G.R. No.

148334

January 21, 2004

ARTURO M. TOLENTINO and ARTURO C.

MOJICA, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, SENATOR RALPH G.
RECTO and SENATOR GREGORIO B.
HONASAN,Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for prohibition to set aside Resolution No.
NBC 01-005 dated 5 June 2001 ("Resolution No. 01-005")
and Resolution No. NBC 01-006 dated 20 July 2001
("Resolution No. 01-006") of respondent Commission on
Elections ("COMELEC"). Resolution No. 01-005 proclaimed
the 13 candidates elected as Senators in the 14 May 2001
elections while Resolution No. 01-006 declared "official
and final" the ranking of the 13 Senators proclaimed in
Resolution No. 01-005.
The Facts
Shortly after her succession to the Presidency in January
2001, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo nominated then
Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. ("Senator Guingona") as
Vice-President. Congress confirmed the nomination of
Senator Guingona who took his oath as Vice-President on
9 February 2001.
Following Senator Guingonas confirmation, the Senate on
8 February 2001 passed Resolution No. 84 ("Resolution
No. 84") certifying to the existence of a vacancy in the
Senate. Resolution No. 84 called on COMELEC to fill the
vacancy through a special election to be held
simultaneously with the regular elections on 14 May 2001.
Twelve Senators, with a 6-year term each, were due to be
elected in that election.1 Resolution No. 84 further
provided that the "Senatorial candidate garnering the 13th
highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired
term of former Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.," which
ends on 30 June 2004.2
On 5 June 2001, after COMELEC had canvassed the
election results from all the provinces but one (Lanao del
Norte), COMELEC issued Resolution No. 01-005
provisionally proclaiming 13 candidates as the elected
Senators. Resolution No. 01-005 also provided that "the
first twelve (12) Senators shall serve for a term of six (6)
years and the thirteenth (13th) Senator shall serve the
unexpired term of three (3) years of Senator Teofisto T.
Guingona, Jr. who was appointed VicePresident."3 Respondents Ralph Recto ("Recto") and
Gregorio Honasan ("Honasan") ranked 12th and 13th,
respectively, in Resolution No. 01-005.

On 20 June 2001, petitioners Arturo Tolentino and Arturo

Mojica ("petitioners"), as voters and taxpayers, filed the
instant petition for prohibition, impleading only COMELEC
as respondent. Petitioners sought to enjoin COMELEC from
proclaiming with finality the candidate for Senator
receiving the 13th highest number of votes as the winner
in the special election for a single three-year term seat.
Accordingly, petitioners prayed for the nullification of
Resolution No. 01-005 in so far as it makes a proclamation
to such effect.
Petitioners contend that COMELEC issued Resolution No.
01-005 without jurisdiction because: (1) it failed to notify
the electorate of the position to be filled in the special
election as required under Section 2 of Republic Act No.
6645 ("R.A. No. 6645");4 (2) it failed to require senatorial
candidates to indicate in their certificates of candidacy
whether they seek election under the special or regular
elections as allegedly required under Section 73 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881;5 and, consequently, (3) it failed to
specify in the Voters Information Sheet the candidates
seeking election under the special or regular senatorial
elections as purportedly required under Section 4,
paragraph 4 of Republic Act No. 6646 ("R.A. No.
6646").6 Petitioners add that because of these omissions,
COMELEC canvassed all the votes cast for the senatorial
candidates in the 14 May 2001 elections without
distinction such that "there were no two separate Senate
elections held simultaneously but just a single election for
thirteen seats, irrespective of term."7
Stated otherwise, petitioners claim that if held
simultaneously, a special and a regular election must be
distinguished in the documentation as well as in the
canvassing of their results. To support their claim,
petitioners cite the special elections simultaneously held
with the regular elections of 13 November 1951 and 8
November 1955 to fill the seats vacated by Senators
Fernando Lopez and Carlos P. Garcia, respectively, who
became Vice-Presidents during their tenures in the
Senate.8 Petitioners point out that in those elections,
COMELEC separately canvassed the votes cast for the
senatorial candidates running under the regular elections
from the votes cast for the candidates running under the
special elections. COMELEC also separately proclaimed the
winners in each of those elections.9
Petitioners sought the issuance of a temporary restraining
order during the pendency of their petition.
Without issuing any restraining order, we required
COMELEC to Comment on the petition.
On 20 July 2001, after COMELEC had canvassed the
results from all the provinces, it issued Resolution No. 01006 declaring "official and final" the ranking of the 13
Senators proclaimed in Resolution No. 01-005. The 13
Senators took their oaths of office on 23 July 2001.
In view of the issuance of Resolution No. 01-006, the
Court required petitioners to file an amended petition
impleading Recto and Honasan as additional respondents.

Petitioners accordingly filed an amended petition in which

they reiterated the contentions raised in their original
petition and, in addition, sought the nullification of
Resolution No. 01-006.
In their Comments, COMELEC, Honasan, and Recto all
claim that a special election to fill the seat vacated by
Senator Guingona was validly held on 14 May 2001.
COMELEC and Honasan further raise preliminary issues on
the mootness of the petition and on petitioners standing
to litigate. Honasan also claims that the petition, which
seeks the nullity of his proclamation as Senator, is actually
a quo warranto petition and the Court should dismiss the
same for lack of jurisdiction. For his part, Recto, as the
12th ranking Senator, contends he is not a proper party to
this case because the petition only involves the validity of
the proclamation of the 13th placer in the 14 May 2001
senatorial elections.
The Issues

declaring anyone as having won in the special election;

and (3) to annul Resolution Nos. 01-005 and 01-006 in so
far as these Resolutions proclaim Honasan as the winner
in the special election. Petitioners anchor their prayers on
COMELECs alleged failure to comply with certain
requirements pertaining to the conduct of that special
election. Clearly then, the petition does not seek to
determine Honasans right in the exercise of his office as
Senator. Petitioners prayer for the annulment of
Honasans proclamation and, ultimately, election is merely
incidental to petitioners cause of action. Consequently,
the Court can properly exercise jurisdiction over the
instant petition.
On the Mootness of the Petition
COMELEC contends that its proclamation on 5 June 2001
of the 13 Senators and its subsequent confirmation on 20
July 2001 of the ranking of the 13 Senators render the
instant petition to set aside Resolutions Nos. 01-005 and
01-006 moot and academic.

The following are the issues presented for resolution:

(1) Procedurally
(a) whether the petition is in fact a
petition for quo warranto over which the
Senate Electoral Tribunal is the sole judge;
(b) whether the petition is moot; and
(c) whether petitioners have standing to
litigate.
(2) On the merits, whether a special election to fill
a vacant three-year term Senate seat was validly
held on 14 May 2001.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
On the Preliminary Matters
The Nature of the Petition and the Courts Jurisdiction
A quo warranto proceeding is, among others, one to
determine the right of a public officer in the exercise of his
office and to oust him from its enjoyment if his claim is
not well-founded.10 Under Section 17, Article VI of the
Constitution, the Senate Electoral Tribunal is the sole
judge of all contests relating to the qualifications of the
members of the Senate.
A perusal of the allegations contained in the instant
petition shows, however, that what petitioners are
questioning is the validity of the special election on 14
May 2001 in which Honasan was elected. Petitioners
various prayers are, namely: (1) a "declaration" that no
special election was held simultaneously with the general
elections on 14 May 2001; (2) to enjoin COMELEC from

Admittedly, the office of the writ of prohibition is to

command a tribunal or board to desist from committing an
act threatened to be done without jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.11 Consequently, the writ will not lie to enjoin
acts already done.12 However, as an exception to the rule
on mootness, courts will decide a question otherwise moot
if it is capable of repetition yet evading review.13 Thus, in
Alunan III v. Mirasol,14 we took cognizance of a petition to
set aside an order canceling the general elections for the
Sangguniang Kabataan ("SK") on 4 December 1992
despite that at the time the petition was filed, the SK
election had already taken place. We noted in Alunan that
since the question of the validity of the order sought to be
annulled "is likely to arise in every SK elections and yet
the question may not be decided before the date of such
elections," the mootness of the petition is no bar to its
resolution. This observation squarely applies to the instant
case. The question of the validity of a special election to
fill a vacancy in the Senate in relation to COMELECs
failure to comply with requirements on the conduct of
such special election is likely to arise in every such
election. Such question, however, may not be decided
before the date of the election.
On Petitioners Standing
Honasan questions petitioners standing to bring the
instant petition as taxpayers and voters because
petitioners do not claim that COMELEC illegally disbursed
public funds. Neither do petitioners claim that they
sustained personal injury because of the issuance of
Resolution Nos. 01-005 and 01-006.
"Legal standing" or locus standi refers to a personal and
substantial interest in a case such that the party has
sustained or will sustain direct injury because of the
challenged governmental act.15 The requirement of
standing, which necessarily "sharpens the presentation of
issues,"16 relates to the constitutional mandate that this

Court settle only actual cases or controversies. 17 Thus,

generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when (1)
he can show that he has personally suffered some actual
or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal
conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly
traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is
likely to be redressed by a favorable action.18
Applied strictly, the doctrine of standing to litigate will
indeed bar the instant petition. In questioning, in their
capacity as voters, the validity of the special election on
14 May 2001, petitioners assert a harm classified as a
"generalized grievance." This generalized grievance is
shared in substantially equal measure by a large class of
voters, if not all the voters, who voted in that
election.19 Neither have petitioners alleged, in their
capacity as taxpayers, that the Court should give due
course to the petition because in the special election held
on 14 May 2001 "tax money [was] x x x extracted and
spent in violation of specific constitutional protections
against abuses of legislative power or that there [was]
misapplication of such funds by COMELEC or that public
money [was] deflected to any improper purpose."20
On the other hand, we have relaxed the requirement on
standing and exercised our discretion to give due course
to voters suits involving the right of suffrage. 21 Also, in
the recent case of Integrated Bar of the Philippines v.
Zamora,22 we gave the same liberal treatment to a
petition filed by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
("IBP"). The IBP questioned the validity of a Presidential
directive deploying elements of the Philippine National
Police and the Philippine Marines in Metro Manila to
conduct patrols even though the IBP presented "too
general an interest." We held:
[T]he IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged
responsibility to uphold the rule of law and the
Constitution. Apart from this declaration, however, the IBP
asserts no other basis in support of its locus standi. The
mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule
of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not
sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case. This is too
general an interest which is shared by other groups and
the whole citizenry x x x.
Having stated the foregoing, this Court has the discretion
to take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the
requirement of legal standing when paramount interest is
involved. In not a few cases, the court has adopted a
liberal attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner where
the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental
significance to the people. Thus, when the issues raised
are of paramount importance to the public, the Court may
brush aside technicalities of procedure. In this case, a
reading of the petition shows that the IBP has advanced
constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this
Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as
precedents. Moreover, because peace and order are under
constant threat and lawless violence occurs in increasing
tempo, undoubtedly aggravated by the Mindanao
insurgency problem, the legal controversy raised in the

petition almost certainly will not go away. It will stare us

in the face again. It, therefore, behooves the Court to
relax the rules on standing and to resolve the issue now,
rather than later.23 (Emphasis supplied)
We accord the same treatment to petitioners in the instant
case in their capacity as voters since they raise important
issues involving their right of suffrage, considering that
the issue raised in this petition is likely to arise again.
Whether a Special Election for a Single, Three-Year Term
Senatorial Seat was Validly Held on 14 May 2001
Under Section 9, Article VI of the Constitution, a special
election may be called to fill any vacancy in the Senate
and the House of Representatives "in the manner
prescribed by law," thus:
In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of
Representatives, a special election may be called to fill
such vacancy in the manner prescribed by law, but the
Senator or Member of the House of Representatives thus
elected shall serve only for the unexpired term. (Emphasis
supplied)
To implement this provision of the Constitution, Congress
passed R.A. No. 6645, which provides in pertinent parts:
SECTION 1. In case a vacancy arises in the Senate at
least eighteen (18) months or in the House of
Representatives at least one (1) year before the next
regular election for Members of Congress, the Commission
on Elections, upon receipt of a resolution of the Senate or
the House of Representatives, as the case may be,
certifying to the existence of such vacancy and calling for
a special election, shall hold a special election to fill such
vacancy. If Congress is in recess, an official
communication on the existence of the vacancy and call
for a special election by the President of the Senate or by
the Speaker of the House of Representatives, as the case
may be, shall be sufficient for such purpose. The Senator
or Member of the House of Representatives thus elected
shall serve only for the unexpired term.
SECTION 2. The Commission on Elections shall fix the
date of the special election, which shall not be earlier than
forty-five (45) days nor later than ninety (90) days from
the date of such resolution or communication, stating
among other things the office or offices to be voted for:
Provided, however, That if within the said period a general
election is scheduled to be held, the special election shall
be held simultaneously with such general election.
(Emphasis supplied)
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7166 subsequently amended
Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as follows:
Postponement, Failure of Election and Special Elections.
x x x In case a permanent vacancy shall occur in the
Senate or House of Representatives at least one (1) year
before the expiration of the term, the Commission shall
call and hold a special election to fill the vacancy not

earlier than sixty (60) days nor longer than ninety (90)
days after the occurrence of the vacancy. However, in case
of such vacancy in the Senate, the special election shall be
held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular
election. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, in case a vacancy arises in Congress at least one
year before the expiration of the term, Section 2 of R.A.
No. 6645, as amended, requires COMELEC: (1) to call a
special election by fixing the date of the special election,
which shall not be earlier than sixty (60) days nor later
than ninety (90) after the occurrence of the vacancy but
in case of a vacancy in the Senate, the special election
shall be held simultaneously with the next succeeding
regular election; and (2) to give notice to the voters of,
among other things, the office or offices to be voted for.
Did COMELEC, in conducting the special senatorial election
simultaneously with the 14 May 2001 regular elections,
comply with the requirements in Section 2 of R.A. No.
6645?
A survey of COMELECs resolutions relating to the conduct
of the 14 May 2001 elections reveals that they contain
nothing which would amount to a compliance, either strict
or substantial, with the requirements in Section 2 of R.A.
No. 6645, as amended. Thus, nowhere in its
resolutions24 or even in its press releases25 did COMELEC
state that it would hold a special election for a single
three-year term Senate seat simultaneously with the
regular elections on 14 May 2001. Nor did COMELEC give
formal notice that it would proclaim as winner the
senatorial candidate receiving the 13th highest number of
votes in the special election.
The controversy thus turns on whether COMELECs failure,
assuming it did fail, to comply with the requirements in
Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended, invalidated the
conduct of the special senatorial election on 14 May 2001
and accordingly rendered Honasans proclamation as the
winner in that special election void. More precisely, the
question is whether the special election is invalid for lack
of a "call" for such election and for lack of notice as to the
office to be filled and the manner by which the winner in
the special election is to be determined. For reasons
stated below, the Court answers in the negative.
COMELECs Failure to Give Notice
of the Time of the Special Election Did Not
Negate the Calling of such Election
The calling of an election, that is, the giving notice of the
time and place of its occurrence, whether made by the
legislature directly or by the body with the duty to give
such call, is indispensable to the elections validity.26 In a
general election, where the law fixes the date of the
election, the election is valid without any call by the body
charged to administer the election.27
In a special election to fill a vacancy, the rule is that a
statute that expressly provides that an election to fill a
vacancy shall be held at the next general elections fixes

the date at which the special election is to be held and

operates as the call for that election. Consequently, an
election held at the time thus prescribed is not invalidated
by the fact that the body charged by law with the duty of
calling the election failed to do so.28 This is because the
right and duty to hold the election emanate from the
statute and not from any call for the election by some
authority29 and the law thus charges voters with
knowledge of the time and place of the election.30
Conversely, where the law does not fix the time and place
for holding a special election but empowers some
authority to fix the time and place after the happening of
a condition precedent, the statutory provision on the
giving of notice is considered mandatory, and failure to do
so will render the election a nullity.31
In the instant case, Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645 itself
provides that in case of vacancy in the Senate, the special
election to fill such vacancy shall be held simultaneously
with the next succeeding regular election. Accordingly, the
special election to fill the vacancy in the Senate arising
from Senator Guingonas appointment as Vice-President in
February 2001 could not be held at any other time but
must be held simultaneously with the next succeeding
regular elections on 14 May 2001. The law charges the
voters with knowledge of this statutory notice and
COMELECs failure to give the additional notice did not
negate the calling of such special election, much less
invalidate it.
Our conclusion might be different had the present case
involved a special election to fill a vacancy in the House of
Representatives. In such a case, the holding of the special
election is subject to a condition precedent, that is, the
vacancy should take place at least one year before the
expiration of the term. The time of the election is left to
the discretion of COMELEC subject only to the limitation
that it holds the special election within the range of time
provided in Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended. This
makes mandatory the requirement in Section 2 of R.A.
No. 6645, as amended, for COMELEC to "call x x x a
special election x x x not earlier than 60 days nor longer
than 90 days after the occurrence of the vacancy" and
give notice of the office to be filled. The COMELECs failure
to so call and give notice will nullify any attempt to hold a
special election to fill the vacancy. Indeed, it will be wellnigh impossible for the voters in the congressional district
involved to know the time and place of the special election
and the office to be filled unless the COMELEC so notifies
them.
No Proof that COMELECs
Failure to Give Notice of the Office
to be Filled and the Manner of
Determining the Winner in the Special
Election Misled Voters
The test in determining the validity of a special election in
relation to the failure to give notice of the special election
is whether the want of notice has resulted in misleading a

sufficient number of voters as would change the result of

the special election. If the lack of official notice misled a
substantial number of voters who wrongly believed that
there was no special election to fill a vacancy, a choice by
a small percentage of voters would be void.32
The required notice to the voters in the 14 May 2001
special senatorial election covers two matters. First, that
COMELEC will hold a special election to fill a vacant single
three-year term Senate seat simultaneously with the
regular elections scheduled on the same date. Second,
that COMELEC will proclaim as winner the senatorial
candidate receiving the 13th highest number of votes in
the special election. Petitioners have neither claimed nor
proved that COMELECs failure to give this required notice
misled a sufficient number of voters as would change the
result of the special senatorial election or led them to
believe that there was no such special election.
Instead, what petitioners did is conclude that since
COMELEC failed to give such notice, no special election
took place. This bare assertion carries no value. Section 2
of R.A. No. 6645, as amended, charged those who voted
in the elections of 14 May 2001 with the knowledge that
the vacancy in the Senate arising from Senator
Guingonas appointment as Vice-President in February
2001 was to be filled in the next succeeding regular
election of 14 May 2001. Similarly, the absence of formal
notice from COMELEC does not preclude the possibility
that the voters had actual notice of the special election,
the office to be voted in that election, and the manner by
which COMELEC would determine the winner. Such actual
notice could come from many sources, such as media
reports of the enactment of R.A. No. 6645 and election
propaganda during the campaign.33
More than 10 million voters cast their votes in favor of
Honasan, the party who stands most prejudiced by the
instant petition. We simply cannot disenfranchise those
who voted for Honasan, in the absence of proof that
COMELECs omission prejudiced voters in the exercise of
their right of suffrage so as to negate the holding of the
special election. Indeed, this Court is loathe to annul
elections and will only do so when it is "impossible to
distinguish what votes are lawful and what are unlawful,
or to arrive at any certain result whatever, or that the
great body of the voters have been prevented by violence,
intimidation, and threats from exercising their franchise." 34
Otherwise, the consistent rule has been to respect the
electorates will and let the results of the election stand,
despite irregularities that may have attended the conduct
of the elections.35 This is but to acknowledge the purpose
and role of elections in a democratic society such as ours,
which is:
to give the voters a direct participation in the affairs of
their government, either in determining who shall be their
public officials or in deciding some question of public
interest; and for that purpose all of the legal voters should
be permitted, unhampered and unmolested, to cast their
ballot. When that is done and no frauds have been

committed, the ballots should be counted and the election

should not be declared null. Innocent voters should not be
deprived of their participation in the affairs of their
government for mere irregularities on the part of the
election officers, for which they are in no way responsible.
A different rule would make the manner and method of
performing a public duty of greater importance than the
duty itself.36 (Emphasis in the original)
Separate Documentation and Canvassing
not Required under Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645,
Neither is there basis in petitioners claim that the manner
by which COMELEC conducted the special senatorial
election on 14 May 2001 is a nullity because COMELEC
failed to document separately the candidates and to
canvass separately the votes cast for the special election.
No such requirements exist in our election laws. What is
mandatory under Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645 is that
COMELEC "fix the date of the election," if necessary, and
"state, among others, the office or offices to be voted for."
Similarly, petitioners reliance on Section 73 of B.P. Blg.
881 on the filing of certificates of candidacy, and on
Section 4(4) of R.A. No. 6646 on the printing of election
returns and tally sheets, to support their claim is
misplaced. These provisions govern elections in general
and in no way require separate documentation of
candidates or separate canvass of votes in a jointly held
regular and special elections.
Significantly, the method adopted by COMELEC in
conducting the special election on 14 May 2001 merely
implemented the procedure specified by the Senate in
Resolution No. 84. Initially, the original draft of Resolution
No. 84 as introduced by Senator Francisco Tatad ("Senator
Tatad") made no mention of the manner by which the seat
vacated by former Senator Guingona would be filled.
However, upon the suggestion of Senator Raul Roco
("Senator Roco"), the Senate agreed to amend Resolution
No. 84 by providing, as it now appears, that "the
senatorial candidate garnering the thirteenth (13th)
highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired
term of former Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr." Senator
Roco introduced the amendment to spare COMELEC and
the candidates needless expenditures and the voters
further inconvenience, thus:
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Mr. President, I move that we now
consider Proposed Senate Resolution No. 934 [later
converted to Resolution No. 84].
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Is there any objection? [Silence]
There being none, the motion is approved.
Consideration of Proposed Senate Resolution No. 934 is
now in order. With the permission of the Body, the
Secretary will read only the title and text of the resolution.
T[HE] S[ECRETARY]. Proposed Senate Resolution No. 934
entitled

RESOLUTION CERTIFYING TO THE EXISTENCE OF A

VACANCY IN THE SENATE AND CALLING ON THE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC) TO FILL UP
SUCH VACANCY THROUGH ELECTION TO BE HELD
SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE REGULAR ELECTION ON MAY
14, 2001 AND THE SENATOR THUS ELECTED TO SERVE
ONLY FOR THE UNEXPIRED TERM
WHEREAS, the Honorable Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. was
elected Senator of the Philippines in 1998 for a term which
will expire on June 30, 2004;
WHEREAS, on February 6, 2001, Her Excellency President
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo nominated Senator Guingona as
Vice-President of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, the nomination of Senator Guingona has been
confirmed by a majority vote of all the members of both
House of Congress, voting separately;

Mr. President, I think I recall that sometime in 1951 or

1953, there was a special election for a vacant seat in the
Senate. As a matter of fact, the one who was elected in
that special election was then Congressman, later Senator
Feli[s]berto Verano.
In that election, Mr. President, the candidates contested
the seat. In other words, the electorate had to cast a vote
for a ninth senator because at that time there were only
eight to elect a member or rather, a candidate to that
particular seat.
Then I remember, Mr. President, that when we ran after
the EDSA revolution, twice there were 24 candidates and
the first 12 were elected to a six-year term and the next
12 were elected to a three-year term.

WHEREAS, Senator Guingona will take his Oath of Office

as Vice-President of the Philippines on February 9, 2001;

My question therefore is, how is this going to be done in

this election? Is the candidate with the 13th largest
number of votes going to be the one to take a three-year
term? Or is there going to be an election for a position of
senator for the unexpired term of Sen. Teofisto Guingona?

WHEREAS, Republic Act No. 7166 provides that the

election for twelve (12) Senators, all elective Members of
the House of Representatives, and all elective provincial
city and municipal officials shall be held on the second
Monday and every three years thereafter; Now, therefore,
be it

S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Mr. President, in this resolution, we

are leaving the mechanics to the Commission on Elections.
But personally, I would like to suggest that probably, the
candidate obtaining the 13th largest number of votes be
declared as elected to fill up the unexpired term of
Senator Guingona.

RESOLVED by the Senate, as it is hereby resolved, to

certify, as it hereby certifies, the existence of a vacancy in
the Senate and calling the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) to fill up such vacancy through election to be
held simultaneously with the regular election on May 14,
2001 and the Senator thus elected to serve only for the
unexpired term.

S[ENATOR] O[SMEA] (J). Is there a law that would allow

the Comelec to conduct such an election? Is it not the
case that the vacancy is for a specific office? I am really at
a loss. I am rising here because I think it is something
that we should consider. I do not know if we can No, this
is not a Concurrent Resolution.

Adopted,
(Sgd.) FRANCISCO S. TATAD
Senator
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Mr. President, I move for the
adoption of this resolution.
S[ENATOR] O[SMEA] (J). Mr. President.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Sen. John H. Osmea is recognized.
S[ENATOR] O[SMEA] (J). Thank you, Mr. President. Will
the distinguished Majority Leader, Chairman of the
Committee on Rules, author of this resolution, yield for a
few questions?

S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. May we solicit the legal wisdom of

the Senate President.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. May I share this information that
under Republic Act No. 6645, what is needed is a
resolution of this Chamber calling attention to the need for
the holding of a special election to fill up the vacancy
created, in this particular case, by the appointment of our
colleague, Senator Guingona, as Vice President.
It can be managed in the Commission on Elections so that
a slot for the particular candidate to fill up would be that
reserved for Mr. Guingonas unexpired term. In other
words, it can be arranged in such a manner.
xxxx
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. Mr. President.

S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. With trepidation, Mr. President.

[Laughter]

T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Sen. Raul S. Roco is recognized.

S[ENATOR] O[SMEA] (J). What a way of flattery.

[Laughter]

S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. May we suggest, subject to a oneminute caucus, wordings to the effect that in the
simultaneous elections, the 13th placer be therefore

deemed to be the special election for this purpose. So we

just nominate 13 and it is good for our colleagues. It is
better for the candidates. It is also less expensive because
the ballot will be printed and there will be less
disfranchisement.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. That is right.
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. If we can just deem it therefore
under this resolution to be such a special election, maybe,
we satisfy the requirement of the law.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Yes. In other words, this shall be a
guidance for the Comelec.
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. Yes.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. to implement.
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. Yes. The Comelec will not have the
flexibility.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. That is right.
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. We will already consider the 13th
placer of the forthcoming elections that will be held
simultaneously as a special election under this law as we
understand it.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Yes. That will be a good compromise,
Senator Roco.
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. Yes. So if the sponsor can introduce
that later, maybe it will be better, Mr. President.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. What does the sponsor say?
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Mr. President, that is a most
satisfactory proposal because I do not believe that there
will be anyone running specifically
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Correct.
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. to fill up this position for three
years and campaigning nationwide.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Actually, I think what is going to
happen is the 13th candidate will be running with specific
groups.
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Yes. Whoever gets No. 13.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. I think we can specifically define that
as the intent of this resolution.
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Subject to style, we accept that
amendment and if there will be no other amendment, I
move for the adoption of this resolution.

ADOPTION OF S. RES. NO. 934

If there are no other proposed amendments, I move that
we adopt this resolution.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. There is a motion to adopt this
resolution. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being
none, the motion is approved.37
Evidently, COMELEC, in the exercise of its discretion to use
means and methods to conduct the special election within
the confines of R.A. No. 6645, merely chose to adopt the
Senates proposal, as embodied in Resolution No. 84. This
Court has consistently acknowledged and affirmed
COMELECs wide latitude of discretion in adopting means
to carry out its mandate of ensuring free, orderly, and
honest elections subject only to the limitation that the
means so adopted are not illegal or do not constitute
grave abuse of discretion.38 COMELECs decision to
abandon the means it employed in the 13 November 1951
and 8 November 1955 special elections and adopt the
method embodied in Resolution No. 84 is but a legitimate
exercise of its discretion. Conversely, this Court will not
interfere should COMELEC, in subsequent special
senatorial elections, choose to revert to the means it
followed in the 13 November 1951 and 8 November 1955
elections. That COMELEC adopts means that are novel or
even disagreeable is no reason to adjudge it liable for
grave abuse of discretion. As we have earlier noted:
The Commission on Elections is a constitutional body. It is
intended to play a distinct and important part in our
scheme of government.1wphi1 In the discharge of its
functions, it should not be hampered with restrictions that
would be fully warranted in the case of a less responsible
organization. The Commission may err, so may this Court
also. It should be allowed considerable latitude in devising
means and methods that will insure the accomplishment
of the great objective for which it was created free,
orderly and honest elections. We may not agree fully with
its choice of means, but unless these are clearly illegal or
constitute gross abuse of discretion, this court should not
interfere.39
A Word to COMELEC
The calling of a special election, if necessary, and the
giving of notice to the electorate of necessary information
regarding a special election, are central to an informed
exercise of the right of suffrage. While the circumstances
attendant to the present case have led us to conclude that
COMELECs failure to so call and give notice did not
invalidate the special senatorial election held on 14 May
2001, COMELEC should not take chances in future
elections. We remind COMELEC to comply strictly with all
the requirements under applicable laws relative to the
conduct of regular elections in general and special
elections in particular.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.

xxxx

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 158466

June 15, 2004

PABLO V. OCAMPO, petitioner,

vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL AND MARIO B. CRESPO a.k.a. MARK
JIMENEZ,respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
The wreath of victory cannot be transferred from the
disqualified winner to the repudiated loser because the
law then as now only authorizes a declaration of election
in favor of the person who obtained a plurality of votes
and does not entitle a candidate receiving the next highest
number of votes to be declared elected.1
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, filed by petitioner
Pablo V. Ocampo. He alleged that the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), herein public
respondent, committed grave abuse of discretion in
issuing in HRET Case No. 01-024, Pablo Ocampo vs. Mario
"Mark Jimenez" Crespo, the (a) Resolution2 dated March
27, 2003 holding that "protestant" (herein petitioner)
cannot be proclaimed the duly elected Representative of
the 6th District of Manila since being a second placer, he
"cannot be proclaimed the first among the remaining
qualified candidates"; and (b) Resolution3 dated June 2,
2003 denying his motion for reconsideration.
The facts are uncontroverted:
On May 23, 2001, the Manila City Board of
Canvassers proclaimed private respondent Mario
B. Crespo, a.k.a. Mark Jimenez, the duly elected
Congressman of the 6th District of Manila
pursuant to the May 14, 2001 elections. He was
credited with 32,097 votes or a margin of 768
votes over petitioner who obtained 31,329 votes.
On May 31, 2001, petitioner filed with the HRET
an electoral protest4 against private respondent,
impugning the election in 807 precincts in the 6th District
of Manila on the following grounds: (1) misreading of
votes garnered by petitioner; (2) falsification of election
returns; (3) substitution of election returns; (4) use of
marked, spurious, fake and stray ballots;
and (5) presence of ballots written by one person or two
persons. The case was docketed asHRET Case No. 01024. Petitioner prayed that a revision and appreciation of
the ballots in the 807 contested precincts be conducted;
and that, thereafter, he be proclaimed the duly elected
Congressman of the 6th District of Manila.
On June 18, 2001, private respondent filed his answer
with counter-protest5 vehemently denying that he

engaged in massive vote buying. He also opposed

petitioners allegation that there is a need for the revision
and appreciation of ballots.
After the preliminary conference between the parties on
July 12, 2001, the HRET issued a Resolution6 limiting the
issues to: first, whether massive vote-buying was
committed by private respondent; and second, whether
petitioner can be proclaimed the duly elected
Representative of the 6th District of Manila.
Meanwhile, on March 6, 2003, the HRET, in HRET Cases
Nos. 01-020, Bienvenido Abante & Prudencio Jalandoni
vs. Mario Crespo, and 01-023, Rosenda Ann M. Ocampo
vs. Mario Crespo, issued Resolutions declaring that private
respondent is "ineligible for the Office of
Representative of Sixth District of Manila for lack of
residence in the district" and ordering "him to vacate
his office."7 Private respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration but was denied.8
On March 12, 2003, petitioner filed a motion to implement
Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646,9 which reads:
"Section 6. Effects of Disqualification
Case. Any candidate who has been declared
by final judgment to be disqualified shall not
be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall
not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is
not declared by final judgment before an election
to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives
the winning number of votes in such election, the
Court or Commission shall continue with the trial
and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and,
upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor,
may during the pendency thereof, order the
suspension of the proclamation of such candidate
whenever the evidence of guilt is strong."
Petitioner averred that since private respondent was
declared disqualified in HRET Cases Nos. 01-020 and
01-023, the votes cast for him should not be counted. And
having garnered the second highest number of votes, he
(petitioner) should be declared the winner in the May 14,
2001 elections and proclaimed the duly elected
Congressman of the 6th District of Manila.
On March 26, 2003, private respondent filed an opposition
to petitioners motion to implement the afore-quoted
provision.
On March 27, 2003, the HRET issued a Resolution holding
that private respondent was guilty of vote-buying and
disqualifying him as Congressman of the 6th District of
Manila. Anent the second issue of whether petitioner can
be proclaimed the duly elected Congressman, the HRET
held:
"x x x Jurisprudence has long established the
doctrine that a second placer cannot be
proclaimed the first among the remaining
qualified candidates. The fact that the

candidate who obtained the highest number

of votes is later declared to be disqualified or
not eligible for the office to which he was
elected does not necessarily give the
candidate who obtained the second highest
number of votes the right to be declared the
winner of the elective office. x x x

In view of the conclusion herein reached, it

is unnecessary to rule on the recount and
revision of ballots in the protested and
counter-protested precincts.
WHEREFORE, the Tribunal Resolved to:
xxxxxx

It is of no moment that there is only a margin of

768 votes between protestant and protestee.
Whether the margin is ten or ten thousand, it still
remains that protestant did not receive the
mandate of the majority during the elections.
Thus, to proclaim him as the duly elected
representative in the stead of protestee would be
anathema to the most basic precepts of
republicanism and democracy as enshrined within
our Constitution. In effect, we would be
advocating a massive disenfranchisement of the
majority of the voters of the sixth district of
Manila.
Congressional elections are different from local
government elections. In local government
elections, when the winning candidate for
governor or mayor is subsequently disqualified,
the vice-governor or the vice-mayor, as the case
may be, succeeds to the position by virtue of the
Local Government Code. It is different in elections
for representative. When a voter chooses his
congressional candidate, he chooses only one. If
his choice is concurred in by the majority of
voters, that candidate is declared the winner.
Voters are not afforded the opportunity of electing
a substitute congressman in the eventuality that
their first choice dies, resigns, is disqualified, or in
any other way leaves the post vacant. There can
only be one representative for that particular
legislative district. There are no runners-up or
second placers. Thus, when the person vested
with the mandate of the majority is disqualified
from holding the post he was elected to, the only
recourse to ascertain the new choice of the
electorate is to hold another election. x x x
This does not mean that the Sixth Legislative
District of Manila will be without adequate
representation in Congress. Article VI, Section 9 of
the Constitution, and Republic Act No. 6645 allows
Congress to call a special election to fill up this
vacancy. There are at least 13 months until the
next congressional elections, which is more than
sufficient time within which to hold a special
election to enable the electorate of the Sixth
District of Manila to elect their representative.
For this reason, the Tribunal holds
that protestant cannot be proclaimed as the
duly elected representative of the Sixth
legislative District of Manila.

2) DENY protestants (petitioner) Motion

to Implement Section 6, Republic Act No.
6646 by declaring the votes cast for Mario
Crespo as stray votes."
Petitioner filed a partial motion for reconsideration but was
denied. Hence, the present petition for certiorari.
Petitioner contends that the HRET committed grave abuse
of discretion when it ruled that "it is unnecessary to
rule on the recount and revision of ballots in the
protested and counter-protested precincts." He
maintains that it is the ministerial duty of the HRET to
implement the provisions of Section 6, R.A. No. 6646
specifically providing that "any candidate who has been
declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall
not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not
be counted."
In his comment, private respondent counters that what
the law requires is that the disqualification by final
judgment takes place before the election. Here, the
HRET Resolutions disqualifying him as Representative of
the 6th District of Manila were rendered long after the
May 14, 2001 elections. He also claims that the
Resolutions are not yet final and executory because they
are the subjects of certiorari proceedings before this
Court. Hence, all his votes shall be counted and none shall
be considered stray.
The HRET, in its comment, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, merely reiterates its ruling.
The petition must be dismissed.
The issues here are: (1) whether the votes cast in favor of
private respondent should not be counted pursuant to
Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646; and (2) whether petitioner, a
second placer in the May 14, 2001 congressional
elections, can be proclaimed the duly elected
Congressman of the 6th District of Manila.
The issues raised are not novel. In Codilla, Sr. vs. De
Venecia,10 we expounded on the application of Section 6,
R.A. No. 6646. There, we emphasized that there must be
a final judgment before the election in order that the
votes of a disqualified candidate can be considered
"stray", thus:
"Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 and section 72 of the
Omnibus Election Code require a final judgment
before the election for the votes of a disqualified

candidate to be considered "stray." Hence, when a

candidate has not yet been disqualified by final
judgment during the election day and was voted
for, the votes cast in his favor cannot be declared
stray. To do so would amount to disenfranchising
the electorate in whom sovereignty resides."
The obvious rationale behind the foregoing ruling is that in
voting for a candidate who has not been disqualified by
final judgment during the election day, the people voted
for him bona fide, without any intention to misapply
their franchise, and in the honest belief that the
candidate was then qualified to be the person to
whom they would entrust the exercise of the
powers of government.11
In the present case, private respondent was declared
disqualified almost twenty-two (22) months after the May
14, 2001 elections. Obviously, the requirement of "final
judgment before election" is absent. Therefore,
petitioner can not invoke Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646.
Anent the second issue, we revert back to the settled
jurisprudence that the subsequent disqualification of a
candidate who obtained the highest number of votes does
not entitle the candidate who garnered the second highest
number of votes to be declared the winner.12 This principle
has been reiterated in a number our decisions, such
as Labo, Jr. vs. COMELEC,13 Abella vs. COMELEC,14 Benito
vs. COMELEC15 and Domino vs. COMELEC.16 As a matter of
fact, even as early as 1912, it was held that the candidate
who lost in an election cannot be proclaimed the winner in
the event that the candidate who won is found to be
ineligible for the office for which he was elected. 17
In Geronimo vs. Ramos,18 if the winning candidate is not
qualified and cannot qualify for the office to which he was
elected, a permanent vacancy is thus created. The second
placer is just that, a second placer he lost in the
elections, he was repudiated by either the majority or
plurality of voters. He could not be proclaimed winner as
he could not be considered the first among the qualified
candidates. To rule otherwise is to misconstrue the nature
of the democratic electroral process and the sociological
and psychological underpinnings behind voters
preferences.19
At any rate, the petition has become moot and academic.
The Twelfth Congress formally adjourned on June 11,
2004. And on May 17, 2004, the City Board of Canvassers
proclaimed Bienvenido Abante the duly elected
Congressman of the Sixth District of Manila pursuant to
the May 10, 2004 elections.
In the recent case of Enrile vs. Senate Electoral
Tribunal,20 we ruled that a case becomes moot and
academic when there is no more actual controversy
between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in
passing upon the merits. Worth reiterating is our
pronouncement in Gancho-on vs. Secretary of Labor and
Employment, thus:21

"It is a rule of universal application, almost, that

courts of justice constituted to pass upon
substantial rights will not consider questions in
which no actual interests are involved; they
decline jurisdiction of moot cases. And where the
issue has become moot and academic, there is no
justiciable controversy, so that a declaration
thereon would be of no practical use or value.
There is no actual substantial relief to which
petitioner would be entitled and which would be
negated by the dismissal of the petition."
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 132875-76

February 3, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ROMEO G. JALOSJOS, accused-appellant.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The accused-appellant, Romeo F. Jaloslos is a full-pledged
member of Congress who is now confined at the national
penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two
counts and acts of lasciviousness on six counts 1is pending
appeal. The accused-appellant filed this motion asking
that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a
Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions
and committee meetings despite his having been
convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense.
The issue raised is one of the first impression.
Does membership in Congress exempt an accused from
statutes and rules which apply to validly incarcerated
persons in general? In answering the query, we are called
upon to balance relevant and conflicting factors in the
judicial interpretation of legislative privilege in the context
of penal law.
The accused-appellant's "Motion To Be Allowed To
Discharge Mandate As Member of House of
Representatives" was filed on the grounds that
1. Accused-appellant's reelection being an
expression of popular will cannot be rendered
inutile by any ruling, giving priority to any right or
interest not even the police power of the State.
2. To deprive the electorate of their elected
representative amounts to taxation without
representation.
3. To bar accused-appellant from performing his
duties amounts to his suspension/removal and

10

mocks the renewed mandates entrusted to him by

the people.
4. The electorate of the First District of
Zamboanga del Norte wants their voice to be
heard.
5. A precedent-setting U.S. ruling allowed a
detained lawmaker to attend sessions of the U.S.
Congress.
6. The House treats accused-appellant as a bona
fide member thereof and urges a co-equal branch
of government to respect its mandate.
7. The concept of temporary detention does not
necessarily curtail the duty of accused-appellant
to discharge his mandate.
8. Accused-appellant has always complied with the
conditions/restrictions when allowed to leave jail.
The primary argument of the movant is the "mandate of
sovereign will." He states that the sovereign electorate of
the First District of Zamboanga del Norte chose him as
their representative in Congress. Having been re-elected
by his constituents, he has the duty to perform the
functions of a Congressman. He calls this a covenant with
his constituents made possible by the intervention of the
State. He adds that it cannot be defeated by insuperable
procedural restraints arising from pending criminal cases.
True, election is the expression of the sovereign power of
the people. In the exercise of suffrage, a free people
expects to achieve the continuity of government and the
perpetuation of its benefits. However, inspite of its
importance, the privileges and rights arising from having
been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law. Our
first task is to ascertain the applicable law.
We start with the incontestable proposition that all top
officials of Government-executive, legislative, and judicial
are subject to the majesty of law. There is an unfortunate
misimpression in the public mind that election or
appointment to high government office, by itself, frees the
official from the common restraints of general law.
Privilege has to be granted by law, not inferred from the
duties of a position. In fact, the higher the rank, the
greater is the requirement of obedience rather than
exemption.
The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and
members of the House of Representatives, the latter
customarily addressed as Congressmen, arises from a
provision of the Constitution. The history of the provision
shows that privilege has always been granted in a
restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as
a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the
ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by
intendment, implication or equitable considerations.

The 1935 Constitution provided in its Article VI on the

Legislative Department.
Sec 15. The Senators and Members of the House
of Representatives shall in all cases except
treason, felony, and breach of the peace be
privileged from arrest during their attendance at
the sessions of Congress, and in going to and
returning from the same, . . .
Because of the broad coverage of felony and breach of the
peace, the exemption applied only to civil arrests. A
congressman like the accused-appellant, convicted under
Title Eleven of the Revised Penal Code could not claim
parliamentary immunity from arrest. He was subject to
the same general laws governing all persons still to be
tried or whose convictions were pending appeal.
The 1973 Constitution broadened the privilege of
immunity as follows:
Art. VIII, Sec. 9. A Member of the Batasang
Pambansa shall, in all offenses punishable by not
more than six years imprisonment, be privileged
from arrest during his attendance at its sessions
and in going to and returning from the same.
For offenses punishable by more than six years
imprisonment, there was no immunity from arrest. The
restrictive interpretation of immunity and intent to confine
it within carefully defined parameters is illustrated by the
concluding portion of the provision, to wit:
. . . but the Batasang Pambansa shall surrender
the member involved the custody of the law within
twenty four hours after its adjournment for a
recess or for its next session, otherwise such
privilege shall cease upon its failure to do so.
The present Constitution adheres to the same restrictive
rule minus the obligation of Congress to surrender the
subject Congressman to the custody of the law. The
requirement that he should be attending sessions or
committee meetings has also been removed. For relatively
minor offenses, it is enough that Congress is in session.
The accused-appellant argues that a member of Congress'
function to attend sessions is underscored by Section 16
(2), Article VI of the Constitution which states that
(2) A majority of each House shall constitute a
quorum to do business, but a smaller number may
adjourn from day to day and may compel the
attendance of absent Members in such manner,
and under such penalties, as such House may
provide.
However, the accused-appellant has not given any reason
why he should be exempted from the operation of Section
11, Article VI of the Constitution. The members of
Congress cannot compel absent members to attend

11

sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one.

The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime
punishable by imprisonment of more than six months is
not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional
foundations.
Accused-appellant's reliance on the ruling in Aguinaldo v.
Santos2, which states, inter alia, that
The Court should never remove a public officer for
acts done prior to his present term of office. To do
otherwise would be to deprive the people of their
right to elect their officers. When a people have
elected a man to office, it must be assumed that
they did this with the knowledge of his life and
character, and that they disregarded or forgave his
fault or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It
is not for the Court, by reason of such fault or
misconduct, to practically overrule the will of the
people.
will not extricate him from his predicament. It can be
readily seen in the above-quoted ruling that the Aguinaldo
case involves the administrative removal of a public officer
for acts done prior to his present term of office. It does
not apply to imprisonment arising from the enforcement
of criminal law. Moreover, in the same way that preventive
suspension is not removal, confinement pending appeal is
not removal. He remains a congressman unless expelled
by Congress or, otherwise, disqualified.
One rationale behind confinement, whether pending
appeal or after final conviction, is public self-defense.
Society must protect itself. It also serves as an example
and warning to others.
A person charged with crime is taken into custody for
purposes of the administration of justice. As stated
in United States v. Gustilo,3 it is the injury to the public
which State action in criminal law seeks to redress. It is
not the injury to the complainant. After conviction in the
Regional Trial Court, the accused may be denied bail and
thus subjected to incarceration if there is risk of his
absconding.4
The accused-appellant states that the plea of the
electorate which voted him into office cannot be
supplanted by unfounded fears that he might escape
eventual punishment if permitted to perform
congressional duties outside his regular place of
confinement.
It will be recalled that when a warrant for accusedappellant's arrest was issued, he fled and evaded capture
despite a call from his colleagues in the House of
Representatives for him to attend the sessions and to
surrender voluntarily to the authorities. Ironically, it is
now the same body whose call he initially spurned which
accused-appellant is invoking to justify his present
motion. This can not be countenanced because, to
reiterate, aside from its being contrary to well-defined

Constitutional restrains, it would be a mockery of the aims

of the State's penal system.
Accused-appellant argues that on several occasions the
Regional Trial Court of Makati granted several motions to
temporarily leave his cell at the Makati City Jail, for official
or medical reasons, to wit:
a) to attend hearings of the House Committee on
Ethics held at the Batasan Complex, Quezon City,
on the issue of whether to expel/suspend him
from the House of Representatives;
b) to undergo dental examination and treatment
at the clinic of his dentist in Makati City;
c) to undergo a thorough medical check-up at the
Makati Medical Center, Makati City;
d) to register as a voter at his hometown in
Dapitan City. In this case, accused-appellant
commuted by chartered plane and private vehicle.
He also calls attention to various instances, after his
transfer at the New Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa City, when
he was likewise allowed/permitted to leave the prison
premises, to wit.
a) to join "living-out" prisoners on "work-volunteer
program" for the purpose of 1) establishing a
mahogany seedling bank and 2) planting
mahogany trees, at the NBP reservation. For this
purpose, he was assigned one guard and allowed
to use his own vehicle and driver in going to and
from the project area and his place of
confinement.
b) to continue with his dental treatment at the
clinic of his dentist in Makati City.
c) to be confined at the Makati Medical Center in
Makati City for his heart condition.
There is no showing that the above privileges are peculiar
to him or to a member of Congress. Emergency or
compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are
allowed to all prisoners, at the discretion of the authorities
or upon court orders.
What the accused-appellant seeks is not of an emergency
nature. Allowing accused-appellant to attend
congressional sessions and committee meeting for five (5)
days or more in a week will virtually make him free man
with all the privilege appurtenant to his position. Such an
aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant's
status to that of a special class, it also would be a
mockery of the purposes of the correction system. Of
particular relevance in this regard are the following
observations of the Court in Martinez v. Morfe:5

12

The above conclusion reached by this Court is

bolstered and fortified by policy considerations.
There is, to be sure, a full recognition of the
necessity to have members of Congress, and
likewise delegates to the Constitutional
Convention, entitled to the utmost freedom to
enable them to discharge their vital
responsibilities, bowing to no other force except
the dictates of their conscience of their
conscience. Necessarily the utmost latitude in free
speech should be accorded them. When it comes
to freedom from arrest, however, it would amount
to the creation of a privileged class, without
justification in reason, if notwithstanding their
liability for a criminal offense, they would be
considered immune during their attendance in
Congress and in going to and returning from the
same. There is likely to be no dissent from the
proposition that a legislator or a delegate can
perform his functions efficiently and well, without
the need for any transgression of the criminal law.
Should such an unfortunate event come to pass,
he is to be treated like any other citizen
considering that there is a strong public interest in
seeing to it that crime should not go unpunished.
To the fear that may be expressed that the
prosecuting arm of the government might unjustly
go after legislators belonging to the minority, it
suffices to answer that precisely all the safeguards
thrown around an accused by the Constitution,
solicitous of the rights of an individual, would
constitute an obstacle to such an attempt at abuse
of power. The presumption of course is that the
judiciary would remain independent. It is trite to
say that in each and every manifestation of
judicial endeavor, such a virtue is of the essence.
The accused-appellant avers that his constituents in the
First District of Zamboanga del Norte want their voices to
be heard and that since he is treated as bona fide member
of the House of Representatives, the latter urges a coequal branch of government to respect his mandate. He
also claims that the concept of temporary detention does
not necessarily curtail his duty to discharge his mandate
and that he has always complied with the
conditions/restrictions when he is allowed to leave jail.
We remain unpersuaded.1wphi1.nt
No less than accused-appellant himself admits that like
any other member of the House of Representatives "[h]e
is provided with a congressional office situated at Room N214, North Wing Building, House of Representatives
Complex, Batasan Hills, Quezon City, manned by a full
complement of staff paid for by Congress. Through [an]
inter-department coordination, he is also provided with an
office at the Administration Building, New Bilibid Prison,
Muntinlupa City, where he attends to his constituents."
Accused-appellant further admits that while under
detention, he has filed several bills and resolutions. It also
appears that he has been receiving his salaries and other
monetary benefits. Succinctly stated, accused-appellant

has been discharging his mandate as a member of the

House of Representative consistent with the restraints
upon one who is presently under detention. Being a
detainee, accused-appellant should not even have been
allowed by the prison authorities at the National
Penitentiary to perform these acts.
When the voters of his district elected the accusedappellant to Congress, they did so with full awareness of
the limitations on his freedom of action. They did so with
the knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative
results which he could accomplish within the confines of
prison. To give a more drastic illustration, if voters elect a
person with full knowledge that he suffering from a
terminal illness, they do so knowing that at any time, he
may no longer serve his full term in office.
In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to
a question of constitutional equal protection.
The Constitution guarantees: ". . . nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of laws."6 This simply means
that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike
both in rights enjoyed and responsibilities imposed. 7The
organs of government may not show any undue favoritism
or hostility to any person. Neither partiality not prejudice
shall be displayed.
Does being an elective official result in a substantial
distinction that allows different treatment? Is being a
Congressman a substantial differentiation which removes
the accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same class
as all persons validly confined under law?
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties
by public officers has never been an excuse to free a
person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the
"mandate of the people" are multifarious. The accusedappellant asserts that the duty to legislative ranks highest
in the hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is
only one of 250 members of the House of
Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the
Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress
continues to function well in the physical absence of one
or a few of its members. Depending on the exigency of
Government that has to be addressed, the President or
the Supreme Court can also be deemed the highest for
that particular duty. The importance of a function depends
on the need to its exercise. The duty of a mother to nurse
her infant is most compelling under the law of nature. A
doctor with unique skills has the duty to save the lives of
those with a particular affliction. An elective governor has
to serve provincial constituents. A police officer must
maintain peace and order. Never has the call of a
particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different
classification from those others who are validly restrained
by law.
A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest wittingly
or otherwise, insidious discriminations are made in favor
of or against groups or types of individuals.8

13

The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The

necessities imposed by public welfare may justify exercise
of government authority to regulate even if thereby
certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are
disregarded.9
We, therefore, find that election to the position of
Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal
law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office
are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the
class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and
restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and
confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and
apply to all those belonging to the same class.10
Imprisonment is the restraint of a man's personal liberty;
coercion exercised upon a person to prevent the free
exercise of his power of
locomotion.11
More explicitly, "imprisonment" in its general sense, is the
restraint of one's liberty. As a punishment, it is restraint
by judgment of a court or lawful tribunal, and is personal
to the accused.12 The term refers to the restraint on the
personal liberty of another; any prevention of his
movements from place to place, or of his free action
according to his own pleasure and will.13 Imprisonment is
the detention of another against his will depriving him of
his power of locomotion14 and it "[is] something more than
mere loss of freedom. It includes the notion of restraint
within limits defined by wall or any exterior barrier." 15
It can be seen from the foregoing that incarceration, by its
nature, changes an individual's status in society.16Prison
officials have the difficult and often thankless job of
preserving the security in a potentially explosive setting,
as well as of attempting to provide rehabilitation that
prepares inmates for re-entry into the social mainstream.
Necessarily, both these demands require the curtailment
and elimination of certain rights.17
Premises considered, we are constrained to rule against
the accused-appellant's claim that re-election to public
office gives priority to any other right or interest, including
the police power of the State.
WHEREFORE, the instant motion is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 179817

June 27, 2008

ANTONIO F. TRILLANES IV, petitioner,

vs.
HON. OSCAR PIMENTEL, SR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS
PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURTBRANCH 148, MAKATI CITY; GEN. HERMOGENES
ESPERON, VICE ADM. ROGELIO I. CALUNSAG, MGEN.
BENJAMIN DOLORFINO, AND LT. COL. LUCIARDO
OBEA, respondents.

DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
At the wee hours of July 27, 2003, a group of more than
300 heavily armed soldiers led by junior officers of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the
Oakwood Premier Apartments in Makati City and publicly
demanded the resignation of the President and key
national officials.
Later in the day, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued
Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 declaring a
state of rebellion and calling out the Armed Forces to
suppress the rebellion.1 A series of negotiations quelled
the teeming tension and eventually resolved the impasse
with the surrender of the militant soldiers that evening.
In the aftermath of this eventful episode dubbed as the
"Oakwood Incident," petitioner Antonio F. Trillanes IV was
charged, along with his comrades, with coup
detat defined under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal
Code before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati. The
case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-2784, "People
v. Capt. Milo D. Maestrecampo, et al."
Close to four years later, petitioner, who has remained in
detention,2 threw his hat in the political arena and won a
seat in the Senate with a six-year term commencing at
noon on June 30, 2007.3
Before the commencement of his term or on June 22,
2007, petitioner filed with the RTC, Makati City, Branch
148, an "Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to be Allowed
to Attend Senate Sessions and Related
Requests"4(Omnibus Motion). Among his requests were:
(a) To be allowed to go to the Senate to attend all
official functions of the Senate (whether at the
Senate or elsewhere) particularly when the Senate
is in session, and to attend the regular and
plenary sessions of the Senate, committee
hearings, committee meetings, consultations,
investigations and hearings in aid of legislation,
caucuses, staff meetings, etc., which are normally
held at the Senate of the Philippines located at the
GSIS Financial Center, Pasay City (usually from
Mondays to Thursdays from 8:00 a.m. to 7:00
p.m.);
(b) To be allowed to set up a working area at his
place of detention at the Marine Brig, Marine
Barracks Manila, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City, with a
personal desktop computer and the appropriate
communications equipment (i.e., a telephone line
and internet access) in order that he may be able
to work there when there are no sessions,
meetings or hearings at the Senate or when the
Senate is not in session. The costs of setting up
the said working area and the related equipment
and utility costs can be charged against the

14

budget/allocation of the Office of the accused from

the Senate;
(c) To be allowed to receive members of his staff
at the said working area at his place of detention
at the Marine Brig, Marine Barracks Manila, Fort
Bonifacio, Taguig City, at reasonable times of the
day particularly during working days for purposes
of meetings, briefings, consultations and/or
coordination, so that the latter may be able to
assists (sic) him in the performance and discharge
of his duties as a Senator of the Republic;
(d) To be allowed to give interviews and to air his
comments, reactions and/or opinions to the press
or the media regarding the important issues
affecting the country and the public while at the
Senate or elsewhere in the performance of his
duties as Senator to help shape public policy and
in the light of the important role of the Senate in
maintaining the system of checks and balance
between the three (3) co-equal branches of
Government;
(e) With prior notice to the Honorable Court and
to the accused and his custodians, to be
allowed to receive, on Tuesdays and
Fridays, reporters and other members of the
media who may wish to interview him and/or to
get his comments, reactions and/or opinion at his
place of confinement at the Marine Brig, Marine
Barracks Manila, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City,
particularly when there are no sessions, meetings
or hearings at the Senate or when the Senate is
not in session; and
(f) To be allowed to attend the organizational
meeting and election of officers of the Senate and
related activities scheduled in the morning (9:00
or 10:00 a.m.) of 23 July 2007 at the Senate of
the Philippines located at the GSIS Financial
Center, Pasay City.5
By Order of July 25, 2007,6 the trial court denied all the
requests in the Omnibus Motion. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration in which he waived his requests in
paragraphs (b), (c) and (f) to thus trim them down to
three.7The trial court just the same denied the motion by
Order of September 18, 2007.8
Hence, the present petition for certiorari to set aside the
two Orders of the trial court, and
for prohibition andmandamus to (i) enjoin respondents
from banning the Senate staff, resource persons and
guests from meeting with him or transacting business with
him in his capacity as Senator; and (ii) direct respondents
to allow him access to the Senate staff, resource persons
and guests and permit him to attend all sessions and
official functions of the Senate. Petitioner preliminarily
prayed for the maintenance of the status quo ante of
having been able hitherto to convene his staff, resource
persons and guests9 at the Marine Brig.

Impleaded as co-respondents of Judge Oscar Pimentel, Sr.

are AFP Chief of Staff, Gen. Hermogenes Esperon
(Esperon); Philippine Navys Flag Officer-in-Command,
Vice Admiral Rogelio Calunsag; Philippine Marines
Commandant, Major Gen. Benjamin Dolorfino; and Marine
Barracks Manila Commanding Officer, Lt. Col. Luciardo
Obea (Obea).
Petitioner later manifested, in his Reply of February 26,
2008, that he has, since November 30, 2007, been in the
custody of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Custodial
Center following the foiled take-over of the Manila
Peninsula Hotel10 the day before or on November 29,
2007.
Such change in circumstances thus dictates the
discontinuation of the action as against the above-named
military officers-respondents. The issues raised in relation
to them had ceased to present a justiciable controversy,
so that a determination thereof would be without practical
value and use. Meanwhile, against those not made parties
to the case, petitioner cannot ask for reliefs from this
Court.11 Petitioner did not, by way of substitution, implead
the police officers currently exercising custodial
responsibility over him; and he did not satisfactorily show
that they have adopted or continued the assailed actions
of the former custodians.12
Petitioner reiterates the following grounds which mirror
those previously raised in his Motion for Reconsideration
filed with the trial court:
I.
THE JURISPRUDENCE CITED BY THE HONORABLE
COURT A QUO IS CLEARLY INAPPLICABLE TO THE
INSTANT CASE BECAUSE OF THE FOLLOWING
REASONS:
A.
UNLIKE IN THIS CASE, THE ACCUSED IN
THE JALOSJOS CASE WAS ALREADY
CONVICTED AT THE TIME HE FILED HIS
MOTION. IN THE INSTANT CASE,
ACCUSED/PETITIONER HAS NOT BEEN
CONVICTED AND, THEREFORE, STILL
ENJOYS THE PRESUMPTION OF
INNOCENCE;
B.
THE ACCUSED IN THE JALOJOS (SIC)
CASE WAS CHARGED WITH TWO (2)
COUNTS OF STATUTORY RAPE AND SIX
(6) COUNTS OF ACTS OF
LASCIVIOUSNESS, CRIMES INVOLVING
MORAL TURPITUDE. HEREIN
ACCUSED/PETITIONER IS CHARGED WITH
THE OFFENSE OF "COUP DETAT", A
CHARGE WHICH IS COMMONLY
REGARDED AS A POLITICAL OFFENSE;

15

C.
THE ACCUSED IN THE JALOSJOS CASE
ATTEMPTED TO FLEE PRIOR TO BEING
ARRESTED. THE ACCUSED/ PETITIONER
VOLUNTARILY SURRENDERED TO THE
AUTHORITIES AND AGREED TO TAKE
RESPONSIBILITY FOR HIS ACTS AT
OAKWOOD;
II.
GEN. ESPERON DID NOT OVERRULE THE
RECOMMENDATION OF THE MARINE BRIGS
COMMANDING OFFICER TO ALLOW PETITIONER
TO ATTEND THE SENATE SESSIONS;

respecting the type of offense involved, the stage of filing

of the motion, and other circumstances which
demonstrate the inapplicability of Jalosjos.14
A plain reading of. Jalosjos suggests otherwise, however.
The distinctions cited by petitioner were not elemental in
the pronouncement in Jalosjos that election to Congress is
not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement
as the functions and duties of the office are not
substantial distinctions which lift one from the class of
prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in
liberty of movement.15
It cannot be gainsaid that a person charged with a crime
is taken into custody for purposes of the administration of
justice. No less than the Constitution provides:

III.
ACCUSED/PETITIONER SUBMITS THAT THE FACT
THAT THE PEOPLE, IN THEIR SOVEREIGN
CAPACITY, ELECTED HIM TO THE POSITION OF
SENATOR OF THE REPUBLIC PROVIDES THE
PROPER LEGAL JUSTIFICATION TO ALLOW HIM TO
WORK AND SERVE HIS MANDATE AS A SENATOR;
- AND IV.
MOREOVER, THERE ARE ENOUGH PRECEDENTS
TO ALLOW LIBERAL TREATMENT OF DETENTION
PRISONERS WHO ARE HELD WITHOUT BAIL AS IN
THE CASE OF FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH "ERAP"
ESTRADA AND FORMER ARMM GOV. NUR
MISUARI.13
The petition is bereft of merit.
In attempting to strike a distinction between his case and
that of Jalosjos, petitioner chiefly points out that former
Rep. Romeo Jalosjos (Jalosjos) was already convicted,
albeit his conviction was pending appeal, when he filed a
motion similar to petitioners Omnibus Motion, whereas he
(petitioner) is a mere detention prisoner. He asserts that
he continues to enjoy civil and political rights since the
presumption of innocence is still in his favor.
Further, petitioner illustrates that Jalosjos was charged
with crimes involving moral turpitude, i.e., two counts of
statutory rape and six counts of acts of lasciviousness,
whereas he is indicted for coup detat which is regarded as
a "political offense."
Furthermore, petitioner justifies in his favor the presence
of noble causes in expressing legitimate grievances
against the rampant and institutionalized practice of graft
and corruption in the AFP.
In sum, petitioners first ground posits that there is a
world of difference between his case and that of Jalosjos

All persons, except those charged with offenses

punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence
of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be
bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right
to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpusis suspended.
Excessive bail shall not be
required.16 (Underscoring supplied)
The Rules also state that no person charged with a capital
offense,17 or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail
when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of
the criminal action.18
That the cited provisions apply equally to rape and coup
detat cases, both being punishable by reclusion
perpetua,19 is beyond cavil. Within the class of offenses
covered by the stated range of imposable penalties, there
is clearly no distinction as to the political complexion of or
moral turpitude involved in the crime charged.
In the present case, it is uncontroverted that petitioners
application for bail and for release on recognizance was
denied.20 The determination that the evidence of guilt is
strong, whether ascertained in a hearing of an application
for bail21 or imported from a trial courts judgment of
conviction,22 justifies the detention of an accused as a
valid curtailment of his right to provisional liberty. This
accentuates the proviso that the denial of the right to bail
in such cases is "regardless of the stage of the criminal
action." Such justification for confinement with its
underlying rationale of public self-defense23 applies equally
to detention prisoners like petitioner or convicted
prisoners-appellants like Jalosjos.
As the Court observed in Alejano v. Cabuay,24 it is
impractical to draw a line between convicted prisoners and
pre-trial detainees for the purpose of maintaining jail
security; and while pre-trial detainees do not forfeit their
constitutional rights upon confinement, the fact of their
detention makes their rights more limited than those of
the public.

16

The Court was more emphatic in People v. Hon. Maceda:25

As a matter of law, when a person indicted for an
offense is arrested, he is deemed placed under the
custody of the law. He is placed in actual restraint
of liberty in jail so that he may be bound to
answer for the commission of the offense. He
must be detained in jail during the pendency of
the case against him, unless he is authorized by
the court to be released on bail or on
recognizance. Let it be stressed that all prisoners
whether under preventive detention or serving
final sentence can not practice their profession nor
engage in any business or occupation, or hold
office, elective or appointive, while in detention.
This is a necessary consequence of arrest and
detention.26 (Underscoring supplied)
These inherent limitations, however, must be taken into
account only to the extent that confinement restrains the
power of locomotion or actual physical movement. It
bears noting that in Jalosjos, which was decided en
banc one month after Maceda, the Court recognized that
the accused could somehow accomplish legislative
results.27
The trial court thus correctly concluded that the
presumption of innocence does not carry with it the full
enjoyment of civil and political rights.
Petitioner is similarly situated with Jalosjos with respect to
the application of the presumption of innocence during the
period material to the resolution of their respective
motions. The Court in Jalosjos did not mention that the
presumption of innocence no longer operates in favor of
the accused pending the review on appeal of the
judgment of conviction. The rule stands that until a
promulgation of final conviction is made, the constitutional
mandate of presumption of innocence prevails.28
In addition to the inherent restraints, the Court notes that
petitioner neither denied nor disputed his agreeing to a
consensus with the prosecution that media access to him
should cease after his proclamation by the Commission on
Elections.29
Petitioner goes on to allege that unlike Jalosjos who
attempted to evade trial, he is not a flight risk since he
voluntarily surrendered to the proper authorities and such
can be proven by the numerous times he was allowed to
travel outside his place of detention.
Subsequent events reveal the contrary, however. The
assailed Orders augured well when on November 29, 2007
petitioner went past security detail for some reason and
proceeded from the courtroom to a posh hotel to issue
certain statements. The account, dubbed this time as the
"Manila Pen Incident,"30 proves that petitioners argument
bites the dust. The risk that he would escape ceased to be
neither remote nor nil as, in fact, the cause for foreboding
became real.

Moreover, circumstances indicating probability of flight

find relevance as a factor in ascertaining the reasonable
amount of bail and in canceling a discretionary grant of
bail.31 In cases involving non-bailable offenses, what is
controlling is the determination of whether the evidence of
guilt is strong. Once it is established that it is so, bail shall
be denied as it is neither a matter of right nor of
discretion.32
Petitioner cannot find solace in Montano v. Ocampo33 to
buttress his plea for leeway because unlike petitioner, the
therein petitioner, then Senator Justiniano Montano, who
was charged with multiple murder and multiple frustrated
murder,34 was able to rebut the strong evidence for the
prosecution. Notatu dignum is this Courts pronouncement
therein that "if denial of bail is authorized in capital cases,
it is only on the theory that the proof being strong, the
defendant would flee, if he has the opportunity, rather
than face the verdict of the jury."35 At the time Montano
was indicted, when only capital offenses were non-bailable
where evidence of guilt is strong,36 the Court noted the
obvious reason that "one who faces a probable death
sentence has a particularly strong temptation to
flee."37Petitioners petition for bail having earlier been
denied, he cannot rely on Montano to reiterate his
requests which are akin to bailing him out.
Second, petitioner posits that, contrary to the trial courts
findings, Esperon did not overrule Obeas
recommendation to allow him to attend Senate sessions.
Petitioner cites the Comment38 of Obea that he
interposed no objection to such request but recommended
that he be transported by the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms
with adequate Senate security. And petitioner faults the
trial court for deeming that Esperon, despite professing
non-obstruction to the performance of petitioners duties,
flatly rejected all his requests, when what Esperon only
disallowed was the setting up of a political office inside a
military installation owing to AFPs apolitical nature.39
The effective management of the detention facility has
been recognized as a valid objective that may justify the
imposition of conditions and restrictions of pre-trial
detention.40 The officer with custodial responsibility over a
detainee may undertake such reasonable measures as
may be necessary to secure the safety and prevent the
escape of the detainee.41 Nevertheless, while the
comments of the detention officers provide guidance on
security concerns, they are not binding on the trial court
in the same manner that pleadings are not impositions
upon a court.
Third, petitioner posits that his election provides the legal
justification to allow him to serve his mandate, after the
people, in their sovereign capacity, elected him as
Senator. He argues that denying his Omnibus Motion is
tantamount to removing him from office, depriving the
people of proper representation, denying the peoples will,
repudiating the peoples choice, and overruling the
mandate of the people.

17

Petitioners contention hinges on the doctrine in

administrative law that "a public official can not be
removed foradministrative misconduct committed during
a prior term, since his re-election to office operates as a
condonation of the officers previous misconduct to the
extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor." 42
The assertion is unavailing. The case against petitioner is
not administrative in nature. And there is no "prior term"
to speak of. In a plethora of cases,43 the Court
categorically held that the doctrine of condonation does
not apply to criminal cases. Election, or more precisely,
re-election to office, does not obliterate a criminal charge.
Petitioners electoral victory only signifies pertinently that
when the voters elected him to the Senate, "they did so
with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of
action [and] x x x with the knowledge that he could
achieve only such legislative results which he could
accomplish within the confines of prison." 44
In once more debunking the disenfranchisement
argument,45 it is opportune to wipe out the lingering
misimpression that the call of duty conferred by the voice
of the people is louder than the litany of lawful restraints
articulated in the Constitution and echoed by
jurisprudence. The apparent discord may be harmonized
by the overarching tenet that the mandate of the people
yields to the Constitution which the people themselves
ordained to govern all under the rule of law.
The performance of legitimate and even essential
duties by public officers has never been an excuse
to free a person validly in prison. The duties
imposed by the "mandate of the people" are
multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that
the duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy
of government. The accused-appellant is only one
of 250 members of the House of Representatives,
not to mention the 24 members of the Senate,
charged with the duties of legislation. Congress
continues to function well in the physical absence
of one or a few of its members. x x x Never has
the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a
different classification from those others who are
validly restrained by law.46 (Underscoring
supplied)
Lastly, petitioner pleads for the same liberal treatment
accorded certain detention prisoners who have also been
charged with non-bailable offenses, like former President
Joseph Estrada and former Governor Nur Misuari who
were allowed to attend "social functions." Finding no
rhyme and reason in the denial of the more serious
request to perform the duties of a Senator, petitioner
harps on an alleged violation of the equal protection
clause.
In arguing against maintaining double standards in the
treatment of detention prisoners, petitioner expressly
admits that he intentionally did not seek preferential
treatment in the form of being placed under Senate

custody or house arrest,47 yet he at the same time, gripes

about the granting of house arrest to others.
Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from
imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners, at the
discretion of the authorities or upon court orders. 48 That
this discretion was gravely abused, petitioner failed to
establish. In fact, the trial court previously allowed
petitioner to register as a voter in December 2006, file his
certificate of candidacy in February 2007, cast his vote on
May 14, 2007, be proclaimed as senator-elect, and take
his oath of office49 on June 29, 2007. In a seeming
attempt to bind or twist the hands of the trial court lest it
be accused of taking a complete turn-around,50 petitioner
largely banks on these prior grants to him and insists on
unending concessions and blanket authorizations.
Petitioners position fails. On the generality and
permanence of his requests alone, petitioners case fails to
compare with the species of allowable
leaves. Jaloslos succinctly expounds:
x x x Allowing accused-appellant to attend
congressional sessions and committee meetings
for five (5) days or more in a week will virtually
make him a free man with all the privileges
appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant
situation not only elevates accused-appellants
status to that of a special class, it also would be a
mockery of the purposes of the correction
system.51
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 7399

August 25, 2009

ANTERO J. POBRE, Complainant,

vs.
Sen. MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
In his sworn letter/complaint dated December 22, 2006,
with enclosures, Antero J. Pobre invites the Courts
attention to the following excerpts of Senator Miriam
Defensor-Santiagos speech delivered on the Senate floor:
x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the
mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated,
debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like
throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of
this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief
Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the
Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position
[of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I
would rather be in another environment but not in the
Supreme Court of idiots x x x.

18

To Pobre, the foregoing statements reflected a total

disrespect on the part of the speaker towards then Chief
Justice Artemio Panganiban and the other members of the
Court and constituted direct contempt of court.
Accordingly, Pobre asks that disbarment proceedings or
other disciplinary actions be taken against the lady
senator.
In her comment on the complaint dated April 25, 2007,
Senator Santiago, through counsel, does not deny making
the aforequoted statements. She, however, explained that
those statements were covered by the constitutional
provision on parliamentary immunity, being part of a
speech she delivered in the discharge of her duty as
member of Congress or its committee. The purpose of her
speech, according to her, was to bring out in the open
controversial anomalies in governance with a view to
future remedial legislation. She averred that she wanted
to expose what she believed "to be an unjust act of the
Judicial Bar Council [JBC]," which, after sending out public
invitations for nomination to the soon to-be vacated
position of Chief Justice, would eventually inform
applicants that only incumbent justices of the Supreme
Court would qualify for nomination. She felt that the JBC
should have at least given an advanced advisory that nonsitting members of the Court, like her, would not be
considered for the position of Chief Justice.

of the pleader, or to the hazard of a judgment against

them based upon a judges speculation as to the motives. 2
This Court is aware of the need and has in fact been in the
forefront in upholding the institution of parliamentary
immunity and promotion of free speech. Neither has the
Court lost sight of the importance of the legislative and
oversight functions of the Congress that enable this
representative body to look diligently into every affair of
government, investigate and denounce anomalies, and
talk about how the country and its citizens are being
served. Courts do not interfere with the legislature or its
members in the manner they perform their functions in
the legislative floor or in committee rooms. Any claim of
an unworthy purpose or of the falsity and mala fides of
the statement uttered by the member of the Congress
does not destroy the privilege.3 The disciplinary authority
of the assembly4 and the voters, not the courts, can
properly discourage or correct such abuses committed in
the name of parliamentary immunity.5
For the above reasons, the plea of Senator Santiago for
the dismissal of the complaint for disbarment or
disciplinary action is well taken. Indeed, her privilege
speech is not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary
proceeding under the Rules of Court. It is felt, however,
that this could not be the last word on the matter.

The immunity Senator Santiago claims is rooted primarily

on the provision of Article VI, Section 11 of the
Constitution, which provides: "A Senator or Member of the
House of Representative shall, in all offenses punishable
by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged
from arrest while the Congress is in session.No member
shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other
place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in
any committee thereof." Explaining the import of the
underscored portion of the provision, the Court,
in Osmea, Jr. v. Pendatun, said:

The Court wishes to express its deep concern about the

language Senator Santiago, a member of the Bar, used in
her speech and its effect on the administration of justice.
To the Court, the lady senator has undoubtedly crossed
the limits of decency and good professional conduct. It is
at once apparent that her statements in question were
intemperate and highly improper in substance. To
reiterate, she was quoted as stating that she wanted "to
spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and
his cohorts in the Supreme Court," and calling the Court a
"Supreme Court of idiots."

Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which

is a fundamental privilege cherished in every legislative
assembly of the democratic world. As old as the English
Parliament, its purpose "is to enable and encourage a
representative of the public to discharge his public trust
with firmness and success" for "it is indispensably
necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of
speech and that he should be protected from resentment
of every one, however, powerful, to whom the exercise of
that liberty may occasion offense."1

The lady senator alluded to In Re: Vicente Sotto.6 We

draw her attention to the ensuing passage in Sotto that
she should have taken to heart in the first place:

As American jurisprudence puts it, this legislative privilege

is founded upon long experience and arises as a means of
perpetuating inviolate the functioning process of the
legislative department. Without parliamentary immunity,
parliament, or its equivalent, would degenerate into a
polite and ineffective debating forum. Legislators are
immune from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of
their legislative duties, not for their private indulgence,
but for the public good. The privilege would be of little
value if they could be subjected to the cost and
inconvenience and distractions of a trial upon a conclusion

x x x [I]f the people lose their confidence in the honesty

and integrity of this Court and believe that they cannot
expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the
law into their own hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos
would be the result.1avvphi1
No lawyer who has taken an oath to maintain the respect
due to the courts should be allowed to erode the peoples
faith in the judiciary. In this case, the lady senator clearly
violated Canon 8, Rule 8.01 and Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which respectively provide:
Canon 8, Rule 8.01.A lawyer shall not, in his
professional dealings, use language which is abusive,
offensive or otherwise improper.

19

Canon 11.A lawyer shall observe and maintain the

respect due to the courts and to the judicial officers and
should insist on similar conduct by others.
Senator/Atty. Santiago is a cut higher than most lawyers.
Her achievements speak for themselves. She was a
former Regional Trial Court judge, a law professor, an oftcited authority on constitutional and international law, an
author of numerous law textbooks, and an elected senator
of the land. Needless to stress, Senator Santiago, as a
member of the Bar and officer of the court, like any other,
is duty-bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this
Court and to maintain the respect due its members.
Lawyers in public service are keepers of public faith and
are burdened with the higher degree of social
responsibility, perhaps higher than their brethren in
private practice.7Senator Santiago should have known, as
any perceptive individual, the impact her statements
would make on the peoples faith in the integrity of the
courts.
As Senator Santiago alleged, she delivered her privilege
speech as a prelude to crafting remedial legislation on the
JBC. This allegation strikes the Court as an afterthought in
light of the insulting tenor of what she said. We quote the
passage once more:
x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the
mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated,
debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like
throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of
this nature. Iam nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief
Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the
Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position
[of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by
idiots. I would rather be in another environment but not in
the Supreme Court of idiots x x x. (Emphasis ours.)
A careful re-reading of her utterances would readily show
that her statements were expressions of personal anger
and frustration at not being considered for the post of
Chief Justice. In a sense, therefore, her remarks were
outside the pale of her official parliamentary functions.
Even parliamentary immunity must not be allowed to be
used as a vehicle to ridicule, demean, and destroy the
reputation of the Court and its magistrates, nor as armor
for personal wrath and disgust. Authorities are agreed
that parliamentary immunity is not an individual privilege
accorded the individual members of the Parliament or
Congress for their personal benefit, but rather a privilege
for the benefit of the people and the institution that
represents them.
To be sure, Senator Santiago could have given vent to her
anger without indulging in insulting rhetoric and offensive
personalities.
Lest it be overlooked, Senator Santiagos outburst was
directly traceable to what she considered as an "unjust
act" the JBC had taken in connection with her application
for the position of Chief Justice. But while the JBC
functions under the Courts supervision, its individual

members, save perhaps for the Chief Justice who sits as

the JBCs ex-officio chairperson,8 have no official duty to
nominate candidates for appointment to the position of
Chief Justice. The Court is, thus, at a loss to understand
Senator Santiagos wholesale and indiscriminate assault
on the members of the Court and her choice of critical and
defamatory words against all of them.
At any event, equally important as the speech and debate
clause of Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the Constitution is Sec. 5(5)
of Art. VIII of the Constitution that provides:
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following
powers:
xxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice,
and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice
of the law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to
the underprivileged. (Emphasis ours.)
The Court, besides being authorized to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts,
exercises specific authority to promulgate rules governing
the Integrated Bar with the end in view that the
integration of the Bar will, among other things:
(4) Shield the judiciary, which traditionally cannot defend
itself except within its own forum, from the assaults that
politics and self interest may level at it, and assist it to
maintain its integrity, impartiality and independence;
xxxx
(11) Enforce rigid ethical standards x x x.9
In Re: Letter Dated 21 February 2005 of Atty. Noel S.
Sorreda,10 we reiterated our pronouncement in Rheem of
the Philippines v. Ferrer11 that the duty of attorneys to the
courts can only be maintained by rendering no service
involving any disrespect to the judicial office which they
are bound to uphold. The Court wrote in Rheem of the
Philippines:
x x x As explicit is the first canon of legal ethics which
pronounces that "[i]t is the duty of a lawyer to maintain
towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake
of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for
the maintenance of its supreme importance." That same
canon, as a corollary, makes it peculiarly incumbent upon
lawyers to support the courts against "unjust criticism and
clamor." And more. The attorneys oath solemnly binds
him to a conduct that should be "with all good fidelity x x
x to the courts."
Also, in Sorreda, the Court revisited its holding in Surigao
Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel12 that:

20

A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, "like the court

itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends of
justice." His duty is to uphold the dignity and authority of
the courts to which he owes fidelity, "not to promote
distrust in the administration of justice." Faith in the
courts, a lawyer should seek to preserve. For, to
undermine the judicial edifice "is disastrous to the
continuity of government and to the attainment of the
liberties of the people." Thus has it been said of a lawyer
that "[a]s an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral
duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high
esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the
proper administration of justice."13
The lady senator belongs to the legal profession bound by
the exacting injunction of a strict Code. Society has
entrusted that profession with the administration of the
law and dispensation of justice. Generally speaking, a
lawyer holding a government office may not be disciplined
as a member of the Bar for misconduct committed while in
the discharge of official duties, unless said misconduct
also constitutes a violation of his/her oath as a lawyer.14
Lawyers may be disciplined even for any conduct
committed in their private capacity, as long as their
misconduct reflects their want of probity or good
demeanor,15 a good character being an essential
qualification for the admission to the practice of law and
for continuance of such privilege. When the Code of
Professional Responsibility or the Rules of Court speaks of
"conduct" or "misconduct," the reference is not confined
to ones behavior exhibited in connection with the
performance of lawyers professional duties, but also
covers any misconduct, whichalbeit unrelated to the
actual practice of their professionwould show them to
be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which
their license and the law invest in them.16
This Court, in its unceasing quest to promote the peoples
faith in courts and trust in the rule of law, has consistently
exercised its disciplinary authority on lawyers who, for
malevolent purpose or personal malice, attempt to
obstruct the orderly administration of justice, trifle with
the integrity of courts, and embarrass or, worse, malign
the men and women who compose them. We have done it
in the case of former Senator Vicente Sotto in Sotto, in
the case of Atty. Noel Sorreda in Sorreda, and in the case
of Atty. Francisco B. Cruz in Tacordan v. Ang17 who
repeatedly insulted and threatened the Court in a most
insolent manner.

definitely tended to denigrate the institution pass by. It is

imperative on our part to re-instill in Senator/Atty.
Santiago her duty to respect courts of justice, especially
this Tribunal, and remind her anew that the parliamentary
non-accountability thus granted to members of Congress
is not to protect them against prosecutions for their own
benefit, but to enable them, as the peoples
representatives, to perform the functions of their office
without fear of being made responsible before the courts
or other forums outside the congressional hall. 18 It is
intended to protect members of Congress against
government pressure and intimidation aimed at
influencing the decision-making prerogatives of Congress
and its members.
The Rules of the Senate itself contains a provision
on Unparliamentary Acts and Language that enjoins a
Senator from using, under any circumstance, "offensive or
improper language against another Senator or against
any public institution."19 But as to Senator Santiagos
unparliamentary remarks, the Senate President had not
apparently called her to order, let alone referred the
matter to the Senate Ethics Committee for appropriate
disciplinary action, as the Rules dictates under such
circumstance.20 The lady senator clearly violated the rules
of her own chamber. It is unfortunate that her peers bent
backwards and avoided imposing their own rules on her.
Finally, the lady senator questions Pobres motives in filing
his complaint, stating that disciplinary proceedings must
be undertaken solely for the public welfare. We cannot
agree with her more. We cannot overstress that the
senators use of intemperate language to demean and
denigrate the highest court of the land is a clear violation
of the duty of respect lawyers owe to the courts. 21
Finally, the Senator asserts that complainant Pobre has
failed to prove that she in fact made the statements in
question. Suffice it to say in this regard that, although she
has not categorically denied making such statements, she
has unequivocally said making them as part of her
privilege speech. Her implied admission is good enough
for the Court.
WHEREFORE, the letter-complaint of Antero J. Pobre
against Senator/Atty. Miriam Defensor-Santiago is,
conformably to Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the
Constitution, DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

The Court is not hesitant to impose some form of

disciplinary sanctions on Senator/Atty. Santiago for what
otherwise would have constituted an act of utter
disrespect on her part towards the Court and its
members. The factual and legal circumstances of this
case, however, deter the Court from doing so, even
without any sign of remorse from her. Basic constitutional
consideration dictates this kind of disposition.
We, however, would be remiss in our duty if we let the
Senators offensive and disrespectful language that

21

G.R. No. 175352

DANTE V. LIBAN, REYNALDO M. BERNARDO, and
SALVADOR M. VIARI, Petitioners,
vs.
RICHARD J. GORDON, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition to declare Senator Richard J. Gordon
(respondent) as having forfeited his seat in the Senate.
The Facts
Petitioners Dante V. Liban, Reynaldo M. Bernardo, and
Salvador M. Viari (petitioners) filed with this Court a
Petition to Declare Richard J. Gordon as Having Forfeited
His Seat in the Senate. Petitioners are officers of the
Board of Directors of the Quezon City Red Cross Chapter
while respondent is Chairman of the Philippine National
Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors.
During respondents incumbency as a member of the
Senate of the Philippines,1 he was elected Chairman of the
PNRC during the 23 February 2006 meeting of the PNRC
Board of Governors. Petitioners allege that by accepting
the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors,
respondent has ceased to be a member of the Senate as
provided in Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution,
which reads:
SEC. 13. No Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives may hold any other office or employment
in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his
term without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be
appointed to any office which may have been created or
the emoluments thereof increased during the term for
which he was elected.
Petitioners cite Camporedondo v. NLRC,2 which held that
the PNRC is a government-owned or controlled
corporation. Petitioners claim that in accepting and
holding the position of Chairman of the PNRC Board of
Governors, respondent has automatically forfeited his seat
in the Senate, pursuant to Flores v. Drilon,3 which held
that incumbent national legislators lose their elective
posts upon their appointment to another government
office.
In his Comment, respondent asserts that petitioners have
no standing to file this petition which appears to be an
action for quo warranto, since the petition alleges that
respondent committed an act which, by provision of law,

constitutes a ground for forfeiture of his public office.

Petitioners do not claim to be entitled to the Senate office
of respondent. Under Section 5, Rule 66 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure, only a person claiming to be entitled to a
public office usurped or unlawfully held by another may
bring an action for quo warranto in his own name. If the
petition is one for quo warranto, it is already barred by
prescription since under Section 11, Rule 66 of the Rules
of Civil Procedure, the action should be commenced within
one year after the cause of the public officers forfeiture of
office. In this case, respondent has been working as a Red
Cross volunteer for the past 40 years. Respondent was
already Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors when
he was elected Senator in May 2004, having been elected
Chairman in 2003 and re-elected in 2005.
Respondent contends that even if the present petition is
treated as a taxpayers suit, petitioners cannot be allowed
to raise a constitutional question in the absence of any
claim that they suffered some actual damage or
threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal act of
respondent. Furthermore, taxpayers are allowed to sue
only when there is a claim of illegal disbursement of public
funds, or that public money is being diverted to any
improper purpose, or where petitioners seek to restrain
respondent from enforcing an invalid law that results in
wastage of public funds.
Respondent also maintains that if the petition is treated as
one for declaratory relief, this Court would have no
jurisdiction since original jurisdiction for declaratory relief
lies with the Regional Trial Court.
Respondent further insists that the PNRC is not a
government-owned or controlled corporation and that the
prohibition under Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution
does not apply in the present case since volunteer service
to the PNRC is neither an office nor an employment.
In their Reply, petitioners claim that their petition is
neither an action for quo warranto nor an action for
declaratory relief. Petitioners maintain that the present
petition is a taxpayers suit questioning the unlawful
disbursement of funds, considering that respondent has
been drawing his salaries and other compensation as a
Senator even if he is no longer entitled to his office.
Petitioners point out that this Court has jurisdiction over
this petition since it involves a legal or constitutional issue
which is of transcendental importance.
The Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues:
1. Whether the Philippine National Red Cross
(PNRC) is a government- owned or controlled
corporation;
2. Whether Section 13, Article VI of the Philippine
Constitution applies to the case of respondent who
is Chairman of the PNRC and at the same time a
Member of the Senate;

22

3. Whether respondent should be automatically

removed as a Senator pursuant to Section 13,
Article VI of the Philippine Constitution; and

powers and discharging the functions and duties

of said office, despite the fact that he is still a
senator.

4. Whether petitioners may legally institute this

petition against respondent.4

7. It is the respectful submission of the

petitioner[s] that by accepting the chairmanship of
the Board of Governors of the PNRC, respondent
has ceased to be a Member of the House of
Senate as provided in Section 13, Article VI of the
Philippine Constitution, x x x

The substantial issue boils down to whether the office of

the PNRC Chairman is a government office or an office in
a government-owned or controlled corporation for
purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the
Constitution.
The Courts Ruling

xxxx

A careful reading of the petition reveals that it is an action

for quo warranto. Section 1, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court
provides:

10. It is respectfully submitted that in accepting

the position of Chairman of the Board of
Governors of the PNRC on February 23, 2006,
respondent has automatically forfeited his seat in
the House of Senate and, therefore, has long
ceased to be a Senator, pursuant to the ruling of
this Honorable Court in the case of FLORES, ET
AL. VS. DRILON AND GORDON, G.R. No. 104732,
xxx

Section 1. Action by Government against individuals. An

action for the usurpation of a public office, position or
franchise may be commenced by a verified petition
brought in the name of the Republic of the Philippines
against:

11. Despite the fact that he is no longer a senator,

respondent continues to act as such and still
performs the powers, functions and duties of a
senator, contrary to the constitution, law and
jurisprudence.

We find the petition without merit.

Petitioners Have No Standing to File this Petition

(a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or

unlawfully holds or exercises a public office,
position or franchise;
(b) A public officer who does or suffers an act
which by provision of law, constitutes a ground for
the forfeiture of his office; or
(c) An association which acts as a corporation
within the Philippines without being legally
incorporated or without lawful authority so to act.
(Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners allege in their petition that:
4. Respondent became the Chairman of the PNRC
when he was elected as such during the First
Regular Luncheon-Meeting of the Board of
Governors of the PNRC held on February 23, 2006,
the minutes of which is hereto attached and made
integral part hereof as Annex "A."
5. Respondent was elected as Chairman of the
PNRC Board of Governors, during his incumbency
as a Member of the House of Senate of the
Congress of the Philippines, having been elected
as such during the national elections last May
2004.
6. Since his election as Chairman of the PNRC
Board of Governors, which position he duly
accepted, respondent has been exercising the

12. Unless restrained, therefore, respondent will

continue to falsely act and represent himself as a
senator or member of the House of Senate,
collecting the salaries, emoluments and other
compensations, benefits and privileges
appertaining and due only to the legitimate
senators, to the damage, great and irreparable
injury of the Government and the Filipino
people.5 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, petitioners are alleging that by accepting the
position of Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors,
respondent has automatically forfeited his seat in the
Senate. In short, petitioners filed an action for usurpation
of public office against respondent, a public officer who
allegedly committed an act which constitutes a ground for
the forfeiture of his public office. Clearly, such an action is
for quo warranto, specifically under Section 1(b), Rule 66
of the Rules of Court.
Quo warranto is generally commenced by the Government
as the proper party plaintiff. However, under Section 5,
Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, an individual may
commence such an action if he claims to be entitled to the
public office allegedly usurped by another, in which case
he can bring the action in his own name. The person
instituting quo warranto proceedings in his own behalf
must claim and be able to show that he is entitled to the
office in dispute, otherwise the action may be dismissed at
any stage.6 In the present case, petitioners do not claim
to be entitled to the Senate office of respondent. Clearly,
petitioners have no standing to file the present petition.

23

Even if the Court disregards the infirmities of the petition

and treats it as a taxpayers suit, the petition would still
fail on the merits.
PNRC is a Private Organization Performing Public Functions
On 22 March 1947, President Manuel A. Roxas signed
Republic Act No. 95,7 otherwise known as the PNRC
Charter. The PNRC is a non-profit, donor-funded,
voluntary, humanitarian organization, whose mission is to
bring timely, effective, and compassionate humanitarian
assistance for the most vulnerable without consideration
of nationality, race, religion, gender, social status, or
political affiliation.8 The PNRC provides six major services:
Blood Services, Disaster Management, Safety Services,
Community Health and Nursing, Social Services and
Voluntary Service.9
The Republic of the Philippines, adhering to the Geneva
Conventions, established the PNRC as a voluntary
organization for the purpose contemplated in the Geneva
Convention of 27 July 1929.10 The Whereas clauses of the
PNRC Charter read:
WHEREAS, there was developed at Geneva, Switzerland,
on August 22, 1864, a convention by which the nations of
the world were invited to join together in diminishing, so
far lies within their power, the evils inherent in war;
WHEREAS, more than sixty nations of the world have
ratified or adhered to the subsequent revision of said
convention, namely the "Convention of Geneva of July 29
[sic], 1929 for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick of Armies in the Field" (referred to in
this Charter as the Geneva Red Cross Convention);
WHEREAS, the Geneva Red Cross Convention envisages
the establishment in each country of a voluntary
organization to assist in caring for the wounded and sick
of the armed forces and to furnish supplies for that
purpose;
WHEREAS, the Republic of the Philippines became an
independent nation on July 4, 1946 and proclaimed its
adherence to the Geneva Red Cross Convention on
February 14, 1947, and by that action indicated its desire
to participate with the nations of the world in mitigating
the suffering caused by war and to establish in the
Philippines a voluntary organization for that purpose as
contemplated by the Geneva Red Cross Convention;
WHEREAS, there existed in the Philippines since 1917 a
Charter of the American National Red Cross which must be
terminated in view of the independence of the Philippines;
and
WHEREAS, the volunteer organizations established in the
other countries which have ratified or adhered to the
Geneva Red Cross Convention assist in promoting the
health and welfare of their people in peace and in war, and
through their mutual assistance and cooperation directly
and through their international organizations promote

better understanding and sympathy among the peoples of

the world. (Emphasis supplied)
The PNRC is a member National Society of the
International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement
(Movement), which is composed of the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the International
Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
(International Federation), and the National Red Cross and
Red Crescent Societies (National Societies). The
Movement is united and guided by its seven Fundamental
Principles:
1. HUMANITY The International Red Cross and
Red Crescent Movement, born of a desire to bring
assistance without discrimination to the wounded
on the battlefield, endeavors, in its international
and national capacity, to prevent and alleviate
human suffering wherever it may be found. Its
purpose is to protect life and health and to ensure
respect for the human being. It promotes mutual
understanding, friendship, cooperation and lasting
peace amongst all peoples.
2. IMPARTIALITY It makes no discrimination as
to nationality, race, religious beliefs, class or
political opinions. It endeavors to relieve the
suffering of individuals, being guided solely by
their needs, and to give priority to the most
urgent cases of distress.
3. NEUTRALITY In order to continue to enjoy the
confidence of all, the Movement may not take
sides in hostilities or engage at any time in
controversies of a political, racial, religious or
ideological nature.
4. INDEPENDENCE The Movement is
independent. The National Societies, while
auxiliaries in the humanitarian services of their
governments and subject to the laws of their
respective countries, must always maintain their
autonomy so that they may be able at all times to
act in accordance with the principles of the
Movement.
5. VOLUNTARY SERVICE It is a voluntary relief
movement not prompted in any manner by desire
for gain.
6. UNITY There can be only one Red Cross or
one Red Crescent Society in any one country. It
must be open to all. It must carry on its
humanitarian work throughout its territory.
7. UNIVERSALITY The International Red Cross
and Red Crescent Movement, in which all Societies
have equal status and share equal responsibilities
and duties in helping each other, is worldwide.
(Emphasis supplied)

24

The Fundamental Principles provide a universal standard

of reference for all members of the Movement. The PNRC,
as a member National Society of the Movement, has the
duty to uphold the Fundamental Principles and ideals of
the Movement. In order to be recognized as a National
Society, the PNRC has to be autonomous and must
operate in conformity with the Fundamental Principles of
the Movement.11
The reason for this autonomy is fundamental. To be
accepted by warring belligerents as neutral workers during
international or internal armed conflicts, the PNRC
volunteers must not be seen as belonging to any side of
the armed conflict. In the Philippines where there is a
communist insurgency and a Muslim separatist rebellion,
the PNRC cannot be seen as government-owned or
controlled, and neither can the PNRC volunteers be
identified as government personnel or as instruments of
government policy. Otherwise, the insurgents or
separatists will treat PNRC volunteers as enemies when
the volunteers tend to the wounded in the battlefield or
the displaced civilians in conflict areas.
Thus, the PNRC must not only be, but must also be seen
to be, autonomous, neutral and independent in order to
conduct its activities in accordance with the Fundamental
Principles. The PNRC must not appear to be an instrument
or agency that implements government policy; otherwise,
it cannot merit the trust of all and cannot effectively carry
out its mission as a National Red Cross Society.12 It is
imperative that the PNRC must be autonomous, neutral,
and independent in relation to the State.
To ensure and maintain its autonomy, neutrality, and
independence, the PNRC cannot be owned or controlled by
the government. Indeed, the Philippine government does
not own the PNRC. The PNRC does not have government
assets and does not receive any appropriation from the
Philippine Congress.13 The PNRC is financed primarily by
contributions from private individuals and private entities
obtained through solicitation campaigns organized by its
Board of Governors, as provided under Section 11 of the
PNRC Charter:
SECTION 11. As a national voluntary organization, the
Philippine National Red Cross shall be financed primarily
by contributions obtained through solicitation campaigns
throughout the year which shall be organized by the Board
of Governors and conducted by the Chapters in their
respective jurisdictions. These fund raising campaigns
shall be conducted independently of other fund drives by
other organizations. (Emphasis supplied)
The government does not control the PNRC. Under the
PNRC Charter, as amended, only six of the thirty members
of the PNRC Board of Governors are appointed by the
President of the Philippines. Thus, twenty-four members,
or four-fifths (4/5), of the PNRC Board of Governors are
not appointed by the President. Section 6 of the PNRC
Charter, as amended, provides:

SECTION 6. The governing powers and authority shall be

vested in a Board of Governors composed of thirty
members, six of whom shall be appointed by the President
of the Philippines, eighteen shall be elected by chapter
delegates in biennial conventions and the remaining six
shall be selected by the twenty-four members of the
Board already chosen. x x x.
Thus, of the twenty-four members of the PNRC Board,
eighteen are elected by the chapter delegates of the
PNRC, and six are elected by the twenty-four members
already chosen a select group where the private sector
members have three-fourths majority. Clearly, an
overwhelming majority of four-fifths of the PNRC Board
are elected or chosen by the private sector members of
the PNRC.
The PNRC Board of Governors, which exercises all
corporate powers of the PNRC, elects the PNRC Chairman
and all other officers of the PNRC. The incumbent
Chairman of PNRC, respondent Senator Gordon, was
elected, as all PNRC Chairmen are elected, by a private
sector-controlled PNRC Board four-fifths of whom are
private sector members of the PNRC. The PNRC Chairman
is not appointed by the President or by any subordinate
government official.
Under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, 14 the
President appoints all officials and employees in the
Executive branch whose appointments are vested in the
President by the Constitution or by law. The President also
appoints those whose appointments are not otherwise
provided by law. Under this Section 16, the law may also
authorize the "heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards" to appoint officers lower in rank
than such heads of departments, agencies, commissions
or boards.15 In Rufino v. Endriga,16 the Court explained
appointments under Section 16 in this wise:
Under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the
President appoints three groups of officers. The first group
refers to the heads of the Executive departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers
of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval
captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested
in the President by the Constitution. The second group
refers to those whom the President may be authorized by
law to appoint. The third group refers to all other officers
of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided by law.
Under the same Section 16, there is a fourth group of
lower-ranked officers whose appointments Congress may
by law vest in the heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards. x x x
xxx
In a department in the Executive branch, the head is the
Secretary. The law may not authorize the Undersecretary,
acting as such Undersecretary, to appoint lower-ranked
officers in the Executive department. In an agency, the

25

power is vested in the head of the agency for it would be

preposterous to vest it in the agency itself. In a
commission, the head is the chairperson of the
commission. In a board, the head is also the chairperson
of the board. In the last three situations, the law may not
also authorize officers other than the heads of the agency,
commission, or board to appoint lower-ranked officers.
xxx
The Constitution authorizes Congress to vest the power to
appoint lower-ranked officers specifically in the "heads" of
the specified offices, and in no other person. The word
"heads" refers to the chairpersons of the commissions or
boards and not to their members, for several reasons.
The President does not appoint the Chairman of the PNRC.
Neither does the head of any department, agency,
commission or board appoint the PNRC Chairman. Thus,
the PNRC Chairman is not an official or employee of the
Executive branch since his appointment does not fall
under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Certainly,
the PNRC Chairman is not an official or employee of the
Judiciary or Legislature. This leads us to the obvious
conclusion that the PNRC Chairman is not an official or
employee of the Philippine Government. Not being a
government official or employee, the PNRC Chairman, as
such, does not hold a government office or employment.
Under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, 17 the
President exercises control over all government offices in
the Executive branch. If an office is legally not under
the control of the President, then such office is not
part of the Executive branch. In Rufino v.
Endriga,18 the Court explained the Presidents power of
control over all government offices as follows:
Every government office, entity, or agency must fall under
the Executive, Legislative, or Judicial branches, or must
belong to one of the independent constitutional bodies, or
must be a quasi-judicial body or local government unit.
Otherwise, such government office, entity, or agency has
no legal and constitutional basis for its existence.
The CCP does not fall under the Legislative or Judicial
branches of government. The CCP is also not one of the
independent constitutional bodies. Neither is the CCP a
quasi-judicial body nor a local government unit. Thus, the
CCP must fall under the Executive branch. Under the
Revised Administrative Code of 1987, any agency "not
placed by law or order creating them under any specific
department" falls "under the Office of the President."
Since the President exercises control over "all the
executive departments, bureaus, and offices," the
President necessarily exercises control over the CCP which
is an office in the Executive branch. In mandating that the
President "shall have control of all executive . . . offices,"
Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution does not
exempt any executive office one performing executive
functions outside of the independent constitutional bodies
from the Presidents power of control. There is no

dispute that the CCP performs executive, and not

legislative, judicial, or quasi-judicial functions.
The Presidents power of control applies to the acts or
decisions of all officers in the Executive branch. This is
true whether such officers are appointed by the President
or by heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or
boards. The power of control means the power to revise or
reverse the acts or decisions of a subordinate officer
involving the exercise of discretion.
In short, the President sits at the apex of the Executive
branch, and exercises "control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices." There can be no
instance under the Constitution where an officer of the
Executive branch is outside the control of the President.
The Executive branch is unitary since there is only one
President vested with executive power exercising control
over the entire Executive branch. Any office in the
Executive branch that is not under the control of the
President is a lost command whose existence is without
any legal or constitutional basis. (Emphasis supplied)
An overwhelming four-fifths majority of the PNRC Board
are private sector individuals elected to the PNRC Board
by the private sector members of the PNRC. The PNRC
Board exercises all corporate powers of the PNRC. The
PNRC is controlled by private sector individuals. Decisions
or actions of the PNRC Board are not reviewable by the
President. The President cannot reverse or modify the
decisions or actions of the PNRC Board. Neither can the
President reverse or modify the decisions or actions of the
PNRC Chairman. It is the PNRC Board that can review,
reverse or modify the decisions or actions of the PNRC
Chairman. This proves again that the office of the PNRC
Chairman is a private office, not a government
office.1avvphi1
Although the State is often represented in the governing
bodies of a National Society, this can be justified by the
need for proper coordination with the public authorities,
and the government representatives may take part in
decision-making within a National Society. However, the
freely-elected representatives of a National Societys
active members must remain in a large majority in a
National Societys governing bodies.19
The PNRC is not government-owned but privately owned.
The vast majority of the thousands of PNRC members are
private individuals, including students. Under the PNRC
Charter, those who contribute to the annual fund
campaign of the PNRC are entitled to membership in the
PNRC for one year. Thus, any one between 6 and 65 years
of age can be a PNRC member for one year upon
contributing P35, P100, P300, P500 or P1,000 for the
year.20 Even foreigners, whether residents or not, can be
members of the PNRC. Section 5 of the PNRC Charter, as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 1264,21 reads:
SEC. 5. Membership in the Philippine National Red Cross
shall be open to the entire population in the Philippines
regardless of citizenship. Any contribution to the Philippine

26

National Red Cross Annual Fund Campaign shall entitle the

contributor to membership for one year and said
contribution shall be deductible in full for taxation
purposes.
Thus, the PNRC is a privately owned, privately funded,
and privately run charitable organization. The PNRC is not
a government-owned or controlled corporation.
Petitioners anchor their petition on the 1999 case of
Camporedondo v. NLRC,22 which ruled that the PNRC is a
government-owned or controlled corporation. In ruling
that the PNRC is a government-owned or controlled
corporation, the simple test used was whether the
corporation was created by its own special charter for the
exercise of a public function or by incorporation under the
general corporation law. Since the PNRC was created
under a special charter, the Court then ruled that it is a
government corporation. However,
the Camporedondoruling failed to consider the definition
of a government-owned or controlled corporation as
provided under Section 2(13) of the Introductory
Provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987:
SEC. 2. General Terms Defined. x x x
(13) Government-owned or controlled corporation refers
to any agency organized as a stock or non-stock
corporation, vested with functions relating to public needs
whether governmental or proprietary in nature, and
owned by the Government directly or through its
instrumentalities either wholly, or where applicable as in
the case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least
fifty-one (51) percent of its capital stock: Provided, That
government-owned or controlled corporations may be
further categorized by the Department of the Budget, the
Civil Service Commission, and the Commission on Audit
for purposes of the exercise and discharge of their
respective powers, functions and responsibilities with
respect to such corporations.(Boldfacing and underscoring
supplied)
A government-owned or controlled corporation must be
owned by the government, and in the case of a stock
corporation, at least a majority of its capital stock must be
owned by the government. In the case of a non-stock
corporation, by analogy at least a majority of the
members must be government officials holding such
membership by appointment or designation by the
government. Under this criterion, and as discussed earlier,
the government does not own or control PNRC.
The PNRC Charter is Violative of the Constitutional
Proscription against the Creation of Private Corporations
by Special Law
The 1935 Constitution, as amended, was in force when
the PNRC was created by special charter on 22 March
1947. Section 7, Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution, as
amended, reads:

SEC. 7. The Congress shall not, except by general law,

provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of
private corporations, unless such corporations are owned
or controlled by the Government or any subdivision or
instrumentality thereof.
The subsequent 1973 and 1987 Constitutions contain
similar provisions prohibiting Congress from creating
private corporations except by general law. Section 1 of
the PNRC Charter, as amended, creates the PNRC as a
"body corporate and politic," thus:
SECTION 1. There is hereby created in the Republic of the
Philippines a body corporate and politic to be the
voluntary organization officially designated to assist the
Republic of the Philippines in discharging the obligations
set forth in the Geneva Conventions and to perform such
other duties as are inherent upon a National Red Cross
Society. The national headquarters of this Corporation
shall be located in Metropolitan Manila. (Emphasis
supplied)
In Feliciano v. Commission on Audit, 23 the Court explained
the constitutional provision prohibiting Congress from
creating private corporations in this wise:
We begin by explaining the general framework under the
fundamental law. The Constitution recognizes two classes
of corporations. The first refers to private corporations
created under a general law. The second refers to
government-owned or controlled corporations created by
special charters. Section 16, Article XII of the Constitution
provides:
Sec. 16. The Congress shall not, except by general law,
provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of
private corporations. Government-owned or controlled
corporations may be created or established by special
charters in the interest of the common good and subject
to the test of economic viability.
The Constitution emphatically prohibits the creation of
private corporations except by general law applicable to all
citizens. The purpose of this constitutional provision is to
ban private corporations created by special charters,
which historically gave certain individuals, families or
groups special privileges denied to other citizens.
In short, Congress cannot enact a law creating a private
corporation with a special charter. Such legislation would
be unconstitutional. Private corporations may exist only
under a general law. If the corporation is private, it must
necessarily exist under a general law. Stated differently,
only corporations created under a general law can qualify
as private corporations. Under existing laws, the general
law is the Corporation Code, except that the Cooperative
Code governs the incorporation of cooperatives.
The Constitution authorizes Congress to create
government-owned or controlled corporations through
special charters. Since private corporations cannot have
special charters, it follows that Congress can create

27

corporations with special charters only if such corporations

are government-owned or controlled.24 (Emphasis
supplied)
In Feliciano, the Court held that the Local Water Districts
are government-owned or controlled corporations since
they exist by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 198, which
constitutes their special charter. The seed capital assets of
the Local Water Districts, such as waterworks and
sewerage facilities, were public property which were
managed, operated by or under the control of the city,
municipality or province before the assets were
transferred to the Local Water Districts. The Local Water
Districts also receive subsidies and loans from the Local
Water Utilities Administration (LWUA). In fact, under the
2009 General Appropriations Act,25 the LWUA has a budget
amounting to P400,000,000 for its subsidy
requirements.26 There is no private capital invested in
the Local Water Districts. The capital assets and
operating funds of the Local Water Districts all come from
the government, either through transfer of assets, loans,
subsidies or the income from such assets or funds.
The government also controls the Local Water Districts
because the municipal or city mayor, or the provincial
governor, appoints all the board directors of the Local
Water Districts. Furthermore, the board directors and
other personnel of the Local Water Districts are
government employees subject to civil service laws and
anti-graft laws. Clearly, the Local Water Districts are
considered government-owned or controlled corporations
not only because of their creation by special charter but
also because the government in fact owns and controls
the Local Water Districts.
Just like the Local Water Districts, the PNRC was created
through a special charter. However, unlike the Local Water
Districts, the elements of government ownership and
control are clearly lacking in the PNRC. Thus, although the
PNRC is created by a special charter, it cannot be
considered a government-owned or controlled corporation
in the absence of the essential elements of ownership and
control by the government. In creating the PNRC as a
corporate entity, Congress was in fact creating a private
corporation. However, the constitutional prohibition
against the creation of private corporations by special
charters provides no exception even for non-profit or
charitable corporations. Consequently, the PNRC Charter,
insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation and
grants it corporate powers,27 is void for being
unconstitutional. Thus, Sections
1,28 2,29 3,304(a),31 5,32 6,33 7,34 8,35 9,36 10,37 11,38 12,39 an
d 1340 of the PNRC Charter, as amended, are void.
The other provisions41 of the PNRC Charter remain valid as
they can be considered as a recognition by the State that
the unincorporated PNRC is the local National Society of
the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement,
and thus entitled to the benefits, exemptions and
privileges set forth in the PNRC Charter. The other
provisions of the PNRC Charter implement the Philippine
Governments treaty obligations under Article 4(5) of the

Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent

Movement, which provides that to be recognized as a
National Society, the Society must be "duly recognized by
the legal government of its country on the basis of the
Geneva Conventions and of the national legislation as a
voluntary aid society, auxiliary to the public authorities in
the humanitarian field."
In sum, we hold that the office of the PNRC Chairman is
not a government office or an office in a governmentowned or controlled corporation for purposes of the
prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution. However, since the PNRC Charter is void
insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation, the
PNRC should incorporate under the Corporation Code and
register with the Securities and Exchange Commission if it
wants to be a private corporation.
WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman
of the Philippine National Red Cross is not a government
office or an office in a government-owned or controlled
corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. We also declare that
Sections 1, 2, 3, 4(a), 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 of
the Charter of the Philippine National Red Cross, or
Republic Act No. 95, as amended by Presidential Decree
Nos. 1264 and 1643, are VOID because they create the
PNRC as a private corporation or grant it corporate
powers.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 196271

October 18, 2011

DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA, in his personal capacity,

and in representation of MAGUINDANAO
FEDERATION OF AUTONOMOUS IRRIGATORS
ASSOCIATION, INC., HADJI MUHMINA J. USMAN,
JOHN ANTHONY L. LIM, JAMILON T. ODIN, ASRIN
TIMBOL JAIYARI, MUJIB M. KALANG, ALIH AL-SAIDI
J. SAPI-E, KESSAR DAMSIE ABDIL, and BASSAM
ALUH SAUPI, Petitioners,
vs.
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its
President JUAN PONCE ENRILE, HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, thru SPEAKER FELICIANO
BELMONTE, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, thru its
Chairman, SIXTO BRILLANTES, JR., PAQUITO
OCHOA, JR., Office of the President Executive
Secretary, FLORENCIO ABAD, JR., Secretary of
Budget, and ROBERTO TAN, Treasurer of the
Philippines,Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 196305
BASARI D. MAPUPUNO, Petitioner,
vs.
SIXTO BRILLANTES, in his capacity as Chairman of
the Commission on Elections, FLORENCIO ABAD, JR.

28

in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of

Budget and Management, PACQUITO OCHOA, JR., in
his capacity as Executive Secretary, JUAN PONCE
ENRILE, in his capacity as Senate President, and
FELICIANO BELMONTE, in his capacity as Speaker of
the House of Representatives, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

BRION, J.:

G.R. No. 197221

On June 30, 2011, Republic Act (RA) No. 10153, entitled

"An Act Providing for the Synchronization of the Elections
in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)
with the National and Local Elections and for Other
Purposes" was enacted. The law reset the ARMM elections
from the 8th of August 2011, to the second Monday of
May 2013 and every three (3) years thereafter, to coincide
with the countrys regular national and local elections. The
law as well granted the President the power to "appoint
officers-in-charge (OICs) for the Office of the Regional
Governor, the Regional Vice-Governor, and the Members of
the Regional Legislative Assembly, who shall perform the
functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials
duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified
and assumed office."

REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, Petitioner,

vs.
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as the
Executive Secretary, and the COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 197280
ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH, DATU CASAN CONDING
CANA, and PARTIDO DEMOKRATIKO PILIPINO
LAKAS NG BAYAN (PDP-LABAN), Petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, through its
Chairman, SIXTO BRILLANTES, JR., HON. PAQUITO
N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as Executive
Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, JR., in his
capacity as Secretary of the Department of Budget
and Management, and HON. ROBERTO B. TAN, in his
capacity as Treasurer of the
Philippines, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 197282
ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and THE OFFICE OF
THE PRESIDENT, through EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 197392
LUIS "BAROK" BIRAOGO, Petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 197454
JACINTO V. PARAS, Petitioner,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,
and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondents.

MINORITY RIGHTS FORUM, PHILIPPINES,

INC., Respondents-Intervenor.
DECISION

Even before its formal passage, the bills that became RA

No. 10153 already spawned petitions against their
validity; House Bill No. 4146 and Senate Bill No. 2756
were challenged in petitions filed with this Court. These
petitions multiplied after RA No. 10153 was passed.
Factual Antecedents
The State, through Sections 15 to 22, Article X of the
1987 Constitution, mandated the creation of autonomous
regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras. Section
15 states:
Section 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in
Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of
provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas
sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural
heritage, economic and social structures, and other
relevant characteristics within the framework of this
Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as
territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.
Section 18 of the Article, on the other hand, directed
Congress to enact an organic act for these autonomous
regions to concretely carry into effect the granted
autonomy.
Section 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for
each autonomous region with the assistance and
participation of the regional consultative commission
composed of representatives appointed by the President
from a list of nominees from multisectoral bodies. The
organic act shall define the basic structure of government
for the region consisting of the executive department and
legislative assembly, both of which shall be elective and
representative of the constituent political units. The

29

organic acts shall likewise provide for special courts with

personal, family and property law jurisdiction consistent
with the provisions of this Constitution and national laws.
The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective
when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the
constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose,
provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas
voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the
autonomous region.
On August 1, 1989 or two years after the effectivity of the
1987 Constitution, Congress acted through Republic Act
(RA) No. 6734 entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic
Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao." A
plebiscite was held on November 6, 1990 as required by
Section 18(2), Article X of RA No. 6734, thus fully
establishing the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM). The initially assenting provinces were Lanao del
Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-tawi. RA No. 6734
scheduled the first regular elections for the regional
officials of the ARMM on a date not earlier than 60 days
nor later than 90 days after its ratification.
RA No. 9054 (entitled "An Act to Strengthen and Expand
the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao, Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No.
6734, entitled An Act Providing for the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao, as Amended") was the next
legislative act passed. This law provided further
refinement in the basic ARMM structure first defined in the
original organic act, and reset the regular elections for the
ARMM regional officials to the second Monday of
September 2001.
Congress passed the next law affecting ARMM RA No.
91401 - on June 22, 2001. This law reset the first regular
elections originally scheduled under RA No. 9054, to
November 26, 2001. It likewise set the plebiscite to ratify
RA No. 9054 to not later than August 15, 2001.
RA No. 9054 was ratified in a plebiscite held on August 14,
2001. The province of Basilan and Marawi City voted to
join ARMM on the same date.
RA No. 93332 was subsequently passed by Congress to
reset the ARMM regional elections to the 2nd Monday of
August 2005, and on the same date every 3 years
thereafter. Unlike RA No. 6734 and RA No. 9054, RA No.
9333 was not ratified in a plebiscite.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional
elections should have been held on August 8, 2011.
COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections and
had accepted certificates of candidacies for the various
regional offices to be elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA
No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the ARMM elections to
May 2013, to coincide with the regular national and local
elections of the country.
RA No. 10153 originated in the House of Representatives
as House Bill (HB) No. 4146, seeking the postponement of

the ARMM elections scheduled on August 8, 2011. On

March 22, 2011, the House of Representatives passed HB
No. 4146, with one hundred ninety one (191) Members
voting in its favor.
After the Senate received HB No. 4146, it adopted its own
version, Senate Bill No. 2756 (SB No. 2756), on June 6,
2011. Thirteen (13) Senators voted favorably for its
passage. On June 7, 2011, the House of Representative
concurred with the Senate amendments, and on June 30,
2011, the President signed RA No. 10153 into law.
As mentioned, the early challenge to RA No. 10153 came
through a petition filed with this Court G.R. No.
1962713 - assailing the constitutionality of both HB No.
4146 and SB No. 2756, and challenging the validity of RA
No. 9333 as well for non-compliance with the
constitutional plebiscite requirement. Thereafter, petitioner
Basari Mapupuno in G.R. No. 196305 filed another
petition4 also assailing the validity of RA No. 9333.
With the enactment into law of RA No. 10153, the
COMELEC stopped its preparations for the ARMM elections.
The law gave rise as well to the filing of the following
petitions against its constitutionality:
a) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition5 filed by
Rep. Edcel Lagman as a member of the House of
Representatives against Paquito Ochoa, Jr. (in his
capacity as the Executive Secretary) and the
COMELEC, docketed as G.R. No. 197221;
b) Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition6 filed by
Atty. Romulo Macalintal as a taxpayer against the
COMELEC, docketed as G.R. No. 197282;
c) Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus, Injunction
and Preliminary Injunction7 filed by Louis "Barok"
Biraogo against the COMELEC and Executive
Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., docketed as G.R.
No. 197392; and
d) Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus8 filed by
Jacinto Paras as a member of the House of
Representatives against Executive Secretary
Paquito Ochoa, Jr. and the COMELEC, docketed as
G.R. No. 197454.
Petitioners Alamarim Centi Tillah and Datu Casan Conding
Cana as registered voters from the ARMM, with the
Partido Demokratiko Pilipino Lakas ng Bayan (a political
party with candidates in the ARMM regional elections
scheduled for August 8, 2011), also filed a Petition for
Prohibition and Mandamus9 against the COMELEC,
docketed as G.R. No. 197280, to assail the
constitutionality of RA No. 9140, RA No. 9333 and RA No.
10153.
Subsequently, Anak Mindanao Party-List, Minority Rights
Forum Philippines, Inc. and Bangsamoro Solidarity
Movement filed their own Motion for Leave to Admit their
Motion for Intervention and Comment-in-Intervention

30

dated July 18, 2011. On July 26, 2011, the Court granted
the motion. In the same Resolution, the Court ordered the
consolidation of all the petitions relating to the
constitutionality of HB No. 4146, SB No. 2756, RA No.
9333, and RA No. 10153.
Oral arguments were held on August 9, 2011 and August
16, 2011. Thereafter, the parties were instructed to
submit their respective memoranda within twenty (20)
days.
On September 13, 2011, the Court issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining the implementation of RA No.
10153 and ordering the incumbent elective officials of
ARMM to continue to perform their functions should these
cases not be decided by the end of their term on
September 30, 2011.

A. Does the postponement of the ARMM

regular elections constitute an amendment
to Section 7, Article XVIII of RA No. 9054?
B. Does the requirement of a
supermajority vote for amendments or
revisions to RA No. 9054 violate Section 1
and Section 16(2), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and the corollary doctrine on
irrepealable laws?
C. Does the requirement of a plebiscite
apply only in the creation of autonomous
regions under paragraph 2, Section 18,
Article X of the 1987 Constitution?
IV. Whether RA No. 10153 violates the autonomy
granted to the ARMM

The Arguments
The petitioners assailing RA No. 9140, RA No. 9333 and
RA No. 10153 assert that these laws amend RA No. 9054
and thus, have to comply with the supermajority vote and
plebiscite requirements prescribed under Sections 1 and
3, Article XVII of RA No. 9094 in order to become
effective.
The petitions assailing RA No. 10153 further maintain that
it is unconstitutional for its failure to comply with the
three-reading requirement of Section 26(2), Article VI of
the Constitution. Also cited as grounds are the alleged
violations of the right of suffrage of the people of ARMM,
as well as the failure to adhere to the "elective and
representative" character of the executive and legislative
departments of the ARMM. Lastly, the petitioners
challenged the grant to the President of the power to
appoint OICs to undertake the functions of the elective
ARMM officials until the officials elected under the May
2013 regular elections shall have assumed office.
Corrolarily, they also argue that the power of appointment
also gave the President the power of control over the
ARMM, in complete violation of Section 16, Article X of the
Constitution.
The Issues
From the parties submissions, the following issues were
recognized and argued by the parties in the oral
arguments of August 9 and 16, 2011:
I. Whether the 1987 Constitution mandates the
synchronization of elections
II. Whether the passage of RA No. 10153 violates
Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
III. Whether the passage of RA No. 10153
requires a supermajority vote and plebiscite

V. Whether the grant of the power to appoint OICs

violates:
A. Section 15, Article X of the 1987
Constitution
B. Section 16, Article X of the 1987
Constitution
C. Section 18, Article X of the 1987
Constitution
VI. Whether the proposal to hold special elections
is constitutional and legal.
We shall discuss these issues in the order they are
presented above.
OUR RULING
We resolve to DISMISS the petitions and thereby UPHOLD
the constitutionality of RA No. 10153 in toto.
I. Synchronization as a recognized constitutional mandate
The respondent Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
argues that the Constitution mandates synchronization,
and in support of this position, cites Sections 1, 2 and 5,
Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of the 1987
Constitution, which provides:
Section 1. The first elections of Members of the Congress
under this Constitution shall be held on the second
Monday of May, 1987.
The first local elections shall be held on a date to be
determined by the President, which may be simultaneous
with the election of the Members of the Congress. It shall
include the election of all Members of the city or municipal
councils in the Metropolitan Manila area.

31

Section 2. The Senators, Members of the House of

Representatives and the local officials first elected under
this Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992.
Of the Senators elected in the election in 1992, the first
twelve obtaining the highest number of votes shall serve
for six year and the remaining twelve for three years.
xxx
Section 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President
and Vice President elected in the February 7, 1986
election is, for purposes of synchronization of elections,
hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992.
The first regular elections for President and Vice-President
under this Constitution shall be held on the second
Monday of May, 1992.

simultaneously since this is the precise intent in

terminating their Office Tenure on the same day or
occasion. This common termination date will synchronize
future elections to once every three years (Bernas, the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Vol. II, p.
605).
That the election for Senators, Members of the House of
Representatives and the local officials (under Sec. 2, Art.
XVIII) will have to be synchronized with the election for
President and Vice President (under Sec. 5, Art. XVIII) is
likewise evident from the x x x records of the proceedings
in the Constitutional Commission. [Emphasis supplied.]
Although called regional elections, the ARMM elections
should be included among the elections to be
synchronized as it is a "local" election based on the
wording and structure of the Constitution.1avvphil

While the Constitution does not expressly state that

Congress has to synchronize national and local elections,
the clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned
from the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the
Constitution,10 which show the extent to which the
Constitutional Commission, by deliberately making
adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials,
sought to attain synchronization of elections. 11

A basic rule in constitutional construction is that the words

used should be understood in the sense that they have in
common use and given their ordinary meaning, except
when technical terms are employed, in which case the
significance thus attached to them prevails.15 As this Court
explained in People v. Derilo,16 "[a]s the Constitution is not
primarily a lawyers document, its language should be
understood in the sense that it may have in common. Its
words should be given their ordinary meaning except
where technical terms are employed."

The objective behind setting a common termination date

for all elective officials, done among others through the
shortening the terms of the twelve winning senators with
the least number of votes, is to synchronize the holding of
all future elections whether national or local to once
every three years.12 This intention finds full support in the
discussions during the Constitutional Commission
deliberations.13

Understood in its ordinary sense, the word "local" refers to

something that primarily serves the needs of a particular
limited district, often a community or minor political
subdivision.17 Regional elections in the ARMM for the
positions of governor, vice-governor and regional
assembly representatives obviously fall within this
classification, since they pertain to the elected officials
who will serve within the limited region of ARMM.

These Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with

the provisions of the Transitory Provisions of the
Constitution, all serve as patent indicators of the
constitutional mandate to hold synchronized national and
local elections, starting the second Monday of May, 1992
and for all the following elections.

From the perspective of the Constitution, autonomous

regions are considered one of the forms of local
governments, as evident from Article X of the Constitution
entitled "Local Government." Autonomous regions are
established and discussed under Sections 15 to 21 of this
Article the article wholly devoted to Local Government.
That an autonomous region is considered a form of local
government is also reflected in Section 1, Article X of the
Constitution, which provides:

We agree with this position.

This Court was not left behind in recognizing the

synchronization of the national and local elections as a
constitutional mandate. In Osmea v. Commission on
Elections,14 we explained:
It is clear from the aforequoted provisions of the 1987
Constitution that the terms of office of Senators, Members
of the House of Representatives, the local officials, the
President and the Vice-President have been synchronized
to end on the same hour, date and year noon of June
30, 1992.
It is likewise evident from the wording of the abovementioned Sections that the term of synchronization is
used synonymously as the phrase holding

Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the

Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities,
municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous
regions in Muslim Mindanao, and the Cordilleras as
hereinafter provided.
Thus, we find the contention that the synchronization
mandated by the Constitution does not include the
regional elections of the ARMM unmeritorious. We shall
refer to synchronization in the course of our discussions
below, as this concept permeates the consideration of the
various issues posed in this case and must be recalled
time and again for its complete resolution.

32

II. The Presidents Certification on the Urgency of RA No.

10153

considered by members of Congress, certainly should

elicit a different standard of review. [Emphasis supplied.]

The petitioners in G.R. No. 197280 also challenge the

validity of RA No. 10153 for its alleged failure to comply
with Section 26(2), Article VI of the Constitution18 which
provides that before bills passed by either the House or
the Senate can become laws, they must pass through
three readings on separate days. The exception is when
the President certifies to the necessity of the bills
immediate enactment.

The House of Representatives and the Senate in the

exercise of their legislative discretion gave full
recognition to the Presidents certification and promptly
enacted RA No. 10153. Under the circumstances, nothing
short of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the two
houses of Congress can justify our intrusion under our
power of judicial review.21

The Court, in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, explained

the effect of the Presidents certification of necessity in the
following manner:
19

The presidential certification dispensed with the

requirement not only of printing but also that of reading
the bill on separate days. The phrase "except when the
President certifies to the necessity of its immediate
enactment, etc." in Art. VI, Section 26[2] qualifies the two
stated conditions before a bill can become a law: [i] the
bill has passed three readings on separate days and [ii] it
has been printed in its final form and distributed three
days before it is finally approved.
xxx
That upon the certification of a bill by the President, the
requirement of three readings on separate days and of
printing and distribution can be dispensed with is
supported by the weight of legislative practice. For
example, the bill defining the certiorari jurisdiction of this
Court which, in consolidation with the Senate version,
became Republic Act No. 5440, was passed on second and
third readings in the House of Representatives on the
same day [May 14, 1968] after the bill had been certified
by the President as urgent.
In the present case, the records show that the President
wrote to the Speaker of the House of Representatives to
certify the necessity of the immediate enactment of a law
synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and
local elections.20 Following our Tolentino ruling, the
Presidents certification exempted both the House and the
Senate from having to comply with the three separate
readings requirement.
On the follow-up contention that no necessity existed for
the immediate enactment of these bills since there was no
public calamity or emergency that had to be met, again
we hark back to our ruling in Tolentino:
The sufficiency of the factual basis of the suspension of
the writ of habeas corpus or declaration of martial law Art.
VII, Section 18, or the existence of a national emergency
justifying the delegation of extraordinary powers to the
President under Art. VI, Section 23(2) is subject to judicial
review because basic rights of individuals may be of
hazard. But the factual basis of presidential certification of
bills, which involves doing away with procedural
requirements designed to insure that bills are duly

The petitioners, however, failed to provide us with any

cause or justification for this course of action. Hence,
while the judicial department and this Court are not bound
by the acceptance of the President's certification by both
the House of Representatives and the Senate, prudent
exercise of our powers and respect due our co-equal
branches of government in matters committed to them by
the Constitution, caution a stay of the judicial hand. 22
In any case, despite the Presidents certification, the twofold purpose that underlies the requirement for three
readings on separate days of every bill must always be
observed to enable our legislators and other parties
interested in pending bills to intelligently respond to them.
Specifically, the purpose with respect to Members of
Congress is: (1) to inform the legislators of the matters
they shall vote on and (2) to give them notice that a
measure is in progress through the enactment process. 23
We find, based on the records of the deliberations on the
law, that both advocates and the opponents of the
proposed measure had sufficient opportunities to present
their views. In this light, no reason exists to nullify RA No.
10153 on the cited ground.
III. A. RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 are not
amendments to RA No. 9054
The effectivity of RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 has also
been challenged because they did not comply with
Sections 1 and 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 in amending
this law. These provisions require:
Section 1. Consistent with the provisions of the
Constitution, this Organic Act may be reamended or
revised by the Congress of the Philippines upon a vote of
two-thirds (2/3) of the Members of the House of
Representatives and of the Senate voting separately.
Section 3. Any amendment to or revision of this Organic
Act shall become effective only when approved by a
majority of the vote cast in a plebiscite called for the
purpose, which shall be held not earlier than sixty (60)
days or later than ninety (90) days after the approval of
such amendment or revision.
We find no merit in this contention.
In the first place, neither RA No. 9333 nor RA No. 10153
amends RA No. 9054. As an examination of these laws will

33

show, RA No. 9054 only provides for the schedule of the

first ARMM elections and does not fix the date of the
regular elections. A need therefore existed for the
Congress to fix the date of the subsequent ARMM regular
elections, which it did by enacting RA No. 9333 and
thereafter, RA No. 10153. Obviously, these subsequent
laws RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 cannot be
considered amendments to RA No. 9054 as they did not
change or revise any provision in the latter law; they
merely filled in a gap in RA No. 9054 or supplemented the
law by providing the date of the subsequent regular
elections.
This view that Congress thought it best to leave the
determination of the date of succeeding ARMM elections to
legislative discretion finds support in ARMMs recent
history.
To recall, RA No. 10153 is not the first law passed that
rescheduled the ARMM elections. The First Organic Act
RA No. 6734 not only did not fix the date of the
subsequent elections; it did not even fix the specific date
of the first ARMM elections,24 leaving the date to be fixed
in another legislative enactment. Consequently, RA No.
7647,25 RA No. 8176,26 RA No. 8746,27 RA No. 8753,28 and
RA No. 901229 were all enacted by Congress to fix the
dates of the ARMM elections. Since these laws did not
change or modify any part or provision of RA No. 6734,
they were not amendments to this latter law.
Consequently, there was no need to submit them to any
plebiscite for ratification.
The Second Organic Act RA No. 9054 which lapsed
into law on March 31, 2001, provided that the first
elections would be held on the second Monday of
September 2001. Thereafter, Congress passed RA No.
914030to reset the date of the ARMM elections.
Significantly, while RA No. 9140 also scheduled the
plebiscite for the ratification of the Second Organic Act
(RA No. 9054), the new date of the ARMM regional
elections fixed in RA No. 9140 was not among the
provisions ratified in the plebiscite held to approve RA No.
9054. Thereafter, Congress passed RA No. 9333, 31 which
further reset the date of the ARMM regional elections.
Again, this law was not ratified through a plebiscite.
From these legislative actions, we see the clear intention
of Congress to treat the laws which fix the date of the
subsequent ARMM elections as separate and distinct from
the Organic Acts. Congress only acted consistently with
this intent when it passed RA No. 10153 without requiring
compliance with the amendment prerequisites embodied
in Section 1 and Section 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054.
III. B. Supermajority voting requirement unconstitutional
for giving RA No. 9054 the character of an irrepealable law
Even assuming that RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 did in
fact amend RA No. 9054, the supermajority (2/3) voting
requirement required under Section 1, Article XVII of RA
No. 905432 has to be struck down for giving RA No. 9054

the character of an irrepealable law by requiring more

than what the Constitution demands.
Section 16(2), Article VI of the Constitution provides that
a "majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do
business." In other words, as long as majority of the
members of the House of Representatives or the Senate
are present, these bodies have the quorum needed to
conduct business and hold session. Within a quorum, a
vote of majority is generally sufficient to enact laws or
approve acts.
In contrast, Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054
requires a vote of no less than two-thirds (2/3) of the
Members of the House of Representatives and of the
Senate, voting separately, in order to effectively amend
RA No. 9054. Clearly, this 2/3 voting requirement is
higher than what the Constitution requires for the passage
of bills, and served to restrain the plenary powers of
Congress to amend, revise or repeal the laws it had
passed. The Courts pronouncement in City of Davao v.
GSIS33 on this subject best explains the basis and reason
for the unconstitutionality:
Moreover, it would be noxious anathema to democratic
principles for a legislative body to have the ability to bind
the actions of future legislative body, considering that
both assemblies are regarded with equal footing,
exercising as they do the same plenary powers. Perpetual
infallibility is not one of the attributes desired in a
legislative body, and a legislature which attempts to
forestall future amendments or repeals of its enactments
labors under delusions of omniscience.
xxx
A state legislature has a plenary law-making power over
all subjects, whether pertaining to persons or things,
within its territorial jurisdiction, either to introduce new
laws or repeal the old, unless prohibited expressly or by
implication by the federal constitution or limited or
restrained by its own. It cannot bind itself or its
successors by enacting irrepealable laws except when so
restrained. Every legislative body may modify or abolish
the acts passed by itself or its predecessors. This power of
repeal may be exercised at the same session at which the
original act was passed; and even while a bill is in its
progress and before it becomes a law. This legislature
cannot bind a future legislature to a particular mode
of repeal. It cannot declare in advance the intent of
subsequent legislatures or the effect of subsequent
legislation upon existing statutes.34 (Emphasis ours.)
Thus, while a supermajority is not a total ban against a
repeal, it is a limitation in excess of what the Constitution
requires on the passage of bills and is constitutionally
obnoxious because it significantly constricts the future
legislators room for action and flexibility.
III. C. Section 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 excessively
enlarged the plebiscite requirement found in Section 18,
Article X of the Constitution

34

The requirements of RA No. 9054 not only required an

unwarranted supermajority, but enlarged as well the
plebiscite requirement, as embodied in its Section 3,
Article XVII of that Act. As we did on the supermajority
requirement, we find the enlargement of the plebiscite
requirement required under Section 18, Article X of the
Constitution to be excessive to point of absurdity and,
hence, a violation of the Constitution.
Section 18, Article X of the Constitution states that the
plebiscite is required only for the creation of autonomous
regions and for determining which provinces, cities and
geographic areas will be included in the autonomous
regions. While the settled rule is that amendments to the
Organic Act have to comply with the plebiscite
requirement in order to become effective,35 questions on
the extent of the matters requiring ratification may
unavoidably arise because of the seemingly general terms
of the Constitution and the obvious absurdity that would
result if a plebiscite were to be required for every
statutory amendment.
Section 18, Article X of the Constitution plainly states that
"The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective
when approved by the majority of the votes case by the
constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose."
With these wordings as standard, we interpret the
requirement to mean that only amendments to, or
revisions of, the Organic Act constitutionally-essential to
the creation of autonomous regions i.e., those aspects
specifically mentioned in the Constitution which Congress
must provide for in the Organic Act require ratification
through a plebiscite. These amendments to the Organic
Act are those that relate to: (a) the basic structure of the
regional government; (b) the regions judicial system, i.e.,
the special courts with personal, family, and property law
jurisdiction; and, (c) the grant and extent of the
legislative powers constitutionally conceded to the
regional government under Section 20, Article X of the
Constitution.36
The date of the ARMM elections does not fall under any of
the matters that the Constitution specifically mandated
Congress to provide for in the Organic Act. Therefore,
even assuming that the supermajority votes and the
plebiscite requirements are valid, any change in the date
of elections cannot be construed as a substantial
amendment of the Organic Act that would require
compliance with these requirements.

where the terms are not constitutionally provided) and is

technically a reiteration of what is already reflected in the
law, given that regional elections are in reality local
elections by express constitutional recognition. 37
To achieve synchronization, Congress necessarily has to
reconcile the schedule of the ARMMs regular elections
(which should have been held in August 2011 based on RA
No. 9333) with the fixed schedule of the national and local
elections (fixed by RA No. 7166 to be held in May 2013).
During the oral arguments, the Court identified the three
options open to Congress in order to resolve this problem.
These options are: (1) to allow the elective officials in the
ARMM to remain in office in a hold over capacity, pursuant
to Section 7(1), Article VII of RA No. 9054, until those
elected in the synchronized elections assume office; 38 (2)
to hold special elections in the ARMM, with the terms of
those elected to expire when those elected in the
synchronized elections assume office; or (3) to authorize
the President to appoint OICs, pursuant to Section 3 of RA
No. 10153, also until those elected in the synchronized
elections assume office.
As will be abundantly clear in the discussion below,
Congress, in choosing to grant the President the power to
appoint OICs, chose the correct option and passed RA No.
10153 as a completely valid law.
V. The Constitutionality of RA No. 10153
A. Basic Underlying Premises
To fully appreciate the available options, certain
underlying material premises must be fully understood.
The first is the extent of the powers of Congress to
legislate; the second is the constitutional mandate for the
synchronization of elections; and the third is on the
concept of autonomy as recognized and established under
the 1987 Constitution.

IV. The synchronization issue

The grant of legislative power to Congress is broad,

general and comprehensive.39 The legislative body
possesses plenary power for all purposes of civil
government.40 Any power, deemed to be legislative by
usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress,
unless the Constitution has lodged it elsewhere. 41 Except
as limited by the Constitution, either expressly or
impliedly, legislative power embraces all subjects and
extends to all matters of general concern or common
interest.42

As we discussed above, synchronization of national and

local elections is a constitutional mandate that Congress
must provide for and this synchronization must include
the ARMM elections. On this point, an existing law in fact
already exists RA No. 7166 as the forerunner of the
current RA No. 10153. RA No. 7166 already provides for
the synchronization of local elections with the national and
congressional elections. Thus, what RA No. 10153
provides is an old matter for local governments (with the
exception of barangay and Sanggunian Kabataan elections

The constitutional limitations on legislative power are

either express or implied. The express limitations are
generally provided in some provisions of the Declaration of
Principles and State Policies (Article 2) and in the
provisions Bill of Rights (Article 3). Other constitutional
provisions (such as the initiative and referendum clause of
Article 6, Sections 1 and 32, and the autonomy provisions
of Article X) provide their own express limitations. The
implied limitations are found "in the evident purpose
which was in view and the circumstances and historical

35

events which led to the enactment of the particular

provision as a part of organic law."43
The constitutional provisions on autonomy specifically,
Sections 15 to 21 of Article X of the Constitution
constitute express limitations on legislative power as they
define autonomy, its requirements and its parameters,
thus limiting what is otherwise the unlimited power of
Congress to legislate on the governance of the
autonomous region.
Of particular relevance to the issues of the present case
are the limitations posed by the prescribed basic structure
of government i.e., that the government must have an
executive department and a legislative assembly, both of
which must be elective and representative of the
constituent political units; national government, too, must
not encroach on the legislative powers granted under
Section 20, Article X. Conversely and as expressly
reflected in Section 17, Article X, "all powers and functions
not granted by this Constitution or by law to the
autonomous regions shall be vested in the National
Government."
The totality of Sections 15 to 21 of Article X should
likewise serve as a standard that Congress must observe
in dealing with legislation touching on the affairs of the
autonomous regions. The terms of these sections leave no
doubt on what the Constitution intends the idea of selfrule or self-government, in particular, the power to
legislate on a wide array of social, economic and
administrative matters. But equally clear under these
provisions are the permeating principles of national
sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the Republic, as
expressed in the above-quoted Section 17 and in Section
15.44 In other words, the Constitution and the supporting
jurisprudence, as they now stand, reject the notion of
imperium et imperio45 in the relationship between the
national and the regional governments.
In relation with synchronization, both autonomy and the
synchronization of national and local elections are
recognized and established constitutional mandates, with
one being as compelling as the other. If their compelling
force differs at all, the difference is in their coverage;
synchronization operates on and affects the whole
country, while regional autonomy as the term suggests
directly carries a narrower regional effect although its
national effect cannot be discounted.
These underlying basic concepts characterize the powers
and limitations of Congress when it acted on RA No.
10153. To succinctly describe the legal situation that faced
Congress then, its decision to synchronize the regional
elections with the national, congressional and all other
local elections (save for barangay and sangguniang
kabataan elections) left it with the problem of how to
provide the ARMM with governance in the intervening
period between the expiration of the term of those elected
in August 2008 and the assumption to office twenty-one
(21) months away of those who will win in the
synchronized elections on May 13, 2013.

The problem, in other words, was for interim measures for

this period, consistent with the terms of the Constitution
and its established supporting jurisprudence, and with the
respect due to the concept of autonomy. Interim
measures, to be sure, is not a strange phenomenon in the
Philippine legal landscape. The Constitutions Transitory
Provisions themselves collectively provide measures for
transition from the old constitution to the new 46and for the
introduction of new concepts.47 As previously mentioned,
the adjustment of elective terms and of elections towards
the goal of synchronization first transpired under the
Transitory Provisions. The adjustments, however, failed to
look far enough or deeply enough, particularly into the
problems that synchronizing regional autonomous
elections would entail; thus, the present problem is with
us today.
The creation of local government units also represents
instances when interim measures are required. In the
creation of Quezon del Sur48 and Dinagat Islands,49 the
creating statutes authorized the President to appoint an
interim governor, vice-governor and members of the
sangguniang panlalawigan although these positions are
essentially elective in character; the appointive officials
were to serve until a new set of provincial officials shall
have been elected and qualified.50 A similar authority to
appoint is provided in the transition of a local government
from a sub-province to a province.51
In all these, the need for interim measures is dictated by
necessity; out-of-the-way arrangements and approaches
were adopted or used in order to adjust to the goal or
objective in sight in a manner that does not do violence to
the Constitution and to reasonably accepted norms. Under
these limitations, the choice of measures was a question
of wisdom left to congressional discretion.
To return to the underlying basic concepts, these concepts
shall serve as the guideposts and markers in our
discussion of the options available to Congress to address
the problems brought about by the synchronization of the
ARMM elections, properly understood as interim measures
that Congress had to provide. The proper understanding
of the options as interim measures assume prime
materiality as it is under these terms that the passage of
RA No. 10153 should be measured, i.e., given the
constitutional objective of synchronization that cannot
legally be faulted, did Congress gravely abuse its
discretion or violate the Constitution when it addressed
through RA No. 10153 the concomitant problems that the
adjustment of elections necessarily brought with it?
B. Holdover Option is Unconstitutional
We rule out the first option holdover for those who were
elected in executive and legislative positions in the ARMM
during the 2008-2011 term as an option that Congress
could have chosen because a holdover violates Section 8,
Article X of the Constitution. This provision states:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials,
except barangay officials, which shall be determined by

36

law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve

for more than three consecutive terms. [emphases ours]
Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are
covered and bound by the three-year term limit prescribed
by the Constitution; they cannot extend their term
through a holdover. As this Court put in Osmea v.
COMELEC:52
It is not competent for the legislature to extend the term
of officers by providing that they shall hold over until their
successors are elected and qualified where the
constitution has in effect or by clear implication prescribed
the term and when the Constitution fixes the day on which
the official term shall begin, there is no legislative
authority to continue the office beyond that period, even
though the successors fail to qualify within the time.
In American Jurisprudence it has been stated as follows:
"It has been broadly stated that the legislature cannot, by
an act postponing the election to fill an office the term of
which is limited by the Constitution, extend the term of
the incumbent beyond the period as limited by the
Constitution." [Emphasis ours.]
Independently of the Osmea ruling, the primacy of the
Constitution as the supreme law of the land dictates that
where the Constitution has itself made a determination or
given its mandate, then the matters so determined or
mandated should be respected until the Constitution itself
is changed by amendment or repeal through the
applicable constitutional process. A necessary corollary is
that none of the three branches of government can
deviate from the constitutional mandate except only as
the Constitution itself may allow.53 If at all, Congress may
only pass legislation filing in details to fully operationalize
the constitutional command or to implement it by
legislation if it is non-self-executing; this Court, on the
other hand, may only interpret the mandate if an
interpretation is appropriate and called for.54
In the case of the terms of local officials, their term has
been fixed clearly and unequivocally, allowing no room for
any implementing legislation with respect to the fixed
term itself and no vagueness that would allow an
interpretation from this Court. Thus, the term of three
years for local officials should stay at three (3) years as
fixed by the Constitution and cannot be extended by
holdover by Congress.
If it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively
another term mandated by Congress, the net result is for
Congress to create a new term and to appoint the
occupant for the new term. This view like the extension
of the elective term is constitutionally infirm because
Congress cannot do indirectly what it cannot do directly,
i.e., to act in a way that would effectively extend the term
of the incumbents. Indeed, if acts that cannot be legally
done directly can be done indirectly, then all laws would
be illusory.55 Congress cannot also create a new term and
effectively appoint the occupant of the position for the

new term. This is effectively an act of appointment by

Congress and an unconstitutional intrusion into the
constitutional appointment power of the
President.56 Hence, holdover whichever way it is viewed
is a constitutionally infirm option that Congress could
not have undertaken.
Jurisprudence, of course, is not without examples of cases
where the question of holdover was brought before, and
given the imprimatur of approval by, this Court. The
present case though differs significantly from past cases
with contrary rulings, particularly from Sambarani v.
COMELEC,57 Adap v. Comelec,58 and Montesclaros v.
Comelec,59 where the Court ruled that the elective officials
could hold on to their positions in a hold over capacity.
All these past cases refer to elective barangay or
sangguniang kabataan officials whose terms of office are
not explicitly provided for in the Constitution; the present
case, on the other hand, refers to local elective officials
the ARMM Governor, the ARMM Vice-Governor, and the
members of the Regional Legislative Assembly whose
terms fall within the three-year term limit set by Section
8, Article X of the Constitution. Because of their
constitutionally limited term, Congress cannot legislate an
extension beyond the term for which they were originally
elected.
Even assuming that holdover is constitutionally
permissible, and there had been statutory basis for it
(namely Section 7, Article VII of RA No. 9054) in the
past,60 we have to remember that the rule of holdover can
only apply as an available option where no express or
implied legislative intent to the contrary exists; it cannot
apply where such contrary intent is evident.61
Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, made it explicitly
clear that it had the intention of suppressing the holdover
rule that prevailed under RA No. 9054 by completely
removing this provision. The deletion is a policy decision
that is wholly within the discretion of Congress to make in
the exercise of its plenary legislative powers; this Court
cannot pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or
expediency of legislation,62 except where an attendant
unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion results.
C. The COMELEC has no authority to order special
elections
Another option proposed by the petitioner in G.R. No.
197282 is for this Court to compel COMELEC to
immediately conduct special elections pursuant to Section
5 and 6 of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 881.
The power to fix the date of elections is essentially
legislative in nature, as evident from, and exemplified by,
the following provisions of the Constitution:
Section 8, Article VI, applicable to the legislature,
provides:

37

Section 8. Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular

election of the Senators and the Members of the House of
Representatives shall be held on the second Monday of
May. [Emphasis ours]
Section 4(3), Article VII, with the same tenor but
applicable solely to the President and Vice-President,
states:

and regulations relative to the conduct of an

election.65 Statutorily, COMELEC has no power to call for
the holding of special elections unless pursuant to a
specific statutory grant. True, Congress did grant, via
Sections 5 and 6 of BP 881, COMELEC with the power to
postpone elections to another date. However, this power is
limited to, and can only be exercised within, the specific
terms and circumstances provided for in the law. We
quote:

xxxx
Section 4. xxx Unless otherwise provided by law, the
regular election for President and Vice-President shall be
held on the second Monday of May. [Emphasis ours]
while Section 3, Article X, on local government, provides:
Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local government
code which shall provide for xxx the qualifications,
election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers
and functions and duties of local officials[.] [Emphases
ours]
These provisions support the conclusion that no elections
may be held on any other date for the positions of
President, Vice President, Members of Congress and local
officials, except when so provided by another Act of
Congress, or upon orders of a body or officer to whom
Congress may have delegated either the power or the
authority to ascertain or fill in the details in the execution
of that power.63
Notably, Congress has acted on the ARMM elections by
postponing the scheduled August 2011 elections and
setting another date May 13, 2011 for regional
elections synchronized with the presidential, congressional
and other local elections. By so doing, Congress itself has
made a policy decision in the exercise of its legislative
wisdom that it shall not call special elections as an
adjustment measure in synchronizing the ARMM elections
with the other elections.
After Congress has so acted, neither the Executive nor the
Judiciary can act to the contrary by ordering special
elections instead at the call of the COMELEC. This Court,
particularly, cannot make this call without thereby
supplanting the legislative decision and effectively
legislating. To be sure, the Court is not without the power
to declare an act of Congress null and void for being
unconstitutional or for having been exercised in grave
abuse of discretion.64 But our power rests on very narrow
ground and is merely to annul a contravening act of
Congress; it is not to supplant the decision of Congress
nor to mandate what Congress itself should have done in
the exercise of its legislative powers. Thus, contrary to
what the petition in G.R. No. 197282 urges, we cannot
compel COMELEC to call for special elections.
Furthermore, we have to bear in mind that the
constitutional power of the COMELEC, in contrast with the
power of Congress to call for, and to set the date of,
elections, is limited to enforcing and administering all laws

Section 5. Postponement of election. - When for any

serious cause such as violence, terrorism, loss or
destruction of election paraphernalia or records, force
majeure, and other analogous causes of such a nature
that the holding of a free, orderly and honest election
should become impossible in any political subdivision, the
Commission, motu proprio or upon a verified petition by
any interested party, and after due notice and hearing,
whereby all interested parties are afforded equal
opportunity to be heard, shall postpone the election
therein to a date which should be reasonably close to the
date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted
in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the
cessation of the cause for such postponement or
suspension of the election or failure to elect.
Section 6. Failure of election. - If, on account of force
majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other
analogous causes the election in any polling place
has not been held on the date fixed, or had been
suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of
the voting, or after the voting and during the preparation
and the transmission of the election returns or in the
custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a
failure to elect, and in any of such cases the failure or
suspension of election would affect the result of the
election, the Commission shall, on the basis of a verified
petition by any interested party and after due notice and
hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election
not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect
on a date reasonably close to the date of the election not
held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but
not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause
of such postponement or suspension of the election or
failure to elect. [Emphasis ours]
A close reading of Section 5 of BP 881 reveals that it is
meant to address instances where elections have already
been scheduled to take place but have to be postponed
because of (a) violence, (b) terrorism, (c) loss or
destruction of election paraphernalia or records, (d) force
majeure, and (e) other analogous causes of such a nature
that the holding of a free, orderly and honest election
should become impossible in any political subdivision.
Under the principle of ejusdem generis, the term
"analogous causes" will be restricted to those unforeseen
or unexpected events that prevent the holding of the
scheduled elections. These "analogous causes" are further
defined by the phrase "of such nature that the holding of a
free, orderly and honest election should become
impossible."

38

Similarly, Section 6 of BP 881 applies only to those

situations where elections have already been scheduled
but do not take place because of (a) force majeure,
(b) violence, (c) terrorism, (d) fraud, or (e) other
analogous causes the election in any polling place
has not been held on the date fixed, or had been
suspendedbefore the hour fixed by law for the closing of
the voting, or after the voting and during the preparation
and the transmission of the election returns or in the
custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a
failure to elect. As in Section 5 of BP 881, Section 6
addresses instances where the elections do not occur or
had to be suspended because
of unexpected and unforeseen circumstances.
In the present case, the postponement of the ARMM
elections is by law i.e., by congressional policy and is
pursuant to the constitutional mandate of synchronization
of national and local elections. By no stretch of the
imagination can these reasons be given the same
character as the circumstances contemplated by Section 5
or Section 6 of BP 881, which all pertain to extralegal
causes that obstruct the holding of elections. Courts, to be
sure, cannot enlarge the scope of a statute under the
guise of interpretation, nor include situations not provided
nor intended by the lawmakers.66 Clearly, neither Section
5 nor Section 6 of BP 881 can apply to the present case
and this Court has absolutely no legal basis to compel the
COMELEC to hold special elections.
D. The Court has no power to shorten the terms of
elective officials
Even assuming that it is legally permissible for the Court
to compel the COMELEC to hold special elections, no legal
basis likewise exists to rule that the newly elected ARMM
officials shall hold office only until the ARMM officials
elected in the synchronized elections shall have assumed
office.
In the first place, the Court is not empowered to adjust
the terms of elective officials. Based on the Constitution,
the power to fix the term of office of elective officials,
which can be exercised only in the case of barangay
officials,67 is specifically given to Congress. Even Congress
itself may be denied such power, as shown when the
Constitution shortened the terms of twelve Senators
obtaining the least votes,68 and extended the terms of the
President and the Vice-President69 in order to synchronize
elections; Congress was not granted this same power. The
settled rule is that terms fixed by the Constitution cannot
be changed by mere statute.70 More particularly, not even
Congress and certainly not this Court, has the authority to
fix the terms of elective local officials in the ARMM for
less, or more, than the constitutionally mandated three
years71 as this tinkering would directly contravene Section
8, Article X of the Constitution as we ruled in Osmena.
Thus, in the same way that the term of elective ARMM
officials cannot be extended through a holdover, the term
cannot be shortened by putting an expiration date earlier
than the three (3) years that the Constitution itself

commands. This is what will happen a term of less than

two years if a call for special elections shall prevail. In
sum, while synchronization is achieved, the result is at the
cost of a violation of an express provision of the
Constitution.
Neither we nor Congress can opt to shorten the tenure of
those officials to be elected in the ARMM elections instead
of acting on their term (where the "term" means the time
during which the officer may claim to hold office as of
right and fixes the interval after which the several
incumbents shall succeed one another, while the "tenure"
represents the term during which the incumbent actually
holds the office).72 As with the fixing of the elective term,
neither Congress nor the Court has any legal basis to
shorten the tenure of elective ARMM officials. They would
commit an unconstitutional act and gravely abuse their
discretion if they do so.
E. The Presidents Power to Appoint OICs
The above considerations leave only Congress chosen
interim measure RA No. 10153 and the appointment by
the President of OICs to govern the ARMM during the presynchronization period pursuant to Sections 3, 4 and 5 of
this law as the only measure that Congress can make.
This choice itself, however, should be examined for any
attendant constitutional infirmity.
At the outset, the power to appoint is essentially executive
in nature, and the limitations on or qualifications to the
exercise of this power should be strictly construed; these
limitations or qualifications must be clearly stated in order
to be recognized.73 The appointing power is embodied in
Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, which states:
Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the
heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls or officers of the armed
forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law, and those whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law,
vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the
President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
[emphasis ours]
This provision classifies into four groups the officers that
the President can appoint. These are:
First, the heads of the executive departments;
ambassadors; other public ministers and consuls; officers
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, from the rank of
colonel or naval captain; and other officers whose
appointments are vested in the President in this
Constitution;

39

Second, all other officers of the government whose

appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by
law to appoint; and
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the
Congress may by law vest in the President alone.74
Since the Presidents authority to appoint OICs emanates
from RA No. 10153, it falls under the third group of
officials that the President can appoint pursuant to Section
16, Article VII of the Constitution. Thus, the assailed law
facially rests on clear constitutional basis.
If at all, the gravest challenge posed by the petitions to
the authority to appoint OICs under Section 3 of RA No.
10153 is the assertion that the Constitution requires that
the ARMM executive and legislative officials to be "elective
and representative of the constituent political units." This
requirement indeed is an express limitation whose nonobservance in the assailed law leaves the appointment of
OICs constitutionally defective.
After fully examining the issue, we hold that this alleged
constitutional problem is more apparent than real and
becomes very real only if RA No. 10153 were to be
mistakenly read as a law that changes the elective and
representative character of ARMM positions. RA No.
10153, however, does not in any way amend what the
organic law of the ARMM (RA No. 9054) sets outs in terms
of structure of governance. What RA No. 10153 in fact
only does is to "appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of
the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and
Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall
perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until
the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall
have qualified and assumed office." This power is far
different from appointing elective ARMM officials for the
abbreviated term ending on the assumption to office of
the officials elected in the May 2013 elections.
As we have already established in our discussion of the
supermajority and plebiscite requirements, the legal
reality is that RA No. 10153 did not amend RA No. 9054.
RA No. 10153, in fact, provides only for synchronization of
elections and for the interim measures that must in the
meanwhile prevail. And this is how RA No. 10153 should
be read in the manner it was written and based on its
unambiguous facial terms.75 Aside from its order for
synchronization, it is purely and simply an interim
measure responding to the adjustments that the
synchronization requires.
Thus, the appropriate question to ask is whether the
interim measure is an unreasonable move for Congress to
adopt, given the legal situation that the synchronization
unavoidably brought with it. In more concrete terms and
based on the above considerations, given the plain
unconstitutionality of providing for a holdover and the
unavailability of constitutional possibilities for lengthening
or shortening the term of the elected ARMM officials, is

the choice of the Presidents power to appoint for a fixed

and specific period as an interim measure, and as allowed
under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution an
unconstitutional or unreasonable choice for Congress to
make?
Admittedly, the grant of the power to the President under
other situations or where the power of appointment would
extend beyond the adjustment period for synchronization
would be to foster a government that is not "democratic
and republican." For then, the peoples right to choose the
leaders to govern them may be said to be systemically
withdrawn to the point of fostering an undemocratic
regime. This is the grant that would frontally breach the
"elective and representative" governance requirement of
Section 18, Article X of the Constitution.
But this conclusion would not be true under the very
limited circumstances contemplated in RA No. 10153
where the period is fixed and, more importantly, the terms
of governance both under Section 18, Article X of the
Constitution and RA No. 9054 will not systemically be
touched nor affected at all. To repeat what has previously
been said, RA No. 9054 will govern unchanged and
continuously, with full effect in accordance with the
Constitution, save only for the interim and temporary
measures that synchronization of elections requires.
Viewed from another perspective, synchronization will
temporarily disrupt the election process in a local
community, the ARMM, as well as the communitys choice
of leaders, but this will take place under a situation of
necessity and as an interim measure in the manner that
interim measures have been adopted and used in the
creation of local government units 76 and the adjustments
of sub-provinces to the status of provinces.77 These
measures, too, are used in light of the wider national
demand for the synchronization of elections (considered
vis--vis the regional interests involved). The adoption of
these measures, in other words, is no different from the
exercise by Congress of the inherent police power of the
State, where one of the essential tests is the
reasonableness of the interim measure taken in light of
the given circumstances.
Furthermore, the "representative" character of the chosen
leaders need not necessarily be affected by the
appointment of OICs as this requirement is really a
function of the appointment process; only the "elective"
aspect shall be supplanted by the appointment of OICs. In
this regard, RA No. 10153 significantly seeks to address
concerns arising from the appointments by providing,
under Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the assailed law, concrete
terms in the Appointment of OIC, the Manner and
Procedure of Appointing OICs, and their Qualifications.
Based on these considerations, we hold that RA No. 10153
viewed in its proper context is a law that is not
violative of the Constitution (specifically, its autonomy
provisions), and one that is reasonable as well under the
circumstances.

40

VI. Other Constitutional Concerns

Outside of the above concerns, it has been argued during
the oral arguments that upholding the constitutionality of
RA No. 10153 would set a dangerous precedent of giving
the President the power to cancel elections anywhere in
the country, thus allowing him to replace elective officials
with OICs.
This claim apparently misunderstands that an across-theboard cancellation of elections is a matter for Congress,
not for the President, to address. It is a power that falls
within the powers of Congress in the exercise of its
legislative powers. Even Congress, as discussed above, is
limited in what it can legislatively undertake with respect
to elections.
If RA No. 10153 cancelled the regular August 2011
elections, it was for a very specific and limited purpose
the synchronization of elections. It was a temporary
means to a lasting end the synchronization of elections.
Thus, RA No. 10153 and the support that the Court gives
this legislation are likewise clear and specific, and cannot
be transferred or applied to any other cause for the
cancellation of elections. Any other localized cancellation
of elections and call for special elections can occur only in
accordance with the power already delegated by Congress
to the COMELEC, as above discussed.
Given that the incumbent ARMM elective officials cannot
continue to act in a holdover capacity upon the expiration
of their terms, and this Court cannot compel the COMELEC
to conduct special elections, the Court now has to deal
with the dilemma of a vacuum in governance in the
ARMM.
To emphasize the dire situation a vacuum brings, it should
not be forgotten that a period of 21 months or close to 2
years intervenes from the time that the incumbent
ARMM elective officials terms expired and the time the
new ARMM elective officials begin their terms in 2013. As
the lessons of our Mindanao history past and current
teach us, many developments, some of them critical and
adverse, can transpire in the countrys Muslim areas in
this span of time in the way they transpired in the
past.78 Thus, it would be reckless to assume that the
presence of an acting ARMM Governor, an acting ViceGovernor and a fully functioning Regional Legislative
Assembly can be done away with even temporarily. To our
mind, the appointment of OICs under the present
circumstances is an absolute necessity.

occur. Albeit both laws deal only with the filling of

vacancies in appointive positions. However, in the absence
of any contrary provision in the Local Government Code
and in the best interest of public service, we see no
cogent reason why the procedure thus outlined by the two
laws may not be similarly applied in the present case. The
respondents contend that the provincial board is the
correct appointing power. This argument has no merit. As
between the President who has supervision over local
governments as provided by law and the members of the
board who are junior to the vice-governor, we have no
problem ruling in favor of the President, until the law
provides otherwise.
A vacancy creates an anomalous situation and finds no
approbation under the law for it deprives the constituents
of their right of representation and governance in their
own local government.
In a republican form of government, the majority rules
through their chosen few, and if one of them is
incapacitated or absent, etc., the management of
governmental affairs is, to that extent, may be hampered.
Necessarily, there will be a consequent delay in the
delivery of basic services to the people of Leyte if the
Governor or the Vice-Governor is missing.80 (Emphasis
ours.)
As in Menzon, leaving the positions of ARMM Governor,
Vice Governor, and members of the Regional Legislative
Assembly vacant for 21 months, or almost 2 years, would
clearly cause disruptions and delays in the delivery of
basic services to the people, in the proper management of
the affairs of the regional government, and in responding
to critical developments that may arise. When viewed in
this context, allowing the President in the exercise of his
constitutionally-recognized appointment power to appoint
OICs is, in our judgment, a reasonable measure to take.
B. Autonomy in the ARMM
It is further argued that while synchronization may be
constitutionally mandated, it cannot be used to defeat or
to impede the autonomy that the Constitution granted to
the ARMM. Phrased in this manner, one would presume
that there exists a conflict between two recognized
Constitutional mandates synchronization and regional
autonomy such that it is necessary to choose one over
the other.

Significantly, the grant to the President of the power to

appoint OICs to undertake the functions of the elective
members of the Regional Legislative Assembly is neither
novel nor innovative. We hark back to our earlier
pronouncement in Menzon v. Petilla, etc., et al.:79

We find this to be an erroneous approach that violates a

basic principle in constitutional construction ut magis
valeat quam pereat: that the Constitution is to be
interpreted as a whole,81 and one mandate should not be
given importance over the other except where the primacy
of one over the other is clear.82 We refer to the Courts
declaration in Ang-Angco v. Castillo, et al.,83 thus:

It may be noted that under Commonwealth Act No. 588

and the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, the
President is empowered to make temporary appointments
in certain public offices, in case of any vacancy that may

A provision of the constitution should not be construed in

isolation from the rest. Rather, the constitution must be
interpreted as a whole, and apparently, conflicting
provisions should be reconciled and harmonized in a

41

manner that may give to all of them full force and effect.
[Emphasis supplied.]
Synchronization is an interest that is as constitutionally
entrenched as regional autonomy. They are interests that
this Court should reconcile and give effect to, in the way
that Congress did in RA No. 10153 which provides the
measure to transit to synchronized regional elections with
the least disturbance on the interests that must be
respected. Particularly, regional autonomy will be
respected instead of being sidelined, as the law does not
in any way alter, change or modify its governing features,
except in a very temporary manner and only as
necessitated by the attendant circumstances.
Elsewhere, it has also been argued that the ARMM
elections should not be synchronized with the national and
local elections in order to maintain the autonomy of the
ARMM and insulate its own electoral processes from the
rough and tumble of nationwide and local elections. This
argument leaves us far from convinced of its merits.
As heretofore mentioned and discussed, while
autonomous regions are granted political autonomy, the
framers of the Constitution never equated autonomy with
independence. The ARMM as a regional entity thus
continues to operate within the larger framework of the
State and is still subject to the national policies set by the
national government, save only for those specific areas
reserved by the Constitution for regional autonomous
determination. As reflected during the constitutional
deliberations of the provisions on autonomous regions:
Mr. Bennagen. xxx We do not see here a complete
separation from the central government, but rather an
efficient working relationship between the autonomous
region and the central government. We see this as an
effective partnership, not a separation.
Mr. Romulo. Therefore, complete autonomy is not really
thought of as complete independence.
Mr. Ople. We define it as a measure of self-government
within the larger political framework of the
nation.84[Emphasis supplied.]
This exchange of course is fully and expressly reflected in
the above-quoted Section 17, Article X of the Constitution,
and by the express reservation under Section 1 of the
same Article that autonomy shall be "within the
framework of this Constitution and the national
sovereignty as well as the territorial integrity of the
Republic of the Philippines."
Interestingly, the framers of the Constitution initially
proposed to remove Section 17 of Article X, believing it to
be unnecessary in light of the enumeration of powers
granted to autonomous regions in Section 20, Article X of
the Constitution. Upon further reflection, the framers
decided to reinstate the provision in order to "make it
clear, once and for all, that these are the limits of the
powers of the autonomous government. Those not

enumerated are actually to be exercised by the national

government[.]"85 Of note is the Courts pronouncement in
Pimentel, Jr. v. Hon. Aguirre86 which we quote:
Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the
national government has not completely relinquished all
its powers over local governments, including autonomous
regions. Only administrative powers over local affairs are
delegated to political subdivisions. The purpose of the
delegation is to make governance more directly
responsive and effective at the local levels. In turn,
economic, political and social development at the smaller
political units are expected to propel social and economic
growth and development. But to enable the country to
develop as a whole, the programs and policies effected
locally must be integrated and coordinated towards a
common national goal. Thus, policy-setting for the entire
country still lies in the President and Congress. [Emphasis
ours.]
In other words, the autonomy granted to the ARMM
cannot be invoked to defeat national policies and
concerns. Since the synchronization of elections is not just
a regional concern but a national one, the ARMM is subject
to it; the regional autonomy granted to the ARMM cannot
be used to exempt the region from having to act in
accordance with a national policy mandated by no less
than the Constitution.
Conclusion
Congress acted within its powers and pursuant to a
constitutional mandate the synchronization of national
and local elections when it enacted RA No. 10153. This
Court cannot question the manner by which Congress
undertook this task; the Judiciary does not and cannot
pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of
legislation.87 As judges, we can only interpret and apply
the law and, despite our doubts about its wisdom, cannot
repeal or amend it.88
Nor can the Court presume to dictate the means by which
Congress should address what is essentially a legislative
problem. It is not within the Courts power to enlarge or
abridge laws; otherwise, the Court will be guilty of
usurping the exclusive prerogative of Congress. 89 The
petitioners, in asking this Court to compel COMELEC to
hold special elections despite its lack of authority to do so,
are essentially asking us to venture into the realm of
judicial legislation, which is abhorrent to one of the most
basic principles of a republican and democratic
government the separation of powers.
The petitioners allege, too, that we should act because
Congress acted with grave abuse of discretion in enacting
RA No. 10153. Grave abuse of discretion is such capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment that is patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act
at all in contemplation of the law as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason
of passion and hostility.90

42

We find that Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, acted

strictly within its constitutional mandate. Given an array of
choices, it acted within due constitutional bounds and with
marked reasonableness in light of the necessary
adjustments that synchronization demands. Congress,
therefore, cannot be accused of any evasion of a positive
duty or of a refusal to perform its duty. We thus find no
reason to accord merit to the petitioners claims of grave
abuse of discretion.
On the general claim that RA No. 10153 is
unconstitutional, we can only reiterate the established rule
that every statute is presumed valid.91 Congress, thus, has
in its favor the presumption of constitutionality of its acts,
and the party challenging the validity of a statute has the
onerous task of rebutting this presumption. 92 Any
reasonable doubt about the validity of the law should be
resolved in favor of its constitutionality.93 As this Court
declared inGarcia v. Executive Secretary:94

separation of powers which enjoins upon each department

a becoming respect for the acts of the other departments.
The theory is that as the joint act of Congress and the
President of the Philippines, a law has been carefully
studied and determined to be in accordance with the
fundamental law before it was finally enacted.95 [Emphasis
ours.]
Given the failure of the petitioners to rebut the
presumption of constitutionality in favor of RA No. 10153,
we must support and confirm its validity.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the
consolidated petitions assailing the validity of RA No.
10153 for lack of merit, and UPHOLD the constitutionality
of this law. We likewise LIFT the temporary restraining
order we issued in our Resolution of September 13, 2011.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional

questions and to presume that the acts of the political
departments are valid in the absence of a clear and
unmistakable showing to the contrary. To doubt is to
sustain. This presumption is based on the doctrine of

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