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The failure of the parties to raise the matter of jurisdiction also cannot be construed as a waiver of
the parties. Jurisdiction is conferred by law and cannot be waived by the parties. The assailed
decision is void, considering that it originates from a void decision of the Regional Trial
Court for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.
2.
3.
No. The civil action cannot proceed independently of the criminal case. This includes subsequent
proceedings on the criminal action such as an appeal. In any case, Ferro Chemicals, Inc. joined
the public prosecutor in filing the petition for certiorari before the SC. Ramon Garcia, President of
Ferro Chemicals, Inc., signed the verification and certification of non-forum shopping of the
petition for certiorari.
However, private complainants in criminal cases are not precluded from filing a motion for
reconsideration and subsequently an appeal on the civil aspect of a decision acquitting the
accused. An exception to the rule that only the Solicitor General can bring actions in criminal
proceedings before the CA or SC is "when the private offended party questions the civil aspect
of a decision of a lower court."
In a criminal case in which the offended party is the State, the interest of the private complainant
or the offended party is limited to the civil liability arising therefrom. Hence, if a criminal case is
dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, a reconsideration of the order of dismissal or
acquittal may be undertaken, whenever legally feasible, insofar as the criminal aspect thereof is
concerned and may be made only by the public prosecutor; or in the case of an appeal, by the
State only, through the OSG. The private complainant or offended party MAY NOT
undertake such motion for reconsideration or appeal on the criminal aspect of the case.
However, the offended party or private complainant MAY file a motion for reconsideration
of such dismissal or acquittal or appeal therefrom but only insofar as the civil aspect thereof
is concerned.
This is in consonance with the doctrine that: the extinction of the penal action does not
necessarily carry with it the extinction of the civil action, whether the latter is instituted with or
separately from the criminal action. The offended party may still claim civil liability ex delicto if
there is a finding in the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which
the liability may arise exists.
Jurisprudence has enumerated three instances when, notwithstanding the accused's acquittal, the
offended party may still claim civil liability ex delicto: (a) if the acquittal is based on reasonable
doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) if the court declared that the liability of
the accused is only civil; and (c) if the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not
based upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted.
However, if the state pursues an appeal on the criminal aspect of a decision of the trial court
acquitting the accused and private complainant/s FAILED TO RESERVE THE RIGHT to
institute a separate civil action, the civil liability ex delicto that is inherently attached to the
offense is likewise appealed. The appeal of the civil liability ex delicto is impliedly instituted with
the petition for certiorari assailing the acquittal of the accused. Private complainant cannot
anymore pursue a separate appeal from that of the state without violating the doctrine of nonforum shopping.
But, if private complainant reserved the right to institute the civil action for the recovery of civil
liability ex delicto before the RTC or institute a separate civil action prior to the filing of the
criminal case in accordance with Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. In these situations, the filing of
an appeal as to the civil aspect of the case cannot be considered as forum shopping.
Since, Ferro Chemicals, Inc. did not reserve it rite to institute a separate civil action prior to the
filing of the criminal case in accordance with Rule 111 of the Rule of Court, the petition was
denied. The resolution of the SC issued on November 16, 1998 denying the petition for certiorari
was reiterated.
2.
Prejudicial Question: The civil action must be instituted prior to the institution of the criminal action.
Civil action must precede the filing of the criminal action for a Prejudicial Question to exist.
Dreamwork Construction, Inc. vs. Janiola (G.R. No. 184861. June 30, 2009)
FACTS:
On October 18, 2004, Dreamwork Construction, Inc. through its President, Roberto S. Concepcion, and
Vice-President for Finance and Marketing, Normandy P. Amora, filed a Complaint Affidavit dated October
5, 2004 against Cleofe S. Janiola before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Pias for violation of BP
22. Correspondingly, Dreamwork Construction, Inc. filed a criminal information for violation of BP 22
against private respondent with the MTC on February 2, 2005, entitled, People of the Philippines v. Cleofe
S. Janiola.
On September 20, 2006, Cleofe S. Janiola, joined by her husband, instituted a civil complaint against
Dreamwork Consturction for the rescission of an alleged construction agreement between the parties,
including damages. The case was filed with the RTC, Branch 197 in Las Pias City. Notably, the checks,
subject of the criminal cases before the MTC, were issued in consideration of the construction agreement.
Thereafter, on July 25, 2007, Janiola filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings dated July 24, 2007 in Criminal
Case, alleging that the civil and criminal cases involved facts and issues similar or intimately related such
that in the resolution of the issues in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily
be determined. In other words, private respondent claimed that the civil case posed a prejudicial question as
against the criminal cases.
Dreamwork Construction Inc. opposed the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal cases on the
grounds that: (1) there is no prejudicial question in this case as the rescission of the contract upon which the
bouncing checks were issued is a separate and distinct issue from the issue of whether private respondent
violated BP 22; and (2) Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states that one of the elements of a
prejudicial question is that "the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately
related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action"; thus, this element is missing in this case, the
criminal case having preceded the civil case.
Later, the MTC issued its Order granting the Motion to Suspend Proceedings, and reasoned that: should the
trial court declare the rescission of contract and the nullification of the checks issued as the same are
without consideration, then the instant criminal cases for alleged violation of BP 22 must be dismissed.
Petitioner appealed the Orders to the RTC but denied the petition. Hence, this petition raised.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the MTC or RTC Court erred in its discretion to suspend proceedings in Criminal Case on
the basis of Prejudicial Question, with respect to the Civil Case belatedly filed.
HELD:
Petition is granted. The civil action must precede the filing of the criminal action for a prejudicial
question to exist. Rule 111, Sec. 7 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedures provide for the elements of
prejudicial question: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related
to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether
or not the criminal action may proceed.
Under the amendment, a prejudicial question is understood in law as that which must precede the criminal
action and which requires a decision before a final judgment can be rendered in the criminal action. The
civil action must be instituted prior to the institution of the criminal action.
The Resolution of the Civil Case Is Not Determinative of the Prosecution of the Criminal Action. Even
if the trial court in the civil case declares that the construction agreement between the parties is void for
lack of consideration, this would not affect the prosecution of private respondent in the criminal case. The
fact of the matter is that private respondent issued checks which were subsequently dishonored for
insufficient funds. It is this fact that is subject of prosecution under BP 22.
Therefore, it is clear that the second element required for the existence of a prejudicial question, is absent.
Thus, no prejudicial question exists and the rules are inapplicable.
The SC granted the petition and ordered the MTC to continue with the proceedings of the criminal case.
2.1. The question whether there is novation of the credit line agreement or not is not determinative
of whether Jacinto should be prosecuted for violation of the bouncing checks law.
Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Jacinto (G.R. No. 154622. August 3, 2010)
FACTS:
First Womens Credit Corporation (FWCC) obtained a loan from Land Bank in the amount of 400
million, evidenced by a Credit Line Agreement. As security, Jacinto, President of FWCC issued nine
(9) Land Bank postdated checks (465million) drawn against FWCCs account at the Philippine
National Bank (PNB). Before the checks matured, Land Bank and Jacinto executed a restructuring
agreement changing the terms of the payment. However, FWCC still defaulted even under the terms of
the restructured agreement. Land Bank presented payment to the drawee bank (PNB) the postdated
checks but they were all dishonored or refused payment for the reason, payment stopped, or drawn
against insufficient funds. Jacinto also failed to make good the checks despite demands.
Land Bank Assistant VP filed before the Makati City Prosecutors Office a complaint for violation of
BP 22. Jacinto denied the charges and averred that the complaint is baseless and utterly devoid of
merit as the loan obligation has been extinguished by payment and novation by virtue of the execution
of the Restructuring Agreement. FWCC restructured and novated the original loan agreement, thus the
checks being issued pursuant to the original loan obligation had lost their validity. Jacinto also invoked
the proscription order of the RTC of Makati City for Involuntary Insolvency which forbade FWCC
from paying any of its debts.
The Makati City Prosecutor dismissed the complaint finding that the letter-agreements between Land
Bank and FWCC restructured and novated the original loan agreement. It was held that there being
novation, the checks issued pursuant to the original loan obligation had lost their efficacy and validity
and cannot be a valid basis to sustain the charge of violation of B.P. 22.
The motion for reconsideration of Land Bank was further denied. Land Bank elevated that matter to
the DOJ for review. DOJ issued a resolution holding that novation is not a mode of extinguishing
criminal liability.
Jacinto moved for the reconsideration of the order of the DOJ. But it was denied. Jacinto filed for a
petition for certiorari before the CA. While the CA ruled that novation is not a mode of extinguishing
criminal liability, it nevertheless held that novation may prevent criminal liability from arising in
certain cases if novation occurs before the criminal information is filed in court because the
novation causes doubt as to the true nature of the obligation. Also, the CA found merit in Jacintos
assertion that a prejudicial question exists in the instant case because the issue of whether the original
obligation of FWCC subject of the dishonored checks has been novated by the subsequent agreements
entered into by FWCC with Land Bank, is already the subject of the appeal in Civil Case.
The CA also gave consideration to Jacinto's assertion that the Order of the RTC proscribing FWCC
from paying its debts constitutes as a justifying circumstance which prevents criminal liability from
attaching.
Land Banks motion for reconsideration issued before the CA was denied, causing the filing of the
petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not there exists a prejudicial question
2. Whether the Order of the RTC of Makati City for Involuntary Insolvency constitutes as a
justifying circumstance that prevents criminal liability from attaching
HELD:
1. No. A prejudicial question generally exists in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action
are both pending, and there exists in the former an issue that must be preemptively resolved
before the latter may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved
would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal
case.
The elements of a prejudicial question are provided under Section 7, Rule 111 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, as follows: (a) the previously instituted civil action
involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action,
and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
In the case, the question whether there was novation of the Credit Line Agreement or not is NOT
determinative of whether respondent should be prosecuted for violation of the Bouncing Checks
Law. There was no express stipulation in the Restructuring Agreement that respondent is released
from his liability on the issued checks and in fact the letter-agreements between FWCC and Land
Bank expressly provide that respondents JSS (Joint and Several Signatures) continue to secure
the loan obligation and the postdated checks issued continue to guaranty the obligation.
There was no proof that he had been released from his obligation. The Restructuring Agreement
contains a proviso which states that "xxx This Agreement shall not novate or extinguish all
previous securityxxx
Moreover, it is well settled that the mere act of issuing a worthless check, even if merely as an
accommodation, is covered by B.P. 22. Thus, the SC held that the agreement surrounding the
issuance of dishonored checks is irrelevant to the prosecution for violation of B.P. 22. The
gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless
check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentment for payment. Thus, even if it be
subsequently declared that novation took place between the FWCC and petitioner, respondent is
not exempt from prosecution for violation of B.P. 22 for the dishonored checks.
2.
No. As stated at the outset, the said order forbids FWCC from paying its debts as well as from
delivering any property belonging to it to any person for its benefit. Jacinto, however, cannot
invoke this Order which was directed only upon FWCC, thus, it is not applicable to him.
Therefore, respondent, as surety of the loan is not exempt from complying with his obligation for
the issuance of the checks.
The SC granted the petition for certiorari. It reversed and set aside the ruling of the CA. The
ruling of the DOJ was reinstated and upholding, directing the filing of appropriate Informations
for violation of B.P. 22 against respondent Ramon P. Jacinto.
1.
information is, therefore, whether the facts alleged therein, if hypothetically admitted, constitute
the elements of the offense.
By alleging in their motion to quash that both complaints should be dismissed for lack of one of
the essential elements of less serious physical injuries, the petitioners were averring that the facts
charged did not constitute offenses.
The complaint filed bears the elements of less serious physical injuries, thus, were specifically
averred therein. The complaint stated that: (a) the petitioners "wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and strike the face of one JOSEFINA GUINTO MORAO;" and (b) the petitioners
inflicted physical injuries upon the complainant "that will require a period of 10 to 12 days barring
healing and will incapacitate his customary labor for the same period of time;" while that in the
second Criminal case, it alleged that: (a) the petitioners "wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and right and give hitting her head against pavement of one PERLA BELTRAN
MORAO;" and (b) the petitioners inflicted upon the complainant "physical injuries [that] will
require Medical Attendance for a period of 12 to 15 days barring unforeseen complication."
In the context of Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, the complaints sufficiently charged the
petitioners with less serious physical injuries. Indeed, the complaints only needed to aver the
ultimate facts constituting the offense, not the details of why and how the illegal acts allegedly
amounted to undue injury or damage, for such matters, being evidentiary, were appropriate for the
trial. Hence, the complaints were not quashable.
As the MTC and RTC rightly held, the presentation of the medical certificates to prove the
duration of the victims need for medical attendance or of their incapacity should take place only at
the trial, not before or during the preliminary investigation.
The Court also further agrees that the issues raised in the motion to quash are matters of defense
that could only be threshed out in a full blown trial on the merits. Indeed, proof of actual healing
period of the alleged injuries of the private complainant could only be established in the trial of the
cases filed against herein petitioners by means of competent evidence.
The SC denied the petition for review on certiorari and ordered the petitioners to pay the costs of
the suit.
2.
The Office of the Special Prosecutor eventually filed with the Sandiganbayan a criminal case charging
respondents as accomplices to the crime of hazing.
Meanwhile, the RTC-Zambales issued an Order dismissing the Information against the principal
accused, Alvarez, et al. The Order was later entered in the Book of Entries of Judgment.
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
v.
vi.
Bayabos, Ferrer, Magsino, Doctor, and Operio (collectively, Bayabos, et al.) filed a Motion to Quash
the Information. Bayabos et al. argued that:
the information did not contain all the essential elements of the offense
there was no allegation that the purported act had been made a prerequisite for admission to the
PMMA, especially considering that the victim had already been accepted in the academy.
that there was no averment in the Information that the PMMA was a fraternity, a sorority, or an
organization
absence in the Information of any assertion that the alleged hazing was not part of the "physical,
mental, and psychological testing and training procedure and practices to determine and enhance
the physical, mental and psychological fitness of prospective regular members."
there was no allegation that they were given prior written notice of the hazing and that they had
permitted the activity
the case against the principal accused had already been dismissed with finality by the RTC; there
being no more principals with whom they could have cooperated in the execution of the offense.
Bayabos et al. asserted that the case against them must be dismissed.
The Special Prosecutor opposed the motion of Bayabos, et al. He insisted that the Information alleged
the material facts that would sufficiently establish the presence of the essential ingredients of the crime
of accomplice to hazing. He also stressed that there was nothing in the law requiring that the principals
must be prosecuted first before a case could be filed against the accomplices. The Special Prosecutor
was, however, silent on the issue of whether the Information contained an allegation that the supposed
hazing had been made a prerequisite for admission to the PMMA, and whether the academy was
considered an "organization" within the meaning of the Anti-Hazing Law.
Six days before Bayabos, et al. were set to be arraigned, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution
quashing the Information and dismissing the criminal case against them. According to the court, the
fact that the charge against the principal accused Alvarez, et al. was dismissed with finality favorably
carried with it the indictment against those charged as accomplices, whose criminal responsibility was
subordinate to that of the former. It stressed that before there can be an accomplice, there must be a
principal by direct participation, the latter being the originator of the criminal design. In this case, as
there were no principal perpetrators to speak of, necessarily, there was no one else with whom they
could have cooperated in the execution of the crime of hazing.
The Sandiganbayan found that the Information charged no offense, and that the allegations therein
were mere conclusions of law. It also stressed that there was no averment that the alleged hazing was
not part of the "physical, mental and psychological testing and training procedure and practices to
determine and enhance the physical, mental and psychological fitness of prospective regular members"
of the AFP and PNP. The Sandiganbayan did not make any categorical determination that the PMMA
was considered an "organization" within the meaning of the Anti-Hazing Law.
Aggrieved, the Office of the Ombudsman, through the Special Prosecutor, filed before the SC the
resolution issued by the Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the prosecution for the crime of accomplice to hazing can proceed in spite of the
dismissal with finality of the case against the principal accused
2. Whether the information filed against respondents contains all the material averments for the
prosecution of the crime of accomplice to hazing under the Anti-Hazing Law
HELD:
1. Yes. The Sandiganbayan erred when it dismissed outright the case against respondents, on the sole
ground that the case against the purported principals had already been dismissed. It is a settled rule
that the case against those charged as accomplices is not ipso facto dismissed in the absence of
trial of the purported principals; the dismissal of the case against the latter; or even the latter's
acquittal, especially when the occurrence of the crime has in fact been established.
The corresponding responsibilities of the principal, accomplice, and accessory are distinct
from each other. Accordingly, so long as the commission of the crime can be duly proven, the trial
of those charged as accomplices to determine their criminal liability can proceed independently of
that of the alleged principal
2.
No. The SC however, affirms the quashal of information against the respondents.
Section 14, Article III of the Constitution, recognizes the right of the accused to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against them. The Rules of Court requires that the information
charging persons with an offense be "sufficient. That is, the statement of the acts or omissions
constituting the offense charged, subject of the complaint.
At any time before entering a plea, an accused may assail the information filed with the court
based on the grounds enumerated in Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, one of which is the
claim that the facts charged do not constitute an offense. In assessing whether an information must
be quashed on that ground, the basic test is to determine if the facts averred would establish the
presence of the essential elements of the crime as defined in the law.
The crime of hazing is committed when the following elements are established: (1) a person is
placed in some embarrassing or humiliating situation or subjected to physical or psychological
suffering or injury; and (2) these acts were employed as a prerequisite for the person's admission or
entry into an organization.
In the case of school authorities and faculty members who have had no direct participation in the
act, they may nonetheless be charged as accomplices if it is shown that (1) hazing, as established
by the above elements, occurred; (2) the accused are school authorities or faculty members; and (3)
they consented to or failed to take preventive action against hazing in spite actual knowledge
thereof.
First, the SC rejects the contention of respondents that PMMA should not be considered an
organization. Under the Anti-Hazing Law, the breadth of the term organization includes but is
not limited to groups, teams, fraternities, sororities, citizen army training corps, educational
institutions, clubs, societies, cooperatives, companies, partnerships, corporations, the PNP, and the
AFP. Attached to the Department of Transportation and Communications, the PMMA is a
government-owned educational institution established for the primary purpose of producing
efficient and well-trained merchant marine officers. Clearly, it is included in the term organization
within the meaning of the law.
Nevertheless, the SC, for a different reason, ruled that the Motion to Quash must be granted, as the
Information does not include all the material facts constituting the crime of accomplice to hazing.
The indictment against the respondents merely states that psychological pain and physical injuries
were inflicted on the victim. There is no allegation that the purported acts were employed as a
prerequisite for admission or entry into the organization. Failure to aver this crucial ingredient
would prevent the successful prosecution of the criminal responsibility of the accused, either as
principal or as accomplice, for the crime of hazing.
Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, expressly states that the information must include, inter
alia, both "the designation of the offense given by the statute" and "the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense."
Thus, the Information must be quashed, as the ultimate facts it presents do not constitute the crime
of accomplice to hazing.
The petition for review on certiorari was denied and the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan was
affirmed.