1.

MOYA VS DEL FIERRO 69 PHIL 199 (1939)

In this petition for review by certiorari of the
judgment of the CA declaring del Fierro as
thecandidate-elect
mayor
of
Paracale,
Camarines Nortewith a majority vote over
Moya. He contended thatthe CA committed
errors in admitting and counting infavor of del
Fierro several ballots. The SC dismissed the
petition because in result evenif the ballots
contested are counted in favor of Moya,del
Fierro still wins by one vote. The SC avers that
in republicanism, the citizens havethe voice in
the government and whenever calledupon to
act in justifiable cases to give it efficacy andnot
to stifle. This is the fundamental reason for
therule that ballots should be read and
appreciated if not with utmost, with reasonable
liberality
2. Badelles vs. Cabili, 27 SCRA 11, February 27,
1969
Facts: Mariano Badelles together with Bonifacio
P. Legaspi and Cecilia T. Barazon who along with
the five protestees were among those who
were registered candidates voted for in such
election for councilors in the City of Iligan, who
contested the election of Honorable Camilo P.
Cabili to the Office of City Mayor of the said
city.
It was then alleged that there are irregularities
on the said election and that illegal votes were
cast by those not qualified to do so. Protestees
moved to dismiss in different suits the petition
on the following grounds:
1. That the protest was filed beyond the
reglementary period allowed by the Revised
Election Code;
2. That the lower court has no jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the present case, the

Commission on Elections being the proper body

to hear the same;
3. That the complaint states no cause of action.
On march 23, 1968, in a single order, the
election protests were dismissed based on the
lack of a cause of action.
Issue: Whether or not the dismissal issued by
COMELEC on March 23, 1968 is valid.
Held: No. The election law has no justification
except as a means for assuring a free, honest
and orderly expression of their views. It is of the
essence that corruption and irregularities
should not be permitted to taint the electoral
process.
3. TOLENTINO VS COMELEC
G.R. No. 148334. January 21, 2004
ARTURO M. TOLENTINO and ARTURO C.
MOJICA vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
SENATOR RALPH G. RECTO and SENATOR
GREGORIO B. HONASAN
FACTS:
Petitioners assailed the manner by which the
simultaneous regular and special elections of
2001
were
conducted
by
the
COMELEC.Petitioners contend that, if held
simultaneously, a special and a regular election
must be distinguished in the documentation as
well as in the canvassing of their results.
Thirteen senators were proclaimed from the
said election with the 13th placer to serve that
of the remaining term of Sen. Guingona, who
vacated a seat in the senate.
Petitioners sought for the nullification of the
special election and, consequently, the
declaration of the 13th elected senator.

Issue:
1Whether or not Court had jurisdiction.
2Whether or not the petition was moot.
3Whether or not petioners had locus standi.
4Whether a Special Election for a Single, ThreeYear Term
Senatorial Seat was Validly Held on 14 May
2001
RULING:
On the issue of jurisdiction, Court had
jurisdiction because what petitioners were
questioning was the validity of the special
election on 14 May 2001 in which Honasan was
elected and not to determine Honasans right in
the exercise of his office as Senator proper
under a quo warranto.
On the issue of mootness, it was held that
courts will decide a question otherwise moot if
it is capable of repetition yet evading review.
On the issue of locus standi, the court had
relaxed the requirement on standing and
exercised our discretion to give due course to
voters suits involving the right of suffrage,
considering that the issue raised in this petition
is likely to arise again
On the VAlidity of the Election, the Court held
that the May 14, 2001 Election was valid.
The Court held that COMELECs Failure to Give
Notice of the Time of the Special Election as
required under RA 6645, as amended, did Not
Negate the Calling of such Election. Section 2 of
R.A. No. 6645 itself provides that in case of
vacancy in the Senate, the special election to fill
such vacancy shall be held simultaneously with

the next succeeding regular election. The law

charges the voters with knowledge of this
statutory notice and COMELECs failure to give
the additional notice did not negate the calling
of such special election, much less invalidate it.
Further, there was No Proof that COMELECs
Failure to Give Notice of the Office to be Filled
and the Manner of Determining the Winner in
the Special Election Misled Voters. IT could not
be said that the voters were not informed since
there had been other accessible information
resources. Finally, the Court held that unless
there had been a patent showing of grave
abuse of discretion, the Court will not interfere
with the affairs and conduct of the Comelec
4. PURISIMA vs SALANGA
ELECTION LAW; ELECTION CONTEST; DISMISSAL
AS MOOT TERM OF OFFICE DISPUTED EXPIRED.
This case has become moot and academic
with respect to both parties, because the term
of the disputed office has already expired; and
with respect to petitioner in particular, also
because by his acceptance of a position in the
Judiciary he has in effect abandoned his claim in
the present case. Even the question of who
would have been entitled to succeed petitioner
upon his assumption of a position as Judge, if he
had succeeded in being proclaimed as winner
over respondent Cordero, has likewise become
moot.
RESOLUTION
MAKALINTAL, J.:
This case is an offshoot of the decision of this
Court in L-22335, Amante P. Purisima v. Hon.
Angelino C. Salanga, Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Ilocos Sur, Et Al., promulgated
December 31, 1965 (15 SCRA 704). The principal
protagonists there, Purisima and Gregorio

Cordero, were among the candidates for the

three positions of Provincial Board Members of
the said province in the elections of 1963. On
account of discrepancies in the election returns
from 41 precincts Purisima filed a petition for
judicial recount under Section 163 of the
Revised Election Code then in force.
Reversing the order of dismissal rendered by
the trial court, We directed respondent Judge
Salanga in the case above-mentioned to
proceed with the recount therein prayed for.
The late Judge Deogracias S. Solis, who had
taken over the said court in the meantime,
started to implement our decision. It was
discovered, however, that in some precincts 1
the ballot boxes and their contents showed
indications that they had been tampered with,
and so the petitioner, Amante P. Purisima,
moved that the recount be stopped and that
the untampered Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) copies of the election returns be
used to determine the number of votes
respectively received by the contending parties
and to provide the basis for the corresponding
canvass. In a resolution dated February 4, 1967
the respondent Judge denied the motion and
ordered the recount to continue, on the ground
that the judgment of this Court of December
31, 1965 in L-22335 was clear and unequivocal
to that effect, and that the petitioners remedy
with respect to the tampering of the ballot
boxes and of the ballots themselves was in a
proper election protest. The petitioner moved
to reconsider but was turned down in an order
dated April 6, 1967, and thereafter came to this
Court in the present case on a petition for
certiorari with preliminary injunction. A
temporary restraining order was issued, and
after respondent Gregorio Cordero had filed his
answer, and failed to submit a memorandum in

lieu of oral argument, the case was deemed

submitted for decision.
The term of the office disputed by the parties
expired on December 30, 1967, and even
before that date, or on May 31, 1967, the
petitioner was appointed Judge of the Court of
Agrarian Relations. However, he has presented
a motion, dated November 26, 1971, praying
that a decision be rendered on the merits,
alleging that if he is declared winner he will take
appropriate steps so that he may be given
service credit for the time he would have
occupied the position of Provincial Board
Member from January 1, 1964 up to the date of
his assumption of office in the Judiciary, which
service credit may be material in connection
with the retirement benefits to which he may
be entitled later.
We are of the opinion that this case has
become moot and academic with respect to
both parties, because the term of the disputed
office has already expired; and with respect to
petitioner in particular, also because by his
acceptance of a position in the Judiciary he has
in effect abandoned his claim in the present
case. Even the question of who would have
been entitled to succeed herein petitioner upon
his assumption of a position as Judge, if he had
succeeded in being proclaimed as the winner
over respondent Cordero, has likewise become
moot.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed, without
costs

5. LUCAS V. CAUTON, Petitioner, v.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and PABLO
SANIDAD, Respondents.

1. ELECTIONS; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS;

CONSTITUTIONAL POWER THEREOF. The
Commission has the power to decide all
administrative questions affecting Elections,
except the question involving the right to vote
(Article x, Section 2, Constitution of the
Philippines).
2. ID.; ID.; CANVASS OF ELECTION RETURNS;
POWER OF THE COMMISSION IN RELATION
THERETO. The Commission on Elections has
the power to investigate and act on the
propriety or legality of the canvass of election
returns made by the board of canvassers. The
power of the Commission in this respect is
simply administrative and supervisory
intended to secure the proclamation of the
winning candidate based on the true count of
the votes cast.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID,; TAMPERED ELECTION
RETURNS; DUTY OF THE COMMISSION. Once
the Commission on Elections is convinced that
the election returns in the hands of the board of
canvassers do not constitute the proper basis in
ascertaining the true result of the elections, it
should be its duty to order the taking of such
steps as may be necessary in order that the
proper basis for the canvass is obtained or
made available.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. The
three copies of the election returns outside the
ballot box do not constitute a reliable basis for
canvass, then the Commission on Elections, in
the exercise of its power to administer and
enforce the laws relative to the conduct of
elections, may order the opening of the ballot
boxes to ascertain whether the copy inside each
ballot box is also tampered like the three copies
outside the ballot box, corresponding to each
precinct. The Commission on Elections may do

this on its own initiative, or upon petition by the

proper party.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PURPOSE AND
EFFECT OPENING BALLOT BOXES UNDER THE
CIRCUMSTANCES. Once it is found that the
copy of the election return inside the ballot box
is untampered, the Commission on Elections
would then have accomplished two things,
namely: (1) secured a basis for the prosecution
for the violation of the laws relative to
elections, and (2) afforded the party aggrieved
by the alteration of the election returns outside
the ballot box a basis for a judicial recount of
the votes as provided for in Section 163 of the
Revised Election Code.
6. ID.; ID.; PURITY OF THE ELECTION; CHOICE OF
MEANS TO INSURE SUCH DISCRETIONARY ON
COMMISSION. Commission on Elections, by
constitutional mandate, must do everything in
its power to secure a fair and honest canvass of
the votes cast in the elections, In the
performance of its duties, the Commission must
be given a considerable latitude in adopting
means and methods that will insure the
accomplishment of the great objective for
which it was created - to promote free, orderly
and honest elections. The choice of means
taken by the Commission, unless they are
clearly illegal or constitute grave abuse of
discretion, should not be interfered with.

7. ID.; ID.; OPENING OF THE BALLOT BOX;

WHEN ALLOWABLE. Under Section 157 of the
Revised Election Code, the ballot boxes may be
opened in case there is an election contest.
They may also be opened even if there is no
election contest when their contents have to be
used as evidence in the prosecution of election
frauds. Moreover, they may be opened when

they are the subject of any official investigation

which may be ordered by a competent court or
other competent authority. The competent
authority must include the Commission on
Elections which is charged with the
administration and enforcement of the laws
relative to the conduct of elections.
DECISION
ZALDIVAR, J.:
In the national elections held on November 9,
1965, petitioner Lucas V. Cauton and
respondent Pablo Sanidad, along with
Godofredo S. Reyes, were candidates for the
Office of Representative in the second
congressional district of Ilocos Sur.
During the canvass by the Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Ilocos Sur of the votes cast for the
candidates for Representative in the second
congressional district of Ilocos Sur, and
particularly after the Board had opened the
envelopes containing the copies of the election
returns from each of the election precincts in
the municipalities of Candon, Santiago and Sta.
Cruz that were presented by the Provincial
Treasurer of Ilocos Sur to the Board, respondent
Sanidad brought to the attention of the Board
the fact that the entries of votes for the
candidates for Representative in those copies of
the election returns that came from the
envelopes presented by the provincial treasurer
differed from the entries appearing in the
copies of the returns from the same election
precincts that were in the possession of the
Liberal Party.
Respondent Sanidad filed a petition with the
Commission on Elections praying for the
opening of the ballot boxes in all the precincts
of Candon, Santiago and Sta. Cruz, in order to

retrieve the election returns deposited therein

so that those election returns might be used in
the canvass of the votes cast for the candidates
for Representative in the second district of
Ilocos Sur, and that in the meantime the
Provincial Board of Canvassers of Ilocos Sur be
ordered to refrain from proclaiming the winning
candidates for the office of Representative in
said district. The Commission on Elections
issued the restraining order prayed for by
respondent Sanidad and set his petition for
hearing.
After hearing, the Commission on Elections
found "that it had been clearly established that
the copies of the election returns for the
Municipal Treasurer, for the Commission on
Elections and for the Provincial Treasurer for
the municipality of Santa Cruz have uniform
alterations in the entries of the votes cast for
representative showing different number of
votes compared with the Liberal Party copies,
while the copies of the election returns for the
Commission on Elections and the Provincial
Treasurer for the municipalities of Candon and
Santiago have likewise uniform alterations and
showing different numbers compared with the
Liberal Party copies . . ." 1 The copies of the
election returns that were furnished the
municipal treasurers of Candon and Santiago
were never verified because the municipal
treasurers of those two municipalities did not
comply with the subpoena duces tecum issued
by the Commission on Elections directing them
to bring to the Commission the copies of the
election returns of the precincts in their
respective municipalities that were in their
possession.
On December
22, 1965, respondent
Commission on Elections issued an order
providing, among others, that

". . . to enable the aggrieved party to establish

discrepancy between copies of the election
returns provided by law in the aforementioned
precincts for the purpose of obtaining judicial
remedy under the provisions of Section 163 of
the Revised Election Code, the Commission
Resolved . . . to direct immediately the opening
of the ballot boxes of the municipalities of
Candon, Sta. Cruz and Santiago which are now
impounded and under the custody of the Zone
Commander of the 1st PC Zone in Camp Olivas,
San Fernando, Pampanga solely for the purpose
of retrieving therefrom the corresponding
election returns, copies for the ballot box, in all
the precincts of said municipalities."cralaw
virtua1aw library
Pursuant to the instructions of respondent
Commission, contained in the resolution of
December 22, 1965, the ballot boxes from all
the precincts in the municipalities of Candon,
Sta. Cruz and Santiago were opened by the
Chief of the Law Enforcement Division of the
Commission, Atty. Fernando Gorospe Jr., in the
presence of witnesses, and the envelopes
containing the election returns found inside the
ballot boxes were taken and brought to Manila
on Deceber 23, 1965.

On the same date, December 23, 1965, herein

petitioner, Lucas V. Cauton, filed before this
Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with preliminary injunction, praying that the
resolution of the respondent Commission on
Elections dated December 22, 1965 ordering
the opening of the ballot boxes used in all the
precincts of Candon, Sta. Cruz and Santiago in
the elections of November 9, 1965 be annulled
and set aside. The petition further prays that

the Commission on Elections be restrained from

opening the envelopes containing the election
returns found in the afore-mentioned ballot
boxes and be ordered to return the said
envelopes to the corresponding ballot boxes. In
his petition, petitioner alleges that the
respondent Commission on Elections acted
without or in excess of its jurisdiction in issuing
the resolution of December 22, 1965. This Court
gave due course to the petition, but did not
issue the writ of preliminary injunction prayed
for. This petition is now the case before Us.

Upon instructions by respondent Commission

on Elections, on December 28, 1965, the
envelopes that were taken from the ballot
boxes were opened and the election returns
were taken out and their contents examined
and recorded by a committee appointed by the
Commission. This was done in a formal hearing
with notice to the parties concerned.
Respondent Pablo C. Sanidad filed his answer to
the instant petition on January 5, 1966,
admitting some of the allegations and denying
others, and maintaining that the Commission on
Elections had acted well within the bounds of
its authority in issuing the order of December
22, 1965. Respondent Commission on Elections
also filed its answer on January 5, 1966,
maintaining that it has authority under the law
to order the opening of the ballot boxes as
stated in its resolution of December 22, 1965.
In the meantime, on the basis of the
discrepancies in the entries of the votes for the
candidates for Representative, between the
election returns taken out of the ballot boxes
that were opened by order of the Commission
on Elections and the election returns submitted
by the Provincial Treasurer of Ilocos Sur to the

Provincial Board of Canvassers of Ilocos Sur,

respondent Pablo S. Sanidad filed a petition
with the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur,
docketed as Election Case No. 16-N, for a
recount of the votes in all the precincts of
Candon, Sta. Cruz and Santiago, pursuant to the
provisions of Section 153 of the Revised
Election Code.
On February 14, 1966, petitioner filed before
this Court an urgent motion, in this case,
praying for the issuance of an order enjoining
the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur (Branch
II-Narvacan) from further proceeding with
Election Case No. 16-N, abovementioned,
pending final decision of the instant case, upon
the ground that the recount of the ballots in
that case in the court below would render the
instant case moot and academic. This motion
was denied by this Court in a resolution dated
February 17, 1966.
The principal issue in the present case revolves
on the legality of the resolution of the
respondent Commission on Elections, dated
December 22, 1965, which orders the opening
of the ballot boxes used in all the precincts in
the municipalities of Candon, Sta. Cruz and
Santiago, Ilocos Sur, during the elections of
November 9, 1965 for the purpose of retrieving
therefrom the corresponding election returns,
copies for the ballot box, "to enable the
aggrieved party to establish discrepancy
between copies of the election returns provided
by law in the aforementioned precincts for the
purpose of obtaining judicial remedy under the
provisions of Section 163 of the Revised
Election Code."cralaw virtua1aw library
It is the stand of the petitioner that respondent
Commission on Elections is without jurisdiction
to issue, or has acted in excess of jurisdiction in
issuing, the resolution in question, so that said

resolution is null and void and should not be

given legal force and effect. The petitioner
contends that under Section 157 of the Revised
Election Code the Commission on Elections has
authority to order the opening of the ballot
boxes "only in connection with an investigation
conducted for the purpose of helping in the
prosecution of any violation of the election laws
or for purely administrative purposes but not
when the sole purpose is, as in this case, to
assist a party in trying to win the election . . ."
The petitioner further contends that "the mere
fact that the copies of the returns in the
precincts in question in the possession of the
Liberal Party do not tally with the returns
involving the same precincts in the possession
of the Provincial Treasurer, the Commission on
Elections and the Nacionalista Party as well
does not legally support the validity of the
resolution of the respondent Commission in
question . . ." 2
We cannot sustain the stand of the petitioner,
We believe that in issuing the resolution in
question the Commission on Elections simply
performed a function as authorized by the
Constitution, that is, to "have exclusive charge
of the enforcement and administration of all
laws relative to the conduct of elections and . . .
exercise all other functions which may be
conferred upon it by law." The Commission has
the power to decide all administrative questions
affecting elections, except the question
involving the right to vote. 3
This Court in a line of decisions has ruled that
the Commission on Elections has the power to
investigate and act on the propriety or legality
of the canvass of election returns made by the
board of canvassers. 4 In the case of Albano v.
Arranz, L-19260, January 31, 1962, this Court,

through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, held as

follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The suspension of the proclamation of the

winning candidate pending an inquiry into
irregularities brought to the attention of the
Commission on Elections was well within its
administrative jurisdiction, in view of the
exclusive authority conferred upon it by the
Constitution (Art. X) for the administration and
enforcement of all laws relative to elections.
The Commission certainly had the right to
inquire whether or not discrepancies existed
between the various copies of election returns
for the precincts in question, and suspend the
canvass in the meantime so the parties could
ask for a recount in case of variance . . ."cralaw
virtua1aw library
What the respondent Commission on Elections
did in the case now before Us is just what is
contemplated in the abovequoted ruling of this
court. The power of the Commission on
Elections in this respect is simply administrative
and supervisory intended to secure the
proclamation of the winning candidate based
on the true count of the votes cast. When the
Commission on Elections exercises this power
the purpose is not for the Commission to help a
candidate win the election but to bring about
the canvass of the true results of the elections
as certified by the boards of election inspectors
in every precinct. The object of the canvass is to
determine the result of the elections based on
the official election returns. In order that the
result of the canvass would reflect the true
expression of the peoples will in the choice of
their elective officials, the canvass must be
based on true, genuine, correct, nay
untampered, election returns. It is in this
proceeding that the Commission on Elections

exercises its supervisory and administrative

power in the enforcement of laws relative to
the conduct of elections, by seeing to it that the
canvass is based on the election returns as
actually certified by the members of the board
of inspectors. Once the Commission on
Elections is convinced that the election returns
in the hands of the board of canvassers do not
constitute the proper basis in ascertaining the
true result of the elections, it should be its
concern, nay its duty, to order the taking of
such steps as may be necessary in order that
the proper basis for the canvass is obtained or
made available.
The election law requires the board of
inspectors to prepare four copies of the election
return in each precinct one to be deposited
in the ballot box, one to be delivered to the
municipal treasurer, one to be sent to the
provincial treasurer, and one to be sent to the
Commission on Elections. In the case of the
canvass of the election returns for candidates
for provincial or national offices, the election
returns received by the provincial treasurer
from the boards of inspectors are used. It is the
duty of the provincial treasurer to turn over to
the provincial board of canvassers the election
returns received by him from the boards of
inspectors. If the Commission on Elections is
duly informed and it so finds, in appropriate
proceedings, that the election returns in the
hands of the provincial treasurer are tampered,
then the Commission should afford the
candidate adversely affected by the tampering
an opportunity to show that there exist
authentic copies of the same election returns
which are not tampered. A recourse may be had
to the copies received by the Commission on
Elections and to the copies received by the
municipal treasurer. If it is shown, that the
copies in the hands of the Commission on

Elections and of the municipal treasurer are

similarly tampered as the copies in the hands of
the provincial treasurer, then it becomes
evident that all the three copies of the election
returns outside the ballot box do not constitute
a reliable basis for a canvass. The only copies
left to be checked, whether they are also
tampered or not, are the ones inside the ballot
boxes. Certainly, the Commission on Elections,
in the exercise of its power to administer and
enforce the laws relative to the conduct of
elections, may order the opening of the ballot
boxes to ascertain whether the copy inside each
ballot box is also tampered like the three copies
outside the ballot box, corresponding to each
precinct. The Commission on Elections may do
this on its own initiative, or upon petition by the
proper party. Once it is found that the copy of
the election return inside the ballot box is
untampered, the Commission on Elections
would then have accomplished two things,
namely: (1) secured a basis for the prosecution
for the violation of the laws relative to
elections, and (2) afforded the party aggrieved
by the alteration of the election returns outside
the ballot box a basis for a judicial recount of
the votes as provided for in Section 163 of the
Revised Election Code. Thus, the Commission on
Elections has thereby made available the proper
and reliable basis for the canvass of the votes
that will lead to the proclamation by the board
of canvassers of the true winner in the
elections. In so doing the Commission on
Elections, as We have said, had performed its
constitutional duty of administering and
enforcing the laws relative to the conduct of
elections with a view to promoting clean and
honest elections the very purpose for which
the Commission on Elections was created by
constitutional mandate.

In the case now before Us, the Commission on

Elections issued the questioned resolution
"After hearing the arguments of the petitioner
and the opposition thereto and considering that
it has been clearly established that the copies of
the election returns for the Municipal
Treasurer, for the Commission on Elections and
for the Provincial Treasurer for the municipality
of Sta. Cruz have uniform alteration in the
entries of the votes cast for representative
showing different number of votes compared
with the Liberal Party copies, while the copies
of the election returns for the Commission on
Elections and the Provincial Treasurers for the
municipalities of Candon and Santiago have
likewise uniform alterations and showing
different numbers compared with the Liberal
Party copies . . ." 5 Indeed, in the face of this
finding by the Commission on Elections, which
indicates a clear violation of the election law,
and which indicates an attempt to procure the
proclamation of the winner in the elections for
representative in the second congressional
district of Ilocos Sur by the use of tampered
election returns, can the Commission on
Elections be remiss in the performance of its
duties as a constitutional body committed with
the exclusive charge of the enforcement and
administration of all laws relative to the
conduct of elections? The Revised Election Code
gives to the Commission on Elections the direct
and immediate supervision over provincial,
municipal and city officials designated by law to
perform duties relative to the conduct of
elections and included among these officials
are members of the provincial board of
canvassers. 6 The provincial board of canvassers
is enjoined by law to canvass all the votes cast
for representative on the basis of the election
returns produced by the provincial treasurer. 7
The Commission on Elections has a duty to
enforce this law, and it has the duty to see to it

that the election returns to be used for

canvassing must be genuine and authentic, not
falsified or tampered with. Where the election
returns produced by the provincial treasurer
have been shown to have been tampered, and
all the other copies outside the ballot boxes
have also been shown to have been tampered
or falsified, it is certainly within the power of
the Commission on Elections to issue such order
as would ascertain the existence of the genuine,
authentic and untampered election returns, and
thus open the way for the summary recount of
the votes, in accordance with law, for the
purposes only of the canvass of the votes and
the proclamation of the candidate found to
have obtained the highest number of votes. In
the case now before Us, it is found by the
Commission on Elections that no other copies
can be had except those deposited in the ballot
boxes. Hence, the necessity for the Commission
to order the retrieving of the copies of the
election returns from the ballot boxes. An order
to this effect does not affect the right to vote or
the validity of any vote cast, so that it is
perfectly within the power of the Commission
on Elections to issue such an order in the
exercise of its exclusive power to administer
and enforce the laws relative to the conduct of
elections. It would indeed be absurd to say that
the Commission on Elections has a legal duty to
perform and at the same time it is denied the
necessary means to perform said duty.
The purpose of the Revised Election Code is to
protect the integrity of elections and to
suppress all evils that may vitiate its purity and
defeat the will of the voters. 8 The purity of the
elections is one of the most fundamental
requisites of popular government. 9 The
Commission on Elections, by constitutional
mandate, must do everything in its power to
secure a fair and honest canvass of the votes

cast in the elections. In the performance of its

duties, the Commission must be given a
considerable latitude in adopting means and
methods that will insure the accomplishment of
the great objective for which it was created
to promote free, orderly and honest elections.
The choice of means taken by the Commission
on Elections, unless they are clearly illegal or
constitute grave abuse of discretion, should not
be interfered with. 10 Technicalities, which are
not conducive to free, orderly and honest
elections, but on the contrary may defeat the
will of the sovereign people as expressed in
their votes, should not be allowed to hamper
the Commission on Elections in the
performance of its duties. To sustain the
petitioner in the present case is to deny the
Commission on Elections the power to retrieve
the copies of the election returns from the
ballot boxes in order that the true number of
votes cast for a candidate may be known and
thus permit a canvass on the basis of election
returns that are patently falsified. We cannot,
and We must not, sanction the stand of
petitioner.
As We have adverted to, the Commission on
Elections has the power to inquire whether
there exist discrepancies among the various
copies of the election returns. 11 Of all the
copies prepared by the board of inspectors the
copy least susceptible to being tampered with is
the one deposited in the ballot box. Where the
three copies outside the ballot boxes appear to
have been uniformly altered, there is no
plausible reason why the copy deposited in the
ballot box may not be used to determine
whether discrepancies exist in the various
copies. Inasmuch as the Commission on
Elections has the right to determine whether
said discrepancies exist, it must also have the
right to consult said returns, which cannot be

done unless the ballot boxes are opened. It is

noteworthy that the Revised Election Code does
not provide that it is the courts that have the
power to order the opening of the ballot box in
a situation like this.
Section 157 of the Revised Election Code, on
which petitioner herein relies in support of his
stand in the present case, authorities the
opening of the ballot box whenever it is the
subject of an official investigation. It
provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The municipal treasurer shall keep the boxes
unopened in his possession in a secure place
and under his responsibility for three months,
unless they are the subject of an official
investigation, or a competent court or tribunal
shall demand them sooner, or the competent
authority shall order their preservation for a
longer time in connection with any pending
contest or investigation."cralaw virtua1aw
library
Under this section, the ballot boxes may be
opened in case there is an election contest.
They may also be opened even if there is no
election contest when their contents have to be
used as evidence in the prosecution of election
frauds. 12 Moreover, they may be opened
when they are the subject of any official
investigation which may be ordered by a
competent court or other competent authority.
13 The "competent authority" must include the
Commission on Elections which is charged with
the administration and enforcement of the laws
relative to the conduct of elections. In the
instant case, the Commission on Elections found
that it has been clearly established that the
election returns outside the ballot boxes, in all
the precincts in the municipalities of Candon,
Santiago and Sta. Cruz have been tampered
with. It is within the power of the Commission

to order the investigation of that anomaly that

has connection with the conduct of elections.
The investigation may be in connection with the
prosecution for the violations of the election
laws and at the same time to ascertain the
condition of the election returns inside the
ballot boxes as compared with the election
returns outside the ballot boxes, for the same
precincts. The opening of the ballot boxes may,
therefore, be prayed for by a candidate who is
prejudiced by the apparent falsification of the
election returns outside the ballot boxes, and in
ordering the opening of the ballot boxes the
purpose of the Commission is not to help a
particular candidate win an election but to
properly administer and enforce the laws
relative to the conduct of elections.
From what has been said We hold that the
order of December 22, 1965, being questioned
by the petitioner in the present case, was
perfectly within the power of the Commission
on Elections to issue.
Wherefore, the petition for certiorari and
prohibition in the present case is dismissed,
with costs against the petitioner. It is so
ordered
6. ROQUE vs Comelec
Facts:
This case is a motion for reconsideration filed
by the petitioners of the September 10, 2009
ruling of the Supreme Court, which denied the
petition of H. Harry L. Roque, Jr., et al. for
certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus to nullify
the contract-award of the 2010 Election
Automation Project to the joint venture of Total
Information Management Corporation (TIM)
and Smartmatic International Corporation
(Smartmatic).

In this MR, petitioners Roque, et al. are again

before the Supreme Court asking that the
contract award be declared null and void on the
stated ground that it was made in violation of
the Constitution, statutes, and jurisprudence.
Intervening petitioner also interposed a similar
motion, but only to pray that the Board of
Election Inspectors be ordered to manually
count the ballots after the printing and
electronic transmission of the election returns.

Petitioners Roque, et al., as movants herein,

seek a reconsideration of the September 10,
2009 Decision on the following issues or
grounds:
1. The Comelecs public pronouncements show
that there is a "high probability" that there will
be failure of automated elections;
2. Comelec abdicated its constitutional
functions in favor of Smartmatic;
3. There is no legal framework to guide the
Comelec in appreciating automated ballots in
case the PCOS machines fail;
4. Respondents cannot comply with the
requirements of RA 8436 for a source code
review;
5. Certifications submitted by private
respondents as to the successful use of the
machines in elections abroad do not fulfill the
requirement of Sec. 12 of RA 8436;

6. Private respondents will not be able to

provide telecommunications facilities that will
assure 100% communications coverage at all

times during the conduct of the 2010 elections;

and
7. Subcontracting the manufacture of PCOS
machines to Quisdi violates the Comelecs
bidding rules.
Issue: Is the motion for reconsideration
meritorious?
Ruling:
No.Upon taking a second hard look into the
issues in the case at bar and the arguments
earnestly pressed in the instant motions, the
Court cannot grant the desired reconsideration.
Petitioners threshold argument delves on
possibilities, on matters that may or may not
occur. The conjectural and speculative nature of
the first issue raised is reflected in the very
manner of its formulation and by statements,
such as "the public pronouncements of public
respondent COMELEC x x x clearly show that
there is a high probability that there will be
automated failure of elections"; "there is a high
probability that the use of PCOS machines in
the May 2010 elections will result in failure of
elections";
"the
unaddressed
logistical
nightmaresand the lack of contingency plans
that should have been crafted as a result of a
pilot testmake an automated failure of
elections very probable"; and "COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion when it
signed x x x the contract for full automation x x
x despite the likelihood of a failure of
elections."

Speculations and conjectures are not equivalent

to proof; they have little, if any, probative value
and, surely, cannot be the basis of a sound
judgment.

Petitioners, to support their speculative venture

vis--vis the possibility of Comelec going
manual, have attributed certain statements to
respondent Comelec Chairman Melo, citing for
the purpose a news item on Inquirer.net,
posted September 16, 2009.
Reacting to the attribution, however,
respondents TIM and Smartmatic, in their
comment, described the Melo pronouncements
as made in the context of Comelecs
contingency plan. Petitioners, however, the
same respondents added, put a misleading spin
to the Melo pronouncements by reproducing
part of the news item, but omitting to make
reference to his succeeding statements to arrive
at a clearer and true picture.
Private respondents observation is well-taken.
Indeed, it is easy to selectively cite portions of
what has been said, sometimes out of their
proper context, in order to assert a misleading
conclusion. The effect can be dangerous.
Improper meaning may be deliberately
attached to innocent views or even occasional
crude comments by the simple expediency of
lifting them out of context from any publication.
Petitioners posture anent the third issue, i.e,
there no is legal framework to guide Comelec in
the appreciation of automated ballots or to
govern manual count should PCOS machines
fail, cannot be accorded cogency. First, it
glosses over the continuity and back-up plans
that would be implemented in case the PCOS
machines falter during the 2010 elections. The
overall fallback strategy and options to address
even the worst-case scenariothe wholesale
breakdown of the 80,000 needed machines
nationwide and of the 2,000 reserved units
have been discussed in some detail in the
Decision subject of this recourse. The Court
need not belabor them again.

While a motion for reconsideration may tend to

dwell on issues already resolved in the decision
sought to be reconsideredand this should not
be an obstacle for a reconsiderationthe hard
reality is that petitioners have failed to raise
matters substantially plausible or compellingly
persuasive to warrant the desired course of
action.
Significantly, petitioners, in support of their
position on the lack-of-legal-framework issue,
invoke the opinion of Associate, later Chief,
Justice Artemio Panganiban in Loong v.
Comelec, where he made the following
observations: "Resort to manual appreciation of
the ballots is precluded by the basic features of
the automated election system," and "the rules
laid down in the Omnibus Election Code (OEC)
for the appreciation and counting of ballots cast
in a manual election x x x are inappropriate, if
not downright useless, to the proper
appreciation and reading of the ballots used in
the automated system." Without delving on its
wisdom and validity, the view of Justice
Panganiban thus cited came by way of a
dissenting opinion. As such, it is without binding
effect, a dissenting opinion being a mere
expression of the individual view of a member
of the Court or other collegial adjudicating
body, while disagreeing with the conclusion
held by the majority.
And going to another but recycled issue,
petitioners would have the Court invalidate the
automation contract on the ground that the
certifications submitted by Smartmatic during
the bidding, showing that the PCOS technology
has been used in elections abroad, do not
comply with Sec. 1222 of RA 8436. Presently,
petitioners assert that the system certified as
having been used in New York was the
Dominion Image Cast, a ballot marking device.

Petitioners have obviously inserted, at this

stage of the case, an entirely new factual
dimension to their cause. This we cannot allow
for compelling reasons. For starters, the Court
cannot plausibly validate this factual assertion
of petitioners. As it is, private respondents have
even questioned the reliability of the website24
whence petitioners base their assertion, albeit
the former, citing the same website, state that
the Image Cast Precinct tabulation device refers
to the Dominions PCOS machines.

The argument is untenable, based as it is again

on news reports. Surely, petitioners cannot
expect the Court to act on unverified reports
foisted on it.

Moreover, as a matter of sound established

practice, points of law, theories, issues, and
arguments not raised in the original
proceedings cannot be brought out on review.
Basic considerations of fair play impel this rule.
The imperatives of orderly, if not speedy, justice
frown on a piecemeal presentation of evidence
and on the practice of parties of going to trial
haphazardly.

The Comelec issued Resolution No. 9266

approving the creation of a joint committee
with the Department of Justice (DOJ), which
shall conduct preliminary investigation on the
alleged election offenses and anomalies
committed during the 2004 and 2007 elections.

Moving still to another issue, petitioners claim

that "there are very strong indications that
Private Respondents will not be able to provide
for telecommunication facilities for areas
without these facilities." This argument, being
again highly speculative, is without evidentiary
value and hardly provides a ground for the
Court to nullify the automation contract. Surely,
a possible breach of a contractual stipulation is
not a legal reason to prematurely rescind, much
less annul, the contract.
Finally, petitioners argue that, based on news
reports,28 the TIM-Smartmatic joint venture
has entered into a new contract with Quisdi, a
Shanghai-based company, to manufacture on
its behalf the needed PCOS machines to fully
automate the 2010 elections.29 This
arrangement, petitioners aver, violates the bid
rules proscribing sub-contracting of significant
components of the automation project.

7. JOSE MIGUEL T. ARROYO, Petitioner, v.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS
FACTS:

The Comelec and the DOJ issued Joint Order No.

001-2011 creating and constituting a Joint
Committee and Fact-Finding Team on the 2004
and 2007 National Elections electoral fraud and
manipulation cases composed of officials from
the DOJ and the Comelec. In its initial report,
the Fact-Finding Team concluded that
manipulation of the results in the May 14, 2007
senatorial elections in the provinces of North
and South Cotabato and Maguindanao were
indeed perpetrated. The Fact-Finding Team
recommended that herein petitioners Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA), et al. to be subjected
to preliminary investigation for electoral
sabotage.
After the preliminary investigation, the
COMELEC en banc adopted a resolution
ordering that information/s for the crime of
electoral sabotage be filed against GMA, et al.
while that the charges against Jose Miguel
Arroyo, among others, should be dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence.

Consequently, GMA, et al. assail the validity of

the creation of COMELEC-DOJ Joint Panel and of
Joint Order No. 001-2011 before the Supreme
Court.
ISSUES: I. Whether or not the creation of
COMELEC-DOJ Joint Panel is valid?
II. Whether or not Joint Order No. 001-2011
violates the equal protection clause?
HELD: Petitions are DISMISSED.
FIRST ISSUE: The creation of COMELEC-DOJ
Joint Panel is valid.
POLITICAL LAW: powers of COMELEC
Section 2, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution
enumerates the powers and functions of the
Comelec. The grant to the Comelec of the
power to investigate and prosecute election
offenses as an adjunct to the enforcement and
administration of all election laws is intended to
enable the Comelec to effectively insure to the
people the free, orderly, and honest conduct of
elections. The constitutional grant of
prosecutorial power in the Comelec was
reflected in Section 265 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election
Code.
Under the above provision of law, the power to
conduct preliminary investigation is vested
exclusively with the Comelec. The latter,
however, was given by the same provision of
law the authority to avail itself of the assistance
of other prosecuting arms of the government.
Thus, under the Omnibus Election Code, while
the exclusive jurisdiction to conduct preliminary
investigation had been lodged with the
Comelec, the prosecutors had been conducting
preliminary investigations pursuant to the

continuing delegated authority given by the

Comelec.
Thus, Comelec Resolution No. 9266, approving
the creation of the Joint Committee and FactFinding Team, should be viewed not as an
abdication of the constitutional bodys
independence but as a means to fulfill its duty
of ensuring the prompt investigation and
prosecution of election offenses as an adjunct
of its mandate of ensuring a free, orderly,
honest, peaceful and credible elections.
SECOND ISSUE: Joint Order No. 001-2011 does
not violate the equal protection clause.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: equal protection
Petitioners claim that the creation of the Joint
Committee and Fact-Finding Team is in violation
of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution because its sole purpose is the
investigation and prosecution of certain persons
and incidents. They insist that the Joint Panel
was created to target only the Arroyo
Administration as well as public officials linked
to the Arroyo Administration.
While GMA and Mike Arroyo were among those
subjected to preliminary investigation, not all
respondents therein were linked to GMA as
there were public officers who were
investigated upon in connection with their acts
in the performance of their official duties.
Private individuals were also subjected to the
investigation by the Joint Committee.
The equal protection guarantee exists to
prevent undue favor or privilege. It is intended
to eliminate discrimination and oppression
based on inequality. Recognizing the existence
of real differences among men, it does not
demand absolute equality. It merely requires
that all persons under like circumstances and

conditions shall be treated alike both as to

privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.
8. REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES, Petitioner, v.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH
SOCORRO B. TAN, Respondents.
PEREZ, J.:
FACTS:
This is a Motion for Reconsideration of the En
Banc Resolution of June 25, 2013 which found
no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Commission on Elections and affirmed the
March 27, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC
First Division.
Petitioner raised the issue in the petition which
is: Whether or not Respondent COMELEC is
without jurisdiction over Petitioner who is duly
proclaimed winner and who has already taken
her oath of office for the position of Member of
the House of Representatives for the lone
congressional district of Marinduque. Petitioner
is a duly proclaimed winner and having taken
her oath of office as member of the House of
Representatives, all questions regarding her
qualifications are outside the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC and are within the HRET exclusive
jurisdiction.
The averred proclamation is the critical pointer
to the correctness of petitioner submission.The
crucial question is whether or not petitioner
could be proclaimed on May 18, 2013.
Differently stated, was there basis for the
proclamation of petitioner on May 18 , 2013.
The June 25, 2013 resolution held that before
May 18, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc had
already finally disposed of the issue of
petitioner lack of Filipino citizenship and
residency via its resolution dated May 14, 2013,

cancelling petitioner certificate of candidacy.

The proclamation which petitioner secured on
May 18, 2013 was without any basis. On June
10, 2013, petitioner went to the Supreme Court
questioning the COMELEC First Division ruling
and the May 14, 2013 COMELEC En Banc
decision, baseless proclamation on 18 May
2013 did not by that fact of promulgation alone
become valid and legal.
ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner was denied of
due process?
HELD: Petitioner was denied of due process.
POLITICAL LAW: administrative due process
Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely
abused its discretion when it took cognizance of
"newly-discovered evidence" without the same
having been testified on and offered and
admitted in evidence. She assails the admission
of the blog article of Eli Obligacion as hearsay
and the photocopy of the Certification from the
Bureau of Immigration. She likewise contends
that there was a violation of her right to due
process of law because she was not given the
opportunity to question and present
controverting evidence.
It must be emphasized that the COMELEC is not
bound to strictly adhere to the technical rules of
procedure in the presentation of evidence.
Under Section 2 of Rule I, the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure "shall be liberally construed in order
to achieve just, expeditious and inexpensive
determination and disposition of every action
and
proceeding
brought
before
the
Commission." In view of the fact that the
proceedings in a petition to deny due course or
to cancel certificate of candidacy are summary
in nature, then the "newly discovered evidence"

was properly
COMELEC.

admitted

by

respondent

Furthermore, there was no denial of due

process in the case at bar as petitioner was
given every opportunity to argue her case
before the COMELEC. From 10 October 2012
when Tan's petition was filed up to 27 March
2013 when the First Division rendered its
resolution, petitioner had a period of five (5)
months to adduce evidence. Unfortunately, she
did not avail herself of the opportunity given
her.
In administrative proceedings, procedural due
process only requires that the party be given
the opportunity or right to be heard. As held in
the case of Sahali v. COMELEC: The petitioners
should be reminded that due process does not
necessarily mean or require a hearing, but
simply an opportunity or right to be heard. One
may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation
but also, and perhaps many times more
creditably and predictable than oral argument,
through
pleadings.
In
administrative
proceedings moreover, technical rules of
procedure and evidence are not strictly applied;
administrative process cannot be fully equated
with due process in its strict judicial sense.
Indeed, deprivation of due process cannot be
successfully invoked where a party was given
the chance to be heard on his motion for
reconsideration.
In moving for the cancellation of petitioner's
COC, respondent submitted records of the
Bureau of Immigration showing that petitioner
is a holder of a US passport, and that her status
is that of a "balikbayan." At this point, the
burden of proof shifted to petitioner, imposing
upon her the duty to prove that she is a naturalborn Filipino citizen and has not lost the same,
or that she has re-acquired such status in

accordance with the provisions of R.A. No.

9225. Aside from the bare allegation that she is
a natural-born citizen, however, petitioner
submitted no proof to support such contention.
Neither did she submit any proof as to the
inapplicability of R.A. No. 9225 to her.
The Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.
9. MACALINTAL VS COMELEC
Romulo Macalintal, as a lawyer and a taxpayer,
questions the validity of the Overseas Absentee
Voting Act of 2003 (R.A. 9189). He questions the
validity of the said act on the following grounds,
among others:
That the provision that a Filipino already
considered an immigrant abroad can be allowed
to participate in absentee voting provided he
executes an affidavit stating his intent to return
to the Philippines is void because it dispenses of
the requirement that a voter must be a resident
of the Philippines for at least one year and in
the place where he intends to vote for at least 6
months immediately preceding the election;
That the provision allowing the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) to proclaim winning
candidates insofar as it affects the canvass of
votes and proclamation of winning candidates
for
president
and
vice-president,
is
unconstitutional because it violates the
Constitution for it is Congress which is
empowered to do so.
ISSUE: Whether or not Macalintals arguments
are correct.

HELD: No.
There can be no absentee voting if the absentee
voters are required to physically reside in the

Philippines within the period required for nonabsentee voters. Further, as understood in
election laws, domicile and resident are
interchangeably used. Hence, one is a resident
of his domicile (insofar as election laws is
concerned). The domicile is the place where
one has the intention to return to. Thus, an
immigrant who executes an affidavit stating his
intent to return to the Philippines is considered
a resident of the Philippines for purposes of
being qualified as a voter (absentee voter to be
exact). If the immigrant does not execute the
affidavit then he is not qualified as an absentee
voter.
The said provision should be harmonized. It
could not be the intention of Congress to allow
COMELEC to include the proclamation of the
winners in the vice-presidential and presidential
race. To interpret it that way would mean that
Congress allowed COMELEC to usurp its power.
The canvassing and proclamation of the
presidential and vice presidential elections is
still lodged in Congress and was in no way
transferred to the COMELEC by virtue of RA
9189.