CESAR HILARIO, as attorney-in-fact of Ibrahim Hiilario et al vs.

ALLAN SALVADOR, et
al
FACTS:
On September 3, 1996, petitioners filed a complaint with RTC of Romblon against
the respondent based on the following allegations:
a. Salvador constructed his dwelling of mixed materials on the property of
the petitioners without the latters knowledge;
b. Demands to vacate have been made but Salvador averred that he sought
permission from the petitioners grandmother Concepcion;
c. Efforts to amicably settle were tried as evidenced by the Barangay Certification
but to no avail;
e. Petitioners have been constrained to engage the services of a lawyer to protect
their rights and interests
However, the respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction over the nature of the action citing Section 33 of BP 129 and
contended that: a. The complaint failed to state the assessed value of the land in
dispute; b. The complaint does not sufficiently identified and/or described the parcel
of land referred. Said facts, according to the respondent were essential for
determining the jurisdiction of the court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC had acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter?
RULING:
RTCruled that the action is incapable of pecuniary estimation and therefore
cognizable by the RTC
CA reversed the decision of the RTC upholding that the case is one of recovery of
ownership and real property and absent any allegation of the assessed value, the
MTC had exclusive jurisdiction SC- ruled that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the
subject matter, thus, all decisions rendered are null and void
The action of the petitioners filed on September 3, 1996 does not involve a claim of
ownership over the property. They allege that they are co-owners thereof, and as
such, entitled to its possession, and that the private respondent, who was the
defendant, constructed his house thereon in 1989 without their knowledge and
refused to vacate the property despite demands for him to do so. They prayed that
the private respondent vacate the property and restore possession thereof to them.
When the petitioners filed their complaint on September 3, 1996, R.A. No. 7691 was
already in effect. The determining jurisdictional element for the
accion reinvindicatoria
is, as RA 7691 discloses, the assessed value of the property in question. For
properties in the provinces, the RTC has jurisdiction if the assessed value exceeds
P20,000, and the MTC, if the value is P20,000 or below. An assessed value can have
reference only to the tax rolls in the municipality where the property is located, and
is contained in the tax declaration. In the case at bench, the most recent tax
declaration secured and presented by the plaintiffs-appellees is Exhibit B. The loose
remark made by them that the property was worth 3.5 million pesos, not to mention
that there is absolutely no evidence for this, is irrelevant in the light of the fact that
there is an assessed value. It is the amount in the tax declaration that should be
consulted and no other kind of value, and as appearing in Exhibit B, this is P5,950.

The case, therefore, falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal
Trial Court of Romblon which has jurisdiction over the territory where the property
is located, and not the court
a quo.
CESAR SAMPAYAN vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, CRISPULO VASQUEZ and
FLORENCIA VASQUEZ GILSAN G.R. No. 156360. January 14, 2005
FACTS:
A complaint for forcible entry was filed by siblings Crispulo Vasquez and Florencia
Vasquez-Gilsano against Cesar Sampayan before the MCTC of Agusan del Sur, for
allegedly having entered and occupied a parcel of land through strategy and
stealth, and built a house thereon without their knowledge, consent or
authority. Defendant Sampayan denied the allegations and moved for the
dismissal of the complaint. He averred the following:
that neither the plaintiffs nor their mother have ever been in possession
of the land and that he
does not even know plaintiffs identities or their places of residence.
he did not enter the subject lot by stealth or strategy because he asked and
was given permission
therefor by Maria Ybaez, the overseer of the lots true owners, Mr. and
Mrs. Anastacio Terrado who were then temporarily residing in Cebu City
for business purposes.
plaintiff s claim has long prescribed for the reason that the lot in dispute had
been possessed and declared for taxation purposes by the spouses
Felicisimo Oriol and Concordia Balida-Oriol in 1960, and that in 1978, the
Oriol spouses sold one-half (1/2) of the lot to the spouses Mr. and Mrs.
Anastacio Terrado, while the other half, to the couple Manolito Occida and Juliana
Sambale-Occida in 1979. Both vendees have actually possessed the respective
portions purchased by them up to the present. The MCTC rendered jud
gment dismissing the compliant for lack of merit. Therefrom, the
plaintiffs appealed to the RTC, which reversed that of the MCTC, taking note of the
fact that Cristita Quita was among the oppositors in Cadastral Case No. 149 and
that she filed a Miscellaneous Sales Application over the lot. On the basis of such
finding, the RTC concluded that it was Cristita Quita, predecessor-ininterest of the herein private respondents, who was in actual prior
physical possession of the land. Unable to accept the RTC judgment, Sampayan
went to the CA on a petition for review which was denied. His motion for
reconsideration having been similarly denied. Sampayan now files a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45.
PETITIONERS CONTENTION
: He had sufficiently proven his prior physical possession of the subject lot.
Private respondents complaint for forcible entry has no leg to stand on since the
proper remedy
available to the latter is accion publiciana or plenaria de posesion which falls under
the original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and not of Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts.
ISSUES:
1.
Whether or not the MCTC had jurisdiction over the complaint filed in this case 2.

Whether or not the complaint for forcible entry is proper.

HELD:
1.
YES.
For the MCTC to acquire jurisdiction over a forcible entry case, it is enough that the
complaint avers the jurisdictional facts, i.e. that the plaintiff had prior physical
possession and that he was deprived thereof by the defendant through force,
intimidation, threats, strategy and stealth. The complaint in this case makes such an
averment. Hence, the irrelevant circumstance that the evidence
adduced during the hearing rendered improper an action for forcible entry is of no
moment and cannot deprive the MCTC of its jurisdiction over the case. The MCTC
continues to have that jurisdiction. 2.
NO. ACCION PUBLICIANA OR PLENARIA DE POSESION
is the proper action. In an action for forcible entry, the plaintiff must prove that
he was in prior possession of the land or building and that he was deprived thereof
by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. Absence of prior physical
possession by the plaintiff in a forcible entry case warrants the dismissal of his
complaint. In the instant case, there is an uncontested finding of the MCTC judge
himself during his ocular inspection of the premises in dispute that what he saw
thereat "confirmed the allegations of the defendant [now petitioner Sampayan that
his predecessors-in-interest have introduced improvements by planting caimito
trees, coconut trees, and others on the land in question", adding that "Nothing can
be seen on the land that plaintiff (now respondents) had once upon a time been in
possession of the land". Likewise, MCTC Judge categorically stated that "The
allegation that Cristita Quita, the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs had been in
possession of the said property since 1957, openly, exclusively, continuously,
adversely and in the concept of an owner is a naked claim, unsupported by any
evidence". Then, too, there is the sworn affidavit of Dionesia Noynay to the effect
that she had been residing since 1960 onward on Lot No. 1957, the lot adjacent to
Lot No. 1959, and that neither the private respondents nor their mother had ever
possessed Lot No. 1959. Coming as it does from an immediate neighbor,
Dionesias statement commands great weight and respect. Incidentally, the
MCTC judge himself found
during the ocular inspection that a portion of the house of Macario Noynay, husband
of Dionesia, protruded on Lot No. 1959. Thus, finding for the petitioner, the instant
petition is GRANTED and the Decision and Resolution, respectively dated May 16,
2002 and November 7, 2002, of the Court of Appeals REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Ganila v CA 28 June 2005 |
Quisumbing Overview: Herrera filed ejectment complaints against Ganila et
al with the MCTC. On appeal, Ganila et al questioned the jurisdiction of the
MCTC. The SC ruled that being a case for unlawful detainer, it was within the
jurisdiction of the MCTC and that Ganila et al are barred from raising their opposition
for the first time on appeal. Statement of the Case Petition for review on certiorari.
Facts: Violeta Herrera filed 21 ejectment complaints alleging that she owns Lot
1227 of Jordan, Guimaras and that she tolerated Ganila et al (18 persons and the

Baptist Christian Learning Center) to construct residential houses or other

improvements on certain portions of the lot without rental. When she
asked Ganila et al to vacate, they refused. Barangay conciliation failed;
hence, she filed the complaints. 8 claimed that Lot 1227 was formerly a
shoreline. 8 maintained that their houses stood on Lot 1229. 3 assrted that Lot
1227 is a social forest area. Geodetic engineers surveyed the area and
reported that all the houses were inside Lot 1227.
MCTC rendered decision in favor of Herrera and ordered Ganila et al to vacate.
RTC dismissed the appeal and the CA affirmed the denial.
Issues:
WON MCTC erred in taking jurisdiction over and deciding the case WON RTC and CA
erred in sustaining the MCTCs judgment?
HELD: No. Ganila et al insist that Herrera should have filed an action to
recover possession de jure, not a mere complaint for ejectment because (1)
they possessed Lot 1227 in good faith for more than 30 years and (2)
there was no withholding of possession since Herrera was not in prior
possession of the lot.
The SC agrees with Herrera that there was no error in her choice of
remedy. The complaint itself is defined by the allegations therein, not the
allegations of Ganila et al. Besides, Ganila et al have admitted in their preliminary
statement that the complaints filed are indeed for unlawful detainer, and that the
only issue to be determined is mere physical possession and not juridical
possession. While petitioners assert that this case involves only deprivation of
possession, they confuse the remedy of an action for forcible entry with that of
unlawful detainer. In unlawful detainer, prior physical possession by the
plaintiff is not necessary. It is enough that plaintiff has a better right of
possession. Actual, prior physical possession of a property by a party is
indispensable only in forcible entry cases. Also, the defendant is necessarily in
prior lawful possession of the property but his possession eventually becomes
unlawful upon termination or expiration of his right to possess. Thus, the fact that
petitioners are in possession of the lot does not automatically entitle them
to remain in possession. And the issue of prior lawful possession by the
defendants does not arise at all in a suit for unlawful detainer, simply because prior
lawful possession by virtue of contract or other reasons is given or admitted. Unlike
in forcible entry where defendants, by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth,
deprive the plaintiff or the prior physical possessor of possession. Here there is no
evidence to show that petitioners entered the lot by any of these acts. An unlawful
detainer is different from a possessory action and from a reinvidicatory action in
that the first is limited to the question of possession de facto. Aside from the
summary action of ejectment, accion publiciana or the plenary action to recover the
right of possession and accion reinvidicatoria or the action to recover ownership
which includes recovery of possession, make up three kinds of actions to judicially
recover possession. Herreras allegations sufficiently present a case of
unlawful detainer: (1) she owns Lot 1227, (2) she tolerated Ganila et al to
construct houses, (3) she withdrew her tolerance, and (4) Ganila et refused to heed
her demand. The suit was well-within the jurisdiction of MCTC. Besides, Ganila et al
raised their opposition only for the first time in their appeal, they are now stopped
from doing so. Judgment: petition is denied.

Ross Rica Sales Center v Sps Ong;

Facts:
In a Decision dated 6 January 1998, the Court of Appeals overturned the
decisions of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) and the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Mandaue City, ruling instead that the
MTC had no jurisdiction over the subject complaint for unlawful detainer.
This petition for review prays for the reversal of the aforesaid CA Decision. 1. The
case originated from a complaint for ejectment filed by RRSC & JKI against
SPOUSES ONG, before the MTC of Mandaue City. In the complaint, RRSC & JKI
alleged the fact of their ownership of three (3) parcels of land covered by
TCT Nos. 36466, 36467 and 36468. 2.RRSC & JKI likewise acknowledged
respondent Elizabeth Ong's ownership of the lots previous to theirs. 3.
26Jan1995: Atty. Joseph M. Baduel, representing Mandaue Prime Estate Realty,
wrote SPOUSES ONG informing them of its intent to use the lots and
asking them to vacate within thirty (30) days from receipt of the letter.
But SPOUSES ONG allegedly refused to vacate, thereby unlawfully
withholding possession of said lots. 4. RRSC & JKI had acquired the lands
from Mandaue Prime Estate Realty through a sale made on 23 March 1995. In
turn, it appears that Mandaue Prime Estate Realty had acquired the properties
from the SPOUSES ONG through a Deed of Absolute Sale dated 14 July 1994.
However, this latter deed of sale and the transfers of title consequential thereto
were subsequently sought to be annulled by SPOUSES ONG in a complaint
filed on 13 February 1995 before the Mandaue RTC against Mandaue Prime
Estate Realty. Per record, this case is still pending resolution.
5.MTC RULING: Ordering SPOUSES ONG to vacate the premises in question and to
peacefully turn over possession thereof to RRSC & JKI.
6. RTC RULING: affirming the MTC's decision in its entirety. 7.SPOUSES ONG's MR
was denied. Hence, appeal to CA.
8.CA RULING: that the MTC had no jurisdiction over said case as there was no
contract between the parties, express or implied, as would qualify the same as one
for unlawful detainer. Thus, the assailed Orders of the MTC and RTC were set aside.
9. Hence the present petition- RRSC & JKI then took this recourse via Petition for
Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Issue: WON the Complaint satisfies the jurisdictional requirements for a case of
unlawful detainer properly cognizable by the MTC?
Held: YES, MTC/RTC HAD JURISDICTION
RATIO: The presence of a contract is not a requisite for unlawful detainer
case. The allegation in the complaint that there was unlawful withholding
of possession is sufficient to make out a case for unlawful detainer. It is
equally settled that in an action for unlawful detainer, an allegation that the
defendant is unlawfully withholding possession from the plaintiff is deemed
sufficient, without necessarily employing the terminology of the law. Hence, the
phrase "unlawful withholding" has been held to imply possession on the part of
defendant, which was legal in the beginning, having no other source than a
contract, express or implied, and which later expired as a right and is being withheld
by defendant. In the subject complaint, RRSC & JKI alleged that they are the
registered owners of the lots covered by TCT Nos. 36466, 36467 and 36468. By their

implied tolerance, they have allowed SPOUSES ONG, the former owners of the
properties, to remain therein. Nonetheless, they eventually sent a letter to SPOUSES
ONG asking that the latter vacate the said lots. SPOUSES ONG refused, thereby
depriving RRSC & JKI of possession of the lots. Clearly, the complaint establishes
the basic elements of an unlawful detainer case, certainly sufficient for
the purpose of vesting jurisdiction over it in the MTC.
Peralta-Labrador v Bugarin G.R. No. 165177; August 25, 2005 Facts: On January
18, 1996, petitioner Lilia V. Peralta-Labrador filed a case for Recovery of
Possession and Ownership, with the MTC of San Felipe, Zambales against
respondent Silverio Bugarin alleging the following:
She is the owner of the land, with an area of 400 sq. m. located at San Felipe,
Zambales, having purchased the same from spouses Artemio and Angela Pronto and
that she was issued Tax Declaration and paid the taxes due thereon.
DPWH constructed a road that traversed the land thereby separating 108 sq. m.
from the rest of petitioner's lot, for which she was issued Tax Declaration.
Sometime in 1994, respondent Silverio Bugarin forcibly took possession of the
108 sq. m. lot and refused to vacate the same despite the pleas of petitioner.
RESPONDENT'S CONTENTION:
-The area claimed by petitioner is included in the 4,473 square meter lot, covered
by the OCT No. P-13011; and that he has been in continuous possession and
occupation thereof since 1955;
-that MTC has no jurisdiction since the action has already prescribed. In his
Amended Answer with Counterclaim, however, respondent failed to allege that the
questioned lot is covered by the OCT No. P-13011, and instead asserted that he
planted fruit bearing trees in the property. The court a quo ruled in favor of
respondent declaring him as the owner of the controverted lot on the basis of the
OCT No. P-13011.
The complaint was dismissed for failure of petitioner to prove prior
physical possession and ownership thereof. The RTC affirmed MTC. Hence,
petitioner filed petition for review before the Court of Appeals. CA denied petition
for insufficiency of evidence to prove ownership or prior actual physical possession.
MR likewise denied. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not MTC has no jurisdiction over the complaint on the ground of
prescription?
Held: YES. MTC HAS NO JURISDICTION. Considering her allegation that the unlawful
possession of respondent occurred two years prior to the filing of the
complaint, the cause of action for forcible entry has prescribed and the
MTC had no jurisdiction to entertain the case. It is settled that jurisdiction over
the subject matter cannot be waived by the parties or cured by their silence,
acquiescence or even express consent. Hence, the failure of respondent to insist on
the defenses of lack of cause of action and prescription stated in his Amended
Answer with Counterclaim will not vest the MTC with jurisdiction over the case. An
action for forcible entry is a quieting process and the one year time bar for
filing a suit is in pursuance of the summary nature of the action. Thus, we
have nullified proceedings in the MTCs when it improperly assumed jurisdiction of a
case in which the unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession had exceeded
one year. After the lapse of the one year period, the suit must be
commenced in the RTC via an accion publiciana, a suit for recovery of the

right to possess. It is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of

possession of realty independently of title. It also refers to an ejectment suit filed
after the expiration of one year from the accrual of the cause of action or from the
unlawful withholding of possession of the realty independently of title. Likewise, the
case may be instituted before the same court as an accion reivindicatoria, which is
an action to recover ownership as well as possession. Corrollarily, jurisdiction of a
court is determined by the allegations of the complaint. Thus, in ascertaining
whether or not the action falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the inferior courts,
the averments of the complaint and the character of the relief sought are to be
examined. It is clear that petitioner's averment make out a case for forcible entry
because she alleged prior physical possession of the subject lot way back in 1976,
and the forcible entry thereon by respondent. Petitioner's complaint therefore
should have been filed with the proper RTC. Moreover, even if the MTC has
jurisdiction over the subject matter, the complaint should still be dismissed because
petitioner failed to prove that the controverted 108 sq. m. lot is part of Cadastra Lot
No. 2650. Failing to discharge this burden, the dismissal of the complaint is
proper.
Serina v Caballero
Facts: Sps Serina filed a complaint for quieting of title, recovery of
possession and damages against Caballero and his tenants Sps. Donela
(Cagayan de Oro City). Serina alleged that they are the absolute owners and have
been in actual possession for 35 years of a parcel of land. Sometime in 1982, they
allegedly discovered that Caballero was claiming ownership over the land and
offering it for sale or mortgage.
Held: In order that an action for recovery of possession may prosper, it is
indispensable that he who brings the action fully proves not only his ownership but
also the identity of the property claimed, by describing the location, area and
boundaries thereof. Boundaries set forth in complaint not the same as in the Deed
of Sale
Perez v Mendoza
Facts: Felisa Montalbo inherited land from her father, which she exchanged with that
of her aunt, Andrea. After the exchange, Andrea donated half the land to daughter
Margarita. Margarita and husband occupied the land continuously in the concept of
owners. When Nicolas sought the transfer of property in their names, he submitted
the deed of exchange. Perezes then accused sps. Nicolas and Andrea of falsifying
the deed of exchange
Held: Possession is an indicium of ownership of the thing possessed and to the
possessor goes the presumption that he holds the thing under a claim of
ownership. Perezes failed to prove ownership of land
Dizon v CA
Facts: Galang spouses owned 2 lots, which they mortgaged. Their son Dionisio
redeemed the lot in his own name despite that fact that the funds came from his 5
sisters. After a cadastral survey of the lots, CFI ordered the issuance of OCTs solely
in Dionisio's name. the heirs of Dionisio's sisters claim that the 6 Galang siblings
partitioned the lots in an unnotarized affidavit

Held: The properties belonged solely to Dionisio and not in co-ownership with his
sisters. Dionisio's ownership had been judicially confirmed by the CGI, which
involved a proceeding in rem and hence, binding on the whole world. Moreover, the
sisters objected only 61 years after the issuance of the OCT.
Lunod v Meneses;
Facts:
14th of March, 1904, Nicolas Lunod, et.al., alleging that they each owned
and possessed farm and, situated in the places known as Maytunas and Balot,
near a small lake named Calalaran; that the defendant Higino Meneses, is the
owner of a fish-pond and a strip of land situated in Paraanan, adjoining
the said lake on one side, and the River Taliptip on the other; that from time
immemorial, and consequently for more than twenty years before 1901, there
existed and still exists in favor of the rice fields of the plaintiffs a
statutory easement permitting the flow of water o'er the said land in
Paraanan, which easement the said plaintiffs enjoyed until the year 1901 and
consisted in that the water collected upon their lands and in the Calalaran Lake flow
through Paraanan into the (Taliptip River. From that year however, the defendant,
without any right or reason, converted the land in Paraanan into a
fishpond and by means of a dam and a bamboo net, prevented the free
passage of the water through said place into the Taliptip River, that in
consequence the lands of the plaintiff became flooded and damaged by
the stagnant waters,
They therefore asked that judgment be entered against the defendant, declaring
that the said tract of land in Paraanan is subject to a statutory easement permitting
the flow of water from the property of the plaintiffs,
Meneses denied each and everyone of the allegations of the complaint, and
alleged that no statutory easement existed nor could exist in favor of the lands
described in the complaint, permitting the waters to flow over the fish pond that he,
together with his brothers, owned in the sitio of Bambang, the area and boundaries
of which were stated by him, and which he and his brothers had inherited from their
deceased mother
.
Held: Upon the evidence adduced by both parties to the suit, the court, on the 13th
of March, 1907, entered judgment declaring that the plaintiffs were entitled to a
decision in their favor, and sentenced the defendant to remove the dam
placed on the east of the Paraanan passage on the side of the Taliptip
River opposite the old dam in the barrio of Bambang, as well as to remove
and destroy the obstacles to the free passage of the waters through the
strip of land in Paraanan
Ratio: It appears to have been clearly proven in this case that the lands owned by
the plaintiffs in the aforesaid barrio, as well as the small adjoining lake, named
Calalaran, are located in places relatively higher than the sitio called Paraanan
where the land and fish pond of the defendant are situated, and which border on
the Taliptip River; that during the rainy season the rain water which falls on he land
of the plaintiffs, and which flows toward the small Calalaran Lake at flood time, has
no outlet to the Taliptip River other than through the low land of Paraanan: that the
border line between Calalaran and Paraanan there has existed from time
immemorial a dam, constructed by the community for the purpose of preventing the

salt waters from the Taliptip River, at high tide, from flooding the land in Calalaran,
passing through the lowlands of Paraanan
According to article 530 of the Civil Code, an easement is charge imposed upon
one estate for the benefit of another estate belonging to a different owner, and the
realty in favor of which the easement isestablished is called the dominant estate,
and the one charged with it the servient estate. The lands of Paraanan being the
lower are subject to the easement of receiving and giving passage to the waters
proceeding from the higher lands and the lake of Calalaran; this easement was not
constituted by agreement between the interested parties; it is of a statutory nature,
and the law had imposed it for the common public utility in view of the difference in
the altitude of the lands in the Barrio Bambang. Article 552 of the Civil Code
provides: Lower estates must receive the waters which naturally and without the
intervention of man descend from the higher estates, as well as the stone or earth
which they carry with them. Neither may the owner of the lower estates
construct works preventing this easement, nor the one of the higher
estate works increasing the burden. The special law cited in the Law of
Waters of August 3, 1866, article 111 of which, treating of natural easements
relating to waters, provides: Lands situated at a lower level are subject to receive
the waters that flow naturally, without the work of man, from the higher lands
together with the stone or earth, which they carry with them. The defendant
Meneses might have constructed the works necessary to make and
maintain a fish pond within his own land, but he was always under the
strict and necessary obligation to respect the statutory easement of
waters charged upon his property, and had no right to close the passage
and outlet of the waters flowing from the lands of the plaintiffs and the
lake of Calalaran into the Taliptip River. He could not lawfully injure the owners
of the dominant estates by obstructing the outlet to the Taliptip River of the waters
flooding the upper lands belonging to the plaintiffs.