Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology

ISSN: 0007-1773 (Print) 2332-0486 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rbsp20

The Concept of Time in the Science of History

Martin Heidegger
To cite this article: Martin Heidegger (1978) The Concept of Time in the Science
of History, Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, 9:1, 3-10, DOI:
10.1080/00071773.1978.11006512
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00071773.1978.11006512

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Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, Vol. 9 No. I, January 1978

THE CONCEPT OF TIME IN THE SCIENCE OF

HISTORY 1
MARTIN HEIIDE!GGER

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Trans.lated by Harry S. Taylor and

Hans W. Uffelmann
An Engib:h tran~lation of "Der Zeitbegriff in der
Geschichtswissenschaft," Zeitschrift fur Philosophie und
Philosophische Kritik 161 (1916): 173-88. This essay has
been reprint~d with changes in punctuation in Martin
Heidegger's Fruhe Schriften (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1972), pp. 35575. We have added to the footnotes
the publi.sher and place of publication, otherwise they
are unchanged. When English translations have been
made they are provided in brackets.
University of Missouri-Kansas City

Motto: "Time is what changes and

evolves; eternity remains simple."
Meister Eckhart
For some time a kind of "metaphysical force"
has been awakened in the field of "scientific"
philosophy. A simple theory of cognition no
longer suffices. A persistence, born of the justifiable, energetic awareness of the necessity and
value of criticism in all problems of the theory of
cognition does not permit an appreciation of the
full meaning of the ultimate question of philosophy. This results in the often concealed, and
sometimes overt tendencies toward metaphysics.
This can be interpreted as a deeper understanding
of philosophy and its prdblems, and also as the
will of philosophy to power; certainly not the will
to power in the sense of intellectual forces of the
so-called "natural-scientific Weltanschauung".
In modern science and philosophy, critical consciousness is too lively to master our culture whh
unfounded or poorly based demands of authority,
and strong enough to expend a major part of its
strength in overcoming the theoretical cognitive
problems-in general problems in logic, while at
the same time recognizing the indispensibility of
an ultimate metaphysical interpretation (the
Platonic assumption). There can be no mistake.
numerous problems in the theory of science

still await a solution. despite the fruitful research

in 1'his area during the last decades. The natural
sciences, like the cultural sciences, have become
problematic with regard to their logical structure.
In fact, one of the main results of this research
has been the sharp delineation and logical basis
for autonomy. But there are still enough individual problems which mast be solved before the
encompassing future task of establishing a general
scientific theory can be undertaken. We will now
examine one suoh individual pwblem.
Several general indications of science and scientific theory may be assumed, so that the goal and
the special character of such investigations are
always extant.
Science is a context of theoretical knowledge
o;dered and founded on principles. This knowledge is presented as judgments; these judgments
are true; they are valid. Strictly speaking the
act of judgment on the part of the individual
researcher is not of utmost importance, but it is
the sense of the judgment-its intrinsic meaning.
Each science, in its entirety, constitutes a context
of valid meanings in and of itself. The empirical
sciences, which are temporally limited cultural
facts, are never complete, but are always engaged
in the searoh for truth.
The manner in which knowledge in the individual sciences are founded, that is, the methods of
research, is determined by the object of the respective science and points of view assumed. The
research methods of the various sciences deal
with' certain basic concepts, whose basic logical
structure must be observed by scientific theory.
The scientific-theoretical questioning leads from
the particular science into the area of the ultimate
basic elements of logic: the categories. Such
scientific investigations can easily awake in the
researcher a certain sense of dealing with the selfevident and thus unprodLoctivity. However, this

I. The following corresponds contextually wi.th the trial lecture given by the author on July 27, 1915, to the
Philosophy Faculty of the University of Freiburg in fulfillment of the venia legendi. That form has been
adopted for the essay.

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happens only as long as he expects from the investigations Olbjectively new things .for his own
particular scientific field. This, of course, cannot
happen because of the completely new dimension
of the investigations. Consequently the investigations are significant for the researcher in his field,
if and only if, he forgets himself as an individual
and philosophizes.
The establishment of a logical basis for research
methods in each science falls within the realm of
logic as the theory of knowledge. This cannot be
developed in its entirety. Moreover, only a particular category (a logical, fundamental element)the concept of time-is selected and its structure
disclosed. Ultimately a central concept becomes
problematic, its solution must shed light on the
logical totality of the appropriate particular
science. Now the question is how we arrive at the
knowledge of the logical structure of the concept
o.f time in the science of history. When we speak
of a particular logical structure of the concept of
time, we mean that its context is determined in
a unique way by definite ultimate categorical
elements. This relation of the concept "time in
general" and the concept of "historical time" must
be disclosed. The science of history applies the
concept of time accordingly. The structure of the
concept of time in history can be described accordingly from its function in the science of history;
but its unique function can be in turn understood
in terms of the goal of the science of history. The
path we follow in determining the logical characteristics of the concept of time in the science of
history proceeds from the goal of the science of
history via the function of the concept of time to
its structure. In summary the problem can be
formulated in the following way: which structure
must the concept of time in the science of history
possess, to be able to function as the time concept
in the goal of this science? Thus no particular
philosophical theory of the science of history is
preserved nor is there any investigation to determine which structure of the concept of time fits
in the framewort. Instead we accept the science
of history as fact, study the actual function of the
2.

concept of time within and consequently determine its logical structure. I.f we arrive at a solution to the pr01blem, and have recognized the concept of time of the science of history as one of its
central concepts, it should then be possible to
generalize about the logical structure of history
as science.
The peculiarity of the structure of the time
concept in the science of history will now appear
unquestionably clearer when compared to another
structure of time. We shall first, however, characterize the concept of time in the natural sciences
- specifically in physics. Our problem -with
reference to the concept of time- in physics is
relatively the same as the concept of time in the
science of history: what structure must the concept of time in the physical sciences possess to
correspondingly function as the concept of time in
the goal of physics?
I
Now we will clarify the goal of physics as
science. The best way to do this is by identifying
the basic trend of physics. which has appeared
even more clearly in its history from Galileo to
the present.

Ancient and medieval philosophy of naturet

sought to research the metaphysical nature of
phenomena in immanent reality and their hidden
causes. Opposite this metaphysical speculation
about nature, Galileo's science is something
fundamentally new in its method. It seeks to
master the multiplicity of phenomena by use of a
law; its uniquely new accomplishment is in the
way it arrives at the law. Because the basic direction of physics can be seen clearest in this particular method of recognizing the law, the method
can ibe explained by using the classic example of
Galileo's discovery of the law of gravity. The
previous view of nature would have pmbably
proceeded by attempting to observe individual
cases of gravitational phenomena and then by
distinguishing the common characteristic in each
phenomenon, thereby determining the nature of

Medieval thinking was really never quite as removed from empirical concerns as it is oftentimes believed;
they certainly knew how to appreciate experientially derived data or at least the perception of that data;
they were conscious of the value of mathematics for the natural sciences - although not on a clearly
expressed theoretical level - and the nature of experimentation was known; however in all this the missing element was still the real nature of problem formulation in the natiD'al sciences.

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gravity. Galileo did not begin with the observation

of individual instances of gravity, rather with a
general assumption, which states: a body - without support - will fall in such a way that its
velocity increases in proportion to time (v = g t),
i.e. the body falls with increasing velocity. The
initial velocity is 0; the final velocity is v = g t.
If we use the average velocity gf2t, then we have
uniform motion; the definitive basic formula for
this is s = c t: the distance traveled is equal to
the product of the velocity and the time. In our
case c = g/2 t. When this is substituted in the
last equation it yields s = g/2 t~. Galileo checked
this equation against specific cases and verified it.
Thus, the foregoing assumption is valid and from
it the law was deduced and later experimentally
verified. Intentionally the entire thought process
was rendered more explicit in order to demonstrate 1that nowhere in the entire inference was
there consideration given to a particular body,
time period, or path of fall. The assumption
v = gt, which finally becomes the law on the
basis of the verified experiment, is a general assumption about all bodies.
There is a two-fold uniqueness about this new
method: (1) an assumption is given which makes
it possible to grasp the phenomena of a particular
field of s~udy, in this case, the phenomena of
motion; (2) the assumption does not indicate some
hidden quality as the underlying cause ex,plaining
the phenomena, rather it contains mathematically
comprehensible, that is measurable relationships
between the ideal instances of the phenomenon.
This method of problem formulation, which Galileo first used intentionally, has proved its superiority in ,the course of time in the various fields of
physics (mechanics, acoustics, heat, optics, magnetic theory, electricity). In each of these areas of
physics one seeks equations in which the most
generalized, ordered relationships of the events
can be applied to the respective area.
Modern physics has not stopped here. It has
discovered basic laws which permit inclusion of

parts of acoustics and heat in the field of mechanics, and optics, magnetism and the theory of
radiant heat in the theory of electricity. Today
the number of the numerous fields in physics has
been reduced to two: mechanics and electrodynamics - or as it is sometimes expressed physics of matter and physics of the ether. As
hotly as the battle between the mechanical and
electro-dynamic "Weltanschauung" has raged
the boundary between the two "cannot be permanently sharply differentiated from each other"
- as Planck says.s "Mechanics requires for its
foundation essentially nothing more than the ideas
of space, of time, and that which is moving,
whether one considers this as a sUibstance or a
state. The same ideas are also involved in electrodynamics. A sufficiently generalized conception
of mechanics can therefore also well include
electrodynamics, and, in .fact, there are many
indications pointing toward the ultimate amalgamation of these two subjects, the domains of
which already overlap in some measure.".
Thus the goal of physics as a science is to
express the unity of the physical world, to trace
all phenomena back to the mathematically fixed
laws of a general dynamics, back to the laws of
motion of a still undetermined mass. Now that
we have determined the goal of physics, we posit
a second question: what is the function of the concept of time in this science?
Briefly, the object of physics is motion in accordance with laws. Motion occurs in time. What
does this say then? The "in" time has a spatial
meaning; time, however, has no spatial quality,
in fact, space and time are opposites of one
another. But it is also clear that motion and
time somehow are closely related. At one point
in his Two New Sciences, Galileo speaks of the
"On Naturally Accelerated Motion". "We easily
understand that the closest affinity holds between
time and motion ... , we call movement equable
when in equal times equal spaces are traversed."5

3. Acht Vorlesungen iiber theoretische Physik (Leipzig: Hirzel, 1910), p. 8. [Planck, M., Eight Lectures on
Theoretical Physics, trans. A. P. Willis (New York.: Columbia University Press, 1915) p. 8.]
4. Ibid., p. 9. [Ibid., p. 9.]
'
5. For a discussion and mathematical demonstration of two new branches of knowledge, mechanics and the
laws of gravity ooncerni.ng the 3rd and 4th Day (1638). Translated and edited by A. OettJingen, "Ostwalds
Klassiker der exakten Wissenschaften" (Leipzig: Engelmann, 1891), No. 24, p. 7. [Galileo, Two New
Sciences, trans. S. Drake (Madison: Univers~ty of Wisconsin Press, 1974) p. 154.]

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In the relation between motion and time we are

clearly concerned with measuring the motion by
using time. The quantitative determination of
such a measurement is the concern of mathematics. Theoretical or mathematical physics forms
the foundation of experimental physics. i.e.,
mathematical physics. Thus if we wish to define
the specific concepts of motion and time, we must
consider their mathematical forms.

point", says Einstein, "we give the values of the

coordinates as functions of time."6

The position of a material point in space is

determined by the spatial point with which it
coincides. Let us suppose now that space is empty,
except for the material point whose position is to
be determined. However. space is infinite. Each
spatial point is equal to every other and the direction of each equal to every other. Thus it is
impossible to determine the position of our material point without another point of reference. Such
a reference point is always prerequisite. Any determination of position is relative to the reference
point, therefore never absolute. To determine the
position, we choose three straight lines, each vertical to the others, and all intersecting the reference point, the x, y and z axes. The position of a
point P is determined by the distances from the
coordinate axes to the coordinates x, y, z. Let us
assume P is a point on a spatial curve. If we
consider the point in motion, i.e., we study its
positions in a time sequence. At each second on
the clock, we can make three measurements, that
is, indicate specific values of x, y, z, which will
determine .the position of the point P at time t.
The values of x, y, z are dependent on the respective time t, that is to say, they are functions
of time [x=x(t); y=y(t); z=z(t)]. H the value of
t changes even infinitesimally. the values of the
coordinates are likewise changed. Now if we
assign the entire sequence of values to t. the
coordinates as constant functions of t express the
basic concept of all sequential positions of the
point P. We call this basic concept of all positions
motion.

So the motion of an object in physics is measured by time. It is the function of time to make
measurement possible. Because motion is always
viewed in physics with respect to measurability,
motion is frequently considered in time .to discover
certain physical knowledge, where time as such
is virtually absent. But as the equations of motion
above indicate, time is a necessary part of the
definition of motion. The necessary interrelationship of motion and time is above all mathematically and physically comprehensible. Since time is
a requirement in any attempt to determine mathematically an object in physics, such as motion, we
are wble to directly answer the ultimate question
concerning the structure of the concept of time.
In the time equations x=x(t), y=y(t), z=z(t),
time is assured to be independently variable in
tha.t it is constantly changing, flowing uniformly
from one point to the next with no jumps. Time
represents a simply constructed series, in which
every point is differentiated by its position as
measured from its initial position. Since any point
in time differs from the preceding one only in that
it is the subsequent point relative to it, it is thus
possible to measure .time, and thus motion. As
soon as time is measured - time only has a
meaningful function in physics when measured or
measurable - we can determine a quantitative
value. This quantitative value considers the elapsed time altogether. We segment .the time scale,
thus destroy the intrinsic flow of time and arrest
i.t. The flow is frozen and becomes a surface, only
as a surface can it be measured. Time then becomes a homogeneous ordered series of points, a
scale, a parameter.

"If we want to describe the motion of a material

6.

All other basic concepts of motion, such as

veloci.ty. uniform motion, acceleration, irregular
motion are defined by definite relationships between space and time. The visually obvious qualities of the phenomenon are eliminated and elevated entirely into the realm of mathematics.

A. Ein&tein, "Zur Elekrodynamik bewegter Korper," Annalen der Physik 17 (1905); rep. in "Fortschritte der
mathematischen Wissenschaften in Monographien," ed. by 0. Blumenthal, Book 2, Das Relativitiitsprinzip
(Berlin, Leipzig: Teubner, 1913), p. 28. [H. A. Lor<mtz, A. Einstein, H. Minkowski, The Principle of Relativity, trans. W. Perrett and G. B. Jeffery (London: Methuen, 1923; rpt. New York: Dover, 1952), pp. 38
39.]

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Before we conclude the discussion of the concept of time in the natural sciences, one more
objection must be considered. One could point
out that. in the discussion so far, no mention has
been made of the newest theory in physics - the
Theory of Relativity. It's resulting perception of
time ''surpasses in boldness everything previously
suggested in speculative natural phenomena and
even in the philosophical theories of knowledge".7
But we usually overlook the following: the
theory of relativity as a physical theory is concerned with the problem of measuring time, not
with time itself. The theory of relativity remains
untouched and in .fact confirms to an even greater
degree the above mentioned characteristics of the
natural science concept of time; namely the homogeneous, quantitatively determinwble character.
Nothing expresses the mathematical character of
the physical concept of time more clearly than the
fact that it can be considered as a fourth dimension
alongside three dimensional space, and can be
calculated using non-Euclidean geometry, that is,
geometry of more than three dimensions.
If we then proceed to represent the structure
of the concept of time in the science of history,
then it becomes really questionable whether in
fact a new problem can be posed. Time is also an
ordering of positions in the science of history
in so far as events are assigned a particular point
in time and thus become historically determined.
Frischeisen-Kobler recently noted that "in certain
circumstances it is sufficient to fix an event in
time to change it from a concept based on scientific principles to an historical one".B Thus the
concept of "the hunger crisis in Fulda in the year
750" denotes a very specific, individual event
and accordingly an historical concept.

We face these alternatives: either the abovementioned concept is not an historical concept. It
is hardly comprehensible why a simple time determination should change a universal concept to an
historical one, since even in physics, occurrences
of motion are fixed in time, - or, on the other
band: we have before us a historical concept,
which is in fact the case. Then the discoverable

tin:e determination in it is a very peculiar one,

which can only be understood by discovering the
nature of the science of history.
At least this much is clear: there is a problem
in the concept of time used in the science of history. Therefore, it is significant and justifiable to
seek the structure of the historical concept of time.
This structure is only discernible by its function
in the science of history, while it is the goal and
the object of the science of history which make
the function understandable.

II
In the science of history the path from the goal
of science to the function of .the concept of time,
and from there to the structure of the concept of
time may seem to 1be a detour. One can succeed
much easier and 'qllit.iC-er in tlie science of history
if we remember that. there exists a methodology
of the science of history containing a special aid
which deals solely with detel1Jliriing time in the
science of history: historical chronology. Here
the uniqueness of the historical concept of time
will immediately come tO light at this point. It
wil11be clear later why this method cannot be used.
We must also understand what part of the chronology is of sole significance for the historical concept of time. We therefore follow a prescribed path
and a.ttempt to delineate the goal of the science
of history.
We are immediately confronted with a difficulty
in so far as there exists no unanimity about the
goal and object of the science of history. Therefore, whatever we decide about the issue cannot
claim to be conclusive and complete. However.
this fact cannot oompromise our particular problem, since we can only identify the various aspects
inherent in the concept of the science of history,
which will enable us to understand the function
of the concept of time in the science of history.
The object of the science of history is man, not
as a biological entity, rather to the extent that his
spiritual-physical accomplishments embody the
idea of culture. The creation of culture in its fullness and variety proceeds in time, it experiences

7. Ibid., p. 117. [Planck, Eight Lectures, p. 120.]

8. Wissenschaft und Wirklichkeit (Berlin, Leipzig: Teubner, 1912), p. 168.

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development, undergoes the most varied re-formation and transformations, absorbs events of the
past in order to assimilate or resist already completed developments. The cultural development of
man within and in relation to societies and organizations (the state) created by him is ultimately
the objectification of the human spirit. The historian is interested in this process of objectification
of the spirit in the course of time, not at each
point of its culmination as though attempting to
record all events in time. It has been said he is
interest.ed only in the historical efficacy. Eduard
Meyer, who made this assertion elaborates and
explicates its meaning correctly saying: "The
selection depends on the historical interest which
the present holds on any effect, that is, with regard
to the development".9
An interest must however always be determined
by a perspective and be guided by a norm. The
selection of the historical from the wealth of
material is thus based upon a value reference.
Accordingly the goal of the science of history is
to represent ,the context of effect and development
of objectifications of human life in its understandruble peculiarity and uniqueness in so far as its
relation to cultural values is concerned. Still one
essential moment of every historical object has not
been touched upon. The historical object, being
historical, is always past; strictly speaking it no
longer exists. There exists a temporal distance
between it and the historian. The past has significance only when seen from the present. Not only
does the past no longer exist, as viewed by us it
was also something different, as contrasted to our
present life-situation. So much is already clear;
time has an entirely original meaning in history.
Only where this qualitative otherness of times past
presses into the consciousness of the present, is
the historical meaning awakened. By virtue of the
fact that the historical past is always something
other as contrasted to the objectifications of
human life, and in which we always live and
create, the possibility has always existed for us
to understand the past, since it cannot be some-

thing incomparably other. However, the temporal

gap remains rbetween the historian and his object.
If he wishes to represent it, he must in some way
have i,t before him. Time must be overcome and
one must live one's way through the temporal gap
from the present to the past. The necessarily inherent requirement for the goal and the object of
the science of history demands ,to overcome time
and representations of a past, which will become
possible only if time itself somehow becomes a
function. Already in 1607 John Bodin included a
chapter on time in his Methodus ad facilem historiarum cognitionem. He states: "Those who
think they can understand histories (the use of
the plural here is noteworthy) without chronology
are as much in error as those who wish to escape
the windings of a larbyrinth without a guide".JO
We can study most reliably the function of time
involved in the necessary overcoming of time if
we cast a glance at the methodology of the science
of history, thereby offering us a pathway to the
past which it represents historically. It would be
too much to trace the function of time within the
historical-scientific methodology in detail, or to
discover the relations of its basic notions to the
main concept. Only a few of the particularly obvious concepts and procedural methods of the
scientific method, which illustrate the function of
the concept of time will be characterized. So at
the very least. a sufficient point is created for the
analysis of ~he structure of the concept of time.
The initial basic task of the science of history
is first of all to ascertain the factuality of those
events which it is supposed to represent. Droysen
says: "Perhaps the greatest service of the critical
school in History, at least the one most important
in respect to method, is to have given rise to the
insight that the groundwork of our studies is the
examination of the 'sources' from which we draw.
In this way the relation of History to past events
is placed at the point which yields a scientific
rule".JI

Kleine Schriften (Halle: Niemeyer, 1910), p. 42.

Methodus ad facilem historiarum cognitionem (1607), Ch. 7, "de temporis universi ratione," p. 431. [Bodin.
J. Method for the Easy Comprehension of History, trans. B. Reynolds (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1945), p. 303.]
11. Grundriss der Historik, 2nd ed. (Leipzig: Viet, 1875), p. 80. [Droysen, J. G. Outline of the Principles of
History, trans. E. B. Andrews (Boston: Ginn, 1893; rpt. New York: Fertig, 1967), p. 111.]
9.
10.

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Thus the "source" allows us the scientific access

to historical reality, from which the very reality
will be constructed in t'he first place. But this is
only possible of the source, as a source is determined, if its authenticity is proven. This is done
by criticism. Let us suppose the authenticity of a
document is to be proven. A decision as to its
"legal style" might be sought. "The documentary
witnesses of an orderly, functioning government
office will at certain times have particular characteristics. The sum total of all these characteristics
at a certain time consti.tute its legal style."U
Within the concept of legal style then is the concept of time.
The proof of legal style, .that is the diplomatic
criticism, must be supplemented by the legalhistorical and generally historical criticism; that is,
the document must be compared with the legal
and prevailing cultural conditions of the time
period to which it is supposed to belong. For
example, the pseudo-Isidorian Papal Decrees were
proved fraudulent by showing the particular Papal
letters to be anachronisms. We know that Pope
Gregory the Great always began his writings with
the title "servus servorum Dei". Previous Popes
already refer to themselves by the same title in
the letters in question within the lsidorian collection. We also know that toward the end of the
fourth century the Popes did not date .their letters
according to Roman advisory; but this is done in
those Isidore Letters. The decrees which are supposed to date from the first centuries assume certain liturgical-legal conditions which did not exist
until later. Criticism also shows that the form and
content of the letters do not display the characteristics of the time in which they were supposed
to have been written, rather of later times. The
scientific use of a source demands that the time
of origin be determined, because its value as
evidence depends on how far removed it is in time
from the historical fact to which it is to testify.
"The most common method used is a comparative
investigation as to which era corresponds to the

source in question, in form, style, and content, in

short, to its entire character, . . . because each
period carries in its entire creation and expression
another differentiating character which one may
very well recognize."J3 In written documents mainly the writing style and the language - "the most
flexible expressions of the intellectual era" enable us to make determinations of the period.
The concept of time plays no less a significant
role in the second main task of the historical
method: the disclosure in contextual arrangement
of the individually established facts. It becomes
a question of correctly understanding the particular facts and their importance in context, that is,
to correctly determine the factual content of the
sources.
An interesting example of the extensive function
of the concept of time in history can be seen in
Troeltsch's recent investigation of Augustine)#
Troeltsch shows that Augustine was "in fact the
conclusion and culmination of Christian antiquity,
its last and greatest thinker, its spiritual practitioner and tribune of the people. It is from this
perspective that he must lbe understood first".J5
Elsewhere, Troeltsch characterizes the termination
of Christian antiquity beginning wit'h Augustine.
This characteristic enables him to separate the
second period in the history of Christianity from
the first. In reference to the distinction of the great
periods Troeltsch writes: "they have to be depicted
in terms of the affiliation of Christian churchdom
to the respective general cultural conditions."J6
These examples are sufficient to recognize
immediately the essential element in the concept
of time. Historical time periods differ qualitatively.
The "leading tendencies" (Ranke) of an age are
decisive for its separation from another.
The concept of time in the science of history
has none of the homogeneous character of the
scientific concept of time. Therefore, historical
time cannot be expressed mathematically by a

12. 0. Redl.ich, Urkundenlehre (Berlin, Munich: Oldeobourg, 1907), Part I, p. 21 f.

13. E. Bernheim, Lehrbuch der Historischen Methode und der Geschichtsphilosophie, 5th and 6th eds. (Leipzig:
Duncker & Humblot, 1908), p. 392.
14. Augustin, Die christliche Antike und das Mittelalter in Anschluss an die Schrift 'de civitate Dei' (Berlin,
Munich: Oldenbourg, 1915).
15. Ibid., p. 6.
16. Ibid., p. 172.

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series, since there is no law which determines how

the time periods succeed one another. The points
in time of physical time are distinguishable only
by their position in the series. Historical times do
in fact succeed one another-otherwise they would
not in fact be times-yet each differs in its content
and structure. The qualitative element of the historical concept of time is nothing more than the
concentration - crystallization - of a given life
objectification in history. Thus science of history
does not work with qualities. Yet what else are
the yearly dates? The historian can do nothing
with the mere number 750 in the concept of
"hunger crisis in Fulda in the year 750". He is not
interested in the number as a quantity, or as an
element which has its particular place among the
ordered numbers one to infinity, dividable by 50,
etc. The number 750 and every other date in
history is significant and of value in the science
of history only with regard to the historically
significant content. Trecento and quattrocento are
nothing less than quantitative concepts. The question "when" in physics and in history has entirely
different meanings. I would ask in physics, when
the weight on the Atwood gravity machine would
reach a certain position on the scale, when - that
is, after how many beats of the seconds-pendulum.
If I ask "when" concerning an event in history,
then I am asking about the position in a qualitative, historical context, not "how much". But on
occasion the historian also poses the question of
"how much". It will later be of historical interest
to know how long Makensen's army required to
move its offensive from the Carpa.thians up to the
fortified Russian-Polish rectangle. But the quantitative determination - about 12 weeks -is only
of significance and value to the historian, who also
understands the tremendous thrust of our allied

17.
18.

10

troops and the clear direction of the whole operation, not to mention the strong resistance of the
Russian army. The year dates are convenient
markers, by themselves however unimportant,
since for each number any other could be substituted by simply changing the starting point of the
counting. But even the beginning of time computation indicates !!hat it commences with an historically significant event (Founding of Rome, the
Birth of Christ, Hedschra).
The aid of the science of history, historical
chronology, is significant for the theory of the
historical concept of time from the beginning of
time computation. For example, it is said that
setting the beginning of the year on January 1st
was at first displeasing to the Christians, "because
it had no relationship to the Christian religion
whatsover".l~ The Church, therefore, moved the
Feast of Circumcision to this day to give it ecclesiastical significance. Important feasts - Easter,
Christmas - always began the new year. That
shows that anything to do with numbers and
counting with reference to time in the science of
history, is determined qualitatively by the manner
in which the counting is first begun. One could
say that even at the start of time computation the
principle of historical concept-formation IS revealed: value relatedness.J8
The recognition of the fundamental significance
of the historical concept of time and its total
otherness as it exists in physics, will make it
possible to penetrate scientifically and theoretically
into the peculiar nature of the science of history
and to establish it theoretically as an original attitude of the mind, irreducible to any other sciences.

RuhL Chronologie des Mitte/alters und der Neuzei1 (Berlin, Reuther & Re-ichard, 1897), p. 24.
C{., a discussion of the fundamental noUoo. of historical concept-formation: H. Rickert, Die Grenzen der
naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung, 2nd ed. (TUbingen: Mohr, 1913), p. 333 If.