Legal Ethics Cases

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
appointment, at least thirty-five years of age and holders of a college degree. However, a
majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.' (Emphasis supplied)
SECOND DIVISION
Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law

as a legal qualification to an appointive office.
G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991

Black defines "practice of law" as:
RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner,
vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT, and
HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and
Management, respondents.
Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.
Legal Ethics SY 2016-2017
Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner.
PARAS, J.:p
We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While ostensibly only legal
issues are involved, the Court's decision in this case would indubitably have a profound effect on
the political aspect of our national existence.
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:
There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six
Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the
time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college
degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the
immediately preceding -elections. However, a majority thereof, including the
Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten years. (Emphasis supplied)
The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution
which similarly provides:
There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and eight
Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal
principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is
not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of
litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident
to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal
instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces
all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the
law. An attorney engages in the practice of law by maintaining an office where he
is held out to be-an attorney, using a letterhead describing himself as an
attorney, counseling clients in legal matters, negotiating with opposing counsel
about pending litigation, and fixing and collecting fees for services rendered by
his associate. (Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust
Co. v. Dworken,129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the practice
of law when he:
... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms,
associations or corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a
representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or prospective,
before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission
constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such
representative capacity performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or
defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in
a representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their
rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court
or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex.
rel. Mckittrick v..C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-177)
stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it
embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on
behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general,
all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in mattersconnected with the
law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services
contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a
mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency
proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of
estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the
preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the
determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions.
(5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied)
Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work
performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings
in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety
of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an
extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these
transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are
always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a
high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great
capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary
functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the
administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the
question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the
lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice
and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the
public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons
possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting
at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all
attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.] , p. 665666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode
Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139,144). (Emphasis
ours)
The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers
(1974-1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as advocacy,
counselling and public service.
One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the
profession. If what he does exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual
for attorneys engaging in the active practice of their profession, and he follows
some one or more lines of employment such as this he is a practicing attorney at
law within the meaning of the statute. (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW 312)
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform
those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice
or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal
knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23)
The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a liberal
interpretation of the term "practice of law."
MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a
manifestation which I forgot to do during our review of the
provisions on the Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to
make a very brief statement?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
The Commissioner will please proceed.
MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members
of the Commission on Audit. Among others, the qualifications
provided for by Section I is that "They must be Members of the
Philippine Bar" I am quoting from the provision "who have
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years".
To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the
Bar who are now employed in the COA or Commission on Audit, we would like to
make the clarification that this provision on qualifications regarding members of
the Bar does not necessarily refer or involve actual practice of law outside the
COA We have to interpret this to mean that as long as the lawyers who are
employed in the COA are using their legal knowledge or legal talent in their
respective work within COA, then they are qualified to be considered for
appointment as members or commissioners, even chairman, of the Commission
on Audit.
This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and
Agencies and we deem it important to take it up on the floor so that this
interpretation may be made available whenever this provision on the
qualifications as regards members of the Philippine Bar engaging in the practice

of law for at least ten years is taken up.
MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a
lawyer is equivalent to the requirement of a law practice that is
set forth in the Article on the Commission on Audit?
MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA,
although it is auditing, will necessarily involve legal work; it will
involve legal work. And, therefore, lawyers who are employed in
COA now would have the necessary qualifications in
accordance with the Provision on qualifications under our
provisions on the Commission on Audit. And, therefore, the
answer is yes.
MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this
is equivalent to the practice of law.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Thank you.
... ( Emphasis supplied)
Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the Chairman
and two Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA) should either be certified public
accountants with not less than ten years of auditing practice, or members of the Philippine Bar
who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (emphasis supplied)
Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways synonymous with the
word "lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do not engage in private practice, it is still a fact
that the majority of lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary Munneke, Opportunities in Law
Careers [VGM Career Horizons: Illinois], [1986], p. 15).
At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly understood,
means "an individual or organization engaged in the business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.).
Lawyers who practice alone are often called "sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called
"firms." The firm is usually a partnership and members of the firm are the partners. Some firms
may be organized as professional corporations and the members called shareholders. In either
case, the members of the firm are the experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or
more inexperienced salaried attorneyscalled "associates." (Ibid.).
The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is essentially
tautologous, unhelpful defining the practice of law as that which lawyers do. (Charles W.
Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice of
law is defined as the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be
the practice of law. (State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d
863, 870 [1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d 623, 626 [1941]).
Because lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and governmental
realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to be workable.(Wolfram, op. cit.).
The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly familiar
role for lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little
time in courtrooms, and a large percentage spend their entire practice without litigating a case.
(Ibid., p. 593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer's role
colors much of both the public image and the self perception of the legal profession. (Ibid.).
In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not reality.
(Ibid.). Why is this so? Recall that the late Alexander SyCip, a corporate lawyer, once articulated
on the importance of a lawyer as a business counselor in this wise: "Even today, there are still
uninformed laymen whose concept of an attorney is one who principally tries cases before the
courts. The members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen, know
that in most developed societies today, substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices
than in the courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-litigation work
also know that in most cases they find themselves spending more time doing what [is] loosely
desccribe[d] as business counseling than in trying cases. The business lawyer has been
described as the planner, the diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not [be]
stress[ed] that in law, as in medicine, surgery should be avoided where internal medicine can be
effective." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in a number of legal
tasks, each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions,
clients, and other interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized
practice wig usually perform at least some legal services outside their specialty. And even within
a narrow specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift from one legal task or role such as
advice-giving to an importantly different one such as representing a client before an
administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687).
By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare
types a litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work
will require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client
counselling, advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation. And increasingly lawyers find that
the new skills of evaluation and mediation are both effective for many clients and a source of
employment. (Ibid.).
Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is constrained in
very important ways, at least theoretically, so as to remove from it some of the salient features of
adversarial litigation. Of these special roles, the most prominent is that of prosecutor. In some
lawyers' work the constraints are imposed both by the nature of the client and by the way in
which the lawyer is organized into a social unit to perform that work. The most common of these
roles are those of corporate practice and government legal service. (Ibid.).
In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are emerging
trends in corporate law practice, a departure from the traditional concept of practice of law.
We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary
transformation in corporate law practice. Lawyers and other professional groups,
in particular those members participating in various legal-policy decisional
contexts, are finding that understanding the major emerging trends in
corporation law is indispensable to intelligent decision-making.
Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an
accurate understanding of the nature and implications of the corporate law
research function accompanied by an accelerating rate of information
accumulation. The recognition of the need for such improved corporate legal
policy formulation, particularly "model-making" and "contingency planning," has
impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional procedures in many decisional
contexts.
In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the sorting
and weighing of significant conditional factors, the appraisal of major trends, the
necessity of estimating the consequences of given courses of action, and the
need for fast decision and response in situations of acute danger have prompted
the use of sophisticated concepts of information flow theory, operational
analysis, automatic data processing, and electronic computing equipment.
Understandably, an improved decisional structure must stress the predictive
component of the policy-making process, wherein a "model", of the decisional
context or a segment thereof is developed to test projected alternative courses
of action in terms of futuristic effects flowing therefrom.
Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting

and projecting the trends of the law, the subject of corporate finance law has
received relatively little organized and formalized attention in the philosophy of
advancing corporate legal education. Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary approach
to legal research has become a vital necessity.
Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained
primarily in the law can be improved through an early introduction to multivariable decisional context and the various approaches for handling such
problems. Lawyers, particularly with either a master's or doctorate degree in
business administration or management, functioning at the legal policy level of
decision-making now have some appreciation for the concepts and analytical
techniques of other professions which are currently engaged in similar types of
complex decision-making.
Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would require
the services of an astute attorney because of the complex legal implications that
arise from each and every necessary step in securing and maintaining the
business issue raised. (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989,
p. 4).
In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as
the "abogado de campanilla." He is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big money and
with a clientele composed of the tycoons and magnates of business and
industry.
Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not
explain what it is that a corporate lawyer does. For one, the number of attorneys
employed by a single corporation will vary with the size and type of the
corporation. Many smaller and some large corporations farm out all their legal
problems to private law firms. Many others have in-house counsel only for
certain matters. Other corporation have a staff large enough to handle most legal
problems in-house.
A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the
legal affairs of a corporation. His areas of concern or jurisdiction may
include, inter alia: corporate legal research, tax laws research, acting out as
corporate secretary (in board meetings), appearances in both courts and other
adjudicatory agencies (including the Securities and Exchange Commission), and
in other capacities which require an ability to deal with the law.
At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the legal
affairs of the business of the corporation he is representing. These include such
matters as determining policy and becoming involved in management.
( Emphasis supplied.)
In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated from the
action, or not understanding how one's work actually fits into the work of the
orgarnization. This can be frustrating to someone who needs to see the results
of his work first hand. In short, a corporate lawyer is sometimes offered this
fortune to be more closely involved in the running of the business.
Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged by a

multinational corporation (MNC). Some large MNCs provide one of the few
opportunities available to corporate lawyers to enter the international law field.
After all, international law is practiced in a relatively small number of companies
and law firms. Because working in a foreign country is perceived by many as
glamorous, tills is an area coveted by corporate lawyers. In most cases,
however, the overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys while the younger
attorneys do their "international practice" in law libraries. (Business Star,
"Corporate Law Practice," May 25,1990, p. 4).
This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of finance.
To borrow the lines of Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad
lawyer is one who fails to spot problems, a good lawyer is one who perceives the
difficulties, and the excellent lawyer is one who surmounts them." (Business
Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm," so to
speak. No longer are we talking of the traditional law teaching method of
confining the subject study to the Corporation Code and the Securities Code but
an incursion as well into the intertwining modern management issues.
Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types of
learning: (1) acquisition of insights into current advances which are of particular
significance to the corporate counsel; (2) an introduction to usable disciplinary
skins applicable to a corporate counsel's management responsibilities; and (3) a
devotion to the organization and management of the legal function itself.
These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a
shared area linking them. Otherwise known as "intersecting managerial
jurisprudence," it forms a unifying theme for the corporate counsel's total

learning.
Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel's role.
For that matter, the corporate lawyer reviews the globalization process, including
the resulting strategic repositioning that the firms he provides counsel for are
required to make, and the need to think about a corporation's; strategy at
multiple levels. The salience of the nation-state is being reduced as firms deal
both with global multinational entities and simultaneously with sub-national
governmental units. Firms increasingly collaborate not only with public entities
but with each other often with those who are competitors in other arenas.
Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within the
corporation is rapidly changing. The modem corporate lawyer has gained a new
role as a stakeholder in some cases participating in the organization and
operations of governance through participation on boards and other decisionmaking roles. Often these new patterns develop alongside existing legal
institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. These trends are complicated as
corporations organize for global operations. ( Emphasis supplied)
The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies
toward the promotion and management of technology. New collaborative
arrangements for promoting specific technologies or competitiveness more
generally require approaches from industry that differ from older, more
adversarial relationships and traditional forms of seeking to influence
governmental policies. And there are lessons to be learned from other countries.
In Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of collaborative efforts
between governmental and business Japan's MITI is world famous. (Emphasis
supplied)
Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate Counsel
comprises a distinct group within the managerial structure of all kinds of
organizations. Effectiveness of both long-term and temporary groups within
organizations has been found to be related to indentifiable factors in the groupcontext interaction such as the groups actively revising their knowledge of the
environment coordinating work with outsiders, promoting team achievements
within the organization. In general, such external activities are better predictors
of team performance than internal group processes.
In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer visa-vis the managerial mettle of corporations are challenged. Current research is
seeking ways both to anticipate effective managerial procedures and to

understand relationships of financial liability and insurance considerations.
(Emphasis supplied)
Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors are apropos:
First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an
effective tool for new managerial thinking regarding both planning and pressing
immediate problems. An understanding of the role of feedback loops, inventory
levels, and rates of flow, enable users to simulate all sorts of systematic
problems physical, economic, managerial, social, and psychological. New
programming techniques now make the system dynamics principles more
accessible to managers including corporate counsels. (Emphasis supplied)
Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions

involving complexity and uncertainty. In the context of a law department, it can
be used to appraise the settlement value of litigation, aid in negotiation
settlement, and minimize the cost and risk involved in managing a portfolio of
cases. (Emphasis supplied)
Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can be
used directly by parties and mediators in all lands of negotiations. All integrated
set of such tools provide coherent and effective negotiation support, including
hands-on on instruction in these techniques. A simulation case of an
international joint venture may be used to illustrate the point.
[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function,
concern three pointed areas of consideration, thus:
Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that comprise
a major part of the general counsel's responsibilities. They differ from those of
remedial law. Preventive lawyering is concerned with minimizing the risks of
legal trouble and maximizing legal rights for such legal entities at that time when
transactional or similar facts are being considered and made.
Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are undertaken
those activities of the firm to which legal consequences attach. It needs to be
directly supportive of this nation's evolving economic and organizational fabric as
firms change to stay competitive in a global, interdependent environment. The
practice and theory of "law" is not adequate today to facilitate the relationships
needed in trying to make a global economy work.
Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office. The general

counsel has emerged in the last decade as one of the most vibrant subsets of
the legal profession. The corporate counsel hear responsibility for key aspects of
the firm's strategic issues, including structuring its global operations, managing
improved relationships with an increasingly diversified body of employees,
managing expanded liability exposure, creating new and varied interactions with
public decision-makers, coping internally with more complex make or by
decisions.
This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not
enough to make one a good general corporate counsel nor to give him a full
sense of how the legal system shapes corporate activities. And even if the
corporate lawyer's aim is not the understand all of the law's effects on corporate
activities, he must, at the very least, also gain a working knowledge of the
management issues if only to be able to grasp not only the basic legal
"constitution' or makeup of the modem corporation. "Business Star", "The
Corporate Counsel," April 10, 1991, p. 4).
The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more than a
passing knowledge of financial law affecting each aspect of their work. Yet, many
would admit to ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law territory. What
transpires next is a dilemma of professional security: Will the lawyer admit
ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign understanding and risk
exposure? (Business Star, "Corporate Finance law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of
Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on
Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod
does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as
Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he
assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's
nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and
Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as
Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of
1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees
as lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo)
After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked
in the law office of his father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod
worked as an operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved
getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries negotiating loans and coordinating legal,
economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked
with the Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer of an investment bank and
subsequently of a business conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to various
companies as a legal and economic consultant or chief executive officer. As former SecretaryGeneral (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved being
knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before
the Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former CoChairman of the Bishops Businessmen's Conference for Human Development, has worked with
the under privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for
and engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and lately the urban land reform
bill. Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, a
quast judicial body, which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of the
Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of
Public Officers, for which he was cited by the President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia
Muoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile government functions with individual
freedoms and public accountability and the party-list system for the House of Representative.
(pp. 128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis supplied)
Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a member.
In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and which
is adequately constituted to meet the various contingencies that arise during a
negotiation. Besides top officials of the Borrower concerned, there are the legal
officer (such as the legal counsel), the finance manager, and an operations
officer (such as an official involved in negotiating the contracts) who comprise
the members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan Negotiating Strategies for
Developing Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2, Central Bank of the
Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)
After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it lays down
the law as far as the loan transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan
Agreement can be compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental parts: (1)
business terms; (2) borrower's representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4)

covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p. 13).
In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring
program. For aside from performing the tasks of legislative drafting and legal
advising, they score national development policies as key factors in maintaining
their countries' sovereignty. (Condensed from the work paper, entitled "Wanted:
Development Lawyers for Developing Nations," submitted by L. Michael Hager,
regional legal adviser of the United States Agency for International Development,
during the Session on Law for the Development of Nations at the Abidjan World
Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by the World Peace Through Law Center
on August 26-31, 1973). ( Emphasis supplied)
Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely
renegotiation policies, demand expertise in the law of contracts, in legislation
and agreement drafting and in renegotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer
may work with an international business specialist or an economist in the
formulation of a model loan agreement. Debt restructuring contract agreements
contain such a mixture of technical language that they should be carefully
drafted and signed only with the advise of competent counsel in conjunction with
the guidance of adequate technical support personnel. (See International Law
Aspects of the Philippine External Debts, an unpublished dissertation, U.S.T.
Graduate School of Law, 1987, p. 321). ( Emphasis supplied)
A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the set of
terms and conditions which determines the contractual remedies for a failure to
perform one or more elements of the contract. A good agreement must not only
define the responsibilities of both parties, but must also state the recourse open
to either party when the other fails to discharge an obligation. For a compleat
debt restructuring represents a devotion to that principle which in the ultimate
analysis issine qua non for foreign loan agreements-an adherence to the rule of
law in domestic and international affairs of whose kind U.S. Supreme Court
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said: "They carry no banners, they beat
no drums; but where they are, men learn that bustle and bush are not the equal
of quiet genius and serene mastery." (See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of
Lawyers in Foreign Investments," Integrated Bar of the Philippine Journal, Vol.
15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law". particularly the
modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by
the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a
lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a
lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional
requirement that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court
said:
Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the
officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being
that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does,
then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others
better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a political question
involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can
decide. (emphasis supplied)
No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171
SCRA 744) where it stated:
It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all the
other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no alternative but to
attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Law. The
Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that
another person is more qualified for a particular position. It also has no authority
to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. To do so would be an
encroachment on the discretion vested upon the appointing authority. An
appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is
vested, subject to the only condition that the appointee should possess the
qualifications required by law. ( Emphasis supplied)
The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4) stages:
(1) nomination; (2) confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a
commission (in the Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on Appointments of its
certificate of confirmation, the President issues the permanent appointment; and (4) acceptance
e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949;
Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p. 200)
without reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall hold office
for seven years, two Members for five years, and the last Members for three
years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the
unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or
designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say that his
definition of the practice of law is the traditional or stereotyped notion of law
practice, as distinguished from the modern concept of the practice of law, which
modern connotation is exactly what was intended by the eminent framers of the
1987 Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's definition would require generally
a habitual law practice, perhaps practised two or three times a week and would
outlaw say, law practice once or twice a year for ten consecutive years. Clearly,
this is far from the constitutional intent.
Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my written
opinion, I made use of a definition of law practice which really means nothing because the
definition says that law practice " . . . is what people ordinarily mean by the practice of law." True
I cited the definition but only by way of sarcasm as evident from my statement that the definition
of law practice by "traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous" or defining a
phrase by means of the phrase itself that is being defined.
Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations, most
individuals, in making use of the law, or in advising others on what the law means, are actually
practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod
is a lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who has been practising law for over ten years. This
is different from the acts of persons practising law, without first becoming lawyers.
Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President of the
Philippines, say, on the ground that he lacks one or more qualifications. This matter, I greatly
doubt. For one thing, how can an action or petition be brought against the President? And even
assuming that he is indeed disqualified, how can the action be entertained since he is the
incumbent President?
We now proceed:
The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of Monsod
as Chairman of the Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article
IX of the Constitution which provides:
The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the President with
the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years
The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's
confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by
law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power
is beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such
grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission's
judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective
power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or
excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly
shown.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
Additionally, consider the following:

(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President, may
the Supreme Court reverse the Commission, and thus in effect confirm the
appointment? Clearly, the answer is in the negative.
(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the Commission
has confirmed? The answer is likewise clear.
Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993

MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner,
vs.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent.
R E SO L U T I O N
(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S.
Congress) decides to confirma Presidential nominee, it would be incredible that
the U.S. Supreme Court would still reverse the U.S. Senate.
Finally, one significant legal maxim is:

We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life.
Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea asked Delilah
(who was Samson's beloved) for help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that
No blade shall touch his skin;
No blood shall flow from his veins.
When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an iron rod
burning white-hot two or three inches away from in front of Samson's eyes. This blinded the man.
Upon hearing of what had happened to her beloved, Delilah was beside herself with anger, and
fuming with righteous fury, accused the procurator of reneging on his word. The procurator calmly
replied: "Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?" The procurator was
clearly relying on the letter, not the spirit of the agreement.
In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
REGALADO, J.:
Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease and desist from issuing
advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as that of annexes "A" and "B" (of said petition)
and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from making advertisements pertaining to the
exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by law."
The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:
Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.
THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL 5217232, 5222041 CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am
6:00 pm 7-Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Mla.
Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE.
DON PARKINSON
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The
Legal Clinic beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext.
Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence.
Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign
Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.
THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave., LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy
CLINIC, INC. 1 Tel. 521-7232; 521-7251; 522-2041; 521-0767
It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are champterous,
unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community
in the integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a member of the legal profession, he is
ashamed and offended by the said advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as
hereinbefore quoted.
In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisement at its
instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal
support services" through paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic machines.
Respondent further argues that assuming that the services advertised are legal services, the act
of advertising these services should be allowed supposedly
in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona, 2 reportedly
decided by the United States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.
Considering the critical implications on the legal profession of the issues raised herein, we
required the (1) Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), (2) Philippine Bar Association (PBA), (3)
Philippine Lawyers' Association (PLA), (4) U.P. Womens Lawyers' Circle (WILOCI), (5) Women
Lawyers Association of the Philippines (WLAP), and (6) Federacion International de Abogadas
(FIDA) to submit their respective position papers on the controversy and, thereafter, their
memoranda. 3 The said bar associations readily responded and extended their valuable services
and cooperation of which this Court takes note with appreciation and gratitude.
The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are whether or not the services offered by
respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes practice of law and, in either
case, whether the same can properly be the subject of the advertisements herein complained of.
Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the merits of this case, we deem it proper and
enlightening to present hereunder excerpts from the respective position papers adopted by the
aforementioned bar associations and the memoranda submitted by them on the issues involved
in this bar matter.
1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines:
xxx xxx xxx
Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which respondent endeavored to
distinguish the two terms,i.e., "legal support services" vis-a-vis "legal services",
common sense would readily dictate that the same are essentially without
substantial distinction. For who could deny that document search, evidence
gathering, assistance to layman in need of basic institutional services from
government or non-government agencies like birth, marriage, property, or
business registration, obtaining documents like clearance, passports, local or
foreign visas, constitutes practice of law?
xxx xxx xxx
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not wish to make issue with
respondent's foreign citations. Suffice it to state that the IBP has made its
position manifest, to wit, that it strongly opposes the view espoused by
respondent (to the effect that today it is alright to advertise one's legal services).
The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms its opposition to
respondent's act of establishing a "legal clinic" and of concomitantly advertising
the same through newspaper publications.
The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative supervision of this Honorable
Court to perpetually restrain respondent from undertaking highly unethical
activities in the field of law practice as aforedescribed. 4
xxx xxx xxx
A. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic, Inc." gives the impression that
respondent corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it renders legal
services.
While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers legal services to the public,
the advertisements in question give the impression that respondent is offering
legal services. The Petition in fact simply assumes this to be so, as earlier
mentioned, apparently because this (is) the effect that the advertisements have
on the reading public.
The impression created by the advertisements in question can be traced, first of
all, to the very name being used by respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." Such a
name, it is respectfully submitted connotes the rendering of legal services for
legal problems, just like a medical clinic connotes medical services for medical
problems. More importantly, the term "Legal Clinic" connotes lawyers, as the
term medical clinic connotes doctors.
Furthermore, the respondent's name, as published in the advertisements subject

of the present case, appears with (the) scale(s) of justice, which all the more
reinforces the impression that it is being operated by members of the bar and
that it offers legal services. In addition, the advertisements in question appear
with a picture and name of a person being represented as a lawyer from Guam,
and this practically removes whatever doubt may still remain as to the nature of
the service or services being offered.
It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is merely offering "legal support
services" as claimed by it, or whether it offers legal services as any lawyer
actively engaged in law practice does. And it becomes unnecessary to make a
distinction between "legal services" and "legal support services," as the
respondent would have it. The advertisements in question leave no room for
doubt in the minds of the reading public that legal services are being offered by
lawyers, whether true or not.
B. The advertisements in question are meant to induce the performance of acts
contrary to law, morals, public order and public policy.
It may be conceded that, as the respondent claims, the advertisements in
question are only meant to inform the general public of the services being
offered by it. Said advertisements, however, emphasize to Guam divorce, and
any law student ought to know that under the Family Code, there is only one
instance when a foreign divorce is recognized, and that is:
Article 26. . . .
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry,
the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under

Philippine Law.
It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family Code (defines) a marriage as
follows:
Article 1. Marriage is special contract of permanent
union between a man and woman entered into accordance with
law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the
foundation of the family and an inviolable social
institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are
governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that
marriage settlements may fix the property relation during the
marriage within the limits provided by this Code.
By simply reading the questioned advertisements, it is obvious that the message
being conveyed is that Filipinos can avoid the legal consequences of a marriage
celebrated in accordance with our law, by simply going to Guam for a divorce.
This is not only misleading, but encourages, or serves to induce, violation of
Philippine law. At the very least, this can be considered "the dark side" of legal
practice, where certain defects in Philippine laws are exploited for the sake of
profit. At worst, this is outright malpractice.
Rule 1.02. A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed
at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal
system.
In addition, it may also be relevant to point out that advertisements such as that
shown in Annex "A" of the Petition, which contains a cartoon of a motor vehicle
with the words "Just Married" on its bumper and seems to address those
planning a "secret marriage," if not suggesting a "secret marriage," makes light
of the "special contract of permanent union," the inviolable social institution,"
which is how the Family Code describes marriage, obviously to emphasize its
sanctity and inviolability. Worse, this particular advertisement appears to
encourage marriages celebrated in secrecy, which is suggestive of immoral
publication of applications for a marriage license.
If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to be reviewed, it can readily be
concluded that the above impressions one may gather from the advertisements
in question are accurate. The Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion example alone
confirms what the advertisements suggest. Here it can be seen that criminal acts
are being encouraged or committed

(a bigamous marriage in Hong Kong or Las Vegas) with impunity simply because
the jurisdiction of Philippine courts does not extend to the place where the crime
is committed.
Even if it be assumed, arguendo, (that) the "legal support services" respondent
offers do not constitute legal services as commonly understood, the
advertisements in question give the impression that respondent corporation is
being operated by lawyers and that it offers legal services, as earlier discussed.
Thus, the only logical consequence is that, in the eyes of an ordinary newspaper
reader, members of the bar themselves are encouraging or inducing the
performance of acts which are contrary to law, morals, good customs and the
public good, thereby destroying and demeaning the integrity of the Bar.
xxx xxx xxx

It is respectfully submitted that respondent should be enjoined from causing the
publication of the advertisements in question, or any other advertisements
similar thereto. It is also submitted that respondent should be prohibited from
further performing or offering some of the services it presently offers, or, at the
very least, from offering such services to the public in general.
The IBP is aware of the fact that providing computerized legal research,
electronic data gathering, storage and retrieval, standardized legal forms,
investigators for gathering of evidence, and like services will greatly benefit the
legal profession and should not be stifled but instead encouraged. However,
when the conduct of such business by non-members of the Bar encroaches
upon the practice of law, there can be no choice but to prohibit such business.
Admittedly, many of the services involved in the case at bar can be better
performed by specialists in other fields, such as computer experts, who by
reason of their having devoted time and effort exclusively to such field cannot
fulfill the exacting requirements for admission to the Bar. To prohibit them from
"encroaching" upon the legal profession will deny the profession of the great
benefits and advantages of modern technology. Indeed, a lawyer using a
computer will be doing better than a lawyer using a typewriter, even if both are
(equal) in skill.
Technological development in the profession may be encouraged without

tolerating, but instead ensuring prevention of illegal practice.
There might be nothing objectionable if respondent is allowed to perform all of its
services, but only if such services are made available exclusively to members of
the Bench and Bar. Respondent would then be offering technical assistance, not
legal services. Alternatively, the more difficult task of carefully distinguishing
between which service may be offered to the public in general and which should
be made available exclusively to members of the Bar may be undertaken. This,
however, may require further proceedings because of the factual considerations
involved.
It must be emphasized, however, that some of respondent's services ought to be
prohibited outright, such as acts which tend to suggest or induce celebration
abroad of marriages which are bigamous or otherwise illegal and void under
Philippine law. While respondent may not be prohibited from simply
disseminating information regarding such matters, it must be required to include,
in the information given, a disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law, that
certain course of action may be illegal under Philippine law, that it is not
authorized or capable of rendering a legal opinion, that a lawyer should be
consulted before deciding on which course of action to take, and that it cannot
recommend any particular lawyer without subjecting itself to possible sanctions
for illegal practice of law.
If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising should be directed exclusively
at members of the Bar, with a clear and unmistakable disclaimer that it is not
authorized to practice law or perform legal services.
The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot be ignored. But nobody
should be allowed to represent himself as a "paralegal" for profit, without such
term being clearly defined by rule or regulation, and without any adequate and
effective means of regulating his activities. Also, law practice in a corporate form
may prove to be advantageous to the legal profession, but before allowance of
such practice may be considered, the corporation's Article of Incorporation and
By-laws must conform to each and every provision of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the Rules of Court. 5
2. Philippine Bar Association:
Both the Bench and the Bar, however, should be careful not to allow or tolerate
the illegal practice of law in any form, not only for the protection of members of
the Bar but also, and more importantly, for the protection of the public.
xxx xxx xxx.
Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in the practice of law but engaged in
giving legal support services to lawyers and laymen, through experienced
paralegals, with the use of modern computers and electronic machines" (pars. 2
and 3, Comment). This is absurd. Unquestionably, respondent's acts of holding
out itself to the public under the trade name "The Legal Clinic, Inc.," and
soliciting employment for its enumerated services fall within the realm of a
practice which thus yields itself to the regulatory powers of the Supreme Court.
For respondent to say that it is merely engaged in paralegal work is to stretch
credulity. Respondent's own commercial advertisement which announces a
certain Atty. Don Parkinson to be handling the fields of law belies its pretense.
From all indications, respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." is offering and
rendering legal services through its reserve of lawyers. It has been held that the
practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court, but includes
drawing of deeds, incorporation, rendering opinions, and advising clients as to
their legal right and then take them to an attorney and ask the latter to look after
their case in court See Martin, Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1984 ed., p. 39).
It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage in the practice of law, and
such limitation cannot be evaded by a corporation employing competent lawyers
to practice for it. Obviously, this is the scheme or device by which respondent
"The Legal Clinic, Inc." holds out itself to the public and solicits employment of its
legal services. It is an odious vehicle for deception, especially so when the public
cannot ventilate any grievance for malpractice against the business conduit.
Precisely, the limitation of practice of law to persons who have been duly
admitted as members of the Bar (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court) is to
subject the members to the discipline of the Supreme Court. Although
respondent uses its business name, the persons and the lawyers who act for it
are subject to court discipline. The practice of law is not a profession open to all
who wish to engage in it nor can it be assigned to another (See 5 Am. Jur. 270).
It is a personal right limited to persons who have qualified themselves under the
law. It follows that not only respondent but also all the persons who are acting for
respondent are the persons engaged in unethical law practice. 6
3. Philippine Lawyers' Association:
The Philippine Lawyers' Association's position, in answer to the issues stated
herein, are wit:
1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law;
2. Such practice is unauthorized;
3. The advertisements complained of are not only unethical, but also misleading
and patently immoral; and
4. The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to supress and punish the Legal
Clinic and its corporate officers for its unauthorized practice of law and for its
unethical, misleading and immoral advertising.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent posits that is it not engaged in the practice of law. It claims that it
merely renders "legal support services" to answers, litigants and the general
public as enunciated in the Primary Purpose Clause of its Article(s) of
Incorporation. (See pages 2 to 5 of Respondent's Comment). But its advertised
services, as enumerated above, clearly and convincingly show that it is indeed
engaged in law practice, albeit outside of court.
As advertised, it offers the general public its advisory services on Persons and
Family Relations Law, particularly regarding foreign divorces, annulment of
marriages, secret marriages, absence and adoption; Immigration Laws,
particularly on visa related problems, immigration problems; the Investments
Law of the Philippines and such other related laws.
Its advertised services unmistakably require the application of the aforesaid law,
the legal principles and procedures related thereto, the legal advices based
thereon and which activities call for legal training, knowledge and experience.
Applying the test laid down by the Court in the aforecited Agrava Case, the
activities of respondent fall squarely and are embraced in what lawyers and
laymen equally term as "the practice of law." 7
4. U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle:
In resolving, the issues before this Honorable Court, paramount consideration
should be given to the protection of the general public from the danger of being
exploited by unqualified persons or entities who may be engaged in the practice
of law.
At present, becoming a lawyer requires one to take a rigorous four-year course
of study on top of a four-year bachelor of arts or sciences course and then to
take and pass the bar examinations. Only then, is a lawyer qualified to practice
law.
While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many jurisdiction as an aid to the

administration of justice, there are in those jurisdictions, courses of study and/or
standards which would qualify these paralegals to deal with the general public as
such. While it may now be the opportune time to establish these courses of
study and/or standards, the fact remains that at present, these do not exist in the
Philippines. In the meantime, this Honorable Court may decide to make
measures to protect the general public from being exploited by those who may
be dealing with the general public in the guise of being "paralegals" without
being qualified to do so.
In the same manner, the general public should also be protected from the
dangers which may be brought about by advertising of legal services. While it
appears that lawyers are prohibited under the present Code of Professional
Responsibility from advertising, it appears in the instant case that legal services
are being advertised not by lawyers but by an entity staffed by "paralegals."
Clearly, measures should be taken to protect the general public from falling prey
to those who advertise legal services without being qualified to offer such
services. 8
A perusal of the questioned advertisements of Respondent, however, seems to
give the impression that information regarding validity of marriages, divorce,
annulment of marriage, immigration, visa extensions, declaration of absence,
adoption and foreign investment, which are in essence, legal matters , will be
given to them if they avail of its services. The Respondent's name The Legal
Clinic, Inc. does not help matters. It gives the impression again that
Respondent will or can cure the legal problems brought to them. Assuming that
Respondent is, as claimed, staffed purely by paralegals, it also gives the
misleading impression that there are lawyers involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc.,
as there are doctors in any medical clinic, when only "paralegals" are involved in
The Legal Clinic, Inc.
Respondent's allegations are further belied by the very admissions of its
President and majority stockholder, Atty. Nogales, who gave an insight on the
structure and main purpose of Respondent corporation in the aforementioned
"Starweek" article." 9
5. Women Lawyer's Association of the Philippines:
Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are clearly advertisements to solicit cases for
the purpose of gain which, as provided for under the above cited law, (are) illegal
and against the Code of Professional Responsibility of lawyers in this country.
Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal in that it is an advertisement to solicit
cases, but it is illegal in that in bold letters it announces that the Legal Clinic,
Inc., could work out/cause the celebration of a secret marriage which is not only
illegal but immoral in this country. While it is advertised that one has to go to said
agency and pay P560 for a valid marriage it is certainly fooling the public for
valid marriages in the Philippines are solemnized only by officers authorized to
do so under the law. And to employ an agency for said purpose of contracting
marriage is not necessary.
No amount of reasoning that in the USA, Canada and other countries the trend
is towards allowing lawyers to advertise their special skills to enable people to
obtain from qualified practitioners legal services for their particular needs can
justify the use of advertisements such as are the subject matter of the petition,
for one (cannot) justify an illegal act even by whatever merit the illegal act may
serve. The law has yet to be amended so that such act could become justifiable.
We submit further that these advertisements that seem to project that secret
marriages and divorce are possible in this country for a fee, when in fact it is not
so, are highly reprehensible.
It would encourage people to consult this clinic about how they could go about
having a secret marriage here, when it cannot nor should ever be attempted,
and seek advice on divorce, where in this country there is none, except under
the Code of Muslim Personal Laws in the Philippines. It is also against good
morals and is deceitful because it falsely represents to the public to be able to do
that which by our laws cannot be done (and) by our Code of Morals should not
be done.
In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the Supreme Court held that
solicitation for clients by an attorney by circulars of advertisements, is
unprofessional, and offenses of this character justify permanent elimination from
the Bar. 10
6. Federacion Internacional de Abogados:
xxx xxx xxx
1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the practice of law, such as
management consultancy firms or travel agencies, whether run by lawyers or
not, perform the services rendered by Respondent does not necessarily lead to
the conclusion that Respondent is not unlawfully practicing law. In the same
vein, however, the fact that the business of respondent (assuming it can be
engaged in independently of the practice of law) involves knowledge of the law
does not necessarily make respondent guilty of unlawful practice of law.
. . . . Of necessity, no one . . . . acting as a consultant can render
effective service unless he is familiar with such statutes and
regulations. He must be careful not to suggest a course of
conduct which the law forbids. It seems . . . .clear that (the
consultant's) knowledge of the law, and his use of that
knowledge as a factor in determining what measures he shall
recommend, do not constitute the practice of law . . . . It is not
only presumed that all men know the law, but it is a fact that
most men have considerable acquaintance with broad features
of the law . . . . Our knowledge of the law accurate or
inaccurate moulds our conduct not only when we are acting
for ourselves, but when we are serving others. Bankers, liquor
dealers and laymen generally possess rather precise knowledge
of the laws touching their particular business or profession. A
good example is the architect, who must be familiar with zoning,
building and fire prevention codes, factory and tenement house
statutes, and who draws plans and specification in harmony with
the law. This is not practicing law.
But suppose the architect, asked by his client to omit a fire
tower, replies that it is required by the statute. Or the industrial
relations expert cites, in support of some measure that he
recommends, a decision of the National Labor Relations Board.
Are they practicing law? In my opinion, they are not, provided no
separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information, and
the legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major nonlegal problem.
It is largely a matter of degree and of custom.
If it were usual for one intending to erect a building on his land to
engage a lawyer to advise him and the architect in respect to the
building code and the like, then an architect who performed this
function would probably be considered to be trespassing on
territory reserved for licensed attorneys. Likewise, if the
industrial relations field had been pre-empted by lawyers, or
custom placed a lawyer always at the elbow of the lay personnel
man. But this is not the case. The most important body of the
industrial relations experts are the officers and business agents

of the labor unions and few of them are lawyers. Among the
larger corporate employers, it has been the practice for some
years to delegate special responsibility in employee matters to a
management group chosen for their practical knowledge and
skill in such matter, and without regard to legal thinking or lack of
it. More recently, consultants like the defendants have the same
service that the larger employers get from their own specialized
staff.
The handling of industrial relations is growing into a recognized
profession for which appropriate courses are offered by our
leading universities. The court should be very cautious about
declaring [that] a widespread, well-established method of
conducting business is unlawful, or that the considerable class
of men who customarily perform a certain function have no right
to do so, or that the technical education given by our schools
cannot be used by the graduates in their business.
In determining whether a man is practicing law, we should
consider his work for any particular client or customer, as a
whole. I can imagine defendant being engaged primarily to
advise as to the law defining his client's obligations to his
employees, to guide his client's obligations to his employees, to
guide his client along the path charted by law. This, of course,
would be the practice of the law. But such is not the fact in the
case before me. Defendant's primarily efforts are along
economic and psychological lines. The law only provides the
frame within which he must work, just as the zoning code limits
the kind of building the limits the kind of building the architect
may plan. The incidental legal advice or information defendant
may give, does not transform his activities into the practice of
law. Let me add that if, even as a minor feature of his work, he
performed services which are customarily reserved to members
of the bar, he would be practicing law. For instance, if as part of
a welfare program, he drew employees' wills.
Another branch of defendant's work is the representations of the
employer in the adjustment of grievances and in collective
bargaining, with or without a mediator. This is not per se the
practice of law. Anyone may use an agent for negotiations and
may select an agent particularly skilled in the subject under
discussion, and the person appointed is free to accept the

employment whether or not he is a member of the bar. Here,
however, there may be an exception where the business turns
on a question of law. Most real estate sales are negotiated by
brokers who are not lawyers. But if the value of the land
depends on a disputed right-of-way and the principal role of the
negotiator is to assess the probable outcome of the dispute and
persuade the opposite party to the same opinion, then it may be
that only a lawyer can accept the assignment. Or if a
controversy between an employer and his men grows from
differing interpretations of a contract, or of a statute, it is quite
likely that defendant should not handle it. But I need not reach a
definite conclusion here, since the situation is not presented by
the proofs.
Defendant also appears to represent the employer before
administrative agencies of the federal government, especially
before trial examiners of the National Labor Relations Board. An
agency of the federal government, acting by virtue of an
authority granted by the Congress, may regulate the
representation of parties before such agency. The State of New
Jersey is without power to interfere with such determination or to
forbid representation before the agency by one whom the
agency admits. The rules of the National Labor Relations Board
give to a party the right to appear in person, or by counsel, or by
other representative. Rules and Regulations, September 11th,
1946, S. 203.31. 'Counsel' here means a licensed attorney, and
ther representative' one not a lawyer. In this phase of his work,
defendant may lawfully do whatever the Labor Board allows,
even arguing questions purely legal. (Auerbacher v. Wood, 53 A.
2d 800, cited in Statsky, Introduction to Paralegalism [1974], at
pp. 154-156.).
1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a person engaged in a lawful calling
(which may involve knowledge of the law) is not engaged in the practice of law
provided that:
(a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal
problem;.
(b) The services performed are not customarily reserved to members of the bar; .
(c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information.

All these must be considered in relation to the work for any particular client as a
whole.
1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer and non-lawyer, the Code of
Professional Responsibility succintly states the rule of conduct:
Rule 15.08 A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or occupation
concurrently with the practice of law shall make clear to his client whether he is
acting as a lawyer or in another capacity.
1.10. In the present case. the Legal Clinic appears to render wedding services
(See Annex "A" Petition). Services on routine, straightforward marriages, like
securing a marriage license, and making arrangements with a priest or a judge,
may not constitute practice of law. However, if the problem is as complicated as
that described in "Rx for Legal Problems" on the Sharon Cuneta-Gabby
Concepcion-Richard Gomez case, then what may be involved is actually the
practice of law. If a non-lawyer, such as the Legal Clinic, renders such services
then it is engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give information on divorce, absence,
annulment of marriage and visas (See Annexes "A" and "B" Petition). Purely
giving informational materials may not constitute of law. The business is similar
to that of a bookstore where the customer buys materials on the subject and
determines on the subject and determines by himself what courses of action to
take.
It is not entirely improbable, however, that aside from purely giving information,
the Legal Clinic's paralegals may apply the law to the particular problem of the
client, and give legal advice. Such would constitute unauthorized practice of law.
It cannot be claimed that the publication of a legal text which
publication of a legal text which purports to say what the law is
amount to legal practice. And the mere fact that the principles or
rules stated in the text may be accepted by a particular reader
as a solution to his problem does not affect this. . . . . Apparently
it is urged that the conjoining of these two, that is, the text and
the forms, with advice as to how the forms should be filled out,
constitutes the unlawful practice of law. But that is the situation
with many approved and accepted texts. Dacey's book is sold to
the public at large. There is no personal contact or relationship

with a particular individual. Nor does there exist that relation of
confidence and trust so necessary to the status of attorney and
client. THIS IS THE ESSENTIAL OF LEGAL PRACTICE THE
REPRESENTATION AND ADVISING OF A PARTICULAR
PERSON IN A PARTICULAR SITUATION. At most the book
assumes to offer general advice on common problems, and
does not purport to give personal advice on a specific problem
peculiar to a designated or readily identified person. Similarly
the defendant's publication does not purport to give personal
advice on a specific problem peculiar to a designated or readily
identified person in a particular situation in their publication
and sale of the kits, such publication and sale did not constitutes
the unlawful practice of law . . . . There being no legal
impediment under the statute to the sale of the kit, there was no
proper basis for the injunction against defendant maintaining an
office for the purpose of selling to persons seeking a divorce,
separation, annulment or separation agreement any printed
material or writings relating to matrimonial law or the prohibition
in the memorandum of modification of the judgment against
defendant having an interest in any publishing house publishing
his manuscript on divorce and against his having any personal
contact with any prospective purchaser. The record does fully
support, however, the finding that for the change of $75 or $100
for the kit, the defendant gave legal advice in the course of
personal contacts concerning particular problems which might
arise in the preparation and presentation of the purchaser's
asserted matrimonial cause of action or pursuit of other legal
remedies and assistance in the preparation of necessary
documents (The injunction therefore sought to) enjoin conduct
constituting the practice of law, particularly with reference to the
giving of advice and counsel by the defendant relating to specific
problems of particular individuals in connection with a divorce,
separation, annulment of separation agreement sought and
should be affirmed. (State v. Winder, 348, NYS 2D 270 [1973],
cited in Statsky, supra at p. 101.).
1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its services are "strictly non-diagnostic,
non-advisory. "It is not controverted, however, that if the services "involve giving
legal advice or counselling," such would constitute practice of law (Comment,
par. 6.2). It is in this light that FIDA submits that a factual inquiry may be
necessary for the judicious disposition of this case.
xxx xxx xxx

2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically objectionable in that it can give the impression
(or perpetuate the wrong notion) that there is a secret marriage. With all the
solemnities, formalities and other requisites of marriages (See Articles 2, et seq.,
Family Code), no Philippine marriage can be secret.
2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically objectionable. The second paragraph
thereof (which is not necessarily related to the first paragraph) fails to state the
limitation that only "paralegal services?" or "legal support services", and not legal
services, are available." 11
A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase "practice of law" becomes exigent for the
proper determination of the issues raised by the petition at bar. On this score, we note that the
clause "practice of law" has long been the subject of judicial construction and interpretation. The
courts have laid down general principles and doctrines explaining the meaning and scope of the
term, some of which we now take into account.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedures, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform
those acts which are characteristic of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give advice
or render any kind of service that involves legal knowledge or skill. 12
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice and
counsel, and the preparation of legal instruments and contract by which legal rights are secured,
although such matter may or may not be pending in a court. 13
In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally engages in three principal
types of professional activity: legal advice and instructions to clients to inform them of their rights
and obligations, preparation for clients of documents requiring knowledge of legal principles not
possessed by ordinary layman, and appearance for clients before public tribunals which possess
power and authority to determine rights of life, liberty, and property according to law, in order to
assist in proper interpretation and enforcement of law. 14
When a person participates in the a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the practice
of law. 15 One who confers with clients, advises them as to their legal rights and then takes the
business to an attorney and asks the latter to look after the case in court, is also practicing
law. 16 Giving advice for compensation regarding the legal status and rights of another and the
conduct with respect thereto constitutes a practice of law. 17 One who renders an opinion as to
the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is, to that extent, practicing law. 18
In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, 19 after citing the doctrines in several cases, we laid
down the test to determine whether certain acts constitute "practice of law," thus:
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal
principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is
not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of
litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident
to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal
instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces
all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the
law.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases on court.(Land Title Abstract and Trust
Co. v. Dworken , 129 Ohio St. 23, 193N. E. 650). A person is also considered to be in the
practice of law when he:
. . . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person,
firms, associations or corporations as to their right under the law, or appears in a
representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings, pending or prospective,
before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission
constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such
representative capacity, performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or
defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in
a representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their
rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court
or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex.
rel. Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S. W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).
This Court, in the case of Philippines Lawyers Association v. Agrava (105 Phil. 173, 176177),stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it
embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on
behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general,
all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the
law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services
contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a
mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency
proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters or

estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the
preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the
determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions.
(5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).
Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work
performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings
in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety
of subjects and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an
extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these
transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are
always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a
high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great
capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary
functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the
administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the
question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the
lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice
and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the
public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons
possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting
at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all
attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules o Court, Vol. 3 [1973 ed.], pp. 665666, citing In Re Opinion of the Justices [Mass], 194 N. E. 313, quoted in Rhode
Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 197 A. 139, 144).
The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of court. Applying the
aforementioned criteria to the case at bar, we agree with the perceptive findings and
observations of the aforestated bar associations that the activities of respondent, as advertised,
constitute "practice of law."
The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be seriously
considered nor sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent's own description of the
services it has been offering, to wit:
Legal support services basically consists of giving ready information by trained
paralegals to laymen and lawyers, which are strictly non-diagnostic, nonadvisory, through the extensive use of computers and modern information
technology in the gathering, processing, storage, transmission and reproduction
of information and communication, such as computerized legal research;
encoding and reproduction of documents and pleadings prepared by laymen or
lawyers; document search; evidence gathering; locating parties or witnesses to a

case; fact finding investigations; and assistance to laymen in need of basic
institutional services from government or non-government agencies, like birth,
marriage, property, or business registrations; educational or employment records
or certifications, obtaining documentation like clearances, passports, local or
foreign visas; giving information about laws of other countries that they may find
useful, like foreign divorce, marriage or adoption laws that they can avail of
preparatory to emigration to the foreign country, and other matters that do not
involve representation of clients in court; designing and installing computer
systems, programs, or software for the efficient management of law offices,
corporate legal departments, courts and other entities engaged in dispensing or
administering legal services. 20
While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve mechanical
and technical knowhow, such as the installation of computer systems and programs for the
efficient management of law offices, or the computerization of research aids and materials, these
will not suffice to justify an exception to the general rule.
What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and
lawyers. Its contention that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent
than real. In providing information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and
adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court that all the respondent corporation will simply do is
look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop there as if it were merely a
bookstore. With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the
client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper course of action to be taken
as may be provided for by said law. That is what its advertisements represent and for the which
services it will consequently charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely within the
jurisprudential definition of "practice of law." Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact that
respondent corporation does not represent clients in court since law practice, as the weight of
authority holds, is not limited merely giving legal advice, contract drafting and so forth.
The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article published in the January 13, 1991
issue of the Starweek/The Sunday Magazine of the Philippines Star, entitled "Rx for Legal
Problems," where an insight into the structure, main purpose and operations of respondent
corporation was given by its own "proprietor," Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales:
This is the kind of business that is transacted everyday at The Legal Clinic, with
offices on the seventh floor of the Victoria Building along U. N. Avenue in Manila.
No matter what the client's problem, and even if it is as complicated as the
Cuneta-Concepcion domestic situation, Atty. Nogales and his staff of lawyers,
who, like doctors are "specialists" in various fields can take care of it. The Legal
Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation and criminal law, medico-legal problems,
labor, litigation, and family law. These specialist are backed up by a battery of
paralegals, counsellors and attorneys.
Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984. Inspired by the trend in the
medical field toward specialization, it caters to clients who cannot afford the
services of the big law firms.
The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients. "when they come, we start by
analyzing the problem. That's what doctors do also. They ask you how you
contracted what's bothering you, they take your temperature, they observe you
for the symptoms and so on. That's how we operate, too. And once the problem
has been categorized, then it's referred to one of our specialists.
There are cases which do not, in medical terms, require surgery or follow-up
treatment. These The Legal Clinic disposes of in a matter of minutes. "Things
like preparing a simple deed of sale or an affidavit of loss can be taken care of
by our staff or, if this were a hospital the residents or the interns. We can take
care of these matters on a while you wait basis. Again, kung baga sa hospital,
out-patient, hindi kailangang ma-confine. It's just like a common cold or
diarrhea," explains Atty. Nogales.
Those cases which requires more extensive "treatment" are dealt with
accordingly. "If you had a rich relative who died and named you her sole heir,
and you stand to inherit millions of pesos of property, we would refer you to a
specialist in taxation. There would be real estate taxes and arrears which would
need to be put in order, and your relative is even taxed by the state for the right
to transfer her property, and only a specialist in taxation would be properly
trained to deal with the problem. Now, if there were other heirs contesting your
rich relatives will, then you would need a litigator, who knows how to arrange the
problem for presentation in court, and gather evidence to support the case. 21
That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not controlling. What
is important is that it is engaged in the practice of law by virtue of the nature of the services it
renders which thereby brings it within the ambit of the statutory prohibitions against the
advertisements which it has caused to be published and are now assailed in this proceeding.
Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U.P. WILOCI, said reported facts
sufficiently establish that the main purpose of respondent is to serve as a one-stop-shop of sorts
for various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal services from simple documentation
to complex litigation and corporate undertakings. Most of these services are undoubtedly beyond
the domain of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in the practice of
law. 22
States with their own code of professional ethics, such as the National Association of Legal
Assistants, Inc. and the American Paralegal Association.29
It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered by private respondent which
constitute practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a
member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of the Rules
of Court, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law. 23
In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and limited acceptance of what may be
considered as paralegal service. As pointed out by FIDA, some persons not duly licensed to
practice law are or have been allowed limited representation in behalf of another or to render
legal services, but such allowable services are limited in scope and extent by the law, rules or
regulations granting permission therefor. 30
Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified
in education and character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyers is an individual and
limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and
professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client and the bar from
the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the
disciplinary control of the court. 24
The same rule is observed in the american jurisdiction wherefrom respondent would wish to draw
support for his thesis. The doctrines there also stress that the practice of law is limited to those
who meet the requirements for, and have been admitted to, the bar, and various statutes or rules
specifically so provide. 25 The practice of law is not a lawful business except for members of the
bar who have complied with all the conditions required by statute and the rules of court. Only
those persons are allowed to practice law who, by reason of attainments previously acquired
through education and study, have been recognized by the courts as possessing profound
knowledge of legal science entitling them to advise, counsel with, protect, or defend the rights
claims, or liabilities of their clients, with respect to the construction, interpretation, operation and
effect of law. 26 The justification for excluding from the practice of law those not admitted to the
bar is found, not in the protection of the bar from competition, but in the protection of the public
from being advised and represented in legal matters by incompetent and unreliable persons over
whom the judicial department can exercise little control. 27
We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent's position that the concept in the United
States of paralegals as an occupation separate from the law profession be adopted in this
jurisdiction. Whatever may be its merits, respondent cannot but be aware that this should first be
a matter for judicial rules or legislative action, and not of unilateral adoption as it has done.
Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. As admitted by respondent, there are
schools and universities there which offer studies and degrees in paralegal education, while
there are none in the Philippines.28 As the concept of the "paralegals" or "legal assistant" evolved
in the United States, standards and guidelines also evolved to protect the general public. One of
the major standards or guidelines was developed by the American Bar Association which set up
Guidelines for the Approval of Legal Assistant Education Programs (1973). Legislation has even
been proposed to certify legal assistants. There are also associations of paralegals in the United
Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy that, in the absence of constitutional or
statutory authority, a person who has not been admitted as an attorney cannot practice law for
the proper administration of justice cannot be hindered by the unwarranted intrusion of an
unauthorized and unskilled person into the practice of law. 31 That policy should continue to be
one of encouraging persons who are unsure of their legal rights and remedies to seek legal
assistance only from persons licensed to practice law in the state. 32
Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true,
honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts. 33 He is not supposed to use
or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or
unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services. 34 Nor shall he pay or give
something of value to representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in return for,
publicity to attract legal business. 35 Prior to the adoption of the code of Professional
Responsibility, the Canons of Professional Ethics had also warned that lawyers should not resort
to indirect advertisements for professional employment, such as furnishing or inspiring
newspaper comments, or procuring his photograph to be published in connection with causes in
which the lawyer has been or is engaged or concerning the manner of their conduct, the
magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of the lawyer's position, and all other like selflaudation. 36
The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents. A
lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession. advertise his talents or skill as in a
manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. 37 The prescription against advertising of
legal services or solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental postulate that the that the
practice of law is a profession. Thus, in the case of The Director of Religious Affairs. vs.
Estanislao R. Bayot 38 an advertisement, similar to those of respondent which are involved in the
present proceeding,39 was held to constitute improper advertising or solicitation.
The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:
It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the

respondent of the ethics of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of
business from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among
other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain,
either personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is
highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant
advertises his wares. Law is a profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades
himself and his profession who stoops to and adopts the practices of
mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them to the public. As a
member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities as
the money-changers of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. "The most worthy and
effective advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, . . . . is the
establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to
trust. This cannot be forced but must be the outcome of character and conduct."
(Canon 27, Code of Ethics.).
We repeat, the canon of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a
well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the
outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the
community has a way of publicizing itself and catching public attention. That publicity is a normal
by-product of effective service which is right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no
artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees the difference
between a normal by-product of able service and the unwholesome result of propaganda. 40
Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited. The canons of the profession
enumerate exceptions to the rule against advertising or solicitation and define the extent to which
they may be undertaken. The exceptions are of two broad categories, namely, those which are
expressly allowed and those which are necessarily implied from the restrictions. 41
The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with
the standards of conduct imposed by the canons, of brief biographical and informative data.
"Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyer's name and
the names of his professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses;
branches of law practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar; schools attended
with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational distinction; public or quasi-public offices;
posts of honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions; membership and offices in bar
associations and committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the
fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with their
written consent, the names of clients regularly represented." 42
The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere
supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published
principally for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his brief
biographical and informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society program.
Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law list the conduct, management or
contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower the
dignity or standing of the profession. 43
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a
statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone
number and special branch of law practiced. The publication of a simple announcement of the
opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership, associates, firm name or office address,
being for the convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have his name
listed in a telephone directory but not under a designation of special branch of law. 44
Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the advertisements for which
respondent is being taken to task, which even includes a quotation of the fees charged by said
respondent corporation for services rendered, we find and so hold that the same definitely do not
and conclusively cannot fall under any of the above-mentioned exceptions.
The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of Arizona, 45 which is repeatedly invoked and
constitutes the justification relied upon by respondent, is obviously not applicable to the case at
bar. Foremost is the fact that the disciplinary rule involved in said case explicitly allows a lawyer,
as an exception to the prohibition against advertisements by lawyers, to publish a statement of
legal fees for an initial consultation or the availability upon request of a written schedule of fees
or an estimate of the fee to be charged for the specific services. No such exception is provided
for, expressly or impliedly, whether in our former Canons of Professional Ethics or the present
Code of Professional Responsibility. Besides, even the disciplinary rule in the Bates case
contains a proviso that the exceptions stated therein are "not applicable in any state unless and
until it is implemented by such authority in that state." 46 This goes to show that an exception to
the general rule, such as that being invoked by herein respondent, can be made only if and when
the canons expressly provide for such an exception. Otherwise, the prohibition stands, as in the
case at bar.
It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American Bar Association after the decision in
Bates, on the attitude of the public about lawyers after viewing television commercials, it was
found that public opinion dropped significantly 47 with respect to these characteristics of lawyers:
Trustworthy from 71% to 14%
Professional from 71% to 14%
Honest from 65% to 14%
Dignified from 45% to 14%
Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation of our legal and judicial systems, to
allow the publication of advertisements of the kind used by respondent would only serve to
aggravate what is already a deteriorating public opinion of the legal profession whose integrity
has consistently been under attack lately by media and the community in general. At this point in
time, it is of utmost importance in the face of such negative, even if unfair, criticisms at times, to
adopt and maintain that level of professional conduct which is beyond reproach, and to exert all
efforts to regain the high esteem formerly accorded to the legal profession.
In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the lawyer, subject to disciplinary action, to
advertise his services except in allowable instances 48 or to aid a layman in the unauthorized
practice of law. 49 Considering that Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales, who is the prime incorporator, major
stockholder and proprietor of The Legal Clinic, Inc. is a member of the Philippine Bar, he is
hereby reprimanded, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts which are
involved in this proceeding will be dealt with more severely.
While we deem it necessary that the question as to the legality or illegality of the purpose/s for
which the Legal Clinic, Inc. was created should be passed upon and determined, we are
constrained to refrain from lapsing into an obiter on that aspect since it is clearly not within the
adjudicative parameters of the present proceeding which is merely administrative in nature. It is,
of course, imperative that this matter be promptly determined, albeit in a different proceeding and
forum, since, under the present state of our law and jurisprudence, a corporation cannot be
organized for or engage in the practice of law in this country. This interdiction, just like the rule
against unethical advertising, cannot be subverted by employing some so-called paralegals
supposedly rendering the alleged support services.
The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by respondent is the concern and province
of the Solicitor General who can institute the corresponding quo warranto action, 50 after due
ascertainment of the factual background and basis for the grant of respondent's corporate
charter, in light of the putative misuse thereof. That spin-off from the instant bar matter is referred
to the Solicitor General for such action as may be necessary under the circumstances.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein respondent, The Legal
Clinic, Inc., from issuing or causing the publication or dissemination of any advertisement in any
form which is of the same or similar tenor and purpose as Annexes "A" and "B" of this petition,
and from conducting, directly or indirectly, any activity, operation or transaction proscribed by law
or the Code of Professional Ethics as indicated herein. Let copies of this resolution be furnished
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Office of the Solicitor
General for appropriate action in accordance herewith.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon,
Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ., concur

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 1625 February 12, 1990

ANGEL L. BAUTISTA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RAMON A. GONZALES, respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
In a verified complaint filed by Angel L. Bautista on May 19, 1976, respondent Ramon A.
Gonzales was charged with malpractice, deceit, gross misconduct and violation of lawyer's oath.
Required by this Court to answer the charges against him, respondent filed on June 19, 1976 a
motion for a bill of particulars asking this Court to order complainant to amend his complaint by
making his charges more definite. In a resolution dated June 28, 1976, the Court granted
respondent's motion and required complainant to file an amended complaint. On July 15, 1976,
complainant submitted an amended complaint for disbarment, alleging that respondent
committed the following acts:
1. Accepting a case wherein he agreed with his clients, namely,
Alfaro Fortunado, Nestor Fortunado and Editha Fortunado
[hereinafter referred to as the Fortunados] to pay all expenses,
including court fees, for a contingent fee of fifty percent (50%) of
the value of the property in litigation.
2. Acting as counsel for the Fortunados in Civil Case No. Q15143, wherein Eusebio Lopez, Jr. is one of the defendants and,
without said case being terminated, acting as counsel for
Eusebio Lopez, Jr. in Civil Case No. Q-15490;
3. Transferring to himself one-half of the properties of the

Fortunados, which properties are the subject of the litigation in
Civil Case No. Q-15143, while the case was still pending;
4. Inducing complainant, who was his former client, to enter into
a contract with him on August 30, 1971 for the development into
a residential subdivision of the land involved in Civil Case No. Q15143, covered by TCT No. T-1929, claiming that he acquired
fifty percent (50%) interest thereof as attorney's fees from the
Fortunados, while knowing fully well that the said property was
already sold at a public auction on June 30, 1971, by the
Provincial Sheriff of Lanao del Norte and registered with the
Register of Deeds of Iligan City;
5. Submitting to the Court of First Instance of Quezon City
falsified documents purporting to be true copies of "Addendum
to the Land Development Agreement dated August 30, 1971"
and submitting the same document to the Fiscal's Office of
Quezon City, in connection with the complaint for estafa filed by
respondent against complainant designated as I.S. No.
7512936;
6. Committing acts of treachery and disloyalty to complainant
who was his client;
7. Harassing the complainant by filing several complaints
without legal basis before the Court of First Instance and the
Fiscal's Office of Quezon City;
8. Deliberately misleading the Court of First Instance and the
Fiscal's Office by making false assertion of facts in his
pleadings;
9. Filing petitions "cleverly prepared (so) that while he does not
intentionally tell a he, he does not tell the truth either."
Respondent filed an answer on September 29, 1976 and an amended answer on November 18,
1976, denying the accusations against him. Complainant filed a reply to respondent's answer on
December 29, 1976 and on March 24, 1977 respondent filed a rejoinder.
In a resolution dated March 16, 1983, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Solicitor
General for investigation, report and recommendation. In the investigation conducted by the
Solicitor General, complainant presented himself as a witness and submitted Exhibits "A" to
"PP", while respondent appeared both as witness and counsel and submitted Exhibits "1" to "11".
The parties were required to submit their respective memoranda.
On May 16, 1988 respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint against him, claiming that
the long delay in the resolution of the complaint against him constitutes a violation of his
constitutional right to due process and speedy disposition of cases. Upon order of the Court, the
Solicitor General filed a comment to the motion to dismiss on August 8, 1988, explaining that the
delay in the investigation of the case was due to the numerous requests for postponement of
scheduled hearings filed by both parties and the motions for extension of time to file their
respective memoranda." [Comment of the Solicitor General, p. 2; Record, p. 365]. Respondent
filed a reply to the Solicitor General's comment on October 26, 1988. In a resolution dated
January 16, 1989 the Court required the Solicitor General to submit his report and
recommendation within thirty (30) days from notice.
On April 11, 1989, the Solicitor General submitted his report with the recommendation that Atty.
Ramon A. Gonzales be suspended for six (6) months. The Solicitor General found that
respondent committed the following acts of misconduct:
a. transferring to himself one-half of the properties of his clients during the

pendency of the case where the properties were involved;
b. concealing from complainant the fact that the property subject of their land
development agreement had already been sold at a public auction prior to the
execution of said agreement; and
c. misleading the court by submitting alleged true copies of a document where
two signatories who had not signed the original (or even the xerox copy) were
made to appear as having fixed their signatures [Report and Recommendation
of the Solicitor General, pp. 17-18; Rollo, pp. 403-404].
him. Respondent claims that the case should be referred to the IBP since Section 20 of Rule
139-B provides that:
This Rule shall take effect on June 1, 1988 and shall supersede the present Rule
139 entitled DISBARMENT OR SUSPENSION OF ATTORNEYS. All cases
pending investigation by the Office of the Solicitor General shall be transferred to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors for investigation and
disposition as provided in this Rule except those cases where the investigation
has been substantially completed.
The above contention of respondent is untenable. In the first place, contrary to respondent's
claim, reference to the IBP of complaints against lawyers is not mandatory upon the Court
[Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 79690-707; Zaldivar v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 80578,
October 7, 1988]. Reference of complaints to the IBP is not an exclusive procedure under the
terms of Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court [Ibid]. Under Sections 13 and 14 of Rule 139B, the Supreme Court may conduct disciplinary proceedings without the intervention of the IBP
by referring cases for investigation to the Solicitor General or to any officer of the Supreme Court
or judge of a lower court. In such a case, the report and recommendation of the investigating
official shall be reviewed directly by the Supreme Court. The Court shall base its final action on
the case on the report and recommendation submitted by the investigating official and the
evidence presented by the parties during the investigation.
Secondly, there is no need to refer the case to the IBP since at the time of the effectivity of Rule
139-B [June 1, 1988] the investigation conducted by the Office of the Solicitor General had been
substantially completed. Section 20 of Rule 139-B provides that only pending cases, the
investigation of which has not been substantially completed by the Office of the Solicitor General,
shall be transferred to the IBP. In this case the investigation by the Solicitor General was
terminated even before the effectivity of Rule 139-B. Respondent himself admitted in his motion
to dismiss that the Solicitor General terminated the investigation on November 26, 1986, the date
when respondent submitted his reply memorandum [Motion to Dismiss, p. 1; Record, p. 353].
Respondent then filed on April 14, 1989 a motion to refer the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation and disposition pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of
Court. Respondent manifested that he intends to submit more evidence before the IBP. Finally,
on November 27, 1989, respondent filed a supplemental motion to refer this case to the IBP,
containing additional arguments to bolster his contentions in his previous pleadings.
Thirdly, there is no need for further investigation since the Office of the Solicitor General already
made a thorough and comprehensive investigation of the case. To refer the case to the IBP, as
prayed for by the respondent, will result not only in duplication of the proceedings conducted by
the Solicitor General but also to further delay in the disposition of the present case which has
lasted for more than thirteen (13) years.
I.
Respondent's assertion that he still has some evidence to present does not warrant the referral
of the case to the IBP. Considering that in the investigation conducted by the Solicitor General
respondent was given ample opportunity to present evidence, his failure to adduce additional
evidence is entirely his own fault. There was therefore no denial of procedural due process. The
record shows that respondent appeared as witness for himself and presented no less than
eleven (11) documents to support his contentions. He was also allowed to cross-examine the
complainant who appeared as a witness against him.
Preliminarily, the Court will dispose of the procedural issue raised by respondent. It is
respondent's contention that the preliminary investigation conducted by the Solicitor General was
limited to the determination of whether or not there is sufficient ground to proceed with the case
and that under Rule 139 the Solicitor General still has to file an administrative complaint against
II.
The Court will now address the substantive issue of whether or not respondent committed the
acts of misconduct alleged by complainant Bautista.
After a careful review of the record of the case and the report and recommendation of the
Solicitor General, the Court finds that respondent committed acts of misconduct which warrant
the exercise by this Court of its disciplinary power.
The record shows that respondent prepared a document entitled "Transfer of Rights" which was
signed by the Fortunados on August 31, 1971. The document assigned to respondent one-half
(1/2) of the properties of the Fortunados covered by TCT No. T-1929, with an area of 239.650 sq.
mm., and TCT No. T-3041, with an area of 72.907 sq. m., for and in consideration of his legal
services to the latter. At the time the document was executed, respondent knew that the
abovementioned properties were the subject of a civil case [Civil Case No. Q-15143] pending
before the Court of First Instance of Quezon City since he was acting as counsel for the
Fortunados in said case [See Annex "B" of Original Complaint, p. 12; Rollo, p. 16]. In executing
the document transferring one-half (1/2) of the subject properties to himself, respondent violated
the law expressly prohibiting a lawyer from acquiring his client's property or interest involved in
any litigation in which he may take part by virtue of his profession [Article 1491, New Civil Code].
This Court has held that the purchase by a lawyer of his client's property or interest in litigation is
a breach of professional ethics and constitutes malpractice [Hernandez v. Villanueva, 40 Phil.
774 (1920); Go Beltran v. Fernandez, 70 Phil. 248 (1940)].
However, respondent notes that Canon 10 of the old Canons of Professional Ethics, which states
that "[t]he lawyer should not purchase any interests in the subject matter of the litigation which he
is conducting," does not appear anymore in the new Code of Professional Responsibility. He
therefore concludes that while a purchase by a lawyer of property in litigation is void under Art.
1491 of the Civil Code, such purchase is no longer a ground for disciplinary action under the new
Code of Professional Responsibility.
This contention is without merit. The very first Canon of the new Code states that "a lawyer shall
uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal
process" (Emphasis supplied), Moreover, Rule 138, Sec. 3 of the Revised Rules of Court
requires every lawyer to take an oath to 44 obey the laws [of the Republic of the Philippines] as
well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein." And for any violation of this
oath, a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred by the Supreme Court [Rule 138, Sec. 27,
Revised Rules of Court]. All of these underscore the role of the lawyer as the vanguard of our
legal system. The transgression of any provision of law by a lawyer is a repulsive and
reprehensible act which the Court will not countenance. In the instant case, respondent, having
violated Art. 1491 of the Civil Code, must be held accountable both to his client and to society.
Parenthetically, it should be noted that the persons mentioned in Art. 1491 of the Civil Code are
prohibited from purchasing the property mentioned therein because of their existing trust
relationship with the latter. A lawyer is disqualified from acquiring by purchase the property and
rights in litigation because of his fiduciary relationship with such property and rights, as well as
with the client. And it cannot be claimed that the new Code of Professional Responsibility has
failed to emphasize the nature and consequences of such relationship. Canon 17 states that "a
lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in him." On the other hand, Canon 16 provides that "a lawyer shall hold in trust all
moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession." Hence, notwithstanding
the absence of a specific provision on the matter in the new Code, the Court, considering the
abovequoted provisions of the new Code in relation to Art. 1491 of the Civil Code, as well as the
prevailing jurisprudence, holds that the purchase by a lawyer of his client's property in litigation
constitutes a breach of professional ethics for which a disciplinary action may be brought against
him.
Respondent's next contention that the transfer of the properties was not really implemented,
because the land development agreement on which the transfer depended was later rescinded,
is untenable. Nowhere is it provided in the Transfer of Rights that the assignment of the
properties of the Fortunados to respondent was subject to the implementation of the land
development agreement. The last paragraph of the Transfer of Rights provides that:
... for and in consideration of the legal services of ATTY. RAMON A. GONZALES,
Filipino, married to Lilia Yusay, and a resident of 23 Sunrise Hill, New Manila,
Quezon City, rendered to our entire satisfaction, we hereby, by these
presents, do transfer and convey to the said ATTY. RAMON A. GONZALES, his
heirs, successor, and assigns, one-half (1/2) of our rights and interests in the
abovedescribed property, together with all the improvements found therein
[Annex D of the Complaint, Record, p. 28; Emphasis supplied].
It is clear from the foregoing that the parties intended the transfer of the properties to respondent
to be absolute and unconditional, and irrespective of whether or not the land development
agreement was implemented.
Another misconduct committed by respondent was his failure to disclose to complainant, at the
time the land development agreement was entered into, that the land covered by TCT No. T1929 had already been sold at a public auction. The land development agreement was executed
on August 31, 1977 while the public auction was held on June 30, 1971.
Respondent denies that complainant was his former client, claiming that his appearance for the
complainant in an anti-graft case filed by the latter against a certain Gilbert Teodoro was upon
the request of complainant and was understood to be only provisional. Respondent claims that
since complainant was not his client, he had no duty to warn complainant of the fact that the land
involved in their land development agreement had been sold at a public auction. Moreover, the
sale was duly annotated at the back of TCT No. T-1929 and this, respondent argues, serves as
constructive notice to complainant so that there was no concealment on his part.
The above contentions are unmeritorious. Even assuming that the certificate of sale was
annotated at the back of TCT No. T-1929, the fact remains that respondent failed to inform the
complainant of the sale of the land to Samauna during the negotiations for the land development
agreement. In so doing, respondent failed to live up to the rigorous standards of ethics of the law
profession which place a premium on honesty and condemn duplicitous conduct. The fact that
complainant was not a former client of respondent does not exempt respondent from his duty to
inform complainant of an important fact pertaining to the land which is subject of their negotiation.
Since he was a party to the land development agreement, respondent should have warned the
complainant of the sale of the land at a public auction so that the latter could make a proper
assessment of the viability of the project they were jointly undertaking. This Court has held that a
lawyer should observe honesty and fairness even in his private dealings and failure to do so is a
ground for disciplinary action against him [Custodio v. Esto, Adm. Case No. 1113, February 22,
1978, 81 SCRA 517].
Complainant also charges respondent with submitting to the court falsified documents purporting
to be true copies of an addendum to the land development agreement.
Based on evidence submitted by the parties, the Solicitor General found that in the document
filed by respondent with the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, the signatories to the
addendum to the land development agreement namely, Ramon A. Gonzales, Alfaro T. Fortunado,
Editha T. Fortunado, Nestor T. Fortunado, and Angel L. Bautistawere made to appear as
having signed the original document on December 9, 1972, as indicated by the letters (SGD.)
before each of their names. However, it was only respondent Alfaro Fortunado and complainant
who signed the original and duplicate original (Exh. 2) and the two other parties, Edith Fortunado
and Nestor Fortunado, never did. Even respondent himself admitted that Edith and Nestor
Fortunado only signed the xerox copy (Exh. 2-A) after respondent wrote them on May 24, 1973,
asking them to sign the said xerox copyattached to the letter and to send it back to him after
signing [Rejoinder to Complainant's Reply, pp. 4-6; Rollo, pp. 327-329]. Moreover, respondent
acknowledged that Edith and Nestor Fortunado had merely agreed by phone to sign, but had not
actually signed, the alleged true copy of the addendum as of May 23, 1973 [Respondent's
Supplemental Motion to Refer this Case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, p. 16]. Thus,
when respondent submitted the alleged true copy of the addendum on May 23, 1973 as Annex
"A" of his Manifestation filed with the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, he knowingly misled
the Court into believing that the original addendum was signed by Edith Fortunado and Nestor
Fortunado. Such conduct constitutes willful disregard of his solemn duty as a lawyer to act at all
times in a manner consistent with the truth. A lawyer should never seek to mislead the court by
an artifice or false statement of fact or law [Section 20 (d), Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court;
Canon 22, Canons of Professional Ethics; Canon 10, Rule 10.01, Code of Professional
Responsibility].
Anent the first charge of complainant, the Solicitor General found that no impropriety was
committed by respondent in entering into a contingent fee contract with the Fortunados [Report
and Recommendation, p. 8; Record, p. 394]. The Court, however, finds that the agreement
between the respondent and the Fortunados, which provides in part that:
We the [Fortunados] agree on the 50% contingent fee, provided, you

[respondent Ramon Gonzales] defray all expenses, for the suit, including court
fees.
Alfaro T. Fortunado [signed]
Editha T. Fortunado [signed]
Nestor T. Fortunado [signed]
CONFORME
Ramon A. Gonzales [signed]
[Annex A to the Complaint, Record, p. 4].
is contrary to Canon 42 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which provides that a lawyer may
not properly agree with a client to pay or bear the expenses of litigation. [See also Rule 16.04,
Code of Professional Responsibility]. Although a lawyer may in good faith, advance the expenses
of litigation, the same should be subject to reimbursement. The agreement between respondent
and the Fortunados, however, does not provide for reimbursement to respondent of litigation
expenses paid by him. An agreement whereby an attorney agrees to pay expenses of
proceedings to enforce the client's rights is champertous [JBP Holding Corp. v. U.S. 166 F. Supp.
324 (1958)]. Such agreements are against public policy especially where, as in this case, the
attorney has agreed to carry on the action at his own expense in consideration of some bargain
to have part of the thing in dispute [See Sampliner v. Motion Pictures Patents Co., et al., 255 F.
242 (1918)]. The execution of these contracts violates the fiduciary relationship between the
lawyer and his client, for which the former must incur administrative sanctions.
The Solicitor General next concludes that respondent cannot be held liable for acting as counsel
for Eusebio Lopez, Jr. in Civil Case No. Q-15490 while acting as counsel for the Fortunados
against the same Eusebio Lopez, Jr. in Civil Case No. Q-15143. The Court, after considering the
record, agrees with the Solicitor General's findings on the matter. The evidence presented by
respondent shows that his acceptance of Civil Case No. Q-15490 was with the knowledge and
consent of the Fortunados. The affidavit executed by the Fortunados on June 23, 1976 clearly
states that they gave their consent when respondent accepted the case of Eusebio Lopez, Jr.
[Affidavit of Fortunados, dated June 23, 1976; Rollo, p. 198]. One of the recognized exceptions to
the rule against representation of conflicting interests is where the clients knowingly consent to
the dual representation after full disclosure of the facts by counsel [Canon 6, Canons of
Professional Ethics; Canon 15, Rule 15.03, Code of Professional Responsibility].
Complainant also claims that respondent filed several complaints against him before the Court of
First Instance and the Fiscal's Office of Quezon City for the sole purpose of harassing him.
The record shows that at the time of the Solicitor General's investigation of this case, Civil Case
No. Q-18060 was still pending before the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, while the
complaints for libel (I.S. No. 76-5912) and perjury (I.S. No. 5913) were already dismissed by the
City Fiscal for insufficiency of evidence and lack of interest, respectively [Report and
Recommendation, pp. 16-17; Rollo, pp. 402-403]. The Solicitor General found no basis for
holding that the complaints for libel and perjury were used by respondent to harass complainant.
As to Civil Case No. Q-18060, considering that it was still pending resolution, the Solicitor
General made no finding on complainants claim that it was a mere ploy by respondent to harass
him. The determination of the validity of the complaint in Civil Case No. Q-18060 was left to the
Court of First Instance of Quezon City where the case was pending resolution.
The Court agrees with the above findings of the Solicitor General, and accordingly holds that
there is no basis for holding that the respondent's sole purpose in filing the aforementioned
cases was to harass complainant.
Grounds 6, 8 and 9 alleged in the complaint need not be discussed separately since the above
discussion on the other grounds sufficiently cover these remaining grounds.
The Court finds clearly established in this case that on four counts the respondent violated the
law and the rules governing the conduct of a member of the legal profession. Sworn to assist in
the administration of justice and to uphold the rule of law, he has "miserably failed to live up to
the standards expected of a member of the Bar." [Artiaga v. Villanueva, Adm. Matter No. 1892,
July 29, 1988, 163 SCRA 638, 647]. The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that, considering
the nature of the offenses committed by respondent and the facts and circumstances of the case,
respondent lawyer should be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months.
WHEREFORE, finding that respondent Attorney Ramon A. Gonzales committed serious
misconduct, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law for SIX (6)
months effective from the date of his receipt of this Resolution. Let copies of this Resolution be
circulated to all courts of the country for their information and guidance, and spread in the
personal record of Atty. Gonzales.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin and
Cortes, JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., Sarmiento, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, JJ., took no part.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
"That having the need to legally recover from the parties to be sued I, on January 4,
1999, deposited the amount of P25,000.00 to Atty. Alberto C. Magulta, copy of the
Receipt attached as Annex B, upon the instruction that I needed the case filed
immediately;
THIRD DIVISION
AC No. 99-634
"That a week later, I was informed by Atty. Alberto C. Magulta that the complaint had
already been filed in court, and that I should receive notice of its progress;
June 10, 2002
DOMINADOR P. BURBE, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ALBERTO C. MAGULTA, respondent.
"That in the months that followed, I waited for such notice from the court or from Atty.
Magulta but there seemed to be no progress in my case, such that I frequented his office
to inquire, and he would repeatedly tell me just to wait;
PANGANIBAN, J.:
"That I had grown impatient on the case, considering that I am told to wait [every time] I
asked; and in my last visit to Atty. Magulta last May 25, 1999, he said that the court
personnel had not yet acted on my case and, for my satisfaction, he even brought me to
the Hall of Justice Building at Ecoland, Davao City, at about 4:00 p.m., where he left me
at the Office of the City Prosecutor at the ground floor of the building and told to wait
while he personally follows up the processes with the Clerk of Court; whereupon, within
the hour, he came back and told me that the Clerk of Court was absent on that day;
After agreeing to take up the cause of a client, a lawyer owes fidelity to both cause and client,
even if the client never paid any fee for the attorney-client relationship. Lawyering is not a
business; it is a profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the primary
consideration.
The Case
Before us is a Complaint for the disbarment or suspension or any other disciplinary action
against Atty. Alberto C. Magulta. Filed by Dominador P. Burbe with the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on June 14, 1999, the Complaint is
accompanied by a Sworn Statement alleging the following:
"x x x
xxx
xxx
"That in connection with my business, I was introduced to Atty. Alberto C. Magulta,

sometime in September, 1998, in his office at the Respicio, Magulta and Adan Law
Offices at 21-B Otero Building, Juan de la Cruz St., Davao City, who agreed to legally
represent me in a money claim and possible civil case against certain parties for breach
of contract;
"That consequent to such agreement, Atty. Alberto C. Magulta prepared for me the
demand letter and some other legal papers, for which services I have accordingly paid;
inasmuch, however, that I failed to secure a settlement of the dispute, Atty. Magulta
suggested that I file the necessary complaint, which he subsequently drafted, copy of
which is attached as Annex A, the filing fee whereof will require the amount of Twenty
Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00);
"That sensing I was being given the run-around by Atty. Magulta, I decided to go to the
Office of the Clerk of Court with my draft of Atty. Magulta's complaint to personally verify
the progress of my case, and there told that there was no record at all of a case filed by
Atty. Alberto C. Magulta on my behalf, copy of the Certification dated May 27, 1999,
attached as Annex C;
"That feeling disgusted by the way I was lied to and treated, I confronted Atty. Alberto C.
Magulta at his office the following day, May 28, 1999, where he continued to lie to with
the excuse that the delay was being caused by the court personnel, and only when
shown the certification did he admit that he has not at all filed the complaint because he
had spent the money for the filing fee for his own purpose; and to appease my feelings,
he offered to reimburse me by issuing two (2) checks, postdated June 1 and June 5,
1999, in the amounts of P12,000.00 and P8,000.00, respectively, copies of which are
attached as Annexes D and E;
"That for the inconvenience, treatment and deception I was made to suffer, I wish to
complain Atty. Alberto C. Magulta for misrepresentation, dishonesty and oppressive
conduct;"
xxx
xxx
x x x.1
On August 6, 1999, pursuant to the July 22, 1999 Order of the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline,2 respondent filed his Answer3 vehemently denying the allegations of complainant "for
being totally outrageous and baseless." The latter had allegedly been introduced as
a kumpadre of one of the former's law partners. After their meeting, complainant requested him
to draft a demand letter against Regwill Industries, Inc. -- a service for which the former never
paid. After Mr. Said Sayre, one of the business partners of complainant, replied to this letter, the
latter requested that another demand letter -- this time addressed to the former -- be drafted by
respondent, who reluctantly agreed to do so. Without informing the lawyer, complainant asked
the process server of the former's law office to deliver the letter to the addressee.
Aside from attending to the Regwill case which had required a three-hour meeting, respondent
drafted a complaint (which was only for the purpose of compelling the owner to settle the case)
and prepared a compromise agreement. He was also requested by complainant to do the
following:
1. Write a demand letter addressed to Mr. Nelson Tan
2. Write a demand letter addressed to ALC Corporation
3. Draft a complaint against ALC Corporation

4. Research on the Mandaue City property claimed by complainant's wife
All of these respondent did, but he was never paid for his services by complainant.
Respondent likewise said that without telling him why, complainant later on withdrew all the files
pertinent to the Regwill case. However, when no settlement was reached, the latter instructed
him to draft a complaint for breach of contract. Respondent, whose services had never been paid
by complainant until this time, told the latter about his acceptance and legal fees. When told that
these fees amounted to P187,742 because the Regwill claim was almost P4 million, complainant
promised to pay on installment basis.
On January 4, 1999, complainant gave the amount of P25,000 to respondent's secretary and told
her that it was for the filing fee of the Regwill case. When informed of the payment, the lawyer
immediately called the attention of complainant, informing the latter of the need to pay the
acceptance and filing fees before the complaint could be filed. Complainant was told that the
amount he had paid was a deposit for the acceptance fee, and that he should give the filing fee
later.
Sometime in February 1999, complainant told respondent to suspend for the meantime the filing
of the complaint because the former might be paid by another company, the First Oriental
Property Ventures, Inc., which had offered to buy a parcel of land owned by Regwill Industries.
The negotiations went on for two months, but the parties never arrived at any agreement.
Sometime in May 1999, complainant again relayed to respondent his interest in filing the
complaint. Respondent reminded him once more of the acceptance fee. In response,
complainant proposed that the complaint be filed first before payment of respondent's
acceptance and legal fees. When respondent refused, complainant demanded the return of
the P25,000. The lawyer returned the amount using his own personal checks because their law
office was undergoing extensive renovation at the time, and their office personnel were not
reporting regularly. Respondent's checks were accepted and encashed by complainant.
Respondent averred that he never inconvenienced, mistreated or deceived complainant, and if
anyone had been shortchanged by the undesirable events, it was he.
The IBP's Recommendation
In its Report and Recommendation dated March 8, 2000, the Commission on Bar Discipline of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) opined as follows:
"x x x [I]t is evident that the P25,000 deposited by complainant with the Respicio Law
Office was for the filing fees of the Regwill complaint. With complainant's deposit of the
filing fees for the Regwill complaint, a corresponding obligation on the part of respondent
was created and that was to file the Regwill complaint within the time frame
contemplated by his client, the complainant. The failure of respondent to fulfill this
obligation due to his misuse of the filing fees deposited by complainant, and his attempts
to cover up this misuse of funds of the client, which caused complainant additional
damage and prejudice, constitutes highly dishonest conduct on his part, unbecoming a
member of the law profession. The subsequent reimbursement by the respondent of part
of the money deposited by complainant for filing fees, does not exculpate the respondent
for his misappropriation of said funds. Thus, to impress upon the respondent the gravity
of his offense, it is recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law
for a period of one (1) year."4
The Court's Ruling
We agree with the Commission's recommendation.
Main Issue:
Misappropriation of Client's Funds
Central to this case are the following alleged acts of respondent lawyer: (a) his non-filing of the
Complaint on behalf of his client and (b) his appropriation for himself of the money given for the
filing fee.
Respondent claims that complainant did not give him the filing fee for the Regwill complaint;
hence, the former's failure to file the complaint in court. Also, respondent alleges that the amount
delivered by complainant to his office on January 4, 1999 was for attorney's fees and not for the
filing fee.
We are not persuaded. Lawyers must exert their best efforts and ability in the prosecution or the
defense of the client's cause. They who perform that duty with diligence and candor not only
protect the interests of the client, but also serve the ends of justice. They do honor to the bar and
help maintain the respect of the community for the legal profession. 5 Members of the bar must do
nothing that may tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, the
honesty, and integrity of the profession.6
Respondent wants this Court to believe that no lawyer-client relationship existed between him
and complainant, because the latter never paid him for services rendered. The former adds that
he only drafted the said documents as a personal favor for the kumpadre of one of his partners.
We disagree. A lawyer-client relationship was established from the very first moment complainant
asked respondent for legal advice regarding the former's business. To constitute professional
employment, it is not essential that the client employed the attorney professionally on any
previous occasion. It is not necessary that any retainer be paid, promised, or charged; neither is
it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward handle the case for which his service had
been sought.
If a person, in respect to business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults a lawyer with a view to
obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces
with the consultation, then the professional employment is established. 7
Likewise, a lawyer-client relationship exists notwithstanding the close personal relationship
between the lawyer and the complainant or the nonpayment of the former's fees. 8 Hence, despite
the fact that complainant waskumpadre of a law partner of respondent, and that respondent
dispensed legal advice to complainant as a personal favor to the kumpadre, the lawyer was dutybound to file the complaint he had agreed to prepare -- and had actually prepared -- at the
soonest possible time, in order to protect the client's interest. Rule 18.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides that lawyers should not neglect legal matters entrusted to
them.
This Court has likewise constantly held that once lawyers agree to take up the cause of a client,
they owe fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed
in them.9 They owe entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and
the defense of the client's rights, and the exertion of their utmost learning and abilities to the end
that nothing be taken or withheld from the client, save by the rules of law legally applied. 10
Similarly unconvincing is the explanation of respondent that the receipt issued by his office to
complainant on January 4, 1999 was erroneous. The IBP Report correctly noted that it was quite
incredible for the office personnel of a law firm to be prevailed upon by a client to issue a receipt
erroneously indicating payment for something else. Moreover, upon discovering the "mistake" -- if
indeed it was one -- respondent should have immediately taken steps to correct the error. He
should have lost no time in calling complainant's attention to the matter and should have issued
another receipt indicating the correct purpose of the payment.
The Practice of Law -- a
Profession, Not a Business
In this day and age, members of the bar often forget that the practice of law is a profession and
not a business.11Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law
advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits. 12 The gaining of a livelihood is not a
professional but a secondary consideration.13 Duty to public service and to the administration of
justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal
interests or what they owe to themselves. The practice of law is a noble calling in which
emolument is a byproduct, and the highest eminence may be attained without making much
money.14
In failing to apply to the filing fee the amount given by complainant -- as evidenced by the receipt
issued by the law office of respondent -- the latter also violated the rule that lawyers must be
scrupulously careful in handling money entrusted to them in their professional capacity.15 Rule
16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that lawyers shall hold in trust all moneys
of their clients and properties that may come into their possession.
Lawyers who convert the funds entrusted to them are in gross violation of professional ethics and
are guilty of betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession. 16 It may be true that they have a
lien upon the client's funds, documents and other papers that have lawfully come into their
possession; that they may retain them until their lawful fees and disbursements have been paid;
and that they may apply such funds to the satisfaction of such fees and disbursements. However,
these considerations do not relieve them of their duty to promptly account for the moneys they
received. Their failure to do so constitutes professional misconduct. 17 In any event, they must still
exert all effort to protect their client's interest within the bounds of law.
If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries
with it correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the
public.18 Respondent fell short of this standard when he converted into his legal fees the filing fee
entrusted to him by his client and thus failed to file the complaint promptly. The fact that the
former returned the amount does not exculpate him from his breach of duty.
Radiowealth Finance Company, Inc., Radiowealth, Inc. and D.M.G., Inc., defendants-appellants,"
the dispositive portion of which reads:
On the other hand, we do not agree with complainant's plea to disbar respondent from the
practice of law. The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution. Only in a clear case of
misconduct that seriously affects the standing and the character of the bar will disbarment be
imposed as a penalty.19
The basic facts appear undisputed and they are as follows:
WHEREFORE, Atty. Alberto C. Magulta is found guilty of violating Rules 16.01 and 18.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of one (1) year, effective upon his receipt of this Decision. Let copies be furnished all
courts as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant, which is instructed to include a copy in
respondent's file. SO ORDERED. Puno, J.*, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the Order appealed from, the same is hereby
affirmed in toto, with costs against the appellants. (Rollo, p. 101).
Sometime in 1978, petitioners Radiowealth, Inc. (RWI) and Radiowealth Finance Company, Inc.
(RFC) applied for and obtained credit facilities from private respondent International Corporate
Bank (Interbank). Petitioners Domingo Guevara (Guevara, for short) and D.M.G., Inc., acted as
sureties to the obligations contracted by RWI and RFC. The obligations of petitioners were
accordingly covered and evidenced by promissory notes, trust receipts and agreements.
A common stipulation in the covering promissory notes, trust receipts, and continuing surety
agreements between the borrowing petitioners and the lending private respondent provided, to
wit:
In the event of the bringing of any action or suit by you or any default of the
undersigned hereunder I/We shall on demand pay you reasonable attorney's
fees and other fees and costs of collection, which shall in no cases be less than
ten percentum (10 %) of the value of the property and the amount involved by
the action or suit. (Rollo, p. 211).
G.R. No. 77042-43 February 28, 1990

RADIOWEALTH FINANCE CO., INC., et al., petitioners
vs.
INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE BANK AND COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Manuel R. Singson for petitioners.
Quisumbing, Torres & Evangelista for private respondent.
BIDIN, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the joint decision * promulgated on December 22,
1986, by the respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 01063 entitled "International Corporate
Bank, plaintiff-appellee vs. Radiowealth, Inc. and Domingo M. Guevara, defendants-appellants"
and in CA-G.R. No. 01064 entitled "International Corporate Bank, plaintiff-appellee vs.
From 1978 to 1980, petitioners were not able to comply with their obligations on time with
Interbank due to subsequent severe economic and financial reverses. Petitioners thus asked
Interbank for a restructuring of their outstanding loans, but the parties were not able to arrive at a
mutually acceptable proposition.
On December 28, 1979, Interbank, constrained to seek judicial remedy, through its counsel
Norberto J. Quisumbing and Associates, lodged before the then Court of First Instance of Manila
its first complaint, docketed thereat as Civil Case No. 128744, for collection of sum of money with
an application for a writ of preliminary attachment against RWI and Guevara covering the
principal sum of P1,585,933.61 plus penalties, service charges, interests, attorney's fees, costs
and exemplary damages (Rollo, pp. 31-38).
This was followed by another complaint filed on January 9, 1980 before the same trial court
against RFC, RWI and D.M.G., Inc., also with an application for a writ of preliminary attachment,
docketed as Civil Case No. 128897, for the collection of the principal sum of P2,113,444.58, plus
interests, penalties, service charges, attorney's fees, costs and exemplary damages (Rollo, pp.
39-47).
Petitioners, however, opted to amicably settle their obligations promptly. They, therefore, did not
file any answer nor any responsive pleading to the complaints, and instead entered into a
compromise agreement with Interbank shortly about four (4) months later. Said compromise
agreement between the parties was embodied in two Motions for Judgment Based on
Compromise dated March 21, 1980 (Rollo, pp. 48-55) corresponding to the separate claims in
the said two complaints which were accordingly submitted to the court a quo for approval. These
motions did not however, cover the payment by the petitioners of Interbank's claims for attorney's
fees, costs of collection and expenses of litigation which were left open by the parties for further
negotiations.
In its decision in Civil Case No. 128744, dated March 28, 1980, the trial court approved the
parties' corresponding compromise agreement thereto, with the reservation that "(T)his decision
does not terminate this case because matters respecting payment of attorney's fees, costs and
collection."
Similarly, the trial court, in its decision in Civil Case No. 128897 of even date, also approved the
parties' corresponding compromise agreement thereto with the Identical reservation as
aforequoted (Rollo, pp. 60-61).
P2,113,444.58, payment of which was to commence on or before January 31,

1980. The service charge of 2 % should be deducted from the 10 % already
mentioned above, to give the rate of attorney's fees which is 8% in accordance
with the provisions already aforequoted. Eight percent (8 %) of l,585,833.61, or
P126,824.68 is the attorney's fees in Civil Case No. 128897 sums which ...
are not excessive and perhaps acceptable to plaintiff which was willing to have
its claim reduced to P73,987.57 had defendants acceded to its offer to
compromise attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court hereby orders the defendants in Civil
Case No. 128744 to pay the plaintiff jointly and severally P126,824.68 and the
defendants in Civil Case No. 128897 to pay the plaintiff, also jointly and
severally, P169,075.56 with interest at 12 % per annum from this date until the
same is paid.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, pp. 80-81).
Not satisfied with said trial court's order, petitioners appealed the same before the respondent
appellate court raising therewith the following assigned errors:
Thereafter, further proceedings were conducted by the trial court particularly on the issue of the
alleged unreasonableness and unconscionableness of the attorney's fees. It appears from the
records of the cases, however, that Atty. Norberto J. Quisumbing, counsel for Interbank, was able
to adduce his evidence in support for the attorney's fees due to his said client, while Attys. Reyes
and Guevara, counsel for petitioners in the trial court, were not given their request for further
hearing against the claimed attorney's fees despite some supervening events as alleged in their
motion for reconsideration dated January 29, 1981 (Rollo, pp. 82-84) which was denied in the
Order of January 30, 1981 (Rollo, p. 85).
At any rate, the trial court, in its Order dated January 2, 1981, had already reduced Interbank's
claim for attorney's fees, from the stipulated 10 % to 8 %, pertinent portions thereof are
hereunder quoted, thus:
(T)he 'ten per cent' in the foregoing quoted provisions includes attorney's fees,
other fees and cost of collection. In paragraph No. 2 of the compromise
agreement in Civil Case No. 128744 under which the defendants therein
acknowledge their indebtedness of Pl,585,933.61 as of December 28, 1979, it is
provided that in paying the same there shall be added to it 16 % per annum as
interest, 2 % per annum as service charge, 2 % per month or any fraction
thereof as penalty from January 31, 1980. A similar provision is contained in
paragraph No. 2 of the compromise agreement filed in Civil Case No.. 128897
under which the defendants therein admitted their indebtedness of
A. The lower court erred in not giving the defendants the

opportunity to be heard in a hearing set for the purpose of
determining the amount of attorney's fees;
B. The lower court erred in insisting that the amount of attorney's
fees should be governed by the contract signed by the parties;
C. The lower court erred in not substantially reducing the
amount of attorney's fees. (Rollo, pp. 242-243).
The respondent appellate court, however, affirmed in toto the assailed order of the trial court.
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioners raise the following issues before this Court:
I. Whether or not the reasonableness of attorney's fees in the
case at bar is a question of law;
II. Whether or not the award of attorney's fees in the case at bar
is reasonable;
III. Whether or not a contracted stipulation regarding attorney's

fees may be disregarded by this Honorable Court;
IV. whether or not attorney's fees require proof (Rollo, p. 243).
Deducible from the contentions of the parties, is the sole issue of whether or not the amount
equivalent to 8 % of the recovery or sums of money due from the two civil complaints adjudged
as attorney's fees by the trial court and affirmed by the respondent appellate court, is fair and
reasonable under the peculiar facts and circumstances herein. Corollarily, whether or not the
court has discretion to modify the attorney's fees previously agreed upon by the parties under a
valid contractual stipulation.
Petitioners assert that the sums of P126,824.68 in Civil Case No. 128744 and P169,075.56 in
Civil Case No. 128897 or 8 % of the amount involved in the respective suits, adjudged as
attorney's fees due to Norberto J. Quisumbing and Associates, counsel of record of the judgment
creditor the herein private respondent Interbank, per the order of the trial court, is unreasonable,
exhorbitant and unconscionable under the premises considering the following undisputed facts:
that said cases were immediately settled with the execution of a compromise agreement after the
complaints with prayer for preliminary attachment had been filed by the private respondent
against the petitioners in the lower court, and no answer was filed by petitioners; that pursuant to
the Compromise Agreement between the parties, petitioner Radiowealth, Inc. has fully paid to
Interbank in Civil Case No. 128744 the total amount of P2,867,802.64, while petitioner
Radiowealth Finance Co., Inc. (RFC) has fully paid to Interbank in Civil Case No. 128897 the
total amount of P3,018,192.52; that of the amounts paid to Interbank, petitioner Radiowealth,
Inc., has fully paid the total sum of P118,075.84 as service charge and penalties, while petitioner
Radiowealth Finance Co., Inc., had paid the total amount of P135,526.40 as penalties and
service charges, all in addition to the interests paid by petitioners to Interbank.
Interbank, on the other hand, avers that petitioners have omitted to state certain facts and
circumstances, as follows: that the collection suits filed against petitioners involve charges of
violation of the trust receipts law for disposing of the goods they had received from Interbank on
trust receipts and failing to surrender the proceeds thereof; that Atty. Quisumbing had
successfully obtained attachment against their properties; that Atty. Quisumbing succeeded in
forcing petitioners to agree in the joint motions for judgment based on compromise to such
stipulation which made them fear a default in the payment of the amortizations or installments of
the compromise amount; that the principal amount collected from petitioners totalled
P3,699,378.19, not counting the interests; that petitioners' obligations to Interbank were not
evidenced by one but many letters of credit and trust receipts; that the records were destroyed by
fire and had to be reconstituted; that Interbank had already given petitioners very substantial
discounts on penalty charges; and, despite clear contractual stipulations, the lower court had
already reduced the 10 % stipulated attorney's fees and expenses of litigation to 8 %.
As a basic premise, the contention of petitioners that this Court may alter, modify or change even
an admittedly valid stipulation between the parties regarding attorney's fees is conceded. The
high standards of the legal profession as prescribed by law and the Canons of Professional
Ethics regulate if not limit the lawyer's freedom in fixing his professional fees. The moment he
takes his oath, ready to undertake his duties first, as a practitioner in the exercise of his
profession, and second, as an officer of the court in the administration of justice, the lawyer
submits himself to the authority of the court. It becomes axiomatic therefore, that power to
determine the reasonableness or the unconscionable character of attorney's fees stipulated by
the parties is a matter falling within the regulatory prerogative of the courts (Panay Electric Co.,
Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 119 SCRA 456 [1982]; De Santos vs. City of Manila, 45 SCRA 409
[1972]; Rolando vs. Luz, 34 SCRA 337 [1970]; Cruz vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 8 SCRA
826 [1963]). And this Court has consistently ruled that even with the presence of an agreement
between the parties, the court may nevertheless reduce attorney's fees though fixed in the
contract when the amount thereof appears to be unconscionable or unreasonable (Borcena vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 147 SCRA 111 [1987]; Mutual Paper Inc. vs. Eastern Scott Paper
Co., 110 SCRA 481 [1981]; Gorospe vs. Gochango, 106 Phil. 425 [1959]; Turner vs. Casabar, 65
Phil. 490 [1938]; F.M. Yap Tico & Co. vs. Alejano, 53 Phil. 986 [1929]). For the law recognizes the
validity of stipulations included in documents such as negotiable instruments and mortgages with
respect to attorney's fees in the form of penalty provided that they are not unreasonable or
unconscionable (Philippine Engineering Co. vs. Green, 48 Phil. 466).
There is no mistake, however, that the reasonableness of attorney's fees, though seemingly a
matter of fact which takes into account the peculiar circumstances of the case, is a question of
law where the facts are not disputed at all. For a question of law does not call for an examination
of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties (Air France vs. Carrascoso, 18
SCRA 155 [1966]), and where the issue is the construction or interpretation to be placed by the
appellate court upon documentary evidence, or when a case is submitted upon an agreed
statement of facts or where all the facts are stated in the judgment, the question is one of law
where the issue is the correctness of the conclusion drawn therefrom (Cunanan vs. Lazatin, 74
Phil. 719 [1944]; Ng Young vs. Villa, 93 Phil. 21 [1953]). In the case at bar, the issues do not call
for an examination of the probative value of the evidence because the ultimate facts are admitted
by the parties and all the basic facts are stated in the judgment.
Nevertheless, a careful review of the records shows that the modified attorney's fees fixed by the
trial court and affirmed by the respondent appellate court, appears reasonable and fair under the
admitted circumstances of the case. As aptly reasoned out by the said court:
We find nothing wrong in the aforegoing disquisition of the lower court.
It is to be remembered that attorney's fees provided in contracts as recoverable
against the other party and damages are not, strictly speaking, the attorney's
fees recoverable as between attorneys and client spoken of and regulated by the
Rules of Court. Rather, the attorney's fees here are in the nature of liquidated
damages and the stipulations therefor is aptly called a penal clause, So long as
such stipulation does not contravene law, morals, or public order, it is strictly
binding upon the defendant (Polytrade Corporation vs. Blanco, 30 SCRA 187
[1969]). However:
"Liquidated damages, whether intended as an indemnity or a
penalty, shall be equitably reduced if they are iniquitous or
unconscionable. For this reason, we do not really have to strictly
view the reasonableness of the attorney's fees in the light of
such facts as the amount and character of the service rendered,
the nature and importance of the litigation, and the professional
character and the social standing of the attorney. We do
concede, however that these factors may be an aid in the
determination of the inequity or unconscionableness of
attorney's fees as liquidated damages. (Supra)
May the attorney's fees granted by the court be tagged as iniquitous or

unconscionable? We give the answer in the negative. The high standing of
plaintiffs counsel has not been challenged.
In the motion for judgment based on compromise agreement, defendants
acknowledged and admitted their default or failure to pay their joint and several
obligations or indebtedness arising from the credit facilities which plaintiff
extended to defendants and availed of by the latter, the punctual payment of
which having been guaranteed and warranted by the other defendants. Having
admitted such default in the payment of their obligations, the filing of the action
in court and, consequently, the legal services of counsel became imperative and
thereby, set into operation the contract clause on the payment of attorney's fees.
The complaints are not simple actions for collection. They are accompanied with
a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment, and charge
defendants with violation of the trust receipts law and they involve several letters
of credit and trust receipts. The fact that the compromise agreements were
entered into after the complaints were filed against appellants indubitably proves
that the legal action taken by counsel for the plaintiff against the defendants
contributed in no measure to the early settlement of defendants' obligation.
Considering further that, apart from the reduction and waiver of penalty charges
due to the plaintiff to the extent of P79, 191.72, the service charge of 2 % was
further deducted by the lower court thereby, reducing the attorney's fees to 8 %
the court is of the considered opinion and so holds that given the prestige of
plaintiff's counsel, the nature of the action and quality of legal services rendered,
the award of attorney's fees in a sum equivalent to 8 % of the judgment which is
below the stipulated fees of 10 % could hardly be suggested as iniquitous and
unconscionable. On the contrary, it easily falls within the rule of conscionable
and reasonable. (Rollo, pp. 100-101).
The foregoing disquisition merits our assent.
Moreover, even if the so-called supervening event which ought to have been heard in the trial
court as alleged in petitioners' motion for reconsideration dated January 29, 1981, i.e., "that
supervening events happened from the time the trust receipt agreements were signed in which
the defendants agreed to pay 10 % of the amount due as attorney's fees and costs of collection
up to the actual filing of the complaint and these events were the payments of interest in the
amount of P285,341.27, as interest, P41,507.37 as service charges and P76,568.47 as penalty
by Radiowealth, Inc.; that Radiowealth Finance Co., Inc. has paid the amount of P281,940.12 as
interest, P38,721.83 as service charges and P96,804.57 as penalty (Rollo, pp. 137-138), were to
be considered, they would still be insufficient to justify a further substantial reduction in the
adjudged attorney's fees. At any rate, it would be noted that petitioners have not even prayed for
a specific reduction as to amount or percentage of the attorney's fees except for their sweeping
allegations of unreasonableness, exhorbitance and unconscionableness.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the respondent appellate court is Affirmed, with costs de
officio.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Cortes, JJ., concur.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
(b) That respondent had paid for the hospital and medical bills of
complainant's wife last May 1981, and visited her at the hospital
everyday;
(c) That he had several times pressed his wife to stop seeing
respondent but that she had refused to do so;
A.M. No. 2385 March 8, 1989

(d) That she had acquired new household and electrical
appliances where she was living although she had no means of
livelihood; and
JOSE TOLOSA, complainant,

vs.
ALFREDO CARGO, respondent.
(e) That respondent was paying for his wife's house rent.
RESOLUTION
Respondent filed a Rejoinder on 19 July 1982, denying the further allegations of complainant,
and stating that he (respondent) had merely given complainant's wife the amount of P35.00 by
way of financial assistance during her confinement in the hospital.
FELICIANO, J.:
On 7 April 1982, complainant Jose Tolosa filed with the Court an Affidavit- Complaint dated 7
March 1982 seeking the disbarment of respondent District Citizens' Attorney Alfredo Cargo for
immorality. Complainant claimed that respondent had been seeing his (complainant's) wife
Priscilla M. Tolosa in his house and elsewhere. Complainant further alleged that in June 1981,
his wife left his conjugal home and went to live with respondent at No. 45 Sisa Street, Barrio
Tenejeros, Malabon, Metro Manila and that since then has been living with respondent at that
address.
Complying with an order of this Court, respondent filed a "Comment and/or Answer" dated 13
May 1982 denying the allegations of complainant. Respondent acknowledged that complainant's
wife had been seeing him but that she bad done so in the course of seeking advice from
respondent (in view of the continuous cruelty and unwarranted marital accusations of affiant
[complainant] against her), much as complainant's mother-in-law had also frequently sought the
advice of respondent and of his wife and mother as to what to do about the" continuous quarrels
between affiant and his wife and the beatings and physical injuries (sometimes less serious) that
the latter sustained from the former." (Rollo, p. 8).
Complainant filed a Reply dated 16 June 1982 to respondent's "Comment and/or Answer" and
made a number of further allegations, to wit:
(a) That complainant's wife was not the only mistress that
respondent had taken;
By a Resolution dated 29 July 1982, the Court referred this case to the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation. The Solicitor General's office held a number of
hearings which took place from 21 October 1982 until 1986, at which hearings complainant and
respondent presented evidence both testimonial and documentary.
The Solicitor General summed up what complainant sought to establish in the following terms:
1. That respondent had been courting his wife, Priscilla (tsn,
May 12, 1982, p. 9).
2. That he actually saw them together holding hands in l980 in
Cubao and Sto. Domingo, Quezon City (tsn, pp. 13-15, May 12,
1983).
3. That sometime in June, 1982, his wife left their conjugal
house at No. 1 Lopez Jaena Street, Galas, Quezon City, to live
with respondent at No. 45 Sisa Street, Barrio Tenejeros,
Malabon, Metro Manila (tsn, pp. 16- 17, May 12, 1983).
4. That while Priscilla was staying there, she acquired
household appliances which she could not afford to buy as she
has no source of income (tsn, pp. 10-11, Sept. 10, 1985, Exh.
'M', N' and 'Q').
5. That when Priscilla was hospitalized in May, 1982, at the FEU

Hospital, respondent paid for her expenses and took care of her
(tsn, pp. 18-20, June 15, 1983). In fact, an incident between
respondent and complainant took place in said hospital (tsn, pp.
5-8, Sept. 20, 1983, Exhibits 'C' and 'C-l').
e) That Priscilla bought all the appliances in her apartment at 45

Sisa Street, Tenejeros, Malabon, Metro Manila from her
earnings;
f) That it is not true that he ran after complainant and tried to
stab him at No. 1 Galas St., Quezon City; that said incident was
between Priscilla's brother and complainant;
6. That an incident which was subject of a complaint took place

involving respondent and complainant at No. 45 Sisa Street,
Barrio Tenejeros, Malabon, Metro Manila (tsn, pp. 8- 10, July 29,
1983; Exh. 'B', 'B-l' and 'K').
g) That it is also not true that he is always in 45 Sisa St.,

Tenejeros, Malabon, Metro Manila and/or he had a quarrel with
complainant at 45 Sisa St., Malabon; that the quarrel was
between Priscilla's brother, Edgardo Miclat, and complainant;
that respondent went there only to intervene upon request of
complainant's wife (see tsn, June 21, 1984). (Rollo, pp. 35-37).
7. That again in Quezon City, incidents involving respondent and

complainant were brought to the attention of the police (Exhibits
'F' and 'G').
8. That Complainant filed an administrative case for immorality
against respondent with the CLAO and that respondent was
suspended for one year (Exhibits 'D' and 'E'). (Rollo, pp. 33-35).
Respondent's defenses were summarized by the Solicitor General in the following manner:
a) That Priscilla used to see respondent for advice regarding her
difficult relationship with complainant; that Priscilla left
complainant because she suffered maltreatment, physical
injuries and public humiliation inflicted or caused by
complainant;
b) That respondent was not courting Priscilla, nor lived with her
at No. 45 Sisa St., Tenejeros, Malabon, Metro Manila; that the
owner of the house where Priscilla lived in Malabon was a friend
and former client whom respondent visited now and then;
c) That respondent only gave P35.00 to Priscilla in the FEU
Hospital, as assistance in her medical expenses; that he
reprimanded complainant for lying on the bed of Priscilla in the
hospital which led to their being investigated by the security
guards of the hospital;
d) That it is not true that he was with Priscilla holding hands with
her in Cubao or Sto. Domingo Church in 1980;
The Solicitor General then submitted the following

FINDINGS
1. That complainant and Priscilla are spouses residing at No.1
Lopez Jaena St., Galas, Quezon City.
2. That respondent's wife was their 'ninang' at their marriage,
and they (complainant and Priscilla) considered respondent also
their 'ninong'.
3. That respondent and complainant are neighbors, their
residences being one house away from each other.
4. That respondent admitted that Priscilla used to see him for
advice, because of her differences with complainant.
5. That Priscilla, in fact, left their conjugal house and lived at No.
45 Sisa St., Barrio Tenejeros, Malabon, Metro Manila; that the
owner of the house where Priscilla lived in Malabon is a friend
and former client of respondent.
6. That Priscilla indeed acquired appliances while she was
staying in Malabon.
7. That incidents involving respondent and complainant had

indeed happened.
8. That Priscilla returned to her mother's house later in 1983 at
No. 1 Lopez Jaena St., Galas, Quezon City; but complainant
was staying two or three houses away in his mother's house.
9. That complainant filed an administrative case for immorality
against respondent in CLAO, where respondent was found guilty
and suspended for one year. (Rollo, pp. 37-39).
In effect, the Solicitor General found that complainant's charges of immorality had not been
sustained by sufficient evidence. At the same time, however, the Solicitor General found that the
respondent had not been able to explain satisfactorily the following:
1. Respondent's failure to avoid seeing Priscilla, in spite of

complainant's suspicion and/or jealousy that he was having an
affair with his wife.
2. Priscilla's being able to rent an apartment in Malabon whose
owner is admittedly a friend and former client of respondent.
3. Respondent's failure to avoid going to Malabon to visit his
friend, in spite of his differences with complainant.
4. Respondent's failure to avoid getting involved invarious
incidents involving complainant and Priscilla's brothers (Exhs.
'B', B-1', 'F', 'G', ['G-1'] and ['I'])
5. Respondent's interest in seeing Priscilla in the evening when
she was confined in the FEU Hospital, in spite again of his
differences with complainant. (Rollo, pp. 39-40).
Thus, the Solicitor General concluded that respondent had failed "to properly deport himself by
avoiding any possible action or behavior which may be misinterpreted by complainant, thereby
causing possible trouble in the complainant's family," which behavior was "unbecoming of a
lawyer and an officer of the court." (Rollo, p. 40). The Solicitor General recommended that
respondent Atty. Alfredo Cargo be suspended from the practice of law for three (3) months and
be severely reprimanded.
We agree with the Solicitor General that the record does not contain sufficient evidence to show
that respondent had indeed been cohabiting with complainant's wife or was otherwise guilty of
acts of immorality. For this very reason, we do not believe that the penalty of suspension from the
practice of law may be properly imposed upon respondent.
At the same time, the Court agrees that respondent should be reprimanded for failure to comply
with the rigorous standards of conduct appropriately required from the members of the Bar and
officers of the court. As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral
character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance
with the highest moral standards of the community. More specifically, a member of the Bar and
officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or the keeping of
mistresses 1 but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the
belief that he is flouting those moral standards.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to REPRIMAND respondent attorney for conduct
unbecoming a member of the Bar and an officer of the court, and to WARN him that continuation
of the same or similar conduct will be dealt with more severely in the future.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-14277
April 30, 1960
MANUEL L. FERNANDEZ, petitioner,

vs.
HON. ELOY B. BELLO, Judge Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, respondent.
Manuel L. Fernandez in his own behalf.
Office of the Solicitor General Edilberto Barot and Solicitor Jorge R. Coquia for respondent.
LABRADOR, J.:
Petition for certiorari with injunction filed by Atty. Manuel L. Fernandez to annul two orders dated
June 16 and July 29, 1958, of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Hon. Eloy B. Bello,
presiding. The first order reprimands petitioner for his improper conduct as counsel in Special
Proceedings No. 3931, entitled "Guardianship of the Minors Federico and Pedro both surnamed
Perreyras, Timotea Perreyras, petitioner-guardian," orders him to return to the guardian within 15
days the sum of P200.00 collected by him, and causes a copy of the order to be sent to the
Supreme Court for corresponding disciplinary action on the petitioner (Annex J). The second
order denies petitioner's motion for reconsideration and warns him not to use improper terms in
his pleadings. (Annex L.)
were, in turn, sold for P200.00 to Atty. Manuel L. Fernandez. Of the purchase price of P1,000,
P200.00 was paid to Atty. Manuel L. Fernandez, redemption price of the nipa land and as
assignee of the credit in favor of Maximiano Umagay and Ricardo Perreyras. The other P200.00
was given to said attorney, in payment of his legal fees for services rendered by him as counsel
of the father of the wards in a civil case. However, the record does not show that these payments
were authorized by the court.
On January 21, 1958, Judge Eloy Bello, who took over the court from Judge Pasicolan, issued
an order requiring Timotea Perreyras to show cause why she should not be punished for
contempt for failing to account for the property and money of the wards. After hearing the
guardian Timotea Perreyras, the court issued another order date January 20, 1958, exonerating
her of the contempt charges, disapproving all payments made by her, including that made to Atty.
Manuel L. Fernandez, and requiring Attys. Manuel L. Fernandez and Braulio Fernandez to show
cause why they should not be suspended from the practice of law and declared in contempt of
court. In the same order, the court charged said attorneys of having abused their relationship with
the guardian and having taken money from her without previous approval of the court (Annex D).
Atty. Braulio Fernandez submitted a written explanation, and the court, considering it satisfactory,
exonerated him of the preferred charges. On January 30, 1958, the court again issued another
order directing Atty. Manuel L. Fernandez to submit in ten days a written answer to the charges
stated in the order of January 27, 1958 (Annex G). On February 1, 1958, he submitted an
explanation (Annex H.), admitting receipt of the sum of P400.00 from the guardian, but alleging
that when he received the amount he was no longer the attorney of the guardian as their relation
had terminated when the guardian secured the services of Atty. Braulio Fernandez; that he acted
in good faith and the guardianship proceedings were instituted by him only to help the minors the
action being less expensive than an intestate proceeding, and that he was paid only P50.00 for
his services to the guardian. So he asked that the charges be dismissed and that the guardian be
warned not to make unjustifiable complaints against him.
The circumstances leading to the issuance of the above orders may be briefly stated as follows:
Timotea Perreyras, through Atty. Manuel L. Fernandez as her counsel, instituted Special
Proceedings No. 3931, for her appointment as guardian over the persons and properties of her
brothers, the minors Federico and Pedro Perreyras. Upon her appointment and upon her
qualifying as such, she petitioned the court for authority to sell a nipa land owned in common with
the wards for the purpose of paying outstanding obligations to Maximiano Umagay. The request
was granted by Judge Villamor, and on August 24, 1951, a deed of sale, prepared and notarized
by Atty. Manuel L. Fernandez, was executed by the guardian in favor of Maximiano Umagay for
the sum of P1,000. This sale was approved by Judge Pasicolan on December 17, 1952 (Annex
C).
On February 10, 1953, Timotea Perreyras and Maximiano Umagay were summoned to appear
for further examination on the proceeds of the sale of the nipa land. After hearing their
testimonies, the court on June 16, 1958, found Atty. Manuel L. Fernandez guilty of contempt of
court because he had taken the amount of P400.00 from the proceeds of the sale without
previous approval from the court. The court also found the conduct of counsel to be anomalous
for the reason that he instituted the guardianship proceedings only to enable him to collect
unpaid attorney's fees due him from the father of the wards (Annex J). This is the first order
sought to be annulled in this appeal. The second order is that denying the motion for
reconsideration of respondent attorney.
The nipa land sold by the guardian had previously been sold with right to repurchase to Ricardo
Perreyras and Maximiano Umagay by Florentino Perreyras, father (now deceased) of the
guardian and the wards. The interest in the land of Ricardo Perreyras and Maximiano Umagay
It is claimed by petitioner in this appeal that the proceedings conducted in the court below are
irregular because no formal charge was filed against him. There is no merit in this contention.
The court motu proprio preferred the charges in its order dated January 20, 1958, and in another
order dated January 27, 1958, the petitioner was duly advised thereof and was given an
opportunity to file a written answer thereto. It has been held in the following case that there has
been sufficient compliance with the requirements of law:
The institution of charges by the prosecuting officer is not necessary to hold person guilty
of civil or criminal contempt amenable to trial and punishment by the court. All that the
law requires is that there be a charge in writing duly filed in court and an opportunity to
the person charged to be heard by himself or counsel. The charge may be made by the
fiscal, by the judge, or even by a private person. The above requirements were complied
with by the filing of the order on September 30, and the giving of full opportunity to the
respondent to appear and defendant himself. The contention that a formal information
filed by a prosecuting officer is necessary to begin proceedings must be overruled.
(People vs. B. M. Venturanza, et al., defendants, Jose Y. Torres, appellant, 98 Phil., 211;
52 Off. Gaz. [2] 769.).
The court below found petitioner guilty of contempt court on two grounds, the first is that he
instituted the guardianship proceedings for the sole purpose of facilitating payment to him of the
debts of the wards. The facts do not, however, bear out this finding. Before the guardianship
proceedings were instituted, the wards were indebted in the sum of P200.00 to Ricardo
Perreyras and Maximiano Umagay, and as the wards had no money with which to pay the debt,
the only way to settle it is by selling the nipa land. But the land could not have been sold by the
minors without intervention of a guardian. So the petitioner must have believed that guardianship
proceedings was the proper remedy. The judges of the court below, from whom Judge Bello took
over, must have been satisfied that the procedure taken by the petitioner was more beneficial to
the wards when they appointed a guardian and approved the sale of the land. As there is no
evidence of bad faith on the part of petitioner, the finding on this point of the court below should
be reversed.
However, the finding of the court that the purchase price of the land is P1,000 was in custodia
legis and could not be taken and used in payment of debts without its previous authority is
correct. As a lawyer the petitioner is charged with the knowledge that the property and effects of
the wards are under the control and supervision of the court, and that they could not be and
expended without the latter's permission, more especially so when the money taken was to pay
the debt of the father of the wards. The reprimand is, therefore, fully justified. But the order for
the refund of the P200.00 and the closing of the guardianship proceedings after such return,
would deprive petitioner of the fees that he was entitled to receive from the father of the guardian
and the wards, for services rendered in a civil case, which services are admitted to have been
due from their father. While the reprimand is in order for petitioner's mistake, the mistake is no
sufficient ground for the non-payment of the fees he lawfully earned and which his client could
not pay before his death. The duty of courts is not alone to see that lawyers act in a proper and
lawful manner; it is also their duty to see that lawyers are paid their just and lawful fees. Certainly
the court can not deny them that right; there is no law that authorizes them to do so.
In his answer before this Court respondent judge justifies his order for the return of the P200.00
on the ground that petitioner is "below average standard of a lawyer." The opinion of a judge as
to the capacity of a lawyer is not the basis of the right to a lawyer's fee. It is the contract between
the lawyer and client and the nature of the services rendered. Petitioner claims that he won a civil
case for his client, the deceased father of the guardian and the wards. That P200.00 is the
amount of the fee of petitioner is admitted by the guardian. We find that the court's order directing
petitioner to return the P200.00, and in effect denying him the right to collect the same, is not
justified, to say the least. This portion of the final order is hereby modified in the sense that the
return of the P200.00 is without prejudice to petitioner's right to demand payment for the services
rendered the deceased out of the proceeds of the property left by him (deceased).
In this Court the judge below desires that portions of petitioner's motion for reconsideration be
stricken out for employing strong language. We believe the said strong language must have been
impelled by the same language used by the judge below in characterizing the act of the petitioner
as "anomalous and unbecoming" and in charging petitioner of obtaining his fee "through
maneuvers of documents from the guardian-petitioner." If any one is to blame for the language
used by the petitioner, it is the judge himself who has made insulting remarks in his orders, which
must have provoked petitioner, and the judge below has nothing to blame but himself. If a judge
desires not to be insulted he should start using temperate language himself; he who sows the
wind will reap a storm.
Wherefore, the orders are modified as above indicated. Without costs.
Paras, C.J., Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Endencia, Barrera and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, J., reserves his vote.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 219
September 29, 1962
CASIANO U. LAPUT, petitioner,

vs.
ATTY. FRANCISCO E.F. REMOTIGUE and ATTY. FORTUNATO P.
PATALINGHUG, respondents.
LABRADOR, J.:
This is an original complaint filed with this Court charging respondents with unprofessional and
unethical conduct in soliciting cases and intriguing against a brother lawyer, and praying that
respondents be dealt with accordingly.
The facts which led to the filing of this complaint are as follow: In May, 1952, petitioner was
retained by Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera to handle her case (Sp. Proc. No. 2-J) in the Court of
First Instance of Cebu, entitled "Testate Estate of Macario Barrera". By January, 1955, petitioner
had contemplated the closing of the said administration proceedings and prepared two
pleadings: one, to close the proceedings and declare Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera as universal
heir and order the delivery to her of the residue of the estate and, second, a notice for the
rendition of final accounting and partition of estate. At this point, however, the administratrix
Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera refused to countersign these two pleadings and instead advised
petitioner not to file them. Some weeks later, petitioner found in the records of said proceedings
that respondent Atty. Fortunato Patalinghug had filed on January 11, 1955 a written appearance
as the new counsel for Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera. On February 5, 1955 petitioner voluntarily
asked the court to be relieved as counsel for Mrs. Barrera. On February 7, 1955, the other
respondent, Atty. Francisco E. F. Remotigue, entered his appearance, dated February 5, 1955.
Complainant here alleges that the appearances of respondents were unethical and improper for
the reason that they had nursed the desire to replace the petitioner as attorney for the estate and
the administratrix and, taking advantage of her goodwill, intrigued against the preparation of the
final inventory and accounting and prodded Mrs. Barrera not to consent to petitioner's decision to
close the administration proceedings; that before their appearance, they brought petitioner's
client to their law office and there made her sign four documents captioned "Revocation of Power
of Attorney" and sent the same by mail to several corporations and establishments where the
Estate of Macario Barrera is owner of certificates of stocks and which documents purported to
disauthorize the petitioner from further collecting and receiving the dividends of the estate from
said corporations, when in fact and in truth the respondents fully knew that no power of attorney
or authority was given to the petitioner by his client, the respondents motive being to embarrass
petitioner to the officials, lawyers and employees of said corporations, picturing him as a
dishonest lawyer and no longer trusted by his client all with the purpose of straining the
relationship of the petitioner and his client, Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera; and that Atty.
Patalinghug entered his appearance without notice to petitioner.
In answer, respondent Atty. Patalinghug stated that when he entered his appearance on January
11, 1955 the administratrix Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera had already lost confidence in her
lawyer, the herein petitioner, and had in fact already with her a pleading dated January 11, 1955,
entitled "Discharge of Counsel for the Administration and Motion to Cite Atty. Casiano Laput",
which she herself had filed with the court.1awphl.nt
In answer, respondent Atty. Remotigue stated that when he filed his appearance on February 7,
1955, the petitioner has already withdrawn as counsel.
After separate answers were filed by the respondents, the Supreme Court referred the case to
the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. The Solicitor General
recommended the complete exoneration of respondents.
It appears and it was found by the Solicitor General that before respondent Atty. Fortunato
Patalinghug entered his appearance, the widow administratrix had already filed with the court a
pleading discharging the petitioner Atty. Casiano Laput. If she did not furnish Atty. Laput with a
copy of the said pleading, it was not the fault of Atty. Patalinghug but that of the said widow. It
appears that the reason why Mrs. Barrera dismissed petitioner as her lawyer was that she did not
trust him any longer, for one time she found out that some dividend checks which should have
been sent to her were sent instead to petitioner, making her feel that she was being cheated by
petitioner. Moreover, she found that withdrawals from the Philippine National Bank and Bank of
the Philippine Islands have been made by petitioner without her prior authority.
We see no irregularity in the appearance of respondent Atty. Fortunato Patalinghug as counsel
for the widow; much less can we consider it as an actual grabbing of a case from petitioner. The
evidence as found by the Solicitor General shows that Atty. Patalinghug's professional services
were contracted by the widow, a written contract having been made as to the amount to be given
him for his professional services.
Petitioner's voluntary withdrawal on February 5, 1955, as counsel for Mrs. Barrera after Atty.
Patalinghug had entered his appearance, and his (petitioner's) filing almost simultaneously of a
motion for the payment of his attorney's fees, amounted to an acquiescence to the appearance
of respondent Atty. Patalinghug as counsel for the widow. This should estop petitioner from now
complaining that the appearance of Atty. Patalinghug was unprofessional.
Much less could we hold respondent Atty. Remotigue guilty of unprofessional conduct inasmuch
as he entered his appearance, dated February 5, 1955, only on February 7, same year, after
Mrs. Barrera had dispensed with petitioner's professional services on January 11, 1955, and after
petitioner had voluntarily withdrawn his appearance on February 5, 1955.
title; and that with the duplicate titles, respondent and his client Mrs. Nieves Rillas Vda. de
Barrera (formerly the client of complainant) sold without notice the lots covered thereby, all of
which, aside from being unfair and unethical, were prejudicial to complainant's recorded lien to
the said lots and titles in question.lwphi1.et
With respect to the preparation by Atty. Patalinghug of the revocations of power of attorney as
complained of by petitioner, the Solicitor General found that the same does not appear to be
prompted by malice or intended to hurt petitioner's feelings, but purely to safeguard the interest
of the administratrix. Evidently, petitioner's pride was hurt by the issuance of these documents,
and felt that he had been pictured as a dishonest lawyer; for he filed a case before the City Fiscal
of Cebu against Atty. Patalinghug and the widow for libel and falsification. It was shown, however,
that the case was dismissed.
Respondent denied any knowledge of the recorded lien of complainant and his retention of
records and transfer certificates of title. Respondent also denied that he was the author of the
first motion complained of; that the second motion prayed for an order directing complainant to
turn over to them the certificates of title; or that he filed another motion alleging that they lost the
Torrens titles to the estate lots, the true facts being that the administratrix, on December 3, 1958,
filed a "Petition for the Issuance of Duplicate Owner's copy", for the reason that she could not
locate said transfer certificate of title in spite of diligent action; that as early as November 18,
1958, the administratrix sought authority from the court to sell real property of the estate in order
to satisfy several indebtedness of the estate; that the court finally approved the sales made, on
October 8, 1959, in spite of the written opposition of complainant; and that if he (respondent)had
known that the transfer certificates of title in question were in the possession of complainant he
could have taken an easier procedure by merely asking Atty. Laput to produce them.
No sufficient evidence having been submitted to sustain the charges, these are hereby dismissed
and the case closed.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal,
JJ., concur.
A.M. No. 434
September 29, 1962
CASIANO U. LAPUT, petitioner,

vs.
ATTY. FRANCISCO E. F. REMOTIGUE, respondent.
LABRADOR, J.:
This is an original complaint a sequel to Adm. Case No. 219 filed with this Court charging
the respondent with malice, bad faith, and misrepresentation when the latter allegedly filed
committing unfair and unethical practices bordering on dishonesty, all to the prejudice of said
complainant.
Complainant alleges that by virtue of a duly recorded "Attorney's Lien" entered into the records of
Special Proceedings No. 2-J of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, he has in his lawful
possession records and papers of the estate under administration, among which are transfer
certificates of title to all real properties of the estate located in Cebu province; that on February
21, 1956 and on September 16, 1957, the respondent, without notice to complainant, filed with
the probate court motions praying that complainant be directed to surrender the aforesaid
certificates of title, and on December 3, 1958, another motion, without notice, praying that he be
issued owner's duplicate copies of the certificates of title on the ground that the same were lost,
the respondent knowing all along that complainant is in lawful possession of said certificates of
The Solicitor General, to whom this Court referred this case for investigation, report and
recommendation found that since January 11, 1955, when the widow, Mrs. Barrera, filed the
pleading entitled "Discharge of Counsel for the Administration and Motion to Cite Atty. Casiano U.
Laput", complainant herein (Atty. Laput) was already asked by the widow in that pleading "to turn
over a the records, bank books, other pertinent papers and documents of the above entitled case
which I have handed him; and assets, if any, to the undersigned administration pending my
appointment of a new lawyer for the administration registration" and that although Atty. Laput was
not served copy of this pleading, he must have come across it inasmuch as from time to time, he
went over the records Special Proceedings No. 2-J of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, and
yet Atty. Laput did not comply with request of the widow to turn over to her all the records of her
case.
In a motion dated September 16, 1957, filed before the Court of First Instance of Cebu in said
special proceedings, respondent asked the court to order Atty. Laput "to surrender to the
administratrix or to the Court the passbook in the Philippine National Bank of the deposits of the
estate and all such other documents in his possession and belonging to the estate . . .". By virtue
of this motion, the Court of First Instance of Cebu, on October 17, 1957, ordered complainant
Laput "to surrender and deposit with the clerk of court, within ten days from notice, the passbook
of the estate's deposit in the Philippine National Bank, Cebu Branch, and of the documents
belonging to the estate in his possession."
The Solicitor General found that in spite of all the above-mentioned pleadings, motions, and
order of the Court, complainant stubbornly kept to himself the transfer certificates of title in
question, and so it could seem that complainant was the one at fault.
The Solicitor General also found that after complainant was discharged by the administratrix, his
claim for attorney's fees in the sum of P26,561.48 out of total of P31,329.15, was already
collected by him from the estate during his incumbency as the lawyer for the administratrix; that
the Court of First Instance of Cebu fixed, as early as December 19, 1955, the amount of
P4,767.67 as the balance to be paid to Attorney Laput, later on increased to P5,699.66, and that
in spite of such fixing by the court of his attorney's fees and the order of payment to him of the
balance of P5,699.66 by the estate, as early as December 27, 1955, which order was later
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, complainant Laput pretended that all throughout the years
following 1955 to the date of his filing the present complaint, he (Atty. Laput) believed that he had
still the right to retain the certificates of title in question.1awphl.nt
An examination of the motions complained of by Atty. Laput shows that respondent's answers
correct; and it is therefore clear from all the foregoing that respondent did not act with malice or
bad faith. Hence, the recommendation of the Solicitor General for respondent's complete
exoneration should be, as it hereby, is approved.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon, Regala and
Makalintal, JJ. concur.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 79690-707 April 27, 1988
ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN AND HONORABLE RAUL M. GONZALEZ, CLAIMING
TO BE AND ACTING AS TANODBAYAN-OMBUDSMAN UNDER THE 1987
CONSTITUTION, respondents.
G.R. No. L-80578 April 27, 1988
ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner,

vs.
HON. RAUL M. GONZALEZ, claiming to be and acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman under
the 1987 Constitution, respondent.
Francisco Carreon and Nestor C. Lumba for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondent.
Honorable Court, restraining the Honorable Sandiganbayan from hearing and

trying Criminal Cases Nos. 12159 to 12161, and 12163 to 12177 insofar as
petitioner Enrique A. Zaldivar is concerned and from hearing and resolving the
special prosecutor's motion to suspend (Annex J) and thereafter, final judgment
be rendered:
(1) ordering that the amended informations in the above-mentioned crimininal
cases be or issuing a writ of mandamus commanding and ordering the
respondent Sandiganbayan to do so and, in consequence, prohibiting and
restraining the respondent Sandigan-bayan from proceeding to hear and try the
abovementioned criminal cases or making the temporary preliminary injunction
permanent;
(2) declaring the acts of respondent Gonzalez as "Tanodbayan-Ombudsman"
after 2 February 1987 relating to these cases as anullity and without legal effect,
particularly, the promulgation of Tanodbayan resolution of 5 February 1987, the
filing of the original informations on 3 March 1987 and the amended ones on 4
June 1987, and the filing of the Motion for Suspension Pendente Lite.
PETITIONER prays for such other and further relief as may be deemed proper in
the premises, with costs against the respondents.
Manila, Philippines, September 9, 1987.
(pp. 45-47, Rollo)
In G.R. No. 80578, petitioner Enrique A. Zaldivar, on substantially the same ground as the first
petition, prays that Tanodbayan Gonzalez be restrained from conducting preliminary
investigations and similar cases with the Sandiganbayan. The prayer reads:
PER CURIAM:
In G.R. Nos. 79690-707 "Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and mandamus under Rule 65,"
petitioner Enrique A. Zaldivar, governor of the province of Antique, sought to restrain the
Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan Raul Gonzalez from proceeding with the prosecution and
hearing of Criminal Cases Nos. 12159 to 12161 and 12163-12177 on the ground thatsaid cases
were filed by said Tanodbayan without legal and constitutional authority, since under the 1987
Constitution which took effect on February 2, 1987, it is only the Ombudsman (not the present or
incumbent Tanodbayan) who has the authority to file cases with the Sandiganbayan. The
complete prayer of the petition reads:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that pending the final disposition of this
petition or until further orders of the Honorable Court, a writ of preliminary
injunction issue upon the filing of a bond in such amount as may be fixed by the
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that pending the final disposition of this

petition or until further orders of this Honorable court, a writ of preliminary
injunction issue restraining the respondent from further acting in TBP CASE NO.
87-01304 and, particularly, from filing the criminal Information consequent
thereof-, and from conducting preliminary investigations in, and filing criminal
informations for, such other complaints/ cases now pending or which may
hereafter be filed against petitioner with the Office of the respondent.
It is likewise prayed that the present petition be consolidated with G.R.L-Nos.
79690-79707.
After proper proceedings, it is prayed that final judgment be rendered annulling

the acts of respondent Gonzalez as "Tanodbayan- Ombudsman" after 2
February 1987 relating to the investigation of complaints against petitioner,
particularly:
The Constitution likewise provides that:

The existing Tanodbayan shall hereafter be known as the office of the Special
Prosecutor. It shall continue to function and exercise its powers as now or
hereafter may be provided by law, contemptexcept those conferred on the office
of the Ombudsman created under this Constitution. (Art. XI, Section 7)
(Emphasis ours).
(1) Annulling, for absolute want of jurisdiction, the preliminary investigation

conducted, and the Resolution rendered, by respondent in TBP CASE NO. 8701304;
(2) Prohibiting and restraining the respondent from filing any criminal Information
as a consequence of the void preliminary investigation he conducted in TBP
CASE NO. 87-01304, or annulling the criminal Information in the said case which
may, in the meantime, have already been filed;
(3) Prohibiting and restraining the respondent from conducting preliminary

investigations in, and filing criminal informations for, such other complaints/cases
now pending or which may hereafter be filed against petitioner with the Office of
the respondent.
PETITIONER further prays for such other and further reliefs as may be deemed
proper in the proper with costs against the respondent.
Manila, Philippines, November 18,1987
(pp. 24-25, Rollo)
We issued the restraining orders prayed for.

After a study of the petitions, We have decided to give due course to the same; to consider the
comments of the Solicitor-General and of Tanodbayan Gonzalez as their Answers thereto; and to
forthwith decide the petitions.
Now then, inasmuch as the aforementioned duty is given to the Ombudsman, the incumbent
Tanodbayan (caged Special Prosecutor under the 1987 constitution and who is supposed to
retain powers and duties NOT GIVEN to the Ombudsman) is clearly without authority to conduct
preliminary investigations and to direct the filing of criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan,
except upon orders of the Ombudsman. This right to do so was lost effective February 2, 1987.
From that time, he has been divested of such authority.
Under the present Constitution, the Special Prosecutor (Raul Gonzalez) is a mere subordinate of
the Tanodbayan Ombudsman) and can investigate and prosecute cases only upon the latter's
authority or orders. The Special Prosecutor cannot initiate the prosecution of cases but can only
conduct the same if instructed to do so by the Ombudsman. Even his original power to issue
subpoena, which he still claims under Section 10(d) of PD 1630, is now deemed transferred to
the Ombudsman, who may, however, retain it in the Spedal Prosecutor in connection with the
cases he is ordered to investigate.
It is not correct either to suppose that the Special Prosecutor remains the Ombudsman as long
as he has not been replaced, for the fact is that he has never been the Ombudsman. The Office
of the Ombudsman is a new creation under Article XI of the Constitution different from the Office
of the Tanodbayan created under PD 1607 although concededly some of the powers of the two
offices are Identical or similar. The Special Prosecutor cannot plead that he has a right to hold
over the position of Ombudsman as he has never held it in the first place.
WHEREFORE, We hereby:
(1) GRANT the consolidated petitions filed by petitioner Zaldivar and hereby
NULLIFY the criminal informations filed against him in the Sandiganbayan; and
We find the petitions impressed with merit.

Under the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman (as distinguished from theincumbent Tanodbayan)
is charged with the duty to:
Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any
public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or commission appears
to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient (Sec. 13, par. 1)
(2) ORDER respondent Raul Gonzalez to cease and desist from conducting
investigations and filing criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan or otherwise
exercising the powers and function of the Ombudsman.
SO ORDERED.
Yap, C.J., Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco,
Padilla, Bidin and Cortes, and Grio-Aquino, JJ., concur.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
SARMIENTO, J.:
The incident before the Court refers to charges for contempt against Atty. J. Cezar Sangco,
counsel for the petitioners Spouses Jose and Lutgarda Sangalang. (G.R. No. 71169.)
G.R. No. 71169 August 30, 1989

JOSE D. SANGALANG and LUTGARDA D. SANGALANG, petitioners, FELIX C. GASTON
and DOLORES R. GASTON, JOSE V. BRIONES and ALICIA R. BRIONES, and BEL-AIR
VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC.,intervenors-petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and AYALA CORPORATION, respondents.
G.R. No. 74376 August 30, 1989
BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner,

vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ROSARIO DE JESUS TENORIO, and CECILIA
GONZALEZ,respondents.
G.R. No. 76394 August 30, 1989
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEAL and EDUARDO and BUENA ROMUALDEZ respondents.
G.R. No. 78182 August 30, 1989
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, DOLORES FILLEY and J. ROMERO & ASSOCIATES, respondents.
G.R. No. 82281 August 30, 1989
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, VIOLETA MONCAL, and MAJAL DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, respondents.
RESOLUTION
On February 2, 1989, the Court issued a Resolution, requiring, among other things, Atty. Sangco
to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt "for using intemperate and
accusatory language." 1 On March 2, 1989, Atty. Sangco filed an explanation.
The Court finds Atty. Sangco's remarks in his motion for reconsideration, reproduced as follows:
...
This Decision of this Court in the above-entitled case reads more like a Brief for
Ayala ... 2
... [t]he Court not only put to serious question its own integrity and competence
but also jeopardized its own campaign against graft and corruption undeniably
pervading the judiciary ... 3
...
The blatant disregard of controlling, documented and admitted facts not put in
issue, such as those summarily ignored in this case; the extraordinary efforts
exerted to justify such arbitrariness and the very strained and unwarranted
conclusions drawn therefrom, are unparalleled in the history of this Court ... 4
...
... [T]o ignore the fact that Jupiter Street was originally constructed for the
exclusive benefit of the residents of Bel- Air Village, or rule that respondent
Court's admission of said fact is "inaccurate," as Ayala's Counsel himself would
like to do but did not even contend, is a manifestation of this Court's unusual
partiality to Ayala and puts to serious question its integrity on that account. 5
...
[i]t is submitted that this ruling is the most serious reflection on the Court's
competence and integrity and exemplifies its manifest partiality towards Ayala. It
is a blatant disregard of documented and incontrovertible and uncontroverted
factual findings of the trial court fully supported by the records and the true
significance of those facts which both the respondent court and this Court did not
bother to read and consequently did not consider and discuss, least of all in the
manner it did with respect to those in which it arrived at conclusions favorable to
Ayala. 6
To totally disregard Ayala's written letter of application for special membership in
BAVA which clearly state that such membership is necessary because it is a new
development in their relationship with respect to its intention to give its
commercial lot buyers an equal right to the use of Jupiter Street without giving
any reason therefor, smacks of judicial arrogance ... 7
We are not satisfied with his explanation that he was merely defending the interests of his clients.
As we held inLaureta, a lawyer's "first duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice;
to that end, his client's success is wholly subordinate; and his conduct ought to and must always
be scrupulously observant of law and ethics." 10And while a lawyer must advocate his client's
cause in utmost earnest and with the maximum skill he can marshal, he is not at liberty to resort
to arrogance, intimidation, and innuendo.
That "[t]he questions propounded were not meant or intended to accuse but to ... challenge the
thinking in the Decision, 11 comes as an eleventh-hour effort to cleanse what is in fact and plainly,
an unfounded accusation. Certainly, it is the prerogative of an unsuccessful party to ask for
reconsideration, but as we held in Laureta, litigants should not "'think that they will win a hearing
by the sheer multiplication of words' ". 12 As we indicated (see Decision denying the motions for
reconsideration in G.R. Nos. 71169, 74376, 76394, 78182, and 82281, and deciding G.R. No.
60727, dated August 25, 1989), the movants have raised no new arguments to warrant
reconsideration and they can not veil that fact with inflammatory language.
...
... [A]re all these unusual exercise of such arbitrariness above suspicion? Will
the current campaign of this Court against graft and corruption in the judiciary be
enhanced by such broad discretionary power of courts? 8
disparaging, intemperate, and uncalled for. His suggestions that the Court might have been guilty
of graft and corruption in acting on these cases are not only unbecoming, but comes, as well, as
an open assault upon the Court's honor and integrity. In rendering its judgment, the Court yielded
to the records before it, and to the records alone, and not to outside influences, much less, the
influence of any of the parties. Atty. Sangco, as a former judge of an inferior court, should know
better that in any litigation, one party prevails, but his success will not justify indictments of
bribery by the other party. He should be aware that because of his accusations, he has done an
enormous disservice to the integrity of the highest tribunal and to the stability of the
administration of justice in general.
As a former judge, Atty. Sangco also has to be aware that we are not bound by the findings of the
trial court (in which his clients prevailed).lwph1.t But if we did not agree with the findings of
the court a quo, it does not follow that we had acted arbitrarily because, precisely, it is the office
of an appeal to review the findings of the inferior court.
To be sure, Atty. Sangco is entitled to his opinion, but not to a license to insult the Court with
derogatory statements and recourses to argumenta ad hominem. In that event, it is the Court's
duty "to act to preserve the honor and dignity ... and to safeguard the morals and ethics of the
legal profession." 9
Atty. Sangco himself admits that "[a]s a judge I have learned to live with and accept with grace
criticisms of my decisions". 13 Apparently, he does not practice what he preaches. Of course, the
Court is not unreceptive to comment and critique of its decisions, but provided they are fair and
dignified. Atty. Sangco has transcended the limits of fair comment for which he deserves this
Court's rebuke.
In our "show-cause" Resolution, we sought to hold Atty. Sangco in contempt, specifically, for
resort to insulting language amounting to disrespect toward the Court within the meaning of
Section 1, of Rule 71, of the Rules of Court. Clearly, however, his act also constitutes malpractice
as the term is defined by Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as follows:
CANON 11-A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE
COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY
OTHERS.
Rule 11.01...
Rule 11.02...
Rule 11.03-A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing
language or behavior before the Courts.
Rule 11.04-A lawyer should not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the
record or have no materiality to the case.
Rule 11.05...
Thus, aside from contempt, Atty. Sangco faces punishment for professional misconduct or
malpractice.
WHEREFORE Atty. J. Cezar Sangco is (1) SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3)
months effective from receipt hereof, and (2) ORDERED to pay a fine of P 500.00 payable from
receipt hereof. Let a copy of this Resolution be entered in his record. IT IS SO ORDERED.

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