Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
Page
310
General Information
300-3
311
312
Scope
313
Good Housekeeping
320
Inspection
321
322
Safety Devices
323
Process Equipment
324
Tanks
325
Piping
326
327
Structures
328
330
Maintenance
331
Job Planning
332
Blinding
333
Vapor-Freeing
334
335
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336
337
Abrasive Blasting
340
Dismantling Equipment
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350
300-11
351
Introduction
352
353
354
Removing Vapor
360
361
Introduction
362
General
363
364
370
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380
References
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Initial Inspection
An initial inspection should be made of new and converted facilities to determine
that the fire prevention principles have been properly applied. The initial inspection
should also acquaint operating personnel with all fire prevention features that have
been built into the facility.
Periodic Inspections
Reinspections should be made periodically to note any changes in hazards,
construction, equipment, conditions, etc. These inspections will probably be made
by qualified specialists familiar with applicable fire protection design considerations (engineer, fire marshal, equipment inspector, etc.) and will include testing of
equipment, fire drills, inspection of new construction, etc., as described in Sections
500, Fire Training, and 600, Fighting the Fire. In addition to such general
inspections, which will perhaps be held every few months, a self-inspection should
be made every few days by operators, supervisors, superintendents, etc., to check on
local conditions in their own areas.
Outside Inspections
Inspections or Fire Loss Prevention Surveys with an outsider such as a member of
the Fire Protection Staff or an insurance inspector should be made periodically
(every one to three years will ordinarily be often enough). These inspections will
sometimes reveal hazards not apparent to those who have become accustomed to the
existing conditions, and will stimulate interest in fire protection efforts as well as
disseminate ideas that may be developed at other facilities. Surveys will be coordinated with the OPCO facility Fire/Safety Engineer and/or Fire Chief to maximize
the benefits from the survey.
312 Scope
The general objectives of inspection and maintenance work intended to promote fire
protection include:
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General neatness. Dirty rags, trash, oil spills, gas or oil leaks, improper storage
of paints or hydrocarbon samples, the careless use of light oils for cleaning,
etc., are all potential fire hazards that can be controlled.
Proper placement. Operators should be constantly alert to make sure that all
fire fighting equipment is in its established location and ready to operate on a
moment's notice (extinguishers and nozzles in place, valves freely operable,
etc.). Access to this equipment should never be obstructed by other equipment,
stacked materials, open trenches or ditches, etc.
320 Inspection
321 Fire Protection Equipment
Scheduled inspections should be set up and made the responsibility of one individual or position. See Appendix E for inspection checklists.
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no case should the interval be greater than required by any Federal, State, local and
industry laws, statutes, or codes, or local operating practices established by experience.
Routine inspection and testing of flame, heat, smoke and combustible gas detectors
should be included in the normal maintenance program. These systems are
discussed in Section 1600.
324 Tanks
See the Tank Manual, Section 1000.
325 Piping
A visual external inspection of aboveground lines should be made annually for
adequacy of overpressure protection (thermal relief valves), for external corrosion,
and for adequacy of supports and provisions for expansion or vibration in service.
Particular emphasis should be given to the support of small connections. Nondestructive testing should be scheduled as appropriate, based on experience, service,
pressure and criticality of the lines. Refer to the Piping Manual for more information.
Lines handling corrosive stocks can be tested using either pit gages or ultrasonic
(UT) gaging.
Buried lines should be daylighted and spot-checked occasionally for evidence of
external corrosion where bare pipe has been used and where there is evidence of
water drainage from any adjacent source. Lines partially buried by erosion and other
weather conditions should be completely uncovered periodically and checked for
evidence of soil corrosion. Housekeeping methods should be improved or supports
modified to prevent recurrence. Internal corrosion in buried lines can be inspected
by using smart pigs, or pipeline scrapers.
Lines that are heavily corroded may be hydrostatically tested to locate weak
sections. Hydrostatic testing of lines having isolated or localized pitting is of little
value except to find severe pitting or existing leakage; it will not give assurance of
future leak-free operation. These lines should be ultrasonically inspected, or
subjected to other nondestructive inspection methods to determine the remaining
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useful life. The ratings and materials of flanges, valves and fittings should be
checked to be sure that they are consistent with the service of the line. Preventive
steps to reduce corrosion, e.g., cathodic protection, may be appropriate to decrease
the rate of corrosion and frequency of failures.
327 Structures
Structures containing pumps, compressors, piping or other equipment that might
possibly leak hydrocarbons should be well ventilated. All the rules of good housekeeping should be particularly emphasized inside structures.
330 Maintenance
331 Job Planning
In facilities that handle flammable and combustible liquids and gases, control
construction and maintenance activities through careful job planning. Activities that
require special consideration include cutting and welding, use of open flames, air
powered tools, sparking electrical tools, and gasoline or diesel engines. Equipment
for activities such as sandblasting can also produce an ignition. This section
includes a general explanation of job planning. See Appendix A for checklists of
items for consideration. Examples of some different types of plans and permits in
use at various facilities are also included in Appendix A.
Job planning includes the proper use of general and hot work permits and the
creation of appropriate plans, which may include:
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A work plan
A contingency plan
An emergency response plan
Job plans must be communicated to and understood by all the employees and
contractors doing the work. While the person issuing the permits is responsible for
adequately covering all conditions that can cause fires, it's also important for maintenance and contract personnel to check for blinding, bonding, equipment depressure, covering of sewers, general cleanliness, and so on, as an added precaution
before opening or entering equipment or doing hot work. Personnel should be on the
alert for changing conditions in the area that might increase the fire hazard. Scrutinize any deviation from established conditions or procedures before proceeding.
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Plans
For larger projects involving multiple permits or work performed in critical, high
value facilities, consider using written work plans. Prepare work plans before work
starts and include input from engineering, operations, contractors, and the facility
fire brigade where appropriate. See Appendix A for examples of the work plans
described in this section.
Work Plan. A work plan identifies and avoids potential hazards that can occur as
work progresses. A work plan might describe equipment isolation procedures such
as lockout/tagout, gas testing requirements, and methods to keep operations and
maintenance informed of the status of the work.
Contingency Plan. A contingency plan addresses the major what ifs that could
occur while a job is in progress. For example, what if the wrong pipe is cut? Or
what if a weld slag causes a fire in the tank seal area? What if a plant upset or
product spill occurs during the work?
Emergency Response Plan. An emergency response plan describes the actions to
be taken if a toxic release or fire occurs. Evacuation procedures as well as fire
fighting responsibilities for workers are included.
332 Blinding
Equipment to be repaired or entered should be isolated to prevent entry of toxic or
flammable vapor or liquid from connected equipment. Isolation may be accomplished by blinding or dismantling attached piping. Closing valves should never be
considered equivalent to blinding; when lines are broken they should be moved
aside to prevent any possible flow into the isolated equipment (e.g., dropout spools).
Double block and bleed valves are often used for equipment isolation, but they
should not be considered acceptable as isolation for personnel entry. Any variation
from blinding or breaking lines for hot work or entry must be approved by operating management.
333 Vapor-Freeing
Before repair work is started on installations producing or containing flammable
vapor, the vapor concentration must be reduced to a safe point, generally regarded
as 10% of the lower flammable limit (LFL) or less, and sources likely to cause
further generation of vapor after the initial vapor-freeing operation must be
removed. For details see Section 335.
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between the nozzle, hose, or hose couplings and a grounded, conducting body,
unless a conductive abrasive blasting hose is used. Most contractors now use
conductive hoses. However, if they do not, the electrostatic hazard can be safely
controlled by bonding the nozzle to the work metal and keeping the hose away from
areas where ignitable vapor-air mixtures may exist. Bonding the nozzle to the metal
being blasted will also eliminate static shocks to operators of the equipment.
Heating of metal. Although the abrasive effect of blasting will tend to heat the
metal at the point of impingement, the maximum temperature reached is well below
the ignition temperature of hydrocarbon vapor.
Friction sparks. The mechanical sparks produced in abrasive blasting operations
have not proved to be an ignition source for petroleum vapor-air mixtures.
The vapor in the tank (or vessel) vapor space is not above 0.6 of the lower
flammable limit (LFL), or is definitely too rich to burn (not less than 1.5 times
the upper flammable limit of the petroleum vapor in air), and
2.
Liquid movement into and out of the tank or vessel is prohibited during
blasting, and
3.
Inlet and outlet valves on the tank or vessel are closed and locked, and
4.
All vents to atmosphere on tank or vessel containing a too-rich-to-burn vaporair mixture extend upward at least 10 feet above the work area, and
5.
The abrasive blast nozzle is bonded to the tank or vessel, and the abrasive blast
hose is kept out of areas where ignitable vapor-air mixtures may exist, or a
conductive hose is used, and
6.
7.
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1.
The conditions outlined in the preceding paragraph for shells of tanks are
complied with, and
2.
3.
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The conditions outlined in the above paragraph for shells of tanks are complied
with, and
2.
The top of roof at the shell is within 4 feet of the top angle, and
3.
The space above the floating roof contains no harmful concentrations of toxic
vapors, and
4.
The roof is free of oil deposits above their flash point temperatures.
Because hydrocarbons sometimes leak into the pontoon spaces, these spaces should
be checked for vapor concentration. Work should not be done on roofs with pontoon
spaces containing a vapor-air concentration more than 60% of the lower flammable
limit. Pontoon spaces should be kept tightly sealed.
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351 Introduction
Ventilation and cleaning of columns, drums, and other process vessels should follow
the same step-by-step procedure discussed in API 2015, except that some of the
conditions present in the process areas permit methods not ordinarily suited to large
storage tanks. Steam, not generally effective for vapor-freeing large storage tanks
because it is not ordinarily available in sufficient quantities in tank fields, is usually
readily available in quantity in process areas. Also, process vessels are normally
smaller in volume than storage tanks. Another important factor that makes steam
more useful in vapor-freeing process equipment is that such vessels are frequently
hot when emptied, greatly reducing the amount of steam lost through condensation.
Therefore, while ventilation with air is the preferred method of vapor-freeing
storage tanks, air and steam can both be considered for process equipment.
Pyrophoric Compounds
Most process vessels are parts of closed systems, and oxygen is not present during
normal operation. In such vessels suspect that the presence of pyrophoric iron
sulfide compounds might become a source of ignition particularly if stock
containing sulfur has been present. See API 2015, Cleaning Petroleum Storage
Tanks for the procedure to follow when pyrophoric compounds are present or
suspected. (See Section 243 for more information on pyrophorics.)
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up and ready to operate before the bottom manhole cover is removed, so that vapor
is not released at that point during installation of the blower.
The blower should be started as soon as feasible. If possible, start it even before the
attachment is completed. All sources of ignition should be carefully controlled
during this period. The air rate should be equivalent to several air changes per hour.
Try to minimize the time during which the tank vapor space is in the flammable
range by maximizing the ventilation flow.
A relatively high air rate is particularly important if pyrophoric iron sulfide is
suspected. Higher air rates ensure a decrease in vapor concentration to well below
the lower flammable limit before the iron sulfide has had time to dry out and oxidize
rapidly enough to burn. If the vessel is dry when ventilation is started, introducing
steam or a spray of water into the vessel to moisten any accumulations of iron
sulfide on surfaces is frequently desirable.
Recent air quality regulations at some locations require vapor recovery or activated
carbon filters to remove the vapors from tanks being opened for inspection,
cleaning, repairs and dismantling. It is important to recognize that this equipment
can provide a source of ignition if not properly designed and controlled. Blowers
should be bonded to the tank vessel and rated for Class I, Div. 2 use. See
Section 226 for additional details.
362 General
The procedures discussed in this section for welding and hot tapping on pipelines,
vessels, and tanks containing flammable liquid, gas, or vapor should be used only as
a guide and source of information. They cannot be expected to cover all contingencies. If a special need or problem exists, responsible supervision should review
these procedures, keeping in mind that safety is the first consideration.
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The possibility of burning through the walls of equipment during welding operations can be minimized by using capable and experienced welders and by thorough
and adequate inspection of the equipment prior to welding. Ultrasonic thickness
gaging is a valuable tool for such inspection. If a flammable atmosphere may exist,
do not weld or hot tap unless the equipment is inerted or vapor-free.
When arc welding, the welding machine must be located beyond any probable path
of vapor that might be released in the repair operation or from any other source.
Combustibles in the area such as staging boards, grass, or seal material on tanks can
be ignited by welding slag. These precautions, however are no different from those
required for any welding operation.
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drawn, and the hot tap valve closed. The advantages of this method include the
ability to isolate sections of pipelines repeatedly using the reinserted stoppling tool.
Disadvantages include a potential reduction in line integrity from an added branch
connection, and need to perform the proper welding procedure on the pipe while it
is in service.
Balloons inserted through small drilled holes in the pipe have been effectively used
for temporary plugs.
Clay packs have also been used, but some products, and some pumping and
metering equipment cannot stand the contamination.
Dry ice packs (solid carbon dioxide) avoid contamination of the line contents. Their
primary use is to make the working area nonflammable by establishing a vapor
barrier of inert gas, rather than to function as a plug.
Dry ice is not a true plug because it constantly diminishes in size as it forms carbon
dioxide gas (CO2). It has been used on motor gasoline and black oil pipelines. Tieins with dry ice, however, should be limited to locations where liquid drain-down is
complete or incoming liquid is so slight that no appreciable amount accumulates
behind the dry ice during fitting and welding. Dry ice packs do not contain pressure.
The open end of the cut line should be covered with plastic or plugged after the dry
ice is in place if any delays are encountered or while the tie-in crew is at the other
end of the job. This keeps the CO2 vapor inside the line, prevents air from mixing,
and helps the carbon dioxide commingle with any hydrocarbon-air mixture back
inside the line.
A vent hole in the pipe behind the dry ice (on the opposite side of the dry ice from
the weld area) is useful to check for fluid accumulation, to test the vapor space in
the line for percent CO2, and to relieve pressure buildup while welding is in
progress. Before trimming or welding is started, the vapor space in the line should
be checked for flammability and, if possible, for percent CO2. Also, as usual, the
open end of the line and the ditch or bell hole should be thoroughly checked with a
combustible gas indicator.
After the pipe has been cut by nonigniting means a screw-expanding plug can be
used to block the line if the plug can be removed through a flanged opening after
welding is completed.
All of the methods discussed here require that the repair area be cleaned up and all
flammable liquid and vapor removed before welding can be done.
Weld-plus-end coupling. This is another commonly used method for making pipeline repairs. In this technique, the pipe is cold-cut with pipe cutters or a saw.
If a power saw is used, it must not be an ignition source. An air-operated or explosion-proof electric motor should be used and the blade kept cool with water or
cutting oil.
The replacement length of pipe or fitting should be fabricated at a safe distance
from the repair site. The replacement length can then be slid into place and the
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weld-plus-end coupling clamped over the ends to be joined. The line can immediately be put back into operation. Then, after any spilled oil has evaporated or been
otherwise disposed of, the coupling can be welded into the pipe with flow in the
pipe to help carry away the heat.
Water Pipe
A pipe filled with water can be welded safely if care is taken that there are no vapor
traps in the area being heated.
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identify the area inside the tank that will be heated by the welding operation on the
outside. If it is impractical to remove all combustible residue from the area to be
heated, the tank or vessel should be emptied and ventilated. Then, in accordance
with entry permit procedures, personnel should be stationed inside the tank with a
water hose, continuously cooling the heated area while welding is in progress. The
precautions listed in this paragraph apply to asphalt, fuel oil and all other heavy
hydrocarbons in addition to the lighter hydrocarbons. Even though the residue is
deposited at a temperature far below its flash point, it may be heated and vaporized,
and possibly ignited during the welding process.
Inert gas blanketing. An alternative to vapor-freeing and cleaning the affected tank
areas (see Section 350) is to blanket the tank atmosphere with CO2 until the oxygen
concentration is below 10 percent.
If nitrogen is used as the diluent, the oxygen concentration should be reduced to 7
percent or below. Vessels containing more than one percent hydrogen should have
the oxygen concentration reduced to less than 4 percent, with CO2 as the inerting
agent. Accurate analysis of the oxygen concentration in representative samples of
tank vapor space is absolutely essential. Several portable oxygen indicators are
available that will indicate in these ranges.
The precautions listed above should be observed for installation of studs and
brackets by the resistance welding method (for instance, Nelson studs), unless it is
definitely established by test with the actual equipment to be used that control of
welding current, thickness of metal and other factors will prevent the temperature on
the inside of the tank from reaching the auto-ignition temperature point of the material or 450F, whichever is lower.
Welding should not be done on the roof of a floating roof tank unless the tank and
pontoons have been emptied and are vapor-free. Exceptions to this rule require
special precautions, management approval and review by the Fire Protection Staff.
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tion of FeS, or reactive chemicals has started small fires within the packing. New
packing is often coated with a thin layer of oil that also is a fuel source. The heat
from these initial fires is sufficient to ignite the metal packing, resulting in a very
hazardous metal fire that is difficult to extinguish.
Some specific fire protection issues associated with structured packing are:
The job planning process needs to ask the question How can we avoid hot
work over the structured packing? The inherently safer solution is to remove
the packing prior to conducting hot work. A Job Safety Analysis should be
conducted to address the specific risks and mitigation prior to commencing hot
work over structured packing.
The metal in the packing itself is a potential source of fuel. Structured packing
(and on occasion, even random packing) metal can burn and create a metal
fire. (Remember the high school chemistry class where you saw steel wool
burn over the top of a Bunsen Burner?) If a relatively small fire occurs in a
packed bed, its heat can ignite the metal and create a much more serious,
intense fire.
When doing work over packed beds, consider the packing to be a potential fire
hazard. People doing work over packed beds of any type, new or old, need to
treat it as if they are working over a major fuel source. This potential hazard,
combined with the difficulty in removing all the hydrocarbon from the packing,
makes it imperative to isolate the packing from the hot work with substantial
plywood decking and fire blankets sealed off at the column walls. Plywood cut
to the vessel radius should be placed under the fire blankets to prevent wearing
a hole in the fire blankets. The seams in the plywood and the edges of the
decking should be sealed using duct tape. Consideration should be given to
chemically treating the plywood to make it more fire resistant. Fire blankets
(cloths) must be rated for 2000F and overlapped a minimum of 4 inches and the
laps sealed with duct tape, including the lap to the vessel wall. A minimum of
two blanket layers with seams orientated 90 degrees should be used to minimize the potential for welding or grinding sparks to reach the packing.
Hot work inside columns with structured packing must always be wet work.
Keep fire blankets wet while hot work is occurring above packed beds. A fire
hose should be pressurized and used to extinguish any embers that are generated during any hot work (welding and grinding). Fire watches should be
trained to inspect and stop the hot work if holes or tears are found in the fire
blankets
A contingency plan should be prepared and reviewed with all operators and
mechanics before hot work begins. These contingency plans need to address the
precautions needed to prevent/suppress a metal fire. These include:
Removal of the packing prior to doing hot work is the best approach to be
sure absolutely that a fire cannot occur in a column.
In some cases, removing the packing is not attractive, especially for small
hot work jobs. In these cases, redundant sealed barriers between the
packing and the hot work area, such as requiring two or more layers of fire
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Also, packed beds should be monitored during initial vessel entry. Pyrophoric iron
sulfides or reactive chemicals can cause fires as the packing dries out, even when no
hot work is occurring. The precautions listed above for extinguishing a packing fire
should be followed in columns with pyrophoric iron sulfide or reactive chemical
concerns.
380 References
American Petroleum Institute (API)
API 2015
API 2201
ChevronTexaco References
Piping Manual
Tank Manual
Welding Manual
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