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Bertrand Russell
First published Thu Dec 7, 1995; substantive revision Mon Mar 29, 2010
Bertrand Arthur William Russell (b.1872 d.1970) was a British philosopher, logician,
essayist and social critic best known for his work in mathematical logic and analytic
philosophy. His most influential contributions include his defense of logicism (the view
that mathematics is in some important sense reducible to logic), his refining of the
predicate calculus introduced by Gottlob Frege (which still forms the basis of most
contemporary logic), his defense of neutral monism (the view that the world consists of
just one type of substance that is neither exclusively mental nor exclusively physical),
and his theories of definite descriptions and logical atomism. Along withG.E. Moore,
Bibliography
o Primary Literature: Russell's Writings
o Secondary Literature
Related Entries
Interested readers may also wish to listen to two sound clips of Russell speaking.
(1876) Death of father; Russell's grandfather, Lord John Russell (the former
Prime Minister), and grandmother succeed in overturning Russell's father's will
to win custody of Russell and his brother.
(1916) Fined 110 pounds and dismissed from Trinity College as a result of antiwar protests.
(1931) Becomes the third Earl Russell upon the death of his brother.
(1940) Appointment at City College New York revoked prior to Russell's arrival
as a result of public protests and a legal judgment in which Russell was found
morally unfit to teach at the college.
As A.J. Ayer writes (1972, 127), The popular conception of a philosopher as one who
combines universal learning with the direction of human conduct was more nearly
satisfied by Bertrand Russell than by any other philosopher of our time,and as W.V.
Quine tells us (1966c, 657), I think many of us were drawn to our profession by
Russell's books. He wrote a spectrum of books for a graduated public, layman to
specialist. We were beguiled by the wit and a sense of new-found clarity with respect to
central traits of reality. Even so, perhaps the most memorable summing up of Russell's
life comes from Russell himself:
Three passions, simple but overwhelmingly strong, have governed my life: the longing
for love, the search for knowledge, and unbearable pity for the suffering of mankind.
These passions, like great winds, have blown me hither and thither, in a wayward
course, over a deep ocean of anguish, reaching to the very verge of despair. This has
been my life. I have found it worth living, and would gladly live it again if the chance
were offered me. (1967, I, 34)
For further information about Russell's life, readers are encouraged to consult Russell's
four autobiographical volumes,My Philosophical Development (London: George Allen
and Unwin, 1959) and The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell (3 vols, London: George
Allen and Unwin, 1967, 1968, 1969). In addition, John Slater's accessible and
informative Bertrand Russell(Bristol: Thoemmes, 1994) gives a helpful and accessible
short introduction to Russell's life, work and influence. Other sources of biographical
information include Ronald Clark'sThe Life of Bertrand Russell (London: Jonathan
Cape, 1975), Ray Monk's Bertrand Russell: The Spirit of Solitude (London: Jonathan
Cape, 1996) and Bertrand Russell: The Ghost of Madness (London: Jonathan Cape,
2000), as well as the first volume of A.D. Irvine's Bertrand Russell: Critical
Assessments (London: Routledge, 1999).
Over the years, Russell has also been the subject of numerous other works, including
Bruce Duffy's novel The World as I Found It (New York: Ticknor & Fields, 1987) and
the graphic novel by Apostolos Doxiadis and Christos Papadimitriou, Logicomix: An
Epic Search for Truth (New York: St Martin's Press, 2009).
For a chronology of Russell's major publications, readers are encouraged to consult the
Primary Literature: Russell's Writingssection of the Bibliography below. For a more
complete list, see A Bibliography of Bertrand Russell (3 vols, London: Routledge,
1994), by Kenneth Blackwell and Harry Ruja. A less detailed, but still comprehensive,
list appears in Paul Arthur Schilpp, The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell, 3rd edn (New
York: Harper and Row, 1963), pp. 746803. For a bibliography of the secondary
literature surrounding Russell up to the close of the twentieth century, see A.D. Irvine,
Bertrand Russell: Critical Assessments, Vol. 1 (London: Routledge, 1999), pp. 247312.
to determine a set (or class). Russell's basic idea was that reference to sets such as the
set of all sets that are not members of themselves could be avoided by arranging all
sentences into a hierarchy, beginning with sentences about individuals at the lowest
level, sentences about sets of individuals at the next lowest level, sentences about sets of
sets of individuals at the next lowest level, and so on. Using a vicious circle principle
similar to that adopted by the mathematician Henri Poincar, together with his own socalled no class theory of classes, Russell was able to explain why the unrestricted
comprehension axiom fails: propositional functions, such as the function x is a set,
may not be applied to themselves since self-application would involve a vicious circle.
On Russell's view, all objects for which a given condition (or predicate) holds must be
at the same level or of the same type. Sentences about these objects will then always
be higher in the hierarchy than the objects themselves.
Although first introduced in 1903, the theory of types was further developed by Russell
in his 1908 article Mathematical Logic as Based on the Theory of Types and in the
three-volume work he co-authored with Alfred North Whitehead, Principia
Mathematica (1910, 1912, 1913). Thus the theory admits of two versions, thesimple
theory of 1903 and the ramified theory of 1908. Both versions of the theory came
under attack: the simple theory for being too weak, and the ramified theory for being too
strong. For some, it was important that any proposed solution be comprehensive enough
to resolve all known paradoxes at once.[1] For others, it was important that any proposed
solution not disallow those parts of classical mathematics that remained consistent, even
though they appeared to violate the vicious circle principle.
Russell himself had recognized many of these weaknesses, noting as early as 1903 that
it was unlikely that any single solution would resolve all of the known paradoxes.
Together with Whitehead, he was also able to introduce a new axiom, the axiom of
reducibility, which lessened the vicious circle principle's scope of application and so
resolved many of the most worrisome aspects of type theory. Even so, some critics
claimed that the axiom was too ad hoc to be justified philosophically.
Of equal significance during this period was Russell's defense of logicism, the theory
that mathematics is in some important sense reducible to logic. First defended in his
1901 article Recent Work on the Principles of Mathematics, and then later in greater
detail in his Principles of Mathematics and in Principia Mathematica, Russell's
logicism consisted of two main theses. The first was that all mathematical truths can be
translated into logical truths or, in other words, that the vocabulary of mathematics
constitutes a proper subset of the vocabulary of logic. The second was that all
mathematical proofs can be recast as logical proofs or, in other words, that the theorems
of mathematics constitute a proper subset of the theorems of logic.
Like Gottlob Frege, Russell's basic idea for defending logicism was that numbers may
be identified with classes of classes and that number-theoretic statements may be
explained in terms of quantifiers and identity. Thus the number 1 would be identified
with the class of all unit classes, the number 2 with the class of all two-membered
classes, and so on. Statements such as There are at least two bookswould be recast as
statements such as There is a book, x, and there is a book,y, and x is not identical to
y.Statements such as There are exactly two books would be recast as There is a
book, x, and there is a book,y, and x is not identical to y, and if there is a book, z, then z
is identical to either x or y. It followed that number-theoretic operations could be
On the epistemological side, Russell argued that it was also important to show that each
questionable entity may be reduced to, or defined in terms of, another entity (or class of
entities) whose existence is more certain. For example, on this view, an ordinary
physical object that normally might be believed to be known only through inference
may be defined instead
as a certain series of appearances, connected with each other by continuity and by
certain causal laws. ... More generally, athing will be defined as a certain series of
aspects, namely those which would commonly be said to be of the thing. To say that a
certain aspect is an aspect of a certain thing will merely mean that it is one of those
which, taken serially, are the thing. (1914a, 106107)
The reason we are able to do this is that
our world is not wholly a matter of inference. There are things that we know without
asking the opinion of men of science. If you are too hot or too cold, you can be perfectly
aware of this fact without asking the physicist what heat and cold consist of. We may
give the namedata to all the things of which we are aware without inference (1959,
23).
We can then use these data (or sensibilia or sense data) with which we are directly
acquainted to construct the relevant objects of knowledge. Similarly, numbers may be
reduced to collections of classes, points and instants may be reduced to ordered classes
of volumes and events, and classes themselves may be reduced to propositional
functions.
It is with these kinds of examples in mind that Russell suggests that we adopt what he
calls the supreme maxim in scientific philosophizing, namely the principle that
Whenever possible, logical constructions, or as he also sometimes puts it, logical
fictions, are to be substituted for inferred entities (1914c, 155; cf. 1914a, 107, and
1924, 326). Anything that resists construction in this sense may be said to be an
ontological atom. Such objects are atomic, both in the sense that they fail to be
composed of individual, substantial parts, and in the sense that they exist independently
of one another. Their corresponding propositions are also atomic, both in the sense that
they contain no other propositions as parts, and in the sense that the members of any
pair of true atomic propositions will be logically independent of one another. It turns out
that formal logic, if carefully developed, will mirror precisely, not only the various
relations between all such propositions, but their various internal structures as well.
It is in this context that Russell also introduces his famous distinction between two
kinds of knowledge of truths: that which is direct, intuitive, certain and infallible, and
that which is indirect, derivative, uncertain and open to error (see 1905, 41f; 1911, 1912,
and 1914b). To be justified, every indirect knowledge claim must be capable of being
derived from more fundamental, direct or intuitive knowledge claims. The kinds of
truths that are capable of being known directly include both truths about immediate
facts of sensation and truths of logic.[2]
Eventually, Russell supplemented this distinction between direct and indirect knowledge
with his famous distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by
description. As Russell explains,I say that I am acquainted with an object when I have
a direct cognitive relation to that object, i.e. when I am directly aware of the object
itself. When I speak of a cognitive relation here, I do not mean the sort of relation which
constitutes judgment, but the sort which constitutes presentation (1911, 209). Later, he
clarifies this point by adding that acquaintance involves, not knowledge of truths, but
knowledge of things (1912a, 44). Thus, while intuitive knowledge and derivative
knowledge both involve knowledge of propositions (or truths), knowledge by
acquaintance and knowledge by description both involve knowledge of objects (or
things).[3] Since it is those objects with which we have direct acquaintance that are the
least questionable members of our ontology, it is these objects upon which Russell
ultimately bases his epistemology.
Russell's contributions to metaphysics and epistemology were also unified by his views
concerning the centrality of both scientific knowledge in general and the importance of
there being an underlying scientific methodology that in large part is common to both
philosophy and the scientific disciplines. In the case of philosophy, this methodology
expressed itself through Russell's use of logical analysis. In fact, Russell often claimed
that he had more confidence in his methodology than in any particular philosophical
conclusion.
This broad conception of philosophy arose in part from Russell's idealist origins (see,
e.g., Griffin 1991 and Hylton 1990a). This is so, even though Russell tells us that his
one, true revolution in philosophy came about as a result of his break from idealism.
Russell saw that the idealist doctrine of internal relations led to a series of contradictions
regarding asymmetrical (and other) relations necessary for mathematics. Thus, in 1898,
he abandoned the idealism that he had encountered as a student at Cambridge, together
with his Kantian methodology, in favour of a pluralistic realism. As a result, he soon
became famous as an advocate of the new realism and for his new philosophy of
logic, emphasizing as he did the importance of modern logic for philosophical analysis.
The underlying themes of this revolution included his belief in pluralism, his
emphasis upon anti-psychologism, and his belief in the importance of science. Each of
these themes remained central to Russell's philosophy for the remainder of his life (see,
e.g., Hager 1994 and Weitz 1944).
Kx,
ii.
iii.
Bx.
This distinction between logical forms allows Russell to explain three important
puzzles. The first concerns the operation of the Law of Excluded Middle and how this
law relates to denoting terms. According to one reading of the Law of Excluded Middle,
it must be the case that either The present King of France is bald is true orThe
present King of France is not bald is true. But if so, both sentences appear to entail the
existence of a present King of France, clearly an undesirable result. Russell's analysis
shows how this conclusion can be avoided. By appealing to analysis (1), it follows that
there is a way to deny (1) without being committed to the existence of a present King of
France, namely by accepting thatIt is not the case that there exists a present King of
France who is bald is true.
The second puzzle concerns the Law of Identity as it operates in (so-called) opaque
contexts. Even though Scott is the author ofWaverley is true, it does not follow that
the two referring terms Scott and the author of Waverley need be interchangeable in
every situation. Thus, although George IV wanted to know whether Scott was the
author of Waverley is true,George IV wanted to know whether Scott was Scott is,
presumably, false. Russell's distinction between the logical forms associated with the
use of proper names and definite descriptions shows why this is so.
To see this we once again let s abbreviate the nameScott. We also let w
abbreviateWaverley andA abbreviate the two-place predicate is the author of. It then
follows that the sentence
(3) s=s
is not at all equivalent to the sentence
(4) x[Axw & y(Ayw y=x) &x=s].
Sentence (3), for example, is clearly a necessary truth, while sentence (4) is not.
The third puzzle relates to true negative existential claims, such as the claim The
golden mountain does not exist. Here, once again, by treating definite descriptions as
having a logical form distinct from that of proper names, Russell is able to give an
account of how a speaker may be committed to the truth of a negative existential
without also being committed to the belief that the subject term has reference. That is,
the claim that Scott does not exist is false since
(5) ~x(x=s)
is self-contradictory. (After all, there must exist at least one thing that is identical to s
since it is a logical truth thats is identical to itself!) In contrast, the claim that a golden
mountain does not exist may be true since, assuming thatG abbreviates the predicate is
golden and Mabbreviates the predicate is a mountain, there is nothing contradictory
about
(6) ~x(Gx & Mx).
One final major contribution to philosophy was Russell's defence of neutral monism, the
view that the world consists of just one type of substance that is neither exclusively
mental nor exclusively physical. Like idealism (the view that there exists nothing but
the mental) and physicalism (the view that there exists nothing but the physical), neutral
monism rejects dualism (the view that there exist distinct mental and physical
substances). However, unlike both idealism and physicalism, neutral monism holds that
this single existing substance may be viewed in some contexts as being mental and in
others as being physical. As Russell puts it,
Neutral monismas opposed to idealistic monism and materialistic monismis the
theory that the things commonly regarded as mental and the things commonly regarded
as physical do not differ in respect of any intrinsic property possessed by the one set and
not by the other, but differ only in respect of arrangement and context. (CP, Vol. 7, 15)
To help understand this general suggestion, Russell introduces the analogy of a postal
directory:
The theory may be illustrated by comparison with a postal directory, in which the same
names comes twice over, once in alphabetical and once in geographical order; we may
compare the alphabetical order to the mental, and the geographical order to the physical.
The affinities of a given thing are quite different in the two orders, and its causes and
effects obey different laws. Two objects may be connected in the mental world by the
association of ideas, and in the physical world by the law of gravitation. Just as every
man in the directory has two kinds of neighbours, namely alphabetical neighbours and
geographical neighbours, so every object will lie at the intersection of two causal series
with different laws, namely the mental series and the physical series. Thoughts are not
different in substance fromthings; the stream of my thoughts is a stream of things,
namely of the things which I should commonly be said to be thinking of; what leads to
its being called a stream of thoughts is merely that the laws of succession are different
from the physical laws. (CP, Vol. 7, 15)
In other words, when viewed as being mental, a thought or idea may have associated
with it other thoughts or ideas that seem related even though, when viewed as being
physical, they have very little in common. As Russell explains, In my mind, Caesar
may call up Charlemagne, whereas in the physical world the two were widely sundered
(CP, Vol. 7, 15). Even so, it is a mistake, on this view, to postulate two distinct types of
thing (the idea of Caesar, and the man Caesar) that are composed to two distinct
substances (the mental and the physical). Instead, The whole duality of mind and
matter, according to this theory, is a mistake; there is only one kind of stuff out of which
the world is made, and this stuff is called mental in one arrangement, physical in the
other (CP, Vol. 7, 15).
Russell appears to have developed this theory around 1913, while he was working on
his Theory of Knowledge manuscript, and on his 1914 Monist article, On the Nature of
Acquaintance.Decades later, in 1964, he remarked that I am not conscious of any
serious change in my philosophy since I adopted neutral monism (Eames 1967, 511).
Russell's most important writings relating to these topics includeOn Denoting (1905),
Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description (1910a), The
large number of public protests and a 1940 judicial decision which found him morally
unfit to teach at the College (see, e.g., Dewey and Kallen 1941).
In 1954 he delivered his famous Man's Peril broadcast on the BBC, condemning the
Bikini H-bomb tests. A year later, together with Albert Einstein, he released the RussellEinstein Manifesto calling for the curtailment of nuclear weapons. In 1957 he was a
prime organizer of the first Pugwash Conference, which brought together a large
number of scientists concerned about the nuclear issue. He became the founding
president of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament in 1958 and was once again
imprisoned, this time in connection with anti-nuclear protests in 1961. The media
coverage surrounding his conviction only served to enhance Russell's reputation and to
further inspire the many idealistic youths who were sympathetic to his anti-war and
anti-nuclear protests.
During these controversial years Russell also wrote many of the books that brought him
to the attention of popular audiences. These include his Principles of Social
Reconstruction (1916), A Free Man's Worship (1923), On Education (1926),Why I Am
Not a Christian (1927c), Marriage and Morals (1929), The Conquest of Happiness
(1930),The Scientific Outlook (1931), and Power: A New Social Analysis (1938).
Upon being awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1950, Russell used his acceptance
speech to emphasize, once again, themes related to his social activism.
Bibliography
Primary Literature: Russell's Writings
(1914a) Our Knowledge of the External World, Chicago and London: The Open
Court Publishing Company.
(1921) The Analysis of Mind, London: George Allen and Unwin; New York: The
Macmillan Company.
(1923) A Free Man's Worship, Portland, Maine: Thomas Bird Mosher. Repr. as
What Can A Free Man Worship?, Girard, Kansas: Haldeman-Julius Publications,
1927.
(1927a) The Analysis of Matter, London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner; New
York: Harcourt, Brace.
(1927c) Why I Am Not a Christian, London: Watts, New York: The Truth Seeker
Company.
(1929) Marriage and Morals, London: George Allen and Unwin; New York:
Horace Liveright.
(1930) The Conquest of Happiness, London: George Allen and Unwin; New
York: Horace Liveright.
(1931) The Scientific Outlook, London: George Allen and Unwin; New York:
W.W. Norton.
(1938) Power: A New Social Analysis, London: George Allen and Unwin; New
York: W.W. Norton.
(1940) An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth, London: George Allen and Unwin;
New York: W.W. Norton.
(1948) Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits, London: George Allen and
Unwin; New York: Simon and Schuster.
(1949a) Authority and the Individual, London: George Allen and Unwin; New
York: Simon and Schuster.
(1954) Human Society in Ethics and Politics, London: George Allen and Unwin;
New York: Simon and Schuster.
A1918, Mysticism and Logic and Other Essays, London and New York:
Longmans, Green. Repr. as A Free Man's Worship and Other Essays, London:
Unwin Paperbacks, 1976.
A1928, Sceptical Essays, London: George Allen and Unwin; New York: W.W.
Norton.
A1935, In Praise of Idleness, London: George Allen and Unwin; New York:
W.W. Norton.
A1950, Unpopular Essays, London: George Allen and Unwin; New York:
Simon and Schuster.
A1956a, Logic and Knowledge: Essays, 19011950, London: George Allen and
Unwin; New York: The Macmillan Company.
A1956b, Portraits From Memory and Other Essays, London: George Allen and
Unwin; New York: Simon and Schuster.
A1957, Why I am Not a Christian and Other Essays on Religion and Related
Subjects, London: George Allen and Unwin; New York: Simon and Schuster.
A1969, Dear Bertrand Russell, London: George Allen and Unwin; Boston:
Houghton Mifflin.
A1992, The Selected Letters of Bertrand Russell, Volume 1, London: Allen Lane,
and New York: Houghton Mifflin.
CP, Vol. 1, Cambridge Essays, 188899, London, Boston, Sydney: George Allen
and Unwin, 1983.
CP, Vol. 2: Philosophical Papers, 189699, London and New York: Routledge,
1990.
CP, Vol. 3: Towarbd the Principles of Mathematics, London and New York:
Routledge, 1994.
CP, Vol. 4: Foundations of Logic, 190305, London and New York: Routledge,
1994.
CP, Vol. 6: Logical and Philosophical Papers, 190913, London and New York:
Routledge, 1992.
CP, Vol. 8: The Philosophy of Logical Atomism and Other Essays, 191419,
London: George Allen and Unwin, 1986.
CP, Vol. 9: Essays on Language, Mind and Matter, 191926, London: Unwin
Hyman, 1988.
CP, Vol. 10: A Fresh Look at Empiricism, 192742, London and New York:
Routledge, 1996.
CP, Vol. 11: Last Philosophical Testament, 194368, London and New York:
Routledge, 1997.
CP, Vol. 12: Contemplation and Action, 190214, London, Boston, Sydney:
George Allen and] Unwin, 1985.
CP, Vol. 13: Prophecy and Dissent, 191416, London: Unwin Hyman, 1988.
CP, Vol. 14: Pacifism and Revolution, 191618, London and New York:
Routledge, 1995.
CP, Vol. 15: Uncertain Paths to Freedom: Russia and China, 19191922,
London and New York: Routledge, 2000.
CP, Vol. 21: How to Keep the Peace: The Pacifist Dilemma, 193538, London
and New York: Routledge, 2008.
CP, Vol. 28: Man's Peril, 195455, London and New York: Routledge, 2003.
CP, Vol. 29: Dtente or Destruction, 195557, London and New York:
Routledge, 2005.
Vol. 32: A New Plan for Peace and Other Essays, 196364.
Secondary Literature
Burke, Tom (1994) Dewey's New Logic: A Reply to Russell, Chicago: University
of Chicago Press.
Clark, Ronald William (1975) The Life of Bertrand Russell, London: J. Cape.
Clark, Ronald William (1981) Bertrand Russell and His World, London: Thames
and Hudson.
Copi, Irving (1971) The Theory of Logical Types, London: Routledge and Kegan
Paul.
Dewey, John, and Horace M. Kallen (eds) (1941) The Bertrand Russell Case,
New York: Viking.
Duffy, Bruce (1987) The World as I Found It, New York: Ticknor & Fields.
Feinberg, Barry, and Ronald Kasrils (eds) (1969) Dear Bertrand Russell,
London: George Allen and Unwin.
Feinberg, Barry, and Ronald Kasrils (1973, 1983) Bertrand Russell's America, 2
vols, London: George Allen and Unwin.
Gabbay, Dov M., and John Woods (eds) (2009) Handbook of the History of
Logic: Volume 5 Logic From Russell to Church, Amsterdam: Elsevier/North
Holland.
Hylton, Peter W. (1990b) Logic in Russell's Logicism, in Bell, David, and Neil
Cooper (eds), The Analytic Tradition: Philosophical Quarterly Monographs,
Vol. 1, Cambridge: Blackwell, 137172.
Irvine, A.D. (1996) Bertrand Russell and Academic Freedom, Russell, n.s.16,
536.
Irvine, A.D., and G.A. Wedeking (eds) (1993) Russell and Analytic Philosophy,
Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Landini, Gregory (1998) Russell's Hidden Substitutional Theory, New York and
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Link, Godehard (ed.) (2004) One Hundred Years of Russell's Paradox, Berlin
and New York: Walter de Gruyter.
Monk, Ray (1996) Bertrand Russell: The Spirit of Solitude, London: Jonathan
Cape.
Monk, Ray (2000) Bertrand Russell: The Ghost of Madness, London: Jonathan
Cape.
Monk, Ray, and Anthony Palmer (eds) (1996) Bertrand Russell and the Origins
of Analytic Philosophy, Bristol: Thoemmes Press.
Pears, David F. (1967) Bertrand Russell and the British Tradition in Philosophy,
London: Collins.
Proops, Ian (2006) Russell's Reasons for Logicism, Journal of the History of
Philosophy, 44: 267-292.
Quine, W.V (1966a) Selected Logic Papers, New York: Random House.
Ryan, Alan (1988) Bertrand Russell: A Political Life, New York: Hill and Wang.
Schilpp, Paul Arthur (ed.) (1944) The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell, Chicago:
Northwestern University; 3rd ed., New York: Harper and Row, 1963.
Schultz, Bart (1992) Bertrand Russell in Ethics and Politics, Ethics, 102: 594
634.
Tait, Katharine (1975) My Father Bertrand Russell, New York: Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich.
Vellacott, Jo (1980) Bertrand Russell and the Pacifists in the First World War,
Brighton, Sussex: Harvester Press.
Williams, Roger (2007) What Is: Correcting the Logical Errors in Russell's
Metaphysics, and the Metaphysical Errors in Predicate Logic, Glasgow: 347
Publications.
Wood, Alan (1957) Bertrand Russell: The Passionate Sceptic, London: Allen
and Unwin.
Related Entries
descriptions | Frege, Gottlob | Gdel, Kurt | knowledge: by acquaintance vs. description
| logic: classical | logical atomism: Russell's | logical constructions | logicism and
neologicism | mathematics, philosophy of | Moore, George Edward | neutral monism |
Principia Mathematica | propositional function | Russell, Bertrand: moral philosophy |
Russell's paradox | type theory | Whitehead, Alfred North | Wittgenstein, Ludwig
Copyright 2010 by
A. D. Irvine<andrew.irvine@ubc.ca>