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MAGDALO PARA SA PAGBABAGO v.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 190793, 19 June 2012, EN BANC (Sereno, J.)
Public knowledge of facts pertaining to employment of violence and unlawful me
ans to
achieve ones goals is within the determination of the COMELEC, and such fact is
suffcient to
deny a party registration and accreditation.
Magdalo sa Pagbabago (MAGDALO) fled its Petition for Registration with
the respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC), seeking its registration
and/or accreditation as a regional political party based in the Nation
al Capital
Region (NCR) for participation in the 2010 National and Local Elections. It was
represented by its Chairperson, Senator Antonio F. Trillanes IV (Trillanes), and
its
Secretary General, Francisco Ashley L. Acedillo (Acedillo).
Taking cognizance of the Oakwood incident, the COMELEC denied
the Petition, claiming that MAGDALOs purpose was to employ violence and
unlawful means to achieve their goals.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it
denied the Petition for Registration fled by MAGDALO on the ground that the
latter seeks to achieve its goals through violent or unlawful means
HELD:
MAGDALO contends that it was grave abuse of discretion for the
COMELEC to have denied the Petition for Registration not on the basis of facts
or evidence on record, but on mere speculation and conjectures. This argument
cannot be given any merit.
Under the Rules of Court, judicial noti
ce may be
taken of matters that are of public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionabl
e
demonstration. Further, Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the
Revised Administrative Code, specifcally empowers administrative agencies
to
admit and give probative value to evidence commonly acceptable by reasonably
prudent men, and to take notice of judicially cognizable facts.
That the Oakwood incident was widely known and extensively covered
by the media made it a proper subject of judicial notice. Thus, the COMELEC
did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it treated these facts
as public
knowledge, and took cognizance thereof without requiring the introduction and
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reception of evidence thereon.
The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in fnding that
MAGDALO uses violence or unlawful means to achieve its goals. Under Article
IX-C, Section 2(5) of the 1987 Constitution, parties, organizations and coaliti
ons
that seek to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means sha
ll be
denied registration. This disqualifcation is reiterated in Section 61 o
f B.P. 881,

which provides that no political party which seeks to achieve its goal
through
violence shall be entitled to accreditation.
In the present case, the Oakwood incident was one that was attended with
violence. As publicly announced by the leaders of MAGDALO during the siege,
their objectives were to express their dissatisfaction with the adminis
tration of
former President Arroyo and to divulge the alleged corruption in the military an
d
the supposed sale of arms to enemies of the state. Ultimately, they wanted th
e
President, her cabinet members, and the top offcials of the AFP and the PNP
to resign. To achieve these goals, MAGDALO opted to seize a hotel occupied
by civilians, march in the premises in full battle gear with ammunitions, and pl
ant
explosives in the building. These brash methods by which MAGDALO opted
to ventilate the grievances of its members and withdraw its support
from the
government constituted clear acts of violence. The COMELEC did not, therefore,
commit grave abuse of discretion when it treated the Oakwood standoff
as a
manifestation of the predilection of MAGDALO for resorting to violenc
e or
threats thereof in order to achieve its objectives.
The fnding that MAGDALO seeks to achieve its goals through violence
or unlawful means did not operate as a prejudgment of Criminal Case
No. 032784.
The power vested by Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the Constit
ution and
Section 61 of BP 881 in the COMELEC to register political parties and ascertain
the eligibility of groups to participate in the elections is purely administrat
ive in
character. In exercising this authority, the COMELEC only has to assess whether
the party or organization seeking registration or accreditation pursues its goal
s by
employing acts considered as violent or unlawful, and not necessarily criminal i
n
nature.
In fnding that MAGDALO resorts to violence or unlawful acts to fulfll
its organizational objectives, the COMELEC did not render an assessment as to
whether the members of MAGDALO committed crimes, as COMELEC was not
required to make that determination in the frst place. Its evaluation was limite
d
only to examining whether MAGDALO possessed all the necessary qualifcations
and none of disqualifcations for registration as a political party.
Accreditation
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as a political party is not a right but only a privilege given to
groups who have
qualifed and met the requirements provided by law.
Noteworthily, however, in view of the subsequent amnesty granted in
favor of the members of MAGDALO, the events that transpired during
the
Oakwood incident can no longer be interpreted as acts of violence in the contex
t

of the disqualifcations from party registration.

RUSSEL ULYSSES I. NIEVES v. JOCELYN LB. BLANCO,
in her capacity as the Regional Director, Regional Offce No. V,
DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY
G.R. No. 190422, 19 June 2012, EN BANC (Reyes, J.)
A reassignment from one provincial offce to another provincial offce within the
same
region is not considered as a reassignment outside geographical location.
Russel Ulysses I. Nieves is a Trade and Industry Development Specialist
of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). Nieves was formerly assigned
to the DTIs offce in Sorsogon but was reassigned by to DTIs provincial offce in
Albay. A year after his reassignment to DTI-Albay, Nieves requested DTI Regional
V Director Jocelyn Blanco for his reassignment back to DTI-Sorsogon but this
was denied.
Nieves appealed his reassignment to the Civil Service Commission
(CSC) asserting that under Section 6(a) of the CSC Omnibus Revised Rules on
Reassignment, he is a station-specifc employee and is allowed only to be reassig
ned
for a maximum period of one year.
CSC however pointed out that Ni
eves
appointment is not station-specifc but this does not mean that Nieves could be
reassigned to DTI-Albay indefnitely. The CSC ruled that under the Revised Rules
on Reassignment, a reassignment outside the geographical location, if without t
he
consent of the employee concerned should not exceed the maximum period of
one year.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the reassignment of Nieves is station-specifc and subject
to the one-year period limitation