but rather extends and expands them. In other words, I
look for technologies that like the infrared telescope detect what "lie[s] beyond
the bodily-perceptual horizons of the human."
5) On the macro-perception level, context can be developed to more complex
situations. Shazam presupposes that the user is listening to music and now it has
to identify the work and the performer. Can we have an app that will activate
Shazam when music is heard in the background? Can we have a recommendation
engine that would provide relevant tips during an important meeting?
These directions may exemplify the role that philosophy of technology can play in
R&D organizations, hi-tech companies and venture capital firms.

http://gigaom.com/2013/08/26/intel-developing-emotion-tracking-cameras-for-laptops-tablets-andphones/.
ii
Not all technologies can be embodied, according to Brey. Some, like doors and nails, do not become
part of the body schema. Others, like keyboards, become extensions and hence are embedded.
iii
"The conservative conception of conscious thought . . . conceives of sensory phenomenology,
broadly construed . . ., as the only kind of phenomenology there is." (Bayne and Montague 2011)

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