Both personality disorders speak of antecedence as they have their onset in

early adulthood, is stable and of long duration. Condition was present even before the
marriage of both parties.
Both personality disorders also speak of gravity, as both the petitioner and the
respondent were not able to carry out the normative and ordinary duties of marriage
shouldered by any average spouse existing under ordinary circumstances.
Both personality disorders also speak of incurability. Psychiatric literatures have
cited that personality disorders consist of deeply ingrained attitudes and behavior
pattern that consolidate during development, are endured to adulthood hence, they
cannot be readily changed.
The treatment of the above personality disorders is difficult and nearly
impossible to have full recovery. The lack of insight of both the petitioner and
respondent regarding the presence of above personality disorders makes any form of
treatment useless. Narcissistic personality disorder with associated antisocial features is
especially difficult to manage, with treatment seemingly implausible, so that the goal
would only be to moderate the symptoms to an extent that the person is able to
function.
It is recommended that the petitioner and respondent be declared psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage, and that the petition
for nullity of their marriage be granted.
In Barcelona, the petitioner assailed the bid for annulment for its failure to state
the "root cause" of the respondent's alleged psychological incapacity. The Court
resolved this issue, ruling that the petition sufficiently stated a cause of action
because the petitioner instead of stating a specific root cause clearly
described the physical manifestations indicative of
the psychological incapacity. This, the Court found to be sufficiently
compliant with the first requirement in the Molina case that the "root
cause" of the psychological incapacity be alleged in an Article 36 petition.
Thus, contrary to Ricardo's position, Barcelona does not do away with the "root
cause" requirement. The ruling simply means that the statement of the root
cause does not need to be in medical terms or be technical in nature, as the
root causes of many psychological disorders are still unknown to science. It is
enough to merely allege the physical manifestations constituting the root cause
of the psychological incapacity. Section 2, paragraph (d) of the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (Rules) 27 in fact provides:
SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.
xxx xxx xxx
(d) What to allege. A petition under Article 36 of the Family
Code shall specially allege the complete facts showing

that either or both parties were psychologically

incapacitated from complying with the essential marital
obligations of marriages at the time of the celebration of
marriage even if suchincapacity becomes manifest only
after its celebration.
|||

(Toring v. Toring, G.R. No. 165321, [August 3, 2010], 640 PHIL 434-457)

Barcelona v. Court of Appeals. G.R. No. 130087, September 24, 2003, 412 SCRA 41,
49-50.
||

other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an

adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage. In the instant case, it appears that petitioner
has simply lost his love for respondent and has consequently refused to stay
married to her. As revealed by his own testimony, petitioner felt that he was no
longer part of respondent's life and that the latter did not need or want him.
Respondent's uncommunicative and withdrawn nature apparently led to
petitioner's discontentment with the marital relationship. However, as held in
Rep. of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals, refusal to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage is not psychological incapacity within the meaning of the
law. The policy of the State is to protect and strengthen the family as the basic
social institution and marriage is the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt
should be resolved in favor of validity of the marriage.
DECISION
(Villalon v. Villalon, G.R. No. 167206, [November 18, 2005], 512 PHIL 219230)
NOTE: compare and explain that petitioner here did not lost her love, but as
stated and explained by Dr. Gomez , she never loved the respondent
|||

___________________ For an intelligent person like

[respondent], he may sincerely want to be able to assume his
duties and responsibilities as a husband and father, but because
of a severe psychological deficit, he was unable to do so.
Based on the clinical data presented, it is the opinion of the examiner,
that [petitioner] manifested inadequacies along her affective sphere,
that made her less responsive to the emotional needs of her husband,
who needed a great amount of it, rendering her relatively
psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities
of marriage. [Respondent], on the other hand, has manifested

strong clinical evidences (sic), that he is suffering from

a PersonalityDisorder, of the antisocial type, associated with
strong sense of Inadequacy along masculine strivings
and narcissistic features that renders him psychologically
incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of
marriage. This is characterized by his inability to conform to the
social norms that ordinarily govern many aspects of adolescent
and adult behavior. His being a "free spirit" associated with no
remorse, no guilt feelings and no anxiety, is distinctive of this
clinical condition. His prolonged drug intake [marijuana] and
maybe stronger drugs lately, are external factors to boost his ego.
The root cause of the above clinical conditions is due to his
underlying defense mechanisms, or the unconscious mental
processes, that the ego uses to resolve conflicts. His prolonged
and closed attachments to his mother encouraged cross identification
and developed a severe sense of inadequacy specifically along
masculine strivings. He therefore has to camouflage his weakness, in
terms of authority, assertiveness, unilateral and forceful decision
making, aloofness and indifference, even if it resulted to antisocial acts.
His narcissistic supplies rendered by his mother was not
resolved (sic).

HDTSCc

It existed before marriage, but became manifest only after the

celebration, due to marital demands and stresses. It is considered
as permanent in nature because it started early in
his psychological development, and therefore became so engrained
into his personality structures (sic). It is considered as severe in
degree, because it hampered, interrupted and interfered with his
normal functioning related to heterosexual adjustments.

(Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes-Reyes, G.R. No. 185286, [August 18, 2010], 642

PHIL 602-634)
|||

[Respondent's] narcissistic personality features were manifested by

his self-centeredness (e.g., moved to Mindoro and lived there for 10
years, leaving his family in Manila); his grandiose sense of selfimportance (e.g., he would just "come and go," without telling his wife
his whereabouts, etc.); his sense of entitlement (e.g., felt entitled to a
mistress because [petitioner] deprived him of his marital rights, etc.);
interpersonally exploitative (e.g., let his wife spend for all the
maintenance needs of the family, etc.); and lack of empathy (e.g.,
when asked to choose between his mistress and his wife, he said he
would think about it, etc.) The aggressive
sadisticpersonality features were manifested whom he has

physically, emotionally and verbally abusive [of] his wife when high on
drugs; and his dependent personalityfeatures were manifested by his
need for others to assume responsibility for most major areas of his
life, and in his difficulty in doing things on his own.
[Respondent], diagnosed with an
antisocial personality disorder with marked narcissistic features
and aggressive sadistic and dependent features, is
psychologically incapacitated to fulfill the essential obligations of
marriage: to love, respect and render support for his spouse and
children. A personalitydisorder is not curable as it is permanent
and stable over time.

EcTDCI

From a psychological viewpoint, therefore, there is evidence that

the marriage of [petitioner] and [respondent is] null and void from
the very beginning.

(Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes-Reyes, G.R. No. 185286, [August 18, 2010], 642

PHIL 602-634)
|||

The recent case of Lim v. Sta. Cruz-Lim, 18 18.G.R. No. 176464, February 4,
2010. (Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes-Reyes, G.R. No. 185286, [August 18, 2010],
|||

642 PHIL 602-634) citing The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders, Fourth Edition (DSM IV), 19 instructs us on the general diagnostic
criteria for personality disorders:
A. An enduring pattern of inner experience and behavior that deviates
markedly from the expectations of the individual's culture. This pattern
is manifested in two (2) or more of the following areas:
(1) cognition (i.e., ways of perceiving and interpreting self, other
people, and events)
(2) affectivity (i.e., the range, intensity, liability, and
appropriateness of emotional response)
(3) interpersonal functioning
(4) impulse control
B. The enduring pattern is inflexible and pervasive across a broad
range of personal and social situations.

DEcTIS

C. The enduring pattern leads to clinically significant distress or

impairment in social, occupational or other important areas of
functioning.

D. The pattern is stable and of long duration, and its onset can be
traced back at least to adolescence or early adulthood.
E. The enduring pattern is not better accounted for as a manifestation
or a consequence of another mental disorder.
F. The enduring pattern is not due to the direct physiological effects of
a substance (i.e., a drug of abuse, a medication) or a general medical
condition (e.g., head trauma).

Specifically, the DSM IV outlines the diagnostic criteria for

Antisocial Personality Disorder:
A. There is a pervasive pattern of disregard for and violation of the
rights of others occurring since age 15 years, as indicated by three (or
more) of the following:
(1) failure to conform to social norms with respect to lawful
behaviors as indicated by repeatedly performing acts that
are grounds for arrest
(2) deceitfulness, as indicated by repeated lying, use of aliases,
or conning others for personal profit or pleasure
(3) impulsivity or failure to plan ahead
(4) irritability and aggressiveness, as indicated by repeated
physical fights or assaults
(5) reckless disregard for safety of self or others
(6) consistent irresponsibility, as indicated by repeated failure to
sustain consistent work behavior or honor financial
obligations
(7) lack of remorse as indicated by being indifferent to or
rationalizing having hurt, mistreated, or stolen from
another
B. The individual is at least 18 years.
C. There is evidence of conduct disorder with onset before age 15
years.
D. The occurrence of antisocial behavior is not exclusively during the
course of schizophrenia or a manic episode.

20

HESIcT

Within their acknowledged field of expertise, doctors can diagnose

the psychological make up of a person based on a number of factors culled

from various sources. A person afflicted with a personality disorder will not
necessarily have personal knowledge thereof. In this case, considering that
a personality disorder is manifested in a pattern of behavior, self-diagnosis by
the respondent consisting only in his bare denial of the doctors' separate
diagnoses, does not necessarily evoke credence and cannot trump the clinical
findings of experts.
The CA declared that, based on Dr. Dayan's findings and recommendation,
the psychological incapacity of respondent is not incurable.
The appellate court is mistaken.
A recommendation for therapy does not automatically imply curability. In
general, recommendations for therapy are given by clinical psychologists, or
even psychiatrists, to manage behavior. In Kaplan and Saddock's textbook
entitled Synopsis of Psychiatry, 21 treatment, ranging from psychotherapy to
pharmacotherapy, for all the listed kinds ofpersonality disorders are
recommended. In short, Dr. Dayan's recommendation that respondent should
undergo therapy does not necessarily negate the finding that
respondent's psychological incapacity is incurable.
(Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes-Reyes, G.R. No. 185286, [August 18, 2010], 642
PHIL 602-634)
|||

In the case at bar, however, even without the experts' conclusions, the factual
antecedents (narrative of events) alleged in the petition and established during
trial, all point to the inevitable conclusion that respondent is psychologically
incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations.
Article 68 of the Family Code provides:

AcSIDE

Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe
mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.

In this connection, it is well to note that persons with

antisocial personality disorder exhibit the following clinical features:
Patients with antisocial personality disorder can often seem to be
normal and even charming and ingratiating. Their histories, however,
reveal many areas of disordered life functioning. Lying, truancy, running
away from home, thefts, fights, substance abuse, and illegal activities
are typical experiences that patients report as beginning in childhood. .
. . Their own explanations of their antisocial behavior make it seem
mindless, but their mental content reveals the complete absence of
delusions and other signs of irrational thinking. In fact, they frequently

have a heightened sense of reality testing and often impress observers

as having good verbal intelligence.
. . . Those with this disorder do not tell the truth and cannot be trusted
to carry out any task or adhere to any conventional standard of
morality. . . . A notable finding is a lack of remorse for these actions;
that is, they appear to lack a conscience. 28

In the instant case, respondent's pattern of behavior manifests an inability, nay,

a psychological incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations as shown
by his: (1) sporadic financial support; (2) extra-marital affairs; (3) substance
abuse; (4) failed business attempts; (5) unpaid money obligations; (6) inability
to keep a job that is not connected with the family businesses; and (7) criminal
charges of estafa.
On the issue of the petitioner's purported psychological incapacity, we agree
with the CA's ruling thereon:
A perusal of the Amended Petition shows that it failed to specifically
allege the complete facts showing that petitioner was psychologically
incapacitated from complying with the essential marital obligations of
marriage at the time of the celebration of marriage even if
such incapacity became manifest only after its celebration . . . . In fact,
what was merely prayed for in the said Amended Petition is that
judgment be rendered "declaring the marriage between the petitioner
and the respondent solemnized on 04 December 1976 to be void ab
initio on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of the
respondent at the time of the celebration of the marriage . . .
At any rate, even assuming arguendo that [petitioner's] Amended
Petition was indeed amended to conform to the evidence, as provided
under Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, Dr. Villegas' finding that
[petitioner] is supposedly suffering from an
Inadequate Personality [Disorder] along the affectional area does not
amount to psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code. Such alleged condition of [petitioner] is not a
debilitating psychological condition that incapacitates her from
complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage. In fact, in
the Psychological Evaluation Report of clinical psychologist Magno,
[petitioner] was given a glowing evaluation as she was found to be a
"good, sincere, and conscientious person and she has tried her best to
provide for the needs of her children. Her achievements in this regard
are praiseworthy." Even in Dr. Villegas' psychiatric report, it was stated

that [petitioner] was able to remain in their marriage for more than 20
years "trying to reach out and lending a hand for better understanding
and relationship." With the foregoing evaluation made by no less than
[petitioner's] own expert witnesses, we find it hard to believe that she is
psychologically incapacitated within the contemplation of Article 36 of
the Family Code.29

cCAIDS

All told, it is wise to be reminded of the caveat articulated by Justice Teodoro R.

Padilla in his separate statement in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina: 30
". . . Each case must be judged, not on the basis of
a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to
its own facts. In the field of psychologicalincapacity as a ground for
annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours"
with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the
factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid
substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court."

In fine, given the factual milieu of the present case and in light of the foregoing
disquisition, we find ample basis to conclude that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations at the
time of his marriage to the petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 89761 is REVERSED. The decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 89, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-01-44854 declaring the
marriage between petitioner and respondent NULL and VOID under Article 36
of the Family Code is REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
(Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes-Reyes, G.R. No. 185286, [August 18, 2010], 642
PHIL 602-634)
|||

Love happens to everyone. It is dubbed to be boundless as it goes

beyond the expectations people tagged with it. In love, "age does
matter". People love in order to be secure that one will share his/her life
with another and that he/she will not die alone. Individuals who are in
love had the power to let love grow or let love die it is a choice one
had to face when love is not the love he/she expected.

cCaATD

In the case presented by petitioner, it is very apparent that love really

happened for her towards the young respondent who used "love" as
a disguise or deceptive tactic for exploiting the confidence she

extended towards him. He made her believe that he is responsible,

true, caring and thoughtful only to reveal himself contrary to what
was mentioned. He lacked the commitment, faithfulness, and remorse
that he was able to engage himself to promiscuous acts that made
petitioner look like an innocent fool. His character traits reveal him to
suffer Narcissistic Personality Disorder declared to be grave, severe
and incurable. 17

(Padilla-Rumbaua v. Rumbaua, G.R. No. 166738, [August 14, 2009], 612

PHIL 1061-1092)
|||

If a psychological disorder can be proven by independent means, no reason

exists why such independent proof cannot be admitted and given
credit. (Padilla-Rumbaua v. Rumbaua, G.R. No. 166738, [August 14, 2009],
612 PHIL 1061-1092)
|||

_________________ ccordingly, We can safely conclude that said

deficiency is so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond
one is about to assume. This Court, finding the gravity of the failed
relationship in which the parties found themselves trapped in its mire of
unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no
less but to declare the marriage between the herein petitioner and the
respondent herein dissolved. While the law provides that the husband
and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect
and fidelity ([A]rticle 68 of the Family Code),
however, what is there to preserve when the other spouse is an unwilli
ng party to the cohesion and creation of a family as an inviolable
socialinstitution. In fine, Laila Tanyag-San Jose must be allowed to
rise from the ashes and begin a new life freed from a marriage
which, to Us, was hopeless from the beginning and where the bonding
could not have been possible.

xxx xxx xxx

While We may not have strictly adhered to the ruling in the Molina case
in arriving at Our present conclusion We have reason to deviate
from the same. In view of the peculiar circumstances attendant in this
case, We were constrained to take exception from the Molina case.
Note that the "(c)ommittee did not give any example of psychological
incapacity for the fear that the giving of examples would limit the
applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis.
Rather, the Committee would like the judge to apply the provision on a

case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and

researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decision of Church
tribunals which although not binding on the civil courts, may be given
persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law."
(page 37, Handbook of the Family Code of the Philippines, SempioDiy, 1991 reprinted). Hence, whether or not psychological incapacity
exists is for Us to establish, as there is no hard and fast rule in the
determination of what maybe considered indicia of psychological
incapacity. To Our mind there are sufficient grounds for Us to conclude
that indeed psychological incapacity exists so as to warrant declaration
of the marriage void ab initio. 15 14.CA rollo, pp. 73-86. Penned by
Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr. with the concurrence of Justices Noel G.
Tijam and Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo. (Republic v. Tanyag-San
|||

Jose, G.R. No. 168328, [February 28, 2007], 545 PHIL 725-738)
(Republic v. Tanyag-San Jose, G.R. No. 168328, [February 28, 2007], 545
PHIL 725-738)
|||

Psychological incapacity, as a ground for nullity of marriage, has been

succinctly expounded in the recent case of Ma. Armida Perez-Ferraris v. Brix
Ferraris (Ferraris), 20 20.G.R. No. 162368, July 17, 2006. thus:
|||

The term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground for the nullity of

marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration
of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to
deprive one of the awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume. As all people may have
certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated characteristics associated
with certain personality disorders, there is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning
of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage. It is for this reason
that the Court relies heavily on psychological experts for its
understanding of the human personality. However, the root cause
must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature must be fully explained[.] (Italics in the
original; emphasis supplied)

(Republic v. Tanyag-San Jose, G.R. No. 168328, [February 28, 2007], 545
PHIL 725-738)
|||

https://cdasiaonline.com/jurisprudences/51529?hits%5B%5D%5Bid
%5D=53540&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid
%5D=59395&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid
%5D=1439&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid
%5D=53555&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid
%5D=54062&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid
%5D=42237&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid
%5D=52177&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid
%5D=52486&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid
%5D=51529&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid
%5D=59467&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid
%5D=54642&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid
%5D=54931&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid
%5D=8216&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid
%5D=54112&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid
%5D=50834&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&path=
%2Fjurisprudences%2Fsearch&q%5Bcitation_finder%5D=&q%5Bfull_text
%5D=psychological+incapacity+narcissistic+personality+disorder&q
%5Bissue_no%5D=&q%5Bponente%5D=&q%5Bsyllabus%5D=&q%5Btitle
%5D=&q%5Butf8%5D=%E2%9C%93&q%5Byear_end%5D=&q%5Byear_start
%5D=
Noteworthy is that in Molina, while the majority of the Court's membership
concurred in the ponencia of then Associate Justice (later Chief Justice)
Artemio V. Panganiban, three justices concurred "in the result" and another
three including, as aforesaid, Justice Romero took pains to compose their
individual separate opinions. Then Justice Teodoro R. Padilla even emphasized
that "each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions,
predelictions or generalizations, but according to its own facts. In the field
of psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to
say that no case is on 'all fours' with another case. The trial judge must take
pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as
possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court." 48
SEAHID

Predictably, however, in resolving subsequent cases, 49 the Court has applied

the aforesaid standards, without too much regard for the law's clear intention
that each case is to be treated differently, as "courts should interpret the
provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts
and researchers in psychologicaldisciplines, and by decisions of church
tribunals".
In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set
of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological incapacity.
Understandably, the Court was then alarmed by the deluge of petitions for the

dissolution of marital bonds, and was sensitive to the OSG's exaggeration of

Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the world". 50 The
unintended consequences of Molina, however, has taken its toll on people who
have to live with deviant behavior, moral insanity and
sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like termites, consume little by little the
very foundation of their families, our basic social institutions. Far from what was
intended by the Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit
into and be bound by it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently
applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics,
nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuously debase and pervert
the sanctity of marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota has annulled marriages on
account of the personality disorders of the said individuals. 51
The Court need not worry about the possible abuse of the remedy provided by
Article 36, for there are ample safeguards against this contingency, among
which is the intervention by the State, through the public prosecutor, to guard
against collusion between the parties and/or fabrication of evidence. 52 The
Court should rather be alarmed by the rising number of cases involving marital
abuse, child abuse, domestic violence and incestuous rape.
In dissolving marital bonds on account of either
party's psychological incapacity, the Court is not demolishing the foundation of
families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of marriage, because it refuses
to allow a person afflicted with a psychological disorder, who cannot comply
with or assume the essential marital obligations, from remaining in that sacred
bond. It may be stressed that the infliction of physical violence, constitutional
indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psychosexual
anomaly are manifestations of a sociopathic personality anomaly. 53 Let it be
noted that in Article 36, there is no marriage to speak of in the first place, as the
same is void from the very beginning. 54 To indulge in imagery, the declaration
of nullity under Article 36 will simply provide a decent burial to a stillborn
marriage.
The prospect of a possible remarriage by the freed spouses should not pose
too much of a concern for the Court. First and foremost, because it is none of
its business. And second, because the judicial declaration
of psychological incapacity operates as a warning or a lesson learned. On one
hand, the normal spouse would have become vigilant, and never again marry a
person with a personality disorder. On the other hand, a would-be spouse of the
psychologically incapacitated runs the risk of the latter's disorderrecurring in
their marriage.
HIAEcT

Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the abandonment of Molina in

this case. We simply declare that, as aptly stated by Justice Dante O. Tinga
in Antonio v. Reyes,55 there is need to emphasize other perspectives as well

which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under
Article 36. At the risk of being redundant, we reiterate once more the principle
that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions,
predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. And, to repeat for
emphasis, courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided
by experience, the findings of experts and researchers
inpsychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
|||

(Ngo Te v. Yu-Te, G.R. No. 161793, [February 13, 2009], 598 PHIL 666-710)

The seriousness of the diagnosis and the gravity of the disorders considered,
the Court, in this case, finds as decisive the psychological evaluation made by
the expert witness; and, thus, rules that the marriage of the parties is null and
void on ground of both parties' psychological incapacity. We further consider
that the trial court, which had a first-hand view of the witnesses' deportment,
arrived at the same conclusion.
Indeed, petitioner, who is afflicted with dependent personality disorder, cannot
assume the essential marital obligations of living together, observing love,
respect and fidelity and rendering help and support, for he is unable to make
everyday decisions without advice from others, allows others to make most of
his important decisions (such as where to live), tends to agree with people even
when he believes they are wrong, has difficulty doing things on his own,
volunteers to do things that are demeaning in order to get approval from other
people, feels uncomfortable or helpless when alone and is often preoccupied
with fears of being abandoned. 67 As clearly shown in this case, petitioner
followed everything dictated to him by the persons around him. He is insecure,
weak and gullible, has no sense of his identity as a person, has no cohesive
self to speak of, and has no goals and clear direction in life.
Although on a different plane, the same may also be said of the respondent.
Her being afflicted with antisocial personality disorder makes her unable to
assume the essential marital obligations. This finding takes into account her
disregard for the rights of others, her abuse, mistreatment and control of others
without remorse, her tendency to blame others, and her intolerance of the
conventional behavioral limitations imposed by society. 68 Moreover, as shown
in this case, respondent is impulsive and domineering; she had no qualms in
manipulating petitioner with her threats of blackmail and of committing
suicide.

SCaIcA

Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and

incurable psychological incapacity, the precipitous marriage which they
contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus, declared null and void.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is

GRANTED. The August 5, 2003 Decision and the January 19, 2004 Resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, and the Decision, dated July 30, 2001, REINSTATED.
|||

(Ngo Te v. Yu-Te, G.R. No. 161793, [February 13, 2009], 598 PHIL 666-710)