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PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS
PRACTICE OF LAW
ATTY. NOE-LACSAMANA vs. ATTY. BUSMENTE

A.C. No. 7269
(2011)
FACTS:
Noe-Lacsamana alleged in her complaint that she was the counsel for Irene Bides, the plaintiff in
Civil Case No. SCA-2481 before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 167, while Busmente was
the counsel for the defendant Imelda B. Ulaso (Ulaso). Noe-Lacsamana alleged that Ulasos deed of sale over
the property subject of Civil Case No. SCA-2481 was annulled, which resulted in the filing of
an ejectment case before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), San Juan, docketed as Civil Case No. 9284,
where Busmente appeared as counsel. Another case for falsification was filed
against Ulaso where Busmente also appeared as counsel. Noe-Lacsamana alleged that one Atty.
Elizabeth Dela Rosa or Atty. Liza DelaRosa (Dela Rosa) would accompany Ulaso in court, projecting herself
as Busmentes collaborating counsel. Dela Rosa signed the minutes of the court proceedings in Civil Case No.
9284 nine times from 25 November 2003 to 8 February 2005. Noe-Lacsamana further alleged that the court
orders and notices specified Dela Rosa as Busmentes collaborating counsel.Noe-Lacsamana alleged that
upon verification with this Court and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, she discovered that Dela Rosa
was not a lawyer.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is in violation of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which states that [a] lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of
law
HELD:
It has been established that Dela Rosa who is not a member of the Bar misrepresented herself as
respondents collaborating counsel. There was also sufficient evidence to prove that respondent allowed
Dela Rosa to illegally practice law, appear in court, and give legal assistance to respondents client.
Busmente alleged that Dela Rosas employment in his office ended in 2000 and that Dela Rosa was able to
continue with her illegal practice of law through connivance with Macasieb, another member of Busmentes
staff. As pointed out by the IBP-CBD, Busmente claimed that Macasieb resigned from his office in 2003.
Yet, Dela Rosa continued to represent Ulaso until 2005. Pleadings and court notices were still sent to
Busmentes office until 2005. The IBP-CBD noted that Dela Rosas practice should have ended in 2003 when
Macasieb left. The term practice of law implies customarily or habitually holding oneself out to the public
as a lawyer for compensation as a source of livelihood or in consideration of his services. Holding ones self
out as a lawyer may be shown by acts indicative of that purpose, such as identifying oneself as attorney,
appearing in court in representation of a client, or associating oneself as a partner of a law office for the
general practice of law.
ALCARAZ, John Victor J.

PRACTICE OF LAW
QUERY OF ATTY. KAREN M. SILVERIO-BUFFE, FORMER Clerk of Court BRANCH 81,

ROMBLON, ROMBLON ON THE PROHIBITION FROM ENGAGING IN THE PRIVATE
PRACTICE OF LAW.
FACTS:
The query arose because Atty. Buffe previously worked as Clerk of Court VI of the (RTC), Branch
81 of Romblon; she resigned from her position effective February 1, 2008. Thereafter (and within the oneyear period of prohibition mentioned in the above-quoted provision), she engaged in the private practice of
law by appearing as private counsel in several cases before RTC-Branch 81 of Romblon. Atty. Buffe alleged
that Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 gives preferential treatment to an incumbent public employee, who
may engage in the private practice of his profession so long as this practice does not conflict or tend to
conflict with his official functions. In contrast, a public official or employee who has retired, resigned, or has
been separated from government service like her, is prohibited from engaging in private practice on any
matter before the office where she used to work, for a period of one (1) year from the date of her separation
from government employment.
Atty. Buffe further alleged that the intention of the above prohibition is to remove the exercise of
clout, influence or privity to insider information, which the incumbent public employee may use in the
private practice of his profession. However, this situation did not obtain in her case, since she had already
resigned as Clerk of Court of RTC-Branch 81 of Romblon. She advanced the view that she could engage in
the private practice of law before RTC-Branch 81 of Romblon, so long as her appearance as legal counsel
shall not conflict or tend to conflict with her former duties as former Clerk of Court of that Branch.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Buffe can appear as private counsel in RTC Br.81 of Romblon within
the 1 year prohibition provided for by law.
HELD:
Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713 generally provides for the prohibited acts and transactions of public
officials and employees. Subsection (b)(2) prohibits them from engaging in the private practice of their
profession during their incumbency. As an exception, a public official or employee can engage in the
practice of his or her profession under the following conditions: first, the private practice is authorized by the
Constitution or by the law; and second, the practice will not conflict, or tend to conflict, with his or her
official functions.
The Section 7 prohibitions continue to apply for a period of one year after the public official or
employee's resignation, retirement, or separation from public office, except for the private practice of
profession under subsection (b)(2), which can already be undertaken even within the one-year
prohibition period. As an exception to this exception, the one-year prohibited period applies with respect to
any matter before the office the public officer or employee used to work with.
The Section 7 prohibitions are predicated on the principle that public office is a public trust; and
serve to remove any impropriety, real or imagined, which may occur in government transactions
between a former government official or employee and his or her former colleagues, subordinates or
superiors. The prohibitions also promote the observance and the efficient use of every moment of the
prescribed office hours to serve the public.

PRACTICE OF LAW
Parenthetically, in the case of court employees, Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 is not the only
prohibition to contend with; Section 5, Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel also
applies. The latter provision provides the definitive rule on the "outside employment" that an incumbent
court official or court employee may undertake in addition to his official duties:
Outside employment may be allowed by the head of office provided it complies with all of the following
requirements:
xxx
(e) The outside employment shall not be with the legislative or executive branch of government, unless
specifically authorized by the Supreme Court.
Where a conflict of interest exists, may reasonably appear to exist, or where the outside employment
reflects adversely on the integrity of the Judiciary, the court personnel shall not accept outside
employment.
In both the above discussed aspect of R.A. No. 6713 and the quoted Canon 3, the practice of law is covered;
the practice of law is a practice of profession, while Canon 3 specifically mentions any outside employment
requiring the practice of law. In Cayetano v. Monsod, we defined the practice of law as any activity, in
and out of court, that requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience. Moreover, we ruled that to engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristics of the profession; to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device
or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill. Under both provisions, a common
objective is to avoid any conflict of interest on the part of the employee who may wittingly or
unwittingly use confidential information acquired from his employment, or use his or her familiarity
with court personnel still with the previous office.
After separation from the service, Section 5, Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel
ceases to apply as it applies specifically to incumbents, but Section 7 and its subsection (b)(2) of R.A. No.
6713 continue to apply to the extent discussed above. Atty. Buffe's situation falls under Section 7.
A distinctive feature of this administrative matter is Atty. Buffe's admission that she immediately
engaged in private practice of law within the one-year period of prohibition stated in Section 7(b)(2) of
R.A. No. 6713.
As discussed above, a clerk of court can already engage in the practice of law immediately after
her separation from the service and without any period limitation that applies to other prohibitions
under Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713. The clerk of court's limitation is that she cannot practice her
profession within one year before the office where he or she used to work with. In a comparison
between a resigned, retired or separated official or employee, on the one hand, and an incumbent
official or employee, on the other, the former has the advantage because the limitation is only with
respect to the office he or she used to work with and only for a period of one year. The incumbent
cannot practice at all, save only where specifically allowed by the Constitution and the law and only in
areas where no conflict of interests exists. This analysis again disproves Atty. Buffe's basic premises.
By acting in a manner that R.A. No. 6713 brands as "unlawful," Atty. Buffe contravened Rule 1.01 of Canon
1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND FOR LEGAL PROCESSES
CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND THE DIGNITY OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.

PRACTICE OF LAW
AGUIRRE vs. RANA

B.M. No.1036
June 10,2003
FACTS:
Respondent Edwin L.Rana was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations. Respondent
while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a candidate in the May 2001 elections before the Municipal
Board of Election Canvassers in Masbate and filed with the MBEC a pleading dated May 19,2001 entitled
Formal Objection to the inclusion in the canvassing of votes in some precint for the office of Vice-Mayor. In
the pleading respondent respresented himself as counsel for and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty candidate
George Bunan and signed as counsel for the latter. Furthermore, respondent also signed as counsel for Emily
Estipona-Hao on May 19,2001 in the petition filed before the MBEC praying for the proclamation of
Estipona-Hao as winning candidate for mayor of Mandaon,Masbate. On May 21,2001, one day before the
scheduled mass oath taking of successful bar examinees as members of the Philippine bar, complainant
Aguirre filed against respondent a petition for Denial of Admission to the Bar. On May 22,2001, respondent
was allowed to take the lawyers oath but was disallowed to from signing the Roll of Attorneys until he is
cleared of the charges against him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent shall be denied admission to the Bar.
HELD:
Yes. Respondent was engaged in the practice of law when appeared in the proceedings before the
MBEC and filed various pleadings without license to do so. Evidence clearly show the charge of
unauthorized practice of law. Respondent called himself Counsel knowing fully well that he was not a
member of the bar. Having held himself out as counsel knowing that he had no authority to practice of law,
respondent has shown moral unfitness to be a member of the Philippine Bar.
The right to practice of law is not a natural or constitutional right but it is a privilege. It is
limited to persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The
exercise of this privilege presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational attainment and
even public trust since a lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar candidate does not acquire the right to
practice law simply by passing the bar examinations. The practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld
even from someone who has passed the bar, if the person seeking admission had practiced law without a
license. True enough, Rana has passed the bar and took the lawyers oath. However, it is the signing of Roll
of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact the Rana passed the bar exams is
immaterial because the two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer is taking the lawyers oath to be
administered by the court and the signing in the Roll of Attorneys.

PRACTICE OF LAW
RE: ELMO S. ABAD, 1978 Successful Bar Examinee. ATTY. PROCOPIO S. BELTRAN, JR.,
President of the Philippine Trial Lawyers Association, Inc., vs.ELMO S. ABAD,
A. M. No. 139 March 28, 1983
FACTS:
Court held respondent Elmo S. Abad a successful bar examinee but has not been admitted to the
Philippine Bar in contempt of Court for unauthorized practice of law and he was fined P500.00 with
subsidiary imprisonment in case he failed to pay the fine. (121 SCRA 217). He paid the fine. Atty. Procopio
S. Beltran, Jr., the complainant, filed a MOTION TO CIRCULARIZE TO ALL METRO MANILA
COURTS THE FACT THAT ELMO S. ABAD IS NOT AUTHORIZED TO PRACTICE LAW. The Report
has found as a fact, over the denials of the respondent under oath, that he signed Exhibits B, C, and D, and
that he made appearances in Metro Manila courts. This aspect opens the respondent to a charge for perjury.
The Report also reveals that Atty. Ruben A. Jacobe collaborated with the respondent as counsels for Antonio
S. Maravilla one of the accused in Criminal Case Nos. 26084, 26085 and 26086 of the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City. (Exhibit D.) Atty. Jacobe should be called to account for his association with the respondent.
Respondent, when asked about the aforesaid motions, Exhibits "B" and "D", and the signatures
therein, denied that he filed the same and that the signatures therein are his. He also denied that he appeared
in the hearing in the afternoon of December 8, 1983 in the said trial court. According to him, he was
in Batangas at the time. He also testified that the only explanation he could give regarding the signatures in
the aforesaid exhibits is that the same could have been effected by Atty. Beltran to show the Supreme Court
that he (respondent) was still illegally practicing law. As to the motion forexamination and analysis of
respondent's signature, the Investigator, to afford respondent full opportunity to prove his defense, sought the
assistance of the National Bureau of Investigation to compare respondent's signature in the aforesaid exhibits
with the signatures appearing in the pleadings that he filed in the Supreme Court, which latter signature he
admits as genuine and as his own. The aforesaid documentary and testimonial evidence, as well as the above
report of the NBI, have clearly proved that respondent Abad is still practicing law despite the decision of this
Court of March 28, 1983.
ISSUES:
(1.) Whether or not Abad can engage in practice of law
(2.) Whether or not Atty. Jacobe liable in his collaboration with the respondent
HELD:
(1.)
No. Only those licensed by the Supreme Court may practice law in this country. The right to
practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited to persons of good moral
character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The exercise of this privilege presupposes
possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational attainment and even public trust, since a lawyer is an
officer of the court. A bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the
bar examinations. The practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even from one who has passed the
bar examinations, if the person seekingadmission had practiced law without license. Respondent Abad
should know that the circumstances which he has narrated do not constitute his admissionto the Philippine
Bar and the right to practice law thereafter. He should know that two essential requisites for becoming a
lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyer's oath to be administered by this Court and his signature
in the Roll of Attorneys. (Rule 138, Secs. 17 and 19, Rules of Court.) The regulation of the practice of law is

PRACTICE OF LAW
unquestionably strict. Under Section 3 (e) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person who engages in the
unauthorized practice of law is liable for indirect contempt of court. Mr. Elmo S. Abad is hereby fined Five
Hundred (P500.00) pesos payable to this Court within ten (10) days from notice failing which he shall serve
twenty-five (25) days imprisonment.
(2.)
Yes. He violated Canon 9 Rule 9.01 A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person
the performance of any task which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar. in good standing.
A lawyer shall not assist anyone who is not a member of the Bar to practice law in this country. Thus, he
must not take as partner or associate in his law firm a person who is not a lawyer, a lawyer who has been
disbarred and a lawyer who has been suspended from practice of law. The lawyer who assists in an
unauthorized practice of law whether directly or indirectly is subject to disciplinary action. Finally, Atty.
Ruben A. Jacobe is required to explain within ten (10) days from notice why he should not be disciplined for
collaborating and associating in the practice of the law with the respondent who is not a member of the bar.

PRACTICE OF LAW
LETTER OF ATTY. CECILIO Y. AREVALO, JR., REQUESTING EXEMPTION FROM

PAYMENT OF IBP DUES.
B.M. No. 1370. May 9, 2005
FACTS:
This case is about a request for exemption from payment of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) dues filed by petitioner Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo,
On September 22, 2004, petitioner sought exemption of IBP dues in the amount of 12,035.00 as
alleged unpaid accountability for the years 1977-2005. According to the petitioner, after passing the bar in
1961, he became part of Philippine Civil Service from July 1962 until 1986. He also averred that he migrated
and worked in the USA in December 1986 until his retirement in 2003. Hence, he cannot be assessed IBP
dues while working in the Philippine Civil Service since the Civil Service law prohibits the practice of ones
profession while in government service, and neither can he be assessed for the years when he was working in
the USA. On November 16, 2004, the IBP submitted its comment stating that membership in the IBP is not
based on the actual practice of law, that it is an obligation for a lawyer to pay annual dues as provided under
Section 9 and 10 rule 139-A of the Rules of Court, that there is no rule allowing the exemption of payment of
annual dues and what is allowed is voluntary termination and reinstatement of membership. It asserted that
what petitioner could have done was to inform the secretary of the IBP of his intention to stay abroad, so that
his membership in the IBP could have been terminated, thus, his obligation to pay dues could have been
stopped. In his reply, petitioner contends that the Policy of Non-exemption in the payment of annual
membership has constitutional infirmities, such as equal protection clause and due process clause.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to exemption from payment of his dues during the time that he
was inactive in the practice of law.
HELD:
No. An Integrated bar is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong. Therefore, they
are subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of
a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, of which no one is exempt. The
Supreme Court, in order to foster the States legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal
services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and
beneficiaries of the regulatory program the lawyers. Also, there is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits
the same.
ALVAREZ, Shiela Bernardo

PRACTICE OF LAW
IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS MICHAEL A. MEHADO

B.M No. 2540
September 24, 2013
FACTS:
Michael A. Medado, herein petitioner, graduated from University of the Philippines with a degree of
Bachelor of Laws in 1979 and admitted to the Bar in the same year. On May 7, 1980, he took the Attorneys
Oath at Philippine International Convention Center. He was then scheduled to sign in the Roll of Attorneys
on May 13, 1980 but failed to do so, allegedly because he had misplaced the Notice to sign the Roll of
Attorneys given by the Bar office when he went to his province. Several years later, he found the notice and
then became aware that he had not signed in the roll, and what he had signed at the entrance of PICC was
probably just an attendance record. In 2005, when Medado attended MCLE, he was required to provide his
roll number in order for his MCLE compliances be credited. Not having signed in the Roll of Attorneys, he
was unable to provide his roll number. Thus, on February 2012 he filed a petition, praying that he be allowed
to sign in the Roll of Attorneys. The Office of Bar Confidant recommended that petition be denied for
petitioners gross negligence, gross misconduct and lack of merit
ISSUE:
Whether or not failure of the petitioner to sign in the Roll of Attorneys will constitute as a
violation of practice of law.
HELD:
Yes. While an honest mistake of fact could be used to excuse a person from the legal consequences
of his acts as it negates malice or evil motive, a mistake of law cannot be utilized as a lawful justification,
because everyone is presumed to know the law and its consequences. At first, Medado may have operated
under an honest mistake of fact when he thought that what he had signed at the PICC entrance before the
oath-taking was already the Roll of Attorneys. However, the moment he realized that what he had signed was
merely an attendance record, he could no longer claim an honest mistake of fact as a valid justification At
that point, Medado should have known that he was not a full-fledged member of the Philippine Bar because
of his failure to sign in the Roll of Attorneys, as it was the act of signing therein that would have made him
so. When, in spite of this knowledge, he chose to continue practicing law without taking the necessary steps
to complete all the requirements for admission to the Bar, he willfully engaged in the unauthorized practice
of law. Moreover, knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law likewise transgresses Canon 9 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.

PRACTICE OF LAW
ROGELIO A. TAN, NORMA and MALIYAWAO PAGAYOKAN vs. BENEDICTO M. BALAJADIA

G.R. No. 169517, March 14, 2006
FACTS:
This case involves a petition of contempt filed by petitioners Rogelio Tan and Norma Tan and
Maliyawao Pagayokan against respondent Benedicto Balajadia.
On May 8, 2005, respondent filed a criminal before Office of the City Prosecutor od Baguio city for
usurpation of authority, grave coercion and violation of city tax ordinance due to alleged illegal collection of
parking fees by petitioners from respondent. Based on the complaint-affidavit of respondent, he is a
practicing lawyer based in Baguio city. However, it was shown in the certifications by the Office of Bar
Confident And IBP that the respondent is not admitted in the Philippine Bar. Hence, should be liable for
indirect contempt for misrepresenting himself as member thereof. The respondent in his comment averred
that such allegation was an honest mistake of a fact. According to the latter the complaint-affidavit was
prepared by the secretary of Atty. Paterno Aquino patterned after Atty. Aquinos first complaint-affidavit.
Liza Laconsay, Atty. Aquinos secretary executed an affidavit admitting her mistake made in the complaintaffidavit.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent may be held liable for indirect contempt
HELD:
No. There is a clear showing that respondent never intended to project himself as a lawyer to the
public. The affidavit of the secretary attending to the circumstances that gave rise to the mistake in the
drafting of the complaint-affidavit conforms to the documentary evidence on record. Taken together, these
circumstances show that the allegation in paragraph 5 of respondents complaint-affidavit was, indeed, the
result of inadvertence. In the case at bar, no evidence was presented to show that respondent acted as an
attorney or that he intended to practice law. Consequently, he cannot be made liable for indirect contempt
considering his lack of intent to illegally practice law.

PRACTICE OF LAW
IN RE: JUAN T. PUBLICO, PETITION FOR REINSTATEMENT IN THE ROLL OF

ATTORNEYS,
February 20, 1981
FACTS:
Three Petitions for the reinstatement of Juan T. Publico in the Roll of Attorneys, have been filed: 1)
by Juan T. Publico himself 2) by the President and twelve members of the faculty of the Polytechnic
University of the Philippines 3) And by the San Page 723 Miguel (Catanduanes) Civic Association in Metro
Manila through its President, Vice-President and Directors.
In 1960, Juan T. Publico petition to take the bar examinations, however was opposed by his uncle alleging
that his nephew is not a person of good moral character for having misrepresented, sometime in 1950, when
he was sixteen (16) years of age, that he was eligible for Third Year High School, University of Manila, by
utilizing the school records of his cousin and name-sake, Juan M. Publico when, in actual fact, petitioner had
not completed Grade VI of his elementary schooling, much less, First and Second Year High School.
Meanwhile, Juan Publico took the bar examinations and fortunately passed it, took the lawyer's oath, and
signed the Roll of Attorneys. The administrative case was referred to the Court's Legal Officer-Investigator,
Ricardo Paras, Jr., for investigation and report. His uncle then moved to drop the complaint on the ground
that his witnesses had turned hostile. The Motion was however denied. And in lieu of the investigation made
by the legal officer/s, they recommended that the petitioner be stricken from the Rollo of Attorneys. And
through a resolution, the name of Juan T. Publico was stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.
Approximately eleven years later, or on June 28, 1973, Juan T. Publico filed a Petition for
Reinstatement alleging that he had never received, for had he been informed, nor did he have any knowledge
of the Resolution of the Court ordering the Bar Division to strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys until
March 1969, when after taking his oath of office as Municipal Judge of Gigmoto, Catanduanes, he was
advised to inquire into the outcome of the disbarment case against him. Petitioner then made petitions
praying for his reinstatement asking the court to take into consideration his exemplary conduct from the time
he became a lawyer, his services to the community the numerous awards, resolutions and/'or commendations
he received, which were incorporated in his petitions, and particularly, for the sake of his children. However,
the court denied all of his petitions for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner should be disbarred for misrepresentations made in his school
records and non-compliance to rules provided by the court.
HELD:
No. The court takes into consideration the applicant's character and standing prior to the disbarment,
the nature and character of the charge for which he was disbarred, his conduct subsequent to the disbarment,
and the time that has elapsed between the disbarment and the application for reinstatement. The court find
that the evidence submitted by petitioner, particularly, the testimonials presented on his behalf, as listed
heretofore, his good conduct and honorable dealings subsequent to his disbarment, his active involvement in
civic, educational, and religious organizations, render him fit to be restored to membership in the Bar, and
that petitioner has been sufficiently punished and disciplined.
10

PRACTICE OF LAW
FIGUEROA vs. BARRANCO

SBC Case No. 519
(1997)
FACTS:
Figueroa and Barranco were sweethearts since their teens. Their intimacy eventually resulted to a son
born out of wedlock. At this point (1964) Barranco promised Figueroa that he would marry her when he
passes the bar examinations. After four takes, he finally passed but did not hold true to his promise of
marriage. In 1971, their relationship ended. Years later, he married another woman. When Barranco was
about to take his oath to enter the legal profession, Figueroa filed a complaint relaying to the court what
happened between her and Barranco. Until 1988, Barranco has filed three motions to dismiss because
Figueroa still would not persecute and because for the past years, he has become elected in the Sangguniang
Bayan, has actively participated in various civic organizations and has acquired a good standing within his
community while the case was pending. The court sought the opinion of the IBP which recommended that
Barranco be allowed to take his oath. Figueroa reappeared and intercepted the scheduled oath-taking of
Barranco which led to its delay.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Barranco should be allowed to take his oath despite the accusations of
Figueroa
HELD:
Yes. The maintenance of an intimate relationship between a man and a woman, both of whom had no
impediment to marry and voluntarily carried on with the affair, does not amount to a grossly immoral
conduct even if a child was born out of the relationship. His previous acts may be said to be a question to his
moral character but none of these are so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled
or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree. Her allegations that she was forced to have sexual
relations with him cannot lie as evidenced by her continued cohabitation with him even after their child was
born in 1964. The ignobleness of his treatment of Figueroa is sufficiently punished by the 26 years that he
has been prevented from entering the profession he has worked so hard for.
AMANSEC, Alexandre Chrissa C.
11

PRACTICE OF LAW
IN RE: JAMES JOSEPH HAMM

123 P 3d 652 (2005)
FACTS:
In 1974, when James Hamm was 26 years of age, he and two accomplices planned to ripoff two
young men who wanted to buy 20 pounds of marijuana. Hamm claims that the plan was merely to rob the
buyers, not murder them. Hamm and an accomplice ended up shooting the buyers and killing them. Hamm
was arrested and charged with two counts of first degree murder and two counts of armed robbery. A few
months later, Hamm pled guilty of one count of first degree murder, involving the victim he killed, and the
remaining charges were dismissed. He was sentenced to life in prison, without the possibility of parole for 25
years. Hamm spent 17 years in prison. During that time, he was a model prisoner. He obtained his
undergraduate degree, wrote numerous grants for programs and speakers on various issues relevant to
prisoners and rehabilitation, and assisted other prisoners in their attempts to better themselves and accept
responsibility for their acts. Hamm and his first wife, with whom he had a son, were in the process of
divorcing at the time of the crime. He never received the final order of child support, and understood that his
former wifes new husband had adopted his son. While in prison, he met and married Donna Leone. She and
Hamm founded Middle Ground Prison Reform, a prisoner and prisoner family advocacy organization. In
1992 Hamm was paroled. While on parole, he devoted many hours to serving the community, appearing and
speaking at various schools and organizations, appearing at legislative hearings regarding revisions to the
criminal code, and answering questions regarding the Department of Corrections policies and procedures.
He attended the ASU College of Law and graduated in 1996. In 1999, he passed the bar examination. In
2001, Hamm was discharged from parole. In early 2004, Hamm filed his Character Report with the
Committee on Character and Fitness. A formal hearing was held on May 20 and June 2, 2004. Hamm
testified and addressed the Committees questions concerning the facts surrounding the murders, certain
omissions in his character report, his neglect of a 1974 child support order, and allegations of the
unauthorized practice of law while working with Middle Ground. Hamm had several character witnesses
testify on his behalf. He also submitted numerous 2 letters of support and recommendation from judges,
attorneys and those who know him and his work. There were also numerous letters opposing his admission.
The Committee recommended the denial of Hamms application for admission. Its report analyzed the
relevant traits, characteristics and conduct listed in Rule 36 and focused on three areas of Hamms conduct:
the 1974 murders, his failure to comply with a longstanding child support order, and the complaints of the
unauthorized practice of law in his work with Middle Ground.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the evidence in the record substantially support the existence of reasonable
doubts about Petitioners present good moral character or about Petitioners fitness to
practice law
HELD:
Hamm received a full opportunity to be heard before a fair tribunal. Because James Hamm has failed
to meet his burden of proving that he is of good moral character, his application for admission to the State
Bar of Arizona is denied.
When Hamm committed first-degree murder in 1974, he demonstrated his extreme lack of good
moral character. Although the Court has not adopted a per se rule excluding an applicant whose past includes
such serious criminal misconduct, the Court agrees that those jurisdictions that have held that an applicant
with such a background must make an extraordinary showing of rehabilitation and present good moral
12

PRACTICE OF LAW
character to be admitted to the practice of law. Perhaps such a showing is, in practical terms, a near
impossibility. That issue need not be decided today, however, because Hamm's lack of candor before the
Committee and the Court, his failure to accept full responsibility for his serious criminal misconduct, and his
failure to accept or fulfill, on a timely basis, his parental obligation of support for his son, all show that
Hamm has not met the stringent standard that applies to an applicant in his position who seeks to show his
present good moral character.
13

PRACTICE OF LAW
ZETA vs. MALINAO

AM No. P.220
December 20, 1978
FACTS
An administrative complaint was filed against Mr. Malinao, court interpreter of the CFI of
Catbalogan Samar. He is charged with:
1. Illegally appearing in court: Mr. Malinao has been appearing in the municipal court of this town for
parties like attorney when he is not an attorney.
2. Grave misconduct in office: Being employed in the Court of First Instance he would instigate
persons, especially in his barrio to grab land rob or coerce. In fact he has cases in the municipal court
in this town involving himself and his men. He incite them telling them not to be afraid as he is a
court employee and has influence over the judges.
3. Crime of Fasification: Information has it that he is unfaithfully filing his time record in the CFI.
Even he has been out practicing in the municipal courts sometimes he would fill his time record as
present. He receives salary for those absent days. This can be checked with time record he has
submitted and if he has any application for leave. He may try to cure it by submitting application for
leave but this should not be allowed as he has already committed crime; and
4. Violation of EO and Civil Service Law: It is prohibited for a civil service employee to engage in
private practice any profession or business without permission from the Department Head. Mr.
Malinao we are sure has not secured that permission because he should not be allowed to practice as
he is not an attorney
The Court proceeded to investigate the case against him by calling Judge Restituto Duran of Sta.
Rita, Samar, Judge Juanito Reyes of Zumarraga, Samar and Judge Miguel Avestruz of Daram, Samar.
Judge Restituto Duran of Sta. Rita, Samar, declared that according to his docket books the
respondent appeared as counsel for Vicente Baculanlan in criminal case No. 1247 in the Municipal Court of
Sta. Rita, Samar, for grave threats and in criminal case No. 1249 for the same accused and Romulo
Villagracia for illegal possession of firearm on August 5, 1960 and on September 17, 1970.
Judge Miguel Avestruz of Daram, Samar, declared that the respondent appeared as counsel in civil
case No. 39 in the Municipal Court of Daram, Samar, entitled Felix Versoza versus Victor Payao, et al., for
forcible entry on December 15, 1962, January 26, 1963, February 18, 1963 and on March 1, 1963.
Judge Juanito Reyes declared that on March 27, 1969, the respondent appeared as counsel for the
defendant in civil case No. 318 of the Municipal Court of Zumarraga entitled Restituto Centino versus Jesus
Tizon for forcible entry and again on June 17, 1970 in the same case.
The dates to which he appeared in the courts of the said judges were found to be the dates when Mr.
Malinao was on leave. The defense of Mr. Malinao that his participation for defendants cause was gratuitous
as they could not engaged legal services due to their poverty.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Mr. Malinao should be relieved of his charges due to his allegation.
HELD:
No. The defense of respondent that "his participation (sic) for defendants' cause was gratuitous as
they could not engage the services of counsel by reason of poverty and the absence of one in the locality"
cannot, even if true, carry the day for him, considering that in appearing as counsel in court, he did so
14

PRACTICE OF LAW
without permission from his superiors and, worse, he falsified his time record of service to conceal his
absence from his office on the dates in question. Indeed, the number of times that respondent acted as
counsel under the above circumstances would indicate that he was doing it as a regular practice obviously for
considerations other than pure love of justice.
Malinao is hereby ordered dismissed from his position as interpreter in the Court of First Instance,
CFI, Zumarraga, Western Samar with prejudice to reemployment in the judicial branch of the government.
15

PRACTICE OF LAW
SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR. vs. ATTY. FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS

A.C. No. 4749.
(2000)
FACTS:
This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues filed against
respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas It appears that Atty. Llamas, who for a number of years now, has not
indicated the proper PTR and IBP OR Nos. and data in his pleadings. If at all, he only indicated IBP Rizal
259060 but he has been using this for at least 3 years already. On the other hand, respondent, who is now of
age, averred that since 1992, he has engaged in law practice without having paid his IBP dues. He likewise
admits that, as appearing in the pleadings submitted by complainant to this Court, he indicated "IBP-Rizal
259060" in the pleadings he filed in court, at least for the years 1995, 1996, and 1997, thus misrepresenting
that such was his IBP chapter membership and receipt number for the years in which those pleadings were
filed. He claims, however, that he is only engaged in a "limited" practice and that he believes in good faith
that he is exempt from the payment of taxes, such as income tax, under R.A. No. 7432, as a senior citizen
since 1992.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether respondent is exempt from paying his yearly dues to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
(2) Whether the respondent has misled the court about his standing in the IBP by using the same IBP
O.R. number in his pleadings of at least six years and therefore liable for his actions.
HELD:
(1) No. Rule 139-A requires that every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay annual dues and
default thereof for six months shall warrant suspension of membership and if nonpayment covers a period of
1-year, default shall be a ground for removal of the delinquents name from the Roll of Attorneys. It does not
matter whether or not respondent is only engaged in limited practice of law. Moreover, While it is true that
R.A. No. 7432, grants senior citizens "exemption from the payment of individual income taxes: provided,
that their annual taxable income does not exceed the poverty level as determined by the National Economic
and Development Authority (NEDA) for that year," the exemption however does not include payment of
membership or association dues.
(2)Yes. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby misrepresenting to the public
and the courts that he had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty of violating the Code
of Professional Responsibility which provides: Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct. His act is also a violation of Rule 10.01 which provides that: A lawyer shall
not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor mislead or allow the court to be misled by
any artifice.
Respondent's failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings he filed in court
indeed merit the most severe penalty. However, in view of respondent's advanced age, his express
willingness to pay his dues and plea for a more temperate application of the law, we believe the penalty of
one year suspension from the practice of law or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later, is
appropriate.
ANACAY, Denise Bunag
16

PRACTICE OF LAW
ROGELIO A. TAN, NORMA TAN & MALIYAWAO PAGAYOKAN

vs. BENEDICTO M. BALAJADIA
G.R. No. 169517
(2006)
FACTS:
Petitioners allege that on May 8, 2005, respondent lawyer filed a criminal case against them with the
Office of the City of Prosecutor of Baguio City for usurpation of authority, grave coercion & violation of city
tax ordinance due to the alleged illegal collection of parking fees by petitioners from respondent. However,
certifications issued by the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines showed that
respondent has never been admitted to the Philippine Bar. Hence, petitioners claim that respondent is liable
for indirect contempt for misrepresenting himself as a lawyer.
Respondent avers that the allegation that he is a practicing lawyer was an honest mistake. He claims
that the secretary of Atty. Paterno Aquino prepared the subject complaint-affidavit which was patterned after
Atty. Aquinos complaint-affidavit. It appears that Atty. Aquino had previously filed a complaint-affidavit
against petitioners involving the same subject matter.
Respondent claims that two complaint-affidavits were drafted by the same secretary; one for the May
5, 2005 parking incident at 10:00 oclock in the morning and another for the parking incident on the same
date but which occurred at 1:00 oclock in the afternoon. Respondent insists that the complaint-affidavit
regarding the 1:00 oclock parking incident correctly alleged that he is a businessman with office address at
Room B-204, 2/F Lopez Building, Session Road, Baguio City. However, the complaint-affidavit regarding
the 10:00 oclock parking incident, which is the subject of the instant petition, erroneously referred to him as
a practicing lawyer because Atty. Aquinos secretary copied verbatim paragraph 5 of Atty. Aquinos
complaint-affidavit. Hence, it was inadvertently alleged that respondent is a practicing lawyer based in
Baguio City with office address at Room B-207, 2/F Lopez Building, Session Road, Baguio City, which
statement referred to the person of Atty. Aquino and his law office address.
Liza Laconsay, Atty. Aquinos secretary, admitted the mistake in the preparation of the complaintaffidavit. Respondent alleged that he did not read the complaint-affidavit because he assumed that the two
complaint-affidavits contained the same allegations with respect to his occupation and office address.
Respondent claims that he had no intention of misrepresenting himself as a practicing lawyer.
ISSUE:
Whether Balajadia is liable for indirect contempt.
HELD:
No. The Court has ruled that the unauthorized practice of law by assuming to be an attorney and
acting as such without authority constitutes indirect contempt which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or
both. The liability for the unauthorized practice of law under Sect. 3(e), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court is in
the nature of criminal contempt and the acts are punished because they are an affront to the dignity and
authority of the court, and obstruct the orderly administration of justice. In determining liability for criminal
contempt, well-settled is the rule that intent is a necessary element, and no one can be punished unless the
evidence makes it clear that he intended to commit it.
17

PRACTICE OF LAW
In the case at bar, a review of the records supports respondents claim that he never intended to
project himself as a lawyer to the public. It was a clear inadvertence on the part of the secretary of Atty
Aquino. The affidavit of Liza Laconsay attesting to the circumstances that gave rise to the mistake in the
drafting of the complaint-affidavit conforms to the documentary evidence on record. Taken together, these
circumstances show that the allegation in paragraph 5 of respondents complaint-affidavit was, indeed, the
result of inadvertence.
Respondent has satisfactorily shown that the allegation that he is a practicing lawyer was the result
of inadvertence and cannot, by itself, establish intent as to make him liable for indirect contempt. In the cases
where we found a party liable for the unauthorized practice of law, the party was guilty of some overt act like
signing court pleadings on behalf of his client; appearing before court hearings as an attorney; manifesting
before the court that he will practice law despite being previously denied admission to the bar; or deliberately
attempting to practice law and holding out himself as an attorney through circulars with full knowledge that
he is not licensed to do so.
In the case at bar, no evidence was presented to show that respondent acted as an attorney or that he
intended to practice law. Consequently, he cannot be made liable for indirect contempt considering his lack
of intent to illegally practice law. However, while the evidence on record failed to prove respondents
deliberate intent to misrepresent himself as an attorney and act as such without authority, he is hereby
warned to be more careful and circumspect in his future actions.
18

PRACTICE OF LAW
PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW OF BENJAMIN M. DACANAY

B.M. No. 1678
(2007)
FACTS:
Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he migrated to
Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied for Canadian
citizenship to avail of Canadas free medical aid program. His application was approved and he became a
Canadian citizen in May 2004.
On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of
2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship. On that day, he took his oath of allegiance as a
Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the
Philippines and now intends to resume his law practice.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner may still resume practice.
HELD:
Yes. As a rule, the practice of law and other professions in the Philippines are reserved and limited
only to Filipino citizens. Philippine citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar. So when Dacanay
became a Canadian citizen in 2004, he ceased to have the privilege to practice law in the Philippines.
However, under RA 9225, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never to
have lost his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires his Filipino citizenship in accordance with RA 9225.
Hence, when Dacanay reacquires his Filipino citizenship in 2006, his membership to the Philippine bar was
deemed to have never been terminated.
But this does not mean that he can automatically resume his practice of law right after reacquisition,
Dacanay must still comply with several conditions before he can resume his practice of law, to wit:
a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP;
b) the payment of professional tax;
c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education; this is
especially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioners knowledge of Philippine laws and
update him of legal developments and;
d) the retaking of the lawyers oath which will not only remind him of his duties and
responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to
maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a member of the Philippine bar.
19

PRACTICE OF LAW
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EUSTACIO DE LUNA, ET AL.

G.R. Nos. L-10236-48
(1958)
FACTS:
This is an appeal, taken by the prosecution, from an order of the CFI of Manila, granting a motion to
dismiss filed by the defendant, for lack of jurisdiction and, also, upon the ground that the facts alleged in the
amended informations, do not constitute the crime of contempt of court with which defendants are charged.
It is alleged in said amended informations that, on or about the 22nd day of December, 1954, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, the person accused in each one of these cases.
. . . well knowing that he has not passed the bar examination and was not in any way authorized to take his
oath as a lawyer and after having been duly informed and notified that certain portions of Republic Act No.
972, known as the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953, are unconstitutional and therefore void and without force and
effect, and that all the petitions of the candidates including the accused who failed in the examinations of
1946 to 1952, inclusive, for admission to the bar were refused and denied by the Resolution of the
Honorable, the Supreme Court, promulgated on March 18, 1954, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
contemptuously disobey and resist in an insolent and defiant manner the said Resolution of the Supreme
Court directed to him and each and every one of the petitioners, and perform acts constituting improper
conduct and manifestations that tend directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration
of justice in all courts of the Philippines and impair the respect to and attack the authority and dignity of the
Honorable, the Supreme Court and all other inferior courts by then and there, without being lawfully
authorized to do so, taking an oath as a lawyer before a notary public and making manifestations to that
effect before the Honorable, the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether the respondents should be admitted to the bar.
HELD:
No. Although know that they did not pass the bar examination. Although they sought admission to
the Bar under the Bar Flunkers Act, they were subsequently notified of the resolution of the Supreme Court
denying their petitions. This notwithstanding, they took their oaths as lawyers before a notary public and
formally advised the Court, not only of such fact, but, also that they will practice in all courts of the
Philippines.
The oath as lawyer is a prerequisite to the practice of law and may be taken only before the Supreme
Court by those authorized by the latter to engage in such practice. The resolution of the Supreme Court
denying appellees' petition for admission to the Bar implied, necessarily, a denial of the right to take said
oath, as well as prohibition of the taking thereof. By taking oaths before a notary public, appellees expressed
clearly their intent to, and did, in fact, challenge and defy the authority of the Supreme Court to pass upon
and settle, in a final and conclusive manner, the issue whether or not they should be admitted to the bar, as
well as, embarrass, hinder and obstruct the administration of justice and impair the respect due to the courts
of justice and the Supreme Court, in particular, in violation of section 3, subdivision (b) of Rule 64 of the
Rules of Court. Such acts, therefore, constitute contempt of court.
20

PRACTICE OF LAW
SOPHIA ALAWI v. ASHARY ALAUYA

AM SDC-97-2-P, February 24, 2007
FACTS:
Sophia Alawi was a sales representative of a real estate and housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is
the incumbent executive clerk of court of the Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi City. Alauya addressed a
letter to the President of the real estate company advising of the termination of his contract with the
company. He stated that his consent was vitiated by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and
abuse of confidence by the aforesaid sales agent which made said contract void ab initio. Alauya wrote
several other letters in all of which, for the same reasons already cited. NHMFC wrote to the Supreme Court
requesting it to stop deductions on Alauya's UHLP loan. Upon learning of the letters sent by Alauya, Alawi
filed with this Court a verified complaint. She deplored Alauya's references to her as "unscrupulous,
swindler, forger, manipulator, etc." without "even a bit of evidence to cloth his allegations with the essence
of truth," denouncing his imputations as irresponsible, "all concoctions, lies, baseless and coupled with
manifest ignorance and evident bad faith," and asserting that all her dealings with Alauya had been regular
and completely transparent. She also alleged that Alauya uses the title attorney. Alauya contended that it
was he who had suffered "undue injury, mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings and untold
financial suffering. He also justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that it is "lexically
synonymous" with "Counsellors-at-law," adding that he prefers the title of "attorney" because "counsellor" is
often mistaken for "councilor," "konsehal or the Maranao term "consial," The Court referred the case to the
Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Alauya should be dismissed or disciplined
HELD:
Alauya was reprimanded. The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees enunciates the State policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in
public service. Sec. 4 of the Code commands that "public officials and employees at all times respect the
rights of others, and refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy,
public order, public safety and public interest." The law requires that he exercise that right with propriety,
without malice or vindictiveness, or undue harm to anyone; consistent with good morals, good customs,
public policy, public order; or otherwise stated, that he act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith. Righteous indignation, or vindication of right cannot justify resort to vituperative
language, or downright name-calling. As a member of the Shari'a Bar and an officer of a Court, Alawi is
subject to a standard of conduct more stringent than for most other government workers. As a man of the
law, he may not use language which is abusive, offensive, scandalous, menacing, or otherwise improper. As
a judicial employee, it is expected that he accord respect for the person and the rights of others at all times,
and that his every act and word should be characterized by prudence, restraint, courtesy, dignity. His radical
deviation from these salutary norms might perhaps be mitigated, but cannot be excused, by his strongly held
conviction that he had been grievously wronged. As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," both may
be considered "counsellors," in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the
latter is an "attorney." The title of "attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree
in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the IBP and remain
members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.
His disinclination to use the title of "counsellor" does not warrant his use of the title of attorney.
ANCHORIZ, Andrei Dominic D.
21

PRACTICE OF LAW
IN RE: PURISIMA
BM No. 979 and 986, December 10, 2002
FACTS:
Petitioner was conditionally admitted to take the Bar Exams in 1999. He passed the Bar exams,
however the Court disqualified him from becoming a member of the Philippine Bar and declared his
examinations null and void on two (2) grounds: (a) Petitioner failed to submit the required certificate of
completion of the pre-bar review course under oath for his conditional admission to the 1999 Bar
Examinations; and (b) He committed a serious act of dishonesty which rendered him unfit to become a
member of the Philippine Bar when he made it appear in his Petition to Take the 1999 Bar Examinations that
he took his pre-bar review course at the Philippine Law School when, PLS had not offered such course.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Due Process where he stated among others that he was enrolled in and regularly
attending the pre-bar review course at the PLS and not at the UST where he in fact took the said course.
Petitioner claimed that the statement in his Petition that he enrolled in and passed the regular fourth year
(law) review classes at the Phil. Law School was a self-evident clerical error and a mere result of an
oversight which is not tantamount to a deliberate and willful declaration of a falsehood. Petitioner explained
that, he requested his schoolmate/friend to fill up the form, have it notarized and then to file it for him with
the OBC. Being consumed with his preparations for the upcoming bar examinations, petitioner admitted that
he did not have the opportunity to check the veracity of the information supplied.The OBC submitted its
Report and Recommendation stating that petitioner should be given the benefit of the doubt.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner must be allowed to take his oath.
HELD:
Yes. The testimony of petitioner and Ms. Felipe that the subject Certification of Dean Dimayuga was
duly submitted to the OBC a week after the filing of the Petition to take the bar appears to be credible. It is
supported by documentary evidence showing that petitioner actually enrolled and completed the required
course in UST. Granting that the Certification of Dean Dimayuga was defective as it certified completion of
the pre-bar review course which was still on-going, this defect should not be attributed to petitioner
considering that he had no participation in the preparation thereof. The fact remains that there is such a
certification issued by UST which appears to be genuine. It must be stressed that there is nothing on record
which impugns the authenticity of the subject Certification as well as that of the other documentary evidence
proferred by petitioner to establish that he was duly enrolled and took the pre-bar review course in UST, not
in PLS. Considering petitioners explanation, fortified by undisputedly genuine documents, at the very least,
petitioner should be given the benefit of the doubt and be allowed to take his oath. The Court is well aware of
instances in the past when ,as a measure of compassion and kindness, it has acted favorably on similar
petitions. In his letter petitioners father pleaded that the denial of permission for Mark to take his oath for
about three (3) years now should be enough penalty. It is time to move on. At this juncture it may be well to
note the Courts growing concern over the apparent laxity of law schools in the conduct of their pre-bar
review classes. It has been observed that the attendance of reviewees is not closely monitored, such that some
reviewees are able to comply with the requisite with minimal attendance. Enrollment and completion of prebar review course is an additional requirement under Rule 138 of the Rules of Court for those who failed the
bar examinations for three (3) or more times. For the Court to insist on strict compliance may be literally
asking for the moon but it can be done. The requirement is not an empty or idle ceremony; it is intended to
ensure the quality and preparedness of those applying for admission to the bar.
22

PRACTICE OF LAW
ALAN PAGUIA v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

GR. No. 176278, June 25, 2010
FACTS:
Petitioner, as a citizen and taxpayer filed an original action for the writ of certiorari to invalidate
PGMA's nomination of respondent former Chief Justice Davide, Jr. as Permanent Representative to the UN.
Petitioner argues that respondent Davides age at that time of his nomination, 70, disqualifies him from
holding his post. Petitioner grounds his argument on Section 23 of RA 7157 pegging the mandatory
retirement age of all officers and employees of the DFA at 65. Petitioner theorizes that Section 23 imposes an
absolute rule for all DFA employees, career or non-career; thus, respondent Davides entry into the DFA
ranks discriminates against the rest of the DFA officials and employees. Respondents raise threshold issues
against the petition. First, they question petitioners standing to bring this suit because of his indefinite
suspension from the practice of law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners standing to bring the suit is barred by his indefinite
suspension from the practice of law
HELD:
Yes. Petitioners suspension from the practice of law bars him from performing any activity, in or out
of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience.
Certainly, preparing a petition raising carefully crafted arguments on equal protection grounds and
employing highly legalistic rules of statutory construction to parse Section 23 of RA 7157 falls within the
proscribed conduct.
23

LAW STUDENT RULE
FERDINAND CRUZ
GR No. 154207
vs. ALBERTO MINA

April 27, 2007
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a formal Entry of Appearance as private prosecutor for a criminal case for Gave
Threats where his father, Mariano, is a complaining witness. Petitioner described himself as a third year law
student, justifies his appearance as private prosecutor on the bases of Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court that a non-lawyer may appear before the inferior courts as an agent or friend of a party litigant. The
petitioner furthermore avers that his appearance was with the prior conformity of the public prosecutor and a
written authority of Mariano Cruz appointing him to be his agent in the prosecution of the said criminal case.
MeTC denied the permission for the petitioner to appear on the ground that Circular No. 19 governing
limited law student practice in conjunction with Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court (Law Student Practice
Rule) should take precedence over the ruling of the Court laid down in Cantimbuhan; and set the case for
continuation of trial. petitioner filed before the RTC a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with Prayer for
Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order against the private respondent and the public
respondent MeTC. RTC denied the issuance of the injunctive writ on the ground that the crime of Grave
Threats, the subject of Criminal Case No. 00-1705, is one that can be prosecuted de oficio, there being no
claim for civil indemnity, and that therefore, the intervention of a private prosecutor is not legally tenable.
Petitioner filed an MR but was denied.
ISSUE: (1.) Whether or not a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a
party litigant
(2.) Whether or not the case filed has no civil aspect which prevents the private prosecutor to
intervene.
HELD:
(1.) Yes. The court a quo must have been confused by the fact that petitioner referred to himself as a law
student in his entry of appearance. Rule 138-A should not have been used by the courts a quo in denying
permission to act as private prosecutor against petitioner for the simple reason that Rule 138-A is not the
basis for the petitioners appearance. Section 34, Rule 138 is clear that appearance before the inferior courts
by a non-lawyer is allowed, irrespective of whether or not he is a law student. As succinctly clarified in Bar
Matter No. 730, by virtue of Section 34, Rule 138, a law student may appear, as an agent or a friend of a
party litigant, without the supervision of a lawyer before inferior courts.
(2.) No. The basic rule applies in the instant case, such that when a criminal action is instituted, the civil
action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with
criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately
or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. There being no reservation, waiver, nor prior
institution of the civil aspect, it follows that the civil aspect arising from Grave Threats is deemed instituted
with the criminal action, and, hence, the private prosecutor may rightfully intervene to prosecute the civil
aspect.
24
LAW STUDENT RULE

BAR MATTER NO. 730 June 13, 1997
FACTS
Mr. Cornelio Carmona, Jr., an intern at the Office of Legal Aid, UP-College of Law (UP-OLA)
represented the plaintiff in the civil case No. BCV-92-11. He conducted hearings and completed the
presentation of the plaintiff's evidence without the presence of a supervising lawyer. Justice Barredo
questioned the appearance of Mr. Carmona during the hearing because the latter was not accompanied by a
duly accredited lawyer. Presiding Judge Edelwina Pastoral issued an Order requiring Mr. Carmona to be
accompanied by a supervising lawyer on the next hearing. In compliance with said Order, UP-OLA and the
Secretary of Justice executed a Memorandum of Agreement directing Atty. Catubao and Atty. Legayada of
the Public Attorney's Office to supervise Mr. Carmona during the subsequent hearings. UP-OLA, on the
other hand submits that "the matter of allowing a law intern to appear unaccompanied by a duly accredited
supervising lawyer should be . . . left to the sound discretion of the court after having made at least one
supervised appearance."
ISSUE:
Whether a law student who appears before the court under the Law Student Practice Rule (Rule
138-A) should be accompanied by a member of the bar during the trial.
HELD:
Yes. A law student appearing before the Regional Trial Court under Rule 138-A should at all times
be accompanied by a supervising lawyer. Section 2 of Rule 138-A provides.
Section 2. Appearance. The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule, shall be under the
direct supervision and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by the
law school. Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be signed the
by supervising attorney for and in behalf of the legal clinic.
The phrase "direct supervision and control" requires no less than the physical presence of the
supervising lawyer during the hearing. . The rule must be strictly construed because public policy demands
that legal work should be entrusted only to those who possess tested qualifications, are sworn to observe the
rules and ethics of the legal profession and subject to judicial disciplinary control. In said in Bulacan v.
Torcino, the court said For relatively simple litigation before municipal courts, the Rules still allow a more
educated or capable person in behalf of a litigant who cannot get a lawyer. But for the protection of the
parties and in the interest of justice, the requirement for appearances in regional trial courts and higher courts
is more stringent.
ANTALAN, Carlo Mayo P.
25
LAW STUDENT RULE

IMELDA Y. MADERADA vs Judge ERNESTO H. MEDIODEA
A.M. No. MTJ-02-1459. October 14, 2003
FACTS
Imelda Y. Maderada, a clerk of court, fied a complaint against Judge Ernesto H. Mediodea . In the
Complaint, the judge was charged with gross ignorance of the law amounting to grave misconduct for failing
to observe and apply the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure in Civil Case No. 252. Prior to the said case,
Maderada filed an action for forcible entry with a prayer for preliminary injunction, temporary restraining
order (TRO) and damages where respondent Judge was designated to hear and try the case. Maderada filed a
petition for Inhibition of Judge Mediodea after the three motions of the Maderada praying for a judgment be
rendered were denied by Judge Mediodea. Maderada in the said case appeared as counsel for herself and her
co-plaintiff.
However, the Office of the Court Administrator recommended, along with a recommendation that
the Judge be fined, that complainant Maderada be also fined in the amount of P1,000 for appearing as
counsel without authority from this Court, with a stern warning that any similar infraction in the future would
be dealt with more severely. According to the OCA, officials and employees of the judiciary must devote
their full time to government service to ensure the efficient and speedy administration of justice. Although
they are not absolutely prohibited from engaging in a vocation or a profession, they should do so only with
prior approval of this Court. The OCA added that engaging in any private business, vocation or profession
without prior approval of the Court is tantamount to moonlighting, which amounts to malfeasance in office.
ISSUE: Whether Maderada can appear as counsel for herself and her co-plaintiffs.
HELD
Complainant was not customarily or habitually holding herself out to the public as a lawyer. Neither
was she demanding payment for such services. Hence, she cannot be said to be in the practice of law. . The
right of complainant to litigate her case personally cannot be taken away from her. Her being an employee of
the judiciary does not remove from her the right to proceedings inpropria persona or to selfrepresentation. However, it was also clearly established that complainant had appeared on behalf of her coplaintiff in the case below, for which act the former cannot be completely exonerated. Representing oneself
is different from appearing on behalf of someone else.
The raison detre for allowing litigants to represent themselves in court will not apply when a person is
already appearing for another party. Obviously, because she was already defending the rights of another
person when she appeared for her co-plaintiff, it cannot be argued that complainant was merely protecting
her rights. That their rights may be interrelated will not give complainant authority to appear in court. The
undeniable fact remains that she and her co-plaintiff are two distinct individuals. The former may be
impairing the efficiency of public service once she appears for the latter without permission from this Court.
26
LAW STUDENT RULE

VICTORIANO BULACAN vs FAUSTINO TORCINO and FELIPA TORCINO
G.R. No. L-44388 January 30, 1985
FACTS
A complaint for forcible entry and damages with preliminary mandatory injunction was filed with
the Municipal Court of Baybay, Leyte by Victoriano Bulacan against Faustino Torcino and Felipa Torcino.
The complaint was signed by Nicolas Nues, Jr., "Friend counsel for the Plaintiff". Due to the failure of the
parties to settle their case amicably, the court rendered a decision ordering the Torcinos to demolish and
remove the portion of their house which was illegally constructed on the land of the plaintiff. The Torcinos
appealed the decision to the Court of First Instance of Leyte.
On September 18, 1973, the appellants Torcinos filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the
ground that the complaint was not signed by the plaintiff or by an admitted attorney, and therefore must be
considered as sham and false. The Court of First Instance of Leyte denied the motion to dismiss. A motion
for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals sustained the decision on the ground
that no testimonial or oral evidence was presented by the parties and, therefore, no factual matters are in
issue in the appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether a non-member of the BAR, a friend of the plaintiff, can be designated to prepare and sign
a complaint for the plaintiff.
HELD
Yes. Under the facts of this case the applicable provision is Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court which states:
SEC. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. In the Court of a municipality a party may conduct his
litigation in person with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an
attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney and his
appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
The Rules are clear. In municipal courts, the litigant may be assisted by a friend, agent, or an
attorney. However, in cases before the regional trial court, the litigant must be aided by a duly authorized
member of the bar. The rule invoked by the Torcinos, invoke Section 5, Rule 7, applies only to cases filed
with the regional trial court and not to cases before a municipal court. In the case before us, the complaint
was verified by the party litigant himself. In the verification, the plaintiff specifically stated that he had
caused Mr. Nues to conduct the litigation and to sign the complaint in Ms behalf, indicating his awareness
that Nues in not a registered lawyer. There is, therefore, added justification for the pleading to be admitted
rather than dismissed.
27
LAW STUDENT RULE

ROMULO CANTIMBUHAN et al. vs HON. NICANOR J. CRUZ et al.
G.R. No. L-51813-14 November 29, 1983
FACTS
In the criminal cases (less serious physical injuries) People of the Philippines vs. Danilo San
AntonioPeople of the Philippines vs. Rodolfo Diaz, Petitioners Nelson B. Malana and Robert V. Lucila,
senior law students of the U.P.assistance to the needy clients in the Office of the Legal Aid filed their
separate appearances, as friends of complainant-petitioner Cantimbuhan. . Herein respondent Fiscal
Leodegario C. Quilatan opposed the appearances of said petitioners, and respondent judge Cruz of then
Municipal Court of Paraaque, Metro Manila, in an Order, sustained the respondent fiscal and disallowed the
appearances of petitioners Malana and Lucila, as private prosecutors in said criminal cases. Likewise,
respondent Judge issued an order denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition
for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with prayers, among others, that the Orders of respondent judge, be
set aside as they are in plain violation of Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and/or were issued with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. On the other hand, respondents invoked sections
4 and 15 Rule 110 of the Rules of Court. They contend that the exercise by the offended party to intervene is
subject to the direction and control of the fiscal and that his appearance, no less than his active conduct of the
case later on, requires the prior approval of the fiscal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not law students can appear and represent complainants in a criminal case before the
Municipal Trial Court.
HELD
Yes. We find merit in the petition. Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, clearly provides that
in the municipal court a party may conduct his litigation in person with the aid of an agent appointed by him
for the purpose. In Laput vs. Bernabe, a law student was allowed to represent the accused in a case pending
before the then Municipal Court, the City Court of Manila, who was charged for damages to property
through reckless imprudence. "It is accordingly our view that error was committed in the municipal court in
not allowing Crispiniano V. Laput to act as an agent or friend of Catalino Salas to aid the latter in conducting
his defense." The permission of the fiscal is not necessary for one to enter his appearance as private
prosecutor. In the first place, the law does not impose this condition. What the fiscal can do, if he wants to
handle the case personally is to disallow the private prosecutor's participation, whether he be a lawyer or not,
in the trial of the case
In the two criminal cases filed before the Municipal Court of Paraaque, Petitioner Cantimbuhan did
not expressly waive the civil action nor reserve his right to institute it separately thus he has personal interest
in the success of the civil action and, in the prosecution of the same, he cannot be deprived of his right to be
assisted by a friend who is not a lawyer.
28

SOLICITATION OF LEGAL SERVICES
LINSANGAN vs. ATTY TOLENTINO

AC NO.6672, SEPTEMBER 4, 2004
FACTS
Pedro Linsangan filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation
of clients and encroachment of professional services. Linsangan alleged that Atty.Tolentino, with the help of
paralegal Fe Marie Labiano, convinced and induced his clients to transfer legal representation by promising
them financial assistance and expeditious collection on their claims. To support his allegations, he presented
the sworn affidavit of James Gregorio attesting that Labiano tried to prevail upon him to sever his lawyerclient relations with complainant and utilize respondent's services instead, in exchange for a loan of P50,000
and attached "respondent's" calling card with a note stating with Financial Assistance.
Atty. Tolentino, in his defense, denied knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing and circulation of the
said calling card.
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) found that
respondent had encroached on the professional practice of complainant, violating Rule 8.02 and contravened
the rule against soliciting cases for gain, personally or through paid agents or brokers as stated in Section 27,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Hence, the CBD recommended that respondent be reprimanded with a stern
warning that any repetition would merit a heavier penalty.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty.Tolentino intruded the complainant's professional practice in violation of Rule
8.02 of the CPR and the means employed by respondent in furtherance of the said misconduct
themselves constituted distinct violations of ethical rules.
HELD
Yes. It is well-settled that a lawyer should not steal another lawyer's client nor induce the latter to
retain him by a promise of better service, good result or reduced fees for his services. Respondent committed
an unethical, predatory overstep into another's legal practice. He cannot escape liability under Rule 8.02 of
the CPR. Moreover, complainant presented substantial to prove that respondent indeed solicited legal
business as well as profited from referrals' suits. Through Labiano's actions, respondent's law practice was
benefited. By engaging in a money-lending venture with his clients as borrowers, respondent violated Rule
16.04. The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The only exception is, when in the interest
of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses (such as filing fees, stenographer's fees for transcript of
stenographic notes, cash bond or premium for surety bond, etc.) for a matter that he is handling for the
client.Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited employment violating Rule 2.03, and Rule 1.03,
Rule 16.04 and Canon 3 of the CPR and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Tolentino was
hereby suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year and he was sternly warned that a
repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
BACAY, Princess Mclaine E.
29

ATTY. KHAN, JR. vs. ATTY. SIMBILLO

AC NO. 5299, AUGUST 19, 2003
FACTS
This administrative complaint arose from a paid advertisement that appeared in the July 5, 2000
issue of the newspaper, Philippine Daily Inquirer, which reads: "ANNULMENT' OF MARRIAGE Specialist
532-4333/521-2667." Further research by the Office of the Court Administrator and the Public Information
Office revealed that similar advertisements were published in the August 2 and 6, 2000 issues of the Manila
Bulletin and August 5, 2000 issue of The Philippine Star. Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., in his capacity as
Assistant Court Administrator and Chief of the Public Information Office, filed an administrative complaint
against Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo for improper advertising and solicitation of his legal services. In his
answer, Simbillo admitted the acts imputed to him, but argued that advertising and solicitation per se are not
prohibited acts.
IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found Atty. Simbillo guilty of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court, and suspended him from
the practice of law for one (1) year with the warning that a repetition of similar acts would be dealt with more
severely. Atty. Simbillo filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied.
ISSUE
Whether or not Atty. Simbillo committed improper advertising and solicitation of his legal
services.
HELD
Yes. What adds to the gravity of respondent's acts is that in advertising himself as a self-styled
"Annulment of Marriage Specialist," he wittingly or unwittingly erodes and undermines not only the stability
but also the sanctity of an institution still considered sacrosanct despite the contemporary climate of
permissiveness in our society. Indeed, in assuring prospective clients that an annulment may be obtained in
four to six months from the time of the filing of the case, he in fact encourages people, who might have
otherwise been disinclined and would have refrained from dissolving their marriage bonds, to do so.The
solicitation of legal business is not altogether proscribed. However, for solicitation to be proper, it must be
compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. If it is made in a modest and decorous manner, it would
bring no injury to the lawyer and to the bar. Even the use of calling cards is now acceptable. Publication in
reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by the canon, of brief
biographical and informative data is likewise allowable. Atty. Simbillo was found guilty in violation of Rules
2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court and
he was SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR effective upon receipt of the Resolution
and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
30

FABILLO vs. IAC

GR. NO. L-68838, MARCH 11, 1991
FACTS
In the last will and testament of Justina Fabillo, she bequeathed to her brother, Florencio, a house and lot in
San Salvador Street, Palo, Leyte and to her husband, Gregorio D. Brioso, a piece of land in Pugahanay, Palo,
Leyte. After Justina's death, Florencio filed a petition for the probate of said will. The probate court approved
the project of partition "with the reservation that the ownership of the land and the house erected thereon be
litigated and determined in a separate proceedings."Florencio sought the assistance of Atty. Murillo in
recovering the San Salvador property. A contract was entered into between them stating that for and in
consideration for his legal services, in the two cases, Atty. Murillo will be paid,in case of success in any or
both cases, the sum equivalent to forty per centum (40%). Pursuant to said contract, Murillo filed for the case
against Gregorio D. Brioso to recover the San Salvador property. The case was terminated when the court,
upon a compromise agreement, declared Florencio Fabillo as the lawful owner not only of the San Salvador
property but also the Pugahanay parcel of land. Murillo proceeded to implement the contract of services
between him and Fabillo by taking possession and exercising rights of ownership over 40% of said
properties. He installed a tenant in the Pugahanay property. Later on, Fabilo claimed exclusive right over the
properties and refused to give Murillo his share of their produce. Murillo then filed a complant for
ownership, damages and appointment of a receiver against Fabillo. In his answer, the Fabillo stated that the
consent to the contract of services of the Fabillo spouses was vitiated by old age and ailment. The lower
court ruled that that there was insufficient evidence to prove that the Fabillo spouses' consent to the contract
was vitiated. The court also declared Murillo to be the lawful owner of 40% of both the San Salvador and
Pugahanay properties and the improvements thereon and pay P2 450.00 as net produced. On appeal,
Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed in toto the decision of the lower court.
ISSUE Whether or not the contract of services violate Article 1491 of the Civil Code.
HELD
No. Article 1491 of the Civil Code, prohibits lawyers from acquiring by purchase even at a public or
judicial auction, properties and rights which are the objects of litigation in which they may take part by virtue
of their profession. The said prohibition, however, applies only if the sale or assignment of the property takes
place during the pendency of the litigation involving the client's property. Hence, a contract between a
lawyer and his client stipulating a contingent fee is not covered by said prohibition under Article 1491 (5) of
the Civil Code because the payment of said fee is not made during the pendency of the litigation but only
after judgment has been rendered in the case handled by the lawyer. As long as the lawyer does not exert
undue influence on his client, that no fraud is committed or imposition applied, or that the compensation is
clearly not excessive as to amount to extortion, a contract for contingent fee is valid and enforceable.
31

YU vs. BONDAL
AC NO. 5534
January 17, 2005
FACTS
Yu filed a complaint against Atty Bondal for gross negligence and violation of Canon 16 and Rule
16.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility arising from his alleged failure to attend to the five cases
she referred to him and to return, the amount of P51,716.54 she has paid him. In the Retainer Agreement, Yu
agreed to pay respondent the amount of P200,000.00 as Acceptance Fee for the five cases, with an
Appearance Fee of P1,500.00 pesos per hearing; and in the event that damages are recovered, she would pay
respondent 10% thereof as success fee. Yu alleged that Atty Bondal failed to file a case against Swire Realty
and Development Corp; due to respondent's negligence, the case for estafa against Lourdes Fresnoza Boon
was dismissed and was not timely appealed to the Department of Justice; respondent negligently failed to
inform complainant, before she left for abroad, to leave the necessary documents for purposes of the
preliminary investigation of the case filed against Julie Teh which case was eventually dismissed and
respondent compelled her to settle the two cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 against San Juan and Chan Ong
under unfair and unreasonable terms. Yu demanded from Atty. Bondal the return of all the records she had
entrusted him bearing on the subject cases but the latter returned only the records bearing on the estafa case
against Boon and the B.P. Blg. 22 case against San Juan. The Office of the Bar Confidant recommends the
dismissal of the complaint for failure of complainant to substantiate it. From the records, it is culled that
except for the case against Swire Development Corporation, the other 4 cases referred by complainant to
respondent were filed in court but were dismissed or terminated for causes not attributable to respondent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty Bondal committed gross negligence and violation of Canon 16 and Rule
16.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
HELD
No. The Court finds well taken the finding of the Office of the Bar Confidant that complainant failed
to establish the guilt of respondent by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof. The charges against him must
thus be dismissed. Yu still owes respondent more, as respondent rendered his legal services in 4 out of the 5
cases. An acceptance fee is not a contingent fee, but is an absolute fee arrangement which entitles a lawyer to
get paid for his efforts regardless of the outcome of the litigation. That complainant was dissatisfied with the
outcome of the four cases does not render void the above retainer agreement for respondent appears to have
represented the interest of complainant. Litigants need to be reminded that lawyers, are not demi-gods or
"magicians" who can always win their cases for their clients no matter the utter lack of merit of the same or
how passionate the litigants may feel about their cause. However, since respondent had been advised by
complainant through counsel, that she intended to terminate his services, as of said date, he was obliged,
under Rule 22.02 of the CPR to immediately turn over all papers and property which complainant entrusted
to his successor.
BELLEN, Martin David B.
32

PEOPLE vs. GONZALEZ, JR.

G.R. No. 139542
June 10, 2003
FACTS:
A resolution of the Supreme Court dated June 10, 2003 was quoted under G.R. No. 139542 (People
Of The Philippines vs. Inocencio Gonzalez, Jr.). It refers to the Motion filed by Pastelero Law office seeking
to clarify whether the firm of Velasquez, Rodriguez, Respicio, Ramos, Nidea, and Prado, counsel for the
private complainant-appellee, may call itself A law Firm of St. Thomas More and Associate Members. In
the Motion for Clarification, movant asks: If lawyers and law firms are allowed to call themselves the law
firm of St. Thomas More, what will prevent other lawyers and law firms from claiming they are the law firm
of St. Josemaria Escriva who was also a lawyer and recently canonized, or the law firm of St. Peter and Paul,
or even the law firm of Jesus Christ himself? Directed to comment, the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC)
invokes, Rule 3.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states that in the choice of a firm name,
no false, misleading or assumed name shall be used.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the name of the lawyers The Law Firm of St. Thomas More and Associate
Members is misleading.
HELD:
The Supreme Court (SC) agrees with the OBC. Rule 3.02 is clear. No name not belonging to any of
the partners or associates may be used in the firm name for any purpose. In one case (Dacanay vs. Baker &
Mckenzie, Adm. Case No. 2131, May 10, 1985, 136 SCRA 349), the SC has ruled that the use of the firm
name of a foreign law firm is unethical because that firm is not authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.
In this case, The Law Firm of St. Thomas More and Associate Members is not a law firm in this
jurisdiction or even in any other jurisdiction. A St. Thomas More and Associates or STMA is in fact the
socio-political ministry or the couples for Christ, a Christian family-renewal community. As pointed out by
the OBC: To appellate to the name of the lawyers The Law Firm of St. Thomas More and Associate
Members indeed appears misleading. It implies that St. Thomas More is a Law Firm when in fact it is not it
would also convey to the public the impression that the lawyers are members of the law firm which does not
exist. To the public, it would seem that the purpose or intention of adding The Law Firm of St. Thomas
More and Associates Members is to bask in the name of a Saint, although that may not really, be the
purpose or intention of the lawyers. The appellation only tends to confuse the public and in a way demean
both the saints and the legal profession whose members must depend on their own name and record and
merit and not on the name/glory of other persons living or dead.
33

No. 80-1431
IN RE R.M.J.
January 25, 1982
FACTS:
Rule 4 of the Missouri Supreme Court, regulating advertising by lawyers, states that a lawyer may
include 10 categories of information in a published advertisement: name, address and telephone number;
areas of practice; date and place of birth; schools attended; foreign language ability; office hours; fee for an
initial consultation; availability of a schedule of fees; credit arrangements; and the fixed fee to be charged for
certain "routine" legal services. Although the Rule does not state explicitly that these 10 categories of
information are the only information that will be permitted, that is the interpretation given the Rule by the
State Supreme Court and appellee Advisory Committee, which is charged with its enforcement. An
addendum to the Rule specifies two ways in which areas of practice may be listed in an advertisement, under
one of which the lawyer may use one or more of a list of 23 areas of practice, but may not deviate from the
precise wording stated in the Rule to describe these areas. In addition, the Rule permits a lawyer to send
professional announcement cards announcing a change of address or firm name, or similar matters, but only
to "lawyers, clients, former clients, personal friends, and relatives." An information was filed in the Missouri
Supreme Court by appellee Advisory Committee, charging appellant, a practicing lawyer in St. Louis, Mo.,
with violations of Rule 4. The information charged that appellant published advertisements which listed areas
of practice in language other than that specified in the Rule and which listed the courts in which appellant
was admitted to practice although this information was not included among the 10 categories of information
authorized by the Rule. In addition, the information charged that appellant had mailed announcement cards to
persons other than those permitted by the Rule. Appellant claimed that each of the restrictions upon
advertising was unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, but the Missouri Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of Rule 4 and issued a private reprimand.
ISSUE:
Whether certain aspects of the revised ethical rules of the Supreme Court of Missouri
regulating lawyer advertising conform to the requirements of the Court's decision in Bates
vs. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U. S. 350 (1977).
HELD:
None of the restrictions in question upon appellant's First Amendment rights can be sustained in the
circumstances of this case.
(a) Although the States retain the ability to regulate commercial speech, such as lawyer advertising
that is inherently misleading or that has proved to be misleading in practice, the First and Fourteenth
Amendments require that they do so with care and in a manner no more extensive than reasonably necessary
to further substantial interests.
(b) Because the listing published by appellant -- e.g., "real estate" instead of "property law" as
specified by Rule 4, and "contracts" and "securities," which were not included in the Rule's listing -- has not
been shown to be misleading, and appellee suggests no substantial interest promoted by the restriction, the
portion of Rule 4 specifying the areas of practice that may be listed is an invalid restriction upon speech as
applied to appellant's advertisements.
(c) Nor has appellee identified any substantial interest in prohibiting a lawyer from identifying the
jurisdictions in which he is licensed to practice. Such information is not misleading on its face. That
34

appellant was licensed to practice in both Illinois and Missouri is factual and highly relevant information,
particularly in light of the geography of the region in which he practices. While listing the relatively
uninformative fact that he is a member of the United States Supreme Court Bar could be misleading, there
was no finding to this effect by the Missouri Supreme Court, there is nothing in the record to indicate it was
misleading, and the Rule does not specifically identify it as potentially misleading.
(d) With respect to the restriction on announcement cards, while mailings may be more difficult to
supervise, there is no indication in the record that an inability to supervise is the reason the State restricts the
potential audience of the cards. Nor is it clear that an absolute prohibition is the only solution, and there is no
indication of a failed effort to proceed along a less restrictive path.
35

SAMONTE
A.M. No. P-99-1292
vs.
ATTY. GATDULA
February 26, 1999
FACTS:
The complaint filed by Julieta Borromeo Samonte charges Rolando R. Gatdula, RTC, Branch 220,
Quezon City with grave misconduct consisting in the alleged engaging in the private practice of law which is
in conflict with his official functions as Branch Clerk of Court. Complainant alleges that she is the authorized
representative of her sister Flor Borromeo de Leon, the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 37-14552 for ejectment
filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 37. A typographical error was committed in
the complaint which stated that the address of defendant is No. 63-C instead of 63-B, P. Tuazon Blvd.,
Cubao, Quezon City. The mistake was rectified by the filing of an amended complaint which was admitted
by the Court. A decision was rendered in favor of the plaintiff who subsequently filed a motion for
execution. Complainant however, was surprised to receive a temporary restraining order signed by Judge
Prudencio Castillo of Branch 220, RTC, Quezon City, where Atty. Rolando Gatdula is the Branch Clerk of
Court, enjoining the execution of the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court. Complainant alleges that the
issuance of the temporary restraining order was hasty and irregular as she was never notified of the
application for preliminary injunction. Complainant further alleges that when she went to Branch 220, RTC,
Quezon City, to inquire about the reason for the issuance of the temporary restraining order, respondent Atty.
Rolando Gatdula, blamed her lawyer for writing the wrong address in the complaint for ejectment and told
her that if she wanted the execution to proceed, she should change her lawyer and retain the law office of
respondent at the same time giving his calling card with the name "Baligod, Gatdula, Tacardon, Dimailig and
Celera" with office at Rm. 220 Mariwasa Bldg., 717 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City; otherwise she will
not be able to eject the defendant Dave Knope. Complainant told respondent that she could not decide
because she was only representing her sister. To her consternation, the RTC Branch 220 issued an order
granting the preliminary injunction as threatened by respondent despite the fact that the MTC, Branch 37 had
issued an Order directing the execution of the Decision in Civil Case No. 37-14552. The case was referred to
Executive Judge Estrella Estrada, RTC, Quezon City, for investigation, report and recommendation. The
investigating judge made some findings based on the record of the administrative case and recommended that
Atty. Gatdula be admonished and censured for the minor infraction he has committed.
ISSUE:
Whether the name of Atty. Gatdula, appearing on the calling card, gives the impression that
he is connected with the law firm and constitutes an act of solicitation and private practice
which is declared unlawful under Republic Act No. 6713
HELD:
The Supreme Court (SC) agreed with the investigating judge that the respondent is guilty of an
infraction. The complainant by her failure to appear at the hearings, failed to substantiate her allegation that it
was the respondent who gave her the calling card of "Baligod, Gatdula, Tacardon, Dimailig and Celera Law
Offices" and that he tried to convince her to change counsels. The SC found however, that while the
respondent vehemently denies the complainant's allegations, he does not deny that his name appears on the
calling card attached to the complaint which admittedly came into the hands of the complainant. Respondent
does not claim that the calling card was printed without his knowledge or consent and the calling card carries
his name primarily and the name of "Baligod, Gatdula, Tacardon,
36

Dimailig and Celera with address at 220 Mariwasa Bldg., 717 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City" in the left
comer. The card clearly gives the impression that he is connected with the said law firm. The
inclusion/retention of his name in the professional card constitutes an act of solicitation which violates
Section 7 sub-par. (b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as "Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees" which declares it unlawful for a public official or employee
to, among others:
"(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided
that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with official functions." Time and again the SC has said
that the conduct and behavior of every one connected with an office charged with the dispensation of justice,
from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk. should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of
responsibility. His conduct, at all times must not only be characterized by proprietor and decorum but above
all else must be above suspicion.
37

DACANAY vs. BAKER & MCKENZIE

A.C. No. 2131 May 10, 1985
FACTS:
In November 1979, Atty. Vicente Torres sent a letter to one Rosie Clurman, represented by Atty.
Adriano Dacanay, asking Clurman to release some shares to Torres client. The letterhead contained the
name Baker & McKenzie. Dacanay denied Clurmans liability and at the same time he asked why is Torres
using the letterhead Baker & McKenzie, a foreign partnership established in Chicago, Illinois. No reply
was received so Dacanay filed an administrative complaint enjoining Torres from using Baker &
McKenzie. Later, Torres said that he is an associate of the law firm Guerrero & Torres; that their law firm is
a member of Baker & McKenzie; that the said foreign firm has members in 30 cities all over the world; that
they associated with them in order to make a representation that they can render legal services of the highest
quality to multinational business enterprises and others engaged in foreign trade and investment.
ISSUE:
Whether respondents can make use of the firm name Baker & McKenzie.
HELD:
Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot practice law in the Philippines (Sec. 1, Rule 138,
Rules of Court). The respondents, members of the Philippine Bar and practicing under the firm name of
Guerrero & Torres, are members or associates of Baker & McKenzie. Respondents use of the firm name
constitutes a representation that they could render legal services of the higher quality to multinational
business enterprises and others engaged in foreign trade and investment. This is unethical, as Baker &
McKenzie is unauthorized to practice here.
38

THE DIRECTOR OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS

vs.
ESTANISLAO R. BAYOT
A.C. No. L-1117
March 20, 1944
FACTS:
The respondent, who is an attorney-at-law, is charged with malpractice for having published an
advertisement in the Sunday Tribune of June 13, 1943, which reads as follows:
Marriage license promptly secured thru our assistance & the annoyance of delay
or publicity avoided if desired, and marriage arranged to wishes of parties.
Consultation on any matter free for the poor. Everything confidential.
Legal assistance service
12 Escolta, Manila, Room, 105
Tel. 2-41-60.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not such act was unethical

(2) Whether or not respondent was only reprimanded
HELD:
(1) The Supreme Court held in the affirmative.
It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the respondent of
the ethics of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from the public. Section 25
of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for
the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is
highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares.
Law is a profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops
to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them to the
public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the
money-changers of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. "The most worth and effective
advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, . . . is the establishment of a well-merited
reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the
outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.)
(2) The Supreme Court held in the affirmative.
Considering his plea for leniency and his promise not to repeat the misconduct, the Court is of the
opinion and so decided that the respondent should be, as he hereby is, reprimanded.
CACAPIT, Lian Marco S.
39

IN RE: LUIS B. TAGORDA

53 PHIL 37
(1929)
FACTS:
The respondent, Luis B. Tagorda, a practicing attorney and a member of the provincial board of
Isabela, admits that previous to the last general elections he made use of a card written in Spanish and
Ilocano, which, in translation, reads as follows:
LUIS B. TAGORDA
Attorney
Notary Public
CANDIDATE FOR THIRD MEMBER
Province of Isabela
(NOTE. As notary public, he can execute for you a deed of sale for the purchase of land as required by the
cadastral office; can renew lost documents of your animals; can make your application and final requisites
for your homestead; and can execute any kind of affidavit. As a lawyer, he can help you collect your loans
although long overdue, as well as any complaint for or against you. Come or write to him in his town,
Echague, Isabela. He offers free consultation, and is willing to help and serve the poor.)
The respondent further admits that he is the author of a letter addressed to a lieutenant of barrio in his
home municipality written in Ilocano, which letter, in essence informs the recipient to acknowledge him to as
a residence of Echague when in fact the former is from Ilagan in order to practice his profession therein. And
other acts which constitute soliciting cases for the purpose of gain.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not respondents acts were unethical

(2) Whether or not respondent was suspended
HELD:
(1) Yes. The facts being conceded, it is next in order to write down the applicable legal provisions.
Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure as originally conceived related to disbarments of members of the
bar. In 1919 at the instigation of the Philippine Bar Association, said codal section was amended by Act No.
2828 by adding at the end thereof the following: "The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice."
The statute as amended conforms in principle to the Canons of Professionals Ethics adopted by the
American Bar Association in 1908 and by the Philippine Bar Association in 1917. Canons 27 Advertising,
Direct or Indirect and 28 Stirring up Litigation directly or through agents of the Code of Ethics.
Common barratry consisting of frequently stirring up suits and quarrels between individuals was a
crime at the common law, and one of the penalties for this offense when committed by an attorney was
disbarment. Statutes intended to reach the same evil have been provided in a number of jurisdictions usually
at the instance of the bar itself, and have been upheld as constitutional. The reason behind statutes of this
type is not difficult to discover. The law is a profession and not a business. The lawyer may not seek or
obtain employment by himself or through others for to do so would be unprofessional. (State vs. Rossman )
(2) Yes. view of all the circumstances of this case, the judgment of the court is that the respondent Luis B.
Tagorda be and is hereby suspended from the practice as an attorney-at-law for the period of one month from
April 1, 1929.
40

ULEP
vs.
223 SCRA 378
LEGAL CLINIC
(1993)
FACTS:
The petitioner contends that the advertisements reproduced by the respondents are champertous,
unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community in the
integrity of the members of the bar and that, to which as a member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and
offended by the following advertisements:
Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.
THE Please call:521-0767,
LEGAL 5217232,5222041
CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am-6:00 pm
7-Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Mla.
Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE
DON PARKINSON
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning
Monday to Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special
Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil.
US/Force Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.
THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave.,
LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy
CLINIC, INC. Tel. 521-7232; 521-7251;
522-2041; 521-0767
ISSUE:
(1.) Whether or not The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law;
(2.)Whether or not its advertisement may be allowed
HELD:
Yes, The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law however, such practice is not allowed. The
Legal Clinic is composed mainly of paralegals. Under Philippine jurisdiction however, the services being
offered by Legal Clinic which constitute practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a person
duly admitted as a member of the bar and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.
Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and
objective information or statement of facts. The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyers
41

advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession, advertise his
talents or skills as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. Further, the advertisements of
Legal Clinic seem to promote divorce, secret marriage, bigamous marriage, and other circumventions of law
which their experts can facilitate. Such is highly reprehensible.
The Supreme Court also noted which forms of advertisement are allowed. The best advertising
possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must
be earned as the outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the
community has a way of publicizing itself and catching public attention. That publicity is a normal byproduct of effective service which is right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial
stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between a normal by-product
of able service and the unwholesome result of propaganda. The Supreme Court also enumerated the
following as allowed forms of advertisement: advertisement in a reputable law list, use of ordinary simple
professional card, listing in a phone directory but without designation as to his specialization.
42

U.S. vs. NEY AND BOSQUE

8 PHIL., 146
FACTS:
This case involves two lawyers, an American, C.W. Ney, and a Spaniard, Juan Garcia Bosque, who
sent out a circular, signed "Ney and Bosque", stating that they had established an office for the general
practice of law in all courts of the Islands and that Bosque would devote himself especially to consultation
and office work relating to Spanish Law. Both were accused of contempt of court.
ISSUE:
Should either of these defendants be thus punished for contempt
Section 232 of the Code of Civil Procedure describes contempt as follows:
1. Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment, or command of a court, or
injunction granted by a court or judge;chanrobles virtual law library
2. Misbehavior of an officer of the court in the performance of his official duties or in his official
transactions.
HELD:
Both were convicted as charged, although upon different grounds.
As regards the Spaniard, it was held that a former order of this Court denying his admission to the practice of
in the Philippines, on account of alienage, "was directly binding upon him;" that the aforementioned circular
"amounted to an assertation of his right and purpose" to engage in such practice of law; and that
"consequently the conduct of the defendant Bosque amounts to disobedience of an order made in a
proceeding to which he was a party."
As regards Ney, he was found guilty of "misbehaviour" committed by "an officer of the court.
43

ATTORNEYS FEES AND COMPENSATION
PINEDA vs. ATTY. DE JESUS ET AL.

GR No. 155224
August 23, 2006
FACTS
Petitioner Vinson Pineda engaged the services of respondents Attys. Clodualdo de Jesus, Carlos
Ambrosio and Emmanuel Mariano as his counsel for the declaration of nullity of his marriage. Throughout
the proceedings, respondent counsels were well-compensated. They, including their relatives and friends,
even availed of free products and treatments from petitioners dermatology clinic. This notwithstanding, they
billed petitioner additional legal fees amounting to P16.5 millions which the latter, however, refused to
pay. Instead, petitioner issued them several checks totaling P1.12 million as full payment for settlement. Still
not satisfied, respondents filed in the same trial court a motion for payment of lawyers fees for P50 million.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondents were entitled to additional legal fees.
HELD
No. Rule 20.4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility advises lawyers to avoid
controversies with clients concerning their compensation and to resort to judicial action only to prevent
imposition, injustice or fraud. Suits to collect fees should be avoided and should be filed only when
circumstances force lawyers to resort to it. The practice of law is a decent profession and not a moneymaking trade. Compensation should be but a mere incident. Respondents claim for additional legal fees was
not justified. They could not charge petitioner a fee based on percentage, absent an express agreement to that
effect. The payments to them in cash, checks, free products and services from petitioners business all of
which were not denied by respondents more than sufficed for the work they did. The full payment for
settlement should have discharged petitioners obligation to them.
CAPISTRANO, Haidelyn Salosa
44

ROSARIO JUNIO vs. ATTY. SALVADOR M. GRUPO

AC No. 5020
December 18, 2001
FACTS
This is a complaint for disbarment filed against Atty. Salvador M. Grupo for malpractice and gross
misconduct.
Complainant Junio alleged that sometime in 1995, she engaged the services of respondent
Atty. Grupo, then a private practitioner, for the redemption of a parcel of land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 20394 registered in the name of her parents, spouses Rogelio and Rufina Nietes, and
located at Concepcion, Loay, Bohol. Complainant Junio also entrusted to respondent Atty. Grupo the amount
of P25,000.00 in cash to be used in the redemption of the aforesaid property. Notwithstanding the foregoing
and for no valid reason, respondent Atty. Grupo did not redeem the property; as a result of which the right of
redemption was lost and the property was eventually forfeited. Because of respondent Atty. Grupo failure to
redeem the property, complainant had demanded the return of the money which she entrusted to the former.
However, despite repeated demands made by the complainant and without justifiable cause, respondent has
continuously refused to refund the money entrusted to him. In his Answer, complainant Atty. Grupo alleged
that the subject land for which the money of complainant was initially intended to be applied could really not
be redeemed anymore. And so, when transaction failed, respondent requested the complainant that he be
allowed, in the meantime, to avail of the money because he had an urgent need for some money himself to
help defray his childrens educational expenses. It was really a personal request, a private matter between
respondent and complainant, thus, respondent executed a promissory note for the amount, a copy of which is
probably still in the possession of the complainant. Respondent also adds that the family of the complainant
and his family were very close and intimate with each other. His services were purely gratuitous; his acts
[were] on his own and by his own. It was more than pro bono; it was not even for charity; it was simply an
act of a friend for a friend. Hence, there was really no attorney-client relationship existing between
them. Complainant filed a reply denying that respondent informed her of his failure to redeem the property
and that respondent requested her to instead lend the money to him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Grupo violates Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which forbids lawyers from borrowing money from their clients unless the latters interests
are protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice
HELD
Yes. A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the clients interests are fully protected
by the nature of the case or by independent advice (Rule 16.04, Code of Professional Responsibility). This
rule is intended to prevent the lawyer from taking advantage of his influence over the client. To constitute
professional employment it is not essential that the client should have employed the attorney professionally
on any previous occasion. It is not necessary that any retainer should have been paid, promised, or charged
for; neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward undertake the case about which the
consultation was had. If a person, in respect to his business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults with his
attorney in his professional capacity with the view to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the
attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces in such consultation, then the professional employment must be
regarded as established. The Court finds petitioner guilty of violation of Rule 16.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and orders him suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) month
and to pay to respondent, within 30 days from notice, the amount of P25,000.00 with interest at the legal rate,
computed from December 12, 1996.
45

BENEDICTO LEVISTE vs. CA

GR No. L-29184
(1989)
FACTS
Petitioner Leviste, a practicing attorney, entered into a written agreement with the private respondent
Rosa del Rosario to appear as her counsel in a petition for probate of the holographic will of the late Maxima
C. Reselva. It was agreed that petitioner's contigent fee would be thirty-five per cent (35%) of the property
that Rosa may receive upon the probate of the will. In accordande to their agrrement, Leviste performed
several services such as (1) Thoroughly researched and studied the law on probate and succession; (2)
Looked for and interviewed witnesses, and took their affidavits; (3) Filed the petition for. probate is Special
Proceeding No. 58325; (4) Made the proper publications; and (5) Presented at the trial witnesses. However,
on August 20, 1965, Leviste received a letter from Ms. Del Rosario, informing him that she was terminating
his services as her counsel due to "conflicting interest." , Petitioner then filed a "Motion to Intervene to
Protect His Rights to Fees for Professional Services." The trial court denied his motion on the ground that he
had "not filed a claim for attorney's fees nor recorded his attorney's lien. Although the order denying his
motion to intervene had become final, petitioner continued to receive copies of the court's orders, as well the
pleadings of the other parties in the case. He also continued to file pleadings. Private respondents Del
Rosario and Rita Banu filed a "Motion To Withdraw Petition for Probate" which the trial court denied as
being contrary to public policy. Nonetheless, the court disallowed the will. The petitioner filed an appeal
bond, notice of appeal, and record on appeal. The private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on
the ground that petitioner was not a party in interest. the trial judge as well as the Court of Appeals dismissed
the appeal and denied petitioner's motion for substitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner Leviste who was engaged on a contingent fee basis may, in order
to collect his fees, has a right to accept for his client Del Rosario to the extent of 35% thereof
the devise in her favor (which she in effect repudiated) under Art. 1052 of the Civil Code
HELD:
No. Article 1052 of the Civil Code does not apply to this case. That legal provision protects the
creditor of a repudiating heir. Petitioner is not a creditor of Rosa del Rosario. The payment of his fees is
contingent and dependent upon the successful probate of the holographic will. Since the petition for probate
was dismissed by the lower court, the contingency did not occur. Attorney Leviste is not entitled to his fee.
Petitioner was not a party to the probate proceeding in the lower court. He had no direct interest in the
probate of the will. His only interest in the estate is an indirect interest as former counsel for a prospective
heir.
46

ARO vs NAAWA
G.R. No. L-24163, April 28, 1969
FACTS:
The services of Regino Aro, as practicing attorney, was engaged by respondents Luis Magtibay and
Pablo Magtibay for the prosecution of their claim, as heirs, in the estate of their deceased uncle Lucio
Magtibay, consisting of properties which were in the possession of the respondents Aurelia Martinez, spouses
Gregorio Lontok and Maria Mendoza and spouses Maximo Porto and Rosario Andaya. Without means to
prosecute their claim Luis and Pablo agreed to avail the services of Regino on a contingent basis secured by
an agreement contract. Petitioner took the necessary steps to gather the needed papers and documents for the
filing of a petition to litigate as pauper and a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Laguna. The petition
to litigate as pauper filed by herein petitioner for respondents Luis Magtibay and Pablo Magtibay was
granted by the respondent Judge. Thereafter, conversation took place between herein petitioner, the attorney
and the spokesman for the defendants for the amicable settlement of the case between the plaintiffs and the
defendants to the effect that a certain property of the spouses Magtibay (deceased) and respondent Aurelia
Martinez, worth P3,000.00, would be given to the plaintiffs in full settlement of their claim, as share in the
properties left by their deceased uncle, it having been agreed for the purpose of said amicable settlement, the
plaintiffs or one of them and herein petitioner would go to Sta. Maria, Laguna. However, Luis and Pablo
failed to show up in the office of Atty Regino and the latter sent a telegram to the spokesman of the
defendants cancelling the trip. A few days later, Regino received a copy of the order and a second motion to
dismiss together with a settlement and an extrajudicial partition made by Pablo, Luis and the other
respondents resulting to the deprivation of the contingent fee agreed upon in favor or Regino. He filed by
registered mail his "opposition to the second motion to dismiss and counter-motion or petition to set aside
deed of extrajudicial partition and waiver and to record attorney's lien The Judge denied the motion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Regino Aro is entitled to the contingent fee despite the amicable settlement
made by the parties.
HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that when such compromise is entered into in fraud of the lawyer,
with intent to deprive him of the fees justly due him, the compromise must be subject to the said fees, and
that when it is evident that the said fraud is committed in confabulation with the adverse party who had
knowledge of the lawyer's contingent interest or such interest appears of record and who would benefit under
such compromise, the better practice is to settle the matter of the attorney's fees in the same proceeding, after
hearing all the affected parties and without prejudice to the finality of the compromise in so far as it does not
adversely affect the rights of the lawyer.
CORPUS, Karl Joseph S.
47

RUSTIA vs. THE JUDGE OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BATANGAS

G.R. No. L-19695. November 17, 1922
FACTS:
The respondent Justo Porcuna, for himself and on behalf of his wife, the respondent Rosa Porcuna,
by means of a written contract, retained the petitioner to represent them as their lawyer in a case then
pending in the Court of First Instance of Batangas and in which Rosa Porcuna was the plaintiff and Eulalia
Magsombol was the defendant. The contract fixed the petitioner's fee at P200 in advance with an additional
contingent fee of P1,300. It was also provided in the contract that Justo Porcuna should not compromise the
claim against the defendant in the case without express consent of his lawyer, Atty. Rustia. After trial,
the Court of First Instance rendered judgment in favor of Justo Rosa ordering the defendant Eulalia
Magsombol to return to them 602 pieces of cloth or in default thereof to pay to them the sum of P3,250.
Later on, the plaintiffs presented a motion waiving their right to collect the entire amount but settling for 800
pesos without any mention of Atty. Rustias fee. The Court of First Instance thereafter dismissed the action
without notice to counsel for the plaintiffs.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty Rustia was impliedly dismissed and whether or not he is entitled, as the
attorney of record, of the mentioned fees in the contract
HELD:
Yes. In the present instance the clients did nothing that they did not have a perfect right to do. By
appearing personally and presenting a motion, they impliedly dismissed their lawyer. The petitioner's
contingent interests in the judgment rendered did not appear of record. Neither as a party in interest nor as
an attorney was he therefore entitled to notice of the motion. Both at the common law and under section
32 of the Code of Civil Procedure a client may dismiss his lawyer at any time or at any stage of the
proceedings and there is nothing to prevent a litigant from appearing before the court to conduct his own
litigation.
The client has also an undoubted right to compromise a suit without the intervention of his lawyer.
Though there is a valid agreement for the payment to the attorney of a large proportion of the sum
recovered in case of success, this does not give the attorney such an interest in the cause of action that it
prevents plaintiff from compromising the suit.
48

ATTY. OROCIO vs EDMUND P. ANGULUAN

G.R. Nos. 179892-93. January 30, 2009
FACTS:
Segovia, together with Baysic, former President of the NAPOCOR Employees Association, in their
personal capacities and on behalf of the 559 non-EPIRA separated members, filed with the Quezon City
RTC, a Petition for Mandamus, Accounting and Liquidation with a Prayer for the Issuance of TRO and
Injunction against respondents NAPOCOR Board, Anguluan and Dy. They were represented by petitioner
Atty. Victoriano V. Orocio under a "Legal Retainer Agreement". The agreement stated that Atty Orocio
wouldnt be accepting any acceptance, retainer and appearance fee but would be entitled to a 15% contingent
fee. Later on, the parties executed a Compromise Agreement 14 whereby they agreed to amicably settle their
dispute. The RTC granted and approved the compromise agreement. When Atty. Orocio was enforcing and
claiming his 15% contingent fee, respondents contested it and argued that the amount is excessive and that
the money claim of the non-EPIRA separated members was settled through a compromise agreement and not
won by petitioner in a trial on the merits.
ISSUE: Whether or not the 15% contingent fee based on the contract is excessive and should be
disregarded.
HELD:
Yes. In cases where contingent fees are sanctioned by the law, the same should be reasonable under
all the circumstances of the case such that under Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a
lawyer is tasked to charge only fair and reasonable fees. In fixing a reasonable compensation for the services
rendered by a lawyer on the basis of quantum meruit, factors such as the time spent, and extent of services
rendered; novelty and difficulty of the questions involved; importance of the subject matter; skill demanded;
probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the proffered case; customary charges for
similar services; amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client; certainty of
compensation; character of employment; and professional standing of the lawyer, may be considered. It is
fair to conclude that petitioner was entitled to a reasonably high compensation. However, petitioner's
attorney's fees in the amount of P17,794,572.70 or equivalent to 15% of the P119,196,000.00 corrected
earnings differential of the non-EPIRA separated members should be equitably reduced. Thus, taking into
account the foregoing circumstances and recognized principles, the 15% attorney's fees of petitioner should
be reduced to 10% or P11,919,600.00.
49

RILLORAZA vs EASTERN TELECOMMUNICATIONS PHILS., INC.

G.R. No. 104600. July 2, 1999
FACTS:
Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. represented by the law firm San Juan, Africa,
Gonzales and San Agustin (SAGA), filed with the Regional Trial Court, Makati, a complaint for recovery of
revenue shares against Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT). Atty. Francisco D. Rilloraza,
a partner of the firm appeared for ETPI. SAGA was dissolved and four of the junior partners formed the law
firm Rilloraza, Africa, De Ocampo & Africa (RADA), which took over as counsel in the case for ETPI. The
latter signed a retainer agreement with counsel and paid the billed amount of 100,000 pesos. Later on,
petitioner received a letter from ETPI signed by its President and Chief Executive Officer. The letter stated
that ETPI was terminating the retainer contract. Petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court a notice of
attorney's lien, furnishing copies to the plaintiff ETPI, to the signatory of the termination letter and PLDT.
RADA informed the court that there were negotiations toward a compromise between ETPI and PLDT.
Rilloraza is now enforcing the 15% contingent fee stipulated in their agreement with ETPI.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Rilloraza is personally entitled to the (1) 15% contingent fee for
representing ETPI from the inception of the case and (2) a charging a lien
HELD:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that when a client employs the services of a law firm, he does not
employ the services of the lawyer who is assigned to personally handle the case. Rather, he employs the
entire law firm. Although Atty. Rilloraza handled the case personally, he did so for and in behalf of SAGA.
The firm is entitled to the fees agreed upon. However, the retainer agreement has been terminated. We
cannot also ignore the fact that an attorney-client relationship between petitioner and respondent no longer
existed during its culmination by amicable agreement. To award the attorneys' fees amounting to 15% of the
sum of P125M plus P50M paid by PLDT to ETPI would be too unconscionable. A lawyer would be entitled
to receive what he merits for his services. Otherwise stated, the amount must be determined on a quantum
meruit basis. One of the grounds to recover attorney's fees on the basis of quantum meruit is when the
counsel, for justifiable cause, was not able to finish the case to its conclusion. In the present case, the services
of Atty. Rilloraza was legally terminated. Hence, he is entitled to recover his attorneys fees based on
quantum meruit.
Also petitioner is not entitled to a charging lien. A charging lien to be enforceable as security for the
payment of attorney's fees requires as a condition sine qua non a judgment for money and execution in
pursuance of such judgment secured in the main action by the attorney in favor of his client. A charging lien
presupposes that the attorney has secured a favorable money judgment for his client. From the facts of the
case it would seem that petitioner had no hand in the settlement that occurred, nor did it ever obtain a
favorable judgment for ETPI.
50

TAN TEK BENG vs. DAVID

AC NO 1261
DEC 29, 1983
FACTS:
By virtue of their partnership, herein respondent, Atty. David made an agreement on August 05,
1969 with herein petitioner Tan Tek Beng where the former not only agreed to give one-half of his
professional fees to the latter an intermediary or commission agent but he also bound himself not to deal
directly with the clients. Allegedly, they did not live up to this agreement. However, the petitioner did not
file any civil action to enforce such but denounced David to the Office of Civil Relations at Camp Crame and
to the Supreme Court. A stipulation of facts did not materialize due to the non-availability of the petitioner
and his counsel until he died.
ISSUE: Whether or not disciplinary action should be taken against lawyer David for not giving Tan Tek
beng,a non-lawyer, one-half of the Attorney's fees received by David from the clients supplied by
Tan Tek Beng.
HELD:
According to the Supreme Court, the said agreement is void because it was tantamount to
malpractice which is "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers" Sec. 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court). That meaning is in consonance with the
elementary notion that the practice of law is a profession, not a business. "The lawyer may not seek or obtain
employment by himself or through others for to do so would be unprofessional" (2 R.C.L. 1097 cited in In re
Tagorda, 53 Phil. 37, 42; Malcolm, J., Jayme vs. Bualan, 58 Phil. 422; Arce vs. Philippine National Bank, 62
Phil. 569). We censure lawyer David for having entered and acted upon such void and unethical agreement.
We discountenance his conduct, not because of the complaint of Tan Tek Beng (who did not know legal
ethics) but because David should have known better. WHEREFORE, respondent is reprimanded for being
guilty of malpractice. A copy of this decision should be attached to his record in the Bar Confidant's office.
DADOLE, Rizzele Panes
51

DE GUZMAN vs. VISAYAN RAPID TRANSIT CO.

GR NO. 46396; SEPTEMBER 30, 1939
FACTS:
In January, 1933, the petitioner Alejandro De Guzman, who was then a law practitioner in Manila,
rendered legal services for the respondent, Nicolas Concepcion, who was the then president, general
manager, and controlling stockholder of the Visayan Rapid Transit Co. and the Negros Transportation Co.
Inc. Accordingly, the petitioner took steps to obtain the suppression, reduction, and refund of certain
tolerates on various bridges along the line operated by the respondent transportation companies. He filed a
petition with the Secretary of Public Works and Communications and signed exhibits but did not result to a
favorable decision. Nonetheless, with conformity of Nicolas Concepcion, the provincial board adopted a
resolution reducing the tolls for 2-ton trucks or more, the only kind of motor vehicles operated by the
respondents, from P1.20 to P0.60 on one bridge, and from P1.20 to 0.40 on the other. The provincial board
further refunded the bridge tolls that were illegally collected from the transportation companies in the amount
of P50,000 to be applied to future payments for tolls. This benefited the economy of the respondent.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to compensation.
HELD:
As ruled by the Supreme Court, Although the professional services rendered by the petitioner are
purely administrative and did not require a high degree of professional skill and experience, the fact remains
that these services were rendered and were productive of substantial beneficial results to his clients. It is clear
that for these services the petitioner is entitled to compensation. No hard and fast rule can be stated which
will serve even as a guide in determining what is or what is not a reasonable fee. That must be determined
from the face in each case. (2 Thornton on Attorney at Law, p. 783.) The following are the circumstances to
be considered in determining the compensation of an attorney: the amount and character of the services
rendered; the labor, time, and trouble involved; the nature and importance of the litigation or business in
which the services were rendered; the responsibility imposed; the amount of money or the value of the
property affected by the controversy, or involved in the employment, the skill and experience called for in
the performance of the services; the professional character and social standing of the attorney; the results
secured; and whether or not the fee is absolute or contingent, it being a recognized rule that an attorney may
properly charge a much larger fee when it is to be contingent than when it is not. The financial ability of the
defendant may also be considered net to enhance the amount above a reasonable compensation, but to
determine whether or not he is able to pay a fair and just compensation for the services rendered, or as an
incident in ascertaining the importance and gravity of the interests involved in the litigation. (Delgado vs. De
la Rama, 43 Phil., 419; Panis vs. Yangco, 52 Phil., 499.) Facts and circumstances considered, That the
reasonable compensation of the petitioner is P7,000, deducting therefrom, however, the sum of P1,280 which
the petitioner had already received.
52

DONALD DEE vs. CA

GR NO. 77439; AUGUST 24, 1989
FACTS:
Sometime in January, 1981, the petitioner Donald Dee and his father sought the legal advice of the
private respondent Atty. Amelito Mutuc, regarding the alleged indebtedness of his brother, Dewey Dee, to
Caesar's Palace, a well-known gambling casino at Las Vegas Nevada, U.S.A. They fear the rumor that the
said casino is being linked to Mafia and that Dewey might be harmed at that instance. The private respondent
made the efforts to inquire into the matter by having long distance telephone calls and trips to Las Vegas. He
even talked to several persons in order to clear the account of Dewey and to assure his safety. Thereafter, he
was no longer bothered by the Casino. Having thus settled such account, Atty. Mutuc then sent several
demand letters to the petitioner demanding the balance of P50,000 as attorney's fees. His services were
reportedly contracted for P100,000. P50,000 was given to him beforehand, which according to the petitioner
was a mere pocket money for the trips to USA. He claimed that there was no lawyer client relationship
between them and what the lawyer did was a mere voluntary act out of their friendship.
ISSUE: Whether or not professional services were actually rendered by the private respondent and thus is
entitled to receive attorney 's fee.
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that the absence of a written contract will not preclude the finding that
there was a professional relationship which merits attorney's fees for professional services rendered.
Documentary formalism is not an essential element in the employment of an attorney; the contract may be
express or implied. To establish the relation, it is sufficient that the advice and assistance of an attorney is
sought and received in any matter pertinent to his profession. An acceptance of the relation is implied on the
part of the attorney from his acting on behalf of his client in pursuance of a request from the latter. A lawyer
is entitled to have and receive the just and reasonable compensation for services rendered at the special
instance and request of his client and as long as he is honestly and in good faith trying to serve and represent
the interests of his client, the latter is bound to pay his just feeds.
53

TRADERS ROYAL BANK EMPLOYEES UNION vs. NLRC

GR NO. 120592
MARCH 14, 1997
FACTS:
Petitioner Traders Royal Bank Employees Union and private respondent Atty. Emmanuel Noel A.
Cruz, entered into a retainer agreement whereby the former obligated itself to pay the latter a monthly
retainer fee of P3,000.00 in consideration of the law firm's undertaking to render the services enumerated in
their contract. Petitioner union referred to private respondent the claims of its members for holiday, mid-year
and year-end bonuses against their employer, Traders Royal Bank (TRB). After the appropriate complaint
was filed by private respondent, the case was certified by the Sec. of Labor to the NLRC which rendered a
decision in favor of the employees, awarding them holiday pay differential, mid-year bonus differential, and
year-end bonus differential. The bank voluntarily complied with such final judgment and determined the
holiday pay differential to be in the amount of P175,794.32. TRB duly paid its concerned employees their
respective entitlement in said sum through their payroll.
Private respondent notified the petitioner union, the TRB management and the NLRC of his right to
exercise and enforce his attorney's lien over the award. Thereafter, private respondent filed a motion before
Labor Arbiter for the determination of his attorney's fees, praying that 10% of the total award for holiday pay
differential computed by TRB at P175,794.32, or the amount of P17,579.43, be declared as his attorney's
fees, and that petitioner union be ordered to pay and remit said amount to him. The labor arbiter issued an
order granting the motion of private respondent. This constrained petitioner union to file an appeal with the
NLRC, seeking a reversal of that order. The NLRC affirmed the order of the labor arbiter. The petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied hence the petition at bar.
ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent is entitled to an additional remuneration under the retainer
agreement for his attorneys fees
HELD:
Yes. Private respondent is entitled to an additional remuneration for pursuing legal action in the
interest of petitioner. The P3,000.00 which petitioner pays monthly to private respondent does not cover the
services the latter actually rendered before the labor arbiter and the NLRC in behalf of the former. The
monthly fee is intended merely as a consideration for the law firm's commitment to render the services. The
difference between a compensation for a commitment to render legal services and a remuneration for legal
services actually rendered can better be appreciated with a discussion of the two kinds of retainer fees. A
general retainer is the fee paid to a lawyer to secure his future services as general counsel for any ordinary
legal problem that may arise in the routinary business of the client and referred to him for legal action while
a special retainer is a fee for a specific case or special service rendered by the lawyer for a client. Evidently,
the P3,000.00 monthly fee provided in the retainer agreement refers to a general retainer, as said monthly fee
covers only the law firm's pledge. Where a lawyer is employed without a price for his services being agreed
upon, the courts shall fix the amount on quantum meruit basis. In such a case, he would be entitled to receive
what he merits for his services. However, we find flaw in the award for attorney's fees in favor of private
respondent. Instead of adopting the above guidelines, the labor arbiter forthwith but erroneously set the
amount of attorney's fees on the basis of Art. 111 of the Labor Code. The criteria found in the CPR are to be
considered, and not disregarded, in assessing the proper amount. On such premises and in the exercise of our
sound discretion, we hold that the amount of P10,000.00 is a reasonable and fair compensation for the legal
services rendered by private respondent to petitioner before the labor arbiter and the NLRC.
De La Pea, Arah Bea V.
54

FLORENCIO FABILLO AND JOSEFA TANA vs. IAC

GR No. L-68838
March 11, 1991
FACTS:
Justina Fabillo bequeathed to her brother, Florencio, a house and lot in San Salvador Street, Palo,
Leyte, and to her husband, Gregorio D. Brioso, a piece of land in Pugahanay, Palo, Leyte. After Justina's
death, Florencio filed a petition for the probate of said will. the probate court approved the project of
partition. Two years later, Florencio sought the assistance of lawyer Alfredo M. Murillo in recovering the
San Salvador property. Later on, they entered into a contact of services. Pursuant to such contract, Murillo
filed for Florencio Fabillo a civil case against Gregorio D. Brioso to recover the San Salvador property. The
case was terminated when the court, upon the parties' joint motion in the nature of a compromise agreement,
declared Florencio Fabillo as the lawful owner not only of the San Salvador property but also the Pugahanay
parcel of land.
Murillo then proceeded to implement the contract of services between him and Florencio Fabillo by
taking possession and exercising rights of ownership over 40% of said properties. He also installed a tenant
in the Pugahanay property. In 1966, Florencio Fabillo claimed exclusive right over the two properties and
refused to give Murillo his share of their produce. Murillo then filed complaint captioned "ownership of a
parcel of land, damages and appointment of a receiver" against Florencio Fabillo, his wife Josefa Taa, and
their children. In their answer, the defendants stated that the consent to the contract of services of the Fabillo
spouses was vitiated by old age and ailment; that Murillo misled them into believing that Special
Proceedings on the probate of Justina's will was already terminated when actually it was still pending
resolution; and that the contingent fee of 40% of the value of the San Salvador property was excessive, unfair
and unconscionable considering the nature of the case, the length of time spent for it, the efforts exerted by
Murillo, and his professional standing. The lower court ruled in favor of Murillo.
ISSUE: Whether or not the contract of services did violate Article 1491 of the Civil Code as said contract
stipulated a contingent fee
HELD:
No. The contract of services did not violate Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code, prohibiting lawyers
from acquiring by purchase even at a public or judicial auction, properties and rights which are the objects of
litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession. The said prohibition, however, applies
only if the sale or assignment of the property takes place during the pendency of the litigation involving the
client's property. Hence, a contract between a lawyer and his client stipulating a contingent fee is not covered
by said prohibition because the payment of said fee is not made during the pendency of the litigation but only
after judgment has been rendered in the case handled by the lawyer. In fact, under the 1988 CPR, a lawyer
may have a lien over funds and property of his client and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to
satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements. As long as the lawyer does not exert undue influence on his client,
that no fraud is committed or imposition applied, or that the compensation is clearly not excessive as to
amount to extortion, a contract for contingent fee is valid and enforceable. However, we disagree with the
courts below that the contingent fee stipulated between the Fabillo spouses and Murillo is 40% of the
properties subject of the litigation for which Murillo appeared for the Fabillos. Considering the nature of the
case, the value of the properties, the length of time and effort exerted on it by Murillo, we hold that Murillo
is entitled to the amount of P3,000.00 as reasonable attorney's fees for services rendered in the case which
ended on a compromise agreement.
55

FEDERICO RAMOS VS ATTY. PATRICIO NGASEO

A.C No. 6210
December 9, 2004
FACTS:
Complainant Federico Ramos went to respondent Atty. Patricio Ngaseos Makati office to engage
his services as counsel in a case involving a piece of land in San Carlos, Pangasinan. Respondent agreed to
handle the case for an acceptance fee of P20,000.00, appearance fee of P1,000.00 per hearing and the cost of
meals, transportation and other incidental expenses. Complainant alleges that he did not promise to pay the
respondent 1,000 sq. m. of land as appearance fees. After the Court rendered a favorable judgment ordering
the land to be returned to Ramos and his sblings (which decision being final and executory) Atty. Ngaseo
sent a demand letter to Ramos asking for the delivery of a piece of land which the Ramos allegedly promised
as payment for Respondents appearance fee. As a result, Ramos filed before the IBP a complaint charging
Atty. Ngaseo of violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility for demanding the delivery of a parcel
of land which was the subject of litigation. The IBP found the respondent guilty of grave misconduct and
conduct unbecoming of a lawyer in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended
that he be suspended from the practice of law for 1 year. Atty. Ngaseo argues that he did not violated Article
1491 of the Civil Code because when he demanded the delivery of the land which was offered and promised
to him in lieu of the appearance fees, the case has been terminated, when the appellate court ordered the
return of the 2-hectare parcel of land to the family of the complainant.
ISSUE:
HELD:
Whether or not Atty. Ngaseo violated Article 1491 of the Civil Code
No. Under Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code, lawyers are prohibited from acquiring either by
purchase or assignment the property or rights involved which are the object of the litigation in which they
intervene by virtue of their profession. The prohibition on purchase is all embracing to include not only sales
to private individuals but also public or judicial sales. The rationale advanced for the prohibition is that
public policy disallows the transactions in view of the fiduciary relationship involved, i.e., the relation of
trust and confidence and the peculiar control exercised by these persons. It is founded on public policy
because, by virtue of his office, an attorney may easily take advantage of the credulity and ignorance of his
client and unduly enrich himself at the expense of his client. However, the said prohibition applies only if the
sale or assignment of the property takes place during the pendency of the litigation involving the clients
property. Consequently, where the property is acquired after the termination of the case, no violation of
paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the Civil Code attaches.
In the instant case, there was no actual acquisition of the property in litigation since the respondent only
made a written demand for its delivery which the complainant refused to comply. Mere demand for delivery
of the litigated property does not cause the transfer of ownership, hence, not a prohibited transaction within
the contemplation of Article 1491.
However, the court finds the recommended penalty of suspension for 6 months too harsh and not
proportionate to the offense committed by the respondent. The power to disbar or suspend must be exercised
with great caution. Only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the
lawyer as an officer of the Court and member of the bar will disbarment or suspension be imposed as a
penalty. All considered, a reprimand is deemed sufficient and reasonable.
56

LIJUACO vs. ATTY. TERRADO

A.C. No. 6317
August 31, 2006
FACTS:
On February 13, 2004, an administrative complaint was filed by complainant Luzviminda C. Lijauco
against respondent Atty. Rogelio P. Terrado.
The complainant engaged the services of respondent sometime in January 2001 for P70,000.00 to
assist in recovering her deposit with Planters Development Bank, Buendia, Makati branch in the amount of
P180,000.00 and the release of her foreclosed house and lot located in Calamba, Laguna. The said property
was the subject of a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession then pending before the Regional Trial
Court of Binan, Laguna. She further alleged that respondent failed to appear before the trial court in the
hearing for the issuance of the Writ of Possession and did not protect her interests in the Compromise
Agreement which she subsequently entered into.
Respondent denied the accusations against him. He averred that the P70,000.00 he received from
complainant was payment for legal services for the recovery of the deposit with Planters Development Bank
and did not include the pending petition for the issuance of a writ of possession.
The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report
and recommendation. The Investigating Commissioner submitted his report finding respondent guilty of
violating the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Investigating Commissioner thus recommended that
he be suspended for Six (6) months and which the IBP Board of Governors adopted.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Terrado charged a fair and reasonable fee for his services
HELD:
No. Respondent's claim that the attorney's fee pertains only to the recovery of complainant's savings
deposit from Planter's Development Bank cannot be sustained. Records show that he acted as complainant's
counsel in the drafting of the compromise agreement between the latter and the bank. Moreover, the
Investigating Commissioner observed that the fee of P70,000.00 for legal assistance in the recovery of the
deposit amounting to P180,000.00 is unreasonable. A lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable
fees.
The duty of a lawyer to safeguard his client's interests commences from his retainer until his
discharge from the case or the final disposition of the subject matter of litigation. Acceptance of money from
a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the client's cause.
The canons of the legal profession require that once an attorney agrees to handle a case, he should undertake
the task with zeal, care and utmost devotion.
Respondent's admission that he divided the legal fees with two other people as a referral fee
does not release him from liability. A lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for legal
services with persons not licensed to practice law, except in certain cases.
Atty. Rogelio P. Terrado was SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months and was
ordered to RETURN, the sum of P70,000.00 to complainant.
DIATO, Jea Mari D.
57

IN RE: ATTY ADRIANO vs. ESTEBIA

G.R. No. L-26868
February 27, 1969
FACTS
Remigio Estebia was convicted of rape by the CFI of Samar, and sentenced to suffer the capital
punishment. His case came up before this Court on review. Lope E. Adriano, a member of the Bar, was
appointed by this Court as Estebia's counsel de oficio. Adriano received his notice of appointment on
December 20, 1966. He sought for extensions to file appellants brief five (5) times plus a 5 day special
extension. The first extension was on January 19, 1967, Adriano sought for a 30-day extension to file the
brief in mimeographed form. On February 18, Adriano again moved for a 20-day extension. A third
extension was filed on March 8 for 15-days, Adriano claimed that it was more than half-way through and that
additional time is needed to review, correct and put it in final form. The fourth extension was filed on March
27, also for 15 days, Adriano claimed that additional time was needed to redraft and rehash the brief and
have it stenciled and mimeographed. He moved for a "last" extension of 10 days on April 11 because he
suddenly got sick which hampered and interrupted his work. On April 21, a special extension of five days
was filed in order to put said brief in final form and have it stenciled and mimeographed. All these motions
for extension were granted but no brief was filed
On September 25, 1967, Adriano was ordered to show cause within ten days from notice thereof why
disciplinary action should not be taken against him for failure to file appellant's brief. Adriano did not bother
to give any explanation, thus the court imposed a P500 fine payable to the court. Counsel paid no heed. On
December 5, 1968, Adriano was ordered again to show cause why he should not be suspended from practice
of law. The resolution was personally served upon him on December 18, but it was ignored
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Adriano rendered the required service as a counsel de oficio
HELD
No. By specific authority, this Court may assign an attorney to render professional aid to a destitute
appellant in a criminal case who is unable to employ an attorney. Correspondingly, a duty is imposed upon
the lawyer so assigned "to render the required service." A lawyer so appointed "as counsel for an indigent
prisoner," our Canons of Professional Ethics demand, "should ways exert his best efforts" in the
indigent's behalf.
It is true that he is a court-appointed counsel. But we do say that as such counsel de oficio, he has as
high a duty to the accused as one employed and paid by defendant himself. Because, as in the case of the
latter, he must exercise his best efforts and professional ability in behalf of the person assigned to his care.
His is to render effective assistance. The accused defendant expects of him due diligence, not mere
perfunctory representation. We do not accept the paradox that responsibility is less where the defended party
is poor. It has been said that courts should "have no hesitancy in demanding high standards of duty of
attorneys appointed to defend indigent persons charged with crime." For, indeed, a lawyer who is a vanguard
in the bastion of justice is expected to have a bigger dose of social conscience and a little less of self-interest.
Because of this, a lawyer should remain ever conscious of his duties to the indigent he defends.
Atty. Lope E. Adriano was suspended from the practice of law for a period of 1 year.
DIATO, Jea Mari D.
58

BURBE vs. ATTY MAGULTA

A.C. No. 5713.
June 10, 2002.
FACTS
A complaint for disbarment or suspension or any other disciplinary action against Atty. Alberto C.
Magulta was filed by Dominador P. Burbe with the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP on June 13,
1999.
Complainant alleged that he was introduced to Atty. Magulta in September 1998, the latter agreed to
legally represent him in a money claim and possible civil case for breach of contract. Upon the failure of the
settlement of the dispute, Atty. Magulta subsequently drafted the complaint and required a filing fee. Upon
the instruction of Atty. Magulta, complainant deposited P25,000.00. In the months that follow no notice
from the court or from respondent was received. Complainant frequented the office of Atty. Magulta but the
latter only instructed complainant to wait. Complainant sensing that he was being given the run-around
decided to go to the Office of the Clerk of Court with the draft of the complaint to verify the progress of the
case, and was told no record was filed by Atty. Magulta on his behalf. Complainant confronted Atty.
Magulta, where the latter continued to lie, and only when the certification was shown that Atty. Magulta
admitted that he had spent the money for his own purpose. To appease complainant, Atty. Magulta issue 2
checks.
The IBP in its report recommended the suspension of Atty. Magulta for 1 year from the practice of
law. The P25,000.00 deposited was for filing fees of the case, and with the deposit of the money is the
obligation of the respondent to file the complaint. The subsequent reimbursement does not remove the
liability of Atty. Magulta.
ISSUE:
Whether or not payment of the attorneys fee creates the attorney-client relationship
HELD:
No. A lawyer-client relationship was established from the very first moment complainant asked
respondent for legal advice regarding the former's business. If a person, in respect to business affairs or
troubles of any kind, consults a lawyer with a view to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the
attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces with the consultation, then the professional employment is
established.
Likewise, a lawyer-client relationship exists notwithstanding the close personal relationship between
the lawyer and the complainant. Hence, despite the fact that complainant was kumpadre of a law partner of
respondent, and that respondent dispensed legal advice to complainant as a personal favor to the kumpadre,
the lawyer was duty-bound to file the complaint he had agreed to.
Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a
capital that necessarily yields profits. The gaining of a livelihood is not a professional but a secondary
consideration. Duty to public service and to the administration of justice should be the primary
consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to
themselves.
Lawyers who convert the funds entrusted to them are in gross violation of professional ethics and are
guilty of betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession. The fact that the former returned the amount
does not exculpate him from his breach of duty.
Atty. Alberto C. Magulta was SUSPENDED from the practice of law for (1) year.
DIATO, Jea Mari D.
59

CENIZA vs. ATTY. RUBIA

A.C. NO. 6166
October 2, 2009
FACTS:
Maria Earl Beverly Ceniza filade a complaint against herein respondent Attorney Rubia for
ignorance of the law and falsification of public documents. It appears that Ceniza sought the legal services of
Atty Rubia with regard to the share of her mother-in-law in the estate of her husband Carlos Ceniza. Rubia
allegedly filed her complaint in a court that has no jurisdiction over the subject properties in question, forged
the signature of Ceniza's husband in an affidavit and misrepresented to her (Ceniza), that the complaint was
already filed in court, when in fact, it was not. However, upon investigation of the Integrated Bar of The
Philippines, her allegations had no factual basis. However, Rubia did commit acts which should be
sanctioned, mainly the failure to maintain open communication with her client regarding the status of the said
complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Attorney Rubia's withdrawal of service was reasonable
HELD:
.
It was unreasonable. When she accepted to handle the case of Ceniza, she is expected to do her
duties with utmost attention, skill and competence, despite other workloads to do with her other clients. This
is a violation of Canon 22 of the CPR that states: "A Lawyer shall withdraw his services only for good cause
upon notice appropriate to the circumstances. Being an officer of the court, who is tasked to assist in the
administration of justice, a lawyer is not permitted to withdraw his services if it will cause injustice to the
client. Thus, the respondent is suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months.
DUARTE, Justine Edward P.
61

NAVARRO vs. SOLIDUM

A.C. NO. 9872
January 28, 2104
FACTS:
A complaint was filed by the petitioners Natividad Navarro and Hilda Presbitero against the
respondent Atty. Solidum. The respondent allegedly entered into numerous transactions with the petitioners
under a retainer agreement. The said transactions involved land registrations, loans, among others as well as
transactions with Presbitero's daughter. The main cause of action were the loans granted by the petitioner
Navarro to Attorney Solidum who agreed to a 10% interest per month. Upon his default and demand from
the petitioners, Atty. Solidum countered stating that the said interest rate was usurious and should therefore
be waived. The court then ordered him to pay at 7% per month interest to the petitioners for the balance of
his obligations. On top of which, he represented Presbitero in February 2006 while his suspension due to his
case against Navarro was still enforced.In his defense however, he claims that he only had knowledge of his
suspension sometime in May 2006.
ISSUE: Whether or not Solidum's actions violate the Code of Professional Responsibility
HELD:
Yes, the IBP-CBD found that respondent was guilty of violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for committing the following acts: (1) signing drawn checks against the account
of his son as if they were from his own account; (2) misrepresenting to Navarro the identity of the lot he
mortgaged to her; (3) misrepresenting to Presbitero the true value of the 263-square-meter lot he mortgaged
to her; (4) conspiring with Yulo to obtain the loans from complainants; (5) agreeing or promising to pay 10%
interest on his loans although he knew that it was exorbitant; and (6) failing to pay his loans because the
checks he issued were dishonored as the accounts were already closed. The IBP-CBD also found that
respondent violated Canon 16 and Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when he failed to
properly account for the various funds he received from complainants. The IBP held that the term "Conduct"
should not be construed so strictly, the test is whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in moral
character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or whether it renders him unworthy to continue as an officer
of the court. That said, Solidum is found guilty for misleading and malicious conduct with regard to his
transactions with his clients.
61

ORCINO vs. GASPAR

A.C. NO. 3773
September 24, 1997
FACTS:
Orcinos husband was murdered and she was zealous in prosecuting the suspects. She hired Atty.
Gaspar as her counsel and they agreed to a P20,000.00 attorneys fee which Orcino paid. Atty. Gaspar did his
duty religiously from interviewing witnesses to attending hearings and the preliminary investigation. But on
the day bail is to be heard, Atty. Gaspar failed to appear. Bail was granted in favor of the suspects and this
enraged Orcino. She then went to Gaspars residence where Gaspar reasoned out that he did not receive a
notice of hearing hence his absence. Finding his reason to be insufficient, Orcino demanded the records of
the case and advised Gaspar that shell be hiring another lawyer. Gaspar complied and thereafter he filed a
motion to withdraw as counsel. The court did not grant his motion because the same was without Orcinos
written consent. Perhaps changing her mind, Orcino refused to give her consent. Gaspar, however, did not
attend the subsequent hearings. Orcino then filed an administrative complaint against Gaspar for abandoning
the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Gaspar violated his duties to Orcino
HELD:
Yes. When she uttered that shes terminating Gaspars services, she did so in a burst of passion. She
did not really mean to terminate Gaspar at all as evidenced by her refusal to give consent to Gaspars motion.
A lawyer cannot unilaterally terminate his legal services to his client. Unlike the other way around where a
client has the absolute right to terminate the attorney-client relationship with or without just cause. Atty.
Gaspar has no reason to presume that his motion shall be granted by the court. He should have not left
Orcino in the cold and should have continued appearing for her until there is a withdrawal of record and a
successor placed in his stead. Gaspar was admonished accordingly. He was also directed to return half of
what was paid him.
62

ATTY. OROCIO VS. ANGULAN, ET. AL.

GR. No. 179892-93
(2009)
FACTS
Atty. Victoriano Orocio (Petitioner) is collecting the 15% contingency fee agreed upon in the Legal
Retainer Agreement with Perla Segovia (Segovia), Emma Baysic (Baysic) and the 559 non-EPIRA separated
members of the National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR). NAPOCOR created a Welfare Fund that grants
an employee a monthly welfare allowance equivalent of 10% of his monthly salary. When Congress passed
R.A. No. 9136, otherwise known as the Electric Power Industry Reform Act (EPIRA), the law reorganized
NAPOCOR which consequently abolished the Welfare Fund. As a result, the Welfare Fund Board of
Trustees issued a resolution implementing the release and distribution of P184 Million among members who
resigned, retired or separated upon the effectivity of EPIRA. Segovia and Baysic, on behalf of themselves
personally and member who separated prior to EPIRA (non-EPIRA separated members), hired Petitioner to
represent them in a Civil Case filed against NAPOCOR. To settle the issue amicably, NAPOCOR and
Segovias group entered into a Compromise Agreement wherein the estimated Corrected Earnings
Differential for the non-EPIRA separated members is P119.196 Million out of which counsel for petitioners
15% attorneys fees shall be deducted from. Both parties filed a joint Motion before the RTC for the approval
of the Compromise Agreement which the court granted. Petitioner then filed for a Motion for Approval of
Charging Attorneys Lien which the RTC granted and a Writ of Execution was issued. Respondents
NAPOCOR filed for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA) praying that the RTC order be set aside and
a TRO. The CA granted the TRO, set aside and annulled the RTCs order on the basis that the amount sought
to be collected by petitioner as attorneys fees, equivalent to 15% of the P119,196,000.00 estimated corrected
earnings differential for non-EPIRA separated members, was excessive
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in granting the TRO on the ground that petitioners alleged
violated or invaded the respondents right, as petitioners clients, to pay only a reasonable
amount of attorneys fees to, and only for services actually rendered by, petitioner.
HELD
Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility: A lawyer is tasked to charge only fair and
reasonable fees. An attorneys fee refers to the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer for the legal
services he has rendered to a client. The client and his lawyer may enter into a written contract whereby the
latter would be paid attorneys fees only if the suit or litigation ends favorably to the client. This is called a
contingency fee contract. The amount of attorneys fees in this contract may be on a percentage basis, and a
much higher compensation is allowed in consideration of the risk that the lawyer may get nothing if the suit
fails. Contingent fee contracts are permitted in this jurisdiction because they redound to the benefit of the
poor client and the lawyer "especially in cases where the client has meritorious cause of action, but no means
with which to pay for legal services unless he can, with the sanction of law, make a contract for a contingent
fee to be paid out of the proceeds of litigation. Oftentimes, the contingent fee arrangement is the only means
by which the poor clients can have their rights vindicated and upheld." However, the same should be
reasonable under all the circumstances of the case, and should always be subject to the supervision of a court,
as to its reasonableness.
Generally, a stipulation on a lawyers compensation in a written contract for professional services
ordinarily controls the amount of fees that may be allowed, unless the court finds such stipulated amount to
be unreasonable or unconscionable. If the attorneys fees is excessive, the contract may be disregarded
ESPALDON, Shelumiel Milagros M.
63

despite the clients expressed approval. Attorneys fees are unconscionable if they affront ones sense of
justice, decency or reasonableness, or if they are so disproportionate to the value of the services rendered.
The courts are empowered to reduce the attorneys fee or fix a reasonable amount thereof taking into
consideration the surrounding circumstances and the established parameters.
The principle of quantum meruit (as much as he deserves) may be a basis for determining the
reasonable amount of attorneys fees. Quantum meruit is a device to prevent undue enrichment based on the
equitable postulate that it is unjust for a person to retain benefit without paying for it. It is applicable even if
there was a formal written contract for attorneys fees as long as the agreed fee was found by the court to be
unconscionable. In fixing a reasonable compensation for the services rendered by a lawyer on the basis
of quantum meruit, factors such as the time spent, and extent of services rendered; novelty and difficulty of
the questions involved; importance of the subject matter; skill demanded; probability of losing other
employment as a result of acceptance of the proferred case; customary charges for similar services; amount
involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client; certainty of compensation; character of
employment; and professional standing of the lawyer, may be considered.
In this case, the non-EPIRA separated members chose the Petitioner as their counsel because the
latter was a former member of the NAPOCOR-WFBT for two terms or four years, is familiar and
knowledgeable on the operation of the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund. According to the contingency fee contract
agreement between the parties, Petitioner received no acceptance fee and appearance/meeting fee when he
took on the non-EPIRA separated members case. Petitioners attorneys fees were absolutely dependent on
the success of non-EPIRA separated members claim on the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund. Despite these
circumstances, petitioner worked diligently in advocating the claims of the non-EPIRA separated members
against respondents as shown by the following: (1) petitioner took pains in verifying the identity and claim of
each of the 559 non-EPIRA separated members on the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund; (2) petitioner prepared and
filed a well-researched and well-argued petition with the RTC for the claims of the non-EPIRA separated
members; (3) he prepared and presented several witnesses and numerous pertinent documents before the
RTC in support of their application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction against respondents plan to exclude the non-EPIRA separated members from
receiving their shares in the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund; (4) he participated, as non-EPIRA separated
members counsel, in the conduct of several hearings regarding the said application for the issuance of
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction; (5) he obtained a temporary restraining
order and a writ of preliminary injunction from the RTC which enjoined/prohibited respondents from
excluding the non-EPIRA separated members from their shares in the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund; (6) he held
numerous conferences with the non-EPIRA separated members wherein he apprised the latter of the status of
their claims and his legal strategies pertinent thereto; and (7) he exerted utmost efforts which eventually led
to the execution of the Compromise Agreement between the non-EPIRA separated members and
respondents. Undoubtedly, were it not for petitioners vigilance and zeal, respondents would not have
executed the Compromise Agreement with the non-EPIRA separated members.
Hence, it is fair to conclude that petitioner was entitled to a reasonably high compensation. However,
petitioners attorneys fees in the amount of P17,794,572.70 or equivalent to 15% of the P119,196,000.00
corrected earnings differential of the non-EPIRA separated members should be equitably reduced to 10%.
64

Petitioner is the counsel for the non-EPIRA separated members in the latters quest to claim their
shares in the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund. Petitioner was never hired or employed by respondents as their
counsel. If anyone would be injured by petitioners claim for attorneys fees, it would be his clients, the nonEPIRA separated members, and not respondents. None of the non-EPIRA separated members has questioned
or complained about petitioners claim for attorneys fees. Respondents do not have a clear right to pay only
a reasonable amount of attorneys fees to the petitioner because such right belongs solely to petitioners
clients, the non-EPIRA separated members. There can be no violation of a right which does not exist in the
first place. Also, there was no necessity for the writ of preliminary injunction since the non-EPIRA separated
members do not claim any damage or injury caused by the execution of the RTC Order. The possibility of
irreparable damage without proof of an actual existing right is not a ground for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction. Thus, the issuance by the Court of Appeals of a writ of preliminary injunction in
favor of respondents was improper.
65

THE LAWYER AND THE FIRM
PEOPLE VS. GONZALES, JR.

GR. No. 139542
(2003)
FACTS
A motion was filed by Pastelero Law office to clarify whether the firm of Velasquez, Rodriguez,
Respicio, Ramos, Nidea, and Pradomay call itself A law Firm Of St. Thomas More and Associate
Members.
ISSUE: Whether or not a law firm can name itself A law Firm Of St. Thomas More and Associate Members.
HELD
Rule 3.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that in the choice of a firm name, no false,
misleading or assumed name shall be used. The Rule is clear. No name not belonging to any of the partners
or associates may be used in the firm name for any purpose. In one case, the use of the firm name of a
foreign law firm is unethical because that firm is not authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction. The Law
Firm of St. Thomas More and Associate Members is not a law firm in this jurisdiction or even in any other
jurisdiction. A St. Thomas More and Associates or STMA is in fact the socio-political ministry or the
couples for Christ, a Christian family-renewal community. To appellate to the name of the lawyers The Law
Firm of St. Thomas More and Associate Members indeed appears misleading. It implies that St. Thomas
More is a Law Firm when in fact it is not it would also convey to the public the impression that the lawyers
are members of the law firm which does not exist. To the public, it would seem that the purpose or intention
of adding The Law Firm of St. Thomas More and Associates Members is to bask in the name of a Saint,
although that may not really, be the purpose or intention of the lawyers. The appellation only tends to
confuse the public and in a way demean both the saints and the legal profession whose members must
depend on their own name and record and merit and not on the name/glory of other persons living or dead.
Thus, the law firm of Velasquez, Rodriguez, Respicio, Ramos, Nidea, and Prado is enjoined from using the
appellation A Law Firm of St. Thomas More and Associate Members in any pleading filed before judicial
and quasi-judicial bodies as well as in its professional transactions.
66

B.R. SEBASTIAN ENTERPRISES, INC. VS. CA

GR. No. L-41862
(1992)
FACTS
B.R. Sebastian Enterprises, Inc. (Petitioner) hired the law firm of Baizas, Alberto and Associates
to represent the company in a civil case against Eulogio Reyes (Reyes). During the pendency of the
appeal, Reyes died and was substituted by his heirs. On 19 February 1974, Petitioner, through its counsel
of record, received a notice to file an Appellants Brief within 45 days upon receipt. However, counsel
failed to comply and the Court of Appeals (CA) issued a resolution requiring counsel to show why the
appeal should not be dismissed for failure to file an Appellants Brief on 9 July 1974. Having failed to
comply again, the CA issued another resolution dismissing the appeal. On 28 September 1974, Petitioner,
through Baizas Law Office, filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution dismissing its appeal
alleging that as a result of the death of Atty. Crispin Baizas, senior partner in the law firm of BAIZAS,
ALBERTO & ASSOCIATES, the affairs of the said firm are still being settled between the formers son
Atty. Jose Baizas and Atty. Ruby Alberto, who have established her own law office; furthermore, Atty.
Rodolfo Espiritu, the lawyer who handled this case in the trial court and who is believed to have also
attended to the preparation of the Appellant's Brief but failed to submit it through oversight and
inadvertence, had also left the firm. The CA denied the motion. Petitioner failed to take action within the
period to file for review, thus the Resolution became final and executory. Petitioner filed a Motion to
Reinstate Appeal with prayer for issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction claiming, among others,
that the dismissal of the case because of the failure to timely file the Appellants Brief was due to the
death of Atty. Crispin Baizas is tantamount to denying BRSEI its (sic) day in court, and is, therefore, a
clear and unmistakable denial of due process on the part of BRSEI. CA denied the motion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not CA gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioner's motion to

reinstate its appeal, previously dismissed for failure to file the Appellant's Brief.
HELD
Undoubtedly, there was inexcusable negligence on the part of petitioner's counsel in failing to file
the Appellant's Brief. Petitioner's counsel was the law firm of BAIZAS, ALBERTO & ASSOCIATES
and not merely Atty. Crispin Baizas. The death of a partner does not extinguish the lawyer-client
relationship between said firm and Petitioner until withdrawal by the former of their appearance in the
manner provided by the Rules of Court. This is so because it was the law firm which handled the case for
petitioner before both the trial and appellate courts. Thus, the excuse presented by said counsel, the death
of Atty. Baizas, was not a valid excuse on the part of his associates for not attending to appeal. That Atty.
Espiritu, an associate who was designated to handle the case, later left the office after the death of Atty.
Baizas is of no moment since others in the firm could have replaced him. Upon receipt of the notice to file
Brief, the law firm should have re-assigned the case to another associate or, it could have withdrawn as
counsel in the manner provided by the Rules of Court so that the petitioner could contract the services of
a new lawyer.
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that there was failure to show a good and sufficient cause
which would justify the reinstatement of petitioner's appeal. Respondent CA did not them commit any
grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioner's motion to reinstate its appeal.
67

SPS. REAPORT vs. JUDGE MARIANO

A.M. No. MTJ-00-1253
July 11, 2001
FACTS:
Petitioners, together with Spouses Uro, filed an ejectment case (unlawful detainer) against Spouses
Natividad with the MTC, Zamboanga City. Respondent Judge set the subject ejectment case for preliminary
conference exactly eighty-four (84) days after the answer of the defendants was filed. Defendants filed a
Manifestation with Omnibus Motion praying that the ejectment case be suspended or held in abeyance on the
ground that there was a case pending before the RTC of Zamboanga City involving the same parties.
Respondent Judge ordered the dismissal of the subject ejectment case for lack of jurisdiction although the
defendants only prayed for the suspension of the proceeding therein and said dismissal was appealed with the
RTC of Zamboanga City. In a Resolution, Judge Vicente L. Cabatingan, RTC of Zamboanga City reversed
and set aside the aforesaid Order. For a period of 11 months, respondent Judge made a mockery of the New
Rules on Summary Procedure by setting the subject ejectment case several times for preliminary conference,
only to cancel the same upon motion/s for postponement/resetting filed by the defendants. Complainants
allege that the act of the respondent of granting several motions for postponement/resetting of the scheduled
preliminary conference on the ground that the defendants' counsel, Atty. Rosendo Castillo, Sr., was sick
without any medical certificate attesting to such fact, as required by the Rules of Court, violated the
provision of Section 19 (i) of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure prohibiting dilatory motions for
postponement. Complainants further assert that defendants' counsel was not Atty. Rosendo Castillo, Sr. but
the law partnership of Castillo and Castillo and that even if in reality Atty. Castillo, Sr. was sick, the
preliminary conference could have taken place with another member of the firm in attendance. Respondent
argued that the material allegations in the complaint were false, baseless and malicious. He admitted that
although there was delay in the proceedings, the same was not his fault.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the counsel in the case at bar is the representative of the defendant as supposed to
the law firm of the latter.
HELD:
No. The Court held that the flimsy explanations of respondent do not detract from his liability,
considering the very long delay incurred. More important, the delay could have been avoided had he
exercised more diligence and determination in disposing of the case. Although the Rules provide that notice
should be served on both counsel and parties, the requirement is deemed to have been complied with when
notice is served on the counsel of record, who in turn is bound to inform the client or else be liable for
administrative sanctions. In the alternative, the absent plaintiffs could have been declared non-suited and the
preliminary conference held with the rest of the plaintiffs in appearance.
Respondent judge should not have accommodated so many Motions for Postponement filed by the
then ailing Atty. Rosendo Castillo Sr. because a law firm (Castillo & Castillo), to which the latter belonged,
was really representing the defendants, there certainly were other competent lawyers who could have handled
the matter. Respondent, however, continued to entertain and grant several Motions for Postponement based
on the same ground. He did not even ascertain the gravity of counsel's illness or require the presentation of a
medical certificate.
Respondent judge was instead quite liberal, too liberal, in granting postponements which greatly contributed
to the long delay in the disposition of petitioner's ejectment suit. In Arquero v. Mendoza, this Court said that
when the motion for postponement based on illness is not supported by documentary evidence such as a
medical certificate, the grant of postponement is "without sufficient basis."
GUEVARA, Lawrenz Matthew L.
68

DUANO ARRASTRE SERVICE, INC. vs. JUDGE ALEONOR

G.R. No. 97664
October 10, 1991
FACTS:
Private respondent International Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (IPI) filed a complaint before the RTC of
Cebu City against Mercantile Insurance Company, Inc. and petitioner Ouano Arrastre Service, Inc. (OASI)
for replacement of certain equipment imported by IPI which were insured by Mercantile but were lost on
arrival in Cebu City, allegedly because of mishandling by petitioner OASI. Petitioner OASI's answer was
filed by the law firm of Ledesma, Saludo and Associates (LSA) and signed by Atty. Manuel Trinidad of the
Cebu office or branch of LSA. However, sometime thereafter, Atty. Trinidad resigned from LSA and Atty.
Fidel Manalo, a partner from the Makati office of LSA, filed a motion to postpone the hearing stating that the
case had just been endorsed to him by petitioner OASI. After trial which Atty. Manalo handled for OASI, the
trial court rendered a decision holding Mercantile and petitioner OASI jointly and severally liable for the cost
of replacement of the damaged equipment plus damages. Only Mercantile appealed from the decision. IPI
filed a motion for execution of the decision against petitioner OASI which public respondent Judge granted.
Petitioner's counsel, through Atty. Catipay of the Cebu Branch of the LSA, filed a notice of appeal.
Petitioner, through the same counsel, filed a motion for reconsideration of the order granting the writ of
execution. Respondent judge denied OASI's motion for reconsideration. On appeal, the CA dismissed
petitioner's appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not LSA, having represented itself to the public as comprising a single firm, be
allowed to pretend that its main office and its branch office in effect constitute separate law
firms with separate and distinct personalities and responsibilities.
HELD:
NO. Petitioner's counsel was and is the firm of Ledesma, Saludo and Associates (and not any
particular member or associate of that firm) which firm happens to have a main office in Makati and a branch
office in Cebu City. The Court notes that both the main and branch offices operate under one and the same
name, Saludo Ledesma and Associates. Having represented itself to the public as comprising a single firm,
LSA should not be allowed at this point to pretend that its main office and its branch office in effect
constitute separate law firms with separate and distinct personalities and responsibilities.
The trial court's decision was validly served upon petitioner's counsel, whether we look to the unjustified
refusal by Atty. Catipay of LSA-Cebu to accept a copy of the trial court's decision on 7 February 1990 and
the actual notice received by Atty. Catipay on that date through his acquisition of a photocopy of that
decision, or whether we look to the receipt of the trial court's decision by LSA Makati on 21 February 1990.
In view of the unitary nature of the law firm retained by petitioner as its counsel, we believe that the
reglementary period for filing a notice of appeal actually began to run on 8 February 1990. However, even if
the Court were to accept (which it does not) the supposition that the reglementary period began to run only
on 22 February 1990, the day after the copy of the trial court's decision was received by LSA-Makati, it is
quite clear that the notice of appeal filed by petitioner's counsel on 26 June 1990 was wholly late. By the
time the notice of appeal was filed, the trial court's decision had become final and executory as to petitioner
and could be executed against it.
69
PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS 70

CONFIDENTIALITY BETWEEN LAWYERS AND CLIENTS
REGALA, et al. vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 105938
September 20, 1996
FACTS:
The matters raised herein are an offshoot of the institution of the Complaint before the
Sandiganbayan by the Republic of the Philippines, through the Presidential Commission on Good
Government against Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., as one of the principal defendants, for the recovery of
alleged ill-gotten wealth, which includes shares of stocks in the named corporations in PCGG Case No. 33.
As members of the ACCRA Law Firm, petitioners and private respondent Raul Roco admit that they
assisted in the organization and acquisition of the companies included in Civil Case No. 0033, and in keeping
with the office practice, ACCRA lawyers acted as nominees-stockholders of the said corporations involved
in sequestration proceedings.
Respondent PCGG filed a Motion to Admit Third Amended Complaint and Third Amended
Complaint which excluded private respondent Raul S. Roco from the complaint in PCGG Case No. 33 as
party-defendant. Respondent PCGG based its exclusion of private respondent Roco as party-defendant on his
undertaking that he will reveal the identity of the principal/s for whom he acted as nominee/stockholder in
the companies involved in PCGG Case No. 33.
Petitioners were included in the Third Amended Complaint.
Petitioners ACCRA lawyers subsequently filed their COMMENT AND/OR OPPOSITION with
Counter-Motion that respondent PCGG similarly grant the same treatment to them (exclusion as partiesdefendants) as accorded private respondent Roco.
Consequently, respondent PCGG presented supposed proof to substantiate compliance by private
respondent Roco of the conditions precedent to warrant the latter's exclusion as party-defendant in PCGG
Case No. 33.
Respondent Sandiganbayan promulgated the Resolution, herein questioned, denying the exclusion of
petitioners in PCGG Case No. 33, for their refusal to comply with the conditions required by respondent
PCGG.
ACCRA lawyers moved for a reconsideration of the above resolution but the same was denied by the
respondent Sandiganbayan. Hence, the ACCRA lawyers filed the petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the attorney-client privilege prohibits petitioners from revealing the identity
of their clients and the other information requested by the respondent.
HELD:
Yes. The Court held that the condition precedent required by the respondent PCGG of the
petitioners for their exclusion as parties-defendants in PCGG Case No. 33 violates the lawyer-client
confidentiality privilege. The condition also constitutes a transgression by respondents Sandiganbayan and
PCGG of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. It is grossly unfair to exempt one similarly situated
litigant from prosecution without allowing the same exemption to the others. Moreover, the PCGG's demand
not only touches upon the question of the identity of their clients but also on documents related to the
suspected transactions, not only in violation of the attorney-client privilege but also of the constitutional right
against self-incrimination. Whichever way one looks at it, this is a fishing expedition, a free ride at the
expense of such rights.

An argument is advanced that the invocation by petitioners of the privilege of attorney-client
confidentiality at this stage of the proceedings is premature and that they should wait until they are called to
testify and examine as witnesses as to matters learned in confidence before they can raise their objections.
But petitioners are not mere witnesses. They are co-principals in the case for recovery of alleged ill-gotten
wealth. They have made their position clear from the very beginning that they are not willing to testify and
they cannot be compelled to testify in view of their constitutional right against self-incrimination and of their
fundamental legal right to maintain inviolate the privilege of attorney-client confidentiality.
It is clear then that the case against petitioners should never be allowed to take its full course in the
Sandiganbayan. Petitioners should not be made to suffer the effects of further litigation when it is obvious
that their inclusion in the complaint arose from a privileged attorney-client relationship and as a means of
coercing them to disclose the identities of their clients. To allow the case to continue with respect to them
when this Court could nip the problem in the bud at this early opportunity would be to sanction an unjust
situation which we should not here countenance. The case hangs as a real and palpable threat, a proverbial
Sword of Damocles over petitioners' heads. It should not be allowed to continue a day longer.

GENATO vs. ATTY. SILAPAN
A.C. No. 4078
July 14, 2003
FACTS:
In this complaint for disbarment filed by William Ong Genato against respondent Atty. Essex L.
Silapan, complainant alleged that respondent asked if he could rent a small office space in complainant's
building for his law practice. Complainant acceded and introduced respondent to Atty. Benjamin Dacanay,
complainant's retained lawyer, who accommodated respondent in the building and made him handle some of
complainant's cases. Hence, the start of the legal relationship between complainant and respondent.
The conflict between the parties started when respondent borrowed P200,000.00 from complainant
which he intended to use as downpayment for the purchase of a new car. In return, respondent issued to
complainant a postdated check in the amount of P176,528.00 to answer for the 6 months interest on the loan.
He likewise mortgaged to complainant his house and lot in Quezon City but did not surrender its title
claiming that it was the subject of reconstitution proceedings before the Quezon City Register of Deeds.
With the money borrowed from complainant, respondent purchased a new car. However, the
document of sale of the car was issued in complainant's name and financed through City Trust Company.
Respondent introduced to complainant a certain Emmanuel Romero. Romero likewise wanted to
borrow money from complainant. Complainant lent Romero the money and, from this transaction,
respondent earned commission in the amount of P52,289.90. Complainant used the commission to pay
respondent's arrears with the car financing firm.
Subsequently, respondent failed to pay the amortization on the car and the financing firm sent
demand letters to complainant. Complainant tried to encash respondent's postdated check with the drawee
bank but it was dishonored as respondent's account therein was already closed.
Respondent failed to heed complainant's repeated demands for payment. Complainant then filed a
criminal case against respondent for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and a civil case for judicial
foreclosure of real estate mortgage.
Complainant gripes that the foregoing allegations are false, immaterial to the foreclosure case and
maliciously designed to defame him. He charged that in making such allegations, respondent is guilty of
breaking their confidential lawyer-client relationship and should be held administratively liable therefor.
Consequently, he filed this complaint for disbarment, praying also that an administrative sanction be meted
against respondent for his issuance of a bouncing check.
In a Resolution, the Court referred the administrative case to the IBP for investigation, report and
recommendation.
The Board of Governors of the IBP approved the report of the investigating commissioner finding
the respondent guilty as charged and recommending his suspension from the practice of law for 1 year.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent committed a breach of trust and confidence by imputing to

complainant illegal practices and disclosing complainant's alleged intention to bribe
government officials in connection with a pending case.

HELD:
Yes. The Court held that Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer
owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him. The
long-established rule is that an attorney is not permitted to disclose communications made to him in his
professional character by a client, unless the latter consents. This obligation to preserve the confidences and
secrets of a client arises at the inception of their relationship. The protection given to the client is perpetual
and does not cease with the termination of the litigation, nor is it affected by the party's ceasing to employ
the attorney and retaining another, or by any other change of relation between them. It even survives the
death of the client.
It must be stressed, however, that the privilege against disclosure of confidential communications or
information is limited only to communications which are legitimately and properly within the scope of a
lawful employment of a lawyer. It does not extend to those made in contemplation of a crime or perpetration
of a fraud. If the unlawful purpose is avowed, as in this case, the complainant's alleged intention to bribe
government officials in relation to his case, the communication is not covered by the privilege as the client
does not consult the lawyer professionally. It is not within the profession of a lawyer to advise a client as to
how he may commit a crime as a lawyer is not a gun for hire. Thus, the attorney-client privilege does not
attach, there being no professional employment in the strict sense.
Be that as it may, respondent's explanation that it was necessary for him to make the disclosures in
his pleadings fails to satisfy us. The disclosures were not indispensable to protect his rights as they were not
pertinent to the foreclosure case. It was improper for the respondent to use it against the complainant in the
foreclosure case as it was not the subject matter of litigation therein and respondent's professional
competence and legal advice were not being attacked in said case. A lawyer must conduct himself, especially
in his dealings with his clients, with integrity in a manner that is beyond reproach. His relationship with his
clients should be characterized by the highest degree of good faith and fairness.

WILLIAM S. UY vs ATTY. FERMIN L. GONZALES
A.C. No. 5280
March 30, 2004
FACTS
Sometime in April 1999, Willian S. Uy engaged the services of respondent lawyer to prepare and file
a petition for the issuance of a new certificate of title. After confiding with respondent the circumstances
surrounding the lost title and discussing the fees and costs, respondent prepared, finalized and submitted to
him a petition to be filed before the Regional Trial Court of Tayug, Pangasinan. When the petition was about
to be filed, respondent went to complainants office demanding a certain amount other than what was
previously agreed upon. Respondent left his office after reasoning with him. Expecting that said petition
would be filed, he was shocked to find out later that instead of filing the petition for the issuance of a new
certificate of title, respondent filed a letter-complaint against him with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
for Falsification of Public Documents. The letter-complaint contained facts and circumstances pertaining to
the transfer certificate of title that was the subject matter of the petition which respondent was supposed to
have filed.
Willian S. Uy, then filed an administrative case against Atty. Fermin L. Gonzales for violation of the
confidentiality of their lawyer-client relationship. On the other hand, respondent alleged that when he filed
the letter- complaint against Uy there was no more lawyer-client relationship between them. It was
manifested through a handwritten letter telling complainant that he is withdrawing the petition he prepared
and that complainant should get another lawyer to file the petition thereby terminating the lawyer-client
relationship between him and complainant.
The IBP found him guilty of violating Rule 21.02, Canon 21 of the Canons of Professional
Responsibility and recommended for his suspension for 6 months.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent violated Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
HELD
No. The records reveals that the relationship between complainant and respondent stemmed from a
personal transaction or dealings between them rather than the practice of law by respondent. Respondent
dealt with complainant only because he redeemed a property which complainant had earlier purchased from
his son. However, despite the period given to him, complainant failed to fulfill his end of the bargain because
of the alleged loss of the title which he had admitted to respondent as having prematurely transferred to his
children, thus prompting respondent to offer his assistance and assume the expenses.
Whatever facts alleged by respondent against complainant were not obtained by respondent in his
professional capacity but as a redemptioner of a property originally owned by his deceased son and therefore,
when respondent filed the complaint for estafa against herein complainant, which necessarily involved
alleging facts that would constitute estafa, respondent was not, in any way, violating Canon 21. There is no
way can it equate the filing of the affidavit-complaint against herein complainant to a misconduct that is
wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or that renders him unworthy to continue
as an officer of the court. To hold otherwise would be precluding any lawyer from instituting a case against
anyone to protect his personal or proprietary interests.
PETITION DISMISSED for lack of merit.
JURILLA, Mark Cabisada

MA. LUISA HADJULA vs. ATTY. ROCELES F. MADIANDA
A.C. No. 6711
July 3, 2007
FACTS
Ma. Luisa Hadjula filed with the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, complainant charged Atty.
Roceles F. Madianda with violation of Article 209 of the Revised Penal Code and Canon Nos. 15.02 and
21.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Complainant alleged that she and respondent used to be
friends as they both worked at the Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP) whereat respondent was the Chief Legal
Officer while she was the Chief Nurse of the Medical, Dental and Nursing Services. Complainant claimed
that, sometime in 1998, she approached respondent for some legal advice. Complainant further alleged that,
in the course of their conversation which was supposed to be kept confidential, she disclosed personal secrets
and produced copies of a marriage contract, a birth certificate and a baptismal certificate, only to be informed
later by the respondent that she would refer the matter to a lawyer friend. It was malicious of respondent to
have refused handling her case only after she had already heard her secrets.
In her answer, respondent denied giving legal advice to the complainant and dismissed any
suggestion about the existence of a lawyer-client relationship between them. Respondent also stated the
observation that the supposed confidential data and sensitive documents adverted to are in fact matters of
common knowledge in the BFP.
The respondent on the other hand filed a counter-complaint with the Ombudsman charging her with
violation of Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019, falsification of public documents and immorality, the last
two charges being based on the disclosures complainant earlier made to respondent. And also on the basis of
the same disclosures, complainant further stated, a disciplinary case was also instituted against her before the
Professional Regulation Commission.
The IBP found that Atty. Madianda found to have violated Canon 21 when she revealed information
given to her during a legal consultation, and accordingly recommended that respondent be reprimanded.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent violated Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility?
HELD
Yes. The purpose of the rule of confidentiality is actually to protect the client from possible breach
of confidence as a result of a consultation with a lawyer.
The seriousness of the respondents offense notwithstanding, the Court feels that there is room for
compassion, absent compelling evidence that the respondent acted with ill-will. Without meaning to condone
the error of respondents ways, what at bottom is before the Court is two former friends becoming bitter
enemies and filing charges and counter-charges against each other using whatever convenient tools and data
that were readily available. Unfortunately, the personal information respondent gathered from her
conversation with complainant became handy in her quest to even the score. It appears clearly that
respondent was actuated by the urge to retaliate without perhaps realizing that, in the process of giving vent
to a negative sentiment, she was violating the rule on confidentiality.
Respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED.

THOMAS J. ALEXIOU vs US
39 F 3d 973
November 2, 1994
FACTS
Mr. Alexiou, an attorney, deposited money in his law firm bank account. The deposit included a
$100 bill which turned out to be counterfeit. The Secret Service eventually contacted him, asking for the
identity of the person who passed the bill. Mr. Alexiou consulted the Washington Rules of Professional
Conduct for attorneys and decided that he could not ethically respond to the inquiry. His concern, based on
his own examination and consultation with staff counsel for the Washington State Bar Association, was that
the identity of a client was secret and could not be disclosed without a court order.
Despite Mr. Alexiou's independent research suggesting that the information requested would be
confidential, the Assistant United States Attorney obtained a subpoena duces tecum, commanding Mr.
Alexiou to appear before the grand jury to testify, and to bring with him the "name, address, date, and
amount of money received from the person who retained his services by giving him a counterfeit $100
federal reserve note." Mr. Alexiou moved to quash on grounds of attorney-client privilege.
The district court denied the motion to quash. Mr. Alexiou brought an expedited appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the disclosure by Mr. Alexiou would violate the attorney-client privilege.
HELD
No. Generally, the attorney client privilege does not protect against disclosure of the identity of the
client and the fee arrangements between lawyer and client. There is an exception where identification of the
client conveys information which is itself privileged. If revealing the client's identity would constitute an
acknowledgment of guilt of the offense which led the client to seek legal assistance, then the identity of the
client would be privileged.
In order to qualify for the protection afforded by the attorney-client privilege, information regarding
client identity or legal fees must be in substance a disclosure of the confidential communication in the
professional relationship between the client and the attorney. The exception might operate to prevent the
disclosure if the disclosure were the last link in the chain of testimony necessary to convict the client. But as
the government explained in its argument, the client's identity would not suffice in this case; knowledge and
intent would still have to be proved. No doubt many innocent people pass counterfeit bills without realizing
it. In all likelihood, Mr. Alexiou was the victim of a counterfeiter, and lost $100 which he was entitled to for
his services because of the crime. His client who paid it to him may be in the same position.
In this case, the communication of the client's name and payment were entirely distinct from the
matter in which the client sought the lawyer's services. It was therefore unprotected by the privilege.
Evidently the client retained Mr. Alexiou to represent him in traffic matters and an assault, not anything
having to do with counterfeiting. If the client knew the bill was counterfeit, then Mr. Alexiou was the victim
of a crime by his client entirely distinct from the matter in which Mr. Alexiou was retained. If the client did
not know, then both of them were victims, and the disclosure would not implicate the client at all. Either
way, the disclosure would not be the last link in a chain of evidence which would lead to conviction, and it
was not error for the district court to deny the motion to quash.
Affirmed.

ELLEN BRETT vs GERALD Z. BERKOWITZ
706 A.2d 509
Del. 1998
FACTS
After her divorce in 1988, Ellen Brett hired Gerald Z. Berkowitz, to represent her before the Family
Court with respect to ancillary matters. Berkowitz represented Brett from August 1989 through March 1991,
whereupon Brett fired Berkowitz and filed a civil suit against him and the firm of Berkowitz, Schagrin,
Coonin Cooper, P.A. Brett alleged sexual misconduct and legal malpractice. She claimed that, over the
course of her attorney-client relationship with Berkowitz, he rubbed her thigh, kissed her against her will and
repeatedly suggested that they sleep together, all in violation of criminal statutes 11 Del. C. 601 and
763(2). Brett's legal malpractice claims were based on allegations that Berkowitz failed to advise her of a
possible claim against her former husband for damages from physical abuse, and that Berkowitz negligently
handled matters concerning property division.
Brett then requested for discovery issue which involved two interrogatories; (1) provide the names
and addresses of all clients who defendant Berkowitz has had any type of sexual contact with or who have
made a complaint of any sexual contact regarding defendant Berkowitz; (2) state all occasions on which any
shareholders or partners of defendant law firm had any indication that defendant Berkowitz was having any
type of sexual contact with any of his clients.
The defendants objected to and refused to answer both interrogatories. In Berkowitz deposition, he
refused to answer a series of questions concerning sexual relations with clients, claiming that they were
beyond the scope of discovery and protected by the privilege communication. Plaintiff then filed a motion to
compel answers to the interrogatories and deposition questions.
The Superior Court found that information concerning Berkowitz' alleged relations with other clients
was relevant to the issue of whether he sought sex from Brett. Nevertheless, noting that the disclosure
requested by Brett was unique in that it implicated the substantial privacy interests of third parties, the court
denied the motion to compel on the ground that the discovery was neither admissible nor reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the disclosure requested by Brett be allowed.
HELD
No. Brett seeks discovery of sensitive information concerning Berkowitz' relationships with former
clients who are not parties to this litigation. Under the unique circumstances of this case, the mere disclosure
of client identity betrays information that is usually the substance of confidential attorney-client
communication. Compelling the information requested would improperly contravene the attorney-client
privilege.
The information requested by Brett necessarily requires that the identity of Berkowitz' former clients be
discovered. The privacy interests of persons who are not parties to this litigation should not be invaded, and
should not risk chilling the free flow of communication that the attorney-client privilege is designed to foster.
The judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed.

MELISSA DIETZ vs. JOHN DOE
No. 64002-5 April 24, 1997
FACTS:
Morgan Dietz died in an automobile accident on May 24, 1989 when his car collided with a dump
truck that lost control while allegedly trying to avoid another car making an unsafe turn. The driver of the car
that made the unsafe left turn has never come forward and the authorities do not know the drivers identity.
After a week, a news article appeared in a local newspaper where an Port Angeles attorney Craig Ritchie
acknowledged that the said driver had retained his services but had no further comment. Now the attorney for
the Dietz family members and estate contacted Ritchie in an attempt to discover the name of the person who
retained him but the latter refused, asserting attorney-client privilege. The plaintiffs attorneys and Ritchie
agreed that the best way to resolve the issue was to have the court hear a motion to compel the latter to
disclose the name. The said motion was denied by the trial court stating that the identification of John Doe
would plainly implicate him in the accident of May 24, 1989. The plaintiffs sought the review of the denial
of the order and the Court of Appeals affirmed denial of the motion. The Supreme Court granted the review.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ritchie is required to disclose the identity of his putative client.
HELD:
No. Ritchie is not required to disclose the identity of his client. Although the Court ruled that in
order to have the privilege of RCW 5.60.060(2), there must first be an attorney-client relationship present. In
the case at bar, it was not established further on the part of the client who has the burden of proof to prove
that there is indeed an attorney-client relationship between Ritchie and the client. The trier of fact on the
issue of the existence of an attorney-client relationship between Doe and Ritchie may not simply accept
Ritchies legal conclusion that Doe was his client. Ritchies legal conclusions are interesting, but not
dispositive. However, the question of the disclosure of a clients identity has been addressed in Washington
law. Ordinarily, the name of a client is not a confidential communication under the protection of the attorneyclient privilege. An exception to this general rule is the legal advice exception which bars disclosure
where the person invoking the privilege can show that a strong probability exists that disclosure of such
information would implicate that client in the very criminal activity for which legal advice was sought.
Further, the Supreme Court held that The name of the client will be considered privileged matter where the
circumstances of the case are such that the name of the client is material only for the purpose of showing an
acknowledgment of guilt on the part of such client of the very offenses on account of which the attorney was
employed. Although this case was remanded to the trial court to further elaborate whether or not there was
an attorney-client relationship, the Supreme Court held that while the name of the client is ordinarily not
protected by the privilege, it expressly adopts the legal advice exception which protects the identity of the
client where the revelation of the clients identity would necessarily reveal the essence of the attorney-client
communications.
LAGUIO, Ysrael Joseph Jr. P.

LINDA BRENNAN vs. DAVID BRENNAN
422 A.2d 510
1980
FACTS:
Plaintiff-Appellee Linda Brennan filed a complaint against her husband, David Brennan, for the
custody of the two minor children of the parties, David and Kelly Brennan. The complaint alleges that the
father took the children to reside in the State of Florida. The complaint was mailed to the defendants last
known residence but the copy mailed by certified mail was returned unclaimed. However, the copy sent by
ordinary mail was not returned and according to the Allegheny County Local Rule of Civil Procedure, the
service procedures were satisfied. The plaintiff then filed a Petition to expedite the hearing date to the lower
court which set a conciliation directing both parties to appear and for the defendant-appellant to produce the
children at the hearing. Several telephone conversations were alleged by the plaintiff and her mother between
them and the defendant as proofs for the defendant taking notice. The defendant then failed to appear or to
produce the children at the scheduled conciliation and the Court awarded temporary custody of the children
to the plaintiff. No further events concerning the case appear of record until October 11, 1979 when Attorney
Breault entered his appearance on behalf of the defendant who presented a Motion for Continuance. He
alleged that the defendant only found out about the hearing by chance a few days earlier and had not been
provided notice and also there was a lack of in personam jurisdiction over defendant. During the hearing,
Attorney Breault was asked by the Court to reveal the home address and telephone number of the father as
well as the school where the children were attending. Constant refusal of Breault, alleging attorney-client
relationship, eventually made the Plaintiff file a petition to the Court to enter a Rule to Show Cause why
Breault should not be held in contempt. After refusing again to disclose the information, the Court entered an
Order finding Breault in civil contempt of court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the attorney-client privilege may prevent a court from compelling an attorney
to disclose his clients address when the said client specifically requested counstel to
maintain confidentiality as to that information.
HELD:
Yes. The Court held that the attorney-client privilege, protecting the confidentiality of information
passed by a client to his attorney, is well-established in the laws. It has been recognized in the statutes and
rules of conduct, as well as being a fundamental concept in the body of common law. The purposes and
necessities of the relation between a client and his attorney require, in many cases, on the part of the client,
the fullest and freest disclosures to the attorney of the clients objects, motives and acts. This disclosure is
made in the strictest confidence, relying upon the attorneys honor and fidelity. An exception to this rule
states that, An attorney may validly assert the privilege as to his clients name or address in the limited
instance where the client intended such information to be confidential and further provided that protecting
this cloak of secrecy will not aid in carrying out an unlawful purpose. This is not applicable in the case at
bar. On the record, the Court cannot find that the defendants custody of his children is in violation of any
proper custody for there was no evidence in the record to indicate that he was indeed served with notice of
the Courts order awarding temporary custody to the plaintiff. In short, the Court finds the present record
insufficient to support the plaintiffs burden of showing either a crime or fraud to overcome the privilege
advanced by the defense.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN A REGULAR LAWYER-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP
BLANDINA GAMBOA HILADO vs. JOSE GUTIERREZ DAVID
G.R. No. L-691
September 21, 1949
FACTS:
On April 23, 1945, Blandina Gamboa Hilado brought an action against Selim Jacob Assad to annul
the sale of several houses and lot executed during the Japanese occupation by Mrs. Hilados now deceased
husband. Attorneys Ohnick, Velilla and Balonkita filed an answer on behalf of the defendant and Attorneys
Delgado, Dizon, Flores and Rodrigo registered their appearance as counsel for the plaintiff. Jacob Assad was
included as a party defendant on a later date. Attorney Francisco then entered his appearance as attorney of
record for the defendant in substitution for the Attorneys of the defendant who withdrew from the case.
Attorney Dizon then wrote Attorney Francisco urging him to discontinue representing the defendants on the
ground that Mrs. Hilado, the plaintiff, had consulted with him about her case and that Francisco sent her a
written opinion which was identified in the evidence. It was alleged in the letter that Francisco gave an
opinion that the action filed by Mrs. Hilado against Mr. Assad will not ordinarily prosper. Not receiving any
answer to this suggestion, Attorney Delgado, Dizon, Flores and Rodrigo filed a formal motion with the court
wherein the case was and is pending to disqualify Attorney Francisco. Attorney Francisco answered the
attorneys complaint alleging that and he signed the letter without reading it and without keeping it for a
minute in his possession and that he told his assistant, Attorney Agrava, that the firm should not handle Mrs.
Hilados case, calling Agravas attention what he (Francisco) already had said to Mrs. Hilado.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the motion for disqualification should be allowed.
HELD:
Yes. Here, the attorney-client relationship must first be established. In order to constitute such
relation, the attorneys must be employed either to give advice upon a legal point, to prosecute or defend an
action in court of justice, or to prepare and draft, in legal form such papers as deeds, bills, contracts and the
like. An attorney is employed-that is, he is engaged in his professional capacity as a lawyer or counsellor
when he is listening to his clients preliminary statement of his case, or when he is giving advice thereon, just
as truly as when he is drawing his clients pleadings, or advocating his clients cause in open court. Formality
is not an essential element since the contract may be express or implied and it is sufficient that the advice and
assistance of the attorney is sought and received, in matters pertinent to his profession.
The defense that Attorney Agrava wrote the letter and that Attorney Francisco did not take the
trouble of reading it, would not take the case out of the interdiction. If this letter was written under the
circumstances explained by Attorney Francisco and he was unaware of its contents, the fact remains that his
firm did give Mrs. Hilado a formal professional advice from which, as heretofore demonstrated, emerged the
relation of attorney and client. The letter binds and estop him in the same manner and to the same degree as
if he personally had written it. Therefore, the motion for disqualification should be allowed.

HUMBERTO C. LIM, JR. vs. ATTY. NICANOR V. VILLAROSA
A.C. No. 5303
June 15, 2006
FACTS:
The respondent is a practicing lawyer and a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Lumot
A. Jalandoni, Chairman/President of Penta Resorts Corporation was then sued on September 19, 1997 before
the RTC for the recovery of possession of property involving Hotel Alhambra, a hotel owned by PRC. The
latter engaged the legal services of herein respondent and as a consequence of said attorney-client
relationship, he represented Lumot A. Jalandoni et al in the entire proceedings of said case. However, on
April 27, 1999 respondent, without due notice prior to a scheduled hearing, surprisingly filed a Motion to
withdraw as counsel, one day before its scheduled hearing on April 28, 1999. A careful perusal of said
Motion to Withdraw as Counsel will conclusively show that no copy thereof was furnished to Lumot A.
Jalandoni, neither does it bear her conformity. The respondent alleged that the grounds for his withdrawal
involved him being a retained counsel of Dennis G. Jalbuena and he was only recommended to by Jalbuena
to be a counsel of Jalandoni since Jalbuena is the son-inlaw of Jalandoni. However, the respondent already
appeared for and in behalf of the Sps. Carmen and Dennis Jalbuena/Vicente Delfin while concurrently
representing Jalandoni in a criminal complaint filed by Mr. Lim and Mrs. Jalandoni even before filing his
Motion to Withdraw as Counsel of Lumot A. Jalandoni. Lim then filed a verified complaint for disbarment
against respondent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent should be liable for conflict of interest and whether or not
respondent properly withdrew his services as counsel of record.
HELD:
The respondent is liable for conflict of interest as stated in Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. In one civil case for recovery of possession of property involving Hotel Alhambra, the
respondent represented Jalandoni. Also, while still being engaged in the attorney-client relationship with
Jalandoni, respondent represented Delfin and spouses Jalbuena as against Lim and Jalandoni in a criminal
case which positioned himself against PRCs interest and caused a blatant display of conflict of interest. It is
only upon strict compliance with the condition of full disclosure of facts that a lawyer may appear against his
client; otherwise, his representation of conflicting interests is reprehensible. The Court held that there is
representation of conflicting interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to do
anything which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and also
whether he will be called upon in his new relation, to use against his first client any knowledge acquired
through their connection. The representation by a lawyer of conflicting interests, in the absence of the written
consent of all parties concerned after a full disclosure of the facts, constitutes professional misconduct which
subjects the lawyer to disciplinary action.
As for the termination of attorney-client relationship by the respondent, it was not proper since
according to Canon 22 of the CPR, a lawyer shall withdraw his services only for good cause and upon notice
appropriate in the circumstances. In the case at bar, respondent presumed that his motion to withdraw as
counsel would be granted by the Court where in fact, there was no order granting it. Without a good cause,
the motion shall not be granted. Therefore, respondent Villarosa is found guilty of violating Canon 15 and
Canon 22 of the CPR.

BENEDICTO HORNILLA and ATTY. FEDERICO D. RICAFORT vs. ATTY. ERNESTO S.
SALUNAT
A.C. No. 5804
(2003)
FACTS
Benedicto Hornilla and Federico D. Ricafort filed an administrative complaint with the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline, against respondent Atty. Ernesto S. Salunat for
illegal and unethical practice and conflict of interest. They alleged that respondent is a member of the ASSA
Law and Associates, which was the retained counsel of the Philippine Public School Teachers Association
(PPSTA). Respondent's brother, Aurelio S. Salunat, was a member of the PPSTA Board which approved
respondent's engagement as retained counsel of PPSTA.
Complainants, who are members of the PPSTA, filed an intra-corporate case against its members of
the Board of Directors for unlawful spending and the undervalued sale of real property of the PPSTA.
Respondent entered his appearance as counsel for the PPSTA Board members in the said cases.
Complainants contend that respondent was guilty of conflict of interest because he was engaged by the
PPSTA, of which complainants were members, and was being paid out of its corporate funds where
complainants have contributed. Despite being told by PPSTA members of the said conflict of interest,
respondent refused to withdraw his appearance in the said cases.
In his Answer, respondent stressed that he entered his appearance as counsel for the PPSTA Board
Members for and in behalf of the ASSA Law and Associates. As a partner in the said law firm, he only filed
a "Manifestation of Extreme Urgency". Respondent pointed out that his relationship to Aurelio S. Salunat
was immaterial; and that when he entered into the retainer contract with the PPSTA Board, he did so, not in
his individual capacity, but in representation of the ASSA Law Firm. He denied that he ensured the victory
of the PPSTA Board in the case he was handling.
The case was referred to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline. After investigation, Commissioner
Lydia A. Navarro recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months.
Respondent filed with this Court a Motion for Reconsideration of the above Resolution of the IBP Board of
Governors.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is in violation of RULE 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which states that a lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
HELD
The pertinent rule of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
RULE 15.03. A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more opposing
parties. The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer's duty to fight for an issue or claim,
but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument will be
opposed by him when he argues for the other client. Also, there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of the
new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in any
matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use against
his first client any knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test of the inconsistency of
interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his
LARA, Peter Emmanuel C.

duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in
the performance thereof.
A lawyer engaged as counsel for a corporation cannot represent members of the same corporation's
board of directors in a derivative suit brought against them. To do so would be tantamount to representing
conflicting interests, which is prohibited by the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In the case at bar, the records show that SEC Case No. 05-97-5657. entitled "Philippine Public
School Teacher's Assn., Inc., et al. v. 1992-1995 Board of Directors of the Philippine Public School
Teacher's Assn. (PPSTA), et al.," was filed by the PPSTA against its own Board of Directors. Respondent
admits that the ASSA Law Firm, of which he is the Managing Partner, was the retained counsel of PPSTA.
Yet, he appeared as counsel of record for the respondent Board of Directors in the said case. Clearly,
respondent was guilty of conflict of interest when he represented the parties against whom his other client,
the PPSTA, filed suit.

HUMBERTO C. LIM, JR., in behalf of PENTA RESORTS CORPORATION/Attorney-in-Fact of
LUMOT A. JALANDONI vs. ATTY. NICANOR V. VILLAROSA
A.C. No. 5303
(2006)
FACTS
Lumot A. Jalandoni, Chairman/President of PRC engaged the services of Atty. Nicanor Villarosa
who formally entered his appearance as counsel for the defendants Lumot A. Jalandoni/Totti Anlap
Gargoles. Utmost trust and confidence was reposed on said counsel, hence delicate and confidential matters
involving all the personal circumstances of his client were entrusted to the respondent. The latter was
provided with all the necessary information relative to the property in question and likewise on legal matters
affecting the corporation (PRC) particularly [involving] problems [which affect] Hotel Alhambra.
However, respondent, without due notice prior to a scheduled hearing, surprisingly filed a Motion to
withdraw as counsel, one day before its scheduled hearing. No copy thereof was furnished to Lumot A.
Jalandoni, neither does it bear her conformity. Such act resulted to irreparable damage and injury to Lumot
A. Jalandoni, et al since the decision of the court proved adverse to Lumot A. Jalandoni, et al. Respondent
alleged that the reason for his withdrawal as counsel of Lumot A. Jalandoni, et al. was that he is a retained
counsel of Dennis G. Jalbuena and the Fernando F. Gonzaga, Inc.
Furthermore, respondent was able to acquire vast resources of confidential and delicate information
by virtue of lawyer-client relationship from Lumot A. Jalandoni when the latter was his client. Using the said
classified information which should have been closely guarded, respondent did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully, feloniously conspired and confabulated with the Sps. Dennis and Carmen J. Jalbuena in
concocting the despicable and fabricated charges against his former clients denominated as PP vs. Lumot A.
Jalandoni, Pamela J. Yulo, Cristina J. Lim and Leica J. Lim for viol. of Art. 172 of Revised Penal Code due
to a board resolution executed by the corporation which the Sps. Jalbuena, with the assistance of herein
respondent. Were it not for said fiduciary relation between client and lawyer, respondent will not be in a
position to furnish his conspirator spouses with confidential information on Lumot A. Jalandoni/PRC,
operator of Alhambra Hotel.
HELD
The pertinent rule of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
RULE 15.03. A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
There is representation of conflicting interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the
attorney to do anything which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him
and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation, to use against his first client any knowledge
acquired through their connection. 32 (emphasis ours)
The rule on conflict of interests covers not only cases in which confidential communications have
been confided but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used.
Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent
an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite
suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance thereof, and also whether he will be called

upon in his new relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquire in the previous employment.
The first part of the rule refers to cases in which the opposing parties are present clients either in the same
action or in a totally unrelated case; the second part pertains to those in which the adverse party against
whom the attorney appears is his former client in a matter which is related, directly or indirectly, to the
present controversy.
The rule prohibits a lawyer from representing new clients whose interests oppose those of a former
client in any manner, whether or not they are parties in the same action or in totally unrelated cases. The
cases here directly or indirectly involved the parties' connection to PRC, even if neither PRC nor Lumot A.
Jalandoni was specifically named as party-litigant in some of the cases mentioned.
An attorney owes to his client undivided allegiance. After being retained and receiving the
confidences of the client, he cannot, without the free and intelligent consent of his client, act both for his
client and for one whose interest is adverse to, or conflicting with that of his client in the same general
matter. The prohibition stands even if the adverse interest is very slight; neither is it material that the
intention and motive of the attorney may have been honest.
The representation by a lawyer of conflicting interests, in the absence of the written consent of all
parties concerned after a full disclosure of the facts, constitutes professional misconduct which subjects the
lawyer to disciplinary action.
Even respondent's alleged effort to settle the existing controversy among the family members was
improper because the written consent of all concerned was still required. A lawyer who acts as such in
settling a dispute cannot represent any of the parties to it.

NESTOR PEREZ vs. ATTY. DANILO DE LA TORRE
A.C. No. 6160
(2006)
FACTS
Nestor Perez charged respondent Atty. Danilo de la Torre with misconduct or conduct unbecoming
of a lawyer for representing conflicting interests.
Perez alleged that he is the barangay captain of Binanuaanan, Calabanga, Camarines Sur; that in
December 2001, several suspects for murder and kidnapping for ransom, among them Sonny Boy Ilo and
Diego Avila, were apprehended and jailed by the police authorities. Respondent went to the municipal
building of Calabanga where Ilo and Avila were being detained and made representations that he could
secure their freedom if they sign the prepared extrajudicial confessions. Unknown to the two accused,
respondent was representing the heirs of the murder victim. Thereafter, on the strength of the extrajudicial
confessions, cases were filed against them, including herein complainant who was implicated in the
extrajudicial confessions as the mastermind in the criminal activities for which they were being charged.
Respondent denied the accusations against him. He explained that while being detained at the
Calabanga Municipal Police Jail, Avila sought his assistance in drafting an extrajudicial confession regarding
his involvement in the crimes of kidnapping for ransom, murder and robbery. He advised Avila to inform his
parents about his decision to make an extrajudicial confession, apprised him of his constitutional rights and
of the possibility that he might be utilized as a state-witness.
Respondent claimed that when Ilo sought his assistance in executing his extrajudicial confession, he
conferred with Ilo in the presence of his parents; and only after he was convinced that Ilo was not under
undue compulsion did he assist the accused in executing the extrajudicial confession.
The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report
and recommendation where it respectfully recommended that Atty. Danilo de la Torre be suspended for one
(1) year from the practice of the legal profession for violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
The Board of Governors of the IBP modified the recommendation by increasing the period of
suspension to two years.
HELD
To negate any culpability, respondent explained that he did not offer his legal services to accused
Avila and Ilo but it was the two accused who sought his assistance in executing their extrajudicial
confessions. Nonetheless, he acceded to their request to act as counsel after apprising them of their
constitutional rights and after being convinced that the accused were under no compulsion to give their
confession.
The excuse proferred by the respondent does not exonerate him from the clear violation of Rule
15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which prohibits a lawyer from representing conflicting
interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
As found by the IBP, at the time respondent was representing Avila and Ilo, two of the accused in the
murder of the victim Resurreccion Barrios, he was representing the family of the murder victim. Clearly, his

representation of opposing clients in the murder case invites suspicion of double-dealing and infidelity to his
clients.
What is unsettling is that respondent assisted in the execution by the two accused of their confessions
whereby they admitted their participation in various serious criminal offenses knowing fully well that he was
retained previously by the heirs of one of the victims. Respondent, who presumably knows the intricacies of
the law, should have exercised his better judgment before conceding to accused's choice of counsel. It did not
cross his mind to inhibit himself from acting as their counsel and instead, he even assisted them in executing
the extrajudicial confession.
Considering that this is respondent's first infraction, disbarment as sought by the complaint is
deemed to be too severe. Under the present circumstances, we find that a suspension from the practice of law
for three years is warranted.

LETICIA GONZALES vs. ATTY. MARCELINO CABUCANA
A.C. No. 6836
(2006)
FACTS
A complaint filed by Leticia Gonzales (Gonzales) praying that Atty. Marcelino Cabucana,
(respondent) be disbarred for representing conflicting interests.
Gonzales filed a petition before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) alleging that she was the
complainant in a case for sum of money and damages where she was represented by the law firm
CABUCANA, CABUCANA, DE GUZMAN AND CABUCANA LAW OFFICE, with Atty. Edmar
Cabucana handling the case and herein respondent as an associate/partner. Thereafter, decision was rendered
in the civil case ordering the losing party to pay Gonzales the amount of P17,310.00 with interest and
P6,000.00 as attorney's fees. Sheriff Romeo Gatcheco, failed to fully implement the writ of execution issued
in connection with the judgment which prompted Gonzales to file a complaint against the said sheriff with
this Court. However, Sheriff Gatcheco and his wife went to the house of Gonzales for the purpose of
harassing Gonzales and asked her to execute an affidavit of desistance regarding her complaint before this
Court. Gonzales thereafter filed against the Gatchecos criminal cases for trespass, grave threats, grave oral
defamation, simple coercion and unjust vexation. Notwithstanding the pendency of Civil Case No. 1-567,
where respondent's law firm was still representing Gonzales, herein respondent represented the Gatchecos in
the cases filed by Gonzales against the said spouses.
In his Answer, respondent averred that he never appeared and represented complainant in Civil Case
No. 1-567 since it was his brother, Atty. Edmar Cabucana who appeared and represented Gonzales in said
case. He admitted that he is representing Sheriff Gatcheco and his wife in the cases filed against them but
claimed that his appearance is pro bono and that the spouses pleaded with him as no other counsel was
willing to take their case. He entered his appearance in good faith and opted to represent the spouses rather
than leave them defenseless. When the Gatchecos asked for his assistance, the spouses said that the cases
filed against them by Gonzales were merely instigated by a high ranking official who wanted to get even
with them for their refusal to testify in favor of the said official in another case.
HELD:
The claim of respondent that there is no conflict of interests in this case, as the civil case handled by
their law firm where Gonzales is the complainant and the criminal cases filed by Gonzales against the
Gatcheco spouses are not related, has no merit. The representation of opposing clients in said cases, though
unrelated, constitutes conflict of interests or, at the very least, invites suspicion of double-dealing which this
Court cannot allow.
Respondent further argued that it was his brother who represented Gonzales in the civil case and not him,
thus, there could be no conflict of interests. We do not agree. As respondent admitted, it was their law firm
which represented Gonzales in the civil case. Such being the case, the rule against representing conflicting
interests applies.

As we explained in the case of Hilado vs. David:

[W]e . . . can not sanction his taking up the cause of the adversary of the party who had
sought and obtained legal advice from his firm; this, not necessarily to prevent any injustice to the
plaintiff but to keep above reproach the honor and integrity of the courts and of the bar. Without
condemning the respondent's conduct as dishonest, corrupt, or fraudulent, we do believe that upon
the admitted facts it is highly inexpedient. It had the tendency to bring the profession, of which he is
a distinguished member, "into public disrepute and suspicion and undermine the integrity of justice."
The claim of respondent that he acted in good faith and with honest intention will also not exculpate him as
such claim does not render the prohibition inoperative.
In the same manner, his claim that he could not turn down the spouses as no other lawyer is willing
to take their case cannot prosper as it is settled that while there may be instances where lawyers cannot
decline representation they cannot be made to labor under conflict of interest between a present client and a
prospective one. Granting also that there really was no other lawyer who could handle the spouses' case other
than him, still he should have observed the requirements laid down by the rules by conferring with the
prospective client to ascertain as soon as practicable whether the matter would involve a conflict with
another client then seek the written consent of all concerned after a full disclosure of the facts. These
respondent failed to do thus exposing himself to the charge of double-dealing.

DR. GAMILLA vs. ATTY. MARIO JR.
A.C. No. 4763
March 20, 2003
FACTS:
Atty. Eduardo Mario Jr. as president of the UST Faculty Union and other union officers entered
into a CBA with the management of UST. The CBA expired but efforts to forge a new one failed. The
faculty members went on strike and as a counter-measure UST terminated the employment of 16 officers and
directors of the union including Atty. Mario Jr. The dismissal was resolved by the SC in favor of the
dismissed employees by ordering their reinstatement with back wages. UST and the Union entered into a
compromise agreement for the payment of P7 Million to settle the back wages and other claims of the
dismissed union officers and directors. In 1992 the parties executed a MOA to settle the salary increases and
other benefits under a new CBA for a total of P42 Million. The MOA also charged the amount of P4.2
Million as the attorney's fees of Atty. Mario. Members of the Union filed 2 complaints before the Regional
Director of the DOLE questioning the alleged lack of transparency among the officers and directors of the
union in the management and disbursement of the monetary benefits. They prayed for their expulsion
because of their alleged failure to account for the balance of the P42 Million ceded to them by UST and the
attorney's fees amounting to P4.2 Million which they deducted from the benefits allotted to faculty members.
The Regional Director ordered the expulsion because of their failure to account for the P42 Million and their
collection of exorbitant attorney's fees. However on appeal, the Bureau of Labor Relations found that the P42
Million had been adequately accounted for. The Decision of the BLR was affirmed in toto by the CA. In the
meantime, a disbarment complaint was sent by the SC to the IBP for investigation, report and
recommendation. A Report of IBP Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro as well as the Resolution of the IBP
Board of Governors found the complaint meritorious and suspended respondent Atty. Mario from the
practice of law "until such time that the required detailed accounting of the questioned remittances made by
UST to the Union has been officially submitted to the Union and to the IBP."
ISSUE:
Whether or not, the respondent had a conflict of interest in the subject matter justifying his
HELD:
As one of the sixteen (16) union officers and directors seeking compensation from the University of
Santo Tomas for their illegal dismissal, respondent was involved in obvious conflict of interests when in
addition he chose to act as concurrent lawyer and president of the UST Faculty Union in forging the
compromise agreement. The test of conflict of interest among lawyers is "whether the acceptance of a new
relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his
client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance thereof." In the same
manner, it is undoubtedly a conflict of interests for an attorney to put himself in a position where self-interest
tempts, or worse, actually impels him to do less than his best for his client.
The test of conflict of interest among lawyers is "whether the acceptance of a new relation will
prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite
suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance thereof." In the same manner, it is
undoubtedly a conflict of interests for an attorney to put himself in a position where self-interest tempts, or
worse, actually impels him to do less than his best for his client. Thus it has been held that an attorney or any
other person occupying fiduciary relations respecting property or persons is utterly disabled from acquiring
for his own benefit the property committed to his custody for management. This rule is entirely independent
MALINAO, John Vincent B.

of whether fraud has intervened as in fact no fraud need be shown; no excuse will be heard from an attorney
because the rule stands on the moral obligation to refrain from placing oneself in positions that ordinarily
excite conflict between self-interest and integrity. Necessarily, a lawyer cannot continue representing a client
in an action or any proceeding against a party even with the client's consent after the lawyer brings suit in his
own behalf against the same defendant if it is uncertain whether the defendant will be able to satisfy both
judgments. No doubt, a lawyer is not authorized to have financial stakes in the subject matter of the suit
brought in behalf of his client.

CATALAN, JR. vs. SILVOSA
A.C. No. 7360
July 24, 2012
FACTS:
Atty. Silvosa was an Asst. Provincial Pros. who appeared as public prosecutor in a criminal case
entitled "People v. Esperon", in which case Atty. Policarpio Catalan was one of the private complainants.
Atty. Catalan took issue with Atty. Silvosa's manner of prosecuting the case, and requested the Provincial
Prosecutor to relieve Atty. Silvosa. Atty. Policarpio filed a complaint against Atty. Silvosa under three causes
of actions. In his first cause of action, Atty. Catalan accused Atty. Silvosa of appearing as private counsel in
a case where he previously appeared as public prosecutor, further alleging that, apart from the fact that Atty.
Silvosa and the accused are relatives, Atty. Silvosa displayed manifest bias in the accused's favor. In his
second cause of action, Atty. Catalan presented the affidavit of Pros. Toribio. In another criminal case where
Atty. Catalan's brother was a respondent, Pros. Toribio downgraded the offense from frustrated murder to
less serious physical injuries. During the hearing before Comm. Funa, Pros. Toribio testified that, while still
a public prosecutor at the time, Atty. Silvosa offered her P30,000 to reconsider her findings and uphold the
charge of frustrated murder. Finally, in the third cause of action, Atty. Catalan presented the Sandiganbayan's
decision in a criminal case, convicting Atty. Silvosa of direct bribery. Nilo Lanticse (Lanticse) filed a
complaint against Atty. Silvosa before the NBI. Despite the execution of an affidavit of desistance by the
complainant in favor of Lanticse's father-in-law, Arsenio Cadinas (Cadinas), Cadinas still remained in
detention for more than two years. Atty. Silvosa demanded P15,000 from Lanticse for the dismissal of the
case and for the release of Cadinas. The NBI set up an entrapment operation for Atty. Silvosa where GMA
7's Imbestigadors footage was admitted as evidence, and viewed by the Sandiganbayan.
In a Report and Recommendation, Comm. Funa found that Atty. Silvosa did intervene in the Esperon
Case. The fact that, subsequently, he entered his appearance in said case only to file a Motion to Post Bail
Bond Pending Appeal would still constitute a violation of Rule 6.03 as such act is sufficient to establish a
lawyer-client relation. It was submitted that Atty. Silvosa is GUILTY only of the First Charge and should be
given the penalty of REPRIMAND. The IBP Board of Governors adopted with modification the Report of
Comm. Funa and suspended Atty. Silvosa from the practice of law for two years.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, Atty. Silvosa violater Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
rendering the judgment of suspension by the IBP proper.
HELD:
Comm. Funa's finding that Atty. Silvosa violated Rule 6.03 is affirmed. When he entered his
appearance on the Motion to Post Bail Bond Pending Appeal, Atty. Silvosa conveniently forgot Rule 15.03
which provides that "A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of facts."
In Hilado v. David: The necessity of setting down the existence of the bare relationship of attorney
and client as the yardstick for testing incompatibility of interests. This stern rule is designed not alone to
prevent the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent conduct, but as well to protect the honest lawyer from
unfounded suspicion of unprofessional practice. It is founded on principles of public policy, on good taste.
As has been said in another case, the question is not necessarily one of the rights of the parties, but as to
whether the attorney has adhered to proper professional standard. With these thoughts in mind, it behooves
attorneys not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and
double-dealing. Only thus can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of

paramount importance in the administration of justice. Indeed, the prohibition against representation of
conflicting interests applies although the attorney's intentions were honest and he acted in good faith.
Mere delay in the filing of an administrative complaint against a member of the bar does not
automatically exonerate a respondent. Administrative offenses do not prescribe. No matter how much time
has elapsed from the time of the commission of the act complained of and the time of the institution of the
complaint, erring members of the bench and bar cannot escape the disciplining arm of the Court.

SEARES, JR. vs. GONZALES-ALZATE
Adm. Case No. 9058
November 14, 2012
FACTS:
In a complaint for violation of the prohibition against representing conflicting interests, Robert
Seares, Jr. alleges that Atty. Saniata Gonzales-Alzate was his legal counsel when he ran for Municipal
Mayor in the May 2007 elections; that after he lost, Atty. Gonzales-Alzate filed in his behalf a "Petition
of Protest ad cautelam" which was dismissed for being "fatally defective;" that several months later, she
insisted on filing a "Petition of Protest," but the same was also dismissed on the grounds that it was
already time-barred, and forum shopping because the certification was false; that he again ran for
Municipal Mayor in the May 2010 elections, and won; that he later learned that his political opponents
retained her as their counsel; that a Carlito Turqueza charged him with abuse of authority, oppression and
grave misconduct represented by Atty. Gonzales-Alzate. Hence, he prays that she should be disbarred.
Atty. Gonzales-Alzate refutes the charge that she represented conflicting interests by explaining that: (a)
she was engaged as an attorney in the May 2010 elections only by a candidate for Municipal Mayor of
another municipality; (b) Carlito Turqueza used to be a political ally of Seares, Jr.; (c) she disclosed to
Turqueza her having once acted as a counsel of Seares, Jr.; (d) Seares, Jr. did not object to her legal
representation of Turqueza; and (e) the 2007 election protest that she handled for Seares, Jr. was unrelated
to the administrative complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, respondent violated the prohibition agai nst representing conflicting
interests when she assisted Turqueza in his administrative case against Seares, Jr., her
former client.
HELD:
The SC dismissed the disbarment complaint against Atty. Gonzales-Alzate.
Representing conflicting interests would occur only where the attorney's new engagement would
require her to use against a former client any confidential information gained from the previous
professional relation. The prohibition did not cover a situation where the subject matter of the present
engagement was totally unrelated to the previous engagement of the attorney. To constitute the violation,
the attorney should be shown to intentionally use against the former client the confidential information
acquired by her during the previous employment. But a mere allegation of professional misconduct would
not suffice to establish the charge, because accusation was not synonymous with guilt.
The charge of representing conflicting interests was immediately unworthy of serious
consideration because it was clear from the start that Atty. Gonzales-Alzate did not take advantage of her
previous engagement by Seares, Jr. in her legal representation of Turqueza in the latter's administrative
charge against Seares, Jr. There was no indication whatsoever of her having gained any confidential
information during her previous engagement by Seares, Jr. that could be used against Seares, Jr. There is
no question that both charges were entirely foreign to one another.
The Court emphasizes that an attorney enjoys the presumption of innocence, and whoever
initiates administrative proceedings against the attorney bears the burden of proof to establish the
allegation of professional misconduct. When the complainant fails to discharge the burden of proof, the
Court has no alternative but to dismiss the charge and absolve the attorney.

QUIAMBAO vs. ATTY. BAMBA
A.C. No. 6708
August 25, 2005
FACTS:
The complainant, Felicita Quiambao, was the president of Allied Investigation Bureau, Inc.
(AIB). She avers that she procured the legal services of Atty. Nestor Bamba not only for the corporate
affairs of AIB but also for her personal case - an ejectment case. After she resigned as president, Atty.
Bamba filed on behalf of AIB a complaint for replevin against to recover from her a service vehicle AIB
assigned to her. This he did without withdrawing as counsel of record in the pending ejectment case.
Quiambao organized Quiambao Risk Management Specialists, Inc., (QRMSI) through the assistance of
Atty. Bamba, causing her to resign as president of AIB. QRMSI was registered under Quiambao's name,
with Atty. Bamba as a "silent partner." Atty. Bamba also convinced complainant's brother to organize
another security agency, San Esteban Security Services, Inc. (SESSI) where Atty. Bamba served as its
president. Atty. Bamba admits that he represented Quiambao in the ejectment case and AIB in the
replevin case. He, however, denies that he was the "personal lawyer" of the complainant, and avers that
he was made to believe that it was part of his function as counsel for AIB to handle even the "personal
cases" of its officers. The respondent also denies the charge that he agreed to be a "silent partner." He
avers that he declined the offer and suggested Atty. Hernandez in his place. The respondent also denies
that he convinced complainant's brother to organize another security agency and that the funds of AIB
were unlawfully diverted to SESSI. It was to complement the business of AIB, which was then in danger
of collapse, that SESSI was established. In his Report and Recommendation, the investigating
commissioner of the IBP found the respondent guilty of representing conflicting interests. Thus, the
investigating commissioner recommended that the respondent be suspended from the practice of law for
one year. The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the report, but reduced the penalty from one
year to a stern reprimand.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, the respondent is guilty of misconduct for representing conflicting

interests in contravention of the basic tenets of the legal profession.
HELD:
One test is whether a lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an issue or claim in behalf of one client
and, at the same time, to oppose that claim for the other client. Thus, if a lawyer's argument for one client
has to be opposed by that same lawyer in arguing for the other client, there is a violation of the rule.
Another test of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the
full discharge of the lawyer's duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of
unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that duty. Still another test is whether the lawyer
would be called upon in the new relation to use against a former client any confidential information
acquired through their connection or previous employment. The proscription against representation of
conflicting interests applies to a situation where the opposing parties are present clients in the same action
or in an unrelated action. It is of no moment that the lawyer would not be called upon to contend for one
client that which the lawyer has to oppose for the other client, or that there would be no occasion to use
the confidential information acquired from one to the disadvantage of the other as the two actions are
wholly unrelated. It is enough that the opposing parties in one case, one of whom would lose the suit, are

present clients and the nature or conditions of the lawyer's respective retainers with each of them would
affect the performance of the duty of undivided fidelity to both clients.
The proscription against representation of conflicting interests finds application where the
conflicting interests arise with respect to the same general matter however slight the adverse interest may
be. It applies even if the conflict pertains to the lawyer's private activity or in the performance of a
function in a non-professional capacity. In the process of determining whether there is a conflict of
interest, an important criterion is probability, not certainty, of conflict. Since the respondent has financial
or pecuniary interest in SESSI, which is engaged in a business competing with his client's, and, more
importantly, he occupies the highest position in SESSI, one cannot help entertaining a doubt on his
loyalty to his client AIB. The close relationship of the majority stockholders of both companies does not
negate the conflict of interest.

LOLITA ARTEZUELA
A.C. No. 4354
v.
ATTY. MADERAZO
April 22, 2002
FACTS
Allan Echavia had a vehicular accident in Mandaue City. He was driving a Ford Telstar car
owned by a Japanese national, Hirometsi Kiyami, but was registered in the name of his brother-in-law,
Jun Anthony Villapez. The car rammed into a small carinderia owned by complainant Lolita Artezuela.
The destruction of the carinderia caused the cessation of the operation of her small business and due to
financial constraints, stopped sending her two children to college. This prompted the complainant to
engage the services of the respondent in filing a damage suit before Cebu RTC. An Amended Complaint
was thereafter filed, impleading Echavia, Kiyami and Villapez, and dropping Sia as a party-defendant.
However, the case was dismissed allegedly upon the instance of the complainant and her husband.
Because of the dismissal, complainant filed a civil case for damages against the respondent lawyer but the
same was dismissed. Artezuela filed a verified complaint for disbarment against the respondent.
Complainant claimed that respondent prepared Echavias Answer to the Amended Complaint. The said
document was even printed in respondents office. Complainant further averred that it was respondent
who sought the dismissal of the case, misleading the trial court into thinking that the dismissal was with
her consent.
Respondents contention:
Respondent denied the complainants allegations and averred that he conscientiously did his part
as the complainants lawyer. He withdrew as counsel because the complainant was uncooperative and
refused to confer with him. He admitted that Echavias Answer to the Amended Complaint was printed in
his office but denied having prepared the document and having acted as counsel of Echavia.
Board of Governors:
The Board of Governors of the IBP recommended the suspension from the practice of law of
respondent Atty. Ricarte B. Maderazo for 6 months, with a stern warning that repetition of representing
conflicting interests in violation of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Ethics, and Canon 15 and Rule
15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility will be dealt with more severely.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent had a direct hand in the preparation of Echavias Answer to
the Amended Complaint which is inimical to complainants interests.
HELD
To be guilty of representing conflicting interests, a counsel-of-record of one party need not also
be counsel-of-record of the adverse party. He does not have to publicly hold himself as the counsel of the
adverse party, nor make his efforts to advance the adverse partys conflicting interests of record--although these circumstances are the most obvious and satisfactory proof of the charge. It is enough that
the counsel of one party had a hand in the preparation of the pleading of the other party, claiming adverse
and conflicting interests with that of his original client. To require that he also be counsel-of-record of the
adverse party would punish only the most obvious form of deceit and reward, with impunity, the highest
form of disloyalty.
Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Ethics states:
It is the duty of a lawyer at the time of the retainer to disclose to the client the
MAULION, Maricar Angela A.

circumstances of his relations to the parties and any interest in or in connection with the
controversy, which might influence the client in the selection of the counsel.
It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning of this Canon, a lawyer
represents conflicting interests when in behalf of one of the clients, it is his duty to contend
for that which duty to another client requires him to oppose.
The professional obligation of the lawyer to give his undivided attention and zeal for his clients
cause is likewise demanded in the Code of Professional Responsibility. Inherently disadvantageous to his
clients cause, representation by the lawyer of conflicting interests requires disclosure of all facts and
consent of all the parties involved. Thus:
CANON 15- All lawyers shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and
transactions with his clients.
xxx
Rule 15.03- A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
While the Resolution of the IBP is purely recommendatory, we find no reason to reverse the same. In
disciplinary proceedings against members of the bar, only clear preponderance of evidence is required to
establish liability. As long as the evidence presented by complainant or that taken judicial notice of by the
Court is more convincing and worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto, the
imposition of disciplinary sanction is justified.
Decision affirmed.

SANTOS VENTURA HOCORMA FOUNDATION, INC., rep. by ABAD v. ATTY. FUNK
A.C. No. 9094
August 15, 2012
FACTS
Atty. Funk used to work as corporate secretary, counsel, CEO, and trustee of Santos Ventura
Hocorma Foundation, Inc. (Hocorma Foundation). According to the foundation, Atty. Funk used
information that he acquired while serving as its counsel in violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR) and in breach of attorney-client relationship.
Don Teodoro V. Santos (Santos) organized Mabalacat Institute and Hocorma Foundation. Santos
hired Atty. Funk to assist Santos and the organizations he established. Mabalacat Institute made Atty.
Funk serve as a director and legal counsel. Atty. Funk emphasized that he was more of Santos personal
lawyer than the lawyer of Hocorma Foundation. Atty. Funk entered into a retainer agreement with Santos.
An SPA was executed in favor of Atty. Funk which authorized him to advise Hocorma Foundation and to
register the 5-hectare land in the name of Mabalacat Institute so a new title could be issued to it, separate
from the properties of Hocorma Foundation. When Santos executed the deeds of conveyances, Atty.
Funks clients were only Santos and Mabalacat Institute. Santos suggested to the foundations Board of
Trustees the inclusion of Atty. Funk in that board, which the foundation followed. After Santos died,
Atty. Funk was elected President of Mabalacat Institute, a position he had since held. When Hocorma
Foundation refused to pay his attorneys fees, Atty. Funk severed his professional relationship with it.
Four years later, he filed a complaint against the foundation for collection of his attorneys fees. The trial
court, the Court of Appeals (CA), and the Supreme Court decided the claim in his favor.
The Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) found Atty. Funk to have violated Canon 15, Rule
15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) with the aggravating circumstance of a pattern of
misconduct consisting of four court appearances against his former client, the Hocorma Foundation. The
CBD recommended Atty. Funks suspension from the practice of law for one year.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Funk betrayed the trust and confidence of a former client in
violation of the CPR when he filed several actions against such client on behalf of a new
one
HELD
Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the CPR provides that a lawyer cannot represent conflicting interests
except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Here, it is undeniable
that Atty. Funk was formerly the legal counsel of Hocorma Foundation. Years after terminating his
relationship with the foundation, he filed a complaint against it on behalf of another client, the Mabalacat
Institute, without foundations written consent.
An attorney owes his client undivided allegiance. Because of the highly fiduciary nature of their
relationship, sound public policy dictates that he be prohibited from representing conflicting interests or
discharging inconsistent duties.
An attorney may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person
whose interest conflicts with that of his present or former client. This rule is so absolute that good faith
and honest intention on the erring lawyers part does not make it inoperative.
The reason for this is that a lawyer acquires knowledge of his former clients doings, whether
documented or not, that he would ordinarily not have acquired were it not for the trust and confidence that

his client placed on him in the light of their relationship. It would simply be impossible for the lawyer to
identify and erase such entrusted knowledge with faultless precision or lock the same into an iron box
when suing the former client on behalf of a new one.
Here, the evidence shows that Hocorma Foundation availed itself of the legal services of Atty.
Funk in connection with, among others, the transfer of one of the properties subject of the several suits
that the lawyer subsequently filed against the foundation. Indeed, Atty. Funk collected attorneys fees
from the foundation for such services. Thus, he had an obligation not to use any knowledge he acquired
during that relationship, including the fact that the property under litigation existed at all, when he sued
the foundation.

PORMENTO, SR. v. ATTY. PONTEVEDRA
A.C. No. 5128
March 31, 2005
FACTS
Complainant claims that respondent, who was his lawyer in a civil case, deliberately failed to inform
him of the dismissal of his counterclaim despite receipt of the order. Hence, he was deprived of his right
to appeal. He only came to know of the trial courts order when the adverse party extrajudicially
foreclosed the mortgage executed over the parcel of land which is the subject matter of the suit. In order
to recover his ownership, he was constrained to hire a new lawyer as Atty. Pontevedra refused to institute
an action for its recovery. Also, he was forced to initiate a criminal case for qualified theft against the
relatives of the alleged new owner of the said land. Respondent is the counsel of the accused.
Complainant claims that respondent utilized pieces of confidential information he obtained from
complainant while the latter is still his client.
In a separate incident, he claims he bought a parcel of land where the Deed of Declaration of
Heirship and Sale of said land was prepared and notarized by respondent. Since there was another person
who claims ownership of the property, he heeded respondents advice to build a small house on the
property and to allow his (complainants) nephew and his family to occupy the house in order for
complainant to establish his possession of the said property. Subsequently, complainants nephew refused
to vacate the property prompting the former to file an ejectment case. Respondent acted as the counsel of
complainants nephew.
Respondents contention:
Respondent contends that he was never a direct recipient of any monetary support coming from the
complainant. Respondent denies the allegations: a) he claims that he delivered to complainant a copy of
the said order, apprising him of its contents; b) as to his representation of the persons against whom
complainant filed criminal cases for theft, respondent honestly believes that there exists no conflict
between his present and former clients interests as the cases he handled for these clients are separate and
distinct from each other and; c) with respect to the case for ejectment, respondent admits that it was he
who notarized the deed of sale but contends that what is being contested in the said case is not the
ownership of the subject land but the ownership of the house built on the said land.
IBP Board of Governors:
It resolved to annul and set aside the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner finding the
respondent guilty of violating Rule 15.03, Canon 15, CPR and instead approved the dismissal of the
complaint for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of malpractice and misconduct on 3 grounds: first,

for representing interests which conflict with those of his former client, herein
complainant; second, for taking advantage of the information and knowledge that he
obtained from complainant; and, third, for not notifying complainant of the dismissal of
his counterclaim and should be disbarred by reason thereof

HELD
Section 12(a), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors.
(a) xx The decision of the Board upon such review shall be in writing and shall clearly and
distinctly state the facts and the reasons on which it is based. xx
As to the 1st and 2nd grounds, Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides:
A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned
given after a full disclosure of the facts.
In the present case, we find no conflict of interests when respondent represented herein complainants
nephew and other members of his family in the ejectment case and in the criminal complaint filed by
herein complainant against them. The only established participation respondent had with respect to the
parcel of land purchased by complainant, is that he was the one who notarized the deed of sale of the said
land. However, we find conflict of interests in respondents representation as counsel of the accused
in criminal case. It cannot be denied that when respondent was the counsel of complainant in the civil
case, he became privy to the documents and information that complainant possessed with respect to the
said parcel of land. Hence, whatever may be said as to whether or not respondent utilized against
complainant any information given to him in a professional capacity, the mere fact of their previous
relationship should have precluded him from appearing as counsel for the opposing side. Hence, we find
respondent guilty of misconduct for representing conflicting interests.
As to the 3rd ground, we find that complainant failed to present substantial evidence to prove that
respondent did not inform him of the dismissal of his counterclaim. The court found sufficient evidence to
prove that complainant has been properly notified of the trial courts order of dismissal.
Respondent Atty. Elias A. Pontevedra is found GUILTY of representing conflicting interests and is
hereby FINED in the amount of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos. He is WARNED that a repetition of
the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST OF CORPORATE LAWYERS
ABC TRANS NAT'L TRANSPORT v. AERONAUTICS FORWARDERS
413 N.E.2d 1299
90 Ill. App.3d 817 (1980)
FACTS
Plaintiff ABC-TNT is a private corporation engaged in transporting freight over land and by air. Its
separately operated air freight division, ABC Air Freight (ABC), acts as an intermediary between customers,
air carriers, and ground cartage companies. ABC was operating at a loss, and defendant Robert Agnes was
hired as president of ABC. Agnes subsequently hired defendants Edward Brownstein, David Eades, Carl
Cohen, Al Krause, and Bernard Marco. In addition to their supervisory roles, these men also solicited and
maintained clients. Thereafter, ABC had become profitable. Meantime, defendant Franklin Weiss began
negotiations for the purchase of Aeronautics on behalf of Fifty States Freight Corp., formed by Perry and
Mildred Zenlea. At the time, Weiss was an attorney for ABC. Agnes eventually resigned which was accepted
by Leon Mitchell (president of ABC-TNT) and Arthur Brown (chairman of the board and owner of all ABCTNT's stock). Mitchell first learned that defendants had organized a competing air forwarder, Aeronautics
Forwarders, Inc. (Aeronautics), and planned to walk out en masse with other ABC personnel. In Chicago,
Brownstein was fired. At the other stations, each defendant vice president was asked to remain with ABC,
but each refused and left ABC. The following day, more than one half the employees of the major ABC
stations had resigned from ABC and joined Aeronautics. Simultaneously, fifty percent of ABC's business,
including most of its major customers, switched over to Aeronautics. In addition, various items of personal
property, such as customer files, had been removed. Thereafter, plaintiff took several measures to recapture
its lost customers and business, including the filing of this action for injunctive relief.
ISSUE:
(1.) Whether party-defendants committed an actionable breach of fiduciary duty

(2.) Whether Weiss breached his attorney-client fiduciary duty to ABC
HELD
( 1. )
Yes. Initially, it should be noted that the fact that none of the defendants (except for Agnes) had
employment contracts is immaterial to plaintiff's tort action. Defendants argue that because their
employment status was terminable at will, their collective departure is not actionable. The malicious
inducement of an employee to terminate an existing employment to enter the employment of another
gives rise to a cause of action and "`the fact that the contract of employment is terminable at will does
not bar recovery.'" (62 Ill.App.3d 671, 683, 379 N.E.2d 1228, 1237.) We further noted that one under a
fiduciary duty breaches the fiduciary trust if he solicits his employer's customers, appropriates his
employer's personalty, or entices co-workers away from his employer. We also stated that it is not
necessarily a breach of duty for an agent to set up a rival business while working for his principal,
although it would be a breach if the agent continued working for his principal after the rival corporation
began doing business in competition with his principal. (1978 ABC Opinion, citing James C. Wilborn &
Sons, Inc. v. Heniff (1968), 95 Ill.App.2d 155, 237 N.E.2d 781.) Thus the agent must terminate his
employment with his employer before actively participating in the rival concern. We reaffirm these
principles as correct statements of Illinois law, applicable to the issue of defendants' liability.
There is ample evidence in the record to support the judgment of liability. Defendants were key
management employees of ABC who were actively promoting the interests of Aeronautics while still
employed by ABC. The injury to ABC was the sudden, potentially crippling loss of half of its business
and major customers, as well as substantial numbers of its personnel. The cause of this injury was
defendants' well-organized plan and their conduct in furtherance of the plan before they departed from
ABC.
(2.)
ABC charges that Weiss' activities on behalf of Aeronautics, at a time when Weiss was ABC's
outside counsel, bring him within the conspiracy of the other defendants. Alternatively, ABC alleges

that Weiss has breached his fiduciary duty to ABC by simultaneously serving two masters having
conflicting interests. At the very least, plaintiff urges, Weiss owed ABC full disclosure of his
involvement with Aeronautics.
It was alleged that Weiss breached his attorney-client fiduciary duty to ABC by secretly representing
Aeronautics' adverse interests. This issue involves the somewhat nebulous standards of professional
responsibility embodied in codes of ethics. It is undisputed that Weiss acted as Aeronautics' counsel
during the time when he was also retained by ABC. Nor is it arguable that the two firms, as direct
competitors, have adverse interests. Weiss, however, characterizes his dual representation as
constituting "competing" rather than "conflicting" interests and declares that there is no legal
prohibition against an attorney's performance of legal services for more than one company in a single
industry.
Having determined that Weiss was not aware of defendants' tortious plan, the court went on to
find that Weiss' acts were capable of the "good inference" that he was merely acting within the
scope of his professional duties, according to his professional judgment. We cannot say that the
court's judgment that Weiss did not breach a fiduciary duty to ABC is against the manifest weight of the
evidence. Plaintiff did not introduce expert testimony to establish the standard of care applicable to
Weiss' decision to represent Aeronautics while in the employment of ABC. Unless the conflict is so
clear as to be undisputed, expert testimony is generally necessary to prove lawyer malpractice.

HEIM vs. SIGNCRAFT SCREENPRINT, INC
NO. OIC50014, 2001
WL 1018228
2001
FACTS:
Plaintiff, Susan Y. Heim, has filed a ten-count complaint against defendants, Signcraft
Screenprint, Inc. ("Signcraft"), Dennis J. Harle, and Sandra A. Redington. She alleges various state law
causes of action and a claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq.
("ADA"). In this order, the court addresses defendants' motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b) and to strike under Rule 12(f), as well as plaintiff's motion to disqualify Theodore
Forsberg as counsel for defendants.
In her motion to disqualify, plaintiff argues Theodore Forsberg, one of defendants' attorneys,
should be disqualified for three reasons but has apparently dropped the third reason in her reply brief.
First, plaintiff believes Forsberg likely will be called to testify as a witness because of his alleged
involvement with the events giving rise to plaintiff's claims. See N.D. Ill. R. ("LR") 83.53.7. However, it
is not clear at this point whether Forsberg will in fact be needed as a witness as other individuals may be
able to supply the same information. In addition, it may very well be plaintiff, not defendants, calling
Forsberg as a witness, in which case he would be testifying "other than on behalf of [his] client" and
would be disqualified only if he expected his testimony to prejudice defendants. See LR 83.53.7(b).
Plaintiff also argues Forsberg, who was (and still is) corporate counsel for Signcraft, previously advised
her in her capacity as a former director of Signcraft on matters substantially related to the matters at issue
in this litigation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Theodore Forsberg should be disqualified as counsel for defendants
HELD:
No. The problem with this argument is that a corporate attorney represents the corporation, not
the individual directors or officers, see LR 83.51.13(a), so plaintiff was never one of Forsberg's former
clients under LR 83.51.9 to begin with. Once again, the need to disqualify Forsberg may become more
apparent at a later stage of the litigation, but for now plaintiff's motion is denied.
Under this rule, a lawyer representing an organization may also represent any of its officers and directors,
so long as there is no conflict of interest.
HOWEVER, when shareholders or members bring a derivative action on behalf of the corporation and the
action involves "serious charges of wrongdoing by those in control of the organization, a conflict may
arise between the lawyer's duty to the organization and the lawyer's relationship with the board." As some
of plaintiff's claims are brought derivatively on behalf of Signcraft and contain allegations of fraud and
self-dealing by Harle and Redington, Forsberg may be forced to withdraw his dual representation of
Signcraft and the individual defendants, both of whom are Signcraft board members, and allow Signcraft
to retain independent counsel.
MENDOZA, John Martin M.

KOPKA vs. KAMENSKY AND RUBENSTEIN
821 NF 2d 719, 727
(2004)
FACTS:
Landau, Omahana & Kopka (LOK Illinois) was an Illinois law firm and closely held corporation.
Kopka, Byron Landau and Gail Omahana were the only shareholders of the corporation. Kopka, Landau
and Omahana were also the sole shareholders of a Michigan corporation (LOK Michigan) and are the
general partners of an Indiana partnership (LOK Indiana). Kopka refers to all three firms jointly as
"LOK." Barry Rosenthal and Morton Kessel are partners at AMG, an Illinois accounting firm. K&R is an
Illinois law firm.
On December 5, 1998, Kopka tendered his 30-day written notice of resignation, effective January
4, 1999, from all three LOK firms. According to the terms of the shareholders' agreement, LOK was
responsible for repurchasing Kopka's shares at the original issue price, but the corporation failed to
repurchase these shares. At the time of Kopka's resignation, LOK owed a $5.5 million promissory note to
the American National Bank and Trust of Chicago (American National). Kopka, Landau and Omahana
had executed individual personal guarantees for the note
In March 1999, American National accelerated the note owed by LOK and demanded payment in
full. On March 26, 1999, American National filed a complaint in the circuit court of Cook County, against
LOK, Kopka, Landau, Omahana and others. Kopka claims that he personally paid $150,000 for
partnership obligations of LOK Indiana during litigation with American National. In November 2000,
Kopka reached a settlement with American National, paying a sum of money in exchange for a release of
his personal guaranty of the LOK loan.
On September 19, 2002, Kopka filed an amended complaint alleging breach of fiduciary duty,
breach of retainer, and negligence against defendants K&R, AMG, Kessel and Rosenthal. Kopka alleged
that Landau and Omahana depleted the assets of LOK with the assistance of K&R and AMG, depriving
him of payment for his shares upon his resignation and causing American National to file suit to recover
on his personal guaranty for LOK's note.
K&R and AMG, Kessel and Rosenthal filed independent motions to dismiss Kopka's amended
complaint pursuant to section 2-615 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-615
(West 2002)). Both motions asserted that Kopka lacked standing to assert his claims, failed to allege the
existence of a duty and failed to state actionable claims for breach of contract and negligence. Kessel and
Rosenthal also moved to dismiss on the basis that Kopka failed to allege any breaches by them
individually.
On April 4, 2003, the circuit court granted defendants' motions and dismissed Kopka's amended
complaint pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code. The court held, inter alia, that Kopka alleged sufficient
facts to establish standing to bring his claims; that Kopka failed to establish that K&R and AMG owed
him, personally, a fiduciary duty and duty of care where he was neither in privity with K&R or AMG, nor
an intended third-party beneficiary of K&R or AMG's relationships with LOK; and that Kopka failed to
allege facts in support of his negligence claim to establish that any alleged breach of the duty of care
proximately caused an injury.
On appeal, Kopka contends that the circuit court erred in finding that he failed to establish that
K&R and AMG owed him a duty of care and fiduciary duty.

ISSUE:
Whether or not circuit court erred in finding that his amended complaint failed to
adequately allege that K&R and AMG owed plaintiff, personally, a duty of care or a
fiduciary duty where he was neither in privity with nor an intended third-party
beneficiary of the attorney-client and accountant-client relationships with K&R and
AMG
HELD:
No. The general rule in Illinois is that an attorney owes a duty of care only to his client and not to
third parties. Pelham v. Griesheimer, 92 Ill. 2d 13, 19 (1982). This limited liability serves to protect the
personal, highly confidential and fiduciary nature of the attorney-client relationship. Schechter, 254 Ill.
App. 3d at 564. However, a narrow exception to this privity requirement has been carved out in limited
circumstances. An attorney or an accountant owes a duty to a third party only where hired by the client
specifically for the purpose of benefitting that third party. Pelham, 92 Ill. 2d at 21; Builders Bank v. Barry
Finkel & Associates, 339 Ill. App. 3d 1, 8-9 (2003). In order for a nonclient third party to succeed in a
negligence action against an attorney, he must prove that the primary purpose and intent of the attorneyclient relationship itself was to benefit or influence the third party. Pelham, 92 Ill. 2d at 21. Similarly, in
order for a nonclient third party to succeed in a negligence action against an accountant, he must prove
that the primary intent of the client was for the professional services to benefit or influence the third
party. Builders Bank, 339 Ill. App. 3d at 8.
Section 30.1 of the Illinois Public Accounting Act (Act) (225 ILCS 450/30.1 (West 2002))
specifically provides that an accountant may be held liable to persons not in privity when "such person,
partnership or corporation was aware that a primary intent of the client was for the professional services
to benefit or influence the particular person bringing the action."
In this case, Kopka acknowledges that he did not allege that he was in privity with either K&R or
AMG or that he was an intended third-party beneficiary of the services K&R and AMG provided for
LOK. There were no facts alleged in the amended complaint indicating that Kopka individually retained
either K&R or AMG or that Kopka was an intended third-party beneficiary of the services provided.
Rather, LOK hired K&R and AMG in December 1998, after Kopka gave notice of his intent to resign
from LOK but before such resignation became effective on January 4, 1999.
Kopka also contends that the circuit court erred by dismissing his breach of fiduciary duty claims,
where both K&R and AMG had a fiduciary relationship with LOK and therefore also owed him a
fiduciary duty based on his status as shareholder and partner in the LOK entities. We disagree.
An attorney can be liable for malpractice only to one to whom the attorney owes a duty. Felty, 169 Ill.
App. 3d at 408. A fiduciary relationship exists between an attorney and client, and the attorney owes the
client the utmost fidelity, honesty, and good faith. Felty, 169 Ill. App. 3d at 408. On the other hand, an
attorney owes a duty to a nonclient only when the nonclient is an intended beneficiary of an attorneyclient relationship. Felty, 169 Ill. App. 3d at 408. Similarly, for a nonprivity third party to hold an
accountant liable, the party must show that the client intended for the accountant's work to benefit or

influence the third party and that the accountant had knowledge of that intent. Builders Bank, 339 Ill.
App. 3d at 7.
In this case, Kopka acknowledges that he failed to allege that he was in privity or an intended
third-party beneficiary of K&R and AMG's relationships with LOK. Rather, Kopka asserts that this court
should find that since K&R and AMG owed a fiduciary duty to LOK, they should also owe him a
fiduciary duty as a shareholder and partner of that corporation. However, this court rejected a similar
argument in Hager-Freeman v. Spircoff, 229 Ill. App. 3d 262, 278 (1992). In that case, this court held that
the attorney for a corporation, even a closely held one, does not have a specific fiduciary duty toward the
individual shareholders. Hager-Freeman, 229 Ill. App. 3d at 277-78, citing Felty, 169 Ill. App. 3d 406.
In Felty, the appellate court acknowledged that even in such closely held corporations, shareholders often
have conflicting interests with the corporation. Felty, 169 Ill. App. 3d at 410. This court has therefore
declined to impose a fiduciary duty upon an attorney to a corporation's shareholders, in the absence of
privity or status as intended third-party beneficiary.

CANNON
vs.
US ACOUSTICS CORP
398 F. SUPP 209
(1973)
FACTS:
Charles B. Cannon, Richard L. Davis, John G. Marsh, and Jeffrey Ross brought this derivative
shareholder's action, as well as personal claims, against the defendants, U.S. Acoustics Corporation
(hereinafter "Acoustics"), a Florida corporation, and National Perlite Products, S.A., (hereinafter
"Perlite"), a Panamanian Corporation.
There are pending for decision cross-motions to disqualify counsel and a motion to disqualify Cannon as
a party plaintiff. Shortly after Robert J. Gareis, Peter J. Mone and the firm of Baker & McKenzie filed
their appearances on behalf of the corporate and individual defendants, plaintiffs moved to disqualify
them from representing the corporate defendants and requested that the court appoint independent
counsel. Plaintiffs base their motion on the theory that dual representation in a shareholder derivative
suit creates a conflict of interest that the court can order terminated.
ISSUE: Whether or not Charles Cannon should be disqualified as counsel and party-plaintiff
HELD:
Yes. In substance, the plaintiffs' complaint is a shareholder's derivative suit. A derivative suit is,
in legal effect, a suit brought by the corporation, but conducted by the shareholders. The corporation,
although formally aligned as a defendant for historical reasons,[3]is in actuality a plaintiff.
[T]he stockholder's suit [has] . . . a double aspect. The stockholders have a right in equity to compel the
assertion of a corporate right of action against the directors or other wrongdoers when the corporation
wrongfully refuses to sue. The suit is thus an action for specific enforcement of an obligation owed by the
corporation to the stockholders to assert its rights of action when the corporation has been put in default
by the wrongful refusal of the directors or management to take suitable measures for its protection.
In a derivative suit the better course is for the corporation to be represented by independent counsel from
the outset, even though counsel believes in good faith that no conflict of interest exists.
The Committee is in full agreement that if the corporation takes an active role in the litigation,
independent counsel must be obtained. If the corporation's role is passive, a majority of the committee
was still of the opinion that, a conflict of interests is inherent in any [derivative] action wherever relief is
sought on behalf of the corporation against the individual director-officer defendants, and in such cases
Canon 6 [presently Canon 5, EC5-14 n. 6 & 18] precludes one firm from representing both the
corporation and the individual director-officer defendants except in unusual circumstances stemming
from particular facts in a given case
In the instant case the record requires that Cannon be disqualified as a plaintiff. He represented
defendants for 12 years, five of which he was their sole counsel. There is no question that in the course of
that former representation he might have acquired information which is substantially related to the
pending suit. And even if defendants had been unable to persuade the court that there was a
substantialrelationship, *229 Cannon's representation was so lengthy and pervasive that he would have to
be disqualified under Canon 9. Defendants' motion to disqualify Charles B. Cannon in this cause, and to
enjoin him from disclosing any information received from the individual and corporate defendants during
the course of his representation of defendants is granted and Charles B. Cannon is dismissed as a party
plaintiff.

QUIAMBAO
AC NO 6708
vs.
ATTY. BAMBA
(AUG 25, 2005)
FACTS:
In this administrative case for disbarment, complainant Felicitas S. Quiambao charges respondent
Atty. Nestor A. Bamba with violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility for representing
conflicting interests when the latter filed a case against her while he was at that time representing her in
another case, and for committing other acts of disloyalty and double-dealing.
From June 2000 to January 2001, the complainant was the president and managing director of
Allied Investigation Bureau, Inc. (AIB), a family-owned corporation engaged in providing security and
investigation services. She avers that she procured the legal services of the respondent not only for the
corporate affairs of AIB but also for her personal case. Particularly, the respondent acted as her counsel of
record in an ejectment case.
Apart from the foregoing litigation matter, the complainant, in her Position Paper, charges the
respondent with acts of disloyalty and double-dealing. She avers that the respondent proposed to her that
she organize her own security agency and that he would assist her in its organization, causing her to
resign as president of AIB. The respondent indeed assisted her in December 2000 in the formation of
another security agency, Quiambao Risk Management Specialists, Inc., (QRMSI), which was later
registered under complainants name, with the respondent as a silent partner represented by his associate
Atty. Gerardo P. Hernandez.
For his part, the respondent admits that he represented the complainant in the aforementioned
ejectment case and later represented AIB in the replevin case against her. He, however, denies that he was
the personal lawyer of the complainant, and avers that he was made to believe that it was part of his
function as counsel for AIB to handle even the personal cases of its officers. Even assuming that the
complainant confided to him privileged information about her legal interests, the ejectment case and the
replevin case are unrelated cases involving different issues and parties and, therefore, the privileged
information which might have been gathered from one case would have no use in the other.
The respondent also denies the charge raised by the complainant in her position paper that he
agreed to be a silent partner of QRMSI through his nominee, Atty. Gerardo P. Hernandez, who was his
former law partner. He declined complainants offer to assume that role and suggested Atty. Hernandez in
his place; thus, 375 shares of stock were registered in Atty. Hernandezs name as consideration of his
(Atty. Hernandezs) legal services as corporate secretary and legal counsel of QRMSI.
The respondent also denies that he convinced complainants brother Leodegario to organize
another security agency and that the funds of AIB were unlawfully diverted to SESSI. It was to
complement the business of AIB, which was then in danger of collapse, that SESSI was established.
Leodegarios wife and her son have the effective control over SESSI. Respondents subscribed
shareholdings in SESSI comprise only 800 shares out of 12,500 subscribed shares. He serves AIB and
SESSI in different capacities: as legal counsel of the former and as president of the latter.
The investigating commissioner of the IBP found the respondent guilty of representing
conflicting interests based on the following undisputed facts: first, the respondent was still complainants

counsel of record in the ejectment case when he filed, as legal counsel of AIB, the replevin case against
her; and second, the respondent was still the legal counsel of AIB when he advised the complainant on the
incorporation of another security agency, QRMSI, and recommended his former law partner, Atty.
Gerardo Hernandez, to be its corporate secretary and legal counsel and also when he conferred with
Leodegario to organize another security agency, SESSI, where the respondent became an incorporator,
stockholder, and president. Thus, the investigating commissioner recommended that the respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for one year.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the investigating commissioners report and
recommendation, but reduced the penalty from one year to a stern reprimand.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of misconduct for representing conflicting interests in

contravention of the basic tenets of the legal profession
HELD:
Yes. Rule 15.03, Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides: A lawyer shall not
represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of
the facts. This prohibition is founded on principles of public policy and good taste. In the course of a
lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer learns all the facts connected with the clients case, including the
weak and strong points of the case. The nature of that relationship is, therefore, one of trust and
confidence of the highest degree. It behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the clients confidence,
but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged
to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice
In broad terms, lawyers are deemed to represent conflicting interests when, in behalf of one
client, it is their duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires them to oppose.
Developments in jurisprudence have particularized various tests to determine whether a lawyers conduct
lies within this proscription. One test is whether a lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an issue or claim in
behalf of one client and, at the same time, to oppose that claim for the other client. Thus, if a lawyers
argument for one client has to be opposed by that same lawyer in arguing for the other client, there is a
violation of the rule.
Another test of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation would
prevent the full discharge of the lawyers duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite
suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that duty. Still another test is whether
the lawyer would be called upon in the new relation to use against a former client any confidential
information acquired through their connection or previous employment.
The proscription against representation of conflicting interests applies to a situation where the
opposing parties are present clients in the same action or in an unrelated action. It is of no moment that
the lawyer would not be called upon to contend for one client that which the lawyer has to oppose for the
other client, or that there would be no occasion to use the confidential information acquired from one to
the disadvantage of the other as the two actions are wholly unrelated. It is enough that the opposing
parties in one case, one of whom would lose the suit, are present clients and the nature or conditions of

the lawyers respective retainers with each of them would affect the performance of the duty of undivided
fidelity to both clients.
It must be noted that the proscription against representation of conflicting interests finds
application where the conflicting interests arise with respect to the same general matter however slight the
adverse interest may be. It applies even if the conflict pertains to the lawyers private activity or in the
performance of a function in a non-professional capacity. In the process of determining whether there is a
conflict of interest, an important criterion is probability, not certainty, of conflict.

DE GUZMAN
A.C.NO. 4943
vs.
ATTY DE DIOS,
January 26, 2001
FACTS:
Diana De Guzman filed a case of disbarment against respondent, Atty Lourdes I. De Dios on the
ground of violation of Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for representing
conflicting of interest. Complainant contends that she engaged the services of Atty De Dios as counsel in
order to form a hotel and restaurant corporation in 1995. Suzuki Beach Hotel Inc. (SBHI) was thereafter
formed with the assistance of the respondent. The complainant was a major stockholder, but eventually
got ousted from the corporation when her unpaid shares were sold in a public auction by the corporation.
The complainant further claims that the respondent even represented her in another case involving a
property. The respondent, however, claims that since the action involved a property of the corporation,
she represented complainant to protect the interests of the corporation, she being its legal counsel. The
IBP dismissed the complaint on the ground that there was no attorney client relationship between the
complainant and the respondent.
ISSUE:
Whether there was attorney client relationship which may justify holding respondent
guilty of representing conflicting interests.
HELD:
Yes, there is an attorney-client relationship between the complainant and the respondent. It was
complainant who retained respondent to form a corporation. She appeared as counsel in behalf of the
complainant. There was also evidence of collusion between the board of directors and respondent. In fact,
the board of directors now included respondent as the president. It was also upon respondents advice that
the delinquent shares of complainant were sold at public auction. According to the Supreme Court the
present situation shows a clear case of conflict of interests of the respondent. The Court thereby suspends
the respondent from the practice of law for six (6) months.
NASAM, Laarnie Bojangin

LIMITATIONS/RESTRICTIONS OF GOVERMENT LAWYERS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW
OLAZO
vs
JUSTICE TINGA
AM No. 10-5-7-SC (2010)
FACTS:
In March 1990, the complainant, Mr Jovito S. Olazo, filed a sales application covering a parcel of
land situated in Barangay Lower Bicutan in the Municipality of Taguig. The subject land was previously part
of Fort Andres Bonifacio that was segregated and declared open for disposition pursuant to Proclamation No.
2476 and Proclamation No. 172. The respondent, retired Supreme Court Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga, in
his official capacity as the Congressman of Taguig and Pateros, became a member of the Committee on
Awards that implements Proclamation No. 172. The respondent was charged of violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility for representing conflicting interests. The complainant claimed that:
a) The respondent abused his position as Congressman and as a member of the Committee on Awards
when he unduly interfered with the complainants sales application because of his personal interest
over the subject land. As a result of the respondents abuse of his official functions, the
complainants sales application was denied. (violating Rule 6.02)
b) The respondent persuaded Miguel Olazo to direct Manuel to convey his rights over the land to
Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. As a result of the respondents promptings, the rights to the land were
transferred to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. (violating Rule 6.03)
c) The respondent engaged in unlawful conduct considering his knowledge that Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez was not a qualified beneficiary under Memorandum No. 119. The complainant averred
that Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez is not a bona fide resident of the proclaimed areas and does not qualify
for an award. (violating Rule 1.01)
The complainant also alleged that the respondent violated Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees or R.A.6713 since he engaged in the practice of
law, within the one-year prohibition period, when he appeared as a lawyer for Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez before the Committee on Awards.
With his own supporting documents, the respondent presented a different version of the antecedent events.
He claimed that Miguel Olazo owned the rights over the subject land and he later conveyed these rights to
Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. Miguel Olazos rights over the subject land and the transfer of his rights to Joseph
Jeffrey Rodriguez were duly recognized by the Secretary of the DENR before whom the conflict of rights
over the subject land was brought. In its decision, the DENR found Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez a qualified
applicant, and his application over the subject land was given due course.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondents actions constitute a breach of the standard ethical conduct, first
-- while the respondent was still an elective public official and a member of the Committee
on Awards, and second-- when he was no longer a public official but a private lawyer who
represented a client before the office he was previously connected with.

HELD:
The Court resolved to dismiss the administrative complaint since the complainant failed to prove by clear
and convincing evidence that the respondent committed unethical infractions warranting the exercise of the
Courts disciplinary power. According to Supreme Court, a lawyer who holds a government office may not
be disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government
official. He may be disciplined by this Court as a member of the Bar only when his misconduct also
constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer.
Accountability of a government lawyer in public office
The first charge involves a violation of Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It imposes the
following restrictions in the conduct of a government lawyer: A lawyer in the government service shall not
use his public position to promote or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his
public duties.
The above provision prohibits a lawyer from using his or her public position to: (1) promote private interests;
(2) advance private interests; or (3) allow private interest to interfere with his or her public duties. The Court
previously held that the restriction extends to all government lawyers who use their public offices to promote
their private interests.
Accordingly, the record of the case shows no proof that the respondent abused his position as a Congressman
and as a member of the Committee on Awards in the manner defined under Rule 6.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. The complainants allegation that the respondent orchestrated the efforts to get
the subject land does not specify how the orchestration was undertaken. The documents merely showed that
the respondent merely acted as a witness and are even consistent with the respondents allegation that Miguel
Olazo decided to sell his rights over the subject land to pay the loans he obtained from the respondent and,
also, to finance his continuing medical treatment.
Private practice of law after separation from public office
In the case at hand, no evidence was presented showing that the respondent previously interfered with the
sales application covering Manuels land when the former was still a member of the Committee on
Awards. The complainant, also, failed to sufficiently establish that the respondent was engaged in the
practice of law. In a previous ruling of the Supreme Court it defined the practice of law as any activity, in
and out of court, that requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience.
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits lawyers, after leaving the government
service, to accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had
intervened while in the said service.
As a rule, government lawyers are not allowed to engage in the private practice of their profession during
their incumbency, EXCEPT under the following conditions: first, the private practice is authorized by the
Constitution or by the law; and second, the practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with his or her official
functions. The last paragraph of Section 7 provides an exception to the exception. In case of lawyers

separated from the government service who are covered under subparagraph (b) (2) of Section 7 of R.A. No.
6713, a one-year prohibition is imposed to practice law in connection with any matter before the office he
used to be with.
Violation of Rule 1.01
Rule 1.01 prohibits a lawyer from engaging in unlawful, immoral or deceitful conduct. The matter
of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguezs qualifications to apply for a sales application over lots covered by the
proclaimed areas has been resolved in the affirmative by the Secretary of the DENR, when the DENR gave
due course to his sales application over the subject land.
The Supreme Court, after considering the serious consequences of the penalty of disbarment or suspension of
a member of the Bar, ruled that the respondent generally is under no obligation to prove his/her defense, until
the burden shifts to him/her because of what the complainant has proven. Where no case has in the first place
been proven, nothing has to be rebutted in defense.

RAMOS vs. ATTY. JOSE R. IMBANG

AC No. 6788
(2007)
FACTS
Ramos sought legal assistance of Imbang for civil and criminal cases. Oddly, Imbang told Ramos
several times never to enter in the courtroom then informs her that the hearing has been rescheduled and
cancelled. Then Imbang charges her P350 for appearance.
The complainant became suspicious and inquired the status of her cases and learned that there was no case
filed and Imbang was employed by PAO.
In defense, Imbang said that Ramos was aware that he is employed by PAO and declined. He advised Ramos
to consult Ungson, but it was not accepted because she was not able to pay the acceptance fee. She asked
Imbang to keep the P5,000 because she was afraid to spend the money on hand and also raise the balance of
Ungson's acceptance fee. A year later, Ramos requested Imbang to issue the antedated receipt because her
daughter requested to account the money. In 1994, Imbang resigned from PAO. Ramos again requested to
help her prepare a complaint but he was not able to finalize it because he cannot contact her anymore.
Commision on Bar Discipline(CBD) found Imbang violated Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR),
recommending him for suspension and return the P5,000. IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the
findings of CBD but modified that legal interest rate shall be applied to the P5000 or in case of failure to
return, an additional suspension of 6 months.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Imbang, as PAO violated the Code of Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees?
HELD:
YES Government employees are expected to devote themselves completely to public service. For this reason,
the private practice of profession is prohibited. Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees provides:
Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. -- In addition to acts and omissions of public officials
and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following constitute
prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby declared
unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto, public officials and employees during
their incumbency shall not:
xxx xxx xxx
(1) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law,
provided that such practice will not conflict with their official function.
Thus, lawyers in government service cannot handle private cases for they are expected to devote themselves
full-time to the work of their respective offices.

PCGG vs. SANDIGANBAYAN AND TAN

G.R. No. 151809-12
April 12, 2005
FACTS
In 1976 the General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial difficulties.
Despite the mega loans GENBANK failed to recover from its financial woes. The Central Bank issued a
resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent and unable to resume business with safety to its depositors,
creditors and the general public, and ordering its liquidation. A public bidding of GENBANKs assets was
held where Lucio Tan group submitted the winning bid. Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza filed a petition
with the CFI praying for the assistance and supervision of the court in GENBANKs liquidation as mandated
by RA 265.
In 1986, after the 1st EDSA Revolution that toppled the Marcos regime, PCGG was established to recover the
ill-gotten wealth against Marcos and his cronies. PCGG filed with Sandiganbayan a complaint for the
reversion, reconveynce, restitution, accounting and damages against Lucio Tan et. Al. PCGG issued several
writs of sequestration on the properties acquired by respondents by taking advantage of their relationship
with Marcos. Tan, et. Al. filed petition for certiorari, prohibition and injuction to nullify the writs. in all these
cases, Tan was represented by former Solgen Mendoza, who has resumed to his private practice.
PCGG filed a motion to disqualify Mendoza because he actively intervened with the liquidation and
acquisition of GENBANK and invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which prohibits
former government lawyers from accepting employment in connection with any matter which he encountered
while in service.
In 1991, Sandiganbayan denied PCGG's motion to disqualify Mendoza. They failed to prove that Mendoza
as former Solgen and existing counsel as Tan to be inconsitent and his appearance as counsel was beyong 1year prohibition. PCGG moved to reconsider but was denied hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Rule 6.03 of the Code of professional Responsibility applies to respondent
Mendoza.
HELD:
No. Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility deals particularly with former government
lawyers, and provides, viz.:
Rule 6.03 A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment
in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility retained the general structure of paragraph 2, Canon 36
of the Canons of Professional Ethics but replaced the expansive phrase "investigated and passed
upon" with the word "intervened." It is, therefore, properly applicable to both "adverse-interest
conflicts" and "congruent-interest conflicts."
The case at bar does not involve the "adverse interest" aspect of Rule 6.03. Nonetheless, there remains
the issue of whether there exists a "congruent-interest conflict" sufficient to disqualify respondent
Mendoza from representing respondents Tan, et al.

The PCGG insists that Atty. Mendoza, as then Solicitor General, actively intervened in the closure of
GENBANK by advising the Central Bank on how to proceed with the said banks liquidation and even filing
the petition for its liquidation with the CFI of Manila.
Therefore, the "matter" or the act of respondent Mendoza as Solicitor General involved in the case at bar is
"advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said banks liquidation and even filing the
petition for its liquidation with the CFI of Manila. The matter involved in the liquidation of Genbank is
entirely different from the matter involved in the sequestration of the stocks owned by Lucio Tan in Allied
Bank. The case does not involve the liquidation of the bank. Whether the shares of stocks of Allied Bank are
ill-gotten is far removed from the issue of the liquidation of the Bank. In short, the legality of the liquidation
of Genbank is not an issue in the sequestration case; hence, Rule 6.03 cannot apply to Mendoza.

UNITED STATES of AMERICA

vs.
RUSSELL WHITE BROTHERS, JR., G. THOMAS NEBEL, and THOMAS WHITE BROTHERS.
No. 3-92-00102
December 18, 1992.
FACTS:
Peter J. Strianse was an Assistant United States Attorney in the Middle District of Tennessee from
January, 1987, to June, 1989. Since leaving the United States Attorney's office, Mr. Strianse has been
engaged in the private practice of law in Nashville, Tennessee. The Government has moved to disqualify Mr.
Strianse from representing the defendant, G. Thomas Nebel, because of actions taken by Mr. Strianse in his
capacity as an Assistant United States Attorney. The parties do not dispute Mr. Strianse's actions so much as
the consequences of those actions.
In April, 1988, federal and state authorities in Florida were investigating the alleged drug-trafficking
activities of the defendant, Russell White Brothers, Jr., a Nashville resident. In connection with their
investigation, agents of the Drug Enforcement Administration *373 (DEA) and the Florida Department of
Law Enforcement (FDLE) came to Nashville to search Russell Brothers' house. The agents met with Mr.
Strianse who prepared the affidavit and search warrant from written reports, charts, and oral information
given to him by the agents.
At the evidentiary hearing on the government's motion to disqualify, Mr. Strianse described the
preparation as a "cut and paste" job done as a courtesy for the agents to conform their information to federal
court affidavit and search warrant forms. He testified that he received no information other than that which
was given to him to cut and paste. He never met the confidential informants mentioned in the affidavit, nor
does he recall their identities being disclosed to him. After the search warrant was executed, he did not
review the results and had no further contact with the agents. He further stated that Mr. Nebel's name never
was mentioned.
Special Agent Cynthia Schultz of the DEA testified that before meeting with Mr. Strianse she met
with the two unidentified confidential informants mentioned in the affidavit. She discussed the substance of
her conversations with the informants with Mr. Strianse and thinks that she told him their names. In addition,
she testified that when meeting with Mr. Strianse to prepare the affidavit and search warrant, she discussed
what she knew about Russell Brothers' activities, that Mr. Strianse determined whether there was probable
cause for a search warrant and what information to include in the search warrant. After Russell Brothers'
house was searched, Ms. Schultz spoke with Mr. Strianse about the documents which had been discovered;
however, she did not go over the inventory item by item with him. Ms. Schultz is not sure whether she
mentioned Mr. Nebel's name to Mr. Strianse.
Special Agent William G. Wolfe of the FDLE testified that the written reports and charts given to Mr.
Strianse contained information regarding smuggling and individuals which was not incorporated into the
affidavit and search warrant. Mr. Wolfe also testified that the identity of the second confidential informant
was made known to Mr. Strianse. Mr. Nebel's name was not mentioned and Mr. Wolfe did not give Mr.
Strianse any information regarding Mr. Nebel.
In June, 1988, Mr. Strianse was approached by Nashville DEA Special Agent Mark Keller about
preparing a seizure warrant and affidavit for a Piper Navajo aircraft allegedly used by Russell Brothers in his
drug smuggling activities. Mr. Strianse testified that this, too, was a cut and paste job in which he took the
affidavit from the April search warrant, added information regarding the pedigree of the airplane, and
substituted Mr. Keller for Ms. Schultz as the affiant. However, he also evaluated the evidence connecting the
airplane to the reports given to him by Mr. Wolfe.
RAMIREZ, Ma. Bernadette Priscilla P.

When the agents went to seize the airplane, its engines, avionics, and log book were missing. The agents
suspected the owner of the hangar, Robert Hancock, of secreting the missing engines, and Mr. Keller asked
Mr. Strianse if Mr. Hancock could be charged with obstruction of justice. Mr. Strianse testified that he was
going to charge Mr. Hancock with obstruction, but that Joe Brown, the United States Attorney, told
him *374 not to. Mr. Brown had spoken with Charles Ray, Mr. Hancock's attorney, and had decided not to
issue a complaint and warrant in return for Mr. Hancock turning over the missing items. Mr. Strianse passed
this information on to Mr. Keller.
According to Mr. Strianse, that was the extent of his involvement. No long-term strategy was discussed, and
he did not learn any confidential information regarding Russell Brothers. He does not recall a letter between
Mr. Ray and himself memorializing the agreement not to prosecute Mr. Hancock; however, he does recall
telling Mr. Ray by telephone that, although there was no current intent to prosecute Mr. Hancock, there was
nothing to stop the DEA from going to the grand jury.
Mr. Keller testified that Mr. Strianse's preparation of the seizure warrant and affidavit was a cut and paste
job, and that he did not give Mr. Strianse any confidential information which went into the seizure warrant.
However, in the days following the attempted seizure of the airplane, Mr. Keller spoke almost daily with Mr.
Strianse. DEA internal memoranda (DEA 6's) regarding the seizure of the airplane and related events were
given to the United States Attorney's office.[7] These memoranda would reflect the information Mr. Keller
would have given verbally to Mr. Strianse,[8] much of which is material, confidential information regarding
the investigation of Russell Brothers and Mr. Hancock.
Mr. Wolfe also testified that Mr. Strianse's preparation of the seizure warrant and affidavit was mostly a cut
and paste job based on the April search warrant and affidavit. However, like the earlier search warrant and
affidavit, they also were based partly on information from a confidential source named in the affidavit. The
investigation into Russell Brothers was still a Florida matter in June, 1988.
It is based on these acts by Mr. Strianse in relation to the investigation of Russell Brothers that the
government seeks to have him disqualified as Mr. Nebel's attorney in this matter. Briefly stated, the three
defendants in this case are being prosecuted for allegedly laundering money received as a result of the
defendant, Russell Brothers', drug trafficking activities.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Mr. Strianse should be disqualified as Mr. Nebels Attorney.
HELD:
Yes. The government bases its motion to disqualify on Canon 9 and Disciplinary Rule 9-101(B) of
the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Ethics in Government Act, 18 U.S.C.App.
207(a) (1).
Code of Professional Responsibility
(1) Canon 9
Canon 9 states that "[a] lawyer should avoid even the appearance of professional
impropriety."[10] Disciplinary Rule 9-101(B) requires that "[a] lawyer shall not accept private employment in
a matter in which he had substantial responsibility while he was a public employee."] The government argues
that Mr. Strianse's actions meet these standards, and therefore, he must be disqualified. The defendant, Mr.
Nebel, naturally disagrees.

"The district court's power to disqualify an attorney derives from its inherent authority to supervise the
professional conduct of attorneys appearing before it." United States v. Miller, 624 F.2d 1198, 1201 (3d Cir.
1980); Handelman v. Weiss, 368 F. Supp. 258, 263 (S.D.N.Y.1973). "[W]hen dealing with ethical principles"
such as attorney conduct, a court "cannot paint with broad strokes." United States v. Standard Oil Co., 136 F.
Supp. 345, 367 (S.D.N.Y.1955). Rather, it should look at the specific conduct of the attorney before it, since
"the conclusion in a particular case can be reached only after painstaking analysis of the facts and precise
application of precedent." Id.
While paying close attention to detail, however, a court should not lose sight of the need to balance the broad
and sometimes contrasting policies involved in a motion to disqualify. "Motions to disqualify opposing
counsel are disfavored. Disqualification has a serious and immediate adverse effect by denying the client his
choice of counsel." Society for Good Will to Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 466 F. Supp. 722, 724
(E.D.N.Y. 1979); cf. United States v. Phillips, 699 F.2d 798, 801-03 (6th Cir.1983), overruled on
other grounds, United States v. Tosh, 733 F.2d 422 (6th Cir.1984).
Special considerations, both for and against disqualification, arise when a motion is interposed to disqualify a
former government attorney.
If service with the government will tend to sterilize an attorney in too large an area of law for too long a time,
or will prevent him from engaging in practice of the very specialty for which the government sought his
service and if that sterilization will spread to the firm with which he becomes associated the sacrifices of
entering government service will be too great for most men to make. As for those men willing to make these
sacrifices, not only will they and their firms suffer a restricted practice thereafter, but clients will find it
difficult to obtain counsel, particularly in those specialties and suits dealing with the government.
Standard Oil Co., 136 F. Supp. at 363. On the other hand, policy considerations underlying DR 9-101(B)
which militate toward disqualification include[t]he treachery of switching sides; the safeguarding of
confidential governmental information from future use against the government; the need to discourage
government lawyers from handling particular assignments in such a way as to encourage their own future
employment in regard to those particular matters after leaving government service; and the professional
benefit derived from avoiding the appearance of evil.

OMAR P. ALI v. ATTY. MOSIB A. BUBONG

A.C. No. 4018
March 8, 2005
FACTS:
This is a verified petition for disbarment filed against Atty. Mosib Ali Bubong for having been found
guilty of grave misconduct while holding the position of Register of Deeds of Marawi City.
It appears that this disbarment proceeding is an off-shoot of the administrative case earlier filed by
complainant against respondent. In said case, which was initially investigated by the Land Registration
Authority (LRA), complainant charged respondent with illegal exaction; indiscriminate issuance of Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-2821 in the names of Lawan Bauduli Datu, Mona Abdullah, Ambobae
Bauduli Datu, Matabae Bauduli Datu, Mooamadali Bauduli Datu, and Amenola Bauduli Datu; and
manipulating the criminal complaint filed against Hadji Serad Bauduli Datu and others for violation of the
Anti-Squatting Law.
Respondent maintains that there was nothing irregular with his issuance of TCT No. T-2821 in the name of
the Bauduli Datus. According to him, both law and jurisprudence support his stance that it was his ministerial
duty, as the Register of Deeds of Marawi City, to act on applications for land registration on the basis only of
the documents presented by the applicants. In the case of the Bauduli Datus, nothing in the documents they
presented to his office warranted suspicion, hence, he was duty-bound to issue TCT No. T-2821 in their
favor.
Respondent also insists that he had nothing to do with the dismissal of criminal complaint for violation of the
Anti-Squatting Law allegedly committed by Hadji Serad Abdullah and the latter's co-defendants. Respondent
explains that his participation in said case was a result of the two subpoenas duces tecum issued by the
investigating prosecutor who required him to produce the various land titles involved in said dispute. He
further claims that the dismissal of said criminal case by the Secretary of Justice was based solely on the
evidence presented by the parties. Complainant's allegation, therefore, that he influenced the outcome of the
case is totally unjustified.
ISSUE:
Whether respondent may be disbarred for grave misconduct committed while he was in the
employ of the government.
HELD:
Yes. The Code of Professional Responsibility does not cease to apply to a lawyer simply because he
has joined the government service. In fact, by the express provision of Canon 6 thereof, the rules governing
the conduct of lawyers "shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official tasks."
Thus, where a lawyer's misconduct as a government official is of such nature as to affect his qualification as
a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of the bar on such grounds.
Although the general rule is that a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a
member of the bar for infractions he committed as a government official, he may, however, be disciplined as
a lawyer if his misconduct constitutes a violation of his oath as a member of the legal profession.
In the case at bar, respondent's grave misconduct, as established by the Office of the President and
subsequently affirmed by this Court, deals with his qualification as a lawyer. By taking advantage of his

office as the Register of Deeds of Marawi City and employing his knowledge of the rules governing land
registration for the benefit of his relatives, respondent had clearly demonstrated his unfitness not only to
perform the functions of a civil servant but also to retain his membership in the bar. Rule 6.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility is explicit on this matter. It reads:
Rule 6.02 A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote
or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.
Respondent's conduct manifestly undermined the people's confidence in the public office he used to occupy
and cast doubt on the integrity of the legal profession. The ill-conceived use of his knowledge of the
intricacies of the law calls for nothing less than the withdrawal of his privilege to practice law.

AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR. vs. ATTYS. ANTONIO M. LLORENTE and LIGAYA P.

SALAYON
A.C. No. 4680
August 29, 2000
FACTS:
Complainant was then a candidate during the May 8, 1995 elections. He filed this complaint against
respondent Attys. Antonio M. Llorente and Lgaya P. Salayon, in their capacity as members of the Pasig City
Board of Canvassers, for gross misconduct, serious breach of trust, and violation of the lawyers oath.
Complainant alleges that respondents tampered with the votes received by him, with the result that, as shown
in the Statements of Votes (SoVs) and Certificate of Canvass (CoC), other senatorial candidates were
credited with votes which were above the number of votes they actually received while, on the other hand,
petitioners votes were reduced. Respondents denied the allegations, claiming that the errors pointed out by
complainant could be attributed to honest mistake, oversight, and/or fatigue.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondents are guilty of misconduct.
HELD:
Considering the facts, the Supreme Court held that respondents are guilty of misconduct.
A lawyer who holds a government position may not be disciplined as a member of the bar for
misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official. However, if the misconduct also
constitutes a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility or the lawyer's oath or is of such character
as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or shows moral delinquency on his part, such individual may be
disciplined as a member of the bar for such misconduct. Here, by certifying as true and correct the SoVs in
question, respondents committed a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code which stipulates that a lawyer shall not
engage in "unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." By express provision of Canon 6, this is made
applicable to lawyers in the government service. In addition, they likewise violated their oath of office as
lawyers to "do no falsehood."

GISELA HUYSSEN vs. ATTY. FRED L. GUTIERREZ

A.C. No. 6707
March 24, 2006
FACTS:
Huyssen alleged that in the process of her and her childrens application for visa to stay in the
Philippines, Gutierrez required US$20,000 as deposit, refundable after one year. Gutierrez was then with the
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation. After one year, when Huyssen demanded the $20,000 from Atty.
Gutierrez, the respondent failed to do so.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Gutierrez should be disbarred
HELD:
Respondent's act of asking money from complainant in consideration of the latter's pending
application for visas is violative of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which prohibits
members of the Bar from engaging or participating in any unlawful, dishonest, or deceitful acts. Moreover,
said acts constitute a breach of Rule 6.02 of the Code which bars lawyers in government service from
promoting their private interest. Promotion of private interest includes soliciting gifts or anything of
monetary value in any transaction requiring the approval of his office or which may be affected by the
functions of his office. Respondent's conduct in office betrays the integrity and good moral character
required from all lawyers, especially from one occupying a high public office. A lawyer in public office is
expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which might tend to lessen the trust and confidence of
the citizenry in government; he must also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a
high standard of honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer in government service is a keeper of the
public faith and is burdened with high degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than his brethren in
private practice.
As a lawyer, who was also a public officer, respondent miserably failed to cope with the strict demands and
high standards of the legal profession. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates that a
lawyer may be disbarred or suspended by this Court for any of the following acts: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice;
(3) gross misconduct in office; (4) grossly immoral conduct; (5) conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude; (6) violation of the lawyer's oath; (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court;
and (8) wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party without authority to do so.
Respondent's acts constitute gross misconduct; and consistent with the need to maintain the high standards of
the Bar and thus preserve the faith of the public in the legal profession, respondent deserves the ultimate
penalty of expulsion from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers.

IMELDA Y. MADERADA vs. Judge ERNESTO H. MEDIODEA

A.M. No. MTJ-02-1459. October 14, 2003.
FACTS
Complainant filed before the MCTC where Respondent is the presiding judge, an action for forcible
entry. Worth noting is the fact that Complainant is a clerk of court at the same MCTC. Complainant
appeared as counsel for herself and for her co-plaintiff. Respondent judge had set a hearing date for the case
but because of numerous motions filed by the parties, the same was held in abeyance for almost a month.
Complainant filed several Motions praying for judgment to be rendered on the civil case. In an Order,
respondent denied complainant's Motions .
Complainant did not ask for a reconsideration of the denial of her motions, instead she filed an
administrative complaint against respondent. The complaint charged respondent with gross ignorance of the
law amounting to grave misconduct" for failing "to observe and apply the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure". Respondent, in his comment, contended that the Complainant failed to exhaust the available
judicial remedies. Instead, she tried to compel him to render a decision on the case. Respondent anchored his
defenses on the fact that Complainant appeared as counsel for herself and her co-plaintiff, for which she
should likewise be held administratively liable. He argues that she did not secure authority from the SC to
appear as counsel, and that she failed to file her leave of absence every time she appeared in court
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Complainant can be held administratively liable for appearing as counsel
for herself and her co-plaintiff
HELD
A party's right to conduct litigation personally is recognized by Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court. The provision provides that in litigation, parties may personally do everything during its progress
from its commencement to its termination. The law allows persons who are not lawyers by profession to
litigate their own case in court. The right of complainant to litigate her case personally cannot be taken away
from her. Her being an employee of the judiciary does not remove from her the right to proceedings in
propria persona or to self-representation. Thus, the lawful exercise of a right cannot make one
administratively liable.
However, representing oneself is different from appearing on behalf of someone else. Because she
was already defending the rights of another person when she appeared for her co-plaintiff, it cannot be
argued that complainant was merely protecting her rights. Complainant may be impairing the efficiency of
public service once she appears for the latter without permission from the SC. The Court cannot countenance
any act that would undermine the people's faith and confidence in the judiciary, even if we consider that this
was the first time complainant appeared in court and that she appeared for her own sister. Again we should
be reminded that everyone connected with an office that is charged with the dispensation of justice carries a
heavy burden of responsibility. The Court will not shirk from its responsibility of imposing discipline upon
its employees in order not to diminish the people's faith in our justice system. But when the charge has no
basis, it will not hesitate to shield the innocent court employee from any groundless accusation that trifles
with judicial processes, and that serves only to disrupt rather than promote the orderly administration of
justice. The penalty of reprimand is deemed sufficient.
RAVAGO, Ma. Danise Ranchelle A.

JULIETA BORROMEO SAMONTE vs. ATTY. ROLANDO R. GATDULA

A.M. No. P-99-1292. February 26, 1999
FACTS
The complaint filed by Samonte charges Gatdula with grave misconduct consisting in the alleged
engaging in the private practice of law which is in conflict with his official functions as Branch Clerk of
Court. Complainant is the representative of her sister who is the plaintiff in an ejectment case. A decision
was rendered in favor of the plaintiff who subsequently filed a motion for execution. Complainant, however,
was surprised to receive a TRO signed by the Judge of the RTC, where Atty. Rolando Gatdula is the Branch
Clerk of Court, enjoining the execution of the decision of the MTC. Complainant alleges that when she went
to respondent to inquire about the reason for the issuance of the TRO, respondent blamed her lawyer for
writing the wrong address in their complaint, and told her that if she wanted the execution to proceed, she
should change her lawyer, at the same time giving his calling card with the name "Baligod, Gatdula,
Tacardon, Dimailig and Celera". In his comment, Respondent claims that complainant returned to his office,
and informed him that she wanted to change counsel and that a friend of hers recommended the Law Firm of
"Baligod, Gatdula, Tacardon, Dimailig and Celera," at the same time showing a calling card, and asking if he
could handle her case. Respondent refused as he was not connected with the law firm, although he was
invited to join but he chose to remain in the judiciary. Complainant returned to court a few days later and told
him that if he cannot convince the judge to recall the writ of preliminary injunction, she will file an
administrative case against respondent and the judge. The case was set for hearing three times but did not
appear despite due notice.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Respondent committed acts
HELD
By her failure to appear at the hearings, Complainant failed to substantiate her allegation that it was
the respondent who gave her the calling card of "Baligod, Gatdula, Tacardon, Dimailig and Celera Law
Offices" and that he tried to convince her to change counsels.
However, while the respondent vehemently denies the complainant's allegations, he does not deny
that his name appears on the calling card attached to the complaint, which admittedly came into the hands of
the complainant. The explanation tendered by Respondent is an admission that it is his name which appears
on the calling card, a permissible form of advertising or solicitation of legal services. Respondent does not
claim that the calling card was printed without his knowledge or consent. The inclusion/retention of his name
in the professional card constitutes an act of solicitation which violates Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713 (Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees) which declares it unlawful for a public
official or employee to Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the
Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with official functions."
Time and again the Court has said that the conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an
office charged with the dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, should be
circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. His conduct, at all times must not only be
characterized by propriety and decorum but above all else must be above suspicion. He is ordered to cause
the exclusion of his name in the firm name or any office engaged in the private practice of law.

NOTARIAL LAW VIOLATIONS
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE ALIPIO ABADA vs. ALIPIO ABAJA

G.R. No. 147145
January 31, 2005
FACTS
Abada died without legitimate children. Alipio C. Abaja filed with the RTC of Kabankalan a petition
for the probate of the last will and testament of Abada. Abada allegedly named as his testamentary heirs his
natural children Rosario and Eulogio, who is the father of respondent Alipio.
Nicanor Caponong opposed the petition and alleged that the will should be disallowed because it was not
executed and attested as required by law. Caponong contends that the will is not acknowledged before a
notary public, citing Article 806 of the Civil Code which provides that Every will must be acknowledged
before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. Thereafter Abadas will was allowed probate, there
having been substantial compliance with the formalities of a Will as the law directs and petitioner being able
to establish the regularity of the execution of the said Will. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Resolution of
the RTC. Caponong appealed to the SC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an acknowledgement before a Notary Public is required for the validity of a
will
HELD
Article 806 of the New Civil Code is taken from Article 685 of the Old Civil Code which provides
that The notary and two of the witnesses who authenticate the will must be acquainted with the testator, or,
should they not know him, he shall be identified by two witnesses who are acquainted with him and are
known to the notary and to the attesting witnesses. The notary and the witnesses shall also endeavor to assure
themselves that the testator has, in their judgment, the legal capacity required to make a will.
However, the Code of Civil Procedure repealed Article 685 of the Old Civil Code. Under the Code
of Civil Procedure, the intervention of a notary is not necessary in the execution of any will. Therefore,
Abada's will does not require acknowledgment before a notary public.

MANUEL L. LEE vs. ATTY. REGINO B. TAMBAGO

A.C. No. 5281. February 12, 2008
FACTS
Complainant Manuel charged respondent Tambago with violation of the Notarial Law and the ethics
of the legal profession for notarizing a spurious last will and testament. Complainant averred that his father,
Vicente Lee, Sr., never executed the contested will. Complainant questioned the absence of notation of the
residence certificates of the purported witnesses Noynay and Grajo. Complainant further asserted that no
copy of such purported will was on file in the archives division of the Records Management and Archives
Office of the National Commission for Culture and the Arts (NCCA). Respondent stated that the complaint
was filed simply to harass him. Respondent did not dispute complainant's contention that no copy of the will
was on file in the archives division of the NCCA. He claimed that no copy of the contested will could be
found there because none was filed. Investigations show that respondent failed to make the necessary entries
pertaining to the will in his notarial register.
ISSUE: Whether or not Respondent should be held liable in this case
HELD
A notarial will, as the contested will in this case, is required by law to be attested and subscribed by
three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another. The will in question was
attested by only two witnesses, Noynay and Grajo. The Civil Code likewise requires that a will must be
acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. An acknowledgment is the act of one
who has executed a deed in going before some competent officer or court and declaring it to be his act or
deed. An examination of the acknowledgment of the will in question shows that this particular requirement
was neither strictly nor substantially complied with. The omissions by respondent invalidated the will.
On the issue of whether respondent was under the legal obligation to furnish a copy of the notarized
will to the archives division, Article 806 provides that Every will must be acknowledged before a notary
public by the testator and the witness. The notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or
file another with the office of the Clerk of Court. Respondent's failure, inadvertent or not, to file in the
archives division a copy of the notarized will was therefore not a cause for disciplinary action.
As to the issue of failure to file the necessary entries in the notarial register and irregularities on the
residence certificates of the witnesses, Section 249 of the old Notarial Law provides the Grounds for
Revocation of Commission: (b) the failure of the notary to make the proper entry or entries in his notarial
register touching his notarial acts in the manner required by law; and (f) the failure of the notary to make the
proper notation regarding cedula certificates.
Notaries public must observe with utmost care and utmost fidelity the basic requirements in the
performance of their duties, otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of notarized deeds will be
undermined. Defects in the observance of the solemnities prescribed by law render the entire will invalid.
This carelessness cannot be taken lightly in view of the importance and delicate nature of a will, considering
that the testator and the witnesses, as in this case, are no longer alive to identify the instrument and to
confirm its contents. Accordingly, respondent must be held accountable for his acts.

HORST FRANZ ELLERT vs. JUDGE VICTORIO GALAPON JR., MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT
OF DULAG LEYTE
A.M No. MTJ-00-1294
July 31, 2000
FACTS:
The complainant is charging Judge Galapon, Jr. of MTC Dulag, Leyte with grave misconduct, abuse
of judicial authority, ignorance of the law and unlawful notarization regarding the DARAB Case No. VIII169-L-91 entitled Lualhati V. Ellert vs. Marina Roca and Odeth Roca. Complainant alleged that in the
Answer filed by Marina Roca and Odeth Roca with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (DARAB), the signature of Judge Galapon was affixed in the Jurat. He avers that a Municipal Trial
Court Judge is only authorized to administer oaths, or sign jurats to documents only for submission before
his court or cases pending before his court but definitely, not all other documents. Even as an Ex-Officio
Notary Public, he is authorized to notarize documents, conveyances of very limited nature. He points out that
by unlawfully and illegally doing so, respondent judge committed grave misconduct, abuse of judicial
authority, and exhibited his ignorance of the law. In his comment, Judge Galapon reveals that the present
complaint is perhaps the tenth in a series of continuous and relentless harassment case filed against him by
Franz Ellert because of the criminal case he has filed against the latter for light threats where Ellert was duly
convicted and sentenced. Judge Galapon candidly admits the charge that he administered the oath in the
verification portion of the answer of respondents Roca in the DARAB case. However, he believes that there
was nothing wrong nor there any abuse of authority in administering such oath. There never was any malice
or bad faith attending such act. He honestly believes that merely administering and oath in the jurat is not
actionable by and administrative sanction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the act of notarizing a pleading in a case which is not pending before the sala
of Judge Galapon, Jr. constitutes an unlawful practice of law.
HELD:
Yes, respondent is guilty of the charge against him, that he engaged in unauthorized notarial work.
According to Circular No. 1-90, Judges of the Municipal Trial Courts or Municipal Circuit Trial Courts may
perform their functions as notaries public ex-officio only in the notarization of documents connected with the
exercise of their official functions. They may not undertake the preparation and acknowledgment of
documents which bear no relation to the performance of their functions as judges. Circular No. 1-90 clearly
provides that it is only when there are no lawyers or notaries public in the municipality or circuit that an
MTC and MCTC judge may act as a notary public provided that, the notarial fees are turned over to the
government and a certification is made in the notarized documents attesting to the lack of any lawyer or
notary public in such municipality or circuit.
In the case at bar, there is no showing that there was no lawyer or notary public in Dulag, Leyte.
Therefore, respondent judges action as a notary public cannot qualify as an exception to Circular No. 1-90.
The defense interposed by the respondent that he sees nothing wrong with what he has done, nor that
he abused his authority when he notarized the subject pleading, is unmeritorious. Judge Galapon should
know what the duties of a judge acting as an ex-officio notary public are, and, if he was uncertain of what
they are, he should have first verified from the Office of the Court Administrator the extent of his authority
to notarize documents.
REAMICO, Krizia Mae Perez

ANGELES, ET. AL.

A.C. No. 7860
vs.
ATTY. IBAEZ
January 15, 2009
FACTS:
This is a complaint filed by Heirs of Angeles in representation of the deceased Loreto Angeles
against Atty. Ibaez for disbarment for allegedly notarizing the Extrajudicial Partition with absolute Sale
without a notarial commission and in the absence of the affiant. The complainants contended that respondent
Atty. Ibaezs act of notarizing the Extrajudicial Partition with Absolute Sale without requiring the presence
of the parties thereto, despite his alleged lack of notarial commission, constitutes professional misconduct for
which reason he should be disbarred. In his Motion to Dismiss and Position Paper, respondent admitted the
he notarized the Extrajudicial Partition with Absolute Sale but clarified that he did so as Notary Public of the
Province of Cavite, with a notarial commission issued by RTC of Cavite. He explained that the designation
of Manila as the place of execution of the said document was a mistake of his former legal secretary, who
failed to correct the same through oversight. Atty. Ibaez alleged that a defect in the notarization does not
invalidate the transaction, and he stated that his failure to require the presence of the parties is wholly
justified because of the assurance of complainant Rosalina Angeles that the signatures appearing in the said
document was indeed those of her co-heirs. In the IBPs report and recommendation, the IBP commissioner
found that respondent notarized the Extrajudicial Partition with Absolute Sale in the absence of affiants and
without a notarial commission. It is recommended that Atty. Ibaez be barred from being commissioned as a
notary public for a period of two years and be suspended from the practice of law for one year. IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved the report. Respondent then filed a supplemental position paper before the
IBP Board of Governors.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a notarized Extrajudicial Partition with Absolute Sale in the absence of the
parties valid.
HELD:
The findings of the IBP was sustained and adopts its recommendations with modification.
Respondent violated his oath as a lawyer and the Code of Professional Responsibility when he notarized the
Extrajudicial Partition with Absolute Sale in the absence of the affiants.
Time and again, we have reminded lawyers commissioned as notaries public that the affiants must personally
appear before them. Section 1 of Public Act No. 2103, or the Notarial Law, provides:
Sec. 1. (a) The acknowledgement shall be before a notary public or an officer duly authorized by
law of the country to take acknowledgements of instruments or documents in the place where the act
is done. The notary public or the officer taking the acknowledgement shall certify that the person
acknowledging the instrument or document is known to him and that he is the same person who
executed it, acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. The certificate shall be made under
the official seal, if he is required by law to keep a seal, and if not, his certificate shall so state.
Section 2(b) of Rule IV of the Rules on Notarial Practice of 2004 reads:
A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument or
document (1) is not in the notarys presence personally at the time of the notarization; and

(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary public through
competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules.
The physical presence of the affiants enables the notary public to verify the genuineness of the
signatures of the acknowledging parties and to ascertain that the document is the parties free act and deed.
Under the facts and circumstances of the case, respondents notarial commission should not only be
suspended but respondent must also be suspended from the practice of law.

TUPAL
A.M. No. MTI 14- 1842
vs.
JUDGE ROJO
February 24, 2014
FACTS:
Rex M. Tupal filed with the Office of the Court Administrator a complaint against Judge Remegio
V. Rojo for violating the Code of Judicial Conduct and for gross ignorance of the law. Judge Rojo allegedly
solemnized marriages without the required marriage license. He instead notarized affidavits of
cohabitation and issued them to the contracting parties. He notarized these affidavits on the day of the
parties marriage. These "package marriages" are allegedly common in Bacolod City. Judge Rojo allegedly
violated Circular No. 1-90 dated February 26, 1990. Circular No. 1-90 allows municipal trial court judges to
act as notaries public ex officio and notarize documents only if connected with their official functions and
duties. Rex argues that affidavits of cohabitation are not connected with a judges official functions and
duties as solemnizing officer.Thus, Judge Rojo cannot notarize ex officio affidavits of cohabitation of parties
whose marriage he solemnized. Also, according to Rex, Judge Rojo allegedly violated the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice. Judge Rojo notarized affidavits of cohabitation without affixing his judicial seal on the
affidavits. He also did not require the parties to present their competent pieces of evidence of identity as
required by law. These omissions allegedly constituted gross ignorance of the law as notarial rules simple
and elementary to ignore. Judge Rojo commented on the complaint. He argued that Rex was only harassing
him. Rex is the father of Frialyn Tupal. Frialyn has a pending perjury case in Branch 5 for allegedly making
false statements in her affidavit of cohabitation. Rex only filed a complaint against Judge Rojo to delay
Frialyns case. Judge Rojo did not deny notarizing the affidavits of cohabitation. He argued that notarizing
affidavits of cohabitation was connected with his official functions and duties as a judge. The Guidelines on
the Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary does not prohibit judges from notarizing
affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriage they will solemnize. Thus, Judge Rojo did not violate
Circular No. 1-90. Judge Rojo also argued that he did not violate the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. He is a
judge, not a notary public. Thus, he was not required to affix a notarial seal on the affidavits he notarized
ISSUE:
Whether Judge Rojo is guilty of violating the New Code of Judicial Conduct and of gross
ignorance of the law.
HELD:
The Supreme Court held Judge Rojo guilty of violating the New Code of Judicial Conduct and
Circular No. 190, and of gross ignorance of the law. Judge Rojo notarized affidavits of cohabitation, which
were documents not connected with the exercise of his official functions and duties as solemnizing officer.
He also notarized affidavits of cohabitation without certifying that lawyers or notaries public were lacking in
his courts territorial jurisdiction. As a solemnizing officer, the judges only duty involving the affidavit of
cohabitation is to examine whether the parties have indeed lived together for at least five years without legal
impediment to marry. The Guidelines does not state that the judge can notarize the parties affidavit of
cohabitation. Notarizing affidavits of cohabitation is inconsistent with the duty to examine the parties
requirements for marriage. If the solemnizing officer notarized the affidavit of cohabitation, he cannot
objectively examine and review the affidavits statements before performing the marriage ceremony. Thus,
Judge Rojo was suspended for six months from office.
Judge Rojo also violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Rule IV, Section 2, paragraph (b) of
the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice prohibits a notary public from notarizing documents if the signatory is

not personally known to him. Otherwise, the notary public must require the signatory to present a competent
evidence of identity
In all the nine affidavits of cohabitation Judge Rojo notarized, he only stated that the parties
subscribed and swore to their affidavits before him. Judge Rojo did not state that the parties were personally
known to him or that the parties presented their competent pieces of evidence of identity. Thus, Judge Rojo
violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.

TAN TIONG BIO (A.K.A. HENRY)

A.C. No. 6634
vs.
ATTY. RENATO L. GONZALES
August 23, 2007
FACTS:
A complaint for for disbarment was filed by Tan Tiong Bio against Atty. Renato L. Gonzales for
allegedly notarizing a conveying deed outside the territory covered by his notarial commission and without
requiring the personal presence before him of the signatories to the deed before notarizing the same,
inviolation of the Notarial Law and the lawyers oath. As records reveal, complainant purchased parcels of
land at Southwoods in Cavite, owned and controlled by FEGDI and FEPI, which has an office located in
Pasig City. In one of the transactions, complainant as vendee, was made to sign a deed of sale covering a lot
described in and covered by the vendors TCT. Following payment the TCT in complainants name was
delivered to him with the corresponding completed deed of sale. Respondent Renato Gonzales, employed as
corporate counsel for FEPI and appointed/reappointed from 1196-2001 as notary public for Quezon City,
was the notarizing officer of Deed 1108 on which the name and signature of Alice Odchigue-Bondoc appear
as the vendors authorized representative. At the preliminary conference before the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline (Commission), complainant and respondent entered into the following stipulation of facts, to wit:
The Deed of Absolute Sale No. 1108 was duly executed by Mr. Henry Tan and Atty. Alice OdchigueBondoc as authorized signatory of the seller; that the subject document was notarized by respondent as
document no. 367, page no. 74, book no. 8, series of 2001 of his notarial register; that respondent admits that
his notarial appointment covers Quezon City and that the subject document was notarized in Pasig City,
specifically, at the Renaissance Tower; and that the parties admit that Atty. Alice Odchigue-Bondoc and
Henry Tan Tan were not present at the same time when the subject document was notarized. After due
hearings, Investigating his REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION, which, as approved by the IBP Director
for Bar Discipline, was forwarded to the Court. In the report, the Commission recommended that respondent
be adjudged liable and penalized for violating the rule proscribing one from acting as a notary outside the
area covered by his commission, but recommended the dismissal of the complaint insofar as it charges the
respondent for notarizing a document without the personal appearance before him of the party-signatories
thereto.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent breached the injunction against notarizing a document in a
place outside his commission.
HELD:
As reported by the Investigating Commissioner, respondent acknowledged that from February 1,
1996 to September 30, 2001, within which period Deed 1108 was notarized, his notarial commission then
issued was for Quezon City.Deed 1108 was, however, notarized in Pasig City. To compound matters, he
admitted having notarized hundreds of documents in Pasig City, where he used to hold office, during the
period that his notarial commission was only for and within Quezon City. While seemingly appearing to be a
harmless incident, respondents act of notarizing documents in a place outside of or beyond the authority
granted by his notarial commission, partakes of malpractice of law and falsification.
Where the notarization of a document is done by a member of the Philippine Bar at a time when he
has no authorization or commission to do so, the offender may be subjected to disciplinary action. For one,
performing a notarial [act] without such commission is a violation of the lawyers oath to obey the laws,
more specifically, the Notarial Law. Then, too, by making it appear that he is duly commissioned when he is
not, he is, for all legal intents and purposes, indulging in deliberate falsehood, which the lawyers oath

similarly proscribes. These violations fall squarely within the prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct. (Nunga vs. Viray)
Notarization is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or
authorized may act as notaries public.Hence, the requirements for the issuance of a commission as notary
public are treated with a formality definitely more than casual.

HEIRS OF SPS. LUCAS and FRANCISCO VILLANUEVA vs. ATTY. SALUD BERADIO
A.C. No. 6270
(2007)
FACTS:
The late spouses Villanueva acquired several parcels of land in Pangasinan, one of which was
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 2522. Their five children, namely, Simeona, Susana, Maria,
Alfonso, and Florencia, survived them. Alfonso executed an Affidavit of Adjudication stating that as the only
surviving son and sole heir of the spouses Villanueva, he was adjudicating to himself the parcel of land under
OCT No. 2522 and then, he executed a Deed of Absolute Sale conveying the property to Adriano
Villanueva. Respondent appeared as notary public on both the affidavit of adjudication and the deed of sale.
Contrary to the misrepresentations of Alfonso, it appears that his sister Florencia was still alive at the time
he executed the affidavit of adjudication and the deed of sale. Complainants claimed that respondent was
aware of this fact, as respondent had been their neighbor from the time of their birth, and respondent
constantly mingled with their family. They accused respondent of conspiring with Alfonso to deprive his coheirs of their rightful shares in the property. Respondent admitted in her comment that she notarized the
affidavit of adjudication and the deed of sale executed by Alfonso in 1984. However, respondent denied that
she conspired with Alfonso to dispose of fraudulently the property that the fact that none of Alfonsos coheirs filed their objections at the time he executed the affidavit of adjudication proved that most of the
properties of the spouses Villanueva had earlier been distributed to the other heirs. Respondent asserted that
the personal appearances and acknowledgment by the party to the document are the core of the ritual that
effectively convert a private document into a public document. The IBP Commissioner found that the
respondent violated the notarial law when she notarized the affidavit knowing that Alfonso was not the sole
compulsory heir of the spouses, recommended the suspension of respondents notarial commission for one
year.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents notarial commission be revoked for her failure to discharge
properly her duties as a notary public and as a member of the bar.
HELD:
Yes. The notary public must be mindful of the significance of the notarial seal as affixed on a
document. The notarial seal converts the document from private to public, after which it may be presented as
evidence without need for proof of its genuineness and due execution. Thus, notarization should not be
treated as an empty, meaningless, or routinary act. In the case of Panganiban v. Borromeo, the court held
that notaries public must inform themselves of the facts to which they intend to certify and to take no part in
illegal transactions. They must guard against any illegal or immoral arrangements. In this case, respondent
herself admitted that she knew of the falsity of Alfonsos statement that he was the sole heir of the spouses
Villanueva and notarized a document while fully aware that it contained a material falsehood. The affidavit
of adjudication is premised on this very assertion. By this instrument, Alfonso claimed a portion of his
parents estate all to himself, to the exclusion of his co-heirs. Where admittedly the notary public has
personal knowledge of a false statement or information contained in the instrument to be notarized, yet
proceeds to affix his or her notarial seal on it, the Court must not hesitate to discipline the notary public
accordingly as the circumstances of the case may dictate. Otherwise, the integrity and sanctity of the
notarization process may be undermined and public confidence on notarial documents diminished. In this
case, respondents conduct amounted to a breach of Canon 1 of the CPR, which requires lawyers to obey the
laws of the land and promote respect for the law and legal processes. Respondent also violated Rule 1.01 of
the Code which proscribes lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct.
RETARDO, Arlyn Reanzares

CHITA PANTOJA-MUMAR vs ATTY. JANUARIO FLORES

A.C. No. 5426
(2007)
FACTS:
Complainant, Chita Pantoja-Mumar filed an administrative case against respondent, Atty. Januario
C. Flores for allegedly falsifying/fabricating an Extrajudicial Partition with Absolute Sale for the
complainant and 11 other co-heirs (compulsory heirs of the late Jose Pantoja, Sr.) covering a three-hectare
property in Danao City in favor of the spouses Filomena and Edilberto Perez. Complainant averred that there
was actually no transaction between the Pantojas and the Perezes, and the deed was notarized in violation of
his oath as a lawyer and a breach of his duty as a notary pulic. The Court referred the matter to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines. In the Investigating Commissioners report, the acts and omissions of
respondent as notary public have been duly established. Accordingly: (1) The document, although already
signed by some of the co-heirs/co-owners on or before December 29, 1987, was not finalized because the
transaction was not pursued; however, the date of notarization was indicated therein to be December 29,
1987; (2). Respondent notarized the document on or after June 13, 1988, without the authority and/or in the
absence of some of the supposed signatories; (3) Respondent did not see one of the co-heirs, Maximina
Pantoja, actually affix her thumbmark to the document; and (4) Respondent notarized the document even if
Complainant, also a co-heir, did not sign it. The Investigating Commissioner pointed out that these acts and
omissions were established through respondents own admission that he notarized the document even if
Maximina Pantoja did not affix her thumbmark in his presence, and that complainant did not appear before
him to sign the deed.
ISSUE:
Whether the respondents notarial commission be revoked and disqualified from

reappointment for a period of two years considering that he was remiss in his duties as
notaries public
HELD:
Yes. A Notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are
the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of
what are stated therein. A notary public is duty-bound to require the person executing a document to be
personally present, to swear before him that he is that person and ask the latter if he has voluntarily and
freely executed the same. Thus, in notarizing the Deed of Absolute Sale without ascertaining that all the
vendors-signatories thereto were the very same persons who executed it and personally appeared before him
to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein, respondent undermined the confidence of the
public on notarial documents; he thereby breached Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
requires lawyers to uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and
legal processes, and Rule 1.01 thereof, which proscribes lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
Notarization of documents is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are
qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. It is through the act of notarization that a private document
is converted into a public one, making it admissible in evidence without need of preliminary proof of
authenticity and due execution. Indeed, a notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its
face, and for this reason, notaries public must observe utmost care in complying with the elementary
formalities in the performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of this
form
of
conveyance
would
be
undermined.

FIRE OFFICER DARWIN S. SAPAYANI vs ATTY. RENATO G. GASMEN

A.C. No. 7073
(2015)
FACTS:
Complainant Sappayani, in his complaint alleged that Atty. Gasmen notarized ducuments which he
purportedly executed, a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) and a loan application.The SPA,which was
notarized by Atty. Gasmen authorized one Newtrade Goodwill Corp. (NGC) through Maravillas to complete
the loan application with Air Materiel Wing Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (AMWSLAI) and receive its
proceeds. By virtue of said notarized documents, AMWSLAI released to Maravillas, as representative of
NGC, a loan amounting to P157,301.43. Sappayani denied executing said documents, claiming that his
signature found on the SPA was forged and that it was physically impossible for him to personally appear
before Atty. Gasmen and execute the documents at the AMWSLAI office in Quezon City, as he was then
training at the Bureau of Fire Protection at General Santos City. In his comment, Atty. Gasmen claimed that
before the SPA and loan application were notarized, the proceeds were already released to NGC by
AMWSLAI, thus, dispensing with the need for notarization. He insisted that the notarization of said
documents was merely done on a ministerial basis, with proper safeguards, and that it cannot be expected of
him to require the personal appearance of every loan applicant considering the hundreds of loan applications
brought to him for signing. It was found out that Sappayanis signature on the SPA was forged, and that Atty.
Gasmen failed to exercise reasonable diligence or that degree of vigilance expected of a bonus pater
familias. Thus, when he notarized a forged SPA and untruthfully certified that Sappayani was the very same
person who personally appeared before him, he violated the Notarial Rules and, as a lawyer, the CPR.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the IBP correctly found Atty. Gasmen liable for violation of the Notarial
Rules and the Code of Professional Responsibility.
HELD:
Yes. Under Section 1 (a) of Act No. 2103, when acknowledging a document, it is required that the
person who signed or executed the same, appears in person before the notary public and represents to the
latter that the signature on the document was voluntarily affixed by him for the purposes stated in the
document, declaring the same as his free and voluntary act and deed. Thereafter, the notary public affixes his
notarial seal on the instrument which certifies the due execution of the document, and resultantly, converts a
private document into a public document which on its face, is entitled to full faith and credit.
In the discharge of his powers and duties, the notary public's certification is one impressed with
public interest, accuracy and fidelity such that he owes it to the public to notarize only when the person who
signs the document is the same person who executed it and personally appeared before him to attest to his
knowledge of the contents stated therein. The Court has repeatedly emphasized the necessity of an affiant's
personal appearance and makes the failure to observe such rule punishable. As stressed in Section 2 (b) of
Rule IV of the Rules on Notarial Practice of 2004, A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person
involved as signatory to the instrument or document (1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time
of the notarization; and (2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary
public through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules.
Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, or routinary act. It is not a purposeless ministerial act of
acknowledging documents executed by parties who are willing to pay fees for notarization. Notarization of a
private document, such as an SPA in this case, converts the document into a public one which, on its face, is
given full faith and credit. Thus, the failure of Atty. Gasmen to observe the utmost care in the performance of
his duties caused not only damage to those directly affected by the notarized document, but also undermined
the integrity of a notary public and tainted the function of notarization.

LEE vs. ATTY. TAMBAGO

AC No. 5281
February 12, 2008
FACTS:
Complainant Manuel L. Lee charged respondent Atty. Regino B. Tambago with violation of the
Notarial Law and the ethics of the legal profession for notarizing a spurious last will and testament. In his
complaint, complainant averred that his father, the decedent Vicente Lee, Sr., never executed the contested
will. Furthermore, the spurious will contained the forged signatures of Cayetano Noynay and Loreto Grajo,
the purported witnesses to its execution.
The will was purportedly executed and acknowledged before respondent on June 30, 1965.
Complainant, however, pointed out that the residence certificate of the testator noted in the acknowledgment
of the will was dated January 5, 1962. Furthermore, the signature of the testator was not the same as his
signature as donor in a deed of donation, which contained his purported genuine signature. Complainant
averred that the signatures of his deceased father in the will and in the deed of donation were, in all aspects,
different from each other.
Respondent in his comment alleged that the last will and testament was validly executed and actually
notarized by respondent per affidavit of Gloria Nebato, common-law wife of Vicente Lee, Sr. and
corroborated by the joint affidavit of the children of Vicente Lee, Sr., namely Elena N. Lee and Vicente N.
Lee, Jr.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Tambago violated the Notarial law
HELD:
Yes. A notarial will, as the contested will in this case, is required by law to be subscribed at the end
thereof by the testator himself. In addition, it should be attested and subscribed by three or more credible
witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another. The will in question was attested by only two
witnesses, Noynay and Grajo. On this circumstance alone, the will must be considered void. Also, in
examining the acknowledgement in the will, the Supreme Court found that there was the conspicuous
absence of a notation of the residence certificates of the notarial witnesses Noynay and Grajo. Similarly, the
notation of the testators old residence certificate in the same acknowledgment was a clear breach of the law.
These omissions by respondent invalidated the will.
As the acknowledging officer of the contested will, respondent was required to faithfully observe the
formalities of a will and those of notarization. As the Court held in Santiago v. Rafana, the Notarial Law is
explicit on the obligations and duties of notaries public. They are required to certify that the party to every
document acknowledged before him had presented the proper residence certificate (or exemption from the
residence tax); and to enter its number, place of issue and date as part of such certification. A notary public,
especially a lawyer is bound to strictly observe these elementary requirements.
By having allowed decedent to exhibit an expired residence certificate, respondent failed to comply
with the requirements of the old Notarial Law. As much could be said of his failure to demand the exhibition
of the residence certificates of Noynay and Grajo. Respondent, as notary public, evidently failed in the
performance of the elementary duties of his office. The Supreme Court found that he acted very irresponsibly
in notarizing the will in question. Such recklessness warrants the less severe punishment of suspension from
the practice of law and a sufficient basis for the revocation of his commission and his perpetual
disqualification to be commissioned as a notary public.
REYES, Ma. Celina Noreen D.

VILLARIN
AC No. 3324
vs.
ATTY. SABATE
February 9, 2000
FACTS:
Complainants alleged that they filed a complaint with the SEC against Paterno Diaz, et al.
Respondents in the SEC Case filed their "Motion to Dismiss With Answer" which was prepared and
notarized by Atty. Restituto Sabate, Jr. In such pleading, he signed for and in behalf of Levi Pagunsan and
Alejandro Bofetiado, while Lilian Diaz signed for her husband Pastor Diaz, three of the respondents in the
SEC case, with the word "By" before their signatures, because he was their counsel in said case and also
because he was an officer of the religious sect and corporation represented by the respondents-Pastors.
Complainants averred that respondent's act of making it appear that said persons participated in the said act
when in fact they did not do so undermined the public's confidence for which reason administrative sanctions
should be imposed against him.
In his Answer, respondent alleged that he signed for and in the interest of his client backed-up by their
authorization and Lilian Diaz was authorized to sign for and in behalf of her husband as evidenced by a
written authority. On the strength of the said authorizations, he notarized the said document.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Sabate violated the Notarial Law
HELD:
Yes. The function of a notary public is, among others, to guard against any illegal or immoral
arrangements. That function would be defeated if the notary public were one of the signatories to the
instrument. For then, he would be interested in sustaining the validity thereof as it directly involves himself
and the validity of his own act. It would place him in an inconsistent position, and the very purpose of the
acknowledgment, which is to minimize fraud, would be thwarted.
A member of the bar who performs an act as a notary public should not notarize a document unless
the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before
said notary public to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein. As a lawyer commissioned as
notary public, respondent is mandated to subscribe to the sacred duties pertaining to his office, such duties
being dictated by public policy impressed with public interest. Faithful observance and utmost respect of the
legal solemnity of the oath in an acknowledgment or jurat is sacrosanct. Simply put, such responsibility is
incumbent upon and failing therein, Atty. Sabate must accept the commensurate consequences of his
professional indiscretion.
For notarizing the Verification of the Motion to Dismiss With Answer when three of the affiants
thereof were not before him and for notarizing the same instrument of which he was one of the signatories,
he failed to exercise due diligence in upholding his duty as a notary public and, as such, he is suspended from
his Commission as Notary Public for a period of one year.

THE LAWYER AND THE MONEY OR PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENTS
ATTY. SALOMON vs. ATTY. FRIAL

AC No. 7820
(2008)
FACTS:
The instant complaint has its beginning in the case, Lucy Lo v. Ricardo Salomon et al. in which a
writ of preliminary attachment was issued in favor of Lucy Lo, Atty. Frial's client. The writ was used to
attach two (2) cars of complainant's black 1995 Volvo and a green 1993 Nissan Sentra.
According to Atty. Salomon, the attaching sheriff of Manila, instead of depositing the attached cars in the
court premises, turned them over to Atty. Frial, Lo's counsel. Atty. Salomon claimed that on several
occasions, the Nissan Sentra was spotted being used by unauthorized individuals and as to the Volvo, Atty.
Salomon averred that during mediation, Atty. Frial deliberately withheld information as to its whereabouts.
As it turned out later, the Volvo was totally destroyed by fire, but the court was not immediately put on
notice of this development.
In his Answer, Atty. Frial admitted taking custody of the cars thru his own undertaking, without
authority and knowledge of the court but he denied personally using or allowing others the use of the cars.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Frial was guilty of infidelity in the custody of the attached properties.
HELD:
Yes. A writ of attachment issues to prevent the defendant from disposing of the attached property,
thus securing the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered by the plaintiff or any proper party.
When the objects of the attachment are destroyed, then the attached properties would necessarily be of no
value and the attachment would be for naught.
From the evidence adduced during the investigation, there is no question that Atty. Frial is guilty of grave
misconduct arising from his violation of Canon 11 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which states:
11. Dealing with trust property
The lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his personal benefit or gain he abuses or takes
advantage of the confidence reposed in him by his client.
Money of the client or collected for the client or other trust property coming into the possession of the lawyer
should be reported and accounted for promptly and should not under any circumstances be commingled with
his own or be used by him.
A lawyer is first and foremost an officer of the court. As such, he is expected to respect the courts
order and processes. Atty. Frial miserably fell short of his duties as such officer. He trifled with the writ of
attachment the court issued. Very patently, Atty. Frial was remiss in his obligation of taking good care of the
attached cars. He also allowed the use of the Nissan Sentra car by persons who had no business using it. He
did not inform the court or at least the sheriff of the destruction of the Volvo car. What is worse is that he
took custody of them without so much as informing the court, let alone securing, its authority.
For his negligence and unauthorized possession of the cars, the Court found Atty. Frial guilty of
infidelity in the custody of the attached cars and grave misconduct. As such, he is suspended from the
practice of law for a period of one year.
143

DAVID L. ALMENDAREZ, JR. vs. ATTY. MINERVO T. LANGIT

A.C. No. 7057
July 25, 2006
FACTS:
Respondent acted as the counsel of Almendarez in an ejectment suit. The defendant in the ejectment
suit deposited rentals. A judgment by compromise has been rendered. Atty. Langit filed for a Motion for
Execution and Withdrawal of Deposited Rentals. A second motion for withdrawal was filed by Atty. Langit.
Almendarez learned from the Clerk of Court that Atty. Langit received a total of P255,000, but was not
informed of such transactions. Almendarez, through a new counsel, sent a letter to Atty Langit for the return
of the P255,000. No reply was made, hence the complaint.
The IBP found Atty. Langit failed to account for the money of his client Almendarez, recommended
the penalty of suspension.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty Langit is guilty of gross misconduct.
HELD:
Yes. The SC sustained the findings of the IBP.
Respondent committed a flagrant violation of his oath when he received the sum of money representing the
monthly rentals intended for his client, without accounting for and returning such sum to its rightful owner.
Respondent received the money in his capacity as counsel for complainant. Therefore, respondent held the
money in trust for complainant.
A lawyer is not entitled to unilaterally appropriate his client's money for himself by the mere fact that the
client owes him attorney's fees. In this case, respondent did not even seek to prove the existence of any lien,
or any other right that he had to retain the money.
Atty. Langit violated Rule 16.01 and Rule 16.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Respondent was suspended for two years from the practice of law.
ROQUE, Jenina Marie Bernadette R.
144

ANA A. CHUA and MARCELINA HSIA vs. ATTY. SIMEON M. MESINA, JR.
A.C. No. 4904. August 12, 2004
FACTS:
Mesina was complainant Chuas legal counsel for many years. Chua and her late husband leased two
properties of the Mesina family, the Burgos and Melencio properties. The two properties were mortgaged by
Mrs. Mesina (respondents mother) with the Planters Development Bank. Mrs. Mesina failed to meet her
obligations, respondent convinced the Chuas to help his mother and in return, they will sell the Melencio
property. The spouses Chua agreed. When they were appraised for capital gains tax, respondent suggested
that they ante-date the deed of sale, the date before the effectivity of the law imposing capital gains tax.
Juanito Tecson, a business partner of the complainants, questioned the transaction. He then filed charges
against complaints and respondent for falsification. In order to avoid the charge of falsification, respondent
suggested that another deed of sale be executed, transferring the title of the Melencio property back to Mrs.
Mesina. The TCT were retained by the complainants. Tecson then desisted.
Respondent borrowed the TCT, promising the complainants that he will process the transfer of the
property to their name. Respondent never returned the TCT. The complainants learned that the Melencio
property was being offered for sale.
The IBP found Mesina guilty for gross misconduct, recommended a penalty of suspension for 1 year.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of gross misconduct.
HELD:
Yes. The SC finds that respondent is guilty of gross misconduct.
First, by advising complainants to execute another Deed of Absolute Sale antedated to 1979 to evade
payment of capital gains taxes, he violated his duty to promote respect for law and legal processes.
Second, when respondent convinced complainants to execute another document, a simulated Deed of
Absolute Sale wherein they made it appear that complainants reconveyed the Melencio property to his
mother, he committed dishonesty.
Third, when he inveigled his own clients into turning over to him the owners copy of his mothers title
upon the misrepresentation that he would, in four months, have a deed of sale executed by his mother in
favor of complainants, he likewise committed dishonesty.
Respondent violated his oath, Rules 1.01, 1.02, 7.03, 15.07, and Canon 17 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Respondent was disbarred.
145

VALERIANA U. DALISAY vs ATTY. MELANIO MAURICIO, JR.

A.C. No. 5655 (2006)
FACTS:
Dalisay engaged the services of Mauricio as counsel in a civil case. Despite receipt of attorneys fees
and documents, Mauricio did not render any legal services to Dalisay. Complainant asked for the return of
the attorneys fees but the respondent refused.
The IBP ordered Mauricio to refund the money and recommend the dismissal of the complaint. The
SC rendered an earlier decision, found Mauricio guilty of malpractice and gross misconduct and meted him
with the penalty of suspension for 6 months. Hence, this motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of malpractice and gross misconduct
HELD:
Yes. Once a lawyer accepts money from a client, an attorney-client relationship is established,
giving rise to the duty of fidelity to the clients cause. He must serve the client with competence and
diligence, and champion the latters cause with wholehearted devotion.
Respondent assumed such obligations when he received the amount of P56,000.00 from complainant and
agreed to handle Dalisays case. Unfortunately, he had been remiss in the performance of his duties. As we
have ruled earlier, there is nothing in the records to show that he entered his appearance as counsel of record
for complainant in Civil Case No. 00-044. Neither is there any evidence nor pleading submitted to show that
he initiated new petitions.
The ethics of the profession demands that, in such a case, he should immediately return the filing fees to
complainant. In Parias v. Paguinto, we held that a lawyer shall account for all money or property
collected from the client. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose, such as for filing fee, but
not used for failure to file the case must immediately be returned to the client on demand. Per records,
complainant made repeated demands, but respondent is yet to return the money.
The MR is denied.
146

A.C. No. 8253

March 15, 2011
ERLINDA R. TAROG vs. ATTY. ROMULO L. RICAFORT
FACTS
In 1992, the Tarogs (Alfredo and Erlinda) engaged Atty. Ricafort as their attorney to recover their
bank-foreclosed property (annulment of sale) located in the Bicol. Atty. Ricafort required the Tarogs the
amount of P7,000.00 as filing fee as well as P65,000. The latter was advised by Atty. Ricafort to be
deposited in court as to counter the P60,000.00 deposited by the buyer of the foreclosed property. The Tarogs
having only P60,000.00, were required to add more by respondent. A loan was thereafter solicited and a
check in that amount was issued in the name of Arnulfo.
On November 7, 1992, the Tarogs delivered the check to Atty. Ricafort. However, instead of first
encashing the check, Atty. Ricafort persuaded Alfredo to entrust the check to him so that he (Atty. Ricafort)
would be the one to encash it and then deposit the amount in court. Atty. Ricafort however did not deposit
the amount in court, but in his own account. He promised to return the money, plus interest. Despite several
inquiries, the Tarogs received mere assurances from Atty. Ricafort that the money was in good hands. When
it became apparent to the Tarogs that Atty. Ricafort would not make good his promise, Arnulfo demanded by
his letter that Atty. Ricafort return the P65,000.00, plus interest, and the P15,000.00 paid for the filing of the
memorandum which Atty. Ricafort also failed to file.
Atty. Ricafort denied that the P65,000.00 was intended to be deposited in court, instead that the
amount was payment for his legal services under a "package deal," which included his acceptance fee,
attorneys fee, and appearance fees.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Ricaforts acts constituted serious breach of his fiduciary duties as an
attorney
HELD:
Yes. Atty. Ricafort was found guilty of a violation of Canon 16, Rule 16.01 and Canon 17 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) and, accordingly, disbarred. The CPR demands the utmost degree
of fidelity and good faith in dealing with the moneys entrusted to lawyers because of their fiduciary
relationship. In particular, Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states: A lawyer shall
account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client. Undoubtedly, Atty. Ricafort
was required to hold in trust any money and property of his clients that came into his possession, and he
needed to be always mindful of the trust and confidence his clients reposed in him. Thus, having obtained the
funds from the Tarogs in the course of his professional employment, he had the obligation to deliver such
funds to his clients (a) when they became due, or (b) upon demand. Furthermore, Rule 16.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, imposes on an attorney the positive obligation to keep all funds of his client
separate and apart from his own and from those of others kept by him.
Atty. Ricaforts act of obtaining P65,000.00 and P15,000.00 from the Tarogs under the respective
pretexts that the amount would be deposited in court and for filing a memorandum for the Tarogs erected a
responsibility to account for and to use the amounts in accordance with the particular purposes intended. In
depositing the amount in his personal account constituted a serious breach of his fiduciary duties as their
attorney. He was thereby presumed to have misappropriated the moneys for his own use to the prejudice of
his clients and in violation of the clients trust reposed in him. He could not escape liability, for upon failing
to use the moneys for the purposes intended, he should have immediately returned the moneys to his clients.
His acts and actuations constituted a gross violation of general morality and of professional ethics that
impaired public confidence in the legal profession and deserved punishment.
UY, Diane Margret V.
147

PEDRO L. LINSANGAN vs. ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO

A.C. No. 6672
September 4, 2009
FACTS:
Pedro Linsangan filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation
of clients and encroachment of professional services. It was alleged that respondent, with the help of
paralegal Fe Labiano, convinced his clients to transfer legal representation. Respondent promised them
financial assistance and expeditious collection on their claims. To induce them to hire his services, he
persistently called them and sent them text messages.
To support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn affidavit of James Gregorio attesting
that Labiano tried to prevail upon him to sever his lawyer-client relations with complainant and utilize
respondents services instead, in exchange for a loan of P50,000. Complainant also attached "respondents"
calling card which stated CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE
on front side of the card.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is in violation of Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility
HELD:
Yes. By engaging in a money-lending venture with his clients as borrowers, respondent violated
Rule 16.04:
Rule 16.04 A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the clients interests are fully protected
by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except,
when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the
client.
The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The only exception is, when in the
interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses (such as filing fees, stenographers fees for
transcript of stenographic notes, cash bond or premium for surety bond, etc.) for a matter that he is handling
for the client.
The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyers independence of mind so that the free exercise of his
judgment may not be adversely affected. It seeks to ensure his undivided attention to the case he is handling
as well as his entire devotion and fidelity to the clients cause. If the lawyer lends money to the client in
connection with the clients case, the lawyer in effect acquires an interest in the subject matter of the case or
an additional stake in its outcome. Either of these circumstances may lead the lawyer to consider his own
recovery rather than that of his client, or to accept a settlement which may take care of his interest in the
verdict to the prejudice of the client in violation of his duty of undivided fidelity to the clients cause.
148

TERESITA T. BAYONLA
A.C. No. 4808
vs.
ATTY. PURITA A. REYES

November 22, 2011
FACTS:
Petra and Paz Durban were sisters who co-owned a parcel of land. Both died intestate. Their land
was thereafter expropriated for the construction of the Bancasi Airport. An expropriation compensation of
P2,453,429.00 was to be paid to their compulsory heirs, herein Complainant Bayonla and her uncle Tabada.
On October 21, 1993, Bayonla had engaged the legal services of respondent (Atty. Reyes) to collect their
share in the compensation from the Air Transportation Office (ATO) agreeing to her attorneys fees of 10%
of whatever amount would be collected. Atty. Reyes had collected the amounts of P1M and P121,119 from
ATO in November 1993 and June 1995, respectively. However it was alleged that Atty. Reyes continuously
failed to deliver the correct balances, after deducting attorneys fees despite repeated demands. On June 22,
1997, Bayonla charged Atty. Reyes with gross dishonesty, deceit, conversion, and breach of trust.
Respondent asserted that they all had agreed to a 40% contingent fee and that she had incurred travel
expenses in collecting such share. In June 1998, the court referred the complaint to the IBP for
investigation, report and recommendation. IBP Commissioner stated that as counsel of the heirs, Atty. Reyes
should have given a breakdown of whatever amount she received as their counsel in accordance with Rule
16.01 of the CPR. She had the chance to rectify her errors but she failed to do so. Respondent was reuired to:
(1) render an accounting or inventory of the collected shares, (2) have the heirs confirm it, and (3) remit said
shares. Atty. Reyes was to be suspended from the practice of law until such time that she had complied with
the aforementioned. Atty. Reyes moved for reconsideration and a reinvestigation but were denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Reyes is guilty violating Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility
HELD:
Yes. Atty. Reyes is guilty of violating Canon 16.03 of the CPR. She is suspended from the practice
of law for 2 years, with a warning that a similar offense will be dealt with more severely. Canon 16 of the
CPR requires that a lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of her client that may come into her
possession. Rule 16.01 imposes on the lawyer the duty to account for all money or property collected or
received for or from the client. Rule 16.03 demands that the lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his
client when due or upon demand, subject to the lawyers lien over the funds, or the lawyers option to apply
so much of the funds as may be necessary to satisfy the lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice
promptly thereafter to the client. The canons are appropriate considering that the relationship between a
lawyer and her client is highly fiduciary, and prescribes on a lawyer a great degree of fidelity and good faith.
Based on the records, Bayonla and her uncle would each receive the amount of P84,852.00 out of the
first release, and the amount of P121,119.11 out of the second release. Her total share from the two releases
was P205,971.11. With Atty. Reyes being entitled to 40% as attorneys fees, the net share of Bayonla was
P123,582.67. Yet, Atty. Reyes actually delivered to her only P79,000.00, which was short by P44,582.67.
Despite demands and orders from the IBP Board of Governors for her to remit the shortage, Atty. Reyes
refused to do so. By not delivering Bayonlas share despite her demand, Atty. Reyes violated the aforestated
canons. The money collected by Atty. Reyes as the lawyer of Bayonla was unquestionably money held in
trust to be immediately turned over to the client. The unjustified withholding of money belonging to the
client warrants the imposition of disciplinary sanctions on the lawyer. Without doubt, Atty. Reyes failure to
immediately account for and to deliver the money upon demand was deceit, for it signified that she had
converted the money to her own use, in violation of the trust Bayonla had reposed in her.
149

J.K. MERCADO AND SONS AGRICULTURAL ENTERPRISES, INC., and SPOUSES JESUS and
ROSARIO K. MERCADO, vs. ATTY. EDUARDO C. DE VERA
A.C. No. 3066
December 3, 2001
FACTS
The complaint for disbarment against Atty. Eduardo C. de Vera was an offshoot of an action, entitled
"Rosario P. Mercado vs. Jesus R. Mercado, Mercado and Sons and Standard Fruits Corporation for
dissolution and liquidation of conjugal partnership, accounting, annulment of contract, reconveyance or
recovery of possession of conjugal share, partition and damages. Rosario Mercado was represented by
respondent Atty. Eduardo C. de Vera.
In December 1986, the case was decided by Judge Bandalan in favor of Rosario Mercado (Rosario)
who was awarded the sum of P9M. A writ of execution was issued, and the total amount of P1,270,734.66
was garnished. In February 1987, Rosario terminated the services of respondent and tendered the amount of
P350,000.00 by way of attorney's fees. She demanded an accounting and the turn-over of the money still in
the custody of respondent but the latter refused, claiming that he was entitled to P2.25M attorney's fees.
Failing to recover the amount, Rosario filed a complaint for disbarment against respondent.
In 1993, the IBP Board of Governors recommended the suspension for one (1) year of Atty. Eduardo
C. de Vera from the practice of law.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. De Vera violated the Code of Professional Responsibility
HELD:
Yes. Atty. Eduardo C. De Vera is suspended from the practice of law for six months and directed to
return to Rosario K. Mercado the amount in his possession in excess of P350,000.00, without prejudice to
whatever judicial action he may take to recover his unsatisfied attorney's fees, if any. His suspension stands
until he has satisfactorily shown to the Court his compliance therewith.
The Court ruled that while the practice of law is not a business venture, a lawyer, nevertheless, is
entitled to be duly compensated for professional services rendered. So he must also be protected against
clients who wrongly refuse to give him his just due. Correlatively, a lawyer is entitled to a "lien over funds,
documents and papers of his client which have lawfully come into his possession.
Under Rule 16.03 of the CPR he may "apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his
lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client." In both cases, however, it is to
be assumed that the client agrees with the lawyer in the amount of attorney's fees. In case of a disagreement,
or when the client disputes the amount claimed by the lawyer for being unconscionable, the lawyer should
not arbitrarily apply the funds in his possession to the payment of his fees; instead, it should behoove the
lawyer to file the necessary action or the proper motion with the proper court to fix the amount of his
attorney's fees. If a lawyer were allowed to unilaterally apply the funds in his hands in payment of his
claimed compensation even when there is a disagreement between him and his client would not only be
violative of the trust relationship between them but can also open the door to possible abuse by those who are
less than mindful of their fiduciary duty. That respondent upon his unilateral estimation entitled to P2.25M in
attorney's fees, would not exculpate him from the condemnable act of infidelity in the custody of his client's
funds. His disagreement with the client entitled him to take proper legal steps in order to recover what might
be his just due but, certainly, it was not a matter that he could take into his own hands. He was duty bound to
turn over and render a full accounting of what he received in satisfaction of the judgment rendered in favor of
complainant Mrs. Mercado. The relation between client and attorney is one of trust and confidence.
150

BURBE vs. ATTY. MAGULTA

AC No. 2519
(2000)
FACTS:
A complaint for the disbarment against Atty. Alberto C. Magulta was filed by Dominador P. Burbe
with the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on June 14, 1999, the
Complaint is accompanied by a Sworn Statement alleging the following:
That in connection with my business, I was introduced to Atty. Alberto C. That consequent to such
agreement, Atty. Alberto C. Magulta prepared for me the demand letter and some other legal papers
inasmuch, however, that I failed to secure a settlement of the dispute, Atty. Magulta suggested that I file the
necessary complaint, which he subsequently drafted, the filing fee whereof will require the amount of
P25,000.00;
That having the need to legally recover from the parties to be sued I, on January 4, 1999, deposited the
amount of P25,000.00 to Atty. Alberto C. Magulta, upon the instruction that I needed the case filed
immediately;
That a week later, I was informed by Atty. Alberto C. Magulta that the complaint had already been filed in
court, and that I should receive notice of its progress;
That in the months that followed, I waited for such notice from the court or from Atty. Magulta but there
seemed to be no progress in my case, such that I frequented his office to inquire, and he would repeatedly tell
me just to wait;
In my last visit to Atty. Magulta last May 25, 1999, he said that the court personnel had not yet acted on my
case and, for my satisfaction, he even brought me to the Hall of Justice Building at Ecoland, Davao City, at
about 4:00 p.m., where he left me at the Office of the City Prosecutor at the ground floor of the building and
told to wait while he personally follows up the processes with the Clerk of Court; whereupon, within the
hour, he came back and told me that the Clerk of Court was absent on that day;
That sensing I was being given the run-around by Atty. Magulta, I decided to go to the Office of the Clerk of
Court with my draft of Atty. Magultas complaint to personally verify the progress of my case, and there told
that there was no record at all of a case filed by Atty. Alberto C. Magulta on my behalf;
I confronted Atty. Alberto C. Magulta at his office the following day, May 28, and only when shown the
certification did he admit that he has not at all filed the complaint because he had spent the money for the
filing fee for his own purpose; and to appease my feelings, he offered to reimburse me by issuing two (2)
checks, postdated June 1 and June 5, 1999, in the amounts of P12,000.00 and P8000.00
x x x x x x x x x.
On August 6, 1999, pursuant to the July 22, 1999 Order of the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline,respondent filed his Answer vehemently denying the allegations of complainant for. The latter had
allegedly been introduced as a kumpadre of one of the formers law partners. After their meeting, complainant
requested him to draft a demand letter against Regwill Industries, Inc. -- a service for which the former never
paid. After Mr. Said Sayre, one of the business partners of complainant, replied to this letter, the latter
requested that another demand letter -- this time addressed to the former -- be drafted by respondent, who
reluctantly agreed to do so.
YAP, Roxani Agnes M.
151

Aside from attending to the Regwill case, he was also requested by complainant to do the following:
1. Write a demand letter addressed to Mr. Nelson Tan
2. Write a demand letter addressed to ALC Corporation
3. Draft a complaint against ALC Corporation
4. Research on the Mandaue City property claimed by complainants wife
All of these respondent did, but he was never paid for his services by complainant.
Respondent likewise said that without telling him why, complainant later on withdrew all the files pertinent
to the Regwill case. However, when no settlement was reached, the latter instructed him to draft a complaint
for breach of contract. Respondent, whose services had never been paid by complainant until this time, told
the latter about his acceptance and legal fees. When told that these fees amounted to P187,742 complainant
promised to pay on installment basis.
On January 4, 1999, complainant gave the amount of P25,000 to respondents secretary and told her that it
was for the filing fee of the Regwill case. When informed of the payment, the lawyer immediately called the
attention of complainant, informing the latter of the need to pay the acceptance and filing fees before the
complaint could be filed. Complainant was told that the amount he had paid was a deposit for the acceptance
fee, and that he should give the filing fee later.
Sometime in February 1999, complainant told respondent to suspend for the meantime the filing of the
complaint because the former might be paid by another company, the First Oriental Property Ventures, Inc.,
which had offered to buy a parcel of land owned by Regwill Industries. The negotiations went on for two
months, but the parties never arrived at any agreement.
Sometime in May 1999, complainant again relayed to respondent his interest in filing the complaint.
Respondent reminded him once more of the acceptance fee. In response, complainant proposed that the
complaint be filed first before payment of respondents acceptance and legal fees. When respondent refused,
complainant demanded the return of the P25,000. The lawyer returned the amount using his own personal
checks. Respondents checks were accepted and encashed by complainant.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent should be suspended as recommended by the IBP?
HELD:
Misappropriation of Clients Funds
Central to this case are the following alleged acts of respondent lawyer: (a) his non-filing of the Complaint
on behalf of his client and (b) his appropriation for himself of the money given for the filing fee.
Lawyers must exert their best efforts and ability in the prosecution or the defense of the clients cause. They
who perform that duty with diligence and candor not only protect the interests of the client, but also serve the
ends of justice. Members of the bar must do nothing that may tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of
the public in the fidelity, the honesty, and integrity of the profession.
Respondent wants this Court to believe that no lawyer-client relationship existed between him and
complainant, because the latter never paid him for services rendered.
We disagree. A lawyer-client relationship was established from the very first moment complainant asked
respondent for legal advice regarding the formers business. To constitute professional employment, it is not
essential that the client employed the attorney professionally on any previous occasion. It is not necessary
that any retainer be paid, promised, or charged; neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not
afterward handle the case for which his service had been sought.
152

If a person, in respect to business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults a lawyer with a view to obtaining
professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces with the consultation,
then the professional employment is established.
Likewise, a lawyer-client relationship exists notwithstanding the close personal relationship between the
lawyer and the complainant or the nonpayment of the formers fees. Hence, despite the fact that complainant
was kumpadre of a law partner of respondent, and that respondent dispensed legal advice to complainant as a
personal favor to the kumpadre, the lawyer was duty-bound to file the complaint he had agreed to prepare -and had actually prepared -- at the soonest possible time, in order to protect the clients interest. Rule 18.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that lawyers should not neglect legal matters entrusted to
them.
This Court has likewise constantly held that once lawyers agree to take up the cause of a client, they owe
fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in them. They owe
entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and the defense of the clients rights,
and the exertion of their utmost learning and abilities to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from the
client, save by the rules of law legally applied.
The Practice of Law -- a

Profession, Not a Business
Practice of law is a profession and not a business.Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making
venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits. The gaining of a livelihood is not a
professional but a secondary consideration.Duty to public service and to the administration of justice should
be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to
themselves. The practice of law is a noble calling in which emolument is a byproduct, and the highest
eminence may be attained without making much money.
In failing to apply to the filing fee the amount given by complainant -- as evidenced by the receipt issued by
the law office of respondent -- the latter also violated the rule that lawyers must be scrupulously careful in
handling money entrusted to them in their professional capacity. Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility states that lawyers shall hold in trust all moneys of their clients and properties that may come
into their possession.
Lawyers who convert the funds entrusted to them are in gross violation of professional ethics and are guilty
of betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession.It may be true that they have a lien upon the clients
funds, documents and other papers that have lawfully come into their possession; that they may retain them
until their lawful fees and disbursements have been paid; and that they may apply such funds to the
satisfaction of such fees and disbursements. However, these considerations do not relieve them of their duty
to promptly account for the moneys they received. Their failure to do so constitutes professional
misconduct.In any event, they must still exert all effort to protect their clients interest within the bounds of
law.
Respondent fell short of this standard when he converted into his legal fees the filing fee entrusted to him by
his client and thus failed to file the complaint promptly. The fact that the former returned the amount does
not exculpate him from his breach of duty.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Alberto C. Magulta is found guilty of violating Rules 16.01 and 18.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year,
effective upon his receipt of this Decision
153

RIVERA vs. ATTY. ANGELES

AC No. 2519
(2000)
FACTS:
On March 25, 1983, complainants filed a Complaint for Disbarment against Atty. Sergio Angeles on
the grounds of Deceit and Malpractice. The Affidavit-Complaint reads as follows:
1.) The undersigned are plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. Q-12841 and Q-13128 of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch V at Quezon City;
2.) Atty. Sergio Angeles is their counsel of record in the said cases;
3.) That after receiving favorable decision from the CFI on May 21, 1973 and sustained by the Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court an alias writ of execution was issued in said cases;
4.) That in the first week of January 1983 we obtained from the CFI a sheriffs return, dated November
10, 1982, stating that no leviable property can be found in the premises of the defendants;
5.) That on or before January 13, 1983, we learned that Mr. Rodolfo M. Silva, one of the defendants in
said cases had already given Atty. Angeles a partial settlement of the judgment in the amount of
P42,999.00 without our knowledge;
6.) That Atty. Sergio Angeles never informed the undersigned of the amount of P42,999.00 he received
from Mr. Silva nor remitted to them even a part of that amount;
7.) That a demand letter was sent to Atty. Sergio Angeles which was received by him on February 17,
1983, but as of this date the undersigned have not yet received any reply.
In his Comment filed on June 21, 1983, respondent denied the accusations and stated that he has the right
to retain the said amount of P42,999.00 and to apply the same to professional fees due him under the
subsequent agreement first with complainant Teodoro Rivera and later with Mrs. Dely Dimson Rivera as
embodied in the Deed of Assignment or under the previous agreement of P20% of P206,000.00.
Investigating Commissioner Julio C. Elamparo of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines submitted his
report on April 29, 1999 finding respondent Atty. Sergio Angeles guilty of violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility specifically Rule 1.01, Canon 16 and Rule 16.01 thereof and recommends his indefinite
ISSUE:
Whether or not the suspension of the IBP should be upheld
HELD:
The Court finds merit in the recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Respondents
act of deceit and malpractice indubitably demonstrated his failure to live up to his sworn duties as a
lawyer. The Supreme Court repeatedly stressed the importance of integrity and good moral character as part
of a lawyers equipment in the practice of his profession. For it cannot be denied that the respect of litigants
for the profession is inexorably diminished whenever a member of the Bar betrays their trust and confidence.
The Court is not oblivious of the right of a lawyer to be paid for the legal services he has extended to his
client but such right should not be exercised whimsically by appropriating to himself the money intended for
his clients. There should never be an instance where the victor in litigation loses everything he won to the
fees of his own lawyer.
154

JUDGE ANGELES vs. ATTY. UY Jr.

AC No. 5019
April 6, 2000
FACTS:
In a letter dated February 11, 1999 addressed to the Office of the Chief Justice, Judge Adoracion G.
Angeles of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City charged Atty. Thomas C. Uy Jr. with violation of
Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Complainant states that respondent's acts, which had
earlier been held contemptible in her February 10, 1999 Order, also rendered him administratively liable. In
the said Order, she narrated the following facts:
"When the case was called for the second time at 11 :25 o'clock in the morning, the private prosecutor Atty.
Thomas C. Uy, Jr. appeared. In open court, accused Norma Trajano manifested that she had already settled in
full the civil aspect in Crim. Case No. C-54177 (98) in the total amount of P36,500.00 pesos. She further
alleged that she paid P20,000.00 directly to the private complainant and the balance of P16,500.00 was
delivered to Atty. Thomas C. Uy, Jr., the lawyer of the private complainant and accordingly produced in
open court the receipt for such payment. Indeed, the civil liability of the accused had already been satisfied in
full. However, the private complainant, Primitiva Malansing Del Rosario manifested that she did not receive
the amount of P16,500.00 which was paid to his lawyer Atty. Thomas C. Uy, Jr., thereby constraining this
court to direct Atty. Thomas C. Uy to turn over the money to the private complainant which he received in
trust for his client. Atty. Uy however argued that his client did not like to accept the money but the assertion
of the lawyer was belied by his own client, the herein private complainant, who manifested in open court x x
x her willingness to accept the money. The Court again directed Atty. Uy to produce the money but the latter
argued that he kept it in his office. Consequently, the Court suspended the proceedings to enable Atty. Uy to
get the money from his law office which is located only at the second floor of the same building where this
court is located. Unfortunately, it is already 12: 15 o'clock past noon but Atty. Uy did not show up anymore
and not even his shadow appeared in Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not it is correct to suspend Atty. Thomas C. Uy Jr from the practice of law for
one month as recommended by the Office of the Bar Confidant
HELD:
The relationship between a lawyer and a client is highly fiduciary; it requires a high degree of
fidelity and good faith. It is designed "to remove all such temptation and to prevent everything of that kind
from being done for the protection of the client."
Thus, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that "a lawyer shall hold in trust all
moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession." Furthermore, Rule 16.01 of the Code
also states that "a lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client."
The Canons of Professional Ethics is even more explicit:
"The lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his personal benefit or gain he abuses or takes
advantage of the confidence reposed in him by his client."
155

"Money of the client collected for the client or other trust property coming into the possession of the lawyer
should be reported and accounted for promptly and should not under any circumstances be commingled with
his own or be used by him."
In the present case, it is clear that respondent failed to promptly report and account for the P16,500 he had
received from Norma Trajano on behalf of his client, Primitiva Del Rosario. Although the amount had been
entrusted to respondent on December 14, 1998, his client revealed during the February 10, 1999 hearing that
she had not yet received it. Worse, she did not even know where it was.
156

The records do not clearly show whether Attorney Uy had in fact appropriated the said amount; in fact, Mrs,
Del Rosario acknowledge that she had received it on February 12, 1999. They do show, however, that
respondent failed to promptly report that amount to her. This is clearly a violation of his professional
responsibility. Indeed, in Aya v. Bigornia, the Court ruled that money collected by a lawyer in favor of his
clients must be immediately turned over to them. In Daroy v. Legaspi, the Court held that "lawyers are bound
to promptly account for money or property received by them on behalf of their clients and failure to do so
constitutes professional misconduct."
Verily, the question is not necessarily whether the rights of the clients have been prejudiced, but whether the
lawyer has adhered to the ethical standards of the bar.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Thomas C. Uy Jr .is hereby SUSPENDED for one month.
156

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