2AC Nietzsche K

1. Framework the affirmative should get to imagine a world of fiat in which the plan happens. The role of the
judge is an academic to determine which team presents the better policy option
Thats best
a. Evaluating reps first moots the 1ac and means the aff never wins.
b. Teaches us about policy implementation thats good education teaches us cost benefit analysis and
decisionmaking
c. Bad methodology doesnt disprove the good outcomes of the plan evaluate the policy before method.
d. Predictable resolution says USFG should do something, and our aff is a response
e. Prerequisite Agonistic competition within a field of accepted rules is crucial to self-overcoming

Hatab 2 (Lawrence J. Hatab, Prospects For A Democratic Agon: Why We Can Still Be Nietzscheans The
Journal of Nietzsche Studies 24, 132-147)
How can we begin to apply the notion of agonistics to politics in general and democracy in particular? First of
all, contestation and competition can be seen as fundamental to self-development and as an intrinsically social
phenomenon. Agonistics helps us articulate the social and political ramifications of Nietzsche's concept of will
to power. As Nietzsche put it in an 1887 note, "will to power can manifest itself only against resistances; it
seeks that which resists it" (KSA 12, p.424). Power, therefore, is not simply an individual possession or a goal
of action; it is more a global, interactive conception. For Nietzsche, every advance in life is an overcoming of
some obstacle or counterforce, so that conflict is a mutual co-constitution of contending forces. [End Page
134] Opposition generates development. The human self is not formed in some internal sphere and then
secondarily exposed to external relations and conflicts. The self is constituted in and through what it opposes
and what opposes it; in other words, the self is formed through agonistic relations. Therefore, any annulment of
one's Other would be an annulment of one's self in this sense. Competition can be understood as a shared
activity for the sake of fostering high achievement and self-development, and therefore as an intrinsically social
activity. 10 In the light of Nietzsche's appropriation of the two forms of Eris, it is necessary to distinguish between
agonistic conflict and sheer violence. A radical agonistics rules out violence, because violence is actually an
impulse to eliminate conflict by annihilating or incapacitating an opponent, bringing the agon to an end. 11 In a
later work Nietzsche discusses the "spiritualization of hostility (Feindschaft)," wherein one must affirm both the
presence and the power of one's opponents as implicated in one's own posture (TI "Morality as Antinature," 3).
And in this passage Nietzsche specifically applies such a notion to the political realm. What this implies is that
the category of the social need not be confined to something like peace or harmony. Agonistic relations,
therefore, do not connote a deterioration of a social disposition and can thus be extended to political
relations. How can democracy in general terms be understood as an agonistic activity? Allow me to quote from
my previous work. Political judgments are not preordained or dictated; outcomes depend upon a contest of
speeches where one view wins and other views lose in a tabulation of votes; since the results are binding and
backed by the coercive power of the government, democratic elections and procedures establish temporary
control and subordinationwhich, however, can always be altered or reversed because of the succession of
periodic political contests. . . . Democratic elections allow for, and depend upon, peaceful exchanges and
transitions of power. . . . [L]anguage is the weapon in democratic contests. The binding results,
however, produce tangible effects of gain and loss that make political exchanges more than just talk or a game.
. . . The urgency of such political contests is that losers must yield to, and live under, the policies of the
winner; we notice, therefore, specific configurations of power, of domination and submission in democratic
politics. 12
2. Being active is inevitable the US will always push policies, its just a question of whether theyre successful
or not our plan is an instance of successful
3. The idea that sufferings irrelevant presumes a position of privilege.

Nussbaum 94 (Martha, David Benedict Professor, Professor of Philosophy and Classics, and Adjunct Professor of Comparative
Literature at Brown University, Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality: Essays on Nietzsches On the Genealogy of Morals, ed. Richard
Schacht, p. 158-59)

We now turn to the heart of the matter, the role of external goods in the good human life. And here we encounter a rather large surprise. There is no philosopher in the modern Western tradition who is more
emphatic than Nietzsche is about the central importance of the body, and about the fact that we are bodily creatures. Again and again he charges Christian and Platonist moralities with making a false separation
between our spiritual and our physical nature; against them, he insists that we are physical through and through. The surprise is that, having said so much and with such urgency, he really is very loathe to draw the
conclusion that is naturally suggested by his position: that human beings need worldly goods in order to function. In all of Nietzsches rather abstract and romantic praise

of solitude and
find no grasp of the simple truth that a hungry person cannot think well; that a person who lacks shelter,
basic health care, and the basic necessities of life, is not likely to become a great philosopher or artist, no matter what her innate
equipment. The solitude Nietzsche describes is comfortable bourgeois solitude, whatever its pains and loneliness. Who are his
ascetic philosophers? Heraclitus, Plato, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant, Schopenhauer none a poor
person, none a person who had to perform menial labor in order to survive . And because Nietzsche does not grasp the simple fact
that if our abilities are physical abilities they have physical necessary conditions, he does not understand what the democratic and
socialist movements of his day were all about. The pro-pity tradition, from Homer on, understood that one functions badly if one is
hungry, that one thinks badly if one has to labor all day in work that does not involve the fully human use of ones faculties. I have suggested that such thoughts were made by Rousseau the basis for the modern
development of democratic-socialist thinking. Since Nietzsche does not get the basic idea, he does not see what socialism is trying to do .
Since he probably never saw or knew an acutely hungry person , or a person performing hard physical labor, he never asked how human
self-command is affected by such forms of life. And thus he can proceed as if it does not matter how people live
from day to day, how they get their food. Who provides basic welfare support for Zarathustra? What are the higher men
doing all the day long? The reader does not know andthe author does not seem to care. Now Nietzsche himself obviously was not a happy
asceticism, we

man. He was lonely, in bad health, scorned by many of his contemporaries. And yet, there still is a distinction to be drawn between the sort of vulnerability that Nietzsches life contained and the sort we find if we
examine the lives of truly impoverished and hungry people. We might say, simplifying things a bit, that there

are two sorts of vulnerability: what we might

that are painful enough but still compatible with
thinking and doing philosophyand what we might call basic vulnerability, which is a deprivation of resources so central
to human functioning that thought and character are themselves impaired or not developed. Nietzsche,
focusing on the first sort of vulnerability, holds that it is not so bad; it may even be good for the philosopher.49 The second sort, I
claim,he simply neglectsbelieving, apparently, that even a beggar can be a Stoic hero, if only socialism does not inspire him with weakness.
call bourgeoisvulnerabilityfor example, the pains of solitude, loneliness, bad reputation, some ill health, pains

4. Alt fails - Negative is totally trapped without action the alternative does absolutely nothing
5. We outweigh Extinction precludes value apocalypse destroys the condition for the possibility of meaning

Connolly 91 (William E., Prof. Poli. Sci. @ Johns Hopkins U, Identity/ Difference: democratic negotiations of
political paradox, p. 186)
Zarathustra says: "The most concerned ask today, 'How is man to be preserved?' But Zarathustra is the first and only one to ask:
`How is man to be overcome?"16 The idea is to stop worrying about the preservation of man, to strive to create a

few overmen. Leave to their own devices those who insist upon being consumed by resentment, so that a few
can cultivate another type of humanity. The new type to be cultivated consists of a few free spirits who fend off the
resentment against the human condition that wells up in everyone, a few who rise above the insistence that there be symmetry
between evil and responsibility, who live above the demand that some guilty agent worthy of punishment be located every time they
themselves suffer, who recognize that existential suffering is a precondition of wisdom. But this typological differentiation
between man and overman no longer makes much sense, if it ever did. For the overman constituted as an
independent, detached typerefers simultaneously to a spiritual disposition and to the residence of free spirits in a social space
relatively insulated from reactive politics. The problem is that the disappearance of the relevant social preconditions

confounds any division of humanity into two spiritual types. If there is anything in the type to be admired, the
ideal must be dismantled as a distinct caste of solitary individuals and folded into the political fabric of latemodern society. The "overman" now falls apart as a set of distinctive dispositions concentrated in a particular
caste or type, and its spiritual qualities migrate to a set of dispositions that may compete for presence in any
self. The type now becomes (as it already was to a significant degree) a voice in the self contending with other voices, including
those of ressentiment. This model is implicitly suggested by Foucault when he eschews the term "overman" (as well as "will to
power") and shifts the center of gravity of Nietzschean discourse from heroes and classical tragic figures to everyday misfits such as
AlexiAlexina and Pierre Riviere. These textual moves are, I think, part of a strategy to fold Nietzschean agonism into the fabric of
ordinary life by attending to' the extraordinary character of the latter. I seek to pursue this same trail. The Nietzschean

conception of a few who overcome resentment above politics while the rest remain stuck in the muck of
resentment in politics is not today viable on its own terms. Today circumstances require that many give the sign
of the overman a presence in themselves and in the ethicopolitical orientations they project onto the life of the
whole. But this break with the spirit of Nietzsche requires further elucidation. The shift results partly from the late-modern
possibility of self-extinction. In this new world the failure to "preserve man" could also extinguish the human
basis for the struggle Nietzsche named "overman." Preservation and overcoming are now drawn closer
together so that each becomes a term in the other: the latter cannot succeed unless it touches the
former. But the entanglement of each with the other in sociopolitical relations means, when the logic of this
entanglement is worked out, that the "overman"'as a type cannot eliminate from its life some of the modalities
definitive of the "human." If the overman was ever projected as a distinct typeand this is not certainit now becomes

refigured into a struggle within the self between the inclination to existential resentment and an affirmation of life that rises above
this tendency.

6. Permutation: Do Both totalizing rejection of morality undermines nietzsches own perspectivial project
saying yes to morality solely in the context plan resolves the problems with morality in general.

Nehamas 98 (Alexander, Professor of Philosophy @ Princeton U, Nietzsche and Politics, Edited by

Jacqueline Scott, Nietzsche and Hitler, pgs. 13-15)
Nietzsche considered morality dangerous because it attempts to impose the same code of behavior on
everyone, making it difficult for his immoralist heroes to function, and claimed that as "a fundamental principle
of society ... it immediately proves to be what it really isa will to the denial of life, a principle of disintegration
and decay" (BGE 259). I believe, with him, that moral principles do not, cannot, and should notgovern all our
relationships with one another, and that they are not generally a sound basis for the practice of politics. But I
also believe, against him, that Kant's insight into our sense of solidarity with other members of our species
needs to keep a place within the economy of our lives, even if not for Kant's own reasons. Objectivity,
Nietzsche famously said, is not "contemplation without interest" but the ability to see each thing from many
points of view, the ability "to employ a variety of perspectives and affective interpretations in the service of
knowledge" (GM 111:12, TI "Germans" 6). He applied his idea to his own examination of Christian morality, to
which he said both Yes for the many who need itand Nofor the few who do not. He did not go far
enough, and he never saw that there may be particular, specific, perhaps even extraordinary situations in which
moral considerations might be appropriate even for the few who manage to live beyond good and evil.He did
not see that the error of morality, which takes good and evil for realities that contradict one another (not as
complementary value concepts, which would be the truth), ... advises taking the side of the good, ... desires
that the good should renounce and oppose the evil down to its ultimate roots [and] therewith denies life which
has in all its instincts both Yes and No (WP 351), is an error he may have made himself when he insisted that
there are absolutely no situations in which moral principles could ever constrain his own heroes. He did not see
that by restricting the area of life to which morality is relevant, he could see it from yet another perspective,
increase his objectivity toward it, become able to say another Yes and No to itBoth "Yes" and "No" are
essential to Nietzsche's thought about values: "Every naturalism in morality," he writes, "that is, every
healthy moralityis dominated by an instinct of life; some commandment of life is fulfilled by a determinate
canon of 'shalt' and 'shalt not'" (TI "Morality" 4). In GS 344, he famously denies the unconditional value of truth
on the grounds that in life "both truth and untruth constantly prove to be useful." His absolute rejection of moral
considerations on behalf of his noble heroesmay not fit so well with his general approach. And if I am right
that Nietzsche depends, and must depend, on a separation of the doer from the deed when he completely
rejects moral considerations, the deliciously ironic point emerges that in order to deny morality
unconditionally(which is, on his own grounds, the manner of the moralist), he needs to appeal exactly to the
distinction he believes to be the great invention of morality itself! For it is only by distinguishing between the
doer and the deed, he argues, that morality could demand, absurdly, that strength express itself as weakness
and reinterpret weakness as the product of choice: The weakness of the weakthat is to say, their essence,
their effects, their ineluctable, irremovable reality[came to be seen as] a voluntary achievement, willed,
chosen, a deed, a meritorious act. This type of man needs to believe in a neutral independent "subject" ... The
subject (or, to use a more popular expression, the soul) has perhaps been believed in hitherto more firmly than
anything else on earth because it makes possible to the majority of mortals, the weak and oppressed of every
kind, the sublime self-deception that interprets weakness a freedom, and their being thus-and-thus as a merit.
(GM 1:13)
7. K links to itself the only positive action of the alternative would still contain the value laden ethics
8. Nietzsches writing was instrumental in Nazism. Their argument that his great politics was only a metaphor
ignores the fact that he did help to inspire one of the worst phases in human history and that other authors
cannot be appropriated in that way.
Richard Wolin, Professor of History and Comparative Literature at the Graduate Center, City University,
2006, The Seduction of Unreason: The Intellectual Romance with Fascism from Nietzsche to Postmodernism
After all, the National Socialists viewed the doctrine of "total war" and the unprecedented genocide and carnage it had unleashed in
quintessentially Nietzschean terms: as aGotzendiimmmng or "twilight of the idols," a macabre aesthetic spectacle of the first order.
Documentary evidence corroborates the extent to which the SS (Schutz Staffel) adopted as its credo-and thereby found ideological

inspiration to carry out the "Final Solution"-Nietzsche's admonitions to "live dangerously" and to practice "self-overcoming." As French
fascist Marcel Deat remarked at the height of World War 11, "Nietzsche's idea of the selection of 'good Europeans' is now being realized
on the battlefield, by the LFV and the Waffen SS. An aristocracy, a knighthood is being created by the war which will be the hard, pure
nucleus of the Europe of the future." The Nazis found Nietzsche's self-understanding as a "good European" eminently serviceable for
their bellicose, imperialist ends: as an ideological justification for continental politicalhegemony. The Third Reich's ideology planners
considered only three books fit for inclusion at the Tannenberg Memorial commemorating Germany's World War I triumph over Russia:
Mein Kampf Alfred Rosenberg's Myth of the Twentieth Century, and Nietzsche's Zarathtra. Although the Nazis also tried to render
German poets such as Goethe and Schiller serviceable for their cause, their attachment to the traditional ideals of European humanism
represented a formidable hurdle. In Nietzsche's case, however, no such obstacles existed. As Steven Aschheim observes in The
Nietzsche Legacy in Germany: Here was a German thinker with what appeared to be genuinely thematic and tonal links, who was able
to provide the Nazis with a higher philosophical pedigree and a rationale for central tenets of their weltanschauung. As Franz Neumann
noted in 1943, Nietzsche "provided National Socialism with an intellectual father who had greatness and wit, whose style was beautiful
and not abominable, who was able to articulate the resentment against both monopoly capitalism and the rising proletariat." Was it
really so far-fetched, as Nietzsche's defenders have claimed, that a thinker who celebrated Machtpolitik, flaunted the annihilation of the
weak, toyed with the idea of a Master Race, and despised the Jews for having introduced a cowardly "slave morality" into the heretofore
aristocratic discourse of European culture-was it really so far-fetched that such a thinker would become the Nazis' court philosopher?
Reflecting on Nietzsche's fascination with breeding, extermination, and conquest-all in the name of a "racial hygiene" designed to
produce superior Beings-the historian Ernst Nolte speculates that the scope and extent of the wars envisioned by the philosopher might
well have surpassed anything Hitler and company were capable of enacting: What Nietzsche had in mind was a "pure" civil war. Yet
when one thinks the idea through to its logical conclusion, what needs to be annihilated [vernichtet] is the entire tendency of human
development since the end of classical antiquity . . .: Christian priests, vulgar champions of the Enlightenment, democrats, socialists,
together with the shepherds and herds of the weak and degenerate. If "annihilation" [Vernichtung] is understood literally, then the result
would be a mass murder in comparison with which the Nazis' "Final Solution" seems microscopic.

9. The Negatives single focus on moral identity cedes the political, causing extinction
Boggs, 1997 (Carl, National University, Los Angeles, Theory and Society, The great retreat: Decline of the
public sphere in late
twentieth-century America, December, Volume 26, Number
6, http://www.springerlink.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/content/m7254768m63h16r0/fulltext.pdf)
The decline of the public sphere in late twentieth-century America poses a series of great dilemmas and
challenges. Many ideological currents are scrutinized here localism, metaphysics, spontaneism, postmodernism, Deep Ecology intersect with and reinforce each other. While these currents have deep origins in
popular movements of the 1960s and 1970s, they remain very much alive in the 1990s. Despite their different
outlooks and trajectories, they all share one thing in common: a depoliticized expression of struggles to combat
and overcome alienation. The false sense of empowerment that comes with such mesmerizing impulses is
accompanied by a loss of public engagement, an erosion of citizenship and a depleted capacity of individuals in
large groups to work for social change. As this ideological quagmire worsens, urgent problems that are
destroying the fabric of American society will go unsolved perhaps even unrecognized only to fester more
ominously in the future. And such problems (ecological crisis, poverty, urban decay, spread of
infectious diseases, technological displacement of workers) cannot be understood outside the larger social
and global context of internationalized markets, finance, and communications. Paradoxically, the widespread
retreat from politics, often inspired by localist sentiment, comes at a time when agendas that ignore or sidestep
these global realities will, more than ever, be reduced to impotence. In his commentary on the state of
citizenship today, Wolin refers to the increasing sublimation and dilution of politics, as larger numbers of people
turn away from public concerns toward private ones. By diluting the life of common involvements, we negate
the very idea of politics as a source of public ideals and visions. 74 In the meantime, the fate of the world hangs
in the balance. The unyielding truth is that, even as the ethos of anti-politics becomes more compelling and
even fashionable in the United States, it is the vagaries of political power that will continue to decide the fate of
human societies. This last point demands further elaboration. The shrinkage of politics hardly means that
corporate colonization will be less of a reality, that social hierarchies will somehow disappear, or that gigantic
state and military structures will lose their hold over peoples lives. Far from it: the space abdicated by a broad
citizenry, well-informed and ready to participate at many levels, can in fact be filled by authoritarian and
reactionary elites an already familiar dynamic in many lesser-developed countries. The fragmentation
and chaos of a Hobbesian world, not very far removed from the rampant individualism, social Darwinism, and
civic violence that have been so much a part of the American landscape, could be the prelude to a powerful
Leviathan designed to impose order in the face of disunity and atomized retreat. In this way the eclipse of
politics might set the stage for a reassertion of politics in more virulent guise or it might help further rationalize the

existing power structure. In either case, the state would likely become what Hobbes anticipated: the
embodiment of those universal, collective interests that had vanished from civil society. 75