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PAL
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court seeking to annul and set aside the Decision and the
Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP. No. 86813.
Petitioners were employed as female flight attendants of respondent
Philippine Airlines (PAL) on different dates prior to November 22, 1996. They
are members of the Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of the
Philippines (FASAP), a labor organization certified as the sole and exclusive
certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the flight
attendants, flight stewards and pursers of respondent.
On July 11, 2001, respondent and FASAP entered into a Collective
Bargaining Agreement incorporating the terms and conditions of their
agreement for the years 2000 to 2005, hereinafter referred to as PAL-FASAP
CBA.
Section 144, Part A of the PAL-FASAP CBA, provides that:
invalidity of Section 144, Part A of the PAL-FASAP CBA. The RTC set a
hearing on petitioners' application for a TRO and, thereafter, required the
parties to submit their respective memoranda.
On August 9, 2004, the RTC issued an Order upholding its jurisdiction over
the present case. The RTC reasoned that:
In the instant case, the thrust of the Petition is Sec. 144 of the
subject CBA which is allegedly discriminatory as it
discriminates against female flight attendants, in violation of the
Constitution, the Labor Code, and the CEDAW. The allegations
in the Petition do not make out a labor dispute arising from
employer-employee relationship as none is shown to exist. This
case is not directed specifically against respondent arising from
any act of the latter, nor does it involve a claim against the
respondent. Rather, this case seeks a declaration of the nullity
of the questioned provision of the CBA, which is within the
Court's competence, with the allegations in the Petition
constituting the bases for such relief sought.
The RTC issued a TRO on August 10, 2004, enjoining the respondent for
implementing Section 144, Part A of the PAL-FASAP CBA.
The respondent filed an omnibus motion[if !supportFootnotes][10][endif] seeking
reconsideration of the order overruling its objection to the jurisdiction of the
RTC the lifting of the TRO. It further prayed that the (1) petitioners'
application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction be denied; and
(2) the petition be dismissed or the proceedings in this case be suspended.
In a letter dated July 22, 2003 petitioners and several female cabin crews
manifested that the aforementioned CBA provision on compulsory retirement
is discriminatory, and demanded for an equal treatment with their male
counterparts. This demand was reiterated in a letter by petitioners' counsel
addressed to respondent demanding the removal of gender discrimination
provisions in the coming re-negotiations of the PAL-FASAP CBA.
On September 27, 2004, the RTC issued an Order directing the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the respondent or any of its agents
and representatives from further implementing Sec. 144, Part A of the PALFASAP CBA pending the resolution of the case.
On July 29, 2004, petitioners filed a Special Civil Action for Declaratory
Relief with Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and Writ
of Preliminary Injunction with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City,
Branch 147, docketed as Civil Case No. 04-886, against respondent for the
SO ORDERED.
In the case at bar, the allegations in the petition for declaratory relief plainly
show that petitioners' cause of action is the annulment of Section 144, Part A
of the PAL-FASAP CBA. The pertinent portion of the petition recites:
CAUSE OF ACTION
The main issue in this case is whether the RTC has jurisdiction
over the petitioners' action challenging the legality or
constitutionality of the provisions on the compulsory retirement
age contained in the CBA between respondent PAL and FASAP.
Petitioners submit that the RTC has jurisdiction in all civil actions
in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary
estimation and in all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of
any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasijudicial functions. The RTC has the power to adjudicate all
controversies except those expressly witheld from the plenary
powers of the court. Accordingly, it has the power to decide
issues of constitutionality or legality of the provisions of Section
144, Part A of the PAL-FASAP CBA. As the issue involved is
constitutional in character, the labor arbiter or the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) has no jurisdiction over the case
and, thus, the petitioners pray that judgment be rendered on the
merits declaring Section 144, Part A of the PAL-FASAP CBA null
and void.
Respondent, on the other hand, alleges that the labor tribunals have
jurisdiction over the present case, as the controversy partakes of a labor
dispute. The dispute concerns the terms and conditions of petitioners'
employment in PAL, specifically their retirement age. The RTC has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of petitioners' petition for declaratory relief
because the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators have
From the petitioners' allegations and relief prayed for in its petition, it is clear
that the issue raised is whether Section 144, Part A of the PAL-FASAP CBA
This Court holds that the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitrators do
not have the power to determine and settle the issues at hand. They have no
jurisdiction and competence to decide constitutional issues relative to the
questioned compulsory retirement age. Their exercise of jurisdiction is futile,
as it is like vesting power to someone who cannot wield it.
In Gonzales v. Climax Mining Ltd. this Court affirmed the jurisdiction of
courts over questions on constitutionality of contracts, as the same involves
the exercise of judicial power. The Court said:
Whether the case involves void or voidable contracts is
still a judicial question. It may, in some instances, involve
questions of fact especially with regard to the determination of
the circumstances of the execution of the contracts. But the
resolution of the validity or voidness of the contracts remains a
legal or judicial question as it requires the exercise of judicial
function. It requires the ascertainment of what laws are
applicable to the dispute, the interpretation and application of
those laws, and the rendering of a judgment based thereon.
Clearly, the dispute is not a mining conflict. It is essentially
judicial. The complaint was not merely for the determination of
rights under the mining contracts since the very validity of those
contracts is put in issue.
In Saura v. Saura, Jr. this Court emphasized the primacy of the regular
court's judicial power enshrined in the Constitution that is true that the trend
is towards vesting administrative bodies like the SEC with the power to
adjudicate matters coming under their particular specialization, to insure a
more knowledgeable solution of the problems submitted to them. This would
also relieve the regular courts of a substantial number of cases that would
otherwise swell their already clogged dockets. But as expedient as this
policy may be, it should not deprive the courts of justice of their power
to decide ordinary cases in accordance with the general laws that do
not require any particular expertise or training to interpret and apply.
Otherwise, the creeping take-over by the administrative agencies of the
judicial power vested in the courts would render the judiciary virtually
impotent in the discharge of the duties assigned to it by the
Constitution.
difference in compulsory age retirement between its female and male flight
attendants, particularly those employed before November 22, 1996. Without
FASAP's active participation on behalf of its female flight attendants, the
utilization of the grievance machinery or voluntary arbitration would be
pointless.
The trial court in this case is not asked to interpret Section 144, Part A of the
PAL-FASAP CBA. Interpretation, as defined in Black's Law Dictionary, is the
art of or process of discovering and ascertaining the meaning of a statute,
will, contract, or other written document. The provision regarding the
compulsory retirement of flight attendants is not ambiguous and does not
require interpretation. Neither is there any question regarding the
implementation of the subject CBA provision, because the manner of
implementing the same is clear in itself. The only controversy lies in its
intrinsic validity.
Although it is a rule that a contract freely entered between the parties should
be respected, since a contract is the law between the parties, said rule is not
absolute.
In Pakistan International Airlines Corporation v. Ople this Court held that:
In the same vein, the dispute in the case at bar is not between FASAP and
respondent PAL, who have both previously agreed upon the provision on the
compulsory retirement of female flight attendants as embodied in the CBA.
The dispute is between respondent PAL and several female flight attendants
who questioned the provision on compulsory retirement of female flight
attendants. Thus, applying the principle in the aforementioned case cited,
referral to the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration would not serve
the interest of the petitioners.
Besides, a referral of the case to the grievance machinery and to the
voluntary arbitrator under the CBA would be futile because respondent
already implemented Section 114, Part A of PAL-FASAP CBA when several
of its female flight attendants reached the compulsory retirement age of 55.
Further, FASAP, in a letter dated July 12, 2004, addressed to PAL, submitted
its association's bargaining proposal for the remaining period of 2004-2005
of the PAL-FASAP CBA, which includes the renegotiation of the subject
Section 144. However, FASAP's attempt to change the questioned provision
was shallow and superficial, to say the least, because it exerted no further
efforts to pursue its proposal. When petitioners in their individual capacities
questioned the legality of the compulsory retirement in the CBA before the
trial court, there was no showing that FASAP, as their representative,
endeavored to adjust, settle or negotiate with PAL for the removal of the
upon in the CBA are absolutely beyond the ambit of judicial review and
nullification. A CBA, as a labor contract, is not merely contractual in nature
but impressed with public interest. If the retirement provisions in the CBA run
contrary to law, public morals, or public policy, such provisions may very well
be voided.
Finally, the issue in the petition for certiorari brought before the CA by the
respondent was the alleged exercise of grave abuse of discretion of the RTC
in taking cognizance of the case for declaratory relief. When the CA annuled
and set aside the RTC's order, petitioners sought relief before this Court
through the instant petition for review under Rule 45. A perusal of the petition
before Us, petitioners pray for the declaration of the alleged discriminatory
provision in the CBA against its female flight attendants.
This Court is not persuaded. The rule is settled that pure questions of fact
may not be the proper subject of an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court. This mode of appeal is generally limited only to
questions of law which must be distinctly set forth in the petition. The
Supreme Court is not a trier of facts.
The question as to whether said Section 114, Part A of the PAL-FASAP CBA
is discriminatory or not is a question of fact. This would require the
presentation and reception of evidence by the parties in order for the trial
court to ascertain the facts of the case and whether said provision violates
the Constitution, statutes and treaties. A full-blown trial is necessary, which
jurisdiction to hear the same is properly lodged with the the RTC. Therefore,
a remand of this case to the RTC for the proper determination of the merits
of the petition for declaratory relief is just and proper.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated August 31, 2005 and March 7,
2006, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP. No. 86813 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 147 is DIRECTED to
continue the proceedings in Civil Case No. 04-886 with deliberate dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 112139. January 31, 2000]
LAPANDAY
AGRICULTURAL
DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION,
petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (Former Eighth
Division) and COMMANDO SECURITY SERVICE AGENCY, INC.,
respondents.
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the decision of the Court of
mandated. However, in the case at bar, the contract for security services had
earlier been terminated without the corresponding amendment. Plaintiff now
demands adjustment in the contract price as the same was deemed
amended by Wage Order Nos. 5 and 6.
Before the plaintiff could pay the minimum wage as mandated by law,
adjustments must be paid by the principal to the security agency concerned.
"Given these circumstances, if PTS pays the security guards, it cannot claim
reimbursements from Eagle. But if its Eagle that pays them, the latter can
claim reimbursement from PTS in lieu of an adjustment, considering that the
contract had expired and had not been renewed. (Eagle Security Agency vs.
NLRC and Phil. Tuberculosis Society, Inc. vs. NLRC, et al., 18 May 1989).
"As to the issue that Wage Orders Nos. 5 and 6 constitute impairments of
contracts in violation of constitutional guarantees, the High Court ruled" The
Supreme Court has rejected the impairment of contract argument in
sustaining the validity and constitutionality of labor and social legislation like
the Blue Sunday Law, compulsory coverage of private sector employees in
the Social Security System, and the abolition of share tenancy enacted
pursuant to the police power of the state (Eagle Security Agency, Inc. vs.
National Labor Relation Commission and Phil. Tuberculosis Society, Inc. vs.
NLRC, et al., May 18, 1989)."
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied. hence this petition where
petitioner cites the following grounds to support the instant petition for
review:
"1. THE WAGE INCREASES PROVIDED FOR IN THE WAGE ORDERS
WERE DUE TO THE GUARDS AND NOT THE SECURITY AGENCY;
2. A SECURITY AGENCY WHO DID NOT PAY WAGE INCREASE TO ITS
GUARDS IT HAD ALREADY TERMINATED AND WITHOUT THEIR
AUTHORIZATION CANNOT INSTITUTE AN ACTION TO RECOVER SAID
WAGE INCREASE FOR ITS BENEFIT;
3. IN THE ABSENCE OF BAD FAITH AND WITHOUT THE TRIAL COURT
CORRECTLY ESTABLISHING THE BASIS FOR ATTORNEYS FEES, THE
SAME MAY NOT BE AWARDED.
4. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS (SIC) IS THE PROPER FORUM
THAT HAS THE JURISDICTION TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE OF WHETHER
OR NOT THE PETITIONER IS LIABLE TO PAY THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENT THE WAGE AND ALLOWANCE INCREASES MANDATED
UNDER WAGE ORDER NOS. 5 AND 6."
Reiterating its position below, petitioner asserts that private respondent has
no factual and legal basis to collect the benefits under subject Wage Order
Nos. 5 and 6 intended for the security guards without the authorization of the
security guards concerned. Inasmuch as the services of the forty-two (42)
security guards were already terminated at the time the complaint was filed
on August 15, 1988, private respondents complaint partakes of the nature of
an action for recovery of what was supposedly due the guards under said
Wage Orders, amounts that they claim were never paid by private
respondent and therefore not collectible by the latter from the petitioner.
Petitioner also assails the award of attorneys fees in the amount of
P115,585.31 or 25% of the total adjustment claim of P462,341.25 for lack of
basis and for being unconscionable.
Moreover, petitioner submits that it is the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) and not the civil courts that has jurisdiction to resolve
the issue involved in this case for it refers to the enforcement of wage
adjustment and other benefits due to private respondents security guards
mandated under Wage Order Nos. 5 and 6. Considering that the RTC has no
jurisdiction, its decision is without force and effect
On the other hand, private respondent contends that the basis of its action
against petitioner-appellant is the enforcement of the Guard Service
Contract entered into by them, which is deemed amended by Section 6 of
Wage Order No. 5 and Section 9 of Wage Order No. 6; that pursuant to their
amended Guard Service Contract, the increases/adjustments in wages and
ECOLA are due to private respondent and not to the security guards who are
not parties to the said contract. It is therefore immaterial whether or not
private respondent paid its security guards their wages as adjusted by said
Wage Orders and that since the forty-two (42) security guards are not parties
to the Guard Service Contract, there is no need for them to authorize the
filing of, or be joined in, this suit.
As regards the award to private respondent of the amount of P115,585.31 as
attorneys fees, private respondent maintains that there is enough evidence
and/or basis for the grant thereof, considering that the adamant attitude of
the petitioner (in implementing the questioned Wage Orders) compelled the
herein private respondent, to litigate in court. Furthermore, since the legal
fee payable by private respondent to its counsel is essentially on contingent
basis, the amount of P115,583.31 granted by the trial court which is 25% of
the total claim is not unconscionable.
As regards the jurisdiction of the RTC, private respondent alleges that the
suit filed before the trial court is for the purpose of securing the upgrading of
the Guard Service Contract entered into by herein petitioner and private
respondent in June 1983. The enforcement of this written contract does not
fall under the jurisdiction of the NLRC because the money claims involved
therein did not arise from employer-employee relations between the parties
and is intrinsically a civil dispute. Thus, jurisdiction lies with the regular
courts. Private respondent further contends that petitioner is estopped or
barred from raising the question of jurisdiction for the first time before the
Supreme Court after having voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the
regular courts below and having lost its case therein.
We resolve to grant the petition.
We resolve first the issue of jurisdiction. We agree with the respondent that
the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the present case. It is well
settled in law and jurisprudence that where no employer-employee
relationship exists between the parties and no issue is involved which may
be resolved by reference to the Labor Code, other labor statutes or any
collective bargaining agreement, it is the Regional Trial Court that has
jurisdiction. In its complaint, private respondent is not seeking any relief
under the Labor Code but seeks payment of a sum of money and damages
on account of petitioners alleged breach of its obligation under their Guard
Service Contract. The action is within the realm of civil law hence jurisdiction
over the case belongs to the regular courts. While the resolution of the issue
involves the application of labor laws, reference to the labor code was only
for the determination of the solidary liability of the petitioner to the
respondent where no employer-employee relation exists. Article 217 of the
Labor Code as amended vests upon the labor arbiters exclusive original
jurisdiction only over the following:
1. Unfair labor practices;
2. Termination disputes;
3. If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that workers
may file involving wages, rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and
conditions of employment;
4. Claims for actual, moral exemplary and other forms of damages arising
from employer-employee relations;
5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code, including
questions involving legality of strikes and lockouts; and
6. Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social Security, Medicare
and maternity benefits, all other claims, arising from employer-employee
relations, including those of persons in domestic or household service,
involving an amount exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) regardless
of whether accompanied with a claim for reinstatement.
In all these cases, an employer-employee relationship is an indispensable
jurisdictional requisite and there is none in this case.
On the merits, the core issue involved in the present petition is whether or
not petitioner is liable to the private respondent for the wage adjustments
provided under Wage Order Nos. 5 and 6 and for attorneys fees.
Private respondent admits that there is no employer-employee relationship
between it and the petitioner. The private respondent is an independent/job
contractor who assigned security guards at the petitioners premises for a
stipulated amount per guard per month. The Contract of Security Services
expressly stipulated that the security guards are employees of the Agency
and not of the petitioner. Articles 106 and 107 of the Labor Code provides
the rule governing the payment of wages of employees in the event that the
contractor fails to pay such wages as follows:
On the other hand, there existed a contractual agreement between PTSI and
EAGLE wherein the former availed of the security services provided by the
latter. In return, the security agency collects from its client payment for its
security services. This payment covers the wages for the security guards
and also expenses for their supervision and training, the guards bonds,
firearms with ammunitions, uniforms and other equipments, accessories,
tools, materials and supplies necessary for the maintenance of a security
force
.
Premises considered, the security guards immediate recourse for the
payment of the increases is with their direct employer, EAGLE. However, in
order for the security agency to comply with the new wage and allowance
rates it has to pay the security guards, the Wage Orders made specific
provision to amend existing contracts for security services by allowing the
adjustment of the consideration paid by the principal to the security agency
concerned. What the Wage Orders require, therefore, is the amendment of
the contracts as to the consideration to cover the service contractors
payment of the increases mandated. In the end, therefore, ultimate liability
for the payment of the increases rests with the principal.
In view of the foregoing, the security guards should claim the amount of the
increases from EAGLE. Under the Labor Code, in case the agency fails to
pay them the amounts claimed, PTSI should be held solidarily liable with
EAGLE [Articles 106, 107 and 109]. Should EAGLE pay, it can claim an
adjustment from PTSI for an increase in consideration to cover the increases
payable to the security guards.
It is clear also from the foregoing that it is only when contractor pays the
increases mandated that it can claim an adjustment from the principal to
cover the increases payable to the security guards. The conclusion that
the right of the contractor (as principal debtor) to recover from the
principal as solidary co-debtor) arises only if he has paid the amounts for
which both of them are jointly and severally liable is in line with Article
1217 of the Civil Code which provides:
"Art. 1217. Payment made by one of the solidary debtors extinguishes the
obligation. If two or more solidary debtors offer to pay, the creditor may
choose which offer to accept.
He who made payment may claim from his co debtors only the share which
corresponds to each, with interest for the payment already made. If the
payment is made before the debt is due, no interest for the intervening
period may be demanded. xxx"
The factual findings of the voluntary arbitrator, as well as of the CA, are not
clear on what happened afterwards. Even the records are bereft of sufficient
information.
On 18 November 2005, the NCMB voluntary arbitrator rendered a Decision
finding petitioner corporation liable for illegal dismissal. 15 The termination of
respondent Albarico, by reason of alleged poor performance, was found
invalid.16 The arbitrator explained that the promotions, increases in salary,
and awards received by respondent belied the claim that the latter was
performing poorly.17 It was also found that Albarico could not have
abandoned his job, as the abandonment should have been clearly shown.
Mere absence was not sufficient, according to the arbitrator, but must have
been accompanied by overt acts pointing to the fact that the employee did
not want to work anymore. It was noted that, in the present case, the
immediate filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal against the employer, with
a prayer for reinstatement, showed that the employee was not abandoning
his work. The voluntary arbitrator also found that Albarico was dismissed
from his work without due process.
However, it was found that reinstatement was no longer possible because of
the strained relationship of the parties.18 Thus, in lieu of reinstatement, the
voluntary arbitrator ordered the corporation to pay separation pay for two
years at P4,456 for each year, or a total amount of P8,912.
Additionally, in view of the finding that Albarico had been illegally dismissed,
the voluntary arbitrator also ruled that the former was entitled to backwages
in the amount of P90,804.19 Finally, the arbitrator awarded attorneys fees in
respondents favor, because he had been compelled to file an action for
illegal dismissal.20
Petitioner corporation subsequently appealed to the CA, imputing to the
voluntary arbitrator grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction for awarding backwages and attorneys fees to respondent
Albarico based on the formers finding of illegal dismissal. 21 The arbitrator
contended that the issue of the legality of dismissal was not explicitly
included in the Submission Agreement dated 19 April 1993 filed for voluntary
arbitration and resolution. It prayed that the said awards be set aside, and
that only separation pay of P8,912.00 and sales commission of P4,787.60
be awarded.
The CA affirmed the Decision of the voluntary arbitrator, but eliminated the
award of attorneys fees for having been made without factual, legal or
equitable justification.22 Petitioners Motion for Partial Reconsideration was
denied as well.23
Hence, this Petition.
ISSUE
The issue before the Court is whether the CA committed reversible error in
finding that the voluntary arbitrator properly assumed jurisdiction to decide
the issue of the legality of the dismissal of respondent as well as the latters
entitlement to backwages, even if neither the legality nor the entitlement was
same Article 262 of the Labor Code can include all those disputes mentioned
in Article 217 over which the Labor Arbiter has original and exclusive
jurisdiction."26
From the above discussion, it is clear that voluntary arbitrators may, by
agreement of the parties, assume jurisdiction over a termination dispute
such as the present case, contrary to the assertion of petitioner that they
may not.
We now resolve the main issue. Petitioner argues that, assuming that the
voluntary arbitrator has jurisdiction over the present termination dispute, the
latter should have limited his decision to the issue contained in the
Submission Agreement of the parties the issue of whether respondent
Albarico was entitled to separation pay and to the sales commission the
latter earned before being terminated.27 Petitioner asserts that under Article
262 of the Labor Code, the jurisdiction of a voluntary arbitrator is strictly
limited to the issues that the parties agree to submit. Thus, it contends that
the voluntary arbitrator exceeded his jurisdiction when he resolved the
issues of the legality of the dismissal of respondent and the latters
entitlement to backwages on the basis of a finding of illegal dismissal.
According to petitioner, the CA wrongly concluded that the issue of
respondents entitlement to separation pay was necessarily based on his
allegation of illegal dismissal, thereby making the issue of the legality of his
dismissal implicitly submitted to the voluntary arbitrator for resolution. 28
Petitioner argues that this was an erroneous conclusion, because separation
pay may in fact be awarded even in circumstances in which there is no
illegal dismissal.
We rule that although petitioner correctly contends that separation pay may
in fact be awarded for reasons other than illegal dismissal, the
circumstances of the instant case lead to no other conclusion than that the
claim of respondent Albarico for separation pay was premised on his
allegation of illegal dismissal. Thus, the voluntary arbitrator properly
assumed jurisdiction over the issue of the legality of his dismissal.
True, under the Labor Code, separation pay may be given not only when
there is illegal dismissal. In fact, it is also given to employees who are
terminated for authorized causes, such as redundancy, retrenchment or
installation of labor-saving devices under Article 283 29 of the Labor Code.
Additionally, jurisprudence holds that separation pay may also be awarded
for considerations of social justice, even if an employee has been terminated
for a just cause other than serious misconduct or an act reflecting on moral
character.30 The Court has also ruled that separation pay may be awarded if
it has become an established practice of the company to pay the said benefit
to voluntarily resigning employees31 or to those validly dismissed for nonmembership in a union as required in a closed-shop agreement.32
Under Art. 129 of the Labor Code, the power of the DOLE and its
duly authorized hearing officers to hear and decide any matter involving the
recovery of wages and other monetary claims and benefits was qualified by
the proviso that the complaint not include a claim for reinstatement, or that
the aggregate money claims not exceed PhP 5,000. RA 7730, or an Act
Further Strengthening the Visitorial and Enforcement Powers of the
Secretary of Labor, did away with the PhP 5,000 limitation, allowing the
DOLE Secretary to exercise its visitorial and enforcement power for claims
beyond PhP 5,000. The only qualification to this expanded power of the
DOLE was only that there still be an existing employer-employee
relationship.
It is conceded that if there is no employer-employee relationship,
whether it has been terminated or it has not existed from the start, the DOLE
has no jurisdiction. Under Art. 128(b) of the Labor Code, as amended by RA
7730, the first sentence reads, Notwithstanding the provisions of Articles 129
and 217 of this Code to the contrary, and in cases where the relationship of
employer-employee still exists, the Secretary of Labor and Employment or
his duly authorized representatives shall have the power to issue compliance
orders to give effect to the labor standards provisions of this Code and other
labor legislation based on the findings of labor employment and enforcement
officers or industrial safety engineers made in the course of inspection. It is
clear and beyond debate that an employer-employee relationship must exist
for the exercise of the visitorial and enforcement power of the DOLE. The
question now arises, may the DOLE make a determination of whether or not
an employer-employee relationship exists, and if so, to what extent?
The first portion of the question must be answered in the
affirmative.
The prior decision of this Court in the present case accepts such
answer, but places a limitation upon the power of the DOLE, that is, the
determination of the existence of an employer-employee relationship cannot
be co-extensive with the visitorial and enforcement power of the DOLE. But
even in conceding the power of the DOLE to determine the existence of an
employer-employee relationship, the Court held that the determination of the
existence of an employer-employee relationship is still primarily within the
power of the NLRC, that any finding by the DOLE is merely preliminary.
This conclusion must be revisited.
No limitation in the law was placed upon the power of the DOLE
to determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship. No
procedure was laid down where the DOLE would only make a preliminary
finding, that the power was primarily held by the NLRC. The law did not say
that the DOLE would first seek the NLRCs determination of the existence of
x.
xxxxxxxxx
Section 3. Requisites for Perfection of Appeal. (a) The appeal shall be filed
within the reglementary period as provided in Section 1 of this Rule; shall be
under oath with proof of payment of the required appeal fee and the posting
of a cash or surety bond as provided in Section 5 of this Rule; shall be
accompanied by a memorandum of appeal which shall state the grounds
relied upon and the arguments in support thereof; the relief prayed for; and a
statement of the date when the appellant received the appealed decision,
order or award and proof of service on the other party of such appeal.
A mere notice of appeal without complying with the other requisite
aforestated shall not stop the running of the period for perfecting an appeal.
xxxxxxxxx
Section 6. Bond. In case the decision of the Labor Arbiter, the Regional
Director or his duly authorized Hearing Officer involves a monetary award,
an appeal by the employer shall be perfected only upon the posting of
a cash or surety bond, which shall be in effect until final disposition of the
case, issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the
Commission or the Supreme Court in an amount equivalent to the monetary
award, exclusive of damages and attorneys fees.
The employer, his counsel, as well as the bonding company, shall submit a
joint declaration under oath attesting that the surety bond posted is genuine.
The Commission may, in justifiable cases and upon Motion of the Appellant,
reduce the amount of the bond. The filing of the motion to reduce bond shall
not stop the running of the period to perfect appeal. (Emphasis ours)
In the case at bar, petitioner received the decision of the Labor Arbiter on
January 6, 2000. He filed his notice of appeal with memorandum of appeal
and paid the corresponding appeal fees on January 17, 2000, the last day of
filing the appeal. However, in lieu of the required cash or surety bond, he
filed a motion to reduce bond alleging that the amount of P1,427,802,04 as
bond is unjustified and prohibitive and prayed that the same be reduced to a
reasonable level. The NLRC denied the motion and consequently dismissed
the appeal for non-perfection. Petitioner now contends that he was deprived
of the chance to post bond because the NLRC took 102 days to decide his
motion.
Petitioners argument is unavailing.
While, Section 6, Rule VI of the NLRCs New Rules of Procedure allows the
Commission to reduce the amount of the bond, the exercise of the authority
is not a matter of right on the part of the movant but lies within the sound
discretion of the NLRC upon showing of meritorious grounds. Petitioners
motion reads:
1. The appeal bond which respondents-appellants will post in this case is
P1,427,802.04. They are precisely questioning this amount as being
unjustified and prohibitive under the premises.
2. The amount of this appeal bond must be reduced to a reasonable level by
petitioner pointed out that neither the NLRC nor the Labor Arbiter is
empowered to adjudicate matters involving ownership of properties.
On August 27, 1996, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
Hence, this appeal.
The Issues
The issues raised are (1) whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that
petitioner was guilty of forum shopping, and (2) whether the Court of Appeals
erred in dismissing the petitioners accion reinvindicatoria on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction of the trial court.
The Courts Ruling
On the first issue raised, we rule that there was no forum shopping.
In Golangco v. Court of Appeals we held:
What is truly important to consider in determining whether forum shopping
exists or not is the vexation caused the courts and parties-litigant by a party
who asks different courts and/or administrative agencies to rule on the same
or related causes and/or grant the same or substantially the same reliefs, in
the process creating possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the
different for a upon the same issues.
xxx xxx xxx
There is no forum-shopping where two different orders were questioned, two
distinct causes of action and issues were raised, and two objectives were
sought. (Underscoring ours)
In the case at bar, there was no identity of parties, rights and causes of
action and reliefs sought.
The case before the NLRC where Labor Arbiter Reyes issued a writ of
execution on the property of petitioner was a labor dispute between Artex
and Samar-Anglo. Petitioner was not a party to the case. The only issue
petitioner raised before the NLRC was whether or not the writ of execution
issued by the labor arbiter could be satisfied against the property of
petitioner, not a party to the labor case.
On the other hand, the accion reinvindicatoria filed by petitioner in the trial
court was to recover the property illegally levied upon and sold at auction.
Hence, the causes of action in these cases were different.
The rule is that for forum-shopping to exist both actions must involve the
same transactions, the same circumstances. The actions must also raise
identical causes of action, subject matter and issues.
In Chemphil Export & Import Corporation v. Court of Appeals we ruled that:
Forum-shopping or the act of a party against whom an adverse judgment
has been rendered in one forum, of seeking another (and possible) opinion
in another forum (other than by appeal or the special civil action of certiorari),
or the institution of two (2) or more actions or proceedings grounded on the
same cause on the supposition that one or the other would make a favorable
disposition.
On the second issue, a third party whose property has been levied upon by a
person and after summary hearing, the court may command that the
property be released from the mistaken levy and restored to the rightful
owner or possessor. What said court do in these instances, however, is
limited to a determination of whether the sheriff has acted rightly or wrongly
in the performance of his duties in the execution of judgment, more
specifically, if he has indeed taken hold of property not belonging to the
judgment debtor. The court does not and cannot pass upon the question of
title to the property, with any character of finality. It can treat of the matter
only insofar as may be necessary to decide if the sheriff has acted correctly
or not. It can require the sheriff to restore the property to the claimants
possession if warranted by the evidence. However, if the claimants proof do
not persuade the court of the validity of his title or right of possession
thereto, the claim will be denied.
Independent of the above-stated recourse, a third-party claimant may also
avail of the remedy known as terceria, provided in Section 17 (now 16), Rule
39, by serving on the officer making the levy an affidavit of his title and a
copy thereof upon the judgment creditor. The officer shall not be bound to
keep the property, unless such judgment creditor or his agent, on demand of
the officer, indemnifies the officer against such claim by a bond in a sum not
greater than the value of the property levied on. An action for damages may
be brought against the sheriff within one hundred twenty (120) days from the
filing of the bond.
The aforesaid remedies are nevertheless without prejudice to any proper
action that a third-party claimant may deem suitable to vindicate his claim to
the property. Such a proper action is, obviously, entirely distinct from that
explicitly prescribed in Section 17 of Rule 39, which is an action for damages
brought by a third-party claimant against the officer within one hundred
twenty (120) days from the date of the filing of the bond for the taking or
keeping of the property subject of the terceria.
Quite obviously, too, this proper action would have for its object the recovery
of ownership or possession of the property seized by the sheriff, as well as
damages resulting from the allegedly wrongful seizure and detention thereof
despite the third-party claim; and it may be brought against the sheriff and
such other parties as may be alleged to have colluded with him in the
supposedly wrongful execution proceedings, such as the judgment creditor
himself. Such proper action, as above pointed out, is and should be an
entirely separate and distinct action from that in which execution has issued,
if instituted by a stranger to the latter suit.
The remedies above mentioned are cumulative and may be resorted to
by a third-party claimant independent of or separately from and without
need of availing of the others. If a third-party claimant opted to file a
proper action to vindicate his claim of ownership, he must institute an action,
distinct and separate from that in which the judgment is being enforced, with
the court of competent jurisdiction even before or without need of filing a
claim in the court which issued the writ, the latter not being a condition sine
qua non for the former. In such proper action, the validity and sufficiency of
the title of the third-party claimant will be resolved and a writ of preliminary
injunction against the sheriff may be issued. (Emphasis and underscoring
ours)
In light of the above, the filing of a third party claim with the Labor Arbiter and
the NLRC did not preclude the petitioner from filing a subsequent action for
recovery of property and damages with the Regional Trial Court. And, the
institution of such complaint will not make petitioner guilty of forum shopping.
In Santos v. Bayhon wherein Labor Arbiter Ceferina Diosana rendered a
decision in NLRC NCR Case No. 1-313-85 in favor of Kamapi, the NLRC
affirmed the decision. Thereafter, Kamapi obtained a writ of execution
against the properties of Poly-Plastic Products or Anthony Ching. However,
respondent Priscilla Carrera filed a third-party claim alleging that Anthony
Ching had sold the property to her. Nevertheless, upon posting by the
judgment creditor of an indemnity bond, the NLRC Sheriff proceeded with
the public auction sale. Consequently, respondent Carrera filed with
Regional Trial Court, Manila an action to recover the levied property and
obtained a temporary restraining order against Labor Arbiter Diosana and
the NLRC Sheriff from issuing a certificate of sale over the levied property.
Eventually, Labor Arbiter Santos issued an order allowing the execution to
proceed against the property of Poly-Plastic Products. Also, Labor Arbiter
Santos and the NLRC Sheriff filed a motion to dismiss the civil case
instituted by respondent Carrera on the ground that the Regional Trial Court
did not have jurisdiction over the labor case. The trial court issued an order
enjoining the enforcement of the writ of execution over the properties
claimed by respondent Carrera pending the determination of the validity of
the sale made in her favor by the judgment debtor Poly-Plastic Products and
Anthony Ching.
In dismissing the petition for certiorari filed by Labor Arbiter Santos, we ruled
that:
x x x. The power of the NLRC to execute its judgments extends only to
properties unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor (Special
Servicing Corp. v. Centro La Paz, 121 SCRA 748).
The general rule that no court has the power to interfere by injunction with
the judgments or decrees of another court with concurrent or coordinate
jurisdiction possessing equal power to grant injunctive relief, applies only
when no third-party claimant is involved (Traders Royal Bank v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 133 SCRA 141 [1984]). When a third-party, or a stranger to
the action, asserts a claim over the property levied upon, the claimant may
vindicate his claim by an independent action in the proper civil court which
may stop the execution of the judgment on property not belonging to the
judgment debtor. (Underscoring ours)
In Consolidated Bank and Trust Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 158
[1991], we ruled that:
The well-settled doctrine is that a proper levy is indispensable to a valid sale
more detailed account of what this HKG incident is all about; but instead, the
petitioners were administratively charged, a hearing on which did not push
through until almost two (2) years after, i.e. on January 20, 1995 xxx where a
confrontation between Mr. Abaca and petitioners herein was compulsorily
arranged by the respondents disciplinary board at which hearing, Abaca was
made to identify petitioners as co-conspirators; that despite the fact that the
procedure of identification adopted by respondents Disciplinary Board was
anomalous as there was no one else in the line-up (which could not be
called one) but petitioners xxx Joseph Abaca still had difficulty in identifying
petitioner Pineda as his co-conspirator, and as to petitioner Cabling, he was
implicated and pointed by Abaca only after respondents Atty. Cabatuando
pressed the former to identify petitioner Cabling as co-conspirator; that with
the hearing reset to January 25, 1995, Mr. Joseph Abaca finally gave
exculpating statements to the board in that he cleared petitioners from any
participation or from being the owners of the currencies, and at which
hearing Mr. Joseph Abaca volunteered the information that the real owner of
said money was one who frequented his headquarters in Hongkong to which
information, the Disciplinary Board Chairman, Mr. Ismael Khan, opined for
the need for another hearing to go to the bottom of the incident; that from
said statement, it appeared that Mr. Joseph Abaca was the courier, and had
another mechanic in Manila who hid the currency at the planes skybed for
Abaca to retrieve in Hongkong, which findings of how the money was found
was previously confirmed by Mr. Joseph Abaca himself when he was first
investigated by the Hongkong authorities; that just as petitioners thought that
they were already fully cleared of the charges, as they no longer received
any summons/notices on the intended additional hearings mandated by the
Disciplinary Board, they were surprised to receive on February 23, 1995 xxx
a Memorandum dated February 22, 1995 terminating their services for
alleged violation of respondents Code of Discipline effective immediately;
that sometime xxx first week of March, 1995, petitioner Pineda received
another Memorandum from respondent Mr. Juan Paraiso, advising him of his
termination effective February 3, 1995, likewise for violation of respondents
Code of Discipline; x x x"
In support of the issuance of the writ of temporary injunction, the
NLRC adopted the view that: (1) private respondents cannot be validly
dismissed on the strength of petitioner's Code of Discipline which was
declared illegal by this Court in the case of PAL, Inc. vs. NLRC, (G.R. No.
85985), promulgated August 13, 1993, for the reason that it was formulated
by the petitioner without the participation of its employees as required in R.A.
6715, amending Article 211 of the Labor Code; (2) the whimsical, baseless
and premature dismissals of private respondents which "caused them grave
and irreparable injury" is enjoinable as private respondents are left "with no
speedy and adequate remedy at law'"except the issuance of a temporary
mandatory injunction; (3) the NLRC is empowered under Article 218 (e) of
the Labor Code not only to restrain any actual or threatened commission of
any or all prohibited or unlawful acts but also to require the performance of a
particular act in any labor dispute, which, if not restrained or performed
forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable damage to any party; and (4) the
temporary mandatory power of the NLRC was recognized by this Court in
the case of Chemo-Technicshe Mfg., Inc. Employees Union,DFA, et.al. vs.
Chemo-Technische Mfg., Inc. [G.R. No. 107031, January 25,1993].
On May 4,1995, petitioner moved for reconsideration arguing that the
NLRC erred:
1. in granting a temporary injunction order when it has no jurisdiction to
issue an injunction or restraining order since this may be issued only
under Article 218 of the Labor Code if the case involves or arises from
labor disputes;
2. in granting a temporary injunction order when the termination of private
respondents have long been carried out;
3. ..in ordering the reinstatement of private respondents on the basis of their
mere allegations, in violation of PAL's right to due process;
4. ..in arrogating unto itself management prerogative to discipline its
employees and divesting the labor arbiter of its original and exclusive
jurisdiction over illegal dismissal cases;
5. ..in suspending the effects of termination when such action is exclusively
within the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Labor;
6. ..in issuing the temporary injunction in the absence of any
irreparable or substantial injury to both private respondents.
On May 31,1995, the NLRC denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration, ruling:
The respondent (now petitioner), for one, cannot validly claim that we
cannot exercise our injunctive power under Article 218 (e) of the Labor
Code on the pretext that what we have here is not a labor dispute as
long as it concedes that as defined by law, a(l) Labor Dispute includes
any controversy or matter concerning terms or conditions of
employment. . If security of tenure, which has been breached by
respondent and which, precisely, is sought to be protected by our temporary
mandatory injunction (the core of controversy in this case) is not a term or
condition of employment, what then is?
xxxxxxxxx
Anent respondents second argument x x x, Article 218 (e) of the Labor
Code x x x empowered the Commission not only to issue a prohibitory
injunction, but a mandatory (to require the performance) one as well.
Besides, as earlier discussed, we already exercised (on August
23,1991) this temporary mandatory injunctive power in the case of
Chemo-Technische Mfg., Inc. Employees Union-DFA et.al. vs. ChemoTechnishe Mfg., Inc., et. al. (supra) and effectively enjoined one (1)
month old dismissals by Chemo-Technische and that our aforesaid
mandatory exercise of injunctive power, when questioned through a
petition for certiorari, was sustained by the Third Division of the
injunction and that on the entire showing from the contending parties, the
injunction is reasonably necessary to protect the legal rights of the plaintiff
pending the litigation. Injunction is also a special equitable relief granted only
in cases where there is no plain, adequate and complete remedy at law.
In labor cases, Article 218 of the Labor Code empowers the NLRC"(e) To enjoin or restrain any actual or threatened commission of any or all
prohibited or unlawful acts or to require the performance of a particular act in
any labor dispute which, if not restrained or performed forthwith, may cause
grave or irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual any
decision in favor of such party; x x x." (Emphasis Ours)
Complementing the above-quoted provision, Sec. 1, Rule XI of the
New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, pertinently provides as follows:
"Section 1. Injunction in Ordinary Labor Dispute.-A preliminary injunction or a
restraining order may be granted by the Commission through its divisions
pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (e) of Article 218 of the Labor Code,
as amended, when it is established on the bases of the sworn allegations in
the petition that the acts complained of, involving or arising from any
labor dispute before the Commission, which, if not restrained or
performed forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable damage to any party or
render ineffectual any decision in favor of such party.
xxx xxx xxx
The foregoing ancillary power may be exercised by the Labor
Arbiters only as an incident to the cases pending before them in order to
preserve the rights of the parties during the pendency of the case, but
excluding labor disputes involving strikes or lockout. (Emphasis Ours)
From the foregoing provisions of law, the power of the NLRC to issue
an injunctive writ originates from "any labor dispute" upon application by a
party thereof, which application if not granted "may cause grave or
irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual any decision in favor of
such party."
The term "labor dispute" is defined as "any controversy or matter
concerning terms and conditions of employment or the association or
representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or
arranging the terms and conditions of employment regardless of whether or
not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employers and
employees."
The term "controversy" is likewise defined as "a litigated question;
adversary proceeding in a court of law; a civil action or suit, either at
law or in equity; a justiciable dispute.
A "justiciable controversy" is "one involving an active antagonistic
assertion of a legal right on one side and a denial thereof on the other
concerning a real, and not a mere theoretical question or issue."
Taking into account the foregoing definitions, it is an essential
requirement that there must first be a labor dispute between the contending
parties before the labor arbiter. In the present case, there is no labor dispute
between the petitioner and private respondents as there has yet been no
complaint for illegal dismissal filed with the labor arbiter by the private
respondents against the petitioner.
The petition for injunction directly filed before the NLRC is in reality
an action for illegal dismissal. This is clear from the allegations in the petition
which prays for: reinstatement of private respondents; award of full
backwages, moral and exemplary damages; and attorney's fees. As such,
the petition should have been filed with the labor arbiter who has the original
and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases involving all
workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural:
(1) Unfair labor practice;
(2) Termination disputes;
(3) If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that
workers may file involving wages, rates of pay, hours of work and other
terms and conditions of employment;
(4) Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages
arising from the employer-employee relations;
(5) Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code, including
questions involving the legality of strikes and lockouts; and
(6) Except claims for employees compensation, social security, medicare
and maternity benefits, all other claims arising from employer-employee
relations, including those of persons in domestic or household service,
involving an amount exceeding five thousand pesos (P 5,000.00), whether or
not accompanied with a claim for reinstatement.
The jurisdiction conferred by the foregoing legal provision to the labor
arbiter is both original and exclusive, meaning, no other officer or tribunal
can take cognizance of, hear and decide any of the cases therein
enumerated. The only exceptions are where the Secretary of Labor and
Employment or the NLRC exercises the power of compulsory arbitration, or
the parties agree to submit the matter to voluntary arbitration pursuant to
Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code, the pertinent portions of which reads:
"(g) When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to
cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest,
the Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the
dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory
arbitration. Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of
automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout as
specified in the assumption or certification order. If one has already taken
place at the time of assumption or certification, all striking or locked out
employees shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers
under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout.
The Secretary of Labor and Employment or the Commission may seek the
assistance of law enforcement agencies to ensure compliance with this
provision as well as with such orders as he may issue to enforce the same.
xxxxxxxxx"
On the other hand, the NLRC shall have exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over all cases decided by labor arbiters as provided in Article
217(b) of the Labor Code. In short, the jurisdiction of the NLRC in illegal
dismissal cases is appellate in nature and, therefore, it cannot entertain the
private respondents' petition for injunction which challenges the dismissal
orders of petitioner. Article 218(e) of the Labor Code does not provide
blanket authority to the NLRC or any of its divisions to issue writs of
injunction, considering that Section 1 of Rule XI of the New Rules of
Procedure of the NLRC makes injunction only an ancillary remedy in
ordinary labor disputes"[
Thus, the NLRC exceeded its jurisdiction when it issued the assailed
Order granting private respondents' petition for injunction and ordering the
petitioner to reinstate private respondents.
The argument of the NLRC in its assailed Order that to file an illegal
dismissal suit with the labor arbiter is not an "adequate" remedy since it
takes three (3) years before it can be disposed of, is patently erroneous. An
"adequate" remedy at law has been defined as one "that affords relief with
reference to the matter in controversy, and which is appropriate to the
particular circumstances of the case.] It is a remedy which is equally
beneficial, speedy and sufficient which will promptly relieve the petitioner
from the injurious effects of the acts complained of.
Under the Labor Code, the ordinary and proper recourse of an
illegally dismissed employee is to file a complaint for illegal dismissal with
the labor arbiter. In the case at bar, private respondents disregarded this rule
and directly went to the NLRC through a petition for injunction praying that
petitioner be enjoined from enforcing its dismissal orders. In Lamb vs.
Phipps, we ruled that if the remedy is specifically provided by law, it is
presumed to be adequate. Moreover, the preliminary mandatory injunction
prayed for by the private respondents in their petition before the NLRC can
also be entertained by the labor arbiter who, as shown earlier, has the
ancillary power to issue preliminary injunctions or restraining orders as an
incident in the cases pending before him in order to preserve the rights of
the parties during the pendency of the case.
Furthermore, an examination of private respondents' petition for
injunction reveals that it has no basis since there is no showing of any
urgency or irreparable injury which the private respondents might suffer. An
injury is considered irreparable if it is of such constant and frequent
recurrence that no fair and reasonable redress can be had therefor in a court
of law or where there is no standard by which their amount can be measured
with reasonable accuracy, that is, it is not susceptible of mathematical
computation. It is considered irreparable injury when it cannot be adequately
compensated in damages due to the nature of the injury itself or the nature