[G.R. No. 104988.

June 18, 1996]

MUSTANG LUMBER, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. FULGENCIO S.
FACTORAN, JR., Secretary, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), and
ATTY. VINCENT A. ROBLES, Chief, Special Actions and Investigation Division,
DENR, respondents.
[G.R. No. 106424. June 18, 1996]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. TERESITA DIZON-CAPULONG, in her capacity
as the Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 172,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and RI CHUY PO, respondents.
[G.R. No. 123784. June 18, 1996]
MUSTANG LUMBER, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ATTY. VINCENT A. ROBLES,
Chief, Special Actions and Investigation Division, Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), ATTY. NESTOR V. GAPUSAN, TIRSO P. PARIAN, JR., and FELIPE H.
CALLORINA, JR., respondents.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
The first and third cases, G.R. No. 104988 and G.R. No. 123784, were originally assigned to the
Second and Third Divisions of the Court, respectively. They were subsequently consolidated with the
second, a case of the Court en banc.
Petitioner, a domestic corporation with principal office at Nos. 1350-1352 Juan Luna Street,
Tondo, Manila, and with a lumberyard at Fortune Street, Fortune Village, Paseo de Blas, Valenzuela,
Metro Manila, was duly registered as a lumber dealer with the Bureau of Forest Development (BFD)
under Certificate of Registration No. NRD-4-092590-0469. Its permit as such was to expire on 25
September 1990.

Respondent Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., and respondent Atty. Vincent A. Robles were,
during all the time material to these cases, the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) and the Chief of the Special Actions and Investigation Division (SAID) of the DENR,
respectively.
The material operative facts are as follows:
On 1 April 1990, acting on an information that a huge stockpile of narra flitches, shorts, and slabs
were seen inside the lumberyard of the petitioner in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, the SAID organized a
team of foresters and policemen and sent it to conduct surveillance at the said lumberyard. In the
course thereof, the team members saw coming out from the lumberyard the petitioner's truck, with Plate
No. CCK-322, loaded with lauan and almaciga lumber of assorted sizes and dimensions. Since the
driver could not produce the required invoices and transport documents, the team seized the truck
together with its cargo and impounded them at the DENR compound at Visayas Avenue, Quezon City.
[1]
The team was not able to gain entry into the premises because of the refusal of the owner. [2]
On 3 April 1990, the team was able to secure a search warrant from Executive Judge Adriano R.
Osorio of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. By virtue thereof, the team seized
on that date from the petitioners lumberyard four truckloads of narra shorts, trimmings, and slabs; a
negligible number of narra lumber; and approximately 200,000 board feet of lumber and shorts of
various species including almaciga and supa.[3]
On 4 April 1990, the team returned to the premises of the petitioner 's lumberyard in Valenzuela
and placed under administrative seizure the remaining stockpile of almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber
with a total volume of 311,000 board feet because the petitioner failed to produce upon demand the
corresponding certificate of lumber origin, auxiliary invoices, tally sheets, and delivery receipts from the
source of the invoices covering the lumber to prove the legitimacy of their source and origin. [4]
Parenthetically, it may be stated that under an administrative seizure the owner retains the
physical possession of the seized articles. Only an inventory of the articles is taken and signed by the
owner or his representative. The owner is prohibited from disposing them until further orders. [5]
On 10 April 1990, counsel for the petitioner sent a letter to Robles requesting an extension of
fifteen days from 14 April 1990 to produce the required documents covering the seized articles because
some of them, particularly the certificate of lumber origin, were allegedly in the Province of

Quirino. Robles denied the motion on the ground that the documents being required from the petitioner
must accompany the lumber or forest products placed under seizure. [6]
On 11 April 1990, Robles submitted his memorandum-report recommending to Secretary Factoran
the following:
1. Suspension and subsequent cancellation of the lumber Dealer's Permit of Mustang
Lumber, Inc. for operating an unregistered lumberyard and resaw mill and possession of
Almaciga Lumber (a banned specie) without the required documents;
2. Confiscation of the lumber seized at the Mustang Lumberyard including the truck with
Plate No. CCK-322 and the lumber loaded herein [sic] now at the DENR compound in
the event its owner fails to submit documents showing legitimacy of the source of said
lumber within ten days from date of seizure;
3. Filing of criminal charges against Mr. Ri Chuy Po, owner of Mustang Lumber Inc. and Mr.
Ruiz, or if the circumstances warrant for illegal possession of narra and almaciga lumber
and shorts if and when recommendation no. 2 pushes through;
4. Confiscation of Trucks with Plate No. CCS-639 and CDV-458 as well as the lumber
loaded therein for transport lumber using recycled documents. [7]
On 23 April 1990, Secretary Factoran issued an order suspending immediately the petitioner's
lumber-dealer's permit No. NRD-4-092590-0469 and directing the petitioner to explain in writing within
fifteen days why its lumber-dealer's permit should not be cancelled.
On the same date, counsel for the petitioner sent another letter to Robles informing the latter that
the petitioner had already secured the required documents and was ready to submit them. None,
however, was submitted.[8]
On 3 May 1990, Secretary Factoran issued another order wherein, after reciting the events which
took place on 1 April and 3 April 1990, he ordered CONFISCATED in favor of the government to be
disposed of in accordance with law the approximately 311,000 board feet of lauan, supa, and almaciga
lumber, shorts, and sticks found inside the petitioner's lumberyard. [9]

On 11 July 1990, the petitioner filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with a prayer for a restraining order or preliminary injunction against Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran,
Jr., and Atty. Vincent A. Robles. The case (hereinafter, the FIRST CIVIL CASE) was docketed as Civil
Case No. 90-53648 and assigned to Branch 35 o the said court. The petitioner questioned therein (a)
the seizure on 1 April 1990, without any search and seizure order issued by a judge, of its truck with
Plate No. CCK-322 and its cargo of assorted lumber consisting of apitong, tanguile, and lauan of
different sizes and dimensions with a total value of P38,000.00; and (b) the orders of Secretary Factoran
of 23 April 1990 for lack of prior notice and hearing and of 3 May 1990 for violation of Section 2, Article
III of the Constitution.
On 17 September 1990, in response to reports that violations of P.D. No. 705 (The Revised
Forestry Code of the Philippines), as amended, were committed and acting upon instruction of Robles
and under Special Order No. 897, series of 1990, a team of DENR agents went to the business
premises of the petitioner located at No. 1352 Juan Luna Street, Tondo, Manila.The team caught the
petitioner operating as a lumber dealer although its lumber-dealer's permit had already been suspended
on 23 April 1990. Since the gate of the petitioner's lumberyard was open, the team went inside and saw
an owner-type jeep with a trailer loaded with lumber. Upon investigation, the team was informed that the
lumber loaded on the trailer was to be delivered to the petitioner's customer. It also came upon the sales
invoice covering the transaction. The members of the team then introduced themselves to the caretaker,
one Ms. Chua, who turned out to be the wife of the petitioner's president and general manager, Mr. Ri
Chuy Po, who was then out of town. The team's photographer was able to take photographs of the
stockpiles of lumber including newly cut ones, fresh dust around sawing or cutting machineries and
equipment, and the transport vehicles loaded with lumber. The team thereupon effected a constructive
seizure of approximately 20,000 board feet of lauan lumber in assorted sizes stockpiled in the premises
by issuing a receipt therefor.[10]
As a consequence of this 17 September 1990 incident, the petitioner filed with the RTC of Manila
a petition for certiorari and prohibition. The case (hereinafter, the SECOND CIVIL CASE) was docketed
as Civil Case No. 90-54610 and assigned to Branch 24 of the said court.
In the meantime, Robles filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ) a complaint against the
petitioner's president and general manager, Ri Chuy Po, for violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as
amended by E.O. No. 277. After appropriate preliminary investigation, the investigating prosecutor,
Claro Arellano, handed down a resolution[11] whose dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby recommended that an information be filed against
respondent Ri Chuy Po for illegal possession of approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber consisting of

almaciga and supa and for illegal shipment of almaciga and lauan in violation of Sec. 68 of PD 705 as
amended by E.O. 277, series of 1987.
It is further recommended that the 30,000 bd. ft. of narra shorts, trimmings and slabs covered by legal
documents be released to the rightful owner, Malupa. [12]

2. The respondents are required to initiate and prosecute the appropriate action before the
proper court regarding the lauan and almaciga lumber of assorted sizes and dimensions
loaded in petitioner's truck bearing Plate No. CCK-322 which were seized on April 1,
1990;

This resolution was approved by Undersecretary of Justice Silvestre H. Bello, III, who served as
Chairman of the Task Force on Illegal Logging.[13]

3. The Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by the Court on August 2, 1990 shall be
rendered functus oficio upon compliance by the respondents with paragraphs 1 and 2 of
this judgment;

On the basis of that resolution, an information was filed on 5 June 1991 by the DOJ with Branch
172 of the RTC of Valenzuela, charging Ri Chuy Po with the violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as
amended, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 324-V-91 (hereinafter, the CRIMINAL CASE). The
accusatory portion of the information reads as follows:

4. Action on the prayer of the petitioner that the lauan, supa and almaciga lumber, shorts
and sticks mentioned above in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this judgment be returned to said
petitioner, is withheld in this case until after the proper court has taken cognizance and
determined how those lumber, shorts and sticks should be disposed of; and

That on or about the 3rd day of April 1990, or prior to or subsequent thereto, within the premises
and vicinity of Mustang Lumber, Inc. in Fortune Village, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there wilfully, feloniously
and unlawfully, have in his possession truckloads of almaciga and lauan and approximately 200,000 bd.
ft. of lumber and shorts of various species including almaciga and supa, without the legal documents as
required under existing forest laws and regulations.[14]

5. The petitioner is ordered to pay the costs.

On 7 June 1991, Branch 35 of the RTC of Manila rendered its decision [15] in the FIRST CIVIL
CASE, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment in this case is rendered as follows:
1. The Order of Respondent Secretary of the DENR, the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran,
Jr., dated 3 May 1990 ordering the confiscation in favor of the Government the
approximately 311,000 board feet of lauan, supa, and almaciga lumber, shorts and
sticks, found inside and seized from the lumberyard of the petitioner at Fortune Drive,
Fortune Village, Paseo de Blas, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, on April 4, 1990 (Exhibit 10),
is hereby set aside and vacated, and instead the respondents are required to report and
bring to the Hon. Adriano Osorio, Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court, NCJR,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, the said 311,000 board feet of Lauan, supa and almaciga
Lumber, shorts and sticks, to be dealt with as directed by law;

SO ORDERED.
In resolving the said case, the trial court held that the warrantless search and seizure on 1 April
1990 of the petitioner's truck, which was moving out from the petitioner's lumberyard in Valenzuela,
Metro Manila, loaded with large volumes of lumber without covering document showing the legitimacy of
its source or origin did not offend the constitutional mandate that search and seizure must be supported
by a valid warrant. The situation fell under one of the settled and accepted exceptions where
warrantless search and seizure is justified, viz., a search of a moving vehicle.[16] As to the seizure of a
large volume of almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber and shorts effected on 4 April 1990, the trial court
ruled that the said seizure was a continuation of that made the previous day and was still pursuant to or
by virtue of the search warrant issued by Executive Judge Osorio whose validity the petitioner did not
even question.[17] And, although the search warrant did not specifically mention almaciga, supa, and
lauan lumber and shorts, their seizure was valid because it is settled that the executing officer is not
required to ignore contrabands observed during the conduct of the search. [18]
The trial court, however, set aside Secretary Factoran's order of 3 May 1990 ordering the
confiscation of the seized articles in favor of the Government for the reason that since the articles were
seized pursuant to the search warrant issued by Executive Judge Osorio they should have been
returned to him in compliance with the directive in the warrant.

As to the propriety of the 23 April 1990 order of Secretary Factoran, the trial court ruled that the
same had been rendered moot and academic by the expiration of the petitioner's lumber-dealer's permit
on 25 September 1990, a fact the petitioner admitted in its memorandum.
The petitioner forthwith appealed from the decision in the FIRST CIVIL CASE to the Court of
Appeals, which docketed the appeal as CA-G.R. SP No. 25510.
On 7 July 1991, accused Ri Chuy Po filed in the CRIMINAL CASE a Motion to Quash and/or to
Suspend Proceedings based on the following grounds: (a) the information does not charge an offense,
for possession of lumber, as opposed to timber, is not penalized in Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as
amended, and even granting arguendo that lumber falls within the purview of the said section, the same
may not be used in evidence against him for they were taken by virtue of an illegal seizure; and (b) Civil
Case No. 90-53648 of Branch 35 of the RTC of Manila, the FIRST CIVIL CASE, then pending before the
Court of Appeals, which involves the legality of the seizure, raises a prejudicial question. [19]
The prosecution opposed the motion alleging that lumber is included in Section 68 of P.D. No.
705, as amended, and possession thereof without the required legal documents is penalized therein. It
referred to Section 3.2 of DENR Administrative Order No. 19, series of 1989, for the definitions
of timber and lumber, and then argued that exclusion of lumber from Section 68 would defeat the very
purpose of the law, i.e., to minimize, if not halt, illegal logging that has resulted in the rapid denudation
of our forest resources.[20]
In her order of 16 August 1991 in the CRIMINAL CASE, [21] respondent Judge Teresita DizonCapulong granted the motion to quash and dismissed the case on the ground that "possession of
lumber without the legal documents required by forest laws and regulations is not a crime." [22]
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied in the order of 18 October 1991, [23] the People
filed a petition for certiorari with this Court in G.R. No. 106424, wherein it contends that the respondent
Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting the motion to quash and in dismissing the case.
On 29 November 1991, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision [24] in CA-G.R. SP No.
25510 dismissing for lack of merit the petitioner's appeal from the decision in the FIRST CIVIL CASE
and affirming the trial court's rulings on the issues raised. As to the claim that the truck was not carrying
contraband articles since there is no law punishing the possession oflumber, and that lumber is
not timber whose possession without the required legal documents is unlawful under P.D. No. 705, as
amended, the Court of Appeals held:

This undue emphasis on lumber or the commercial nature of the forest product involved has
always been foisted by those who claim to be engaged in the legitimate business of lumber
dealership. But what is important to consider is that when appellant was required to present the valid
documents showing its acquisition and lawful possession of the lumber in question, it failed to present
any despite the period of extension granted to it. [25]
The petitioner's motion to reconsider the said decision was denied by the Court of Appeals in its
resolution of 3 March 1992. [26] Hence, the petitioner came to this Court by way of a petition for review
on certiorari in G.R. No. 104988, which was filed on 2 May 1992.[27]
On 24 September 1992, Branch 24 of the RTC of Manila handed down a decision in the SECOND
CIVIL CASE dismissing the petition for certiorari and prohibition because (a) the petitioner did not
exhaust administrative remedies; (b) when the seizure was made on 17 September 1990 the petitioner
could not lawfully sell lumber, as its license was still under suspension; (c) the seizure was valid under
Section 68-A of P.D. No. 705, as amended; and (d) the seizure was justified as a warrantless search
and seizure under Section 80 of P.D. No. 705, as amended.
The petitioner appealed from the decision to the Court of Appeals, which docketed the appeal
as CA-G.R. SP No. 33778.
In its decision[28] of 31 July 1995, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petitioner's appeal in CAG.R. SP No. 33778 for lack of merit and sustained the grounds relied upon by the trial court in
dismissing the SECOND CIVIL CASE. Relying on the definition of "lumber" by Webster, viz., "timber or
logs, especially after being prepared for the market," and by the Random House Dictionary of the
English Language, viz., "wood, esp. when suitable or adapted for various building purposes," the
respondent Court held that since wood is included in the definition of forest product in Section 3(q) of
P.D. No. 705, as amended, lumber is necessarily included in Section 68 under the term forest product.
The Court of Appeals further emphasized that a forest officer or employee can seize the forest
product involved in a violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705 pursuant to Section 80 thereof, as amended
by P.D. No. 1775, which provides in part as follows:
SEC. 80. Arrest, Institution of Criminal Actions. A forest officer or employee of the Bureau or any
personnel of the Philippine Constabulary/Integrated National Police shall arrest even without warrant
any person who has committed or is committing in his presence any of the offenses defined in this
chapter. He shall also seize and confiscate, in favor of the Government, the tools and equipment used in

committing the offense, or the forest products cut, gathered or taken by the offender in the process of
committing the offense.
Among the offenses punished in the chapter referred to in said Section 80 are the cutting,
gathering, collection, or removal of timber or other forest products or possession of timber or other forest
products without the required legal documents.

timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised
Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who
ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens,
they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation.

Its motion to reconsider the decision having been denied by the Court of Appeals in the resolution
of 6 February 1996, the petitioner filed with this Court on 27 February 1996 a petition for review
on certiorari in G.R. No. 123784.

The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest
products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment,
implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found.

We shall now resolve these three cases starting with G.R. 106424 with which the other two were
consolidated.

Punished then in this section are (1) the cutting, gathering, collection, or removal of timber or
other forest products from the places therein mentioned without any authority; and (b) possession of
timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations.

G.R. No. 106424

The petitioner had moved to quash the information in Criminal Case No. 324-V-91 on the ground
that it does not charge an offense. Respondent Judge Dizon-Capulong granted the motion reasoning
that the subject matter of the information in the CRIMINAL CASE is LUMBER, which is neither "timber"
nor "other forest product" under Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and hence, possession
thereof without the required legal documents is not prohibited and penalized under the said section.
Under paragraph (a), Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, an information may be quashed
on the ground that the facts alleged therein do not constitute an offense. It has been said that "the test
for the correctness of this ground is the sufficiency of the averments in the information, that is, whether
the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, constitute the elements of the offense, [29] and
matters aliunde will not be considered." Anent the sufficiency of the information, Section 6, Rule 110 of
the Rules of Court requires, inter alia, that the information state the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense.

Indeed, the word lumber does not appear in Section 68. But conceding ex gratia that this omission
amounts to an exclusion of lumber from the section's coverage, do the facts averred in the information
in the CRIMINAL CASE validly charge a violation of the said section?
A cursory reading of the information readily leads us to an infallible conclusion that lumber is not
solely its subject matter. It is evident therefrom that what are alleged to be in the possession of the
private respondent, without the required legal documents, are truckloads of
(1) almaciga and lauan; and
(2) approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of various species including almaciga
and supa.

Respondent Ri Chuy Po is charged with the violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended
by E.O. No. 277, which provides:

The almaciga and lauan specifically mentioned in no. (1) are not described as lumber. They cannot refer
to the lumber in no. (2) because they are separated by the words approximately 200,000 bd. ft. with the
conjunction and, and not with the preposition of. They must then be raw forest products or, more
specifically, timbers under Section 3(q) of P.D. No. 705, as amended, which reads:

SEC. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without License. Any
person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or
timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess

SEC. 3. Definitions.

xxx xxx xxx

(q) Forest product means timber, pulpwood, firewood, bark, tree top, resin, gum, wood, oil, honey,
beeswax, nipa, rattan, or other forest growth such as grass, shrub, and flowering plant, the associated
water, fish, game, scenic, historical, recreational and geological resources in forest lands.
It follows then that lumber is only one of the items covered by the information. The public and the
private respondents obviously miscomprehended the averments in the information.Accordingly, even
if lumber is not included in Section 68, the other items therein as noted above fall within the ambit of the
said section, and as to them, the information validly charges an offense.
Our respected brother, Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, suggests in his dissenting opinion that this Court
go beyond the four corners of the information for enlightenment as to whether the information
exclusively refers to lumber. With the aid of the pleadings and the annexes thereto, he arrives at the
conclusion that only lumber has been envisioned in the indictment.
The majority is unable to subscribe to his view. First, his proposition violates the rule that only the
facts alleged in the information vis-a-vis the law violated must be considered in determining whether an
information charges an offense.
Second, the pleadings and annexes he resorted to are insufficient to justify his conclusion. On the
contrary, the Joint Affidavit of Melencio Jalova, Jr., and Araman Belleng, which is one of the annexes he
referred to,[30] cannot lead one to infer that what the team seized was all lumber. Paragraph 8 thereof
expressly states:
8. That when inside the compound, the team found approximately four (4) truckloads of narra
shorts, trimmings and slabs and a negligible amount of narra lumber, and approximately 200,000 bd. ft.
of lumber and shorts of various species including almaciga and supa which are classified as prohibited
wood species. (Italics supplied)
In the same vein, the dispositive portion of the resolution [31] of the investigating prosecutor, which
served as the basis for the filing of the information, does not limit itself to lumber; thus:

supaand for illegal shipment of almaciga and lauan in violation of Sec. 63 of PD 705 as amended by
E.O. 277, series of 1987. (Italics supplied)
The foregoing disquisitions should not, in any manner, be construed as an affirmance of the
respondent Judge's conclusion that lumber is excluded from the coverage of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705,
as amended, and thus possession thereof without the required legal documents is not a crime. On the
contrary, this Court rules that such possession is penalized in the said section because lumber is
included in the term timber.
The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either timber or lumber. While the former is
included in forest products as defined in paragraph (q) of Section 3, the latter is found in paragraph (aa)
of the same section in the definition of Processing plant; which reads:
(aa) Processing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine or combination of machine used for the
processing of logs and other forest raw materials into lumber, veneer, plywood, wallboard, block-board,
paper board, pulp, paper or other finished wood products.
This simply means that lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw material. Clearly, the
Code uses the term lumber in its ordinary or common usage. In the 1993 copyright edition of Webster's
Third New International Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter alia, as timber or logs after being prepared
for the market.[32] Simply put, lumber is a processed log or timber.
It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words and phrases used in a
statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning. [33] And insofar as possession
of timber without the required legal documents is concerned, Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended,
makes no distinction between raw or processed timber.Neither should we. Ubi lex non distanguit nec
nos distinguere debemus.
Indisputably, respondent Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong of Branch 172 of the RTC of Valenzuela,
Metro Manila, committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the motion to quash the information in the
CRIMINAL CASE and in dismissing the said case.
G.R. No. 104988

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby recommended that an information be filed against

respondent Ri Chuy Po for illegal possession of 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber consisting of almaciga and

We find this petition to be without merit. The petitioner has miserably failed to show that the Court
of Appeals committed any reversible error in its assailed decision of 29 November 1991.

It was duly established that on 1 April 1990, the petitioner's truck with Plate No. CCK-322 was
coming out from the petitioner's lumberyard loaded with lauan and almaciga lumber of different sizes
and dimensions which were not accompanied with the required invoices and transport documents. The
seizure of such truck and its cargo was a valid exercise of the power vested upon a forest officer or
employee by Section 80 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by P.D. No. 1775. Then, too, as correctly held by
the trial court and the Court of Appeals in the FIRST CIVIL CASE, the search was conducted on a
moving vehicle. Such a search could be lawfully conducted without a search warrant.
Search of a moving vehicle is one of the five doctrinally accepted exceptions to the constitutional
mandate[34] that no search or seizure shall be made except by virtue of a warrant issued by a judge after
personally determining the existence of probable cause. The other exceptions are (1) search as an
incident to a lawful arrest, (2) seizure of evidence in plain view, (3) customs searches, and (4)
consented warrantless search.[35]
We also affirm the rulings of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the search on 4 April
1990 was a continuation of the search on 3 April 1990 done under and by virtue of the search warrant
issued on 3 April 1990 by Executive Judge Osorio. Under Section 9, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, a
search warrant has a lifetime of ten days. Hence, it could be served at any time within the said period,
and if its object or purpose cannot be accomplished in one day, the same may be continued the
following day or days until completed. Thus, when the search under a warrant on one day was
interrupted, it may be continued under the same warrant the following day, provided it is still within the
ten-day period.[36]
As to the final plea of the petitioner that the search was illegal because possession of lumber
without the required legal documents is not illegal under Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended,
since lumber is neither specified therein nor included in the term forest product, the same hardly merits
further discussion in view of our ruling in G.R. No. 106424.
G.R. No. 123784
The allegations and arguments set forth in the petition in this case palpably fail to show prima
facie that a reversible error has been committed by the Court of Appeals in its challenged decision of 31
July 1995 and resolution of 6 February 1996 in CA-G.R. SP No. 33778. We must, forthwith, deny it for
utter want of merit. There is no need to require the respondents to comment on the petition.
The Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petitioner's appeal from the judgment of the trial
court in the SECOND CIVIL CASE. The petitioner never disputed the fact that its lumber-dealer's license

or permit had been suspended by Secretary Factoran on 23 April 1990. The suspension was never
lifted, and since the license had only a lifetime of up to 25 September 1990, the petitioner has absolutely
no right to possess, sell, or otherwise dispose of lumber. Accordingly, Secretary Factoran or his
authorized representative had the authority to seize the lumber pursuant to Section 68-A of P.D. No.
705, as amended, which provides as follows:
Section 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department Head or his Duly Authorized Representative to
Order Confiscation. In all cases of violations of this Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations, the
Department Head or his duly authorized representative may order the confiscation of any forest
products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned. . . .
The petitioner's insistence that possession or sale of lumber is not penalized must also fail in view
of our disquisition and ruling on the same issue in G.R. No. 106424. Besides, the issue is totally
irrelevant in the SECOND CIVIL CASE which involves administrative seizure as a consequence of the
violation of the suspension of the petitioner's license as lumber dealer.
All told then, G.R. No. 104988 and G.R. No. 123784 are nothing more than rituals to cover up
blatant violations of the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines (P.D. No. 705), as amended. They are
presumably trifling attempts to block the serious efforts of the DENR to enforce the decree, efforts which
deserve the commendation of the public in light of the urgent need to take firm and decisive action
against despoilers of our forests whose continuous destruction only ensures to the generations to come,
if not the present, an inheritance of parched earth incapable of sustaining life. The Government must not
tire in its vigilance to protect the environment by prosecuting without fear or favor any person who dares
to violate our laws for the utilization and protection of our forests.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered

G.R. No. 184098

November 25, 2008

AMADO TAOPA, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
On April 2, 1996, the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office of Virac, Catanduanes
seized a truck loaded with illegally-cut lumber and arrested its driver, Placido Cuison. The lumber was
covered with bundles of abaca fiber to prevent detection. On investigation, Cuison pointed to petitioner
Amado Taopa and a certain Rufino Ogalesco as the owners of the seized lumber.

Taopa, Ogalesco and Cuison were thereafter charged with violating Section 68 of Presidential Decree
(PD) No. 705,1 as amended, in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Virac, Catanduanes. The information
against them read:
That on or about the 2nd day of April 1996 at around 9:00 o'clock in the morning at Barangay
Capilihan, Municipality of Virac, Province of Catanduanes, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to possess,
conspiring, confederating and helping one another, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully,
criminally possess, transport in a truck bearing Plate No. EAS 839 and have in their control
forest products, particularly one hundred thirteen (113) pieces of lumber of Philippine
Mahogany Group and Apitong species with an aggregate net volume of One Thousand Six
Hundred Eighty Four (1,684) board feet with an approximate value of Ninety-Nine Thousand
One Hundred Twenty (Php99,120.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, without any authority and/or
legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, prejudicial to the
public interest.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.2
Taopa, Ogalesco and Cuison pleaded not guilty on arraignment. After trial on the merits, the RTC found
them guilty as charged beyond reasonable doubt.3
Only Taopa and Cuison appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals (CA). Cuison was acquitted
but Taopa's conviction was affirmed.4 The dispositive portion of the CA decision read:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is REVERSED with respect to accused-appellant
Placido Cuison, who is ACQUITTED of the crime charged on reasonable doubt,
and MODIFIEDwith respect to accused-appellants Amado Taopa and Rufino Ogalesco by
reducing the penalty imposed on them to four (4) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days
of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.5
In this petition,6 Taopa seeks his acquittal from the charges against him. He alleges that the prosecution
failed to prove that he was one of the owners of the seized lumber as he was not in the truck when the
lumber was seized.

We deny the petition.

Both the RTC and the CA gave scant consideration to Taopa's alibi because Cuison's testimony proved
Taopa's active participation in the transport of the seized lumber. In particular, the RTC and the CA
found that the truck was loaded with the cargo in front of Taopa's house and that Taopa and Ogalesco
were accompanying the truck driven by Cuison up to where the truck and lumber were seized. These
facts proved Taopa's (and Ogalesco's) exercise of dominion and control over the lumber loaded in the
truck. The acts of Taopa (and of his co-accused Ogalesco) constituted possession of timber or other
forest products without the required legal documents. Moreover, the fact that Taopa and Ogalesco ran
away at the mere sight of the police was likewise largely indicative of guilt. We are thus convinced that
Taopa and Ogalesco were owners of the seized lumber.
However, we disagree with both the RTC and CA as to the penalty imposed on Taopa.
Section 68 of PD 705, as amended,7 refers to Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) for
the penalties to be imposed on violators. Violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended, is punished as
qualified theft.8 The law treats cutting, gathering, collecting and possessing timber or other forest
products without license as an offense as grave as and equivalent to the felony of qualified theft.
Articles 309 and 310 read:
Art. 309. Penalties. - Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:
1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of
the thing stolen is more 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; but if the
value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount, the penalty shall be the
maximum period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for each
additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be imposed
shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory
penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this
Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case
may be. (emphasis supplied)
2. xxx

Art. 310. Qualified theft. - The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher
bytwo degrees than those respectively specified in the next preceding articles xxx (emphasis
supplied).
The actual market value of the 113 pieces of seized lumber was P67,630.9 Following Article 310 in
relation to Article 309, the imposable penalty should be reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum
periods or a period ranging from 14 years, eight months and one day to 20 years plus an additional
period of four years for the excess of P47,630.
The minimum term of the indeterminate sentence 10 imposable on Taopa shall be the penalty next lower
to that prescribed in the RPC. In this case, the minimum term shall be anywhere between 10 years and
one day to 14 years and eight months or prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in
its minimum period.
The maximum term shall be the sum of the additional four years and the medium period 11 ofreclusion
temporal in its medium and maximum periods or 16 years, five months and 11 days to 18 years, two
months and 21 days of reclusion temporal. The maximum term therefore may be anywhere between 16
years, five months and 11 days of reclusion temporal to 22 years, two months and 21 days of reclusion
perpetua.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The January 31, 2008 decision and July 28, 2008
resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 30380
are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.Petitioner Amado Taopa is hereby found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt for violation of Section 68 of PD No. 705, as amended, and sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from 10 years and one day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 20
years of reclusion temporal as maximum, with the accessory penalties provided for by law.
SO ORDERED.

GALO MONGE, G.R. No. 170308

Petitioner,
Present:
CARPIO,

Acting Chairperson,
- versus - CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,*
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.

but Potencios whereabouts had been unknown since the time of the seizure [6] until he surfaced on 3
January 1998.[7]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent. Promulgated:
March 7, 2008

An information was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Iriga City, Branch 35 charging petitioner

x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

Executive Order (E.O.) No. 277, series of 1997. The inculpatory portion of the information reads:

and Potencio with violation of Section 68[8] of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705, [9] as amended by

That on or about the 20th day of [July 1994], at about 9:30 oclock in
the morning, in Barangay Sto. Domingo, Iriga City, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating with each other, without any authority of law, nor armed with
necessary permit/license or other documents, with intent to gain, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, transport and have in their possession
three (3) pieces of Mahogany of assorted [dimension] with a[n] appropriate
volume of seventy-seven (77) board feet or point eighteen (0.18) cubic meter
with a total market value of P1,925.00, Philippine currency, to the damage and
prejudice of the DENR in the aforesaid amount.

RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:

This

is

Petition

for

Review[1] under

Rule

45

of

the

Rules

of

Court

whereby petitioner Galo Monge (petitioner) assails the Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals dated 28 June
2005 which affirmed his conviction as well as the discharge of accused Edgar Potencio (Potencio) as a

CONTRARY TO LAW.[10]

state witness.
The factual antecedents follow. On 20 July 1994, petitioner and Potencio were found
by barangay tanods Serdan and Molina in possession of and transporting three (3) pieces of mahogany

At the 26 November 1996 arraignment, petitioner entered a negative plea. [11]

lumber in Barangay Santo Domingo, Iriga City. Right there and then, the tanods demanded that they be
shown the requisite permit and/or authority from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) but neither petitioner nor Potencio was able to produce any.[3] Petitioner fled the scene in that
instant whereasPotencio was brought to the police station for interrogation, and thereafter, to the DENRCommunity Environment and Natural Resources Office (DENR-CENRO). [4] The DENR-CENRO issued a
seizure receipt for the three pieces of lumber indicating that the items, totaling 77 board feet of
mahogany valued at P1,925.00, had been seized fromPotencio. [5] Later on, petitioner was arrested,

Trial ensued. On 17 June 1997, Serdan testified on the circumstances of the apprehension
but for failing to appear in court for cross examination, his testimony was stricken out. [12] On 16 January
1998, Potencio was discharged to be used as a state witness on motion of the prosecutor.
[13]

Accordingly, he testified on the circumstances of the arrest but claimed that for a promised fee he

was merely requested by petitioner, the owner of the log, to assist him in hauling the same down from
the mountain. Potenciostestimony was materially corroborated by Molina. [14] Petitioner did not contest

the allegations, except that it was not he but Potencio who owned the lumber. He lamented that contrary

products without the legal documents required under existing laws and regulations. [19] DENR

to what Potencio had stated in court, it was the latter who hired him to bring the log from the site to the

Administrative Order No. 59 series of 1993 specifies thedocuments required for the transport of timber

sawmill where the same was to be sawn into pieces.[15]

and other forest products. Section 3 thereof materially requires that the transport of lumber be
accompanied by a certificate of lumber origin duly issued by the DENR-CENRO. In the first offense, the

The trial court found petitioner guilty as charged. Petitioner was imposed nine (9) years, four (4) months

legality of the acts of cutting, gathering, collecting or removing timber or other forest products may be

and one (1) day to ten (10) years and eight (8) months of prision mayorin its medium and maximum

proven by the authorization duly issued by the DENR. In the second offense, however, it is immaterial

periods and ordered to pay the costs.[16]

whether or not the cutting, gathering, collecting and removal of forest products are legal precisely

Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals where he challenged the
discharge of Potencio as a state witness on the ground that the latter was not the least guilty of the

because mere possession of forest products without the requisite documents consummates the crime.
[20]

offense and that there was no absolute necessity for his testimony. [17] The appellate court dismissed this
challenge and affirmed the findings of the trial court.However, it modified the penalty to an indeterminate

It is thus clear that the fact of possession by petitioner and Potencio of the subject mahogany

prison sentence of six (6) years of prision correccional as minimum to ten (10) years and eight (8)

lumber and their subsequent failure to produce the requisite legal documents, taken together, has

months of prision mayoras maximum.[18] His motion for reconsideration was denied, hence the present

already given rise to criminal liability under Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, particularly the second act

appeal whereby petitioner reiterates his challenge against the discharge of Potencio.

punished thereunder. The direct and affirmative testimony of Molina and Potencio as a state witness on
the circumstances surrounding the apprehension well establishes petitioners liability. Petitioner cannot

The petition is utterly unmeritorious.

take refuge in his denial of ownership over the pieces of lumber found in his possession nor in his claim

Petitioner and Potencio were caught in flagrante delicto transporting, and thus in possession

that his help was merely solicited by Potencio to provide the latter assistance in transporting the said

of, processed mahogany lumber without proper authority from the DENR. Petitioner has never denied

lumber. P.D. No. 705 is a special penal statute that punishes acts essentially malum prohibitum. As

this fact. But in his attempt to exonerate himself from liability, he claims that it was Potencio, the owner

such, in prosecutions under its provisions, claims of good faith are by no means reliable as defenses

of the lumber, who requested his assistance in hauling the log down from the mountain and in

because the offense is complete and criminal liability attaches once the prohibited acts are committed.
[21]

transporting the same to the sawmill for processing. The contention is unavailing.

In other words, mere possession of timber or other forest products without the proper legal

documents, even absent malice or criminal intent, is illegal. [22] It would therefore make no difference at
Section

68

of

P.D.

No.

705,

as

amended

by

E.O.

No.

277,

all whether it was petitioner himself or Potencio who owned the subject pieces of lumber.

criminalizes two distinct and separate offenses, namely: (a) the cutting, gathering, collecting and
removing of timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable
public land, or from private land without any authority; and (b) the possession of timber or other forest

Considering the overwhelming body of evidence pointing to nothing less than petitioners guilt
of the offense charged, there is no cogent reason to reverse his conviction.

Petitioners challenge against Potencios discharge as a state witness must also fail. Not a few
cases established the doctrine that the discharge of an accused so he may turn state witness is left to
the

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED.

exercise of the trial courts sound discretion[23] limited only by the requirements set forth in Section

17,[24] Rule 119 of the Rules of Court. Thus, whether the accused offered to be discharged appears to be

SO ORDERED.

the least guilty and whether there is objectively an absolute necessity for his testimony are questions
that lie within the domain of the trial court, it being competent to resolve issues of fact. The discretionary
judgment of the trial court with respect this highly factual issue is not to be interfered with by the
appellate courts except in case of grave abuse of discretion. [25] No such grave abuse is present in this
case. Suffice it to say that issues relative to the discharge of an accused must be raised in the trial court
as they cannot be addressed for the first time on appeal. [26]
Moreover

and

more

importantly,

an

order

discharging

an

accused

from the information in order that he may testify for the prosecution has the effect of an acquittal. [27]Once
the discharge is ordered by the trial court, any future development showing that any or all of the
conditions provided in Section 17, Rule 119 have not actually been fulfilled will not affect the legal
consequence of an acquittal.[28] Any witting or unwitting error of the prosecution, therefore, in moving for
the discharge and of the court in granting the motionno question of jurisdiction being involvedwill not
deprive the discharged accused of the benefit of acquittal and of his right against double jeopardy. A
contrary rule would certainly be unfair to the discharged accused because he would then be faulted for a
failure attributable to the prosecutor. It is inconceivable that the rule has adopted the abhorrent legal
policy of placing the fate of the discharged accused at the mercy of anyone who may handle the
prosecution.[29] Indeed, the only instance where the testimony of a discharged accused may be

G.R. No. 144640

June 26, 2006

disregarded is when he deliberately fails to testify truthfully in court in accordance with his commitment,
[30]

as provided for in Section 18, Rule 119. Potencio lived up to his commitment and for that reason,

petitioners challenge against his discharge must be dismissed.

RODOLFO TIGOY, Petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the decision and resolution,
dated March 6, 2000 and August 23, 2000, respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
20864 entitled "People of the Philippines v. Nestor Ong and Rodolfo Tigoy," acquitting Nestor Ong for
insufficiency of evidence, while convicting Rodolfo Tigoy for violating Section 68 of Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines, as amended by Executive Order (E.O.)
No. 277, Series of 1987, in relation to Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On August 3, 1993, Nestor Ong, who had been engaged in the trucking business in Iligan City since
1986, was allegedly introduced by his friend Gamad Muntod to Lolong Bertodazo who signified his
intent to rent the trucks of Ong to transport construction materials from Larapan, Lanao del Norte to
Dipolog City. A Contract to Transport was supposedly entered into between Ong and Bertodazo, the
salient portions of which state:
1. That the party of the First Part is an owner of Cargo Trucks with place of business at Iligan
City;
2. That the party of the Second Part is a businessman dealing in buy and sell of General
Merchandise, dry goods and construction materials;
3. That the party of the Second Part will engage the services of the two (2) cargo trucks of the
party of the First Part;
4. That the services agreed upon should be rendered by the party of the First Part on August
3, 1993 from Larapan, Linamon, Lanao del Norte to Dipolog City for an agreed amount of TEN
THOUSAND (P10,000.00) Pesos per truck or a total of TWENTY THOUSAND (P20,000.00)
Pesos, Philippine Currency for the carriage of cement and other merchandise owned by the
party of the Second Part;

5. That any legal controversy involving the cargo or of and when the cargo trucks are not
actually used for the purpose herein stipulated, it is agreed that the same is the sole
responsibility of the party of the Second Part without any liability of the party of the First Part. 1
In the evening of October 3, 1993, Ong allegedly ordered Nestor Sumagang and petitioner Rodolfo
Tigoy who had been employed by him as truck drivers for two (2) years and ten (10) years, respectively,
to bring the two trucks to Lolong Bertodazo in Larapan, Lanao del Norte which is about fifteen (15)
minutes away from Iligan City. He instructed the two drivers to leave the trucks in Larapan for the
loading of the construction materials by Lolong Bertodazo, and to go back at dawn for the trip to Dipolog
City. Thus, after meeting with Bertodazo, Sumagang and petitioner Tigoy allegedly went home to return
to Larapan at four oclock in the morning the next day. When they arrived, the trucks had been laden
with bags of cement and were half-covered with canvas. 2 Before departing, they allegedly checked the
motor oil, water, engine and tires of the trucks to determine if the same were in good condition.
That same morning of October 4, 1993, Senior Inspector Rico Lacay Tome (then Deputy Chief of Police
of Ozamis City), while escorting Provincial Director Dionisio Coloma at the ICC Arts Center in Ozamis
City, along with the members of the Special Operation Group, received a dispatch from the 466th PNP
Company situated at Barangay Bongbong, Ozamis City, informing him that two trucks, a blue and green
loaded with cement, that were going towards Ozamis City did not stop at the checkpoint. Upon receiving
the report, Tome, along with PO2 Peter Paul Nuqui and PO3 Bienvenido Real, boarded their patrol
vehicle, a mini cruiser jeep, to intercept the two trucks at Lilian Terminal, Ozamis City. 3
At the Lilian Terminal, PO2 Nuqui, who was the only one in uniform among the police officers, flagged
down the two trucks but the same just sped away and proceeded towards the direction of Oroquieta
City. Aboard their patrol vehicle, they chased the trucks and overtook the same at Barangay Manabay.
They blocked the road with their vehicle causing the two trucks to stop.
According to Senior Inspector Tome, he asked the driver who had alighted from the green truck why he
did not stop at the checkpoint but the latter did not answer. When he inquired what was loaded in the
truck, the driver replied that there is "S.O.P," which means grease money in street parlance. 4 This raised
the suspicion of Tome that the trucks were loaded with "hot items."
Meanwhile, the blue truck which had been speeding behind the green truck and was being driven by
Sumagang was intercepted by PO3 Real. Upon inspection, the police officers discovered piles of sawn
lumber beneath the cement bags in both trucks. Tome inquired if the drivers had a permit for the lumber
but the latter could not produce any.

The drivers were brought and turned over to the investigator at the City Hall in Ozamis City. The
truckmen, namely, Felix Arante and Doro Lopez, and another passenger whom Tigoy identified as
Lolong Bertodazo, who were riding with them in the trucks, were not investigated. According to Nuqui,
they did not notice that the group had left. It was later learned that they were instructed by Sumagang to
inform Nestor Ong of the incident.
Afterwards, the group of Tome proceeded back to the ICC Arts Center and informed the Provincial
Director of the apprehension. Meanwhile, the drivers, Tigoy and Sumagang, were detained at the
Ozamis City Police Station while Arante and Lopez were released. 5
Meanwhile, Ermelo delos Santos, Chief of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
Community and Environment and Natural Resources Office (DENR-CENRO), 6 after receiving a call from
the Ozamis City Police Station that two trucks were apprehended transporting sawn lumber without a
permit and were brought to the City Hall, sent Rolando Dingal, Forester of the DENR, together with
Teodoro Echavez, Juanito Taruc and Lucio Penaroya, to investigate.
Petitioner Tigoy and Sumagang presented to Dingal the registration papers of the two trucks and
appearing therein was the name of Nestor Ong as the owner. After ascertaining that the sawn lumber
loaded on the two trucks did not have supporting documents, Dingal and his companions scaled the
subject lumber and prepared a tally sheet. Loaded in the blue Nissan ten-wheeler truck were 229 pieces
of lumber with a total volume of 6,232.46 board feet; and, in the green Isuzu eight-wheeler truck, 333
pieces of lumber with a total volume of 5,095.5 board feet. 7 Consequently, the lumber and the vehicles
were seized upon the order of the DENR Regional Executive Director. 8
On October 6, 1993, an Information was filed against Nestor Ong, Sumagang, Lolong Bertodazo and
petitioner Tigoy for possession of forest products without legal permit, thus:
That on or about the 4th day of August, 1993 at Barangay Catadman, Ozamiz City, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating
together and mutually helping each other, for a common design, did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and illegally possess and transport without the necessary legal documents nor permit from
the lawful authorities, sawn dipterocarp lumbers (Philippine Mahogany), in the following manner, to wit:
accused Nestor Ong, being the owner of 2 ten wheeler trucks with Plate Nos. GDA-279 and PNH-364
facilitated and allowed the use and transport of above-stated sawn [lumber] from Larapan, Lanao del
Norte, but intercepted by the PNP authorities in Ozamiz City; while the accused Lolong Bertodazo
facilitated the loading and transport of said sawn lumbers, while accused Nestor Sumagang y Lacson
drove the Nissan 10 wheeler cargo truck bearing Plate No. GDA-279 which was loaded with 333 pieces

of said sawn dipterocarp lumbers (Philippine Mahogany) of assorted sizes equivalent [to] 5,095.5 board
feet which was concealed under piled bags of cement, which lumbers [were] valued at P134, 242.36;
while accused Rodolfo Tigoy drove the 8 wheeler Isuzu truck bearing Plate No. ONH-364, which was
loaded and transported with 229 pieces of sawn dipterocarp lumbers (Philippine Mahogany) of assorted
sizes equivalent to 6,232.46 board feet which was concealed under piled bags of cement which lumbers
[were] valued at P92,316.77 or total value of P226,559.13, without, however, causing damage to the
government, inasmuch as the aforestated lumbers were recovered.
CONTRARY to Section 68 of Presidential Decree 705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277, Series
of 1987, in relation to Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. 9
Ong and petitioner Tigoy entered pleas of not guilty during the arraignment. Sumagang died after the
case was filed while the other co-accused, Lolong Bertodazo, was not arrested and has remained at
large.
On October 11, 1996, the Regional Trial Court rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, finding accused Nestor Ong and Rodolfo Tigoy [GUILTY] beyond reasonable doubt of
possession of dipterocarp lumber [VALUED] at more than P22,000.00 without the legal documents as
required by existing laws and regulations, penalized as qualified theft, this Court sentences them to an
indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor to eighteen (18) years and
three (3) months of reclusion temporal. The lumber and the conveyances used are forfeited in favor of
the government. With costs.
The DENR is ordered to sell/dispose of the lumber and conveyances in accordance with the existing
laws, WITHOUT DELAY. Let the Court of Appeals, Fourteenth Division, before which accused Ongs
appeal of this Courts denial of his action for replevin relative to his trucks is pending, be furnished with a
copy of this judgment.
With costs.
SO ORDERED.10

Declaring that "constructive possession" of unlicensed lumber is not within the contemplation of Section
68 of P.D. No. 705, and for failure by the prosecution to prove the complicity of Ong, the Court of
Appeals rendered its decision on March 6, 2000 modifying the ruling of the lower court, thus:

Stated otherwise, the core issue presented is whether or not petitioner Tigoy is guilty of conspiracy in
possessing or transporting lumber without the necessary permit in violation of the Revised Forestry
Code of the Philippines.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby MODIFIED in that accused-appellant Nestor Ong
is acquitted for insufficiency of evidence and his two (2) trucks are ordered returned to him. The
conviction of Rodolfo Tigoy is upheld and the decision dated October 11, 1996 is AFFIRMED in all
respects.

Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by E.O. No. 277, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry
Code of the Philippines, provides:

SO ORDERED.11
On March 24, 2000, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion for Reconsideration praying for
his acquittal but the same was denied on August 23, 2000.
Hence, this petition, with the following assignment of errors:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING "COLLUSION" BETWEEN LOLONG BERTODAZO
AND PETITIONER TIGOY;
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN COMPLETELY DISREGARDING THE AFFIDAVIT OF LOLONG
BERTODAZO AGAINST HIS PENAL INTEREST;
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING PETITIONER TIGOY TO HAVE KNOWLEDGE OF
THE LUMBER HE WAS TRANSPORTING; AND,
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT PETITIONER TIGOY HAD ACTUAL AND
PHYSICAL POSSESSION OF THE UNDOCUMENTED LUMBER.12

Section 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber or Other Forest Products Without License.
Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or
timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess
timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised
Penal Code. . . .
There are two ways of violating Section 68 of the above Code: 1) by cutting, gathering and/or collecting
timber or other forest products without a license; and, 2) by possessing timber or other forest products
without the required legal documents.
Petitioner was charged with and convicted of transporting lumber without a permit which is punishable
under Section 68 of the Code. He, Sumagang and the rest of their companions were apprehended by
the police officersin flagrante delicto as they were transporting the subject lumber from Larapan to
Dipolog City.
Petitioner maintains that he could not have conspired with Lolong Bertodazo as he did not know about
the unlicensed lumber in the trucks. He believed that what he was transporting were bags of cement in
view of the contract between Ong and Bertodazo. Also, he was not around when Bertodazo loaded the
trucks with the lumber hidden under the bags of cement.
This contention by petitioner, however, was not believed by the lower court. In declaring that petitioner
connived with Bertodazo in transporting the subject lumber, the court a quo noted:
x x x The evidence of the prosecution established that the two drivers of accused Ong refused to stop at
a checkpoint, a fact admitted by both in their affidavit, Exhs. "E" and "E-2". Likewise, the two drivers
refused to stop on the national highway near a bus terminal when required by a uniformed policeman.
When finally accosted, one of the drivers, whom witness Tome identified as the driver of the green truck,
Sumagang, but who actually was Tigoy (as he was the driver of the green truck and who came to the

road block first, being the lead driver) offered "S.O.P." which to witness Tome meant that the trucks were
carrying "hot items."
Why would the drivers refuse to stop when required? Did they fear inspection of their cargo? Why would
"S.O.P." (which in street parlance is grease money) be offered to facilitate the passage of the trucks?
The only logical answer to all these questions is that the drivers knew that they were carrying
contraband lumber. This Court believes that the drivers had knowledge of the fact that they were
transporting and were in possession of undocumented lumber in violation of law. 13
In offenses considered as mala prohibita or when the doing of an act is prohibited by a special law such
as in the present case, the commission of the prohibited act is the crime itself. It is sufficient that the
offender has the intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by the special law, and that it is done knowingly
and consciously.14
Direct proof of previous agreement to commit an offense is not necessary to prove
conspiracy.15 Conspiracy may be proven by circumstantial evidence.16 It may be deduced from the
mode, method and manner by which the offense is perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused
when such acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest. 17 It is
not even required that the participants have an agreement for an appreciable period to commence it. 18
Petitioners actions adequately show that he intentionally participated in the commission of the offense
for which he had been charged and found guilty by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
Finding that petitioners conviction was reached without arbitrariness and with sufficient basis, this Court
upholds the same. The Court accords high respect to the findings of facts of the trial court, its calibration
of the collective testimonies of the witnesses, its assessment of the probative weight of the evidence of
the parties as well as its conclusions19 especially when these are in agreement with those of the Court of
Appeals, which is the case here. As a matter of fact, factual findings of the trial court, when adopted and
confirmed by the Court of Appeals, are generally final and conclusive. 20
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the Decision and Resolution, dated March 6, 2000 and
August 23, 2000, respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20864 are
hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

There were three persons on board the truck: driver Wilfredo Cacao, accused-appellant Wilson Que,
and an unnamed person. The driver identified accused- appellant as the owner of the truck and the
cargo. 5
SPO1 Corpuz checked the cargo and found that it contained coconut slabs. When interviewed,
accused-appellant told SPO1 Corpuz that there were sawn lumber inserted in between the coconut
slabs. 6

G.R. No. 120365 December 17, 1996

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
WILSON B. QUE, accused-appellant

PUNO, J.:p
Accused-appellant Wilson B. Que appeals from his conviction for violation of Section 68 of Presidential
Decree (P.D.) 705 1 as amended by Executive Order (E.O.) 277. 2
The facts show that two weeks before March 8, 1994, SPO1 Dexter Corpuz, a member of the Provincial
Task Force on Illegal Logging, received an information that a ten-wheeler truck bearing plate number
PAD-548 loaded with illegally cut lumber will pass through Ilocos Norte. Acting on said information,
members of the Provincial Task Force went on patrol several times within the vicinity of General
Segundo Avenue in Laoag City. 3
On March 8, 1994, SPO1 Corpuz, together with SPO1 Zaldy Asuncion and SPO1 Elmer Patoc went on
patrol around the area. At about 1:00 in the morning, they posted themselves at the corner of General
Segundo Avenue and Rizal Street. Thirty minutes later, they saw a ten-wheeler truck with plate number
PAD-548 pass by. They followed the truck and apprehended it at the Marcos Bridge. 4

SPO1 Corpuz asked accused-appellant for the cargo's supporting documents, specifically: (1) certificate
of lumber origin, (2) certificate of transport agreement, (3) auxiliary invoice, (4) receipt from the DENR,
and (5) certification from the forest ranger regarding the origin of the coconut slabs. Accused-appellant
failed to present any of these documents . All he could show was a certification 7 from the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO), Sanchez Mira, Cagayan that he legally acquired
the coconut slabs. The certification was issued to facilitate transport of the slabs from Sanchez Mira,
Cagayan to San Vicente, Urdaneta, Pangasinan. 7
SPO1 Corpuz brought accused-appellant to the office of the Provincial Task Force at the provincial
capitol. Again, accused-appellant admitted to the members of the Provincial Task Force that there were
sawn lumber under the coconut slabs. 9
At 10:00 o'clock in the morning, the members of the Provincial Task Force, together with three CENRO
personnel examined the cargo. The examination confirmed that the cargo consisted of coconut slabs
and sawn tanguile lumber. The coconut slabs were piled at the sides of the truck, concealing the
tanguile lumber. 10 When the CENRO personnel inventoried and scaled the seized forest products, they
counted two hundred fifty eight (258) pieces of tanguile lumber with a total volume of 3,729.3 board feet
(8.79 cubic meters) and total assessed value of P93,232.50. 11
On June 23, 1994, accused-appellant was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Laoag with
violation of Section 68 of P.D. 705 as amended by E.O. 277. The Information alleged:
That on or about the 8th day of March, 1994, in the City of Laoag, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being
then the owner of an I(s)uzu Ten wheeler Truck bearing Plate No. PAD-548, with
intent of gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in
possession, control and custody 258 pieces of various sizes of Forest Products
chainsawn lumber (species of Tanguile) with a total volume of 3,729.3 bd. ft. or
equivalent to 8.79 cubic meters valued in the total amount of P93,232.50 at

P25.00/bd. ft., necessary permit, license or authority to do so from the proper

authorities, thus violating the aforecited provision of the law, to the damage and
prejudice of the government.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 12
Accused-appellant denied the charge against him. He claimed that he acquired the 258 pieces of
tanguile lumber from a legal source. During the trial, he presented the private land timber permits
(PLTP) issued by the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) to Enrica Cayosa 13 and Elpidio Sabal. 14 The PLTP
authorizes its holder to cut, gather and dispose timber from the forest area covered by the permit. He
alleged that the tanguile lumber came from the forest area covered by the PLTP's of Cayosa and Sabal
and that they were given to him by Cayosa and Sabal as payment for his hauling services. 15
Accused-appellant also objected to the admission of the 258 pieces of lumber as evidence against him.
He contended that they were fruits of an illegal search and seizure and of an uncounselled extrajudicial
admission.
The trial court found accused-appellant guilty and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua. It also ordered
the confiscation of the seized lumber and the ten-wheeler truck owned by accused-appellant. The
dispositive portion of the Decision 16 states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring accused Wilson B. Que
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as
amended by Executive Order No. 277 and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, plus all the accessory penalties provided by
law. The bail bond filed for the provisional liberty of the accused is CANCELLED.
The two hundred fifty-eight (258) pieces of lumber (tanguile specie) and the tenwheeler truck bearing plate No. PAD-548 which was used in the commission of the
crime are hereby ordered confiscated in favor of the government to be disposed of
in accordance with law.
Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED. 17

Appellant now comes before us with the following assignment of

errors: 18
1. It was error for the Court to convict accused under Section 68, PD 705 as
amended by EO 277 for possessing timber or other forest products without the legal
documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations on the ground that
since it is only in EO No. 277 where for the first time mere possession of timber was
criminalized, there are no existing forest laws and regulations which required certain
legal documents for possession of timber and other forest products.
2. The Court erred in allowing evidence secured in violation of the constitutional
rights of accused against unlawful searches and seizures.
3. The Court erred in allowing evidence secured in violation of the constitutional
rights of accused under custodial investigation.
On the first assignment of error, appellant argues that he cannot be convicted for violation of Section 68
of P.D. 705 because E.O. 277 which amended Section 68 to penalize the possession of timber or other
forest products without the proper legal documents did not indicate the particular documents necessary
to make the possession legal. Neither did the other forest laws and regulations existing at the time of its
enactment.
Appellant's argument deserves scant consideration. Section 68 of P.D. 705 provides:
Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or other Forest Products
Without License. Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or
other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable
public land, or from private land without any authority, or possess timber or other
forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws
and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309
and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships,
associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering,
collection or possession shall be liable and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in
addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation.

The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the
timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as
well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area
where the timber or forest products are found. (emphasis supplied).
Appellant interprets the phrase "existing forest laws and regulations" to refer to those laws and
regulations which were already in effect at the time of the enactment of E.O. 277. The suggested
interpretation is strained and would render the law inutile. Statutory construction should not kill but give
life to the law. The phrase should be construed to refer to laws and regulations existing at the time of
possession of timber or other forest products. DENR Administrative Order No. 59 series of 1993
specifies the documents required for the transport of timber and other forest products. Section 3 of the
Administrative Order provides:
Section 3. Documents Required.
Consistent with the policy stated above, the movement of logs, lumber, plywood,
veneer, non-timber forest products and wood-based or nonwood-based
products/commodities shall be covered with appropriate Certificates of Origin,
issued by authorized DENR officials, as specified in the succeeding sections.
xxx xxx xxx
3.3 Lumber. Unless otherwise herein provided, the transport of lumber shall be
accompanied by a CERTIFICATE OF LUMBER ORIGIN (CLO) issued by the
CENRO or his duly authorized representative which has jurisdiction over the
processing plant producing the said lumber or the lumber firm authorized to deal in
such commodities. In order to be valid, the CLO must be supported by the company
tally sheet or delivery receipt, and in case of sale, a lumber sales invoice.
xxx xxx xxx
When apprehended on March 8, 1994, accused-appellant failed to present any certificate of origin of the
258 pieces of tanguile lumber. The trial court found:
xxx xxx xxx

. . . When apprehended by the police officers, the accused admittedly could not
present a single document to justify his possession of the subject lumber. . . .
Significantly, at the time the accused was apprehended by the police offices, he
readily showed documents to justify his possession of the coconut slabs. Thus, he
showed a certification issued by Remigio B. Rosario, Forest Ranger, of the DENR,
CENRO, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan (Exhibit "E") and a xerox copy of the original
certificate of title covering the parcel of land where the coconut slabs were cut.
(Exhibit "F").
It is worthy to note that the certification dated March 7, 1994 states:
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the one (1) truckload of coconut
slabs to be transported by Mr. Wilson Que on board truck
bearing Plate No. PAD 548 were derived from matured coconut
palms gathered inside the private land of Miss Bonifacia Collado
under OCT No. P-11614(8) located at Nagrangtayan, Sanchez
Mira, Cagayan.
This certification is being issued upon the request of Mr. Wilson
Que for the purpose of facilitating the transportation of said
coconut slabs from Sanchez Mira, Cagayan to San Vicente,
Urdaneta, Pangasinan and is valid up to March 11, 1994 or
upon discharge of its cargoes at its final destination, whichever
comes first.
It is crystal clear, therefore, that the accused was given permit by the DENR to
transport one (1) truckload of coconut slabs only between March 7 to 11, 1994. The
accused was apprehended onMarch 8, 1994 aboard his truck bearing plate number
PAD-548 which was loaded not only with coconut slabs but with chainsawn lumber
as well. Admittedly, the lumber could not be seen from the outside. The lumber were
placed in the middle and not visible unless the coconut slabs which were placed on
the top, sides and rear of the truck were removed.
Under these circumstances, the Court has no doubt that the accused was very
much aware that he needed documents to possess and transport the lumber (b)ut
could not secure one and, therefore, concealed the lumber by placing the same in

such a manner that they could not be seen by police authorities by merely looking at
the cargo.
In this regard, the Court cannot give credence to his alleged letter dated March 3,
1994 addressed to the OIC CENRO Officer, CENRO, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan
informing the CENRO that he would be transporting the subject lumber on March 7,
1994 from Sanchez Mira, Cagayan to Sto. Domingo, Ilocos Sur but was returned to
him for the reason that he did not need a permit to transport the subject lumber.
(Exhibits "8", "8-A").
While it is true that the letter indicates that it was received by CENRO on March 4,
1994, the Court has doubts that this was duly filed with the concerned office.
According to the accused, he filed the letter in the morning of March 4 and returned
in the afternoon of the same day. He was then informed by an employee of the
CENRO whom he did not identify that he did not need a permit to transport the
lumber because the lumber would be for personal used (sic) and ". . . came from
PLTP." (Ibid) The letter-request was returned to him.
The fact that the letter-request was returned to him creates doubts on the stance of
the accused. Documents or other papers, i.e., letter-request of this kind filed with a
government agency are not returned. Hence, when a person files or submits any
document to a government agency, the agency gets the original copy. The filer only
gets a duplicate copy to show that he has filed such document with the agency.
Moreover, his avoidance as regards the identity of the employee of the CENRO who
allegedly returned the letter-request to him also creates doubts on his stance. Thus,
on cross-examination, the accused, when asked about the identity of the employee
of the CENRO who returned the letter-request to him answered that he could
recognize the person ". . . but they were already reshuffled." (TSN, February 8,
1995, p. 104) At one point, the accused also said that he did not know if that person
was an employee of the DENR. (Ibid, p. 105)
Be that as it may, the Court finds significance in the last paragraph of this letterrequest, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx

Please consider this as my Certificate of Transport Agreement in

view of the fact that I am hauling and transporting my own
lumber for my own needs.
Thus, the accused through this letter considered the same as his certificate of
transport agreement. Why then, if he was telling the truth, did he not take this letter
with him when he transported the lumber on March 7, 1994?
All these circumstances clearly show that the letter comes from a polluted source. 19
xxx xxx xxx
Accused-appellant's possession of the subject lumber without any documentation clearly
constitutes an offense under Section 68 of P.D. 705.
We also reject appellant's argument that the law only penalizes possession of illegal forest products and
that the possessor cannot be held liable if he proves that the cutting, gathering, collecting or removal of
such forest products is legal. There are two (2) distinct and separate offenses punished under Section
68 of P.D. 705, to wit:
(1) Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other forest products from
any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private
land without any authority; and
(2) Possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents
required under existing forest laws and regulations.
In the first offense, one can raise as a defense the legality of the acts of cutting, gathering, collecting or
removing timber or other forest products by presenting the authorization issued by the DENR. In the
second offense, however, it is immaterial whether the cutting, gathering, collecting and removal of the
forest products is legal or not. Mere possession of forest products without the proper documents
consummates the crime. Whether or not the lumber comes from a legal source is immaterial because
E.O 277 considers the mere possession of timber or other forest products without the proper legal
documents as malum prohibitum.

On the second and third assignment of error, appellant contends that the seized lumber are inadmissible
in evidence for being "fruits of a poisonous tree". Appellant avers that these pieces of lumber were
obtained in violation of his constitutional right against unlawful searches and seizures as well as his right
to counsel.

With regard to the search of moving vehicles, this had been justified on the ground
that the mobility of motor vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to be searched to
move out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.
This in no way, however, gives the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct
warrantless searches of automobiles in the absence of probable cause. When a
vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless search
has been held to be valid as long as the officers conducting the search have
reasonable or probable cause to believe before search that they will find the
instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched.
(citations omitted; emphasis supplied)

We do not agree.
The rule on warrantless search and seizure of a moving vehicle was summarized by this court in People
vs.Bagista, 20 thus:
The general rule regarding searches and seizures can be stated in this manner: no
person shall be subjected to a search of his person, personal effects or belongings,
or his residence except by virtue of a search warrant or on the occasion of a lawful
arrest. The basis for the rule can be found in Article III, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution, which states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose, shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to
be seized.
Article III, Section 3 (2) further ordains that any evidence obtained in violation of the
aforementioned right shall, among others, "be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding."
The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures admits of
certain exceptions. Aside from a search incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless
search had been upheld in cases of moving vehicles, and the seizure of evidence in
plain view.

As in Bagista, the police officers in the case at bar had probable cause to search appellant's truck. A
member of the Provincial Task Force on Illegal Logging received a reliable information that a tenwheeler truck bearing plate number PAD-548 loaded with illegal lumber would pass through Ilocos
Norte. Two weeks later, while members of the Provincial Task Force were patrolling along General
Segundo Avenue, they saw the ten-wheeler truck described by the informant. When they apprehended it
at the Marcos Bridge, accused-appellant, the owner of the truck and the cargo, admitted that there were
sawn lumber in between the coconut slabs. When the police officers asked for the lumber's supporting
documents, accused-appellant could not present any. The foregoing circumstances are sufficient to
prove the existence of probable cause which justified the extensive search of appellant's truck even
without a warrant. Thus, the 258 pieces of tanguile lumber were lawfully seized and were thus properly
admitted as evidence to prove the guilt of accused-appellant.
The foregoing disquisition renders unnecessary the issue of whether appellant's right to counsel under
custodial investigation was violated. The Resolution of the issue will not affect the finding of guilt of
appellant.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.
Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.

FELIPE CALUB and RICARDO VALENCIA, DEPARTMENT of ENVIRONMENT and NATURAL

RESOURCES (DENR), CATBALOGAN, SAMAR, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, MANUELA T. BABALCON, and CONSTANCIO ABUGANDA, respondents.

QUISUMBING, J.:
For review is the decision1 dated May 27, 1994, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 29191,
denying the petition filed by herein petitioners for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, in order to annul
the Order dated May 27, 1992, by the Regional Trial Court of Catbalogan, Samar. Said Order had
denied petitioners' (a) Motion to Dismiss the replevin case filed by herein private respondents, as well
as (b) petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of said trial court dated April 24, 1992,
granting an application for a Writ of replevin.2
The pertinent facts of the case, borne by the records, are as follows:
On January 28, 1992, the Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Team of the Community Environment
and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the DENR apprehended two (2) motor vehicles, described as
follows:
1. Motor Vehicle with Plate No. HAK-733 loaded with one thousand and twenty six (1,026)
board feet of illegally sourced lumber valued at P8,544.75, being driven by one Pio Gabon
and owned by [a certain] Jose Vargas.
2. Motor Vehicle with Plate No. FCN-143 loaded with one thousand two hundred twenty four
and ninety seven (1,224.97) board feet of illegally-sourced lumber valued at P9,187.27, being
driven by one Constancio Abuganda and owned by [a certain] Manuela Babalcon. . . . 3
Constancio Abuganda and Pio Gabon, the drivers of the vehicles, failed to present proper documents
and/or licenses. Thus, the apprehending team seized and impounded the vehicles and its load of lumber
at the DENR-PENR (Department of Environment and Natural Resources-Provincial Environment and
Natural Resources) Office in Catbalogan.4 Seizure receipts were issued but the drivers refused to
accept the receipts.5 Felipe Calub, Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer, then filed
before the Provincial Prosecutor's Office in Samar, a criminal complaint against Abuganda, in Criminal
G.R. No. 115634

April 27, 2000

Case No. 3795, for violation of Section 68 [78], Presidential Decree 705 as amended by Executive
Order 277, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code. 6
On January 31, 1992, the impounded vehicles were forcibly taken by Gabon and Abuganda from the
custody of the DENR, prompting DENR Officer Calub this time to file a criminal complaint for grave
coercion against Gabon and Abuganda. The complaint was, however, dismissed by the Public
Prosecutor.7
On February 11, 1992, one of the two vehicles, with plate number FCN 143, was again apprehended by
a composite team of DENR-CENR in Catbalogan and Philippine Army elements of the 802nd Infantry
Brigade at Barangay Buray, Paranas, Samar. It was again loaded with forest products with an equivalent
volume of 1,005.47 board feet, valued at P10,054.70. Calub duly filed a criminal complaint against
Constancio Abuganda, a certain Abegonia, and several John Does, in Criminal Case No. 3625, for
violation of Section 68 [78], Presidential Decree 705 as amended by Executive Order 277, otherwise
known as the Revised Forestry Code.8
In Criminal Cases Nos. 3795 and 3625, however, Abegonia and Abuganda were acquitted on the
ground of reasonable doubt. But note the trial court ordered that a copy of the decision be furnished the
Secretary of Justice, in order that the necessary criminal action may be filed against Noe Pagarao and
all other persons responsible for violation of the Revised Forestry Code. For it appeared that it was
Pagarao who chartered the subject vehicle and ordered that cut timber be loaded on it. 9
Subsequently, herein private respondents Manuela Babalcon, the vehicle owner, and Constancio
Abuganda, the driver, filed a complaint for the recovery of possession of the two (2) impounded vehicles
with an application for replevin against herein petitioners before the RTC of Catbalogan. The trial court
granted the application for replevin and issued the corresponding writ in an Order dated April 24,
1992. 10 Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss which was denied by the trial court. 11
Thus, on June 15, 1992, petitioners filed with the Supreme Court the present Petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus with application for Preliminary Injunction and/or a Temporary Restraining
Order. The Court issued a TRO, enjoining respondent RTC judge from conducting further proceedings in
the civil case for replevin; and enjoining private respondents from taking or attempting to take the motor
vehicles and forest products seized from the custody of the petitioners. The Court further instructed the
petitioners to see to it that the motor vehicles and other forest products seized are kept in a secured
place and protected from deterioration, said property being in custodia legis and subject to the direct
order of the Supreme Court. 12 In a Resolution issued on September 28, 1992, the Court referred said
petition to respondent appellate court for appropriate disposition. 13

On May 27, 1994, the Court of Appeals denied said petition for lack of merit. It ruled that the mere
seizure of a motor vehicle pursuant to the authority granted by Section 68 [78] of P.D. No. 705 as
amended by E.O. No. 277 does not automatically place said conveyance in custodia legis. According to
the appellate court, such authority of the Department Head of the DENR or his duly authorized
representative to order the confiscation and disposition of illegally obtained forest products and the
conveyance used for that purpose is not absolute and unqualified. It is subject to pertinent laws,
regulations, or policies on that matter, added the appellate court. The DENR Administrative Order No.
59, series of 1990, is one such regulation, the appellate court said. For it prescribes the guidelines in the
confiscation, forfeiture and disposition of conveyances used in the commission of offenses penalized
under Section 68 [78] of P.D. No. 705 as amended by E.O. No. 277. 14
Additionally, respondent Court of Appeals noted that the petitioners failed to observe the procedure
outlined in DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990. They were unable to submit a report of
the seizure to the DENR Secretary, to give a written notice to the owner of the vehicle, and to render a
report of their findings and recommendations to the Secretary. Moreover, petitioners' failure to comply
with the procedure laid down by DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990, was confirmed by
the admission of petitioners' counsel that no confiscation order has been issued prior to the seizure of
the vehicle and the filing of the replevin suit. Therefore, in failing to follow such procedure, according to
the appellate court, the subject vehicles could not be considered in custodia legis. 15
Respondent Court of Appeals also found no merit in petitioners' claim that private respondents'
complaint for replevin is a suit against the State. Accordingly, petitioners could not shield themselves
under the principle of state immunity as the property sought to be recovered in the instant suit had not
yet been lawfully adjudged forfeited in favor of the government. Moreover, according to respondent
appellate court, there could be no pecuniary liability nor loss of property that could ensue against the
government. It reasoned that a suit against a public officer who acted illegally or beyond the scope of his
authority could not be considered a suit against the State; and that a public officer might be sued for
illegally seizing or withholding the possession of the property of another. 16
Respondent court brushed aside other grounds raised by petitioners based on the claim that the subject
vehicles were validly seized and held in custody because they were contradicted by its own
findings. 17 Their petition was found without merit. 18
Now, before us, the petitioners assign the following errors: 19
(1) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT MERE SEIZURE OF A
CONVEYANCE PURSUANT TO SECTION 68-A [78-A] OF P.D. NO. 705 AS AMENDED BY
EXECUTIVE ORDER 277 DOES NOT PLACE SAID CONVEYANCE IN CUSTODIA LEGIS;

(2) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE OPERATIVE ACT
GIVING RISE FOR THE SUBJECT CONVEYANCE TO BE IN CUSTODIA LEGIS IS ITS
LAWFUL SEIZURE BY THE DENR PURSUANT TO SECTION 68-A [78-A] OF P.D. NO. 705,
AS AMENDED BY E.O. NO. 277; AND
(3) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE COMPLAINT FOR
REPLEVIN AGAINST THE PETITIONERS IS NOT A SUIT AGAINST THE STATE.
In brief, the pertinent issues for our consideration are:
(1) Whether or not the DENR-seized motor vehicle, with plate number FCN 143, is in custodia
legis.
(2) Whether or not the complaint for the recovery of possession of impounded vehicles, with
an application for replevin, is a suit against the State.
We will now resolve both issues.
The Revised Forestry Code authorizes the DENR to seize all conveyances used in the commission of
an offense in violation of Section 78. Section 78 states:
Sec. 78. Cutting, Gathering, and/or Collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products without
License. Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products
from any forestland, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land,
without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents
as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties
imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. . .
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any
forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery,
equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products
are found.
This provision makes mere possession of timber or other forest products without the accompanying
legal documents unlawful and punishable with the penalties imposed for the crime of theft, as prescribed
in Articles 309-310 of the Revised Penal Code. In the present case, the subject vehicles were loaded
with forest products at the time of the seizure. But admittedly no permit evidencing authority to possess
and transport said load of forest products was duly presented. These products, in turn, were deemed

illegally sourced. Thus there was a prima facie violation of Section 68 [78] of the Revised Forestry Code,
although as found by the trial court, the persons responsible for said violation were not the ones
charged by the public prosecutor.
The corresponding authority of the DENR to seize all conveyances used in the commission of an
offense in violation of Section 78 of the Revised Forestry Code is pursuant to Sections 78-A and 89 of
the same Code. They read as follows:
Sec. 78-A. Administrative Authority of the Department Head or His Duly Authorized
Representative to Order Confiscation. In all cases of violation of this Code or other forest
laws, rules and regulations, the Department Head or his duly authorized representative, may
order the confiscation of any forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or
abandoned, and all conveyances used either by land, water or air in the commission of the
offense and to dispose of the same in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies
on the matter.
Sec. 89. Arrest; Institution of criminal actions. A forest officer or employee of the Bureau
[Department] or any personnel of the Philippine Constabulary/Philippine National Police shall
arrest even without warrant any person who has committed or is committing in his presence
any of the offenses defined in this Chapter. He shall also seize and confiscate, in favor of the
Government, the tools and equipment used in committing the offense. . . [Emphasis supplied.]
Note that DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990, implements Sections 78-A and 89 of the
Forestry Code, as follows:
Sec. 2. Conveyances Subject to Confiscation and Forfeiture. All conveyances used in the
transport of any forest product obtained or gathered illegally whether or not covered with
transport documents, found spurious or irregular in accordance with Sec. 68-A [78-A] of P.D.
No. 705, shall be confiscated in favor of the government or disposed of in accordance with
pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter.
Sec. 4. Who are Authorized to Seize Conveyance. The Secretary or his duly authorized
representative such as the forest officers and/or natural resources officers, or deputized
officers of the DENR areauthorized to seize said conveyances subject to policies and
guidelines pertinent thereto. Deputized military personnel and officials of other agencies
apprehending illegal logs and other forest products and their conveyances shall notify the
nearest DENR field offices, and turn oversaid forest products and conveyances for proper
action and disposition. In case where the apprehension is made by DENR field officer, the

conveyance shall be deposited with the nearest CENRO/PENRO/RED Office as the case may
be, for safekeeping wherever it is most convenient and secured. [Emphasis supplied.]
Upon apprehension of the illegally-cut timber while being transported without pertinent documents that
could evidence title to or right to possession of said timber, a warrantless seizure of the involved
vehicles and their load was allowed under Section 78 and 89 of the Revised Forestry Code.
Note further that petitioners' failure to observe the procedure outlined in DENR Administrative Order No.
59, series of 1990 was justifiably explained. Petitioners did not submit a report of the seizure to the
Secretary nor give a written notice to the owner of the vehicle because on the 3rd day following the
seizure, Gabon and Abuganda, drivers of the seized vehicles, forcibly took the impounded vehicles from
the custody of the DENR. Then again, when one of the motor vehicles was apprehended and
impounded for the second time, the petitioners, again were not able to report the seizure to the DENR
Secretary nor give a written notice to the owner of the vehicle because private respondents immediately
went to court and applied for a writ of replevin. The seizure of the vehicles and their load was done upon
their apprehension for a violation of the Revised Forestry Code. It would be absurd to require a
confiscation order or notice and hearing before said seizure could be effected under the circumstances.
Since there was a violation of the Revised Forestry Code and the seizure was in accordance with law, in
our view the subject vehicles were validly deemed in custodia legis. It could not be subject to an action
for replevin. For it is property lawfully taken by virtue of legal process and considered in the custody of
the law, and not otherwise. 20
In Mamanteo, et. al. v. Deputy Sheriff Magumun, A.M. No. P-98-1264, promulgated on July 28, 1999,
the case involves property to be seized by a Deputy Sheriff in a replevin suit. But said property were
already impounded by the DENR due to violation of forestry laws and, in fact, already forfeited in favor
of the government by order of the DENR. We said that such property was deemed in custodia legis. The
sheriff could not insist on seizing the property already subject of a prior warrant of seizure. The
appropriate action should be for the sheriff to inform the trial court of the situation by way of partial
Sheriff's Return, and wait for the judge's instructions on the proper procedure to be observed.
Note that property that is validly deposited in custodia legis cannot be the subject of a replevin suit.
In Mamanteo v. Deputy Sheriff Magumun, we elucidated further:

On the second issue, is the complaint for the recovery of possession of the two impounded vehicles,
with an application for replevin, a suit against the State?
Well established is the doctrine that the State may not be sued without its consent. 22 And a suit against
a public officer for his official acts is, in effect, a suit against the State if its purpose is to hold the State
ultimately liable. 23However, the protection afforded to public officers by this doctrine generally applies
only to activities within the scope of their authority in good faith and without willfulness, malice or
corruption. 24 In the present case, the acts for which the petitioners are being called to account were
performed by them in the discharge of their official duties. The acts in question are clearly official in
nature. 25 In implementing and enforcing Sections 78-A and 89 of the Forestry Code through the seizure
carried out, petitioners were performing their duties and functions as officers of the DENR, and did so
within the limits of their authority. There was no malice nor bad faith on their part. Hence, a suit against
the petitioners who represent the DENR is a suit against the State. It cannot prosper without the State's
consent.
Given the circumstances in this case, we need not pursue the Office of the Solicitor General's line for
the defense of petitioners concerning exhaustion of administrative remedies. We ought only to recall
that exhaustion must be raised at the earliest time possible, even before filing the answer to the
complaint or pleading asserting a claim, by a motion to dismiss. 26 If not invoked at the proper time, this
ground for dismissal could be deemed waived and the court could take cognizance of the case and try
it. 27
ACCORDINGLY, the Petition is GRANTED, and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 29191 is SET ASIDE.1wphi1 Consequently, the Order issued by the Regional Trial Court
of Catbalogan, dated May 27, 1992, and the Writ of replevin issued in the Order dated April 24, 1992,
are ANNULLED. The Sheriff of the Regional Trial Court of Catbalogan, Branch 29, is directed to take
possession of the subject motor vehicle, with plate number FCN 143, for delivery to the custody of and
appropriate disposition by petitioners. Let a copy of this decision be provided the Honorable Secretary of
Justice for his appropriate action, against any and all persons responsible for the abovecited violation of
the Revised Forestry Code.
Costs against private respondents.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.

. . . the writ of replevin has been repeatedly used by unscrupulous plaintiffs to retrieve their
chattel earlier taken for violation of the Tariff and Customs Code, tax assessment, attachment
or execution. Officers of the court, from the presiding judge to the sheriff, are implored to be
vigilant in their execution of the law otherwise, as in this case, valid seizure and forfeiture
proceedings could easily be undermined by the simple devise of a writ of replevin. . . 21

G.R. No. 158182

June 12, 2008

SESINANDO MERIDA, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review1 of the Decision2 dated 28 June 2002 and the Resolution dated 14 May 2003
of the Court of Appeals. The 28 June 2002 Decision affirmed the conviction of petitioner Sesinando
Merida (petitioner) for violation of Section 68,3 Presidential Decree No. 705 (PD 705),4 as amended by
Executive Order No. 277. The Resolution dated 14 May 2003 denied admission of petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.5
The Facts
Petitioner was charged in the Regional Trial Court of Romblon, Romblon, Branch 81 (trial court) with
violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended, for "cut[ting], gather[ing], collect[ing] and remov[ing]" a
lone narra tree inside a private land in Mayod, Ipil, Magdiwang, Romblon (Mayod Property) over which
private complainant Oscar M. Tansiongco (Tansiongco) claims ownership. 6
The prosecution evidence showed that on 23 December 1998, Tansiongco learned that petitioner cut a
narra tree in the Mayod Property. Tansiongco reported the matter to Florencio Royo (Royo), the punong
barangay of Ipil. On 24 December 1998,7 Royo summoned petitioner to a meeting with Tansiongco.
When confronted during the meeting about the felled narra tree, petitioner admitted cutting the tree but
claimed that he did so with the permission of one Vicar Calix (Calix) who, according to petitioner, bought
the Mayod Property from Tansiongco in October 1987 under a pacto de retro sale. Petitioner showed to
Royo Calix's written authorization signed by Calix's wife.8
On 11 January 1999, Tansiongco reported the tree-cutting to the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) forester Thelmo S. Hernandez (Hernandez) in Sibuyan, Romblon. When
Hernandez confronted petitioner about the felled tree, petitioner reiterated his earlier claim to Royo that

he cut the tree with Calix's permission. Hernandez ordered petitioner not to convert the felled tree trunk
into lumber.
On 26 January 1999, Tansiongco informed Hernandez that petitioner had converted the narra trunk into
lumber. Hernandez, with other DENR employees and enforcement officers, went to the Mayod Property
and saw that the narra tree had been cut into six smaller pieces of lumber. Hernandez took custody of
the lumber,9 deposited them for safekeeping with Royo, and issued an apprehension receipt to
petitioner. A larger portion of the felled tree remained at the Mayod Property. The DENR subsequently
conducted an investigation on the matter.10
Tansiongco filed a complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Romblon (Provincial
Prosecutor) charging petitioner with violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended. During the
preliminary investigation, petitioner submitted a counter-affidavit reiterating his claim that he cut the
narra tree with Calix's permission. The Provincial Prosecutor11 found probable cause to indict petitioner
and filed the Information with the trial court (docketed as Criminal Case No. 2207).
During the trial, the prosecution presented six witnesses including Tansiongco, Royo, and Hernandez
who testified on the events leading to the discovery of and investigation on the tree-cutting. Petitioner
testified as the lone defense witness and claimed, for the first time, that he had no part in the treecutting.

In its Decision dated 28 June 2002, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling but ordered the
seized lumber confiscated in the government's favor. 13 The Court of Appeals sustained the trial court's
finding that petitioner is bound by his extrajudicial admissions of cutting the narra tree in the Mayod
Property without any DENR permit. The Court of Appeals also found nothing irregular in the filing of the
complaint by Tansiongco instead of a DENR forest officer considering that the case underwent
preliminary investigation by the proper officer who filed the Information with the trial court.
On the imposable penalty, the Court of Appeals, in the dispositive portion of its ruling, sentenced
petitioner to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years of reclusion temporal. However, in the body of its
ruling, the Court of Appeals held that "the penalty to be imposed on [petitioner] should be (14) years,
eight (8) months and one (1) day to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal,"14 the same penalty the trial
court imposed.
Petitioner sought reconsideration but the Court of Appeals, in its Resolution dated 14 May 2003, did not
admit his motion for having been filed late.15
Hence, this petition. Petitioner raises the following issues:
I. WHETHER x x x SECTION 68 OF P.D. 705 AS AMENDED PROHIBITING THE CUTTING,
GATHERING, COLLECTING AND REMOVING TIMBER OR OTHER FOREST PRODUCTS
FROM ANY FOREST LAND APPLIES TO PETITIONER.

The Ruling of the Trial Court

In its Decision dated 24 November 2000, the trial court found petitioner guilty as charged, sentenced
him to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal and ordered theseized lumber forfeited in Tansiongco's favor. 12 The trial court dismissed
petitioner's defense of denial in view of his repeated extrajudicial admissions that he cut the narra tree in
the Mayod Property with Calix's permission. With this finding and petitioner's lack of DENR permit to cut
the tree, the trial court held petitioner liable for violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals reiterating his defense of denial. Petitioner also contended
that (1) the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case because it was based on a complaint
filed by Tansiongco and not by a forest officer as provided under Section 80 of PD 705 and (2) the
penalty imposed by the trial court is excessive.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

II. WHETHER x x x POSSESSION OF THE NARRA TREE CUT IN PRIVATE LAND

CONTESTED BY VICAR CALIX AND PRIVATE-COMPLAINANT OSCAR TANSIONGCO IS
COVERED BY SECTION 80 OF P.D. 705 AS AMENDED.
III. WHETHER PRIVATE-COMPLAINANT CAN INITIATE THE CHARGE EVEN WITHOUT
THE STANDING AUTHORITY COMING FROM THE INVESTIGATING FOREST OFFICER
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES AS MANDATED
BY SECTION 80 OF P.D. 705 AS AMENDED.
[IV.] WHETHER x x x THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN TAKING COGNIZANCE OF THE CASE
FILED BY PRIVATE-COMPLAINANT BECAUSE IT WAS NOT THE INVESTIGATING
OFFICER AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 80 OF P.D. 705 AS AMENDED WHO MUST BE THE
ONE TO INSTITUTE THE FILING OF THE SAME.16

In its Comment to the petition, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) countered that (1) the trial court
acquired jurisdiction over the case even though Tansiongco, and not a DENR forest officer, filed the
complaint against petitioner and (2) petitioner is liable for violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as
amended.
The Issues
The petition raises the following issues:17
1) Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 2207 even though it
was based on a complaint filed by Tansiongco and not by a DENR forest officer; and
2) Whether petitioner is liable for violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
The Trial Court Acquired Jurisdiction Over
Criminal Case No. 2207
We sustain the OSG's claim that the trial court acquired jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 2207. The
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (Revised Rules) list the cases which must be initiated by a
complaint filed by specified individuals,18 non-compliance of which ousts the trial court of jurisdiction
from trying such cases.19However, these cases concern only defamation and other crimes against
chastity20 and not to cases concerning Section 68 of PD 705, as amended. Further, Section 80 of PD
705 does not prohibit an interested person from filing a complaint before any qualified officer for
violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended. Section 80 of PD 705 provides in relevant parts:
SECTION 80. Arrest; Institution of criminal actions. - x x x x
Reports and complaints regarding the commission of any of the offenses defined in this
Chapter, not committed in the presence of any forest officer or employee, or any of the
deputized officers or officials,shall immediately be investigated by the forest officer assigned in
the area where the offense was allegedly committed, who shall thereupon receive the
evidence supporting the report or complaint.

If there is prima facie evidence to support the complaint or report, the investigating forest
officer shall file the necessary complaint with the appropriate official authorized by law to
conduct a preliminary investigation of criminal cases and file an information in Court.
(Emphasis supplied)
We held in People v. CFI of Quezon21 that the phrase "reports and complaints" in Section 80 refers to
"reports and complaints as might be brought to the forest officer assigned to the area by other forest
officers or employees of the Bureau of Forest Development or any of the deputized officers or officials,
for violations of forest laws not committed in their presence." 22
Here, it was not "forest officers or employees of the Bureau of Forest Development or any of the
deputized officers or officials" who reported to Hernandez the tree-cutting in the Mayod Property but
Tansiongco, a private citizen who claims ownership over the Mayod Property. Thus, Hernandez cannot
be faulted for not conducting an investigation to determine "if there is prima facie evidence to support
the complaint or report."23 At any rate, Tansiongco was not precluded, either under Section 80 of PD 705
or the Revised Rules, from filing a complaint before the Provincial Prosecutor for petitioner's alleged
violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended. For its part, the trial court correctly took cognizance of
Criminal Case No. 2207 as the case falls within its exclusive original jurisdiction. 24
Petitioner is Liable for Cutting Timber in Private
Property Without Permit
Section 68, as amended, one of the 12 acts25 penalized under PD 705, provides:
SECTION 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without
License. - Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products
from any forest land, ortimber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land,
without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents
as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties
imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of
partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering,
collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to
the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation.
The court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any
forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed as well as the machinery,

equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products
are found. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 68 penalizes three categories of acts: (1) the cutting, gathering, collecting, or removing of timber
or other forest products from any forest land without any authority; (2) the cutting, gathering, collecting,
or removing of timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land without any
authority;26 and (3) the possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents as
required under existing forest laws and regulations.27 Petitioner stands charged of having "cut, gathered,
collected and removed timber or other forest products from a private land 28 without x x x the necessary
permit x x x " thus his liablity, if ever, should be limited only for "cut[ting], gather[ing], collect[ing] and
remov[ing] timber," under the second category. Further, the prosecution evidence showed that petitioner
did not perform any acts of "gathering, collecting, or removing" but only the act of "cutting" a lone narra
tree. Hence, this case hinges on the question of whether petitioner "cut x x xtimber" in the Mayod
Property without a DENR permit.29
We answer in the affirmative and thus affirm the lower courts' rulings.
On the question of whether petitioner cut a narra tree in the Mayod Property without a DENR permit,
petitioner adopted conflicting positions. Before his trial, petitioner consistently represented to the
authorities that he cut a narra tree in the Mayod Property and that he did so only with Calix's permission.
However, when he testified, petitioner denied cutting the tree in question. We sustain the lower courts'
rulings that petitioner's extrajudicial admissions bind him. 30 Petitioner does not explain why Royo and
Hernandez, public officials who testified under oath in their official capacities, would lie on the stand to
implicate petitioner in a serious criminal offense, not to mention that the acts of these public officers
enjoy the presumption of regularity. Further, petitioner does not deny presenting Calix's authorization to
Royo and Hernandez as his basis for cutting the narra tree in the Mayod Property. Petitioner has no use
of Calix's authorization if, as he claimed during the trial, he did not cut any tree in the Mayod Property.

We further hold that the lone narre tree petitioner cut from the Mayod Property constitutes "timber"
under Section 68 of PD 705, as amended. PD 705 does not define "timber," only "forest product" (which
circuitously includes "timber.")31 Does the narra tree in question constitute "timber" under Section 68?
The closest this Court came to defining the term "timber" in Section 68 was to provide that
"timber," includes "lumber" or "processed log."32 In other jurisdictions, timber is determined by
compliance with specified dimensions33 or certain "stand age" or "rotation age."34 In Mustang Lumber,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals,35 this Court was faced with a similar task of having to define a term in Section
68 of PD 705 - "lumber" - to determine whether possession of lumber is punishable under that provision.
In ruling in the affirmative, we held that "lumber" should be taken in its ordinary or common usage
meaning to refer to "processed log or timber," thus:
The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either timber or lumber. While the former
is included in forest products as defined in paragraph (q) of Section 3, the latter is found in
paragraph (aa) of the same section in the definition of "Processing plant," which reads:
(aa) Processing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine or combination of machine
used for the processing of logs and other forest raw materials into lumber, veneer,
plywood, wallboard, blackboard, paper board, pulp, paper or other finished wood
products.
This simply means that lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw material. Clearly,
the Code uses the term lumber in its ordinary or common usage. In the 1993 copyright edition
of Webster's Third New International Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter alia, as "timber or logs
after being prepared for the market." Simply put, lumber is a processed log or timber.
It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words and phrases used in
a statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning. And in so far as
possession of timber without the required legal documents is concerned, Section 68 of PD No.
705, as amended, makes no distinction between raw and procesed timber. Neither should
we.36 x x x x (Italicization in the original; boldfacing supplied)
We see no reason why, as in Mustang, the term "timber" under Section 68 cannot be taken in its
common acceptation as referring to "wood used for or suitable for building or for carpentry or
joinery."37 Indeed, tree saplings or tiny tree stems that are too small for use as posts, panelling, beams,
tables, or chairs cannot be considered timber.38

Here, petitioner was charged with having felled a narra tree and converted the same into "several
pieces of sawn lumber, about three (3) pcs. 2x16x6 and three (3) pcs. 2x18x7 x x x consisting of 111
board feet x x x." These measurements were indicated in the apprehension receipt Hernandez issued to
petitioner on 26 January 1999 which the prosecution introduced in evidence. 39 Further, Hernandez
testified that the larger portion of the felled log left in the Mayod Property "measured 76 something
centimeters [at the big end] while the smaller end measured 65 centimeters and the length was 2.8
meters."40 Undoubtedly, the narra tree petitioner felled and converted to lumber was "timber" fit "for
building or for carpentry or joinery" and thus falls under the ambit of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended.

4. Arresto mayor in its medium period to prisin correccional in its minimum period,
if the value of the property stolen is over 50 pesos but does not exceed 200 pesos.

The Penalty Imposable on Petitioner

7. Arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, if the theft is committed under
the circumstances enumerated in paragraph 3 of the next preceding article and the
value of the thing stolen does not exceed 5 pesos. If such value exceeds said
amount, the provisions of any of the five preceding subdivisions shall be made
applicable.

Violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended, is punishable as Qualified Theft under Article 310 in
relation to Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), thus:
Art. 310. Qualified theft. - The crime of qualified theft shall be punished by the penalties next
higher by two degrees than those respectively specified in the next preceding article x x x.
Art. 309. Penalties. - Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:
1. The penalty of prisin mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of
the thing stolen is more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; but if
the value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount, the penalty shall be the
maximum period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for each
additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be imposed
shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory
penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this
Code, the penalty shall be termed prisin mayor or reclusin temporal, as the case
may be.
2. The penalty of prisin correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the
value of the thing stolen is more than 6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000
pesos.
3. The penalty of prisin correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the
value of the property stolen is more than 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000
pesos.

5. Arresto mayor to its full extent, if such value is over 5 pesos but does not exceed
50 pesos.
6. Arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if such value does not exceed
5 pesos.

.
8. Arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not exceeding 50 pesos, when the
value of the thing stolen is not over 5 pesos, and the offender shall have acted
under the impulse of hunger, poverty, or the difficulty of earning a livelihood for the
support of himself or his family.
The Information filed against petitioner alleged that the six pieces of lumber measuring 111 board feet
were valued at P3,330. However, if the value of the log left at the Mayod Property is included, the
amount increases toP20,930.40. To prove this allegation, the prosecution relied on Hernandez's
testimony that these amounts, as stated in the apprehension receipt he issued, are his "estimates"
based on "prevailing local price."41
This evidence does not suffice. To prove the amount of the property taken for fixing the penalty
imposable against the accused under Article 309 of the RPC, the prosecution must present more than a
mere uncorroborated "estimate" of such fact.42 In the absence of independent and reliable corroboration
of such estimate, courts may either apply the minimum penalty under Article 309 or fix the value of the
property taken based on the attendant circumstances of the case. 43 In People v. Dator44 where, as here,
the accused was charged with violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended, for possession of lumber
without permit, the prosecution's evidence for the lumber's value consisted of an estimate made by the
apprehending authorities whose apparent lack of corroboration was compounded by the fact that the

transmittal letter for the estimate was not presented in evidence. Accordingly, we imposed on the
accused the minimum penalty under Article 309(6) 45 of the RPC.46
Applying Dator in relation to Article 310 of the RPC and taking into account the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, we find it proper to impose on petitioner, under the circumstances obtaining here, the penalty of
four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to three (3) years, four (4) months and
twenty-one (21) days of prision correcional, as maximum.

WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision dated 28 June 2002 and the Resolution dated 14 May 2003 of
the Court of Appeals with the modification that petitioner Sesinando Merida is sentenced to four (4)
months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to three (3) years, four (4) months and twentyone (21) days of prision correcional, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.