I value Morality.

The standard is mitigating structural violence.

1] Structural violence is based in moral exclusion, which is
fundamentally flawed because exclusion is not based on desert but
rather on arbitrarily perceived differences.
Winter and Leighton 99 |Deborah DuNann Winter and Dana C. Leighton. Winter|[Psychologist that
specializes in Social Psych, Counseling Psych, Historical and Contemporary Issues, Peace Psychology. Leighton: PhD
graduate student in the Psychology Department at the University of Arkansas. Knowledgable in the fields of social
psychology, peace psychology, and justice and intergroup responses to transgressions of justice] Peace, conflict,
and violence: Peace psychology in the 21st century. Pg 4-5 ghs//VA

to recognize the operation of structural violence forces us to ask

questions about how and why we tolerate it, questions which often
ha[s] painful answers for the privileged elite who unconsciously support it. A final question
Finally,

of this section is how and why we allow ourselves to be so oblivious to structural violence. Susan Opotow offers an intriguing set of

our normal perceptual cognitive

processes divide people into in-groups and out-groups. Those
outside our group lie outside our scope of justice. Injustice that would be
instantaneously confronted if it occurred to someone we love or know is barely noticed if it occurs to
strangers or those who are invisible or irrelevant. We do not seem to be able to open
our minds and our hearts to everyone, so we draw conceptual lines between those who
are in and out of our moral circle. Those who fall outside are
morally excluded , and become either invisible, or demeaned in some way so that we do not
have to acknowledge the injustice they suffer. Moral exclusion is a human failing, but Opotow argues convincingly
that it is an outcome of everyday social cognition. To reduce its nefarious effects, we
must be vigilant in noticing and listening to oppressed, invisible,
outsiders. Inclusionary thinking can be fostered by relationships, communication, and appreciation of diversity. Like
Opotow, all the authors in this section point out that structural violence is not inevitable if we
become aware of its operation, and build systematic ways to
mitigate its effects. Learning about structural violence may be discouraging, overwhelming, or maddening, but
answers, in her article Social Injustice. She argues that

these papers encourage us to step beyond guilt and anger, and begin to think about how to reduce structural violence. All the
authors in this section note that the same structures (such as global communication and normal social cognition) which feed
structural violence, can also be used to empower citizens to reduce it. In the long run, reducing structural violence by reclaiming
neighborhoods, demanding social justice and living wages, providing prenatal care, alleviating sexism, and celebrating local
cultures, will be our most surefooted path to building lasting peace.

2] Debate should deal with questions of real-world consequences

ideal theories ignore the concrete nature of the world and legitimize
oppression.
Dr. Tommy J. Curry 14, The Cost of a Thing: A Kingian Reformulation of a Living Wage Argument in the 21st
Century, Victory Briefs, 2014, BE

Despite the pronouncement of debate as an activity and intellectual

exercise pointing to the real world consequences of dialogue , thinking,
and (personal) politics when addressing issues of racism, sexism,
economic disparity, global conflicts, and death, many of the
discussions concerning these ongoing challenges to humanity are
fixed to a paradigm which sees the adjudication of material

disparities and sociological realities as the conquest of one ideal

theory over the other. In Ideal Theory as Ideology, Charles Mills outlines the problem contemporary
theoretical-performance styles in policy debate and value-weighing in Lincoln-Douglass are confronted with in their
attempts to get at the concrete problems in our societies. At the outset, Mills concedes that ideal

theory
applies to moral theory as a whole (at least to normative ethics as
against metaethics); [s]ince ethics deals by definition with
normative/prescriptive/evaluative issues, [it is set] against
factual/descriptive issues. At the most general level, the conceptual chasm
between what emerges as actual problems in the world (e.g.: racism, sexism,
poverty, disease, etc.) and how we frame such problems theoreticallythe
assumptions and shared ideologies we depend upon for our problems to be heard and accepted as a worthy
problem by an audienceis

the most obvious call for an anti-ethical

paradigm, since such a paradigm insists on the actual as the basis
of what can be considered normatively. Mills, however, describes this chasm as a
problem of an ideal-as-descriptive model which argues that for any actual-empiricalobservable social phenomenon (P), an ideal of (P) is necessarily a
representation of that phenomenon. In the idealization of a social phenomenon (P), one
necessarily has to abstract away from certain features of (P) that
is observed before abstraction occurs. This gap between what is
actual (in the world), and what is represented by theories and
politics of debaters proposed in rounds threatens any real
discussions about the concrete nature of oppression and the racist
economic structures which necessitate tangible policies and
reorienting changes in our value orientations. As Mills states: What
distinguishes ideal theory is the reliance on idealization to the
exclusion, or at least marginalization, of the actual , so what we are seeking to
resolve on the basis of thought is in fact incomplete, incorrect, or ultimately irrelevant to the actual problems

Our attempts to situate social disparity

cannot simply appeal to the ontologization of social phenomenon
meaning we cannot suggest that the various complexities of social
problems (which are constantly emerging and undisclosed beyond the effects we observe) are
totalizable by any one set of theories within an ideological frame be
it our most cherished notions of Afro-pessimism, feminism,
Marxism, or the like. At best, theoretical endorsements make us aware
of sets of actions to address ever developing problems in our
empirical world, but even this awareness does not command us to
only do X, but rather do X and the other ideas which compliment the
material conditions addressed by the action X. As a whole, debate
(policy and LD) neglects the need to do X in order to remedy our castaway-ness among our ideological tendencies and politics. How then do we
which our theories seek to address.

pull ourselves from this seeming ir-recoverability of thought in general and in our endorsement of socially
actualizable values like that of the living wage? It is my position that Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.s thinking about the
need for a living wage was a unique, and remains an underappreciated, resource in our attempts to impose value
reorientation (be it through critique or normative gestures) upon the actual world. In other words, King aims to
reformulate the values which deny the legitimacy of the living wage, and those values predicated on the flawed

views of the worker, Blacks, and the colonized (dignity, justice, fairness, rights, etc.) used to currently justify the
living wages in under our contemporary moral parameters.

3] Morality is based on response to problems in the world, which

justifies focus on resolving material conditions of violence.
Gregory Fernando Pappas 16 [Texas A&M University] The Pragmatists Approach to Injustice, The Pluralist
Volume 11, Number 1, Spring 2016, BE
In Experience and Nature, Dewey names the empirical way of doing philosophy the denotative method (LW
1:371).18 What Dewey means by denotation is simply the phase of an empirical inquiry where we are con- cerned
with designating, as free from theoretical presuppositions as possible, the concrete problem (subject matter) for

empirical inquiry
about an injustice must begin with a rough and tentative
designation of where the injustices from within the broader context
of our everyday life and activities are. Once we designate the subject matter, we then
which we can provide different and even competing descriptions and theories. Thus an

engage in the inquiry itself, including diagnosis, possibly even constructing theories and developing concepts. Of
course, that is not the end of the inquiry. We must then take the results of that inquiry as a path pointing and
leading back to something in primary experience (LW 1:17). This looping back is essential, and it neverends as

Injustices are
events suffered by concrete people at a particular time and in a
situation. We need to start by pointing out and describing these
problematic experiences instead of starting with a theoretical
account or diagnosis of them. Dewey is concerned with the consequences of not following the
long as there are new experiences of injustice that may require a revi- sion of our theories.

methodological advice to distinguish designation from diagnosis. Definitions, theoretical criteria, and diagnosis can
be useful; they have their proper place and function once inquiry is on its way, but if stressed too much at the start

We must
attempt to pretheoretically designate the subject matter, that is, to
point in a certain direction, even with a vague or crude
description of the problem. But, for philosophers, this task is not easy because, for instance, we
of inquiry, they can blind us to aspects of concrete problems that escape our theoretical lenses.

are often too prone to interpret the particular problem in a way that verifies our most cherished theories of

One must be careful to designate the subject matter in such a

way as not to slant the question in favor of ones theory or
theoretical preconceptions. A philosopher must make an honest
effort to designate the injustices based on what is experienced as
such because a concrete social problem (e.g., injustice) is independent and
neutral with respect to the different possible competing diagnoses
or theories about its causes. Otherwise, there is no way to test or adjudicate between competing
injustice.

accounts. That designation precedes diagnosis is true of any inquiry that claims to be empirical. To start with the
diagnosis is to not start with the problem. The problem is pretheoretical or preinquiry, not in any mysterious sense
but in that it is first suffered by someone in a particular context. Otherwise, the diagnosis about the causes of the
problem has nothing to be about, and the inquiry cannot even be initiated. In his Logic, Dewey lays out the pattern
of all empirical inquiries (LW 12). All inquiries start with what he calls an indeterminate situation, prior even to a
problematic situation. Here is a sketch of the process: Indeterminate situation problematic situation
diagnosis: What is the problem? What is the solution? (operations of analysis, ideas, observations, clarification,
formulating and testing hypothesis, reasoning, etc.) final judgment (resolution: determinate situation) To make
more clear or vivid the difference of the starting point between Anderson and Dewey, we can use the example (or
analogy) of medical prac- tice, one that they both use to make their points.19 The doctors startingpoint is the
experience of a particular illness of a particular patient, that is, the concrete and unique embodied patient
experiencing a disruption or prob- lematic change in his life. The patient having something the matter with him is
antecedent; but being ill (having the experience of illness) is not the same as being an object of knowledge.20 The
problem becomes an object of knowledge once the doctor engages in a certain interaction with the patient,
analysis, and testing that leads to a diagnosis. For Dewey, diagnosis occurs when the doctor is already engaged in
operations of experimental observation in which he is already narrowing the field of relevant evidence, concerned

with the correlation between the nature of the problem and possible solu- tions. Dewey explains the process: A
physician . . . is called by a patient. His original material of experience is thereby provided. This experienced object
sets the problem of inquiry. . . . He calls upon his store of knowledge to sug- gest ideas that may aid him in reaching
a judgment as to the nature of the trouble and its proper treatment.21 Just as with the doctor, empirical inquirers
about injustice must return to the concrete problem for testing, and should never forget that their con- ceptual
abstractions and general knowledge are just means to ameliorate what is particular, context-bound, and unique. In
reaching a diagnosis, the doc- tor, of course, relies on all of his background knowledge about diseases and
evidence, but a good doctor never forgets the individuality of the particular problem (patient and illness). The
physician in diagnosing a case of disease deals with something in- dividualized. He draws upon a store of general
principles of physiology, etc., already at his command. Without this store of conceptual material he is helpless. But
he does not attempt to reduce the case to an exact specimen of certain laws of physiology and pathology, or do
away with its unique individuality. Rather he uses general statements as aids to direct his observation of the
particular case, so as to discover what it is like. They function as intellectual tools or instrumentalities. (LW 4:166)
Dewey uses the example of the doctor to emphasize the radical contex- tualism and particularism of his view. The
good doctor never forgets that this patient and this ill is just the specific ill that it is. It never is an exact duplicate
of anything else.22 Similarly, the empirical philosopher in her in- quiry about an injustice brings forth general
knowledge or expertise to an inquiry into the causes of an injustice. She relies on sociology and history as well as
knowledge of different forms of injustice, but it is all in the service of inquiry about the singularity of each injustice
suffered in a situation. The correction or refinement that I am making to Andersons character- ization of the
pragmatists approach is not a minor terminological or scholarly point; it has methodological and practical
consequences in how we approach an injustice. The distinction between the diagnosis and the problem (the illness, the injustice) is an important functional distinction that must be kept in inquiry because it keeps us alert to

To rectify or improve any

diagnosis, we must return to the concrete problem; as with the patient, this may
the provisional and hypothetical aspect of any diagnosis.

require attending as much as possible to the uniqueness of the problem. This is in the same spirit as Andersons
preference for an empirical inquiry that tries to capture all of the expressive harms in situations of injustice. But
this requires that we begin with and return to concrete experiences of injustice and not by starting with a diagnosis
of the causes of injustice provided by studies in the social sciences, as in (5) above. For instance, a diagnosis of
causes that are due to systematic, structural features of society or the world disregards aspects of the concrete

Making problematic situations

of injustice our explicit methodological commitment as a starting
point rather than a diagnosis of the problem is an important and
useful imperative for nonideal theories. It functions as a directive to inquirers toward the problem, to
experiences of injustice that are not systematic and structural.

locate it, and designate it before venturing into descriptions, diagnosis, analysis, clarifications, hypotheses, and
reasoning about the problem. These operations are instrumental to its ame- lioration and must ultimately return (be
tested) by the problem that sparked the inquiry. The directive can make inquirers more attentive to the complex
ways in which such differences as race, culture, class, or gender intersect in a problem of injustice. Sensitivity to
complexity and difference in matters of injustice is not easy; it is a very demanding methodological prescription
because it means that no matter how confident we may feel about applying solutions designed to ameliorate

our cures should try to address as much as possible the

unique circumstances of each injustice. The analogy with medical inquiry and practice is
systematic evil,

useful in making this point, since the hope is that someday we will improve our tools of inquiry to prac- tice a much
more personalized medicine than we do today, that is, provide a diagnosis and a solution specific to each patient.

Advantage 1: Gender Equality

Middle East democratization is necessary for womens rights.
Valentine M. Moghadam 04 [currently the chief of the section for Gender Equality and Development in the
sector of Social and Human Sciences at UNESCO in Paris. She is on leave from her position as director of women's
studies and professor of sociology at Illinois State University], The Gender of Democracy: The Link Between
Women's Rights and Democratization in the Middle East, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 20 Jul 2004,
BE
In the United States and in European countries such as Britain, democratic rights initially were enjoyed exclusively by propertyowning white males, and only extended to women and to the rest of the male population much later. In other parts of the world,

the expansion of women's rights has gone hand-in-hand with the

establishment of democracy[.]and [W]omen have played a key role in the transition
from authoritarianism to democracy. The Latin American experience is a leading example,

in the 1980s, when civil society was

under tight military control, the new Turkish feminist movement helped to
usher in democratization through campaigns for women's rights, participation, and personal freedom. And today,
across the Arab world and in Iran, modernizing women are principal agents
of democratization and cultural change. Democratization and women's rights movements have emerged
more or less in tandem. These processes are closely intertwined and indeed mutually dependent: the fate of
democratization is bound to the fate of women's rights and vice
versa. Separating the two is conceptually muddled as well as politically dangerous. This is because women can pay a high price when a democratic
especially the cases of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. In Turkey

process is launched without strong institutions and without firmly-established principles of equality and the rights of all citizens. In such

situations, a party based on patriarchal norms can come to power through free elections and then move to relegate women to
second-class citizenship. In fact, this was the Algerian feminists' nightmare. It is the reason why many educated Algerian women
who wanted democratic change opposed the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) after it burst on the scene in 1989 with its rhetoric of
'democracy' but with an agenda of rolling back women's rights. (The FIS's complicity in violence against women during the
insurrection that occurred after the military nullified the 1991 elections cast further doubt on the FIS's dubious commitment to

, policies to protect women's

rights and to increase women's participation in parties, in the
judiciary, and in civil society are essential. Many of the calls for reform emanating from Arab
women's rights). To prevent "democracy without democrats," therefore

countries appear to be gender-blind and inattentive to issues of women's rights. These calls seem to be trapped in formalistic
rhetoric without being conscious of the importance of the quality and gender of democracy. The recent reform manifesto of the
Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, for example, extols the laudable goals of forming political parties and establishing an independent
judiciary, but it also calls for "conformity to Islamic Sharia," a goal that is incompatible with gender equality. The U.S. government
has made numerous and profound mistakes in its Middle East policy. U.S. efforts to promote women's rights and women's
empowerment as part of a broader policy of democracy promotion, however, are not among them. More important, it behooves
Middle Eastern intellectuals and activists working for political reform to understand the interconnections among women's rights,
political rights, and democracy, and to acknowledge that a democratic system without women's human rights and gender equality is

democracy
needs women if it is to be an inclusive, representative, and enduring
system of government.
an inferior form of democracy. Women may need democracy in order to flourish, but the converse is also true:

Advantage 2: ISIS
Democracy promotion is key to curbing ISIS recruitment
Ghannouchi 16
Rached Ghannouchi (co-founder and president of Tunisias Muslim democrats party, Ennahdha). Fight ISIS With
Democracy. The Atlantic. February 1st, 2016. http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/02/tunisiademocracy-ennahdha-isis/458703/
As more countries confront the question of how to counter terrorist groups like ISIS, it is clear that a short-term,
reductionist approach focused largely on

Efforts to dislodge
by strengthening and

military force has proven ineffective .

the so-called

Islamic State through bombing, and

equipping security forces

limited success

in the places it operates,

to keep it at bay

have

so far

had

despite their enormous financial costs. This is because, although such efforts are

critical, they are not sufficient. The rise of ISIS, and its ability to recruit from a region that just five years ago was
swept by democratic hopes and aspirations, requires a global response that is informed by where the group came
from. For such a response to work, I believe it must reflect five principles. These are based on Tunisias experience
as the most successful democratic transition to emerge from the Arab uprisings, as well as my personal intellectual
and political work in Tunisia and the Arab world over five decades. First, there is no universal approach to tackling
ISIS. Rather, the group can only be defeated through a variety of locally designed and targeted responses.
Extremist groups like ISIS use technology and social networks to cross boundaries and attract recruits globallybut

ISIS has had its

greatest recruiting successes in societies that suffered for decades under
their discourse is linked to local grievances wherever they operate. It is no accident that

dictatorship.

The citizens of Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Iraq, Syria, and Libya experienced long years of
endemic corruption, bad governance, and the repression of their rights and freedoms. By fueling economic,
political, and social exclusion and inequality, the regions dictatorships created a tinderbox of pent-up grievances,
which have manifested themselves in various forms, from democratic protests and peaceful calls for change to
violent extremism, sectarianism, chaos, and civil war. ISIS has opportunistically exploited the Arab worlds problems
to build its own image as an alternative.

It tapped into Sunni resentment over Shiite

sectarian repression to forge support in Iraq. In countries like Tunisia, where sectarianism is less of a factor
but unemployment remains at a crushing 40 percent for those under 35, it has exploited resentment at economic

ISIS superimposes its global ideological narrative onto

local contexts, presenting itself as the solution to local grievances. An
effective response therefore must involve addressing these local problems,
exclusion to appeal to marginalized youth. In this way,

which are significantly different in Iraq than in Libya, and in Egypt than in Yemen. It is local governments that must
take the lead role in designing solutions, with strong support from the international community. Second, the fight

ISIS recruits by
highlighting the shortcomings of the status quocorruption, insecurity, poverty,
discrimination, injusticeand appearing to present an alternative in the form of a fantastical utopia in which
against ISIS must be not only a fight against something, but a fight for something.

justice and order reign supreme. This vision is clearly a far cry from the reality of ISISs brutal and degrading rule in

The groups message only works because the region

offers few other models that succeed in providing economic security, social
the territories it holds.

and political inclusion,

and respect for human dignity.

world need a genuine alternative ,

People across the Arab

not a false choice between ISIS and the kinds of

dictatorships, like Bashar al-Assads, that helped produce the terrorist group. Tunisia, if it succeeds, can offer the
true alternative the region needs. The apparent choice between Islam and democracy that ISIS insists Muslims must
make is just as false. Tunisia, if it succeeds in building a politically and economically inclusive system, can offer the
true alternative the region needs. It can show that democracy can work in the Arab world and that ordinary citizens
can have a say in the running of their affairs. It can refute the notion promoted by dictators that security and
stability can only be achieved at the expense of freedom and human rights. And this is precisely why Tunisia has
become a prime target of ISISs violence, as well as of the groups recruitment efforts. The country endured three
horrific terrorist attacks last year, and many Tunisian youth have left to fight for ISIS. The legacy of dictatorship
continues to weigh heavily on uschanging this culture of despotism to one of critical thinking and political
engagement will require long-term educational reform. Third, Tunisias experience demonstrates why the solution to
ISIS cannot be less freedom, and why cracking down on freedom of religion is particularly likely to exacerbate
extremism. Over the last few decades, moderate Islamic thought was repressed in the country, and mainstream
religious institutions that had fostered moderate religious practice were closed down or severely restricted. This
included the historically renowned al-Zaytuna University, which for more than a thousand years prior had produced
intellectual luminaries such as Ibn Arafa, one of the greatest scholars of Islam. Young people growing up in the era
of former dictator Zine el Abidine Ben Ali, who ruled Tunisia from 1987 until he was deposed during the Arab
uprisings, had no reference point for moderate Islamic thought, so they turned to extreme sources instead.
Countering violent extremism thus requires ensuring that people understand the true teachings of Islam, which
challenge the radicals black-and-white views and allow for interpretations that accommodate the needs of modern
life. Fourth,

countries that have made the transition to democracy need

the international communitys support to ensure that

democratic ideals and

political inclusion translate into tangible improvements

in peoples lives.
Guaranteeing free elections and human rights is not sufficient. A successful democratic transition requires forging
economic and social conditions in which people can enjoy opportunities, prosperity, and security. People must feel
that the state protects their rights, serves their interests, safeguards their resources and, whatever its
shortcomings, works for and is accountable to them. Tunisias stability depends on meeting the expectations of
those who placed their trust in the revolution. The Tunisian revolution was precisely about these goalsreasserting
peoples sovereignty, and demanding governance that involves citizens as well as economic growth that benefits
them. Having successfully held two rounds of free and fair elections and peaceful transfers of power, Tunisia is now
focused on making bold economic reforms and investing in large-scale projects that can create jobs, build
infrastructure in previously neglected areas, stimulate economic activity, and attract investments. Without the
necessary economic growth and job creation, our democratic progress remains incomplete. But this process will not

be easy, as evident from the new wave of unrest in Tunisia, sparked once again by the death of a young man, this
time protesting his exclusion from a list of government jobs. Undertaking massive political and economic reforms
would be a challenge for any country, let alone one in Tunisias difficult neighborhood. The government needs
international help to finance stimulus programs and create much-needed jobs, so that young people, and those in
marginalized regions of the country, see the palpable fruits of democracy. Without these tangible benefits, young
people remain vulnerable to extremist propaganda that democracy is no better than other alternatives. Given the
regional context, Tunisias stability depends on its ability to meet the expectations of those who placed their trust in
the revolution to improve their prospects. Lastly, young people must be at the center of any strategy to build a
brighter future in the Middle East. Youth participated in the Arab revolutions in vast numbers, defying threats and
risking their lives to protest against the deprivation and repression that had shaped their experience. The Middle
East and North Africa have seen unprecedented growth in the youth population, and also have the highest rates of
youth unemployment in the world. In Tunisia, for example, young people make up three-quarters of the
unemployed. The same young people who fueled uprisings in Tunisia and across the Arab world are still trying to
find a place within the labor market and struggling to attain the financial independence needed to lead autonomous
lives. Angry

and frustrated youth will more easily be drawn to angry and

ISISindeed it is youth who make up a large proportion of ISISs foreign
recruits. We must give young people hope and tangible change, and restore
their trust in a new system of inclusive governance that puts them at its heart.
frustrated narratives like that of

Thus the Plan Text: The United States federal government ought to
establish a multilateral endowment for reform, as advocated by
Shadi Hamid and Peter Mandaville, to promote democracy in the
Middle East.

A multilateral endowment for reform is a process by which the US will give money to countries that engage in
organic forms of democracy, it is distinct from current forms of democracy promotion where we push what must be
done and how it must be done onto other countries. The MER involves creating a separate pool of money that other
countries can also contribute to, and the more reforms instituted, the more aid given which is good for the long
term.

The MER is the best path to democratization in the Middle East and
multilateralism is keythe plan establishes a fund for conditional
aid given to Middle Eastern countries based on achieving different
levels of democratization.
Hamid and Mandaville 13, SHADI HAMID AND PETER MANDAVILLE [Shadi Hamid is a correspondent
for The Atlantic, the director of research at the Brookings Doha Center, and a fellow at the Saban Center for Middle
East Policy. Peter Mandaville is a professor of public and international affairs at George Mason University and a
former member of the State Departments policy-planning staff], Bringing the United States Back into the Middle
East, The Washington Quarterly, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2013, BE

The central thrust of this model is the idea that the international
community, led by the United States, makes a serious investment in

the economic and political future of the Middle East by making

available significant new funding above and beyond existing aid
commitments. Its multilateral nature would be key to its success, both in
terms of reducing the level of direct financial burden on the United States as well as avoiding perceptions that Washington hopes to engineer political

Europe would be a major partner and contributor to the

Endowment. Regional players such as Turkey and Qatar that have shown an interest in skirting the pre - uprising status quo and
outcomes.

supporting political change will also be encouraged to contribute significant dollar amounts. Of course, it may be difficult to get countries beyond the usual

For the model to succeed, however, it will need to be

informed by the kinds of technical expertise and experience found in
many countriesfrom Latin America to Central and Eastern Europe
to Asiawhich have undergone successful transitions to democracy
club of international donors to make large contributions.

in recent decades. A genuinely multilateral response has been one of the great chimeras of the post - Arab Spring period. While the United States and the
European Union have established programs focused on supporting the transitions, the whole has been less than the sum of various disjointed parts. The
most ambitious assistance platform has been the Deauville Partnership, which dates to the eponymous spring 2011 G8 summit held in the aftermath of
the Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions. Its implementation, however, has been another story. Always somewhat vague, the Deauville frameworks precise
mechanisms and parameters remain a mystery not only to partner governments in the region, but even to the officials in the G8 nations charged with
delivering on its commitments. Its signature elements, such as a $250 million MENA Transition Fund and inclusion of the Arab world within the mandate of
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), have been slow to appear and in any case are focused on spurring economic growth
rather than on securing democratic outcomes. What any potential fund needs is a single, dedicated mechanism for aggregating, programming, and
disbursing large - scale assistance focused on democratic reform in the Middle East (rather than, say, the economic restructuring that the IMF, World Bank,
and other international institutions prioritize). Like the administrations proposed MENA Incentive Fund, the MER would take its lead from recent
innovations in delivering large - scale development assistance. The Bush administrations Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) is one such example,
which established a firm linkage between governance qualityincluding democracy and significant levels of economic aid. 12 Based on reform goals

the MER would disburse funds

against those reform commitments by partner governments.
Mechanisms of accountability would need to be built into all
partnerships, with clear and enforceable benchmarks, ongoing
monitoring, and transparent criterianot to mention the necessary political willfor suspending or
agreed to jointly by the Endowment, partner governments, and civil society,

terminating funding if reform commitments are not met. With the rising tide of nationalism in the region, populist leaders may see this as unwelcome

unused funds would be reinvested back

into the Endowment and accumulate over time, [so] politicians in cash strapped countries would be hard pressed to justify rejecting billions in
international support. Moreover, such support can give political cover to
democratically - elected leadersIslamist and secular alikein their efforts to
restructure corrupt government bureaucracies and institutions . Even if
interference in their domestic affairs. But, considering that

funds are ultimately rejected, the Endowment can send a clear message to understandably skeptical Arab audiences that although democracy cannot be
imposed, it can be actively and vigorously supported in good faith. The Obama administrations proposed MENA Incentive Fund stalled for a variety of
reasons. First, the White House structured its funding request in a way that combined both the distinctive incentive mechanism as well as resources
pegged to vague stabilization contingencies. This diluted the appeal of the former and caused the Incentive Fund to appear to some in Congress as little
more than a slush fund. Second, once the idea was launched, the administration did not actively promote or build support for the Fund among
appropriators. Finally, given the U.S. fiscal climate, any request for sizeable amounts of new foreign aid was likely to engender resistance. But the
administration missed crucial opportunities to help Republicans on Capitol Hillwho tend to be wary of foreign aid giveawaysto understand that the
various forms of accountability built in to the Fund meant that it would operate according to foreign assistance principles they support. Our proposed MER
would not avoid all of these pitfalls, but would have at least two clear advantages over the Incentive Fund. First, it would operate exclusively on the basis
of transparent and benchmarked incentives measured against actual performance on reform indicators, thereby avoiding any accusation of slush funding.

The multilateral nature of the MER would spread the financial burden
across a wider range of stakeholders (meaning that the United States would not have to foot the entire bill)
and thereby avoid some of the political sensitivities in the region associated
with U.S. bilateral funding.
Current approaches failonly the long-term approach MER uses will
solve.
Hamid and Mandaville 13, SHADI HAMID AND PETER MANDAVILLE [Shadi Hamid is a correspondent
for The Atlantic, the director of research at the Brookings Doha Center, and a fellow at the Saban Center for Middle
East Policy. Peter Mandaville is a professor of public and international affairs at George Mason University and a
former member of the State Departments policy-planning staff], Bringing the United States Back into the Middle
East, The Washington Quarterly, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2013, BE

the United States should fundamentally reorient its approach to

reflect the changing nature of reform challenges in Arab countries. For
With this in mind,

example, one of the greatest obstacles to democratization in the Arab world is an ossified civil service habituated toand in many

A changing of the guard in the top

echelons of power will only take a democratic transition so far , particularly
respects a byproduct ofdeeply entrenched autocracy.

when there are good reasons to doubt new incumbents commitment to inclusive democracy. And while the path to

accountable governance certainly must be signaled from above, its realization in practice
depends on reformulating everyday bureaucratic processes. This kind of
necessarily wholesale, top - to - bottom reform of government institutions is an expensive undertaking that requires resources far

the
MER, however, could provide funding of the magnitude needed to make
comprehensive bureaucratic change a meaningful prospect,
including in the security, judicial, and media sectors. It is also important to
beyond the relatively paltry sums of democracy and governance funding the United States currently provides. A tool such as

recognize that one - off injections of economic aid, even when sizeable, are unlikely to lead to enduring, long - term reform
commitments. Democratic transitions in Central and Eastern Europe (and arguably reforms in Turkey during the 2000s) succeeded
because the prospect of EU membership held the promise[d] not just of short - term dividends but also the opportunity of

The
assistance delivered through the MER could lay the groundwork for
a new economic order that can serve to anchor ongoing transitions
and embed potentially anti - Western and nationalist governments within an attractive
regional framework. While the Endowment on its own cannot serve as the functional equivalent of EU
integrating into a lasting economic and political safety net. Painful reforms were worth the effort because of the return.

membership, the development of enhanced trade partnerships and foreign investment flows under its auspices can achieve similar
effects. The geographic happenstance of the 2011 Arab uprisingsinvolving several geographically contiguous countries along the
Mediterranean littoralcan contribute to positive neighborhood effects and political learning across countries.

The plan accounts for historical failureseffective targeting of aid is

necessary.
Wittes and Youngs 9, Tamara Cofman Wittes [Saban Center at Brookings] and Richard Youngs
[Fundacion para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Dialogo Exterior], "Europe, the United States, and Middle
Eastern Democracy: Repairing the Breach, The Saban Center for Middle East Policy and the Brookings Institution,
Number 18, January 2009, BE

European and American officials struggle with the same

two challenges: whether and how to offer Arab governments
significant incentives for democratic reform, and how to mesh the
longterm objective of supporting democracy with shorterterm
strategic objectives. In short, both actors share the same challenge of transcending the fundamental
ambivalence about the democracy project that hampers their policy effectiveness. Advancing
sustainable and meaningful political reform in the Middle East will
require the efforts of governments on both sides of the Atlantic .
Fundamentally,

American and European policymakers should build upon their shared strategic framework to forge a new
partnership on behalf of Arab reform. In this vein, the paper suggests several concrete steps that

European

and American governments should take: Avoid concretizing divergent rhetoric in disparate
European and American mechanisms or institutions. Brussels and Washington should consider setting up a higherlevel transatlantic forum for coordinating policies in the Middle East, along the lines of the U.S.-E.U. strategic

Continue issuing joint diplomatic statements

on the need for and desired shape of Middle Eastern reform. The
Atlantic community should leave Arab leaders in no doubt of the
Wests continued interest in and attention to democratic growth and
human rights improvements in the Middle East. Coordinate rewards on offer for
democratic reform. The Atlantic allies should seek common criteria for
determining such rewards and coordinate on the use of positive
dialogue on Asia established in 2005.

conditionality to induce greater reform and ease the costs of

change.
The EU will get on boardthey recognize the need for a new
program and are leaning towards aid conditionality.
Silvia Colombo et al. 12 and Kristian Coates-Ulrichsen and Shafeeq Ghabra and Shadi Hamid and Eman
Ragab [1 Researcher, Mediterranean and Middle East Programme, Istituto Affari Internazionali, (IAI), Rome. 2 CoDirector, Kuwait Research Programme, London School of Economics. 3 Professor of Political Science at Kuwait
University. 4 Director of Research at the Brookings Doha Center and a Fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East
Policy at the Brookings Institution, Washington. 5 Researcher specialized in Gulf affairs, Security and Strategic
Studies Unit, Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, Cairo] THE GCC IN THE MEDITERRANEAN IN LIGHT
OF THE ARAB SPRING, MEDITERRANEAN PAPER SERIES, 2012, BE
It is ironic that the Arab uprisings happened at precisely the time when U.S. and EU influence was at a low ebb. As the Syrian and
Libyan uprisings demonstrated, Western powers can still be indispensable actors in world politics, without whom the resolution of
armed conflict is difficult, if not impossible. Yet, while the GCC states have pledged billions in new funding to their neighbors, the

The question of
economic aid after the Arab Spring is directly tied to aid
conditionality the notion that aid can, and should, be used as leverage to incentivize Arab governments to
democratize. In both the U.S. and European capitals, there is a firm
movement toward greater conditionality, although coupled with a concern that the line
United States has struggled to appropriate new funding beyond existing bilateral aid. 108

between encouraging political reform and political interference can be blurry. 109 The Obama administrations MENA Incentive Fund
and the European Unions Support for Partnership, Reform, and Inclusive Growth (SPRING) programs are both nods in the direction of
conditionality (although the mechanisms of conditionality remain vague). The problem with both programs is their small scope,
amounting to a proposed total of about $1.3 billion annually. This means that no one country can expect to get more than a couple
hundred million dollars at most a number that is simply not high enough to have a real impact on the recipients political
calculations. With the sharp increase in GCC funding pledges, the United States and Europe are no longer the only game in town.
Western economic support, however, cannot be measured solely in terms of direct aid. There are loans (including from the IMF and
World Bank), trade benefits (e.g., free trade agreements), and foreign direct investment. Taken together, these can have a decisive
impact on economic recovery. Considering their economic difficulties, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and others cannot do without these
sources of support. If the goal is not just providing economic support, but using such funds to incentivize political reform and

there is a need to coordinate funding across the United

States, EU, as well as international financial institutions and agree
on a set of explicit benchmarks for recipient countries. Elsewhere, I have
democratization, then

proposed a multilateral reform endowment of at least $5 billion that would provide clear incentives to Arab countries to implement
necessary reforms. 110 Ideally, the Gulf could be enlisted in such an effort, but, with the exception of Qatar, the GCC states are
unlikely to support explicit aid conditionality on democracy.

Aid conditionality has worked in the past

Brian Katulis 9, Democracy Promotion in the miDDle east anD the obama aDministration, the century
FounDation, 2009, BE
The fourth priority for the new administration in advancing democracy in the Middle East is developing ways that
the United States can increase the number of positive incentives that encourage countries, particularly those

The Millennium
Challenge Corporation (MCC), which was aimed at promoting
economic growth while putting a greater emphasis on democracy,
human rights, anti-corruption, and better governance, is a model
that the new administration should look to develop and integrate with other
policy tools. The incentives should be significant enough to shape the calculations and decisions of
lacking oil and gas wealth, to promote the rule of law and suppress corruption.

governments in the region. The MCC should increase its minimum standards on democracy for providing assistance
and not narrowly focus on governance or suppression of corruption. The assessment of whether a regime is ruling
justlyincluding indicators on civil liberties, political rights, public voice and accountability, government
effectiveness, rule of law, and control of corruptionshould become the central criterion for evaluating the
eligibility of countries for assistance.

The US is keythe plan is perceived as a major policy overhaul that

democracy can be supported in good faith by the USkey to US
interests.
Hamid and Mandaville 13,
SHADI HAMID AND PETER MANDAVILLE Shadi Hamid is a correspondent for The Atlantic, the director of research at
the Brookings Doha Center, and a fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy. Peter Mandaville is a professor
of public and international affairs at George Mason University and a former member of the State Departments
policy-planning staff, Bringing the United States Back into the Middle East, The Washington Quarterly, Center for
Strategic and International Studies, 2013, BE
With the Arab revolts, senior U.S. officials repeatedly argued that this was not about America, emphasizing instead
the indigenous nature of the uprisings. After the fall of Mubarak, President Obama declared, Its not America that
put people into the streets of Tunis and Cairo, 6 while Secretary Clinton remarked, These revolutions are not ours.
They are not by us, for us, or against us. 7 There was concern that too much U.S. involvement went against the
very spirit of what was occurring in these countries. That may have been true, but doing less during the Arab
uprisingsthere was, after all, no fundamental reorientation of U.S. policymeant that pre - Arab Spring policies
remained largely intact, particularly in Jordan, Morocco, and the Gulf countries. In the transitional countriesTunisia,
Egypt, Libya, and Yementhe United States pledged only a limited amount of new aid, despite deteriorating
economies. For the most part, the administration continued business as usual even as it promised to back
democratic transformations across the region. In Egypt, such pronouncements rang hollow; Washington watched
quietly while the Morsi government grew increasingly inept and authoritarian. And when the military subsequently
deposed the democratically - elected Morsi, the United States expressed only mild criticism, refusing to call what
happened a coup. Secretary of State John Kerry even claimed that Egypts generals were restoring democracy,
a bizarre statement given the violent crackdown on opposition forces. 8 These early years of the Arab uprisings tell
a story that is largely at odds with the predominant narrative that external actors can and should play only a quiet,

revolutionsin Egypt, Libya,

Yemen, and Syria (as well as the one near - revolution in Bahrain)has been notable for
the important, even decisive role of international actors. In Egypt, as the
supporting role. With the exception of Tunisia, each of the

crowds swelled in Tahrir Square, senior U.S. officials exerted pressure on the military to refrain from
using force against protesters. In Libya, the NATO operation provided a protective umbrella for the
rebel forces, allowing them to defeat Muammar Qaddafis army. Meanwhile, the uprising in Bahrain was
quashed when Saudi and Emirati forces arrived to crush the protests led by the countrys majority Shia population. In Yemen, the removal of president Ali Abdullah Saleh was facilitated through
negotiations involving Saudi Arabia, the United States, and other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
nations. And Russias unfailing support of the Syrian regime has ensured the UNs inability to take any
meaningful action as it slaughters its own citizens. Iran and Hezbollah have helped Assad check rebel
advances on the ground, while aid from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Western nations has been vital in
sustaining the rebellion. It is also worth noting that perceptions of U.S. influence and leverage in the
Arab world very much depend on the preconceptions of whoever happens to be watching. It may be
the case that U.S. influence has diminished in purely objective terms, but that does not mean that all

If the United States acts as if it has diminished

influence, then it becomes a self - fulfilling prophecy. Contrary to declinist
assumptions, the United States does, in fact, have more leverage in the Middle
East than many U.S. policymakers assume. For example, former NSC director Steven Simon argues
that the United States can do very little to pressure Egypts generals, but the fact remains that there is simply no
replacement for the crucial spare parts and equipment that the
United States provides, not to mention the thickness of military - to
- military relations built up over decades. When it comes to the Gulf, the threat of Iran, while
Arabs will or must believe it.

often overstated, continues to loom large, but in a way that affirms U.S. leverage. Instead of viewing the United States as dependent
on the Gulf, the reverse is more accurate, especially now with U.S. domestic energy production rapidly expanding. Meanwhile

, in

the face of Iranian aggression, the Gulf states have never been
more dependent on U.S. security provisions including advanced
weaponry and efforts at coordinating regional missile defense. As long as

the Iranian threat festers, the United States has an opportunity, one which will almost certainly diminish if Iran gives up its nuclear
ambitions and reconciles with the West. In other words, Iran currently provides an opening for the United States to adopt a more
comprehensive approach of linking what have until now been treated as discrete concernssecurity and reform. Developing a New

Anything short of a major policy

overhaulincluding tinkering around the margins with well - intentioned but small - scale initiativeswill not
make much of a difference. (In contrast, decisive action, as in Libya, drove favorability
Strategy Arab attitudes toward the United States are inelastic.

ratings for the United States to all - time regional highs, putting Libyans on par with Australian and
Israeli attitudes. 9 )

Underview:
Presume aff a) 7-13 rebuttal time skew b) 60% neg bias on a sample size of
over 32,000 rounds. Stats prove that generic args against time skew are not
responsive, and all args from the neg claiming abuse must be weighed
against this structural disadvantage otherwise it is just leveling the playing
field and I meet. Prefer theoretical reasons to presume since even if there is
substantive reasons to presume neg you still lean to a side that was most
structurally disadvantaged because they did the better debating in the case
of a tie. And permissibility affirms since the aff won 60% more rounds on the
2012 topic questioning permissibility.
I should get an RVI because
1. Time skew: I waste time reading theory if I cant even win off of it. Key to
fairness because debaters should get equal chance to generate offense
2. Deter friv theory: I should be able to win so that friv theory no longer
occurs Key to educates: judge educates us to
3. It should be a two way street, or it wont be reciprocal and its unfair for
him/her to have a route to the ballot when I dont
4. Strat skew: I cant win off of theory while they can, they can read as many
shells as they want and I have to respond, but I cant win. K2F
5. Strat skew 2: Neg can run T and theory and win, while I can only run
theory and win. I should get RVI because of this fairness skew.
I will concede any reasonable advocacy in CX