P O LITICS: 2001 VO L 21(3), 193199

Blind Alley
Defining Feminism
John Hoffman
University of Lancaster
Feminism is sometimes seen either as multiple or singular as though we have to make a choice
along ideological as well as philosophical lines. Feminism, I shall argue, is both multiple and
singular, since liberal, socialist and radical feminisms are distinctive feminisms that can and
should be assessed according to the extent to which they contribute positively to the development
of a post-patriarchal society. The same holds for the philosophically differentiated varieties of
feminist empiricism, standpoint and post-modern theory. Each represent differing feminisms
within a single body of argument unified by its commitment to the emancipation of women. It is
important to distinguish here between the way in which particular theorists regard their
endeavours, and the practical implications of the positions taken.

A recent work on Feminism After Postmodernism raises the question of recovering

feminisms from the intolerance of other feminisms (Zalewski, 2000, p. 142). Is
there one feminism or are there many? I think there are both.
Feminism1 is sometimes presented as though there are only different feminisms
that are to be distinguished along ideological lines liberal feminism, socialist
feminism or radical feminism or along more philosophical lines empiricist
feminism, standpoint feminism or post-modern feminism. Endless additions
and permutations are possible to these qualifying labels (for the importance of
national identity in feminism, see Bulbeck, 1998, p. 4).
I want to argue that there is both one feminism and many feminisms. Or, to put it
less paradoxically, there is a feminism that can only be identified through its
multiple forms. Heidi Sofia Mirza puts the question well when she argues in
relation to black feminism, you can have difference (polyvocality) with a conscious
construction of sameness (Mirza, 1997, p. 2; see also Afshar and Maynard, 1994,
pp. 18 and 97). To argue that there is no feminism but only multiple feminisms is
as unsatisfactory as contending that there is only one feminism and all the rest are
counterfeits or fraudulent. Posing the question in an either/or fashion represents a
blind alley, which feminist theory should avoid if a coherent and viable theory of
feminism is to be constructed.

The ideological feminisms

It has been argued that feminism is basically rooted in the liberal tradition
(Eisenstein, 1981, p. 4), and I think that this is correct. Unless there is a general
presupposition that all humans are individuals people who are free and equal
then there is no conceptual space for stretching the notion to include women.
Political Studies Association, 2001.
Published by Blackwell Publishers, 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA

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There is, however, a difference between being rooted in liberal tradition and
endorsing the liberal tradition. Liberalism as an ideology is, in my view, hostile to
feminism since the exclusion of women from political rights by classical liberals
flows from an uncritical acceptance of private property, class divisions and the
state. These are institutions that embody a patriarchal version of what feminists
call the public/private divide. If feminism is rooted in liberalism, it also involves
a critique of liberal institutions, however embryonic and limited this critique
might be.
For this reason, reference to liberal feminism, as a distinct and autonomous brand
of feminism, is problematic. Mary Wollstonecrafts Vindication of the Rights of Woman
(1792) is often described as a classic exposition of liberal feminism. It is undeniable
that Wollstonecraft was deeply influenced by the liberal tradition. She takes for
granted what was subsequently called the sexual division of labour; she naturalises
motherhood as a female vocation; she does not explicitly raise the case of political
rights for women, and she has a view of reason which sees it as a universalising
force that suppresses particularistic passion. The point, however, is not that
Wollstonecraft is still influenced by the liberal tradition. The point is that her
feminism moves beyond this tradition so that, to the extent that she advances the
case for feminism, she is beginning to break with liberalism.
Once we argue, as Wollstonecraft did (Coole, 1988, pp. 120123; Shanley and
Pateman, 1991, pp. 117124; Bryson, 1992, pp. 2227), that women are just as
rational as men, that they must be as free as men to choose their own careers, and
that being a mother is linked to being a citizen, then we are (implicitly at any rate)
challenging the naturalism of the liberal tradition and the patriarchal public/private
divide that flows from it. The notion of liberal feminism as a purely separate notion
is paradoxical, since to be a feminist is to be critical of liberal institutions.
J.S. Mill (and Taylors) Subjection of Women bears this point out. Mill supports the
right of women to vote and hold office. It is true that much of his text is painfully
uncritical (Coole, 1988, p. 144; Bryson, 1992, pp. 5363), but although Mill has
been presented as a thinker who tries to bring the relation between the sexes into
line with his wider liberal principles (Shanley and Pateman, 1991, p. 6), the point
is that his argument implicitly challenges the liberal concept of the public/private
divide and the masculinist notions of politics upon which this divide rests.
It is necessary to define feminism in a way that accepts not only that views about
women will differ, but that no particular feminist will be free from inconsistency.
The point is not that either Wollstonecraft or Mill and Taylor had wholly defensible
views of womans autonomy and equality. Rather it is that they like numerous
other writers throughout history have contributed to the movement towards
female equality, and thus to the development of a post-patriarchal society. Each
contribution made by particular writers is partial and flawed, but to the extent that
it adds something to the case for womens freedom and equality, it is one of many
feminisms, all of which contribute to feminism as a dynamic notion that has no
final resting place or ultimate destiny.
Feminism can only express itself through particular and diverse forms. If feminism
is to be coherently defined, then, in my view, it needs to be conceived as both

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singular and multiple rather than as one or the other. A universal true feminism
is as one-sided and exclusive as the notion that there are only multiple feminisms
with nothing to anchor them. Feminism (in the singular) is a movement towards
greater equality and freedom, to which particular feminists and feminisms
contribute both positively and partially, When Jill Steans comments that liberal
feminism is not merely feminism added onto liberalism (Steans, 1998, p. 17), she
surely raises a question mark over the conceptual validity of the term. Zillah
Eisenstein puts the point well when she comments that the demand for womens
equality even in the purely legal-formal sense has the subversive quality of
questioning the male domination of public life (Eisenstein, 1981, p. 229).
The same problem applies to the concept of a socialist/Marxist feminism. In so far
as socialists (and Marxists) substitute the community for the individual, they ignore
the liberties and rights of large numbers of women. Feminism needs to be defined
in a way that embraces the various bodies of thought upon which it draws, and the
particular contributions that particular writers make to its development.
This argument pertains no less to what has sometimes been called radical
feminism. To the extent that radical feminism embraces versions of naturalism
that invert rather than transcend patriarchal biases, its proponents weaken a
dynamic definition of feminism. Sandra Whitworth underlines this point when she
points to the essentialism that is embraced by some radical feminists, since the
point about essentialism, as she notes, is that it leaves no scope for transforming
the relations between women and men (Whitworth, 1994, p. 19). Radical feminism,
taken outside of rather than as an expression of feminism in general, is problematic
and limiting in its contribution to the freedom and equality of women.
If we are to define feminism dynamically as a single yet multiple concept then
ideological distinctions between liberalism, socialism and radicalism should be seen
as differentiated forms of feminism itself, and not rival versions that are competing
for the Truth. For this reason, it is difficult to disagree with Christine Delphys
argument that because feminism is concerned with the oppression of women,
theoretical premises which do not include this premise, i.e. which exclude it, can
only be used at the risk of incoherence (cited by Brown, 1988, p. 471).

Feminist empiricism as a form of feminism

Philosophical distinctions are sometimes made between feminist empiricism,
feminist standpoint theory and feminist post-modernism. But these three varieties
are best conceived as separate moments or as particular feminisms within an
argument for the emancipation or freedom of women as a whole. Each moment
reinforces the other, and it would be wrong to separate them out as distinct
variants of a heterogeneous feminism, with the implication that we should choose
one in preference to the others.
Nancy Hirshmann and Christine Di Stefano support (as I do) Sylvia Benhabibs
definition of feminist theory as the theoretical articulation of the emancipatory
aspirations of women. Feminists will necessarily disagree about what constitutes
emancipation, and indeed how we should define women. But however they are
defined, these two terms are a political and intellectual priority (Hirshmann and

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Di Stefano, 1996, p. 22). Contention and debate are fruitful as part of a common
project the emancipation of women.
Feminist empiricism is seen as emphasising the factual character of the exclusion of
women from official society, and feminist empiricists, we are told, see themselves
as scientists who extend scientific norms (as they are positivistically construed) to
women (Harding, 1990, p. 91). But those who consider themselves feminist
empiricists are committed to a position which in practice challenges the whole
edifice of empiricist thought. The point, as Sandra Harding stresses, is that feminist
empiricism is a justificatory strategy which, although apparently conservative,
begins to undermine Enlightenment assumptions in significant ways (ibid.,
pp. 9293). Feminist empiricists cannot but be aware both of the personal and
domestic circumstances of their subjects and of themselves, and this awareness
necessarily subverts concepts of reason and truth as ideals manifesting themselves
outside of history and situation.
This is why I argue that feminist empiricism is a one of the many forms of feminism
itself. A commitment to feminism of any kind must challenge, albeit implicitly, the
apparent neutrality and point of viewlessness of the empiricist position. Harding is
right to argue that inadvertently feminist empiricists take steps to reconstruct the
concept of the ideal knower and the ideal of objectivity in ways uncongenial to
Enlightenment assumptions (Harding, 1990, p. 94).
Supposedly, feminist empiricists point to facts that challenge patriarchal power
structures. It is therefore misleading to say, as Jill Steans does, that a stress on facts
is itself positivistic (Steans, 1998, p. 43), since positivism is a theory which mystifies
the facts by treating them in an abstract, atomistic and non-relational manner.
Marysia Zalewskis own reference to the fact that two out of every three women
suffer from a highly infectious disease called poverty might be cited as a good
example of feminist empiricism (Zalewski, 1995, p. 342). Facts like these challenge
patriarchal power structures since they imply a critique which is incompatible with
the empiricist argument. Feminist empiricism focuses on reality in a way which
necessarily suggests an emancipatory alternative. The fact, for example, that
women are dramatically under-represented in the decision-making structures of
the UN, has important implications for the kind of peace-keeping which that
organisation pursues (Black, 1994, p. 28). It is an empiricist fallacy and one that
feminist empiricism resists in practice to assume that facts are isolated, separate
entities which are value-free. On the contrary, facts are part of, and only become
coherent as, an expression of relationships, and it is these relationships that
give particular facts their explanatory power. Any attempt to divorce facts from
values ends up ignoring the facts themselves.
Because it is feminist in character, feminist empiricism espouses a notion of
emancipation that challenges the abstract and masculinist character of classic
empiricism (Harding, 1990, p. 94).

Standpoint and post-modern theory

Standpoint theorists argue that the subjective social position of women must be
taken into account as a factor influencing the production of knowledge. Standpoint

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theory is sometimes sharply juxtaposed to feminist post-modernism, as though

theorists must choose one rather than the other. Zalewski, in an earlier piece
supporting standpoint theory, sees post-modernism as destructively critical, and
she argues that, by opposing all essentialism, post-modernists seek to deconstruct
gender categories so that women themselves become an essentialised fiction
(Zalewski, 1993, p. 16). But the idea that we should support standpoint theory as
opposed to post-modernism is, in my view, problematic.
Standpoint theory asserts that women generally experience the world in a way that
is different from men. Zalewski argues that this notion of experience is not a
naturalistic reference to womens biology, but encapsulates the lives (Zalewski,
1993, p. 23) of women as an oppressed group. In other words, reference here is to
subordinate social roles that exclude women from power and confine them to
domestic and private activities. Two points in particular emerge from Zalewskis
defence of standpoint theory.
The first is that Zalewski focuses upon womens experience of domination (and not
experience as the mere biological embodiment of natural difference) and,
secondly, her view of experience emphasises plurality and diversity. Different
women experience oppression in different ways (Zalewski, 1993, p. 23). This point
has been particularly emphasised by black feminists who have rightly argued that
gender is not experienced in the same way when you are positioned as working
class or black, or both (Mirza, 1997, p. 12). In other words, standpoint theory
contributes to feminism in general when it incorporates the post-modern emphasis
on diversity and plurality, and by stressing the constructed character of experience,
it avoids the kind of (pseudo-) feminist naturalism which inverts rather than
transcends patriarchal analysis.
Although Zalewski is critical of both feminist empiricism and feminist postmodernism, she incorporates the concerns of both in seeking to construct what she
calls a strong version (Zalewski, 1993, p. 20) of standpoint theory. Zalewski does
actually endorse the post-modern position when she argues that we should avoid
the kind of foundationalism which commits us to essential truths about the world
which women can discern but not men (ibid., p. 24). Her notion that men can be
feminists constitutes a break with the naturalism and biologism of some versions of
standpoint theory, and she supports the understandable concern that postmoderns and feminists of colour have about avoiding the trap that there is just
one univocal womens-eye view of the world (ibid., p. 29). It seems to me that
Zalewskis strategy is in practice (whatever the strictures she makes in theory) to
incorporate those elements of post-modernism which strengthen feminism as a
subversive and transformative theory. As she puts it, the most crucial part of
feminist standpoint theory is the word feminist (ibid., pp. 2223).
This is surely the point. Feminism is a theory of emancipation, and feminist
empiricism, standpoint theory and feminist post-modernism all emphasise
moments that constitute a coherent theory of female freedom. Zalewski has
recently argued that we should resist the choice between post-modern and
modern feminism on the grounds that feminism challenges modernist
epistemology but is located in the emancipatory impulses of modernism (Zalewski,
2000, p. 140). Precisely so!

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This is why Harding is right to stress the links between feminist empiricism,
standpoint theory and feminist post-modernism. Standpoint theory, she argues,
builds upon feminist empiricism by explicitly developing some of the notions that
appear only dimly in feminist empiricist assumptions (Nicholson, 1990, p. 94).
Indeed, Harding acknowledges that while so-called feminist empiricists attack postmodernist projects in feminism, in practice they take significant steps towards
embracing post-modernism by implicitly rejecting the Enlightenment abstraction
of the ideal knower (ibid., p. 93). The point is not that the three feminisms are
identical. Rather, the argument here is that feminist empiricism, standpoint theory
and post-modernism are separate feminisms which are at the same time linked
to feminism as a dynamic concept, a concept concerned with the movement
towards freedom and equality of all women. It is misleading to conceptualise these
feminisms as though they are incompatible variants so that we must choose one
rather than the other. Each feminism has a logic that links it to the others.
Essentialism actually undermines standpoint theory (even if particular standpointers have been tempted by it), since, as Harding points out, a coherent defence
of womens standpoint requires a critique of the essentialism that andocentrism
assigns to women (ibid., p. 99).
Feminism needs both Enlightenment and post-modernist agendas. It builds upon
the notions of freedom, autonomy and emancipation which were developed in
Enlightenment thought, reconstructing them so that they can move beyond the
abstract individualism (and thus patriarchy) inherent in the liberal tradition itself.
The dialogue between feminisms constitutes Feminism, is actually the moment
at which Feminism occurs (personal communication with Madeleine Jowett,
16 March 2001). It is therefore misleading to depict feminism in polarised terms:
all feminisms are a critique of patriarchy or male domination, and are identifiable
as feminist, because they all contribute, in their different ways, to the same end.
Chilla Bulbeck is right to argue that while some feminists today are preoccupied
with difference as a retort to the universalising claims of categories like
sisterhood, we are in danger of losing sight of commonalities and connections
between women (1998, p. 6; see also ibid., p. 56). Theories are problematic if,
despite the intentions of their architects, they espouse (at best) an inverted
patriarchy, an inverted liberalism or a nihilism that may be post-modern in name,
but fails to go beyond modernity in reality. The test is whether a theory adds
anything practically to the emancipation of women. If it does not, it does not
deserve the label of feminism. Mirza puts the matter brilliantly when speaking of
identity, she comments: it is possible to be one with many parts (Mirza, 1997,
p. 16). That is precisely the point about feminism.

Note
1 For an argument about womanism as a substitute for feminism see Charles, 1997.

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