1963:Augustines View of Reality, Vernon J. Bourke, Saint Louis University. Villanova, PA: Villanova University Press.

Introduction
The Saint Augustine Leeture, presented annually
by Villanova University and having for its general
theme "Saint Augustine and the Augustinian Tradition," was inaugurate in the Spring of 1959. Eaeh
year outstanding seholars from here and abroad are
invited to diseuss signifieant and timely aspeets of
Saint Augustine's thought and influenee. These leetures are subsequently made available in published
form.
Ever sinee the appearanee in 1945 of his wellknown work "Augustine's Quest of Wisdom," Dr.
Vernon J. Bourke has eontinued to gain reeognition
and authority in the field of Augustinian seholarship.
Partieularly noteworthy is his eomplete translation of
the Con/essions of Saint Augustine published in 1953
for the series entitled The Fathers 0/ the Church.
In the present leeture, Dr. Bourke surveys the strueture of Augustine's philosophy in an eflort to diseover
the Saint's authentie notion of being. The result is a
riehly-doeumented and penetrating study of a problem
that is of unusual interest and importanee for Augustinian students of our time.
The Editor wishes to thank Dr. Benediet A. Paparella, Assoeiate Professor of Philosophy at Villanova
University, for generous assistanee in the preparation
of the leeture for publieation.
Robert P. RusselI, O.S.A.
Villanova University
Villanova, Pennsylvania
v

Author's Preface

A word of explanation of the contents of this little

study may not be amiss. The basic lecture on Augustine's View 0/ Reality is essentially the same text that
was presented orally. Since the interpretation of 8t.
Augustine's metaphysics hinges on the meaning of
certain Latin words ( essentia, esse, causa existendi,
substantia, mensura, numerus, ordo, ratio, idea, jorma,
etc.) in their actual contexts, quotations from English translations of Augustine would not provide an
adequate documentary base for our discussion. Moreover, certain key texts would have had to be cited
several times, in order to document various points
in the exposition. To avoid repetition of these texts in
different footnotes and to provide the reader with
easy access to them, thirty-nine of these Latin selections have been included, in the section entitled
viii

Selected Texts. These 11ave been numbered according

to chronological sequence (except for the passages
from the Enarrationes in Psalmos which have been
placed at the end, because their dates are not clearly
established) and reference is made to them by their
Text numbers.

The edition used for all quotations and references

is the Maurist: Sancti Aurel Augustini, Opera
Omnia, opera et studio Monachorum Ordinis Sancti
Benedicti e congregatione Sancti Mauri, Venetiis
MDCCXXIX-MDCCXXXIV, in eleven volumes.
This is an accurate reprint of the original Maurist
edition of Paris 1679. Tllere are two reasons for using
it. First, there is as yet no complete critical edition
of St. Augustine's Latin works. Second, it is generally
recognized that the Maurist editors employed some
good manuscripts which are no longer extant. To
secure uniformity of reference, then, this excellent old
edition (also reprinted, but with some errors, in Migne,
Patrologia Latina, tomes 32-47) has been taken as
the source of the key texts. The only change made
here has been to print causa for their caussa and to
delete a few of the conlmas which the Maurists sprinkled liberally in their sentences. Since internal references are also given for all quotations, they may be
checked in any modern printing without great difficulty.
Brief notes on four topics (participation, causality,
analogy, and the meaning of In Idipsum) which were
not treated in the lecture are offered in the Appendices. It is hoped that t11ese may suggest areas in which
IX

future research on the metaphysics of 8t. Augustine

could be prosecuted. Secondary studies of these topics
are much needed today, if we are to understand the
Augustinian approach to being.
In the Bibliography, those secondary works that
have been used in the preparation of the lecture and
appendices have been listed. It is obvious that we lack
a definitive study of St. Augustine's theory of reality
but one may hope that the present brief introduction
will stimulate more scholarly publication in this field.
There remains only the pleasant task of expressh,g
my gratitude to the Reverend Robert P. Russell,
O.S.A., and his associates at Villanova University,
for the opportunity to do something that I have long
had in mind. Father Russell 110t only brought this
ambition to accomplishment, he put at my disposal
his Index to St. Augustine (an unpublished collection
of cards listing thousands of key texts on the thought
and language of the Bishop of Hippo). Several of
the references used in my Appendices were located
as a result of consulting Father Russell's index cards.
With the growth of Villanova University as a center
of Augustinian studies, one may look forward to the
possibility that this valuable Index may eventually
be published.

A ugustine's V iew 0/ Reality

8t. Augustine of Hippo wrote many treatises. Much

of his thought in these works is practical, moral and
religious in character. Indeed, he apparently feIt that
all serious thinking should have some bearing on what
constitutes a good and happy life, and so Augustinian
wisdom is preeminently a type of practical knowledge.
However, Augustine obviously has some sort of Weltanschauung, some general theory of reality, which
would entitle him to consideration in the history of
human speculation on ultimate matters. Whether he
may properly be called a metaphysician, remains an
open question : the answer depends, at least in part,
on how we define metaphysics. I would not suggest

that Augustine developed a demonstrative science of

ultimate reality of tlle type that Aristotle attempted
in his Metaphysics. Yet Augustine did look for, and
succeeded in finding, certain characteristic answers to
some of the same problems that are raised in traditional
metaphysics. 80me of these answers originate in simple
insights found in the Bible but they take on a new
dimension of meaning as a result of Augustine's personal curiosity and wonder.
It is proposed to examine here some OI his thinking
on these ultimate questions of speculative wisdom-not
with the intention of offering a definitive statement of
Augustinian metaphysics Cif such there be) but rather
to open up a field which has been somewhat neglected
in recent study of the Bishop of Hippo.
1

Belief and Reason

Early in his life, 5t. Augustine decided that there
are two ways in which a man may leam: one is the
way of faith, the other the way of reason. 1 He was
much impressed by the text of Isaias 7: 9, nisi credideritis, non intelligetis (unless you will have believed,
you will not understand). Through Augustine, this
text in the 5eptuagint suggested the slogan which
medieval intellectualism adopted as its own: "faith
seeking understanding."2 As far as Augustine was
concerned, it is the function of faith to accept what is
not yet seen. 3 On the other hand, reason culminates
in a direct vision of what is true. In the cognitive
sense, Augustlllian ratio has little to do with discursive
and demonstrative reasoning in the Aristotelian sense.
Reason is the gaze of tlle mind upon its appropriate
objects. 4
Augustinian belief does not always imply religious
or supematural faith. There is an interesting passage
in which he distinguishes three kinds of objects of
belief (tria genera credibilium). Sonle things, Augustine explains, are always believed and never understood: these are events in hunlan history that are not
witnessed by the believer. Secondly, there are other
things that are understood as soon as they are believed: these are all items evident to human reason,
all mathematical and other truths in the various academic disciplines. Finally, there are things that must
first be believed and then later understood by persons
who live good moral and religious lives: these are
divine truths, matters of religious faith. 5 It is clear that
the notion of faith seeking understanding applies par2

ticularly to the third category but that Augustine also

regards any sort of mental assent as an act of faith,
provided it is not based on an immediate experience
of the truth. In point of fact, he so defines faith, in
one of his later writings: "to believe is simply to
think with assent."6
Three Levels 0/ Reality
Now Augustine not only believed but also understood that all things fall into a triple-Iayered scheme
of reality.7 At the top is God, in the middle is the
hunlan soul, and at the bottom is the world of
bodies. 8 Apart from these three levels of the divine,
the psychic and the corporeal, there are no other
general types of beings. Things do exist and are, in a
broad sense, real-on all three levels. Augustine never
doubts, for instance, the existence of even the lowest
sorts of bodies. 9
One of the chief ways in which these levels are distinguished is by their relations to t11e quality of immutability. God is not subject to any kind of change:
He remains always the same. God is unmoved, either
in regard to space or time. Similarly, the divine truths,
the exenlplary Ideas in the mind of God, are eternal
and immutable. Not only basic religious truths but
also the immutable judgments of all wisdom, the true
principles of mathematics, logic and morals, abide
eternally and immutably on the top level with God.
This is the level of the rationes aeternae, Wllich are
eternal standards of reality, truth and goodness. 10
The second level of reality includes all created
spirits, both 11uman souls and angels. Such beings are
not subject to change in space or place: in this they
3

too are immutable. In regard to time, created spirits

are mutable; they grow older, they are modified by
cognitive and moral changes: in this they are mutable. 11 All finite spirits share in this mixed characteristic of spatial immutability and temporal mutability.
Some angels and some human souls eventually achieve
rest with God; the rest never reach such stability and
are doomed to perpetual disturbance away from God.
The good angels are now "with God" and enjoy a
stability which is similar to that participation in divine
in1mutability that is granted to the souls of blessed
human persons in Heaven. 12
All bodies, whether living or not, exist on the lowest level. They are in no way immutable. There is no
true permanence in this lowest order of being. Corporeal things are subject both to temporal and local
changes. 13 They exist but, of themselves, they are not
really enduring. Bodies lack that dimension of being
which Augustine calls manentia, a feature that we
shall return to later. The primary cause of change
and motion in the bodily world is GOd. 14 There are
secondary causes, however, which God has created
in matter from the very beginning. 15 These created
causes are the rationes seminales, those seedlike but
infinitesin1al principles which are the immediate factors of growth and reproduction t11foughout the biological order. 16 Whether there are any non-living
natural forces in the world of Augustine is not clear.
It is possible that he considered an bodily changes to
be related to some principle of life. 17 For this reason,
it is difficult to find anything like modem physics or
chemistry among the academic disciplines recognized
4

by Augustine. On the other hand, biologists and

psychologists will find him a kindred spirit.
In one sense, Augustine's triple-Iayered schematism
reduces to a dualism. The great difference is between
the mutable and the immutable. 18 One might say
that he has made room in bis thinking for the permanent being of Parmenides and for the flux of
Heraclitus. It is closer to bistorical fact to say that
Augustine accepts, with some modifications, the two
worlds of Plato: above is the realm of intelligible and
unchanging Ideas; below is the region of flickering
shadows. Writing at the beginning of bis literary
career, Augustine expressed bis general satisfaction
with Platonism:
It is quite enough for my purpose that Plato feIt
that there are two worlds, the one intelligible in
which truth dweIls, the other sensible and evident
to our visual and tactile sense perceptions. 19
The world of intelligible forms is the realm of true
reality; the lower world of bodies is but a copy of it.
Augustine makes only two revisions in Plato's theory
of Ideal Forms-and he was probably unaware that
he was editing the original. He insists that the Platonic Ideas are contained in the divine mind;20 and
he obviously thinks that there are divine Ideas not
only for the various species and genera of created
things but also that there is an Idea in God's mind
for each individual creature. 21
In Augustine's day, philosophy was commonly
divided into tllree parts: rational, moral and physical. 22 The last, physica, professed to treat the natures
of all realities. Summarizing the Platonie theory of
;

reality in the maturely written City 0/ God, Augustine

still insists that it is the best example of a pagan
philosophy.
The Platonists saw that what is mutable is not the
supreme God: and so they rose above every mutable
soul and all changeable spirits, in their quest for
the highest God. Then they saw that no species in
a mutable reality, whereby a thing is what it is,
whatever its mode of being and nature iS,-no
species could have existence except from that which
truly exists because it does so unchangeably. As
a result, existence is not possible unless it comes
from Him who simply is: neither for the whole
world of bodies, shapes, qualities and orderly motions, including the elements arranged in their
places from sky to earth, nor for whatever kinds
of bodies are constituted out of them; nor for any
sort of life, whether nutritive and enduring as in
plants, or for the sort of life that has t11ese properties and also the capacity to sense, as in the case of
beasts, or for the kind of life that has these properties and also the capacity to understand, as in the
case of men, or for the kind of life that has no
nutritional needs but simply endures, perceives and
understands, as is the case with the angels.
Indeed, in Him [God] it is not one thing to be,
another thing to live (as if He could exist without
living); nor is it one thing to live and another
thing to understand (as if He could live and not
understand ); nor finally is it one thing for Him to
understand and another thing to be happy (as if
He could understand and not be happy); instead,
6

for Hirn to live, to understand, to be happy-this

is for Hirn to be. 23
This remarkable text has been quoted at length, because it is not merely a historical account of Augustine's notion of Platonism. It is one of the key passages in which Augustine has set down the framework
of his own ontology.24
How Augustine Understood Being
The question now to be faced is: how did Augustine really think of being? Did he ever achieve metaphysical knowledge? Both St. Augustine and St.
Thomas Aquinas meditated a great deal on the text
in Exodus 3: 14, where God addresses Moses, saying,
"I am Wl10 am." Of course, Aquinas interprets this
statement in function of 11is highly developed theory
of potency and act. For the Thomist, God is existential
act, the pure act-of-being. 25 God is saying, my Essence is To Be.
On the other hand, St. Augustine did not know the
theory of act and potency and he said that the Exodus
text means: "I am He Who never changes." It has
been suggested that Augustine is thinking like a
Platonist, not so much of existence as of being. 26
Augustine did stress the immutability of God. This
appears to incline his thought in the direction of a
type of supreme being that is static. In other words,
it may be argued that Augustine lacks an existential
approach to reality.27
Yet Augustine is not a man who deals with abstractions. Who would suggest that the God of the
Con/essions is a static entity? Even Augustine's phil7

osophic background might cause us to hesitate to

regard him as an essentialist. His reading of Neoplatonic philosophy not only freed him from a purely
materialistic notion of reality but it also inclined him
toward a basically dynamistic or energistic comprehension of the ultimate character of reality. The mature
Augustine came to think of God, the supreme instance of being, in active terms as the source or
principle of all activities. 28 Such a metaphysical dynamism would appear to be quite the opposite of a
theory of static essence.
It seems to me that Augustine and Aquinas had
almost entirely different notions of what it means to
understand and explain things. St. Thomas thought
that man's understanding, during this present life, was
limited to a direct comprehension of the beings that
are observed by sense perception. That is why he
always says that the proper object of the human intellect consists in the quiddities of sensible things. Indirectly, by dint of hard and lengthy reasoning, some
negative and analogical knowledge of immaterial
being can be achieved- but, for St. Thomas, man's
present understanding of being, existence, life, goodness, and so on, is derived entirely from human experience of corporeal realities. As a result, what St.
Thomas said about being was always in function of
the things that he primarily and directly understood,
material beings. He was quite right in reporting that
such instances of being are composite, not simple.
All the beings that Aquinas directly observed and
understood are composed of really distinct principles,
essence and esse. When he painfully and laboriously
8

established the conclusion that other beings besides

bodies do exist, 8t. Thomas brought with bim bis
initial understanding of being as composite but he
eventually discovered that God's being is not such.
God's being requires the Thomist to abandon bis
bifurcated notion of being and to recognize that, in
this supreme instance, the fact that God is is simply
identical with what He is.
Now the road to the human understanding of being
was quite different for Augustine. Rightly or wrongly,
he took it that man's understanding starts with something other than corporeal beings as objects. Augustine's starting-point is human experience of incorporeal
realities. 29 Indeed, 8t. Augustine did not think that
bodies, taken by themselves, have anything in them
that can be understood. Even finite spirits are not
intelligible apart from their 80urce, who is God.
The primary understanding to which Augustine laid
claim is that nothing in the world can be comprehended unless it be related to God. God is the only
instance of esse that is self-explanatory: He is ipsum
esse. so For Augustine, one does not explain or demonstrate God, by first knowing what reality means on
a lower level. True, God is reached by going through
the things that He has made but this is like saying that
New York is seen by going through the Holland tunnel. In the analogy of God and creatures, God is, in
Augustinism, always the primary analogate. S1 H you
think that you understand any being without referring
it to God, you are mistaken, as far as Augustine is
concerned.
9

One of the best ways to grasp this point is through

an examination of the three types of vision described
in the twelfth Book of the Literal Commentary on
Genesis. 32 Bodies are seen through corporeal vision;
the images of bodies are perceived and combined
through spiritual vision, and this is the level on which
ordinary human thinking (cogitatio) is accomplished;
finally, purely intelligible objects are seen (without any
inlages) through intellectual vision. (5t. Thomas has
nothing in his theory of human knowledge on earth
that is the equivalent of this imageless Augusthlian
intellection.) What are the objects of Augustine's
il1tellectual vision? He gives a sampie listing.
Charity, joy, peace, longanimity, kindness, goodness, faith, gentleness, continence and other items
like these, whereby an approach to God is made;
and also God Himself, from Whom, through Whom,
and in Whom, are all things. 33
Augustine goes on to say that corporeal vision
cannot be experienced without spiritual vision, and
the latter (which is an imaginative seeing of the
images of bodies) is always superior to the former.
Then he adds that nlan's soul, on the level of spirital
vision, requires intellectual vision in order to make
judgments but intellectual vision does not need spirital vision. 34 He does not assert that spirital vision may
not be experienced without an accompanying intellectual vision; indeed, his whole discussion in this
twelfth Book implies the possibility of imaginative,
dream, and even ecstatic, experiences that are not
understood by those who have them. What he does
emphasize is that one cannot understand one's ex10

periences of mutable things, unless one has some

direct mental intuition of purely intelligible realities.
To be able to judge mutable things, one must have
an independent vision of immutable standards of
judgment. Augustine insists on this point. Man's soul
can be in error on the levels of corporeal and spirital
vision. However, error is impossible concerning intelligible objects: in illis intellectualibus visis non
fallitur. 35 One either understands them and does so
truly, or, if one's understanding is not true, then it
is not understanding at al1. 36 We have seen that Augustine here illustrates the character of these objects of
purely intellectual vision by naming a group of Christian virtues, and then he includes God, because, as 11e
says, God is the Source of all things. So He must be
the Source of understanding.
Now to interpret what Augustine says here to mean
that a person first understands mutable beings and
later comes to an understanding of the immutable
God runs counter to the whole force of Augustine's
explanation. The mutable does not supply the principles, or starting-points, from which the immutable
is to be understood. On the contrary, one understands the realm of change by judging it in terms of
one's grasp of the immutable. It is not that Augustine
claimed that one must first see God before knowing
anything else; what he does say is that one must first
see the meaning of charity or joy, before one can
judge that a certain man is charitable or that a certain
event is joyful. Augustine's view is not ontologism
but, by the same token, it is not Thomism.
The procedures of Thomistic metaphysics are not
11

admissible in Augustine's view of reality. It would be

ridiculous for Augustine to say: in the beings which
first come into my understanding there is areal distinction between their essences and the fact that they
exist. He has cogitative experiences of a variety of
objects, none of these are understood until he sees
intellectua1ly that the primary and simplest instance of
being is that existing Essence which is God.
Where a non-Augustinian thinker is amazed to
find, after laborious reasonings from many understood instances of composite beings, that there is
another instance of being which is not composite but
so simple that for Hirn to be is simply to be what He
is,-Augustine is surprised to discover that, apart
from God Who simply is what He is, there are other
beings which exist but whose existence is not what
they are! These second-rate beings have an esse which
is not their essentia.
So, if we ca11 Augustine an essentialist, we must
understand essence as he did, as completely one with
esse. It is not a matter of first separating essence from
the act of being, and thus giving essence a reduced
and static meaning. That was what happened to
essentia in some types of medieval thought, after
Augustine. We must face up to the primary Augustinian meaning of essence, where (in the unique case of
God) essence fully embraces existence. Here is what
Augustine says:
Thou art my God.... And Thou dost cry out from
afar: Yea, verily, 1 amWho am. And 1 heard it as
one hears something in the heart, and there was no
reason for me to doubt. It would have been easier
12

for me to doubt that I am alive than that there is

no truth which is clearly seen being understood
through the things that are made.
And I looked closely at the other things below
Thee and saw that they are not wholly existent, nor
are they wholly non-existent. Indeed, they do exist,
for they are from Thee: but they do not exist, because they are not what Thou art. That truly exists
which abides immutably.37
The most obvious meaning of this much discussed
text seenlS to me to be this: there are two kinds of
beings that can be experienced by man, first God,
and second all things that are different from God yet
like Him in some remote way. The being of God is
being in the fullest sense; the being of all else is
really some sort of precarious composition of being
and non-being. Here, non-being is not the contradictory of esse but a deficiency in the fullness of being.
If one wishes to understand real being, this must be
done in terms of what God is-not in terms of the
second-rate being of creatures.
Elsewhere in the Con/essions, speaking of the
mutability of bodies and souls, Augustine says practically the same thing. A creature is a "nothing-something"; "it is but it is not."38 Clearly, Augustine does
not propose to present a theory of reality founded on
such metaphysical hybrids as instances of real being.
Augustine is not unaware of the difference between
the two questions: (i) does it exist? and (ii) what is
it that exists? If he were unable to distinguish these
queries, he would be an essentialist in the pejorative
sense. In fact, he recognizes three basic questions that
13

may be asked about any reality: does it exist; is it

this or that; and does it endure?39 Of course, he stated
these questions in an early letter but this is not the
only place in which he showed that he knew the difference between the question about existence and the
question about essence. In one of his answers to the
variety of questions that came to him as abishop, he
wrote:
For everything that is, there is one aspect whereby
it stands in being (aIiud est quo constat), another
whereby it is differentiated (aIiud quo discernitur) ,
and a third whereby it is in agreement (aliud
quo congruit). So, if the whole of creation exists
in same way, and is greatly different from tllat

which is nothing at all, and is congruent with itself

in all its parts, then there must be a threefold cause
for it: whereby it is, whereby it is this, whereby it
is in agreement with itself. Now we say that God
is the cause, that is the Author, of creation. So,
there must be a Trinity, than which perfected
reason can find nothing more exalted, more intelligent, or more blessed. And so, when truth is
sought, there can be only three kinds of questions :
whether it exists at all, whether it is this or that,
and whether it should be agreed to or not?40
Being ItseI!: Ipsum Esse
As a writer and thinker, Augustine was much limited by the nature of his education and by the conditions of the Latin language in his time. More than
a century later, Boethius, knowing more Greek than
Augustine and more of the thought of the Greek phi14

losophers, was able to fashion some of the basic terminology which provided the medium of linguistic
precision for the later medieval discussions of the
great problems in theology and philosophy. It is hard
to realize what a pioneer Augustine was. He knew no
word for being-in-general. Nor did he have a word
for reality. The present participle, ens, was not used
in the Patristic period. 41
Augustine had at his disposal words such as esse,
natura, and substantia. He had to make them fit his
thought. Essentia was a neologism which he always
used with some hesitation. There is a place in his
treatise On the Trinity, where he tries to pin down
its meaning. He has been talking about a person who
is trying to think about God and Augustine warns
that he should be careful not to think that God is
other than He is. Then he proceeds to ofIer this explanation.
Doubtless, He [God] is substance (substantia), or
if this is a better word essence (essentia) , what the
Greeks call ousia. For, as wisdom (sapientia) is
derived from what it is to be wise (ab eo quod est
sapere), and as knowledge (seientia) is from what
it is to know (seire) , so is essence (essentia) derived
from what it is to be (ab eo quod est esse). 42
This text is very difficult to put into English; some
translations imply that essentia, here, means some
sort of quality, or kind, of being. 43 It seems to mean
to-be-ness, which we express as being, in English.
In a later Book of the work On the Trinity, he returned to the problem of finding the right word for
this. Hepointed out that substantia is improperly ap15

plied to God, because it suggests the notion of

"standing under" accidents and God's attributes are
not accidents. Then Augustine added:
Hence it is obvious that God is improperly called
substance, and better usage requires that He be
understood as essence, which He is truly and prop"
erly called; and thus, perhaps God alone should
be called essence. For He alone truly is, since He is
immutable. 44
Notice how, in this text, essence is said to be appli..
cable to God in the proper sense. Now this certainly
suggests that the Augustinian meaning of essence does
not disassociate it from existence. This is precisely the
instance in which essence is coexistensive with existence.
In his discussion of the Manichaean notion of evil,
Augustine indicates what he means by esse. 45 They
claimed that evil is an existing nature and Augustine
undertook to show them that it cannot be. He argues
that to understand the highest good it is necessary to
understand the highest being. Men with attentive
minds can see that "something exists which is most
properly called esse in the highest and original
sense."46 This would be the primary instance of being
and would be immutable. Such is the truest meaning
of esse. 47
Applying this meaning to the problem in hand,
Augustine again recalls the Manichaean assertion that
evil is a nature or substance. 48 Now, they admit that
evil fights against nature, since it tends to make that..
which-is not to exist. 49 The whole force of Augustine's
argument is lost if it be interpreted to mean that esse,
16

or essentia, or natura (all three terms are used in the

passage) can become some other kind of being. The
only contrary that Augustine will permit is non
esse. 50 He is thinking of God's being not as acertain
kind of being, among other kinds, but as a unique
instance of existing being. At the end of the argument,
he concludes:
And so, as we speak of essence using a new word
derived from that which is to be (ab eo quod est
esse) in reference to what we frequently call substance, so the ancients who lacked this word used
the term nature for essence and substance. Therefore, if you wish to attend to the meaning without
being stubborn, evil is that which defects from
essence ( deficere ab essentia) and tends toward
.non-existence (ad id tendere ut non sit) .51
The plain conclusion to which Augustine comes is
that essentia signifies the opposite of non-being,
namely, existing being. Indeed, this is what he also
says in the treatise On the Immortality 0/ the Soul.
For, if no essence (in so far as it is essentia) has
any contrary, much less does this first essence which
is called Truth (in so far as it is essentia) have a
contrary. But the first hypothesis is true: for every
essence is essence for no other reason than the fact
that it is. To be has no contrary other than not to
be: hence nothing is the contrary of essence. Therefore, it is impossible for any thing (res ulla) to be
contrary to that substance which chiefly and primarily iS. 52
From these texts, it is clear that Augustine does not
think of essence as really distinct from esse, in its
17

primary meaning. If we call him a metaphysical

essel1tialist, then this label should be understood on
his own terms: essentia non ob aliud essentia est,
nisi quia est. 53 In every instance where you find essence, you find being itself, existing being. 54

The Triadic Character 0/ Reality

We have noted earlier that Augustine listed three
basic questions: (i) does it exist, (ii) what is it, and
(iii) does it endure? Thus far, we have considered
the importance of the first two questions. Much traditional metaphysics revolves around the first two
questions but says very little about the third. Augustine has an important third dimension in his analysis
of reality. Besides thinking about esse and essentia,
he dweIls upon the feature which he calls manentia.
Perhaps we may translate it as permanence or duration. 55 Actually, manentia takes us into the area of
the finality of being, for it has to do with the ordering of all things toward what is good and appropriate
for them. 56 Indeed, it is possible that Augustine's
third question about being somewhat anticipates modern value theory, since he also states this query in the
form: "is a thing to be approved or disapproved?"57
His triadic analysis partly stems from the biblical
text, "Thou has ordered all things in measure, and
number, and weight."58 His many meditations on this
basic triad led to the use of other sets of terms for
these three characteristics of reality. One of his best
explanations of the triad is found in the Literal Commentary on Genesis. 59 He has just finished talking
about the work of the first six days of creation, and
18

about the perfection and order in creation. Observing

the gradation of the parts of the universe, Augustine
professes suddenly to recall the statement that this
ordering involves measure, number and weight. He
wonders whether these three items existed somewhere
before creation, or whether they too were created.
Eventually, he decides that measure, number and
weight, as primary determinants of all things, must
have existed in God, for there was nothing other than
God before creation. Yet God is not measure, number
or weight, in the way that these items are present in
creatures. (Note that we have here an awareness of
the analogy of being, without the use of the terminology of analogy.) These supreme standards of divine
order are now given new names: measure, number
and weight now become modus, species and ordo.
The text ends with still another triad of verb forms:

God limits (terminat) , forms (format), and orders

(ordinat) all things.
It is always useful to keep in mind that Augustine
did not know the speculative philosophy of Aristotle. 60
He was never aware of the metaphysical theories of
potency and act, causality, matter and form, and so
on, as they are precisely found in Aristotelianism.
Augustine uses Latin terms for matter (materies,
materia) and form (forma, species) but his understanding of these terms is not Aristotelian. This does
not mean that Augustine is left without some notions
of the various determinants of being. In point of fact,
this role is played by the triad, measure, number and
weight, or their various equivalents.
The first member of the triad is called measure and
19

mode, as we have seen, and it is also associated with

the notion of limit or termination. 61 EIsewhere, Augustine extends the meaning of measure to include the
notion of unity and even esse. 62 Similarly, the second
member is not only designated as number but also as
species and forma. The third of these triadic determinants is called order, as weIl as weight. Unity, species
and order, for instance, is the set of terms used in the
following text:
So, all these things that are made by the divine
mind of the Creator manifest some sort of unity
and species and order, within themselves. For each
of these things is one thing, as is evident in the
case of bodily natures and psychic talents; and
each is formed by some species, such as the shapes
or qualities of bodies and the disciplines or artistic
skills of souls; and each seeks or holds some sort of
order, as is exemplified by the weights or respective
places of bodies and the loves and satisfactions of
souls. 63
Variations of these triadic principles are found
throughout Augustine's writingS. 64 Many interpreters
have treated them from the point of view of their use
in understanding the Christian teaching on the divine
Trinity.65 However, our interest is in the way in which
this trinitarian analysis may illuminate Augustine's
ontology.
It has been suggested by one interpreter66 that the
import of the first member of the triad is existential.
It is possible that Augustine is here trying to get at
the principle of existence in each instance of being.
If so, then modus (which is sometimes named esse)
20

may approximate the existential characteristic of every

entity. Fundamental to this interpretation is the fact
that the unity which Augustine attributes to each being
is not an abstraction but rather the concrete fact that
to be is to be one. 67
The second term of the triad, number or species, is
more obvious in its metaphysical role. Throughout
the second Book, De libero arbitrio, number is
stressed as that which gives form or species to each
and everything.
Look at the sky [Augustine says], the earth and
the sea, and whatever sInnes forth in them or
above them, or creeps underneath, or flies or
swims: they have forms (formas habent) because
they have numbers; take these away from them and
they will be nothing. 68
In many of the texts, the second term is called species,
a difficult word to translate. It carries the suggestion
of "external appearance"-that feature which renders a being visually beautiful or attractive. The adjectives, formosus and speciosus, mean beautiful. However, species has a more general meaning than the
basic esthetic one.
In the treatise On the True Religion,69 we find not
only that each thing exists as one but that it is distinguished from other things by its proper species
(et specie propria discernatur a ceteris). This would
seem to be the formal principle in each reality. In
the philosophies of the thirteenth century, this second
feature will be called essentia or natura. It is noteworthy that Augustine does not seem to use essence
or nature to designate the second term of the triade
21

As far as the third term is concerned, the meaning

of order or weight is rather clear. Augustine knows
that there are different types of order, in space, in
time, in causality, and in nobility. Much quoted is his
definition of order as, "the arrangement of equal and
unequal things which assigl1s to each its place."7o
Actually, this does not fully indicate the meaning of
ordo in the triad, mode, species and order. Of course,
order suggests that there is a place in the gradated
franlework of reality for each tlling. More t11an this,
ordo is a teleological term in Augustinian usage. It
takes us into the field of appetite, will and goodness.
Order is a value term.
In the Literal Commentary on Genesis,71 the weight
that characterizes each thing is said to be its own; it
is not God. A thing's pondus inclines it toward its
appropriate rest and stability. This seems to be connected with the notion of final causality. Obviously,
this association of order with the terminus, or good,
to which each real thing is inclined has some connection with the notion of manentia. To endure or abide
in being is not merely to last but to achieve that ideal
perfection in the whole of things which is part of the
divine plan of Providence. This is the theme of Augustine's early dialogue, De ordine. 72 Reviewing this work
in the Retractations,73 Augustine says that it faces the
great question: whether the order of divine Providence embraces all goods and evils. He denies that
God causes evils but he insists that all evils are ordered by God toward the over-all good. The point is
beautifully expressed by Augustine, in another work
against the Manichaeans.
22

If you wish to find what it is, observe where the

agent of corruption strives to lead: for it is what
influences things that are corrupted. Now all things
become defective through corruption from their
status in being, and as they are drawn away from
permanence they are drawn toward non-being. For,
to be pertains to duration (esse enim ad manendum
re/ertur). Hence, that which is said to be in the
highest and greatest way, is said to be enduring in
itself. Indeed, that which is changed for the better
does not change because it has endllred but because
it was perverted for the worse, that is, it fell short
of being (ab essentia deficiebat): the author of its
defection is not He who is the author of being.
Some things, then, are changed into better things
and on this account they incline toward being: nO'1
are they said to be perverted by this sort of changl~'
but rather they are turned back and converted. 1~~.
fact, perversion is the contrary of ordering. Those
things that incline toward being (esse) incline toward order, and when they have attained it tlley
have attained being itself, to the extent that its
attainment is possible for a creature. For order
leads the object of its ordering back to a suitable
status (convenientiam). 74
This text shows how manentia, or permanence in
goodness, is coextensive with being, just as essentia
and esse are.
The Basic Themes
We have now examined some of the main insiglltS
that Augustine has concerning reality. There are
23

Iother characteristic views which may be mentioned

I now with great brevity.
Certain items evidently function as transcendentals
in Augustine's thought, even though he does not call
them that. Unity, truth, goodness and beauty are obviously such, as are also essence, nature and esse.
These are aspects of reality on all its levels. Where
most metaphysicians in the great tradition think of
these passiones entis as transcending all categories
and classes of things, Augustine seems to take these
general features as simply present to greater or less
degree in all concrete things. The question might weIl
be raised whether Augustine ever posed the question
of universals, as such. He never seems to have worried whether to call species and genera thoughts or
things. The problem of universals has not yet ansen
in Christian thought. So transcendentals have a special status for Augustine. Many other items may be
listed as equally broad in scope: light, life, ratio,
modus, and manentia-all these may be transcen...
dental. Further investigation of these features of reality
might reveal a surprisingly rich theory of the transcendental dimensions of being in Augustinism.
Another theme weIl worth study is the nature of
participation in Augustine's writingS. 75 The language
of participation is much used in the middle books of
the City 0/ God, and also in his other works. Basically,
participation indicates a rather elementary notion of
sharing, on the part of creatllres, in any of the transcendentals mentioned above. Most commonly, good
souls and angels are said to participate in divine
happiness. Occasionally, there is mention of par24

ticipation in esse; but whether there is some more

technical meaning for tlIe term in Augustine is a point
yet to be studied.
Does he possess some awareness of the analogy of
being? He does not use the term, analogia, but he
certainly broaches this metaphysical theme in discussing the various likenesses (similitudines ) between
God and creatures, in the De Trinitate and elsewhere. 76 Here again one might suggest that Augustine's
unconcern with universals led hirn to take such a
concrete view of all things that it is resemblances between individuals, rather than between classes of
beings, that are stressed. This topic would bear further investigation. 77
Augustine's theory of causality would also merit a
full-scale study.78 Although he does not know the four
causes as Aristotle treated them, he did consider various aspects of causality that are roughly eqtlivalent
to the traditional four causes. Finality, as we have
seen, is involved in Augustine's views on order. Efficiency is often discussed in meditations on God's
will and power. The many commentaries on Genesis
are replete with suggestions on material and formal
causality. Both exemplary causality and primary causality are among Augustine's favorite subjects.
Perhaps we have said enough in this sketch to justify the conclusion that Augustine has an over-all
view of reality which would entitle him to a place
anlong tllose who have been serious thinkers on the
ultimate nature of things. His view is not a systematic
theory of being. It is rather aseries of profound insights which owe much to bis meditations on Scrip-

2,

ture, something to his reading of philosophical

ers,79 and perhaps most to bis own inquiring
seminal mind.
I

26

NOTES

1. Contra A cademicos, 111, 20, 43; see Text 11 (in the seleeted
passages which follow these Notes) . For other texts on faith and
reason, see: Saneti Augustini, Doctrina de Cognitione, ed. L. W.
Keeler, Romae: Gregorianum, 1934, pp. 3-7.
2. Cf. E. Gilson, Introduction
l'etude de s. Augustin, Paris:
Vrin, 1949, pp. 39-41.
3. "Est autem fides credere quod nondum vides." Sermo 43,
1, 1; t. V (1), 211. (References are to volume and column of
Opera ,Omnia, studio Monachorum Sancti Mauri, Venetiis, 17291734, XI vols.)
4. "ut ratio sit quidam mentis aspectus, ratiocinatio autem
rationis inquisitio, id est, aspeetus ilHus, per ea quae aspicienda
sunt, motio," De quantitate animae, 27, 53; t. I, 427.
5. De diversis quaestionibus LXXXIII, q. 48; see Text XIII.
6. De praedestinatione sanctorum, 11, 5; t. X, 792: "Quamquam
et ipsum eredere, nihil aliud est quam eum assensione cogitare."
7. "In quadam quippe mediatate [anima rationaHsl posita est,
infra se habens corporalem ereaturam, supra se autem sui et corporis Creatorem." Epistola 140, 2, 3; t. 11, 423. De doctrina Christiana, II, 38, 57; t. 111, 41; see Text XIV. De civit,ate Dei, VIII,
6; t. VII, 195-196; see Text XXIII. Cf. Cooke, B. J., "The Mutability-Immutability Principle in St. Augustine's Metaphysics,"
Modern Schoolman, XXIII (1946) 175-193, XXIV (1946) 37-49;
and Bourke, V.J., "Wisdom in the Gnoseology of St. Augustine,"
Augustinus, 111, 10-11 (1958) 331-336.

27

8. De div. quaest. LXXXIII, q. 45; see Text XI.

9. De civ. Dei, XI, 27; Text XX:X:VII.

10. Cf. L.F. J ansen, "The Divine Ideas in the Writings of St.
Augustine," Modern Schoolman, XXII (1945) 117-131.
11. "Mutari autem animam posse, non quidem loealiter, sed
tarnen temporaliter, suis affeetionibus quisque eognoseit." De tVera
religione, 10, 18; t. I, 754. Gilson, History of Christian PhilosopJzy
in the Middle Ages, New York: Random House, 1955, p. 73, attributes a theory of the aevum to St. Augustine. I find no mention
of theaetVum in Augustine.
12. De civ. Dei, X, 7; t. VII, 243; and XI, 9; t. VII, 279.
13. "corpus vero et temporibus et loeis esse mutabile . . ." De
vera religione, loe. eit.
14. De Genesi ad litteram, VIII, 25, 46, et 26, 48; see Text
XXII.
15. De Gen. ad lit., V. 23, 45; see Text XXI.
16. De Gen. ad lit., IX, 17, 32; see Text XXIII; De Trinitate,
111, 9, 16; see Text XXV. Cf. A. Mitterer, Die Entwicklungslehre
Augustins, Wien-Freiburg: Herder, 1956, pp. 47-266, where almost
all the texts on rationes seminales are eited and diseussed. Still useful is: C. Boyer, "La theorie augustinienne des raisons seminales,"
in Miscellanea A gostiniana, Roma, 1931, 11, 795-819.
17. Cf. V. J. Bourke, "St. Augustine and the Cosmie Soul," Giornale
di Metafisica, XI (1956) 431-440.
18. "Incommutabile praeferendum est mutabile . . ." Confessiones,
VII, 17, 23; t. I, 141. "Spiritus ineommutabilis Deus est, spiritus
mutabilis facta natura est, sed eorpore melior
" De n,atura
boni, I; t. VIII, 501.
19. Contra A cad., 111, 17, 37; see Text I.
20. De div. quaest. LXXXIII, q. 46; see Text XII.
21. "Quis audeat dicere Deum irrationabiliter omnia eondidisse?
Quodsi recte diei vel eredi non potest, restat, ut omnia ratione
sint condita, nee eadem ratione homo qua equus; hoc enim absurdUlTI est existimare. Singula igitur propriis sunt ereata rationibus."
De di'V. quaest. LXXXIII, q. 46, 2. Cf. S.J. Grabowski, The AllPresent God, St. Louis: Herder, 1954, pp. 204-210.
22. De civ Dei, XI, 25; t. VII, 291; Epist. 118, 3, 19: "Nosti
enim quidquid propter adipiseendam. sapientiam quaeritur, aut de
maribus, aut de natura, aut de ratiaue quaestianem habere."

23. De civ. Die, VIII, 6; see Text XXXIII.

24. De doct. C,hrist., 11, 38, 57; Text XV; this is his elassie
statement on the right of the Christian to use philosophy.

28

25. Cf. E. Gilson, The Ghristian Philosophy 0/ St. Thomas

A quinas, N ew York: Random House, 1956, pp. 84-95; reprinted
as "Haec Sublimis Veritas," in Gilson Reader, ed. A.C. Pegis, New
York: Doubleday, 1957, pp. 230-245.
26. "Fidele ci la tradition de Platon, saint Augustin pense moins
a l'existence qu'ci l'etre." Gilson, Introd. a l'etude de s. Augustin,
p.26.
27. Thus there is a "distance separating the God essentia of St.
Augustine from the God of St. Thomas whose essentia is, as it
were, absorbed by its esse." See "Haec Sublimis Veritas," in Gilson
Reader, p. 241.
28. In Gon/. VII 1, 1-2, Augustine speaks of his early, corporeal notion of God; then in c. 4, 6, he says that he came to
realize that "the will and power of God is God Himself." See
also: De eiv. Dei, XI, 10, 2; Text XXXV. Cf. J. Pepin, "Une
hesitation de saint Augustin sur la distinction de l'intelligence et
de l'intelligible," A etes du XIme Gongres Int. de Philosophie,
(BruxeIles, 1953), XII, 137-145, with particular reference to De
Gen. ad litt. XII, 10, 21. Pepin concIudes that the non-distinction
of intelleetuale and intelligibile is not a mere question of word~
but of "existences et realites." (p. 138).
29. H. Guthrie and V. J. Bourke, "Two Tendencies in the
Scholastic Approach to Metaphysics," Proe. A mer. Cath. Phi/os.
Assoe., XIV, (1938) 134-151.
30. Gon/., VII, 20, 26; see Text XVIII. In Joan. Evang., Tr.
XXXVIII, 8, 8 et 10; See Text XXXI. Enar. in Psalmos, CXXI,
3; 5; see Text XXXVIII; ibid; 3, 6; Text XXXIV.
31. See the interesting case of the analogy of light, De eitU. Dei,
XI, 10,2; Text XXXIV.
32. De Gen. ad lit., XII, 24-25; see Text XXIV. On the Porphyrian background of the distinction between the inteIIectual and
the spiritual, see: J.]. O'Meara, Porphyry's PhiJosophy /rom Oraeles
in Augustine, Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes, 1959, pp. 104, 117.
Cf. J. H. Taylor, "The Meaning of Spiritus in St. Augustine's
De Genesi XII," Modern Sehoolma'n, XXVI (1945) 211-218.
33. De Gen. ad lit., XII, 24, 50; t. 111 (1) 315: "Quo enim alio
modo ipse inteIIectus nisi intelligendo conspicitur? Ita et caritas,
gaudium, pax, longanimitas, benignitas, bonitas, :fides, quibus propinquatur Deo: et ipse Deus, ex quo omnia, per quem omnia, in
quo omnia."
34. Ibid., 51; see Text XXIV: "spiritalis visio indiget intellectuali
ut dijudicetur, intellectualis autem ista spiritali inferiore non
indiget ..."
35. Ibid., 52; see Text XXIV.
29

36. I bid., "aut enim intelligit et verum est; aut si verum non
est, non intelligit ..."
37. Gonf., VII, 10, 16-11, 17; see Text XVII.
38. Gonf., XII, 6, 6; t. I, 211: "Numquid species animi vel corporis? Si dici posset : N ihil aliquid j et Est non est ..."
39. Epist., XI, ad Nebridium; t. 11, 14-15; see Text 111: "primo
ut sit, deinde ut hoc vel illud sit, tertio ut in eo quod est maneat
quantum potest."
40. De div. quaest. LXXXIII, q. 18; t. IV, 4-5; see Text X.
41. Cf. E. Gilson, "Notes sur le Vocabulaire de l'Etre," Mediaeval Studies, VII, (1946) 150-158; ]. Owens, Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics, Toronto: Pont. Inst. of Med. Studies, 1951, pp.
65-74.
42. De Trinitate, V, 2, 3; t. VIII, 833; Text XXVI. Cf. Gilson,
Introd. a l'etude de s. Augustin, pp. 28-29.
43. Cf. E. Przywara, An Augustine Synthesis, New York: Harper Torchbook, 1958, p. 96: "As wisdom is so called from that
quality which is being wise, and knowledge from knowing, so
from being (esse) comes that which is called essence."
44. De Trin., VII, 5, 10; see Text XXIX. Cf. Enar. in Ps.
CXXI, 3, 6; Text XXXIX. Compare also, De Trin., VII, 4, 7-8;
Text XXVIII.
45. De moribus ecclesiae Gatholicae et Manichaeorum, 11, 1 et
2; t. I, 715-716; see Text IV. For the general explanation of
evil, consult: R. Jolivet, Le Probleme du mal chez saint Augustin,
Paris: Archives de Philosophie, 1936.
46. "id esse, quod summe esse ac primitus esse rectissime dicitur."
De moribus, loc. cit., sect. 1, col. 715.
47. "Id enim est quod esse verissime dicitur." Ibid.
48. Ibid., sect. 2, col. 716.
49. "Tendit ergo [maluml id quod est face re ut non sit." Ibid.
50. "Esse enim contrarium non habet, nisi non esse." Ibid., sect.
1, col. 715. Cf. De civ. Dei, XII, 2; t. VII, 302: "Cum enim Deus
summa essentia sit, hoc est, summe sit, et ideo immutabilis sit; rebus
quas ex nihilo creavit esse dedit, sed non summe esse sicut ipse est;
et aliis dedit esse amplius, aliis minus; atque ita naturas essentiarum
gradibus ordinavit. Sicut enim ab eo quod est esse vocatur essentia:
novo quidem nomine, quo usi veteres non sunt Latini sermonis auctores, sed j am nostris temporibus usitato, ne deesset etiam linguae
nostrae quod Graeci appellant ousi,an. Hoc enim verbum e verbo
expressum est, ut diceretur essentia. Ac per hoc ei naturae quae
summe est, qua faciente sunt quaecumque sunt, contraria natura

30

non est, nisi quae non este Ei quippe quod est, non esse contrarium
est."
51. De moribusJ loc. cit., sect. 2, co!. 716, ad fine
52. De immortalitate animae, 12, 19; t. I, 395-396. Cf. De fide
et symbolo J 4, 7; t. VI, 155: "Si enim ille est, et de solo Deo proprie dici potest hoc verbum; (quod enim vere est, incommutabiliter
manet; quoniam quod mutatur, fuit aliquid quod jam non est, et
erit quod nondum est) nihil ergo habet Deus contrarium. . . . Cum
autem quaeritur quid sit contrarium ei quod est, recte respondetur
quod non est."
53. Ibid. Compare the very suggestive thesis put forward by
I. Quiles, "Para una interpretaci6n integral de la illuminaci6n
agostiniana," Augustinus, 111, 10-11 (1958) 255-268. He argues
that Augustine described four types of metaphysical experience:
(i) experimental cognition of one's own soul; (ii) cognition of
being, truth, goodness; (iii) experimental cognition of God; (iv)
immediate cognition of the rationes aeternae. He emphasizes the
"dato existencial primero deI Absoluto que le permite IIegar al
juicio existencial con sequridad, no meramente te6rica et indirecta,
sobre la realidad de Dios."
54. Cf. E. Gilson, Introd. a lJetude de s. AugustinJ p. 275: "ar
l'acte d'exister est precisement ce que designe le mot 'essence'."
55. Epist. XI, 3; see Text 111: "at si cernis necesse esse, ut
quidquid sit, continuo et hoc aut illud sit, et in suo genere maneat
quantum potest ..." J. Guitton, Le Tempts et IJeternite chez Plotin
et s. Au,gustinJ Paris, 1933, is the basic study.
56. Contra Faustum J XX, 7; see Text XVI. Cf. Sermo
CXXXIV, 1, 1; t. V (1), 653: "Maneamus in eo, qui manet in
nobis [J oan. 8 :31] . . . Absit autem ab homine, ut maneat in se,
qui perdidit se. Ergo nos in iBo manemus indigentia: ipse in nobis
manet misericordia."
57. De div. quaest. LXXXIIIJ q. 18; Text X: "utrum approbandum improbandumve sit."
58. Wisdom 11 :21, "Omnia in mensura et numero et pondere
disposuisti."
59. De Gen. ad lit., IV, 3, 7-4, 9; see Text XX.
60. For some indirect influences of Aristotelianism, see: N. Kaufmann, "Les elements aristoteliciens dans la cosmologie et la psychologie de saint Augustin," RetV. Neoscolastique Je Philosophie, XI
(1904) 140-156.
61. De civ. Dei, XI, 15; see Text XXXVI.
62. De musica, VI, 17, 56-57; see Text IX; De tVera relig. J 7,
13; see Text VIII; De Trin'itate, VI, 10, 12; see Text XXVII.
J

31

63. De Trin.} loc. eit. For the variant, measure, number and
order, see: De moribus} 11, 6, 8; Text V. Cf. W.J. Roche, "Measure,
Number and Weight in Saint Augustine," Nerw Scholasticism} XV
(1941) 352.
64. Besides the texts cited above, see: De Genesi contra Manichaeos, I, 16, 26; Text VI; De libero arbitrio, 11, 20, 54; Text
VII; Contra Faustum} XX, 7; Text XVI; De natura b,oni} 3;
Text XIX; and De Trinitate} XI, 11, 18; Text XXX.
65. See the Table of Similitudines in: Saint Augustin, La Trinite}
texte, traduction et notes par M. MeIIet, O.P. et Th. Camelot, O.P.,
Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 1955, p. 571.
66. This is the interpretation of W.J. Roche, art. cit.} p. 353.
67. Thus, in De tVera religione} 7, 13, Augustine remarks that
the first feature of each thing is, "ut et unum aliquid sit;" see
Text VIII. Cf. De Musica} VI, 17, 56-57; Text IX.
68. De lib. arb.} 11, 15, 42; t. I, 603.
69. De vera relig.} 7, 13; see Text VIII.
70. "Ordo est parium dispariumque rerum sua cuique loca tribuens dispositio." De civ. Dei. XIX, 13; t. VII, 557.
71. De Gen. ad lit.} IV, 3, 7; see Text XX.
72. The point is emphasized in the English tide given to the
De ordin.e, in the translation by R.P. RusselI: On Providence and
the Problem 0/ Evil} New York: Fathers of the Chureh, Inc., 1948.
73. Retractationes, I, 3: "duos etiam Iibros de ,Ordine seripsi, in
quibus magna quaestio versatur, utrum bona et mala divinae providentiae ordo contineat."
74. De moribus} 11, 6, 8; see Text V.
75. See infra} Appendix A.
76. See infra:, Appendix C.
77. Cf. C. Boyer, L'I die de tVerite dans la philosophie de saint
Au.gustin} Paris: Beauchesne, 1920, pp. 179-18178. See infra} Appendix B.
79. The literature on his indebtedness to Neoplatonism is weIl
known. For some suggestions on what he owed to another school:
Sister Rita Marie Bushman, "St. Augustine's Metaphysics and
Stoic Doctrine," Nerw Scholasticism} XXVI (1952) 283-304.

32

INDEX OF TEXTS
Plato's Two Worlds
(C. Acad., In, 17,37)

11

Authority and Reason

(c. Acad., 111, 20, 43 )

111

To Be, To Be This or That, To Endure

(Ep. XI, 3)

IV

The Primary Meaning of To Be

(De moribus, 11, 1-2)

Order, Permanence and Being

(De moribus, 11, 6, 8)

VI

Measure, Nunlber and Order

(De Gen. c. Man., I, 16, 26)

VII Measure, Number, and Order

(De lib. arb., 11, 20, 54 )
VIII One, Species and Order
(De vera relig., 7, 13)
IX

Unity, Number and Order

(De musica, VI, 17,56-57)

Three Basic Questions

(De div. Q., 83, q. 18)

XI

Soul, Inferior to God, Superior to Bodies

(De div. Q., 83, q. 45)

XII PIatonie Forms as Divine Ideas

(De div. Q., 83, q. 46)
XIII Three Objects of Belief
(De div. Q., 83, q. 48)
34

XN Soul, between Immutable and Mutable

(De doct. Christ., 11, 38, 57)
XV The Utility of Philosophy
(De doct. Christ., 11, 39, 60)
XVI Measure, Number and Weight
(C. Faust., XX, 7)
XVII Truly To Be Immutable
(Cont., VII, 10-11, 16-17)
XVIII To Be Always the Same
(Cont., VII, 20, 26)
XIX Mode, Speeies and Order
(De nat. boni, 3)
XX Measure, Number and Weight
(De Gen. ad lit., IV, 3-4, 7-9)
XXI All Things Created at Onee
(De Gen. ad lit., V, 23, 4.5)
XXII God Moves All Creation
(De Gen. ad lit., VIII, 25, 46 et 26, 48)
XXIII Seminal Reasons in the Elements
(De Gen. ad lit., IX, 17, 32)
XXIV Bodily, Spirital and Intelleetual Visions
(De Gen. ad lit., XII, 24-25)
XXV Causes Created in the Elements
(De Trin., 111, 9, 16)
XXVI Substanee, Essenee and Ta Be
(De Trin., V, 1-2, 2-3)
35'

XXVII

One, Species and Order

(De Trin., VI, 10, 12)

XXVIII

Essence and the Divine Trinity

(De Trin., VII, 4, 7-8)

XXIX

Substance, Essence and God

(De Trin., VII, 4-5, 9-10)

XXX

Measure, Number and Weight

(DeTrin.,XI, 11, 18)

XXXI Ipsum Esse: Truly To Be

(In Joan. Ev., XXXVllI, 8, 8 et 10)
XXXII

Cause, Principle and Order

(DCD, VIII, 4)

XXXXIII

The Platonie Scheme of Reality

(DCD, VIll, 6)

XXXIV

The Analogy of Light

(DCD, XI, 10, 2)

XXXV

To Be and To Be Known

(DCD, XI, 10, 3)

XXXVI

Mode, Species and Order

(DCD, XI, 15)

XXXVII

To Be, in the Existential Sense

(DCD, XI, 27)

XXXVllI

To Be Eternally and Immutably

(En. in Ps., CXXI, 3, 5)

XXXIX

God Is Ipsum Esse

(En. in Ps., CXXI, 3, 6)

36

TEXT I
Igitur Plato adjiciens lepori subtilitatique Socraticae
quam in moralibus habuit, naturalium divinarumque
rerunl peritianl, quam ab eis quas memoravidiligenter
acceperat, subjungensque quasi formatricem illarum
partium, judicemque dialecticam, quae allt ipsa esset,
aut sine qua sapientia omnino esse non posset, perfectam dicitur composuisse philosophiae disciplinam, de
qua nunc disserere temporis non este Sat est enim ad
id quod volo, Platonem sensisse duos esse mundos,
unum intelligibilem, in quo ipsa veritas habitaret,
istum autem sensibilem quem manifestum est nos visu
tactuque sentire. Itaque illum verum, hunc verisimilem
et ad illius imaginem factum. Et ideo de illo in ea quae
se cognosceret anima, velut expoliri et quasi serenari
veritatem; de hoc autem in stultorum animis non scientiam, sed opinionem posse generari. ...

(Contra Academicos, 111, 17, 37; t. I, 292.)

38

TEXT I
Plato's Two Worlds

To the Socratic charm and precision which he 11ad

mastered in ethics, Plato joined the skill in the natural and divine seiences whieh he had diligently aequired from the men I have mentioned. Then he
added dialeetie, whieh he believed to be either wisdom itself or at least an indispensable prerequisite for
wisdom, and whieh would synthesize and determine
those eomponents. Henee, he is said to have elaborated
a complete philosophie seience. 3 But we have no time
to treat of this at the present moment. For my present
purpose, it is sufficient that Plato held the following
theories: that there are two worlds-an intelligible
world in which the truth itself resides, and this sensible world which it is manifest that we perceive by
sight and touch; that eonsequently the former is a
true world, and the present world is truth-like-made
unto the image of the other; that the truth emanates
from the intelligible world, and is, as it were, refined
and brightened in the soul which knows itself; that
with regard to the present world, opinion-but not
knowledge (seientia)-can be engendered in the
minds of the unwise....
EDITOR'S NOTE: Some English translations, ineluding
Dr. BOllrke's translation of the Con/essions, are
reproduced from the series, The Fathers of the
Church. Remaining translations are the work of the
author.
39

TEXT 11

Nulli autem dubium est gemino pondere nos impelli

ad discendum, auctoritatis atque rationis. Mihi autem
certum est nusquam prorsus a Christi auctoritate discedere: non enim reperio valentiorem. Quod autem
subtilissima ratione persequendum est, ita enim jam
sunl affectus, ut quid sit verum non credendo solum
sed etiam intelIigendo apprehendere impatienter desiderem, apud Platonicos me interim quod sacris nostris
non repugnet reperturum esse confido.
(Contra Academicos, 111, 20, 43; I, 294.)

TEXT 111

NulIa natura est, Nebridi, et omnino nulIa substantia, quae non in se habeat haec tria, et prae se gerat,
prima ut sit, deinde ut hoc vel liud sit, tertio ut in eo
quod est maneat quantum potest. Prlmum liud,
causam ipsam naturae ostentat, ex qua sunt omnia;
alterum, speciem per quam fabricantur, et quodammodo formantur omnia; tertium, manentiam quamdam, ut ita dicam, in qua sunt omnia.
Quod si fieri potest ut aliquid sit, quod non hoc
vel liud sit, neque in genere suo maneat; aut hoc
quidem aut illud sit, sed non sit, neque in genere suo
maneat, quantum potest; aut in suo genere quidem
pro ipsius sui generis viribus maneat, sed tamen nec
40

TEXT 11
Authority and Reason
Certainly, no one doubts that we are impelled
toward knowledge by a twofold force: the force of
authority and the force of reason. And I am resolved
never to deviate in the least from the authority of
Christ, for I find none more powerful. But, as to what
is attainable by acute and accurate reasoning, such is
my state of mind that I am impatient to grasp what
truth is-to grasp it not only by belief, but also by
comprehension. Meanwhile, I am confident that I
shall find among the Platonists what is not in opposition to our Sacred Scriptures.'
(BCf. Cicero, Academ. 1.4.17, 2.28.91.)
TEXT 111

To Be, To Be This or That, To Endure

There is no n3:ture, my dear Nebridius, and certainly no substance, which does not possess and show
forth these three characteristics: first, that it should
continue to be what it is, as far as it is able. The first
shows us the very cause of nature from which all
things come; the second shows us the appearance
(species) in which all things are fashioned and in a
certain manner formed; the third shows a certain
continuance, so to speak, in which all things are maintained. But, if it could happen that something should
be, and should not be this or that, and that it should
be, and should be what it is as long as it remains in
its own genus, or that it should be this or that, but
should not be nor remain in its own genus as far as it
41

sit, neque hoc vel illud sit: fieri etiam potest, ut in

illa Trinitate aliqua persona praeter alias aliquid faciat.
At si cernis necesse esse, ut quidquid sit, continuo
et hoc aut illud sit, et in suo genere maneat quantum
potest, nihil tria illa praeter invicem faciunt.
(Epistola XI, ad Nebridium, 3; t. 11, 14-15.)

TEXT IV
Quamobrem vellem quidem, ut tarn serenam mentis aciem homines ad l1aec investiganda deferrent, ut
possent videre illud summum bonum, quo non est
quidquam melius aut superius, cui rationalis anima
pura et perfecta subjungitur. Hoc enim intellecto et
perfecto, simul viderent id esse quod summe ac primitus esse rectissime dicitur. Hoc enim maxime esse
dicendum est quod senlper eodem modo sese habet,
quod omni modo sui simile est, quod nulla ex parte
corrunlpi ac mutari potest, quod non subjacet tempori, quod aliter nunc se habere quam habebat antea
non potest. Id enim est quod esse verissime dicitur.
Subest enim huic verbo manentis in se atque incommutabiliter sese habentis naturae significatio. Hanc
nihil aliud quam Deum possumus dicere, cui si contrarium recte quaeras, nihil omnino este Esse enim
contrarium non habet, nisi non esse. Nulla est ergo
Deo natura contraria....
42

is able, or that it should remain in its own genus

according to the powers of its genus, but nevertheless
should not be, or should not be this or that, then,
indeed, it could happen that in that Trinity one of the
Persons would do something without the other Persons. But, if you perceive that it inevitably follows
that whatever it must forthwith be this or that, and
must remain in its own genus, as far is it is able, then
the Three perfornl no act except jointly.
TEXT IV
The Primary Meaning 0/ To Be
For this reason, I should like men to bring to the
study of these things such a clear mental view that
they might be enabled to see the highest good, than
which there is nothing better or higher, and to which
every rational soul that is pure and perfect is subjected. For, when they have understood and become
perfect in this good, they should see that it is that
which is rightly called the highest and first being.
Indeed, we should say that the greatest being is that
which always keeps itself in t!le same condition, which
is like unto itself in every way, which can in no aspect
be corrupted or changed, which is not subject to
time, which cannot exist now in a different state from
what it was in formerly. For this is the truest meaning
of to be. Underlying this infinitive is the meaning of
a nature which endures in itself and keeps itself without any change. We can say that this is nothing else
than God, and if you look properly for its contrary,
you find absolutely nothing. For there is no contrary
43

Vos autem asseritis quamdam naturam atque substantiam malum esse. Accedit etiam illud, quod contra naturam quidquid est, utique naturae adversatur,
et eam perimere nititllr. Tendit ergo id quod est,
facere ut non sit. Nam et ipsa natura nihil est aliud
quam id quod intelligitur in suo genere aliquid esse.
Itaque ut nos janl novo nomu1e ab eo, quod est esse,
vocamus essentiam, quam plerumque substantiam
etiam nominamus : ita veteres qui haec nomina non
habebant, pro essentia et substantia naturam vocabant.
Idipsum ergo malum est, si praeter pertinaciam velitis adtendere, deficere ab essentia et ad id tendere ut

non sit.
(De moribus ecclesiae Catholicae, 11, 1 et 2; t. I, 715716.)

TEXT V
Si autem quaeritis quid sit, videte quoconetur perducere quae corrurnpit: ex seipsa enim afficit ea quae
corrumpuntur. Deficiunt autem omnia per corruptionem ab eo quod erant, et non permanere coguntur,
non esse coguntur. Esse enim ad manendum refertur.
Itaque quod summe et maxime esse dicitur, permanendo in se dicitur. Nam quod mutatur in melius, non
quia manebat mutatur, sed quia pervetebatur in pejus,
id est, ab essentia deficiebat: cujus defectionis auctor
non estqui est auctor essentiae. Mutantur ergo quae44

to being, except not to be. So, there is no nature contrary to God....

You claim that evil is some sort of nature and substance. Now this occasions the thought that whatever
is contrary to a nature is certainly struggling against
that nature and striving to destroy it. Therefore, it
tends to make that which is become that which is not.
In fact, l1ature itself is nothing but that which is
understood as something existing in its kinde Thus, to
use a new word for what it is to be, we may call it
essence, what we also frequently call slLbstance. So
the ancients who do not have these words used the
term, nature, for essence and substance. If you wish
to get away from your stubbornness, then, evil is
precisely that which lacks essence and tends toward
a term which is non-existence.
TEXT V
Order, Permanence and Being
Now, if you ask me what evil is, then look at the
termination to which it tends to bring what it corrupts; for it does, of itself, influence the objects that
are corrupted. In fact, all things become defective
through corruption from what they were, and then
are forced into impermanence; they are forced not to
be. Indeed, to be pertains to endllring. Hence, what
is said to be, in the highest and greatest sense, is said
to be enduring in itself. Indeed, that which is changed
for the better does not change because it was enduring
but because it was open to change for the worse; that
is, it was defective in relation to its essence. The author
45

dam in meliora, et propterea tendunt esse: nec dicuntur ista mutatione perverti, sed reverti atque converti.
Perversio eninl contraria est ordinationi. Haec vero
quae tendunt esse, ad ordinem tendunt: quem cum
fuerint consecuta, ipsum esse consequuntur, quantum
id creatura consequi potest. Ordo enim ad convenientiam quamdam quod ordinat redigit.
Nihil est autem esse, quam unum esse. Itaque in
quantum quidque unitatem adipiscitur, in tantum este
Unitas est enim operatio, convenientia et concordia,
qua sunt in quantum sunt ea quae composita sunt:
nam simplicia per se sunt, quia una sunt: quae autem
non sunt simplicia, concordia partium imitantur unitatern, et in tantunl sunt in quantum assequuntur.
Quare ordinatio esse cogit, inordinatio vero non esse,
quae perversio etiam nominatur atque corruptio. Quidquid igitur corrumpitur, eo tendit ut non sit.
(De moribus ecclesiae Catholicae et Manichaeorum,
II, 6, 8; t. I, 718-719.)

TEXT VI
Ego vero fateor me nescire mures et ranae quare
creatae sint, aut muscae aut vermiculi: video tamen
omnia in suo genere puIcra esse, quamvis propter
peccata nostra multa nobis videantur adversa: non
enim animalis aIicujus corpus et membra considero,
ubi non mensuras et numeros et ordinem inveniam
ad unitatem concordiae pertinere. Quae omnia unde
46

of such defection is not the author of essence. So, some

things change for the better and on this basis they
tend to be; by such change they are not said to be
perverted but to be turned back or converted. Perversion is the contrary of being weIl ordered. Now, those
things that tend to be have a tendency toward order,
and when they have achieved it t11ey have achieved
being itself, to the extent that this achievement is possible for a creature. In fact, order brings the object of
its ordering back to some sort of suitable condition.
Furthermore, to be is not other than to be one. So,
to the extent that something seeks unity, precisely
to that extent does it exist. Unity is the function,
through mutual suitability and agreement, whereby
composite things exist to the extent that they do.
Simple things exist of themselves, for they are one;
but those that are not simple imitate unity by virtue
of an agreement of their parts, and they exist to the
extent that they achieve it. That is why order impels
toward being, while disorder inclines toward nonbeing, which is another word for perversion and corruption. Therefore, whatever is corrupted, by that fact,
it tends toward non-existence.

TEXT VI
Measure, Number and Order

As a matter of fact, ladmit that I don't know why

mice and frogs, or flies and worms, were created; yet
I see that all things are beautiful according to their
types, even though because of our sins many of them
seem to be against us. Indeed, I cannot think of the
47

veniant non intelligo, nisi a summa mensura et numero et ordine, quae in ipsa Dei sublimitate incommutabili atque aeterna consistunt....
In omnibus tarnen cum mensuras et numeros et
ordinem vides, artificem quaere. Nec alium invenies,
nisi ubi summa mensura, et summus numerus, et
sumnlUS ordo est, id est Deum, de quo verissime dictum est, quod omnia in mensura et numero et pondere
disposuerit.
(De Genesi contra Manichaeos, I, 16, 26; t. I, 655.)

TEXT VII
Ita enim nulla natura occurrit quae non sit ex Deo.
Omnem quippe rem, ubi mensuram et numerum et
ordinem videris, Deo artifici tribuere ne cuncteris.
Unde autem ista penitus detraxeris, nihil omnino remanebit: quia etsi remanserit aliqua formae alicujus inchoatio, ubi neque mensuram neque numerum neque
ordinem invenias, quia ubicumque ista sunt, forma
perfecta est, oportet auferas etiam ipsam inchoationem
formae, quae tamquam materies ad perficiendum subjacere videtur artifici. Si enim formae perfectio bonum
est, nonnuIIum jam bonum est et formae inchoatio:
ita detracto penitus omni bono, non quidem nonnihil,
sed omnino nihil remanebit. Omne autem bonum ex
Deo: nuIIa ergo natura est quae non sit ex Deo.
(De libero arbitrio, TI, 20, 54; t. I, 608-609.)
48

body and members of any animal, in which I fall to

find that measures and numbers and order pertain to
the unity of agreement. Where all of these come from,
I don't understand, unless from the highest measure
and number and order, which dweIl in the immutable
and eternal sublimity of God Himself....
In all things in which you discern measures and
numbers and order, look for the maker. You will find
none other than He in Whom is the highest measure,
the highest number, the highest order, that is God, of
Whom it was most truly said that He hath disposed all
in measure, number and weight.

TEXT VII
Measure, Number and Order
Consequently, we find no nature that does not come
from God. Wherever, indeed, you see measure and
number and order, do not llesitate to ascribe the
thing in its entirety to God, its Maker. But take these
three away completely and nothing at all will be left.
Even should there remain sonle beginning of a form
where you find neither measure nor number nor order
(for wherever these exist, the form is complete), you
would have to take away even this beginning of form
since this is regarded as material placed at the disposal of the Maker for its completion. If the full
realization of form is good, then the beginning of form
is also something good. If all good is thus taken away
completely, there will be left, not something, but
nothing at alle
But every good is from God; therefore, there is no
nature that is not from God.
49

TEXT VIII
Quae cum credita fuerit mentern purgabit vitae
modus divinis praeceptis conciliatus, et idoneam faciet spiritalibus percipiendis, quae nec praeterita sunt,
nec futura, sed eodem modo semper manentia, null
nlutabilitati obnoxia, id est, unum ipsum Deum Patrem et Filium et Spiritum sanctum: qua Trinitate
quantum in hac vita datum est cognita, omnis intelIectualis et animalis et corporalis creatura, ab eadem
Trinitate creatrice esse in quantum est, et speciem
suam habere et ordinatissime administrari, sine ulla
dubitatione perspicitur, non ut aliam partem totius
creaturae fecisse intelligatur Pater, et aliam Filius, et
aliam Spiritus sanctus, sed et simul omnia et unamquamque naturam Patrem fecisse per Filium in dono
Spiritus sancti. Omnis enim res vel substantia vel
essentia vel natura, vel si quo alio verbo rnelius enuntiatur, simul haec tria habet, ut et unum aliquid sit,
et specie propria discernatur a ceteris, et rerunl ordinem non excedat.
(De vera religione, VII, 13; t. I, 752-753.)

TEXT IX
Deus autem summe bonus, et summe justus,
nulli invidet pulcritudini, quae sive damnatione animae, sive regressione, sive permansione fabricatur.
Numerus autem et ab uno incipit, et aequalitate ac
similitudine pulcher est, et ordine copulatur. Quamobrem quisquis fatetur nullam esse naturam, quae non
50

TEXT VIII
One, Species and Order

With the aeeeptanee of these beliefs, the way of life

that is in agreement with divine rules will purge the
mind and make it suitable for the grasping of spiritual matters whieh belong neither to past nor future
but endure always in the same way, unharmed by any
tendency to change. This is the One God Himself,
Father, Son and Holy Spirit. Once this Trinity is
known (to the extent possible in this life) every intellectual and animated and bodily creature will be seen,
without any hesitation, to exist insofar as it ean by
virtue of that ereative Trinity, and to possess its speeies, and to be regulated in a most orderly manner. Not
that the Father is understood as having made one part
of the whole of creation, the Son another, and the
Spirit a third, but that the Father has made all things
and each nature through the Son and in the gift of
the Holy Spirit. For every reality, whether substance
or essence or nature, or whatever may be better expressed in another term has these three coneomitant
features: it is one thing; it is distinguished fronl others
by its proper species; and it does not go beyond the
order of realities.

TEXT IX
Unity, Number and Order

But God, most good and most just, grudges no

beauty whether fashioned by the soul's damnation,
retreat or perseveranee. But number also begins from
51

ut sit quidquid est, appetat unitatem, suique similis in

quantum potest esse conetur, atque ordinem proprium
vel locis vel temporibus, vel in corpore quodam libramenta salutem suam teneat: debet fateri ab uno principio per aequalem illi ac similem speciem divits
bonitatis ejus, qua inter se unum et de uno unum
carissima, ut ita dicam, cantate junguntur, omnia
facta esse atque condita quaecumque sunt, in quantumcumque sunt. ...
Quae primo generalem speciem corporis habet, in
qua unitas quaedam et numeri et ordo esse convincitur.
(De musica, VI, 17,56-57; t. 1.537-538.)

TEXT X

Omne quod est, aliud est quo constat, aliud qua

discernitur, aliud quo congruit. Universa igitur creatura si et est quoquo modo, et ab eo quod omnino
nihil est plurimum distat, et suis partibus sibimet congruit, causam quoque ejus trinam esse oportet, qua
sit, qua hoc sit, qua sibi amica sit. Creaturae autem
causam, id est, auctorem Deum dicimus. Oportet ergo
esse Trinitatem, qua nihil praestantius, intelligentius
et beatius invenire perfecta ratio potest. Ideoque etiam
cum veritas quaeritur, plus quam tria genera quaestionum esse non possunt, utrum omnino sit, utrum hoc
an aliud sit, utrum approbandum improbandumve sit.
(De diversis quaestionibus.83, q. 18; t. VI, 4-5.)
52

one, and is beautiful in equality and likeness, and

bound by order. And so, whoever confesses tllere is
no nature of any kind, but desires unity, and tries as
much as it can to be like itself, and holds its salvation
as a proper order in place or time or weight of body,
must confess all things whatever and of any size are
made from one beginning through a form equal to it
and like to the riches of His goodness, by which they
are joined together in charity as one and one gift from
one....
Yet first it has the general form of body where a
unity and numbers and order are clearly shown to be.

TEXT X
Three Basic Questions

Everything that exists is different in regard to that

whereby it exists, that whereby it is distinguished, and
that whereby it is in agreement. Therefore, for the
whole of creation, if it also exists in some way and is
far different from that which is utterly nothing and yet
is in agreement with itself and its parts, there should
be a threefold cause, whereby it is, whereby it is this,
whereby it is in agreement with itself. Now, we say
that the cause or author of creation is God. So, there
should be a Trinity such that perfect reason can find
none higher, more intelligent and more blessed. And
so, when seeking the truth, no more than three kinds
of questions are to be asked: whether a thing exists
at all; whether it is this kind or that; whether it should
be approved or condemned.
53

TEXT XI
Mens enim humana de visibilibus judicans, potest
agnoscere omnibus visibilibus se ipsam esse meliorem.
Quae tarnen cum etiam se propter defectum profectumque in sapientia fatetur esse mutabilern, invenit
supra se esse incommutabilem veritatem: atque ita
adhaerens post ipsam, sicut dictum est, Adhaesit
anima mea post te [Ps. 6:9], beata efficitur, intrinsecus inveniens etiam omnium visibilium Creatorem
atque Dominum; non quaerens extrinsecus visibilia,
quamvis caelestia: quae aut non inveniuntur, aut cum
nlagno labore frustra inveniuntur, nisi ex eorum quae
foris sunt pulcritudine, inveniatur artifex qui intus est,
et prius in anima superiores, deinde in corpore inferiores pulcritudines operatur.
(De diversis quaestionibus 83, q. 45; t. VI, 16.)

TEXT XII

Ideas Plato primus appellasse perhibetur: non tarnen

si hoc nomen, ante quanl ipse institueret, non erat,
ideo vel res ipsae non erant quas ideas vocavit, vel
a nullo erant in~ellectae: sed alio fortasse atque alio
nomine ab aliis atque aliis nuncupatae sunt. Licet
enim cuique rei cognitae, quae nullum habeat usitatum
nomen, quodlibet nomen imponere. . .. Sed de nomine
hactenus dictum sit: rem videamus, quae maxime consideranda atque noscenda est, in potestate constitutis
vocabulis, ut quod volet quisque, appellet rem quam
cognoverit.
54

TEXT XI
Soul: Inferior 10 God, Superior 10 Bodies

When the lluman mind sits in judgment on visible

things, it is able to discover that it is itself better than
all visible things. Yet, when it is forced to admit that
even the mind itself is mutable because of its regress
and progress in the way of wisdom, it discovers that
there is immutable truth above it, and thus, attaching
itself to this [truth], according to the text: "My soul
is attached to Thee", it is made happy, finding even
the Creator and Lord of all visible things within itself,
and not by seeking visible things externally, even those
that are celestial; for these are either not found, or
tlley are found only with much vain effort,-except
that the artist who dweIls within may be discovered
from the things that exist externally in a beautiful
way, and t1Ie higher examples of beauty are first in
the soul and are thence produced in the bodily world
as lower beauties.

TEXT XII
Platonic Forms as Divine Ideas

Plato is known as the first to have named the Ideas.

Not that if this name were non-existent before he
established it, the things that he called Ideas would
not have existed, or would not have been understood
by anyone-but they were probably called by different
names by different people. It is permitted to give to
any known thing that lacks an accepted name, whatever name one wishes.... But enough has previously
55

Ideas igitur Latine possumus vel formas vel species

dicere, ut verbum e verba transferre videamur. Si
autem rationes eas vocemus, ab interpretandi quidem
proprietate discedimus; rationes enim Graece logoi
appellantur, non ideae: sed tarnen quisquis hoc vocabulo uti voluerit, a re ipsa non aberrabit. Sunt
namque ideae principales formae quaedam, vel rationes rerun1 stabiles atque incommutabiles, quae
ipsae formatae non sunt, ac per hoc aeternae ac
semper eodem modo sese habentes, quae in divina
intelligentia continentur. Et cum ipsae neque oriantur,
neque intereant; secundum eas tarnen formari dicitur
omne quod oriri et interire potest, et omne quod
oritur et interit.
Anima vero negatur eas intueri posse, nisi rationalis,
ea sui parte qua excellit, id est, ipsa mente atque
ratione, quasi quadam facie vel oculo suo interiore
atque intelligibili. Et ea quidem ipsa rationalis anima
non omnis et quaelibet, sed quae saneta et pura fuerit,
haec asseritur illi visioni esse idonea: id est, quae
illum ipsum oculum, quo videntur ista, sanum et sincerum et serenum et similem bis rebus, quas videre
intendit, habuerit.
Quis autem religiosus et vera religione imbutus,
quamvis nondum possit haec intueri, negare tan1en
audeat, immo non etiam profiteatur, omma quae sunt,
id est, quaecumque in suo genere propria quadam
natura continentur, ut sint, Deo auctore esse procreata,
eoque auetore omnia quae vivunt vivere, atque universalem rerum ineolumitatem, ordinemque ipsum
quo ea quae mutantur, suos temporales eursus certo
moderamine celebrant; summi Dei legibus contineri et
56

been said about the name, let us examine the thing

which is principally to be considered and understood,
leaving each person free, as far as the terms are concerned, to give whatever name he wishes to the object
of his knowledge.
So, in Latin we may call Ideas forms or species,
to make it clear that we are translating word for word.
But, if we call them "reasons," we are departing
somewhat from a strict translation; reasons are called
logoi in Greek and not Ideas: however, if a person
chose to use this term, he would not be far from the
real meaning. In fact, Ideas are the primary forms,
or the permanent and immutable reasons of real
things, and they are not themselves formed; so they
are, as a consequence, eternal and ever the same in
themselves; and they are contained in the divine intelgence. And since they never come into being or go
out of it, everything that can come into being and
go out of it, and everything that does come into being
and goes out of it, may be said to be formed in accord
with them.
It is denied that the soul can look upon them, unless
it be rational, in that part whereby it excels, that is,
in its mind and reason, as it were in its face or interior
and intellectual eye. And for this vision not everyone
is suitable but only that rational soul which is holy
and pure, that one which keeps the eye, in which
such objects are seen, healthy, clear, serene and like
unto those objects to which its view is directed. What
religious man, infused with the true religion, even
thugh not yet able to contemplate these objects,
would nevertheless dare to deny and even refuse to
57

~ernari? Quo constituto atque concesso, quis audeat

dicere Deum irrationabiliter omnia condidisse? Quod

si recte dici vel credi non potest, restat ut omnia ratione sint condita. Nec eadenl ratione homo qua equus:
hoc enim absurdum est existimare. Singula igitur propriis sunt creata rationibus. Has autem rationes ubi
arbitrandum est esse, nisi in ipsa mente Creatoris?
Non eninl extra se quidquam positum intuebatur, ut
secundum id constitueret quod constituebat: nam hoc
opinari sacrilegum este
Quod si hae rerum omnium creandarum creatarumve rationes in divina mente continentur, neque in
divina mente quidquam nisi aeternum atque incommutabile potest esse; atque has rerum rationes principales appellat ideas Plato: non solum sunt ideae, sed
ipsae verae sunt, quia aeternae sunt, et ejusmodi atque
incommutabiles manent; quarum participatione fit, ut
sit quidquid est, quoquo modo este
Sed anima rationalis inter eas res, quae sunt a Deo
conditae, omnia superat; et Deo proxima est, quando
pura est; eique in quantum caritate cohaeserit, in tanturn ab eo lumine illo intelligibili perfusa quodam
modo et illustrata cernit, non per corporeos oculos,
sed per ipsius sui principale, quo excellit, id est, per
intelligentiam suam, istas rationes, quarum visione fit
beatissima. Quas rationes, ut dictum est, sive ideas,
sive formas, sive species, sive rationes licet vocare, et
multis conceditur appellare quod libet, sed paucissimis
videre quod verum este
(De diversis quaestionibus LXXXIII, q. 46; VI, 1718.)
58

confess that all things that are, that is, whatsoever

things are constituted with a nature of their own in
their proper kinds, were created by God as their
source, so that they might exist? And that all living
things are alive by virtue of t11e same source? And
that the whole of things is preserved, and the very order in which they change, as they manifest their
temporal courses according to a definite pattern, is
maintained and governed by the laws of the highest
God? When this is established and admitted, who will
dare to say that God established all things in an irrational manner? Now if this cannot be said or accepted
in any proper sense, the conclusion remains that all
things were founded by means of reason. Not that a
man is based on the same reason as a horse: this
would be an absurd notion. So, each one of these
is created in accord with its own reason. Now, where
should we think that these reasons are, if not in the
mind of the Creator? For He did not look to anyt11ing
placed outside Himself as a model for the construction
of what He created: to think that He did would be
irreligious.
Now, if these reasons for all things to be created, or
already created, are contained in the divine mind,
and if there can be nothing in the divine mind unless
it be eternal and immutable, and if Plato called these
primary reasons of things Ideas,-then not only do
Ideas exist but they are true because they are eternal
and they endure immutably in this way; and it is by
participation in these that whatever exists is produced,
however its way of existing may be.
59

TEXT XIII
Credibilium tria sunt genera. Alia sunt quae semper creduntur, et numquam intelliguntur: sicut est
omnis historia, temporalia et hllmana gesta percurrens. Alia quae mox ut creduntur, intelliguntur: sicut
sunt omnes rationes humanae, vel de numeris, vel de
quibuslibet disciplinis. Tertium, quae prima creduntur
et postea intelliguntur: qualia sunt et quae de divinis
rebus non possunt intelligi, nisi ab his qui mundo sunt
corde, quod fit praeceptis servatis,quae de bene
vivendo accipiuntur.
(De diversis quaestionibus LXXXIII, q. 48; t. VI, 18-

19.)

TEXT XN
Quae tarnen onmia quisquis ita delexerit, ut jactare
se inter imperitos velit, et non potius quaerere unde
sint vera, quae tantummodo vera esse persenserit; et
unde quaedam non solurn vera sed etiam incommutabilia, quae incommutabilia esse comprehenderit; ac
si a specie corporum usque ad humanam mentern
perveniens, eum et ipsam mutabilern invenerit, quod
nunc docta, nunc indocta sit, constituta tarnen inter
incommutabilem supra se veritatem, et mutabilia
infra se cetera, ad unius Dei laudem atque dilectionem
60

TEXT XIII
Three Objects of Belief
There are three kinds of objects of belief. One kind
consists of those that are always believed and never
understood: such is history in all cases, running
through the course of temporal and human events.
Second, there are those objects which, as soon as they
are believed, are understood: such are all human uses
of reason, in the field of numbers or in any of the
academic studies. Third are those objects that are
first believed and later on understood: such are those
things that cannot be understood about divine matters, except by the clean of heart, a condition achieved
by obeying the commandments which have to do with
living properly.
TEXT XIV
Soul: Between Immutable and Mutable
Yet, whoever esteems all these things so highly that
he wants to speak boastfully of himself among unlearned men, instead of trying to learn the source of
the truth of things which he has seen are true, or the
source of the truth and immutability of those which he
has learned are immutable, or in advancing from the
bodily appearance to the human mind, has found out
that it is inconstant, sometimes learned, sometimes
ignorant, but still established between Immutable
Truth above it and the other changeable things below
it; whoever, I say, acts in this manner and does not
refer everything to the praise and love of the one God,
from whom he knows that everything has conle into
61

cuncta convertere, a quo cuncta esse cognoscit; doctus

videri potest, esse autem sapiens nullo modo.
(De doctrina Christiana, 11, 38, 57; t. 111, 41.)

TEXT XV
Pllilosophi autem qui vocantur, si qua forte vera et
fidei nostrae accomnl0data dixerunt, maxime Platonici,
non solunl formidanda non sunt, sed ab eis etiam
tamquam injustis possessoribus in usum nostrum
vindicanda.
(De doctrina Christiana, 11, 39, 60; t. 111, 42.)

TEXT XVI
Proinde cum tantum intersit inter cogitationem qua
cogito terram luminis vestram quae omnino nusquam est, et cogitationem qua cogito Alexandrianl
quam numquam vidi, sed tarnen est, rursusque tantum
intersit inter istam qua cogito Alexandriam incognitanl,
et eam qua cogito Carthaginem cognitam: ab hac
quoque cogitatione qua certa et nota corpora cogito,
longe incomparabiliter distat cogitatio qua intelligo
justitiam, castitatem, fidem, veritatem, caritatem, bonitatern, et quidquid ejusmodi est: quae cogitatio, dicite,
si potestis, quale lumen sit, quo illa omnia quae hoc
non sunt, et inter se discernuntur, et quantunl ab hoc
distent, fida manifestatione cognoscitur: et tarnen
etiam hoc lumen, non est lumen illud quod Deus est;
62

existence, may seem to be erudite, but he can by no

means be considered wise.
TEXT XV
The Utility 0/ Philosophy
Furthermore, if those who are called philosophers,
especially the Platonists, have said things by chance
that are truthful and conformable to our faith, we
must not only have no fear of them, but even appropriate them for our own use from those who are, in
asense, their illegal possessors.
TEXT XVI
Measure, Number and Weight
Since there is so much difference between the
cogitation whereby I think of YOllr luminous earth
which never exists at all and the cogitation in whicll
I think of Alexandria which I 11ave never seen but yet
does exist-or again, there is so much difIerence between that whereby I cogitate an unknown Alexandria and that in which I cogitate a Carthage that
is known-so too, far different from the cogitation
whereby I thirlk of definite and well known bodies is
that incomparably distinct cogitation in which I understand justice, chastity, faith, truth, charity, goodness
and whatever else is like these. Now tell me, if you
can, in regard to this cogitation known by trustworthy
evidence, what kind of illumination is identified with
this cogitation, whereby all those things that are not
like it and yet are distinguished among themselves,
and how distant they are from this light. Yet even this
light is not the Light that is God; the former is cre63

hoc enim creatura est, Creator est ille; hoc factum,

ille qui fecit; hoc denique mutabile, dum vult quod
nolebat, et scit quod nesciebat, et reminiscitur quod
oblitum erat, illud autem incommutabili voluntate,
veritate, aeternitate persistit; et inde nobis est initium
existendi, ratio cognoscendi, lex amandi; inde omnibus
et irrationabilibus animantibus natura qua vivunt,
vigor quo sentiunt, motus quo appetllnt; inde etiam
omnibus corporibus mensura ut subsistant, numerus
ut ornentur, pondus ut ordinentur.
(Contra Faustum Manichaeum, XX, 7; t. VIII, 335336.)

TEXT XVII
Tu es Deus meus. . . . Et clamasti de longinquo:
Immo vero, Ego sum qui Sllm. Et audivi sicut auditur
in corde, et non erat prorsus unde dubitarem; faciliusque dubitarem vivere me, quam non esse veritatem
quae per ea quae facta sunt intellecta conspicitur.
Et inspexi cetera infra te, et vidi nec omnino esse,
nec omnino non esse. Esse quidem, quoniam abs te
sunt: non esse autem, quoniam id quod es non sunt.
Id vere est, quod incommutabiliter manet.
(Confessiones, VII, 10, 16 - 11,17; I, 139.)

TEXT XVIII
Sed tunc lectis Platonicorum illis libris, postea
quam inde admonitus quaerere incorpoream veritatem,
64

ated, .the latter is the Creater; the former is made,

the latter is He Who makes; the former is tllen
mutable (for it now wills what it formerly rejected,
and it knows what it used to ignore, and it remembers
what was once forgotten) and the latter endures by
an unchangeable will, truth and eternity. From it come
the beginning of our act of being, the reason of our
act of knowing, the law of our act of loving. From it
come the nature whereby all irrational animals live,
the strength whereby they sense, the motion whereby
they desire. From it, too, come to all bodies the measure enabling them to exist substantially, the number
enabling them to live in beauty, the weight enabling
them to be weIl ordered.

TEXT XVII
Truly to be lmmutable
Thou art my God.... And Thou didst cry out from
afar: 'Yea, verily, I Am WlI0 Am!
I looked closely at the rest of things below Thee
and saw that they are neither wholly in existence, nor
wholly out of existence: they exist, indeed, for they
are from Thee, but they do not exist, for they are
not what Thou art. For, that truly is which endures
immutably.
TEXT XVllI
To Be Always the Same
Bllt, having then read those books of the Platonists and after being thence admonished to seek the
incorporeal Truth, I clearly saw Thy invisible things
65

invisibilia tua per ea quae facta sunt intellecta conspexi; et repulsus sensi quid per tenebras animae
meae contemplari non sinerer, certus esse te, et infinitum esse, nec tarnen per locos finitos infinitosve
diffundi; et vere te esse qui semper idem ipse esses, ex
nulla parte nulloque motu aliter aut aliter, cetera
vero ex te esse omnia, hoc solo firmissimo documento,
quia sunt: certus quidem in istis eram, nimis tarnen
infirmus ad fruendum tee
(Confessiones, VII, 20, 26; 1,143.)

TEXT XIX

Nos enim Catholici Christiani Deum colimus, a quo

onlnia bona sunt, seu magna seu parva; a quo est
omnis modus, seu magnus seu parvus; a quo omnis
species, seu magna seu parva; a quo omnis ordo, seu
magnus seu parvus. Omnia enim quanto magis moderata, speciosa, ordinata sunt, tanto magis utique bona
sunt: quanta autem minus moderata, minus speciosa,
minus ordinata sunt, minus bona sunt. Haec itaque
tria, modus, species et ordo, ut de innumerabilibus
taceam, quae ad ista tria pertinere monstrantur; haec
ergo tria, nl0dus, species, ordo, tamquam generalia
bona sunt in rebus a Deo factis, sive in spiritu, sive in
corpore. Deus itaque supra omnem creaturae modum
66

which are understood through the things which are

made. Though repulsed in this attempt, I perceived
what it was I was not permitted, because of the darkness of my soul, to observe clearly. I was certain that
Thou dost exist and that Thou art both infinite and
yet not diffused throughout either finite or infinite
space; and that Thou truly art He who art ever the
same in Thyself, never different in any part nor changing in any way so as to become different; and, indeed,
that all the rest of things exist from Thee, and that
is proved solely and most definitely by the fact that
they exist. I was certain indeed about these matters,
but still too weak to enjoy Thee.
TEXT XIX
Mode, Species and Order

We Catholic Christians worship a God from Whom

come all things that are good, whether great or small;
from Whom is every mode, whether great or small;
from Whom is every species, whether great or small;
from Whom is every order, great or small. Indeed,
the more moderated, specified and ordered all things
are, the greater are they in goodness. On the other
hand, the less moderated, specified and ordered they
are, the less good are tlley. So, these three principles,
mode, species and order, not to speak of innumerable other pertinent aspects,-these three, tllen, mode,
species, order, are like general goods in the things
made by God, eitller in the spirit or in the body.
Hellce, God is above every creaturely mode, above
every species, above every order. It is not spatially
67

est, supra omnem speciem, supra omnem ordinem:

nec spatiis locorum supra est, sed ineffabili et singu~
lari potentia, a quo omnis modus, omnis species, omnis
ordo. Haec tria ubi magna sunt, magna bona sunt:
ubi parva sunt, parva bona sunt: ubi nulla sunt, nullum
bonus este Et rursus ubi haec tria magna sunt,
magnae naturae sunt: ubi parva sunt, parvae naturae
sunt: ubi nulla sunt, nulla natura este Omnis ergo
natura bona este (De natura boni, 3; t. VIII, 501502.)

TEXT XX

Quapropter cum eum legimus sex diebus omnia

perfecisse, et senarium numerum considerantes, invenimus esse perfeetum, atque ita creaturarum ordinem currere, ut etiam ipsarum partium, quibus iste
nllmerus perficitur, appareat quasi gradata distinctio;
veniatetiam illud in nlentem, quod alio loco Scripturarum ei dicitur, Omnia in mensura et numero et
pondere disposuisti [Sap. 11 :21]; atque ita cogitet
anima, quae potest, invocata in auxilium Deo, et
impertiente atque inspirante vires, utrum haec tria,
mensura, numerus, pondus, in quibus Deum disposuisse omnia scriptum est, erant alicubi antequam crearetur universa creatura, an etiam ipsa creata sunt; et
si erant antea, ubi erant.
68

that He is above but by an indescribable and unique

power whence come every mode, species and order.
Where these three are great, they are gr~at goods;
where snlall, they are small goods; wllere they are
non-existent, there is no good. Again, where these
three are great, natures are great; where they are
small, natures are small; where they are not, no
nature is present. Tllerefore, every nature is good.
TEXT XX
Measure, Number and Weight

For this reason, when we read that He perfected

all things in six days, and we think over the number
six, we discover that it is perfect and moreover that
the orderly course of creation ran in such a way that
there was evidently a sort of step by step distinction
of the parts of creation whereby this number was perfected. So the thought came to mind of the statement
in another place in Scripture, "He hath arranged all
things according to measure, number and weight."
And thus may the soul think, as weIl as it can, having
asked the help of God Who both provides and energizes its powers, whether these three items, measure,
number and weight, according to which it was written
that God arranged all things, were anywhere in
existence before the whole of creation was made, or
whether these three were themselves created, and if
they existed before, where were they.
Indeed, before creation there was nothing other
than the Creator. So, they were in Hirn. But how?
In fact, we also read that the things that were cre69

Neque enim ante creaturam erat aliquid nisi Creator. In ipso ergo erant. Sed quomodo? nam et ista
quae creata sunt, in ipso esse legimus: an i11a sicut
ipse, ista vero sicut in i110 a quo reguntur et gubernantur? Et quomodo illa ipse? Neque enim Deus
mensura est, aut numerus, aut pondus, aut ista omnia.
An secllndum id quod novimus mensuram in eis quae
metimur, et numerum in eis quae numeramus, et
pondus in eis quae appendimus, non est Deus ista:
secundum id vero quod mensura omni rei modum
praefigit, et numerus omni rei speciem praebet, et
pondus omnem rem ad quietem ac stabilitatem trahit,
ille primitus et veraciter et singulariter ista est, qui
terminat omnia, et format omnia, et ordinat omnia;
nihilque aliud dictum intelligitur, quomodo per cor et
linguam humanam potuit omnia in mensura, et numero et pondere disposuisti, nisi omnia in te disposuisti?
Magnum est, paucisque concessum, excedere omnia,
quae metiri possunt, ut videatur mensura sine mensura; excedere omnia quae numerari possunt, ut
videatur numerus sine numero; excedere omnia quae
appendi possunt, ut videatur pondus sine pondere.
Neque enim mensura et numerus et pondus, in
lapidibus tantummodo et lignis atque hujusmodi molibus, et quantiscumque corporalibus vel terrestribus vel
caelestibus animadverti, et cogitari potest. Est etiam
70

ated were in Him: now were these three identical with

Him, while the otl1er things were present in Him by
Whom they are ruled and governed? Then, how were
they identical with Him? For God is neither measure,
nor number, nor weight, nor is He all these together.
Is it according to what we know was measure in the
things that we measure, and as number in the things
that we number, and as weight in the things that we
weigh-but surely God is not these? Or is it according to that original standard that provides a measure
for everything, and tl1e number that offers a species
to everything, and the weight that draws everything
to rest and stability-He is identical with these three,
originally, truly and especially, for He limits all, He
shapes all, and He orders all? Through the heart and
tongue of man, how was there any other way of
understanding the statement that Thou hast arranged
all things according to measure, number and weight,
th~n that Thou hast arranged all things within Thyself?
[t is a great feat, granted to few, to rise above all
th? ngs that can be measured, in order to see the measure that is without measure; to go beyond all that may
be numbered, to see number without nUlTlber; to
surpass all that can be weighed, to see weight without weight.
For this meaning cannot be thought in terms of
these as observed in stones only, and in pieces of
wood and bulky thil1gs like that, or in bodily things
of whatever size, either on earth or in the heavens.
Measure is some sort of principle of action, to prevent an unalterable and unregulated process; num71

mensura aliquid agendi, ne sit irrevoeabilis et immoderata progressio; et est numerus et affeetionum animi
et virtutum, quo ab stultitiae deformitate, ad sapientiae formam deeusque eolligitur; et est pondus. voluntatis et amoris, ubi apparet quanti quidque in appetendo, fugiendo, praeponendo, postponendoque pendatur: sed haee animorum atque mentium et mensura
alia mensura eohibetur, et numerus alio numero formatur, et pondus alio pondere rapitur. Mensura autem
sine mensura est, eui aequatur quod de illa est, nee
aliunde ipsa est: Numerus sine numero est, quo formantur omnia, nee formatur ipse: Pondus sine pondere est, quo referuntur ut quieseant, quorum quies
purum gaudium est, nee illud jam refertur ad aliud.
Sed nomina mensurae et numeri et ponderis, quisquis nonnisi visibiliter novit, serviliter novit. Transeendat itaque omne, quod ita novit, aut si nondum
potest, nee ipsis nominibus haereat, de quibus eogitare
nisi sordide non potest. Tanto enim magis euique ista
in superioribus eara sunt, quanta ipse minus est in
inferioribus earo. Quod si non vult aliquis ea voeabula,
quae in rebus infimis et abjeetissimis didieit, transferre
ad illa sublimia, quibus intuendis mentem serenare
eonatur, non est urgendus ut faeiat. Dum enim hoe
intelligatur, quod intelligendum est, non magnopere
eurandum est quid voeetur. Seire oportet tamen eujus72

ber pertains to the dispositions and powers of the

soul, whereby it is properly gathered in from the deformity of foolishness to the form of wisdom; and
weight applies to will and love, when it becomes evident how much and what weight is to be given to
feelings of desire or dislike, or of preference and
undervaluation. But this measure of the soul and
mind is determined by another measure, and this
llumber is formed by another number, and this weight
is balanced by another weight. Now, the measure
without measure is that one to which its derivatives
are compared but which has itself no other origin;
number without number is that whereby all things are
formed but it is not itself formed; weight without
weight is that whereby those beings whose rest is
pure joy are carried to their rest bllt it is not itself
carried toward any other thing.
Of course, whoever knows the terms, measure,
number and weight, only in the visible sphere has but
a servile knowledge. So let him rise above everything
that is so known, or if he is not yet able, let him not
stick to tllese meanings which can only be thought
in a base sense. To the extent that these principles
are dear to a man on the level of higher things, they
are less dear to hirn on the level of lower things. And
if a person does not care to transfer those terms that
he learned from lower and less worthy things to those
sublime entities through whose contemplation he
strives to order his mind, then he should not be pressed
to do so. As long as the point is understood that needs
to be understood, it is not of much concern how it
is expressed. Yet one should recognize that there is
73

nlodi similitudo est inferiorum ad superiora. Non

enim aliter recte hinc illuc ratio tendit, et nititur.
(De Genesi ad litteram, IV, 3, 7-4, 9; t. 111 (1),
163-164.)

TEXT XXI
Sicut autem in ipso grano invisibiliter erant omnia
simul, quae per tempora in arborem surgerent: ita
ipse mundus eogitandus est, eum Deus simul omnia
ereavit, habuisse simul omnia quae in illo et eum i1lo
facta sunt, quando factus est dies; non solum eaelum

eum sole et luna et sideribus, quorum speeies manent

motu rotabili, et terram et abyssos, quae velut ineonstantes motus patiuntur, atque inferius adjuneta partem alteram munda eonferunt; sed etiam illa quae
aqua et terra produxit potentialiter atque causaliter,
priusquam per temporum moras ita exorirentur, quomodo nobis jam nota sunt in eis operibus, quae Deus
usque nune operatur.
(De Genesi ad litteram, V, 23,4.5; 1. 111 (1) 196.)

TEXT XXII
Natura igitur universitatis eorporalis non adjuvatur
extrinseeus corporaliter. Neque enim est extra eam
ullum corpus, alioquin non est universitas. Intrinseeus
74

such a likeness between lower things and higher ones.

For, it is not different for reason to have a right
inclination OD. one level or another, and it does tend
upward.

TEXT XXI
All Things Created at Once
Just as all things which during the course of time
contributed to the growth of the tree were invisibly
present together and at once in this seed, so should we
think of this world, at the point when God created all
things together, as having possessed simultaneously
all things that have been made in it, when day was
made; not only the heavens, including the sun, m.oon
and stars, whose species endure in circular motion,
and the earth and the depths which are subject to
motions but not continuous ones, and those additional
things which constitute another part of the world on
a lower level; but even tllose things that He has pro...
duced in water and on earth, potentially and in their
causes, before they have developed througll the stages
of time, in the way that God's products are now known
to us in His present working.

TEXT XXII
God Moves All Creation

So the nature of the whole corporeal universe is not

helped in a corporeal way by anything extrinsie to it.
The reason for this is that outside it there is no body,
if there were it would not be the whole universe. From
75

autem adjuvatur ineorporatiter, Deo id agente ut omnino natura sit; quoniam ex ipso et per ipsum et in
ipso sunt omnia. Partes vero ejusdem universitatis et
intrinseeus ineorporaliter adjuvantur, vel potius fiunt,
ut naturae sint; et extrinseeus eorporatiter, quo se
melius habeant, sieut alimentis, agrieultura, medieina
et quaeeumque etiam ad ornatum fiunt, ut non solum
salvae ae feeundiores, verum etiam deeentiores sint....
Quae eum ita sint, eum Deus omnipotens et omnitenens, ineommutabili aeternitate, veritate, voluntate
semper idem, non per tempus nee per loeum motus,
movet per tempus creaturam spiritalem, movet etiam
per tempus et loeum ereaturam eorporalem, . . .
(De Genesi ad litteram, VIII, 25, 46 et 26, 48; t. TII
[1],241-242.)

TEXT XXIII
Et elementa mundi hujus eorporei habent definitam
vim qualitatemque suam, quid unumquodque valeat
vel non valeat, quid de quo fieri possit vel non possit.
Ex his velut primordiis rerum, omnia quae gignuntur,
suo quoque tempore exortus proeessusque sumunt,
finesque et deeessiones sui eujusque generis. Unde
fit ut. de granD tritiei non naseatur faba, vel de faba
triticum, vel de peeore homo, vel de homine peeus.
Super 11une autem rnotum eursumque rerum naturalern, potestas Creatoris habet apud se posse de bis
76

within, however, it is assisted incorporeally, for God

moves it in such a way that it remains entirely natural, since all things are from Hirn, through Hirn, and
in Hirn. Yet the parts of this universe are helped both
from within and in an incorporeal way, or rather they
are made, so that they may exist as natures; and they
are helped from outside in a corporeal way, so that
they may become better; thus, the provision of food,
agriculture, medicine and even the decorative arts
is made not simply for protection and greater growth
but also so that men may live more decently. . . .
These points being established, since God the
omnipotent and all-supporting, Who is unmoved in
time or place and always the same in the immutability
of eternity, truth and volition, does more spiritual
creation through the course of tin1e, He also moves
corporeal creation through both time and place.

TEXT XXIII
Seminal Reasons in the Elements
The elements of this bodily world have their own
precise force and quality, what each of them can do
or cannot do, what can be made from what, or cannot. From these elements as the original principles of
things, all things that are generated take their origin
and development, each in its proper time, and they
receive their terminations and diminutions, each according to its kind. Hence it develops that a bean does
not grow from a grain of wheat, or wheat from a bean,
or a man from a beast, or a beast from a man. Above
this natural change and course ofthings, the power
77

omnibus facere aliud, quan1 eorum quasi seminales

rationes habent, non tarnen id, quod non in eis posuit
ut de his fieri vel ab ipso possit. Neque enim potentia
temeraria, sed sapientiae virtute omnipotens est.
(De Genesi ad litteram, IX, 17, 32; t. 111 [1], 255.)

TEXT XXIV
Quamquam itaque in eadem anima fiant visiones
sive quae sentiuntur per corpus, sicut hoc corporeum
caelum, terra, et quaecumque in eis nota esse possunt,
quemadmodum possunt; sive quae spiritu videntur
similia corporum, de quibus multa jam diximus; sive
cum mente intelliguntur, quae nec corpora sunt, nec
similitudines corporum; habent utique ordinem suum,
et est aliud alio praecellentius. Praestantior est enim
visio spiritalis quam corporalis, et rursus praestantior
intellectualis quam spiritalis. Corporalis enim sine
spiritali esse non potest, ... Non potest itaque fieri
visio corporalis, nisi etiam spiritalis simul fiat: . . .
At vero spiritalis visio etiam sine corporali fieri potest,
. . . Item spiritalis visio indiget intellectuali ut dijudicetur, intellectualis autem ista spiritali inferiore non
indiget, ac per hoc spiritali corporalis, intellectuali
autem utraque subjecta est....
Illuditur autem anima similitudinibus rerum, non
earum vitio, sed opinionis suae, cum approbat quae
78

of the Creator keeps to Hirnself the ability to make

out of all these things sonlething other than what their
seminal reasons, as it were, contain,-but not something tllat He did not place in them, so that it might
develop out of them or be produced by Himself. For
He is omnipotent, not by virtue of thoughtless power
but by virtue of His wisdonl.
TEXT XXIV
Bodily, Spiritual and Intellectual Visions

Even though these visions occur in the same soul;

either those perceived through the body, to the extent
that this is possible, such as the seeing of this bodily
heavel1 and earth and whatever can be observed in
them; or those in which the likenesses of bodies are
seen in the "spirit," on which we have already said
a good deal; or when those objects that are neither
bodies nor bodily images are perceived by the nund,
-in any case, they occur in a definite order and one
outranks the next. For, the spirital vision is higher
than the corporeal vision; and then the intellectual
vision is higller than the spirital. For the corporeal
cannot occur without the spirital. ... So the corporeal
vision cannot go on, unless the spirital is also occurring at the same time.... However, the spirital vision
can occur without the corporeal. . . . Moreover, the
spirital vision requires the intellectual one, so that it
may be judged, but the intellectual vision does not
need this lower spirital one, consequently the corporeal is placed below the spirital and both are below
the intellectual. ...
79

similia sunt pro iis quibus similia sunt, ab intelligentia

defieiens. Fallitur ergo in visione corporali, eum in
ipsis eorporibus fieri putat, quod fit in eorporis sensibus.... In visione autem spiritali, id est in eorporum
similitudinibus, quae spiritu videntur, fallitur anima,
eum ea quae sie videt, ipsa corpora esse arbitratur;
vel quod sibi suspieione falsaque eonjeetura finxerit,
hoc etiam in eorporibus putat, quod non visa eonjeetat. At vero in illis intelleetualibus visis non fallitur:
aut enim intelligit, et verum est, aut si verum non est,
non intelligit: unde aliud est in bis errare quae videt,
aliud ideo errare quia non videt.
(De Genesi ad litteram, XII, 24-25, 51-52; t. 111
[1],315-316.)

TEXT XXV

Aliud est enim ex intima ae summa causarum eardine eondere atque administrare ereaturam, quod quid
faeit, solus ereator est Deus: aliud autem pro distributis ab illo viribus et faeultatibus aliquam operationem
forinseeus admovere, ut tune vel tune, sie vel sie,
exeat quod ereatur. Ista quippe originaliter ae primordialiter in quadam textura elementorum euneta
jam ereata sunt, sed aeeeptis opportunitatibus prodeunt. Nam sieut matres gravidae sunt fetibus, sie ipse
mundus gravidus est eausis naseentium: quae in illo
80

The soul is subject to illusion from the likenesses

of things; the fallIt is not theirs but belongs to its own
way of thinking, when unintelligently it takes the
likenesses to be the realities which they resemble. So,
amistake occurs in corporeal vision, when something
that happens in the sense processes of the body is
thought to occur in other bodily things. . . . In the
case of spirital vision, that is, of the likenesses of
things that are seen in the "spirit," t1Ie soul is subject
to illusion when it thinks that the objects that it sees
in this way are the bodies themselves, or because it
thinks that the product of its own distrust or false conjecture is present in bodies, because it projects what
is not seen. However, there is no illusion on the level
of things seen intellectually: either understanding
occurs and it is true, or if it is not true, then there is
no understanding. Hence, in these matters, it is Olle
thing to err in regard to what one sees, and still another to err because one does not see.
TEXT XXV

Causes Created in the Elements

It is one thing to create and to rule the creature

from the innermost and highest pivotal cause of an
causation (He who does so is alone the Creator-God),
but something quite different to apply some operation
from without in accordance with the powers and the
faculties which have been granted to each one by Hirn,
so that what has already been created may come forth
either now or later, either in this way or that way.
The being' that thus appears has already been wholly
81

non creantur nisi ab illa summa essentia, ubi nec

oritur nec moritur aliquid, nec incipit esse, nec desinit.
Adhibere autem forinsecus accedentes causas, quae
tametsi non sunt naturales, tarnen secundum naturam
adhibentur, ut ea quae secreto naturae sinu abdita
continentur, erumpant et foris creentur quodam modo
explicando mensuras et numeros et pondera sua quae
in occulto acceperunt ab illo, qui omnia in mensura
et numero et pondere disposuit, non solum mali angeli,
sed etiam mali homines possunt, sicut exemplo agriculturae supra docui.
(De Trinitate, 111, 9, 16; t. VIII, 801.)

TEXT XXVI
Quisquis Deum ita cogitat, etsi nondum potest omni
modo invenire quid sit, pie tarnen cavet, quantum potest, aliquid de eo sentire quod non sit.
Est tarnen sine dubitatione substantia, vel si melius
hoc appellatur, essentia, quam Graeci ousian vocant.
Sicut enim ab eo quod est sapere dicta est sapientia,
et ab eo quod est scire dicta est scientia, ita ab eo
quod est esse dicta est essentia. Et quis magis est,
quam ille qui dixit famulo suo Moysi, Ego sum qui
sum: et dices filiis Israel, Qui est misit me ad vos?
Sed aliae quae dicuntur essentiae sive substantiae,
capiunt accidentia, quibus in eis fiat vel magna vel
82

created in the texture as it were of the material elements, but only emerges when the opportunity presents itslf.
For as nlothers are pregnant with unborn offspring,
so the world itself is pregnant with the causes of unborn beings, which are not created in it except from
that highest essence, where nothing is either born or
dies, begins to be or ceases to be. But, as I have explained above in the metaphor from farming, not only
wicked angels but even wicked men can apply extrinsie causes to the nature from without. Although such
causes are not natural, yet they are applied according to nature, in order that those things Wllich lead
a hidden life in the secret womb of nature may break
forth and be created outwardly by developing according to their proper measures, numbers, and weights,
which they have received in secret frorn Hirn, who has
ordered all things in measure, number, and weight.
TEXT XXVI
Substance, Essence and To Be

Whoever so tllinks of God, even though 11e does not

yet discover all that can be known about Hirn, never..
theless, by his pious frame of mind avoids, as far as
possible, the danger of thinking anything about Hirn
which He is not.
But God is without doubt a substance, or perhaps
essence would be a better term, which the Greeks call
ousia. For just as wisdom is so called from being wise,
and knowledge is so called from knowing, so essence
is so called from being [esse]. And who possesses
83

quantacumque mutatio: Deo autem aliquid ejusmodi

accidere non potest; et ideo sola est incommutabilis
substantia vel essentia, qui Deus est, cui profecto ipsum esse, unde essentia nominata est, maxime ac
verissime competit. Quod enim mutatur, non servat
ipsum esse; et quod nlutari potest, etiam si non nlutetur, potest quod fuerat non esse: ac per hoc illud
solum quod non tantum non mutatur, verum etiam
mutari onlnino non potest, sine scrupulo occurrit quod
verissime dicatur esse.
(De Trinitate, V, 1-2, 2-3; t. VIII, 833.)

TEXT XXVII
Haec igitur omnia, quae arte divina facta sunt, et
unitatem quamdam in se ostendunt, et speciem, et
ordinem. Quidquid enim horum est, et unum aliquid
est, sicut sunt naturae corporum, et ingenia animarum;
et aliqua specie formatur, sicut sunt figurae vel qualitates corporum, ac doctrinae vel artes animarum; et
ordinem aliquem petit aut tenet, sicut sunt pondera
vel collocationes corporum, atque amores aut delectationes animarum. Oportet igitur ut Creatorem per
ea quae facta sunt intellectum conspicientes, Trinitatenl intelligamus, cujus in creatura quomodo dignum
est apparet vestigium. In illa enim Trinitate summa
origo est rerum omnium et perfectissima pulcritudo,
84

being in a higher degree than He, who said to His

servant Moses: 'I am who am,' and 'He who is, has
sent me to you.' But allother things that are called
essences or substances are susceptible of accidents,
by which a change, whether great or small, is brought
about in them. But there can be no accidents of this
kind in God. Therefore, only the essence of God, or
the essence which God is, is unchangeable. Being is in
the highest and truest sense of the term proper to Him
from whom being derives its name. For what undergoes a change does not retain its own being, and what
is subject to change, even though it may not actually
be changed, can still lose the being which it had. And,
therefore, only that which is not only not changed,
but cannot undergo any change at all, can be called
being in the truest sense without any scruple.
TEXT XXVII
One, Species and Order

All these things, therefore, which have been made

by the divine art, manifest a certain unity, form, and
order in themselves. For each of them is some one
thing, as are the natures of bodies and the skills of
souls; is shaped according to a determined form, as
are the figures and qualities of bodies and the sciences
and arts of souls; and either seeks for or maintains a
certain order, as are the weights and arrangements of
bodies and the loves and delights of souls.
When in our mind, therefore, we perceive the Creator through the things which have been made, we
ought to recognize Him as the Trinity of which a
85

et beatissima delectatio. Itaque illa tria, et ad se invicenl determinari videntur, et in se infinita sunt.

(De Trinitate, VI, 10, 12; t. VIII, 851-852.)

TEXT XXVIII
eum enim dicimus non eumdem esse J acob qui
est Abraham, Isaac autem nec Abraham esse nec
Jacob, tres esse utique fatemur, Abraham, Isaac et
J acob. Sed cunl quaeritur quid tres, respondemus tres
honlines, nomine speciali eos pluraliter appellantes;
generali autem, si dicamus tria animalia. . . . Item
cum dicimus bovem non esse equum, canem vero nec
bovem esse nec equum, tria quaedam dicimus: et percontantibus quid tria, non jam speciali nomine dicimus
tres equos, aut tres boves, aut tres canes, quia non
eadem specie continentur: sed generali tria animalia,
sive superiore genere tres substantias, vel tres creaturas, vel tres naturas....
Ba quippe uno nomine quamvis pluraliter enuntiamus quae communiter habent illud quod eo nomine
significatur. . . .
Pater ergo et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus, quoniam
tres sunt, quaeramus quid tres sint, et quid comnlune
habeant. Non enim commune iltis est id quod Pater
est, ut invicem sibi sint patres; sicut amici, cum relative ad alterutrum dicantur, possunt dici tres amici,
quod invicem sibi sunt. Non autem hoc ibi, quia
86

trace appears, as is fitting, in the creature. For in

that Trinity is the highest origin of all things, their
most perfeet beauty, and their most blessed delight.
These three, therefore, seem to be limited in their
relations to one another, and yet at the same time they
are infinite in tllemselves.
TEXT XXVIII
Essence and the Divine Trinity

For when we say that J acob is not the same as

Abraham, and that Isaac is not the same as Abraham
or J acob, then we certainly acknowledge that they
are three, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. But when we
are asked what the three are, we answer three men,
and thus use a specific name in the plural; but if we
want to use a generic name, then we reply, three

animals. . . . Again, when we say that an ox is not a

horse, and that a dog is neither an ox nor a horse, we
say that they are three, and to those inquiring what
are these three, we cannot tell them by a specific name,
three horses, or three oxen, or three dogs, because
they do not belong to the sanle species; but we call
them by the generic name, three animals, or if we
wish to use a higher genus, then we say three substances, or three creatures, or three natures.
But whatever things are designated specifically by
one name in the plural number can also be designated
generically by one name....
Since, therefore, the Father, the Son, and the Holy
Spirit are three, let us ask what three, and what they
have in common. They do not have in common that
87

tantum Pater ibi pater; nec duorum pater, sed unici

Filii. . . .
Quid igitur tres? Si enim tres personae, cummune
est eis id quod persona est: ergo speciale hoc aut
generale nomen est eis, si consuetudinem loquendi
respicimus. Sed ubi est naturae nulla diversitas, ita
generaliter enuntiantur aliqua plura, ut etiam specialiter enuntiari possint. Naturae enim differentia facit, ut
laurus et myrtus et olea, aut equus et bos et canis, non
dicantur speciali nomine, iste tres lauri, aut illi tres
boves; sed generali, et istae tres arbores, et illa tria
animalia. Hic vero ubi nulla est essentiae diversitas,
oportet ut speciale nomen habeant haec tria, quod
tarnen non invenitur. Nam persona generale nomen
est, in tantum ut etiam llomo possit hoc dici, cum
tantum intersit inter homil1em et Deum.
. . . cur non etiam tres deos dicimus? . . . An quia
Scriptura non dicit tres deos? Sed nec tres personas
alicubi Scripturam commemorare invenimus. . . . Si
autem diceremus tres deos, contradiceret Scriptura
dicens, Audi Israel, Dominus Deus tuus Deus unus
este (Deut. 6:4)
Cur ergo et tres essentias non licet dicere, quod
similiter Scriptura, sicut non dicit, ita nec contradicit?
Nam essentia si speciale nomen est commune tribus,
cur non dicantur tres essentiae, sicut Abraham, Isaac
et Jacob tres homines, quia homo speciale nomen
est commune omnibus hominibus? Si autem speciale
88

which the Father is, so that they themselves are

fathers in relation to one another; as friends, since
they are mlltually so called in relation to one another,
can be called three friends, because they are mutually
friends to one another. But it is not so in God, because there, only the Father is the Father, and indeed
He is not the Father of the other two, but only of the
one Sone . . . What then are these three? If we say
three persons, then they have in common that which
is meant by person. Hence, in their case, if we follow
the customary manner of speaking, person is either
their specific or their generic name.
But where there is no diversity of nature, then a
generic as weIl as a specific name can also be applied
to a number of things. For the diversity of nature is
the reason why the laurel, the myrtle, and the olive,
or the horse, the

OX,

and the dog cannot be included

under one specific name; and the former cannot be

called three laureIs, nor the latter three oxen; but a
generic name only can be used, that is, three trees for
the former, and three animals for the latter. But here,
where there is no diversity of nature, these three
should have a specific name, but none has been found.
For person is a generic name, so much so, in fact, that
even man can be so called. in spite of the great distance between man and God.
. . . why do we not also call them three gods? . . .
Is it perhaps because Scripture does not speak of three
gods?
... Why, then, are we not also allowed to say three
essences, which Scripture in like manner, as it does
not use this term, so neither does it contradict it? For
89

nomen non est essentia, sed generale, . . . cur non

dicuntur istae tres essentiae? ...
Aut si propter unitatem Trinitatis non dicuntur tres
essentiae, sed una essentia, cur non propter eamdem
unitatem Trinitatis non dicuntur tres substantiae vel
tres personae, sed una substantia et una persona?
(De Trinitate, VII, 4, 7-8; t. VIII, 858-860.)

TEXT XXIX
Sicut enim ab eo quod est esse appellatur essentia,
ita ab eo quod est subsistere substantiam dicimus.
Absurdum est autem, ut substantia relative dicatur:
omnis enim res ad se ipsam subsistit; quanto rnagis
Deus?
Si tarnen dignum est ut Deus dicatur subsistere: de
his enim rebus recte intelligitur in quibus subjectis
sunt ea quae in aliquo subjecto esse dicuntur, sicut
color aut forma in corpore. Corpus enim subsistit, et
ideo substantia est: illa vero in subsistente atque subjecto corpore, quae non substantiae sunt, sed in substantia; et ideo si esse desinat, vel ille color, vel illa
forma, non adimunt corpori esse corpus, quia non hoc
ei est esse, quod illam vel illarn formam coloremve
retinere. Res ergo mutabiles neque simplices, proprie
dicuntur substantiae.
Deus autem si subsistit ut substantia proprie dici
90

if essence is a specific name common to the three of

them, why are they not called three essences, as
Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob are called three men, because man is the specific name common to all men?
But if essence is not a specific name but a generic
name, . . . why are they not called three essences.
. . . Or if they are not called three essences, but one
essence, on account of the unity of the Trinity, why
are they called, not three substances or three persons,
but one substance and one person, on account of the
unity of the same Trinity?

TEXT XXIX
Substance, Essence and GO'd
For just as essence receives its name from being
[esse], so substance is derived from subsisting. But it
is absurd to give a relative meaning to the word substance, for everything subsists in respect to itself; how
much more God?
If, indeed, it is fitting to speak of God as subsisting!
(For to subsist is rightly applied to those things to
which the qualities, which need another being in order
to be able to be, cling for support, as the color or form
of the body. For the body subsists and, therefore, is
a substance, but those things which are in a body that
subsists and is their subject, are not 'Substances, but
are in a substance; therefore, if that color or that
form ceases to be, it does not deprive the body of
being a body, because it is not of the being of a body
that it retain this or that form or color. Therefore,
things that are changeable and not simple are properly
91

possit, inest in eo aliquid tamquam in subjecto, et

non est simplex, cui hoc sit esse quod illi est quidquid
aliud de illo ad illum dicitur, sicut nlagnus, omnipotens, bonus, et si quid hujusmodi de Deo non incongrue dicitur: nefas est autem dicere ut subsistat et
subsit Deus bonitati suae, atque illa bonitas non substantia sit vel potius essentia, neque ipse Deus sit
bonitas sua, sed in illo sit tamquam in subjecto: unde
manifestum est Deum abusive substantiam vocari, ut
nomine usitatiore intelligatur essentia, quod vere ac
proprie dicitur; ita ut fortasse solum Deum dici oporteat essentiam. Est enim vere solus, quia incommuta-

bilis est, ...

(De Trinitate, VII, 4-5, 9-10; t. VIII, 860-861.)

TEXT XXX

Sed quia numerose cogitari possunt quae singillatim

sunt impressa memoriae, videtur ad memoriam mensura, ad visionem vero numerus pertinere. . . . In bis
ergo rebus unde visiones exprimuntur, quaedam mensura est: in ipsis autem visionibus numerus. Voluntas
vero quae ista conjungit et ordinat, et quadam unitate
copulat, nec sentiendi aut cogitandi appetitum nisi in
his rebus unde visiones formantur, adquiescens collocat, ponderi similis este Quapropter haec tria, mensuram, nunlerum, pondus, etiam in ceteris omnibus
92

called substances.) But if God subsists, so that He

may be properly called a substance, then there is
something in Him as it were in a subject, and He is no
longer simple; His being, accordingly, would not be
one and the same with the other qualities that are
predicated of Hirn in respect to Himself, as for example, to be great, omnipotent, good, and any other
attributes of this kind that are not unfittingly said of
God.
But it is wrong to assert that God subsists and is the
subject of His own goodness, and that goodness is not
a substance, or rather not an essence, that God Himself
is not His own goodness, and that it inheres in Hirn
as in its subject. It is, therefore, obvious that God
is improperly called a substance. The more usual name
is essence, which He is truly and properly called, so
that perhaps God alone should be called essence.
For He is truly alone, because He is unchangeable.
TEXT XXX
Measure, Number and Weight
But because things which 11ave been impressed on
the memory singly can be conceived according to number, measure seems to belong to the memory, but number to the vision.... Accordingly, there is sorne measure in those things from wllich the visions are expressed, but in the visions themselves, there is number. But the will unites and arranges them, and binds
them into a kind of unity, and does not choose to
rest its desire of perceiving and thinking except in
those things from which the visions are formed, re93

rebus animadvertenda praelibaverim. Nune interim

voluntatem eopulatrieem rei visibilis atque visionis
quasi parentis et prolis, sive in sentiendo, sive in
eogitando, nee parentern nee prolern diei posse, quodmodo valui et quibus valui demonstravi. Unde tempus
admonet, hane eamdem trinitatem in interiore homine
requirere, atque ab isto de quo tamdiu loeutus sum
animali atque earnali, qui exterior dieitur, introrsus
tendere. Ubi speramus invenire nos posse seeundum
trinitatem imaginem Dei, eonatus nostros illo ipso
adjuvante, quem omnia, sieut res ipsae indieant, ita
etiam saneta Scriptura, in mensura et numero et pon-

dere disposuisse testatur.

(De Trinitate, XI, 11, 18; t. VIII, 912.)
TEXT XXXI

Tarnen hoc adtende, quod ait Dominus Christus:

Si non credideritis quia ego sum, moriemini in peccatis vestris. [Ioan. 8:24] Quid est, Si non credideritis
quia ego sum? Ego sum, quid? Nihil addidit: et quia
nihil addidit, multum est quod eommendavit. Expeetabatur enim ut dieeret quid esset, nee tarnen dixit. . . .
Multum est quod ait, ipsum ego sum: quia sie
dixerat et Deus Moysi, Ego sum qui sum [Exod.
3: 14]. Quis digne eloquatur, quid sit, sum? ...
Dieam ergo Domino nostro J esu Christo, dicam,
et audiat me. Credo praesentem, omnino non dubito;
94

sembles a weight. Therefore, by way of anticipation,

I would like to point out that these three, measure,
number, and weight, are also found in all o,ther things.
In tlle meantime I have now shown, as 1 could and to
whom I could, that the will as the unifier of the
visible object and the vision, as it were, of the parent
and the offspring, whether it be in perceiving or in
thinking, cannot be called the parent or the offspring.
Therefore, time admonishes us to seek this same trinity
in the inner man, and to endeavor to proceed within,
from the animal and carnal man, of whom 1 have
been speaking for so long, who is called the outer
man. We hope to be able to find there a trinity which
is an image of God; He Himself will aid our efforts;
He, of whom as the things themselves indicate, so
also the Sacred Scripture testifies that He has ordered
all things in measure, number, and weight.
TEXT XXXI
lpsum Esse: Truly To Be
Nevertheless, pay attention to the statement of the
Lord Christ: "If you will not believe that I am, you
will die in your sins." What does this mean: "If you
will not believe that I am"? "I am," what is that? He
adds nothing, and since nothing more is added, there
is much that is implied. One would hope that He
might have said what He is but He did not. . . .
This is a great statement that He made, this "I am;"
for, thus did God speak to Moses, "I am Who am."
Who could fittingly express what this means, "I
am"? ...
95

ipse enim dixit, Ecce ego vobiscum sum usque in

consummationem saeculi [Matt. 28 :20]. 0 Domine
Deus noster, quid est quod aisti, Nisi credideritis quia
ego sum? Quid enim non est eorum quae fecisti?
Numquid caelum non est? numquid terra non est?
numquid non sunt ea quae in terra et in caelo sunt?
nunlquid homo ipse cui loqueris non est? numquid
Angelus quem mittis non est? Si omnia sunt haec quae
per te facta sunt, quid est quod tibi proprium quiddam
tenuisti ipsum esse, quod aliis non dedisti, ut tu solus
esses: Nam quomodo audio, Ego sum qui sum, quasi
alia non sint? Et quomodo audio, Nisi credideritis
quia ego sum? Illi enim non erant qui audiebant?
Et si peccatores erant, homines erant. Quid ergo
facio? Quid sit ipsum esse, dicat cordi, intus dicat,
intus loquatur, homo interior audiat, mens capiat
vere esse: est enim semper eodem modo esse. Res enim
aliqua . . . res enim quaelibet, prorsus qualiscumque
excellentia, si mutabilis est, non vere est: non est ibi
verum esse, ubi est et non esse.

(ln Joannis Evangelium, Tr. XXXVIII, 8, 8 et 10;

t.III [2],558-5,59.)

TEXT XXXII
Sed inter discipulos Socratis, non quidem immerito,
excelIentissima gloria claruit, qui omnino ceteros obscuraret Plato. . . . Itaque cum studium sapientiae in
actione et contemplatione versetur, unde una pars
ejus activa, altera contemplativa dici potest; quarum
activa ad agendam vitam, id est, ad mores institu96

I will speak, then, to our Lord J esus Christ, I will

speak, and may He hear me. I believe that He is here;
I do not doubt it at all. He bimself has said, "Behold,
I am with you until the consummation of the world."
o Lord our God, what is this that Thou hast said,
"Unless you will believe that I am"? For what does not
belong among the things tllat Thou hast made? Does
not the sky? Does not the earth? Doesn't man bimself,
to whom you spoke? Doesn't the angel wll0m you sent?
If all these are things made by Thee, what is that being
that Thou hast kept as Thy very own and hast not
granted to others, so that Thou alone might be? For,
how is it that I hear, "I am Who am," as if other
things do not exist? And how is it that I hear, "Unless
you will believe that I am"? Were those Wll0 heard
Hirn non-existent? Even if tlley were sinners, they
were nlen. What can I do about it? What being itself
is, let Hirn tell my heart, speak to me within, utter
it internally-Iet the interior man hear it, let my mind
grasp being truly: indeed, it is always to be in the
same way. As for any other thing . . . any thing
whatever, however excellent it may be, if it is mutable,
it does not truly exist: there is no true being wllere
non-being is also present.

TEXT XXXII
Cause, Principle and Order
Of the pupils of Socrates, Plato was so remarkable
for his brilliance that he has deservedly outshone all
the rest....
97

endos pertinet, contemplativa autem ad conspiciendas

naturae causas et sincerissimam veritatem: Socrates
in activa excelluisse memoratur; Pythagoras vero magis
contemplativae, quibus potuit intelligentiae viribus,
institisse. Proinde Plato utrumque jungendo philosophiam perfecisse laudatur, quam in tres partes distribuit: unam moralem, quae maxime in actione versatur; alteram naturalem, quae contemplationi deputata est; tertiam rationalem, qua verum disterminatur
a falso. Quae licet utrique, id est, actioni et contemplationi sit necessaria, maxime tamen contemplatio
perspectionem sibi vindicat veritatis. Ideo haec tripartitio non est contraria illi distinctioni, qua intelligitur
omne studium sapientiae in actione et contemplatione
consistere. Quid autem in his vel de his singulis partibus Plato senserit, id est, ubi finem omnium actionum,
ubi causam omnium naturarum, ubi lumen omnium
rationum esse cognoverit vel crediderit, disserendo
explicare et longum esse arbitror, et temere esse affirrnandum non arbitror....
Ex his tarnen quae apud eum leguntur, sive quae ab
aliis dicta esse narravit atque conscripsit, quae sibi
placita viderentur, quaedam commemorari et huic
operi inseri oportet a nobis, vel ubi suffragatur religioni verae quam fides nostra suscipit ac defendit, vel
ubi ei videtur esse contrarius, quantum ad istam de
uno Deo et pluribus pertinet quaestionem, propter
vitam quae post mortem futura est, veraciter beatam.
98

Thus, one division of philosophy may be called

active; tlle other part, contemplative. The former
deals with the conduct of life; that is to say, with the
cultivation of morals. Contemplative philosophy considers natural causality and truth as such. Socrates excelled in practical wisdom; Pythagoras favored contemplation, and to this he applied his whole intelligence.
It is to Plato's praise that he combined both in a
more perfect philosophy, and then divided the whole
into three parts: first moral philosophy which pertains to action; second, natural philosophy whose purpose is contemplation; third, rational philosophy which
discriminates between truth and error. Although this
last is necessary for both action and contemplation,
it is contemplation especia1ly which claims to reach
avision of the truth. Hence, this threefold division
in no way invalidates the distinction whereby action
and contemplation are considered the constituent elements of the whole of philosophy. Just what Plato's
position was in each of these three divisions-that is to
say, just what he knew or believed to be the end of
all action, the cause of all nature, the light of all
reason-I think it would be rash to aflirm and would
take too long to discuss at length....
However, of the views which are set forth in his
writings, whether his own or those of others which
seemed to have pleased hirn, a few must be recalled
and included here. In some places, Plato is on the side
of the true religion which our faith accepts and defends. At other times he seems opposed; for example,
99

Fortassis enim qui Platonem ceteris philosophis gentium longe recteque praelatum acutius atque veracius
intellexisse atque secuti esse fama celebriore laudantur,
aliquid tale de Deo sentiunt, ut in illo inveniatur et
causa subsistendi, et ratio intelligendi et ordo vivendi.
Quorum trium, unum ad naturalem, alterum ad rationalem, tertium ad moralem partem intelligitur pertinere.
Si enim homo ita creatus est, ut per id quod in eo
praecellit, adtingat illud quod cuncta praecellit, id
est, unum verum optimum Deum, sine quo nulla
natura subsistit, nulla doctrina instruit, nullus usus
expedit: ipse quaeratur, ubi nobis secura sunt omnia;
ipse cernatur, uti nobis certa sunt omnia; ipse diligatur, ubi nobis recta sunt omnia.
(De civitate Dei, VIII, 4; VII, 193-194.)

TEXT XXXIII
Viderunt ergo isti [Platonici] philosophi, quos ceteris non immerito fama atque gloria praelatos videmus, nullum corpus esse Deum: et ideo cuncta corpora transcenderunt quaerentes Deum. Viderunt quidquid mutabile est, non esse summum Deum: et ideo
amnem animam mutabilesque omnes spiritus transcenderunt, quaerentes summum Dellm. Deinde viderunt omnem speciem in re quacumque mutabili, qua
100

on the respective merits of monotheism and polytheism

in relation to genlline beatitude after death.
Perhaps this may be said of the best disciples of
Plato-of those who fonowed most closely and understood most clearly the teachings of a master rightly
esteemed above allother pagan philosophers-that
they have perceived, at least, these truths about God:
that in Hirn is to be found the cause of an being, the
reason of an thinking, the rule of an living. The first
of these truths belongs to natural, the second to
rational, the third to moral philosophy.
Now, if man was created so that by his highest
faculty he might attain to the highest of all realities,
that is, to the one, true and supreme God, apart from
whom no nature exists, no teaching is true, no conduct is good, then let us seek Him in whom all we
find is real, know Hirn in whorn all we conternplate

is true, love Him in whom all things for us are good.

TEXT XXXIII
The Platonic Scheme 0/ Reality
The Platonic philosophers, then, so deservedly considered superior to all the others in reputation and
achievement, weIl understood that no body could be
God and, therefore, in order to find Hinl, they rose
beyond an material things. Convinced that no mutable
reality could be the Most High, they transcended every
soul and spirit subject to change in their search for
God. They perceived that no determining form by
which any mutable being is what it is-whatever be
101

est quiquid illud est, quoquo modo et qualiscumque

natura est, non esse posse nisi ab illo qui vere est,
quia incommutabiliter este
Ac per hoc sive universi mundi corpus, figuras,
qualitates, ordinatumque motum, et elementa disposita a caelo usque ad terram, et quaecumque corpora in eis sunt; sive omnem vitam, vel quae nutrit
et continet, qualis est in arboribus; vel quae et hoc
habet et sentit, qualis est in pecoribus; vel quae et
haec habet et intelligit, qualis est in hominibus; vel
quae nutritorio subsidio non indiget, sed tantum continet, sentit, inteillgit, qualis est in angells, nisi ab
illo esse non posse qui simpliciter est: quia non aliud
illi est esse, aliud vivere, quasi possit esse non vivens;
nec allud illi est vivere, allud intelligere, quasi possit
vivere non intelligens; nec aliud illi est intelligere, aliud
beatum esse, quasi possit intelligere et non beatus esse;
sed quod est illi vivere, intelligere, beatum esse, hoc
est illi esse.
Propter hanc incommutabilitatem et simplicitatem
intellexerunt eum et omnia ista fecisse, et ipsum a
nullo fieri potuisse. Consideraverunt enim quidquid
est, vel corpus esse, vel vitam; meliusque aliquid vitam
esse, quam corpus; speciemque corporis esse sensibilem, intelligibilem vitae. Proinde intelligibilem
speciem sensibili praetulerunt. Sensibilia dicimus quae
visu tactuque corporis sentiri queunt: intelligibilia,
quae conspectu mentis intelligi possunt.
102

the reality, mode or nature of that form-could have

any existence apart from I-lim who truly exists because
His existence is immutable.
From tllis it follows that neither the whole tlniverse,
with its frame, figures, qualities and ordered movement, all the elements and bodies arranged in the
heavens and on earth, nor any life-whether merely
nourishing and preserving as in trees, or both vegetative and sensitive as in animals, or which is also intellectual as in man, or which needs no nourishment but
merely preserves, feels and knows as in angels-can
have existence apart from Him whose existence is
simple and indivisible. For, in God, being is not one
thing and living another-as though He could be and
not be living. Nor in God is it one thing to live and
anotller to understand-as though He could know
and not be blessed. For, in God, to live, to know, to
be blessed is one and tlle same as to be.
The Platonists have understood that God, by reason
of His immutability and simplicity, could not have
been produced from any existing thing, but that He
Hirnself made all those things that are. They argued
that whatever exists is either matter or life; that life is
superior to matter; that the appearance of a body is
sensible, whereas. the form of life is intelligible. Hence,
they preferred intelligible form to sensible appearance.
We call things sensible which can be perceived by
sight and bodily touch.
If there is any loveliness discerned in the lineaments of the body, or beauty in the movement of
music and song, it is the nrlnd that makes this judg103

Nulla est enim pulcritudo corporalis, sive in statu

corporis, sicut est figura, sive in motu, sicut est cantilena, de qua non animus judicet. Quod profecto non
posset, nisi melior in illo esset haec species, sine tumore molis, sine strepitu vocis, sine spatio vel loci vel
temporis. Sed ibi quoque nisi mutabilis esset, non
alius alio melius de specie sensibili judicaret: melius
ingeniosior quam tardior, melius peritior quam imperitior, melius exercitatior quam minus exercitatus,
et idem ipse unus cum proficit, melius utique postea
quamprius.
Quod autem recipit magis et minus, sine dubitatione
mutabile este Unde ingeniosi et docti et in his exercitati homines facile collegerunt, non esse in eis rebus
primam speciem, ubi mutabilis esse convincitur. Cum
igitur in eorum conspectu et corpus et animus magis
minusque speciosa essent, et si omni specie carere
possent, omnino nulla essent, viderunt esse aliqllid ubi
prima esset et incommutabilis [speciesJ, et ideo nec
comparabilis: atque ibi esse rerum principium rectissime crediderunt, quod factum non esset, et ex quo
facta cuncta essent. Ita quod notum est Dei, ipse manifestavit eis, cum ab eis invisibilia ejus, per ea quae
facta sunt intellecta conspecta sunt; sempiterna quoque virtus ejus et divinitas: a quo etiam visibilia et
temporalia cuncta creata sunt. Haec de illa parte quam
physicam, id est naturalem nuncupant, dicta sint.
(De civitate Dei, VITI, 6; VII, 195-196.)
104

ment. This means that there must be within the mind

a superior form, one tlIat is immaterial and independent of sound and space and time. However, the
mind itself is not immutable, for, if it were, all minds
would judge alike concerning sensible forms. Actually,
a clever mind judges more aptly than the stupid one;
a skilIed one better than one unskilled; an experienced one better than one inexperienced. Even the
same mind, once it improves, judges better than it did
before.
Undoubtedly, anything susceptible of degrees is
mutable, and for this reason, tlIe most able, learned
and experienced philosophers readily concluded that
the first form of all could not be in any of these things
in which the form was clearly mutable. Once they perceived various degrees of beauty in both body and
mind, they realized that, if all form were lacking, their
very existence would end. Thus, they argued that there
must be some reality III which the form was ultimate,
immutable and, therefore, not susceptible of degrees.
They rightly concluded that only a reality unmade
fronl which allother realities originate could be the
ultimate principle of things.
So that what is known about God, God Himself
manifested to them, since 'his invisible attributes are
clearly seen by them-his ever-Iasting power also and
divinity-being understood through the things that
are made.' By Him, also all visible and temporal
things were created. Enough has been said, I think,
concerning what the Platonists call physical or natural
philosophy.
105

TEXT XXXIV
Anima quoque ipsa, etiamsi sernper sit sapiens, sicut
erit cum liberabitur in aeternurn, participatione tarnen
incommutabilis sapientiae sapiens erit, quae non est
quod ipsa. Neque enim si aer infusa luce numquam
deseratur ideo non aliud est ipse, aliud lux qua illuminatur. Neque hoc ita dixerim, quasi aer sit anima:
quod putaverunt quidam, qui non potuerunt incorpoream cogitare naturam. Sed habent haec ad illa
etiam in magna disparllitate quamdam similitudinem,
ut non inconvenienter dicatur, sie illuminari animam
incorpoream luce incorporea simplicis sapientiae Dei,
sicut illuminatur aeris corpus luce corporea; et sicut
aer tenebrescit ista luce desertus, (nam nihil sunt
aliud quae dicuntur locorum quorumcumque corporalium tenebrae, quam aer carens luce) ita tenebrescere animam sapientiae luce privatam.
(De civitate Dei, XI, 10, 2; t. VII, 280-281.)

TEXT XXXV
Neque enim multae sed una sapientia est, in qua
sunt immensi quidanl atque infiniti thesauri rerum
intelligibilium, in qtlibus sunt omnes invisibiles atque
incomnlutabiles rationes rerum, etiam visibilium et
mutabilium, quae per ipsam factae sunt. Quoniam
Deus non aliquid nesciens fecit, quod nec de quolibet
106

TEXT XXXIV

The Analogy 0/ Light

So, too, with the soul. Although it will be forever
wise when redeemed in eternity, yet it will be wise
only by participating in the unchangeable Wisdom,
which is not the soul itself. So, with the air. If it were
never to be deprived of its infused light, it would still
not be identical with that light by which it is illuminated. I am not suggesting that the soul is air, as
some have supposed who were unable to conceive of
a spiritual nature, although, for all their dissimilarity,
there is here a kind of analogy which makes it reasonable to say that the immaterial soul is made luminous by the immaterial light of the simple Wisdom
of God, much as we say that the material air is made
luminous by the material light. And, as air grows dark
when dispossessed of this light-for what is called
darkness in this place or that is nothing else than
air lacking light-so we may say that the soul grows
dark when deprived of the light of Wisdom.
TEXT XXXV

Ta Be and Ta Be Known
There are not many wisdoms but only one. And in
this Wisdom there is an infinite and inexhaustible
treasury of intelligible realities containing all the
invisible and unchangeable ideas of all the visible and
changeable existences which were made by this Wisdonl. For, God has made nothing unknowingly; not
even a human craftsman can be said to do so. But,
107

homine artifiee recte diei potest: porro si seiens feeit

omnia, ea utique feeit quae noverat. Ex quo oeeurrit
animo quiddam mirum, sed tarnen verum, quod iste
mundus nobis notus esse non potest, nisi esset; Deu
autem nisi notus esset, esse non potest.
(De civitate Dei, XI, 10,3; t. VII, 281.)

TEXT XXXVI
Non enim est ulla natura etiam in extremis infimisque bestiolis, quam non ille constituit, a quo est omnis
modus, omnis speeies, omnis ordo, sine quibus nihil
rerum inveniri vel cogitari potest: quanto magis
angeliea creatura, quae omnia cetera quae Deus eondidit, naturae dignitate praeeedit?
(De civitate Dei, XI, 15; t. VII, 284.)

TEXT XXXVII
Ita vero vi quadam naturali ipsum esse jueundum
est, ut non ob aliud et hi qui miseri sunt nolint interire, et eum se miseros esse sentiant, non se ipsos de
rebus sed miseriam suam potius auferri velint . . . et
sie semper eligerent esse, quam omnino non esse. . . .
Quid, animalia. omnia etiam irrationales, quibus
datum non est ista eogitare, ab immensis draeonibus
108

if He knew all tllat He created, He created only those

things which He knew. This conclusion suggests a
striking but true idea: that this world could not be
known by us unless it first existed; but it could not
have existed unless it had first been known to God.

TEXT XXXVI
Mode, Species and Order

There is no nature even among the least and lowest of beasts that He did not fashion. From Him has
proceeded all measure, all form, all order-the properties without which nothing can either be or be conceived. How much more, then, is this true of the angelic nature, which is higher in dignity than all the
other creations of God.
TEXT xxxvrr
To Be, In the Existential Sense
Merely to exist is, by the very nature of things, so
pleasant that in itself it is enough to make even the
wretched unwilling to die; for, even when they are conscious of their misery, what they want to put an end to
is not themselves but the misery.... They would be
delighted to choose to live forever in misery rather
than not to exist at alle ...
Why, even irrational animals, with no mind to
make such reflections, from the greatest serpents to
the tiniest worms, show in every movement they can
make that they long to live and escape destruction.
Even trees and plants . . . can, in some sense, be said
to guard their own existence by guaranteeing suste109

usque ad exiguos vermiculos, nonne se esse velle. . . .

Quid, arbusta omnesque frutices ... ita suunl quodam
modo esse conservent? Ipsa postremo corpora, quibus
non solum sensus, sed nec ulla saltem seminalis est
vita, ita tarnen vel exsiliunt in superna, vel in ima
descendunt, vellibrantur in mediis, ut essentiam suam,
ubi secundum naturam possunt esse, custodiant.
(De civitate Dei, XI, 27; t. VII, 293.)

TEXT XXXVIII
Sed dicat quod sequitur, et auferat omnem dubitationern, quia non carnaliter debemus accipere,
Jerusalem quae aedificatur ut civitas. Cujus participatio ejus in idipsum. Jam ergo, fratres, quisquis
erigit aciem mentis, quisquis deponit caliginem carnis,
quisquis nlundat oculum cordis, elevet, et videat
idipsum. Qtlid est idipsum? Quonl0do dicam, nisi
idipsum? Fratres, si potestis, intelligite idipsum. Nam
et ego quidquid aliud dixero, non dico idipsum.
Conemur tarnen quibusdam vicinitatibus verborum et
significationum perducere infirmitatem mentis ad
cogitandum idipsum.
Quid est idipsum? Quod semper eodem modo est;
quod non modo aliud, et modo aliud este Quid est
quod est? Quod aeternum este Nam quod semper
aliter atque aliter est, non est, quia non manet: non
110

nance. . ~ . Last of all, even material bodies, lacking

sensation and every sign of life, at least rise upwards
or sink downwards or remain balanced in between,
as though seeking the place where they can best
exist in accordance with their nature.
TEXT XXXVIII
Ta Be Eternally and Immutably
But let what follows in the statement remove all
doubt, for we ought not take a carnal meaning of,
"Jerusalem which is bullt as a city: of which His participation is in the self-same." So now, brethren, whoever lifts up the gaze of his mind, whoever puts aside
the obscurity of the flesh, whoever cleanses the eye
of his heart, let hirn rise up and see the self-same.
What is the self-same? How may I express it, except
as the self-same? Brethren, if you are able, understand
the self-same. For, whatever other expression 1 use, 1
do not express the self-same. Let us attempt, however,
by means of some approximations of words and meanings, to extend the weakness of our minds to think
upon the self-same.
What is the self-same? That which exists always in
the same way; that which is not now one thing and
at the next instant a different thing. What is that
which is? That which is eternal. For, what is always
existing in one way and then in another simply does
not exist, because it does not endure; it is not altogether non-existent but it does not exist in the highest sense. And what is that which is, if not He Who,
when He sent Moses forth, said to him, "I am Who
111

omnino non est, sed non summe este Et quid est quod
est, nisi ille qui quando mittebat Moysen, dixit illi:
Ego sum qui sum? Quid est hoc, nisi ille qui cum
diceret famulus ejus, Ecce mittis me: si dixerit mihi
populus, Quis te misit? quid dicam ei? nomen suum
noluit aliud dicere, quam, Ego sum qui sum; et adjecit
et ait, Dices itaque filiis Israel, Qui est, misit me ad
vos. Ecce idipsum, Ego sum qui sum, Qui est, misit
me ad vos. Non potes capere; multum est intelligere,
multum est apprehendere.
(Enarratio in Psalmum CXXI, 3, 5; t. IV, 1387.)

TEXT XXXIX
Omnia enim ibi stant, ubi nilril transit. Vis et tu
stare et non transire? Illuc curre. Idipsum nemo Ilabet
ex se. Intendite fratres. Quod corpus habet, non est
idipsum: quia non in se stat. Mutatur per aetates,
mutatur per nlutationes locorum ac temporum, mutatur per morbos et defectus carnales; non ergo in se
stat. Corpora coelestia non in se stant: habent quasdam mutationes suas, etsi occultas; certe de locis in
loca mutantur, ascendunt ab oriente in occidentem,
et rursus circumeunt ad orientern: non ergo stant, non
sunt idipsum.
Anima humana nec ipsa stat. Quantis enim mutationibus et cogitationibus variatur! quantis voluptati112

am"? What is this, if not He Who, when His servant

said, "Behold, Thou sendest me, if the people say to
me, Who sent you?, what shall I reply?"-He Who
would not give any other name than, "I am Who am."
He added this statement, "Say, then, to the sons of
Israel, He Who Is hath sent me to you." Behold the
self-same, "I am Who am, He Who Is hath sent me
. to you." You cannot grasp it; it's a great deal to understand, a great deal to take in.
TEXT XXXIX
God is Ipsum Esse
For all things there stand fiml, where nothing
passes away. Do you also wish to stand firm and not
pass away? Then llurry there. From his own resources,
no one possesses the self-same. Keep your minds on
this, brethren. That which has a body is not the selfsame, for it does not stand firm in itself. It undergoes
change through periods of time, it is changed through
changes of place and time, it is changed through diseases and fleshly weaknesses; so it does not stand firm
in itself. Nor do the celestial bodies stand firm in
themselves; they have their own changes, even though
hidden; certainly they are moved from place to place,
they go up from the east to the west and again they
go around to the east; so they do not stand firm,
they are not the self-same.
Nor does the human soul itself stand firm. Through
how many modifications and variations of cogitation
does it fluctuate! By how many desires is it moved!
By how many perverse feelings is it disrupted and
113

bus immutatur! quantis eupiditatibus diverberatur atque discinditur! Mens ipsa hominis, quae dicitur rationalis, mutabilis est, non est idipsum. Modo vult,
modo non vult; modo seit, modo nescit; modo meminit, modo obliviscitur; ergo idipsum nemo habet
ex se.
Qui voluit ex se habere idipsum, ut quasi ipse sibi
esset idipsum, lapsus est: eecidit angelus, et factus
est diabolus. Propinavit homini superbiam, dejecit
secum invidentia qui stabat. Isti sibi voluerunt idipsum
esse; sibi principari, sibi dominari voluerunt: noluerunt habere verum Dominum, qui vere est idipsum,
cui dictum est, Mutabis ea, et mutabuntur, tu autem
idem ipse es.

(Enarratio in Psalmum CXXI, 3, 6; t. IV, 1388.)

114

split apart! The very mind of man that is ealled rational is mutable, it is not the self-same. At one moment it wills, at the next it does not will; at one point
it knows, at the next it does not know; at one instant
it renlembers, at the next it has forgotten; therefore,
no one from bis own resourees possesses the self-same.
He who has desired to possess the self-same for
his own reosurees, as if he eould be the self-same for
himself, he has fallen: the Angel fell and beeame the
Devil. He offered pride to man and, in his envy, he
dragged down with himself the man who was standing
firm. These desired to be the self-same for themselves,
they wanted to eommand themselves, to be their ,?wn
nlasters; they refused to have the true God Who is
truly the self-same, to Whom it is said, "Thou shalt
change them and they shall be ehanged, but Thou art
Thyself the same."

11~

APPENDIX A

Participation

The metaphysics of participation is a very important theme in PIatonie and Neoplantonic philosophy.
It represents an effort to explain the relation of the
many and the One. In its simplest form, participation
denotes a sharing, by a plurality of inferior members,
of some one perfeetion which is possessed in full by
one highest member of that class or order. Recently,
participation has become a major theme in certain
expositions of Thomistic metaphysics. 1 Now, although
8t. Augustine very frequently uses the language of
participation, very little attention has been paid to this
theme in his thought. 2 The present note is intended
merely to raise the question of what participatio
means in Augustinism.
Doubtless one source of Augustine's many references to participation is the New Testament. 8t. Paul
often speaks of Christians as "partakers" (participes)
in the Body of Christ, in the Gospel, and in the advantages of redemption. 8 Even the associated notion and
117

language of "imitation" is a commonplace in St.

Pau1. 4
Blessedness or happiness (beatitudo) is one of the
perfections that Augustine most frequently mentions
as an object of participation for men and angels. The
City 0/ God is particularly rich in such uses. Man's
soul, he explains, is made blessed by participating in
God's immutable and incorporeal light. 5 At times, it
is simply stated that men are made blessed by participation in God. 6 The angels are blessed and enjoy
other perfections by a similar participation in the life,
light and other attributes of divinity.7
Participation in wisdom (sapientia) is another frequently occurring theme. The soul, Augustine says,
will be everlastingly wise in eternity; yet it will not
become wisdom itself but, "will be wise only by
participating in immutable wisdom."8 In the Con/essions this sapiential participation is associated with
the sharing in the fullness of the Son of God, Who is
especially identified with divine Wisdom. 9
Indeed, nearly all the divine perfections are treated
by Augustine as objects of participation on the part
of creatures. Thus men or angels are said to share
in unity, goodness, truth, beauty, life, eternity, light,
likeness (similitudo) andin God. 10 In his answer to
Question 46 (the famous Quaestio de Ideis) , Augustine has indicated that he understands the PIatonie
Ideas to be the immutable principles of all things.
These rationes abide. eternally in the divine Mind.
Thevery existenee of creatures seems to be. a sharing
in the rationes .ae~ernae; for, Augustine adds, "whatever exists, in any manner, ,desso byparticipation
118

in these Ideas. "11 There is, then, a participation by

creatures in being itself.
Thus far, we have noted how Augustine speaks of
inferior things participating in the highest pedections.
However, he also thinks that God participates in
humanity, in the very special case of the Incarnation
of the Second Person of the Trinity. "God Himself,"
Augustine explains, "became a blessed and beatifying participant in our humanity and thus provided us
with a profitable example, so that we might participate
in His divinity.13 In asense" he is saying that the
supreme instance of participation is that of the incarnate Christ and that this instance shows us how we
should share in God's life. Later in the City 0/ God,
this point is restated with perfect clarity: "Jesus Christ
became a participant in our mortality, in order to
make us participants in His divinity."14
How participation may work from above, as well
as from below, is explained in a beautiful text whieh
provides us with several instances. It is weIl worth
reading in its entirety.
Every ehaste being is ehaste beeause of ehastity;
and every eternal thing is eternal beeause of eternity; and every beautiful thing because of beauty;
and every good thing beeause of goodness. So too,
is every being wise because of wisdom and every
being that is like because of likeness (similitudo).
But achaste being is said to be such beeause of
chastity, in two ways: either it is chaste by virtue
of the chastity whieh it generates, for whieh it is
the source and thecause of its existence; or secondly, when a being is chaste by participation in
119

chastity, it is the kind of being that can be, at some

time, not chaste. The same explanation should be
applied to the understanding of the other perfections. 15
Here, Augustine intimates that there is some sort of
analogy of participation. When inferiors share in a
higher perfeetion, they are dependent on it and are
made to be what they are by this sharing in something that is above them. On the other hand, when
God is said to participate, this means that He causes
the very perfeetion by which He is distinguished.
Moreover, even that remote "likeness" (similitudo) ,
whereby the creature resembles from afar his Creator,
is a sharing in that perfect divine Likeness (Similitudo) which is the identity of the Second Person of
the Trinity with the Father and the Holy Spirit. 16
There is no question, then, that St. Augustine
speaks frequently, and in at least two ways, about
participation. When he uses this language in reference
to creaturely participation in various absolute perfeetions, he appears to mean that imperfect beings
share more or less in various divine attributes without
ever fully realizing any of these perfeetions. Thus,
he plainly states: "it is one thing to be God, quite
another thing to be a participant in God."17 The meaning of Augustinian participation on the side of creatures is interwoven with other major themes in Augustine's theory of reality. Divine exemplarism implies
participation, for the exemplars are perfeetions in the
creative Mind of God which serve as models for the
limited existence, goodness, beauty, wisdom, and so
on, of lower things. The exemplar isparticipated in
120

by all the many things that are made in its likeness.

Similarly, the theory of the rationes aeternae provides
an alternative but complementary theme in which participation functions. In particular, the rationes seminales, as created principles of life and specification
implanted in the material elements by GOd,18 would
appear to be the means within living creatures
whereby their participation in higher perfections is
effected. For every ratio seminalis in matter, there
must be a corresponding ratio aeterna in the divine
Mind; otherwise God would not fully know the universe that He has made.
It would be possible to illustrate the same interpenetation of the participation theory in the other key
themes of Augustine's ontology. The explanation of
the fact that creatures exist, and of what they are in
their various limited ways, always focuses on God as
t11e one being in terms of which all other things are
to be understood. It is in this sense that Augustinism
is completely theocentric. As far as creatures are concerned, their participation is that of multiple effects
in the causality of a supreme cause.
Conversely, when God is said to participate in
humanity, in the unique instance of the Incarnate
Christ, this participation is a different sort of sharing.
God has made men and has produced their very
humanity. God chose to share this limited type of
being which is humanity-not as the lower shares
in ahigher perfection but as a highest cause freely
wills to submit Himself to the conditions of a lower
form of life which is but one of His effects. This divine
participationin human life must be left a mystery.19
121

NOTES TO APPENDIX A
1. Geiger, L. B., La p,articipation dans la philosophie de saint
T homas d'A quin, Paris: Vrin, 1942. Fabro, C., La nozion,e meta/isica di partecipazione secondo S. Tommaso d'Aquino, Milano: Vita
e Pensiero, 1950. Henle, R. J., Saint Thomas and Platonism, The
Hague: Nijhoff, 1956.
2. For some brief comment, see: V. Capanaga, "EI Ser y el tener
en el dinamismo de la voluntad segun S. Augustin," Atti dei XII
Congresso Internazionale di Filoso/ia, (Firenze 1960) XI, 67-73.
3. Thus, 1 Cor. 9 :23, "I do all things for the sake of the gospel,
that I may be made partaker thereof;" 1 Cor. 10; 16-18, "And the
bread that we break, is it not the partaking of the body of the
Lord? Because the bread is one, we though many are one body,
all of us who partake of the one bread;" Ephes. 5:7-8, "the children of disobedience. Do not, then, become partakers with them."
The fact that Augustine found the language of participation in
the Bible does not necessarily mean that this was his unique source
of information. Participation runs through all the literature of
Platonism-and Augustine had read some of it.
4. 1 Cor. 11 :1, "Be imitators of me as I am of Christ;" and
Ephes. 5:1, "Be you, therefore, imitators of God."
5. De citV. Dei, VIII, 1: "Deum, qui . . . [animam] participatione sui luminis incommutabilis et incorporei beatam facit."
6. De civ. Dei, IX, 23: "nisi unum Dei coli, a quo creati et cujus
participatione beati sunt." Cf. De civ. Dei, IX, 15.
7. De citV. Dei, X, 2: "atque ejus participatione [angeli] perfecti beatique subsistunt" (here, this view is attributed to the Platonists); X, 7: "Merito illi in caelestibus sedibus constituti immortales et beati, qui ereatoris sui participatione congaudent"; XI, 9:
"et vocarentur [angeli] dies participatione incommutabilis lueis
et diei, quod est Verbum Dei"; XII, 9: "ejusque [Creatoris] participatione sapienter beateque viverent [angeH]"; and speaking of
the fallen angels, in XI, 11: "illius sapientiae fuerint participes,
definire quis potest? In ejus tarnen participatione aequales fuisse
istos ilIis, qui propterea vere pleneque beati sunt?"
8. De citV. Dei, XI, 10: "Anima quoque ipsa, etiamsi semper sit
sapiens, sieut erit eum liberabitur in aeternum, participatione tarnen
incommutabilis sapientiae sapiens erit, quae non est quod ipsa."
Coneerning angeHe partieipation in wisdom, see XI, 11.
9. Con!., VII, 9, 14: "Quod enim ante omnia tempora, et supra
omnia tempora incommutabiliter manet unigenitus Filius tuus coae-

122

ternus tibi, et quia de plenitudine ejus accipiunt animae ut beatae

sint, et quia participationis manentis, in se sapientiae renovantur
ut sapientes sint, est ibi."
10. De vera religione, 34, 63 (for unitas) ; De Trin., VIII, 3, 5,
and De div. quaest. LXXXIII, q. 46 (for bonitas); De civ. Dei,
XI, 13 (for veritas) ; De div. quaest. LXXXIII, q. 46 (for pulcritudo); In Joan. Ev., Tr. LXX, 1 (for vit.a); De div. quaest.
LXXXIII, q. 46 (for aeternitas) ; De civ. Dei, VIIIJ 1 and XI, 9
(for lux or lumen) ; De Gen., lihe'r imperf., 16, 57 (for similitudo) ;
and De civ. Dei, XI, 12 and XXII, 30 (for participatio Dei).
11. De div. quaest. LXXXIII, q. 46: "has rerum rationes principales appellat ideas Plato . . . quarum participatione fit, ut sit
quidquid est, quoquo modo est." For the full context, see Text XII,

lupra.
12. De civ. Dei, IX, 15: "quia beatus et beatificus Deus factus
particeps humanitatis nostrae compendium praebuit participandae
divinitatis suae."
13. De civ. Dei, XXI, 16: "Jesum Christum, qui factus est particeps mortalitatis nostrae, ut nos participes faceret divinitatis suae."
For a longer explanation of human participation in the Perhu,m
Dei, see Epist. 140, 4, 12.
14. De div. quaest. LXXXIII, q. 23: "Omne castum castitate
castum est, et omne aeternum aeternitate aeternum est, et omne
pulcrum pulcritudine, et omen bonum bonitate. Ergo et omne sapiens
sapientia et omne simile similitudine. Sed duobus modis castum
castitate dicitur, vel quod eam gignat, ut ea sit castum castitate
quam gignit et cui principium atque causa est ut sit; aliter autem
cum participatione castitatis quidque castum est, quod potest aliquando esse non castum; atque ita de ceteris intelligendum est."
15. De Trin., VI, 10, 11: "Filius autem de Patre est ut sit, atque
ut illi coaeternus sit. Imago enim si perfecte implet illud cujus
imago est, ipsa coaequatur ei, non illud imagini suae. In qua imagine speciem nominavit, credo, propter pulcritudinem, ubi jam est
tanta congruentia, et prima aequalitas, et prima similitudo . ."
Cf. De Gen., liher imperf., 16, 57: "non participatione alicujus
similitudinis similis est, sed ipsa est prima similitudo cujus partici patione similia sunt, quaecumque per iIIam fecit Deus."
16. D,e civ. Dei, XXII, 30: "aliud est esse Deum; aliud participem Dei."
17. See De Gen. ad lit., V, 23, 45: Text XXI, supra, and De
Gen ad lit., IX, 17, 32: Text XXIII, supra.
18. Cf. E. Portalie, A Gu,ide to the Thought 0/ St. Augusti1lc,
pp. 152-161.

123

APPENDIX B

Causality

There seems to be no satisfactory secondary study

of 8t. Augustine's views on causality. Yet he has much
to say on the subject and what he has said has doubtless been influential on later thought.
First of all, Augustine thought that all finite things
and events must be caused efficiently. As he expresses
the axiom: "no thing can occur without a preceding
productive cause ( causa efficiens)."1 In one of his
early works, he ofIers a negative formulation of causality which has been much quoted: "A thing cannot
fashion itself, for a thing cannot give itself what it
does not have."2 Primarily, causality is viewed in
terms of efficiency or production. 3 One might find
certain superficial parallels with the four causes of
Aristotle, in various texts, but Augustine has not read
the Physics or the Metaphysics and does not know the
analysis which is characteristic of Aristotelianism.
125

Augustine usually grants some sort of priority of

cause in relation to its effect.
Next, all efficient causes are volitional; they are of
the nature of the "spirit of life."4 His explanation of
this phrase reveals what is basically a divine voluntarism. God's will is the uncaused cause of all things.
The spirit of life which enlivens all things is God
Hirnself, a spirit, indeed, but uncreated. In His will
lies the highest power which helps the good volitions of spiritual creatures, judges the evil ones,
and orders all, granting powers to some and not to
others. As He is the creator of all natures, so is He
the giver of all powers, though not of all volitions.
For, evil volitions are not from Hirn, since they
are contrary to nature which is from Hirn. Thus
bodies are subject to wills: some to our wills, that
is, to the wills of all mortal animals, and especially
of men rather than beasts; some are subject to the
wills of angels. However, all things are subject, in
the highest way, to the will of God. 5
There are two kinds of causes in creatures, volitional and corporeal. Created wills are actively effieient. These include the wills of angels, of men, and
possibly of other animated things. These creatllrely
causes are both produced and producing. 6 Bodily
causes are mentioned as a second type of creaturely
causes but they are produced rather than producing
and they are not actually included among efficient
causes. 7 The power of these corporeal causes is limited to what spiritual wills may produce out of them
(ex ipsis). It is not entirely clear what role Augustine is here assigning to bodies. He may mean that
126

they function as material, or as instrumental, causes

under the efficiency of wills. The point is left unexplained.
Most distinctive of St. Augustine's teaching is bis
emphasis on primary causality. As the first cause of
all events, God is the primary agent in all causal
series. Far from denying the existence of secondary,
proximate, created causes, Augustine simply insists
that their efficiency is quite derivative. This point is
best developed in the third Book of the treatise, On
the Trinity. 8
In the ultinlate analysis, this means that there is
not too much difIerence between events in the order
of nature and those happenings that men regard as
miraculous. If something occurs in the regular way
(say a tree takes fifty years to grow), we think tllat
we understand this and we do not marvel at the power
of God which makes such growth possible. On the
other hand, if much the same event occurs in a very
short time (say a tree grows in a day), we are struck
with wonder and are inclined to attribute this extraordinary event to some power beyond nature. To
Augustine it is clear that the will of God is the cause
of all happenings and it nlakes little difIerence, from
the viewpoint of eternity, whether they occur slowl}
or quickly. 9 He takes illness in the human body as a
special example. One medical doctor might say that a
"dryness of the body" caused this illness; anothet
doctor might attribtlte it to an "excess of some hu..
mor." One would be right and the other wrong but
both are talking about proximate causes. 10 Now, if
they ask what is the cause of the dryness of the body
127

and discover that it is the work of some hunlan will,

they have reached a higher cause. 11 However, the
human will is not the first cause of this illness. There
is no first cause to be found, other than the will of
GOd. 12 The manner in which all lower causes are
united in the divine power is then described as folIows:
The will of God which makes His angelic spirits
and His ministers a burning fire [Ps. 103:4], presiding over spirits that are united in supreme peace
and friendship and mutually enflamed into one will
by some sort of spiritual charity, as on a high and
110ly and secret seat, as in its own horne and temple-this will diffuses itself through all by means of
various well-ordered movements in creatures, first
by spiritual and then by bodily movements. And
it uses all for the immutable decision of His judgment, whether incorporeal or corporeal things,
whether rational or irrational spirits, whether they
are good by His grace or evil through their own
will. Yet, just as grosser and lower bodies are regulated in a definite order by finer and more powerful ones, so too are all bodies ruled by the spirit
of life, and the spirit of irrational life by the spirit
of rational life, and the defective and sinful spirit
of life by the pious and just spirit of rationallife,
and thus the whole of creation is ruled by its Creator, from Whom and through Whom and in Whom
it is brought into being and established [Col. 1: 16].
Thus it is, that the will of God is the first and
supreme cause of all bodily species and movements.
For nothing happens visibly and sensibly that is
not commanded or permitted from the inner, invis128

ible and intelligible judgment hall of the supreme

Ruler, in accord with the indescribable justice of
rewards and punishments, of graces and retributions, in the vast economy of creation as a whole. 18
Again Augustine returns to his basic thenle, that
all events in the universe, whether ordinary (and so,
natural) or extraordinary (and so, miraculous), are
ultimately caused by God's supreme power. 14 When
God puts life into living bodies that are generated in
the regular manner, this is called natural; but when
He puts life back into a corpse, this is called a miracle. In any case, the cause of it all is GOd. 15 Even
the wonders that are worked by magicians are made
possible by the fact that God has created things containing the latent powers which clever men may use
for good or evil purpose. God has arranged all things
in accord with measure, number and weight-and
thus, in the 110rmal course of events, things of each
species generate their own kind but it is always within
God's power to pennit the miraculous to occur. Evil
actions are permitted by God but are t11e direct effects
of the evil wills of some creatures. 16
Tlle whole teaching on primary and secondary
causality is finally summarized in t11e ninth chapter
of this third Book.
For it is one thing to establish and administer creation from that innermost and highest turning-point
( cardine) of all causes, because He Who does this
is God, the only Creator. And it is a different thing
extrinsically to bring about (admovere ) some activity by virtue of the powers and capacities that
He has distributed, so that at this time or that, in
129

one way or allother, some creature puts in its

appearance. All these, in fact, have already been
created originally and primordially in the texture
of the elements: they appear when conditions are
appropriate. For, just as mothers are pregnant with
their unborn children, so is this world pregnant
with the causes of things to be born. These are
created in it only by that highest essential Being
(ab illa summa essentia) in which there is neither
origination nor termination, neither coming into
existing being nor going out of it (nec incipit esse,
nec desinit).
Now, as I have indicated in the preceding exampIe of agriculture, not only evil angels but also evil
men are able extrinsically to use adventitious causes
(accedentes causas) which, though not natural, are
nevertheless employed in accord with nature, so
that those things implicitly contained in the hidden
breast of nature break forth and are overtly created,
somehow making manifest their measures, numbers
and weights which they have secretly received from
Him Who disposes all things according to measure,
number and weight. 17
Note two things in this remarkable text. At the end
of the first paragraph, there is explicit mention of the
famous metaphysical pair, essentia and esse, with no
effort to make their meaning precise. Secondly, the
created causes are described as hidden in the texture
of the elements, in the same language that is used for
the rationes seminales in the Literal Commentary on
Genesis. 18
The theory of semina! reasons appears to be very
130

closely related to Augustine's conception of secondary

causes. It becomes very difficult to interpret the sort
of causality wlrich attaches to these "seeds" of all
things to come. In one sense, they are part of that vast
order of efficient willing which has just been described. In another sense, these secondary causes are
closely associated with the initial endowment of matter (in quadam textura elementorum 19 ) and might be
regarded as that aspect of material creation out of
which finite wills draw forth new species and types
of things. Thirdly, these "seeds" are somewhat like
formal causes, for they grow into members of their
own species: from fish "seeds" come fish, from birds
come birds, and so on. 20 It is vain, however, to attempt to relate the Augustinian treatment of causality
to the Aristotelian theory of the four causes (agent,
final, formal and material). St. Augustine does not

think as Aristotle does.

Exemplary causality is at work, of course. The
rationes aeternae are like extrinisic formal causes.
For each kind of created thing that is observed by
man on earth, and for each existing individual, there
is an etemal ratio, or prototype, in the mind of GOd. 21
In turn, there is also a created ratio seminalis, existing in matter, for each and every living being which
can or does grow on earth. Discussing the resurrection of infants, in the City 0/ God, Augustine shows
how he thinks of the seminal pre-existence of all living perfections in their created rationes seminales.
There was a privation of the perfect size of its
body, for the dead infant; even the perfect infant
lacks the perfection of bodily size; and if he had
131

achieved this, then he would not have been able

to be of any greater stature. Now, an beings possess
this measure of perfection, in the sense that they
are conceived and born with it. But they possess it
in principle (in ratione) , not in actual bulk (non in
mole). Similarly, an the organs are latent in the
seed, even though at birth some have not yet appeared, as is the case with teeth and other such
parts. In this implanted corporeal principle of every
material thing, there seems to be inbom, so to say,
that which is not yet, or rather, what is not evident
but will be with the progress of time, or rather will
appear. On this basis, the infant is already short
or taU, if he is going to be short or taU.22
Aetiologically, the similarity of this Augustinian insight with the modern biological explanation of inherited characteristics in terms of genes is striking. 23
.Augustine simply puslles the causal explanation back
to the very beginning of the genetic process: the
"~.eeds" of all living things, with an the special characteristics that they are to have in maturity, are im.planted by God from the beginning of creation in the
invisible recesses of the original materials of life.
Finally, there is more than a suggestion of final
causality in Augustine's treatment of order and weight.
Human life, for instance, is well-ordered when dir(~cted toward its proper goOd. 24 However, Augustine
seems to make no formal attempt to relate finality
to causality. The notion of end,or good, is not discussed by Augustine in terms of causa. This is why
he can say, as we noted at the beginning of this Appendix, that omnis causa elJiciens est. 25
132

NOTES TO APPENDIX B
1. De eitzJ. Dei, V, 9, 4; t. VII, 122: "et si certus est ordo rerum,
certus est ordo causarum ; non enim aliquid fieri potest, quod non
aliqua efficiens causa praecesserit."
2. De libero arbitrio, 11, 17, 45; t. I, 605: "Nulla autem res
formare seipsam potest: quia nulla res potest dare sibi quod non
habet."
3. De ditzJ. quaest. LXXXIII, q. 28; t. VI, 7-8: "Qui quaerit
quare voluerit Deus mundum facere, causam quaerit voluntatis Dei.
Sed omnis causa efficiens este Omne autem efficiens majus est quam
id quod efficitur. Nihil autem majus est voluntate Dei. Non ergo
ej us causa quaerenda est."
4. De eitzJ. Dei, V, 9, 4; t. VII, 123: "Ac per hoc colligitur,
non esse causas efficientes omnium quae fiunt, nisi voluntarias, illius
naturae scilicet quae spiritus vitae est."
5. Ibi.d., coI. 124.
6. Ibid., "cui [Deo] etiam voluntates omnes subjiciuntur, quia
non habent potestatem nisi quam ille concedit. Causa itaque rerum
facit, nec fit, Deus este Aliae vero causae et faciunt et fiunt; sicut
sunt omnes creati spiritus, maxime rationales."
7. Ibid., "Corporales autem causae, quae magis fiunt quam
faciunt, non sunt inter causas efficientes annumerandae; quoniam hoc
possunt, quod ex ipsis faciunt spirituum voluntates."
8. De Trinitate, 111, chapters 2-9, is a small treatise on primary
and secondary causaIity.
9. Loe. eit., 2, 7; t. VIII, 795-796: after speaking of the "ordo
naturalis in conversione et mutabilitate corporum, qui quamvis
etiam ad nutum Deiserviat, perseverantia tarnen consuetudinis
amisit admirationem, ..." Augustine proceeds to contrast those corporeal events that occur in unusually short times. Then he speaks
of rare events (earthquakes, biological monsters, "new stars") and
remarks that none of these occurs apart from God's will: "nihil fit
nisi voluntate Dei." He concludes : "Itaque licuit vanitati Philosophorum, etiam causis aliis ea tribuere, vel veris, sed proximis, cum
omnino videre non possent superiorem ceteris omnibus causam, id
est voluntatem Dei; ..."
10. Ibid., 3, 8, coI. 796: "uterque tarnen de proximis causis, id
est, corporalibus pronuntiaret."
11. Ibid., "jam ventum esset ad superiorem causam, quae ab anima
proficisceretur ad afficiendum corpus quod regit .."

133

12. For an explanation of causaI analogy in Thomism, see: G. P.

Klubertanz, St. Thomas Aquinas on Analogy, Chicago: Llyola U.
Press, 1960, pp. 24-26, 45-48.
13. Ibid.,4, 9, co!. 797-798.
14. Ibid., 5, 11, co!. 798-799.
15. Ibid., 6-7, co!. 799.
16. Ibid., 8, 14-15, co!. 800-801.
17. De Trin., 111, 9, 16; co!. 801-802.
18. Compare in the Latin Texts supra: Text XXI (De Gen. ad
lit., V, 23, 45) and Text XXIII (De Gen. ad lit., IX, 17, 32) witb
Text XXV (De Trin., 111, 9, 16).
19. De Trin., 111, 9, 16, co!. 801 F.
20. De Trin., 111, 8, 13, co!. 799: "Omnium quippe rerum quae
corporaliter visibiliterque nascuntur, occulta quaedam semina in
istis corporeis mundi hujus elementis latent. Alia sunt enim haec
jam conspicua oculis nostris ex fructibus et animantibus, unde
jubente Creatore produxit aqua prima natatilia et volatilia, terra
autem prima sui generis germina, et prima sui generis animalia."
21. Cf. De div. quaest. LXXXIII, q. 46; Text XII, supra..
22. See Sir Charles Sherrington, Man on His Nature, 2na ed.,
New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1955, p. 112.
23. De civ. Dei, XXIII, 14; t. VII, 678.
24. Cf. De civ. Dei, XIX, 10-17; t. VII, 553-561.
25. Cf. supra, note 3, Appendix B.

134

APPENDIX C

Analogy

There is some disagreement as to whether St.

Augustine ever recognized areal analogy between
God and creatures. Przywara thinks that he did
anticipate the analogy of being that is found more
fully developed in St. Thomas Aquinas. 1 Lyttkens
denies this, claiming that there is no real approach to
analogy in Augustine's explanation of tile similitude
between God and man. 2
St. Augustine does use, though rarely, the word
analogia. In one place he speaks of "analogy" as one
of the four senses, or special meanings, of the Old
Testament. s He apologizes for using the Greek word
and explains tilat one treats Scripture, "according to
analogy, when one demonstrates that the two Testaments, Old and New, are not opposed to each other."4
135

Later, this meaning is expressed positively: the analogy of the two Testaments is simply their agreement
( congruentia ) .5 This oeeurrenee of the word is of no
help in determining whether Augustine knew something abOtIt the analogy of being.
However, there is a Sermon (On the Trinity) in
whieh Augustine uses the word analogia to speak of
the eomparison between God and ereatures. The passage is signifieant enough to be quoted in full.
I do not say, the Father is memory, the Son is
understanding, the Spirit is will: I do not say how
this may be understood, I don't dare. Let us keep
the greater meanings for those who ean grasp them;
for the weak, we who are weak do what we ean.
I don't say that t11ese three features are to be
equated with that Trinity, as if for an analogy, thut
is, as features direeted toward some sort of ratio
of eomparison. I don't say this. 6
There is no further explanation of analogy in this se\,mon but, at least, the term is used here in a promi~
ing eontext and is assoeiated with the notion of a eomparison of two types of reality. I have found no other
verbal referenees to analogia in Augustine.
However, there are diseussions in whieh the notion
of an analogieal relationship is suggested by Augustine. First of all, there is a weIl known passage in the
City 0/ God7 where Augustine endeavers to explain
God's "resting" on the seventh day of ereation. He
insists that this should not be understood ehildishly
(pueriliter), as if God were tired. God's rest signifies,
he says, the rest of those who rest in God. To illustrate this, Augustine uses several examples whieh
136

become stock instances of analogies in medieval and

Scholastic treatments of the subject. A joyful house,
for example, can simply mean that the people in it
are rejoicing. However, a joyful house mayaIso mean
ahorne which by its very beauty makes its inhabitants
joyful. This is close to causal analogy, even though
Augustine professes to regard it as a figure of speech
(Zoquendi modo). Other examples used here by Augustine are: a joyfulletter, a lowing meadow8 and an
applauding theatre. Throughout this text, he is suggesting that there is some similarity between God's
resting and creatures' resting, in the sense that God
causes them to rest. 9 The efIect is like the cause but
not entirely so.
Since Augustine presented the preceding examples
in association with the idea of figures of speech, one
might expect hirn to speak elsewhere about analogy
from the point of view of grammar or logic. One of
his treatises on falsehood does contain a passage intended to show that figures of speech (tropica Zocutio)
are not lies. He illustrates this point by reference to
metaphors and gives many examples (flowering
yOllth, snowy hair, Christ as a lion, etc.). Metaphor is
explained as, "the transferred use of any word from
a proper thing to one that is not proper."lO No mention is made of analogy, as such, but one phrase, "one
thiIlg is to be understood from another thing" (aZiud
ex aZio est inteZZigendum), is a generalized formlLla of
analogy. However, in spite of bis education in the
rhetorical tradition, it must be admitted that Augustine pays little attention to the logico-grammatical
aspects of analogy.
137

There are, nevertheless, texts in which Augustine

uses some type of analogical explanation. To show
this, one must give the full context. Let us take a first
illustration fronl a passage in which he appears to be
saying that life is analogical.
Therefore, He is the eternal life in which we shall
eventually be, when He takes us to Hirnself: and
this eternal life, because it is He, is in Hirnself, so
that where He is there are we, that is, in Hirn. For
just as the Father possesses life in His very self and
yet is not other than the life which He has, for that
is what He is Who possesses this life, so also has
He given to the Son the possession of life in Hinlself, since the Son is the same life that He has in
Hirnself.
Now does this mean that we shall be this life that
He is, when we are in this future life; shall we begin
to exist in Hirn? Not at all, for He has this life by
the very fact of existing and He is what He has,
and because life is in Hirn He is in Hirnself. We,
however, are not life itself but are participants
in life itself. And thus, we shall be in it in such a
way that we are incapable of ourselves being what
He is, and not being ourselves the life we may
possess Hirn as the life, for He has life by the very
fact that He is life. 11
This text is a tortured efIort on the part of Augustine
to explain two meanings of life: that which is open
to the Blessed in eternity and that which is identical
with divinity. The Blessed will participate in that
Eternal Life which is God; they will not become iden138

tical with God Hirnself. Their life will be like His,

and yet different. Life is analogous.
The participation theme in the foregoing text suggests that we have some sort of causal analogy in the
thought of St. Augustine. 12 In discussing participation
above in Appendix A, we examined a text from the
Answers to Eighty-Three Questions13 where Augustine
'says that items such as chastity, eternity, beauty, goodness, wisdonl and likeness have two meanings. The
primary meaning is that of the causal perfection and
the secondary meaning is that of the participated
effect. It would appear that, in all these instances, -we
have examples of causal analogies.
Light is also understood by Augustine in an analogical manner. Indeed, for those who may wish to
make a further study of Augustinian analogy, it would
seem that bis many meditations on light would be a
fruitful starting-point. It is weIl known that later
medieval thinkers, partly under the influence of Augustine, developed a remarkable metaphysics of
ligllt. 14 Perhaps it will be sufficient, here, to present
one key text in which Augustine indicates something
of the analogical character of light. This passage also
illustrates the analogy of wisdom.
The soul, also, even if it were always wise (as it
will be when redeemed in eternity), will be wise
however by participation in immutable wisdom,
which is not what the soul is. Indeed, if air were
suffused with light which it would never lose, it
would still be true that illuminated air is different
from the source-light (lux) whereby it is illuminated. Now I donot suggest that the soul is air,
139

as some people have thought because they were

unable to think of an incorporeal nature. Yet these
two items have some resemblance even though
there isa grat difference, so that it is not inappropriate to say that the incorporeal soul is illuminated
by the incorporeal light of the simple wisdom of
God as the corporeal air is illuminated by corporeal
light. And just as the air may become darkened
when deprived of this light (for those p.atches that
are called dark in certain places and on certain
bodies are nothing but air deprived of light), so
too does the soul grow dark when deprived of the
light of wisdom. 15
Of course, this is a very common analogy in the
works of Augustine. It is the foundation of his famous
theory of divine illumination. The light of divine wisdom is related to the soul which it enlightens as the
original physical light of the sun is to the bodily medium which it enlightens. Four meanings of light are
involved: they are all "lights" but they are all somewhat different.
Finally, we might consider a text in which there is
more than a suggestion of the analogy of being, between God and creatures. This text uses the Latin
term comparatio (comparison) which may be an
Augustinian equivalent for the Greek term analogia.
Augustine has been speaking about the different
meanings of "good" and his view that they all depend
on divine goodness. He proceeds to say this:
Indeed, it is not so, that the things that He has
made do not exist: if we were to say.that the things
that He has made" do not exist, that." would do"" in140

jury to Hirn. Why did He make them, if the things

that He has made do not exist? Or what did He
make, if what He has made does not exist?
Hence, since these things that He has made also
exist, we are brought to a comparison with Hirn.
As if He alone existed, He said, "I am Who am:"
and "Say to the sons of Israel, He Who is hath sent
me to you." [Exod. 3:14] He did not say, God the
omnipotent, the merciful, the just-yet had He said
these names, they would certainly have been true.
He replied that He is called "being itself" (ipsum
esse), having taken this name from the midst of
all t11e things that God could be called. And He
did this, as if this were His name: "This shall you
tell them," He said, "He Who is, hath sent me."
hldeed, He exists in such a way that, in comparison with Hirn, the things that He has made are not.
When not compared with Hirn, they are, for they
are from Hirn; but when compared with Hirn, they
are not, for truly to be is to be immutably, and
this He alone is. He is, is (Est enim est), just as
the good of goods, is goOd. 16
I think that the man who wrote these lines certainly understood that being, or "to be," is analogous.
Augustine is saying, as plainly as any man has said it,
that creaturely things do exist and are real, that they
are like God (in that esse is quite properly said of
them) but that they are also unlike God (in that
creaturely esse is nothing, compared to the divine
Esse). To my mind, this means that Augustine has
anticipated the metaphysical analogy between God
and creatures.
141

NOTES TO APPENDIX C
1. E. Przywara, Polarity, London: Oxford University Press, 1935,
pp. 33-35.
2. H. Lyttkens, The Analogy between God and the World: An
Investigation 0/ its Background and Interpretation 0/ its Use by
Thomas 0/ Aquino, Uppsala: Almqvist and Wiksells, 1952, p. 121.
3. De utilitate credendi, 3, 5; t. VIII, 48.
4. Ibid., "Secundum analogiam [traditur], cum demonstratur
non sibi adversari duo Testamenta vetus et novum."
5. Ibid., 3, 7; coI. 49: "J am porro analogiam, qua utriusque
Testamenti congruentia perspicitur, quid ego dicam usos fuisse
omnes quorum auctoritati illi cedunt; ... ?"
6. Sermo LII, 10, 23; t. V (1), 310: "Non dico, Pater memoria
est, Filius intellectus est, Spiritus voluntas est: non dico quomodo
libet intel ligatur, non audeo. Servemus majora capientibus, infirmis

infirmi quod possumus. Non dico ista illi Trinitati velut aequanda,
quasi ad analogiam, id est, ad rationem quamdam comporotionis
dirigenda: non hoc dico."
7. De civ. D,ei, XI, 8; t. VII, 277-278.
8. This becomes a smiling meadow in medieval discussions,; see
inter Opera Omnia S. Thom,ae Aquinatis (ed. Parma, XIX, 417)
the Expositio in 117 M eteororum, lectio 4: "sed analogice praedicatur pepansis de suis subj ectis, sicut ridere de animali et prato
viridi." This part of the commentary was not written by St.
Thomas.
9. De civ. Dei, XI, 8; vol. 278: "Convenientissime itaque cum
Deum requievisse prophetica narrat auctoritas, significatur requies
eorum qui in illo requiescunt et quos fach ipse requiescere."
10. Contra M endacium ad Consentium, 10, 24; t. VI, 461: "Quae
si mendacia dixerimus, omnes etiam parabolae ac figurae significandarum quarumcumque re rum, quae non ad proprietatem accipiendae sunt, sed in eis aliud ex alio est intelligendum, dicentur
esse mendacia, quod absit omnino. Nam qui hoc putat, tropicis etiam
tarn multis locutionibus omnibus potest hanc importare calumniam;
ita ut et ipsa quae appellatur metaphora, hoc est de re propria ad
rem non propriam verbi alicuj us .usurpata translatio, possit ista
ratione mendaciurn nuncupari."
11. In Joannis Evangelium, tr.LXX, 1; t. 111(2), 683: "Ipse
est igitur vita aeterna in qua futuri sumus, cum acceperit nos ad se:
et ipsa vita aeterna quod ipse est in ipso est, ut ubi est ipse et nos

142

simus, hoc est, in ipso. Sicut enim habet Pater vitam in semetipso
et utique non aliud est vita quam habet, nisi quod est ipse qui hane
habet: sic dedit Filio habere vitam in semetipso, eum ipse sit eadem
vita quam habet in semetipso. Numquid autem nos vita quod est
ipse, hoc erimus, cum in iIIa vita, hoc est in ipso esse coeperimus?
Non utique, quia ipse exsistendo vita habet vitam, et ipse est quod
habet, et quod vita est in ipso, ipse est in seipso: nos autem non ipsa
vita, sed ipsius vitae participes sumus; atque ita ibi erimus, ut in
nobis ipsis non quod ipse est esse possimus, sed nos ipsi non vita,
ipsum habeamus vitam, qui seipsum habet vitam, eo quod ipse sit
vita."
12. For an explanation of causal analogy in Thomism, see: G. P.
Klubertanz, St. Thomas Aquinas on An:alogy, Chicago: Loyola U.
Press, 1960, pp. 24-26, 45-48.
13. De ditO. quaest. LXXXIII, q. 23; Latin text supra, Appendix
A, note 14.
14. For this later theory, see: C. C. Riedl, Rohert Grosseteste
on Light, Milwaukee: Marquette U. Press, 1942; and A. C. Crombie, Robert Grosseteste and the Origins 01 Experimental Seien ce,
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953, pp. 104-109 (bibliography on p. 104,
note 5), and Chap. VI: "Metaphysics of Light," pp. 128-131.
Crombie cites (p. 128, note 1) St. Augustine's De Trinitate, XII,
9-14, and De libero arbitrio, 11, 13, as sources of Grosseteste's
light metaphysics. Many other medieval thinkers (Witelo, Roger
Bacon, J ohn Peckham, and the author of the Summa P;hilosophiae
attributed to Grosseteste ) share this interest in light metaphysics.
15. De civ. De'i, XI, 10, 2; t. VII, 280-281; see the Latin text
supra, Text XXXIV.
16. Enarr. in Ps., 134, 4; t. IV, 1494-1495: "N'eque enim ea quae
fecit, non sunt; aut injuria iIIi fit, cum dicimus non esse quae fecit.
Quare enim fecit, si non sunt quae fecit? Aut quid fecit, si non est
quod fecit? Cum ergo sint et iIIa quae fecit, venitur tarnen ad illius
comparationem; et tamquam solus sit, dixit, Ego sum qui sum: et,
Dices filiis Israel, Qui est, misit me ad vos. Non dixit, Deus iIIe
omnipotens, misericors, justus: quae si diceret, utique vera diceret.
Sublatis de medio omnibus quibus appellari posset et dici Deus,
ipsum esse se vocari respondit: et tamquam hoc esset ei nomen,
Hoc dices eis, inquit, Qui est misit me. Ita enim ille est, ut in
ejus comparatione ea quae facta sunt, non sinto 1110 non comparato,
sunt, quoniam ab iIIo sunt; illi autem comparata, non sunt; quia
verum esse, incommutabile esse est, quod iIIe solus este Est enim est,
sicut bonorum bonum, bonum est."

143

APPENDIX D

In Idipsum

Considerable light is thrown on St. Augustine's

ontology by tlle way in which he explained the biblical phrase, in idipsum. 1 This phrase is found in six
pIaces in the Latin text of the Psalms which Augustine
read. 2 We are not here concerned with what presentday Scripture scholars take these texts to mean;3 our
interest is in how Augustine fitted the phrase, in idipsum, into the general picture of reality which he was
developing during the many years in which he meditated on the Psalms.
First of all, it is immediately evident that in idipsum
meant to Augustine that supreme characteristic of
God's being which is variously called unity, immutability and eternity. To document this statement, let
_us consider two of t11e most informative passages in
the Enarrationes in Psalmos.
145

Augustine's text of Psalm 33:4 read, Et exaltemus

nomen ejus in idipsum. After quoting this, he commented as follows:
What is the meaning of, 'let us extol His name in
idipsum'? It is this, in the one (in unum). Indeed,
many codices have it this way: 'Magnify the Lord
with me, and let us extol His name in the one.'
Whether it be expressed in idipsum, or in unum, the
meaning is the same. 4
From this, it is clear that Augustine thought that in
idipsum expresses tlle concrete fact of God's unity.
The second major explanation is offered in the
conlmentary on Psalm 121:3 which, in Augustllle's
Psalter, read, Jerusalem quae aedificatur ut civitas.
Cujus participatio ejus in idipsum. On this, Augustine had much to say.
Now then, Brethren, whoever raises the gaze of his
mind, whoever puts away the darkness of the flesh,
whoever cleanses the eye of his heart, let hirn rise
up and see idipsum. What is idipsum? How can I
say it, except idipsum? Brethren, if you can, understand idipsum. For, if I call it anything else, I do
not say idipsum.
However, let us try to bring the weakness of our
minds to think idipsum by means of certain approximations of language and meaning. What is idipsum?That which is, always and in the same way:
that which is .not one thing now and a different
thing the next moment. What then is idipsum, unless
it be what is? What is that which is? That which
is eternal. For that which is ever in one way and
then in another, is not, fr it does not endure;not
146

that it is altogether non-existent but it does not exist

in the highest way.
And what is that which is, except He Who when
He sent forth Moses said to him: 'I am Who am'?
What is this, except He Who when His servant said,
'Behold, Thou hast sent me, if the people say to
me: Who sent you, what shall I say to them?' He
did not wish him to express His name otherwise
than, 'I am Who am,' and in addition He said,
'Thus shalt thou say to the children of Israel, He
Who is hath sent me to you.'
Behold idipsum, I am Who am, He Who is hath
sent me to you. You are not able to grasp it; it is
a great deal to understand, a great deal to comprehend. 5
The same text continues at great length, emphasizing Augustine's point that only one being, God, is
idipsum. Neither bodies nor spirits are truly immutable, because they do not fully exist. The fallen angels
erred on this matter; they wished to be idipsum, to be
their own masters. They refused to accept the Lord
Who is idipsum-and so they became devils. Only
God exists by virtue of Hirnself; only God is ipsum
esse. 6
Not only, then, does in idipsum denote the divine
unity, eternity and immutability. In the final analysis,
it means ipsum esse: to be, in the unique sense that
is proper to God alone. 7

147

NOTES TO APPENDIX D
1. Cf. J. Swetnam, S. J., "A Note on In Idipsum in St. Augustine," The Modern Schoolman, XXX (1953) 328-331. My brief
treatment of this phrase obviously owes much to this note by a
former student of mine.
2. For the six uses, consult Enarrationes in Psalmos, ed. Venetiis,
tome IV; for Ps. 4 :9, see coI. 15; for Ps. 33 :4, see coI. 218; for Ps.
40:8, see coI. 351; for Ps. 61:10, see coI. 599 (with the variant: in
unum) ; for Ps. 73 :6, see coI. 773; and for Ps. 121 :3, see coI. 1387.
3. As Father Swetnam indicates (art. cit., p. 328), it is now
generally agreed that the Greek or Hebrew expressions in these
loci mean : together, llt once, or completely.
4. En. in Ps., XXXIII, 4, 11, 7, t. IV, 218: "Quid est, exaltemus
nomen ejus in idipsum? Hoc est, in unum. N am multi codices sie
habent, M agni/icate Dominu,m mecum, et exaltemus nomen ejus in
unum. Sive in idipsum dicatur, sive in unum, hoc idem dicitur."
5. En. in Ps., CXXI, 5, coI. 1387; see Text XXXVIII.
6. En. in Ps., CXXI, 6, coI. 1388; see Text: XXXIX.
7. Cf. De vera religione, 21, 41, t. I, 761; De moribus eecl. Cath.,
I, 14, 24, t. I, 696; Con!., IX, 10, 24, t. I, 166; and the additional
references in Swetnam, art. cit., p. 331.

148