Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
VM Realty
292 SCRA 676
Panganiban, J.:
FACTS:
Pursuant to a Sanggunian Bayan Resolution of the petitioner
municipality, an expropriation complaint against the property of herein
respondent for the purpose of alleviating the living conditions of the
underprivileged by providing homes for the homeless through a
socialized housing project. The RTC of Makati authorized petitioner to
take possession of subject property upon deposit to the court an amount
of its fair market value. Respondent filed a counter claim alleging that the
complaint failed to state a cause of action because it was filed pursuant
to a resolution and not to an ordinance as required by RA 7160.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Resolution of the Municipal council is a substantial
compliance of the statutory requirement of Section 19, RA 7160 in the
exercise of the power of eminent domain.
RULING:
The power of eminent by LGUs may be affected only by ordinance not
by a mere resolution. The following essential requisites must concur
before an LGU can exercise the power of eminent domain.
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the
local chief executive, in behalf of the LGUs to exercise the power of
eminent domain to pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular
private property.
2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or
welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless.
3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Sec 9,
Article III of the Constitution and other pertment.
4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the
property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.
In the case at bar, the first requisite that there must be an ordinance was
not complied with by the local chief executive. A municipal ordinance is
different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, it possesses a general
and permanent character while a resolution is temporary in nature.
The petition is hereby denied without prejudice to petitioners proper
exercise of its power of eminent domain over subject property.
Estate of Heirs of Justice JBL Reyes vs. City of Manila
422 SCRA 550February 13, 2004
FACTS:Petitioners acquired a favorable judgment of eviction
against respondents Abiog and Maglonso. In 1998, the said
judgments became final and executory. Consequently, writs of
execution were issued.During the pendency of the complaints
for unlawful detainer, respondent City filed a case for the
expropriation of the same properties involved in the ejectment
cases.The trial court allowed respondent City to take possession
of the property; it denied the motions for intervention and
injunction, and, after allowing respondent City to oppose the
motion to dismiss, dismissed the complaint for expropriation.On
appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and found
that respondent City properly exercised its right to expropriate
the subject properties. Petitioners appealed the CA decision to
this Court. Thereafter, on motion of respondent occupants, the
Court of Appeals issued protective orders that required the
parties to maintain the status quo (prohibiting any ejectment)
pending this Courts resolution of the appeal.Petitioner now
questions the legality of the CAs expropriation order and the
propriety of its act enjoining the execution of the final
judgments in the ejectment cases.
ISSUES:Whether the respondent City may legally expropriate
the subject properties, considering that a negative finding will
necessarily moot the issue of the propriety of the protective
orders of the Court of Appeals.Did the city of Manila comply
with RA 7279 (Secs.9-10) when it expropriated petitioners
properties?
HELD:
Whether respondent City deprived petitioners of their property
without due process of law depends on whether it complied with
the legal requirements for expropriation. Before respondent City
Proprietary
Held:
Yes
Ratio:
All things considered, even as the Court commiserates
with plaintiffs for the unfortunate happening complained of and
untimely desecration of the resting place and remains of their
deceased dearly beloved, it finds the reliefs prayed for by them
lacking in legal and factual basis. Under the aforementioned
facts and circumstances, the most that plaintiffs ran ask for is
the replacement of subject lot with another lot of equal size and
similar location in the North Cemetery which substitute lot
plaintiffs can make use of without paying any rental to the city
government for a period of forty-three (43) years, four (4)
months and eleven (11) days corresponding to the unexpired
portion of the term of the lease sued upon as of January 25,
1978 when the remains of the late Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr.
were prematurely removed from the disputed lot; and to require
the defendants to look in earnest for the bones and skull of the
late Vivencio Sto. Domingo Sr. and to bury the same in the
substitute lot adjudged in favor of plaintiffs hereunder.
As regards the issue of the validity of the contract of
lease of grave lot No. 159, Block No. 195 of the North Cemetery
for 50 years beginning from June 6, 1971 to June 6, 2021 as
clearly stated in the receipt duly signed by the deputy treasurer
of the City of Manila and sealed by the city government, there is
nothing in the record that justifies the reversal of the conclusion
of both the trial court and the Intermediate Appellate Court to
the effect that the receipt is in itself a contract of lease. (
Under the doctrine of respondent superior, (Torio v. Fontanilla),
petitioner City of Manila is liable for the tortious act committed
by its agents who failed to verify and check the duration of the
contract of lease. The contention of the petitioner-city that the
lease is covered by Administrative Order No. 5, series of 1975
dated March 6, 1975 of the City of Manila for five (5) years only
beginning from June 6, 1971 is not meritorious for the said
administrative order covers new leases. When subject lot was
certified on January 25, 1978 as ready for exhumation, the lease
contract for fifty (50) years was still in full force and effect.
San Diego vs. Nauhan Oriental Mindoro 107 Phil. 118
FACTS:
FollowingapublicbiddingconductedbythemunicipalityofNaujan,Oriental
Mindorofortheleaseofitsmunicipalwaters,Resolution46waspassed
awardingtheconcessionoftheButasRiverandtheNaujanLaketoBartolome
SanDiego.AcontractwasenteredintobetweenthesaidSanDiegoandthe
municipality,foraperiodofleasefor5years.
Thelesseethenrequestedfora5yearextensionoftheoriginalleaseperiod,this
wasgrantedbythemunicipalcouncil.Aftertheresolutionhadbeenapprovedby
theProvincialBoardofOrientalMindoro,thelessorandthelessee,contracted
fortheextensionoftheperiodofthelease.Thecontractwasapprovedand
confirrmedonDecember29,1951byResolution229ofthemunicipalcouncil
ofNaujanwhosetermwasthenabouttoexpire.Pursuanttothesaidcontract,
thelesseefiledasuretybondofP52,000andthenreconstructedhisfishcorrals
andstockedtheNaujanLakewithbangusfingerlings.
OnJanuary2,1952,themunicipalcouncilofNaujan,thisTmecomposedofa
newsetofmembers,adoptedResoluTon3,seriesof1952,revokingResolution
222,seriesof1951.Onthesamedate,thenewcouncilalsopassedResoluTon
11,revokingresolution229oftheoldcouncilwhichconFrmedtheextensionof
theleaseperiod.
ThelesseerequestedforreconsiderationandrecallofResoluTon3,onthe
ground,amongothers,thatitviolatedthecontractexecutedbetweenhimandthe
municipalityonDecember23,1951,and,therefore,contrarytoArticleIII,
section1,clause10oftheConstitution.Therequest,however,wasnotgranted.
ThelesseeinstitutedproceedingstoannultheResolution.Thedefendant
assertedthattheoriginalleasecontract,reducingtheleaserentalsandrenewing
theleasearenullandvoidfornothavingbeenpassedinaccordancewithlaw.
Thetrialcourtupheldthevalidityoftheleasecontract
ISSUE:
WONResolutionNo.3,seriesof1952,revokingresolution222,seriesof1951,
ofthemunicipalcouncilofNaujanisvalid
HELD:Yes
Thelaw(Sec.2323oftheRevisedAdministrativeCode)requiresthatwhenthe
exclusiveprivilegeofFisheryortherighttoconductafishbreedinggroundis
grantedtoaprivateparty,thesameshallbelettothehighestbidderinthesame
mannerasisbeingdoneinexploitingaferry,amarketoraslaughterhouse
belongingtothemunicipality.Therequirementofcompetitivebiddingisforthe
purposeofinvitingcompetitionandtoguardagainstfavoritism,fraudand
corruptioninthelettingoffisheryprivileges.Thereisnodoubtthattheoriginal
leasecontractinthiscasewasawardedtothehighestbidder,butthereduction
oftherentalandtheextensionofthetermoftheleaseappeartohavebeen
grantedwithoutpreviouspublicbidding.
City of Manila vs. (???) 22 SCRA 267 (1968)
Facts:
In1958,atabout8:00p.m.,TeoticowasatthecorneroftheOldLunetaandP.
BurgosAvenue,Manila,withina"loadingandunloading"zone,waitingfora
jeepney.Whenajeepneycamealongtoastop,hesteppeddownfromthecurb
toboardthejeepneybuthefellinsideanuncoveredmanhole.Duetothefall,his
headhittherimofthemanholebreakinghiseyeglassesandcausingbroken
piecesthereoftopiercehislefteyelid.Severalpersonspulledhimoutofthe
manholeandoneofthembroughthimtothehospital,wherehisinjurieswere
treated.Thereafter,hesuedfordamages,underArticle2189oftheCivilCode,
theCityofManila,themayor,thecityengineer,thecityhealthofficer,thecity
treasurer,andthechiefofpolice.CFIManilaruledagainsthimbuttheCA,on
appeal,ruledthattheCityofManilashouldpaydamages.TheCityofManila
assailedthedecisionoftheCAonthegroundthatthecharterofManilastates
that it shall not be liable for damages caused by the negligence of the city
officersinenforcingthecharter;thatthecharterisaspeciallawandshallprevail
overtheCivilCodewhichisagenerallaw;andthattheaccidenthappenedin
nationalhighway.
Issue:
IstheCityofManilaliable?
Held:
Yes.Itistruethatincaseofconflict,aspeciallawprevailsoveragenerallaw
andthatthecharterofManilaisaspeciallawwhiletheCivilCodeisageneral
law.However,lookingattheparticularprovisionsofeachlawconcerned,the
charterofManilaestablishesageneralruleregulatingtheliabilityoftheCityof
Manilafor:"damagesorinjurytopersonsorpropertyarisingfromthefailure
of"cityofficers"toenforcetheprovisionsof"saidAct"oranyotherlawor
ordinance,orfromnegligence"ofthecity"Mayor,MunicipalBoard,orother
officerswhileenforcingorattemptingtoenforcesaidprovisions."Thereisno
particular exemption but merely a general exemption. Upon the other hand,
Article 2189 of the Civil Code provides a particular prescription making
"provinces,citiesandmunicipalities...liablefordamagesforthedeathof,or
injurysufferedbyanypersonbyreason"specifically"ofthedefective
condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and otherpublic works
undertheircontrolorsupervision."Inotherwords,saidsection4ofthecharter
ofManilareferstoliabilityarisingfromnegligence,ingeneral,regardlessofthe
objectthereof,whereasArticle2189governsliabilitydueto"defectivestreets,"
in particular. Since the present action is based upon the alleged defective
conditionofaroad,saidArticle2189isdecisivethereon.
Theallegationthattheincidenthappenedinanationalhighwaywasonlyraised
forthefirsttimeintheCitysmotionforreconsiderationintheCourtof
Appeals,henceitcannotbegivendueweight.Atanyrate,eventhoughitisa
nationalhighway,thelawcontemplatesthatregardlessifwhetherornottheroad
isnational,provincial,city,ormunicipal,solongasitisundertheCityscontrol
andsupervision,itshallberesponsiblefordamagesbyreasonofthedefective
conditionsthereof.Inthecaseatbar,theCityadmittedtheyhavecontroland
supervisionovertheroadwhereTeoticofellwhentheCityallegedthatithas
beendoingconstantandregularinspectionofthecitysroads,P.Burgos
included.(CityofManilavs.Teotico,
G.R.No.L23052,29January1968)