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Contents
Contents
List of tables and
figures Preface to the
English edition
Introduction
Part I Theoretical framework
one
Theoretical perspectives on policy analysis
v
v
i
1
3
17
21
39
63
91
111
113
125
151
187
221
251
273
References
289
iii
Tables
2.1 The different sequences of a public policy
31
2.2 Similarities between the policy cycle and the stages of35
problem solving
5.1 Synopsis of neo-institutionalist schools
93
7.1 The relationships between the structuring of a problem
and
138
political strategies
7.2 Variables for the political agenda setting of public
problems
146
8.1 Actors, resources and institutional rules involved in the
183
decision-making process (programming)
9.1 Differences between the top-down and bottom-up
visions
196
of policy implementation
9.2 Qualification of the products PAP, action plan and formal
199
implementation acts according to the type of legal
dimension
11.1 Utility of the model on the basis of the level and
ambition
252
of the proposed empirical research
11.2 Summary of the operational elements for the analysis of
254
the six products of a public policy
Figures
1
2.1
2.2
2.3
3.1
4.1
5.1
6.1
Public policy
analysis
6.2 The direct and indirect influence of the triangle of actors
117
on the first two stages of a public policy (postulate no 2)
6.3 Theoretical model for the analysis of a public policy120
7.1 Definition process for public problems and possible
pitfalls
131
8.1 The constituent elements of a political-administrative154
programme
v
i
vii
i
Introduction
Introduction
The recent evolution of western democracies is
characterised by the myriad challenges currently facing
public sector actors.These include:
the reduction of budget deficits and structural debt;
the maintenance of political control over the
economy in the face of the increasing influence of
globalisation processes;
the fulfilment of increased public expectations with
respect to the levels of services provided;
the increasing competition between public
authorities at local, regional and international level;
the management of the redistribution conflicts
associated with the long-term exclusion of certain
social groups;
the need for the more professional management of
(increasingly) scarce public resources;
the democratic imperative of a systematic evaluation
of the effects of laws and regulations;
the political integration of minorities and the
consensual management of the conflicts that
result in their opposition to the majority.
Various institutional responses to these problems are
currently being tested in the majority of western
democratic regimes. Governmental and parliamentary
agendas at all levels (local, regional, national and
European) currently feature numerous pilot projects
involving
New
Public
Management
or
the
reinvention/modernisation
of
the
state,
various
accompanying
processes
involving
liberalisation,
deregulation and privatisation of certain public sectors and
companies and alternative proposals for the reform of
legislative and executive bodies. In this context of
growing uncertainty, political-administrative actors are
seeking credible and consensual solutions and, hence
also, expertise on the different possible solutions for the
Public policy
analysis
Introducti
Comparative analysis
The analysis model presented here has been developed in such a
way that it can also be used in comparative studies. The reason for
this is that the quality of policies increasingly needs to be
considered on the basis of their actual implementation by different
public authorities.
The benchmarking principle, which was created as a substitute
for the application of market prices for non-market public services,
is frequently adopted as a guide in the evaluation of administrative
products and policies.This makes it possible to improve the ability
to evaluate the efficiency of public administrations offering similar
services. Benchmarking also leads to greater transparency with
respect to the costs and advantages of public action.Thus, it also
gives rise to indirect competition between the different public
authorities responsible for the implementation of policies. Both
analysts and practitioners should also take into account this
recent development in political- administrative practice.
The approach proposed here benefits from a research tradition
that is extensive in both synchronic (spatial) and diachronic
(temporal) terms.Thus, the analytical framework presented in this
book has already been applied on several occasions.These
empirical studies have made it possible, inter alia, to identify the
main factors behind the success and failure of policies.
Furthermore, highlighting differences and similarities with respect
to the implementation and effects of one and the same policy by
different public authorities makes it possible to guarantee the
transfer of knowledge and, indeed, learning processes between
public administrations. This improvement in the status of
comparative studies proves particularly interesting for federal
systems that are, in themselves, veritable policy laboratories.
and processes on which the state bases and supports its democratic
legitimacy.
Although it deconstructs the state into multiple tangible policies,
which are, in turn, subdivided into several clearly distinct
constituent elements (see Part III), the approach used here also
presents a view of all of the individualised and sometimes
complementary and contradictory actions of the different
political-administrative actors. In order to make sense of a
multitude of individual and concrete acts, which are dispersed
through time and space but concretely observable in reality, the
analyst must engage in an interpretive process involving the
reconstruction (or designation) of a policy as a group of decisions
and activities taken and implemented by private and public actors
and aimed at the resolution of a clearly delineated public problem.
For the researcher or the practitioner, the objective of this analytical
redefinition process is to be able to judge the relevance, efficacy and
efficiency of these state interventions with respect to a social
situation that is judged as politically problematic and unacceptable.
Thus, it is a question of identifying an action logic and
discussing its coherence and implementation with the main aim
of attributing responsibility to the public and private actors
involved in the different state arenas (in particular legislative,
executive and judicial bodies; local, regional, national and
supranational levels).
Furthermore, policy analysis can also help political actors and
public agents in their efforts to estimate the chances of success
of modernisation projects undertaken by the state and, more
generally, the political-administrative institutions2.
Through the accumulation of the results of their research and
expert mandates, policy analysts are able to demonstrate certain
empirical consistencies (or, indeed, laws) specific to the
functioning of public authorities and policies. By taking such
information into account, political-administrative actors are better
placed to judge the level of innovation and scope of various
reforms in the course of being implemented (in particular with
respect to previous experience with approaches such as the
Planning, Programming and Budgeting System [PPBS],
management by objectives and zero-base budgeting). This will
facilitate the improved management of changes in administrative
services and policies that are sometimes perceived as unfolding too
quickly. In this sense, the approach proposed in this manual offers a
useful framework for the re-examination of certain hypotheses with
respect to the inefficacy and shortcomings of the public sector as
xiii
xi
v
Notes
In this context, the term state refers to all of the public institutions comprising
what is referred to as the political-administrative system.
1
Note that the use of political-administrative system in this text takes into
account the complexity of contemporary policy systems that is often
2
Part I
Theoretical framework
In the first part of the manual, we provide a clear and detailed
presentation of the theoretical framework on which our policy
analysis model is based.
ONE
Theoretical perspectives on
policy analysis
Policy analysis consists in the study of the action of public
authorities within society (Mny and Thoenig, 1989, p 9). In terms
of disciplines, a number of academic sectors have been and are
associated with it. It was adopted as early as 1979 by Wildavsky
(1979, p 15) in his plea for the development of this
approach:Policy analysis is an applied subfield whose contents
cannot be determined by disciplinary boundaries but by whatever
appears appropriate to the circumstances of the time and the
nature of the problem. Similarly, Muller (1990, p 3) mentions
that policy analysis is located at the junction of previously
established knowledge from which it borrows its principal
concepts.
We start by presenting a quick review of the literature from the
traditional policy analysis schools 1 and then go on to examine
the specific theoretical framework adopted in this book.
1.1.1
Policy analysis based on the theories of
state
3
Public policy
analysis
Theoretical perspectives on
1.1.2
Dente, 1985, 1989; Dente and Fareri, 1993; Gom and Subirats, 1998,
pp 21-36).
This approach does not exclude the adoption of a viewpoint
based on the above-presented theories, which explains why several
authors from this second group actually have a foot in both camps.
Here, however, the focus is not on the justification of a theory, but
on the demonstration of continuities, general rules of functioning
that are specific to public actions. In this context, policy analysis
makes it possible to understand how the state and, more broadly,
public authorities work.
This second approach actually constitutes the initial set of issues
tackled by policy analysts. Historically, the latter were strongly
influenced by North American political scientists, whose initial
considerations in this area emerged between 1950 and 1960 and
were linked with a context of therationalisation of public decision
making with a view to improving its efficacy. Lerner and Lasswell
published The policy sciences in the United States as early as 1951,
thereby laying the foundations for this approach.
However, this unified approach to the study of public problems
and policy ... soon settled into two main approaches (Parsons,
1995, pp 18-19), one that endeavours to develop a better
knowledge of the policy formation and implementation processes (the
analysis of policy), while the other concentrates on developing
knowledge that is usable in and for the policy formation and
implementation processes (analysis in and for policy). It should be
stressed, however, that the analyses carried out by one school feed
into the experiences of the other, and vice versa.Thus, in their
critique of this approach, Mny and Thoenig (1989, p 65) make a
distinction between the function of the scientist who is interested in
the progress of knowledge and learning and that of the professional
whose aim is to apply the sciences for the purpose of action.
The second approach adopts its theoretical thrust from several
different scientific approaches: administrative science, the sciences
of complexity (particularly systems analysis), the sociology of
(public) decision making and, more generally, the sociology of
collective action, the economic sciences and the information
sciences.
The emergence of this approach was dominated by four major
figures (Mny and Thoenig, 1989; Parsons, 1995). The first is the
North American political scientist Lasswell (1951) who was the
movements main source of inspiration and who adopted a
completely managerial approach: his work deliberately attempted
1.1.3
of this book was associated with this work. It is also based on texts
on the implementation of public policy15.
trends as divergent as neo-Marxism, neo-liberalism and neocorporatism, on condition that the researchers
take the trouble to use the concepts in accordance with the basic
dimensions proposed with respect to their empirical field testing.
Notes
This analysis is adopted in part from that presented in the work Analyser les
politiques publiques denvironnement (Larrue, 2000).
1
The public choice school is based on the work of Buchanan and Tullock
(1962). A critical review of the main principles of this school can be found in
Self (1993).
2
For France, see, in particular, the work of Jobert and Muller (1987) and, for
Germany, that of Lehmbruch and Schmitter (1982).
6
See, in particular, the work of March and Olsen (1984) and our own
approach (Chapter Five, this volume).
7
See Jordan and Richardson (1987); Marsh and Rhodes (1992); Smith (1993).
11
Duran (1993) and more recently Kessler et al (1998). For Switzerland, refer
to the
14
Part II
Keys to the
analysis
In this second section, we present the prerequisites of our policy
analysis model.We also define the concepts necessary to our
analysis.
More precisely, our approach focuses on the individual and
collective behaviour of the actors involved in the different stages
of a policy. Thus, we assume that the content and institutional
characteristics of a public action (the variable to be explained) are
the product of the interaction between the political-administrative
authorities, on the one hand, and the social groups that cause
and/or support the negative effects of the collective problem that the
public action seeks to resolve (explanatory variables), on the
other.Apart from respective values and interests, the games these
actors play are dependent on the resources they succeed in
mobilising so as to defend their positions with respect to the
objectives, instruments and development process involved in a
public intervention measure. These games can affect equally
the substantive content of the public policy and the procedural
and organisational modes of its formulation and implementation.
In all of these cases, however, the actors must take into account the
constraints and opportunities constituted by the institutional rules
in force. The (meta) rules established at constitutional level and
hence theoretically applicable to all policies, predetermine the more
specific rules associated with a specific policy.The latter directly
influence an actors access to both this policy arena and the action
resources that can be mobilised. If these specific institutional rules
pre-structure the actors game, it should be kept in mind that they
too are (partly) negotiated, mainly during policy formulation, by
the actors who are (potentially) affected by the substantive targeted
results.
Figure 1 summarises the key elements of the public policy
analysis model adopted in this manual.
Before we explore all of the possible relationships between actors,
resources and the institutions involved in a given policy, we must
define exactly what we mean by these concepts.
17
1
8
Public policy
analysis
Figure 1: Key elements of public policy analysis
Actors
Basic triangle consisting of political-administrative authorities, the target groups and
end beneficiaries
Chapter Three
Resources
General institutional rules (applicable to all public policies)
Law, rules
personnel,
force,
organisation, consensus, political support, time, infrastructure
Specific institutional
(specific
to amoney,
policy) information,
Chapter Five
Chapter Four
analysis
Keys to the
The analysts then tried to explain these deficits. In their quest for
explanatory factors, they focused primarily on the role of the
public and private actors who are involved in the legislation
and its implementation. In effect, these actors are human beings
with their own values, interests, means of defence and capacities
for innovation and adaptation; in short, capable of using policies
for their own ends. Thus, the analysts studied the social reality of
the actors involved in the policy area whose behaviour was
supposed to be predictably and enduringly loyal to the established
legal order.
The research carried out on policies and their actors showed that
the latter, their umbrella organisations and their representatives
enjoyed extensive autonomy. In effect, they appeared to benefit
from a very extensive margin for manoeuvre that enabled them to
influence policies to suit their own interests. However, the research
also quickly revealed that the scope of this autonomy varied
considerably from one actor to the next.Thus, the old question of
power raised its head, hitherto seen as the preserve of the political
scientists who study politics, on the far side of the artificially
erected barrier between political analysis and policy analysis, a
barrier that was very probably the outcome of the legal fiction of
the equality of all citizens before the law.
In their quest for an explanation of this phenomenon, researchers
more or less simultaneously identified the availability of and
accessibility to policy resources for the different types of actors and
the key roles played by the institutions (parliamentary, governmental,
administrative and judicial).
Nowadays, while the analysis of resources benefits from the wide
range of academic disciplines applied to the public sector that are
united under the concept of public management, institutional
analysis is supported by neo-institutionalism (Hall and Taylor,
1996), an approach that is strongly rooted in the economic and
political sciences and in sociology.
Public policy
TWO
Public policy
22
Public policy
analysis
Public
1st phase
2nd phase
3rd phase
4th phase
5th phase
Terminology
Emergence of problems
Agenda setting
Formulation and
adoption
of the policy programme
Policy implementation
Policy evaluation
Content
Emergence of a
problem
Selection (filtering) of
emerging problems
Definition of the
causality model
Application of
selected solutions
Determination of
eventual
policy effects
Problem perception
Definition of suitable
and
acceptable
solution(s)
to
the defined problem
Action of
administrative
implementation agents
Evaluation of extent of
impacts, effectiveness,
efficiency, relevance,
with
respect
to the original
problem
Responses of public
powers to problems
recognised as being the
necessary object of a
policy
Definition of the
problem
and
identification of
possible causes
Representation of
the problem
Analysts
main questions
31
Selection of instruments
Publi
c
poli
y
Public policy
analysis
Figure 2.2:The policy cycle
(Re-)emergenc
e of a problem
Evaluation
of policy
effects
Implementat
ion of action
plans (APs)
Adoption of a
legislative
programme
Perception of
private and
public problems
Agenda setting
Formulatio
n of
alternatives
Public
33
3
4
Problem
recognised
but
left uncontrolled
by public policy
Problem
Implementation
By the implementing
administrations
Evaluation
Problem rejected
because concern of
another public policy
system
Problem solved
according to
evaluation
Outputs
Problem
submitted for
consideration by
public policy
Implementation
objective 1
Proble
m
solved
Implementation
objective 2
Problem to
be dealt
with by the
new policy
Problem
not
recognise
d
Implementati
on objective
3
Problem ignored
because of lack of
intervention
instruments
Retroactive loop
Initial
filtering
Adjustment
filtering
Implementation
filtering
Evaluation filtering
Publi
poli
analys
is
Public
policy
Table 2.2: Similarities between the policy cycle and the stages
of problem solving
Sta
ge
1
2
3
4
Problem solving
Public policy
Problem recognition
Proposal of solution
Choice of solution
Putting solution into
effect
Agenda setting
Policy
formulation
Decision
making
Policy
implementation
35
Public policy
5
analysis
Monitoring results
36
Policy evaluation
In effect:
This is a descriptive approach that can be deceptive as
the chronological course of the policy process does not
necessarily coincide with the order of the different stages in
the model. Thus, a programme may be implemented prior
to its precise formulation during the emergence of new
problems (for example, in the case of efforts to overcome
pollution caused by agriculture in France; see Larrue, 2000).
Breaks may also occur in the process with the reformulation of
the public problem and the solutions before the measures
initially planned are implemented and/or evaluated (for
example, in the case of political asylum policy in
Switzerland; see Frossard and Hagmann, 2000; there
are similarities to this in the UK in the case of the rapid
succession of political responses to fears about terrorism, with
new initiatives occurring before exiting policies have been
properly established).
This heuristic approach does not enable the development
of a true model of the causality of public policies and the
identification of logical links between the different stages. It
runs the risk of giving an artificial coherence to the policy
by prompting the analyst to construct links between elements
that do not exist in reality.
The policy cycle model is in line with a legalistic
interpretation of public action (top-down approach) and
centred on state action, and it fails to take account of an
approach that originates with social actors and their context
(bottom-up approach).Thus, one could be led to
incorrectly attribute the reduction in electricity
consumption to energy-saving measures when it actually
results from an increase in prices or downturn in the
economy. Similarly, a number of solutions exist that are
looking for a problem: a state service that is due to be
closed down (for example, the federal Swiss stud farm) will
create a new problem in order to survive (the risk of
disappearance of traditional horse races that are part of the
national heritage).
This approach does not make it possible to go beyond a
sequential analysis and consider, in particular, several cycles
unfolding at the same time or the possibility of incomplete
cycles. For example, in order to understand drug policy it is
important to dissociate the cycles and identify the
Notes
The terms public policy and policy (or government policy) are used
synonymously here. It should be noted, however, that certain authors make
explicit distinctions here:For government actors, policy refers to specific
actions of an official nature. For teachers and researchers, public policy refers
to groups of actions, the majority of which are not considered as policies by
government actors (Lemieux, 1995, pp 1-2).
1
Policy actors
THREE
Policy actors
3.1Empirical actors
Given that policies embody the results of the interactions between
different public and private actors, we must start by defining the
actual concept of an actor. For the purposes of this study, the
termactor can be taken to designate either an individual (a
minister, member of parliament, specialist journalist etc), several
individuals (constituting for example an office or a section of an
administration), a legal entity (a private company, an association, a
trade union and so on) or a social group (farmers, drug users, the
homeless etc)1.
Note, however, that a group of several individuals constitutes a
single actor insofar as, with respect to the policy under
consideration, they are in broad agreement and share a common
approach as far as the values and interests that they represent and
the concrete aims that they pursue are concerned.This consensus
can be arrived at, for example, through the hierarchical structure or
through the democratic process. Talcott Parsons (1951) inspired our
approach to the concept of actor. In his view, in order to analyse a
social action, we must focus essentially on the simplest unit that
39
40
Public policy
analysis
view to which the actions of the actor in question are directed), and
who uses certain means to achieve that objective (Bourricaud,
1977, p 31).Thus, depending on the individual case, the actor
concept can apply to an individual, a group or groups of individuals
or to an organisation, the latter being defined in terms of the shared
ideas or common interests that link its members.As Olson remarks
in his book on the logic of collective action:Without a common
point of interest, there is no group (Olson, 1965).
Every individual, legal entity or social group is considered as an
actor once, by virtue of their very existence, they belong to the
social field regarded as being relevant to the analysis:
An individual in a given field does not qualify as an
actor by virtue of his understanding of, or control over,
events, nor on the basis of his awareness of his interests
and scope for action, nor, a fortiori, because he is aware
of his place in history or in the process of social change,
or because he participates in the production of society.
(Segrestin, 1985, p 59) 2
In so far as their behaviour can be shown to contribute to the
structuring of this field, they have this status simply by belonging
to the field being studied. It is not, therefore, a problem of
awareness, lucidity or identification: it is simply a de facto
situation, which means that this becomes a question of research
(Friedberg, 1993, p 199).
In this way, every individual or social group concerned by the
collective problem addressed by a policy can be considered as a
potential actor capable of being part of the arena (see Section
3.3.1) of this policy. In fact, the actors more or less active
behaviour influences the way in which the public intervention in
question is devised and implemented.
This broad definition of the actor concept means that the analyst
must consider all individuals and social groups concerned by a
specific collective problem. Such a viewpoint has the advantage of
taking account of the fact that public and private actors do not all
intervene actively and visibly at all stages of a policy: their
behaviour is sometimes directly tangible, but equally it is
sometimes hard to identify directly. This depends on, among other
factors, the process by which they become aware of their own
interests, their capacity to mobilise resources and form a coalition to
defend their rights and interests and, finally, their strategic decision
Policy
3.2Intentional actors
Adopting a scheme of intelligibility known as actantial (Berthelot,
1990, p 76), we acknowledge the intentionality of individual action.
This takes place in a social context that can be perceived
alternatively as a system of interdependence (Crozier and
Friedberg, 1977; Boudon, 1979), a historical stage in a process
(Touraine, 1984) or a situation pertaining to the here and now. In
each case, an actors behaviour is never reduced to a position, role
or other type of fixed category. In other words, in our opinion, an
actor always disposes of a greater or lesser margin of discretion and
of manoeuvre, depending on the situation in question. Our thesis
here is that no social or political field is perfectly structured,
controlled or regulated. For this reason, individual and collective
actors deliberately exploit areas of uncertainty (to use the
expression coined by Crozier, 1963) that are an inherent part of
political-administrative organisations, formal regulations and social
norms in order to promote their own values, ideas and
interests.They possess, therefore, a certain degree of freedom but
also resources (see Chapter Four), which enables them to develop
strategies and tactics, or even to adopt goal-oriented behaviour
(Berthelot, 1990, p 80).
Thus, we do not seek to deny the influence that is sometimes
quite considerable that the actors institutional and social context
has on their decisions and actions. On the other hand, we believe
that these institutional factors do not determine the assessments,
choices and behaviour of public and private actors in an absolute
and linear manner (see Chapter Five).We reject, therefore, the
holistic theses that assume that social phenomena, policies for
example, have their own intrinsic nature and their own laws that
inevitably lead individuals to act in one way rather than another. On
the contrary, we propose that policies should be interpreted as the
result of the behaviour of actors who are (partially) autonomous.
Thus, we adopt the principles of methodological individualism as
developed by the sociologists Boudon and Bourricaud (1990, pp
301-9).
The area of uncertainty is particularly significant in the context
of unforeseen crises (for example, the accident at the Chernobyl
nuclear power station, natural disasters).The actors who have to
intervene in such circumstances are unprepared and have to cope as
best they can with no system to fall back on.When this happens, the
different public authorities concerned can be observed to react in
different ways (Czada, 1991; Keller-Lengen et al, 1998; Schneich
3.3.1
Policy arena
Our intention here is to deal with policy from the perspective of the
solution of a problem considered as pertaining to the public
domain. Here we present the different actors found in a policy
context, a context in which crucial interaction takes place between
the different policy actors.The way in which this arena, in which
these actors interact, is structured is neither neutral nor without
3.3.2
Public actors
3.3.3
Affected actors
of this, to form coalitions either with the end beneficiaries (in the
case of those who benefit), or with the target groups of the public
initiative that has been implemented (in the case of the negatively
affected third parties).
This system for the classification of actors is illustrated by the
following examples of actors involved in a range of policies:
The target groups of environment policy are polluters
(industries, farmers, households and public bodies) whose
pollutant emissions need to be reduced; the end beneficiaries
are all those whose environment is affected by the different
sources of pollution in a given area (human beings, flora and
fauna); the positively affected third parties are the
industrialists who develop new less polluting technologies
(environment-friendly industries), and the negatively
affected third parties are those who can no longer market their
polluting technologies and the consumers who end up paying
more for their products.
According to the model prevailing in most European
countries, the target groups of agricultural policy are farmers
producing subsidised agricultural products; the end
beneficiaries are the consumers who profit from the best
market prices.The positively affected third parties are the
food-processing industries, while the negatively affected third
parties are the environmentalists, who see the environment as
being harmed by intensive farming methods, those small
farmers whose produce is not subsidised and third countries
who import products that compete unequally with their homegrown produce as a result of this agricultural dumping.
The target groups of policy to combat unemployment (at least in
the micro-economic sense as opposed to broad economy
regulation measures) are the companies that need to recruit
staff (whose resistance or discriminatory practices are in
question); the end beneficiaries are the unemployed people
who are likely to obtain employment; the positively affected
third parties are the job agencies who act as mediators on the
job market; and the negatively affected third parties are those
who see their incomes limited by the increase in compulsory
deductions designed to fund, partially at least, the measures
against unemployment. In this field of policy we may
particularly find individuals who may be seen as both targets
and beneficiaries: they are required to change their behaviour
undergoing training, participating
Intervention hypothesis
Political definition
of the collective problem to be resolved
Causal hypothesis
the context of Aids prevention policy, the disease was first regarded
as
Notes
Note here that every group is always a social (and political) construct. With
regard to this point, refer to the example of the typology of social groups
developed by Schneider and Ingram (1997).
1
Policy resources
FOUR
Policy resources
Policy
resources
Public policy
stages
of a policy life cycle. For example, even if the resource law
analysis
Force
Political
support
Law
Personnel
Infrastructure
Management of resources
(production, combination, conservation and substitution)
Money
Time
Consensus
Information
Organisation
the form of legal and regulatory bases and in the absence of this
resource, administrative measures can be contested and even
invalidated by decisions of administrative courts.
In the context of policy resources as a whole, the law occupies a
prominent place because it constitutes the normative raison dtre
of the PAP that organises both the content (definition of objectives
and behaviour of target groups) and choice of other resources
(organisations, procedure or financial provisions).
The endowment of different actors with legal resources is defined
by the combined rules of law adopted by the legislature and the
executive. In democratic regimes, the legislature generally finds
itself involved in the process of the production of this resource.
However, in the majority of cases, parliamentary decisions are
limited to its allocation in terms of money and rights. Nevertheless,
through the attribution of these two resources, the legislature
equally decides at least in part on the endowment of other
resources (inasmuch as they consider them important).
Despite its relatively high degree of objectivisation, statute law
requires reproductive and management activity.Like the other
resources, the law can lose its value: when it is used in an
excessively intensive or abusive manner it is no longer a source of
support for public policies. Thus, excessive formalism or extreme
normative density may deprive the regulations of sense and,
consequently, lead to their questioning by those at whom they are
directed, or even by the administration that is supposed to enforce
them. Thus, the law loses its legitimacy. This was (or sometimes
still is) the case in the former Eastern-bloc countries where overregulation in the different areas of public intervention led to the
absence of respect for law.
More generally in order to retain its normative character and thus
avoid becoming completely devalued, the law needs to be stated
and re-stated (Moor, 1997) through administrative and legal
practice.
4.1.2
4.1.3
This resource is clearly one of the most obvious for all concerned.
It is raised and allocated not only in the case of distributive
policies, but also in the case of regulatory or constitutive policies.
Without the finance to pay for salaries, accommodation, office and
system has been criticised for its rigidity in the past by public
finance experts and, today, by the supporters of New Public
Management, who propose its replacement with service mandates
or contracts and budgets extending over several years to be defined
in an ad hoc manner for each public policy on the basis of proposed
services. The shift to a cost accounting system (developed on the
basis of the estimation of the cost of administrative products) gives
rise to profound changes at the level of how the organisation of the
public administration works (structuring according to
administrative product categories), and at the level of state financial
policy. In effect, cost accounting tends to prevent MPs from
monitoring the different types of accrued expenses that represent
important factors for the management of economic, fiscal or
budgetary policies, which
in periods of economic recession and financial crisis are the
focus of the attention of parliamentarians. Furthermore, it may be
noted that in many instances, parliament is more interested in the
way in which state resources (in particular, money) are used than in
the purpose of the spending in question (policy objective). For
example, the Swiss programme for the construction of water
treatment plants prescribed by the legislation of 1972 on the
protection of waters against pollution and the programme for the
construction of national and cantonal roads (from 1961) subsidised
by the Swiss Confederation were passed almost unanimously on the
basis of their positive effects on the regional economy, as opposed
to concerns about water quality or the extension of the road
network. In France, the failure of recent attempts to introduce
parliamentary control of public spending from the point of view of
its appropriateness bears witness to the difficulties facing reform in
this area (Migaud, 2000).
In general, monetary resources are the most easily quantified and
exchanged with or substituted for other types of resources.
However, money is probably also the resource that is most
unequally distributed among private actors, and one of the most
essential in terms of the real political power of a policy actor.
4.1.4
4.1.5
4.1.6
4.1.7
they will only act if the other actors act first, simultaneously or
subsequently.
4.1.8
the interface between the state and civil society. It is true that the
characteristics of
4.1.9
4.1.10
4.2
Management of resources
4.2.1
Principle of the sustainable management
of resources
The link between the analysis and management of public policies
and the public management sector consists in the processing
and management of the above-listed resources. Each resource has
its own laws that govern its production, reproduction and
utilisation.Today, relatively well-developed disciplinary knowledge
exists in the areas of personnel management (human resources
management), money (public finance), organisations
(sociology of organisations, organisational learning) and
information (information systems management).
The same more or less applies with regard to the management of
the law as a resource law (jurisprudence legislative techniques),
although to our knowledge a real law management sector does not
yet exist.The management of consensus orsocial engineering,
which is necessary for the reasonable management of conflicts,
would appear to be still at an early stage in its gestation at present.
In effect, although almost endless improvements have been made to
legal procedure, this discipline is still relatively underdeveloped in
the area of political and administrative procedure (for example, the
case of mediation and participative evaluation).With regard to
the management of time as a resource (logistics) highly sporadic
achievements have been realised without, however, leading to the
creation of an actual discipline. In our opinion, all researchers and
practitioners working in the area of policy analysis must be
familiar with the specific features of the sustainable production and
management of all of the states action resources.
According to the theory of sustainable development, which
originated in the field of environmental policy and subsequently
became more generalised, all scarce resources, be they public or
private, natural or artificial, must be utilised in a moderate manner
with an awareness of the long-term perspectives. The adoption
and implementation of this perspective will have important
consequences for the public sector as a whole because it would
appear that our public resources are currently managed in an
abusive and non- sustainable manner.
Can it not be said that we are abusing time as a resource in our
companies and administrations that tend to accelerate the rhythms
of production with the result that nobody can allow themselves
4.2.2
From resource
management
management
to
policy
Notes
According to these authors, the other three resources at the disposal of
organisations are: control of relationships with the environment,
communication and the use of organisational rules. We have adopted these
resources in our typology; however, the forms we use sometimes differ.
1
Pierre Moor does not share this point of view. According to him, it is not the
constitutional state that demands participation, but the deficit of the
constitutional state, which was prompted to create a kind of compensation
through procedure thanks to the influence of democratic movements (see
Moor, 1994, pp 300ff).
2
Institutional rules
FIVE
Institutional rules
92
Public policy
analysis
Definitions of
institutions)3
institutional
rules
(that
is,
It is then appropriate to differentiate between the three neoinstitutionalist schools referred to as sociological, economic and
historical rather than speak of a theoretical approach that has
93
Sociological
(cultural
approach)
March and Olsen (1989); Powell and
Di Maggio (1991); Scott and Meyer (1994)
Historical
(structuralist approach)
Economic
(calculating approach)
Williamson (1985); Ostrom (1990);
North (1990)
Institutions individuals
Analytical
definition of
institutional
rules
Epistemological
status of
institutional
rules
Creation of
institutional
rules
Institutional
change
Strengths of
the approach
Weaknesses of
the approach
Instituti
na
Public policy
analysis
Institutional
95
In addition to highlighting the differences between these three neoinstitutionalist schools deliberately presented here as ideal types
we note that the major authors agree on at least three points.
Firstly, all of these research movements define institutional rules
as both structures and rules that are formal, explicit and generally
legally formalised and as informal norms that are implicit but
shared by the members of an organisation or community.
Consideration of both of these types of rules is necessary as the
informal norms may replace the influence of formal rules or even
prove to be more stable (more mythical) than the latter (see
Knight, 1992, p 17; and also North, 1990, p 4). An MP may vote
against the party line for personal and ethical reasons (for example,
on abortion).Administrations sometimes also tolerate the breaching
of their regulations for cultural reasons (for example, lax
application of state regulations in certain French-speaking Swiss
cantons, or certain French regulations in regions like Corsica).
Policy analysis must, therefore, accommodate this dual dimension
and question the relative influence of formal and informal
institutional rules on political behaviour, their respective stability
and the conflicts that may arise between these two categories of
rules.
Secondly, and as demonstrated by the empirical work carried out
by the historical school of neo-institutionalism, institutional rules
establish structures and procedures that facilitate or limit the
political participation of individuals and groups (for example, the
right to launch a popular initiative or facultative referendum in
Switzerland, the right to a hearing in an administrative procedure,
the right of a linguistic minority to be represented in the Swiss
government) and the efficacy of policies (for example, inequalities in
implementation associated with federalism of execution, compromise
solutions negotiated to avoid appeals). Furthermore, they
substantiate and define in temporal terms the power relationships
between the social groups (for example, under- representation of
women in executive and legislative bodies, clientelistic
relationships between an administration and an interest group,
consultation of employees in the context of collective agreements).
Even if they appear to display a very high level of stability,
institutions are not, however, completely frozen and immovable.
Developments may prompt changes in social reality (for example,
recognition of the right of appeal of environmental protection
organisations, granting of the right to vote to women and
foreigners) or repeated statements on the inefficacy of the
institutional rules in place (for example, reform of consultation
5.1.3
Institutional changes
100
5.2
Operationalisation
institutional rules
of
the
concept
of
5.2.1
Hierarchy of institutions: some constituent
principles of concrete action
Adopting the slogan Bringing the state back in (Evans
et al, 1985), the so-called state-centred theories define
legislative, judicial and executive organisations as
autonomous actors who pursue their own objectives and as
structures inherited from the past that define in a stable
way the rules governing the mediation between social
interests
10
3
Constitutional rules
of the democratic
regime
Rules
governing the
administration
and para-state
organisations
Public
actor
Public
actor Private
actor
5.2.2
Tensions between the institutional policies and
institutional rules specific to public policies
While the institutional rules governing the PAA are generally a part
of substantive public policies, the development and transformation
of
5.2.3
Typology of institutional rules: from the
actor to the institutional arrangement
The other approach adopted here for the identification and
operationalisation of the institutional rules that influence public
policies is based on a bottom-up type process.The analyst adopts
the point of view of the actors affected by the collective problem
dealt with by the policy under scrutiny. He or she then poses the
question as to which institutional rules are necessary to solve the
problem in question in a concerted and targeted fashion. These
rules are often implicit and follow decisions taken during earlier
phases of the policy life cycle. For example, if the causal
hypothesis is adopted that unemployment is primarily due to a low
level of educational qualifications among unemployed people, it
will be necessary to include professional training establishments in
the policys PAA by means of the relevant institutional rule.
Thus, it is not a question of considering all the existing
institutional rules and their hierarchical links. Instead it is
necessary to identify the formal and informal rules to which private
and public actors have concrete access so as to assert their interests,
manage the modes of their interaction and, ultimately, ensure the
efficacy of the public policy in question.These rules in their
entirety are generally described in the literature as the institutional
arrangements:
In analyzing the structure of an institutional
arrangement, the analyst investigates what participants
are involved, what their stakes and resources are, and
how they are linked to one another and to outcomes in
the world. Specifically, the analyst identifies the types of
actions the actors can take, the type of information
available to them, how actions lead to outcomes, and
Notes
The public choice authors face the following paradox: the decisions of the
North American Congress display a certain stability while, according to the
theories of rational choice, it should be difficult, if not impossible, to obtain
stable majorities for the voting on laws in Congress.This paradox can be
resolved by taking the procedural rules and commissions of Congress into
account as institutions.
1
free-riding, but that it is also necessary to turn to the actual nature of goods
(private versus public, material versus axiological) that they produce, as well
as the opportunistic calculations of certain individuals, as an explanatory
variable for the existence of institutions and the activities of their members.
To avoid confusion between the terms institution and organisation, we
prefer to use the term institutional rules.When used in this text, the term
institution is considered as a synonym for institutional rules.
3
1. The rules of scope define the boundaries of the domain concerned, that
is, the perimeter of the collective problem that the public policy seeks
to resolve.
2. The rules of boundary define the actors and the conditions, under which
they have the right to participate in the collective resolution of the
collective problem.
3. The rules of position assign a particular role or position to a specific
actor.
4. The rules of enforcement prescribe the connection between the
permitted position and decisions or actions, that is, the hierarchy of
positions and activities.
5. The rules of information define the information channels and language
used by the actors.
6. The rules of decision establish the modality for the weighting of
individual voices during collective decision-making processes.
7. The rules of appropriation stipulate how the benefits and costs that
result from the resolution of the collective problem are redistributed
among the actors on the basis of their positions and activities.
Hill and Hupe have developed a similar approach based on Ostroms work in
which they write of constitutive governance, institutional governance and
operational governance (Hill and Hupe, 2006; Hupe and Hill, 2006).
6
Analysis model
Part III
Analysis model
Part III presents in detail the logic behind our analysis model and the
variables and hypothesis that constitute it. Our approach is designed
to take into account both substantive (how can the public problem
be resolved) and institutional (which actors will get involved,
which resources are required and which institutional rules apply?)
dimensions. We start this section of the book by presenting the
framework that facilitates the empirical analysis as part of a
comparative approach (Chapter Six). This is followed by the
definition of the dependent variables (or social phenomena to be
explained) based on the four main stages of a policy: agenda setting
(Chapter Seven), programming (Chapter Eight), implementation
(Chapter Nine) and evaluation
(Chapter Ten).
In the context of these policy phases, we identify six types of
products to be analysed:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
111
Analysis model
SIX
Analysis model
11
4
Public policy
analysis
means of action plans (APs) and formal acts (outputs); and (4) the
evaluation of the resulting effects (impacts and outcomes).
Figure 6.1 presents the six products of a public policy as a
function of these different stages.
Thus, the analyst must try to identify these six types of products
for all policies in accordance with the following characteristics:
The political definition of the public problem (PD) not only
includes the decision on political intervention, but also, and
above all, the delimitation of the perimeter of the public
problem to be resolved, the identification of its probable
causes by the public actors and the kinds of public
intervention envisaged.
The PAP includes all of the legislative or regulatory decisions
taken by both central state and public bodies and necessary to
the implementation of the policy in question.
The political-administrative arrangements (PAAs) define the
competencies, responsibilities and main resources at the
disposal of public actors for the execution of the PAP.
The APs establish the priorities for policy implementation in
the context of geographical and social space and with respect
to time.
The implementation acts (outputs) cover all activities and
administrative decisions involving the application of
measures.
The evaluative statements on the effects of a given policy
objective to demonstrate the changes (that may have taken
place) in the
Figure 6.1: Policy stages and products (postulate no 1)
Analysis
model
4th stage: Evaluation
Product 6: evaluative statements on the policy effects (impacts and outcomes) (EE)
Resources
Actors
Direct game
Indirect game
Institutional
Direct game
Resources
Institutional
Indirect game
Actors
12
0
Resources
Actors
Agenda setting
Product 1: Political definition of the
problem to be solved
Substantive
Institutional rules,
general and specific
Evaluation
Programming
Institutional
Product 6: Evaluative
statements
Resource
s
Actor
s
Institution
al
Substanti
ve
Institutional rules,
general and specific
Product 2:
PAP
Product 3:
PAA
Substantive
Implementation
Product 4: Plan of
action
Product 5: Outputs
Institutional
Actor
s
Resources
Institutional
Substantive
Institutional rules,
general and specific
Resource
s
Publi
poli
analys
is
Analysis
model
Public policy
The exploitation of the entire range of resources: public and
analysis
122
taken during the previous stage of the same public policy (postulate
no 1).
Secondly,and above all, if it is established that a fundamental
difference exists between the scope and content of two successive
stages, it is necessary to explain this empirically observed absence
of continuity: that is, which (new) actors intervened with which
(new combinations of) resources, which (new) interactions took
place with which other actors and on the basis of which (new)
institutional rules (postulate no 2).
To stress that in spite of their strongly varied content the six
products observable in the four stages of a public policy cycle are
characterised by a similar structure linked to the duality of the
substantive and institutional aspects, the chapters devoted to each
of these are structured in the same way:
1. The general definition of the product as the result of a
particular stage of a public policy cycle (the variable to be
explained).
2. The operationalisation of the product according to several
analytical dimensions, substantive and institutional,
necessary for an empirical study (the dimensions to be
observed empirically).
3. Summary description of the decision-making process leading
to the product (what type of actor, which resources and which
institutional rules?).
Finally, it should again be noted that this kind of approach
facilitates a truly comparative approach.The analytical dimensions
proposed here make it possible to compare the actors, the
resources used, the institutions in action and the policy products,
both throughout the different phases of one and the same policy
(diachronic analysis) and in the context of decision-making
processes in different countries or in politically or administratively
different parts of the same country (synchronic analysis).
SEVEN
12
6
Public policy
analysis
7.2.1
No social
recognition
(lack of social
mobilisation)
Social problem
(for example,
violence between
couples, incest,
doping in sport)
Public problem
Public policy
(for example,
paedophile
networks, child
labour)
N
o
p
u
b
l
i
c
intervention (no
public policy
adopted/implemen
ted)
(for
example,
private
insurance, no tax
on
financial
transactions)
7.2.2
7.3.1
From competing causal stories
towards a dominant hypothesis of
causality
According to the constructivist approach, all social problems and
to an even greater extent all public problems are collective
constructs. Thus, the definition of the problem that a public policy
Publi
poli
analys
is
13
8
Table 7.1:The relationships between the structuring of a problem and political strategies
At
normative
At
level
cognitive level
Ignorance of the
nature
actual of the
problem
to
be resolved
(Scientific) certainties
with respect to the
causes and effects
of the problem
to be resolved
Source: Loose adaptation of Hisschemller and Hoppe (1996, p 56) with illustrations
Political agenda
setting
7.3.2
Process: actors, resources and institutions
mobilised
The study of political agenda setting looks into the factors that
influence the fact that one social problem attracts the attention of
the actors concerned (and thus becomes a public problem), while
another is not subject to public debate or state intervention. In
concrete terms, this involves the definition of the actors and
processes involved in the agenda setting. Up to now, no general
theory has made it possible to explain the constitution and
definition of the policy agenda and the ways that the initiators of
the debate on a social problem access it. On the contrary, a number
of partial models are proposed in the literature, each of which
describes a particular process within the overall agenda- setting
context.Without making any claim to their exhaustiveness, we
present below five ideal types of agenda setting.
Thematicisation through media coverage
13
9
Public policy
The
supporters of the media coverage model highlight the
analysis
decisive role of the media (in particular the press, radio and
television and the Internet) and polling institutes (for example,
regular polls on problems identified as priorities according to
the general public) in the identification of a public problem.The
media directly influence public
14
0
the political agendas at the level of all member states is one of the
major impacts of the EU (see, in particular, Mny et al, 1995;
Larrue, 2000, pp 49ff; Larrue and Vlassopoulou, 1999).
In the British literature on environmental regulation this external
influence is linked with another influence (external to the original
policy agenda if not to the country): privatisation. For example, the
co-incidence of the establishment of a privatised water industry,
requiring specific regulation by government agencies, with
European directives on water quality together put water pollution
issues on the policy agenda. This provided opportunities for
pressure groups concerned with the quality of drinking and sea
bathing water (Maloney and Richardson, 1994; Jordan, 1998).
Policy supply or electoral competition
Inspired by public choice theory, the policy supply model assumes
that political parties do not just respond in a reactive way to social
demands that have been articulated already. They may also take the
initiative. Hence they may define and formulate public problems
with a view to expanding their electoral base through the addition
of the beneficiaries of the proposed new policies.Thus, in this
context, the policy agenda is constituted on the basis of the topics
selected by the main competing parties in their programmes and
during campaigns. Various sub-variants of this model are proposed
according to which the confrontation between the parties is instead
expressed in terms of an ideological dimension (a situation of direct
competition according to Downs, 1957 and Odershook, 1986), or in
terms of the selective declaration of certain topics, for which one
party has greater credibility among the population than another
(the situation of indirect competition according to Budge and
Farlie, 1983; Klingeman et al, 1994).This is particularly true in the
case of the problem of immigration that is thematicised by extreme
Right-wing parties in most European countries, the highlighting of
the problem of unemployment by the parties of the Left and of
environmental problems by the Green parties. It should be noted that
these theories were developed to account for agenda setting in
democratic regimes of the Westminster type, in which parties
develop clear programmes of legislation that they can realise with
the support of a parliamentary majority (Hofferbert and
Budge, 1992; Ptry, 1995).
Here, the resources mobilised by political parties generally
encompass the resources information (declarations of political
7.3.3
Comparison criteria
14
6
Thematicisation
through media
coverage
Mobilisation
(exterior
initiative)
Policy supply
(electoral
competition)
Actors: proprietor of
the problem or initiator
of the process?
Various media
opinion
polling
and
institutes
Pressure
and social
groups
movements
Political parties
other
and
organisations
Clearly articulated
social demand?
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
Audience vis--vis
the problem?
Large
Large
Large
Rather limited
Very limited
Yes
Yes
Yes
Not necessarily
In no case
Not
necessarily
Information,
infrastructure
and time
Not
necessarily
Organisation
political
and
support
Yes
No
No
Information and
law
Constitutional
guarantee:
freedom
of expression
Direct
(and
perhaps
democracy
illegal actions)
Information,
organisation
and
political
support
Constitutional
guarantee,
direct
democracy and
electoral and
government
rules
Organisatio
consensus
n,
and
political
support
Informal
a
substitute
rules
as
for
formal rules
Partisan exploitation?
Main resources mobilised
Main institutional
rules used
Internal
anticipati
on
Politicaladministrative
authoriti
es
Principle
administrative
s of
law
and traditional
decisional rules
Source: Loose adaptation of Garraud (1990, p 39) with added information regarding resources and mobilised institutions
Silent
corporatist
action
Sectoral
groups
interest
Publi
poli
analys
is
Political agenda
setting
7.4 Dynamics
of
the
political
competition and change
agenda:
Public policy
there is competition between social problems, and some end up
analysis
14
8
confirmed that the causal model fills out as also do the institutional
elements which flow in part already from the
Policy programming
EIGHT
Policy programming
15
1
15
2
Public policy
analysis
Policy
8.1.1
Substantive elements
(core and flesh or
internal layers)
Political-administrative arrangements,
financial means and other resources
Concrete objectives
Evaluative elements
Operational elements
(instruments)
cases, instructions are also given on the way that this data should
be interpreted. Examples of this
doubt, these are the elements of the PAP that best characterise a
policy because they
define those affected, its level of interventionism and the type, scope
and quality of the proposed public intervention and services.
The choice of instruments is hugely dependent on the mode of
intervention selected (for example, police order, direct offer of
services, incentives, redistribution, persuasion, creation of social or
organisational structures). Due to its more or less extensive effects
on the legal situation of those affected, this choice necessitates an
explicit legal basis. From both a legal and administrative science
perspective, it is important that the operational elements also
indicate the conditions under which the measures may or should be
applied. In this context, the lawyers refer to conditional clauses.The
latter are generally formulated on the basis of an if, then logic: if
someone wants to build a house, then such and such a condition
must be fulfilled so as to obtain planning permission; if excessive
deterioration in air quality is confirmed, then the emissions by the
company causing it must be curbed; if someone loses their job due
to no fault of their own, then they may benefit from unemployment
insurance; if a company creates employment in a particular region,
then it can benefit from a tax exemption.
In the frame of the recent debate on New Public Management,
the objection is often raised to the effect that policies are
excessively controlled by very detailed conditional clauses of this
kind while, at the same time, they lack precise definitions of their
ultimate purpose (Habltzel, 1995). In fact, the conditional
clauses restrict the administrations room for manoeuvre;
conversely, they ensure the predictability and legality of policies
(Knoepfel, 1996, 1997b).
We use the term operational element here because it defines the
means used to motivate those affected (particularly target groups)
to comply with the policy provisions.This is the sine qua non
condition for rendering a policy operational.Without this
indispensable element, even the most legitimate objectives will go
unheeded. The precise definition of the contribution of target
groups to the change in the situation commonly judged as
inadmissible is essential to the operationalisation of a public
policy.This motivation can take a number of forms; the following
four are the main forms usually identified in this context5:
The regulatory mode is based on bans, obligations and the
allocation of various rights that may be the object of sanctions
in the case of failure to respect them. In this sense, it aims to
directly influence the behaviour of target groups.The
operational elements cover the general prohibition of an
and police) and, as a result of this, the presence of more than one
administrative structure for one policy. In the interest of uniformity
of implementation, the central legislature may partly overrule
this prerogative of regional and local areas and restrictively order
them to create specialised administrative services that respond
specifically to requirements for similar qualifications (in
Switzerland, for example, in spatial development policies,
environment policies and, more recently, in the fight against
unemployment; in the UK it may be noted how central government
has partly overruled local governments prerogatives in respect of
departmental organisation in areas like social services and
education, sometimes using informal advice rather than legal
prescription).
For many policies, this creation of competency structures simply
consists in attributing new tasks to existing services; the granting of
resources (finance, personnel and others) is then globally decided
when the budgets of the services concerned are decided. On the
other hand, certain PAPs contain specific finance clauses or
establish an entire network of new services that are responsible for
the implementation of the (new) public policy.
In Switzerland the subsidies paid to the cantons or local
authorities responsible for the implementation of federal spatial
planning policy, environment policy or civil protection that result in
the creation of ad hoc services (for example, the cantonal economic
delegate for regional development policy) are an example of the
case in point. The phenomenon can also be observed in France
where various taxes on activities giving rise to pollution are used for
the benefit of environment protection policy and are managed by
bodies specifically created for this purpose (for example, the water
agencies, the agency for the environment and energy management
[ADEME] and the Superior Council for fishing). In the field of
social care in the UK there is both funding for new policies through
additions to the general grant to local authorities and through
specific earmarked funds (Hill, 2000, pp 143-8).
The designation of administrative organisations at the different
decision-making levels is not without effect on the conduct of
public policies. Unsuitable PAAs can result in considerable deficits
in the implementation of objectives defined in the PAP and, as a
result, considerably diminish the scope of its substantive elements.
Conversely, a particularly well-tailored PAA can trigger an
accelerating effect that results in a faster and more advanced
resolution of the problem in one region as compared with another
8.1.2
PAP: coherence
constituent elements
and
legality
of
the
cantons and the local authorities; and in the UK: the EU, the UK
government, the devolved governments
costs of
8.1.3
Homogeneous
implementation
Framework programme
Diverse
implementation
(b) PAP
PAPs)
PAP institutional
PAP mixed
Note: The circles represent the five layers of a PAP as presented in Figure 8.1.The
darker colouring indicates detailed provisions, the lighter that they are missing or
ill-defined.
8.2.1
A PAA incorporates not only public actors, but also all of the
private actors who may be assimilated into it due to the fact
that they are invested with public power, and who, based on
this delegation of responsibility, participate on an equal footing
in the production of concrete actions (outputs) associated with
the policy in question. In fact, the PAA links these actors through
formal or informal institutional rules governing the assignment of
specific functions with respect to the action to be taken in the
relevant social area.These rules facilitate the (positive or negative,
proactive or reactive) substantive coordination between the different
services that perform the multiple administrative tasks required
under the targeted application of a policy. This is reinforced by
procedural rules that give rise to a network of horizontal and/or
vertical interactions between the actors (procedural
coordination).As a result, a PAA may be interpreted as the
organisational and procedural basis of a policy. It represents the
network of public and private actors responsible for the
implementation of a policy without, however, encompassing the
entire group of actors in the policy arena (see Section 3.3.1,
Chapter Three), who are affected by the problem dealt with by
the policy in question (policy network). Thus, despite
undoubtedly participating in many aspects of a policy being
analysed, all of the private actors involved will not generally form
an integral part of the PAA; this rule is applicable almost without
exception.
8.2.2
PAA 2
Office 4
Office 2
Office 1
Note: PAA 1 is composed of three actors each situated in a different office (or
ministry). PAA 2 is composed of three actors of which two belong to the same office
(or ministry) and the third to another. Interaction between PAAs 1 and 2 is facilitated by
the fact that three of the six actors belong to the same office.
Office B
PAA 1 pol 1
Output
PAA 2 pol 2
Output
Note: PAAs 1 and 2 are each composed of actors in the same office (or
ministry), who cannot easily facilitate interactions between them.
Table 8.1: Actors, resources and institutional rules involved in the decision-making process
(programming)
Stage
European
Preparliamentary
Content
based on
chronologi
cal
sequence
1. Variable initiative
2. Expert
commissions,
working groups
3. Pilot study for
directive
proposed by
the Commission
4. Presentation to
the
Council and
5.Parliament
Reformulation
6.Adoption by the
Council
Principal
actors
involved
European
Administrative services
Commission
National
ministries Extra-parliamentary
Interest groups
commissions
Government
Government
Parliamentary
12. Recommendations
by parliamentary
commissions
(with amendments)
13. Debate (with
defence
of
the project
by the
government) and
votetwo
in chambers
the
14. Eventual conciliation
procedure between
the chambers
15. Final adoption by the
Federal/National
Assembly
Parliamentary
commissions
Political
parties
Interest groups
Government
Referendumrelated
(in Switzerland)
16. Collection of
50,000
signatures
in
the case
of
legislative
referendum
(optional)
17. Referendum
campaign
18. Popular
ballot
Regulatory
19. Development
of an
ordinance/
executive
20. decree
Possible
consultation
procedure
21. Adoption of
thedecree by
the
government
22. Eventual
passing
of
administrativ
e
directives
(circular)
by
department
office/ministr
y
concerned
Government Government
Political
Administrativ
parties
e
Interest
services
groups
Interest
groups
(continued)
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Table 8.1: Actors, resources and institutional rules involved in the decision-making process
(programming) (contd.)
Stage
European
Principal
mobilisabl
e
resources
Information, law,
personnel,
organisation,
consensus,
infrastructure,
political
support,
time
Procedural rules for
European decisionmaking
procedures
Principal
institution
al
rules
(general
and
specific)
Preparliamen
tary
Information, law,
personnel, consensus,
organisation,
infrastructure, political
support
Decision-making rules
for the
functioning
of
parliamentary
assemblies, informal
rules of (majority
consensus
parties),
rule
of legislative
federalism
(for
Council of States in
Switzerland), rule of
loyalty
to political parties etc
Parliamentary
Referendumrelated
(in
Switzerland)
Money,
organisation,
infrastructure,
time,
political
support
Laws of direct
democracy
(optional
or
mandatory
referendums),
rule
of
legislative
federalism,
freedom
of expression
etc
Regulatory
Law, consensus,
political support
Principles of
administrative law
(right to be
informed
and
heard,
legality, of
equality
treatment,
proportionality,
nonretroactivity
etc),
procedural roles
for
internal and
external
consultation
procedures etc
programming
Policy
Notes
We use the term in a more concrete way that is more directly based on formal
documents than is the case in the North American literature (Bobrow and
Dryzek, 1987; Dryzek and Ripley, 1988; Linder and Peters, 1988, 1989, 1990,
1991; Schneider and Ingram, 1990).
1
18
5
18
6
Public policy
analysis
(1991) on information and persuasion; and another by Delley (1991) on action
by training; see also Knig and Dose (1993) and Klti (1998). On
thecontractual mode, see Gaudin (1996) and Godard (1997). On the
conventional mode, see Lascoumes and Valuy (1996).
For example, the Swiss Federal Law on Administrative Procedure of
20 December 1968 RS 172.02.
6
On this point, see Article 61a of the Federal Law on the Organisation of the
Government and the Administration of 21 March 1997 (RS 172.010).
Following the new regulation adopted in 1989, authorisation is only necessary
if explicitly required by a federal law or a general decree. As a result of this
provision and the elimination of submissions for authorisation, the number of
authorisations has been significantly reduced.
9
For more information on this sociological concept, see, for example, Jaeger
et al (1998).
10
11
Policy implementation
NINE
Policy implementation
Public policy
analysis
18
8
9.2
Classical implementation theory and
recent developments
Classical implementation research starts with the observation
of implementation deficits: these deficits were traditionally
demonstrated
Related issues about the power of target groups within the public
policy delivery system: there is an issue here about the extent
the state is able to influence the behaviour of its own
functionaries. In this respect the literature on implementation
connects up with a wide literature about control within
organisations (see the discussion in Hill, 2005, chapter 10).
An important concern within the implementation literature
has been about the behaviour of staff at the delivery end of
policy systems. Furthermore the street-level bureaucracy
literature (the seminal work here was by Lipsky, 1980, but the
ideas here are further explored in Hill, 2005, chapter 12 and in
Hupe and Hill, 2007) suggests reasons why a measure of
autonomy may and even should be present at this level,
particularly when complex professional services are involved.
In this sense the targets of policy changes may be changes of
behaviour within the system. The whole issue is made more
complex, particularly in the context of New Public
Management, by the extent to which tasks are delegated to
organisations that are not directly managed by policy makers.
Hence, we may see issues about targeting, and about the
strategies used to resist targeting in similar terms as those
where the target groups are clearly private and external to the
system, and issues about the weight of such target groups
(note, for example, doctors) as having many similarities.
The position of target groups vis--vis public activity is also
influenced by variables referred to as situational, which may
extend or reduce their room for manoeuvre during
negotiations concerning implementation. Such variables are
constituted by external events, changes in the economic and
social context, disruptions of an economic nature etc that
occur independently of the will of the actors involved. For
example, the increases in the price of petrol have strengthened
the position of public actors implementing energy-saving and
rational use policies vis--vis the target groups that have
shown a certain reticence in regard to such processes.
Similarly, in the context of synchronous comparisons in
particular, the position of actors will vary in different
implementation zones in accordance with variables referred to
as structural. In effect, research has demonstrated the existence
of relatively constant determinants with respect to the relative
influence of actors, such as institutional rules governing
property relationships or constitutional political rights (for
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Table 9.1: Differences between the top-down and bottom-up visions of policy implementation
Implementation approaches
Top-down vision
Bottom-up vision
Activities of actors of the implementation
network at local level (PAA, public action
network)
From the bottom (street-level) to the top with
simultaneous consideration of public and private
actors
No a priori clearly defined criteria
Eventual level of participation of actors involved
Eventual degree of conflict in implementation
Which interactions between the public and
actors
privateof a policy network should be considered
during implementation so that it will be
accepted?
Source: Loose adaptation (with our modifications) of the comparison proposed by Sabatier (1986, p 33)
Policy
implementation
such a position as the person who defines, interprets and modifies the
institutional rules of the game (fixer of the game).
Thus, this approach, which was adopted in part in our theoretical
framework (indirect games, see Section 6.2, Chapter Six), tends
to relativise the ideal-type image of implementation as a process
based on the intention of implementing actors, the substantive
content of a PAP, to abandon the conceptualisation of
programming and implementation as two clearly distinct stages
and to subject to re- examination the legitimate supremacy of
public actors over private actors both economic and social.
The definition of implementation proposed here only partly takes
the logical consequences of Bardachs approach into account.
Despite its unquestionably original nature that draws the analysts
attention to all of the actors (and not just the public actors), this
approach seemed too American-centrist to fully encompass the
realities of certain European democracies. In effect, the latters
traditions with respect to the primordial role of the public function
and content of substantive and institutional decisions taken
democratically at the level of policy programming (PAP and PAA)
are very deeply rooted. In the US, in contrast, the rule-making
process (that is, the production of rules by independent agencies in
accordance with a procedure of legal inspiration) is located
between the law making (or classical programming) and
implementation (that is, classical implementation). This last statement
must not, however, be considered as an invitation to strictly limit
the analysis of implementation processes to this last phase. On the
contrary, it is increasingly accepted today that the understanding of
implementation processes also incorporates the analysis of the
programming phase. From this perspective, we discuss below the
APs (product no 4) that constitute a direct link between the PAP
and the results of its application (outputs, product no 5).
Although our approach does not limit itself to a simple analysis
of policy implementation, it does adopt a considerable part of the
traditional concept of implementation research while generalising
the elements adopted at the level of the entire policy life cycle and
bringing them back to the three basic elements, that is, actors,
resources and institutions.When applied to the analysis of the
implementation stage of a policy, as a factor explaining services, in
our conceptualisation, the programmes of a certain structure to be
implemented become the substantive elements of product numbers
2, 3 and 4 (PPA, PAA and APs), which guide the direct game of
the actors. The old administrative implementation system covers
19
7
Public policy
the
institutional elements of these three products that are likely to
analysis
198
General
Individual
AP
Concrete
Intermediary
implementation
measure (for
example,
(Formal)
implementation
acts (outputs)
20
1
Implementati
on activities
(outputs)
Deficits (temporary) non-foreseen in the plans of action.
Deficits (temporary) foreseen and legitimised by the plans of
action.
20
3
dimensions, which are applicable to all APs, are not exclusive but
complementary. In fact, the substantive and institutional content of
this product can only be taken into account through their
simultaneous analysis.
Explicit or implicit APs: as already indicated, an AP is
generally presented in the form of an internal document that
does not legally link the political-administrative authorities to
the affected groups. Irrespective of this principle, an AP can
vary in terms of its degree of explicitness.The fact that it is
declared official and is familiar to all of the (public and
private) policy actors should positively influence its degree of
realisation. Conversely, it can be assumed that an implicit, or
(quasi-)secret, AP will only represent a minimal constraint
with respect to the different administrative services responsible
for its coordinated and targeted application. Nevertheless, it is
interesting to note that nowadays it is possible to observe a
very real trend involving the formal organisation of these APs
as an element for the creation of a consensus during the
effective implementation of public policies (production of
outputs). The degree of formalisation of the planning activity
is, therefore, a relevant criterion for the analysis of these
plans.
Open or closed APs: along with the degree of formalisation,
the degree of openness of the planning activity requires
analysis. The establishment of a priority plan between
different areas or social groups may be subject to internal
actor activity or, conversely, it may be open to all of the
public actors concerned, that is, target groups, end
beneficiaries and third parties. As mentioned above, this
opening up of the planning process in a way that facilitates
political debate is increasingly common.
APs that are more or less discriminatory in nature: by definition,
an AP may define priorities and hence be discriminatory in
nature. The scope of this discrimination may be large or small
and relate to temporal, geographical and social dimensions.
Thus, it may clearly establish implementation deadlines or
reference periods for the production of implementation acts
(for example, annual plans versus ones that run over several
years), deadlines that ensure a certain predictability (or pseudo
acquired rights, for example, in the case of subsidy policies)
to the affected groups defined as being in a position of
priority. Similarly, the borders of geographical areas
Implementation activities
(5)
(1)
Third parties
affected
negatively
(1)
(1)
Third parties
benefiting
(4)
Impacts
Final beneficiaries
(3)
(4)
Target
(2) groups
Effects (outcomes)
(6)
(6)
Structural and
situational variables
Notes
1
See, for example, the papers presented to the congress of the Association of
Political Science of the Federal Republic of Germany in October 1984, which
were devoted to this debate.
4
See also the exploration of this issue in Hill and Hupe (2002).
This assumption of the 1960s as a turning point may vary from society to
society.
10
Evaluating policy
effects
TEN
10.1
(that is, the tangible results of implementation), the impacts and the
outcomes
22
2
Public policy
analysis
10.1.1
Evaluating policy
10.1.2
Outcomes (observable effects among the
end beneficiaries)
We define the outcomes of a policy as all of the effects in relation
to the public problem to be resolved that are attributable to the
policy and triggered in turn by the implementation acts (outputs).
The results (outcomes) literally represent that which comes out of
the state activity. Thus, the outcomes include all effects desired
and undesired, direct and indirect, primary and secondary, and so
on.To identify and quantify the results targeted by a policy, the
analyst generally refers to the definitions of objectives and
evaluative elements provided by the PAPs and, if necessary,
concretised in APs and implementation acts. It should be noted
here that these definitions may not be used for this purpose if they
are formulated in terms of the (number of) measures to be realised
rather than substantive objectives.
The analysis of the effects may show that the existence of
optimum outputs and impacts constitutes a necessary but
insufficient condition for the achievement of adequate outcomes.
Furthermore,the observable changes only contribute to the
realisation of objectives if the hypotheses on the causes of the
public problem to be resolved (any causal hypothesis that
identifies target groups) prove relevant and no counter- productive
effects emerge. It should be noted that the causeeffect
relationships of a public problem, which a policy tries to influence,
are often very complex and, thus, the results are difficult to record
and appreciate.
The concept ofoutcomes is an analytical category. It is only
fleshed out by the indicators that provide data on the evolution of
the collective problem that the policy aims to resolve.Among this
data, it is essential that, in particular, the information on the
situation of the social groups affected by the public problem in
question conditions that may have changed over time be taken
into account.These end beneficiaries of a policy may be social
groups such as neighbours, tenants, residents or visitors (in the case
of spatial development policy), customers (in the case of consumer
protection policy) or patients (in the case of health policy). Given
that, in most cases, these groups are not clearly identifiable with
individual people, the use of aggregate indicators is desirable.
However, it is sometimes possible to question the groups affected
by certain public policies directly (for example, post office clients,
the patients of service X in hospital Y).
10.2.1
10.2.2
about smog seriously and reduce their speed in accordance with the
regulations and then read in the newspaper that the ozone levels
have reached a record high and that official speed limits have had
no influence in this context.
Finally, policies also exist whose results correspond to the
defined objectives because they produce acts and impacts that are
truly capable of improving the problematic situation in the desired
way.
An example of an effective policy is that of public support for
home ownership in Switzerland. In 1970 an average of 28.1% of
households were homeowners.This percentage was very low
compared with other European countries. Thus, the Swiss
Confederation passed a law supporting residential construction and
access to home ownership6. This law contained the following
measures to reduce the initial costs incurred by future homeowners:
a federal guarantee, a reduction in the price of land and nonreimbursable supplementary reductions. The main objective of this
policy was to increase residential property ownership in
Switzerland. According to an evaluation of this law (Schulz et al,
1993), the federal support of access to home ownership had the
desired effect. Up to 1991, some 15,747 construction projects were
financially supported by the Confederation (outputs). Access to
home ownership with the help of public support was primarily of
assistance to young households that, in view of their limited
finances, would not otherwise have had an opportunity to become
homeowners (impacts). Thanks to this measure the proportion of
homeowners increased during the study period (around 15 years) to
reach 31.3% (= outcomes in accordance with the objective).
Furthermore, the law has had other indirect positive effects.Thus, in
a period of recession, the support of access to home ownership
constitutes an important support for the economy7.This was the
case, for example, during 1991, a weak period in the construction
sector because 20% of family housing built was supported by
federal aid.A similar conclusion could be drawn about the UK
legislation on the sale of public rented council houses to their
occupiers, a success in terms of the goals of the government of the
time (although heavily criticised by those who saw such a measure
as undermining local government capacities to respond to the needs
of the homeless but of course exploring that involves the
imposition of an evaluation criteria not implicit in the policy goal)
(Forrest and Murie, 1988).
10.2.3
Efficiency (outcomes/resources)
10.2.4
Relevance (objectives/public problem) and
productive economy (outputs/resources)
The criterion of relevance examines the link that exists or should
exist between the objectives defined in the PAP, on the one hand,
and the nature and pressure of the public problem to be resolved,
on the other. Thus, a policy is described as relevant if the objectives
implicitly formulated in the PAP, and sometimes concretised in the
APs, are adapted to the nature and temporal and socio-spatial
distribution of the problem that the policy is intended to resolve. In
fact, the question of the relevance of a policy is the most political
and hence most delicate and sensitive dimension that an evaluation
may have to examine. For this reason, political-administrative
leaders and officials often exclude it from the area of evaluation to
be studied by an external expert in the context of a commissioned
study.
10.2.5
Evaluation criteria: overview and application
logic
As a summary of the preceding discussion, Figure 10.1 presents the
relationships that exist between the constituent elements of a policy
and the evaluation criteria, whose purpose it is to assess the
capacity of the state to resolve public problems. We stress again
here that all evaluations should involve the successive analysis of
the criteria of relevance, impact, effectiveness and efficiency,
followed by productive economy. In effect, it is a question of
finding out first and foremost if the policy enables the effective
resolution or at least partial resolution
of the social problem in question and, secondly only, whether the
allocation of resources between the actors of the policys PAA is
optimal. Having presented the operational dimensions of impacts
and the results as well as the evaluation criteria of a policy, we will
now set out a typology of these elements in order to distinguish
different types of
evaluative statements observable in reality.
Political-administrative
programme (PAA) andProcedural
political-administrative
arrangement (PAA)
Objectives, elementsOperational
elements
Resources
to be evaluatedelements
Planning by the actors and the political-administrative arrangement (PAA) in the context of the elaboration of the plans of acti
Extent of
impact (2)
Effectiveness (3)
Productive
economy (5)
Efficiency (4)
Just like the programming stage, the policy evaluation process and
political value of its results (or evaluative statements) depends to a
great extent on the institutional rules of the democratic regime in
question.The institutionalisation of evaluation in the US through
the General Accounting Office (GAO) is very different to the
process observable in Switzerland with its Organe parlementaire de
contrle de ladministration (OPCA) and in France with its Conseil
national de lvaluation (see Bussmann, 1998, pp 13-32 for
Switzerland and Monnier, 1992, pp 63-8 for France). In the UK,
official evaluation activity is divided between the National Audit
Office for much central government activity and the Audit
Commission with particular responsibilities for local government
and the NHS.
Beyond this institutional data on the place of evaluation in the
conduct of public policies, we discuss below the strategic aims of
actors with respect to the evaluative process (adopting the
arguments of Bussmann et al, 1998, pp 113-17).
10.4.2
only one kind of test, and that arguments concerning whether the
appropriate conditions for falsification have been met will never
cease (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000, p 23).
Notes
Such data is difficult to obtain because it is a known fact that the effective
degree of social prescription of punishable facts often varies significantly (refer
to the research by Killias and Grapendaal, 1997; Killias, 1998).
2
ELEVEN
25
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Table 11.1: Utility of the model on the basis of the level and ambition of the proposed empirical
research
Ambition of the analysis
Descriptive
perspective
Analytical perspective
(knowledge of
public policy)
Prescriptive
perspective
(knowledge for
public policy)
11.1
Variables to be explained: the substantive
and institutional dimensions of policy products
Table 11.2 presents the six products that the analyst can define in
the course of a policy cycle as a function of multiple material
supports (for example, government programmes, legislation and
regulations, annual reports of administrative services, expert
evaluations, informal documents produced by the administration
and interest groups, syntheses of consultation or negotiation
processes, print media, websites).
Beyond the generic definition of these six products,Table 11.2
lists the operational dimensions presented earlier by way of
illustration for the detailed study of their constituent elements. We
divide these dimensions into two categories, according to whether
they are more concerned with the substantive content (how to
resolve the public problem) or the institutional content of a
determined product (which actors participate in the resolution of
the public problem, which resources do they use and what are
the rules of the game that apply). Once again, we stress that the
operational elements listed have all been proven in empirical
analysis; at the same time, however, we are not claiming that the list
is exhaustive.
Even if the boundary between substantive and institutional
elements is at times fluid (or arbitrary), the simultaneous
consideration and the examination of these two categories of the
content of a product are indispensable in the context of an
empirical study. In effect, the quality of a policy depends on the
degree of differentiation between its substantive and institutional
elements and, to a greater extent, on the coherence or at least the
negative coordination of the latter. Insofar as a state action aims
to achieve a high level of effectiveness (= achievement of stated
substantive objectives) and a certain level of foreseeable ability and
temporal durability (= institutional stabilisation of exchange
relationships between the actors involved), each of these six
products should progressively concretise the causal and intervention
hypothesis of its causal model (what needs to be done to resolve
the public problem in question) as well as the tasks, competencies
and resources of the actors that constitute its public action
network (that is, who participates in the resolution of the public
policy and according to which of the specific and general rules in
force).
25
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Table 11.2: Summary of the operational elements for the analysis of the six products of a public policy
Operational elements for the analysis of the
product
Policy stage
Agenda setting
Programming
Product
to be
explained
Political definition of
the
public
problem (PD)
Politicaladministrative
programme
(PAP)
Politicaladministrative
arrangement
(PAA)
Generic
definition of
the product
Mandate formulated for the attention
of the authorities to formulate a
political
policy
aimedthe public problem that
at resolving
has been
placed
on the political agenda (
request for and start of an initial
intervention
solution)
All of the legislative norms and
regulatory
that
define acts
the substantive and
proceduralof the policy ( definition
elements
of
normative
content and primary
legitimation)
Structured group of public and parapublic responsible for the
actors
implementation
of the policy ( designation of
actors
competencies,
of intraorganisational
and
interorganisational management and
general
allocation
of resources)
Predominantly
substantive content
Degree of intensity
(severity)
Scope
of involvement
(audience)
Degree of innovation
Concretisation of
objectives
Evaluative criteria
Operational elements
(or action
instruments)
Number and type of
actors defined by
Context
other
policies
Predominantly
institutional
content
Degree of urgency
Administrative
authorities
and
resources
Procedural elements
(including judicial)
Degree of
horizontal and
vertical
coordination
Degree
of centrality
Degree of
politicisation
Degree
of openness
(continued)
Table 11.2: Summary of the operational elements for the analysis of the six products of a public policy
(contd.)
Operational elements for the analysis of the
product
Product
to be
explained
Implementation Action plans (APs)
define
Policy stage
Evaluation
25
5
Generic
definition of
the product
All decisions of a planning nature that
the priorities in time, space and vis-vis social
groups
for the implementation of the
policy
(
specific allocation of resources for
targeted of outputs)
production
Predominantly
substantive content
Explicit (formal) versus
absent
Degree of
discrimination
(in time, space and
vis--vis
social
groups)
Implementation acts
(outp
uts)
Perimeter (complete
versus
incomplete)
Substantive, internal
external coherency
Evaluative
statements
on
the
policy effects
(impacts
and
outcomes)
Predominantly
institutional
content
Degree of
structuring
for
implementing
Associatedauthorities
resources
versus nonassociated
resources
Degree of openness
Institutional content
(for example,
creation
a target
group) of
Intermediary
final acts
Formal versus
informal
acts
Ex-ante,
concomitant or
ex-post
Formal versus
informal
Future
use of the
statement
Resear
h an
workin
hypothe
ses
Public policy
analysis
25
7
11.2
Explanatory variables: the actors game,
the resources and the institutional rules
During the preliminary discussion of policy actors (Chapter Three),
we identified a basic triangle composed of the politicaladministrative authorities (public actors), the target groups and end
beneficiaries, to which third-party groups (positively affected
versus negatively affected third parties) are often added. According
to the general logic of our analysis model, the strategic behaviour
of these actors who in a changing institutional context mobilise
different resources to assert their values, interests and rights make
it possible to explain in part the content of the six policy products.
In effect, we should recall here that our theoretical approach rests
on two postulates (see Chapter Six):
Postulate no 1: the substantive and institutional results of a
policy stage (for example, the PAP and PAA) directly
influence the results of the following stages (for example, the
APs and formal implementation acts).
Postulate no 2: during each stage, the public policy actors
resort to (new) institutional rules and (new) combinations of
resources to influence the results of the stage in question.
The first postulate indicates that to ensure a certain level of
finalisation, continuity and predictability for the policy, the actors
formulate products that attempt to restrict the field of
possibilities for the subsequent stages of the policy.The substantive
and institutional content of a product is directly influenced by the
decisions and actions taken during the earlier stages of the same
public policy.
However, the second postulate qualifies the first in the sense that
certain actors intentionally try to adjust, modify or cancel the
Figure 11.1: Direct and indirect games based on the substantive and institutional content of policy products
Substantive elements
(which decisions and actions should be taken to resolve
the problem?)
Institutional elements
(which actors, according to which rules, and with which
resources?)
Complementa
rity
Resear
h an
workin
hypothe
ses
26
1
Public policy
analysis
11.3
11.3.1
Research hypotheses
26
3
Substantive and
institutional
contents of
product X
Hypothes
is II
Substantive and
institutional
contents of
product Y
Hypothesi
s III
they do not necessarily try to combine all of the possible games (in
particular due to their high cost in terms of resources) to modify all
of the elements of the
11.3.2
Working hypotheses
level of
the PAP
need to
case, for
Resources
26
6
Figure Substantive
11.3: Possible combinations of variables for the
contents
Actors
Hypothesis II
Product X
Law,
formulation
money, etc
Institutions
General rules
Hi
of working hypotheses
Specific rules
Hypothesis I
Actors
Institutional
contents
Target groups
Final
beneficiaries
Product Y
substantive
or
institutional
content of
the product
Y,
general
institutional
rule
direct game;
example,
product
a
availing of
the popular
right to
launch a
referendum
Hypothesis III
in Switzerland or by
demanding an examination
of the constitutionality by
the Constitutional Council
in France) or specific
institutional rule (here:
indirect game; for example,
if product Y is a PAP, by
referring, for example, to
the violation of particular
formal or informal rules in
the area in question
concerning the consultation
of interested milieus) with a
view to obtaining a
particular result expected
at the level of product Y.
Publi
poli
analys
is
Public policy
actually
analysis
26
8
Note
Conclusion
TWELVE
Conclusion
This review of the arguments and cases discussed throughout the
book is primarily intended to prompt researchers and practitioners
working in the area of policy analysis and management to revisit
the arguments presented, develop them further, complement them
with other theoretical approaches and apply them in actual analysis
situations. Thus, we present some reflections on the strengths
(Section 12.1) and weaknesses (Section 12.2) of our theoretical
concepts and their application in concrete cases. Finally, we
describe two possible future directions for the development of
policy analysis (Section 12.3), that is, governance and institutional
regimes.
12.1
27
3
27
4
Public policy
analysis
Conclusi
context of the policy actors and does not place the interactions we
analyse in these contexts.This may be a serious limit to an
approach
largely on the cultural traditions that prevail in the regions and local
authority areas.This point is particularly well illustrated in
Switzerland
why, for example, do comparisons of the conduct of individual
policies in the cantons of Vaud, Geneva and Valais regularly reveal
the adoption of similar models at the level of administrative action?
Thirdly, the comparative analysis of policies sometimes proves
excessively causal when it comes to researching the explanatory
factors behind policy products. It is true that all social scientific
studies must define precisely the social phenomena that they
propose to analyse and propose, in the form of hypotheses, the
factors likely to explain the observed facts. In doing this, however,
all such approaches risk quickly taking the wrong turn. Policy
analysts, who concentrate on an extremely limited area, which in a
great many cases is artificially dissociated from the rest of the
world, should interpret their results with even greater care than
analysts involved in other social science approaches (for example,
the analysis of state measures that makes no claim to be
explanatory and only proposes to confirm whether or not a specific
measure is accompanied by a change in the real world).
(d) Additional comments on possible limitations
It is appropriate to add here some comments, linking the three
points above, which seem particularly relevant to the application of
this model to the UK.The emphasis of the model on analysing
individual policies with a strong emphasis on problem solving, in a
context of (as noted above) increasingly frenetic political action,
seems to be at variance with:
a strong emphasis on the ways in which policies are
interconnected (expressed in colloquial terms as a need for
joined-up government);
very rapid policy change, making evaluation very difficult,
and suggesting an absence of a clear view of the cause of a
problem;
a tendency of politicians to express justifications of their
policies in terms that the public regard with scepticism,
something to which any detached policy analysis activity
must pay attention.
Exploration of ways to deal with the problems these issues pose for
analysis have been expressed at various points throughout the book,
although readers who have been concentrating on the main aspects
of the model may have disregarded them.They do not provide
objections to the model; on the contrary the fact that the model
offers an approach
12.3Future developments
Bearing in mind the weaknesses identified above, it is very
probable that our policy analysis model will develop further in the
direction of
(1) the analysis of governance examining the cooperation of
several policies in a given functional or territorial unit, and (2)
towards the real analysis of institutional regimes which, apart from
public policies, would also include property relationships between
actors (evolving in the medium and long term). More specifically,
what is involved here is the introduction of new heuristic
dimensions making it possible to record analytically the links,
which in our opinion are still tenuous, between the ideas of
governance,institutional regimes and the concept of policy
adopted in this book.
12.3.1
Governance: towards the analysis of a
set of policies
12.3.2
Institutional regimes: towards an analysis that
includes the property rights of actors
In a number of areas, policy implementation activities consist in the
provision of goods (for example, drinking water, electricity) and
services (for example, hospital care, education) to citizens. In the
past, in France, Switzerland and the UK, these goods and services
were produced by public organisations.As part of the ongoing
deregulation of these, the production of these goods and services
is now being transferred to competing public and/or private
companies. We are currently also witnessing a wave of
privatisations of former public organisations. This significant
trend not only affects traditional public goods and services, it is
also resulting in the allocation of new use rights in areas that were
previously freely accessible to all. This can be observed, in
particular, in the distribution of rights to the use of natural
resources such as air, air space, nature and water and in the
restriction of rights of access by the state through the levying of
fees to public resources, such as roads and public spaces and
museums.
In many such cases, what is actually involved are activities
controlled by policies that allocate actual use rights to certain goods
and services in their attempts to resolve collective problems. These
use rights are increasingly characterised by their transferability and
their degree of exclusivity.Thus, we qualify this type of public
intervention not as the simple management of a policy, but as the
creation and maintenance of actual institutional regimes for the
production and allocation of goods and services vital to the
everyday life of a society.
These institutional regimes are characterised by the creation and
(legal) recognition of rights of ownership, disposal and use defined
in the constitution (for example, the recognition of private
property) and/or in civil law. Certain policies create new rights that
modify this general property order or create a property order
specific to a given sector. In other cases, this change in the
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Index
Index
The concepts of actors (other than public ones when specifically
discussed), political-administrative programmes, political administrative
arrangements and institutions are so central to the analysis that they are
not indexed. Some other concepts which are indexed such as policy
resources,institutional rules, end beneficiaries,target groups and third
parties are indexed where they are given particular attention, but also crop
up throughout the book.
B
benchmarking 208, 235
beneficiaries, see end beneficiaries and
third parties
bottom-up approach, the 36, 177, 194-6
bounded rationality 7, 96
budgetary tools, see money
bureaucrats 4, 12, 54
C
causal hypothesis/es 57-8, 60, 108, 139,
152, 156-7, 226, 230-2, 236, 237,
Ch 11
causal stories 118-9, 136-7, 139
causality model, see causal hypothesis
civil servants 8, 43, 63, 67-8, 166, 191,
see also bureaucrats and public actors
cognitive resources, see also information
71-3
comparative analysis 12, 13, 110 (note 4),
123, 171, 174, 246, 274-5, 283-4
comparative politics 13
consensus, as a resource 18, 63, 65, 76-7,
82-6, 122, 145-6, 183-4
constituent elements
of a political-administrative arrangement
172-3
of a political-administrative programme
153-63
of a public policy 25-30
constituent policies 25,
102
31
5
D
decentralisation 8, 53, 104, 143, 152,
159-61, 167, 169, 176-7, 267, 270,
274
definitions of public policy 23-5
democracy 11, 46, 53, 63, 76,
105, 107,
130, 143, 161, 279, 285
direct democracy 99, 102, 141, 143,
146,
184
discretion 42, 168, 191, 209, 270
E
economics 7-8, 19, 35, 43, 92, 93, 101,
155-6, 190, 246, 274
effectiveness 227, 230-2, 236, 237, 241,
242-3, 246
efficiency 98, 115, 202, 204, 221, 227,
228,
233-4, 235, 236, 241, 242-3
electoral competition 60, 142-3
end beneficiaries 18, 45, 53-7, 115, 121,
316
F
federalism 8, 48, 53, 54, 70, 74-5, 106, 152,
159-61, 163-4, 166-7, 169, 170-1, 173,
176, 178, 191, 198, 268
force, as a resource 18, 65, 84
G
game theory 12, 92
globalism, global influences 99, 149
governance 46, 110 (note 6), 284-6
H
horizontal coordination 46, 175-6
I
ideological paradigm shifts 110-1
impacts, see policy impacts
L
law, as a resource 18, 63, 64, 65-6, 77,
83,
85, 87, 88, 122, 141, 146, 152, 166-7,
173, 184, 191, 199-200, 207, 212,
266
legitimacy, legitimation 12, 28, 29, 65-6,
76-7, 81-3, 107-8, 152, 173, 235,
254-5, 256, 279
liberal state, the 24-5
local government 53, 68, 70, 160, 167,
206
M
Marxism, see neo-Marxism
media, the impact of 22, 32, 82, 131,
139-40, 244
mobilisation of bias, the 13, see also nondecisions
mobilising action through evaluation
244-6
N
neo-corporatism 4, 13, 214, 273
neo-liberalism 13, 273, 279
Public policy
neo-managerialism
4, 6
analysis
O
organised groups, see interest
groups organisation, as a resource
56, 74-5 outcomes, see policy
outcomes outputs, see policy
outputs
outsourcing 69-70, see also privatisation
P
path dependency 190
personnel, as a resource 18, 63, 65, 66-9,
74, 84, 85, 132, 141, 144, 160, 184,
209,
270
Planning, Programming and
Budgeting systems (PPBS) 35, 127,
235
pluralism 4
policy communities 5, 46-7
policy cycle, the 30-7, 113-6, 118, 122-3,
127-8, 242, 249-50, 253, 276-7
policy entrepreneurs 134, 143
Index
R
research hypotheses Ch 11
S
social class 4, 12, 60
social construction, of problems 126-9,
135-6
social movements 22, 131, 140-1, 144,
147, 214, 282
social problems 21-3, 26, 32, 102, 126-30,
132, 135, 147-8, 224, 227
sociology 6, 7, 11, 14 (notes 2 and 5), 19,
35, 63, 64, 85, 93, 131, 192, 194, 278
state theory 3-5, 12-13, 273-5
street-level bureaucracy 193, 209
symbols, manipulation of 59, 83, 93, 94,
136-7, 248
U
uses of evaluation 241-9
V
vertical coordination 46, 174, 176-82, 254,
270
violence, see force as a resource
votes, voting, see electoral competition
W
Weberianism, see neo-Weberianism
T
target groups 18, 22, 24, 26-7, 33, 45,
53-60, 75-7, 115, 121, 139, 151, 157-8,
164-5, 182, 192, 195, 198, 200, 202,
209, 211, 212-17, 222-5, 228, 231, 236,
255, 267-70, 284
think-tanks 143
third party groups 54-6, 121, 182, 200,
213, 217-18, 257
time, as a resource 18, 65, 78, 81, 83, 85,
87, 140, 146, 184
top-down approach, the 36