TodayisTuesday,August02,2016

RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
BaguioCity
SECONDDIVISION
G.R.No.207983April7,2014
WENPHILCORPORATION,Petitioner,
vs.
ALMERR.ABINGandANABELLEM.TUAZON,Respondents.
DECISION
BRION,J.:
Weresolvethispetitionforreviewoncertiorari1underRule45oftheRulesofCourt,challengingtheAugust31,
2012decision2andtheJune20,2013resolution3(assailedCArulings)oftheCourtofAppeals(CA)inCAG.R.
SPNo.117366.
These assailed CA rulings annulled and set aside the March 26, 2010 Decision4 and September 15, 20105
resolution(NLRCrulings)oftheNationalLaborRelationsCommission(NLRC)inNLRCCANo.02823301(Rl
08).
TheNLRCrulings,inturn,fullyaffirmedtheNovember16,2007Order6oftheLaborArbiter(LA)inNLRCNCR
CaseNos.30030099300and30030102000.TheLAsorderfoundthatanillegaldismissaltookplace.Thus,
theLAdirectedpetitionerWenphilCorporation(Wenphil)topayrespondentsAlmerAbingandAnabelleTuazon
(respondents)theirbackwagesfortheperiodfromFebruary15,2002toNovember8,2002,pursuanttotherule
thatanorderofreinstatementisimmediatelyexecutoryevenpendingappeal.7
FactualAntecedents
ThiscasestemmedfromacomplaintforillegaldismissalfiledbytherespondentsagainstWenphil,docketedas
NLRCNCRCaseNo.30030099300.
On December 8, 2000, LA Geobel A. Bartolabac ruled8 that the respondents had been illegally dismissed by
Wenphil. According to the LA, the allegation of serious misconduct against the respondents had no factual and
legal basis.9 Consequently, LA Bartolabac ordered Wenphil to immediately reinstate the respondents to their
respectivepositionsortoequivalentones,whetheractuallorinthepayroll.Also,theLAorderedWenphiltopay
therespondentstheirbackwagesfromFebruary3,2000untilthedateoftheiractualreinstatement.10
BecauseoftheunfavorableLAdecision,WenphilappealedtotheNLRConApril16,200111.Inthemeantime,the
respondentsmovedfortheimmediateexecutionoftheLAsDecember8,2000decision.12
On October 29, 2001, Wenphil and the respondents entered into a compromise agreement13 before LA
Bartolabac. They agreed to the respondents payroll reinstatement while Wenphils appeal with the NLRC was
ongoing.WenphilalsoagreedtopaytheaccumulatedsalariesoftherespondentsforthepayrollperiodfromApril
5, 2001 until October 15, 2001.14 As for the remaining payroll period starting October 16, 2001, Wenphil
committeditselftocredittherespectivesalariesoftherespondentstotheirATMpayrollaccountsuntilsuchtime
thatthequestioneddecisionofLABartolabaciseithermodified,amendedorreversedbytheHonorableNational
LaborRelationsCommission.15
On January 30, 2002, the NLRC issued a resolution16 affirming LA Bartolabacs decision with modifications.
Instead of ordering the respondents reinstatement, the NLRC directed Wenphil to pay the respondents their
respectiveseparationpayattherateofone(1)monthsalaryforeveryyearofservice.Also,theNLRCfoundthat
whiletherespondentshadbeenillegallydismissed,theyhadnotbeenillegallysuspended.Thus,theperiodfrom
February3toFebruary28,2000duringwhichtherespondentswereonpreventivesuspensionwasexcluded
bytheNLRCinthecomputationoftherespondentsbackwages.17
Subsequently,Wenphilmovedforthereconsideration18oftheNLRCsJanuary30,2002resolution,buttheNLRC
deniedthemotioninanotherresolutiondatedSeptember24,2002.19
Wenphil thereafter went up to the CA via a petition for certiorari to question the NLRCs January 30, 2002 and
September 24, 2002 resolutions.20 On August 27, 2003, the CA rendered its decision21 reversing the NLRCs
finding that the respondents had been illegally dismissed. According to the CA, there was enough evidence to
show that the respondents had been guilty of serious misconduct thus, their dismissal was for a valid cause.22

TherespondentsmovedforthereconsiderationoftheCAsdecision.23Inaresolution24datedFebruary23,2004,
theCAdeniedtherespondentsmotion.
On appeal to the Supreme Court (SC) via Rule 45 (docketed as G.R. No. 16244725 and dated December 27,
2006), the SC denied the respondents petition for review on certiorari26 and affirmed the CAs August 27, 2003
decision and February 23, 2004 resolution. The respondents did not file any motion for reconsideration to
questiontheSCsdecisionthus,thedecisionbecamefinalandexecutoryonFebruary15,2007.27
TheLaborArbitrationRulings
SometimeaftertheSCsdecisioninG.R.No.162447becamefinalandexecutory,therespondentsfiledwithLA
Bartolabacamotionforcomputationandissuanceofwritofexecution.28Therespondentsassertedinthismotion
that although the CAs ruling on the absence of illegal dismissal (as affirmed by the SC) was adverse to them,
underthelawandsettledjurisprudence,theywerestillentitledtobackwagesfromthetimeoftheirdismissaluntil
theNLRCsdecisionfindingthemtobeillegallydismissedwasreversedwithfinality.29
LABartolabacgrantedtherespondentsmotionand,inanorderdatedNovember16,2007,30directedWenphilto
pay each complainant their salaries on reinstatement covering the period from February 15, 2002 (the date
Wenphillastpaidtherespondentsrespectivesalaries)toNovember8,2002(sincetheNLRCsdecisionfinding
therespondentsillegallydismissedbecamefinalandexecutoryonFebruary28,2002).
BothpartiesappealedtotheNLRCtoquestionLABartolabacsNovember16,2007order.31Wenphilarguedthat
the respondents were no longer entitled to payment of backwages in view of the compromise agreement they
executed on October 29, 2001. According to Wenphil, the compromise agreement provided that Wenphils
obligationtopaytherespondentsbackwagesshouldceaseassoonasLABartolabacsdecisionwas"modified,
amended or reversed" by the NLRC. Since the NLRC modified the LAs ruling by ordering the payment of
separation pay in lieu of reinstatement, then the respondents, under the terms of the compromise agreement,
wereentitledtobackwagesonlyuptothefinalityoftheNLRCdecision.32
Therespondentsquestionedintheirappealthedeterminedperiodforthecomputationoftheirbackwagesthey
positedthattheperiodforpaymentshouldend,notonNovember8,2002,butonFebruary14,2007,sincethe
SCsdecisionwhichupheldtheCAsrulingbecamefinalandexecutoryonFebruary15,2007.33
TheNLRCdeniedthepartiesrespectiveappealsinitsdecisiondatedMarch26,201034andaffirmedintotothe
LAs order. Both parties moved for the reconsideration of the NLRCs decision but the NLRC denied their
respectivemotionsintheresolutionofSeptember15,2010.35
TheCAsRuling
InitsdecisiondatedAugust31,2012,36theCAreversedtheNLRCrulingsandprescribedadifferentcomputation
period.
The CA ruled that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion when it affirmed the LAs computed period
whichwasfromFebruary15,2002toNovember8,2002.Inarrivingatthisconclusion,theCAcitedthecaseof
Pfizerv.Velasco37wherethisCourtruledthateveniftheorderofreinstatementoftheLaborArbiterisreversed
onappeal,itisobligatoryonthepartoftheemployertoreinstateandpaythedismissedemployeeswagesduring
theperiodofappealuntilreversalbythehighercourt.38TheCAconstruedthis"highercourt"tobetheCA,notthe
SC.
TheCAreasonedoutthatitwasa"highercourt"thantheNLRCwhenitreversedtheNLRCsrulingsthus,the
periodforcomputationshouldendwhenitpromulgateditsdecisionreversingthatoftheNLRC,andnotonthe
datewhentheSCaffirmeditsdecision.
The CA likewise held that the compromise agreement did not contain any waiver of rights for any award the
respondentsmighthavereceivedwhentheNLRCchangedormodifiedtheLAsaward.39
ThePetition
In its petition for review with this Court, Wenphil maintained that the respondents were no longer entitled to
paymentofbackwagesinviewofthemodificationoftheLAsrulingbytheNLRCpursuantwiththeirOctober29,
2001compromiseagreement.
Wenphil argued that the CA utterly disregarded the terms of the parties compromise agreement whose terms
wereverycleartheagreementreads:
3.ThatforthepayrollperiodfromOctober1631andthereafter,their[respondents]salaries(netofwithholding
tax,SSS,PhilhealthandPagibig)shallbecreditedevery10thand25thofthesucceedingmonthsthroughtheir
respectiveATMemployeesaccountuntilsuchtimethatthequestioneddecisionoftheHonorableLaborArbiter
GeobelBartolabacismodified,amendedorreversedbytheHonorableLaborRelationsCommission.40[emphasis
ours]
It was Wenphils assertion that since the NLRCs decision partly changed the decision of LA Bartolabac by
orderingpaymentofseparationpayinlieuofreinstatement,theNLRCdecisionwasa"modification"thatshould
operatetoremoveWenphilsobligationtopaytherespondentsbackwagesfortheperiodoftheCAsreversalof

theNLRCsillegaldismissalruling.41AccordingtoWenphil,thewordsofthecompromiseagreementleftnoroom
forinterpretationastothepartiesintentions42asavalidagreementbetweentheparties,itmustbegiveneffect
andrespectedbythecourt.
Wenphil also contended that the CAs cited Pfizer case cannot apply to the present case since there was no
compromiseagreementinPfizerwherethedismissedemployeewaivedherentitlementtobackwages.43
Finally,Wenphilclaimedthatthereliefsofreinstatementandbackwagesareonlyavailabletoillegallydismissed
employees. A ruling that the respondents were still entitled to reinstatement pay notwithstanding the validity of
theirdismissal,wouldamounttothecourtstoleranceofanunjustandequitablesituation.44
TheCourtsRuling
WeresolvetoDENYthepetition.Anorderofreinstatementisimmediatelyexecutoryevenpendingappeal.The
employer has the obligation to reinstate and pay the wages of the dismissed employee during the period of
appealuntilreversalbythehighercourt.
Under Article 223 of the Labor Code, "the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated
employee, insofar as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall immediately be executory, even pending
appeal.Theemployeeshalleitherbeadmittedbacktoworkunderthesametermsandconditionsprevailingprior
tohisdismissalorseparation,orattheoptionoftheemployer,merelyreinstatedinthepayroll.Thepostingofa
bondbytheemployershallnotstaytheexecutionforreinstatement."
TheCourtdiscussedreasonbehindthislegalpolicyinArisv.NLRC,45whereitexplained:
InauthorizingexecutionpendingappealofthereinstatementaspectofadecisionoftheLaborArbiterreinstating
a dismissed or separated employee, the law itself has laid down a compassionate policy which, once more,
vivifiesandenhancestheprovisionsofthe1987Constitutiononlaborandtheworkingman.Theseprovisionsare
thequintessenceoftheaspirationsoftheworkingmanforrecognitionofhisroleinthesocialandeconomiclifeof
thenation,fortheprotectionofhisrights,andthepromotionofhiswelfareThesedutiesandresponsibilitiesof
the State are imposed not so much to express sympathy for the workingman as to forcefully and meaningfully
underscorelaborasaprimarysocialandeconomicforce,whichtheConstitutionalsoexpresslyaffirmswithequal
intensity.Laborisanindispensablepartnerforthenation'sprogressandstability.[emphasisours]
Since the decision is immediately executory, it is the duty of the employer to comply with the order of
reinstatement,whichcanbedoneeitheractuallyorthroughpayrollreinstatement.AsprovidedunderArticle223
oftheLaborCode,thisimmediatelyexecutorynatureofanorderofreinstatementisnotaffectedbytheexistence
ofanongoingappeal.Theemployerhasthedutytoreinstatetheemployeeintheinterimperioduntilareversalis
decreedbyahighercourtortribunal.
In the case of payroll reinstatement, even if the employers appeal turns the tide in its favor, the reinstated
employee has no duty to return or reimburse the salary he received during the period that the lower court or
tribunalsgoverningdecisionwasfortheemployeesillegaldismissal.
Otherwise,thesituationwouldruncountertotheimmediatelyexecutorynatureofanorderofreinstatement.The
caseofGarciav.PhilippineAirlines46isenlighteningonthispoint:
Evenoutsidethetheoreticaltrappingsofthediscussionandintothemundanerealitiesofhumanexperience,the
"refunddoctrine"easilydemonstrateshowafavorabledecisionbytheLaborArbitercouldharm,morethanhelp,
a dismissed employee. The employee, to make both ends meet, would necessarily have to use up the salaries
received during the pendency of the appeal, only to end up having to refund the sum in case of a final
unfavorabledecision.Itismirageofastopgapleadingtheemployeetoariskycliffofinsolvency.
Advisably,thesumisbetterleftunspent.Itbecomesmorelogicalandpracticalfortheemployeetorefusepayroll
reinstatement and simply find work elsewhere in the interim, if any is available. Notably, the option of payroll
reinstatementbelongstotheemployer,eveniftheemployeeisableandraringtoreturntowork.
1 w p h i1

WeseethesituationdiscussedabovetobepresentinthecasebeforeusasWenphilobservedthemandateof
Article 223 to immediately comply with the order of reinstatement by the LA. On October 29, 2001, while
WenphilsappealwiththeNLRCwaspending,itenteredintoacompromiseagreementwiththerespondents.In
this agreement, Wenphil committed to reinstate the respondents in its payroll. However, the commitment came
withacondition:Wenphilstipulatedthatitsobligationtopaythewagesduetotherespondentswouldceaseifthe
decisionoftheLAwouldbe"modified,amendedorreversed"bytheNLRC.47
Thus, when the NLRC rendered its decision on the appeal affirming the LAs finding that the respondents were
illegally dismissed, but modifying the award of reinstatement to payment of separation pay, Wenphil stopped
payingtherespondentswages.
The reinstatement salaries due to the respondents were, by their nature, payment of unworked backwages.
TheseweresalariesduetotherespondentsbecausetheyhadbeenpreventedfromworkingdespitetheLAand
theNLRCfindingsthattheyhadbeenillegallydismissed.
We point out that reinstatement and backwages are two separate reliefs available to an illegally dismissed
employee.Thenormalconsequencesofafindingthatanemployeehasbeenillegallydismissedare:first,thatthe

employeebecomesentitledtoreinstatementtohisformerpositionwithoutlossofseniorityrightsandsecond,the
paymentofbackwagescoverstheperiodrunningfromhisillegaldismissaluptohisactualreinstatement.48These
tworeliefsarenotinconsistentwithoneanotherandthelaborarbitercanawardbothsimultaneously.
Moreover,thereliefofseparationpaymaybegrantedinlieuofreinstatementbutitcannotbeasubstituteforthe
payment of backwages. In instances where reinstatement is no longer feasible because of strained relations
between the employee and the employer, separation pay should be granted. In effect, an illegally dismissed
employeeshouldbeentitledtoeitherreinstatementifviable,orseparationpayifreinstatementisnolongerbe
viable, plus backwages in either instance.49 The rationale for such policy of distinction was vividly explained in
Santosv.NLRCundertheseterms:50
Though the grant of reinstatement commonly carries with it an award of backwages, the inappropriateness or
nonavailabilityofonedoesnotcarrywithittheinappropriatenessornonavailabilityoftheother.Separationpay
wasawardedinfavorofpetitionerLydiaSantosbecausetheNLRCfoundthatherreinstatementwasnolonger
feasibleorappropriate.Asthetermsuggests,separationpayistheamountthatanemployeereceivesatthetime
ofhisseverancefromtheserviceand,ascorrectlynotedbytheSolicitorGeneralinhisComment,isdesignedto
providetheemployeewith"thewherewithalduringtheperiodthatheislookingforanotheremployment."Inthe
instant case, the grant of separation pay was a substitute for immediate and continued reemployment with the
privaterespondentBank.Thegrantofseparationpaydidnotredresstheinjurythatisintendedtoberelievedby
the second remedy of backwages, that is, the loss of earnings that would have accrued to the dismissed
employeeduringtheperiodbetweendismissalandreinstatement.Putalittledifferently,paymentofbackwagesis
aformofreliefthatrestorestheincomethatwaslostbyreasonofunlawfuldismissalseparationpay,incontrast,
is oriented towards the immediate future, the transitional period the dismissed employee must undergo before
locatingareplacementjob.ItwasgrievouserroramountingtograveabuseofdiscretiononthepartoftheNLRC
tohaveconsideredanawardofseparationpayasequivalenttotheaggregatereliefconstitutedbyreinstatement
plus payment of backwages under Article 280 of the Labor Code. The grant of separation pay was a proper
substitute only for reinstatement it could not be an adequate substitute both for reinstatement and for
backwages.Ineffect,theNLRCinitsassaileddecisionfailedtogivetopetitionerthefullrelieftowhichshewas
entitledunderthestatute.[emphasisours]
Apparently,whentheNLRCchangedtheLAsdecision(specifically,theordertoawardseparationpayinlieuof
reinstatement), Wenphil read this to mean to be the "modification" envisioned in the compromise agreement,
Wenphillikewiseeffectivelyconcludedthatseparationpayandbackwagesarethesameorareinterchangeable
reliefs. This conclusion can be deduced from Wenphils insistence not to pay the respondents remaining
backwages under its erroneous reasoning that this was the effect of the NLRCs order to Wenphil to pay
separationpayinlieuofreinstatement.
Weemphasizethatthebasisforthepaymentofbackwagesisdifferentfromthatoftheawardofseparationpay.
Separationpayisgrantedwherereinstatementisnolongeradvisablebecauseofstrainedrelationsbetweenthe
employee and the employer. Backwages represent compensation that should have been earned but were not
collected because of the unjust dismissal. The basis for computing separation pay is usually the length of the
employees past service, while that for backwages is the actual period when the employee was unlawfully
preventedfromworking.51
Had Wenphil really wanted to put a stop to the running of the period for the payment of the respondents
backwages, then it should have immediately complied with the NLRCs order to award the employees their
separation pay in lieu of reinstatement. This action would have immediately severed the employeremployee
relationship. However, the records are bereft of any evidence that Wenphil actually paid the respondents
separationpay.Thus,theemployeremployeerelationshipbetweenWenphilandtherespondentsneverceased
and the employment status remained pending and uncertain until the CA actually rendered its decision that the
respondentshadnotbeenillegallydismissed.Inthecontextofthepartiesagreement,itwasonlyatthispointthat
thepaymentofbackwagesshouldhavestopped.
Acompromiseagreementshouldnotbecontrarytolaw,morals,goodcustomsandpublicpolicy.
While it is true that a compromise agreement is binding between the parties and becomes the law between
them,52 it is also a rule that to be valid, a compromise agreement must not be contrary to law, morals, good
customsandpublicpolicy.53
In the present case, the parties compromise agreement simply provided that Wenphils obligation to pay the
respondents backwages shall end the moment the NLRC modifies, amends or reverses the illegal dismissal
decision of LA Bartolabac. On its face, there is nothing invalid with such stipulation. Indeed, had the NLRC
reversed the LA, the obligation to pay backwages would have stopped. The NLRC, however, did not decree a
reversalofthefindingofillegaldismissal.Infact,itaffirmedtheillegaldismissalconclusion,confiningitselfmerely
toamodificationoftheconsequencesoftheillegaldismissalfromreinstatementtothepaymentofseparation
pay.
This"modification"ofcoursewecannotaccepttheoptionunderthelegalpolicyissolelylimitedtoarulingthat
the respondents had not been illegally dismissed. Otherwise, we would be violating the Labor Codes policy
entitlingillegallydismissedemployeestotheirrighttobackwagesevenduringtheperiodofappeal.Asweheldin
thecaseofGarciav.PhilippineAirlines:54
TheCourtreaffirmstheprevailingprinciplethateveniftheorderofreinstatementoftheLaborArbiterisreversed

onappeal,itisobligatoryonthepartoftheemployertoreinstateandpaythewagesofthedismissedemployee
duringtheperiodofappealuntilreversalbythehighercourt.ItsettlestheviewthattheLaborArbiter'sorderof
reinstatement is immediately executory and the employer has to either readmit them to work under the same
terms and conditions prevailing prior to their dismissal, or to reinstate them in the payroll, and that failing to
exercisetheoptionsinthealternative,employermustpaytheemployeessalaries.[emphasisours]
This ruling embodies a principle and policy of the law that cannot be watered down by any lesser agreement
exceptperhapswhenbackwagesarealreadyearnedentitlementsthattheemployeechoosestosurrenderfora
valuable consideration (and even then, the consideration must at least be equitable). This legal policy
emphasizes, too, the rule that separation pay cannot be a substitute for backwages but only for reinstatement.
The award of separation pay is not inconsistent with the payment of backwages. Thus, until a higher courts or
tribunalsreversalofthefindingthatanemployeehadbeenillegallydismissed,theemployeewouldbeentitledto
receivehisreinstatementsalaryorbackwagesduringtheperiodofappealuntilsuchreversal.Thisisinlinewith
the Labor Codes policy that an order of reinstatement, which can either be actual or through the payroll, is
immediatelyexecutoryandisnotaffectedbytheperiodofappeal.
PeriodforComputationofBackwages
The records show that the inconsistency between the labor arbitration rulings and the CAs ruling was on the
period for the computation of such backwages and not on whether the respondents were still entitled to such
backwagesduringtheperiodofappealuntilthereversalofthefindingofillegaldismissal.
According to the LA, whose ruling the NLRC affirmed, the period for computation should be from February 15,
2002 until November 8, 2002 since the NLRCs decision which affirmed the LAs finding of illegal dismissal
became final and executory on November 8, 2002. The LA started the counting of the period on February 15,
2002sincethatwasthedaywhenWenphillastpaidtherespondentsbackwages.
Ontheotherhand,theCA,insettingasidetheNLRCsrulings,reliedonthecaseofPfizerv.Velascowherewe
ruledthatthebackwagesofthedismissedemployeeshouldbegrantedduringtheperiodofappealuntilreversal
byahighercourt.SincethefirstCAdecisionwhichfoundthattherespondentshadnotbeenillegallydismissed
waspromulgatedonAugust27,2003,thenthereversalbythehighercourtwaseffectivelymadeonAugust27,
2003.
As against this view, the respondents argued that the period for payment of their backwages should end on
February 14, 2007 since the SC decision in G.R. No. 162447 which affirmed the CAs findings that the
respondentshadnotbeenlegallydismissedbecamefinalandexecutoryonFebruary15,2007.
Amongtheseviews,thecommandingoneistheruleinPfizer,whichmerelyechoestherulingswemadeinthe
cases of Roquero v. Philippine Airlines55 and Garcia v. Philippine Airlines56 that the period for computing the
backwages due to the respondents during the period of appeal should end on the date that a higher court
reversed the labor arbitration ruling of illegal dismissal. In this case, the higher court which first reversed the
NLRCsrulingwasnottheSCbutrathertheCA.Inthislight,theCAwascorrectwhenitfoundthatthattheperiod
of computation should end on August 27, 2003. The date when the SCs decision became final and executory
neednotmatterastheruleinRoquero,GarciaandPfizermerelyreferredtothedateofreversal,notthedateof
theultimatefinalityofsuchreversal.
As a last minor detail, we do not agree with the CA that the date of computation should start on February 15,
2002. Rather, it should be on February 16, 2002. The respondents themselves admitted in their motion for
computation and issuance of writ of execution that the last date when they were paid their backwages was on
February15,2002.Tostartthecomputationonthesamedatewouldresulttoaduplicationofwagesforthisday
thus,computationshouldstartonthefollowingdateFebruary16,2002.
WHEREFORE, in light of these considerations, we hereby DENY the petition. The Court of Appeals' decision
dated August 31, 2012 and resolution dated June 20, 2013, which annulled and set aside the March 26, 2010
decision and September 15, 2010 resolution of the NLRC, are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The
periodforthecomputationofbackwagesofrespondentsAlmerR.AbingandAnabelleM.Tuazonshouldbefrom
February 16, 2002 until August 27, 2003, when the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision reversing the
NLRC'sfindingofillegaldismissal.Nocosts.
SOORDERED.
ARTUROD.BRION
AssociateJustice
WECONCUR:
ANTONIOT.CARPIO
AssociateJustice
Chairperson
MARIANOC.DELCASTILLO
AssociateJustice

JOSEPORTUGALPEREZ
AssociateJustice

ESTELAM.PERLASBERNABE

AssociateJustice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assignedtothewriteroftheopinionoftheCourt'sDivision.
ANTONIOT.CARPIO
AssociateJustice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
PursuanttoSection13,ArticleVIIIoftheConstitution,andtheDivisionChairperson'sAttestation,Icertifythatthe
conclusionsintheaboveDecisionhadbeenreachedinconsultationbeforethecasewasassignedtothewriterof
theopinionoftheCourt'sDivision.
MARIALOURDESP.A.SERENO
ChiefJustice

Footnotes
1

Rollo,p.722.

PennedbyAssociateJusticeMarinaL.Buzon,andconcurredinbyAssociateJusticesMarioL.Guaria
andSantiagoJavierRanadaid.at2741.
3

Id.at4345.

Id.at171177.

Id.at188190.

Id.at148153.

LABORCODE,article223.

Rollo,pp.4667.

Id.at62.

10

Id.at67.

11

Id.at9.

12

Id.

13

Id.at98100.

14

Id.at99.

15

Id.

16

Id.at101108.

17

Id.at107.

18

Id.at10.

19

Id.at109110.

20

Id.atnote19.

21

Id.at111127.

22

Id.at118.

23

Id.atnote19.

24

Id.at125127.

25

AnabelleMuajeTuazonandAlmerR.Abingv.WenphilCorporation,ElizabethP.Orbita,andtheCourtof
Appeals,G.R.No.162447,December27,2006,511SCRA521.

26

Id.atnote19.

27

Id.at138.

28

Id.at139141onAugust16,2007.

29

Id.at140.

30

Id.at148153.

31

Id.at154170.

32

Id.at160.

33

Id.atp.168169.

34

Id.atnote4.

35

Id.atnote5.

36

Id.atnote2.

37

G.R.No.177467,March9,2011,645SCRA135.

38

Id.at152.

39

Rollo,pp.3940.

40

Id.at99.

41

Id.at1415.

42

Id.at16.

43

Id.at17.

44

Id.at19.

45

G.R.No.90501,August5,1991,200SCRA246.

46

G.R.No.164856,January20,2009,576SCRA479.

47

Id.atnote15.

48

Santosv.NLRC,G.R.No.76721,September21,1987,154SCRA171.

49

Macaserov.SouthernIndustrialGasesPhilippines,597Phil.494(2009).

50

Supranote48,at172.

51

GoldenAceBuildersv.Talde,G.R.No.187200,May5,2010,620SCRA288.

52

Agov.CourtofAppeals,116Phil.841(1962).

53

Magbanuav.Uy,497Phil.518(2005).

54

Supranote46.

55

G.R.No.152329,449Phil.437(2003).

56

Supranote46.

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