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A. BILL OF RIGHTS OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION

1. BASIC PRINCIPLES
(A)
G.R. No. L-31195 June 5, 1973
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT
ORGANIZATION, NICANOR TOLENTINO, FLORENCIO,
PADRIGANO RUFINO, ROXAS MARIANO DE LEON,
ASENCION PACIENTE, BONIFACIO VACUNA, BENJAMIN
PAGCU and RODULFO MUNSOD, petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC. and COURT OF
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.
FACTS:
The
petitioner
Philippine
Blooming
Mills
Employees
Organization (hereinafter referred to as PBMEO) is a legitimate
labor union composed of the employees of the respondent
Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and petitioners Nicanor
Tolentino, Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon,
Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu and
Rodulfo Munsod are officers and members of the petitioner
Union.
Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage
a mass demonstration at Malacaang on March 4, 1969, in
protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police, to be
participated in by the workers in the first shift (from 6 A.M. to 2
P.M.) as well as those in the regular second and third shifts
(from 7 A.M. to 4 P.M. and from 8 A.M. to 5 P.M., respectively);
and that they informed the respondent Company of their
proposed demonstration.
The questioned order dated September 15, 1969, of Associate
Judge Joaquin M. Salvador of the respondent Court reproduced
the following stipulation of facts of the parties parties
3. That on March 2, 1969 complainant company learned of the
projected mass demonstration at Malacaang in protest against
alleged abuses of the Pasig Police Department to be
participated by the first shift (6:00 AM-2:00 PM) workers as well
as those working in the regular shifts (7:00 A.M. to 4:00 PM and
8:00 AM to 5:00 PM) in the morning of March 4, 1969;
4. That a meeting was called by the Company on March 3, 1969
at about 11:00 A.M. at the Company's canteen, and those
present were: for the Company: (1) Mr. Arthur L. Ang (2) Atty. S.
de Leon, Jr., (3) and all department and section heads. For the
PBMEO (1) Florencio Padrigano, (2) Rufino Roxas, (3) Mariano
de Leon, (4) Asencion Paciente, (5) Bonifacio Vacuna and (6)
Benjamin Pagcu.
5. That the Company asked the union panel to confirm or deny
said projected mass demonstration at Malacaang on March 4,
1969. PBMEO thru Benjamin Pagcu who acted as spokesman
of the union panel, confirmed the planned demonstration and
stated that the demonstration or rally cannot be cancelled
because it has already been agreed upon in the meeting. Pagcu
explained further that the demonstration has nothing to do with
the Company because the union has no quarrel or dispute with
Management;
6. That Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, Company
personnel manager, informed PBMEO that the demonstration is
an inalienable right of the union guaranteed by the Constitution
but emphasized, however, that any demonstration for that
matter should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the
Company. For which reason, the Company, thru Atty. C.S. de
Leon warned the PBMEO representatives that workers who
belong to the first and regular shifts, who without previous

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leave of absence approved by the Company, particularly , the

officers present who are the organizers of the demonstration,
who shall fail to report for work the following morning (March 4,
1969) shall be dismissed, because such failure is a violation of
the existing CBA and, therefore, would be amounting to an
illegal strike;
7. That at about 5:00 P.M. on March 3, 1969, another meeting
was convoked Company represented by Atty. C.S. de Leon, Jr.
The Union panel was composed of: Nicanor Tolentino, Rodolfo
Munsod, Benjamin Pagcu and Florencio Padrigano. In this
afternoon meeting of March 3, 1969, Company reiterated and
appealed to the PBMEO representatives that while all workers
may join the Malacaang demonstration, the workers for the
first and regular shift of March 4, 1969 should be excused from
joining the demonstration and should report for work; and thus
utilize the workers in the 2nd and 3rd shifts in order not to
violate the provisions of the CBA, particularly Article XXIV: NO
LOCKOUT NO STRIKE'. All those who will not follow this
warning of the Company shall be dismiss; De Leon reiterated
the Company's warning that the officers shall be primarily liable
being the organizers of the mass demonstration. The union
panel countered that it was rather too late to change their
plans inasmuch as the Malacaang demonstration will be held
the following morning; and
8. That a certain Mr. Wilfredo Ariston, adviser of PBMEO sent a
cablegram to the Company which was received 9:50 A.M.,
March 4, 1969, the contents of which are as follows:
'REITERATING REQUEST EXCUSE DAY SHIFT EMPLOYEES JOINING
DEMONSTRATION MARCH 4, 1969.' (Pars. 3-8, Annex "F", pp.
42-43, rec.)
(COMPANY) Because the petitioners and their members
numbering about 400 proceeded with the demonstration
despite the pleas of the respondent Company that the first shift
workers should not be required to participate in the
demonstration and that the workers in the second and third
shifts should be utilized for the demonstration from 6 A.M. to 2
P.M. on March 4, 1969, respondent Company prior notice of the
mass demonstration on March 4, 1969, with the respondent
Court, a charge against petitioners and other employees who
composed the first shift, charging them with a "violation of
Section 4(a)-6 in relation to Sections 13 and 14, as well as
Section 15, all of Republic Act No. 875, and of the CBA
providing for 'No Strike and No Lockout.' " (Annex "A", pp. 1920, rec.). The charge was accompanied by the joint affidavit of
Arthur L. Ang and Cesareo de Leon, Jr. (Annex "B", pp. 21-24,
rec.). Thereafter, a corresponding complaint was filed, dated
April 18, 1969, by Acting Chief Prosecutor Antonio T. Tirona and
Acting Prosecutor Linda P. Ilagan (Annex "C", pp. 25-30, rec.)
(PBMEO) In their answer, dated May 9, 1969, herein petitioners
claim that they did not violate the existing CBA because they
gave the respondent Company prior notice of the mass
demonstration on March 4, 1969; that the said mass
demonstration was a valid exercise of their constitutional
freedom of speech against the alleged abuses of some Pasig
policemen; and that their mass demonstration was not a
declaration of strike because it was not directed against the
respondent firm (Annex "D", pp. 31-34, rec.)
(COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS) After considering the
aforementioned stipulation of facts submitted by the parties,
Judge Joaquin M. Salvador, in an order dated September 15,
1969, found herein petitioner PBMEO guilty of bargaining in bad
faith and herein petitioners Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas,
Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna,
Benjamin Pagcu, Nicanor Tolentino and Rodulfo Munsod as
directly responsible for perpetrating the said unfair labor
practice and were, as a consequence, considered to have lost
their status as employees of the respondent Company (Annex
"F", pp. 42-56, rec.)

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(PBMEO ARGUMENTS) Herein petitioners claim that they

received on September 23, 1969, the aforesaid order (p. 11,
rec.); and that they filed on September 29, 1969, because
September 28, 1969 fell on Sunday (p. 59, rec.), a motion for
reconsideration of said order dated September 15, 1969, on the
ground that it is contrary to law and the evidence, as well as
asked for ten (10) days within which to file their arguments
pursuant to Sections 15, 16 and 17 of the Rules of the CIR, as
amended.
(COMPANY COUNTER-ARGUMENT) In its opposition dated
October 7, 1969, filed on October 11, 1969 (p. 63, rec.),
respondent Company averred that herein petitioners received
on September 22, 1969, the order dated September 17 (should
be September 15), 1969; that under Section 15 of the amended
Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations, herein petitioners had
five (5) days from September 22, 1969 or until September 27,
1969, within which to file their motion for reconsideration; and
that because their motion for reconsideration was two (2) days
late, it should be accordingly dismissed, invoking Bien vs.
Castillo, 1 which held among others, that a motion for extension
of the five-day period for the filing of a motion for
reconsideration should be filed before the said five-day period
elapses.
Subsequently, herein petitioners filed on October 14, 1969 their
written arguments dated October 11, 1969, in support of their
motion for reconsideration.
(MOTION FOR RECON DISMISSED) In a resolution dated October
9, 1969, the respondent en banc dismissed the motion for
reconsideration of herein petitioners for being pro forma as it
was filed beyond the reglementary period prescribed by its
Rules.
At the bottom of the notice of the order dated October 9, 1969,
which was released on October 24, 1969 and addressed to the
counsels of the parties (pp. 75-76, rec.), appear the
requirements of Sections 15, 16 and 17, as amended, of the
Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations, that a motion for
reconsideration shall be filed within five (5) days from receipt of
its decision or order and that an appeal from the decision,
resolution or order of the C.I.R., sitting en banc, shall be
perfected within ten (10) days from receipt thereof (p. 76, rec.).
(PETITION FOR RELIEF WITH THE CIR) On October 31, 1969,
herein petitioners filed with the respondent court a petition for
relief from the order dated October 9, 1969, on the ground that
their failure to file their motion for reconsideration on time was
due to excusable negligence and honest mistake committed by
the president of the petitioner Union and of the office clerk of
their counsel, attaching thereto the affidavits of the said
president and clerk.
(FILING OF NOTICE OF APPEAL WITH THE SC) Without waiting
for any resolution on their petition for relief from the order
dated October 9, 1969, herein petitioners filed on November 3,
1969, with the Supreme Court, a notice of appeal.
There is need of briefly restating basic concepts and principles
which underlie the issues posed by the case at bar.
(1) In a democracy, the preservation and enhancement of the
dignity and worth of the human personality is the central core
as well as the cardinal article of faith of our civilization. The
inviolable character of man as an individual must be "protected
to the largest possible extent in his thoughts and in his beliefs
as the citadel of his person." 2
(2) The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the ideals of
liberty, equality and security "against the assaults of
opportunism, the expediency of the passing hour, the erosion
of small encroachments, and the scorn and derision of those
who have no patience with general principles." 3

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(SC DECISION) In the pithy language of Mr. Justice Robert

Jackson, the purpose of the Bill of Rights is to withdraw "certain
subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place
them beyond the reach of majorities and officials, and
to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the
courts. One's rights to life, liberty and property, to free speech,
or free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other
fundamental rights may not be submitted to a vote; they
depend on the outcome of no elections." 4 Laski proclaimed
that "the happiness of the individual, not the well-being of the
State, was the criterion by which its behaviour was to be
judged. His interests, not its power, set the limits to the
authority it was entitled to exercise." 5
(3) The freedoms of expression and of assembly as well as the
right to petition are included among the immunities reserved
by the sovereign people, in the rhetorical aphorism of Justice
Holmes, to protect the ideas that we abhor or hate more than
the ideas we cherish; or as Socrates insinuated, not only to
protect the minority who want to talk, but also to benefit the
majority who refuse to listen. 6 And as Justice Douglas cogently
stresses it, the liberties of one are the liberties of all; and the
liberties of one are not safe unless the liberties of all are
protected. 7
(4) The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition,
are not only civil rights but also political rights essential to
man's enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and to his full and
complete fulfillment. Thru these freedoms the citizens can
participate not merely in the periodic establishment of the
government through their suffrage but also in the
administration of public affairs as well as in the discipline of
abusive public officers. The citizen is accorded these rights so
that he can appeal to the appropriate governmental officers or
agencies for redress and protection as well as for the
imposition of the lawful sanctions on erring public officers and
employees.
(5) While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the
primacy
of
human
rights
over
property
rights
is
recognized. 8 Because these freedoms are "delicate and
vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society" and
the "threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as
potently as the actual application of sanctions," they "need
breathing space to survive," permitting government regulation
only "with narrow specificity." 9
(IMPRESCRIPITIBILITY OF HUMAN RIGHTS) Property and
property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights
are imprescriptible. If human rights are extinguished by the
passage of time, then the Bill of Rights is a useless attempt to
limit the power of government and ceases to be an efficacious
shield against the tyranny of officials, of majorities, of the
influential and powerful, and of oligarchs political, economic
or otherwise.
In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression
and of assembly occupy a preferred position as they are
essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and
political institutions; 10 and such priority "gives these liberties
the sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious
intrusions." 11
The superiority of these freedoms over property rights is
underscored by the fact that a mere reasonable or rational
relation between the means employed by the law and its object
or purpose that the law is neither arbitrary nor
discriminatory nor oppressive would suffice to validate a law
which restricts or impairs property rights. 12 On the other hand,
a constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires
a more stringent criterion, namely existence of a grave and
immediate danger of a substantive evil which the State has the
right to prevent. So it has been stressed in the main opinion of
Mr. Justice Fernando in Gonzales vs. Comelec and reiterated by
the writer of the opinion in Imbong vs. Ferrer. 13It should be

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added that Mr. Justice Barredo in Gonzales vs. Comelec, supra,

like Justices Douglas, Black and Goldberg in N.Y. Times Co. vs.
Sullivan, 14 believes that the freedoms of speech and of the
press as well as of peaceful assembly and of petition for
redress of grievances are absolute when directed against public
officials or "when exercised in relation to our right to choose
the men and women by whom we shall be governed," 15 even
as Mr. Justice Castro relies on the balancing-of-interests
test. 16 Chief Justice Vinson is partial to the improbable danger
rule formulated by Chief Judge Learned Hand, viz. whether
the gravity of the evil, discounted by its improbability, justifies
such invasion of free expression as is necessary to avoid the
danger. 17
II
The respondent Court of Industrial Relations, after opining that
the mass demonstration was not a declaration of strike,
concluded that by their "concerted act and the occurrence
temporary stoppage of work," herein petitioners are guilty
bargaining in bad faith and hence violated the collective
bargaining agreement with private respondent Philippine
Blooming Mills Co., inc.. Set against and tested by foregoing
principles governing a democratic society, such conclusion
cannot be sustained. The demonstration held petitioners on
March 4, 1969 before Malacaang was against alleged abuses
of some Pasig policemen, not against their employer, herein
private respondent firm, said demonstrate was purely and
completely an exercise of their freedom expression in general
and of their right of assembly and petition for redress of
grievances in particular before appropriate governmental
agency, the Chief Executive, again the police officers of the
municipality of Pasig. They exercise their civil and political
rights for their mutual aid protection from what they believe
were police excesses. As matter of fact, it was the duty of
herein private respondent firm to protect herein petitioner
Union and its members from the harassment of local police
officers. It was to the interest herein private respondent firm to
rally to the defense of, and take up the cudgels for, its
employees, so that they can report to work free from
harassment, vexation or peril and as consequence perform
more efficiently their respective tasks enhance its productivity
as well as profits. Herein respondent employer did not even
offer to intercede for its employees with the local police. Was it
securing peace for itself at the expenses of its workers? Was it
also intimidated by the local police or did it encourage the local
police to terrorize or vex its workers? Its failure to defend its
own employees all the more weakened the position of its
laborers the alleged oppressive police who might have been all
the more emboldened thereby subject its lowly employees to
further indignities.
In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of expression well as
their right of assembly and of petition against alleged
persecution of local officialdom, the employees and laborers of
herein private respondent firm were fighting for their very
survival, utilizing only the weapons afforded them by the
Constitution the untrammelled enjoyment of their basic
human rights. The pretension of their employer that it would
suffer loss or damage by reason of the absence of its
employees from 6 o'clock in the morning to 2 o'clock in the
afternoon, is a plea for the preservation merely of their
property rights. Such apprehended loss or damage would not
spell the difference between the life and death of the firm or its
owners or its management. The employees' pathetic situation
was a stark reality abused, harassment and persecuted as
they believed they were by the peace officers of the
municipality. As above intimated, the condition in which the
employees found themselves vis-a-vis the local police of Pasig,
was a matter that vitally affected their right to individual
existence as well as that of their families. Material loss can be
repaired or adequately compensated. The debasement of the
human being broken in morale and brutalized in spirit-can
never be fully evaluated in monetary terms. The wounds fester
and the scars remain to humiliate him to his dying day, even as

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he cries in anguish for retribution, denial of which is like

rubbing salt on bruised tissues.
As heretofore stated, the primacy of human rights freedom
of expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress
of
grievances

over
property
rights
has
been
sustained. 18 Emphatic reiteration of this basic tenet as a
coveted boon at once the shield and armor of the dignity and
worth of the human personality, the all-consuming ideal of our
enlightened civilization becomes Our duty, if freedom and
social justice have any meaning at all for him who toils so that
capital can produce economic goods that can generate
happiness for all. To regard the demonstration against police
officers, not against the employer, as evidence of bad faith in
collective bargaining and hence a violation of the collective
bargaining agreement and a cause for the dismissal from
employment of the demonstrating employees, stretches unduly
the compass of the collective bargaining agreement, is "a
potent means of inhibiting speech" and therefore inflicts a
moral as well as mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees
of free expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition. 19
The collective bargaining agreement which fixes the working
shifts of the employees, according to the respondent Court
Industrial Relations, in effect imposes on the workers the
"duty ... to observe regular working hours." The strain
construction of the Court of Industrial Relations that a
stipulated working shifts deny the workers the right to stage
mass demonstration against police abuses during working
hours, constitutes a virtual tyranny over the mind and life the
workers and deserves severe condemnation. Renunciation of
the freedom should not be predicated on such a slender
ground.
The mass demonstration staged by the employees on March 4,
1969 could not have been legally enjoined by any court, such
an injunction would be trenching upon the freedom expression
of the workers, even if it legally appears to be illegal picketing
or strike. 20 The respondent Court of Industrial Relations in the
case at bar concedes that the mass demonstration was not a
declaration of a strike "as the same not rooted in any industrial
dispute although there is concerted act and the occurrence of a
temporary stoppage work."
The respondent firm claims that there was no need for all its
employees to participate in the demonstration and that they
suggested to the Union that only the first and regular shift from
6 A.M. to 2 P.M. should report for work in order that loss or
damage to the firm will be averted. This stand failed appreciate
the sine qua non of an effective demonstration especially by a
labor union, namely the complete unity of the Union members
as well as their total presence at the demonstration site in
order to generate the maximum sympathy for the validity of
their cause but also immediately action on the part of the
corresponding government agencies with jurisdiction over the
issues they raised against the local police. Circulation is one of
the aspects of freedom of expression. 21 If demonstrators are
reduced by one-third, then by that much the circulation of the
issues raised by the demonstration is diminished. The more the
participants, the more persons can be apprised of the purpose
of the rally. Moreover, the absence of one-third of their
members will be regarded as a substantial indication of disunity
in their ranks which will enervate their position and abet
continued alleged police persecution. At any rate, the Union
notified the company two days in advance of their projected
demonstration and the company could have made
arrangements to counteract or prevent whatever losses it
might sustain by reason of the absence of its workers for one
day, especially in this case when the Union requested it to
excuse only the day-shift employees who will join the
demonstration on March 4, 1969 which request the Union
reiterated in their telegram received by the company at 9:50 in
the morning of March 4, 1969, the day of the mass
demonstration (pp. 42-43, rec.). There was a lack of human
understanding or compassion on the part of the firm in

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rejecting the request of the Union for excuse from work for the
day shifts in order to carry out its mass demonstration. And to
regard as a ground for dismissal the mass demonstration held
against the Pasig police, not against the company, is gross
vindictiveness on the part of the employer, which is as
unchristian as it is unconstitutional.
III
The respondent company is the one guilty of unfair labor
practice. Because the refusal on the part of the respondent firm
to permit all its employees and workers to join the mass
demonstration against alleged police abuses and the
subsequent separation of the eight (8) petitioners from the
service constituted an unconstitutional restraint on the freedom
of expression, freedom of assembly and freedom petition for
redress of grievances, the respondent firm committed an unfair
labor practice defined in Section 4(a-1) in relation to Section 3
of Republic Act No. 875, otherwise known as the Industrial
Peace Act. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 8 guarantees to the
employees the right "to engage in concert activities for ...
mutual aid or protection"; while Section 4(a-1) regards as an
unfair labor practice for an employer interfere with, restrain or
coerce employees in the exercise their rights guaranteed in
Section Three."
We repeat that the obvious purpose of the mass demonstration
staged by the workers of the respondent firm on March 4, 1969,
was for their mutual aid and protection against alleged police
abuses, denial of which was interference with or restraint on
the right of the employees to engage in such common action to
better shield themselves against such alleged police
indignities. The insistence on the part of the respondent firm
that the workers for the morning and regular shift should not
participate in the mass demonstration, under pain of dismissal,
was as heretofore stated, "a potent means of inhibiting
speech." 22
Such a concerted action for their mutual help and protection
deserves at least equal protection as the concerted action of
employees in giving publicity to a letter complaint charging
bank president with immorality, nepotism, favoritism an
discrimination in the appointment and promotion of ban
employees. 23 We further ruled in the Republic Savings Bank
case, supra, that for the employees to come within the
protective mantle of Section 3 in relation to Section 4(a-1) on
Republic Act No. 875, "it is not necessary that union activity be
involved or that collective bargaining be contemplated," as
long as the concerted activity is for the furtherance of their
interests. 24
As stated clearly in the stipulation of facts embodied in the
questioned order of respondent Court dated September 15,
1969, the company, "while expressly acknowledging, that the
demonstration is an inalienable right of the Union guaranteed
by the Constitution," nonetheless emphasized that "any
demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice the
normal operation of the company" and "warned the PBMEO
representatives that workers who belong to the first and
regular shifts, who without previous leave of absence approved
by the Company, particularly the officers present who are the
organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to report for
work the following morning (March 4, 1969) shall be dismissed,
because such failure is a violation of the existing CBA and,
therefore, would be amounting to an illegal strike (;)" (p. III,
petitioner's brief). Such threat of dismissal tended to coerce the
employees from joining the mass demonstration. However, the
issues that the employees raised against the local police, were
more important to them because they had the courage to
proceed with the demonstration, despite such threat of
dismissal. The most that could happen to them was to lose a
day's wage by reason of their absence from work on the day of
the demonstration. One day's pay means much to a laborer,
more especially if he has a family to support. Yet, they were
willing to forego their one-day salary hoping that their

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demonstration would bring about the desired relief from police

abuses. But management was adamant in refusing to recognize
the superior legitimacy of their right of free speech, free
assembly and the right to petition for redress.
Because the respondent company ostensibly did not find it
necessary to demand from the workers proof of the truth of the
alleged abuses inflicted on them by the local police, it thereby
concedes that the evidence of such abuses should properly be
submitted to the corresponding authorities having jurisdiction
over their complaint and to whom such complaint may be
referred by the President of the Philippines for proper
investigation and action with a view to disciplining the local
police officers involved.
On the other hand, while the respondent Court of Industrial
Relations found that the demonstration "paralyzed to a large
extent the operations of the complainant company," the
respondent Court of Industrial Relations did not make any
finding as to the fact of loss actually sustained by the firm. This
significant circumstance can only mean that the firm did not
sustain any loss or damage. It did not present evidence as to
whether it lost expected profits for failure to comply with
purchase orders on that day; or that penalties were exacted
from it by customers whose orders could not be filled that day
of the demonstration; or that purchase orders were cancelled
by the customers by reason of its failure to deliver the
materials ordered; or that its own equipment or materials or
products were damaged due to absence of its workers on
March 4, 1969. On the contrary, the company saved a sizable
amount in the form of wages for its hundreds of workers, cost
of fuel, water and electric consumption that day. Such savings
could have amply compensated for unrealized profits or
damages it might have sustained by reason of the absence of
its workers for only one day.
IV
Apart from violating the constitutional guarantees of free
speech and assembly as well as the right to petition for redress
of grievances of the employees, the dismissal of the eight (8)
leaders of the workers for proceeding with the demonstration
and consequently being absent from work, constitutes a denial
of social justice likewise assured by the fundamental law to
these lowly employees. Section 5 of Article II of the Constitution
imposes upon the State "the promotion of social justice to
insure the well-being and economic security of all of the
people," which guarantee is emphasized by the other directive
in Section 6 of Article XIV of the Constitution that "the State
shall afford protection to labor ...". Respondent Court of
Industrial Relations as an agency of the State is under
obligation at all times to give meaning and substance to these
constitutional guarantees in favor of the working man; for
otherwise these constitutional safeguards would be merely a
lot of "meaningless constitutional patter." Under the Industrial
Peace Act, the Court of Industrial Relations is enjoined to effect
the policy of the law "to eliminate the causes of industrial
unrest by encouraging and protecting the exercise by
employees of their right to self-organization for the purpose of
collective bargaining and for the promotion of their moral,
social and economic well-being." It is most unfortunate in the
case at bar that respondent Court of Industrial Relations, the
very governmental agency designed therefor, failed to
implement this policy and failed to keep faith with its avowed
mission its raison d'etre as ordained and directed by the
Constitution.
V
It has been likewise established that a violation of a
constitutional right divests the court of jurisdiction; and as a
consequence its judgment is null and void and confers no
rights. Relief from a criminal conviction secured at the sacrifice
of constitutional liberties, may be obtained through habeas
corpus proceedings even long after the finality of the judgment.

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Thus, habeas corpus is the remedy to obtain the release of an

individual, who is convicted by final judgment through a forced
confession, which violated his constitutional right against selfincrimination; 25or who is denied the right to present evidence
in his defense as a deprivation of his liberty without due
process of law, 26 even after the accused has already served
sentence for twenty-two years. 27
Both the respondents Court of Industrial Relations and private
firm trenched upon these constitutional immunities of
petitioners. Both failed to accord preference to such rights and
aggravated the inhumanity to which the aggrieved workers
claimed they had been subjected by the municipal police.
Having violated these basic human rights of the laborers, the
Court of Industrial Relations ousted itself of jurisdiction and the
questioned orders it issued in the instant case are a nullity.
Recognition and protection of such freedoms are imperative on
all public offices including the courts 28 as well as private
citizens and corporations, the exercise and enjoyment of which
must not be nullified by mere procedural rule promulgated by
the Court Industrial Relations exercising a purely delegate
legislative power, when even a law enacted by Congress must
yield to the untrammelled enjoyment of these human rights.
There is no time limit to the exercise of the freedoms. The right
to enjoy them is not exhausted by the delivery of one speech,
the printing of one article or the staging of one demonstration.
It is a continuing immunity to be invoked and exercised when
exigent and expedient whenever there are errors to be
rectified, abuses to be denounced, inhumanities to be
condemned. Otherwise these guarantees in the Bill of Rights
would be vitiated by rule on procedure prescribing the period
for appeal. The battle then would be reduced to a race for time.
And in such a contest between an employer and its laborer, the
latter eventually loses because he cannot employ the best an
dedicated counsel who can defend his interest with the
required diligence and zeal, bereft as he is of the financial
resources with which to pay for competent legal services. 28-a
VI
The Court of Industrial Relations rule prescribes that motion for
reconsideration of its order or writ should filed within five (5)
days from notice thereof and that the arguments in support of
said motion shall be filed within ten (10) days from the date of
filing of such motion for reconsideration (Sec. 16). As above
intimated, these rules of procedure were promulgated by the
Court of Industrial Relations pursuant to a legislative
delegation. 29
The motion for reconsideration was filed on September 29,
1969, or seven (7) days from notice on September 22, 1969 of
the order dated September 15, 1969 or two (2) days late.
Petitioners claim that they could have filed it on September 28,
1969, but it was a Sunday.
Does the mere fact that the motion for reconsideration was
filed two (2) days late defeat the rights of the petitioning
employees? Or more directly and concretely, does the
inadvertent omission to comply with a mere Court of Industrial
Relations procedural rule governing the period for filing a
motion for reconsideration or appeal in labor cases,
promulgated pursuant to a legislative delegation, prevail over
constitutional rights? The answer should be obvious in the light
of the aforecited cases. To accord supremacy to the foregoing
rules of the Court of Industrial Relations over basic human
rights sheltered by the Constitution, is not only incompatible
with the basic tenet of constitutional government that the
Constitution is superior to any statute or subordinate rules and
regulations, but also does violence to natural reason and logic.
The dominance and superiority of the constitutional right over
the aforesaid Court of Industrial Relations procedural rule of
necessity should be affirmed. Such a Court of Industrial
Relations rule as applied in this case does not implement or
reinforce or strengthen the constitutional rights affected,' but
instead constrict the same to the point of nullifying the

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enjoyment thereof by the petitioning employees. Said Court of

Industrial Relations rule, promulgated as it was pursuant to a
mere legislative delegation, is unreasonable and therefore is
beyond the authority granted by the Constitution and the law. A
period of five (5) days within which to file a motion for
reconsideration is too short, especially for the aggrieved
workers, who usually do not have the ready funds to meet the
necessary expenses therefor. In case of the Court of Appeals
and the Supreme Court, a period of fifteen (15) days has been
fixed for the filing of the motion for re hearing or
reconsideration (See. 10, Rule 51; Sec. 1, Rule 52; Sec. 1, Rule
56, Revised Rules of Court). The delay in the filing of the motion
for reconsideration could have been only one day if September
28, 1969 was not a Sunday. This fact accentuates the
unreasonableness of the Court of Industrial are concerned.
It should be stressed here that the motion for reconsideration
dated September 27, 1969, is based on the ground that the
order sought to be reconsidered "is not in accordance with law,
evidence and facts adduced during the hearing," and likewise
prays for an extension of ten (10) days within which to file
arguments pursuant to Sections 15, 16 and 17 of the Rules of
the Court of Industrial Relations (Annex "G", pp. 57-60, rec.);
although the arguments were actually filed by the herein
petitioners on October 14, 1969 (Annex "I", pp. 70-73, rec.),
long after the 10-day period required for the filing of such
supporting arguments counted from the filing of the motion for
reconsideration. Herein petitioners received only on October
28, 1969 the resolution dated October 9, 1969 dismissing the
motion for reconsideration for being pro forma since it was filed
beyond the reglementary period (Annex "J", pp. 74-75, rec.)
It is true that We ruled in several cases that where a motion to
reconsider is filed out of time, or where the arguments in suppf
such motion are filed beyond the 10 day reglementary period
provided for by the Court of Industrial Relations rules, the order
or decision subject of 29-a reconsideration becomes final and
unappealable. But in all these cases, the constitutional rights of
free expression, free assembly and petition were not involved.
It is a procedural rule that generally all causes of action and
defenses presently available must be specifically raised in the
complaint or answer; so that any cause of action or defense not
raised in such pleadings, is deemed waived. However, a
constitutional issue can be raised any time, even for the first
time on appeal, if it appears that the determination of the
constitutional issue is necessary to a decision of the case, the
very lis mota of the case without the resolution of which no
final and complete determination of the dispute can be
made. 30 It is thus seen that a procedural rule of Congress or of
the Supreme Court gives way to a constitutional right. In the
instant case, the procedural rule of the Court of Industrial
Relations, a creature of Congress, must likewise yield to the
constitutional rights invoked by herein petitioners even before
the institution of the unfair labor practice charged against them
and in their defense to the said charge.
In the case at bar, enforcement of the basic human freedoms
sheltered no less by the organic law, is a most compelling
reason to deny application of a Court of Industrial Relations rule
which impinges on such human rights. 30-a
It is an accepted principle that the Supreme Court has the
inherent power to "suspend its own rules or to except a
particular case from its operation, whenever the purposes of
justice require." 30-b Mr. Justice Barredo in his concurring
opinion in Estrada vs. Sto. Domingo. 30-c reiterated this
principle and added that
Under this authority, this Court is enabled to cove with all
situations without concerning itself about procedural niceties
that do not square with the need to do justice, in any case,
without further loss of time, provided that the right of the
parties to a full day in court is not substantially impaired. Thus,
this Court may treat an appeal as a certiorari and vice-versa. In

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other words, when all the material facts are spread in the
records before Us, and all the parties have been duly heard, it
matters little that the error of the court a quo is of judgment or
of jurisdiction. We can then and there render the appropriate
judgment. Is within the contemplation of this doctrine that as it
is perfectly legal and within the power of this Court to strike
down in an appeal acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or
committed with grave abuse of discretion, it cannot be beyond
the admit of its authority, in appropriate cases, to reverse in a
certain proceed in any error of judgment of a court a quo which
cannot be exactly categorized as a flaw of jurisdiction. If there
can be any doubt, which I do not entertain, on whether or not
the errors this Court has found in the decision of the Court of
Appeals are short of being jurisdiction nullities or excesses, this
Court would still be on firm legal grounds should it choose to
reverse said decision here and now even if such errors can be
considered as mere mistakes of judgment or only as faults in
the exercise of jurisdiction, so as to avoid the unnecessary
return of this case to the lower court for the sole purpose of
pursuing the ordinary course of an appeal. (Emphasis
supplied). 30-d

necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling the dispute

or dispelling any doubts that may give rise to future disputes.
(Ang Tibay v. C.I.R., G.R. No. 46496, Feb. 17, 1940; Manila
Trading & Supply Co. v. Phil. Labor, 71 Phil. 124.) For these
reasons, We believe that this provision is ample enough to have
enabled the respondent court to consider whether or not its
previous ruling that petitioners constitute a minority was
founded on fact, without regard to the technical meaning of
newly discovered evidence. ... (Alonso v. Villamor, 16 Phil. 315;
Chua Kiong v. Whitaker, 46 Phil. 578). (emphasis supplied.)

Insistence on the application of the questioned Court industrial

Relations rule in this particular case at bar would an
unreasoning adherence to "Procedural niceties" which denies
justice to the herein laborers, whose basic human freedoms,
including the right to survive, must be according supremacy
over the property rights of their employer firm which has been
given a full hearing on this case, especially when, as in the
case at bar, no actual material damage has be demonstrated
as having been inflicted on its property rights.

Many a time, this Court deviated from procedure technicalities

when they ceased to be instruments of justice, for the
attainment of which such rules have been devised.
Summarizing the jurisprudence on this score, Mr. Justice
Fernando, speaking for a unanimous Court in Palma vs.
Oreta, 30-f Stated:

If We can disregard our own rules when justice requires it,

obedience to the Constitution renders more imperative the
suspension of a Court of Industrial Relations rule that clash with
the human rights sanctioned and shielded with resolution
concern by the specific guarantees outlined in the organic law.
It should be stressed that the application in the instant case
Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules relied upon
by herein respondent firm is unreasonable and therefore such
application becomes unconstitutional as it subverts the human
rights of petitioning labor union and workers in the light of the
peculiar facts and circumstances revealed by the record.
The suspension of the application of Section 15 of the Court of
Industrial Relations rules with reference to the case at is also
authorized by Section 20 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, the
C.I.R. charter, which enjoins the Court of Industrial Relations to
"act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of
the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms ..."
On several occasions, We emphasized this doctrine which was
re-stated by Mr. Justice Barredo, speaking for the Court, in the
1970 case of Kapisanan, etc. vs. Hamilton, etc., et. al., 30e thus:
As to the point that the evidence being offered by the
petitioners in the motion for new trial is not "newly discovered,"
as such term is understood in the rules of procedure for the
ordinary courts, We hold that such criterion is not binding upon
the Court of Industrial Relations. Under Section 20 of
Commonwealth Act No. 103, 'The Court of Industrial Relations
shall adopt its, rules or procedure and shall have such other
powers as generally pertain to a court of justice: Provided,
however, That in the hearing, investigation and determination
of any question or controversy and in exercising any duties and
power under this Act, the Court shall act according to justice
and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to
technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any
technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in
such manner as it may deem just and equitable.' By this
provision the industrial court is disengaged from the rigidity of
the technicalities applicable to ordinary courts. Said court is
not even restricted to the specific relief demanded by the
parties but may issue such orders as may be deemed

To apply Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules

with "pedantic rigor" in the instant case is to rule in effect that
the poor workers, who can ill-afford an alert competent lawyer,
can no longer seek the sanctuary of human freedoms secured
to them by the fundamental law, simply because their counsel
erroneously believing that he received a copy of the decision
on September 23, 1969, instead of September 22, 1969 - filed
his motion for reconsideration September 29, 1969, which
practically is only one day late considering that September 28,
1969 was a Sunday.

As was so aptly expressed by Justice Moreland in Alonso v.

Villamor (16 Phil. 315 [1910]. The Villamor decision was cited
with approval in Register of Deeds v. Phil. Nat. Bank, 84 Phil.
600 [1949]; Potenciano v. Court of Appeals, 104 Phil. 156
[1958] and Uy v. Uy, 14243, June 30, 1961, 2 SCRA 675.),
decided as far back as 1910, "technicality. when it deserts its
proper-office as an aid to justice and becomes its great
hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from
courts." (Ibid., p, 322.) To that norm, this Court has remained
committed. The late Justice Recto in Blanco v. Bernabe, (63
Phil. 124 [1936]) was of a similar mind. For him the
interpretation of procedural rule should never "sacrifice the
ends justice." While "procedural laws are no other than
technicalities" view them in their entirety, 'they were adopted
not as ends themselves for the compliance with which courts
have organized and function, but as means conducive to the
realization the administration of the law and of justice (Ibid.,
p.,128). We have remained steadfastly opposed, in the highly
rhetorical language Justice Felix, to "a sacrifice of substantial
rights of a litigant in altar of sophisticated technicalities with
impairment of the sacred principles of justice." (Potenciano v.
Court of Appeals, 104 Phil. 156, 161 [1958]). As succinctly put
by Justice Makalintal, they "should give way to the realities of
the situation." (Urbayan v. Caltex, L-15379, Aug. 31, 1962, 5
SCRA 1016, 1019). In the latest decision in point promulgated
in 1968, (Udan v. Amon, (1968, 23 SCRA citing McEntee v.
Manotok, L-14968, Oct. 27, 1961, 3 SCRA 272.) Justice Zaldivar
was partial to an earlier formulation of Justice Labrador that
rules of procedure "are not to be applied in a very rigid,
technical sense"; but are intended "to help secure substantial
justice." (Ibid., p. 843) ... 30-g
Even if the questioned Court of Industrial Relations orders and
rule were to be given effect, the dismissal or termination of the
employment of the petitioning eight (8) leaders of the Union is
harsh for a one-day absence from work. The respondent Court
itself recognized the severity of such a sanction when it did not
include the dismissal of the other 393 employees who are
members of the same Union and who participated in the
demonstration against the Pasig police. As a matter of fact,
upon the intercession of the Secretary of Labor, the Union
members who are not officers, were not dismissed and only the
Union itself and its thirteen (13) officers were specifically
named as respondents in the unfair labor practice charge filed
against them by the firm (pp. 16-20, respondent's Brief;
Annexes "A", "B" and "C", pp. 20-30, rec.). Counsel for

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respondent firm insinuates that not all the 400 or so employee

participated in the demonstration, for which reason only the
Union and its thirteen (13) officers were specifically named in
the unfair labor practice charge (p. 20, respondent's brief). If
that were so, then many, if not all, of the morning and regular
shifts reported for work on March 4, 1969 and that, as a
consequence, the firm continued in operation that day and did
not sustain any damage.
The appropriate penalty if it deserves any penalty at all
should have been simply to charge said one-day absence
against their vacation or sick leave. But to dismiss the eight (8)
leaders of the petitioner Union is a most cruel penalty, since as
aforestated the Union leaders depend on their wages for their
daily sustenance as well as that of their respective families
aside from the fact that it is a lethal blow to unionism, while at
the same time strengthening the oppressive hand of the petty
tyrants in the localities.
Mr. Justice Douglas articulated this pointed reminder:
The challenge to our liberties comes frequently not from those
who consciously seek to destroy our system of Government,
but from men of goodwill good men who allow their proper
concerns to blind them to the fact that what they propose to
accomplish involves an impairment of liberty.
... The Motives of these men are often commendable. What we
must remember, however, is thatpreservation of liberties does
not depend on motives. A suppression of liberty has the same
effect whether the suppress or be a reformer or an outlaw. The
only protection against misguided zeal is a constant alertness
of the infractions of the guarantees of liberty contained in our
Constitution. Each surrender of liberty to the demands of the
moment makes easier another, larger surrender. The battle
over the Bill of Rights is a never ending one.
... The liberties of any person are the liberties of all of us.
... In short, the Liberties of none are safe unless the liberties of
all are protected.

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activity, in the exercise of their right of self organization that

includes concerted activity for mutual aid and protection,
(Section 3 of the Industrial Peace Act ...) This is the view of
some members of this Court. For, as has been aptly stated, the
joining in protests or demands, even by a small group of
employees, if in furtherance of their interests as such, is a
concerted activity protected by the Industrial Peace Act. It is
not necessary that union activity be involved or that collective
bargaining be contemplated. (Annot., 6 A.L.R. 2d 416 [1949]).
xxx xxx xxx
Instead of stifling criticism, the Bank should have allowed the
respondents to air their grievances.
xxx xxx xxx
The Bank defends its action by invoking its right to discipline
for what it calls the respondents' libel in giving undue publicity
to their letter-charge. To be sure, the right of self-organization
of employees is not unlimited (Republic Aviation Corp. vs. NLRB
324 U.S. 793 [1945]), as the right of the employer to discharge
for cause (Philippine Education Co. v. Union of Phil. Educ.
Employees, L-13773, April 29, 1960) is undenied. The Industrial
Peace Act does not touch the normal exercise of the right of the
employer to select his employees or to discharge them. It is
directed solely against the abuse of that right by interfering
with the countervailing right of self organization (Phelps Dodge
Corp. v. NLRB 313 U.S. 177 [1941])...
xxx xxx xxx
In the final sum and substance, this Court is in unanimity that
the Bank's conduct, identified as an interference with the
employees' right of self-organization or as a retaliatory
action, and/or as a refusal to bargain collectively, constituted
an unfair labor practice within the meaning and intendment of
section 4(a) of the Industrial Peace Act. (Emphasis supplied.) 33

... But even if we should sense no danger to our own liberties,

even if we feel secure because we belong to a group that is
important and respected, we must recognize that our Bill of
Rights is a code of fair play for the less fortunate that we in all
honor and good conscience must be observe. 31

If free expression was accorded recognition and protection to

fortify labor unionism in the Republic Savings case, supra,
where the complaint assailed the morality and integrity of the
bank president no less, such recognition and protection for free
speech, free assembly and right to petition are rendered all the
more justifiable and more imperative in the case at bar, where
the mass demonstration was not against the company nor any
of its officers.

The case at bar is worse.

WHEREFORE, judgement is hereby rendered:

Management has shown not only lack of good-will or good

intention, but a complete lack of sympathetic understanding of
the plight of its laborers who claim that they are being
subjected to indignities by the local police, It was more
expedient for the firm to conserve its income or profits than to
assist its employees in their fight for their freedoms and
security against alleged petty tyrannies of local police officers.
This is sheer opportunism. Such opportunism and expediency
resorted to by the respondent company assaulted the
immunities and welfare of its employees. It was pure and
implement selfishness, if not greed.

(1) setting aside as null and void the orders of the respondent
Court of Industrial Relations dated September 15 and October
9, 1969; and

Of happy relevance is the 1967 case of Republic Savings Bank

vs. C.I.R., 32 where the petitioner Bank dismissed eight (8)
employees for having written and published "a patently libelous
letter ... to the Bank president demanding his resignation on
the grounds of immorality, nepotism in the appointment and
favoritism as well as discrimination in the promotion of bank
employees." Therein, thru Mr. Justice Castro, We ruled:
It will avail the Bank none to gloat over this admission of the
respondents. Assuming that the latter acted in their individual
capacities when they wrote the letter-charge they were
nonetheless protected for they were engaged in concerted

(2) directing the re instatement of the herein eight (8)

petitioners, with full back pay from the date of their separation
from the service until re instated, minus one day's pay and
whatever earnings they might have realized from other sources
during their separation from the service.

(B)
G.R. No. 81561

January 18, 1991

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee

vs.
ANDRE MARTI, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Reynaldo B. Tatoy and Abelardo E. Rogacion for accusedappellant.
This is an appeal from a decision * rendered by the Special
Criminal Court of Manila (Regional Trial Court, Branch XLIX)
convicting accused-appellant of violation of Section 21 (b),
Article IV in relation to Section 4, Article 11 and Section 2 (e)
(i), Article 1 of Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.
FACTS:
On August 14, 1987, between 10:00 and 11:00 a.m., the
appellant and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes, went to the
booth of the "Manila Packing and Export Forwarders" in the
Pistang Pilipino Complex, Ermita, Manila, carrying with them
four (4) gift wrapped packages. Anita Reyes (the proprietress
and no relation to Shirley Reyes) attended to them. The
appellant informed Anita Reyes that he was sending the
packages to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Appellant filled up
the contract necessary for the transaction, writing therein his
name, passport number, the date of shipment and the name
and address of the consignee, namely, "WALTER FIERZ,
Mattacketr II, 8052 Zurich, Switzerland".

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The package which allegedly contained books was likewise

opened by Job Reyes. He discovered that the package
contained bricks or cake-like dried marijuana leaves. The
package which allegedly contained tabacalera cigars was also
opened. It turned out that dried marijuana leaves were neatly
stocked underneath the cigars (tsn, p. 39, October 6, 1987).
The NBI agents made an inventory and took charge of the box
and of the contents thereof, after signing a "Receipt"
acknowledging custody of the said effects (tsn, pp. 2-3,
October 7, 1987).
Thereupon, the NBI agents tried to locate appellant but to no
avail. Appellant's stated address in his passport being the
Manila Central Post Office, the agents requested assistance
from the latter's Chief Security. On August 27, 1987, appellant,
while claiming his mail at the Central Post Office, was invited
by the NBI to shed light on the attempted shipment of the
seized dried leaves. On the same day the Narcotics Section of
the NBI submitted the dried leaves to the Forensic Chemistry
Section for laboratory examination. It turned out that the dried
leaves were marijuana flowering tops as certified by the
forensic chemist. (Appellee's Brief, pp. 9-11, Rollo, pp. 132134).
Thereafter, an Information was filed against appellant for
violation of RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs
Act.
After trial, the court a quo rendered the assailed decision.

Anita Reyes then asked the appellant if she could examine and
inspect the packages. Appellant, however, refused, assuring
her that the packages simply contained books, cigars, and
gloves and were gifts to his friend in Zurich. In view of
appellant's representation, Anita Reyes no longer insisted on
inspecting the packages. The four (4) packages were then
placed inside a brown corrugated box one by two feet in size (1'
x 2'). Styro-foam was placed at the bottom and on top of the
packages before the box was sealed with masking tape, thus
making the box ready for shipment.
Before delivery of appellant's box to the Bureau of Customs
and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes (proprietor) and husband
of Anita (Reyes), following standard operating procedure,
opened the boxes for final inspection. When he opened
appellant's box, a peculiar odor emitted therefrom. His
curiousity aroused, he squeezed one of the bundles allegedly
containing gloves and felt dried leaves inside. Opening one of
the bundles, he pulled out a cellophane wrapper protruding
from the opening of one of the gloves. He made an opening on
one of the cellophane wrappers and took several grams of the
contents thereo
Job Reyes forthwith prepared a letter reporting the shipment to
the NBI and requesting a laboratory examination of the
samples he extracted from the cellophane wrapper (tsn, pp. 56, October 6, 1987).
He brought the letter and a sample of appellant's shipment to
the Narcotics Section of the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI), at about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon of that date, i.e.,
August 14, 1987. He was interviewed by the Chief of Narcotics
Section. Job Reyes informed the NBI that the rest of the
shipment was still in his office. Therefore, Job Reyes and three
(3) NBI agents, and a photographer, went to the Reyes' office at
Ermita, Manila (tsn, p. 30, October 6, 1987).
Job Reyes brought out the box in which appellant's packages
were placed and, in the presence of the NBI agents, opened
the top flaps, removed the styro-foam and took out the
cellophane wrappers from inside the gloves. Dried marijuana
leaves were found to have been contained inside the
cellophane wrappers (tsn, p. 38, October 6, 1987; Emphasis
supplied).

In this appeal, accused/appellant assigns the following errors,

to wit:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE
ILLEGALLY SEARCHED AND SEIZED OBJECTS CONTAINED IN THE
FOUR PARCELS.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANT DESPITE
THE UNDISPUTED FACT THAT HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION WHILE UNDER CUSTODIAL PROCEEDINGS WERE
NOT OBSERVED.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE
EXPLANATION OF THE APPELLANT ON HOW THE FOUR PARCELS
CAME INTO HIS POSSESSION (Appellant's Brief, p. 1; Rollo, p.
55)
(APPELLANT CONTENTION)1. Appellant contends that the
evidence subject of the imputed offense had been obtained in
violation of his constitutional rights against unreasonable
search and seizure and privacy of communication (Sec. 2 and
3, Art. III, Constitution) and therefore argues that the same
should be held inadmissible in evidence (Sec. 3 (2), Art. III).
Sections 2 and 3, Article III of the Constitution provide:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence
shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or
when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by
law.

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(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding

section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.
Our present constitutional provision on the guarantee against
unreasonable search and seizure had its origin in the 1935
Charter which, worded as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but
upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
(Sec. 1 [3], Article III)
It was in turn derived almost verbatim from the Fourth
Amendment ** to the United States Constitution. As such, the
Court may turn to the pronouncements of the United States
Federal Supreme Court and State Appellate Courts which are
considered doctrinal in this jurisdiction.
Thus, following the exclusionary rule laid down in Mapp v. Ohio
by the US Federal Supreme Court (367 US 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6
L.Ed. 1081 [1961]), this Court, in Stonehill v. Diokno (20 SCRA
383 [1967]), declared as inadmissible any evidence obtained
by virtue of a defective search and seizure warrant, abandoning
in the process the ruling earlier adopted in Moncado v. People's
Court (80 Phil. 1 [1948]) wherein the admissibility of evidence
was not affected by the illegality of its seizure. The 1973
Charter
(Sec.
4
[2],
Art.
IV)
constitutionalized
the Stonehill ruling and is carried over up to the present with
the advent of the 1987 Constitution.
In a number of cases, the Court strictly adhered to the
exclusionary rule and has struck down the admissibility of
evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional safeguard
against unreasonable searches and seizures. (Bache & Co.,
(Phil.), Inc., v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 [1971]; Lim v. Ponce de Leon,
66 SCRA 299 [1975]; People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1 [1986];
Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687 [1987]; See also Salazar v.
Hon. Achacoso, et al., GR No. 81510, March 14, 1990).
(SC DECISION ON THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THE EVIDENCE) It
must be noted, however, that in all those cases adverted to,
the evidence so obtained were invariably procured by the State
acting through the medium of its law enforcers or other
authorized government agencies.
On the other hand, the case at bar assumes a peculiar
character since the evidence sought to be excluded was
primarily discovered and obtained by a private person, acting
in a private capacity and without the intervention and
participation of State authorities. Under the circumstances, can
accused/appellant validly claim that his constitutional right
against unreasonable searches and seizure has been violated?
Stated otherwise, may an act of a private individual, allegedly
in violation of appellant's constitutional rights, be invoked
against the State?
We hold in the negative. In the absence of governmental
interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution
cannot be invoked against the State.
As this Court held in Villanueva v. Querubin (48 SCRA 345
[1972]:
1. This constitutional right (against unreasonable search and
seizure) refers to the immunity of one's person, whether citizen
or alien, from interference by government, included in which is
his residence, his papers, and other possessions. . . .

H A N A

B E E

. . . There the state, however powerful, does not as such have

the access except under the circumstances above noted, for in
the traditional formulation, his house, however humble, is his
castle. Thus is outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by
government, which is called upon to refrain from any invasion
of his dwelling and to respect the privacies of his life. . . . (Cf.
Schermerber v. California, 384 US 757 [1966] and Boyd v.
United States, 116 US 616 [1886]; Emphasis supplied).
In Burdeau v. McDowell (256 US 465 (1921), 41 S Ct. 547; 65
L.Ed. 1048), the Court there in construing the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures declared that:
(t)he Fourth Amendment gives protection against unlawful
searches and seizures, and as shown in previous cases, its
protection applies to governmental action. Its origin and history
clearly show that it was intended as a restraint upon the
activities of sovereign authority, and was not intended to be a
limitation upon other than governmental agencies; as against
such authority it was the purpose of the Fourth Amendment to
secure the citizen in the right of unmolested occupation of his
dwelling and the possession of his property, subject to the right
of seizure by process duly served.
The above ruling was reiterated in State v. Bryan (457 P.2d 661
[1968]) where a parking attendant who searched the
automobile to ascertain the owner thereof found marijuana
instead, without the knowledge and participation of police
authorities, was declared admissible in prosecution for illegal
possession of narcotics.
And again in the 1969 case of Walker v. State (429 S.W.2d 121),
it was held that the search and seizure clauses are restraints
upon the government and its agents, not upon private
individuals (citing People v. Potter, 240 Cal. App.2d 621, 49
Cap. Rptr, 892 (1966); State v. Brown, Mo., 391 S.W.2d 903
(1965); State v. Olsen, Or., 317 P.2d 938 (1957).
Likewise appropos is the case of Bernas v. US (373 F.2d 517
(1967). The Court there said:
The search of which appellant complains, however, was made
by a private citizen the owner of a motel in which appellant
stayed overnight and in which he left behind a travel case
containing the evidence***complained of. The search was
made on the motel owner's own initiative. Because of it, he
became suspicious, called the local police, informed them of
the bag's contents, and made it available to the authorities.
The fourth amendment and the case law applying it do not
require exclusion of evidence obtained through a search by a
private citizen. Rather, the amendment only proscribes
governmental action."
The contraband in the case at bar having come into possession
of the Government without the latter transgressing appellant's
rights against unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees
no cogent reason why the same should not be admitted against
him in the prosecution of the offense charged.
Appellant, however, would like this court to believe that NBI
agents made an illegal search and seizure of the evidence later
on used in prosecuting the case which resulted in his
conviction.
The postulate advanced by accused/appellant needs to be
clarified in two days. In both instances, the argument stands to
fall on its own weight, or the lack of it.
First, the factual considerations of the case at bar readily
foreclose the proposition that NBI agents conducted an illegal
search and seizure of the prohibited merchandise. Records of
the case clearly indicate that it was Mr. Job Reyes, the
proprietor
of
the
forwarding
agency,
who
made

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search/inspection of the packages. Said inspection was

reasonable and a standard operating procedure on the part of
Mr. Reyes as a precautionary measure before delivery of
packages to the Bureau of Customs or the Bureau of Posts.
It will be recalled that after Reyes opened the box containing
the illicit cargo, he took samples of the same to the NBI and
later summoned the agents to his place of business. Thereafter,
he opened the parcel containing the rest of the shipment and
entrusted the care and custody thereof to the NBI agents.
Clearly, the NBI agents made no search and seizure, much less
an illegal one, contrary to the postulate of accused/appellant.
Second, the mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert
the reasonable search effected by Reyes into a warrantless
search and seizure proscribed by the Constitution. Merely to
observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a search.
Having observed that which is open, where no trespass has
been committed in aid thereof, is not search (Chadwick v.
State, 429 SW2d 135). Where the contraband articles are
identified without a trespass on the part of the arresting officer,
there is not the search that is prohibited by the constitution (US
v. Lee 274 US 559, 71 L.Ed. 1202 [1927]; Ker v. State of
California 374 US 23, 10 L.Ed.2d. 726 [1963]; Moore v. State,
429 SW2d 122 [1968]).
In Gandy v. Watkins (237 F. Supp. 266 [1964]), it was likewise
held that where the property was taken into custody of the
police at the specific request of the manager and where the
search was initially made by the owner there is no
unreasonable search and seizure within the constitutional
meaning of the term.
That the Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is not
meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals finds
support in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
True, the liberties guaranteed by the fundamental law of the
land must always be subject to protection. But protection
against whom? Commissioner Bernas in his sponsorship speech
in the Bill of Rights answers the query which he himself posed,
as follows:
First, the general reflections. The protection of fundamental
liberties in the essence of constitutional democracy. Protection
against whom? Protection against the state. The Bill of Rights
governs the relationship between the individual and the state.
Its concern is not the relation between individuals, between a
private individual and other individuals. What the Bill of Rights
does is to declare some forbidden zones in the private sphere
inaccessible to any power holder. (Sponsorship Speech of
Commissioner Bernas , Record of the Constitutional
Commission, Vol. 1, p. 674; July 17, 1986; Emphasis supplied)
The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and
seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only against
the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement
of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to
whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise
of power is imposed.
If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a
warrant must generally be first secured if it is to pass the test
of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the
behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment
for its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and
without the intervention of police authorities, the right against
unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for only
the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved.
In sum, the protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private
individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful
intrusion by the government.

H A N A

B E E

Appellant argues, however, that since the provisions of the

1935 Constitution has been modified by the present
phraseology found in the 1987 Charter, expressly declaring as
inadmissible any evidence obtained in violation of the
constitutional prohibition against illegal search and seizure, it
matters not whether the evidence was procured by police
authorities or private individuals (Appellant's Brief, p. 8, Rollo,
p. 62).
The argument is untenable. For one thing, the constitution, in
laying down the principles of the government and fundamental
liberties of the people, does not govern relationships between
individuals. Moreover, it must be emphasized that the
modifications introduced in the 1987 Constitution (re: Sec. 2,
Art. III) relate to the issuance of either a search warrant or
warrant of arrest vis-a-vis the responsibility of the judge in the
issuance thereof (SeeSoliven v. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393
[1988]; Circular No. 13 [October 1, 1985] and Circular No. 12
[June 30, 1987]. The modifications introduced deviate in no
manner as to whom the restriction or inhibition against
unreasonable search and seizure is directed against. The
restraint stayed with the State and did not shift to anyone else.
Corolarilly, alleged violations against unreasonable search and
seizure may only be invoked against the State by an individual
unjustly traduced by the exercise of sovereign authority. To
agree with appellant that an act of a private individual in
violation of the Bill of Rights should also be construed as an act
of the State would result in serious legal complications and an
absurd interpretation of the constitution.
Similarly, the admissibility of the evidence procured by an
individual effected through private seizure equally applies,
in pari passu, to the alleged violation, non-governmental as it
is, of appellant's constitutional rights to privacy and
communication.
2. In his second assignment of error, appellant contends that
the lower court erred in convicting him despite the undisputed
fact that his rights under the constitution while under custodial
investigation were not observed.
Again, the contention is without merit, We have carefully
examined the records of the case and found nothing to
indicate, as an "undisputed fact", that appellant was not
informed of his constitutional rights or that he gave statements
without the assistance of counsel. The law enforcers testified
that accused/appellant was informed of his constitutional
rights. It is presumed that they have regularly performed their
duties (See. 5(m), Rule 131) and their testimonies should be
given full faith and credence, there being no evidence to the
contrary. What is clear from the records, on the other hand, is
that appellant refused to give any written statement while
under investigation as testified by Atty. Lastimoso of the NBI.
The testimony of the witness for the prosecution was not
contradicted by the defense on cross-examination. As borne
out by the records, neither was there any proof by the defense
that appellant gave uncounselled confession while being
investigated. What is more, we have examined the assailed
judgment of the trial court and nowhere is there any reference
made to the testimony of appellant while under custodial
investigation which was utilized in the finding of conviction.
Appellant's second assignment of error is therefore misplaced.
3. Coming now to appellant's third assignment of error,
appellant would like us to believe that he was not the owner of
the packages which contained prohibited drugs but rather a
certain Michael, a German national, whom appellant met in a
pub along Ermita, Manila: that in the course of their 30-minute
conversation, Michael requested him to ship the packages and
gave him P2,000.00 for the cost of the shipment since the
German national was about to leave the country the next day
(October 15, 1987, TSN, pp. 2-10).

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Rather than give the appearance of veracity, we find

appellant's disclaimer as incredulous, self-serving and contrary
to human experience. It can easily be fabricated. An
acquaintance with a complete stranger struck in half an hour
could not have pushed a man to entrust the shipment of four
(4) parcels and shell out P2,000.00 for the purpose and for
appellant to readily accede to comply with the undertaking
without first ascertaining its contents. As stated by the trial
court, "(a) person would not simply entrust contraband and of
considerable value at that as the marijuana flowering tops, and
the cash amount of P2,000.00 to a complete stranger like the
Accused. The Accused, on the other hand, would not simply
accept such undertaking to take custody of the packages and
ship the same from a complete stranger on his mere say-so"
(Decision, p. 19, Rollo, p. 91). As to why he readily agreed to do
the errand, appellant failed to explain. Denials, if
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are
negative self-serving evidence which deserve no weight in law
and cannot be given greater evidentiary weight than the
testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative
matters (People v. Esquillo, 171 SCRA 571 [1989]; People vs.
Sariol, 174 SCRA 237 [1989]).
Appellant's bare denial is even made more suspect considering
that, as per records of the Interpol, he was previously convicted
of possession of hashish by the Kleve Court in the Federal
Republic of Germany on January 1, 1982 and that the
consignee of the frustrated shipment, Walter Fierz, also a Swiss
national, was likewise convicted for drug abuse and is just
about an hour's drive from appellant's residence in Zurich,
Switzerland (TSN, October 8, 1987, p. 66; Original Records, p.
244; Decision, p. 21; Rollo, p. 93).
Evidence to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth
of a credible witness, but it must be credible in itself such as
the common experience and observation of mankind can
approve as probable under the circumstances (People v. Alto,
26 SCRA 342 [1968], citing Daggers v. Van Dyke, 37 N.J. Eg.
130; see also People v. Sarda, 172 SCRA 651 [1989]; People v.
Sunga, 123 SCRA 327 [1983]); Castaares v. CA, 92 SCRA 567
[1979]). As records further show, appellant did not even bother
to ask Michael's full name, his complete address or passport
number. Furthermore, if indeed, the German national was the
owner of the merchandise, appellant should have so indicated
in the contract of shipment (Exh. "B", Original Records, p. 40).
On the contrary, appellant signed the contract as the owner
and shipper thereof giving more weight to the presumption that
things which a person possesses, or exercises acts of
ownership over, are owned by him (Sec. 5 [j], Rule 131). At this
point, appellant is therefore estopped to claim otherwise.
Premises considered, we see no error committed by the trial
court in rendering the assailed judgment.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction finding appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged is hereby
AFFIRMED. No costs.
(C)
[G.R. No. 113271. October 16, 1997]
WATEROUS DRUG CORPORATION and
CO, petitioners,
vs. NATIONAL
LABOR
COMMISSION
and
ANTONIA
CATOLICO, respondents.

MS. EMMA
RELATIONS
MELODIA

DECISION
DAVIDE, JR. J.:
Nor is he a true Servant [who] buys dear to share in the Profit
with the Seller.[1]

H A N A

B E E

This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court

seeks to declare private respondent Antonia Melodia Catolico
(hereafter Catolico) not a true Servant, thereby assailing the 30
September
1993
decision[2] and
2
December
1993
Resolution[3] of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
in NLRC-NCR CA No. 005160-93, which sustained the
reinstatement and monetary awards in favor of private
respondent[4] and
denied
the
petitioners
motion
for
reconsideration.[5]
The facts are as follows:
Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by petitioner Waterous Drug
Corporation (hereafter WATEROUS) on 15 August 1988.
On 31 July 1989, Catolico received a memorandum [6] from
WATEROUS Vice President-General Manager Emma R. Co
warning her not to dispense medicine to employees chargeable
to the latters accounts because the same was a prohibited
practice. On
the
same
date,
Co
issued
another
memorandum[7] to Catolico warning her not to negotiate with
suppliers of medicine without consulting the Purchasing
Department, as this would impair the companys control of
purchases and, besides she was not authorized to deal directly
with the suppliers.
As regards the first memorandum, Catolico did not deny her
responsibility but explained that her act was due to negligence,
since fellow employee Irene Soliven obtained the medicines in
bad faith and through misrepresentation when she claimed that
she was given a charge slip by the Admitting Dept. Catolico
then asked the company to look into the fraudulent activities of
Soliven.[8]
In a memorandum[9] dated 21 November 1989, WATEROUS
Supervisor Luzviminda E. Bautro warned Catolico against the
rush delivery of medicines without the proper documents.
On 29 January 1990, WATEROUS Control Clerk Eugenio Valdez
informed Co that he noticed an irregularity involving Catolico
and Yung Shin Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (hereafter YSP), which he
described as follows:
A case in point is medicine purchased under our Purchase
Order (P.O.) No. 19045 with YSP Sales Invoice No. 266
representing purchase of ten (10) bottles of Voren tablets
at P384.00 per unit. Previous P.O.s issued to YSP, Inc. showed
that the price per bottle is P320.00 while P.O. No. 19045 is
priced at P384.00 or an over price of P64.00 per bottle (or total
of P640.00). WDRC paid the amount of P3,840.00 thru MBTC
Check No. 222832 dated December 15, 1988. Verification was
made to YSP, Inc. to determine the discrepancy and it was
found that the cost per bottle was indeed overpriced. YSP, Inc.
Accounting Department (Ms. Estelita Reyes) confirmed that the
difference represents refund of jack-up price of ten bottles of
Voren tablets per sales invoice no. 266 as per their check
voucher no. 629552 (shown to the undersigned), which
was paid to Ms. Catolico through China Bank check no. 892068
dated November 9, 1989....
The undersigned talked to Ms. Catolico regarding the check but
she denied having received it and that she is unaware of the
overprice. However, upon conversation with Ms. Saldana, EDRC
Espana Pharmacy Clerk, she confirmed that the check
amounting to P640.00 was actually received by Ms. Catolico. As
a matter of fact, Ms. Catolico even asked Ms. Saldana if she
opened the envelope containing the check but Ms. Saldana
answered her talagang ganyan, bukas. It appears that the
amount in question (P640.00) had been pocketed by Ms.
Catolico.[10]
Forthwith, in her memorandum[11] dated 31 January 1990, Co
asked Catolico to explain, within twenty-four hours, her side of
the reported irregularity. Catolico asked for additional time to

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give her explanation,[12] and she was granted a 48-hour

extension from 1 to 3 February 1990. However, on 2 February
1990, she was informed that effective 6 February 1990 to 7
March 1990, she would be placed on preventive suspension to
protect the interests of the company.[13]
In a letter dated 2 February 1990, Catolico requested access to
the file containing Sales Invoice No. 266 for her to be able to
make a satisfactory explanation. In said letter she protested
Saldaas invasion of her privacy when Saldaa opened an
envelope addressed to Catolico.[14]
In a letter[15] to Co dated 10 February 1990, Catolico, through
her counsel, explained that the check she received from YSP
was a Christmas gift and not a refund of overprice. She also
averred that the preventive suspension was ill-motivated, as it
sprang from an earlier incident between her and Cos secretary,
Irene Soliven.
On 5 March 1990, WATEROUS Supervisor Luzviminda Bautro,
issued a memorandum[16] notifying Catolico of her termination;
thus:
We received your letter of explanation and your lawyer's letter
dated Feb. 2, 1990 and Feb. 10, 1990 respectively regarding
our imposition of preventive suspension on you for acts of
dishonesty. However, said letters failed to rebut the evidences
[sic] in our possession which clearly shows that as a Pharmacist
stationed at Espana Branch, you actually made Purchase
Orders at YSP Phils., Inc. for 10 bottles of Voren tablets
at P384.00/bottle with previous price of P320.00/bottle only. A
check which you received in the amount of P640.00 actually
represents the refund of over price of said medicines and this
was confirmed by Ms. Estelita Reyes, YSP Phils., Inc. Accounting
Department.
Your actuation constitutes an act of dishonesty detrimental to
the interest of the company. Accordingly, you are hereby
terminated effective March 8, 1990.
On 5 May 1990, Catolico filed before the Office of the Labor
Arbiter a complaint for unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal,
and illegal suspension.[17]
In his decision[18] of 10 May 1993, Labor Arbiter Alex Arcadio
Lopez found no proof of unfair labor practice against
petitioners. Nevertheless, he decided in favor of Catolico
because petitioners failed to prove what [they] alleged as
complainants dishonesty, and to show that any investigation
was conducted. Hence, the dismissal was without just cause
and due process. He thus declared the dismissal and
suspension illegal but disallowed reinstatement, as it would not
be to the best interest of the parties. Accordingly, he awarded
separation pay to Catolico computed at one-half months pay
for every year of service; back wages for one year; and the
additional sum of P2,000.00 for illegal suspension representing
30 days work. Arbiter Lopez computed the award in favor of
Catolico as follows:
30 days Preventive Suspension P 2,000.00
Backwages 26,858.50
1/12 of P26,858.50 2,238.21
Separation pay (3 years) 4,305.15
TOTAL AWARD: P35,401.86
Petitioners seasonably appealed from the decision and urged
the NLRC to set it aside because the Labor Arbiter erred in
finding that Catolico was denied due process and that there
was no just cause to terminate her services.

H A N A

B E E

In its decision[19] of 30 September 1993, the NLRC affirmed the

findings of the Labor Arbiter on the ground that petitioners
were not able to prove a just cause for Catolicos dismissal from
her employment. It found that petitioners evidence consisted
only of the check of P640.00 drawn by YSP in favor of
complainant, which her co-employee saw when the latter
opened the envelope. But, it declared that the check was
inadmissible in evidence pursuant to Sections 2 and 3(1 and 2)
of Article III of the Constitution.[20] It concluded:
With the smoking gun evidence of respondents being rendered
inadmissible, by virtue of the constitutional right invoked by
complainants, respondents case falls apart as it is bereft of
evidence which cannot be used as a legal basis for
complainants dismissal.
The NLRC then dismissed the appeal for lack of merit, but
modified the dispositive portion of the appealed decision by
deleting the award for illegal suspension as the same was
already included in the computation of the aggregate of the
awards in the amount of P35,401.86.
Their motion for reconsideration having been denied,
petitioners filed this special civil action for certiorari, which is
anchored on the following grounds:
I. Public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in its
findings of facts.
II. Due process was duly accorded to private respondent.
III. Public respondent gravely erred in applying Section 3,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
As to the first and second grounds, petitioners insist that
Catolico had been receiving commissions from YSP, or probably
from other suppliers, and that the check issued to her on 9
November 1989 was not the first or the last. They also
maintained that Catolico occupied a confidential position and
that Catolicos receipt of YSPs check, aggravated by her
propensity to violate company rules, constituted breach of
confidence. And contrary to the findings of NLRC, Catolico was
given ample opportunity to explain her side of the controversy.
Anent the third ground, petitioners submit that, in light of the
decision in the People v. Marti,[21] the constitutional protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures refers to the
immunity of ones person from interference by government and
cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so
as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by
the government.
In its Manifestation in Lieu of Comment, the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) disagreed with the NLRC's decision, as
it was of the persuasion that (a) the conclusions reached by
public respondent are inconsistent with its findings of fact; and
(b) the incident involving the opening of envelope addressed to
private respondent does not warrant the application of the
constitutional provisions. It observed that Catolico was given
several opportunities to explain her side of the check
controversy, and concluded that the opportunities granted her
and her subsequent explanation satisfy the requirements of
just cause and due process. The OSG was also convinced that
Catolicos dismissal was based on just cause and that Catolicos
admission of the existence of the check, as well as her lame
excuse that it was a Christmas gift from YSP, constituted
substantial evidence of dishonesty. Finally, the OSG echoed
petitioners argument that there was no violation of the right of
privacy of communication in this case, [22] adding that petitioner
WATEROUS was justified in opening an envelope from one of its
regular suppliers as it could assume that the letter was a
business communication in which it had an interest.

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In its Comment which we required to be filed in view of the

adverse stand of the OSG, the NLRC contends that petitioners
miserably failed to prove their claim that it committed grave
abuse of discretion in its findings of fact. It then prays that we
dismiss this petition.
In her Comment, Catolico asserts that petitioners evidence is
too flimsy to justify her dismissal. The check in issue was given
to her, and she had no duty to turn it over to her
employer.Company rules do not prohibit an employee from
accepting gifts from clients, and there is no indication in the
contentious check that it was meant as a refund for overpriced
medicines.Besides, the check was discovered in violation of the
constitutional provision on the right to privacy and
communication; hence, as correctly held by the NLRC, it was
inadmissible in evidence.
Catolico likewise disputes petitioners claim that the audit report
and her initial response that she never received a check were
sufficient to justify her dismissal. When she denied having
received a check from YSP, she meant that she did not receive
any refund of overprice, consistent with her position that what
she received was a token gift. All that can be gathered from the
audit report is that there was apparently an overcharge, with
no basis to conclude that Catolico pocketed the amount in
collusion with YSP. She thus concluded that her dismissal was
based on a mere suspicion.
Finally, Catolico insists that she could not have breached the
trust and confidence of WATEROUS because, being merely a
pharmacist, she did not handle confidential information or
sensitive properties. She was doing the task of a saleslady:
selling drugs and making requisitions when supplies were low.
A thorough review of the record leads us to no other conclusion
than that, except as to the third ground, the instant petition
must fail.
Concededly, Catolico was denied due process. Procedural due
process requires that an employee be apprised of the charge
against him, given reasonable time to answer the charge,
allowed ample opportunity to be heard and defend himself, and
assisted by a representative if the employee so desires.
[23]
Ample opportunity connotes every kind of assistance that
management must accord the employee to enable him to
prepare adequately for his defense, including legal
representation.[24]
In the case at bar, although Catolico was given an opportunity
to explain her side, she was dismissed from the service in the
memorandum of 5 March 1990 issued by her Supervisor after
receipt of her letter and that of her counsel. No hearing was
ever conducted after the issues were joined through said
letters. The Supervisors memorandum spoke of evidences [sic]
in [WATEROUS] possession, which were not, however,
submitted. What the evidences [sic] other than the sales
invoice and the check were, only the Supervisor knew.
Catolico was also unjustly dismissed. It is settled that the
burden is on the employer to prove just and valid cause for
dismissing an employee, and its failure to discharge that
burden would result in a finding that the dismissal is
unjustified.[25] Here, WATEROUS proved unequal to the task.
It is evident from the Supervisors memorandum that Catolico
was dismissed because of an alleged anomalous transaction
with YSP. Unfortunately for petitioners, their evidence does not
establish that there was an overcharge. Control Clerk Eugenio
C. Valdez, who claims to have discovered Catolicos
inappropriate transaction, stated in his affidavit:[26]
4. My findings revealed that on or before the month of July 31,
1989, Ms. Catolico in violation of the [company] procedure,
made an under the table deal with YSP Phils. to supply WDRC

H A N A

B E E

needed medicines like Voren tablets at a jack-up price

of P384.00 per bottle of 50 mg. which has a previous price of
only P320.00;
5. I verified the matter to YSP Phils. to determine the
discrepancy and I found out that the cost per bottle was indeed
overpriced. The Accounting Department of YSP Phils. through
Ms. Estelita Reyes confirmed that there was really an overprice
and she said that the difference was refunded through their
check voucher no. 629552 which was shown to me and the
payee is Melodia Catolico, through a China Bank Check No.
892068 dated November 9, 1989.
It clearly appears then that Catolicos dismissal was based on
hearsay information. Estelita
Reyes
never
testified
nor
executed an affidavit relative to this case; thus, we have to
reject the statements attributed to her by Valdez. Hearsay
evidence carries no probative value.[27]
Besides, it was never shown that petitioners paid for the Voren
tablets. While Valdez informed Co, through the formers
memorandum[28] of 29 January 1990, that WATEROUS paid
YSPP3,840.00 thru MBTC Check No. 222832, the said check was
never presented in evidence, nor was any receipt from YSP
offered by petitioners.
Moreover, the two purchase orders for Voren tablets presented
by petitioners do not indicate an overcharge. The purchase
order dated 16 August 1989[29] stated that the Voren tablets
cost P320.00 per box, while the purchase order dated 5
October 1989[30] priced the Voren tablets at P384.00 per
bottle. The difference in price may then be attributed to the
different packaging used in each purchase order.
Assuming that there was an overcharge, the two purchase
orders for the Voren tablets were recommended by DirectorMMG Mario R. Panuncio, verified by AVP-MNG Noli M. Lopez and
approved by Vice President-General Manager Emma R. Co. The
purchase orders were silent as to Catolicos participation in the
purchase. If the price increase was objectionable to petitioners,
they or their officers should have disapproved the
transaction. Consequently, petitioners had no one to blame for
their predicament but themselves. This set of facts emphasizes
the
exceedingly
incredible
situation
proposed
by
petitioners. Despite the memorandum warning Catolico not to
negotiate with suppliers of medicine, there was no proof that
she ever transacted, or that she had the opportunity to
transact, with the said suppliers. Again, as the purchase orders
indicate, Catolico was not at all involved in the sale of the
Voren tablets. There was no occasion for Catolico to initiate,
much less benefit from, what Valdez called an under the table
deal with YSP.
Catolicos dismissal then was obviously grounded on mere
suspicion, which in no case can justify an employees
dismissal. Suspicion is not among the valid causes provided by
the Labor Code for the termination of employment; [31] and even
the dismissal of an employee for loss of trust and confidence
must rest on substantial grounds and not on the employers
arbitrariness, whims, caprices, or suspicion.[32] Besides, Catolico
was not shown to be a managerial employee, to which class of
employees the term trust and confidence is restricted.[33]
As regards the constitutional violation upon which the NLRC
anchored its decision, we find no reason to revise the doctrine
laid down in People vs. Marti[34] that the Bill of Rights does not
protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures
perpetrated by private individuals. It is not true, as counsel for
Catolico claims, that the citizens have no recourse against such
assaults. On the contrary, and as said counsel admits, such an
invasion gives rise to both criminal and civil liabilities.
Finally, since it has been determined by the Labor Arbiter that
Catolicos reinstatement would not be to the best interest of the

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parties,
he
correctly
awarded
separation
pay
to
Catolico.Separation pay in lieu of reinstatement is computed at
one months salary for every year of service. [35] In this case,
however, Labor Arbiter Lopez computed the separation pay at
one-half months salary for every year of service. Catolico did
not oppose or raise an objection. As such, we will uphold the
award of separation pay as fixed by the Labor Arbiter.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and
the challenged decision and resolution of the National Labor
Relations Commission dated 30 September 1993 and 2
December 1993, respectively, in NLRC-NCR CA No. 005160-93
are AFFIRMED, except as to its reason for upholding the Labor
Arbiters decision, viz., that the evidence against private
respondent was inadmissible for having been obtained in
violation of her constitutional rights of privacy of
communication and against unreasonable searches and
seizures which is hereby set aside.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
(D)
[G.R. No. 130612. May 11, 1999]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
BERNARDINO DOMANTAY, @ JUNIOR OTOT, accusedappellant.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This case is here on appeal from the decision[1] of the Regional
Trial Court of Dagupan City (Branch 57), finding accusedappellant guilty of rape with homicide and sentencing him to
death, and to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount
of P480,000.00, and to pay the costs.
The facts hark back to the afternoon of October 17, 1996, at
around 4 oclock, when the body of six-year old Jennifer
Domantay was found sprawled amidst a bamboo grove in
Guilig, Malasiqui, Pangasinan. The childs body bore several stab
wounds. Jennifer had been missing since lunch time.
The medical examination conducted the following day by Dr.
Ma. Fe Leticia Macaranas, the rural health physician of
Malasiqui, showed that Jennifer died of multiple organ failure
and hypovolemic shock secondary to 38 stab wounds at the
back. Dr. Macaranas found no lacerations or signs of
inflammation of the outer and inner labia and the vaginal walls
of the victims genitalia, although the vaginal canal easily
admitted the little finger with minimal resistance. Noting
possible commission of acts of lasciviousness, Dr. Macaranas
recommended an autopsy by a medico-legal expert of the NBI.
[2]

The investigation by the Malasiqui police pointed to accusedappellant Bernardino Domantay, a cousin of the victims
grandfather, as the lone suspect in the gruesome crime. At
around 6:30 in the evening of that day, police officers
Montemayor, de la Cruz, and de Guzman of the Malasiqui
Philippine National Police (PNP) picked up accused-appellant at
the Malasiqui public market and took him to the police station
where accused-appellant, upon questioning by SPO1 Antonio
Espinoza, confessed to killing Jennifer Domantay. He likewise
disclosed that at around 3:30 that afternoon, he had given the
fatal weapon used, a bayonet, to Elsa and Jorge Casingal, his
aunt and uncle respectively, in Poblacion Sur, Bayambang,
Pangasinan. The next day, October 18, 1996, SPO1 Espinoza
and another policeman took accused-appellant to Bayambang
and recovered the bayonet from a tricycle belonging to the

H A N A

B E E

Casingal spouses. The police officers executed a receipt to

evidence the confiscation of the weapon.[3]
On the basis of the post-mortem findings of Dr. Macaranas,
SPO4 Juan Carpizo, the Philippine National Police chief
investigator at Malasiqui, filed, on October 21, 1996, a criminal
complaint for murder against accused-appellant before the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Malasiqui. On October 25, 1996,
Dr. Ronald Bandonill, medico-legal expert of the NBI, performed
an autopsy on the embalmed body of Jennifer. The result of his
examination of the victims genitalia indicated that the childs
hymen had been completely lacerated on the right side. Based
on this finding, SPO4 Carpizo amended the criminal complaint
against
accused-appellant
to
rape
with
homicide. Subsequently, the following information was filed:[4]
That on or about the 17th day of October, 1996, in the
afternoon, in barangay Guilig, Municipality of Malasiqui,
province of Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd
design and armed with a bayonnete, did then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with
Jennifer Domantay, a minor of 6 years old against her will and
consent, and on the same occasion, the said accused with
intent to kill, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
stab with the use of a bayonnete, the said Jennifer Domantay,
inflicting upon her multiple stab wounds, which resulted to her
death, to the damage and prejudice of her heirs.
At the trial, the prosecution presented seven witnesses,
namely, Edward, Jiezl, Lorenzo, all surnamed Domantay,
Joselito Mejia, Antonio Espinoza, Celso Manuel, and Dr. Ronald
Bandonill, to establish its charge that accused-appellant had
raped and killed Jennifer Domantay.
Edward Domantay testified that in the morning of October 17,
1996, accused-appellant and his two brothers-in-law, Jaime
Caballero and Daudencio Macasaeb, had a round of drinks in
front
of
the
latters
house
in
Guilig,
Malasiqui,
Pangasinan. Edward Domantay said that he was in front of
Macasaebs house, tending to some pigeons in his yard. [5] After
the group had consumed several bottles of San Miguel gin,
accused-appellant gave money to Edward Domantay and asked
him to buy two bottles of gin and a bottle of Sprite. [6] Edward
said he joined the group and sat between Daudencio Macasaeb
and accused-appellant.[7] Edward said that accused-appellant,
who, apparently had one too many then, rolled up his shirt and
said: No diad Antipolo tan L[i]pa et walay massacre, diad Guilig
wala, walay massacren kod dia, walay onakis-akis (In Antipolo
and Lipa, there were massacres; here in Guilig, there will also
be a massacre. I will massacre somebody here, and they will
cry and cry). Edward Domantay saw that tucked in the left side
of accused-appellants waistline was a bayonet without a cover
handle.[8] It was not the first time that Edward had seen
accused-appellant with the knife as the latter usually carried it
with him.[9]
Jiezl Domantay, 10, likewise testified. She said that, at about 2
oclock in the afternoon on October 17, 1996, she and four other
children were playing in front of their house in Guilig, Malasiqui,
Pangasinan. Jiezl saw accused-appellant and Jennifer Domantay
walking towards the bamboo grove of Amparo Domantay where
Jennifers body was later found. Accused-appellant was about
two meters ahead of Jennifer. The bamboo grove was about 8
to 10 meters from the house of Jiezl Domantay.[10]
Lorenzo Domantay, a relative of the victim, corroborated Jiezls
testimony that accused-appellant had gone to Amparo
Domantays bamboo grove in the afternoon of October 17,
1996. Lorenzo said that that afternoon, on his way to his farm,
he saw accused-appellant about 30 meters away, standing at
the spot in the bamboo grove where Jennifers body was later
found. Accused-appellant appeared restless and worried as he
kept looking around. However, as Lorenzo was in a hurry, he

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did not try to find out why accused-appellant appeared to be

nervous.[11]

five pictures (Exhibits A, B, C, D, and E) offered by the

prosecution.

Prosecution witness Joselito Mejia, a tricycle driver, said that, in

the afternoon of October 17, 1996, he was about to take his
lunch at home in Alacan, a neighboring barangay about half a
kilometer from Guilig, when accused-appellant implored Mejia
to take him to Malasiqui at once. Mejia told accused-appellant
that he was going to take his lunch first, but the latter pleaded
with him, saying they will not be gone for long. Mejia, therefore,
agreed. Mejia noticed that accused-appellant was nervous and
afraid. Accused-appellant later changed his mind. Instead of
going to the town proper, he alighted near the Mormons
church, outside Malasiqui.[12]

The defense then presented accused-appellant as its lone

witness. Accused-appellant denied the allegations against him.
He testified he is an uncle of Jennifer Domantay (he and her
grandfather are cousins) and that he worked as a janitor at the
Malasiqui Municipal Hall. He said that at around 1 oclock in the
afternoon of October 17, 1996, he was bathing his pigs outside
the house of his brother-in-law Daudencio Macasaeb in Guilig,
Malasiqui, Pangasinan. He confirmed that Daudencio was then
having drinks in front of his (Macasaebs) house. Accusedappellant claimed, however, that he did not join in the drinking
and that it was Edward Domantay, whom the prosecution had
presented as witness, and a certain Jaime Caballero who joined
the party. He also claimed that it was he whom Macasaeb had
requested to buy some more liquor, for which reason he gave
money to Edward Domantay so that the latter could get two
bottles of gin, a bottle of Sprite, and a pack of cigarettes. [26] He
denied Edward Domantays claim that he (accused-appellant)
had raised his shirt to show a bayonet tucked in his waistline
and that he had said he would massacre someone in Guilig.[27]

In addition, the prosecution presented SPO1 Antonio Espinoza

and Celso Manuel who testified that, on separate occasions,
accused-appellant had confessed to the brutal killing of Jennifer
Domantay.
SPO1 Espinoza testified that he investigated accused-appellant
after the latter had been brought to the Malasiqui police station
in the evening of October 17, 1996. Before he commenced his
questioning, he apprised accused-appellant of his constitutional
right to remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel, in English, which was later translated into
Pangasinense.[13] According to SPO1 Espinoza, accusedappellant agreed to answer the questions of the investigator
even in the absence of counsel and admitted killing the
victim. Accused-appellant also disclosed the location of the
bayonet he used in killing the victim. [14] On cross-examination,
Espinoza admitted that at no time during the course of his
questioning was accused-appellant assisted by counsel. Neither
was accused-appellants confession reduced in writing.
[15]
Espinozas testimony was admitted by the trial court over the
objection of the defense.
Celso Manuel, for his part, testified that he is a radio reporter of
station DWPR, an AM station based in Dagupan City. He covers
the third district of Pangasinan, including Malasiqui. Sometime
in October 1996, an uncle of the victim came to Dagupan City
and informed the station about Jennifer Domantays case. [16] On
October 23, 1996, Manuel went to Malasiqui to interview
accused-appellant who was then detained in the municipal jail.
On cross-examination, Manuel explained that the interview was
conducted in the jail, about two to three meters away from the
police station. An uncle of the victim was with him and the
nearest policemen present were about two to three meters
from him, including those who were in the radio room. [18] There
was no lawyer present. Before interviewing accused-appellant,
Manuel said he talked to the chief of police and asked
permission to interview accused-appellant. [19] On questioning
by the court, Manuel said that it was the first time he had been
called to testify regarding an interview he had conducted. [20] As
in the case of the testimony of SPO1 Espinoza, the defense
objected to the admission of Manuels testimony, but the lower
court allowed it.

Accused-appellant also confirmed that, at about 2 oclock in the

afternoon, he went to Alacan passing on the trail beside the
bamboo grove of Amparo Domantay. But he said he did not
know that Jennifer Domantay was following him. He further
confirmed that in Alacan, he took a tricycle to Malasiqui. The
tricycle was driven by Joselito Mejia. He said he alighted near
the Mormon church, just outside of the town proper of
Malasiqui to meet his brother. As his brother did not come,
accused-appellant proceeded to town and reported for work.
That night, while he was in the Malasiqui public market, he was
picked up by three policemen and brought to the Malasiqui
police station where he was interrogated by SPO1 Espinoza
regarding the killing of Jennifer Domantay. He denied having
owned to the killing of Jennifer Domantay to SPO1 Espinoza. He
denied he had a grudge against the victims parents because of
a boundary dispute.[28] With respect to his extrajudicial
confession to Celso Manuel, he admitted that he had been
interviewed by the latter, but he denied that he ever admitted
anything to the former.[29]
As already stated, the trial court found accused-appellant guilty
as charged. The dispositive portion of its decision reads:[30]
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, the Court hereby
finds the accused, Bernardino Domantay @ Junior Otot guilty
beyond reasonable doubt with the crime of Rape with Homicide
defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code in relation and as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 and
accordingly, the Court hereby sentences him to suffer the
penalty of death by lethal injection, and to indemnify the heirs
of the victim in the total amount of Four Hundred Eighty
Thousand Pesos (P480,000.00),[31] and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
In this appeal, accused-appellant alleges that:[32]

Dr. Bandonill, the NBI medico-legal who conducted an autopsy

of the victim on October 25, 1996, testified that Jennifer
Domantay died as a result of the numerous stab wounds she
sustained on her back,[21] the average depth of which was six
inches.[22] He opined that the wounds were probably caused by
a pointed sharp-edged instrument.[23] He also noted contusions
on the forehead, neck, and breast bone of the victim. [24] As for
the results of the genital examination of the victim, Dr.
Bandonill said he found that the laceration on the right side of
the hymen was caused within 24 hours of her death. He added
that the genital area showed signs of inflammation.[25]
Pacifico Bulatao, the photographer who took the pictures of the
scene of the crime and of the victim after the latters body was
brought to her parents house, identified and authenticated the

I.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE
EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION[S] MADE BY THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT.
II.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED
DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
First. Accused-appellant contends that his alleged confessions
to SPO1 Antonio Espinoza and Celso Manuel are inadmissible in

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evidence because they had been obtained in violation of Art. III,

12(1) of the Constitution and that, with these vital pieces of
evidence excluded, the remaining proof of his alleged guilt,
consisting of circumstantial evidence, is inadequate to establish
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.[33]
Art. III, 12 of the Constitution in part provides:
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to
remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
....
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this
section or section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence.
This
provision
applies
to
the
stage
of
custodial
investigation, that is, when the investigation is no longer a
general inquiry into an unsolved crime but starts to focus on a
particular person as a suspect.[34]R.A. No. 7438 has extended
the constitutional guarantee to situations in which an individual
has not been formally arrested but has merely been invited for
questioning.[35]
Decisions[36] of
this
Court
hold
that
for
an
extrajudicial confession to be admissible, it must satisfy the
following requirements: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be
made with the assistance of competent and independent
counsel; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in writing.
In the case at bar, when accused-appellant was brought to the
Malasiqui police station in the evening of October 17, 1996,
[37]
he was already a suspect, in fact the only one, in the brutal
slaying of Jennifer Domantay. He was, therefore, already under
custodial investigation and the rights guaranteed in Art. III,
12(1) of the Constitution applied to him. SPO1 Espinoza
narrated
what
transpired
during
accused-appellants
interrogation:[38]
[I] interrogated Bernardino Domantay, prior to the interrogation
conducted to him, I informed him of his constitutional right as
follows; that he has the right to remain silent; that he has the
right to a competent lawyer of his own choice and if he can not
afford [a counsel] then he will be provided with one, and further
informed [him] that all he will say will be reduced into writing
and will be used the same in the proceedings of the case, but
he told me that he will cooperate even in the absence of his
counsel; that he admitted to me that he killed Jennifer
Domantay, and he revealed also the weapon used [and] where
he gave [it] to.
But though he waived the assistance of counsel, the waiver
was neither put in writing nor made in the presence of
counsel. For this reason, the waiver is invalid and his
confession is inadmissible. SPO1 Espinozas testimony on the
alleged confession of accused-appellant should have been
excluded by the trial court. So is the bayonet inadmissible in
evidence, being, as it were, the fruit of the poisonous tree.As
explained in People v. Alicando:[39]
. . . According to this rule, once the primary source (the tree) is
shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or
derivative evidence (the fruit) derived from it is also
inadmissible. Stated otherwise, illegally seized evidence is
obtained as a direct result of the illegal act, whereas the "fruit
of the poisonous tree is at least once removed from the illegally
seized evidence, but it is equally inadmissible. The rule is
based on the principle that evidence illegally obtained by the
State should not be used to gain other evidence because the

H A N A

originally
illegal
obtained
subsequently obtained.

B E E

evidence taints all

evidence

We agree with the Solicitor General, however, that accusedappellants confession to the radio reporter, Celso Manuel, is
admissible. In People v. Andan,[40] the accused in a rape with
homicide case confessed to the crime during interviews with
the media. In holding the confession admissible, despite the
fact that the accused gave his answers without the assistance
of counsel, this Court said:[41]
[A]ppellants [oral] confessions to the newsmen are not covered
by Section 12(1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. The
Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the relation between a
private individual and another individual. It governs the
relationship between the individual and the State. The
prohibitions therein are primarily addressed to the State and its
agents.
Accused-appellant claims, however, that the atmosphere in the
jail when he was interviewed was tense and intimidating and
was similar to that which prevails in a custodial investigation.
[42]
We are not persuaded. Accused-appellant was interviewed
while he was inside his cell. The interviewer stayed outside
the cell and the only person besides him was an uncle of the
victim. Accused-appellant
could
have
refused
to
be
interviewed, but instead, he agreed. He answered questions
freely and spontaneously. According to Celso Manuel, he said
he was willing to accept the consequences of his act.
Celso Manuel admitted that there were indeed some police
officers around because about two to three meters from the jail
were the police station and the radio room. [43] We do not think
the presence of the police officers exerted any undue pressure
or influence on accused-appellant and coerced him into giving
his confession.
Accused-appellant contends that it is . . . not altogether
improbable for the police investigators to ask the police
reporter (Manuel) to try to elicit some incriminating information
from the accused.[44] This is pure conjecture. Although he
testified that he had interviewed inmates before, there is no
evidence to show that Celso was a police beat reporter. Even
assuming that he was, it has not been shown that, in
conducting the interview in question, his purpose was to elicit
incriminating information from accused-appellant. To the
contrary, the media are known to take an opposite stance
against the government by exposing official wrongdoings.
Indeed, there is no showing that the radio reporter was acting
for the police or that the interview was conducted under
circumstances where it is apparent that accused-appellant
confessed to the killing out of fear. As already stated, the
interview was conducted on October 23, 1996, 6 days after
accused-appellant had already confessed to the killing to the
police.
Accused-appellants extrajudicial confession is corroborated by
evidence of corpus delicti, namely, the fact of death of Jennifer
Domantay. In addition, the circumstantial evidence furnished by
the other prosecution witnesses dovetails in material points
with his confession. He was seen walking toward the bamboo
grove, followed by the victim. Later, he was seen standing near
the bamboo grove where the childs body was found. Rule 133
of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:
3. Extrajudicial
confession,
not
sufficient
ground
for
conviction. An extrajudicial confession made by an accused,
shall not be sufficient ground for conviction, unless
corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti.
4. Evidence necessary in treason cases. No person charged
with treason shall be convicted unless on the testimony of two

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witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession in open

court.
Accused-appellant argues that it was improbable for a brutal
killing to have been committed without the children who were
playing about eight to ten meters from Amparo Domantays
grove, where the crime took place, having heard any
commotion.[45] The contention has no merit. Accused-appellant
could have covered the young childs mouth to prevent her from
making any sound. In fact, Dr. Bandonill noted a five by two
inch (5 x 2) contusion on the left side of the victims forehead,
which he said could have been caused by a hard blunt
instrument or by impact as her head hit the ground. [46] The
blow could have rendered her unconscious, thus precluding her
from shouting or crying.
Accused-appellant also contends that the testimony of Jiezl
Domantay contradicts that of Lorenzo Domantay because while
Jiezl said she had seen accused-appellant walking towards the
bamboo grove, followed by the victim, at around 2 oclock in the
afternoon on October 17, 1996, Lorenzo said he saw accusedappellant standing near the bamboo grove at about the same
time.
These witnesses, however, did not testify concerning what they
saw at exactly the same time. What they told the court was
what they had seen at around 2 oclock in the afternoon. There
could have been a difference in time, however little it was,
between the time Jiezl saw accused-appellant and the victim
walking and the time Lorenzo saw accused-appellant near the
place where the victims body was later found. Far from
contradicting each other, these witnesses confirmed what each
had said each one saw. What is striking about their testimonies
is that while Jiezl said she saw accused-appellant going toward
the bamboo grove followed by the victim at around 2 oclock in
the afternoon on October 17, 1996, Lorenzo said he had seen
accused-appellant near the bamboo grove at around that
time. He described accused-appellant as nervous and
worried. There is no reason to doubt the claim of these
witnesses. Lorenzo is a relative of accused-appellant. There is
no reason he would testify falsely against the latter.Jiezl, on the
other hand, is also surnamed Domantay and could also be
related to accused-appellant and has not been shown to have
any reason to testify falsely against accused-appellant. At the
time of the incident, she was only 10 years old.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court is convinced of accusedappellants guilt with respect to the killing of the child. It is clear
that the prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt that
accused-appellant is guilty of homicide. Art. 249 of the Revised
Penal Code provides:
Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246
[parricide] shall kill another without the attendance of any of
the circumstances enumerated in the next preceding article
[murder], shall be deemed guilty of homicide and be punished
by reclusion temporal.
The killing was committed with the generic aggravating
circumstance of abuse of superior strength. The record shows
that the victim, Jennifer Domantay, was six years old at the
time of the killing. She was a child of small build, 46 in height.
[47]
It is clear then that she could not have put up much of a
defense against accused-appellants assault, the latter being a
fully grown man of 29 years. Indeed, the physical evidence
supports a finding of abuse of superior strength: accusedappellant had a weapon, while the victim was not shown to
have had any; there were 38 stab wounds; and all the knife
wounds are located at the back of Jennifers body.
But we think the lower court erred in finding that the killing was
committed with cruelty.[48] The trial court appears to have been
led to this conclusion by the number of wounds inflicted on the
victim.But the number of wounds is not a test for determining

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whether there was cruelty as an aggravating circumstance.

[49]
The test . . . is whether the accused deliberately and
sadistically augmented the victims suffering thus . . . there
must be proof that the victim was made to agonize before the
[the accused] rendered the blow which snuffed out [her] life.
[50]
In this case, there is no such proof of cruelty. Dr. Bandonill
testified that any of the major wounds on the victims back
could have caused her death as they penetrated her heart,
lungs and liver, kidney and intestines.[51]
Second. There is, however, no sufficient evidence to hold
accused-appellant guilty of raping Jennifer Domantay. Art. 335
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in part provides:
ART. 335. When and how rape is committed. Rape is committed
by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances.
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is
demented.
As the victim here was six years old, only carnal knowledge had
to be proved to establish rape. Carnal knowledge is defined as
the act of a man having sexual intercourse or sexual bodily
connections with a woman.[52] For this purpose, it is enough if
there was even the slightest contact of the male sex organ with
the labia of the victims genitalia.[53] However, there must be
proof, by direct or indirect evidence, of such contact.
Dr. Ronald Bandonills report on the genital examination he had
performed on the deceased reads:[54]
GENITAL EXAMINATION; showed a complete laceration of the
right side of the hymen. The surrounding genital area shows
signs of inflamation.
....
REMARKS: 1) Findings at the genital area indicate the
probability of penetration of that area by a hard, rigid
instrument.
Hymenal laceration is not necessary to prove rape; [55] neither
does its presence prove its commission. As held in People v.
Ulili,[56] a medical certificate or the testimony of the physician is
presented not to prove that the victim was raped but to show
that the latter had lost her virginity. Consequently, standing
alone, a physicians finding that the hymen of the alleged victim
was lacerated does not prove rape. It is only when this is
corroborated by other evidence proving carnal knowledge that
rape may be deemed to have been established.[57]
This conclusion is based on the medically accepted fact that a
hymenal tear may be caused by objects other than the male
sex organ[58] or may arise from other causes.[59] Dr. Bandonill
himself admitted this. He testified that the right side of the
victims hymen had been completely lacerated while the
surrounding genital area showed signs of inflammation. [60] He
opined that the laceration had been inflicted within 24 hours of
the victims death and that the inflammation was due to a
trauma in that area.[61] When asked by the private prosecutor
whether the lacerations of the hymen could have been caused
by the insertion of a male organ he said this was possible. But
he also said when questioned by the defense that the
lacerations could have been caused by something blunt other
than the male organ.
To be sure, this Court has sustained a number of convictions for
rape with homicide based on purely circumstantial evidence. In

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those instances, however, the prosecution was able to present

other tell-tale signs of rape such as the location and description
of the victims clothings, especially her undergarments, the
position of the body when found and the like. [63] In People v.
Macalino,[64] for instance, the Court affirmed a conviction for the
rape of a two year-old child on the basis of circumstantial
evidence:[65]
The Court notes that the testimony or medical opinion of Dr.
Gajardo that the fresh laceration had been produced by sexual
intercourse is corroborated by the testimony given by
complainant Elizabeth that when she rushed upstairs upon
hearing her daughter suddenly cry out, she found appellant
Macalino beside the child buttoning his own pants and that she
found some sticky fluid on the childs buttocks and some blood
on her private part. (Emphasis in the original)
In contrast, in the case at bar, there is no circumstantial
evidence from which to infer that accused-appellant sexually
abused the victim. The only circumstance from which such
inference might be made is that accused-appellant was seen
with the victim walking toward the place where the girls body
was found. Maybe he raped the girl. Maybe he did not. Maybe
he simply inserted a blunt object into her organ, thus causing
the lacerations in the hymen. Otherwise, there is no
circumstance from which it might reasonably be inferred that
he abused her, e.g., that he was zipping up his pants, that
there was spermatozoa in the girls vaginal canal.
Indeed, the very autopsy report of Dr. Bandonill militates
against the finding of rape. In describing the stab wounds on
the body of the victim, he testified:[66]
[A]fter examining the body I took note that there were several
stab wounds . . . these were all found at the back area sir . . .
extending from the back shoulder down to the lower back area
from the left to the right.
Considering the relative physical positions of the accused and
the victim in crimes of rape, the usual location of the external
bodily injuries of the victim is on the face,[67] neck,[68] and
anterior portion[69] of her body. Although it is not unnatural to
find contusions on the posterior side, these are usually caused
by the downward pressure on the victims body during the
sexual assault.[70] It is unquestionably different when, as in this
case, all the stab wounds (except for a minor cut in the lower
left leg) had their entry points at the back running from the
upper left shoulder to the lower right buttocks.
It is noteworthy that the deceased was fully clothed in blue
shorts and white shirt when her body was brought to her
parents house immediately after it was found. [71] Furthermore,
there is a huge bloodstain in the back portion of her shorts.
[72]
This must be because she was wearing this piece of clothing
when the stab wounds were inflicted or immediately thereafter,
thus allowing the blood to seep into her shorts to such an
extent. As accused-appellant would naturally have to pull down
the girls lower garments in order to consummate the rape,
then, he must have, regardless of when the stab wounds were
inflicted, pulled up the victims shorts and undergarments after
the alleged rape, otherwise, the victims shorts would not have
been stained so extensively. Again, this is contrary to ordinary
human experience.
Even assuming that Jennifer had been raped, there is no
sufficient proof that it was accused-appellant who had raped
her. He did not confess to having raped the victim.
From the foregoing, we cannot find that accused-appellant also
committed rape. In the special complex crime of rape with
homicide, both the rape and the homicide must be established
beyond reasonable doubt.[73]

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Third. The trial court ordered accused-appellant to pay the

heirs of Jennifer Domantay the amount of P30,000.00 as actual
damages. However, the list of expenses produced by the
victims father, Jaime Domantay, only totaled P28,430.00. Of
this amount, only P12,000.00 was supported by a receipt. Art.
2199 of the Civil Code provides that a party may recover actual
or compensatory damages only for such loss as he has duly
proved. Therefore, the award of actual damages should be
reduced to P12,000.00.
In addition, the heirs of Jennifer Domantay are entitled to
recover exemplary damages in view of the presence of the
aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength. Art.
2230 of the Civil Code provides for the payment of exemplary
damages when the crime is committed with one or more
aggravating circumstance. An amount of P25,000.00 is deemed
appropriate.[74]
In accordance with our rulings in People v. Robles[75] and People
v. Mengote,[76] the indemnity should be fixed at P50,000.00 and
the moral damages at P50,000.00.[77]
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court is SET ASIDE and
another one is rendered FINDING accused-appellant guilty of
homicide with the aggravating circumstance of abuse of
superior strength and sentencing him to a prison term of 12
years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 20 years of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, and ORDERING him to pay the heirs of
Jennifer
Domantay
the
amounts
of P50,000.00,
as
indemnity, P50,000.00, as moral damages, P25,000.00, as
exemplary damages, and P12,000.00, as actual damages, and
the costs.
(E)
[G.R. No. 79543. October 16, 1996]
JOSE D. FILOTEO, JR., petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A person under investigation for the commission of an offense
is constitutionally guaranteed certain rights. One of the most
cherished of these is the right to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his choice. The 1987
Constitution, unlike its predecessors, expressly covenants that
such guarantee cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel. In the present case, petitioner claims that
such proscription against an uncounselled waiver of the right to
counsel is applicable to him retroactively, even though his
custodial investigation took place in 1983 -- long before the
effectivity of the new Constitution. He also alleges that his
arrest was illegal, that his extrajudicial confession was
extracted through torture, and that the prosecutions evidence
was insufficient to convict him. Finally, though not raised by
petitioner, the question of what crime -- brigandage or robbery
-- was committed is likewise motu propio addressed by the
Court in this Decision.
Challenged in the instant amended petition is the Decision [1] of
respondent Sandiganbayan[2] in Criminal Case No. 8496
promulgated on June 19, 1987 convicting petitioner of
brigandage, and the Resolution[3] promulgated on July 27,
1987 denying his motion for reconsideration.
The Facts
Petitioner Jose D. Filoteo, Jr. was a police investigator of the
Western Police District in Metro Manila, an old hand at dealing
with suspected criminals. A recipient of various awards and
commendations attesting to his competence and performance

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as a police officer, he could not therefore imagine that one day

he would be sitting on the other side of the investigation table
as the suspected mastermind of the armed hijacking of a postal
delivery van.
Along with his co-accused Martin Mateo, Jr. y Mijares, PC/Sgt.
Bernardo Relator, Jr. y Retino, CIC Ed Saguindel y Pabinguit, ExPC/Sgt. Danilo Miravalles y Marcelo and civilians Ricardo Perez,
Reynaldo Frias, Raul Mendoza, Angel Liwanag, Severino Castro
and Gerardo Escalada, petitioner Filoteo was charged in the
following Information:[4]
That on or about the 3 rd day of May, 1982, in the municipality of
Meycauyan, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, two of
whom were armed with guns, conspiring, confederating
together and helping one another, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously with intent of gain and by means of
violence, threat and intimidation, stop the Postal Delivery Truck
of the Bureau of Postal while it was travelling along the
MacArthur Highway of said municipality, at the point of their
guns, and then take, rob and carry away with them the
following, to wit:
1) Postal Delivery Truck
2) Social Security System Medicare Checks and Vouchers
3) Social Security System Pension Checks and Vouchers
4) Treasury Warrants
5) Several Mail Matters from abroad
in the total amount of P253,728.29 more or less, belonging to
US Government Pensionados, SSS Pensionados, SSS Medicare
Beneficiaries
and
Private
Individuals
from
Bulacan,
Pampanga, Bataan, Zambales andOlongapo City, to the
damage and prejudice of the owners in the aforementioned
amount.
Contrary to law.
On separate dates, accused Filoteo, Mateo, Saguindel, Relator
and Miravalles, assisted by their respective counsel, pleaded
not guilty. Their co-accused Perez, Frias, Mendoza, Liwanag,
Castro and Escalada were never arrested and remained at
large. Accused Mateo escaped from police custody and was
tried in absentia in accordance with Article IV, Section 19 of the
1973 Constitution. Accused Saguindel and Relator failed to
appear during the trial on February 21, 1985 and on March 31,
1986, respectively, and were thus ordered arrested but
remained at large since then. Like in the case of Mateo,
proceedings against them were held in absentia.[5] Only Filoteo
filed this petition, after the respondent Court rendered its
assailed Decision and Resolution.
Before trial commenced and upon the instance of the
prosecution for a stipulation of facts, the defense admitted the
following:[6]
The existence of the bound record of Criminal Case No. 50737B-82, consisting of 343 pages from the Bulacan CFI (Exhibit A);
in 1982 or thereabouts, accused Bernardo Relator was a PC
Sergeant at Camp Bagond Diwa, Bicutan, Metro Manila; as such
PC Sergeant, accused Relator was issued a service revolver,
Smith & Wesson Revolver, 32 (sic), with Serial No. 11707
(Exhibit B) and holster (Exhibit B-1) with six (6) live ammo
(Exhibit B-2); in 1982 or thereabouts, accused Eddie Saguindel
was a PC Constable First Class; on May 30, 1982, accused
Saguindel, together with accused Relator and Danilo Miravalles,
a former PC Sergeant, was invited for investigation in
connection with the hijacking of a delivery van by the elements
of the Special Operations Group, PC, and the three availed of

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their right to remain silent and to have counsel of their choice,

as shown by their Joint Affidavit (Exhibit A-20); and the
existence of the sworn statement executed by accused Martin
Mateo (Exhibit A-11) as well as the Certification dated May 30,
1982, subject to the qualification that said document was made
under duress.
The prosecution sought to prove its case with the testimonies
of Bernardo Bautista, Rodolfo Miranda, Capt. Rosendo Ferrer,
M/Sgt. Noel Alcazar and Capt. Samuel Pagdilao, Jr. 6-a and the
submission of Exhibits A to K. In their defense, accused Filoteo
and Miravalles presented their respective testimonies plus
those of Gary Gallardo and Manolo Almogera. Filoteo also
submitted his Exhibits 1-14-Filoteo, but Miravalles filed no
written evidence. Thereafter, the prosecution proffered rebuttal
evidence and rested with the admission of Exhibits A-16-a, A-31
and L.
Evidence for the Prosecution
At about 6:30 in the morning of May 3, 1982, Bureau of Post
mail van no. MVD 02 left San Fernando, Pampanga to pick up
and deliver mail matters to and from Manila. On board the
vehicle were Nerito Miranda, the driver, and two couriers
named Bernardo Bautista and Eminiano Tagudar who were
seated beside the driver. They arrived at around 9:40 that
morning
at
the Airmail Distribution Center of
the Manila International Airport where
they
were
issued
waybills[7] for the sacks of mail they collected. They then
proceeded to the Central Post Office where they likewise
gathered mail matters including 737 check letters[8] sent by the
United States Embassy. All the mail matters were placed inside
the delivery van, and its door padlocked.
As they had to deliver mail matters to several towns of
Bulacan, they took the MacArthur Highway on the return trip to
Pampanga. When they reached Kalvario, Meycauayan, Bulacan
at about 4:30 in the afternoon, an old blue Mercedes Benz
sedan[9] overtook their van and cut across its path. The car had
five (5) passengers -- three seated in front and two at the
back.The cars driver and the passenger beside him were in
white shirts; the third man in front and the person immediately
behind him were both clad in fatigue uniforms, while the fifth
man in the back had on a long-sleeved shirt.[10]
Two of the car passengers aimed an armalite and a hand gun at
driver Nerito Miranda as someone uttered, Are you not going to
stop this truck?[11] Frightened, Miranda pulled over and stopped
the vans engine. Alighting from the car, the armed group
identified themselves as policemen.[12] They ordered the postal
employees to disembark from the van. As he stepped out of the
van, Miranda took the ignition key with him, but when
threatened, he surrendered it to one of the car passengers.
[13]
The three postal employees were then ordered to board the
Benz.
As he was about to enter the car, Bautista looked back and saw
one of the malefactors, who turned out to be Reynaldo Frias,
going up the van. Inside the car, the three delivery employees
were ordered to lower their heads. They sat between two of
their captors at the back of the car while two others were in
front. Later, Nerito Miranda asked permission to straighten up
as he was feeling dizzy for lack of air. As he stretched, he
caught a glimpse of the pimply face of the man to his left. He
also recognized the driver who had glanced back.These men
turned out to be Angel Liwanag and Reynaldo Frias,
respectively.[14]
As the car started moving, Bautista complained about feeling
densely confined. He was allowed to raise his head but with
eyes closed. However, he sneaked a look and recognized the
driver of the car as Raul Mendoza and the fellow beside him
who poked a balisong at him as Angel Liwanag. The man in
uniform on the front seat was Eddie Saguindel. Earlier, as he

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was about to enter the car, Bautista looked back and

recognized Frias.[15] These incidents yielded the pieces of
information critical to the subsequent identification of Mendoza,
Liwanag, Saguindel and Frias in the line-up of suspects at Camp
Crame later on.
The car seemed to move around in circles. When it finally came
to a stop, the captured men discovered that they were along
Kaimito Road in Kalookan City. They were made to remove their
pants and shoes and then told to run towards the shrubs with
their heads lowered. Upon realizing that the hijackers had left,
they put on their pants and reported the incident to the
Kalookan Police Station.
The Security and Intelligence Unit of the Bureau of Posts
recovered the postal van at the corner of Malindang and Angelo
Streets, La Loma, Quezon City on May 4, 1982. Discovered
missing were several mail matters,[16] including checks and
warrants, along with the vans battery, tools and fuel. [17]
In a letter-request dated May 6, 1982 to then Col. Ramon
Montao, then Postmaster General Roilo S. Golez sought the
assistance of the Special Operations Group (SOG) of the
Philippine Constabulary in the investigation of the hijacking
incident.[18] Responding to the request, the SOG, which was
tasked to detect, investigate and neutralize criminal syndicates
in Metro Manila and adjacent provinces, organized two
investigative teams. One group was led by Capt. Rosendo
Ferrer and the other by 1st Lt. Samuel Pagdilao. Initially, they
conducted a massive intelligence build-up to monitor the drop
points where the stolen checks could be sold or negotiated.
On May 28, 1982, the SOG received a tip from a civilian
informer that two persons were looking for buyers of stolen
checks. Capt. Ferrer requested the informer to arrange a
meeting with them. The meeting materialized at about 9:00
P.M. of May 29, 1982 at the Bughaw Restaurant in Cubao,
Quezon City. With cash on hand, Capt. Ferrer posed as the
buyer. The informer introduced him to Rey Frias and Rafael
Alcantara. Frias in turn showed Capt. Ferrer a sample Social
Security System (SSS) pension check and told him that the bulk
of the checks were in the possession of their companions in
Obrero, Tondo, Manila. After some negotiations, they agreed to
proceed to Tondo. Then as they boarded a car, Capt. Ferrer
introduced himself and his companions as lawmen
investigating the hijacking incident. Shocked and distressed,
Frias calmed down only when assured that his penalty would be
mitigated should he cooperate with the authorities. Frias thus
volunteered to help crack the case and lead the SOG team to
Ricardo Perez and Raul Mendoza.
Capt. Ferrer instructed Lt. Pagdilao, his assistant operations
officer who was in another car during the mission, to
accompany Frias to Obrero, Tondo while he escorted Alcantara
to their headquarters at Camp Crame. On the way to the
headquarters, Alcantara denied participation in the hijacking
although he admitted living with Martin Mateo who allegedly
was in possession of several checks. Alcantara was turned over
to the investigation section of the SOG for further questioning.
Meanwhile, Lt. Pagdilaos group was able to corner Ricardo
Perez in his house in Tondo. Confronted with the hijacking
incident, Perez admitted participation therein and expressed
disappointment over his inability to dispose of the checks even
after a month from the hijacking. He surrendered the checks in
his possession to Lt. Pagdilao.[19]
An hour and a half later, Capt. Ferrer received information over
their two-way radio that Ricardo Perez and Raul Mendoza were
in Lt. Pagdilaos custody. Capt. Ferrer ordered that, instead of
returning to headquarters, Lt. Pagdilao and his companions
should meet him in Quirino, Novaliches to apprehend Martin
Mateo. They met at the designated place and proceeded to

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Gulod, Novaliches arriving there at about 10:30 P.M. of May 29,

1982.
Walking atop a ricefield dike to the house of Mateo, they
noticed two men heading in their direction. Perez identified
them as Martin Mateo and Angel Liwanag. The latter threw
something into the ricefield which, when retrieved, turned out
to be bundles of checks wrapped in cellophane inside a plastic
bag.[20] As the two were about to board the SOG teams's car,
Mateo said, Sir, kung baga sa basketball, talo na kami. Ibibigay
ko yong para sa panalo. Marami pa akong tseke doon sa bahay
ko, sir, kunin na natin para di na natin babalikan. [21] Capt. Ferrer
accompanied Mateo to his house where they retrieved several
other checks in another plastic bag.
On the way to the SOG headquarters in Camp Crame, Mateo
and Liwanag admitted participation in the postal hijacking. At a
confrontation with Perez and Mendoza, all four of them pointed
to petitioner, Jose D. Filoteo, Jr., as the mastermind of the
crime.
Consequently, Capt. Ferrer directed Lt. Pagdilao to accompany
Mateo to the house of petitioner in Tondo, Manila. The lawmen
found petitioner at home. Upon being invited to Camp Crame to
shed light on his participation in the hijacking, petitioner was
dumbfounded (parang nagulat). Pursuant to standard operating
procedure in arrests, petitioner was informed of his
constitutional rights,[22] whereupon they proceeded to Camp
Crame. However, the group, including petitioner, returned to
the latters place to recover the loot. It was in the neighborhood,
not in petitioners house, where the authorities located the
checks.[23]
The authorities confronted Filoteo about his participation in the
hijacking, telling him that Frias, Mendoza and Perez had earlier
volunteered the information that petitioner furnished the Benz
used in the hijacking. Thereupon, Filoteo admitted involvement
in the crime and pointed to three other soldiers, namely, Eddie
Saguindel, Bernardo Relator and Jack Miravalles (who turned
out to be a discharged soldier), as his confederates. At 1:45 in
the afternoon of May 30, 1982, petitioner executed a sworn
statement in Tagalog before M/Sgt. Arsenio C. Carlos and Sgt.
Romeo P. Espero
Petitioner executed two other documents on the same day, May
30, 1982. One was a certification stating that he voluntarily
surrendered voluminous assorted US checks and vouchers, that
because of the large number of pieces of checks, he affixed his
signature upon the middle portion of the back of each check to
serve as identification in the future, prior to the completion of
its proper inventory and listing conducted by elements of SOG
in his presence, and that he guided the elements of SOG to the
residence of Rodolfo C. Miranda, the owner of the sky-blue
Mercedes Benz car which was surrendered to the SOG
Headquarters.[25] The other document was a sworn statement
wherein petitioner attested to his waiver of the provisions of
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code and the following
facts: (a) that he was apprised of his constitutional rights under
Section 20, Article IV of the (1973) Constitution, that he
understood all his rights thereunder, and that the investigators
offered him counsel from the CLAO-IBP but he refused to avail
of the privilege; (b) that he was arrested by SOG men in his
house at around 11:00 p.m. of May 29, 1982 sa dahilang ako
ay kasangkot sa pagnanakaw ng mga US Treasury Warrants,
SSS Pension Checks and Vouchers at SSS Medicare Checks and
Vouchers mula sa delivery van ng Philippine Mail; (c) that the
SOG men confiscated from him numerous checks and a
Mercedes Benz 200 colored sky-blue, and (d) that he was not
hurt or maltreated nor was anything taken from him which was
not duly receipted for.[26]
As certified to by petitioner (in the above described document),
he led the SOG operatives to the house of Rodolfo Miranda on
Singalong where the latter admitted that petitioner was his
friend. He denied, however, having knowledge that his car was

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used in the hijacking until the authorities came to his

house. According to Miranda, he was made to believe that his
car would be used for surveillance purposes because
petitioners jeep was not available. The car was not returned
until the evening following that when it was borrowed.[27] After
the trip to Mirandas house, petitioner informed the
investigators that some more checks could be recovered from
his kumare. Said checks were retrieved and turned over to
headquarters along with the car surrendered by Miranda who
later executed a sworn statement dated May 31, 1992 at the
SOG.[28]
Upon learning of the whereabouts of Miravalles, Eddie
Saguindel and Bernardo Relator, the team of Capt. Ferrer
proceeded to Taguig, Metro Manila in the afternoon of May 30,
1982.They met Miravalles along the way to his house. Informed
by Capt. Ferrer that six of his companions were already under
custody and that they implicated him as one of their
confederates, Miravalles reacted by saying, Sir, ang hihina kasi
ng mga loob niyan, eh.[29]
Capt. Ferrer later asked Miravalles to bring him to Eddie
Saguindel. At the barracks of the Long Range Patrol in Bicutan,
Metro Manila, Saguindel voluntarily accepted the invitation to
proceed to the SOG headquarters, after Miravalles initially
informed
him
of
the
facts
obtained
during
the
investigation. Saguindel was heard saying, Hindi na kami
interesado, sir, sa mga tsekeng iyan kasi isang buwan na hindi
pa nabebenta.[30] With Miravalles and Saguindel, Capt. Ferrer
and his team moved on to Binondo, Manila to look for Bernardo
Relator. When they found him at home, Relator excused
himself, went upstairs, returned with a .32 caliber revolver with
six bullets[31] and said, Sir, ito yong baril na nagamit.[32] The
three suspects were brought to Camp Crame for further
investigation. Thereafter, Capt. Ferrer submitted an afteroperations report about their mission and executed jointly with
Lt. Pagdilao on affidavit on the same matter. [33]
Aside from petitioner, Liwanag, Mateo and Perez executed
sworn statements.[34] Prior to doing so, they waived their right
to counsel. Liwanag and Mateo admitted their participation and
implicated petitioner in the crime. Perez, on the other hand,
denied having driven a Lancer car in the hijacking and stated
that he was implicated in the crime only because in one
drinking spree with petitioner, Mateo and one alias Buro during
that month of May, they had a heated altercation. Like
petitioner, Liwanag and Mendoza certified that they voluntarily
surrendered vouchers and checks which were part of their loot
in the hijacking; they also executed waivers under Article 125
of the Revised Penal Code. For his part, Relator executed a
certification to the effect that he voluntarily surrendered his .32
caliber Smith & Wesson service revolver used in the
commission of the crime. In spite of the fact that his father-inlaw was a lawyer, petitioner did not manifest that he needed
the assistance of counsel. During the taking of his statement,
petitioner was visited by Jimmy Victorino and another comrade
from the General Assignment Section of the WPD.
For their part, Relator, Saguindel and Miravalles executed a
joint affidavit[35] manifesting their option to avail of their right to
remain silent until such time as they would have retained a
counsel of their choice. Frias and Mendoza executed a similar
joint affidavit.[36] Severino Castro, the postal employee
implicated, also chose to remain silent as he wanted to testify
in court.However, he linked to the crime a certain Gerardo
Escalada, a former clerk of the Central Post Office and son of a
director of the Bureau of Posts in Region I.[37]
On May 31, 1982, then Postmaster General Golez summoned
postal employees Miranda, Bautista and Tagudar and directed
them to proceed to Camp Crame. At the office of the SOG, they
were told to go over some pictures for identification of the
culprits. The three recognized and pointed to the suspects in a
line-up. Tagudar identified Saguindel and Liwanag.[38] Miranda
pointed at Frias and Liwanag[39] while Bautista identified Frias,

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Mendoza and Liwanag .[40] Petitioner himself, when told to

identify his alleged cohorts, pointed to Severino Castro as their
contact at the post office.[41] Five of the suspects who were not
identified in the line-up were however implicated by Liwanag,
Mateo and petitioner.
SOG Chief Investigator Jorge C. Mercado filed a complaint for
robbery-in-band (hijacking) before the Municipal Court of
Meycauyan, Bulacan against petitioner and ten (10) others,
namely, Mateo, Saguindel, Relator, Miravalles, Perez, Frias,
Mendoza, Liwanag, Castro and Escalada (Criminal Case No.
7885).[42]
On August 8, 1983, the Information previously referred to and
aforequoted was filed with the Sandiganbayan and docketed as
Criminal Case No. 8496.
On September 20, 1983, Sandiganbayan Associate Justice
Romeo M. Escareal issued orders for the arrest of the
accused[43] and fixed bail at P13,000.00 each. Saguindel and
Relator filed a motion to quash the Information asserting that
under the Articles of War and Section 1 of P.D. 1850, they
should be tried by a court martial. [44] The Sandiganbayan
denied the motion on January 3, 1984 [45] on the ground that
courts martial could no longer exercise jurisdiction over them
by virtue of their separation from military service.
Evidence for the Defense
Testifying in his own defense, petitioner alleged that as a
patrolman since August 21, 1978 assigned to the Investigation
Division or the Detective Bureau of the WPD to which the
General Assignment Section belonged, he was the recipient of
several awards and recognitions starting with ranking fifth in
the Final Order of Merit in the basic course for police officers.
[46]
He also claimed to have received a loyalty medal for
meritorious service above the call of duty [47] and several
commendations[48] for the distinguished performance of his
duties. On that fateful date of May 3, 1982, he was a member
of the Special Task Force Unit covering the tourist belt area.
Of the ten other accused in this case, petitioner admitted
knowing only Martin Mateo whose name appeared in the initial
follow-up operation he allegedly participated in regarding
aP250,000 qualified theft case on May 16, 1980 at the
Shemberg Marketing Corporation.[49] Although a suspect, Mateo
was not charged in the information subsequently filed in that
case.Sometime in March 1981, Mateo visited petitioner at the
police headquarters seeking assistance in his bid to lead a new
life. Considering Mateos familiarity with underworld characters,
petitioner readily made him an informer who was paid from
time to time out of the police intelligence fund. Mateo proved
to be an effective informer. In fact, he allegedly supplied vital
information on the identities and whereabouts of suspects in
robbery cases at the La Elegancia Jewelry Store, at the Likha
Antique and Crafts,[50] and in an alleged racket in Aranque
Market in Manila involving jewelries.
As such informer, Mateo became accustomed to borrowing
petitioners owner-type jeep whenever he was given an
assignment. In one instance however, petitioner saw Mateo
using his jeep with some male companions. Because Mateo
denied the occurrence of the incident, petitioner from then on
refused to lend his jeep to Mateo. Instead, Mateo was given an
allowance to cover his travelling expenses.
About a month prior to May 3, 1982, petitioner met Mateo and
requested the latter to give him a good project as he was
working for his transfer to the Metrocom Intelligence Security
Group (MISG). On May 2, 1982, Mateo urged petitioner to lend
him his jeep in order that he could follow-up a bank robbery
case. That same evening, petitioner approached his kumpare,
accused Rodolfo Miranda, to borrow the latters old Mercedes
Benz since, if the jeep was used, Mateo could be identified as

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an informer. Petitioner left his jeep with Miranda and went

around boasting of the Mercedes Benz.[51]
Mateo took the Benz in the morning of May 3, 1982. Petitioner
advised him to return the car between the hours of two and
three in the afternoon at the Lakan Beer House at the corner of
Rizal Avenue and Zurbaran Streets in Sta. Cruz, Manila where
petitioner was to meet his friend Manolo Almoguera who would
be celebrating his birthday there. Petitioner met Almoguera and
company at around 3:30 in the afternoon. He waited for Mateo
until shortly before 5:00 in the afternoon when he was
constrained to leave without seeing Mateo because he had to
attend a mandatory regular troop formation at 5:00 P.M. at the
police headquarters. From there, petitioner proceeded to his
area of responsibility in the tourist belt. He returned to the beer
house at about 6:00 in the evening hoping to find Mateo and
the automobile. A little before 8:00 oclock, someone informed
him that Mateo had finally arrived. Petitioner went out and
scolded Mateo for being late; the latter apologized and said
that his surveillance bore good results. Petitioner then returned
the car to Miranda, through the latters cousin.
At around 11:00 in the evening of May 29, 1982, Mateo,
escorted by a group of military men, went to petitioners house
at 810 Cabezas St., Tondo, Manila. The group refused to give
any reason for their visit but arrested him. Wearing only short
pants, petitioner was made to board a car where he was
handcuffed. The men asked him about the Benz and the
identities of his companions in an alleged hijacking
incident. Petitioner admitted having knowledge of the exact
location of the car but denied participation in the
crime. Nobody apprised him of his constitutional rights to
remain silent and to be assisted by counsel.[52]
Petitioner was then instructed to accompany Lt. Pagdilao to the
residence of Miranda to get the Benz. They were on board two
cars. When petitioner noticed that they were not heading for
Mirandas place, he clutched the hand of Lt. Pagdilao, pleading
for pity and thinking that he was about to be salvaged. Lt.
Pagdilao however informed him that they would be dropping by
petitioners house first per the investigators information that
more checks could be recovered thereat. A warrantless search
was then allegedly conducted in petitioners house but nothing
was found. Suddenly, someone from the other car came out of
a nearby house owned by Mateo and reported that they had
recovered some checks. Thereafter, they proceeded to the
house of Miranda who was also invited for questioning. The
latter surrendered his Benz to the group.
At the SOG headquarters in Camp Crame, petitioner repeatedly
coaxed to admit participation in the hijacking. As he
vehemently denied the accusation against him, someone
blindfolded him from behind, led him outside and loaded him in
a car. He was taken to an unidentified place and made to lie flat
on his back. An object was tied to his small finger to electrocute
him. While a wet handkerchief was stuffed in his mouth,
someone mounted his chest and applied the water cure
(tinutubig) through his nose. Because these ordeals were
simultaneously carried out, petitioner felt unbearable pain. He
sought permission to get in touch with his father-in-law, Atty.
Felix Rosacia, but his request was denied. They urged him to
cooperate otherwise something terrible would happen to him.
Meanwhile, petitioners wife reported to the WPD General
Assignment Section her husbands forcible abduction by armed
men whom she mistook for CIS agents. A check with the CIS
yielded negative results. Thereafter, Lt. Reynaldo Dator went to
the SOG where he was informed that petitioner was being
investigated but no details were given thereon pending
clearance with superior officers. [53] Consequently, a newspaper
carried an item on the SOGs refusal to allow petitioners copolice officers to see him in his detention cell.[54]
Among his comrades, only Jimmy Victorino, formerly of the
WPD who was transferred to the SOG, was able to visit

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him. Petitioner revealed to Victorino the maltreatment done

him but the latter expressed helplessness about it. In fact,
Victorino advised him to just cooperate so that the SOG would
not incriminate him (para hindi ka pag-initan dito).[55] The
advice came after petitioner was warned that he, like Pat.
Serrano of the WPD, would be liquidated by the SOG, [56] should
he refused to cooperate. Later, Mateo came to petitioners cell
and confided that he had been similarly maltreated and forced
to implicate petitioner.
After Mateo left, a prepared statement was shown and read to
petitioner. Because its contents were false, petitioner refused
to sign it. Placing his arm around petitioner, a certain Capt.
Lagman told petitioner that he thought they had an
understanding already. Petitioner later discovered that Lagman
was not member of the military but an agent of the SOG, and a
member of the Contreras gang. Petitioner was therefore
constrained to sign the statement because of his excruciating
experience (hirap na hirap). He however admitted having read
the document before affiixing his signature thereto and
initialing the corrections therein. The waiver under Article 125
of the Revised Penal Code and the certification he executed
were allegedly also obtained by duress. Although he picked out
one Severino Castro in a police line-up, he did not even know
Castro. He implicated Castro because he was threatened by a
certain Boy Zapanta.
Petitioner filed a complaint for grave coercion and
maltreatment against Lt. Rosendo Ferrer and several John
Does. On August 4, 1982, Asst. City Fiscal Emelita H. Garayblas
recommended its dismissal for petitioners failure to appear
despite subpoenas and to answer clarificatory questions as well
as to authenticate his statement. [57] However, petitioner swore
that he never received the subpoenas.
Petitioners alibi was supported by Manolo Almoguera whose
birthday on May 3, 1995 was the reason for the celebration at
the Lakan Beer House. While his baptismal certificate indicated
that he was born on May 4, 1956, [58] a joint affidavit[59] also
attested that his birth date was actually May 3, 1956. Gary
Gallardo, the owner of the beer house, corroborated
Almogueras testimony as to petitioners alleged presence
during the birthday celebration.
The Respondent Courts Decision
On June 18, 1987, the Sandiganbayan rendered the herein
questioned 51-page Decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Jose
Filoteo, Jr. y Diendo, Martin Mateo, Jr. y Mijares, Bernardo
Relator, Jr. y Retino and Eddie Saguindel y Pabinguit GUILTY as
co-principals beyond reasonable doubt of the violation of
Section 2 (e), in relation to Section 3 (b) of Presidential Decree
No. 532, otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway
Robbery Law of 1974 and hereby sentences each of said
accused to suffer the indeterminate penalty ranging from
TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY as minimum, to THIRTEEN
(13) YEARS, ONE (1) MONTH and ELEVEN (11) DAYS as
maximum, both of reclusion temporal, and to pay their
proportionate share of the costs of the action. Accused Danilo
Miravalles y Marcelo is hereby acquitted, with costs de oficio,
for insufficiency of evidence.
No civil indemnity is hereby awarded due to the complete
dearth of any proof as to the actual damages suffered by the
Bureau of Posts or the owners of the pilfered mail matters, and
it further appearing that the mail van which was hijacked had
been recovered, as well as most of the checks and warrants
which were surrendered by some of the accused, without
prejudice to the institution of the proper civil action to recover
damages should proof thereof be available.

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Consequently, it is hereby ordered that Exhibits B, B-1 and B-2,

which are the .32 Cal. Revolver, Smith and Wesson, Serial No.
11707, its holster and six (6) live ammunition respectively,
which were surrendered by accused Relator, and Exhibits J, J-1
to J-5, consisting of 187, 222, 215, 197, 194 and 22 pieces,
respectively, of Social Security System and Medicare checks
and vouchers, be returned to the Firearm and Explosive Unit
(FEU), PC, Camp Crame, Quezon City and the Social Security
System, respectively, upon proper receipts.

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thereon confirm the confiscation from and/or surrender by him

of said checks, said findings being absolutely without any
support in the evidence.
Fifth

Let copies of this decision be furnished the Postmaster-General,

Central Post Office, Liwasang Bonifacio, Metro Manila and the
Commanding General and Chief, PC-INP, Camp Crame, Quezon
City for their information and guidance with respect to the
other accused who are still at-large.

The respondent court erred and gravely abused its discretion as

well as exceeded its jurisdiction in admitting and considering
against petitioner his alleged extra judical confession, despite
petitioners uncontradicted testimony and documentary proof
that he was made to give or sign the same through torture,
maltreatment, physical compulsion, threats and intimidation
and without the presence and assistance of counsel, his
request for which was refused, in gross violation of
Constitutional Provisions and the prevailing jurisprudence.

SO ORDERED.

Sixth

Petitioners motion for reconsideration of said Decision was

denied by the Sandiganbayan in its challenged Resolution of
July 27, 1987. Hence, the instant alternative petition
forcertiorari and/or
review
on certiorari charging
the
Sandiganbayan with having gravely abused its discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and with reversible
error in arriving at said Decision.

The amended petition raises the following:

The respondent court erred and gravely abused its discretion as

well as exceeded its jurisdiction in finding that petitioners
participation in the hijacking of the mail van is indubitably
established by the manner by which the SOG operatives
succeeded in ferreting out the members of the hijacking
syndicate one by one through patient sleuthing and in finding
that they did so without resorting to extra-legal measures and
that no evidence having been adduced to show that they were
actuated by improper motives to testify falsely against the
herein accused, then their testimonies should be accorded full
credence.

Assignments of Error

Seventh

and / or

xxxxxxxxx

The respondent court erred and gravely abused its discretion as

well as exceeded its jurisdiction in finding that even setting
aside the inter-locking confessional statements of Filoteo,
Mateo and Liwanag, x x x substantial and sufficient evidence
exist which indubitably prove the guilt of Filoteo (Petitioner).

First

Eight

The respondent court erred and gravely abused its discretion as

well as exceeded its jurisdiction when it made its determination
of the alleged guilt of petitioner on the basis of mere
preponderance of evidence and not proof beyond reasonable
doubt.

Insofar as petitioner is concerned, the respondent court erred

and gravely abused its discretion as well as exceeded its
jurisdiction in finding that accused Filoteos (petitioners) and
Mateos [alleged] unexplained possession of the stolen checks
raised the presumption that they were responsible for the
robbery in question, petitioners alleged possession not being
borne out but disputed by the prosecutions own evidence.

The Issues

Excess of Jurisdiction / Grave Abuse of Discretion

Second
The respondent court erred and gravely abused its discretion as
well as exceeded its jurisdiction in finding that petitioners
having borrowed the Mercedes Benz car utilized by the other
accused in the hijacking of the mail van idubitably established
his direct participation and/or indispensable cooperation in the
said hijacking, the same being in gross disregard of basic Rules
of Law.
Third
The respondent court erred and gravely abused its discretion as
well as exceeded its jurisdiction in finding that the voluminous
SSS Medicare and Pension Checks were confiscated from and
surrendered by petitioner and three of the other accused and in
finding the testimonies and investigation reports relative
thereto, credible and unrefuted, said findings being, insofar as
petitioner is concerned, absolutely without any basis in the
evidence and in fact contrary to the prosecutions only evidence
that has some measure of competency and admissibility.
Fourth
The respondent court erred and gravely abused its discretion in
finding that dorsal portions of the checks and warrants
allegedly taken from petitioner were signed by him to indicate
his admission of accountability therefor and that his signatures

Ninth
The respondent court erred and gravely abused its discretion as
well as exceeded its jurisdiction in finding that accused Filoteos
denials and alibi cannot be entertained for being quite weak
and implausible. The truth of the matter being that they should
have been sustained since petitioner was not identified by the
direct victims-eyewitnesses as among those who participated
in or were present at the hijack and none of the checks and
treasury warrants were found in his possession or retrieved
from him.
Tenth
The respondent court erred and gravely abused its discretion as
well as exceeded its jurisdiction in finding that the participation
of petitioner in the criminal conspiracy has been proven beyond
reasonable doubt by the evidence of record and that said
evidence not only confirms the conspiracy between [him and
the other accused] as easily discernible from their conduct
before, during and after the commission of the offense; but also
their participation therein as co-principals by direct
participation and/or indispensable cooperation.
Eleventh

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The respondent Court erred and gravely abused its discretion

as well as exceeded its jurisdiction in cavalierly rejecting,
through the use of pejorative words, and without stating the
legal basis of such rejection, the various vital factual points
raised by petitioner, in gross violation of the express mandate
of the 1987 Constitution.
The Court believes that the above errors may be condensed
into four:
(1) Are the written statements, particularly the extra-judicial
confession executed by the accused without the presence of his
lawyer, admissible in evidence against him?
(2) Were said statements obtained through torture, duress,
maltreatment and intimidation and therefore illegal and
inadmissible?
(3) Was petitioners warrantless arrest valid and proper?
(4) Is the evidence of the prosecution sufficient to find the
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt?
The Courts Ruling

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importance of the issues raised, the Court decided to take

cognizance of the matter.
First Issue: Uncounselled Waiver
On the merits of the petition, we find that the pivotal issue here
is the admissibility of petitioners extrajudicial confession which
lays out in detail his complicity in the crime. Petitioner
contends that respondent Court erred in admitting his
extrajudicial
confession
notwithstanding
uncontradicted
testimony and documentary proof that he was made to sign the
same through torture, maltreatment, physical compulsion,
threats and intimidation and without the presence and
assistance of counsel. He also claims that in executing the
extrajudicial confession, he was denied the right to counsel in
the same way that his waiver of the said right was likewise
without the benefit of counsel. Petitioner therefore questions
the respondent Courts admission in evidence of his
extrajudicial confession on the strength of cases [62] upholding
the admissibility of extrajudicial confessions notwithstanding
the absence of counsel especially where the statements are
replete with details and circumstances which are indicative of
voluntariness. We shall first tackle the issue of his uncounselled
waiver of his right to counsel.

Preliminary Issue: Rule 45 or Rule 65?

The pertinent provision of Article IV, Section 20 of the 1973

Constitution reads as follows:

Before ruling on the foregoing issues, it is necessary to dwell on

the procedural aspects of the case. Petitioner, a segurista,
opted
to
file
an
(amended) alternative
petition for certiorariunder
Rule
65
and
for
review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. We however
hold that the instant petition must be considered as one for
review
on certiorari under
Rule
45.In Jariol,
Jr.
vs.
Sandiganbayan,[60] this Court clearly ruled:

No person shall be compelled to be a witness against

himself. Any person under investigation for the commission of
an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel
and to be informed of such rights.No force, violence, threat,
intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will
shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation
of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence.

Presidential Decree No. 1486, as amended by P.D. No. 1606,

which created the Sandiganbayan, specified that decisions and
final orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be subject to review on
certiorari by this Court in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court. And Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court provides, in
Section 2, that only questions of law may be raised in the
Petition for Review and these must be distinctly set forth. Thus,
in principle, findings of fact of the Sandiganbayan are not to be
reviewed by this Court in a petition for review on
certiorari. There are, of course, certain exceptions to this
general principle. Here, reading petitioners Petition for Review
and Memorandum in the most favorable possible light,
petitioner may be seen to be in effect asserting that the
Sandiganbayan misapprehended certain (f)acts in arriving at its
factual conclusions.
As amended by Republic Act No. 7975, Section 7 of P.D. No.
1606 expressly provides that (d)ecisions and final orders of the
Sandiganbayan shall be appealable to the Supreme Court by
petition for review on certiorari raising pure questions of law in
accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. However, in
exceptional cases, this Court has taken cognizance of questions
of fact in order to resolve legal issues, as where there was
palpable error or grave misapprehension of facts by the lower
court. Criminal cases elevated by convicted public officials from
the Sandiganbayan deserve the same thorough treatment by
this Court as criminal cases involving ordinary citizens simply
because the constitutional presumption of innocence must be
overcome by proof beyond reasonable doubt. In all criminal
cases, a persons life and liberty are at stake.[61]
As a petition for review under Rule 45 is the available remedy,
a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 would not prosper. Basic
it is that certiorari is invocable only where there is no other
plain, speedy or adequate remedy. For waffling on procedural
matters, petitioner could have lost this battle through a
summary dismissal of his alternative petition. But in view of the

In comparison, the relevant rights of an accused under Article

III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution are, inter alia, as
follows:
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to
remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other
means which vitiate the free will shall be used against
him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other
similar forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or
Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against
him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for
violations of this section as well as compensation to and
rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices and their
families. (underscoring
supplied.Obviously,
the
1973
Constitution did not contain the right against an uncounselled
waiver of the right to counsel which is provided under
paragraph 1, Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution,
above underscored.)
In the landmark case of Magtoto vs. Manguera,[63] the Court
categorically held that the aforequoted provisions of the 1973
Constitution (which were not included in the 1935 Charter)
must be prospectively applied. This Court said:
We hold that this specific portion of this constitutional mandate
has and should be given a prospective and not a retrospective
effect. Consequently, a confession obtained from a person

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under investigation for the commission of an offense, who has

not been informed of his right (to silence and) to counsel, is
inadmissible in evidence if the same had been obtained after
the effectivity of the New Constitution on January 17,
1973. Conversely, such confession is admissible in evidence
against the accused, if the same had been obtained before the
effectivity of the New Constitution, even if presented after
January 17, 1973, and even if he had not been informed of his
right to counsel, since no law gave the accused the right to be
so informed before that date.
By parity of reasoning, the specific provision of the 1987
Constitution requiring that a waiver by an accused of his right
to counsel during custodial investigation must be made with
the assistance of counsel may not be applied retroactively or in
cases where the extrajudicial confession was made prior to the
effectivity of said Constitution. Accordingly, waivers of the right
to counsel during custodial investigation without the benefit of
counsel during the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution should,
by such argumentation, be admissible. Although a number of
cases held that extrajudicial confessions made while the 1973
Constitution was in force and effect, should have been made
with the assistance of counsel,[64] the definitive ruling was
enunciated only on April 26, 1983 when this Court,
through Morales, Jr., vs. Enrile,[65] issued the guidelines to be
observed by law enforcers during custodial investigation. The
court specifically ruled that (t)he right to counsel may be
waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the
assistance of counsel.[66] Thereafter, in People vs. Luvendino,
[67]
the Court through Mr. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano
vigorously taught:
x x x. The doctrine that an uncounseled waiver of the right to
counsel is not to be given legal effect was initially a judgemade one and was first announced on 26 April 1983 in Morales
vs. Enrile and reiterated on 20 March 1985 in People vs. Galit. x
x x.
While the Morales-Galit doctrine eventually became part of
Section 12(1) of the 1987 Constitution, that doctrine affords no
comfort to appellant Luvendino for the requirements and
restrictions outlined in Moralesand Galit have no retroactive
effect and do not reach waivers made prior to 26 April 1983 the
date of promulgation of Morales.
Pursuant to the above doctrine, petitioner may not claim the
benefits of the Morales and Galit rulings because he executed
his extrajudicial confession and his waiver to the right to
counsel on May 30, 1982, or before April 26, 1983. The
prospective application of judge-made laws was underscored
in Co vs. Court of Appeals[68] where the Court ruled thru Chief
Justice Andres R. Narvasa that in accordance with Article 8 of
the Civil Code which provides that (j)udicial decisions applying
or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form part of
the legal system of the Philippines, and Article 4 of the same
Code which states that (l)aws shall have no retroactive effect
unless the contrary is provided, the principle of prospectivity of
statutes, original or amendatory, shall apply to judicial
decisions, which, although in themselves are not laws, are
nevertheless evidence of what the law means.[69]
Petitioners contention that Article III, Section 12 of the 1987
Constitution should be given retroactive effect for being
favorable to him as an accused, cannot be sustained. While
Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code provides that (p)enal laws
shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person
guilty of a felony who is not a habitual criminal, what is being
construed here is a constitutional provision specifically
contained in the Bill of Rights which is obviously not a penal
statute. A bill of rights is a declaration and enumeration of the
individual rights and privileges which the Constitution is
designed to protect against violations by the government, or by
individuals or groups of individual. It is a charter of liberties for
the individual and a limitation upon the power of the state.
[70]
Penal laws, on the other hand, strictly and properly are

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those imposing punishment for an offense committed against

the state which the executive of the state has the power to
pardon. In other words, a penal law denotes punishment
imposed and enforced by the state for a crime or offense
against its law.[71]
Hence, petitioners vigorous reliance on People vs. Sison[72] to
make his extrajudicial confession inadmissible is misplaced. In
that case, the extrajudicial confession was executed on May 19,
1983, clearly after the promulgation of Morales on April 26,
1983.
The admissibility of petitioners uncounselled waiver of the right
to counsel notwithstanding, the Court has still to determine
whether such waiver was made voluntarily and intelligently.
[73]
The waiver must also be categorical and definitive, [74] and
must rest on clear evidence.[75]
In his affidavit of May 30, 1982 waiving the provisions of Article
125 of the Revised Penal Code,[76] petitioner stated that:
x x x matapos akong mapagpaliwanagan ng mga imbestigador
ng Special Operations Group, PC/INP Central Anti-Organized
Crime Task Force, Camp Crame, Quezon City ng aking mga
karapatan alinsunod sa mga isinasaad ng Section 20, Article IV
ng Bagong Saligang Batas ng Republika ng Pilipinas ay malaya
at kusang-loob na nagsasalaysay ng mga sumusunod kahit na
walang abugadong magpapayo sa akin sa pagsasagawa nito sa
dahilang alam at nauunawaan ko ang aking ginagawa at wala
naman akong isasalaysay kung hindi mga katotohanan
lamang, bagamat ako ay inalok ng mga imbestigador na ikuha
ng isang abugadong walang bayad mula sa CLAO-IBP na akin
namang tinanggihan:
x x x x x x x x x;
Na ako ay hindi sinaktan o minaltrato gayunding walang kinuha
mula sa akin na hindi niresibohan;
x x x x x x x x x.
Sgt. Arsenio Carlos, investigating officer, testified that he
apprised petitioner of his right to counsel even in waiving the
same right[77] but petitioner did not even inform him that his
father-in-law was a lawyer. Although allowed to talk for thirty
minutes with Jimmy Victorino, who was his comrade at the WPD
General Assignment Section,[78] still, petitioner did not invoke
his right to counsel.
It should be emphasized that petitioner could not have been
ignorant of his rights as an accused. He was a fourth year
criminology student and a topnotch student in the police basic
course.[79] Having been in the police force since 1978, with
stints at the investigation division or the detective bureau, he
knew the tactics used by investigators to incriminate criminal
suspects.[80] in other words, he was knowledgeable on the
matter of extrajudicial confessions.
The Second
Torture?

Issue: Confession

Extracted

Through

Petitioners claim that he was tortured into signing the

confession appears incredible, or at least susceptible to serious
doubts. The allegation of torture was negated by the medical
report[81] showing no evidence of physical injuries upon his
person. As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, there is
no reason to maltreat him in particular when the record shows
that the investigating team respected the right of the other
suspects to remain silent. When he was presented before Judge
Mariano Mendieta of the municipal court in Meycauayan,
petitioner even waived his right to present evidence[82] instead
of impugning his confession on account of the torture allegedly
inflicted upon him. If indeed he had been tortured, he would

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have revived the case he filed against his alleged torturers

upon learning of its dismissal.
Furthermore, an examination of his signatures in the different
documents on record bearing the same discloses an evenness
of lines and strokes in his penmanship which is markedly
consistent in his certification, extrajudicial confession and
waiver of detention. Human experience has proven that the
lines and strokes of a persons handwriting reflect his
disposition at a certain given time. In the present case, no
handwriting expert is needed to declare that petitioners
signatures were written voluntarily and not under compulsion
of fear immediately after he had been subjected to
maltreatment. In view of the foregoing, his extrajudicial
confession is presumed to have been voluntarily made, in the
absence of conclusive evidence showing that petitioners
consent in executing the same had been vitiated.[83]
Besides, the question of whether petitioner was indeed
subjected to torture or maltreatment is a factual question
addressed primarily to trial courts, the findings of which are
binding on this Court whose function, as afore-discussed, is
principally to review only of questions of law. Moreover, we
have pored over the assailed Decision and we are satisfied that
respondent Court performed its duty in evaluating the
evidence. More on this later.
The Third Issue: Illegal Arrest?
Petitioner questions the manner of his arrest, stating that the
arresting officers invited him without a warrant of arrest and
brought him to Camp Crame where he was allegedly subjected
to torture almost a month after the commission of the crime.
[84]
Petitioners claim is belatedly made. He should have
questioned the validity of his arrest before he entered his plea
in the trial court. On this point, this Court explained in People
vs. Lopez, Jr.:[85]
Finally, it is much too late for appellant to raise the question of
his arrest without a warrant. When accused-appellant was
arrested and a case was filed against him, he pleaded not
guilty upon arraignment, participated in the trial and presented
his evidence. Appellant is thus estopped from questioning the
legality of his arrest. It is well-settled that any objection
involving a warrant of arrest or procedure in the acquisition by
the court of jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be
made before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is
deemed waived. Besides, this issue is being raised for the first
time by appellant. He did not move for the quashal of the
information before the trial court on this ground. Consequently,
any irregularity attendant to his arrest, if any, was cured when
he voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial
court by entering a plea of not guilty and by participating in the
trial. Moreover, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient
cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a
sufficient complaint after trial free from error.
The only move petitioner made in regard to his arrest was to
file a complaint for grave coercion, grave threat &
maltreatment which was docketed as I.S. No. 82-12684 before
the Fiscals Office of Quezon City. [86] The complaint was an
offshoot of his alleged maltreatment in the hands of the SOG
upon his arrest. However, as stated above, he did not lift a
finger to revive it upon its dismissal.
The Fourth
Evidence

Issue: Sufficiency

of

the

Prosecutions

Contrary to petitioners claim, his culpability has been proven

beyond reasonable doubt. He borrowed a car to use in the
hijacking knowing fully well that his owner-type jeep would give
away his identity. He could not be identified by the postal
employees in the postal van simply because after overtaking
said vehicle and forcing its driver to pull over, he gave up

H A N A

B E E

driving the Mercedes Benz where the postal employees were

made to ride, and commandeered the van. That the checks
were not found in his own home is of no moment. Before the
arrest and upon learning that the authorities had begun to nail
down the identities of the malefactors, he had entrusted them
to his kumare. It was petitioner himself who led the team of Lt.
Pagdilao back to his place after he had admitted to Sgt. Arsenio
Carlos that his share of the checks were in the possession of
his kumare in the neighborhood.[87]
In view of these facts, it is beyond dispute that petitioner was a
direct participant in the commission of the crime. His alibi has
been correctly considered by the Sandiganbayan to be weak
and implausible. The distance between Kalvario, Meycauayan,
Bulacan and downtown Manila where petitioner claimed to
have been at the crucial time was between fifteen (15) to
twenty (20) kilometers, which, through first-class roads, could
be negotiated during that time in approximately thirty (30)
minutes. It could not therefore have been physically impossible
for him to be at the crime scene or its immediate vicinity when
the crime was committed.[88]
Having already ruled on the admissibility of petitioners
confession, this Court holds that the full force of the totality of
the prosecutions evidence proves his guilt well beyond
reasonable doubt. Weighing heavily against the defense is the
well-settled doctrine that findings of facts of the trial courts -- in
this case, the Sandiganbayan itself -- particularly in the
assessment of the credibility of witnesses, is binding upon this
Court, absent any arbitrariness, abuse or palpable error.
x x x It is well-settled that this Court will not interfere with the
judgment of the trial court in passing on the credibility of the
witnesses, unless there appears in the record some fact or
circumstance of weight and influence which has been
overlooked or the significance of which has been
misapprehended or misinterpreted. The reason for this is that
the trial court is in a better position to decide the question,
having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their
deportment and manner of testifying during the trial.[89]
The doctrine is firmly settled that the trial courts conclusion on
issues of credibility is accorded with highest respect by the
appellate courts (People vs. Dominguez, 217 SCRA
170). Appellate courts will generally respect the findings of trial
courts on the credibility of witnesses since trial courts are in a
better position to weigh conflicting testimonies. They heard the
witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and
manner of testifying. x x x.[90]
So overwhelming is the prosecutions evidence that respondent
Court opined that even without the inter-locking confessions of
Filoteo, Mateo and Liwanag the remaining evidence would still
be sufficient for conviction.[91] Said the respondent tribunal:
However, even setting aside the inter-locking confessional
statements of Filoteo, Mateo and Liwanag, we are of the
considered opinion that substantial and sufficient evidence
exist which indubitably prove the guilt of Filoteo, Relator, Mateo
and Saguindel who had submitted themselves to the
jurisdiction of this Court. As above-stated, Filoteo was
responsible for securing the use of the Mercedes Benz car used
by the co-conspirators in the hi-jacking. Together with Mateo,
Liwanag and Mendoza, he surrendered voluminous assorted
checks which were part of the loot. Relator admitted that his
service firearm was used by him in the hi-jacking, which firearm
was identified by prosecution witnesses Miranda and
Bautista. Saguindel was identified in line-ups at the SOG office
as the suspect clad in fatigue uniform and carrying an Armalite
rifle by prosecution witnesses Tagudar and Bautista. All three
(3) accused, namely, Mateo, Relator and Saguindel also jumped
bail during the trial and did not offer any evidence to refute the
evidence presented by the prosecution against them. Such
flight to evade prosecution constitutes an implied admission of
guilt.

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Moreover, accused Filoteos and Mateos unexplained possession

of the stolen checks raises the presumption that they were
responsible for the robbery in question. It is a rule established
by an abundance of jurisprudence that when stolen property is
found in the possession of one, not the owner, without a
satisfactory explanation of his possession, he will be presumed
the thief. This rule is in accordance with the disputable
presumption that a person found in possession of a thing taken
in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and doer of
the whole act. In the instant case, said accused has not given
such satisfactory explanation, much more so when their
possession had been positively established by the testimonies
of prosecution witnesses Capt. Ferrer and Sgt. Carlos and by
accuseds own signatures at the back of said checks.
Furthermore, accused Filoteos denials and alibi cannot be
entertained for being quite weak and implausible. His claim
that he merely borrowed the Mercedes Benz car from Rodolfo
Miranda to help out his co-accused Mateo, who had been
utilized by the police as an informer and was following up tips
in certain unsolved cases, appears to be incredible and
fantastic. He also claimed that he could not have participated
in the hi-jack because after giving the car to Mateo in the
morning of May 2, 1982, he waited at the corner of Zurbaran
St. and Avenida Rizal between 2-3:00 oclock p.m. of the same
day and then went to the WPD headquarters to attend the
police formation at around 5:00 oclock p.m. when Mateo failed
to show up. Thereafter, he tried to show through his witnesses
Gary Gallardo and Manolo Almogera that he was with them
between 3:00 oclock to 4:45 oclock p.m., then from 6:00 oclock
to 8:30 oclock p.m. and, finally, from 10:45 oclock p.m. to
11:00 oclock of the same date. It was through said witnesses
that he tried to establish his whereabouts between 4:30 oclock
to 7:30 oclock p.m. of May 2, 1982, the period from the time
the mail van was hi-jacked up to when postal employees
Bautista, Miranda and Tagudar were brought to Caloocan City
and freed by their captors. Such alibi, however, fails to show
that it was physically impossible for him to be present at the
scene of the hi-jacking. We take judicial notice that the distance
between the crime scene and downtown Manila is some 15-20
kilometers and negotiable over first-class roads in some thirty
(30) minutes.
We are likewise convinced that there is sufficient evidence of
conspiracy as convincing as the evidence of the participation of
each of the accused. As ratiocinated in the assailed Decision:[92]
The participation of accused Filoteo, Mateo, Relator and
Saguindel in the criminal conspiracy have (sic) been proved
beyond reasonable doubt by the evidence on record and which
evidence not only confirms the existence of the conspiracy
between them as easily discernible from their conduct before,
during and after the commission of the offense, but also their
participation therein as co-principals by direct participation
and/or indispensable cooperation. Their concerted efforts were
performed with closeness and coordination indicating their
common purpose. Hence, there being collective criminal
responsibility, the act of one is the act of all, and each of the
participants are responsible for what the others did in all the
stages of execution of the offense.
Final Question: Brigandage or Robbery?
The Court believes that, though not raised as an issue and
though not argued by the parties in their pleadings, the
question of which law was violated by the accused should be
discussed and passed upon. In fact, petitioner should have
brought up such question as it may benefit him with a reduced
penalty.
The respondent Court convicted the accused of brigandage
punishable under Presidential Decree No. 532.[93]

H A N A

Justifying the
ratiocinates:

above

disposition,

the

B E E

assailed

Decision

Accused herein are charged with the violation of Presidential

Decree No. 532, otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy and AntiHighway Robbery Law of 1974. Under said decree, with respect
to the highway robbery aspect, the offense is committed on a
Philippine Highway which under Section 2 (c) thereof has been
defined as any road, street, passage, highway and bridges or
any part thereof, or railway or railroad within the Philippines,
used by persons or vehicles, or locomotives or trains for the
movement or circulation of persons or transportation of goods,
articles or property or both, while under Section 2 (e) thereof
Highway Robbery/Brigandage has been defined as the the
seizure of any person for ransom, extortion or other unlawful
purposes or the taking away of property of another by means
of violence against or intimidation of persons nor force upon
things or other unlawful means, committed by any person on
any Philippine Highway. (Underscoring supplied)
The offense described in the information and established by the
evidence presented by the prosecution properly falls within the
ambit of the aforesaid special law. Therein, it was conclusively
proven that a postal van containing mail matters, including
checks and warrants, was hi-jacked along the national highway
in Bulacan by the accused, with the attendant use of force,
violence and intimidation against the three (3) postal
employees who were occupants thereof, resulting in the
unlawful taking and asportation of the entire van and its
contents consisting of mail matters. Also the evidence further
showed that the crime was committed by the accused who
were PC soldiers, policeman (sic) and private individuals in
conspiracy with their co-accused Castro and Escalada who were
postal employees and who participated in the planning of the
crime. Accordingly, all the essential requisites to constitute a
consummated offense under the law in point are
present. (Underscoring in the original text.)
Obviously, the Court a quo labored under the belief that
because the taking or robbery was perpetrated on a national
highway (McArthur Highway), ergo, Presidential Decree No.
532, otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway
Robbery Law of 1974, must have been the statute
violated. Such reasoning has already been debunked by this
Court in the case ofPeople vs. Isabelo Puno,[94] where it was
ruled in unmistakable language that it takes more than
the situs of the robbery to bring it within the ambit of PD
532. Said the Court through Mr. Justice Florenz D. Regalado:
The following salient distinctions between brigandage and
robbery are succinctly explained in a treatise on the subject
and are of continuing validity:
The main object of the Brigandage Law is to prevent the
formation of bands of robbers. The heart of the offense consists
in the formation of a band by more than three armed persons
for the purpose indicated in art. 306. Such formation is
sufficient to constitute a violation of art. 306. It would not be
necessary to show, in a prosecution under it, that a member or
members of the band actually committed robbery or
kidnapping or any other purpose attainable by violent
means. The crime is proven when the organization and purpose
of the band are shown to be such as are contemplated by art.
306. On the other hand, if robbery is committed by a band,
whose members were not primarily organized for the purpose
of committing robbery or kidnapping, etc., the crime would not
be brigandage, but only robbery. Simply because robbery was
committed by a band of more than three armed persons, it
would not follow that it was committed by a band of
brigands. In the Spanish text of art. 306, it is required that the
band sala a los campos para dedicarse a robar. (Italics ours.)
In fine, the purpose of brigandage, is inter alia, indiscriminate
highway robbery. If the purpose is only a particular robbery, the
crime is only robbery, or robbery in band if there are at least

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four armed participants.The martial law legislator, in creating

and promulgating Presidential Decree No. 532 for the
objectives announced therein, could not have been unaware of
that distinction and is presumed to have adopted the same,
there being no indication to the contrary. This conclusion is
buttressed by the rule on contemporaneous construction, since
it is one drawn from the time when and the circumstances
under
which
the
decree
to
be
construed
originated. Contemporaneous exposition or construction is the
best and strongest in the law.
Further, that Presidential Decree No. 532 punishes as highway
robbery or brigandage only acts of robbery perpetrated by
outlaws indiscriminately against any person or persons on
Philippine highways as defined therein, and not acts of robbery
committed against only a predetermined or particular victim, is
evident from the preambular clauses thereof, to wit:
WHEREAS, reports from law-enforcement agencies reveal that
lawless are still committing acts of depredation upon
the persons and properties of innocent and defenseless
inhabitants who travel from one place to another, thereby
disturbing the peace, order and tranquility of the nation
and stunting the economic and social progress of the people:
WHEREAS, such acts of depredations constitute x x x highway
robbery/brigandage which are among the highest forms of
lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all countries:
WHEREAS, it is imperative that said lawless elements be
discouraged from perpetrating such acts of depredations by
imposing heavy penalty on the offenders, with the end in view
of eliminating all obstacles to the economic, social, educational
and community progress of the people; (Emphasis supplied.)
Indeed, it is hard to conceive of how a single act of robbery
against a particular person chosen by the accused as their
specific victim could be considered as committed on the
innocent and defenseless inhabitants who travel from one
place to another, and which single act of depredation would be
capable of stunting the economic and social progress of the
people as to be considered among the highest forms of
lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all countries,
and would accordingly constitute an obstacle to the economic,
social, educational and community progress of the people, such
that said isolated act would constitute the highway robbery or
brigandage contemplated and punished is said decree. This
would be an exaggeration bordering on the ridiculous.

H A N A

* unlawfully taken by the accused

* with intent to gain (animo lucrandi)
* with intimidation against three persons (Art. 293)
* in an uninhabited place, or
* by an band, or
* by attacking a moving motor vehicle
* on a highway; and
* the intimidation was made with the use of firearms (Art. 295)
Hence, the offender shall be punished by the maximum period
of the penalty provided under paragraph 5 of Art. 294, which
is, prision correctional in its maximum period to prision
mayor in its medium period.
Effectively, the penalty imposed by the Court a quo should be
lightened. However, such lighter penalty shall benefit only
herein petitioner and not his co-accused who did not contest or
appeal the Sandiganbayans Decision.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, but the first paragraph of
the dispositive portion of the assailed Decision is
partially MODIFIED to read as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Jose
Filoteo, Jr. y Diendo GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as coprincipal in the crime of robbery as defined in Arts. 293 and
295 and penalized under Art. 294, paragraph 5, of the Revised
Penal Code Code IMPOSING on him an indeterminate sentence
of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correctional, as
minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor as maximum, and
to pay his proportionate share of the costs of the action.
All other parts of the disposition are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
2. POLICE POWER
(A)
G.R. No. L-24693

From the above, it is clear that a finding of brigandage or

highway robbery involves not just the locus of the crime or the
fact that more than three (3) persons perpetrated it. It is
essential to prove that the outlaws were purposely organized
not just for one act of robbery but for several indiscriminate
commissions thereof. In the present case, there had been no
evidence presented that the accused were a band of outlaws
organized for the purpose of depredation upon the persons and
properties of innocent and defenseless inhabitants who travel
from one place to another. What was duly proven in the present
case is one isolated hijacking of a postal van. There was also no
evidence of any previous attempts at similar robberies by the
accused to show the indiscriminate commission thereof.[95]
Upon the other hand, the Information did not specifically
mention P.D. 532.[96] The facts alleged therein and proven by
the evidence constitute the offense of robbery defined in Art.
293 in relation to Art. 295 and punished by Art. 294, par. 5, all
of the Revised Penal Code. [97] From the facts, it was duly proven
that:
* personal property (treasury warrants, checks, mail, van, tools,
etc.)
* belonging to another were

B E E

July 31, 1967

ERMITA-MALATE
HOTEL
AND
MOTEL
OPERATORS
ASSOCIATION, INC., HOTEL DEL MAR INC. and GO
CHIU, petitioners-appellees,
vs.
THE HONORABLE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, respondentappellant.
VICTOR ALABANZA, intervenor-appellee.
(ISSUE) The principal question in this appeal from a judgment
of the lower court in an action for prohibition is whether
Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due
process clause. The lower court held that it is and adjudged it
"unconstitutional, and, therefore, null and void." For reasons to
be more specifically set forth, such judgment must be reversed,
there being a failure of the requisite showing to sustain an
attack against its validity.
FACTS:
The petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 was
filed on July 5, 1963 by the petitioners, Ermita-Malate Hotel and
Motel Operators Association, one of its members, Hotel del Mar
Inc., and a certain Go Chiu, who is "the president and general
manager of the second petitioner" against the respondent

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Mayor of the City of Manila who was sued in his capacity as

such "charged with the general power and duty to enforce
ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the necessary
orders for the faithful execution and enforcement of such
ordinances." (par. 1). It was alleged that the petitioner nonstock corporation is dedicated to the promotion and protection
of the interest of its eighteen (18) members "operating hotels
and motels, characterized as legitimate businesses duly
licensed by both national and city authorities, regularly paying
taxes, employing and giving livelihood to not less than 2,500
person and representing an investment of more than P3
million."1 (par. 2). It was then alleged that on June 13, 1963, the
Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No.
4760, approved on June 14, 1963 by the then Vice-Mayor
Herminio Astorga, who was at the time acting as Mayor of the
City of Manila. (par. 3).
After which the alleged grievances against the ordinance were
set forth in detail. There was the assertion of its being beyond
the powers of the Municipal Board of the City of Manila to enact
insofar as it would regulate motels, on the ground that in the
revised charter of the City of Manila or in any other law, no
reference is made to motels; that Section 1 of the challenged
ordinance is unconstitutional and void for being unreasonable
and violative of due process insofar as it would impose
P6,000.00 fee per annum for first class motels and P4,500.00
for second class motels; that the provision in the same section
which would require the owner, manager, keeper or duly
authorized representative of a hotel, motel, or lodging house to
refrain from entertaining or accepting any guest or customer or
letting any room or other quarter to any person or persons
without his filling up the prescribed form in a lobby open to
public view at all times and in his presence, wherein the
surname, given name and middle name, the date of birth, the
address, the occupation, the sex, the nationality, the length of
stay and the number of companions in the room, if any, with
the name, relationship, age and sex would be specified, with
data furnished as to his residence certificate as well as his
passport number, if any, coupled with a certification that a
person signing such form has personally filled it up and affixed
his signature in the presence of such owner, manager, keeper
or duly authorized representative, with such registration forms
and records kept and bound together, it also being provided
that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and
lodging houses would be open for inspection either by the City
Mayor, or the Chief of Police, or their duly authorized
representatives is unconstitutional and void again on due
process grounds, not only for being arbitrary, unreasonable or
oppressive but also for being vague, indefinite and uncertain,
and likewise for the alleged invasion of the right to privacy and
the guaranty against self-incrimination; that Section 2 of the
challenged ordinance classifying motels into two classes and
requiring the maintenance of certain minimum facilities in first
class motels such as a telephone in each room, a dining room
or, restaurant and laundry similarly offends against the due
process clause for being arbitrary, unreasonable and
oppressive, a conclusion which applies to the portion of the
ordinance requiring second class motels to have a dining room;
that the provision of Section 2 of the challenged ordinance
prohibiting a person less than 18 years old from being accepted
in such hotels, motels, lodging houses, tavern or common inn
unless accompanied by parents or a lawful guardian and
making it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly
authorized representative of such establishments to lease any
room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours, runs
counter to the due process guaranty for lack of certainty and
for its unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive character; and
that insofar as the penalty provided for in Section 4 of the
challenged ordinance for a subsequent conviction would, cause
the automatic cancellation of the license of the offended party,
in effect causing the destruction of the business and loss of its
investments, there is once again a transgression of the due
process clause.

H A N A

B E E

There was a plea for the issuance of preliminary injunction and

for a final judgment declaring the above ordinance null and
void and unenforceable. The lower court on July 6, 1963 issued
a writ of preliminary injunction ordering respondent Mayor to
refrain from enforcing said Ordinance No. 4760 from and after
July 8, 1963.
In the a answer filed on August 3, 1963, there was an
admission of the personal circumstances regarding the
respondent Mayor and of the fact that petitioners are licensed
to engage in the hotel or motel business in the City of Manila,
of the provisions of the cited Ordinance but a denial of its
alleged nullity, whether on statutory or constitutional grounds.
After setting forth that the petition did fail to state a cause of
action and that the challenged ordinance bears a reasonable
relation, to a proper purpose, which is to curb immorality, a
valid and proper exercise of the police power and that only the
guests or customers not before the court could complain of the
alleged invasion of the right to privacy and the guaranty
against self incrimination, with the assertion that the issuance
of the preliminary injunction ex parte was contrary to law,
respondent Mayor prayed for, its dissolution and the dismissal
of the petition.
Instead of evidence being offered by both parties, there was
submitted a stipulation of facts dated September 28, 1964,
which reads:
1. That the petitioners Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators
Association, Inc. and Hotel del Mar Inc. are duly organized and
existing under the laws of the Philippines, both with offices in
the City of Manila, while the petitioner Go Chin is the president
and general manager of Hotel del Mar Inc., and the intervenor
Victor Alabanza is a resident of Baguio City, all having the
capacity to sue and be sued;
2. That the respondent Mayor is the duly elected and
incumbent City Mayor and chief executive of the City of Manila
charged with the general power and duty to enforce ordinances
of the City of Manila and to give the necessary orders for the
faithful execution and enforcement of such ordinances;
3. That the petitioners are duly licensed to engage in the
business of operating hotels and motels in Malate and Ermita
districts in Manila;
4. That on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of
Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760, which was approved on
June 14, 1963, by Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga, then the acting
City Mayor of Manila, in the absence of the respondent regular
City Mayor, amending sections 661, 662, 668-a, 668-b and 669
of the compilation of the ordinances of the City of Manila
besides inserting therein three new sections. This ordinance is
similar to the one vetoed by the respondent Mayor (Annex A)
for the reasons stated in its 4th Indorsement dated February
15, 1963 (Annex B);
5. That the explanatory note signed by then Councilor Herminio
Astorga was submitted with the proposed ordinance (now
Ordinance 4760) to the Municipal Board, copy of which is
attached hereto as Annex C;
6. That the City of Manila derived in 1963 an annual income of
P101,904.05 from license fees paid by the 105 hotels and
motels (including herein petitioners) operating in the City of
Manila.1wph1.t
Thereafter came a memorandum for respondent on January 22,
1965, wherein stress was laid on the presumption of the
validity of the challenged ordinance, the burden of showing its
lack of conformity to the Constitution resting on the party who
assails it, citing not only U.S. v. Salaveria, but likewise
applicable American authorities. Such a memorandum likewise
refuted point by point the arguments advanced by petitioners

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against its validity. Then barely two weeks later, on February 4,

1965, the memorandum for petitioners was filed reiterating in
detail what was set forth in the petition, with citations of what
they considered to be applicable American authorities and
praying for a judgment declaring the challenged ordinance "null
and void and unenforceable" and making permanent the writ of
preliminary injunction issued.
After referring to the motels and hotels, which are members of
the petitioners association, and referring to the alleged
constitutional questions raised by the party, the lower court
observed: "The only remaining issue here being purely a
question of law, the parties, with the nod of the Court, agreed
to file memoranda and thereafter, to submit the case for
decision of the Court." It does appear obvious then that without
any evidence submitted by the parties, the decision passed
upon the alleged infirmity on constitutional grounds of the
challenged ordinance, dismissing as is undoubtedly right and
proper the untenable objection on the alleged lack of authority
of the City of Manila to regulate motels, and came to the
conclusion that "the challenged Ordinance No. 4760 of the City
of Manila, would be unconstitutional and, therefore, null and
void." It made permanent the preliminary injunction issued
against respondent Mayor and his agents "to restrain him from
enforcing the ordinance in question." Hence this appeal.
As noted at the outset, the judgment must be reversed. A
decent regard for constitutional doctrines of a fundamental
character ought to have admonished the lower court against
such a sweeping condemnation of the challenged ordinance. Its
decision cannot be allowed to stand, consistently with what has
hitherto been the accepted standards of constitutional
adjudication, in both procedural and substantive aspects.
Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the
absence of any evidence to offset the presumption of validity
that attaches to a challenged statute or ordinance. As was
expressed categorically by Justice Malcolm: "The presumption
is all in favor of validity x x x . The action of the elected
representatives of the people cannot be lightly set aside. The
councilors must, in the very nature of things, be familiar with
the necessities of their particular municipality and with all the
facts and circumstances which surround the subject and
necessitate action. The local legislative body, by enacting the
ordinance, has in effect given notice that the regulations are
essential to the well being of the people x x x . The Judiciary
should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not
a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise
of police regulation.2
It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption
of validity, the necessity for evidence to rebut it is unavoidable,
unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face which is not
the case here. The principle has been nowhere better
expressed than in the leading case of O'Gorman & Young v.
Hartford Fire Insurance Co.,3 where the American Supreme
Court through Justice Brandeis tersely and succinctly summed
up the matter thus: The statute here questioned deals with a
subject clearly within the scope of the police power. We are
asked to declare it void on the ground that the specific method
of regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives
the plaintiff of due process of law. As underlying questions of
fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this
character, the resumption of constitutionality must prevail in
the absence of some factual foundation of record for
overthrowing the statute." No such factual foundation being
laid in the present case, the lower court deciding the matter on
the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the presumption of
validity must prevail and the judgment against the ordinance
set aside.
Nor may petitioners assert with plausibility that on its face the
ordinance is fatally defective as being repugnant to the due
process clause of the Constitution. The mantle of protection
associated with the due process guaranty does not cover

H A N A

B E E

petitioners. This particular manifestation of a police power

measure being specifically aimed to safeguard public morals is
immune from such imputation of nullity resting purely on
conjecture and unsupported by anything of substance. To hold
otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of
police power which has been properly characterized as the
most essential, insistent and the least limitable of
powers,4extending as it does "to all the great public needs." 5 It
would be, to paraphrase another leading decision, to destroy
the very purpose of the state if it could be deprived or allowed
itself to be deprived of its competence to promote public
health, public morals, public safety and the genera
welfare.6 Negatively put, police power is "that inherent and
plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all that
is hurt full to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society.7
There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was
precisely enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public
morals. The explanatory note of the Councilor Herminio Astorga
included as annex to the stipulation of facts, speaks of the
alarming increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery and
fornication in Manila traceable in great part to the existence of
motels, which "provide a necessary atmosphere for clandestine
entry, presence and exit" and thus become the "ideal haven for
prostitutes and thrill-seekers." The challenged ordinance then
proposes to check the clandestine harboring of transients and
guests of these establishments by requiring these transients
and guests to fill up a registration form, prepared for the
purpose, in a lobby open to public view at all times, and by
introducing several other amendatory provisions calculated to
shatter the privacy that characterizes the registration of
transients and guests." Moreover, the increase in the licensed
fees was intended to discourage "establishments of the kind
from operating for purpose other than legal" and at the same
time, to increase "the income of the city government." It would
appear therefore that the stipulation of facts, far from
sustaining any attack against the validity of the ordinance,
argues eloquently for it.
It is a fact worth noting that this Court has invariably stamped
with the seal of its approval, ordinances punishing vagrancy
and classifying a pimp or procurer as a vagrant; 8 provide a
license tax for and regulating the maintenance or operation of
public
dance
halls;9 prohibiting
gambling;10 prohibiting
jueteng;11 and monte;12prohibiting playing of panguingui on
days other than Sundays or legal holidays; 13 prohibiting the
operation of pinball machines; 14 and prohibiting any person
from keeping, conducting or maintaining an opium joint or
visiting a place where opium is smoked or otherwise used, 15 all
of which are intended to protect public morals.
On the legislative organs of the government, whether national
or local, primarily rest the exercise of the police power, which,
it cannot be too often emphasized, is the power to prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order,
safety and general welfare of the people. In view of the
requirements of due process, equal protection and other
applicable constitutional guaranties however, the exercise of
such police power insofar as it may affect the life, liberty or
property of any person is subject to judicial inquiry. Where such
exercise of police power may be considered as either
capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, a denial of due
process or a violation of any other applicable constitutional
guaranty may call for correction by the courts.
We are thus led to considering the insistent, almost shrill tone,
in which the objection is raised to the question of due
process.16 There is no controlling and precise definition of due
process. It furnishes though a standard to which the
governmental action should conform in order that deprivation
of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid.
What then is the standard of due process which must exist both
as a procedural and a substantive requisite to free the
challenged ordinance, or any governmental action for that
matter, from the imputation of legal infirmity sufficient to spell

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its doom? It is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason,

obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put,
arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided. To satisfy the
due process requirement, official action, to paraphrase
Cardozo, must not outrun the bounds of reason and result in
sheer oppression. Due process is thus hostile to any official
action marred by lack of reasonableness. Correctly it has been
identified as freedom from arbitrariness. It is the embodiment
of the sporting idea of fair play. 17 It exacts fealty "to those
strivings for justice" and judges the act of officialdom of
whatever branch "in the light of reason drawn from
considerations of fairness that reflect [democratic] traditions of
legal and political thought."18 It is not a narrow or "technical
conception with fixed content unrelated to time, place and
circumstances,"19 decisions based on such a clause requiring a
"close and perceptive inquiry into fundamental principles of our
society."20 Questions of due process are not to be treated
narrowly or pedantically in slavery to form or phrases.21
It would thus be an affront to reason to stigmatize an ordinance
enacted precisely to meet what a municipal lawmaking body
considers an evil of rather serious proportion an arbitrary and
capricious exercise of authority. It would seem that what should
be deemed unreasonable and what would amount to an
abdication of the power to govern is inaction in the face of an
admitted deterioration of the state of public morals. To be more
specific, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila felt the need
for a remedial measure. It provided it with the enactment of the
challenged ordinance. A strong case must be found in the
records, and, as has been set forth, none is even attempted
here to attach to an ordinance of such character the taint of
nullity for an alleged failure to meet the due process
requirement. Nor does it lend any semblance even of deceptive
plausibility to petitioners' indictment of Ordinance No. 4760 on
due process grounds to single out such features as the
increased fees for motels and hotels, the curtailment of the
area of freedom to contract, and, in certain particulars, its
alleged vagueness.
Admittedly there was a decided increase of the annual license
fees provided for by the challenged ordinance for hotels and
motels, 150% for the former and over 200% for the latter, firstclass motels being required to pay a P6,000 annual fee and
second-class motels, P4,500 yearly. It has been the settled law
however, as far back as 1922 that municipal license fees could
be classified into those imposed for regulating occupations or
regular enterprises, for the regulation or restriction of nonuseful occupations or enterprises and for revenue purposes
only.22 As was explained more in detail in the above Cu Unjieng
case: (2) Licenses for non-useful occupations are also incidental
to the police power and the right to exact a fee may be implied
from the power to license and regulate, but in fixing amount of
the license fees the municipal corporations are allowed a much
wider discretion in this class of cases than in the former, and
aside from applying the well-known legal principle that
municipal ordinances must not be unreasonable, oppressive, or
tyrannical, courts have, as a general rule, declined to interfere
with such discretion. The desirability of imposing restraint upon
the number of persons who might otherwise engage in nonuseful enterprises is, of course, generally an important factor in
the determination of the amount of this kind of license fee.
Hence license fees clearly in the nature of privilege taxes for
revenue have frequently been upheld, especially in of licenses
for the sale of liquors. In fact, in the latter cases the fees have
rarely been declared unreasonable.23
Moreover in the equally leading case of Lutz v. Araneta24 this
Court affirmed the doctrine earlier announced by the American
Supreme Court that taxation may be made to implement the
state's police power. Only the other day, this Court had
occasion to affirm that the broad taxing authority conferred by
the Local Autonomy Act of 1959 to cities and municipalities is
sufficiently plenary to cover a wide range of subjects with the
only limitation that the tax so levied is for public purposes, just
and uniform.25

H A N A

B E E

As a matter of fact, even without reference to the wide latitude

enjoyed by the City of Manila in imposing licenses for revenue,
it has been explicitly held in one case that "much discretion is
given to municipal corporations in determining the amount,"
here the license fee of the operator of a massage clinic, even if
it were viewed purely as a police power measure.26 The
discussion of this particular matter may fitly close with this
pertinent citation from another decision of significance: "It is
urged on behalf of the plaintiffs-appellees that the enforcement
of the ordinance could deprive them of their lawful occupation
and means of livelihood because they can not rent stalls in the
public markets. But it appears that plaintiffs are also dealers in
refrigerated or cold storage meat, the sale of which outside the
city markets under certain conditions is permitted x x x . And
surely, the mere fact, that some individuals in the community
may be deprived of their present business or a particular mode
of earning a living cannot prevent the exercise of the police
power. As was said in a case, persons licensed to pursue
occupations which may in the public need and interest be
affected by the exercise of the police power embark in these
occupations subject to the disadvantages which may result
from the legal exercise of that power."27
Nor does the restriction on the freedom to contract, insofar as
the challenged ordinance makes it unlawful for the owner,
manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of any
hotel, motel, lodging house, tavern, common inn or the like, to
lease or rent room or portion thereof more than twice every 24
hours, with a proviso that in all cases full payment shall be
charged, call for a different conclusion. Again, such a limitation
cannot be viewed as a transgression against the command of
due process. It is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary. Precisely it
was intended to curb the opportunity for the immoral or
illegitimate use to which such premises could be, and,
according to the explanatory note, are being devoted. How
could it then be arbitrary or oppressive when there appears a
correspondence between the undeniable existence of an
undesirable situation and the legislative attempt at correction.
Moreover, petitioners cannot be unaware that every regulation
of conduct amounts to curtailment of liberty which as pointed
out by Justice Malcolm cannot be absolute. Thus: "One thought
which runs through all these different conceptions of liberty is
plainly apparent. It is this: 'Liberty' as understood in
democracies, is not license; it is 'liberty regulated by law.'
Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the
individual and for the greater good of the peace and order of
society and the general well-being. No man can do exactly as
he pleases. Every man must renounce unbridled license. The
right of the individual is necessarily subject to reasonable
restraint by general law for the common good x x x The liberty
of the citizen may be restrained in the interest of the public
health, or of the public order and safety, or otherwise within
the proper scope of the police power."28
A similar observation was made by Justice Laurel: "Public
welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of said law,
and the state in order to promote the general welfare may
interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business
and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to all
kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general
comfort, health, and prosperity of the state x x x To this
fundamental aim of our Government the rights of the individual
are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a
misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority
because then society will fall into anarchy. Neither should
authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the
individual will fall into slavery. The citizen should achieve the
required balance of liberty and authority in his mind through
education and personal discipline, so that there may be
established the resultant equilibrium, which means peace and
order and happiness for all.29
It is noteworthy that the only decision of this Court nullifying
legislation because of undue deprivation of freedom to
contract, People v. Pomar,30 no longer "retains its virtuality as a

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living principle. The policy of laissez faire has to some extent

given way to the assumption by the government of the right of
intervention even in contractual relations affected with public
interest.31 What may be stressed sufficiently is that if the liberty
involved were freedom of the mind or the person, the standard
for the validity of governmental acts is much more rigorous and
exacting, but where the liberty curtailed affects at the most
rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory measure
is wider.32 How justify then the allegation of a denial of due
process?
Lastly, there is the attempt to impugn the ordinance on another
due process ground by invoking the principles of vagueness or
uncertainty. It would appear from a recital in the petition itself
that what seems to be the gravamen of the alleged grievance
is that the provisions are too detailed and specific rather than
vague or uncertain. Petitioners, however, point to the
requirement that a guest should give the name, relationship,
age and sex of the companion or companions as indefinite and
uncertain in view of the necessity for determining whether the
companion or companions referred to are those arriving with
the customer or guest at the time of the registry or entering
the room With him at about the same time or coming at any
indefinite time later to join him; a proviso in one of its sections
which cast doubt as to whether the maintenance of a
restaurant in a motel is dependent upon the discretion of its
owners or operators; another proviso which from their
standpoint would require a guess as to whether the "full rate of
payment" to be charged for every such lease thereof means a
full day's or merely a half-day's rate. It may be asked, do these
allegations suffice to render the ordinance void on its face for
alleged vagueness or uncertainty? To ask the question is to
answer
it.
From Connally
v.
General
Construction
Co.33 toAdderley v. Florida,34 the principle has been consistently
upheld that what makes a statute susceptible to such a charge
is an enactment either forbidding or requiring the doing of an
act that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at
its meaning and differ as to its application. Is this the situation
before us? A citation from Justice Holmes would prove
illuminating: "We agree to all the generalities about not
supplying criminal laws with what they omit but there is no
canon against using common sense in construing laws as
saying what they obviously mean."35
That is all then that this case presents. As it stands, with all due
allowance for the arguments pressed with such vigor and
determination, the attack against the validity of the challenged
ordinance cannot be considered a success. Far from it. Respect
for constitutional law principles so uniformly held and so
uninterruptedly adhered to by this Court compels a reversal of
the appealed decision.
Wherefore, the judgment of the lower court is reversed and the
injunction issued lifted forthwith. With costs.
(B)
CITY OF MANILA, HON. ALFREDO S. LIM as the Mayor of
the City of Manila, HON. JOSELITO L. ATIENZA, in his
capacity as Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila and
Presiding Officer of the City Council of Manila, et.al vs.
HON. PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO, JR., as Presiding Judge,
RTC, Manila and MALATE TOURIST DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION

H A N A

B E E

Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary

Restraining Order7 with the lower court impleading as
defendants, herein petitioners City of Manila, Hon. Alfredo S.
Lim (Lim), Hon. Joselito L. Atienza, and the members of the City
Council of Manila (City Council). MTDC prayed that the
Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its
prohibited
establishments,
be
declared
invalid
and
unconstitutional.
Enacted by the City Council and approved by petitioner City
Mayor, the said Ordinance is entitled
AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR
OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF
AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN
THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR
VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

Judge Laguio rendered the assailed Decision (in favour of

respondent).
On 11 January 1995, petitioners filed the present Petition,
alleging that the following errors were committed by the lower
court in its ruling:
(1) It erred in concluding that the subject ordinance is ultra
vires, or otherwise, unfair, unreasonable and oppressive
exercise
of
police
power;
(2) It erred in holding that the questioned Ordinance
contravenes P.D. 499 which allows operators of all kinds of
commercial establishments, except those specified therein; and
(3) It erred in declaring the Ordinance void and
unconstitutional.
ISSUE: WON the ordinance is unconstitutional.
HELD: The Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that the lower
court did not err in declaring the Ordinance, as it did, ultra vires
and therefore null and void.
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line
of decisions has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must
not only be within the corporate powers of the local
government unit to enact and must be passed according to the
procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the
following substantive requirements:

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)

must
must
must
must
must
must

not contravene the Constitution or any statute;

not be unfair or oppressive;
not be partial or discriminatory;
not prohibit but may regulate trade;
be general and consistent with public policy; and
not be unreasonable.

The Ordinance was passed by the City Council in the exercise of

its police power, an enactment of the City Council acting as
agent of Congress. This delegated police power is found in
Section 16 of the LGC, known as the general welfare clause.
The inquiry in this Petition is concerned with the validity of the
exercise of such delegated power.
A. The Ordinance contravenes the Constitution

G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005

FACTS: Private respondent Malate Tourist Development
Corporation (MTDC) is a corporation engaged in the business of
operating hotels, motels, hostels and lodging houses. It built
and opened Victoria Court in Malate which was licensed as a
motel although duly accredited with the DOT as a hotel. On 28
June 1993, MTDC filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with

The enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of

delegated power as it is unconstitutional and repugnant to
general
laws.
The police power granted to LGUs must always be exercised
with utmost observance of the rights of the people to due
process and equal protection of the law. Due process requires
the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of
the person to his life, liberty and property.

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Requisites for the valid exercise of Police Power are not met
To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the
rationale for the enactment of the Ordinance, and to free it
from the imputation of constitutional infirmity, not only must it
appear that the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require an
interference with private rights, but the means adopted must
be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.60 It must
be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of
the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. A
reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the
police measure and the means employed for
its
accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the
public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private
property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.
Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police
measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into
private rights a violation of the due process clause.
The object of the Ordinance was, accordingly, the promotion
and protection of the social and moral values of the community.
Granting for the sake of argument that the objectives of the
Ordinance are within the scope of the City Councils police
powers, the means employed for the accomplishment thereof
were unreasonable and unduly oppressive.
The worthy aim of fostering public morals and the eradication
of the communitys social ills can be achieved through means
less restrictive of private rights; it can be attained by
reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition.
The closing down and transfer of businesses or their conversion
into businesses allowed under the Ordinance have no
reasonable relation to the accomplishment of its purposes.
Otherwise stated, the prohibition of the enumerated
establishments will not per se protect and promote the social
and moral welfare of the community; it will not in itself
eradicate the alluded social ills of prostitution, adultery,
fornication nor will it arrest the spread of sexual disease in
Manila.
The enumerated establishments are lawful pursuits which are
not per se offensive to the moral welfare of the community.
While a motel may be used as a venue for immoral sexual
activity, it cannot for that reason alone be punished. It cannot
be classified as a house of ill-repute or as a nuisance per se on
a mere likelihood or a naked assumption.
If the City of Manila so desires to put an end to prostitution,
fornication and other social ills, it can instead impose
reasonable regulations such as daily inspections of the
establishments for any violation of the conditions of their
licenses or permits; it may exercise its authority to suspend or
revoke their licenses for these violations; and it may even
impose increased license fees. In other words, there are other
means to reasonably accomplish the desired end.
It is readily apparent that the means employed by the
Ordinance for the achievement of its purposes, the
governmental interference itself, infringes on the constitutional
guarantees of a persons fundamental right to liberty and
property.

H A N A

B E E

There are two different types of taking that can be identified. A

possessory taking occurs when the government confiscates
or physically occupies property. A regulatory taking occurs
when the governments regulation leaves no reasonable
economically viable use of the property.
What is crucial in judicial consideration of regulatory takings is
that government regulation is a taking if it leaves no
reasonable economically viable use of property in a manner
that interferes with reasonable expectations for use. When the
owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all
economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good,
that is, to leave his property economically idle, he has suffered
a taking.
The Ordinance gives the owners and operators of the
prohibited establishments three (3) months from its approval
within which to wind up business operations or to transfer to
any place outside of the Ermita-Malate area or convert said
businesses to other kinds of business allowable within the
area. The directive to wind up business operations amounts
to a closure of the establishment, a permanent deprivation of
property, and is practically confiscatory. Unless the owner
converts his establishment to accommodate an allowed
business, the structure which housed the previous business will
be left empty and gathering dust. It is apparent that the
Ordinance leaves no reasonable economically viable use of
property in a manner that interferes with reasonable
expectations for use.
The second and third options to transfer to any place outside
of the Ermita-Malate area or to convert into allowed
businesses are confiscatory as well. The penalty of permanent
closure in cases of subsequent violations found in Section 4 of
the Ordinance is also equivalent to a taking of private
property.
Petitioners cannot take refuge in classifying the measure as a
zoning ordinance. A zoning ordinance, although a valid exercise
of police power, which limits a wholesome property to a use
which can not reasonably be made of it constitutes the taking
of such property without just compensation. Private property
which is not noxious nor intended for noxious purposes may
not, by zoning, be destroyed without compensation. Such
principle finds no support in the principles of justice as we know
them. The police powers of local government units which have
always received broad and liberal interpretation cannot be
stretched to cover this particular taking.
Further, The Ordinance confers upon the mayor arbitrary and
unrestricted power to close down establishments. Ordinances
such as this, which make possible abuses in its execution,
depending upon no conditions or qualifications whatsoever
other than the unregulated arbitrary will of the city authorities
as the touchstone by which its validity is to be tested, are
unreasonable and invalid. The Ordinance should have
established a rule by which its impartial enforcement could be
secured. Similarly, the Ordinance does not specify the
standards to ascertain which establishments tend to disturb
the community, annoy the inhabitants, and adversely
affect the social and moral welfare of the community.
The cited case supports the nullification of the Ordinance for
lack of comprehensible standards to guide the law enforcers in
carrying out its provisions.

Modality employed is unlawful taking

It is an ordinance which permanently restricts the use of
property that it can not be used for any reasonable purpose
goes beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of
the property without just compensation.78 It is intrusive and
violative of the private property rights of individuals.

Petitioners cannot therefore order the closure of the

enumerated establishments without infringing the due process
clause. These lawful establishments may be regulated, but not
prevented from carrying on their business.
B. The Ordinance violates Equal Protection Clause

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In the Courts view, there are no substantial distinctions

between motels, inns, pension houses, hotels, lodging houses
or other similar establishments. By definition, all are
commercial establishments providing lodging and usually
meals and other services for the public. No reason exists for
prohibiting motels and inns but not pension houses, hotels,
lodging houses or other similar establishments. The
classification in the instant case is invalid as similar subjects
are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and
obligations imposed. It is arbitrary as it does not rest on
substantial distinctions bearing a just and fair relation to the
purpose of the Ordinance.
The Court likewise cannot see the logic for prohibiting the
business and operation of motels in the Ermita-Malate area but
not outside of this area. A noxious establishment does not
become any less noxious if located outside the area.
The standard where women are used as tools for
entertainment is also discriminatory as prostitution one of
the hinted ills the Ordinance aims to banish is not a profession
exclusive to women. Both men and women have an equal
propensity to engage in prostitution. Thus, the discrimination is
invalid.
C. The Ordinance is repugnant to general laws; it is ultra vires
The Ordinance is in contravention of the Code (Sec 458) as the
latter merely empowers local government units to regulate,
and not prohibit, the establishments enumerated in Section 1
thereof.
With respect to cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels,
inns, pension houses, lodging houses, and other similar
establishments, the only power of the City Council to legislate
relative thereto is to regulate them to promote the general
welfare. The Code still withholds from cities the power to
suppress and prohibit altogether the establishment, operation
and maintenance of such establishments.
It is well to point out that petitioners also cannot seek cover
under the general welfare clause authorizing the abatement of
nuisances without judicial proceedings. That tenet applies to a
nuisance per se, or one which affects the immediate safety of
persons and property and may be summarily abated under the
undefined law of necessity. It can not be said that motels are
injurious to the rights of property, health or comfort of the
community. It is a legitimate business. If it be a nuisance per
accidens it may be so proven in a hearing conducted for that
purpose. A motel is not per se a nuisance warranting its
summary abatement without judicial intervention.
Not only does the Ordinance contravene the Code, it likewise
runs counter to the provisions of P.D. 499. As correctly argued
by MTDC, the statute had already converted the residential
Ermita-Malate area into a commercial area. The decree allowed
the establishment and operation of all kinds of commercial
establishments except warehouse or open storage depot, dump
or yard, motor repair shop, gasoline service station, light
industry with any machinery or funeral establishment. The rule
is that for an ordinance to be valid and to have force and effect,
it must not only be within the powers of the council to enact
but the same must not be in conflict with or repugnant to the
general law.
Conclusion
All considered, the Ordinance invades fundamental personal
and property rights and impairs personal privileges. It is
constitutionally infirm. The Ordinance contravenes statutes; it
is discriminatory and unreasonable in its operation; it is not
sufficiently detailed and explicit that abuses may attend the
enforcement of its sanctions. And not to be forgotten, the City
Council under the Code had no power to enact the Ordinance
and is therefore ultra vires, null and void.

H A N A

B E E

Petition Denied.
(C)
G.R. No. L-59234 September 30, 1982
TAXICAB OPERATORS OF METRO MANILA, INC.,
FELICISIMO CABIGAO and ACE TRANSPORTATION
CORPORATION, petitioners,
vs.
THE BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION and THE DIRECTOR OF
THE BUREAU OF LAND TRANSPORTATION,respondents.
This Petition for "Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus with
Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order" filed
by the Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc., Felicisimo
Cabigao and Ace Transportation, seeks to declare the nullity of
Memorandum Circular No. 77-42, dated October 10, 1977, of
the Board of Transportation, and Memorandum Circular No. 52,
dated August 15, 1980, of the Bureau of Land Transportation.
FACTS:
Petitioner Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. (TOMMI) is a
domestic corporation composed of taxicab operators, who are
grantees of Certificates of Public Convenience to operate
taxicabs within the City of Manila and to any other place in
Luzon accessible to vehicular traffic. Petitioners Ace
Transportation Corporation and Felicisimo Cabigao are two of
the members of TOMMI, each being an operator and grantee of
such certificate of public convenience.
On October 10, 1977, respondent Board of Transportation (BOT)
issued Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 which reads:
SUBJECT: Phasing out and Replacement of
Old and Dilapidated Taxis
WHEREAS, it is the policy of the government to insure that only
safe and comfortable units are used as public conveyances;
WHEREAS, the riding public, particularly in Metro-Manila, has,
time and again, complained against, and condemned, the
continued operation of old and dilapidated taxis;
WHEREAS, in order that the commuting public may be assured
of comfort, convenience, and safety, a program of phasing out
of old and dilapidated taxis should be adopted;
WHEREAS, after studies and inquiries made by the Board of
Transportation, the latter believes that in six years of operation,
a taxi operator has not only covered the cost of his taxis, but
has made reasonable profit for his investments;
NOW, THEREFORE, pursuant to this policy, the Board hereby
declares that no car beyond six years shall be operated as taxi,
and in implementation of the same hereby promulgates the
following rules and regulations:
1. As of December 31, 1977, all taxis of Model 1971 and earlier
are ordered withdrawn from public service and thereafter may
no longer be registered and operated as taxis. In the
registration of cards for 1978, only taxis of Model 1972 and
later shall be accepted for registration and allowed for
operation;
2. As of December 31, 1978, all taxis of Model 1972 are
ordered withdrawn from public service and thereafter may no
longer be registered and operated as taxis. In the registration
of cars for 1979, only taxis of Model 1973 and later shall be
accepted for registration and allowed for operation; and every
year thereafter, there shall be a six-year lifetime of taxi, to wit:

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1980 Model 1974

1981 Model 1975, etc.
All taxis of earlier models than those provided above are
hereby ordered withdrawn from public service as of the last day
of registration of each particular year and their respective
plates shall be surrendered directly to the Board of
Transportation for subsequent turnover to the Land
Transportation Commission.
For an orderly implementation of this Memorandum Circular,
the rules herein shall immediately be effective in Metro-Manila.
Its implementation outside Metro- Manila shall be carried out
only after the project has been implemented in Metro-Manila
and only after the date has been determined by the Board. 1
Pursuant to the above BOT circular, respondent Director of the
Bureau of Land Transportation (BLT) issued Implementing
Circular No. 52, dated August 15, 1980, instructing the Regional
Director, the MV Registrars and other personnel of BLT, all
within the National Capitol Region, to implement said Circular,
and formulating a schedule of phase-out of vehicles to be
allowed and accepted for registration as public conveyances. To
quote said Circular:
Pursuant to BOT Memo-Circular No. 77-42, taxi units with year
models over six (6) years old are now banned from operating
as public utilities in Metro Manila. As such the units involved
should be considered as automatically dropped as public
utilities and, therefore, do not require any further dropping
order from the BOT.
Henceforth, taxi units within the National Capitol Region having
year models over 6 years old shall be refused registration.
In accordance therewith, cabs of model 1971 were phase-out in
registration year 1978; those of model 1972, in 1979; those of
model 1973, in 1980; and those of model 1974, in 1981.
On January 27, 1981, petitioners filed a Petition with the BOT,
docketed as Case No. 80-7553, seeking to nullify MC No. 77-42
or to stop its implementation; to allow the registration and
operation in 1981 and subsequent years of taxicabs of model
1974, as well as those of earlier models which were phasedout, provided that, at the time of registration, they are
roadworthy and fit for operation.
On February 16, 1981, petitioners filed before the BOT a
"Manifestation and Urgent Motion", praying for an early hearing
of their petition. The case was heard on February 20, 1981.
Petitioners presented testimonial and documentary evidence,
offered the same, and manifested that they would submit
additional documentary proofs. Said proofs were submitted on
March 27, 1981 attached to petitioners' pleading entitled,
"Manifestation, Presentation of Additional Evidence and
Submission of the Case for Resolution." 3
On November 28, 1981, petitioners filed before the same Board
a "Manifestation and Urgent Motion to Resolve or Decide Main
Petition" praying that the case be resolved or decided not later
than December 10, 1981 to enable them, in case of denial, to
avail of whatever remedy they may have under the law for the
protection of their interests before their 1975 model cabs are
phased-out on January 1, 1982.
Petitioners, through its President, allegedly made personal
follow-ups of the case, but was later informed that the records
of the case could not be located.
On December 29, 1981, the present Petition was instituted
wherein the following queries were posed for consideration by
this Court:

H A N A

B E E

A. Did BOT and BLT promulgate the questioned memorandum

circulars in accord with the manner required by Presidential
Decree No. 101, thereby safeguarding the petitioners'
constitutional right to procedural due process?
B. Granting, arguendo, that respondents did comply with the
procedural requirements imposed by Presidential Decree No.
101, would the implementation and enforcement of the
assailed memorandum circulars violate the petitioners'
constitutional rights to.
(1) Equal protection of the law;
(2) Substantive due process; and
(3) Protection against arbitrary and unreasonable classification
and standard?
On Procedural and Substantive Due Process:
Presidential Decree No.
Transportation the power

101

grants

to

the

Board

of

4. To fix just and reasonable standards, classification,

regulations, practices, measurements, or service to be
furnished, imposed, observed, and followed by operators of
public utility motor vehicles.
Section 2 of said Decree provides procedural guidelines for said
agency to follow in the exercise of its powers:
Sec. 2. Exercise of powers. In the exercise of the powers
granted in the preceding section, the Board shag proceed
promptly along the method of legislative inquiry.
Apart from its own investigation and studies, the Board, in its
discretion, may require the cooperation and assistance of the
Bureau of Transportation, the Philippine Constabulary,
particularly the Highway Patrol Group, the support agencies
within the Department of Public Works, Transportation and
Communications, or any other government office or agency
that may be able to furnish useful information or data in the
formulation of the Board of any policy, plan or program in the
implementation of this Decree.
The Board may also can conferences, require the submission of
position papers or other documents, information, or data by
operators or other persons that may be affected by the
implementation of this Decree, or employ any other suitable
means of inquiry.
In support of their submission that they were denied procedural
due process, petitioners contend that they were not caged
upon to submit their position papers, nor were they ever
summoned to attend any conference prior to the issuance of
the questioned BOT Circular.
It is clear from the provision aforequoted, however, that the
leeway accorded the Board gives it a wide range of choice in
gathering necessary information or data in the formulation of
any policy, plan or program. It is not mandatory that it should
first call a conference or require the submission of position
papers or other documents from operators or persons who may
be affected, this being only one of the options open to the
Board, which is given wide discretionary authority. Petitioners
cannot justifiably claim, therefore, that they were deprived of
procedural due process. Neither can they state with certainty
that public respondents had not availed of other sources of
inquiry prior to issuing the challenged Circulars. operators of
public conveyances are not the only primary sources of the
data and information that may be desired by the BOT.
Dispensing with a public hearing prior to the issuance of the
Circulars is neither violative of procedural due process. As held

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in Central Bank vs. Hon. Cloribel and Banco Filipino, 44 SCRA

307 (1972):

authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may

plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded". 7

Pevious notice and hearing as elements of due process, are

constitutionally required for the protection of life or vested
property rights, as well as of liberty, when its limitation or loss
takes place in consequence of a judicial or quasi-judicial
proceeding, generally dependent upon a past act or event
which has to be established or ascertained. It is not essential to
the validity of general rules or regulations promulgated to
govern future conduct of a class or persons or enterprises,
unless the law provides otherwise. (Emphasis supplied)

In so far as the non-application of the assailed Circulars to

other transportation services is concerned, it need only be
recalled that the equal protection clause does not imply that
the same treatment be accorded all and sundry. It applies to
things or persons Identically or similarly situated. It permits of
classification of the object or subject of the law provided
classification is reasonable or based on substantial distinction,
which make for real differences, and that it must apply equally
to each member of the class. 8 What is required under the
equal protection clause is the uniform operation by legal means
so that all persons under Identical or similar circumstance
would be accorded the same treatment both in privilege
conferred and the liabilities imposed. 9 The challenged Circulars
satisfy the foregoing criteria.

Petitioners further take the position that fixing the ceiling at six
(6) years is arbitrary and oppressive because the
roadworthiness of taxicabs depends upon their kind of
maintenance and the use to which they are subjected, and,
therefore, their actual physical condition should be taken into
consideration at the time of registration. As public contend,
however, it is impractical to subject every taxicab to constant
and recurring evaluation, not to speak of the fact that it can
open the door to the adoption of multiple standards, possible
collusion, and even graft and corruption. A reasonable standard
must be adopted to apply to an vehicles affected uniformly,
fairly, and justly. The span of six years supplies that reasonable
standard. The product of experience shows that by that time
taxis have fully depreciated, their cost recovered, and a fair
return on investment obtained. They are also generally
dilapidated and no longer fit for safe and comfortable service to
the public specially considering that they are in continuous
operation practically 24 hours everyday in three shifts of eight
hours per shift. With that standard of reasonableness and
absence of arbitrariness, the requirement of due process has
been met.

Evident then is the conclusion that the questioned Circulars do

not suffer from any constitutional infirmity. To declare a law
unconstitutional, the infringement of constitutional right must
be clear, categorical and undeniable.10
WHEREFORE, the Writs prayed for are denied and this Petition
is hereby dismissed. No costs.

On Equal Protection of the Law:

Petitioners alleged that the Circular in question violates their
right to equal protection of the law because the same is being
enforced in Metro Manila only and is directed solely towards the
taxi industry. At the outset it should be pointed out that
implementation outside Metro Manila is also envisioned in
Memorandum Circular No. 77-42. To repeat the pertinent
portion:
For an orderly implementation of this Memorandum Circular,
the rules herein shall immediately be effective in Metro Manila.
Its implementation outside Metro Manila shall be carried out
only after the project has been implemented in Metro Manila
and only after the date has been determined by the Board. 4
In fact, it is the understanding of the Court that implementation
of the Circulars in Cebu City is already being effected, with the
BOT in the process of conducting studies regarding the
operation of taxicabs in other cities.
The Board's reason for enforcing the Circular initially in Metro
Manila is that taxicabs in this city, compared to those of other
places, are subjected to heavier traffic pressure and more
constant use. This is of common knowledge. Considering that
traffic conditions are not the same in every city, a substantial
distinction exists so that infringement of the equal protection
clause can hardly be successfully claimed.
As enunciated in the preambular clauses of the challenged BOT
Circular, the overriding consideration is the safety and comfort
of the riding public from the dangers posed by old and
dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercise, of its police power,
can prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace,
good order, safety and general welfare of the people. It can
prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety and welfare of
society. 5 It may also regulate property rights. 6 In the language
of Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando "the necessities imposed
by public welfare may justify the exercise of governmental

(D)
LAO H. ICHONG, in his own behalf and in behalf of other
alien residents, corporations and partnerships adversely
affected. by Republic Act No. 1180, petitioner,
vs.
JAIME HERNANDEZ, Secretary of Finance, and
MARCELINO SARMIENTO, City Treasurer of
Manila,respondents.
G.R. No. L-7995

May 31, 1957

Facts:
Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien
residents corporations and partnerships adversely affected by
the provisions of Republic Act. No. 1180, An Act to Regulate
the Retail Business, filed to obtain a judicial declaration that
said Act is unconstitutional contending that: (1) it denies to
alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of
their liberty and property without due process of law ; (2) the
subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title
thereof; (3) the Act violates international and treaty obligations
of the Republic of the Philippines; (4) the provisions of the Act
against the transmission by aliens of their retail business thru
hereditary succession, and those requiring 100% Filipino
capitalization for a corporation or entity to entitle it to engage
in the retail business, violate the spirit of Sections 1 and 5,
Article XIII and Section 8 of Article XIV of the Constitution.
Issue: Whether RA 1180 denies to alien residents the equal
protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property
without due process of law
Held:
No. The equal protection of the law clause is against undue
favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile

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discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended

to prohibit legislation, which is limited either in the object to
which it is directed or by territory within which is to operate. It
does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely
requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred
and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not
infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons
falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons
within such class, and reasonable grounds exists for making a
distinction between those who fall within such class and those
who do not. (2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 824-825.)
The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of
legislation enacted in pursuance of the police power. Is there
public interest, a public purpose; is public welfare involved? Is
the Act reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
legislatures purpose; is it not unreasonable, arbitrary or
oppressive? Is there sufficient foundation or reason in
connection with the matter involved; or has there not been a
capricious use of the legislative power? Can the aims conceived
be achieved by the means used, or is it not merely an
unjustified interference with private interest? These are the
questions that we ask when the due process test is applied.
The conflict, therefore, between police power and the
guarantees of due process and equal protection of the laws is
more apparent than real. Properly related, the power and the
guarantees are supposed to coexist. The balancing is the
essence or, shall it be said, the indispensable means for the
attainment of legitimate aspirations of any democratic society.
There can be no absolute power, whoever exercise it, for that
would be tyranny. Yet there can neither be absolute liberty, for
that would mean license and anarchy. So the State can deprive
persons of life, liberty and property, provided there is due
process of law; and persons may be classified into classes and
groups, provided everyone is given the equal protection of the
law. The test or standard, as always, is reason. The police
power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest
and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between
purposes and means. And if distinction and classification has
been made, there must be a reasonable basis for said
distinction.
The law does not violate the equal protection clause of
the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the
distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of
the occupation regulated, nor the due process of law clause,
because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the
privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation and
reasonably protects their privilege; that the wisdom and
efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives appear to us to be
plainly evident as a matter of fact it seems not only
appropriate but actually necessary and that in any case such
matter falls within the prerogative of the Legislature, with
whose power and discretion the Judicial department of the
Government may not interfere; that the provisions of the law
are clearly embraced in the title, and this suffers from no
duplicity and has not misled the legislators or the segment of
the population affected; and that it cannot be said to be void
for supposed conflict with treaty obligations because no treaty
has actually been entered into on the subject and the police
power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any
other conventional agreement.
(E)
G.R. No. L-7859

December 22, 1955

WALTER LUTZ, as Judicial Administrator of the Intestate

Estate of the deceased Antonio Jayme Ledesma, plaintiffappellant,
vs.

H A N A

B E E

J. ANTONIO ARANETA, as the Collector of Internal

Revenue, defendant-appellee.
This case was initiated in the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental to test the legality of the taxes imposed by
Commonwealth Act No. 567, otherwise known as the Sugar
Adjustment Act.
FACTS:
Promulgated in 1940, the law in question opens (section 1) with
a declaration of emergency, due to the threat to our industry
by the imminent imposition of export taxes upon sugar as
provided in the Tydings-McDuffe Act, and the "eventual loss of
its preferential position in the United States market";
wherefore, the national policy was expressed "to obtain a
readjustment of the benefits derived from the sugar industry by
the component elements thereof" and "to stabilize the sugar
industry so as to prepare it for the eventuality of the loss of its
preferential position in the United States market and the
imposition of the export taxes."
In section 2, Commonwealth Act 567 provides for an increase of
the existing tax on the manufacture of sugar, on a graduated
basis, on each picul of sugar manufactured; while section 3
levies on owners or persons in control of lands devoted to the
cultivation of sugar cane and ceded to others for a
consideration, on lease or otherwise
a tax equivalent to the difference between the money value of
the rental or consideration collected and the amount
representing 12 per centum of the assessed value of such land.
According to section 6 of the law
SEC. 6. All collections made under this Act shall accrue to a
special fund in the Philippine Treasury, to be known as the
'Sugar Adjustment and Stabilization Fund,' and shall be paid out
only for any or all of the following purposes or to attain any or
all of the following objectives, as may be provided by law.
First, to place the sugar industry in a position to maintain itself,
despite the gradual loss of the preferntial position of the
Philippine sugar in the United States market, and ultimately to
insure its continued existence notwithstanding the loss of that
market and the consequent necessity of meeting competition
in the free markets of the world;
Second, to readjust the benefits derived from the sugar
industry by all of the component elements thereof the mill,
the landowner, the planter of the sugar cane, and the laborers
in the factory and in the field so that all might continue
profitably to engage therein;lawphi1.net
Third, to limit the production of sugar to areas more
economically suited to the production thereof; and
Fourth, to afford labor employed in the industry a living wage
and to improve their living and working conditions: Provided,
That the President of the Philippines may, until the adjourment
of the next regular session of the National Assembly, make the
necessary disbursements from the fund herein created (1) for
the establishment and operation of sugar experiment station or
stations and the undertaking of researchers (a) to increase the
recoveries of the centrifugal sugar factories with the view of
reducing manufacturing costs, (b) to produce and propagate
higher yielding varieties of sugar cane more adaptable to
different district conditions in the Philippines, (c) to lower the
costs of raising sugar cane, (d) to improve the buying quality of
denatured alcohol from molasses for motor fuel, (e) to
determine the possibility of utilizing the other by-products of
the industry, (f) to determine what crop or crops are suitable
for rotation and for the utilization of excess cane lands, and (g)
on other problems the solution of which would help rehabilitate

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and stabilize the industry, and (2) for the improvement of living
and working conditions in sugar mills and sugar plantations,
authorizing him to organize the necessary agency or agencies
to take charge of the expenditure and allocation of said funds
to carry out the purpose hereinbefore enumerated, and,
likewise, authorizing the disbursement from the fund herein
created of the necessary amount or amounts needed for
salaries, wages, travelling expenses, equipment, and other
sundry expenses of said agency or agencies.
Plaintiff, Walter Lutz, in his capacity as Judicial Administrator of
the Intestate Estate of Antonio Jayme Ledesma, seeks to
recover from the Collector of Internal Revenue the sum of
P14,666.40 paid by the estate as taxes, under section 3 of the
Act, for the crop years 1948-1949 and 1949-1950; alleging that
such tax is unconstitutional and void, being levied for the aid
and support of the sugar industry exclusively, which in
plaintiff's opinion is not a public purpose for which a tax may be
constitutioally levied. The action having been dismissed by the
Court of First Instance, the plaintifs appealed the case directly
to this Court (Judiciary Act, section 17).
The basic defect in the plaintiff's position is his assumption that
the tax provided for in Commonwealth Act No. 567 is a pure
exercise of the taxing power. Analysis of the Act, and
particularly of section 6 (heretofore quoted in full), will show
that the tax is levied with a regulatory purpose, to provide
means for the rehabilitation and stabilization of the threatened
sugar industry. In other words, the act is primarily an exercise
of the police power.
This Court can take judicial notice of the fact that sugar
production is one of the great industries of our nation, sugar
occupying a leading position among its export products; that it
gives employment to thousands of laborers in fields and
factories; that it is a great source of the state's wealth, is one of
the important sources of foreign exchange needed by our
government, and is thus pivotal in the plans of a regime
committed to a policy of currency stability. Its promotion,
protection and advancement, therefore redounds greatly to the
general welfare. Hence it was competent for the legislature to
find that the general welfare demanded that the sugar industry
should be stabilized in turn; and in the wide field of its police
power, the lawmaking body could provide that the distribution
of benefits therefrom be readjusted among its components to
enable it to resist the added strain of the increase in taxes that
it had to sustain (Sligh vs. Kirkwood, 237 U. S. 52, 59 L. Ed.
835; Johnson vs. State ex rel. Marey, 99 Fla. 1311, 128 So. 853;
Maxcy Inc. vs. Mayo, 103 Fla. 552, 139 So. 121).
As stated in Johnson vs. State ex rel. Marey, with reference to
the citrus industry in Florida
The protection of a large industry constituting one of the great
sources of the state's wealth and therefore directly or indirectly
affecting the welfare of so great a portion of the population of
the State is affected to such an extent by public interests as to
be within the police power of the sovereign. (128 Sp. 857).
Once it is conceded, as it must, that the protection and
promotion of the sugar industry is a matter of public concern, it
follows that the Legislature may determine within reasonable
bounds what is necessary for its protection and expedient for
its promotion. Here, the legislative discretion must be allowed
fully play, subject only to the test of reasonableness; and it is
not contended that the means provided in section 6 of the law
(above quoted) bear no relation to the objective pursued or are
oppressive in character. If objective and methods are alike
constitutionally valid, no reason is seen why the state may not
levy taxes to raise funds for their prosecution and attainment.
Taxation may be made the implement of the state's police
power (Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. vs. Grosjean, 301 U. S. 412, 81
L. Ed. 1193; U. S. vs. Butler, 297 U. S. 1, 80 L. Ed. 477;
M'Culloch vs. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L. Ed. 579).

H A N A

B E E

That the tax to be levied should burden the sugar producers

themselves can hardly be a ground of complaint; indeed, it
appears rational that the tax be obtained precisely from those
who are to be benefited from the expenditure of the funds
derived from it. At any rate, it is inherent in the power to tax
that a state be free to select the subjects of taxation, and it has
been repeatedly held that "inequalities which result from a
singling out of one particular class for taxation, or exemption
infringe no constitutional limitation" (Carmichael vs. Southern
Coal & Coke Co., 301 U. S. 495, 81 L. Ed. 1245, citing numerous
authorities, at p. 1251).
From the point of view we have taken it appears of no moment
that the funds raised under the Sugar Stabilization Act, now in
question, should be exclusively spent in aid of the sugar
industry, since it is that very enterprise that is being protected.
It may be that other industries are also in need of similar
protection; that the legislature is not required by the
Constitution to adhere to a policy of "all or none." As ruled in
Minnesota ex rel. Pearson vs. Probate Court, 309 U. S. 270, 84
L. Ed. 744, "if the law presumably hits the evil where it is most
felt, it is not to be overthrown because there are other
instances to which it might have been applied;" and that "the
legislative authority, exerted within its proper field, need not
embrace all the evils within its reach" (N. L. R. B. vs. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp. 301 U. S. 1, 81 L. Ed. 893).
Even from the standpoint that the Act is a pure tax measure, it
cannot be said that the devotion of tax money to experimental
stations to seek increase of efficiency in sugar production,
utilization of by-products and solution of allied problems, as
well as to the improvements of living and working conditions in
sugar mills or plantations, without any part of such money
being channeled directly to private persons, constitutes
expenditure of tax money for private purposes, (compare
Everson vs. Board of Education, 91 L. Ed. 472, 168 ALR 1392,
1400).
The decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against
appellant. So ordered.
(F)
G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987
RESTITUTO
YNOT, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE
COURT,
THE
STATION
COMMANDER, INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE, BAROTAC
NUEVO, ILOILO and THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU
OF
ANIMAL
INDUSTRY,
REGION
IV,
ILOILO
CITY, respondents.
Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioner.

CRUZ, J.:
The essence of due process is distilled in the immortal cry of
Themistocles to Alcibiades "Strike but hear me first!" It is
this cry that the petitioner in effect repeats here as he
challenges the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A.
The said executive order reads in full as follows:
WHEREAS, the President has given orders prohibiting the
interprovincial movement of carabaos and the slaughtering of
carabaos not complying with the requirements of Executive
Order No. 626 particularly with respect to age;
WHEREAS, it has been observed that despite such orders the
violators still manage to circumvent the prohibition against

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inter-provincial movement of carabaos by transporting carabeef

instead; and

the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A. That is an

entirely different matter.

WHEREAS, in order to achieve the purposes and objectives of

Executive Order No. 626 and the prohibition against
interprovincial movement of carabaos, it is necessary to
strengthen the said Executive Order and provide for the
disposition of the carabaos and carabeef subject of the
violation;

This Court has declared that while lower courts should observe
a becoming modesty in examining constitutional questions,
they are nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same
whenever warranted, subject only to review by the highest
tribunal. 6 We have jurisdiction under the Constitution to
"review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal
or certiorari, as the law or rules of court may provide," final
judgments and orders of lower courts in, among others, all
cases involving the constitutionality of certain measures. 7 This
simply means that the resolution of such cases may be made in
the first instance by these lower courts.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the

Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the
Constitution, do hereby promulgate the following:
SECTION 1. Executive Order No. 626 is hereby amended such
that henceforth, no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical
condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from
one province to another. The carabao or carabeef transported
in violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be subject
to confiscation and forfeiture by the government, to be
distributed to charitable institutions and other similar
institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection
Commission may ay see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to
deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal
Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos.

And while it is true that laws are presumed to be constitutional,

that presumption is not by any means conclusive and in fact
may be rebutted. Indeed, if there be a clear showing of their
invalidity, and of the need to declare them so, then "will be the
time to make the hammer fall, and heavily," 8 to recall Justice
Laurel's trenchant warning. Stated otherwise, courts should not
follow the path of least resistance by simply presuming the
constitutionality of a law when it is questioned. On the
contrary, they should probe the issue more deeply, to relieve
the abscess, paraphrasing another distinguished jurist, 9 and so
heal the wound or excise the affliction.

SECTION 2. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately.

Done in the City of Manila, this 25th day of October, in the year
of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and eighty.
(SGD.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS
President
Republic of the Philippines
The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat
from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when they were
confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo,
Iloilo, for violation of the above measure. 1 The petitioner sued
for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a
writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of
P12,000.00. After considering the merits of the case, the court
sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they
could no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the
bond. The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of
the executive order, as raise by the petitioner, for lack of
authority and also for its presumed validity. 2
The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate
Appellate Court,* 3 which upheld the trial court, ** and he has
now come before us in this petition for review on certiorari.
The thrust of his petition is that the executive order is
unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes outright confiscation of
the carabao or carabeef being transported across provincial
boundaries. His claim is that the penalty is invalid because it is
imposed without according the owner a right to be heard
before a competent and impartial court as guaranteed by due
process. He complains that the measure should not have been
presumed, and so sustained, as constitutional. There is also a
challenge to the improper exercise of the legislative power by
the former President under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973
Constitution. 4
While also involving the same executive order, the case
of Pesigan v. Angeles 5 is not applicable here. The question
raised there was the necessity of the previous publication of
the measure in the Official Gazette before it could be
considered enforceable. We imposed the requirement then on
the basis of due process of law. In doing so, however, this Court
did not, as contended by the Solicitor General, impliedly affirm

Judicial power authorizes this; and when the exercise is

demanded, there should be no shirking of the task for fear of
retaliation, or loss of favor, or popular censure, or any other
similar inhibition unworthy of the bench, especially this Court.
The challenged measure is denominated an executive order but
it is really presidential decree, promulgating a new rule instead
of merely implementing an existing law. It was issued by
President Marcos not for the purpose of taking care that the
laws were faithfully executed but in the exercise of his
legislative authority under Amendment No. 6. It was provided
thereunder that whenever in his judgment there existed a
grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof or
whenever the legislature failed or was unable to act adequately
on any matter that in his judgment required immediate action,
he could, in order to meet the exigency, issue decrees, orders
or letters of instruction that were to have the force and effect
of law. As there is no showing of any exigency to justify the
exercise of that extraordinary power then, the petitioner has
reason, indeed, to question the validity of the executive order.
Nevertheless, since the determination of the grounds was
supposed to have been made by the President "in his
judgment, " a phrase that will lead to protracted discussion not
really necessary at this time, we reserve resolution of this
matter until a more appropriate occasion. For the nonce, we
confine ourselves to the more fundamental question of due
process.
It is part of the art of constitution-making that the provisions of
the charter be cast in precise and unmistakable language to
avoid controversies that might arise on their correct
interpretation. That is the Ideal. In the case of the due process
clause, however, this rule was deliberately not followed and the
wording was purposely kept ambiguous. In fact, a proposal to
delineate it more clearly was submitted in the Constitutional
Convention of 1934, but it was rejected by Delegate Jose P.
Laurel, Chairman of the Committee on the Bill of Rights, who
forcefully argued against it. He was sustained by the body. 10
The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it
would remain also conveniently resilient. This was felt
necessary because due process is not, like some provisions of
the fundamental law, an "iron rule" laying down an implacable
and immutable command for all seasons and all persons.
Flexibility must be the best virtue of the guaranty. The very
elasticity of the due process clause was meant to make it adapt
easily to every situation, enlarging or constricting its protection
as the changing times and circumstances may require.

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Aware of this, the courts have also hesitated to adopt their own
specific description of due process lest they confine themselves
in a legal straitjacket that will deprive them of the elbow room
they may need to vary the meaning of the clause whenever
indicated. Instead, they have preferred to leave the import of
the protection open-ended, as it were, to be "gradually
ascertained by the process of inclusion and exclusion in the
course of the decision of cases as they arise." 11 Thus, Justice
Felix Frankfurter of the U.S. Supreme Court, for example, would
go no farther than to define due process and in so doing
sums it all up as nothing more and nothing less than "the
embodiment of the sporting Idea of fair play." 12
When the barons of England extracted from their sovereign
liege the reluctant promise that that Crown would thenceforth
not proceed against the life liberty or property of any of its
subjects except by the lawful judgment of his peers or the law
of the land, they thereby won for themselves and their progeny
that splendid guaranty of fairness that is now the hallmark of
the free society. The solemn vow that King John made at
Runnymede in 1215 has since then resounded through the
ages, as a ringing reminder to all rulers, benevolent or base,
that every person, when confronted by the stern visage of the
law, is entitled to have his say in a fair and open hearing of his
cause.
The closed mind has no place in the open society. It is part of
the sporting Idea of fair play to hear "the other side" before an
opinion is formed or a decision is made by those who sit in
judgment. Obviously, one side is only one-half of the question;
the other half must also be considered if an impartial verdict is
to be reached based on an informed appreciation of the issues
in contention. It is indispensable that the two sides
complement each other, as unto the bow the arrow, in leading
to the correct ruling after examination of the problem not from
one or the other perspective only but in its totality. A judgment
based on less that this full appraisal, on the pretext that a
hearing is unnecessary or useless, is tainted with the vice of
bias or intolerance or ignorance, or worst of all, in repressive
regimes, the insolence of power.
The minimum requirements of due process are notice and
hearing 13 which, generally speaking, may not be dispensed
with because they are intended as a safeguard against official
arbitrariness. It is a gratifying commentary on our judicial
system that the jurisprudence of this country is rich with
applications of this guaranty as proof of our fealty to the rule of
law and the ancient rudiments of fair play. We have consistently
declared that every person, faced by the awesome power of
the State, is entitled to "the law of the land," which Daniel
Webster described almost two hundred years ago in the famous
Dartmouth College Case, 14 as "the law which hears before it
condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment
only after trial." It has to be so if the rights of every person are
to be secured beyond the reach of officials who, out of
mistaken zeal or plain arrogance, would degrade the due
process clause into a worn and empty catchword.
This is not to say that notice and hearing are imperative in
every case for, to be sure, there are a number of admitted
exceptions. The conclusive presumption, for example, bars the
admission of contrary evidence as long as such presumption is
based on human experience or there is a rational connection
between the fact proved and the fact ultimately presumed
therefrom. 15 There are instances when the need for
expeditions action will justify omission of these requisites, as in
the summary abatement of a nuisance per se, like a mad dog
on the loose, which may be killed on sight because of the
immediate danger it poses to the safety and lives of the
people. Pornographic materials, contaminated meat and
narcotic drugs are inherently pernicious and may be summarily
destroyed. The passport of a person sought for a criminal
offense may be cancelled without hearing, to compel his return
to the country he has fled. 16Filthy restaurants may be
summarily padlocked in the interest of the public health and

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bawdy houses to protect the public morals. 17 In such

instances, previous judicial hearing may be omitted without
violation of due process in view of the nature of the property
involved or the urgency of the need to protect the general
welfare from a clear and present danger.
The protection of the general welfare is the particular function
of the police power which both restraints and is restrained by
due process. The police power is simply defined as the power
inherent in the State to regulate liberty and property for the
promotion of the general welfare. 18 By reason of its function,
it extends to all the great public needs and is described as the
most pervasive, the least limitable and the most demanding of
the three inherent powers of the State, far outpacing taxation
and eminent domain. The individual, as a member of society, is
hemmed in by the police power, which affects him even before
he is born and follows him still after he is dead from the
womb to beyond the tomb in practically everything he does
or owns. Its reach is virtually limitless. It is a ubiquitous and
often unwelcome intrusion. Even so, as long as the activity or
the property has some relevance to the public welfare, its
regulation under the police power is not only proper but
necessary. And the justification is found in the venerable Latin
maxims, Salus populi est suprema lex and Sic utere tuo ut
alienum non laedas, which call for the subordination of
individual interests to the benefit of the greater number.
It is this power that is now invoked by the government to justify
Executive Order No. 626-A, amending the basic rule in
Executive Order No. 626, prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos
except under certain conditions. The original measure was
issued for the reason, as expressed in one of its Whereases,
that "present conditions demand that the carabaos and the
buffaloes be conserved for the benefit of the small farmers who
rely on them for energy needs." We affirm at the outset the
need for such a measure. In the face of the worsening energy
crisis and the increased dependence of our farms on these
traditional beasts of burden, the government would have been
remiss, indeed, if it had not taken steps to protect and preserve
them.
A similar prohibition was challenged in United States v.
Toribio, 19 where a law regulating the registration, branding
and slaughter of large cattle was claimed to be a deprivation of
property without due process of law. The defendant had been
convicted thereunder for having slaughtered his own carabao
without the required permit, and he appealed to the Supreme
Court. The conviction was affirmed. The law was sustained as a
valid police measure to prevent the indiscriminate killing of
carabaos, which were then badly needed by farmers. An
epidemic had stricken many of these animals and the reduction
of their number had resulted in an acute decline in agricultural
output, which in turn had caused an incipient famine.
Furthermore, because of the scarcity of the animals and the
consequent increase in their price, cattle-rustling had spread
alarmingly, necessitating more effective measures for the
registration and branding of these animals. The Court held that
the questioned statute was a valid exercise of the police power
and declared in part as follows:
To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of
the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require such interference; and second, that the means are
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose,
and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. ...
From what has been said, we think it is clear that the
enactment of the provisions of the statute under consideration
was required by "the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class" and that the
prohibition of the slaughter of carabaos for human
consumption, so long as these animals are fit for agricultural
work or draft purposes was a "reasonably necessary" limitation
on private ownership, to protect the community from the loss

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of the services of such animals by their slaughter by

improvident owners, tempted either by greed of momentary
gain, or by a desire to enjoy the luxury of animal food, even
when by so doing the productive power of the community may
be measurably and dangerously affected.
In the light of the tests mentioned above, we hold with the
Toribio Case that the carabao, as the poor man's tractor, so to
speak, has a direct relevance to the public welfare and so is a
lawful subject of Executive Order No. 626. The method chosen
in the basic measure is also reasonably necessary for the
purpose sought to be achieved and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals, again following the above-cited doctrine. There is
no doubt that by banning the slaughter of these animals except
where they are at least seven years old if male and eleven
years old if female upon issuance of the necessary permit, the
executive order will be conserving those still fit for farm work or
breeding and preventing their improvident depletion.
But while conceding that the amendatory measure has the
same lawful subject as the original executive order, we cannot
say with equal certainty that it complies with the second
requirement, viz., that there be a lawful method. We note that
to strengthen the original measure, Executive Order No. 626-A
imposes an absolute ban not on theslaughter of the carabaos
but on their movement, providing that "no carabao regardless
of age, sex, physical condition or purpose (sic) and no carabeef
shall be transported from one province to another." The object
of the prohibition escapes us. The reasonable connection
between the means employed and the purpose sought to be
achieved by the questioned measure is missing
We do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial
transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate
slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with
no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously,
retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their
slaughter there, any more than moving them to another
province will make it easier to kill them there. As for the
carabeef, the prohibition is made to apply to it as otherwise, so
says executive order, it could be easily circumvented by simply
killing the animal. Perhaps so. However, if the movement of the
live animals for the purpose of preventing their slaughter
cannot be prohibited, it should follow that there is no reason
either to prohibit their transfer as, not to be flippant dead meat.
Even if a reasonable relation between the means and the end
were to be assumed, we would still have to reckon with the
sanction that the measure applies for violation of the
prohibition. The penalty is outright confiscation of the carabao
or carabeef being transported, to be meted out by the
executive authorities, usually the police only. In the Toribio
Case, the statute was sustained because the penalty
prescribed was fine and imprisonment, to be imposed by the
court after trial and conviction of the accused. Under the
challenged measure, significantly, no such trial is prescribed,
and the property being transported is immediately impounded
by the police and declared, by the measure itself, as forfeited
to the government.
In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by
the police station commander, were returned to the petitioner
only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given
a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00, which was ordered
confiscated upon his failure to produce the carabaos when
ordered by the trial court. The executive order defined the
prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed
punishment, which was carried out forthright. The measure
struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving
him a chance to be heard, thus denying him the centuries-old
guaranty of elementary fair play.
It has already been remarked that there are occasions when
notice and hearing may be validly dispensed with
notwithstanding the usual requirement for these minimum

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guarantees of due process. It is also conceded that summary

action may be validly taken in administrative proceedings as
procedural due process is not necessarily judicial only. 20 In the
exceptional cases accepted, however. there is a justification for
the omission of the right to a previous hearing, to wit,
the immediacy of the problem sought to be corrected and
the urgency of the need to correct it.
In the case before us, there was no such pressure of time or
action calling for the petitioner's peremptory treatment. The
properties involved were not even inimical per se as to require
their instant destruction. There certainly was no reason why the
offense prohibited by the executive order should not have been
proved first in a court of justice, with the accused being
accorded all the rights safeguarded to him under the
Constitution. Considering that, as we held in Pesigan v.
Angeles, 21 Executive Order No. 626-A is penal in nature, the
violation thereof should have been pronounced not by the
police only but by a court of justice, which alone would have
had the authority to impose the prescribed penalty, and only
after trial and conviction of the accused.
We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the
disposition of the confiscated property as prescribed in the
questioned executive order. It is there authorized that the
seized property shall "be distributed to charitable institutions
and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National
Meat Inspection Commissionmay see fit, in the case of
carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the
Director of Animal Industrymay see fit, in the case of
carabaos." (Emphasis supplied.) The phrase "may see fit" is an
extremely generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is.
It is laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse,
and even corruption. One searches in vain for the usual
standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the
limitations that the said officers must observe when they make
their distribution. There is none. Their options are apparently
boundless. Who shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of their
generosity and by what criteria shall they be chosen? Only the
officers named can supply the answer, they and they alone
may choose the grantee as they see fit, and in their own
exclusive discretion. Definitely, there is here a "roving
commission," a wide and sweeping authority that is not
"canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing," in short,
a clearly profligate and therefore invalid delegation of
legislative powers.
To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an
invalid exercise of the police power because the method
employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably
necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly
oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the
property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his
defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The
conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to
adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear
encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the
doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an
invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers
mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the
distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. For these
reasons, we hereby declare Executive Order No. 626-A
unconstitutional.
We agree with the respondent court, however, that the police
station commander who confiscated the petitioner's carabaos
is not liable in damages for enforcing the executive order in
accordance with its mandate. The law was at that time
presumptively valid, and it was his obligation, as a member of
the police, to enforce it. It would have been impertinent of him,
being a mere subordinate of the President, to declare the
executive order unconstitutional and, on his own responsibility
alone, refuse to execute it. Even the trial court, in fact, and the
Court of Appeals itself did not feel they had the competence,

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for all their superior authority, to question the order we now

annul.
The Court notes that if the petitioner had not seen fit to assert
and protect his rights as he saw them, this case would never
have reached us and the taking of his property under the
challenged measure would have become afait accompli despite
its invalidity. We commend him for his spirit. Without the
present challenge, the matter would have ended in that pump
boat in Masbate and another violation of the Constitution, for
all its obviousness, would have been perpetrated, allowed
without protest, and soon forgotten in the limbo of relinquished
rights.
The strength of democracy lies not in the rights it guarantees
but in the courage of the people to invoke them whenever they
are ignored or violated. Rights are but weapons on the wall if,
like expensive tapestry, all they do is embellish and impress.
Rights, as weapons, must be a promise of protection. They
become truly meaningful, and fulfill the role assigned to them
in the free society, if they are kept bright and sharp with use by
those who are not afraid to assert them.
WHEREFORE, Executive Order No. 626-A is hereby declared
unconstitutional. Except as affirmed above, the decision of the
Court of Appeals is reversed. The supersedeas bond is
cancelled and the amount thereof is ordered restored to the
petitioner. No costs.
3. POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN
(A)
G.R. No. L-119694 May 22, 1995
PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE, INC., for and in behalf of
139 members, represented by its President, Amado P.
Macasaet and its Executive Director Ermin F. Garcia,
Jr., petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
FACTS:
The Philippine Press Institute, Inc. ("PPI") is before this Court
assailing the constitutional validity of Resolution No. 2772
issued by respondent Commission on Elections ("Comelec") and
its corresponding Comelec directive dated 22 March 1995,
through a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition. Petitioner PPI is
a non-stock, non-profit organization of newspaper and
magazine publishers.
In this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for the
issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order, PPI asks us to
declare Comelec Resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional and void
on the ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by the
Constitution upon the government, and any of its agencies,
against the taking of private property for public use without just
compensation. Petitioner also contends that the 22 March 1995
letter directives of Comelec requiring publishers to give free
"Comelec Space" and at the same time process raw data to
make it camera-ready, constitute impositions of involuntary
servitude, contrary to the provisions of Section 18 (2), Article III
of the 1987 Constitution. Finally, PPI argues that Section 8 of
Comelec Resolution No. 2772 is violative of the constitutionally
guaranteed freedom of speech, of the press and of
expression. 1
On 20 April 1995, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining
Order enjoining Comelec from enforcing and implementing
Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772, as well as the Comelec
directives addressed to various print media enterprises all
dated 22 March 1995. The Court also required the respondent
to file a Comment on the Petition.

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The Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment on behalf

of respondent Comelec alleging that Comelec Resolution No.
2772 does not impose upon the publishers any obligation to
provide free print space in the newspapers as it
does not provide any criminal or administrative sanction for
non-compliance with that Resolution. According to the Solicitor
General, the questioned Resolution merely established
guidelines to be followed in connection with the procurement of
"Comelec space," the procedure for and mode of allocation of
such space to candidates and the conditions or requirements
for the candidate's utilization of the "Comelec space" procured.
At the same time, however, the Solicitor General argues
that even if the questioned Resolution and its implementing
letter directives are viewed as mandatory, the same would
nevertheless be valid as an exercise of the police power of the
State. The Solicitor General also maintains that Section 8 of
Resolution No. 2772 is a permissible exercise of the power of
supervision or regulation of the Comelec over the
communication and information operations of print media
enterprises during the election period to safeguard and ensure
a fair, impartial and credible election. 2
At the oral hearing of this case held on 28 April 1995,
respondent Comelec through its Chairman, Hon. Bernardo
Pardo, in response to inquiries from the Chief Justice and other
Members of the Court, stated that Resolution No. 2772,
particularly Section 2 thereof and the 22 March 1995 letters
dispatched
to
various
members
of
petitioner
PPI,
were not intended to compel those members to supply
Comelec with free print space. Chairman Pardo represented to
the Court that Resolution and the related letter-directives were
merely designed to solicit from the publishers the same free
print space which many publishers had voluntarily given to
Comelec during the election period relating to the 11 May 1992
elections. Indeed, the Chairman stated that the Comelec would,
that very afternoon, meet and adopt an appropriate amending
or clarifying resolution, a certified true copy of which would
forthwith be filed with the Court.
On 5 May 1995, the Court received from the Office of the
Solicitor General a manifestation which attached a copy of
Comelec Resolution No. 2772-A dated 4 May 1995. The
operative portion of this Resolution follows:
NOW THEREFORE, pursuant to the powers vested in it by the
Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, Republic Acts No.
6646 and 7166 and other election laws, the Commission on
Elections RESOLVED to clarify Sections 2 and 8 of Res. No. 2772
as follows:
1. Section 2 of Res. No. 2772 shall not be construed to mean as
requiring publishers of the different mass media print
publications to provide print space under pain of prosecution,
whether administrative, civil or criminal, there being no
sanction or penalty for violation of said Section provided for
either in said Resolution or in Section 90 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code, on
the grant of "Comelec space."
2. Section 8 of Res. No. 2772 shall not be construed to mean as
constituting prior restraint on the part of publishers with
respect to the printing or publication of materials in the news,
opinion, features or other sections of their respective
publications or other accounts or comments, it being clear from
the last sentence of said Section 8 that the Commission shall,
"unless the facts and circumstances clearly indicate otherwise .
. .respect the determination by the publisher and/or editors of
the newspapers or publications that the accounts or views
published are significant, newsworthy and of public interest."
This Resolution shall take effect upon approval. (Emphasis in
the original)

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While, at this point, the Court could perhaps simply dismiss the
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition as having become moot
and academic, we consider it not inappropriate to pass upon
the first constitutional issue raised in this case. Our hope is to
put this issue to rest and prevent its resurrection.
Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is not a model of clarity in
expression. Section 1 of Resolution No. 2772-A did not try to
redraft Section 2; accordingly, Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772
persists in its original form. Thus, we must point out that, as
presently worded, and in particular as interpreted and applied
by the Comelec itself in its 22 March 1995 letter-directives to
newspaper publishers, Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is
clearly susceptible of the reading that petitioner PPI has given
it. That Resolution No. 2772 does not, in express terms,
threaten publishers who would disregard it or its implementing
letters with some criminal or other sanction, does not by itself
demonstrate that the Comelec's original intention was simply
to solicit or request voluntary donations of print space from
publishers. A written communication officially directing a print
media company to supply free print space, dispatched by a
government (here a constitutional) agency and signed by a
member of the Commission presumably legally authorized to
do so, is bound to produce a coercive effect upon the company
so addressed. That the agency may not be legally authorized to
impose, or cause the imposition of, criminal or other sanctions
for disregard of such directions, only aggravates the
constitutional difficulties inhearing in the present situation. The
enactment or addition of such sanctions by the legislative
authority itself would be open to serious constitutional
objection.
To compel print media companies to donate "Comelec-space"
of the dimensions specified in Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772
(not less than one-half page), amounts to "taking" of private
personal property for public use or purposes. Section 2 failed to
specify the intended frequency of such compulsory "donation:"
only once during the period from 6 March 1995 (or 21 March
1995) until 12 May 1995? or everyday or once a week? or as
often as Comelec may direct during the same period? The
extent of the taking or deprivation is not insubstantial; this is
not a case of a de minimis temporary limitation or restraint
upon the use of private property. The monetary value of the
compulsory "donation," measured by the advertising rates
ordinarily charged by newspaper publishers whether in cities or
in non-urban areas, may be very substantial indeed.
The taking of print space here sought to be effected may first
be appraised under the rubric of expropriation of private
personal property for public use. The threshold requisites for a
lawful taking of private property for public use need to be
examined here: one is the necessity for the taking; another is
the legal authority to effect the taking. The element of
necessity for the taking has not been shown by respondent
Comelec. It has not been suggested that the members of PPI
are unwilling to sell print space at their normal rates to
Comelec for election purposes. Indeed, the unwillingness or
reluctance of Comelec to buy print space lies at the heart of
the problem. 3Similarly, it has not been suggested, let alone
demonstrated, that Comelec has been granted the power of
eminent domain either by the Constitution or by the legislative
authority. A reasonable relationship between that power and
the enforcement and administration of election laws by
Comelec must be shown; it is not casually to be assumed.
That the taking is designed to subserve "public use" is not
contested by petitioner PPI. We note only that, under Section 3
of Resolution No. 2772, the free "Comelec space" sought by the
respondent Commission would be used not only for informing
the public about the identities, qualifications and programs of
government of candidates for elective office but also for
"dissemination of vital election information" (including,
presumably, circulars, regulations, notices, directives, etc.
issued by Comelec). It seems to the Court a matter of judicial
notice that government offices and agencies (including the

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Supreme Court) simply purchase print space, in the ordinary

course of events, when their rules and regulations, circulars,
notices and so forth need officially to be brought to the
attention of the general public.
The taking of private property for public use is, of course,
authorized by the Constitution, but not without payment of
"just compensation" (Article III, Section 9). And apparently the
necessity of paying compensation for "Comelec space" is
precisely what is sought to be avoided by respondent
Commission, whether Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is read
as petitioner PPI reads it, as an assertion of authority to require
newspaper publishers to "donate" free print space for Comelec
purposes, or as an exhortation, or perhaps an appeal, to
publishers to donate free print space, as Section 1 of Resolution
No. 2772-A attempts to suggest. There is nothing at all to
prevent newspaper and magazine publishers from voluntarily
giving free print space to Comelec for the purposes
contemplated in Resolution No. 2772. Section 2 of Resolution
No. 2772 does not, however, provide a constitutional basis for
compelling publishers, against their will, in the kind of factual
context here present, to provide free print space for Comelec
purposes. Section 2 does not constitute a valid exercise of the
power of eminent domain.
We would note that the ruling here laid down by the Court is
entirely in line with the theory of democratic representative
government. The economic costs of informing the general
public about the qualifications and programs of those seeking
elective office are most appropriately distributed as widely as
possible throughout our society by the utilization of public
funds, especially funds raised by taxation, rather than cast
solely on one small sector of society, i.e., print media
enterprises. The benefits which flow from a heightened level of
information on and the awareness of the electoral process are
commonly thought to be community-wide; the burdens should
be allocated on the same basis.
As earlier noted, the Solicitor General also contended that
Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772, even if read as compelling
publishers to "donate" "Comelec space, " may be sustained as
a valid exercise of the police power of the state. This argument
was, however, made too casually to require prolonged
consideration on our part. Firstly, there was no effort (and
apparently no inclination on the part of Comelec) to show that
the police power essentially a power of legislation has
been
constitutionally
delegated
to
respondent
Commission. 4 Secondly, while private property may indeed be
validly taken in the legitimate exercise of the police power of
the state, there was no attempt to show compliance in the
instant case with the requisites of a lawful taking under the
police power. 5
Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is a blunt and heavy
instrument that purports, without a showing of existence of a
national emergency or other imperious public necessity,
indiscriminately and without regard to the individual business
condition of particular newspapers or magazines located in
differing parts of the country, to take private property of
newspaper or magazine publishers. No attempt was made to
demonstrate that a real and palpable or urgent necessity for
the taking of print space confronted the Comelec and that
Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 was itself the only reasonable
and calibrated response to such necessity available to the
Comelec. Section 2 does not constitute a valid exercise of the
police power of the State.
We turn to Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772, which needs to be
quoted in full again:
Sec. 8. Undue Reference to Candidates/Political Parties in
Newspapers. No newspaper or publication shall allow to be
printed or published in the news, opinion, features, or other
sections of the newspaper or publication accounts or comments
which manifestly favor or oppose any candidate or political

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party by unduly or repeatedly referring to or including therein

said candidate or political party. However, unless the facts and
circumstances clearly indicate otherwise, the Commission will
respect the determination by the publisher and/or editors of the
newspapers or publications that the accounts or views
published are significant, newsworthy and of public interest.
It is not easy to understand why Section 8 was included at all in
Resolution No. 2772. In any case, Section 8 should be viewed in
the context of our decision in National Press Club v.
Commission on Elections. 6 There the Court sustained the
constitutionality of Section 11 (b) of R.A. No. 6646, known as
the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which prohibits the sale or
donation of print space and airtime for campaign or other
political purposes, except to the Comelec. In doing so, the
Court
carefully
distinguished
(a) paid
political
advertisements which are reached by the prohibition of Section
11 (b), from (b) the reporting of news, commentaries and
expressions of belief or opinion by reporters, broadcasters,
editors, commentators or columnists whichfall outside the
scope of Section 11 (b) and which are protected by the
constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of the
press:
Secondly, and more importantly, Section 11 (b) is limited in its
scope of application. Analysis ofSection 11 (b) shows that
it purports to apply only to the purchase and sale, including
purchase and sale disguised as a donation, of print space and
air time for campaign or other political purposes.Section 11 (b)
does not purport in any way to restrict the reporting by
newspapers or radio ortelevision stations of news or newsworthy events relating to candidates, their qualifications,
political
parties
and
programs
of
government.
Moreover, Section 11 (b) does not reach commentaries and
expressions of belief or opinion by reporters or broadcaster or
editors or commentators or columnists in respect of
candidates, their qualifications, and programs and so forth, so
long at least as such comments, opinions and beliefs are not in
fact advertisements for particular candidates covertly paid for.
In sum, Section 11 (b) is not to be read as reaching any report
or commentary or other coverage that, in responsible media, is
not paid for by candidates for political office. We read Section
11 (b) as designed to cover only paid political advertisements
of particular candidates.
The above limitation in scope of application of Section 11 (b)
that it does not restrict either the reporting of or the expression
of belief or opinion or comment upon the qualifications and
programs and activities of any and all candidates for office
constitutes the critical distinction which must be made between
the instant case and that of Sanidad v. Commission on
Elections. . . . 7 (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied)
Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772 appears to represent the effort
of the Comelec to establish a guideline for implementation of
the above-quoted distinction and doctrine in National Press
Club an effort not blessed with evident success. Section 2 of
Resolution No. 2772-A while possibly helpful, does not add
substantially to the utility of Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772.
The distinction between paid political advertisements on the
one hand and news reports, commentaries and expressions of
belief or opinion by reporters, broadcasters, editors, etc. on the
other hand, can realistically be given operative meaning only in
actual cases or controversies, on a case-to-case basis, in terms
of very specific sets of facts.
At all events, the Court is bound to note that PPI has failed to
allege any specific affirmative action on the part of Comelec
designed to enforce or implement Section 8. PPI has not
claimed that it or any of its members has sustained actual or
imminent injury by reason of Comelec action under Section 8.
Put a little differently, the Court considers that the precise
constitutional issue here sought to be raised whether or not
Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772 constitutes a permissible

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exercise of the Comelec's power under Article IX, Section 4 of

the Constitution to
supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all
franchise or permits for the operation of media of
communication or information [for the purpose of ensuring]
equal opportunity, time and space, and the right of reply,
including reasonable, equal rates therefore, for public
information campaigns and forums among candidates in
connection with the objective of holding free, orderly honest,
peaceful and credible elections
is not ripe for judicial review for lack of an actual case or
controversy involving, as the very lis mota thereof, the
constitutionality of Section 8.
Summarizing our conclusions:
1. Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772, in its present form and as
interpreted by Comelec in its 22 March 1995 letter directives,
purports to require print media enterprises to "donate" free
print space to Comelec. As such, Section 2 suffers from a fatal
constitutional vice and must be set aside and nullified.
2. To the extent it pertains to Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772,
the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition must be dismissed for
lack of an actual, justiciable case or controversy.
WHEREFORE,
for
all
the
foregoing,
the
Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition is GRANTED in part and Section 2
of Resolution No. 2772 in its present form and the related
letter-directives dated 22 March 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE as
null and void, and the Temporary Restraining Order is hereby
MADE PERMANENT. The Petition is DISMISSED in part, to the
extent it relates to Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772.
B)
Telecommunications And Broadcast Attorneys Of The
Phils. Vs. COMELEC
289 SCRA 337
G.R. No. 132922
April 21, 1998
Facts: Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys
of the Philippines, Inc. (TELEBAP) is an organization of lawyers
of radio and television broadcasting companies. It was declared
to be without legal standing to sue in this case as, among other
reasons, it was not able to show that it was to suffer from
actual or threatened injury as a result of the subject law.
Petitioner GMA Network, on the other hand, had the requisite
standing to bring the constitutional challenge. Petitioner
operates radio and television broadcast stations in
the Philippinesaffected by the enforcement of Section 92, B.P.
No. 881.
Petitioners challenge the validity of Section 92, B.P. No. 881
which provides:
Comelec Time- The Commission shall procure radio and
television time to be known as the Comelec Time which shall
be allocated equally and impartially among the candidates
within the area of coverage of all radio and television stations.
For this purpose, the franchise of all radio broadcasting and
television stations are hereby amended so as to provide radio
or television time, free of charge, during the period of
campaign.
Petitioner contends that while Section 90 of the same law
requires COMELEC to procure print space in newspapers and
magazines with payment, Section 92 provides that air time
shall be procured by COMELEC free of charge. Thus it contends
that Section 92 singles out radio and television stations to
provide free air time.

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Petitioner claims that it suffered losses running to several

million pesos in providing COMELEC Time in connection with
the 1992 presidential election and 1995 senatorial election and
that it stands to suffer even more should it be required to do so
again this year. Petitioners claim that the primary source of
revenue of the radio and television stations is the sale of air
time to advertisers and to require these stations to provide free
air time is to authorize unjust taking of private property.
According to petitioners, in 1992 it lost P22,498,560.00 in
providing free air time for one hour each day and, in this years
elections, it stands to lost P58,980,850.00 in view of
COMELECs requirement that it provide at least 30 minutes of
prime time daily for such.

FACTS:

Issue:

Sangguniang Panlalawigan disapproved said Resolution and

returned it with the comment that expropriation is
unnecessary considering that there are still available lots in
Bunawan for the establishment of the government center.

Whether of not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 denies radio and

television broadcast companies the equal protection of the
laws.
Whether or not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 constitutes taking of
property without due process of law and without just
compensation.
Held:
Petitioners argument is without merit. All broadcasting,
whether radio or by television stations, is licensed by the
government. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as there
are more individuals who want to broadcast that there are
frequencies to assign. Radio and television broadcasting
companies, which are given franchises, do not own the
airwaves and frequencies through which they transmit
broadcast signals and images. They are merely given the
temporary privilege to use them. Thus, such exercise of the
privilege may reasonably be burdened with the performance by
the grantee of some form of public service. In granting the
privilege to operate broadcast stations and supervising radio
and television stations, the state spends considerable public
funds in licensing and supervising them.
The argument that the subject law singles out radio and
television stations to provide free air time as against
newspapers and magazines which require payment of just
compensation for the print space they may provide is likewise
without merit. Regulation of the broadcast industry requires
spending of public funds which it does not do in the case of
print media. To require the broadcast industry to provide free
air time for COMELEC is a fair exchange for what the industry
gets.
As radio and television broadcast stations do not own the
airwaves, no private property is taken by the requirement that
they provide air time to the COMELEC.
(C)
G.R. No. 107916 February 20, 1997
PERCIVAL MODAY, ZOTICO MODAY (deceased) and
LEONORA
MODAY, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE EVANGELINE S. YUIPCO OF
BRANCH 6, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, AGUSAN DEL SUR
AND MUNICIPALITY OF BUNAWAN, respondents.
The main issue presented in this case is whether a
municipality may expropriate private property by virtue of a
municipal resolution which was disapproved by the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Petitioner seeks the reversal of the
Court of Appeals decision and resolution, promulgated on July
15, 1992 and October 22, 1992 respectively, 1and a declaration
that Municipal Resolution No. 43-89 of the Bunawan
Sangguniang Bayan is null and void.

On July 23, 1989, the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality

of Bunawan in Agusan del Sur passed Resolution No. 43-89,
Authorizing the Municipal Mayor to Initiate the Petition for
Expropriation of a One (1) Hectare Portion of Lot No. 6138-Pls-4
Along the National Highway Owned by Percival Moday for the
Site of Bunawan Farmers Center and Other Government Sports
Facilities.
In due time, Resolution No. 43-89 was approved by then
Municipal Mayor Anuncio C. Bustillo and transmitted to the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan for its approval

The Municipality of Bunawan, herein public respondent,

subsequently filed a Petition for Eminent Domain against
petitioner Percival Moday before the RTC
, public respondent municipality filed a Motion to Take or
Enter Upon the Possession of Subject Matter of This Case
stating that it had already deposited with the municipal
treasurer the necessary amount in accordance with Section 2,
Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court and that it would be in
the governments best interest for public respondent to be
allowed to take possession of the property
the Regional Trial Court granted respondent municipalitys
motion to take possession of the land
o that the Sangguniang Panlalawigans failure to declare the
resolution
invalid
leaves
it
effective.
o that the duty of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is merely to
review the ordinances and resolutions passed by the
Sangguniang
Bayan
under
the
old
LGC
o that the exercise of eminent domain is not one of the two
acts enumerated in Section 19 thereof requiring the approval of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
CA upheld the trial court. Meanwhile, the Municipality of
Bunawan had erected three buildings on the subject property.
ISSUE: whether a municipality may expropriate private property
by virtue of a municipal resolution which was disapproved by
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
HELD:
YES.
Eminent domain, the power which the Municipality of Bunawan
exercised in the instant case, is a fundamental State power that
is inseparable from sovereignty. It is governments right to
appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory sale to the State,
private property for public use or purpose. Inherently
possessed by the national legislature the power of eminent
domain may be validly delegated to local governments, other
public entities and public utilities. For the taking of private
property by the government to be valid, the taking must be for
public use and there must be just compensation
The Municipality of Bunawans power to exercise the right of
eminent domain is not disputed as it is expressly provided for
in Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, the Local Government Code 18 in
force at the time expropriation proceedings were initiated.
Section
9
of
said
law
states:
Section 9.Eminent Domain. A local government unit may,
through its head and acting pursuant to a resolution of its
sanggunian, exercise the right of eminent domain and institute
condemnation proceedings for public use or purpose.

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POLITICAL LAW; LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE (B.P. 337); POWER

OF
THE
SANGGUNIANG
PANLALAWIGAN
TO
REVIEW
ORDINANCES,
RESOLUTIONS
AND
EXECUTIVE
ORDERS
PROMULGATED BY THE MUNICIPAL MAYOR; DECLARATION OF
INVALIDITY MUST BE ON THE SOLE GROUND THAT IT IS BEYOND
THE POWER OF THE SANGGUNIAN BAYAN OR MAYOR TO ISSUE
THE RESOLUTION, ORDINANCE OR ORDER UNDER REVIEW.
The Sangguniang Panlalawigans disapproval of Municipal
Resolution No. 43-89 is an infirm action which does not render
said resolution null and void. The law, as expressed in Section
153 of B.P. BLG. 337, grants the Sangguniang Panlalawigan the
power to declare a municipal resolution invalid on the sole
ground that it is beyond the power of the Sangguniang Bayan
or the Mayor to issue. Although pertaining to a similar provision
of law but different factual milieu then obtaining, the Courts
pronouncements in Velazco vs. Blas, where we cited significant
early jurisprudence, are applicable to the case at bar. The only
ground upon which a provincial board may declare any
municipal resolution, ordinance, or order invalid is when such
resolution, ordinance, or order is beyond the powers conferred
upon the council or president making the same. Absolutely no
other ground is recognized by the law. A strictly legal question
is before the provincial board in its consideration of a municipal
resolution, ordinance, or order. The provincial (boards)
disapproval of any resolution, ordinance, or order must be
premised specifically upon the fact that such resolution,
ordinance, or order is outside the scope of the legal powers
conferred by law. If a provincial board passes these limits, it
usurps the legislative functions of the municipal council or
president. Such has been the consistent course of executive
authority. Thus, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was without
the authority to disapprove Municipal Resolution No. 43-89 for
the Municipality of Bunawan clearly has the power to exercise
the right of eminent domain and its Sangguniang Bayan the
capacity to promulgate said resolution, pursuant to the earlierquoted Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337. Perforce, it follows that
Resolution No. 43-89 is valid and binding and could be used as
lawful authority to petition for the condemnation of petitioners
property.
(D)
Municipality of Paranaque v VM Realty G.R. No. 127820.
July 20, 1998
J. Panganiban
Petition for review on certiorari
Facts:
Under a city council resolution, the Municipality of Paraaque
filed on September 20, 1993, a Complaint for expropriation
against Private Respondent V.M. Realty Corporation over two
parcels of land of 10,000 square meters. The city previously
negotiated for the sale of the property but VM didnt accept.
The trial court issued an Order dated February 4, 1994,
authorizing petitioner to take possession of the subject
property upon deposit with its clerk of court of an amount
equivalent to 15 percent of its fair market value based on its
current tax declaration.
According to the respondent, the complaint failed to state a
cause of action because it was filed pursuant to a resolution
and not to an ordinance as required by RA 7160 (the Local
Government Code); and (b) the cause of action, if any, was
barred by a prior judgment or res judicata. Petitioner claimed
that res judicata was not applicable.
The trial court dismissed the case. The petitioners MFR was
denied. The CA affirmed.
Issues:

H A N A

B E E

1. WON a resolution duly approved by the municipal council has

the same force and effect of an ordinance and will not deprive
an expropriation case of a valid cause of action. NO
2. WON the principle of res judicata as a ground for dismissal of
case is not applicable when public interest is primarily involved.
YES

Held:
1. Petitioner contends that a resolution approved by the
municipal council for the purpose of initiating an expropriation
case substantially complies with the requirements of the law
because the terms ordinance and resolution are
synonymous for the purpose of bestowing authority [on] the
local government unit through its chief executive to initiate the
expropriation proceedings in court in the exercise of the power
of eminent domain.
To strengthen this point, the petitioner cited Article 36, Rule VI
of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code, which provides: If the LGU fails to acquire
a private property for public use, purpose, or welfare through
purchase, the LGU may expropriate said property through a
resolution of the Sanggunian authorizing its chief executive to
initiate expropriation proceedings.
Court-No. The power of eminent domain is lodged in the
legislative branch of government, which may delegate the
exercise thereof to LGUs, other public entities and public
utilities. An LGU may therefore exercise the power to
expropriate private property only when authorized by Congress
and subject to the latters control and restraints, imposed
through the law conferring the power or in other legislations.
Sec 19, RA 7160
A local government unit may, through its chief executive and
acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent
domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of
the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation,
pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent
laws.
Thus, the following essential requisites must concur before an
LGU can exercise the power of eminent domain:
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council
authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the LGU, to
exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation
proceedings over a particular private property.
2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use,
purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the
landless.
3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under
Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and other pertinent
laws.
4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the
owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer
was not accepted.
In the case at bar, the local chief executive sought to exercise
the power of eminent domain pursuant to a resolution of the
municipal council. Thus, there was no compliance with the first
requisite that the mayor be authorized through an ordinance.
We are not convinced by petitioners insistence that the terms
resolution and ordinance are synonymous. A municipal
ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law,

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but a resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or

opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. An ordinance
possesses a general and permanent character, but a resolution
is temporary in nature.
If Congress intended to allow LGUs to exercise eminent domain
through a mere resolution, it would have simply adopted the
language of the previous Local Government Code. But
Congress did not. In a clear divergence from the previous Local
Government Code, Section 19 of RA 7160 categorically requires
that the local chief executive act pursuant to an ordinance.
Moreover, the power of eminent domain necessarily involves a
derogation of a fundamental or private right of the people.[35]
Accordingly, the manifest change in the legislative language -from resolution under BP 337 to ordinance under RA 7160 -demands a strict construction.
When the legislature interferes with that right and, for greater
public purposes, appropriates the land of an individual without
his consent, the plain meaning of the law should not be
enlarged by doubtful interpretation.
Petitioner relies on Article 36, Rule VI of the Implementing
Rules, which requires only a resolution to authorize an LGU to
exercise eminent domain. It is axiomatic that the clear letter of
the law is controlling and cannot be amended by a mere
administrative rule issued for its implementation.

H A N A

B E E

Appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of

Pampanga in its Civil Case No. 1623, an expropriation
proceeding.
Plaintiff-appellant, the Republic of the Philippines, (hereinafter
referred to as the Republic) filed, on June 26, 1959, a complaint
for eminent domain against defendant-appellee, Carmen M.
Vda. de Castellvi, judicial administratrix of the estate of the late
Alfonso de Castellvi (hereinafter referred to as Castellvi), over a
parcel of land situated in the barrio of San Jose, Floridablanca,
Pampanga.
FACTS:
In 1947, the republic, through the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP), entered into a lease agreement over a land in
Pampanga with Castellvi on a year-to-year basis. When
Castellvi gave notice to terminate the lease in 1956, the AFP
refused because of the permanent installations and other
facilities worth almost P500,000.00 that were erected and
already established on the property. She then instituted an
ejectment proceeding against the AFP. In 1959, however, the
republic commenced the expropriation proceedings for the land
in question.
Issue: Whether or not the compensation should be determined
as of 1947 or 1959.
Ruling:

Strictly speaking, the power of eminent domain delegated to an

LGU is in reality not eminent but inferior domain, since it
must conform to the limits imposed by the delegation, and thus
partakes only of a share in eminent domain.
2. As correctly found by the Court of Appeals and the trial
court, all the requisites for the application of res judicata are
present in this case. There is a previous final judgment on the
merits in a prior expropriation case involving identical interests,
subject matter and cause of action, which has been rendered
by a court having jurisdiction over it.
Be that as it may, the Court holds that the principle of res
judicata, which finds application in generally all cases and
proceedings, cannot bar the right of the State or its agent to
expropriate private property.
Eminent Domain can reach every form of property which the
State might need for public use whenever they need it.
While the principle of res judicata does not denigrate the right
of the State to exercise eminent domain, it does apply to
specific issues decided in a previous case.
In Republic vs De Knecht, the Court ruled that the power of the
State or its agent to exercise eminent domain is not diminished
by the mere fact that a prior final judgment over the property
to be expropriated has become the law of the case as to the
parties. The State or its authorized agent may still
subsequently exercise its right to expropriate the same
property, once all legal requirements are complied with.
(E)
G.R. No. L-20620 August 15, 1974
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
CARMEN M. VDA. DE CASTELLVI, ET AL., defendantsappellees.
ZALDIVAR, J.:p

The Supreme Court ruled that the taking should not be

reckoned as of 1947, and that just compensation should not be
determined on the basis of the value of the property that year .
The requisites for taking are:
1. The expropriator must enter a private property;
2. The entry must be for more than a momentary period;
3. It must be under warrant or color of authorities;
4. The property must be devoted for public use or otherwise
informally appropriated or injuriously affected; and
5. The utilization of the property for public use must be such a
way as to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial
enjoyment of the property.
Only requisites 1, 3 and 4 are present. It is clear, therefore, that
the taking of Castellvis property for purposes of eminent
domain cannot be considered to have taken place in 1947
when the republic commenced to occupy the property as
lessee thereof.
Requisite number 2 is not present according to the Supreme
Court, momentary when applied to possession or occupancy
of real property should be construed to mean a limited period
-- not indefinite or permanent. The aforecited lease contract
was for a period of one year, renewable from year to year. The
entry on the property, under the lease, is temporary, and
considered transitory. The fact that the Republic, through AFP,
constructed some installations of a permanent nature does not
alter the fact that the entry into the lant was transitory, or
intended to last a year, although renewable from year to year
by consent of the owner of the land. By express provision of the
lease agreement the republic, as lessee, undertook to return
the premises in substantially the same condition as at the time
the property was first occupied by the AFP. It is claimed that the
intention of the lessee was to occupy the land permanently, as
may be inferred from the construction of permanent
improvements. But this intention cannot prevail over the
clear and express terms of the lease contract.

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The 5th requirement is also lacking. In the instant case the

entry of the Republic into the property and its utilization of the
same for public use did not oust Castellvi and deprive her of all
beneficial enjoyment of the property. Cstellvi remained as
owner, and was continuously recognized as owner by the
Republic, as shown by the renewal of the lease contract from
year to year, and by the provision in the lease contract
whereby the Republic undertook to return the property to
Castellvi when the lease was terminated. Neither was Castellvi
deprived of all the beneficial enjoyment of the property,
because the Republic was bound to pay, and had been paing,
Castellvi the agreed monthly rentals until the time when it filed
the complaint for eminent domain on June 26, 1959.
It is clear, therefore, that the taking of Castellvis property for
purposes of eminent domain cannot be considered to have
taken place in 1947 when the Republic commenced to occupy
the property as lessee thereof, and that the just compensation
to be paid for the Castellvis property should not be determined
on the basis of the value of the property as of that year. The
lower court did not commit an error when it held that the
taking of the property under expropriation commenced with
the filing of the complaint in this case.
Under Sec. 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, just
compensation is to be determined as of the date of the filing
of the complaint. The Supreme Court has ruled that when the
taking of the property sought to be expropriated coincides with
the commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes
place subsequent to the filing of the complaint for eminent
domain, the just compensation should be determined as of the
date of the filing of the complaint.
(F)
G.R. No. L-60077

January 18, 1991

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
SPS. MISERICORDIA GUTIERREZ and RICARDO MALIT and
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,respondents.
Pedro S. Dabu for private respondents.
IDIN, J.:

H A N A

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proceedings against the herein defendants on January 20,

1965.
Upon filing of the corresponding complaint, plaintiff corporation
deposited the amount of P973.00 with the Provincial Treasurer
of Pampanga, tendered to cover the provisional value of the
land of the defendant spouses Ricardo Malit and Misericordia
Gutierrez. And by virtue of which, the plaintiff corporation was
placed in possession of the property of the defendant spouses
so it could immediately proceed with the construction of its
Mexico-Limay 230 KV transmission line. In this connection, by
the trial court's order of September 30, 1965, the defendant
spouses were authorized to withdraw the fixed provisional
value of their land in the sum of P973.00.
The only controversy existing between the parties litigants is
the reasonableness and adequacy of the disturbance or
compensation fee of the expropriated properties.
Meanwhile, for the purpose of determining the fair and just
compensation due the defendants, the court appointed three
commissioners, comprised of one representative of the plaintiff,
one for the defendants and the other from the court, who then
were empowered to receive evidence, conduct ocular
inspection of the premises, and thereafter, prepare their
appraisals as to the fair and just compensation to be paid to
the owners of the lots. Hearings were consequently held before
said commissioners and during their hearings, the case of
defendant Heirs of Natalia Paule was amicably settled by virtue
of a Right of Way Grant (Exh. C) executed by Guadalupe
Sangalang for herself and in behalf of her co-heirs in favor of
the plaintiff corporation. The case against Matias Cruz was
earlier decided by the court, thereby leaving only the case
against the defendant spouses Ricardo Malit and Misericordia
Gutierrez still to be resolved. Accordingly, the commissioners
submitted their individual reports. The commissioner for the
plaintiff corporation recommended the following:
. . . that plaintiff be granted right of way easement over the
760 square meters of the defendants Malit and Gutierrez land
for plaintiff transmission line upon payment of an easement fee
of P1.00 therefor. . . . (Annex M)
The commissioner for the defendant spouses recommended
the following:

This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by the National

Power Corporation (NPC) seeking the reversal or modification of
the March 9, 1986 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R.
No. 54291-R entitled "National Power Corporation v. Sps.
Misericordia Gutierrez and Ricardo Malit", affirming the
December 4, 1972 Decision of the then Court of First Instance
of Pampanga, Fifth Judicial District, Branch II, in Civil Case No.
2709, entitledNational Power Corporation v. Matias Cruz, et al.

. . . that Mr. and Mrs. Ricardo Malit be paid as disturbance

compensation the amount of P10.00 sq. meter or the total
amount of P7,600.00' (Annex K)

The undisputed facts of the case, as found by the Court of

Appeals, are as follows:

The plaintiff corporation urged the Court that the assessment

as recommended by their commissioner be the one adopted.
Defendant spouses, however, dissented and objected to the
price recommended by both the representative of the court and
of the plaintiff corporation.

Plaintiff National Power Corporation, a government owned and

controlled entity, in accordance with Commonwealth Act No.
120, is invested with the power of eminent domain for the
purpose of pursuing its objectives, which among others is the
construction, operation, and maintenance of electric
transmission lines for distribution throughout the Philippines.
For the construction of its 230 KV Mexico-Limay transmission
lines, plaintiff's lines have to pass the lands belonging to
defendants Matias Cruz, Heirs of Natalia Paule and spouses
Misericordia Gutierrez and Ricardo Malit covered by tax
declarations Nos. 907, 4281 and 7582, respectively.
Plaintiff initiated negotiations for the acquisition of right of way
easements over the aforementioned lots for the construction of
its transmission lines but unsuccessful in this regard, said
corporation was constrained to file eminent domain

The Court's commissioner recommended the following:

. . . the payment of Five (P 5.OO) Pesos per square meter of the
area covered by the Right-of-way to be granted, . . .(Annex L)

With these reports submitted by the three commissioners and

on the evidence adduced by the defendants as well as the
plaintiff for the purpose of proving the fair market value of the
property sought to be expropriated, the lower court rendered a
decision the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, responsive to the foregoing considerations,
judgment is hereby rendered ordering plaintiff National Power
Corporation to pay defendant spouses Ricardo Malit and
Misericordia Gutierrez the sum of P10.00 per square meter as
the fair and reasonable compensation for the right-of-way
easement of the affected area, which is 760 squares, or a total

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sum of P7,600.00 and P800.00 as attorney's fees' (Record on

Appeal, p. 83)
Dissatisfied with the decision, the plaintiff corporation filed a
motion for reconsideration which was favorably acted upon by
the lower court, and in an order dated June 10, 1973, it
amended its previous decision in the following tenor:
On the basis of an ocular inspection made personally by the
undersigned, this court finally classified the land of the spouses
Ricardo Malit and Misericordia to be partly commercial and
partly agricultural, for which reason the amount of P10.00 per
sq. meter awarded in the decision of December 4,1972 is
hereby reduced to P5.00 per square meter as the fair and
reasonable market value of the 760 square meters belonging to
the said spouses.
There being no claim and evidence for attorney's fees, the
amount of P800.00 awarded as attorney's fees, in the decision
of December 4, 1972 is hereby reconsidered and set aside.
(Annex S)
Still not satisfied, an appeal was filed by petitioner (NPC) with
the Court of Appeals but respondent Court of Appeals in its
March 9, 1982, sustained the trial court, as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error committed by the
court a quo, the appealed judgment is hereby affirmed with
costs against the plaintiff-appellant.
Hence, the instant petition.
The First Division of this Court gave due course to the petition
and required both parties to submit their respective
memoranda (Resolution of January 12, 1983). It also noted in
an internal resolution of August 17, 1983 that petitioner flied its
memorandum while the respondents failed to file their
memorandum within the period which expired on February
24,1983; hence, the case was considered submitted for
decision.
The sole issue raised by petitioner is
WHETHER PETITIONER SHOULD BE MADE TO PAY SIMPLE
EASEMENT FEE OR FULL COMPENSATION FOR THE LAND
TRAVERSED BY ITS TRANSMISSION LINES.
It is the contention of petitioner that the Court of Appeals
committed gross error by adjudging the petitioner liable for the
payment of the full market value of the land traversed by its
transmission lines, and that it overlooks the undeniable fact
that a simple right-of-way easement (for the passage of
transmission lines) transmits no rights, except that of the
easement. Full ownership is retained by the private
respondents and they are not totally deprived of the use of the
land. They can continue planting the same agricultural crops,
except those that would result in contact with the wires. On this
premise, petitioner submits that if full market value is required,
then full transfer of ownership is only the logical equivalent.
The petition is devoid of merit. The resolution of this case
hinges on the determination of whether the acquisition of a
mere right-of-way is an exercise of the power of eminent
domain contemplated by law.1wphi1
The trial court's observation shared by the appellate court show
that ". . . While it is true that plaintiff are (sic) only after a rightof-way easement, it nevertheless perpetually deprives
defendants of their proprietary rights as manifested by the
imposition by the plaintiff upon defendants that below said
transmission lines no plant higher than three (3) meters is
allowed. Furthermore, because of the high-tension current
conveyed through said transmission lines, danger to life and
limbs that may be caused beneath said wires cannot altogether

H A N A

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be discounted, and to cap it all plaintiff only pays the fee to

defendants once, while the latter shall continually pay the
taxes due on said affected portion of their property."
The foregoing facts considered, the acquisition of the right-ofway easement falls within the purview of the power of eminent
domain. Such conclusion finds support in similar cases of
easement of right-of-way where the Supreme Court sustained
the award of just compensation for private property
condemned for public use (SeeNational Power Corporation vs.
Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 665, 1984; Garcia vs. Court of
Appeals, 102 SCRA 597,1981). The Supreme Court, in Republic
of the Philippines vs. PLDT, * thus held that:
Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the
taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of, the
expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why said
power may not be availed of to impose only a burden upon the
owner of condemned property, without loss of title and
possession. It is unquestionable that real property may,
through expropriation, be subjected to an easement of right-ofway.
In the case at bar, the easement of right-of-way is definitely a
taking under the power of eminent domain. Considering the
nature and effect of the installation of the 230 KV Mexico-Limay
transmission lines, the limitation imposed by NPC against the
use of the land for an indefinite period deprives private
respondents of its ordinary use.
For these reasons, the owner of the property expropriated is
entitled to a just compensation, which should be neither more
nor less, whenever it is possible to make the assessment, than
the money equivalent of said property. Just compensation has
always been understood to be the just and complete equivalent
of the loss which the owner of the thing expropriated has to
suffer by reason of the expropriation (Province of Tayabas vs.
Perez, 66 Phil. 467 [1938]; Assoc. of Small Land Owners of the
Phils., Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 78742;
Acuna vs. Arroyo, G.R. No. 79310; Pabrico vs. Juico, G.R. No.
79744; Manaay v. Juico, G.R. No. 79777,14 July 1989, 175 SCRA
343 [1989]). The price or value of the land and its character at
the time it was taken by the Government are the criteria for
determining just compensation (National Power Corp. v. Court
of Appeals, 129 SCRA 665, [1984]). The above price refers to
the market value of the land which may be the full market
value thereof. According to private respondents, the market
value of their lot is P50.00 per square meter because the said
lot is adjacent to the National and super highways of Gapan,
Nueva Ecija and Olongapo City.
Private respondents recognize the inherent power of eminent
domain being exercised by NPC when it finally consented to the
expropriation of the said portion of their land, subject however
to payment of just compensation. No matter how laudable
NPC's purpose is, for which expropriation was sought, it is just
and equitable that they be compensated the fair and full
equivalent for the loss sustained, which is the measure of the
indemnity, not whatever gain would accrue to the expropriating
entity (EPZA v. Dulay, 149 SCRA 305 [1987]; Mun. of Daet v.
Court of Appeals, 93 SCRA 503 (1979]).
It appearing that the trial court did not act capriciously and
arbitrarily in setting the price of P5.00 per square meter of the
affected property, the said award is proper and not
unreasonable.
On the issue of ownership being claimed by petitioner in the
event that the price of P5.00 per square meter be sustained, it
is well settled that an issue which has not been raised in the
Court a quo cannot be raised for the first time on appeal as it
would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and
due process . . . (Filipino Merchants v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 85141, November 8, 1989, 179 SCRA 638; Commissioner of

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Internal Revenue v. Procter and Gamble Philippines

Manufacturing
Corporation,
160
SCRA
560
[1988];
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Wander Philippines, Inc.,
160 SCRA 573 1988]). Petitioner only sought an easement of
right-of-way, and as earlier discussed, the power of eminent
domain may be exercised although title was not transferred to
the expropriator.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED.

(G)
G.R. No. L-18841

January 27, 1969

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE
COMPANY, defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz,
Assistant Solicitor General Antonio A. Torres and
Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason for plaintiff-appellant.
Ponce Enrile, Siguion Reyna, Montecillo and Belo for
defendant-appellant.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Direct appeals, upon a joint record on appeal, by both the
plaintiff and the defendant from the dismissal, after hearing, by
the Court of First Instance of Manila, in its Civil Case No. 35805,
of their respective complaint and counterclaims, but making
permanent a preliminary mandatory injunction theretofore
issued against the defendant on the interconnection of
telephone facilities owned and operated by said parties.
The plaintiff, Republic of the Philippines, is a political entity
exercising governmental powers through its branches and
instrumentalities,
one
of
which
is
the
Bureau
of
Telecommunications. That office was created on 1 July 1947,
under Executive Order No. 94, with the following powers and
duties, in addition to certain powers and duties formerly vested
in the Director of Posts: 1awphil.t
SEC. 79. The Bureau of Telecommunications shall exercise the
following powers and duties:
(a) To operate and maintain existing wire-telegraph and radiotelegraph offices, stations, and facilities, and those to be
established to restore the pre-war telecommunication service
under the Bureau of Posts, as well as such additional offices or
stations as may hereafter be established to provide
telecommunication service in places requiring such service;
(b) To investigate, consolidate, negotiate for, operate and
maintain wire-telephone or radio telephone communication
service throughout the Philippines by utilizing such existing
facilities in cities, towns, and provinces as may be found
feasible and under such terms and conditions or arrangements
with the present owners or operators thereof as may be agreed
upon to the satisfaction of all concerned;
(c) To prescribe, subject to approval by the Department Head,
equitable rates of charges for messages handled by the system
and/or for time calls and other services that may be rendered
by said system;

H A N A

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(d) To establish and maintain coastal stations to serve ships at

sea or aircrafts and, when public interest so requires, to engage
in the international telecommunication service in agreement
with other countries desiring to establish such service with the
Republic of the Philippines; and
(e) To abide by all existing rules and regulations prescribed by
the International Telecommunication Convention relative to the
accounting, disposition and exchange of messages handled in
the international service, and those that may hereafter be
promulgated by said convention and adhered to by the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines. 1
The defendant, Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company
(PLDT for short), is a public service corporation holding a
legislative franchise, Act 3426, as amended by Commonwealth
Act 407, to install, operate and maintain a telephone system
throughout the Philippines and to carry on the business of
electrical transmission of messages within the Philippines and
between the Philippines and the telephone systems of other
countries. 2 The RCA Communications, Inc., (which is not a party
to the present case but has contractual relations with the
parties) is an American corporation authorized to transact
business in the Philippines and is the grantee, by assignment,
of a legislative franchise to operate a domestic station for the
reception and transmission of long distance wireless messages
(Act 2178) and to operate broadcasting and radio-telephone
and radio-telegraphic communications services (Act 3180). 3
Sometime in 1933, the defendant, PLDT, and the RCA
Communications, Inc., entered into an agreement whereby
telephone messages, coming from the United States and
received by RCA's domestic station, could automatically be
transferred to the lines of PLDT; and vice-versa, for calls
collected by the PLDT for transmission from the Philippines to
the United States. The contracting parties agreed to divide the
tolls, as follows: 25% to PLDT and 75% to RCA. The sharing was
amended in 1941 to 30% for PLDT and 70% for RCA, and again
amended in 1947 to a 50-50 basis. The arrangement was later
extended to radio-telephone messages to and from European
and Asiatic countries. Their contract contained a stipulation
that either party could terminate it on a 24-month notice to the
other. 4 On 2 February 1956, PLDT gave notice to RCA to
terminate their contract on 2 February 1958. 5
Soon after its creation in 1947, the Bureau of
Telecommunications set up its own Government Telephone
System by utilizing its own appropriation and equipment and by
renting trunk lines of the PLDT to enable government offices to
call private parties. 6 Its application for the use of these trunk
lines was in the usual form of applications for telephone
service, containing a statement, above the signature of the
applicant, that the latter will abide by the rules and regulations
of the PLDT which are on file with the Public Service
Commission. 7 One of the many rules prohibits the public use of
the service furnished the telephone subscriber for his private
use. 8 The Bureau has extended its services to the general
public since 1948, 9 using the same trunk lines owned by, and
rented from, the PLDT, and prescribing its (the Bureau's) own
schedule of rates. 10 Through these trunk lines, a Government
Telephone System (GTS) subscriber could make a call to a PLDT
subscriber in the same way that the latter could make a call to
the former.
On 5 March 1958, the plaintiff, through the Director of
Telecommunications, entered into an agreement with RCA
Communications, Inc., for a joint overseas telephone service
whereby the Bureau would convey radio-telephone overseas
calls received by RCA's station to and from local
residents. 11 Actually, they inaugurated this joint operation on 2
February 1958, under a "provisional" agreement. 12
On 7 April 1958, the defendant Philippine Long Distance
Telephone Company, complained
to
the Bureau of
Telecommunications that said bureau was violating the

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conditions under which their Private Branch Exchange (PBX) is

inter-connected with the PLDT's facilities, referring to the
rented trunk lines, for the Bureau had used the trunk lines not
only for the use of government offices but even to serve private
persons or the general public, in competition with the business
of the PLDT; and gave notice that if said violations were not
stopped by midnight of 12 April 1958, the PLDT would sever
the telephone connections. 13 When the PLDT received no reply,
it disconnected the trunk lines being rented by the Bureau at
midnight on 12 April 1958. 14 The result was the isolation of the
Philippines, on telephone services, from the rest of the world,
except the United States. 15
At that time, the Bureau was maintaining 5,000 telephones
and
had
5,000
pending applications
for
telephone
connection. 16 The PLDT was also maintaining 60,000
telephones
and
had
also
20,000
pending
applications. 17Through the years, neither of them has been
able to fill up the demand for telephone service.
The Bureau of Telecommunications had proposed to the PLDT
on 8 January 1958 that both enter into an interconnecting
agreement, with the government paying (on a call basis) for all
calls passing through the interconnecting facilities from the
Government Telephone System to the PLDT. 18 The PLDT replied
that it was willing to enter into an agreement on overseas
telephone service to Europe and Asian countries provided that
the Bureau would submit to the jurisdiction and regulations of
the Public Service Commission and in consideration of 37 1/2%
of the gross revenues. 19 In its memorandum in lieu of oral
argument in this Court dated 9 February 1964, on page 8, the
defendant reduced its offer to 33 1/3 % (1/3) as its share in the
overseas telephone service. The proposals were not accepted
by either party.
On 12 April 1958, plaintiff Republic commenced suit against
the defendant, Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, in
the Court of First Instance of Manila (Civil Case No. 35805),
praying in its complaint for judgment commanding the PLDT to
execute a contract with plaintiff, through the Bureau, for the
use of the facilities of defendant's telephone system
throughout the Philippines under such terms and conditions as
the court might consider reasonable, and for a writ of
preliminary injunction against the defendant company to
restrain the severance of the existing telephone connections
and/or restore those severed.
Acting on the application of the plaintiff, and on the ground
that the severance of telephone connections by the defendant
company would isolate the Philippines from other countries, the
court a quo, on 14 April 1958, issued an order for the
defendant:
(1) to forthwith reconnect and restore the seventy-eight (78)
trunk lines that it has disconnected between the facilities of the
Government Telephone System, including its overseas
telephone services, and the facilities of defendant; (2) to refrain
from carrying into effect its threat to sever the existing
telephone
communication
between
the
Bureau
of
Telecommunications and defendant, and not to make
connection over its telephone system of telephone calls coming
to the Philippines from foreign countries through the said
Bureau's telephone facilities and the radio facilities of RCA
Communications, Inc.; and (3) to accept and connect through
its telephone system all such telephone calls coming to the
Philippines from foreign countries until further order of this
Court.
On 28 April 1958, the defendant company filed its answer,
with counterclaims.
It denied any obligation on its part to execute a contrary of
services with the Bureau of Telecommunications; contested the
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance to compel it to enter

H A N A

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into interconnecting agreements, and averred that it was

justified to disconnect the trunk lines heretofore leased to the
Bureau of Telecommunications under the existing agreement
because its facilities were being used in fraud of its rights. PLDT
further claimed that the Bureau was engaging in commercial
telephone operations in excess of authority, in competition
with, and to the prejudice of, the PLDT, using defendants own
telephone poles, without proper accounting of revenues.
After trial, the lower court rendered judgment that it could not
compel the PLDT to enter into an agreement with the Bureau
because the parties were not in agreement; that under
Executive
Order
94,
establishing
the
Bureau
of
Telecommunications, said Bureau was not limited to servicing
government offices alone, nor was there any in the contract of
lease of the trunk lines, since the PLDT knew, or ought to have
known, at the time that their use by the Bureau was to be
public throughout the Islands, hence the Bureau was neither
guilty of fraud, abuse, or misuse of the poles of the PLDT; and,
in view of serious public prejudice that would result from the
disconnection of the trunk lines, declared the preliminary
injunction permanent, although it dismissed both the complaint
and the counterclaims.
Both parties appealed.
Taking up first the appeal of the Republic, the latter complains
of the action of the trial court in dismissing the part of its
complaint seeking to compel the defendant to enter into an
interconnecting contract with it, because the parties could not
agree on the terms and conditions of the interconnection, and
of its refusal to fix the terms and conditions therefor.
We agree with the court below that parties can not be coerced
to enter into a contract where no agreement is had between
them as to the principal terms and conditions of the contract.
Freedom to stipulate such terms and conditions is of the
essence of our contractual system, and by express provision of
the statute, a contract may be annulled if tainted by violence,
intimidation, or undue influence (Articles 1306, 1336, 1337,
Civil Code of the Philippines). But the court a quo has
apparently overlooked that while the Republic may not compel
the PLDT to celebrate a contract with it, the Republic may, in
the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, require
the telephone company to permit interconnection of the
government telephone system and that of the PLDT, as the
needs of the government service may require, subject to the
payment of just compensation to be determined by the court.
Nominally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in
the taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of, the
expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why the
said power may not be availed of to impose only a burden upon
the owner of condemned property, without loss of title and
possession. It is unquestionable that real property may,
through expropriation, be subjected to an easement of right of
way. The use of the PLDT's lines and services to allow interservice connection between both telephone systems is not
much different. In either case private property is subjected to a
burden for public use and benefit. If, under section 6, Article
XIII, of the Constitution, the State may, in the interest of
national welfare, transfer utilities to public ownership upon
payment of just compensation, there is no reason why the
State may not require a public utility to render services in the
general interest, provided just compensation is paid therefor.
Ultimately, the beneficiary of the interconnecting service would
be the users of both telephone systems, so that the
condemnation would be for public use.
The Bureau of Telecommunications, under section 78 (b) of
Executive Order No. 94, may operate and maintain wire
telephone or radio telephone communications throughout the
Philippines by utilizing existing facilities in cities, towns, and
provinces under such terms and conditions or arrangement
with present owners or operators as may be agreed upon to the
satisfaction of all concerned; but there is nothing in this section

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that would exclude resort to condemnation proceedings where

unreasonable or unjust terms and conditions are exacted, to
the extent of crippling or seriously hampering the operations of
said Bureau.
A perusal of the complaint shows that the Republic's cause of
action is predicated upon the radio telephonic isolation of the
Bureau's facilities from the outside world if the severance of
interconnection were to be carried out by the PLDT, thereby
preventing the Bureau of Telecommunications from properly
discharging its functions, to the prejudice of the general public.
Save for the prayer to compel the PLDT to enter into a contract
(and the prayer is no essential part of the pleading), the
averments make out a case for compulsory rendering of interconnecting services by the telephone company upon such
terms and conditions as the court may determine to be just.
And since the lower court found that both parties "are
practically at one that defendant (PLDT) is entitled to
reasonable compensation from plaintiff for the reasonable use
of the former's telephone facilities" (Decision, Record on
Appeal, page 224), the lower court should have proceeded to
treat the case as one of condemnation of such services
independently of contract and proceeded to determine the just
and reasonable compensation for the same, instead of
dismissing the petition.
This view we have taken of the true nature of the Republic's
petition necessarily results in overruling the plea of defendantappellant PLDT that the court of first instance had no
jurisdiction to entertain the petition and that the proper forum
for the action was the Public Service Commission. That body,
under the law, has no authority to pass upon actions for the
taking of private property under the sovereign right of eminent
domain. Furthermore, while the defendant telephone company
is a public utility corporation whose franchise, equipment and
other properties are under the jurisdiction, supervision and
control of the Public Service Commission (Sec. 13, Public
Service Act), yet the plaintiff's telecommunications network is a
public service owned by the Republic and operated by an
instrumentality of the National Government, hence exempt,
under Section 14 of the Public Service Act, from such
jurisdiction, supervision and control. The Bureau of
Telecommunications was created in pursuance of a state policy
reorganizing the government offices
to meet the exigencies attendant upon the establishment of
the free and independent Government of the Republic of the
Philippines, and for the purpose of promoting simplicity,
economy and efficiency in its operation (Section 1, Republic Act
No. 51)
and the determination of state policy is not vested in the
Commission (Utilities Com. vs. Bartonville Bus Line, 290 Ill. 574;
124 N.E. 373).
Defendant PLDT, as appellant, contends that the court below
was in error in not holding that the Bureau of
Telecommunications was not empowered to engage in
commercial telephone business, and in ruling that said
defendant was not justified in disconnecting the telephone
trunk lines it had previously leased to the Bureau. We find that
the court a quo ruled correctly in rejecting both assertions.
Executive Order No. 94, Series of 1947, reorganizing the
Bureau of Telecommunications, expressly empowered the latter
in its Section 79, subsection (b), to "negotiate for, operate and
maintain wire telephone or radio telephone communication
service throughout the Philippines", and, in subsection (c), "to
prescribe, subject to approval by the Department Head,
equitable rates of charges for messages handled by the system
and/or for time calls and other services that may be rendered
by the system". Nothing in these provisions limits the Bureau to
non-commercial activities or prevents it from serving the
general public. It may be that in its original prospectuses the
Bureau officials had stated that the service would be limited to

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government offices: but such limitations could not block future

expansion of the system, as authorized by the terms of the
Executive Order, nor could the officials of the Bureau bind the
Government not to engage in services that are authorized by
law. It is a well-known rule that erroneous application and
enforcement of the law by public officers do not block
subsequent correct application of the statute (PLDT vs.
Collector of Internal Revenue, 90 Phil. 676), and that the
Government is never estopped by mistake or error on the part
of its agents (Pineda vs. Court of First Instance of Tayabas, 52
Phil. 803, 807; Benguet Consolidated Mining Co. vs. Pineda, 98
Phil. 711, 724).
The theses that the Bureau's commercial services constituted
unfair competition, and that the Bureau was guilty of fraud and
abuse under its contract, are, likewise, untenable.
First, the competition is merely hypothetical, the demand for
telephone service being very much more than the supposed
competitors can supply. As previously noted, the PLDT had
20,000 pending applications at the time, and the Bureau had
another 5,000. The telephone company's inability to meet the
demands for service are notorious even now. Second, the
charter of the defendant expressly provides:
SEC. 14. The rights herein granted shall not be exclusive, and
the rights and power to grant to any corporation, association or
person other than the grantee franchise for the telephone or
electrical transmission of message or signals shall not be
impaired or affected by the granting of this franchise: (Act
3436)
And third, as the trial court correctly stated, "when the Bureau
of Telecommunications subscribed to the trunk lines, defendant
knew or should have known that their use by the subscriber
was more or less public and all embracing in nature, that is,
throughout the Philippines, if not abroad" (Decision, Record on
Appeal, page 216).
The acceptance by the defendant of the payment of rentals,
despite its knowledge that the plaintiff had extended the use of
the trunk lines to commercial purposes, continuously since
1948, implies assent by the defendant to such extended use.
Since this relationship has been maintained for a long time and
the public has patronized both telephone systems, and their
interconnection is to the public convenience, it is too late for
the defendant to claim misuse of its facilities, and it is not now
at liberty to unilaterally sever the physical connection of the
trunk lines.
..., but there is high authority for the position that, when such
physical connection has been voluntarily made, under a fair
and workable arrangement and guaranteed by contract and the
continuous line has come to be patronized and established as a
great public convenience, such connection shall not in breach
of the agreement be severed by one of the parties. In that
case, the public is held to have such an interest in the
arrangement that its rights must receive due consideration.
This position finds approval in State ex rel. vs. Cadwaller, 172
Ind. 619, 636, 87 N.E. 650, and is stated in the elaborate and
learned opinion of Chief Justice Myers as follows: "Such physical
connection cannot be required as of right, but if such
connection is voluntarily made by contract, as is here alleged
to be the case, so that the public acquires an interest in its
continuance, the act of the parties in making such connection
is equivalent to a declaration of a purpose to waive the primary
right of independence, and it imposes upon the property such a
public status that it may not be disregarded" citing Mahan v.
Mich. Tel. Co., 132 Mich. 242, 93 N.W. 629, and the reasons
upon which it is in part made to rest are referred to in the same
opinion, as follows: "Where private property is by the consent
of the owner invested with a public interest or privilege for the
benefit of the public, the owner can no longer deal with it as
private property only, but must hold it subject to the right of
the public in the exercise of that public interest or privilege

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conferred for their benefit." Allnut v. Inglis (1810) 12 East, 527.

The doctrine of this early case is the acknowledged law.
(Clinton-Dunn Tel. Co. v. Carolina Tel. & Tel. Co., 74 S.E. 636,
638).

and other proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. No

costs.

It is clear that the main reason for the objection of the PLDT
lies in the fact that said appellant did not expect that the
Bureau's telephone system would expand with such rapidity as
it has done; but this expansion is no ground for the
discontinuance of the service agreed upon.

[G.R. No. 113194. March 11, 1996]

The last issue urged by the PLDT as appellant is its right to

compensation for the use of its poles for bearing telephone
wires of the Bureau of Telecommunications. Admitting that
section 19 of the PLDT charter reserves to the Government

PANGANIBAN, J.:

the privilege without compensation of using the poles of the

grantee to attach one ten-pin cross-arm, and to install,
maintain and operate wires of its telegraph system
thereon; Provided, however, That the Bureau of Posts shall
have the right to place additional cross-arms and wires on the
poles of the grantee by paying a compensation, the rate of
which is to be agreed upon by the Director of Posts and the
grantee;
the defendant counterclaimed for P8,772.00 for the use of its
poles by the plaintiff, contending that what was allowed free
use, under the aforequoted provision, was one ten-pin crossarm attachment and only for plaintiff's telegraph system, not
for its telephone system; that said section could not refer to the
plaintiff's telephone system, because it did not have such
telephone system when defendant acquired its franchise. The
implication of the argument is that plaintiff has to pay for the
use of defendant's poles if such use is for plaintiff's telephone
system and has to pay also if it attaches more than one (1) tenpin cross-arm for telegraphic purposes.
As there is no proof that the telephone wires strain the poles
of the PLDT more than the telegraph wires, nor that they cause
more damage than the wires of the telegraph system, or that
the Government has attached to the poles more than one tenpin cross-arm as permitted by the PLDT charter, we see no
point in this assignment of error. So long as the burden to be
borne by the PLDT poles is not increased, we see no reason
why the reservation in favor of the telegraph wires of the
government should not be extended to its telephone lines, any
time that the government decided to engage also in this kind of
communication.
In the ultimate analysis, the true objection of the PLDT to
continue the link between its network and that of the
Government is that the latter competes "parasitically" (sic) with
its own telephone services. Considering, however, that the
PLDT franchise is non-exclusive; that it is well-known that
defendant PLDT is unable to adequately cope with the current
demands for telephone service, as shown by the number of
pending applications therefor; and that the PLDT's right to just
compensation for the services rendered to the Government
telephone system and its users is herein recognized and
preserved, the objections of defendant-appellant are without
merit. To uphold the PLDT's contention is to subordinate the
needs of the general public to the right of the PLDT to derive
profit from the future expansion of its services under its nonexclusive franchise.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of First Instance, now
under appeal, is affirmed, except in so far as it dismisses the
petition of the Republic of the Philippines to compel the
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company to continue
servicing the Government telephone system upon such terms,
and for a compensation, that the trial court may determine to
be just, including the period elapsed from the filing of the
original complaint or petition. And for this purpose, the records
are ordered returned to the court of origin for further hearings

(H)

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT

OF
APPEALS
and
MACAPANTON
MANGONDATO, respondents.

At what point in time should the value of the land subject of

expropriation be computed: at the date of the taking or the
date of the filing of the complaint for eminent domain? This is
the main question posed by the parties in this petition for
review on certiorari assailing the Decision [1] of the Court of
Appeals[2] which
affirmed in
toto the
decision
of
the Regional Trial Court ofMarawi City.[3] The dispositive portion
of the decision of the trial court reads:[4]
WHEREFORE, the prayer in the recovery case for Napocors
surrender of the property is denied but Napocor is ordered to
pay monthly rentals in the amount of P15,000.00 from 1978 up
to July 1992 with 12% interest per annum from which sum the
amount of P2,199,500.00 should be deducted; and the property
is condemned in favor of Napocor effective July 1992 upon
payment of the fair market value of the property at One
Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos per square meter or a total of
Twenty-One Million Nine Hundred Ninety-Five Thousand
(P21,995,000.00) Pesos.
SO ORDERED. Costs against NAPOCOR.
The Facts
The facts are undisputed by both the petitioner and the private
respondent,[5] and are quoted from the Decision of the
respondent Court,[6] as follows:
In 1978, National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR), took
possession of a 21,995 square meter land which is a portion
of Lot 1 of the subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-116159 situated
in Marawi City, owned by Mangondato, and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-378-A, under the mistaken belief that it
forms part of the public land reserved for use by NAPOCOR for
hydroelectric power purposes under Proclamation No. 1354 of
the President of the Philippines dated December 3, 1974.
NAPOCOR alleged that the subject land was until then
possessed and administered by Marawi City so that in
exchange for the citys waiver and quitclaim of any right over
the property, NAPOCOR had paid the city a financial assistance
of P40.00 per square meter.
In 1979, when NAPOCOR started building its Agus I HE
(Hydroelectric
Plant)
Project,
Mangondato
demanded
compensation
from
NAPOCOR.
NAPOCOR
refused
to
compensate insisting that the property is public land and that it
had already paid financial assistance to Marawi City in
exchange for the rights over the property.
Mangondato claimed that the subject land is his duly registered
private property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T378-A in his name, and that he is not privy to any agreement
between NAPOCOR andMarawi City and that any payment
made to said city cannot be considered as payment to him.
More than a decade later NAPOCOR acceded to the fact that
the property belongs to Mangondato.
At the outset, in March, 1990, NAPOCORs regional legal
counsel, pursuant to Executive Order No. 329 dated July 11,

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1988 requested Marawi Citys City Appraisal Committee to

appraise
the
market
value
of
the
property
in
Saduc, Marawi City affected by the infrastructure projects of
NAPOCOR without specifying any particular land-owner. The
City Appraisal Committee in its Minutes dated March 8, 1990,
fixed the fair market value as follows:[7]
Land Fair Market Value Per Sq. M.
Price Per Sq. M Price per Sq. M.
Along the City Not in the City
National Highway National Highway
P150 Residential Lot P100
P250 Commercial Lot P180
P300 Industrial Lot P200
(Records, Civil Case No. 610-92, p. 20).
On July 13, 1990, NAPOCORs National Power Board (hereafter
NAPOCORs board) passed Resolution No. 90-225 resolving to
pay Mangondato P100.00 per square meter for only a 12,132
square meter portion of the subject property plus 12% interest
per annum from 1978. However, in the August 7, 1990 board
meeting, confirmation of said resolution was deferred to allow
NAPOCORs regional legal counsel to determine whether
P100.00 per square meter is the fair market value. (Records,
Civil Case No. 605-92, p. 45).
On August 14, 1990, NAPOCORs board passed Resolution No.
90-316 resolving that Mangondato be paid the base price of
P40.00 per square meter for the 12,132 square meter portion
(P485,280.00) plus 12% interest per annum from 1978
(P698,808.00) pending the determination whether P100.00 per
square meter is the fair market value of the property (id.).
Pursuant to the aforementioned resolution Mangondato was
paid P1,184,088.00 (Id., p. 58).
NAPOCORs regional legal counsels findings embodied in 2
memoranda to NAPOCORs general counsel (dated January 29,
1991 and February 19, 1991) state that Mangondatos property
is classified as industrial, that the market value of industrial lots
in Marawi City when NAPOCOR took possession is P300.00 for
those along the national highway and P200.00 for those not
along the highway and that on the basis of recent Supreme
Court decisions, NAPOCOR has to pay not less than P300.00 per
square meter. NAPOCORs general counsel incorporated the
foregoing findings in his report to the board plus the data that
the area possessed by NAPOCOR is 21,995 square meters, and
that the legal rate of interest per annum from the time of the
taking of the property alleged to be in 1978, is 12%, but
recommended to the board that the fair market value of the
property is P 100.00 per square meter; NAPOCORs board on
May 17, 1991 passed Resolution No. 91-247 resolving to pay
Mangondato P100.00 per square meter for the property
excluding 12% interest per annum (id., pp. 50-52).
In a letter dated December 17, 1991, Mangondato disagreed
with the NAPOCOR boards Resolution No. 91-247 pegging the
compensation for his land at P 100.00 per square meter
without interest from 1978. Mangondato submitted that the fair
market value of his land is even more than the P300.00 (per)
square meter stated in the City Appraisal Report but that for
expediency, he is willing to settle for P300.00 per square meter
plus 12% interest per annum from 1978 (id., pp. 53-59).
In another letter dated February 4, 1992, Mangondato
reiterated his disagreement to the P100.00 per square meter
compensation without interest. At the same time, to get partial

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payment, he asked that he be paid in the meantime, P 100.00

per square meter without prejudice to pursuing his claim for
the proper and just compensation plus interest thereon (id., p.
60).
On February 12, 1992, NAPOCORs general counsel filed a
memorandum for its president finding no legal impediment if
they, in the meantime were to pay Mangondato P100.00 per
square meter without prejudice to the final determination of the
proper and just compensation by the board inasmuch as the
regional counsel submitted to him (general counsel) 2
memoranda stating that the appraisal of industrial lots in
Marawi City when NAPOCOR took possession is P300.00 per
square meter for those along the national highway and P200.00
per square meter for those not along the highway, and that
NAPOCOR has to pay not less than P300.00 per square meter
plus 12% interest on the basis of recent Supreme Court
decisions. Further, the general counsel submitted that since the
board has already set the purchase price at P100.00 per square
meter (Resolution No. 91-247), NAPOCOR would not be
prejudiced thereby (id., pp 60-62)
In March, 1992, the parties executed a Deed of Sale Of A
Registered Property where NAPOCOR acceded to Mangondatos
request of provisional payment of P100.00 per square meter
excluding interest and without prejudice to Mangondatos
pursuance of claims for just compensation and interest.
Mangondato was paid P1,015,412.00 in addition to the
P1,184,088.00 earlier paid to him by NAPOCOR which
payments total P2,199,500.00 for the 12,995 square meter
land (Records, Civil Case No. 610-92, pp. 85-87).
In his letter to NAPOCORs president dated April 20, 1992,
Mangondato asked for the payment of P300.00 per square
meter plus 12% interest per annum from 1978. NAPOCORs
president, in his memorandum to the board dated April 24,
1992 recommended the approval of Mangondatos request
(Records, Civil Case No. 605-92, pp. 63-69).
On May 25, 1992, NAPOCORs board passed Resolution No. 92121 granting its president the authority to negotiate for the
payment of P100.00 per square meter for the land plus 12%
interest per annum from 1978 less the payments already made
to Mangondato and to Marawi City on the portion of his land
and with the provisos that said authorized payment shall be
effected only after Agus I HE Project has been placed in
operation and that said payment shall be covered by a deed of
absolute
sale
with
a
quitclaim
executed
by
Mangondato (Id., pp. 70-71).
On July 7, 1992, Mangondato filed before the lower court Civil
Case No. 605-92 against NAPOCOR seeking to recover the
possession of the property described in the complaint as Lots 1
and 3 of the subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-116159 against
NAPOCOR, the payment of a monthly rent of P15,000.00 from
1978 until the surrender of the property, attorneys fees and
costs, and the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to restrain NAPOCOR
from proceeding with any construction and/or improvements on
Mangondatos land or from committing any act of
dispossession (id., pp. 1-8).
The temporary restraining order was issued by the lower court.
Anent the prayer for the writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction, NAPOCOR filed its Opposition thereto on July 23,
1992 (Id., pp. 17-20).
Before the lower court could resolve the pending incident on
the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, and instead of
filing a motion to dismiss, NAPOCOR, on July 27, 1992, filed also
before the lower court, Civil Case No. 610-92 which is a
Complaint for eminent domain against Mangondato over the
subject property (Records, Civil Case No. 610-92, pp. 1-3).

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On the same date Mangondato filed his Manifestation in Lieu of

Answer contending that the negotiations for payment made by
NAPOCOR were virtual dictations on a take it or leave it basis;
that he was given the run-around by NAPOCOR for 15 years; so
that there was no agreement reached as to payment because
of NAPOCORs insistence of its own determination of the price;
that he treats the P2,199.500.00 so far received by him as
partial payment for the rent for the use of his property.
Mangondato prayed that he be compensated in damages for
the unauthorized taking and continued possession of his land
from 1978 until the filing of the Complaiant (sic) in the
expropriation case; that should the lower court order the
expropriation of the subject property, that the just
compensation for the land be reckoned from the time of the
filing of the expropriation case; that the expropriation case be
consolidated with the recovery of possession case; that the
restraining order issued in the recovery of possession case be
maintained and a writ of preliminary injunction be at once
issued against NAPOCOR; and that NAPOCOR be ordered to
deposit the value of the land as provisionally determined by the
lower court (id., pp. 4-5).
Upon agreement of the parties, the 2 cases were ordered
consolidated and the lower court appointed the following
commissioners: Atty. Saipal Alawi, representing the lower court;
Atty. Connie Doromal, representing NAPOCOR; and Mr. Alimbsar
A. Ali, from the City Assessors Office to ascertain and report to
the court the just compensation (id., pp. 6-7).
The lower court ordered NAPOCOR to deposit with the
Philippine National Bank the amount of P10,997,500.00,
provisionally fixing the value of the land at P500.00 per square
meter P100.00 lower than the assessed value of the land
appearing in Tax Declaration No. 0873 for 1992 which was used
as basis by the lower court (id., p. 8).
In its Motion for Reconsideration of the Order For Provisional
Deposit[,] NAPOCOR opposed the provisional value quoted by
the lower court saying that the basis of the provisional value of
the land should be the assessed value of the property as of the
time of the taking which in this case is 1978 when the assessed
value of the land under Tax Declaration No. 7394 was P100.00
per square meter (id., pp. 28-32). In reply, Mangondato filed his
Opposition To Motion For Reconsideration Of the Order For
Provisional Deposit (id., pp. 44-46). However, the lower court
did not rule on the provisional value to be deposited and chose
to go right into the determination of just compensation on the
ground that the provisional valuation could not be decided
without going into the second phase of expropriation cases
which is the determination by the court of the just
compensation for the property soguht (sic) to be taken
(NPC vs. Jocson, supra) (Decision, p. 5).
On August 5, 1992, Mangondato filed a Motion To Dismiss in the
expropriation case alleging that NAPOCOR filed its Complaint
for eminent domain not for the legitimate aim of pursuing
NAPOCORs business and purpose but to legitimize a patently
illegal possession and at the same time continue dictating its
own valuation of the property. Said motion was however, later
withdrawn by Mangondato (id., pp. 37-39 and 47).
In the meanwhile, the commissioners filed their respective
reports. On July 28, 1992, Commissioner Doromal filed his
report recommending a fair market value of P300.00 per square
meter as of November 23, 1978, (Id., pp. 11-27). On August 6,
1992, Commissioners Alawi and Ali filed their joint report
recommending a fair market value of P1,000.00 per square
meter as of 1992 (id., pp. 40-42).
After the parties filed their respective comments to the
commissioners reports, on August 21, 1992, the lower court
rendered its decision denying Mangondato recovery of
possession of the property but ordering NAPOCOR to pay a
monthly rent of P15,000.00 from 1978 up to July 1992 with 12%
interest per annum and condemning the property in favor of

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NAPOCOR effective July, 1992 upon the payment of P1,000.00

per square meter or a total of P2 1,995,000.00 as just
compensation.
Mangondato filed a Motion For Partial Execution Pending Appeal
which was granted by the lower court in an Order
dated September 15, 1992 (id., pp. 151-152 and 157-160).
However, on appeal by NAPOCOR via a Petition For Certiorari in
CA-G.R. SP No. 28971 to this Court, said Order was annulled
and set aside (Rollo, pp. 30-37).
NAPOCOR filed a Motion For Reconsideration of the decision
alleging that the fair market value of the property at the time it
was taken allegedly in 1978 is P40.00 per square meter. After
Mangondato filed his Opposition To Motion For Reconsideration
the lower court denied NAPOCORs motion for reconsideration in
an Order dated September 15, 1992 (Records, Civil Case No.
610-92, pp. 145-149).
In the meanwhile, on August 7, 1992, Mangondato filed an ExParte Manifestation To Correct Clerical Error of Description of
Property submitting that Lot 3 which does not form part of the
subject property was included in the Complaint because of a
clerical error inadvertently committed by the typist who
continuously copied the description of the property covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-378-A, and thus praying that
the portion of the Complaint describing Lot 3 be deleted
(Records, Civil Case No. 605-92, p. 22).
On August 12, 1992, the intervenors filed their Motion For
Intervention and Intervention claiming interest against each of
the parties on the ground that Lot 3 which is included in the
Complaint has since been conveyed by Mangondato to their
predecessors-in-interest and that they are entitled to just
compensation from NAPOCOR should the lower court decide
that NAPOCOR is entitled to expropriate the entire area
described in the Complaint (id., pp. 23-34).
In an Order dated August 19, 1992 the lower court granted
intervenors Motion For Intervention (id., p. 72).
On August 25, 1992, the lower court ordered the deletion of the
portion in the Complaint describing Lot 3 and declared that
intervenors Motion For Intervention has become moot (id., p.
82).
On October 13, 1992 the intervenors filed their Motion To
Reconsider The Order Of August 25, 1992 and The Decision
Dated August 21, 1992 which was however denied by the lower
court in an Order datedNovember 26, 1992 (id., pp. 162-184).
The Issues
Two errors were raised before this Court by the petitioner, thus:
[8]

ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THAT THE JUST
COMPENSATION FOR THE PROPERTY IS ITS VALUE IN 1992,
WHEN THE COMPLAINT WAS FILED, AND NOT ITS VALUE IN
1978, WHEN THE PROPERTY WAS TAKEN BY PETITIONER.
THE COURT ERRED IN FIXING THE VALUE OF JUST
COMPENSATION AT P 1,000.00 PER SQUARE METER INSTEAD OF
P40.00 PER SQUARE METER.
The petitioner summarized the two issues it raised by asking
whether or not the respondent court was justified in deviating
from the well-settled doctrine that just compensation is the
equivalent of the value of the property taken for public use
reckoned from the time of taking.[9] In his Comment, private
respondent worded the issues as follows:[10]

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x x x As stated by the respondent court, Napocor, in its appeal

x x x avers that the taking of the proerty (sic) should not be
reckoned as of the year 1992 when NAPOCOR filed its
Complaint for eminent domain but as of the year 1978 when it
took possession of the property, and that the just
compensation, determined as it should be, on the basis of the
value of the property as of 1978, as P40.00 per square meter.
The petitioner, after failing to persuade both lower courts,
reiterated before us its proposition (with cited cases) that when
the taking of property precedes the filing of the judicial
proceeding, the value of the property at the time it was taken
shall be the basis for the payment of just compensation.[11]
The First Issue: Date of Taking or Date of Suit?
The general rule in determining just compensation in eminent
domain is the value of the property as of the date of the filing
of the complaint, as follows:[12]
Sec. 4. Order of Condemnation. When such a motion is
overruled or when any party fails to defend as required by this
rule, the court may enter an order of condemnation declaring
that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought
to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in
the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be
determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint x x
x (Italics supplied).
Normally, the time of the taking coincides with the filing of the
complaint for expropriation. Hence, many rulings of this Court
have equated just compensation with the value of the property
as of the time of filing of the complaint consistent with the
above provision of the Rules. So too, where the institution of
the action precedes entry into the property, the just
compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the filing of
the complaint.[13]
The general rule, however, admits of an exception: where this
Court fixed the value of the property as of the date it was taken
and not at the date of the commencement of the expropriation
proceedings.
In the old case of Provincial Government of Rizal vs. Caro de
Araullo,[14] the Court ruled that x x x the owners of the land
have no right to recover damages for this unearned increment
resulting from the construction of the public improvement
(lengthening of Taft Avenue from Manila to Pasay) for which the
land was taken. To permit them to do so would be to allow them
to recover more than the value of the land at the time when it
was taken, which is the true measure of the damages, or just
compensation, and would discourage the construction of
important public improvements.
In subsequently cases,[15] the Court, following the above
doctrine, invariably held that the time of taking is the critical
date in determining lawful or just compensation. Justifying this
stance, Mr. Justice (later Chief Justice) Enrique Fernando,
speaking for the Court in Municipality of La Carlota vs. The
Spouses Felicidad Baltazar and Vicente Gan, [16] said, x x x the
owner as is the constitutional intent, is paid what he is entitled
to according to the value of the property so devoted to public
use as of the date of the taking. From that time, he had been
deprived thereof. He had no choice but to submit. He is not,
however, to be despoiled of such a right. No less than the
fundamental law guarantees just compensation. It would be an
injustice to him certainly if from such a period, he could not
recover the value of what was lost. There could be on the other
hand, injustice to the expropriator if by a delay in the
collection, the increment in price would accrue to the owner.
The doctrine to which this Court has been committed is
intended precisely to avoid either contingency fraught with
unfairness.

H A N A

B E E

Simply stated, the exception finds application where the owner

would be given undue incremental advantages arising from the
use to which the government devotes the property
expropriated -as for instance, the extension of a main
thoroughfare as was the case in Caro de Araullo. In the instant
case, however, it is difficult to conceive of how there could
have been an extra-ordinary increase in the value of the
owners land arising from the expropriation, as indeed the
records do not show any evidence that the valuation of
P1,000.00 reached in 1992 was due to increments directly
caused by petitioners use of the land. Since the petitioner is
claiming an exception to Rule 67, Section 4,[17] it has the burden
of proving its claim that its occupancy and use - not ordinary
inflation and increase in land values - was the direct cause of
the increase in valuation from 1978 to 1992.
Side Issue: When is There Taking of Property?
But there is yet another cogent reason why this petition should
be denied and why the respondent Court should be sustained.
An examination of the undisputed factual environment would
show that the taking was not really made in 1978.
This Court has defined the elements of taking as the main
ingredient in the exercise of power of eminent domain, [18] in the
following words:
A number of circumstances must be present in the taking of
property for purposes of eminent domain: (1) the expropriator
must enter a private property; (2) the entrance into private
property must be for more than a momentary period; (3) the
entry into the property should be under warrant or color of
legal authority; (4) the property must be devoted to a public
use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected;
and (5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in
such a way to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial
enjoyment of the property. (Italics supplied)
In this case, the petitioners entrance in 1978 was without
intent to expropriate or was not made under warrant or color of
legal authority, for it believed the property was public land
covered by Proclamation No. 1354. When the private
respondent raised his claim of ownership sometime in 1979,
the petitioner flatly refused the claim for compensation,
nakedly insisted that the property was public land and wrongly
justified its possession by alleging it had already paid financial
assistance to Marawi City in exchange for the rights over the
property. Only in 1990, after more than a decade of beneficial
use, did the petitioner recognize private respondents ownership
and negotiate for the voluntary purchase of the property. A
Deed of Sale with provisional payment and subject to
negotiations for the correct price was then executed.
Clearly, this is not the intent nor the expropriation
contemplated by law. This is a simple attempt at a voluntary
purchase and sale. Obviously, the petitioner neglected and/or
refused to exercise the power of eminent domain.
Only in 1992, after the private respondent sued to recover
possession and petitioner filed its Complaint to expropriate, did
petitioner manifest its intention to exercise the power of
eminent domain. Thus, the respondent Court correctly held:[19]
If We decree that the fair market value of the land be
determined as of 1978, then We would be sanctioning a
deceptive scheme whereby NAPOCOR, for any reason other
than for eminent domain would occupy anothers property and
when later pressed for payment, first negotiate for a low price
and then conveniently expropriate the property when the land
owner refuses to accept its offer claiming that the taking of the
property for the purpose of eminent domain should be
reckoned as of the date when it started to occupy the property
and that the value of the property should be computed as of

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the date of the taking despite the increase in the meantime in

the value of the property.
In Noble vs. City of Manila,[20] the City entered into a leasepurchase agreement of a building constructed by the
petitioners predecessor-in-interest in accordance with the
specifications of the former. The Court held that being bound
by the said contract, the City could not expropriate the
building. Expropriation could be resorted to only when it is
made necessary by the opposition of the owner to the sale or
by the lack of any agreement as to the price. Said the Court:
The contract, therefore, in so far as it refers to the purchase of
the building, as we have interpreted it, is in force, not having
been revoked by the parties or by judicial decision. This being
the case, the city being bound to buy the building at an agreed
price, under a valid and subsisting contract, and the plaintiff
being agreeable to its sale, the expropriation thereof, as sought
by the defendant, is baseless. Expropriation lies only when it is
made necessary by the opposition of the owner to the sale or
by the lack of any agreement as to the price. There being in the
present case a valid and subsisting contract, between the
owner of the building and the city, for the purchase thereof at
an agreed price, there is no reason for the expropriation. (Italics
supplied)
In the instant case, petitioner effectively repudiated the deed of
sale it entered into with the private respondent when it passed
Resolution
No.
92-121
on May 25, 1992 authorizing
its
president to negotiate, inter alia, that payment shall be
effected only after Agus I HE project has been placed in
operation. It was only then that petitioners intent to expropriate
became manifest as private respondent disagreed and, barely a
month after, filed suit.
The Second Issue: Valuation
We now come to the issue of valuation.
The fair market value as held by the respondent Court, is the
amount of P1,000.00 per square meter. In an expropriation
case where the principal issue is the determination of just
compensation, as is the case here, a trial before Commissioners
is indispensable to allow the parties to present evidence on the
issue of just compensation.[21] Inasmuch as the determination of
just compensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial
function[22] and factual findings of the Court of Appeals are
conclusive on the parties and reviewable only when the case
falls within the recognized exceptions, [23] which is not the
situation obtaining in this petition, we see no reason to disturb
the factual findings as to valuation of the subject property. As
can be gleaned from the records, the court-and-the-partiesappointed commissioners did not abuse their authority in
evaluating the evidence submitted to them nor misappreciate
the clear preponderance of evidence. The amount fixed and
agreed to by the respondent appellate Court is not grossly
exorbitant.[24] To quote:[25]
Commissioner Ali comes from the Office of the Register of
Deeds who may well be considered an expert, with a general
knowledge of the appraisal of real estate and the prevailing
prices of land in the vicinity of the land in question so that his
opinion on the valuation of the property cannot be lightly
brushed aside.
The prevailing market value of the land is only one of the
determinants used by the commissioners report the others
being as herein shown:
xxx xxx xxx
Commissioner Doromals report, recommending P300.00 per
square meter, differs from the 2 commissioners only because
his report was based on the valuation as of 1978 by the City

H A N A

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Appraisal Committee as clarified by the latters chairman in

response to NAPOCORs general counsels query (id., pp. 128129).
In sum, we agree with the Court of Appeals that petitioner has
failed to show why it should be granted an exemption from the
general rule in determining just compensation provided under
Section 4 of Rule 67. On the contrary, private respondent has
convinced us that, indeed, such general rule should in fact be
observed in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the
judgment appealed from AFFIRMED, except as to the interest
on the monthly rentals, which is hereby reduced from twelve
percent (12%) to the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum.
(I)
NATIONAL POWER G.R. No. 168732
CORPORATION,
Petitioner,
Present:
-versusLUCMAN G. IBRAHIM, OMAR PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
G. MARUHOM, ELIAS G. SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,*
MARUHOM, BUCAY G. CORONA,
MARUHOM, FAROUK G. AZCUNA, and
MARUHOM, HIDJARA G. GARCIA, JJ.
MARUHOM, ROCANIA G.
MARUHOM, POTRISAM G.
MARUHOM, LUMBA G. Promulgated:
MARUHOM, SINAB G.
MARUHOM, ACMAD G.
MARUHOM, SOLAYMAN G. June 29, 2007
MARUHOM, MOHAMAD M.
IBRAHIM, and CAIRONESA M.
IBRAHIM,
Respondents.
X---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------X
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court seeking to annul the Decision [1] dated June 8,
2005 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R. CV No.
57792.
The facts are as follows:
On November 23, 1994, respondent Lucman G. Ibrahim, in his
personal capacity and in behalf of his co-heirs Omar G.
Maruhom, Elias G. Maruhom, Bucay G. Maruhom, Mamod G.
Maruhom, Farouk G. Maruhom, Hidjara G. Maruhom, Rocania G.
Maruhom, Potrisam G. Maruhom, Lumba G. Maruhom, Sinab G.
Maruhom, Acmad G. Maruhom, Solayman G. Maruhom,
Mohamad M. Ibrahim and Caironesa M. Ibrahim, instituted an
action against petitioner National Power Corporation
(NAPOCOR) for recovery of possession of land and damages
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lanao del Sur.
In their complaint, Ibrahim and his co-heirs claimed that they
were owners of several parcels of land described in Survey
Plan FP (VII-5) 2278 consisting of 70,000 square meters,
divided into three (3) lots, i.e. Lots 1, 2, and 3 consisting of
31,894, 14,915, and 23,191 square meters each respectively.
Sometime in 1978, NAPOCOR, through alleged stealth and
without respondents knowledge and prior consent, took
possession of the sub-terrain area of their lands and
constructed therein underground tunnels. The existence of the
tunnels was only discovered sometime in July 1992 by
respondents and then later confirmed on November 13, 1992
by NAPOCOR itself through a memorandum issued by the
latters Acting Assistant Project Manager. The tunnels were
apparently being used by NAPOCOR in siphoning the water
of Lake Lanao and in the operation of NAPOCORs Agus II, III, IV,
V, VI, VII projects located in Saguiran, Lanao del Sur; Nangca
and Balo-i in Lanao del Norte; and Ditucalan and Fuentes
in Iligan City.
On September 19, 1992, respondent Omar G. Maruhom
requested the Marawi City Water District for a permit to

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construct and/or install a motorized deep well in Lot 3 located

in Saduc, Marawi City but his request was turned down because
the construction of the deep well would cause danger to lives
and property. On October 7, 1992, respondents demanded that
NAPOCOR pay damages and vacate the sub-terrain portion of
their lands but the latter refused to vacate much less pay
damages. Respondents further averred that the construction of
the underground tunnels has endangered their lives and
properties as Marawi City lies in an area of local volcanic and
tectonic activity. Further, these illegally constructed tunnels
caused them sleepless nights, serious anxiety and shock
thereby entitling them to recover moral damages and that by
way of example for the public good, NAPOCOR must be held
liable for exemplary damages.
Disputing respondents claim, NAPOCOR filed an answer with
counterclaim denying the material allegations of the complaint
and interposing affirmative and special defenses, namely that
(1) there is a failure to state a cause of action since
respondents seek possession of the sub-terrain portion when
they were never in possession of the same, (2) respondents
have no cause of action because they failed to show proof that
they were the owners of the property, and (3) the tunnels are a
government project for the benefit of all and all private lands
are subject to such easement as may be necessary for the
same.[2]
On August 7, 1996, the RTC rendered a Decision, the decretal
portion of which reads as follows:

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1) they did not file a motion to reconsider or appeal the

decision within the reglementary period of fifteen (15) days
from receipt of judgment because they believed in good faith
that the decision was for damages and rentals and attorneys
fees only as prayed for in the complaint:
2) it was only on August 26, 1996 that they learned that the
amounts awarded to the plaintiffs represented not only rentals,
damages and attorneys fees but the greatest portion of which
was payment of just compensation which in effect would make
the defendant NPC the owner of the parcels of land involved in
the case;
3) when they learned of the nature of the judgment, the period
of appeal has already expired;
4) They were prevented by fraud, mistake, accident, or
excusable negligence from taking legal steps to protect and
preserve their rights over their parcels of land in so far as the
part of the decision decreeing just compensation for petitioners
properties;
5) they would never have agreed to the alienation of their
property in favor of anybody, considering the fact that the
parcels of land involved in this case were among the valuable
properties they inherited from their dear father and they would
rather see their land crumble to dust than sell it to anybody.[4]

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

1.
Denying plaintiffs [private respondents] prayer for
defendant [petitioner] National Power Corporation to dismantle
the underground tunnels constructed between the lands of
plaintiffs in Lots 1, 2, and 3 of Survey Plan FP (VII-5) 2278;
2.
Ordering defendant to pay to plaintiffs the fair
market value of said 70,000 square meters of land covering
Lots 1, 2, and 3 as described in Survey Plan FP (VII-5) 2278 less
the area of 21,995 square meters at P1,000.00 per square
meter or a total of P48,005,000.00 for the remaining unpaid
portion of 48,005 square meters; with 6% interest per annum
from the filing of this case until paid;
3.
Ordering defendant to pay plaintiffs a reasonable
monthly rental of P0.68 per square meter of the total area of
48,005 square meters effective from its occupancy of the
foregoing area in 1978 or a total of P7,050,974.40.
4.
Ordering defendant to pay plaintiffs the sum
of P200,000.00 as moral damages; and
5.
Ordering defendant to pay the further sum
of P200,000.00 as attorneys fees and the costs.
SO ORDERED.[3]
On August 15, 1996, Ibrahim, joined by his co-heirs, filed an
Urgent Motion for Execution of Judgment Pending Appeal. On
the other hand, NAPOCOR filed a Notice of Appeal by registered
mail on August 19, 1996. Thereafter, NAPOCOR filed a vigorous
opposition to the motion for execution of judgment pending
appeal with a motion for reconsideration of the Decision which
it had received on August 9, 1996.
On August 26, 1996, NAPOCOR filed a Manifestation and Motion
withdrawing its Notice of Appeal purposely to give way to the
hearing of its motion for reconsideration.
On August 28, 1996, the RTC issued an Order granting
execution pending appeal and denying NAPOCORs motion for
reconsideration, which Order was received by NAPOCOR
on September 6, 1996.
On September 9, 1996, NAPOCOR filed its Notice of Appeal by
registered mail which was denied by the RTC on the ground of
having been filed out of time. Meanwhile, the Decision of the
RTC was executed pending appeal and funds of NAPOCOR were
garnished by respondents Ibrahim and his co-heirs.
On October 4, 1996, a Petition for Relief from Judgment was
filed by respondents Omar G. Maruhom, Elias G. Maruhom,
Bucay G. Maruhom, Mamod G. Maruhom, Farouk G. Maruhom,
Hidjara G. Maruhom, Potrisam G. Maruhom and Lumba G.
Maruhom asserting as follows:

The RTC granted the petition and rendered a modified

judgment dated September 8, 1997, thus:
WHEREFORE, a modified judgment is hereby rendered:

1) Reducing the judgment award of plaintiffs for the fair market

value of P48,005,000.00 by 9,526,000.00 or for a difference
by P38,479,000.00 and by the further sum ofP33,603,500.00
subject of the execution pending appeal leaving a difference of
4,878,500.00 which may be the subject of execution upon the
finality of this modified judgment with 6% interest per annum
from the filing of the case until paid.
2) Awarding the sum of P1,476,911.00 to herein petitioners
Omar G. Maruhom, Elias G. Maruhom, Bucay G. Maruhom,
Mahmod G. Maruhom, Farouk G. Maruhom, Hidjara G.
Maruhom, Portrisam G. Maruhom and Lumba G. Maruhom as
reasonable rental deductible from the awarded sum
of P7,050,974.40 pertaining to plaintiffs.
3) Ordering defendant embodied in the August 7, 1996 decision
to pay plaintiffs the sum of P200,000.00 as moral damages;
and further sum of P200,000.00 as attorneys fees and costs.
SO ORDERED.[5]
Subsequently, both
appealed to the CA.

respondent

Ibrahim

and

NAPOCOR

In the Decision dated June 8, 2005, the CA set aside the

modified judgment and reinstated the original Decision
dated August 7, 1996, amending it further by deleting the
award of moral damages and reducing the amount of rentals
and attorneys fees, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, herein Appeals are hereby
partially GRANTED, the Modified Judgment is ordered SET
ASIDE and rendered of no force and effect and the original
Decision of the court a quo dated 7 August 1996 is
hereby RESTORED with the MODIFICATION that the award of
moral damages is DELETED and the amounts of rentals and
attorneys
fees
are REDUCED to P6,888,757.40
and P50,000.00, respectively.
In this connection, the Clerk of Court of RTC Lanao del Sur is
hereby directed to reassess and determine the additional filing
fee that should be paid by Plaintiff-Appellant IBRAHIM taking
into consideration the total amount of damages sought in the
complaint vis--vis the actual amount of damages awarded by
this Court. Such additional filing fee shall constitute a lien on
the judgment.

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SO ORDERED.[6]
Hence, this petition ascribing the following errors to the CA:
(a) RESPONDENTS WERE NOT DENIED THE BENEFICIAL USE OF
THEIR SUBJECT PROPERTIES TO ENTITLE THEM TO JUST
COMPENSATION BY WAY OF DAMAGES;
(b) ASSUMING THAT RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO JUST
COMPENSATION BY WAY OF DAMAGES, NO EVIDENCE WAS
PRESENTED ANENT THE VALUATION OF RESPONDENTS
PROPERTY AT THE TIME OF ITS TAKING IN THE YEAR 1978 TO
JUSTIFY THE AWARD OF ONE THOUSAND SQUARE METERS
(P1000.00/SQ. M.) EVEN AS PAYMENT OF BACK RENTALS IS
ITSELF IMPROPER.
This case revolves around the propriety of paying just
compensation to respondents, and, by extension, the basis for
computing the same. The threshold issue of whether
respondents are entitled to just compensation hinges upon who
owns the sub-terrain area occupied by petitioner.
Petitioner maintains that the sub-terrain portion where the
underground tunnels were constructed does not belong to
respondents because, even conceding the fact that
respondents owned the property, their right to the subsoil of
the same does not extend beyond what is necessary to enable
them to obtain all the utility and convenience that such
property can normally give. In any case, petitioner asserts that
respondents were still able to use the subject property even
with the existence of the tunnels, citing as an example the fact
that one of the respondents, Omar G. Maruhom, had
established his residence on a part of the property. Petitioner
concludes that the underground tunnels 115 meters below
respondents property could not have caused damage or
prejudice to respondents and their claim to this effect was,
therefore, purely conjectural and speculative.[7]
The contention lacks merit.
Generally, in an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, the Court does not pass upon questions of
fact. Absent any showing that the trial and appellate courts
gravely abused their discretion, the Court will not examine the
evidence introduced by the parties below to determine if they
correctly assessed and evaluated the evidence on record. [8] The
jurisdiction of the Court in cases brought to it from the CA is
limited to reviewing and revising the errors of law imputed to it,
its findings of fact being as a rule conclusive and binding on the
Court.
In the present case, petitioner failed to point to any evidence
demonstrating grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA
or to any other circumstances which would call for the
application of the exceptions to the above rule. Consequently,
the CAs findings which upheld those of the trial court that
respondents owned and possessed the property and that its
substrata was possessed by petitioner since 1978 for the
underground tunnels, cannot be disturbed. Moreover, the Court
sustains the finding of the lower courts that the sub-terrain
portion of the property similarly belongs to respondents. This
conclusion is drawn from Article 437 of the Civil Code which
provides:
ART. 437. The owner of a parcel of land is the owner of
its surface and of everything under it, and he can construct
thereon any works or make any plantations and excavations
which he may deem proper, without detriment to servitudes
and subject to special laws and ordinances. He cannot complain
of the reasonable requirements of aerial navigation.
Thus, the ownership of land extends to the surface as well as to
the subsoil under it. In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of
Appeals,[9] this principle was applied to show that rights over
lands are indivisible and, consequently, require a definitive and
categorical classification, thus:
The Court of Appeals justified this by saying there is no conflict
of interest between the owners of the surface rights and the
owners of the sub-surface rights. This is rather strange
doctrine, for it is a well-known principle that the owner of a
piece of land has rights not only to its surface but also to
everything underneath and the airspace above it up to a
reasonable height. Under the aforesaid ruling, the land is

H A N A

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classified as mineral underneath and agricultural on the

surface, subject to separate claims of title. This is also difficult
to understand, especially in its practical application.
Under the theory of the respondent court, the surface owner
will be planting on the land while the mining locator will be
boring tunnels underneath. The farmer cannot dig a well
because he may interfere with the mining operations below and
the miner cannot blast a tunnel lest he destroy the crops
above. How deep can the farmer, and how high can the miner
go without encroaching on each others rights? Where is the
dividing line between the surface and the sub-surface rights?
The Court feels that the rights over the land are indivisible and
that the land itself cannot be half agricultural and half mineral.
The classification must be categorical; the land must be either
completely mineral or completely agricultural.
Registered landowners may even be ousted of ownership and
possession of their properties in the event the latter are
reclassified as mineral lands because real properties are
characteristically indivisible. For the loss sustained by such
owners, they are entitled to just compensation under the
Mining Laws or in appropriate expropriation proceedings.[10]
Moreover, petitioners argument that the landowners right
extends to the sub-soil insofar as necessary for their practical
interests serves only to further weaken its case. The theory
would limit the right to the sub-soil upon the economic utility
which such area offers to the surface owners. Presumably, the
landowners right extends to such height or depth where it is
possible for them to obtain some benefit or enjoyment, and it is
extinguished beyond such limit as there would be no more
interest protected by law.[11]
In this regard, the trial court found that respondents could have
dug upon their property motorized deep wells but were
prevented from doing so by the authorities precisely because of
the construction and existence of the tunnels underneath the
surface of their property. Respondents, therefore, still had a
legal interest in the sub-terrain portion insofar as they could
have excavated the same for the construction of the deep well.
The fact that they could not was appreciated by the RTC as
proof that the tunnels interfered with respondents enjoyment of
their property and deprived them of its full use and enjoyment,
thus:
Has it deprived the plaintiffs of the use of their lands when from
the evidence they have already existing residential houses over
said tunnels and it was not shown that the tunnels either
destroyed said houses or disturb[ed] the possession thereof by
plaintiffs? From the evidence, an affirmative answer seems to
be in order. The plaintiffs and [their] co-heirs discovered [these]
big underground tunnels in 1992. This was confirmed by the
defendant on November 13, 1992 by the Acting Assistant
Project Manager, Agus 1 Hydro Electric Project (Exh. K).
On September 16, 1992, Atty. Omar Maruhom (co-heir)
requested the Marawi City Water District for permit to construct
a motorized deep well over Lot 3 for his residential house (Exh.
Q). He was refused the permit because the construction of the
deep well as (sic) the parcels of land will cause danger to lives
and property. He was informed that beneath your lands are
constructed the Napocor underground tunnel in connection
with Agua Hydroelectric plant (Exh. Q-2). There in fact exists
ample evidence that this construction of the tunnel without the
prior consent of plaintiffs beneath the latters property
endangered the lives and properties of said plaintiffs. It has
been proved indubitably that Marawi City lies in an area of local
volcanic and tectonic activity. LakeLanao has been formed by
extensive earth movements and is considered to be a drowned
basin of volcano/tectonic origin. In Marawi City, there are a
number of former volcanoes and an extensive amount of
faulting. Some of these faults are still moving. (Feasibility
Report on Marawi City Water District by Kampsa-Kruger,
Consulting Engineers, Architects and Economists, Exh. R).
Moreover, it has been shown that the underground tunnels
[have] deprived the plaintiffs of the lawful use of the land and
considerably reduced its value. On March 6, 1995, plaintiffs
applied for a two-million peso loan with the Amanah Islamic
Bank for the expansion of the operation of the Ameer
Construction and Integrated Services to be secured by said
land (Exh. N), but the application was disapproved by the bank
in its letter of April 25, 1995 (Exh. O) stating that:

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Apropos to this, we regret to inform you that we cannot

consider your loan application due to the following reasons, to
wit:
That per my actual ocular inspection and verification, subject
property offered as collateral has an existing underground
tunnel by the NPC for the Agus I Project, which tunnel is
traversing
underneath
your
property,
hence,
an
encumbrance. As a matter of bank policy, property with an
existing encumbrance cannot be considered neither accepted
as collateral for a loan.
All the foregoing evidence and findings convince this Court that
preponderantly plaintiffs have established the condemnation of
their land covering an area of 48,005 sq. meters located at
Saduc, Marawi City by
the
defendant
National
Power
Corporation without even the benefit of expropriation
proceedings or the payment of any just compensation and/or
reasonable monthly rental since 1978.[12]
In the past, the Court has held that if the government takes
property without expropriation and devotes the property to
public use, after many years, the property owner may demand
payment of just compensation in the event restoration of
possession is neither convenient nor feasible. [13] This is in
accordance with the principle that persons shall not be
deprived of their property except by competent authority and
for public use and always upon payment of just compensation.
[14]

Petitioner contends that the underground tunnels in this case

constitute an easement upon the property of respondents
which does not involve any loss of title or possession.The
manner in which the easement was created by petitioner,
however, violates the due process rights of respondents as it
was without notice and indemnity to them and did not go
through proper expropriation proceedings. Petitioner could
have, at any time, validly exercised the power of eminent
domain to acquire the easement over respondents property as
this power encompasses not only the taking or appropriation of
title to and possession of the expropriated property but likewise
covers even the imposition of a mere burden upon the owner of
the condemned property.[15] Significantly, though, landowners
cannot be deprived of their right over their land until
expropriation proceedings are instituted in court. The court
must then see to it that the taking is for public use, that there
is payment of just compensation and that there is due process
of law.[16]
In disregarding this procedure and failing to recognize
respondents ownership of the sub-terrain portion, petitioner
took a risk and exposed itself to greater liability with the
passage of time. It must be emphasized that the acquisition of
the easement is not without expense. The underground tunnels
impose limitations on respondents use of the property for an
indefinite period and deprive them of its ordinary use. Based
upon the foregoing, respondents are clearly entitled to the
payment of just compensation.[17]Notwithstanding the fact that
petitioner only occupies the sub-terrain portion, it is liable to
pay not merely an easement fee but rather the full
compensation for land. This is so because in this case, the
nature of the easement practically deprives the owners of its
normal beneficial use. Respondents, as the owners of the
property thus expropriated, are entitled to a just compensation
which should be neither more nor less, whenever it is possible
to make the assessment, than the money equivalent of said
property.[18]
The entitlement of respondents to just compensation having
been settled, the issue now is on the manner of computing the
same. In this regard, petitioner claims that the basis for the
computation of the just compensation should be the value of
the property at the time it was taken in 1978. Petitioner also
impugns the reliance made by the CA uponNational Power
Corporation
v.
Court
of
Appeals
and
Macapanton
Mangondato[19] as the basis for computing the amount of just
compensation in this action. The CA found that the award of
damages is not excessive because the P1000 per square meter
as the fair market value was sustained in a case involving a lot
adjoining the property in question which case involved an
expropriation by [petitioner] of portion of Lot 1 of the
subdivision plan (LRC) PSD 116159 which is adjacent to Lots 2
and 3 of the same subdivision plan which is the subject of the
instant controversy.[20]

H A N A

B E E

Just compensation has been understood to be the just and

complete equivalent of the loss [21] and is ordinarily determined
by referring to the value of the land and its character at the
time it was taken by the expropriating authority. [22] There is a
taking in this sense when the owners are actually deprived or
dispossessed of their property, where there is a practical
destruction or a material impairment of the value of their
property, or when they are deprived of the ordinary use
thereof. There is a taking in this context when the expropriator
enters private property not only for a momentary period but for
more permanent duration, for the purpose of devoting the
property to a public use in such a manner as to oust the owner
and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof.
[23]
Moreover, taking of the property for purposes of eminent
domain entails that the entry into the property must be under
warrant or color of legal authority.[24]
Under the factual backdrop of this case, the last element of
taking mentioned, i.e., that the entry into the property is under
warrant or color of legal authority, is patently lacking. Petitioner
justified its nonpayment of the indemnity due respondents
upon its mistaken belief that the property formed part of the
public dominion.
This
situation
is
on
all
fours
with
that
in
the Mangondato case. NAPOCOR in that case took the property
of therein respondents in 1979, using it to build its Aqua I
Hydroelectric Plant Project, without paying any compensation,
allegedly under the mistaken belief that it was public land. It
was only in 1990, after more than a decade of beneficial use,
that NAPOCOR recognized therein respondents ownership and
negotiated for the voluntary purchase of the property.
In Mangondato, this Court held:
The First Issue: Date of Taking or Date of Suit?
The general rule in determining just compensation in
eminent domain is the value of the property as of the
date of the filing of the complaint, as follows:
Sec. 4. Order of Condemnation. When such a motion is
overruled or when any party fails to defend as required by this
rule, the court may enter an order of condemnation declaring
that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought
to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in
the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be
determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. x x x
(Italics supplied).
Normally, the time of the taking coincides with the filing of the
complaint for expropriation. Hence, many ruling of this Court
have equated just compensation with the value of the property
as of the time of filing of the complaint consistent with the
above provision of the Rules. So too, where the institution of
the action precedes entry to the property, the just
compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of filing of the
complaint.
The general rule, however, admits of an exception:
where this Court fixed the value of the property as of
the date it was taken and not the date of the
commencement of the expropriation proceedings.
In the old case of Provincial Government of Rizal vs. Caro de
Araullo, the Court ruled that x x x the owners of the land have
no right to recover damages for this unearned increment
resulting from the construction of the public improvement
(lengthening of Taft Avenue from Manila to Pasay) from which
the land was taken. To permit them to do so would be to allow
them to recover more than the value of the land at the time it
was taken, which is the true measure of the damages, or just
compensation, and would discourage the construction of
important public improvements.
In subsequent cases, the Court, following the above
doctrine, invariably held that the time of taking is the
critical
date
in
determining
lawful
or
just
compensation. Justifying this stance, Mr. Justice (later Chief
Justice)
Enrique
Fernando,
speaking
for
the
Court in Municipality of La Carlota vs. The Spouses Felicidad
Baltazar and Vicente Gan, said, x x x the owner as is the
constitutional intent, is paid what he is entitled to according to
the value of the property so devoted to public use as of the
date of taking. From that time, he had been deprived
thereof. He had no choice but to submit. He is not, however, to
be despoiled of such a right. No less than the fundamental law

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guarantees just compensation. It would be injustice to him

certainly if from such a period, he could not recover the value
of what was lost. There could be on the other hand,
injustice to the expropriator if by a delay in the
collection, the increment in price would accrue to the
owner. The doctrine to which this Court has been committed is
intended precisely to avoid either contingency fraught with
unfairness.
Simply stated, the exception finds the application where
the owner would be given undue incremental
advantages arising from the use to which the
government devotes the property expropriated -- as for
instance, the extension of a main thoroughfare as was in the
case in Caro de Araullo. In the instant case, however, it is
difficult to conceive of how there could have been
an extra-ordinary increase in the value of the owners
land arising from the expropriation, as indeed the
records do not show any evidence that the valuation of
P1,000.00 reached in 1992 was due to increments
directly caused by petitioners use of the land. Since the
petitioner is claiming an exception to Rule 67, Section 4, it has
the burden in proving its claim that its occupancy and use -not ordinary inflation and increase in land values -- was the
direct cause of the increase in valuation from 1978 to 1992.
Side Issue: When is there Taking of Property?
But there is yet another cogent reason why this petition should
be denied and why the respondent Court should be
sustained. An examination
of
the undisputed factual
environment would show that the taking was not really made in
1978.
This Court has defined the elements of taking as the main
ingredient in the exercise of power of eminent domain, in the
following words:
A number of circumstances must be present in taking of
property for purposes of eminent domain: (1) the expropriator
must enter a private property; (2) the entrance into private
property must be for more than a momentary period; (3) the
entry into the property should be under warrant or color of
legal authority; (4) the property must be devoted to a public
use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected;
and (5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in
such a way to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial
enjoyment of the property.(Italics supplied)
In this case, the petitioners entrance in 1978 was without
intent to expropriate or was not made under warrant or color of
legal authority, for it believed the property was public land
covered by Proclamation No. 1354. When the private
respondent raised his claim of ownership sometime in 1979,
the petitioner flatly refused the claim for compensation,
nakedly insisted that the property was public land and wrongly
justified its possession by alleging it had already paid financial
assistance to Marawi City in exchange for the rights over the
property. Only in 1990, after more than a decade of beneficial
use, did the petitioner recognize private respondents ownership
and negotiate for the voluntary purchase of the property. A
Deed of Sale with provisional payment and subject to
negotiations for the correct price was then executed. Clearly,
this is not the intent nor the expropriation contemplated by
law. This is a simple attempt at a voluntary purchase and sale.
Obviously, the petitioner neglected and/or refused to exercise
the power of eminent domain.
Only in 1992, after the private respondent sued to recover
possession and petitioner filed its Complaint to expropriate, did
petitioner manifest its intention to exercise the power of
eminent domain. Thus the respondent Court correctly held:
If We decree that the fair market value of the land be
determined as of 1978, then We would be sanctioning a
deceptive scheme whereby NAPOCOR, for any reason
other than for eminent domain would occupy anothers
property and when later pressed for payment, first
negotiate for a low price and then conveniently
expropriate the property when the land owner refuses
to accept its offer claiming that the taking of the
property for the purpose of the eminent domain should
be reckoned as of the date when it started to occupy
the property and that the value of the property should

H A N A

B E E

be computed as of the date of the taking despite the

increase in the meantime in the value of the property.
In Noble vs. City of Manila, the City entered into a leasepurchase agreement of a building constructed by the
petitioners predecessor-in-interest in accordance with the
specifications of the former. The Court held that being bound
by the said contract, the City could not expropriate the
building. Expropriation could be resorted to only when it is
made necessary by the opposition of the owner to the sale or
by the lack of any agreement as to the price. Said the Court:
The contract, therefore, in so far as it refers to the purchase of
the building, as we have interpreted it, is in force, not having
been revoked by the parties or by judicial decision. This being
the case, the city being bound to buy the building at an agreed
price, under a valid and subsisting contract, and the plaintiff
being agreeable to its sale, the expropriation thereof, as sought
by the defendant, is baseless. Expropriation lies only when it is
made necessary by the opposition of the owner to the sale or
by the lack of any agreement as to the price. There being in the
present case a valid and subsisting contract, between the
owner of the building and the city, for the purchase thereof at
an agreed price, there is no reason for the expropriation. (Italics
supplied)
In the instant case, petitioner effectively repudiated the deed of
sale it entered into with the private respondent when it passed
Resolution No. 92-121 on May 25, 1992 authorizing its
president to negotiate, inter alia, that payment shall be
effective only after Agus I HE project has been placed in
operation. It was only then that petitioners intent to expropriate
became manifest as private respondent disagreed and, barely a
month, filed suit.[25]
In the present case, to allow petitioner to use the date it
constructed the tunnels as the date of valuation would be
grossly unfair. First, it did not enter the land under warrant or
color of legal authority or with intent to expropriate the
same. In fact, it did not bother to notify the owners and wrongly
assumed it had the right to dig those tunnels under their
property. Secondly, the improvements introduced by petitioner,
namely, the tunnels, in no way contributed to an increase in
the value of the land. The trial court, therefore, as affirmed by
the CA, rightly computed the valuation of the property as of
1992, when respondents discovered the construction of the
huge underground tunnels beneath their lands and petitioner
confirmed the same and started negotiations for their purchase
but no agreement could be reached.[26]
As to the amount of the valuation, the RTC and the CA both
used as basis the value of the adjacent property, Lot 1 (the
property involved herein being Lots 2 and 3 of the same
subdivision plan), which was valued at P1,000 per sq. meter as
of 1990, as sustained by this Court in Mangondato, thus:
The Second Issue: Valuation
We now come to the issue of valuation.
The fair market value as held by the respondent Court, is the
amount of P1,000.00 per square meter. In an expropriation
case where the principal issue is the determination of just
compensation, as is the case here, a trial before Commissioners
is indispensable to allow the parties to present evidence on the
issue of just compensation. Inasmuch as the determination of
just compensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial
function and factual findings of the Court of Appeals are
conclusive on the parties and reviewable only when the case
falls within the recognized exceptions, which is not the situation
obtaining in this petition, we see no reason to disturb the
factual findings as to valuation of the subject property. As can
be gleaned from the records, the court-and-the-partiesappointed commissioners did not abuse their authority in
evaluating the evidence submitted to them nor misappreciate
the clear preponderance of evidence. The amount fixed and
agreed to by the respondent appellate Court is not grossly
exorbitant. To quote:
Commissioner Ali comes from the Office of the Register of
Deeds who may well be considered an expert, with a general
knowledge of the appraisal of real estate and the prevailing
prices of land in the vicinity of the land in question so that his
opinion on the valuation of the property cannot be lightly
brushed aside.

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The prevailing market value of the land is only one of the

determinants used by the commissioners report the other
being as herein shown:
xxx
xxx
Commissioner Doromals report, recommending P300.00 per
square meter, differs from the 2 commissioners only because
his report was based on the valuation as of 1978 by the City
Appraisal Committee as clarified by the latters chairman in
response to NAPOCORs general counsels query.
In sum, we agree with the Court of Appeals that petitioner has
failed to show why it should be granted an exemption from the
general rule in determining just compensation provided under
Section 4 of Rule 67. On the contrary, private respondent has
convinced us that, indeed, such general rule should in fact be
observed in this case.[27]
Petitioner has not shown any error on the part of the CA in
reaching such a valuation. Furthermore, these are factual
matters that are not within the ambit of the present review.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the Decision of the
Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 57792 dated June 8, 2005
is AFFIRMED
(J)
REPUBPLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (DPWH), petitioner VS
ISMAEL ANDAYA, respondent
G.R. No. 160656
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is a petition for review of the Decision [1] dated October 30,
2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 65066 affirming
with
modification
the
Decision[2] of
the Regional Trial Court of Butuan City, Branch 33 in Civil Case
No. 4378, for enforcement of easement of right-of-way (or
eminent domain).
Respondent Ismael Andaya is the registered owner of two
parcels of land in Bading, Butuan City. His ownership is
evidenced by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. RT-10225 and
RT-10646. These properties are subject to a 60-meter wide
perpetual easement for public highways, irrigation ditches,
aqueducts, and other similar works of the government or public
enterprise, at no cost to the government, except only the value
of the improvements existing thereon that may be affected.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic) negotiated with
Andaya to enforce the 60-meter easement of right-of-way. The
easement was for concrete levees and floodwalls for Phase 1,
Stage 1 of the Lower Agusan Development Project. The parties,
however, failed to reach an agreement.
On December 13, 1995, the Republic instituted an action
before the Regional Trial Court of Butuan City to enforce the
easement of right-of-way or eminent domain. The trial court
issued a writ of possession on April 26, 1996.[3] It also
constituted a Board of Commissioners (Board) to determine the
just compensation. Eventually, the trial court issued an Order of
Expropriation upon payment of just compensation. [4] Later, the
Board reported that there was a discrepancy in the description
of the property sought to be expropriated.The Republic thus
amended its complaint, reducing the 60-meter easement to 10
meters, or an equivalent of 701 square meters.
On December 10, 1998, the Board reported that the project
would affect a total of 10,380 square meters of Andayas
properties, 4,443 square meters of which will be for the 60meter easement. The Board also reported that the easement
would diminish the value of the remaining 5,937 square
meters. As a result, it recommended the payment of
consequential damages amounting to P2,820,430 for the
remaining area.[5]
Andaya objected to the report because although the Republic
reduced the easement to 10 meters or an equivalent of 701
square meters, the Board still granted it 4,443 square
meters. He contended that the consequential damages should
be based on the remaining area of 9,679 square meters. Thus,
the just compensation should be P11,373,405.The Republic did
not file any comment, opposition, nor objection.
After considering the Boards report, the trial court decreed
on April 29, 1999, as follows:

H A N A

B E E

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Court decides as

follows:
a) That the plaintiff is legally entitled to its inherent right of
expropriation to, viz.: 1) the lot now known as lot 3291-B-1-A,
portion of lot 3291-B-1, (LRC) Psd-255693, covered by TCT No.
RT-10225, with an area of 288 sq. m.; and 2) the lot now known
as lot 3293-F-5-B-1, portion of lot 3293-F-5-B (LRC) Psd-230236,
covered by TCT No. RT-10646, with an area of 413 sq. m., both
of the Butuan City Registry of Deeds, it being shown that it is
for public use and purpose --- free of charge by reason of the
statutory lien of easement of right-of-way imposed on
defendants titles;
b) That however, the plaintiff is obligated to pay defendant the
sum of TWO MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED TWENTY THOUSAND
FOUR HUNDRED THIRTY (P2,820,430.00) PESOS as fair and
reasonable severance damages;
c) To pay members of the Board of Commissioners, thus: for the
chairman --- TWENTY THOUSAND (P20,000.00) PESOS and the
two (2) members at FIFTEEN THOUSAND (P15,000.00) PESOS
each;
d) To pay defendants counsel FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00)
PESOS as Attorneys fees; and finally,
e) That the Registry of Deeds of Butuan City is also directed to
effect the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Titles for the
aforementioned two (2) lots in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines, following the technical description as appearing in
pages 6, 7, and 8 of the Commissioners Report.
NO COSTS.
IT IS SO ORDERED.[6]
Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Republic
contested the awards of severance damages and attorneys
fees while Andaya demanded just compensation for his entire
property minus the easement. Andaya alleged that the
easement would prevent ingress and egress to his property and
turn it into a catch basin for the floodwaters coming from
the Agusan River. As a result, his entire property would be
rendered
unusable
and
uninhabitable.
He
thus
demanded P11,373,405 as just compensation based on the
total compensable area of 9,679 square meters.
The Court of Appeals modified the trial courts decision by
imposing a 6% interest on the consequential damages from the
date of the writ of possession or the actual taking, and by
deleting the attorneys fees.
Hence, the instant petition. Simply put, the sole issue for
resolution may be stated thus: Is the Republic liable for just
compensation if in enforcing the legal easement of right-of-way
on a property, the remaining area would be rendered unusable
and uninhabitable?
It is undisputed that there is a legal easement of right-of-way in
favor of the Republic. Andayas transfer certificates of
title[7] contained the reservation that the lands covered thereby
are subject to the provisions of the Land Registration Act [8] and
the Public Land Act. [9] Section 112[10] of the Public Land Act
provides that lands granted by patent shall be subject to a
right-of-way not exceeding 60 meters in width for
public highways, irrigation ditches, aqueducts, and other
similar works of the government or any public enterprise, free
of charge, except only for the value of the improvements
existing thereon that may be affected. In view of this, the Court
of Appeals declared that all the Republic needs to do is to
enforce such right without having to initiate expropriation
proceedings and without having to pay any just compensation.
[11]
Hence, the Republic may appropriate the 701 square meters
necessary for the construction of the floodwalls without paying
for it.
We are, however, unable to sustain the Republics argument
that it is not liable to pay consequential damages if in enforcing
the legal easement on Andayas property, the remaining area
would be rendered unusable and uninhabitable. Taking, in the
exercise of the power of eminent domain, occurs not only when
the government actually deprives or dispossesses the property
owner of his property or of its ordinary use, but also when there
is a practical destruction or material impairment of the value of
his property.[12] Using this standard, there was undoubtedly a
taking of the remaining area of Andayas property. True, no
burden was imposed thereon and Andaya still retained title and
possession of the property. But, as correctly observed by the
Board and affirmed by the courts a quo, the nature and the
effect of the floodwalls would deprive Andaya of the normal use

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of the remaining areas. It would prevent ingress and egress to

the property and turn it into a catch basin for the floodwaters
coming from the Agusan River.
For this reason, in our view, Andaya is entitled to payment of
just compensation, which must be neither more nor less than
the monetary equivalent of the land. [13] One of the basic
principles enshrined in our Constitution is that no person shall
be deprived of his private property without due process of law;
and in expropriation cases, an essential element of due process
is that there must be just compensation whenever private
property is taken for public use. Noteworthy, Section 9, Article
III of our Constitution mandates that private property shall not
be taken for public use without just compensation.[14]
Finally, we affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals and the
trial court that just compensation should be paid only for 5,937
square meters of the total area of 10,380 square
meters. Admittedly, the Republic needs only a 10-meter
easement or an equivalent of 701 square meters. Yet, it is also
settled that it is legally entitled to a 60-meter wide easement
or an equivalent of 4,443 square meters. Clearly, although the
Republic will use only 701 square meters, it should not be liable
for the 3,742 square meters, which constitute the difference
between this area of 701 square meters and the 4,443 square
meters to which it is fully entitled to use as easement, free of
charge except for damages to affected existing improvements,
if any, under Section 112 of the Public Land Act.
In effect, without such damages alleged and proved, the
Republic is liable for just compensation of only the remaining
areas consisting of 5,937 square meters, with interest thereon
at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the date of the writ of
possession or the actual taking until full payment is made. For
the purpose of determining the final just compensation, the
case is remanded to the trial court. Said court is ordered to
make the determination of just compensation payable to
respondent Andaya with deliberate dispatch.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated October 30, 2003 in CA-G.R. CV No. 65066, modifying the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Butuan City, Branch 33 in
Civil
Case
No.
4378,
is AFFIRMED
with
MODIFICATION as herein set forth.

(J)

(K)

(L)

(M)

H A N A

(N)

(O)

(P)

(Q)

(R)

(S)

(T)

(U)

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B E E