[G.R. No. 128540.

April 15, 1998]

EDUARDO CUISON, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The constitutional proscription of double jeopardy is
not violated by a Court of Appeals order requiring the
trial court to promulgate a decision sentencing the
accused to imprisonment even if, earlier, the same
decision has been promulgated in regard only to the
payment of the modified civil indemnity arising from
the same criminal act. Otherwise stated, the
promulgation of only one part of the decision, i.e., the
liability for civil indemnity, is not a bar to the
subsequent promulgation of the other part, the
imposition of the criminal accountability.
The Case
This is the gist of this Courts resolution of the petition
for review on certiorari , assailing the November 5,
1996 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals[2] in CA-GR SP
No. 41096. The dispositive portion of the said Decision,
which set aside the April 12, 1996 Resolution[3] of the
Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch
39,[4] reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Resolution
dated April 12, 1996 of the respondent Judge is
hereby SET ASIDE and he is ordered to set anew the
promulgation of the decision of the Court of Appeals
affirming the judgment of conviction and sentencing
the accused to serve imprisonment for the duration
stated in the decision of the said respondent Court
dated February 7, 1989. The order for the payment of
the civil liabilities has been promulgated earlier.
SO ORDERED.[5]
The RTC Resolution, set aside by the Court of Appeals,
disposed:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations,
the Court finds that the Urgent Motion to Set Aside
Promulgation filed by the accused thru counsel, is
meritorious and accordingly, the same is hereby
granted.
The Facts
The undisputed facts of this case, as narrated by the
Court of Appeals, are reproduced below:
On February 7, 1989, respondent Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan (Branch 39)
rendered a Joint Decision in Criminal Cases Nos. L-3553

and L-3554, the dispositive portion of which is as

follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding
accused Eduardo Cuison guilty of the crime of double
homicide, beyond reasonable doubt and therefore
sentences him to suffer imprisonment from 6 years and
1 day of [p]rision [m]ayor as [m]inimum to 12 years
and 1 day of [r]eclusion [t]emporal as [m]aximum, for
each offense, with the accessories provided by law and
to pay the costs. Accused is also ordered to indemnify
the heirs of Rafael Sapigao the amount of P30,000.00
and the heirs of Rulo Castro also the amount
of P30,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the said decision
was affirmed with the modification that the civil
indemnity was increased to P50,000.00. The dispositive
portion of said Decision of this Court dated July 30,
1991 reads:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the joint decision appealed
from is hereby MODIFIED by ordering accused Eduardo
Cuison to indemnify the heirs of Rafael Sapigao the
amount of P50,000.00 and the heirs of Rulo Castro also
the amount of P50,000.00 without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.
The accused elevated the decision on a petition for
review docketed as G.R. Nos. 108985-86 but the
Supreme Court denied the said petition on December
1, 1993.
The case was remanded to the Regional Trial Court of
Pangasinan (Br. 39) for promulgation of the
decision. However, respondent Judge promulgated [on
April 4, 1995] the decision of [the Court of Appeals]
only with respect to the modified civil liability of the
accused but did not commit the accused to jail to
commence service of his sentence.
Asst. City Prosecutor Abraham L. Ramos II reported the
matter to the Solicitor General and requested that a
motion for clarification be filed with this Court to clarify
the decision dated July 30, 1991. On July 7, 1995, the
Solicitor General filed a Motion to Clarify Decision. On
August 17, 1995, [the Court of Appeals] rendered a
Resolution which states in pertinent portions thereof:
In the dispositive portion of this Courts decision, We
simply modified the appealed decision of the court a
quo in one respect only - the increase of the indemnity
to be paid by the appellant to the heirs of the victims
from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00 as ruled in various
cases including that cited in Our decision, People vs.
Sison, 189 SCRA 643, 646.

In view of the foregoing, it is ineluctable that the

penalty imposed by the lower court was not touched on
at all by this Court especially in the light of [o]ur
[o]bservation in the said decision, as follows:
After a careful review of the evidence on records, this
Court entertains no doubt as to the participation of the
accused-appellant in the shooting of Sapigao and Rulo
Castro. The court a quohas expressed the following
findings in its decision, to which findings this Court
accords the great weight and respect such findings of
the trial court are entitled to:
Conspiracy . . . was proven by the following
circumstances:
xxx xxx xxx
The following circumstances showing the sequence of
events, the mode or manner in which the offenses
were perpetrated taken together indicated that the
assailants cooperated and helped each other in the
attainment of the same aim. (Memorandum, pp. 20-21)
(CA Decision, pp. 14-16; Rollo, pp. 127-129)
Acting on the afore-cited motion to clarify decision, this
Court hereby declares that this Court had affirmed the
decision of the court a quo with regard to the penalty
of imprisonment imposed in the said trial courts
decision.
Respondent Judge then set the promulgation of the
decision anew. The accused, however, filed a Motion to
Set Aside Promulgation on the following grounds:
1. That the judgment in said case was already
promulgated on 4 April 1995 and therefore there is
nothing to promulgate anymore.
2. To pursue with [sic] the scheduled promulgation will
violate the accuseds constitutional right against
jeopardy.
In a Resolution dated April 12, 1996, the respondent
Judge granted the aforestated motion holding:
Now, the question is: May the resolution of the
Honorable Court of Appeals promulgated on 17 August
1995 which clarified the dispositive portion of its
original decision, be considered as an amendment,
alteration or modification of the decision? Here, we
must not forget the basic rule that in the execution of
the judgment, it is the dispositive portion of the
decision which controls. We cannot also forget that, as
already mentioned above, we have already
promulgated the said decision by reading to the
accused the dispositive portion, and that to the best of
our knowledge, he had already complied therewith by
paying the damages which were awarded. It may be
relevant at this point in time, to cite the decision of the
Honorable Supreme Court in the case of Heirs of

George Bofill vs. Court of Appeals, 237 SCRA

393 that
Had the Court of Appeals been more accurate and
precise in quoting data from the records, it would have
arrived at the right conclusion
The Honorable Court of Appeals cited the decision of
the Honorable Supreme Court in the case of Partola-Jo
vs. CA, 216 SCRA 692, that:
Where there is an ambiguity caused by an omission or
mistake in the dispositive portion of the decision,
the Supreme Court may clarify such ambiguity by an
amendment even after the judgment has become
final. (emphasis supplied)
The above decision is in consonance with the decision
of the Honorable Supreme Court in the case of Buan
vs. Court of Appeal, et al., 235 SCRA 424 wherein
the Supreme Court said:
x x x Thus the respondent Court stated, it is undisputed
that the Decision of the Court of Appeals x x x had
become final and executory. Taken in this light the
respondent court apparently did not err in leaving the
issue unresolved, a final decision being unreviewable
and conclusive.
But judging from the facts presented by this case, it is
beyond doubt that serious injustice will be committed if
strict adherence to procedural rules were to be
followed. It should be remembered that rules of
procedure are but mere tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice, such that when rigid application
of the rules would tend to frustrate rather than
promote substantial justice, this Court is
empowered to suspend its operation. (emphasis
supplied)
It would seem from the above pronouncements of the
Honorable Supreme Court therefore, that it may
suspend the operation of the rules of procedure
by virtue of its rule-making power. Certainly if the
Honorable Supreme Court has the power to promulgate
the Rules of Court, then it has the power
to suspend its operation in order to promote
substantial justice. Unquestionably, however, the
Honorable Court of Appeals does not have that
rule[-] making authority. Therefore it may not suspend
the operation of the Rules of Court.
Moreover, the above discussion refers to civil
cases. Will the same doctrines apply to criminal cases
as in the cases before us? The accused thru his
counsels raised the issues of the effect of a
promulgation already once made arguing in the
process that another promulgation can no longer be
legally feasible if the constitutional right of the accused
against double jeopardy will not be violated.

We are not unmindful of the injunction upon lower

courts, which the Honorable Supreme Court has
imposed, i.e., to accept with modesty the orders and
decisions of the appellate courts. However, we feel that
we must equate this with another injunction, that trial
judges must keep abreast with the jurisprudence or run
the risk of being found to be grossly ignorant of the
law. In short, this Court finds itself in the horns of a
dilemma. Since the very jurisprudential authority relied
upon by the Honorable [Court] of Appeals refers to the
power of the Supreme Court to clarify an ambiguity,
may not this Court therefore conclude that the
Honorable Court of Appeals does not have the power to
clarify the dispositive portion of the decision which has
not only become final, but has already been previously
promulgated?
Finally, it appears to this Court that there is validity to
the observation made by counsel for the accused in
paragraph 4 of their motion which we quote:
4. It appears, therefore, that there is nothing to
promulgate as the same had already been
promulgated on April 4, 1995. Besides, there is,
likewise, nothing to promulgate in the Court of Appeals
Resolution dated February 2, 1996 and much less in
the alluded August 17, 1995 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals.
Indeed, the said Resolution did not authorize nor did it
direct this Court to re-promulgate the Decision.
On June 28, 1996, the Solicitor General, representing
the People of the Philippines, filed [before the Court of
Appeals a] petition
for certiorari and mandamus contending that the
respondent Judge seriously erred and gravely abused
his discretion in refusing to execute the penalty of
imprisonment in spite [the Court of Appeals] Decision
of July 30, 1991 and Resolution of August 17, 1995. He
prays that the Order dated April 12, 1996 of
respondent Judge be nullified and the penalty of
imprisonment rendered against the accused be
enforced.[6]
Ruling of the Appellate Court
In ruling for the People, the Court of Appeals
ratiocinated in this way:
Obviously, respondent Judge was of the belief that the
penalty of imprisonment was not affirmed by [the
Court of Appeals] although it increased the civil liability
from P30,000.00 toP50,000.00. He failed to recognize
the fact that the only modification made by [the Court
of Appeals] on the decision [was] to increase the civil
liability, which would not have been imposed if the
accused was not found guilty of the charge. Had he
looked carefully into the text of the decision he would
have found that [the Court of Appeals] affirmed the

decision of conviction, as borne out by the following

portions of said decision:
After a careful review of the evidence on record, this
Court entertains no doubt as to the participation of the
accused-appellant in the shooting of Sapigao and Rulo
Castro.The Court a quo has expressed the following
findings in its decision, to which findings this Court
accords the great weight and respect such findings of
the trial court are entitled to:
Conspiracy ... was proven by the following
circumstances:
1. Accused Eduardo Cuison was seen together
occupying the same table with Sgt. Bustarde and Sgt.
Castro drinking beer at the terrace upon the arrival of
Leo Petete and his companions;
2. They left the terrace of the Tropical Hut about 10 to
15 minutes after the arrival of Rulo Castro, Rafael
Sapigao, Leo Petete and Agardo Reyes and boarded the
same yellow car owned and driven by accused Eduardo
Cuison.
3. Accused Eduardo Cuison was seen by Ronald Ligayo,
a resident of Poblacion, Bugallon, Pangasinan, a
disinterested witness in the evening of May 27, 1986
infront (sic) of the house of said accused Eduardo
Cuison in Poblacion, Bugallon, Pangasinan. Accused
Eduardo Cuison alighted from his car, proceeded to his
house and after coming out of his house was seen
holding a 45 (sic) caliber and a carbine pistol. Eduardo
Cuison called for his brother Warling to whom he
handed the carbine pistol and received by the latter.
Eduardo Cuison sent Domy Cuison to call for Bot
Cuison. When Bot Cuison arrived, he, Warling, Domy,
Eduardo Cuison and two others inside the car
proceeded towards the north. Obviously, these two
were Sgt. Castro and Sgt. Bustarde.
4. Upon arrival of accused Eduardo Cuison, Bot Cuison,
Warling Cuison, Domy Cuison, Sgt. Bustarde and Sgt.
Castro at the driveway of the Tropical Hut on board the
car of accused Eduardo Cuison, each of them with the
use of their respective firearms simultaneously fired
several shots in the air;
5. Sgt. Castro and Sgt. Bustarde pulled and poked their
guns to [sic] Sapigao. Then Sgt. Castro fired the fatal
shot to [sic] Sapigao;
6. After Sapigao fell down, Sgt. Castro, Warling Cuison,
Eduardo Cuison, Bot and Domy Cuison turned at [sic]
Sapigao obviously to see to it and make sure Sapigao
was already dead;
7. After ascertaining that Sapigao was shot dead,
accused Eduardo Cuison called for Rulo Castro to come
outside the restaurant and when Rulo Castro emerged

at the door, accused Eduardo Cuison, Warling Cuison,

Bot Cuison, Domy Cuison and Sgt. Bustarde
simultaneously pointed their guns and shot at Rulo
Castro hitting the latter;

Resolution dated August 17, 1995 which categorically

stated that the court affirmed the decision of the
respondent court with respect to the penalty of
imprisonment imposed upon the accused.

8. Accused Eduardo Cuison and Warling Cuison are

brothers and uncles of Bot and Domy Cuison. Eduardo
Cuison being a kagawad enjoyed moral influence upon
his brother Warling and his two nephews Bot and
Domy;

This clarification is not an amendment, modification,

correction or alteration to an already final decision. It is
conceded that such cannot be done anymore. The
Court of Appeals simply stated in categorical terms
what it obviously meant in its decision - - that the
conviction of the accused is affirmed with the
modification that the civil liability is increased. The
dispositive portion of the decision may not have used
the exact words but a reading of the decision can lead
to no other conclusion.

9. Sgts. Bustarde and Castro and Kagawad Cuison

knew each other before the incident;
10.After shooting the victims to death, the accused
Cuisons went away from the scene of the crime on
board the same car.
The following circumstances showing the sequence of
events, the mode o[r] manner in which the offenses
were perpetrated taken together indicated that the
assailants cooperated and helped each other in the
attainment of the same aim. (Memorandum, pp. 20-21)
As held by the Supreme Court in the case of People vs.
Colman, et al. 55 O.G. 2392 (cited in Regalado,
Remedial Law Compendium, 88 ed., Vol. 2, p. 560),
Conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence
of the acts charged, but may and generally must be
proved by a number of indefinite acts, conditions and
circumstances which vary according to the purpose to
be accomplished. If it be proved that two or more
persons aimed by their acts towards the
accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each
doing a part so that their acts, though apparently
independent, were in fact connected and cooperative,
indicating a closeness of personal association and a
concurrence of sentiment, a conspiracy may be
inferred though no actual meeting among them for
concerted means is proved (People vs. Colman, et. al.,
55 O.G. 2393).
In the appealed decision, the trial court had ordered
the accused-appellant to indemnify the heirs of Rafael
Sapigao [in] the amount of P30,000.00 and to [sic] the
heirs of Rulo Castro also the amount of P30,000.00
(Decision, p. 24). In accordance with the new policy of
the Supreme Court on this matter, the above-specified
amount ofP30,000.00 should be increased
to P50,000.00 (People vs. Sison, 189 SCRA 643, 646).
It is absurd to conclude that [the Court of Appeals]
increased the civil liability in accordance with new
rulings of the Supreme Court without finding that the
accused [was] guilty of the offense of homicide. Thus,
the promulgation of the civil liability only and omission
of the criminal liability is an error.
Furthermore, [the Court of Appeals] has clarified the
ambiguity in the dispositive portion through its

It certainly would be ridiculous to allow the accused to

go scot-free after paying the heirs the civil indemnity
imposed by the Court for his participation in the act of
killing the two (2) victims in these cases, because of a
wrong interpretation of a decision.[7]'
Hence, this appeal.[8]
The Issues
In this appeal, Petitioner Eduardo Cuison raises the
following assignment of errors:
I. The Respondent Court seriously erred and gravely
abused its discretion in not holding that the Solicitor
General failed to establish the requisites for the
issuance of the extraordinary writ of certiorari .
II. The Respondent Court seriously erred and gravely
abused its discretion in not holding that the Solicitor
General failed to show the existence of the elements
for the issuance of a Writ of Mandamus.
III. The Respondent Court seriously erred and gravely
abused its discretion in not holding that the
promulgation of April 4, 1995 cannot be modified, over
objection of the accused.
IV. The Respondent Court seriously erred and gravely
abused its discretion in not holding that the filing of the
Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus dated June 28,
1995 by the Solicitor General violates the constitutional
right of the accused against double jeopardy.
V. The Respondent Court seriously erred and gravely
abused its discretion in deciding as it did and in
denying herein petitioners motion for reconsideration.[9]
Simply put, petitioner raises the following issues: (1)
whether the writs of certiorari and mandamus were
properly issued by the Court of Appeals, and (2)
whether petitioners right against double jeopardy was
violated.
The Courts Ruling

The petition is utterly unmeritorious.

First Issue: Certiorari and Mandamus Justified
A petition for certiorari is allowed under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, provided the following requisites are
present: (1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a
board or an officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions; (2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.[10] Grave abuse of discretion x x x implies such
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, in other words
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and
it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law.[11]
Petitioner points out that the solicitor generals petition
for certiorari and mandamus before the Court of
Appeals failed to show grave abuse of discretion in the
assailed April 12, 1996 Resolution of the trial court. In
the said Resolution, the trial court declined to order the
incarceration of petitioner and, thus, effectively refused
to promulgate the August 17, 1995 CA Decision which,
in turn, clarified that the CAs earlier Decision dated July
30, 1991 merely increased the amount of indemnity
but did not delete the penalty of imprisonment. In
justifying its said Order, the trial court insisted that it
had already promulgated the July 30, 1991 CA Decision
when it ordered petitioner to pay the increased amount
of indemnity. Petitioner argues that the trial courts
Order, far from being whimsical, capricious or
malevolent, [was] valid and substantial, to say the
least, and the impugned [R]esolution was issued after
a careful deliberation and weighing of the facts, issues
and points of applicable law.[12]
We disagree. While its language may have been a little
faulty, it is still quite obvious that the Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial courts Decision convicting Petitioner
Eduardo Cuison of double homicide. The dispositive
portion of the CA Decision, therefore, cannot be
construed to mean that the appellate court merely
imposed an indemnity and deleted the penalty of
imprisonment. The dispositive portion of the Court of
Appeals Decision in no way communicated that the
appealed Decision of the trial court was modified only
in regard to the amount of indemnity. Nowhere could it
be gleaned that the penalty of imprisonment was
deleted. In fact, the CA Decision and the entire records
of this case contain no legal or factual basis for
acquitting petitioner or dismissing the criminal cases
against him.

In granting petitioners motion, the trial court judge

capriciously and arbitrarily decided not to promulgate
the Court of Appeals July 30, 1991 Decision.[13] He had
no discretion to refuse; his refusal was thus a glaring
transgression of his jurisdiction.
We must also emphasize that we dismissed the petition
questioning the Court of Appeals July 30, 1991
Decision, thereby affirming the conviction of
petitioner. The trial courts assailed April 12, 1996
Resolution was therefore tantamount to overruling a
judicial pronouncement of the highest Court of the land
affirming the judgment of conviction of respondent
Court and unmistakably a very grave abuse of
discretion.[14]
Manifestly erroneous then is the trial judges
justification that he has previously promulgated the
Court of Appeals Decision on April 4, 1995. As already
stated, the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals
was imprisonment plus a higher amount of civil
indemnity. In ordering only the payment of the
indemnity, the trial court failed to execute the CA
Decision in its entirety.Notwithstanding the subsequent
CA Decision clarifying -- and this Courts dismissal of
the petition questioning -- the said earlier CA Decision,
the trial court still adamantly refused to do so.The
persistent refusal of the trial court is a clear display of
grave abuse of discretion.
We find misleading the claim of petitioner that the
Court of Appeals itself acknowledged that the latters
July 30, 1991 Decision was ambiguous and obscure.
[15]
Such claim is bereft of factual basis. Nowhere in its
Resolution[16] did the CA so describe its previous
Decision. It merely restated the import of its July 30,
1991 Decision. Evidently, this was either
misunderstood or distorted by the trial court, which
stated that it is ineluctable that the penalty imposed by
the lower court was not touched on at all by [the Court
of Appeals] x x x.[17]
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for
issuing a writ of mandamus, in view of the trial courts
refusal to perform its ministerial duty of promulgating
the appellate courts Decision in its entirety. Under
Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, a petition
for mandamus is warranted [w]hen any tribunal,
corporation, board, or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting
from an office, trust, or station x x x. [18] Obedience to a
superior courts order is a ministerial duty of lower
courts.
Lastly, petitioner contends that the petition
for certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals was
improper, because the People had not filed a motion
for reconsideration of the assailed trial court Order.
[19]
This contention is bereft of merit. A motion for

reconsideration need not precede a petition

for certiorari where the questioned resolution was a
patent nullity, as in this case.[20]
Second Issue: Promulgation of Conviction

We must stress that Respondent Courts questioned

Decision did not modify or amend its July 30, 1991
Decision. It merely ordered the promulgation of the
judgment of conviction and the full execution of the
penalty it had earlier imposed on petitioner.

Not Barred by Double Jeopardy

Cases Cited Not Applicable

Petitioner submits that the trial courts promulgation of

the CA Decision on April 4, 1995 cannot be set aside
and a second promulgation be ordered[21] because to
do so would contravene the prohibition against double
jeopardy.[22] He contends that the judgment as
promulgated on April 4, 1995 has become final[23] and
that courts have thus lost jurisdiction over the case. [24]

People vs. Hernando, Ramos vs. Hodges and Republic

vs. Court of Appeals, cited by petitioner, are
not applicable because they refer either to the lower
courts proceeding that is not void or to errors of
judgment, not to lack or excess or abuse of
jurisdiction. Thus, in People vs. Hernando,[30] the Court
ruled that the questioned proceedings of the court a
quo were not an absolute nullity as to render the
judgment of acquittal null and void, considering that
the prosecution was not denied due process. In Ramos
vs. Hodges[31] the Court found that the trial judges
erroneous conclusion merely constituted errors of fact
or of law, and not of jurisdiction. Lastly, in Republic vs.
Court of Appeals[32] the Court held that the lower court
committed merely an error of judgment and not an
error of jurisdiction as there was no clear showing [that
it] exercised its power in [an] arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or
that its act was so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion or a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act in contemplation of law.

To substantiate a claim of double jeopardy, the

following must be proven:
x x x (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to
the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been
validly terminated; (3) the second jeopardy must be for
the same offense, or the second offense includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the first
information, or is an attempt to commit the same or is
a frustration thereof (citations omitted).
And legal jeopardy attaches only: (a) upon a valid
indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after
arraignment; (d) [when] a valid plea [has] been
entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without the express consent of the accused
(citation omitted).[25]
Petitioner contends that the promulgation by Judge
Ramos on April 4, 1995 of the Respondent Courts
decision of June 30, 1991 by reading its dispositive
portion has effectively terminated the criminal cases
against the petitioner x x x.[26] In other words,
petitioner claims that the first jeopardy attached at
that point.
The Court is not persuaded. As a rule, a criminal
prosecution includes a civil action for the recovery of
indemnity.[27] Hence, a decision in such case disposes
of both the criminal as well as the civil liabilities of an
accused. Here, trial court promulgated only the civil
aspect of the case, but not the criminal.
As earlier observed, the promulgation of the CA
Decision was not complete. In fact and in truth, the
promulgation was not merely incomplete; it was also
void. In excess of its jurisdiction, the trial judge
rendered a substantially incomplete promulgation on
April 4, 1995, and he repeated his mistake in his April
12, 1996 Order. We emphasize that grave abuse of
discretion rendered the aforementioned act of the trial
court void.[28] Since the criminal cases have not yet
been terminated, the first jeopardy has not yet
attached. Hence, double jeopardy cannot prosper as a
defense.[29]

Epilogue
This Court takes this occasion to remind members of
the bench to be precise in their ponencias, most
especially in the dispositions thereof. Accuracy and
clarity in substance and in language are revered
objectives in decision-making.
Having said that, we also lament the trial courts
convoluted attempt at sophistry, which obviously
enabled the petitioner to delay the service of his
imprisonment and to unnecessarily clog the dockets of
this Court and of the Court of Appeals. His Honors
expressed desire to accept with modesty the orders
and decisions of the appellate court was, in truth and
in fact, merely a sarcastic prelude to his veiled
rejection of the superior courts order modifying his
earlier decision. His sophomoric justification of his
refusal to obey for fear of being found to be grossly
ignorant of the law does not deserve one whit of
sympathy from this Court. Lady Justice may be
blindfolded but she is neither blind nor naive. She can
distinguish chicanery from wisdom, fallacious
argument from common sense.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the
assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED. Double costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 127772. March 22, 2001]

ROBERTO P. ALMARIO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, HON. FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR.,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND RIZAL
COMMERCIAL BANKING CORP., respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This appeal by certiorari seeks to set aside the
resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated November
21, 1996[1] and of January 7, 1997,[2] in CA-G.R. No. SP42312, which denied the petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction
instituted by petitioner against the Hon. Florentino A.
Tuason, Jr., in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch
139, Regional Trial Court of Makati City, the Rizal
Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC), and the
People of the Philippines.[3] Involved in said petition
were the orders of Judge Jaime D. Discaya and Judge
Tuason dated October 25, 1995[4] and April 11, 1996,
[5]
respectively, issued in Criminal Cases Nos. 91-676162 which petitioner claimed were violative of his
constitutional right against double jeopardy but which
respondent appellate court upheld.
The factual antecedents in these cases, as culled by
the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
Petitioner is one of the accused in Criminal Case No.
91-6761, for estafa thru falsification of public
document, and Criminal Case No. 91-6762, for estafa,
with respondent RCBC as the offended party in both
cases.
The informations were filed on October 22, 1992. After
petitioners arraignment on March 18, 1992, pre-trial
was held, which was terminated on October 21,
1994. Thereafter, the cases were scheduled for
continuous trial in December 1994, and in January and
February 1995, but the hearings were cancelled
because the Presiding Judge of the court was elevated
to this Court and no trial judge was immediately
appointed/detailed thereto.
The hearing set for June 21, 1995, was postponed for
lack of proof of notice to all the accused and their
counsel. The hearing on July 17, 1995, upon request of
private prosecutor, and without objection on the part of
petitioners counsel, postponed to July 24,
1995. However, for lack of proof of service of notice
upon petitioners three co-accused, the hearing set for
July 24, 1995, was likewise cancelled and the cases
were reset for trial on September 8 and 25, 1995.

On September 8, 1995, private complainant failed to

appear despite due notice. Hence, upon motion of
petitioners counsel, respondent court issued the
following order:
When this case was called for hearing, private
complainant is not in Court despite notice. Atty.
Alabastro, counsel for accused Roberto Almario, moved
that the case against the latter be dismissed for failure
to prosecute and considering that accused is entitled to
a speedy trial.
WHEREFORE, the case against accused Roberto
Almario is hereby dismissed. With respect to accused
Spouses Susencio and Guillerma Cruz and Dante
Duldulao, 1st warrant be issued for their arrest.
SO ORDERED.
Upon motion of the private prosecutor and despite the
opposition of petitioner, respondent court in its Order
dated October 25, 1995, reconsidered the Order of
September 8, 1995. The pertinent portion of said order
reads as follows:
In Hipolito vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 108478-79,
Feb. 21, 1993) the Supreme Court held that the right of
the accused to a speedy trial is deemed violated only
when the proceedings is attended by vexations,
capricious and oppressive delays, or when unjustified
postponements of the trial are asked for and secured,
or when without cause or unjustifiable motive, a long
period of time is allowed to (e) lapse without the party
having his case tried. At least this right is relative,
taking into (the) account the circumstances of each
case.
There has been no vexations, capricious and
oppressive delays, or unjustified postponements of the
trial, or a long time is allowed to (e) lapse without the
party having his case tried which would constitute,
according to the above case, violation of the right of
the accused to speedy trial. After arraignment of the
accused, the pre-trial was set and the same was
ordered terminated on October 25, 1994. On June 21,
1995, the case was set for initial presentation of
evidence of the proof of service of the notices to the
accused and their respective counsels. On July 17,
1995, counsel for the accused did not interpose
objection to private prosecutors motion to postpone
due to absence of witnesses. On July 24, 1995, the trial
could not proceed as, being a joint trial of three
criminal cases, the three other accused were not
present. There were only three settings from the date
of termination of the pre-trial for the prosecution to
present evidence and the same were postponed with
valid reasons.
The dismissal in the Order dated September 8, 1995,
did not result in the acquittal of the accused since the
right of the accused to speedy trial has not been

violated, and its dismissal having been made upon the

motion of the accused there is no double jeopardy.

Section 7, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court

provides:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Order dated

September 8, 1995 dismissing the charge/case against
the accused Roberto Almario is reconsidered and set
aside.

SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy.

When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or
the case against him dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent by a court of
competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or
information or other formal charge sufficient in form
and substance to sustain a conviction and after the
accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or
acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case
shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense
charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or
frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily
includes or is necessarily included in the offense
charged in the former complaint or information.

SO ORDERED.
Petitioner sought a reconsideration of the above
order. Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration dated
November 9, 1995, respondent Judge issued his
assailed Order of April 11, 1996, the dispositive portion
of which reads as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Motion for
Reconsideration dated 9 November 1995 is hereby
denied for lack of merit considering that, based on the
foregoing facts, the proceedings in this case have not
been prolonged unreasonably nor were there
oppressive delays and unjustified postponements in
violation of the Accuseds constitutional right to speedy
trial.
SO ORDERED.[6]
Aggrieved by the foregoing order, petitioner filed
before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction
against the presiding judge of Branch 139 of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, RCBC and the
People of the Philippines. In a resolution dated
November 21, 1996, respondent appellate court denied
the petition due course and dismissed it for lack of
merit. Petitioners motion to reconsider it was likewise
denied for lack of merit in a resolution dated January 7,
1997.
Before us, petitioner maintains that the appellate court
erred in sustaining the trial court which, in turn, had
gravely abused its discretion, amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, when it reconsidered the order which
dismissed the criminal cases against him. Petitioner
asserts that this reversal was a violation of the doctrine
of double jeopardy, as the criminal cases were initially
dismissed for an alleged violation of petitioners
constitutional right to a speedy trial.[7]
The issue for resolution is whether, in petitioners cases,
double jeopardy had set in so that petitioners
constitutional right against such jeopardy had been
violated.
Article III, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished
by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal
under either shall constitute a bar to another
prosecution for the same act.

xxx
Clearly, jeopardy attaches only (1) upon a valid
indictment, (2) before a competent court, (3) after
arraignment, (4) when a valid plea has been entered,
and (5) when the defendant was convicted or
acquitted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without the express consent of the
accused.[8]
In the cases at bar, the order of dismissal based on a
violation of the right to speedy trial was made upon
motion by counsel for petitioner before the trial
court. It was made at the instance of the accused
before the trial court, and with his express
consent. Generally, the dismissal of a criminal case
resulting in acquittal made with the express consent of
the accused or upon his own motion will not place the
accused in double jeopardy. However, this rule admits
of two exceptions, namely: insufficiency of evidence
and denial of the right to speedy trial.[9] Double
jeopardy may attach when the proceedings have been
prolonged unreasonably, in violation of the accuseds
right to speedy trial.[10]
Here we must inquire whether there was unreasonable
delay in the conduct of the trial so that violation of the
right to speedy trial of the accused, herein petitioner,
resulted. For it must be recalled that in the application
of the constitutional guaranty of the right to speedy
disposition of cases, particular regard must also be
taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each
case.[11] Both the trial court and the appellate court
noted that after pre-trial of petitioners case was
terminated on October 21, 1994, continuous trial was
set in the months of December 1994, and January and
February of 1995. The scheduled hearings, however,
were cancelled when the presiding judge was
promoted to the Court of Appeals, and his successor as
trial judge was not immediately appointed, nor another
judge detailed to his sala.

Records show that on June 21, 1995, hearing was

postponed for lack of proof of notice to the accused
and their counsel. The hearing on July 17, 1995, was
postponed upon motion of the private prosecutor
without objection from petitioners counsel. The hearing
set on July 24, 1995 was reset, despite the presence of
petitioner and his counsel, because of lack of proof of
service of notice to co-accused Dante Duldulao and the
spouses Susencio and Guillerma Cruz.[12]
As observed by respondent appellate court, delay in
the trial was due to circumstances beyond the control
of the parties and of the trial court. The first and third
postponements were clearly justified on the ground of
lack of notice to accused, co-accused, and/or
counsel. Another was made without objection from
petitioners counsel. However, on September 8, 1995,
counsel for petitioner moved for dismissal of this case,
because of the absence of the private prosecutor due
to a severe attack of gout and arthritis, although he
had sent his associate lawyer acceptable to the court.
[13]
All in all, there were only three re-setting of hearing
dates. Thus, after a closer analysis of these successive
events, the trial court realized that the dates of the
hearings were transferred for valid grounds. Hence, the
trial court set aside its initial order and reinstated the
cases against petitioner,[14] which order the appellate
court later sustained.
That there was no unreasonable delay of the
proceedings is apparent from the chronology of the
hearings with the reasons for their postponements or
transfers. Petitioner could not refute the appellate
courts findings that petitioners right to speedy trial had
not been violated. As both the trial and appellate
courts have taken pains to demonstrate, there was no
unreasonable, vexatious and oppressive delay in the
trial. Hence, there was no violation of petitioners right
to speedy trial as there were no unjustified
postponements which had prolonged the trial for
unreasonable lengths of time.[15]
There being no oppressive delay in the proceedings,
and no postponements unjustifiably sought, we concur
with the conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals
that petitioners right to speedy trial had not been
infringed. Where the right of the accused to speedy
trial had not been violated, there was no reason to
support the initial order of dismissal.
It follows that petitioner cannot invoke the
constitutional right against double jeopardy when that
order was reconsidered seasonably.[16] For as
petitioners right to speedy trial was not transgressed,
this exception to the fifth element of double jeopardy
that the defendant was acquitted or convicted, or the
case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without
the express consent of the accused was not met. The
trial courts initial order of dismissal was upon motion of
petitioners counsel, hence made with the express

consent of petitioner. That being the case, despite the

reconsideration of said order, double jeopardy did not
attach. As this Court had occasion to rule in People vs.
Tampal, (244 SCRA 202) reiterated in People vs.
Leviste,[17] where we overturned an order of dismissal
by the trial court predicated on the right to speedy trial
It is true that in an unbroken line of cases, we have
held that the dismissal of cases on the ground of failure
to prosecute is equivalent to an acquittal that would
bar further prosecution of the accused for the same
offense. It must be stressed, however, that these
dismissals were predicated on the clear right of the
accused to speedy trial. These cases are not applicable
to the petition at bench considering that the right of
the private respondents to speedy trial has not been
violated by the State. For this reason, private
respondents cannot invoke their right against double
jeopardy.
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals were thus
not in error when they allowed reinstatement of the
cases against petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the resolutions of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. No. SP-42312, dated November 21, 1996
and January 7, 1997, which upheld the orders of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 139, in Criminal
Cases Nos. 91-6761-62, are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 107125. January 29, 2001]

GEORGE MANANTAN, petitioner, vs. THE COURT
OF APPEALS, SPOUSES MARCELINO NICOLAS and
MARIA NICOLAS, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision dated
January 31, 1992 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 19240, modifying the judgment of the Regional
Trial Court of Santiago, Isabela, Branch 21, in Criminal
Case No. 066. Petitioner George Manantan was
acquitted by the trial court of homicide through
reckless imprudence without a ruling on his civil
liability. On appeal from the civil aspect of the
judgment in Criminal Case No. 066, the appellate court
found petitioner Manantan civilly liable and ordered
him to indemnify private respondents Marcelino Nicolas
and Maria Nicolas P104,400.00 representing loss of
support, P50,000.00 as death indemnity, and moral

damages of P20,000.00 or a total of P174,400.00 for

the death of their son, Ruben Nicolas.
The facts of this case are as follows:
On June 1, 1983, the Provincial Fiscal of Isabela filed an
information charging petitioner Manantan with reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide, allegedly committed
as follows:
That on or about the 25th day of September 1982, in
the municipality of Santiago, province of Isabela,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, being then the driver and
person-in-charge of an automobile bearing Plate No.
NGA-816, willfully and unlawfully drove and operated
the same while along the Daang Maharlika at Barangay
Malvar, in said municipality, in a negligent, careless
and imprudent manner, without due regard to traffic
laws, regulations and ordinances and without taking
the necessary precaution to prevent accident to person
and damage to property, causing by such negligence,
carelessness and imprudence said automobile driven
and operated by him to sideswipe a passenger jeep
bearing plate No. 918-7F driven by Charles Codamon,
thereby causing the said automobile to turn down (sic)
resulting to the death of Ruben Nicolas a passenger of
said automobile.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]
On arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the
charge. Trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecutions evidence, as summarized by the trial
court and adopted by the appellate court, showed that:
[I]n the morning of September 25, 1982, Fiscal Wilfredo
Ambrocio decided to catch shrimps at the irrigation
canal at his farm. He invited the deceased who told
him that they (should) borrow the Ford Fiera of the
accused George Manantan who is also from
Cordon. The deceased went to borrow the Ford Fiera
butsaid that the accused also wanted to (come)
along. So Fiscal Ambrocio and the deceased dropped
by the accused at the Manantan Technical School. They
drank beer there before they proceeded to the farm
using the Toyota Starlet of the accused. At the farm
they consumed one (more) case of beer. At about
12:00 oclock noon they went home. Then at about 2:00
or 3:00 oclock that afternoon, (defense witness Miguel)
Tabangin and (Ruben) Nicolas and the accused
returned to the house of Fiscal Ambrocio with a
duck. They cooked the duck and ate the same with one
more case of beer. They ate and drank until about 8:30
in the evening when the accused invited them to go
bowling. They went to Santiago, Isabela on board the
Toyota Starlet of the accused who drove the
same. They went to the Vicap Bowling Lanes at Mabini,
Santiago, Isabela but unfortunately there was no
vacant alley. While waiting for a vacant alley they

drank one beer each. After waiting for about 40

minutes and still no alley became vacant the accused
invited his companions to go to the LBC Night
Club. They had drinks and took some lady partners at
the LBC. After one hour, they left the LBC and
proceeded to a nearby store where they ate arroz
caldoand then they decided to go home. Again the
accused drove the car. Miguel Tabangin sat with the
accused in the front seat while the deceased and Fiscal
Ambrocio sat at the back seat with the deceased
immediately behind the accused. The accused was
driving at a speed of about 40 kilometers per hour
along the Maharlika Highway at Malvar, Santiago,
Isabela, at the middle portion of the highway (although
according to Charles Cudamon, the car was running at
a speed of 80 to 90 kilometers per hours on [the]
wrong lane of the highway because the car was
overtaking a tricycle) when they met a passenger
jeepney with bright lights on. The accused immediately
tried to swerve the car to the right and move his body
away from the steering wheel but he was not able to
avoid the oncoming vehicle and the two vehicles
collided with each other at the center of the road.
xxx
As a result of the collision the car turned turtle twice
and landed on its top at the side of the highway
immediately at the approach of the street going to the
Flores Clinic while the jeep swerved across the road so
that one half front portion landed on the lane of the car
while the back half portion was at its right lane five
meters away from the point of impact as shown by a
sketch (Exhibit A) prepared by Cudamon the following
morning at the Police Headquarters at the instance of
his lawyer. Fiscal Ambrocio lost consciousness. When
he regained consciousness he was still inside the car
(lying) on his belly with the deceased on top of
him. Ambrocio pushed (away) the deceased and then
he was pulled out of the car by Tabangin. Afterwards,
the deceased who was still unconscious was pulled out
from the car. Both Fiscal Ambrocio and the deceased
were brought to the Flores Clinic. The deceased died
that night (Exhibit B) while Ambrocio suffered only
minor injuries to his head and legs.[2]
The defense version as to the events prior to the
incident was essentially the same as that of the
prosecution, except that defense witness Miguel
Tabangin declared that Manantan did not drink beer
that night. As to the accident, the defense claimed
that:
The accused was driving slowly at the right lane [at]
about 20 inches from the center of the road at about
30 kilometers per hour at the National Highway at
Malvar, Santiago, Isabela, when suddenly a passenger
jeepney with bright lights which was coming from the
opposite direction and running very fast suddenly
swerve(d) to the cars lane and bumped the car which

turned turtle twice and rested on its top at the right

edge of the road while the jeep stopped across the
center of the road as shown by a picture taken after
the incident (Exhibit 1) and a sketch (Exhibit 3) drawn
by the accused during his rebuttal testimony. The car
was hit on the drivers side. As a result of the collision,
the accused and Miguel Tabangin and Fiscal Ambrocio
were injured while Ruben Nicolas died at the Flores
Clinic where they were all brought for treatment.[3]
In its decision dated June 30, 1988, promulgated on
August 4, 1988, the trial court decided Criminal Case
No. 066 in petitioners favor, thus:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing
considerations, the Court finds the accused NOT
GUILTY of the crime charged and hereby acquits him.
SO ORDERED.[4]
On August 8, 1988, private respondents filed their
notice of appeal on the civil aspect of the trial courts
judgment. In their appeal, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
19240, the Nicolas spouses prayed that the decision
appealed from be modified and that appellee be
ordered to pay indemnity and damages.
On January 31, 1992, the appellate court decided CAG.R. CV No. 19240 in favor of the Nicolas spouses,
thus:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED
in that defendant-appellee is hereby held civilly liable
for his negligent and reckless act of driving his car
which was the proximate cause of the vehicular
accident, and sentenced to indemnify plaintiffsappellants in the amount of P174,400.00 for the death
of Ruben Nicolas,
SO ORDERED.[5]
In finding petitioner civilly liable, the court a quo noted
that at the time the accident occurred, Manantan was
in a state of intoxication, due to his having consumed
all in all, a total of at least twelve (12) bottles of
beerbetween 9 a.m. and 11 p.m.[6] It found that
petitioners act of driving while intoxicated was a clear
violation of Section 53 of the Land Transportation and
Traffic Code (R.A. No. 4136)[7] and pursuant to Article
2185 of the Civil Code,[8] a statutory presumption of
negligence existed. It held that petitioners act of
violating the Traffic Code is negligence in itself because
the mishap, which occurred, was the precise injury
sought to be prevented by the regulation.[9]
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the appellate
court in its resolution of August 24, 1992 denied the
motion.

Hence, the present case. Petitioner, in his

memorandum, submits the following issues for our
consideration:
FIRST THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT ACQUITTING
THE PETITIONER OF THE CRIME OF RECKLESS
IMPRUDENCE RESULTING TO HOMICIDE FORECLOSED
ANY FURTHER INQUIRY ON THE ACCUSEDS
(PETITIONERS) NEGLIGENCE OR RECKLESS
IMPRUDENCE BECAUSE BY THEN HE WILL BE PLACED IN
DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND THEREFORE THE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN PASSING UPON THE SAME ISSUE
AGAIN.
SECOND THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT HAVE
JURISDICTION TO AWARD DAMAGES AND INDEMNITY
TO THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS CONSIDERING THAT
THE NON-DECLARATION OF ANY INDEMNITY OR AWARD
OF DAMAGES BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
ISABELA, BRANCH XXI, WAS ITSELF CONSISTENT WITH
THE PETITIONERS ACQUITTAL FOR THE REASON THAT
THE CIVIL ACTION WAS IMPLIEDLY INSTITUTED WITH
THE CRIMINAL ACTION AND THERE WAS NO EXPRESS
WAIVER OF THE CIVIL ACTION OR RESERVATION TO
INSTITUTE IT SEPARATELY BY THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS IN THE TRIAL COURT.
THIRD THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT HAVE
JURISDICTION TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE CASE CAG.R. CV No. 19240 ENTITLED: SPOUSES MARCELINO
NICOLAS AND MARIA NICOLAS v. GEORGE
MANANTAN, AND RENDER THE DECISION SOUGHT TO
BE REVIEWED WHEN THE SAME WAS PROSECUTED BY
THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS IN THEIR PERSONAL
CAPACITIES AND THE FILING FEES NOT HAVING BEEN
PAID, THUS VIOLATING THE MANCHESTER DOCTRINE.
In brief, the issues for our resolution are:
(1) Did the acquittal of petitioner foreclose any further
inquiry by the Court of Appeals as to his negligence or
reckless imprudence?
(2) Did the court a quo err in finding that petitioners
acquittal did not extinguish his civil liability?
(3) Did the appellate court commit a reversible error in
failing to apply the Manchester doctrine to CA-G.R. CV
No. 19240?
On the first issue, petitioner opines that the Court of
Appeals should not have disturbed the findings of the
trial court on the lack of negligence or reckless
imprudence under the guise of determining his civil
liability. He argues that the trial courts finding that he
was neither imprudent nor negligent was the basis for
his acquittal, and not reasonable doubt. He submits
that in finding him liable for indemnity and damages,
the appellate court not only placed his acquittal in
suspicion, but also put him in double jeopardy.

Private respondents contend that while the trial court

found that petitioners guilt had not been proven
beyond reasonable doubt, it did not state in clear and
unequivocal terms that petitioner was not recklessly
imprudent or negligent. Hence, impliedly the trial court
acquitted him on reasonable doubt. Since civil liability
is not extinguished in criminal cases, if the acquittal is
based on reasonable doubt, the Court of Appeals had
to review the findings of the trial court to determine if
there was a basis for awarding indemnity and
damages.
Preliminarily, petitioners claim that the decision of the
appellate court awarding indemnity placed him in
double jeopardy is misplaced. The constitution provides
that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the
same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an
ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall
constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same
act.[10] When a person is charged with an offense and
the case is terminated either by acquittal or conviction
or in any other manner without the consent of the
accused, the latter cannot again be charged with the
same or identical offense.[11]This is double jeopardy. For
double jeopardy to exist, the following elements must
be established: (a) a first jeopardy must have attached
prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have
terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for
the same offense as the first.[12] In the instant case,
petitioner had once been placed in jeopardy by the
filing of Criminal Case No. 066 and the jeopardy was
terminated by his discharge. The judgment of acquittal
became immediately final. Note, however, that what
was elevated to the Court of Appeals by private
respondents was the civil aspect of Criminal Case No.
066.Petitioner was not charged anew in CA-G.R. CV No.
19240 with a second criminal offense identical to the
first offense. The records clearly show that no second
criminal offense was being imputed to petitioner on
appeal. In modifying the lower courts judgment, the
appellate court did not modify the judgment of
acquittal. Nor did it order the filing of a second criminal
case against petitioner for the same
offense. Obviously, therefore, there was no second
jeopardy to speak of. Petitioners claim of having been
placed in double jeopardy is incorrect.
Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different
effects on the civil liability of the accused. First is an
acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the
author of the act or omission complained of. This
instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person
who has been found to be not the perpetrator of any
act or omission cannot and can never be held liable for
such act or omission.[13] There being no delict, civil
liability ex delicto is out of the question, and the civil
action, if any, which may be instituted must be based
on grounds other than the delict complained of. This is
the situation contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court.[14] The second instance is an acquittal based on

reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this

case, even if the guilt of the accused has not been
satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil
liability which may be proved by preponderance of
evidence only.[15] This is the situation contemplated in
Article 29 of the Civil Code,[16] where the civil action for
damages is for the same act or omission. Although the
two actions have different purposes, the matters
discussed in the civil case are similar to those
discussed in the criminal case. However, the judgment
in the criminal proceeding cannot be read in evidence
in the civil action to establish any fact there
determined, even though both actions involve the
same act or omission.[17] The reason for this rule is that
the parties are not the same and secondarily, different
rules of evidence are applicable. Hence,
notwithstanding herein petitioners acquittal, the Court
of Appeals in determining whether Article 29 applied,
was not precluded from looking into the question of
petitioners negligence or reckless imprudence.
On the second issue, petitioner insists that he was
acquitted on a finding that he was neither criminally
negligent nor recklessly imprudent. Inasmuch as his
civil liability is predicated on the criminal offense, he
argues that when the latter is not proved, civil liability
cannot be demanded. He concludes that his acquittal
bars any civil action.
Private respondents counter that a closer look at the
trial courts judgment shows that the judgment of
acquittal did not clearly and categorically declare the
non-existence of petitioners negligence or
imprudence. Hence, they argue that his acquittal must
be deemed based on reasonable doubt, allowing Article
29 of the Civil Code to come into play.
Our scrutiny of the lower courts decision in Criminal
Case No. 066 supports the conclusion of the appellate
court that the acquittal was based on reasonable
doubt; hence, petitioners civil liability was not
extinguished by his discharge. We note the trial courts
declaration that did not discount the possibility that the
accused was really negligent. However, it found that a
hypothesis inconsistent with the negligence of the
accused presented itself before the Court and since
said hypothesis is consistent with the recordthe Courts
mind cannot rest on a verdict of conviction.[18] The
foregoing clearly shows that petitioners acquittal was
predicated on the conclusion that his guilt had not
been established with moral certainty. Stated
differently, it is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt
and a suit to enforce civil liability for the same act or
omission lies.
On the third issue, petitioner argues that the Court of
Appeals erred in awarding damages and indemnity,
since private respondents did not pay the
corresponding filing fees for their claims for damages
when the civil case was impliedly instituted with the

criminal action. Petitioner submits that the nonpayment of filing fees on the amount of the claim for
damages violated the doctrine in Manchester
Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 149
SCRA 562 (1987) and Supreme Court Circular No. 7
dated March 24, 1988.[19] He avers that
since Manchester held that The Court acquires
jurisdiction over any case only upon payment of the
prescribed docket fees, the appellate court was without
jurisdiction to hear and try CA-G.R. CV No. 19240,
much less award indemnity and damages.
Private respondents argue that
the Manchester doctrine is inapplicable to the instant
case. They ask us to note that the criminal case, with
which the civil case was impliedly instituted, was filed
on July 1, 1983, while the Manchester requirements as
to docket and filing fees took effect only with the
promulgation of Supreme Court Circular No. 7 on March
24, 1988. Moreover, the information filed by the
Provincial Prosecutor of Isabela did not allege the
amount of indemnity to be paid. Since it was not then
customarily or legally required that the civil damages
sought be stated in the information, the trial court had
no basis in assessing the filing fees and demanding
payment thereof. Moreover, assuming that
the Manchester ruling is applied retroactively, under
the Rules of Court, the filing fees for the damages
awarded are a first lien on the judgment. Hence, there
is no violation of the Manchester doctrine to speak of.
At the time of the filing of the information in 1983, the
implied institution of civil actions with criminal actions
was governed by Rule 111, Section 1 of the 1964 Rules
of Court.[20] As correctly pointed out by private
respondents, under said rule, it was not required that
the damages sought by the offended party be stated in
the complaint or information. With the adoption of the
1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the amendment
of Rule 111, Section 1 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure by a resolution of this Court dated July 7,
1988, it is now required that:
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability
against the accused by way of moral, nominal,
temperate or exemplary damages, the filing fees for
such civil action as provided in these Rules shall
constitute a first lien on the judgment except in an
award for actual damages.
In cases wherein the amount of damages, other than
actual, is alleged in the complaint or information, the
corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended
party upon the filing thereof in court for trial.
The foregoing were the applicable provisions of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure at the time private
respondents appealed the civil aspect of Criminal Case
No. 066 to the court a quo in 1989. Being in the nature
of a curative statute, the amendment applies

retroactively and affects pending actions as in this

case.
Thus, where the civil action is impliedly instituted
together with the criminal action, the actual damages
claimed by the offended parties, as in this case, are not
included in the computation of the filing fees. Filing
fees are to be paid only if other items of damages such
as moral, nominal, temperate, or exemplary damages
are alleged in the complaint or information, or if they
are not so alleged, shall constitute a first lien on the
judgment.[21] Recall that the information in Criminal
Case No. 066 contained no specific allegations of
damages. Considering that the Rules of Criminal
Procedure effectively guarantee that the filing fees for
the award of damages are a first lien on the judgment,
the effect of the enforcement of said lien must retroact
to the institution of the criminal action. The filing fees
are deemed paid from the filing of the criminal
complaint or information. We therefore find no basis for
petitioners allegations that the filing fees were not paid
or improperly paid and that the appellate court
acquired no jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for
lack of merit. The assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 19240 promulgated on
January 31, 1992, as well as its resolution dated August
24, 1992, denying herein petitioners motion for
reconsideration, are AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 136258. October 10, 2001]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. CARLOS FELICIANO, accused-appellant.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
From being the subject of moral condemnation, the
Kiss of Judas appears to attain a different dimension in
criminal procedure. Indeed, by entering into an
"unholy" contract with an accused, so that the latter
might betray his partner in crime in exchange for an
acquittal, the State demonstrates how far its efforts
could go to vindicate crime. That the State should
agree to become a party to setting up a premium on
"treachery," and that it should reward conduct from
which an honorable man would ordinarily recoil with
aversion, paradoxically illustrates the perceived
necessity of such kind of an arrangement in criminal
procedure.[1] It is this doggedness of purpose on the

part of the State which herein accused-appellant, in

one of his assignment of errors, decries The trial court [has] erred in discharging accused Rodel
de la Cruz to be the state witness against co-accused
Carlos Feliciano despite strong objections from the
defense.[2]
The accused-appellant, Carlos Feliciano, was a security
guard detailed by the Atlantic Security Agency at the
Kingsmen building, also popularly known in the small
community as the hub of four disco pubs located on
four floors of the edifice, in Kalibo, Aklan. He was
assigned to the "Superstar" disco pub and his duties
ranged from refusing entry to dubious characters to
making certain that no customer would leave without
first paying his bill. Rodel de la Cruz, a security guard
from another agency, the Rheaza Security Agency, was
stationed at the parking lot of the same building. In
keeping with the nocturnal business hours of the
establishments at Kingsmen, the two security guards
would report for duty at 7:00 in the evening until the
wee hours of the next morning or when the last
customer would have by then left the premises. In the
early morning of 05 June 1995, Feliciano and de la Cruz
centrally figured in the investigation over the grisly
death of an unidentified woman whose body was found
sprawled in Barangay New Buswang, Kalibo, Aklan.
Finding a dead body at 5:30 in the morning in nearby
Barangay Buswang was big news to the small
community of Kalibo. The radio news about an
unidentified lifeless female lying in the Sampaton
Funeral Parlor caught the curiosity of Rosalie
Ricarto. The dead woman, so described as wearing a
red jacket emblazoned with the words "El-Hassan,
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia" and maong pants, fit the
description of Teresita Fuentes. Rosalie, a rice retailer,
shared a stall with Teresita, a vendor of spices,
condiments and fruits, at the Yambing Building. Rosalie
last saw Teresita on the afternoon of 04 June
1995. Teresita, who regularly went to Iloilo twice a
week to buy goods to sell, was scheduled to leave the
following morning of 05 June 1995. According to
Rosalie, Teresita, who normally would take the 2:00
a.m. trip to Iloilo, should already be back at Kalibo by
about 4:00 p.m. of the same day. But Teresita did not
return that afternoon. Rosalie said that Teresita wore
pieces of jewelry - a necklace, a pair of earrings, a
bracelet, four rings and a Seiko wristwatch - all of
which, except for the timepiece, were eventually
recovered. Anna Liza Pronton Fuentes, the daughter of
Teresita, was able to identify the bag recovered by
Myca Banson from the crime scene, as well as all its
contents, to be those belonging to her
mother. Likewise, recovered at the crime scene were
twelve P100.00 bills, seven P5.00 bills and the broken
windshield of the tricycle owned by Ruben
Barte. Turned over to the police by the manager of the
Superstar Disco Club was the sum of P1,000.00.

The autopsy report showed that whoever bludgeoned

the hapless Teresita Fuentes to death had used a blunt
instrument, inflicting twelve different wounds on her
head and face. The cause of death was noted to be
severe hemorrhage secondary to lacerated wounds
and skull fracture.
On 02 August 1995, an Information was filed against
Rodel de la Cruz and Carlos Feliciano "That on or about the 5th day of June 1995, in the early
morning, in Barangay New Buswang, Municipality of
Kalibo, Province of Aklan, Republic of the Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring and confederating
together and mutually helping one another, while
armed with a handgun, by means of force and violence,
and with intent of gain and without the consent of the
owner thereof, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously take, steal, rob and carry away cash
money in the amount of TEN THOUSAND PESOS
(P10,000.00), Philippine currency, more or less,
belonging to TERESITA FUENTES Y OSORIO, to the
damage and prejudice of the owner in the aforesaid
amount; that by reason or in the occasion of said
robbery, and for the purpose of enabling the accused
to take, steal and carry away the aforesaid amount, the
above-named accused with intent to kill and conspiring
with one another, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously and with evident
premeditation and under the cover of darkness,
treacherously attack, assault and wound TERESITA
FUENTES Y OSORIO, thereby inflicting upon her mortal
wounds, to wit:
1. Lacerated wound about 1 inches in length left chin.
2. Lacerated wound about 1 inch in length left lower
lip.
3. Fracture of the left mandible.
4. Fracture of the left upper lateral incisor and the left
upper canine.
5. Lacerated wound about 1 inches in length and about
1 in depth left face.
6. Punctured wound in diameter and about 1 inches in
depth mid-portion base nose bridge left.
7. Lacerated wound about 2 inches in length and about
1 inches in depth left cheek.
8. Lacerated wound about 1 inch in length left ear
medially.
9. Lacerated wound about inch in length left face near
the left ear.

10. Lacerated wound about 1 in length below the left

eyebrow.
11.Punctured wound about 1 inch in diameter and
about 5 inches in depth left parietal
12.Skull fracture occiput right.
"as per autopsy report of Dr. Agrelita D. Fernandez, of
the Rural Health Unit, Kalibo, Aklan, hereto attached
and forming an integral part hereof which wounds
directly caused the death of said TERESITA FUENTES Y
OSORIO.
"That as a result of the criminal acts of the accused,
the heirs of the victim suffered actual and
compensatory damages in the amount of FIFTY
THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS."[3]
The prosecution sought the discharge of accused Rodel
de la Cruz so that the latter could testify against his coaccused Carlos Feliciano. Pending resolution by the trial
court on the motion, Carlos Feliciano and Rodel de la
Cruz were arraigned on 08 February 1996. The two
accused entered a plea of not guilty. On 18 June 1996,
the court a quo granted the motion of the prosecution
and the name of Rodel de la Cruz, an accused turned
state witness, was forthwith stricken off from the
Information.[4]
A detailed account of the incident presented at the trial
by the prosecution was narrated by the Office of the
Solicitor General.
"In the early morning of June 5, 1995, before 2 o'clock,
appellant went to the guard post of Dela Cruz to tell
the latter to assist him in going after a customer who
did not pay the bill. It was not the first time that they
had to run after a non-paying customer. Dela Cruz thus
accompanied appellant who rented for the purpose a
tricycle from its driver, Ruben Barte, who stayed
behind. Appellant initially drove but about twenty
meters past Kingsmen Building, he asked Dela Cruz to
take over while he stayed inside the passenger sidecar
of the tricycle. Somewhere between the Ceres and
Libacao terminals, appellant alighted from the tricycle
after instructing Dela Cruz to stop and wait for
him. Appellant subsequently informed Dela Cruz that
they shall wait there for the customer they were
after. About a half hour later, however, appellant
decided to leave the place, apparently because the
person he was looking for was nowhere in sight. As
they passed Banga, New Washington crossing, they
saw a woman walking alone.Appellant waved at her,
giving Dela Cruz the impression that they knew each
other. Dela Cruz stopped the vehicle, as he was told by
appellant, who then jumped out. Drawing his service
gun, appellant suddenly held the woman by the neck
and at the same time poked his gun at her face. He
dragged her towards the tricycle and ordered her to
board it. The woman would later be identified as

Teresita Fuentes.Dela Cruz was shocked with what

appellant did and was at a loss on what to do. Still
stricken with panic, Dela Cruz asked appellant what
was going on and said he was leaving as he did not
want to be part of whatever plans appellant
had. Appellant retorted that Dela Cruz was already
involved. Dela Cruz was about to alight from the
tricycle when appellant poked his gun at him and
ordered him to drive. Thinking that appellant was in a
position to easily shoot him, Dela Cruz did as he was
ordered.
"Appellant then instructed Dela Cruz to drive back to
the public market. When they reached the junction of
Toting Reyes and Roxas Avenues, appellant told Dela
Cruz to turn right at Rizal Memorial College of Arts and
Trade (RMCAT). They noticed at this point that another
tricycle, which came from the direction of Kingsmen
Building, was following them. This prompted appellant
to order Dela Cruz to turn left at Magdalena Village
instead and to drive faster. During the ride, appellant
held Fuentes, who was crouching, by her hair, pressing
her head down. He also kicked her and struck her head
with the butt of his gun whenever she struggled. Dela
Cruz asked appellant to stop hurting Fuentes and to
have pity but his entreaties fell on deaf ears. Appellant
even threatened to shoot Dela Cruz if he does not stop
complaining.
"When they reached New Buswang, they noticed that
the other tricycle they saw earlier was still trailing
them by about 15 meters. As they approached
Magdalena Village after passing Camp Martelino,
Fuentes struggled so appellant hit her again. Dela Cruz
told appellant to desist from striking her. Appellant did
not take kindly to the unsolicited advice and fired his
gun in the air. Seeing an opportunity for escape, Dela
Cruz suddenly swerved the tricycle towards Magdalena
Village until the vehicle toppled over. When the tricycle
was lifted from its fallen state, Dela Cruz immediately
jumped out of it and ran towards a feeder road leading
to the Cooperative Rural Bank. He was resting at the
back of the bank for a few minutes when appellant also
arrived. Enraged, Dela Cruz this time drew his service
firearm and aimed it at appellant, demanding from the
latter an explanation why he had to involve him (Dela
Cruz). With an assurance that he would own up the
responsibility for everything that had happened,
appellant was able to calm Dela Cruz down. After
returning his service gun to the holster, Dela Cruz
headed back to the road. Behind him following was
appellant. Then, they saw Barte, from whom appellant
rented the tricycle earlier, trying to start the engine
thereof. It turned out that it was Barte who was in the
other tricycle, driven by Ramon Yael. Appellant assured
Barte that he will pay for all the damages of the rented
tricycle.
"Meanwhile, Dela Cruz went back to Kingsmen Building
aboard Yael's tricycle to look for his dancer girlfriend,

Myka (or Mika) Banzon (or Vanson), but she was not
there. Dela Cruz, with Yael in his tricycle, were about to
go to Banzon's boarding house when appellant
approached them, insisting that Yael take him first to
Magdalena Village. Afraid of appellant, Yael
agreed. When they got there, particularly where
Barte's tricycle turned over earlier, appellant walked
towards a mango tree. Curious, Dela Cruz followed
him. Dela Cruz saw appellant hitting Fuentes on the
head with his gun. She was lying down face up,
groaning. Dela Cruz admonished and pushed appellant
away, telling him to have pity on Fuentes. Since he did
not want to get involved further nor did he want to see
any more of what appellant was up to, Dela Cruz
walked back to the tricycle. He took a last look back
and saw appellant getting something from the pocket
of Fuentes and putting it inside the pocket of
his chaleco. Soon enough, appellant caught up with
Dela Cruz and Yael as they were about to leave and
they all went back to Kingsmen Building.
"Dela Cruz finally found Banzon at the third floor of the
building and informed her that he was going to bring
her home already. She passed by the ladies' room while
he stood watch outside. Appellant arrived and told Dela
Cruz and Banzon that they had to talk inside the ladies'
room. He was giving Dela Cruz and Banzon P600.00
each, but they declined to accept the money. Appellant
threatened Dela Cruz not to squeal whatever he knows
or appellant will kill him and his family. When appellant
insisted in giving the money, Dela Cruz took it only to
place it on the sink, then, he and Banzon left.
"Dela Cruz and Banzon were leaving for her boarding
house aboard Yael's tricycle when appellant caught up
with them again and ordered Yael to first take him to
Ceres terminal. As they passed the Tumbokan Memorial
Hospital, they came across Barte driving his
tricycle. After signaling for Barte to stop, appellant
gave him money. Dela Cruz and Banzon quickly
transferred to Barte's tricycle since Yael still had to take
appellant to the terminal. In the course of the transfer
to the other tricycle, appellant placed something inside
the pocket of Dela Cruz who thought nothing of it as he
was in a hurry to go home.In Banzon's boarding house,
Dela Cruz found out that what appellant had put in his
pocket was a blood-stained necklace wrapped in a
piece of paper. Banzon also showed him a bag she
found at the place where Barte's tricycle turned
turtle. Dela Cruz planned to return the necklace and
the bag the next day.
"In the evening of June 5, 1995, Dela Cruz reported for
work. Appellant asked him for the necklace so that he
could pawn it. Dela Cruz, however, was unable to give
the necklace back because in the morning of June 6,
1995, the police raided the boarding house of
Banzon. Among those confiscated by the police was his
wallet where he placed the necklace. The police invited
Dela Cruz to the police station to shed light on what he

knew about a murder committed in Magdalena

Village. The police had earlier confirmed an anonymous
call that a dead woman was found at New
Buswang. Twelve 100-peso bills were found at the
scene, as well as a broken windshield that was traced
to the tricycle rented by Barte to appellant. The dead
person was identified as Fuentes by her daughter,
Analiza Fuentes Pronton. Thus, Dela Cruz revealed
everything that appellant had done. The police asked
Dela Cruz to go with them to Lalab, Bataan where
appellant was arrested. Appellant was then brought to
the Kalibo Police Station for investigation."[5]
Carlos Feliciano, in his testimony, denied the
asseverations of state witness de la Cruz. He claimed
that the accusations were motivated out of pure spite
and revenge borne of the hostility between them due
to work-related differences. An altercation arose
between him and de la Cruz two months before the
incident, on 06 April 1995, when a customer had
complained to the Kingsmen Building manager that the
toolbox of his tricycle, parked near the building, was
missing. The manager then ordered Feliciano to go to
the parking lot and summon de la Cruz. Feliciano
reported back to say that he did not find de la Cruz in
his designated post, a fact that de la Cruz later
resented. The next incident happened the following
month. On the evening of 01 May 1995, Myca Banson,
the live-in girlfriend of de la Cruz, was to be "taken out"
by a customer. Feliciano, upon orders of the
management, refused de la Cruz entry within the
premises of the pub house, in order to avoid any
possible trouble, which culminated in a physical tussle
between the two men and ended with de la Cruz
aiming his gun at Feliciano. The third incident occurred
when a motorcycle parked at the Kingsmen parking lot
could not be located and de la Cruz again was not at
his post. Feliciano reported the matter to the manager
and, two days later, de la Cruz was fired from
work. Feliciano admitted having seen de la Cruz at
about 9:30 on the evening of 04 June 1995 escorting
Myca Banson to the pubhouse. De la Cruz stayed at the
billiard house fronting Kingsmen, while waiting for
Myca to finish work, often at 4:00 in the early morning
of the next day. Feliciano said that he knew Ramon
Barte, the driver, being a habitue of the Kingsmen
premises. It was Barte who would often fetch Rodel de
la Cruz and Myca Banson from work during early
mornings.
The defense placed at the stand two additional
witnesses. Eduardo Magsangya, a cigarette vendor at
the Ceres terminal, testified that on the late evening of
04 June 1995, de la Cruz went to see him at the Ceres
Terminal to inquire whether Teresita Fuentes had
already arrived. Magsangya responded in the
negative. De la Cruz returned to the terminal looking
for Teresita four times that night. Magsangya knew
Teresita as being a biweekly passenger of the 2:00 a.m.
bus for Iloilo and de la Cruz as a security guard at

Kingsmen where he would at times sell his

wares. Jefferson Arafol, a pahinante of Ideal Trucking,
testified that at approximately 2:30 on the early
morning of 05 June 1995, he and truck driver Oca, were
transporting coconut lumber to Iloilo, when, at the
vicinity of Magdalena Village, they spotted a tricycle
running at high speed, eventually overtaking them. Its
fast pace caused the vehicle to turn turtle. When Arafol
approached, the tricycle driver, Rodel de la Cruz,
pointed a gun at him and told him not to come any
closer. Arafol was acquainted with Rodel de la Cruz and
Carlos Feliciano because he frequented Kingsmen on
Sundays after getting his salary. The pahinante saw
two more persons with de la Cruz, one male and the
other female. Arafol was certain that the male
companion of de la Cruz was not Carlos Feliciano. While
de la Cruz was pointing his gun at him, his male
companion was dragging an unidentified woman
towards the nearby mango tree.
When the trial concluded, the Regional Trial Court of
Kalibo, Aklan, found for the prosecution and
pronounced accused Carlos Feliciano guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with
Homicide and sentenced him to suffer the extreme
penalty of death "WHEREFORE, finding the accused CARLOS FELICIANO
Y MARCELINO guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
principal by direct participation of the crime of Robbery
with Homicide defined and penalized under paragraph
1 of Article 294 x x x, with three aggravating
circumstances, the court hereby imposes upon the said
accused the supreme penalty of DEATH and to
indemnify the heirs of Teresita Fuentes the sum of
P50,000.00.
"The caliber .38 revolver Squires Bingham with SN #
14223 (Exhibit J) used by Feliciano is hereby forfeited
and confiscated in favor of the government to be
disposed in accordance with law.
"Costs against the accused."[6]
In an automatic review before this tribunal, appellant
Carlos Feliciano raised the following assignment of
errors "I.
"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISCHARGING THE
ACCUSED RODEL DE LA CRUZ TO BE THE STATE
WITNESS AGAINST CO-ACCUSED CARLOS FELICIANO
DESPITE STRONG OBJECTIONS FROM THE DEFENSE.
"II.
"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RELYING HEAVILY ON THE
WELL-REHEARSED TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION
WITNESSES.

"III.
"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSEDAPPELLANT CARLOS FELICIANO FOR THE CRIME
CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION DESPITE THE
INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE AGAINST HIM." [7]
The Court is inclined to agree with appellant that state
witness Rodel de la Cruz appears to be far from being
the inculpable young man who has simply been an
unwitting and reluctant accomplice to a gruesome
crime. Several incidents militate against his
innocence. The events, related by him, make tenuous
the purported threat and intimidation exerted by
appellant over him.
The behavior of Rodel de la Cruz during and
immediately after the crime could not be that of a
threatened, frightened man. If he indeed wanted to
escape, he had in his possession his own service gun,
and he was in control of the tricycle. He had enough
advantage and chances to escape, if he really wanted
to, from Feliciano who was at that time engrossed at
restraining a struggling victim. In fact, it was de la Cruz
who was caught in the possession of the dead womans
necklace. Another damning evidence against de la Cruz
was the letter introduced by police inspector Winnie
Jereza, Chief of Intelligence of the Philippine National
Police of Kalibo, Aklan, who, after taking the witness
stand for the prosecution, testified for the defense. The
letter, dated 02 June 1995, came from one Roger R.
Zaradulla, proprietor of the Rheaza Security Agency,
addressed to SPO3 Gregorio F. Ingenerio of the Kalibo
Police Station, to the effect that the detail order of
Rodel de la Cruz to the Kingsmen Disco pub had
expired as of 31 May 1995. According to Zaradulla, de
la Cruz was nowhere to be found and his whereabouts
were unknown. Apprehensive that de la Cruz had gone
on AWOL without first surrendering to the agency the
firearm issued to him, Zaradulla sought the arrest of de
la Cruz by the police.
The evident attempt, nevertheless, of the accused
turned state witness to mitigate his own culpability did
not adversely affect his discharge nor did it render
completely weightless the evidentiary value of his
testimony.
The rules of procedure allowing the discharge of an
accused to instead be a witness for the state [8] is not a
home grown innovation but is one with a long and
interesting history. It has its origins in the common law
of ancient England where faithful performance of such
an agreement with the Crown could entitle a criminal
offender to an equitable right to a recommendation for
executive clemency. The practice, soon recognized
through widespread statutory enactments in other
jurisdictions, finally has found its way to our own
criminal procedure in a short and compact military
General Order No. 58 issued in 1900. Its adoption

highlights the emphasis placed by the new system on

the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused,
on the requirement that the State must first establish
its case beyond a reasonable doubt before an accused
can be called upon to defend himself, and on the
proscription against compelling an accused to be a
witness against himself as well as against drawing
inferences of guilt from his silence.[9] Underlying the
rule is the deep-lying intent of the State not to let a
crime that has been committed go unpunished by
allowing an accused who appears not to be the most
guilty to testify, in exchange for an outright acquittal,
against a more guilty co-accused. It is aimed at
achieving the greater purpose of securing the
conviction of the most guilty and the greatest number
among the accused for an offense committed.[10]
In this jurisdiction, it is the trial court judge who has
the exclusive responsibility of ensuring that the
conditions prescribed by the rules exist.[11] This grant is
not one of arbitrary discretion but rather a sound
judicial prerogative to be exercised with due regard to
the proper and correct dispensation of criminal justice.
[12]
But that there would be the possibility of error on
the part of the judge is understandable. A trial judge
cannot be expected or required to inform himself with
absolute certainty at the outset of the trial as to
everything which may develop in the course of the trial
in regard to the guilty participation of the accused in
the commission of the crime charged in the complaint.
[13]
If that were possible, the judge would conveniently
rely on large part upon the suggestion and the
information furnished by the prosecuting officer in
coming to the conclusion as to the "necessity for the
testimony" of the accused whose discharge is
requested, as to the "availability of other direct or
corroborative evidence," and as to who among the
accused is the "most guilty," and so the like.[14] Then,
there would be little need for the formality of a trial.
[15]
Thus, here, even while one might be convinced that
state witness Rodel de la Cruz would, on the basis of
evidence ultimately submitted, appear to be equally
as, and not less than, guilty in conspiracy with
appellant Carlos Feliciano, the hands of the State are
now stayed and the Court must assure the exemption
of the witness from punishment.
It is widely accepted that the discharge of an accused
to become a state witness has the same effect as an
acquittal. The impropriety of the discharge would not
have any effect on the competency and quality of the
testimony, nor would it have the consequence of
withdrawing his immunity from prosecution.[16] A
discharge, if granted at the stage where jeopardy has
already attached, is equivalent to an acquittal, such
that further prosecution would be tantamount to the
state reneging on its part of the agreement and
unconstitutionally placing the state witness in double
jeopardy. The rule, of course, is not always
irreversible. In an instance where the discharged

accused fails to fulfill his part of the bargain and

refuses to testify against his co-accused, the benefit of
his discharge can be withdrawn and he can again be
prosecuted for the same offense.
In US vs. de Guzman,[17] one of the earlier cases
discussing this issue, Justice Carson had occasion to
briefly touch on the immunity clauses in the Acts of the
United States Congress and some States. In Wisconsin,
the immunity clause contained a proviso providing that
persons committing perjury when called upon to testify
could be punished therefor.[18] Oklahoma law suffered
from the absence of any reservation; thus observed
Justice Carson
"x x x. We have no such reservation in our
constitutional provision; and, as before said, if we
should follow the precedents, when the witness does
not speak the truth, the State would be left without
redress, although the witness had violated the purpose
and spirit of the constitution. We cannot believe that it
was the purpose of the intelligent and justice-loving
people of Oklahoma, when they voted for the adoption
of the constitution, to grant immunity to any man,
based upon a lie, or, in other words, that they intended
that the commission of perjury should atone for an
offense already committed. It is a familiar rule of
common law, common sense, and common justice that
a legal right cannot be based upon fraud. We therefore
hold that the witness who claims immunity on account
of self-incriminatory testimony which he had been
compelled to give must act in good faith with the State,
and must make truthful replies to the questions which
are propounded to him, and which he had been
compelled to answer, and that any material
concealment or suppression of the truth on his part will
deprive him of the immunity provided by the
constitution; and the witness must testify to something
which, if true, would tend to criminate him. This
immunity is only granted to those who earn it by
testifying in good faith. In our judgment any other
construction would be an insult to and a libel upon the
intelligence of the people of Oklahoma, an outrage on
law, and a prostitution of justice."[19]
Despite an obvious attempt to downgrade his own
participation in the crime, state witness de la Cruz,
nevertheless, did not renege from his agreement to
give a good account of the crime, enough to indeed
substantiate the conviction of his co-accused, now
appellant Carlos Feliciano, by the trial court. On
significant points, the damaging testimony of de la
Cruz against appellant was corroborated by Ruben
Barte and Ramon Yael. On the night of the incident,
Feliciano hired his vehicle and drove it himself while De
la Cruz was seated on its passenger seat. When the
two did not return at the appointed time, Barte asked
Ramon Yael, another tricycle driver who happened to
be at the Kingsmen parking area, to accompany him to
look for them. Myca Banson decided to come with

them. After a while, the trio spotted Bartes tricycle

being driven by de la Cruz, and followed it. Barte
testified how the first tricycle turned turtle at the
junction towards Magdalena Village. When the tricycle
tilted, he saw a person in red falling from the vehicle,
while another person who was in white, lifted the first
person. When the first tricycle precariously lurched, its
occupants hurriedly abandoned the vehicle. The
obfuscating foliage, however, blocked his view so Barte
was not able to identify who was with appellant and de
la Cruz nor ascertain where the two men were later
headed. When the three of them approached the
overturned tricycle they found no one. Near the
vehicle, they saw an abandoned bag which Myca
Banson hastily retrieved. While Barte struggled to turn
his vehicle upright, Myca left with Ramon Yael. Later,
while riding his vehicle on his way back, Ruben Barte
was forced to stop because its engine stalled. While
inspecting the tricycle engine, appellant and de la Cruz
approached him, and the former told him not to worry
as he would pay for the damages. After a while, at the
parking lot of the Kingsmen Building, appellant told
him to take his vehicle to a dark place where he wiped
off the blood from the tricycles seats.When they met
again several hours later, appellant gave him P450.00
for the damages sustained by the vehicle. Much later,
Yael handed him another P250.00 given by appellant as
additional payment. Ruben Barte kept quiet about the
incident because appellant warned him against
reporting the matter to anyone. Ramon Yael
corroborated the testimony of Barte, adding that while
they were chasing appellant and de la Cruz, one of the
two fired a gun in the air, constraining them to
decrease their speed. Militating against the unbiased
nature of the testimony of these two witnesses was
their admission of having willingly accepted the blood
money which appellant gave them that could well
qualify them as being themselves accessories to the
crime.[20]
Appellant Carlos Feliciano was not able to sufficiently
dispute his participation therein. Neither his blanket
denial nor his alibi, both inherently weak defenses, was
amply proved.
Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code as amended
by Republic Act No. 7659, provides "1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death [shall be
imposed], when by reason or on occasion of the
robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been
committed, or when the robbery shall have been
accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation or
arson." (Italics supplied.)
Given the evidence in this case, heretofore narrated,
the Court is not convinced that the prosecution has
succeeded in establishing beyond reasonable doubt
any of the aggravating circumstances alleged in the
information that can warrant the imposition of the

maximum of the penalty prescribed by law. Evidence is

wanting that appellant has especially sought nighttime
to perpetrate the crime or that the criminal act has
been preceded, required in evident premeditation, by
cool thought and reflection. Not only is treachery an
aggravating circumstance merely applicable to crimes
against persons but neither also has the mode of
attack on the victim of the robbery been shown to have
been consciously adopted.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court a quo is
AFFIRMED except insofar as it imposed on appellant
Carlos Feliciano the penalty of death which is hereby
reduced to reclusion perpetua. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 124171. March 18, 2002]

LETICIA R. MERCIALES, petitioner, vs. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, JOSELITO NUADA, PAT. EDWIN
MORAL, ADONIS NIEVES, ERNESTO LOBETE,
DOMIL GRAGEDA, and RAMON POL
FLORES, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Petitioner seeks the reversal of the Decision of the
Court of Appeals[1] in CA-G.R. SP No. 37341, denying
her petition to annul the Order of the Regional Trial
Court of Legazpi City, Branch 8,[2] in Criminal Case Nos.
6307-6312, which dismissed the charge of rape with
homicide based on a demurrer to evidence filed by
private respondents, accused therein.
The antecedent facts as succinctly synthesized by the
respondent court are as follows:
On August 12, 1993, Criminal Case Nos. 6307, 6308,
6309, 6310, 6311, and 6312, for rape with homicide, in
connection with the death of one Maritess Ricafort
Merciales, were filed against the private respondents,
Joselito Nuada, Pat. Edwin Moral, Adonis Nieves,
Ernesto Lobete, Domil Grageda and Ramon "Pol"
Flores, before the Regional Trial Court, Fifth Judicial
Region, Legaspi City. The said cases were consolidated
in Branch 8, presided over by the respondent judge.
During the trial, after presenting seven witnesses, the
public prosecutor filed a motion for the discharge of
accused Joselito Nuada, in order that he may be
utilized as a state witness. However, the prosecution
contended that it was not required to present evidence
to warrant the discharge of accused Nuada, since the

latter had already been admitted into the Witness

Protection Program of the Department of
Justice.Consequently, the respondent judge denied the
motion for discharge, for failure of the prosecution to
present evidence as provided for by Section 9, Rule
119 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.
On December 22, 1993, the prosecution filed a
petition[3] for certiorari [G.R. No. 113273-78] before the
Supreme Court, questioning the respondent judge's
denial of the motion to discharge the accused
Nuada. Despite the fact that the petition did not
contain a prayer for a temporary restraining order, the
trial judge did not set the case for further hearing so as
to give the prosecution time to secure such temporary
restraining order from the Supreme Court.
On July 13, 1994, herein private respondents filed a
motion to set the case for hearing, invoking their
constitutional right to speedy trial. The respondent
judge granted the motion, and set the case for hearing
on July 29, 1994.
On the said date, the prosecution filed a motion for
reconsideration, instead of presenting further
evidence. The respondent Judge postponed the hearing
and reset the same for August 9, 1994.
On August 9, 1994, again the prosecution filed a
motion for reconsideration, invoking its pending
petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court. The
private respondents, thru counsel, objected to any
further resetting as this would constitute a violation of
their right to a speedy trial. The respondent judge
called for a recess so as to let the prosecution decide
whether or not to present an NBI agent, who was then
present, to prove the due execution of the accused
Nuada's extrajudicial confession.
However, after the recess, the public prosecutor
declined to present the NBI agent, and instead
manifested that he was not presenting any further
evidence. The defense then moved that the cases be
deemed submitted for decision, and asked leave of
court to file a demurrer to evidence.
On August 29, 1994, the Solicitor General filed [in G.R.
No. 113273-78] a motion for issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order
with the Supreme Court, to enjoin the respondent
judge from proceeding with the resolution of the
case. However, on September 19, 1994, the motion
was denied by the Supreme Court.
In due time, the accused filed their demurrer to
evidence x x x.[4]
On October 21, 1994, the trial court issued the assailed
Order, the dispositive portion of which reads:

For lack of sufficient evidence to prove the guilt of the

accused beyond reasonable doubt, all the accused in
all these cases are hereby ACQUITTED and the cases
filed against them are hereby DISMISSED.The accused
in all these cases, being detention prisoners, are
hereby ordered RELEASED from detention, unless they
are being detained for some other legal cause.
SO ORDERED.[5]
Petitioner Leticia Merciales, who is the mother of the
victim in the said criminal cases, filed before the
respondent Court of Appeals a petition to annul the
foregoing Order of the trial court. However, the Court
of Appeals dismissed the petition on October 4, 1995.
A motion for reconsideration was denied on March 6,
1996. Hence, the instant petition based on the ground
that:
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE
ERROR WHEN IT REFUSED TO NULLIFY THE ORDER
DATED OCTOBER 21, 1994 OF THE TRIAL COURT FOR
BEING NULL AND VOID ON THE GROUND THAT THE
TRIAL JUDGE TOLERATED AND/OR COMMITTED
INJUSTICE BY FAILING TO REQUIRE THE PROSECUTION
TO PRESENT ALL THEIR EVIDENCE INSTEAD OF
SUPPRESSING THEM APPARENTLY TO FAVOR THE
ACCUSED IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO DUE PROCESS, OUSTING THE
TRIAL COURT OF ITS JURISDICTION.[6]
The case was set for oral argument on December 11,
2001. Counsel for petitioner and the Solicitor General
appeared. During the oral argument, the Solicitor
General manifested that he was joining the cause of
petitioner in order to prevent a miscarriage of
justice. The Court directed the parties to submit their
respective memoranda in amplification of the points
raised during the oral argument.
Petitioner maintains that the reopening of the criminal
case will not violate the accuseds right to double
jeopardy. More particularly, she ascribes prosecutorial
and judicial misconduct in the undue haste which
attended the prosecutions premature resting and the
trial courts grant of the demurrer to evidence when the
presentation of the evidence for the prosecution has
not been completed.
Private respondent Ramon Flores filed his
Memorandum, arguing that petitioner, being the
private complainant in the criminal case below, has no
legal standing to appeal the acquittal of private
respondents; that there was no extrinsic fraud, abuse
of discretion or jurisdictional defect to warrant either a
petition for annulment of judgment or certiorari; and
that the reopening of the criminal case will violate the
accuseds right against double jeopardy.

It is true that a private complainant cannot bring an

action questioning a judgment of acquittal, except
insofar as the civil aspect of the criminal case is
concerned.[7] In the case at bar, we agree with
petitioner that this issue was rendered moot when the
Solicitor General, in representation of the People,
changed his position and joined the cause of petitioner,
thus fulfilling the requirement that all criminal actions
shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of
the public prosecutor.[8]
In any event, petitioner has an interest in the
maintenance of the criminal prosecution, being the
mother of the deceased rape victim. The right of
offended parties to appeal an order of the trial court
which deprives them of due process has always been
recognized, the only limitation being that they cannot
appeal any adverse ruling if to do so would place the
accused in double jeopardy.[9]
The criminal case below was for rape with
homicide. Although the public prosecutor presented
seven witnesses, none of these actually saw the
commission of the crime. It was only Joselito Nuada,
one of the accused, who came forward and expressed
willingness to turn state witness. His testimony was
vital for the prosecution, as it would provide the only
eyewitness account of the accuseds complicity in the
crime. The trial court required the public prosecutor to
present evidence to justify Nuadas discharge as a state
witness, but the latter insisted that there was no need
for such proof since Nuada had already been admitted
into the Witness Protection Program of the Department
of Justice. The public prosecutors obstinate refusal to
present the required evidence prompted the trial court
to deny the motion to discharge Nuada.
The prosecution elevated the matter to the Supreme
Court on a petition for certiorari. Meanwhile, the
accused moved to set the case for hearing, invoking
their constitutional right to speedy trial. The trial court
granted the motion. The public prosecutor moved for a
continuance, and the trial court acceded. At the next
scheduled hearing, however, the trial court denied a
similar motion by the prosecution in view of the
objection of the accused. The trial court directed the
public prosecutor to present Atty. Carlos S. Caabay, the
NBI Agent who took Nuada's extrajudicial
confession. At the resumption of the hearing, the public
prosecutor declared that he was resting the
prosecutions case, knowing fully well that the evidence
he has presented was not sufficient to convict the
accused. Consequently, the ensuing demurrer to
evidence filed by the accused was granted by the trial
court.
It is clear from the foregoing that the public prosecutor
was guilty of serious nonfeasance. It is the duty of the
public prosecutor to bring the criminal proceedings for
the punishment of the guilty.[10]Concomitant with this is

the duty to pursue the prosecution of a criminal action

and to represent the public interest. A crime is an
offense against the State, and hence is prosecuted in
the name of the People of the Philippines. For this
reason, Section 5 of Rule 110 provides that all criminal
actions either commenced by complaint or by
information shall be prosecuted under the direction
and control of the fiscal x x x. As the representative of
the State, the public prosecutor has the right and the
duty to take all steps to protect the rights of the People
in the trial of an accused.[11] If the public prosecutor
commits a nonfeasance in refusing to perform a
specific duty imposed on him by law, he can be
compelled by an action for mandamus.[12]
In the case at bar, the public prosecutor knew that he
had not presented sufficient evidence to convict the
accused. Yet, despite repeated moves by the accused
for the trial court to continue hearing the case, he
deliberately failed to present an available witness and
thereby allowed the court to declare that the
prosecution has rested its case. In this sense, he was
remiss in his duty to protect the interest of the
offended parties. More specifically, the public
prosecutor in this case was guilty of blatant error and
abuse of discretion, thereby causing prejudice to the
offended party. Indeed, the family of the deceased
victim, Maritess Merciales, could do nothing during the
proceedings, having entrusted the conduct of the case
in the hands of the said prosecutor. All they could do
was helplessly watch as the public prosecutor, who was
under legal obligation to pursue the action on their
behalf, renege on that obligation and refuse to perform
his sworn duty.
Indeed, Rule 119, Section 9 (now Section 17) of the
Rules of Court expressly requires the presentation of
evidence in support of the prosecutions prayer for the
discharge of an accused to be a state witness, viz:
When two or more persons are jointly charged with the
commission of any offense, upon motion of the
prosecution before resting its case, the court may
direct one or more of the accused to be discharged
with their consent so that they may be witnesses for
the state when after requiring the prosecution to
present evidence and the sworn statement of each
proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the
discharge, xxx xxx xxx.
By refusing to comply with the trial courts order to
present evidence, the public prosecutor grossly
violated the above-quoted rule. Moreover, the public
prosecutor violated his bounden duty to protect the
interest of the offended party, at least insofar as the
criminal aspect is concerned. After the trial court
denied his motion to discharge Nuada as a state
witness, he should have proceeded to complete the
evidence of the prosecution by other means. Instead,
he willfully and deliberately refused to present an

available witness, i.e., the NBI Agent who was present

in court on that date and time. The public prosecutor
was duty-bound to exhaust all available proofs to
establish the guilt of the accused and bring them to
justice for their offense against the injured party.

Lack of jurisdiction is one of the grounds for the

annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments or
final orders and resolutions of Regional Trial Courts.
[19]
Hence, the remedy taken by petitioner before the
Court of Appeals was correct.

Likewise guilty for serious nonfeasance was the trial

court. Notwithstanding its knowledge that the evidence
for the prosecution was insufficient to convict,
especially after the public prosecutor tenaciously
insisted on utilizing Nuada as state witness, the trial
court passively watched as the public prosecutor
bungled the case. The trial court was well aware of the
nature of the testimonies of the seven prosecution
witnesses that have so far been presented. Given this
circumstance, the trial court, motu proprio, should
have called additional witnesses for the purpose of
questioning them himself in order to satisfy his mind
with reference to particular facts or issues involved in
the case.[13]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is

GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 37341 is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The
Order dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 6307-6312 is
ANNULLED, and this case is REMANDED to the Regional
Trial Court of Legazpi City, Branch 8, for further
proceedings. The public prosecutor is ORDERED to
complete the presentation of all available witnesses for
the prosecution.

Based on the foregoing, it is evident that petitioner was

deprived of her day in court. Indeed, it is not only the
State, but more so the offended party, that is entitled
to due process in criminal cases.Inasmuch as the
acquittal of the accused by the court a quo was done
without regard to due process of law, the same is null
and void. It is as if there was no acquittal at all, and the
same cannot constitute a claim for double jeopardy. [14]
By contending that the challenged Decision is void for
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the petition
does not violate the right of the accused against
double jeopardy. It is elementary that double jeopardy
attaches only when the following elements concur: (1)
the accused are charged under a complaint or
information sufficient in form and substance to sustain
their conviction; (2) the court has jurisdiction; (3) the
accused have been arraigned and have pleaded; and
(4) they are convicted or acquitted, or the case is
dismissed without their consent.
Thus, even assuming that a writ of certiorari is granted,
the accused would not be placed in double jeopardy
because, from the very beginning, the lower tribunal
had acted without jurisdiction. Precisely, any ruling
issued without jurisdiction is, in legal contemplation,
necessarily null and void and does not exist.[15]
Otherwise put, the dismissal of the case below was
invalid for lack of a fundamental prerequisite, that is,
due process.[16] In rendering the judgment of dismissal,
the trial judge in this case acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, for a judgment which is void for lack of due
process is equivalent to excess or lack of jurisdiction.
[17]
Indeed, jurisdiction is the right to hear and
determine, not to determine without hearing.[18]

SO ORDERED.

[G. R. No. 143547. June 26, 2002]

JOEY POTOT y SURIO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES and LOLITO DAPULAG,
respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
After the accused has filed with the trial court a
manifestation that he is not appealing its Decision
convicting him of homicide and that he is ready to
serve his sentence, can the same court, upon motion
by the private complainant with the conformity of the
public prosecutor, set aside the said judgment and
remand the records of the case to the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor for re-evaluation of the evidence
and the filing of the corresponding charge? This is the
issue raised in the instant petition for review on
certiorari.
Joey S. Potot, petitioner, was charged with homicide in
Criminal Case No. 2739 before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 19, Catarman, Northern Samar. The
information against him, filed on December 12, 1999,
alleges:
That on or about the 2nd day of November, 1999, at
about 3:00 oclock in the early morning in the public
cemetery of the Municipality of Mondragon, Province of
Northern Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
armed with a knife locally called dipang, with
deliberate intent to kill and without justifiable cause,
did then and there wifully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and stab RODOLFO DAPULAG @ PILI
with the use of said weapon which the accused had
provided himself for the purpose, thereby inflicting

upon said Rodolfo Dapulag @ Pili a mortal wound which

caused the death of said victim.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

[1]

Upon arraignment on February 1, 2000, wherein the

information was read to him in his own dialect,
petitioner, assisted by counsel, pleaded guilty to the
charge.[2] Forthwith, he invoked not only the mitigating
circumstance of plea of guilty, but also the
circumstance of voluntary surrender since, as shown in
the records, he surrendered voluntarily to the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Headquarters
immediately after the commission of the crime. The
public prosecutor did not raise any objection. Instead,
he manifested that there is no aggravating
circumstance which attended the commission of the
crime.
Thereupon, the trial court, after being satisfied that
petitioner understood the meaning and consequences
of his plea of guilty, rendered and promulgated its
Decision[3] in open court convicting him of homicide,
with the mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty and
voluntary surrender appreciated in his favor. The
dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court accepts the plea of guilty of
Joey Potot y Sorio, and finds him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide, and
appreciating in his favor the mitigating circumstances
of plea of guilty and voluntary surrender, with no
aggravating circumstance in attendance, and applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, sentences him to
suffer an imprisonment ranging from two (2) years four
(4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as
minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as maximum; to indemnify the heirs of Rodolfo
Dapulag y Conge, also known as Pili, in the amount
of P50,000.00; and to pay the costs.
The period during which the accused has undergone
preventive imprisonment shall be deducted in full from
the foregoing sentences involving deprivation of liberty
should the records reveal that he expressly agreed in
writing to abide by the same rules and regulations
governing convicted prisoner during his entire
detention period and if the records show that he is
entitled to the privilege under the law.
SO ORDERED.[4]
On February 3, 2000, petitioner, through counsel, filed
a manifestation with motion[5] informing the trial court
that he is not appealing from the Decision and praying
that a commitment order be issued so he could
immediately serve his sentence. Attached to the
motion is petitioner's letter to the court stating that he
does not intend to appeal from its Decision.[6]

However, on February 11, 2000, the private

complainant, Rosalie Dapulag (wife of the victim), filed
through counsel, a motion for
reconsideration/retrial[7] praying that the Decision be
set aside and that the case be heard again because
there were irregularities committed before and during
the trial which caused miscarriage of justice. The
motion, which bears the conformity of the public
prosecutor, alleges, among others, that:
The true facts surrounding the commission of the crime
as revealed by the eyewitnesses, EDUARDO BOYSON
and JIMUEL MARQUITA, on December 8, 1999 is that
RODOLFO DAPULAG, private offended partys deceased
husband, was killed on that fateful morning by accused
JOEY POTOT with the aid of DOMING JARILLA and
MARLITO NAZAM who respectively held the right and
left arm of Rodolfo Dapulag to ensure the commission
of the crime by accused Joey Potot.
This information was deliberately withheld by
the said eyewitnesses, especially EDUARDO
BOYSON, during the investigation conducted by
the police and the preliminary investigations
conducted by the presiding judge of MCTC of
Mondragon-San Roque and the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor upon the solicitations of Mayor
Elito Dapulag, who in good faith believed that the
inclusion of Doming Jarilla and Marlito Nazam would
make the prosecution of the case more difficult. The
eyewitnesses, who are likewise in the belief that
indeed the inclusion of the above-named persons
would complicate the case, withheld the said
information until witness Jimuel Marquita revealed
the same to the private offended party on December 8,
1999.
xxxxxxxxx
The private offended party (not in her capacity as such,
but as a citizen) has the right to demand from the
State the punishment of heinous crimes in accordance
with law. And such right is now in jeopardy of being lost
for some causes not attributable to her.
xxxxxxxxx
Hereto attached and made integral parts hereof are the
affidavits of eyewitnesses JIMUEL MARQUITA and
EDUARDO BOYSON. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner opposed[8] the motion, asserting that there
was no irregularity in the preliminary investigation of
the case and in the proceedings before the trial court;
and that the decision can no longer be modified or set
aside because it became final when he formally waived
his right to appeal.
The trial court, in its order dated May 3, 2000,
[9]
granted private complainant's motion and set aside
its February 1, 2000 Decision as proceeding from a

rigged, hence, sham hearing. It likewise ordered that

the records of the case be remanded to the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor for re-evaluation of the
evidence and to file the corresponding charge, thus:

partially or totally satisfied or served, or when the

accused has waived in writing his right to
appeal, or has applied for probation. (7a) (Emphasis
ours)

From the records are gathered that the case, as

originally referred to the Municipal Circuit Trial Court,
was for murder. In the conduct of the preliminary
investigation, said court determined that a prima
faciecase exists and recommended the accused be
held for trial on the charge. In his resolution
reviewing the records of the preliminary
investigation conducted by the municipal court,
the prosecutor entirely missed discussion of the
participation of two others allegedly in
conspiracy with the accused. The exclusion of
the two others identified as Doming Jarilla and
Marlito Nazam was orchestrated by the
Municipal Mayor who, in good faith, prevailed
upon the witnesses not to implicate them. To
these foregoing, the Provincial Prosecutor is in
conformity.

It is thus clear that only the accused may ask for a

modification or setting aside of a judgment
of conviction. And this he must do before the said
judgment becomes final or before he perfects his
appeal.Such judgment becomes final in any of the
following ways: (a) when no appeal is seasonably filed
by the accused, except in case of automatic review of
the decision imposing the capital penalty; [13] (b) when
he has partially or totally served his sentence; (c) when
he expressly waives his right to appeal the judgment,
except when the death penalty is imposed; or (d) when
he applies for probation. When one of these
circumstances is present, the trial court which
rendered the judgment of conviction loses jurisdiction
to alter, modify or revoke it.[14]

Accordingly, the Branch Clerk of Court shall remand the

records hereof to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
for re-evaluation of the evidence and to file the
corresponding charge supported by the same.The
motion or manifestation requesting for the issuance of
a commitment order filed by the defense is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration[10] contending that the trial court has
no jurisdiction to issue the February 1, 2000 order as
the Decision had become final, and that the said order
would place the accused in double jeopardy. In the
order of May 26, 2000,[11] the trial court denied the
motion for reconsideration for the reason that the State
is not bound by the error or negligence of its
prosecuting officers, hence, jeopardy does not attach.
Petitioner now assails the orders of May 3 and 26,
2000.
The Solicitor General agrees with the petitioner that
the challenged orders should be set aside and that the
February 1, 2000 Decision should be reinstated. [12]
We find the petition meritorious.
Section 7, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, as amended, provides:
SEC. 7. Modification of judgment. A judgment
of conviction may, upon motion of the
accused, be modified or set aside before it
becomes final or before appeal is perfected. Except
where the death penalty is imposed, a judgment
becomes final after the lapse of the period for
perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has been

It is an undisputed fact that on February 3, 2000, or

three days after the promulgation of the judgment of
conviction, petitioner filed a manifestation expressly
waiving his right to appeal therefrom. His intention not
to appeal is further indicated by his prayer in the same
manifestation for the immediate issuance of a
commitment order so he could serve his
sentence. Such waiver has the effect of causing the
judgment to become final and unalterable.[15] Thus, it
was beyond the authority of the trial court to issue the
order of May 3, 2000 setting aside its February 3, 2000
Decision which had attained finality.
In Calalang vs. Register of Deeds of Quezon City [16] and
in a long line of cases, this Court (En Banc) held that a
judgment which has acquired the status of finality
becomes immutable. Any error, assuming one was
committed in the judgment, will not justify its
amendment except only to correct clerical errors or
mistakes.
It is likewise procedurally impermissible for the trial
court to grant private complainant's motion for
reconsideration of its Decision. Section 1, Rule 121 of
the same Rules provides:
SECTION 1. New trial or reconsideration. - At any
time before a judgment of conviction becomes final,
the court may, on motion of the accused or at its
own instance but with the consent of the
accused, grant a new trial or reconsideration.
(1a) (Emphasis ours)
Since the motion for reconsideration of the judgment of
conviction was not initiated by the accused (petitioner)
or at the instance of the trial court with his consent,
the same should have been denied outright as being
violative of the above provision.

At any rate, the records do not show any irregularity in

the preliminary investigation of the case before the
Provincial Prosecutors Office. The motion for
reconsideration filed by the private complainant
questions the (1) alleged failure of the Provincial
Prosecutor to appreciate the sworn statements of two
prosecution witnesses implicating two other individuals
in the commission of the crime; and the (2)
downgrading by the Provincial Prosecutor of the initial
charge of murder to homicide. But the motion for
reconsideration itself reveals that the supposed vital
information from two witnesses implicating two other
persons in the crime was deliberately withheld by
the said witnesses during the police investigation
and the preliminary investigation conducted by the
MCTC Judge and the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor. Hence, the Provincial Prosecutor who
reviewed the records could not have possibly
appreciated the alleged vital facts. Besides, the
complainant did not appeal from the Provincial
Prosecutors finding of probable cause for the crime of
homicide against petitioner. It bears stressing at this
point that the public prosecutor has the quasi-judicial
prerogative to determine what crime should be filed in
court and who should be charged therefor. He always
assumes and retains full discretion and control of the
prosecution of all criminal actions.[17] As held by this
Court in People vs. Vergara:[18]
Section 5 of Rule 110 of the New Rules of Criminal
Procedure expressly provides that [a]ll criminal
actions commenced by a complaint or
information shall be prosecuted under the
direction and control of the fiscal. It must be
remembered that as public prosecutor he is the
representative not of the ordinary party to a
controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to
govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to
govern all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal
prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that
justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and
very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold
aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence
suffer. Hence, the fiscal or public prosecutor
always assumes and retains full direction and
control of the prosecution of the case. The
institution of a criminal action depends upon his
sound discretion. He has the quasi-judicial
discretion to determine whether or not a
criminal case should be filed in court; whether
a prima facie case exists to sustain the filing of
an Information; whether to include in the charge
those who appear to be responsible for the
crime; whether to present such evidence which he
may consider necessary. (Emphasis ours)
Finally, we agree with the petitioner that the assailed
orders would violate his constitutional right against
double jeopardy.[19] Such right prohibits any subsequent
prosecution of any person for a crime of which he has

previously been acquitted or convicted. The objective

is to set the effects of the first prosecution forever at
rest, assuring the accused that he shall not thereafter
be subjected to the peril and anxiety of a second
charge against him for the same offense.[20]
To invoke the defense of double jeopardy, the following
requisites must be present: (1) a valid complaint or
information; (2) the court has jurisdiction to try the
case; (3) the accused has pleaded to the charge;
and (4) he has been convicted or acquitted, or the case
against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without
his express consent.[21]
These requisites have been established. Records show
that petitioner was charged with homicide in Criminal
Case No. 2739 under a valid information before the
trial court which has jurisdiction over it.He was
arraigned and pleaded guilty to the charge. On the
basis of his plea, petitioner was convicted and meted
the corresponding penalty. As petitioner has been
placed in jeopardy for the crime of homicide, he cannot
be prosecuted anew for the same offense, or any
offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily
included in the first offense charged.[22]
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby
GRANTED. The assailed orders dated May 3, 2000 and
May 26, 2000 issued in Criminal Case No. 2739 by the
trial court are SET ASIDE. Its Decision dated February
1, 2000 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 141518. April 29, 2003]

PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. CLARENCE
ASTUDILLO, CRISANTO ASTUDILLO, alias ANTENG
or ENTENG, HILARIO ASTUDILLO, alias
BODA, appellant.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision[1] of the Regional
Trial Court of Bangued, Abra, Branch 2, in Criminal
Case No. 1698, convicting appellants Clarence
Astudillo, Crisanto Astudillo and Hilario Astudillo of the
crime of Murder; sentencing them to suffer the
penalty reclusion perpetua and ordering them, jointly
and severally, to pay damages to the heirs of the
deceased, Silvestre Aquino, Jr.
The Information filed against the appellants reads:

That on or about November 12, 1995, at around 7:30

oclock in the evening at Zone 7, Municipality of
Bangued, Province of Abra, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping one another, with intent to kill, with treachery
and evident premeditation and while armed with a
sharp-pointed instrument (unrecovered) did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously stab one
SILVESTRE AQUINO, JR., thereby inflicting multiple stab
wounds on the different parts of his body, which
caused his death and thereafter, the accused rode on
an unregistered motorized tricycle (recovered) with
Municipal Plate No. 7077, which they used in escaping
from the crime scene.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
Upon arraignment on November 21, 1995, appellants
pleaded not guilty.[3] Trial on the merits thereafter
ensued.
The prosecutions account of the antecedent facts are
as follows: At around 7:00 p.m., of November 12, 1995,
brothers Clarence, Crisanto and Hilario Astudillo, went
to house of Alberto Damian who was celebrating the
eve of his birthday. Clarence greeted Alberto and
thereafter asked the victim, Silvestre Aquino, who was
one of the visitors, to go with him.[4] Silvestre acceded
and the two walked towards Floras Store, where they
were later joined by Crisanto and Hilario. While at the
store, Crisanto and Silvestre had an argument.[5]
At around that time, prosecution eyewitnesses Manuel
Bareng and Eduardo Bata, 12 and 11 years of age,
respectively, were selling balut in front of Floras
Store. They saw Clarence stab Silvestre with a bolo
while Crisanto and Hilario held him by the
wrists. Clarence delivered several stab blows at the
back and on the chest of the victim until the latter fell
to the ground.Thereafter, the three appellants fled on
board a tricycle.[6]
Silvestre was rushed to the Municipal Health Office of
Bangued, Abra, where he was pronounced dead on
arrival. The Autopsy Report prepared by Dr. Milagros
Cardenas-Burgos revealed that the victim sustained 15
stab wounds and 1 abrasion, as follows:
EXTERNAL FINDINGS:
Stab wound 2 cm., Antero-lateral aspect, neck, [r]ight
Stab wound #2, penetrating 3 cm., each. Antero-lateral
aspect, neck, left [2 cm.], penetrating , 3rd Intercostal
space, paresternal area, left
2 cm., 7th mid axillary line, left
1.5 cm., anterior superior iliac spine, left

1.5 cm., upper outer quadrant, left

1.5 cm., Antero-lateral aspect, middle third thigh, left
2.0 cm., infrascapular area, left
3.0 cm., dorsolateral aspect, forearm, middle third, left
2 cm., dorsomidial aspect, forearm, middle third, left
2.0 cm., suprascapular area, right
1.5 cm., infrascapular area, paravertebral area, right
1.5 cm., paravertebral area, right
2.5 cm., Level of T8, midscapular area, right
#2, 1.5-2.0 cm., lumbar area, paravertebral area, right
Abrasion #2 1.0 2.0 cm., Level T7, paravertebral area,
left and right
INTERNAL FINDINGS:
Pericardium, 1.5 liter
LW, Right atrium traversing the right ventricle
Hemothorax, left 1 liter
LW, 1.0 cm., posterior lobe, lung left
CAUSE OF DEATH:
Cardiac Tamponade, secondary to Stab Wound.[7]
On the other hand, the version of the defense is as
follows: On November 12, 1995 at around 7:00 p.m.,
Clarence passed by the house of Alberto Damian where
Silvestre and several others were playing
cards. Silvestre offered Clarence a glass of gin, which
he declined. Silvestre got embarrassed and cursed him
so he decided to leave the house. However, Silvestre
followed him in front of Floras Store and pushed him
twice, causing him to fall on the ground. Then, Silvestre
struck him on the head and arm with an empty oneliter softdrink bottle.[8]
Hilario arrived and tried to pacify Silvestre but the
latter attacked him. As he retreated, he saw a knife
which he then swung at the victim. Silvestre was hit
but continued to attack him.Left with no choice, Hilario
stabbed Silvestre 2 or 3 times. When the latter
collapsed to the ground, Hilario rushed to the succor of
his elder brother, Clarence.[9] Meanwhile, Clarence
suffered from shock and remained seated on the
ground while their other brother, Crisanto, stood on the
roadside and called for help.[10] The appellants left the
scene on board a tricycle and proceeded to the house
of Clarences in-laws. On the same night, they
surrendered to the Philippine National Police, stationed
at Bangued, Abra.[11]

On March 16, 1998, the trial court rendered a decision

convicting appellants of the crime of Murder qualified
by abuse of superior strength.[12] Appellants filed a
motion for reconsideration contending that the
prosecution failed to prove their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt and, assuming that it did, the
qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength,
not having been alleged in the information, cannot be
appreciated against them.[13] Appellants motion for
reconsideration was denied in an Order dated July 13,
1998.[14] However, an Amended Decision[15] was
rendered where the phrase abuse of superior strength
was replaced with TREACHERY in the body of the
Decision and in the decretal portion thereof, which
reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds all the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of murder, defined and
penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code
as amended by Rep Act No. 7659, qualified by
TREACHERY AND for having conspired together and
helping one another to kill Silvestre Aquino, Jr., with the
aggravating circumstance of use of motor vehicle,
[which is] however, offset by the ordinary mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender and sentences
them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to
pay jointly and severally the heirs of Silvestre Aquino,
Jr., the amount of P65,288.50 [as] actual damages,
P50,000.00 for his death and suffering plus
P500,000.00 [as] moral and exemplary damages and
to pay the costs of this suit.

judge who had the front-line opportunity to personally

evaluate the witnesses demeanor, conduct, and
behavior while testifying. In the absence of a clear
showing that some fact or circumstance of weight or
substance had been overlooked, misunderstood or
misapplied, the trial judges assessment of the
witnesses testimonies shall not be disturbed on appeal.
A careful review of the records of the case at bar shows
that the trial court did not miss any such material
circumstance, nor did it commit any palpable error in
upholding the facts as established by the
prosecution. We see no reason to doubt the positive
and straightforward testimonies of the prosecution
eyewitnesses, Manuel Bareng and Eduardo Bata, that
the appellants ganged up on the defenseless
victim. These witnesses were not shown to have been
impelled by ill-motive to falsely testify against the
appellants, hence, their testimony is entitled to full
faith and credit.[18]

THE TRIAL COURT FURTHER ERRED WHEN IT RULED

THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS GUILTY OF CONSPIRACY
AND SENTENCED THEM TO A UNIFORM PENALTY. [17]

Moreover, the alleged inconsistencies between the

testimony of the prosecution witnesses and their
affidavit are too inconsequential to merit
consideration. Specifically, appellants point to the
failure of Eduardo Bata to state in his sworn statement
that appellants Crisanto and Hilario restrained the
victim while Clarence stabbed him, as well as the
alleged unfamiliarity of prosecution witness Manny
Bareng with the Ilocano
words bagsol and binagsol (which mean stab and
stabbed, respectively), in his sworn statement. Suffice
it to state that inconsistencies between the sworn
statement and direct testimony given in open court do
not necessarily discredit the witness since an affidavit,
being taken ex-parte, is oftentimes incomplete and is
generally regarded as inferior to the testimony of the
witness in open court. Judicial notice can be taken of
the fact that testimonies given during trial are much
more exact and elaborate than those stated in sworn
statements, usually being incomplete and inaccurate
for a variety of reasons, at times because of partial and
innocent suggestions or for want of specific
inquiries. Additionally, an extrajudicial statement or
affidavit is generally not prepared by the affiant
himself but by another who uses his own language in
writing the affiants statement, hence, omissions and
misunderstandings by the writer are not
infrequent. Indeed, the prosecution witnesses direct
and categorical declarations on the witness stand are
superior to their extrajudicial statements. This is
especially so because their testimony to the effect that
Crisanto and Hilario held the victims wrists while
Clarence stabbed him remained consistent even under
cross-examination.[19]

The resolution of the instant case hinges on the

credibility of the witnesses. The settled rule is that the
matter of assigning value to a declaration on the
witness stand is more competently performed by a trial

The trial court correctly rejected the appellants selfdefense theory. When an accused invokes self-defense,
he thereby admits authorship of the crime. The burden
of proof is thus shifted on him to prove all the elements

SO ORDERED.[16]
Hence, appellants interposed the instant appeal,
raising the following errors:
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR
WHEN IT DID NOT ACQUIT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS
ON THE GROUND OF REASONABLE DOUBT.
THE TRIAL COURT LIKEWISE COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE
ERROR WHEN IT CONVICTED THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANTS OF MURDER.
THE TRIAL COURT FURTHER COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE
ERROR AND ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION WHEN IT RENDERED THE SECOND
DECISION DATED JULY 10, 1998.
THE TRIAL COURT ALSO ERRED WHEN IT CONVICTED
ALL THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

of self-defense, to wit: (1) unlawful aggression on the

part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the
means employed to repel the aggression; and (3) lack
of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused.[20]
In the instant case, even if it was true that the initial
act of aggression came from the deceased, still the
appellants plea of self-defense will not prosper. As
stated above, the evidence overwhelmingly shows that
appellants Crisanto and Hilario were able to restrain
the victim by the wrists. At that point, any unlawful
aggression or danger on the lives of the appellants
ceased, hence, it was no longer necessary for appellant
Clarence to repeatedly stab the victim. Verily, their act
could no longer be interpreted as an act of selfpreservation but a perverse desire to kill.
[21]
Furthermore, the number of wounds sustained by
the victim negates self-defense. It certainly defies
reason why the victim sustained a total of 15 wounds
on the different parts of his body if appellants were
only defending themselves. Parenthetically, the
number of wounds was eloquently established by the
physical evidence, which is a mute manifestation of
truth and ranks high in the hierarchy of trustworthy
evidence.[22]
From the attendant circumstances, it is evident that
appellants collective and individual act of holding the
victims wrists and delivering several stab blows
demonstrated the existence of their common design to
kill the victim. Direct proof of an agreement concerning
the commission of a felony and the decision to commit
it is not necessary. Conspiracy, as in the instant case,
can be inferred from the acts of the three appellants
which clearly manifest a concurrence of wills and a
common intent or design to commit a crime.[23]
Anent the qualifying circumstance of treachery, we find
no merit in appellants contention that the trial cannot
validly appreciate the same in its amended decision
because the attendance of treachery was not one of
the issues raised in their motion for
reconsideration. Otherwise stated, appellants posit that
the reconsideration of the judgment of conviction
should be limited only to the issues raised in their
motion for reconsideration, i.e., their guilt or innocence
and/or the propriety of appreciating the qualifying
circumstance of abuse of superior strength which was
not alleged in the information.
Under Rule 121, Section 1 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure,[24] a motion for reconsideration of a
judgment of conviction may be filed by the accused, or
initiated by the court, with the consent of the
accused. Likewise, under Rule 120, Section 7,[25] a
judgment of conviction may be modified or set aside
only upon motion of the accused.[26] These provisions
changed the previous rulings[27] of the Court to the
effect that such modification may be made upon
motion of the fiscal, provided the same is made before

a judgment has become final or an appeal has been

perfected.[28] The requisite consent of the accused to
such motion for reconsideration or modification is
intended to protect the latter from having to defend
himself anew from more serious offenses or penalties
which the prosecution or the court may have
overlooked.[29] Accordingly, once the judgment has
been validly promulgated, any reconsideration or
amendment to correct a manifest substantial error,
even if unwittingly committed by the trial court through
oversight or an initially erroneous comprehension, can
be made only with the consent or upon the instance of
the accused. Errors in the decision cannot be corrected
unless the accused consents thereto, or himself moves
for reconsideration of, or appeals from, the decision. [30]
It must be stressed, however, that the protection
against double jeopardy in the foregoing rules may be
waived by the accused. Thus, when the accused
himself files or consents to the filing of a motion for
reconsideration or modification, double jeopardy
cannot be invoked because the accused waived his
right not to be placed therein by filing such motion.
[31]
His motion gives the court an opportunity to rectify
its errors or to reevaluate its assessment of facts and
conclusions of law and make them conformable with
the statute applicable to the case in the new judgment
it has to render.[32] The raison detre is to afford the
court a chance to correct its own mistakes and to avoid
unnecessary appeals from being taken.[33] In effect, a
motion for reconsideration or modification filed by or
with consent of the accused renders the entire
evidence open for the review of the trial court without,
however, conducting further proceedings, such as the
taking of additional proof.
Clearly, therefore, appellants cannot dictate upon the
trial court which aspects of the judgment of conviction
should be reviewed. Having filed a timely motion for
reconsideration asking the court to acquit, or in the
alternative, convict them of the lesser offense of
homicide, appellants waived the defense of double
jeopardy and effectively placed the evidence taken at
the trial open for the review of the trial court. At any
rate, the issue of the attendant qualifying circumstance
in the case at bar was squarely raised by the
appellants in their alternative prayer for conviction for
the lesser offense of homicide in view of the erroneous
appreciation of the qualifying circumstance of abuse of
superior strength which was not alleged in the
information.Hence, the court a quo is not only
empowered but also under obligation to rectify its
mistake in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of
abuse of superior strength instead of treachery.Verily, it
is precluded from considering the attendance of a
qualifying circumstance if the complaint or information
did not allege such facts.[34] Even before the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure[35] took effect on
December 1, 2000, qualifying circumstances were
required to be so specified in the complaint or

information, otherwise they cannot be appreciated

against the accused.
In order that treachery may be considered, the
following requisites must concur: (1) the employment
of means, method or manner of execution which would
ensure the safety of the malefactor from defensive or
retaliatory acts on the part of the victim, no
opportunity being given to the latter to defend himself
or to retaliate; and (2) the means, method, or manner
of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted
by the offender.[36] Here, it is clear that treachery
qualified the killing of the deceased to murder,
considering that the appellants deliberately restrained
the victim so as to enable one of them to successfully
deliver the stab blows without giving the latter a
chance to defend himself or to retaliate.
As regards the generic aggravating circumstance of
use of motor vehicle, the trial court erred in
appreciating the same inasmuch as the prosecution
failed to show that the tricycle was deliberately used
by the appellants to facilitate the commission of the
crime or that the crime could not have been committed
without it. The use of motor vehicle is not aggravating
where the use thereof was merely incidental and was
not purposely sought to facilitate the commission of
the offense or to render the escape of the offender
easier and his apprehension difficult.[37]
The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender
was correctly appreciated in favor of appellants. To
benefit an accused, the following requisites must be
proven, namely: (1) the offender has not actually been
arrested; (2) the offender surrendered himself to a
person in authority; and (3) the surrender was
voluntary. A surrender to be voluntary must be
spontaneous, showing the intent of the accused to
submit himself unconditionally to the authorities, either
because he acknowledges his guilt, or he wishes to
save them the trouble and expense necessarily
incurred in his search and capture.[38]
In the case at bar, appellants voluntarily surrendered to
the authorities on the same night of the incident when
they learned that the authorities were looking for them.
[39]
Though they did not give a statement regarding the
stabbing incident, the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender should nonetheless be considered
in their favor. What matters is that they spontaneously,
voluntarily and unconditionally placed themselves at
the disposal of the authorities. This act of respect for
the law indicates a moral disposition favorable to their
reform.[40]
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, Murder is
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. With no
generic aggravating circumstance and one generic
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the

penalty imposable on the appellants, in accordance

with Article 63 (3) of the Revised Penal Code, should be
the minimum period, which is reclusion perpetua.[41]
With respect to the civil liability of the appellants, the
award of moral and exemplary damages cannot be
lumped together as was done by the trial court. These
kinds of damages are different in nature, and require
separate determination. Moral damages are awarded
where the claimant experienced physical suffering,
mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, and similar injury as a result of the
felonious act.[42] The award of exemplary damages, on
the other hand, is warranted when the commission of
the offense is attended by an aggravating
circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying. In People
v. Catubig,[43] we explained:
The term aggravating circumstances used by the Civil
Code, the law not having specified otherwise, is to be
understood in its broad or generic sense. The
commission of an offense has a two-pronged effect,
one on the public as it breaches the social order and
the other upon the private victim as it causes personal
sufferings, each of which is addressed by, respectively,
the prescription of heavier punishment for the accused
and by an award of additional damages to the
victim. The increase of the penalty or a shift to a
graver felony underscores the exacerbation of the
offense by the attendance of aggravating
circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, in its
commission. Unlike the criminal liability which is
basically a State concern, the award of damages,
however, is likewise, if not primarily, intended for the
offended party who suffers thereby. It would make little
sense for an award of exemplary damages to be due
the private offended party when the aggravating
circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is
qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying nature of
an aggravating circumstance is a distinction that
should only be of consequence to the criminal, rather
than to the civil, liability of the offender. In fine, relative
to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating
circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should
entitle the offended party to an award of exemplary
damages within the unbridled meaning of Article 2230
of the Civil Code.[44]
As testified to by the widow of the deceased, the death
of her husband brought grief and emotional suffering
to their family.[45] Hence, they are entitled to moral
damages in the amount of P50,000.00, pursuant to
current jurisprudence.[46] Likewise, the presence of the
qualifying circumstance of treachery in the killing of
the deceased justifies the award of P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages.[47]
The award of actual damages should also be
modified. In order that actual damages may be

recovered, the amount actually expended in

connection with the death of the victim must be
substantiated with a reasonable degree of certainty,
premised upon competent proof and on the best
evidence obtainable by the injured party. In the instant
case, the records show that the amount of P65,288.50
awarded by the trial court as actual damages is not
fully substantiated by receipts.[48] However, as the heirs
of the deceased actually incurred funeral expenses,
they are entitled to temperate damages.[49] In the
recent case of People v. Abrazaldo,[50] we ruled that
where the amount of actual damages cannot be
determined because of absence or lack of receipts to
prove the amount claimed, temperate damages in the
amount of P25,000.00 should be awarded.
Finally, the civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00
is affirmed. In murder, the grant of civil indemnity
which has been fixed by jurisprudence at P50,000.00,
requires no proof other than the fact of death as a
result of the crime and proof of the accuseds
responsibility therefor.[51]

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Decision

of the Regional Trial Court of Bangued, Abra, Branch 2,
in Criminal Case No. 1698, finding appellants, Clarence
Astudillo, Crisanto Astudillo @ Anteng or Enteng, and
Hilario Astudillo @ Boda, guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of murder and sentencing them to
suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetuais AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to the civil
liability. As modified, appellants are ordered, jointly and
severally, to pay the heirs of the deceased, Silvestre
Aquino, Jr., the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00
as temperate damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.