Published in Bellona Quarterly Number 1/2008 (652) p 66-72

In Search of An
Ideal Victory COL Ong Yulin
Singapore Armed Forces

W inston Churchill called the fall of Malaya and Singapore to the Japanese ‘the greatest
and most humiliating defeat in British history’ 1 , as the Malayan campaign was
conducted with speed, tempo and cunningness which completely outwitted the British
despite being numerically superior. The Malayan campaign lasted just 68 days from the time
when the Japanese invaded Malaya on 8 December 1941, to the fall of Singapore on 15 February
1942, and throughout the campaign, the British lost the initiative and never regained it, allowing
the Japanese complete freedom to impose their wills. The overwhelming success of the campaign
can be attributed to an insightful application of the principles in Sunzi’s The Art of War, where
the Japanese attempted to achieve an ‘ideal victory to subdue the enemy without fighting’ 2 .

The concept of an ideal victory has often been interpreted literally and mistakenly
understood to mean the absence of military actions and the need to do battles. Careful reading of
Chapter 3 on the ‘Attack by Stratagem’, in Sunzi’s The Art of War, revealed that the intention is
to out-maneuver the enemy to produce a sense of lost cause in his heart and mind to convince
him of the futility of further violence and bloodshed, and the best option is then to surrender.
Sunzi advocated achieving this by ‘attacking his strategy’ as the best option and the second best
option is to ‘disrupt his alliances through diplomatic means’. The next best option is to ‘attack
his army in the field’ and the least preferred option is to ‘attack his walled cities’, which is also a
last resort when all other alternatives have failed. 3 This paper will examine how the Japanese
attempted to achieve this ideal victory by ‘attacking the adversary’s strategy’ at the strategic and
operational levels, and how the British’s inability to do so, hastened the fall of Malaya and
Singapore.

ATTACKING AN ADVERSARY’S STRATEGY

To understand the concept of attacking the adversary’s strategy, it is imperative that we

understand what strategy is. Yet, there is no single definition of strategy. The word ‘strategy’ is
derived from its Greek word ‘strategos’, meaning ‘the art of the general’. Clausewitz defined
‘strategy’ as ‘the use of combat or the threat of combat, for the purpose of the war in which it

1
Masanobu Tsuji, Japan's Greatest Victory/ Britain's Greatest Defeat, Edited by H.V. Howe; translated by
Margaret E. Lake, Staplehurst, Kent : Spellmount, 1997.
2
Pan Jianbin and Liu Ruixiang, Sunzi – The Art of War, A Chinese-English Bilingual Reader, Military Science
Publishing House, Beijing, 1993, p 15.
3
Pan Jianbin and Liu Ruixiang, Sunzi – The Art of War p 15.

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takes place’, but also defined it as the ‘use of armed force to achieve military objectives and by
extension the political purpose of the war’. 4 Liddell Hart provided further clarity by defining
‘strategy’ as two interlinked concepts of ‘grand strategy’ and ‘strategy’ 5 with the intent to re-
emphasize the subordination of war to the political objectives. Liddell Hart defined ‘grand
strategy’ as ‘the coordination and direction of all resources of a nation or band of nations,
towards the attainment of the political object of the war’, while ‘strategy’ is ‘the art of
distributing and applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy’. 6

For those engaged in the direction and conduct of war, strategy has always taken on a
narrower and operational definition and such a definition will be adopted for this paper. The
proposed definition is: Strategy is essentially a plan of action sequences to achieve an objective
or intent, utilizing available resources and with due consideration of one’s current status. The
current status, available resources and the intent interact to produce strengths and weaknesses
that are an intrinsic part of the strategy. Finding ways to strike at an enemy's weaknesses,
bypassing his main strength and thus avoiding a head-to-head confrontation is the focus of every
strategist, 7 as it promises an early capitulation of the enemy, for prolonged wars have never
benefited a country. 8
Ja
pa
n

Attack the critical

St
ra

vulnerabilities or
te
gy

weaknesses
–
At
ta
ck
th
e

Britain
En

Britain
e

Britain Strategy Start

m

Intent
y’s

State
St
ra

Sunzi’s Idea of
te
gy

“Attacking the
Enemy’s Strategy”
J a te n

To achieve Sunzi concept of

pa t
In

“breaking the enemy’s

resistance without fighting”
Figure 1: Attacking the Adversary’s Strategy

4
Peter Paret, The Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, Princeton University Press,
1986, p 3.
5
This is now usually referred to as military strategy, which the United States military defined it as ‘the art and
science of employing the armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives of a national policy by application of
force or the threat of force.’ Extracted from the Dictionary of United States Military Terms.
6
Liddell Hart, Strategy, New York: New American Library, 1974, pp 322-336.
7
Michael I. Handel, Masters of War: Sun Tzu, Clausewitz and Jomini , London; Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass 1992,
p 39.
8
Pan Jianbin and Liu Ruixiang, Sunzi – The Art of War, p 10.

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Attacking the enemy’s strategy is to defeat him at every stage of his plans to produce a
sense of hopelessness and the futility of further contest. This is done by attacking the critical
vulnerabilities or ‘weaknesses’ in the strategy and to change the strengths into weaknesses. By
doing so, it breaks the enemy’s planned sequence of actions and prevents him from achieving his
higher intent (See Figure 1). This is executed through strategies to ‘exploit the enemy’s
vulnerabilities, erode the enemy’s capabilities, achieve relative superiority, and capitalize on the
element of surprise and unpredictability’. 9

The concept of ‘attacking the enemy’s strategy’ does not preclude the need to attack the
enemy through military actions to produce the desired effects of hopelessness and lost cause. The
concept requires application of Sunzi’s other inter-related principles such as adequate
preparations, intelligence gathering, employment of deception, direct and indirect maneuver, and
executing swift and decisive tactical engagements while remaining adaptive to changing
situations. The effects of these principles are not purely confined to the tactical level only, as the
outcomes of a series of tactical operations, bounded by the higher commander’s intent and plan,
will contribute to strategic success in a theatre of military operations. 10 This was seen often in
the Malayan campaign, where Japanese tactical commanders, who were well-schooled 11 in
Sunzi’s The Art of War, displayed an excellent understanding of the overall operational
campaign and intent, overcame tactical issues expeditiously to attain the strategic intent. 12 The
Japanese commanders demonstrated ‘an understanding that the whole facilitates the handling of
the parts and that the parts are subordinate to the whole.’ 13 In the language of modern military
thinking, this is described as the dynamic interactions between the three levels of war at the
strategic, operational and tactical levels.

ATTACKING BRITAIN’S STRATEGY AT THE STRATEGIC LEVEL

Japan’s Strategy and Intent. In the summer of 1941, Japan’s deteriorating relationship with
Britain and the United States (US), culminated in US imposed economic sanctions on Japan in
retaliation for its attacks on China. The economically strangulating sanctions led Japan to carry
out its plans to secure the resource-rich Southeast Asia as an intermediate objective in order to
complete its conquest of China. The intent was to capture Singapore as a key objective in order
to use its strategic location as a launch pad to complete the conquest of Southeast Asia.
Thereafter, Japan’s long-term objectives were to continue further south to Australia and north
from Manchuria into the Soviet Union. These plans inevitably placed Japan on a war path with
the Allied Powers (See Figure 2)
.

9
Wee Chou-Hou, Sun Zi Art of War, An Illustrated Translation with Asian Perspectives and Insights, Pearson,
Prentice Hall, 2003, p 35.
10
V.K. Triandafillov, The Nature of the Operations of Modern Armies, Portland: Frank Cass & Co, 1994.
11
Samuel B. Griffith, Sun Tzu: The Art of War. Translated by Samuel B. Griffith, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1965, pp.
169-177.
12
Brian P. Farrell. The Defence and Fall of Singapore 1940-1942, Stroud: Tempus 2005, p 321.
13
Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Volume 1, Foreign Languages Press, Peking 1965.

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Figure 2: Japanese Short Term and Long Term War Objectives

Source: Australia Under Attack, 1942-43 (With Refinement by the author)
http://www.awm.gov.au/underattack/index.asp

Britain’s Strategy and Intent. The British strategy for the Southeast Asia centered on
Singapore being ‘the naval key to the Far East’, where its naval base would either serve as a
‘deterrence against attacks’ or as a ‘staging point’ for counter-attacks. 14 This so-called
‘Singapore Strategy’ hinged upon the protection of Singapore which, in turn, depended on the
security of the Malayan peninsula. The Malayan peninsula was, however, lightly defended as the
bulk of the British military forces were deployed in the Middle East, poised for the European
theatre. The British strategy for the defence of Malaya was then to hold off any invading forces
until the forces in the Middle East were re-deployed to reinforce troops already in Malaya. The
strategy also assumed that the US would enter the conflict and render assistance in the defence of
Malaya. 15

Attacking Britain’s Strategy. Japan exploited the critical vulnerabilities in the British’s
strategy by attacking almost simultaneously, 16 Pearl Harbour to prevent an immediate US
response, and the lightly defended Malaya to neutralize the naval base in Singapore. It also relied
on its Axis allies to keep the Allied forces occupied in the European theater and prevented the
British from diverting its forces to the Far East.

Key Lessons at the Strategic Level. The British strategy was clearly flawed as it was premised
on improbable diversion of forces from the Middle East to Malaya and a reluctant and uncertain
US involvement. These weaknesses were well understood and attacked by the Japanese. The
14
Farrell, The Defence and Fall of Singapore, pp. 76-77 & 386
15
Malcolm Murfett, et al. Between Two Oceans: A Military History of Singapore: From First Settlement to Final
British Withdrawal, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1999, p. 186
16
The Japanese 25th Army landed in Malaya an hour and 20 minutes before the attack on Pearl Harbour.

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attack on Pearl Harbour was a tactical triumph and served a strategic purpose of preventing US
assistance throughout the Malayan campaign but it was a costly strategic mistake as it brought
the US into the Second World War. Instead of ‘attacking the enemy’s alliance’ as advocated by
Sunzi, Japan attacked the enemy’s ally and brought it into the war.

ATTACKING BRITAIN’S STRATEGY AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL

Japan’s Operational Strategy. The Japanese operational strategy was an excellent application
of Sunzi’s concepts that attacked the British’s strategy at the operational level. The operational
designer of the Japanese campaign plans, Tsuji Masanobu shared how the Japanese had thought
through and devised actions to counter British actions in it operational plan. 17 So, although the
British were ‘first in the field and awaits the coming of the enemy’, the Japanese were ‘clever
combatants who impose their will on the enemy and do not allow the enemy’s will to be imposed
on them’. 18 Even the preparation for the campaign was carried out very much according to
Sunzi’s principles. The Japanese made extensive ‘use of spies’ who infiltrated into Malaya as
‘commercial travellers’ and ‘topographical survey teams’ 19 to allow Japan to formulate accurate
and detailed estimation of the British defence strategy. Japan determined that:

• Firstly, the British would rely on the Royal Air Force (RAF) and the Malaya Command
to use delaying tactics against the Japanese advance while they wait for reinforcements.
• Secondly, the British intended to fight the Japanese forces near the Thai frontier and
correctly interpreted the weak enemy air force strength to predict that the British did not
expect a Japanese invasion during the northwest monsoon. 20 The Japanese also
discovered the presence of airfields in northern Malaya where the British could deploy all
available aircrafts and predicted that the British will commit all available combat power
on the flanks of the Japanese landing in southern Thailand. 21

Britain’s Operational Strategy. The British, commanded by Percival, had made a very accurate
assessment of the Japanese operational options and had designed an operational plan codenamed
Operation Matador, to move forces into positions to counter possible Japanese amphibious
landings at Singora, Patani (which are located in southern Thailand) and Kota Bahru (in Malaya).
The British strategy also relied on Force Z, spearheaded by two British battleships, the Prince of
Wales and the Repulse, being deployed to the east coast of Malaya as a deterrence to and to
intercept Japanese landings. The final component of the operational plan was to delay the
Japanese advance as far as possible in order to buy time and space needed for reinforcement to
arrive. As Percival has determined that the key objective was Singapore, he also intended to
preserve his forces as much as possible for a final battle at Singapore.

Attacking the Britain’s Operational Plan (See Figure 3). The Japanese was able to impose
their will completely on the British during the campaign. They attacked the British’s intention of
countering the Japanese amphibious landings at Singora and Patani, and subsequent advance to

17
Masanobu Tsuji, Japan’s Greatest Victory, Britain’s Worst Defeat. p. 91
18
Lionel Giles, Sun Tzu on The Art of War, Translated, (London, Luzac & Co, 1910), See Weak and Strong Points.
19
Masanobu Tsuji, Japan’s Greatest Victory, Britain’s Worst Defeat, pp 6-9
20
Tsuji, Japan’s Greatest Victory, Britain’s Worst Defeat, pp. 33-34
21
Tsuji, Japan’s Greatest Victory, Britain’s Worst Defeat, pp. 38-40

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the Thai border, with a simultaneous attack on Kota Bahru to divert the attention of the RAF
from the Japanese landings. The Japanese also swiftly bombed the nearby Sungei Patani
aerodrome and captured the important aerodromes of Kota Bahru, Alor Star and others to negate
the threat of the British air force, effectively destroying half of the RAF’s strength in northern
Malaya. The Japanese was also able to use the captured airfields for its own air force to support
the advance southwards. The Japanese air force was already on the look out for Force Z and
promptly sank the two battleships off Kuantan on 10 Dec 1941. At the end of these phases of
operations, the Japanese had isolated the entire operational theatre and had gained the initiative,
naval command of the seas surrounding and air superiority over the Malayan peninsula.

Figure 3: Japan’s Advance– A Combination of Direct and Indirect Maneuver

Source: www.OnWar.com

Knowing that the British would employ delaying tactics to wait for reinforcement, the
Japanese commanded by Yamashita, devised a fighting strategy ‘to sustain the attack on the
enemy without suffering defeat through the operations of extraordinary and normal forces’. 22

22
Liu Chunzhi and Zhu Chenghu, Sun Tzu: The Art of War, Beijing, PLA National Defence University Press, 2006.
p 102

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The Japanese army would relentlessly pressure forward like Sunzi’s idea of ‘torrential water’ to
pursue or destroy the enemy, without allowing him the opportunity to regroup. The ‘momentum
of the torrential water’ was enhanced by the use of bicycles by the mainly infantry force. These
frontal attacks were supported by indirect approaches, through the dense Malayan jungle and
coastal hook operations along the western coast, to cut-off the enemy’s withdrawal routes as well
as to destroy the entrapped enemy. The tempo of these successive direct and indirect maneuvers
allowed the Japanese to complete the capture of Malaya and Singapore in 68 days.

Key Lessons at the Operational Level. There are many lessons to be learnt from the manner
the British and Japanese conducted the Malayan campaign. Besides, the attacking the enemy’s
strategy, the other key ones are:

• ‘Know the enemy, know yourself, your victory will never be endangered. Know the
weather and terrain, your victory will be complete’. 23 Through the use of spies, the
Japanese had good foreknowledge of the deposition of British troops in Malaya and
understood the strengths and weaknesses of their battle plans. In contrast, the British had
an advantage in terms of knowing the terrain and weather better, but it was not put into
good use. In fact, the British had a mindset that it was not possible for a Japanese landing
during the northwest monsoon months of November to March. This presented an
opportunity that was exploited by the Japanese. Despite an extensive intelligence
gathering network, and an excellent appreciation of the Malayan campaign (done by
Percival himself prior to his posting to Malaya), the British did not understand how the
Japanese was conducting the war and underestimated the capabilities of the Japanese
troops. 24 This produced a series of psychological dislocation for the British, especially in
the initial stages of the campaign.

• In strength, there is weakness and in weakness, there is strength. Strength and

weakness are not absolute but relative terms. It is possible to discover weaknesses in
strengths and conversely, it is also possible to find strengths in weaknesses. As the
situation changes, it is possible to turn weaknesses into strengths and strengths into
weaknesses. There are many such examples in the Malayan campaign but only the key
ones are:

The British had numerical superiority in Malaya of about 88,000 British,

Australian, and Indian soldiers and Malay volunteers, outnumbering the Japanese troops
of 20,000. Despite, the numerical advantage, there were command and control issues as it
was a hastily assembled force, lacking communication equipment and were insufficiently
trained in jungle warfare. The Japanese exploited this by attacking each defence line by
mastering relative superiority at each point of contact. Poor communications led to gaps
surfacing in the defence lines as troops withdrew prematurely. The Japanese who had
undergone jungle training prior to arriving in Malaya also exploited the dense jungle as
an outflanking approach rendering many of the well-prepared defence lines useless.

23
Pan Jianbin and Liu Ruixiang, Sunzi – The Art of War, p 75.
24
Farrell, The Defence and Fall of Singapore, pp 128-129

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On the other hand, the speed of the Japanese advance created vulnerable long
lines of communications but they were not exploited by the British. However, the
Japanese troops remained well-supplied using the vast quantities of stores and supplies
abandoned by the British in their haste to withdraw. Tsuji refers to these as ‘Churchill
Supplies’, and the Japanese used the food, transport, and munitions to ease their tenuous
logistical situation. 25

• ‘One should not repeat the used tactics, but always respond to circumstances in an
infinite variety of ways’. 26 As the campaign progressed, the Japanese continued to apply
their tactics in a flexible, adaptive and shaping manner as battlefield circumstances
changed. In contrast, the British troops fought with tactical rigidity, caused by the
disunity of command, poorly trained soldiers and the ambiguity of reconciling tactical
decisions with the over-arching strategic objective of delaying the Japanese to gain time
for arrival of reinforcements. In turn, this created the dilemma of fighting stubbornly but
yet to be ready to withdraw in order to conserve military strength for a final battle in
Singapore. Soon, the ‘fighting withdrawal’ became a pattern where the British would try
to make a stand, the Japanese would attack, and the British would then retreat. 27 The
British did little to seize initiative but maintained a fighting strategy that was clearly
failing from the time the Japanese landed. At no time, did the British attempted to attack
the Japanese’s fighting strategy or protect its strengths from being turned into weaknesses.
In the campaign, the British had many well-prepared defence lines but they were forced
to withdraw by the Japanese outflanking maneuvers as their flanks were unprotected.

CONCLUSION

The Japanese military success demonstrated the value of ‘attacking the enemy’s strategy’.
In some ways, the Japanese success was aided by the British rigidness in adhering to a
predictable grand strategy, methodical strategy and fixed tactics. The Japanese conduct of the
Malayan campaign has demonstrated that attacking an enemy’s strategy requires careful analysis
of the enemy’s plans to understand its shortcomings and strengths, so that military actions can be
directed to exploit shortcomings and to change strengths into weaknesses. This is usually
achieved through the use of both ordinary and extraordinary forces in a combination of direct
and indirect maneuvers. The execution of military actions calls for flexibility and adaptiveness to
respond to changes in the situation but yet it demands the constant need to achieve the overall
strategic intent. The Malayan campaign remains one of the best illustrations of the application of
Sunzi’s The Art of War, achieving overwhelming success with little fighting. The British troops
never recovered from the opening shock of the Malayan campaign and were psychologically
defeated in part from the tempo of the Japanese operations and in part from their own fighting
withdrawal strategy. The deep understanding and excellent application of Sunzi’s principles gave
Japan its greatest victory and the lack of understanding and non-application, Britain its greatest
defeat.

25
Masanobu Tsuji, Japan’s Greatest Victory, Britain’s Worst Defeat. pp 105-107
26
Liu Chunzhi and Zhu Chenghu, Sun Tzu: The Art of War, p 107
27
Louis Allen, Singapore 1941-42, Newark, NJ: University of Delaware Press, 1979, p 185, 190 & 192.

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