BERKENKOTTER VS CU UNJIENG

FACTS:
This is an appeal taken by the plaintiff, B. H. Berkenkotter, from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
dismissing said plaintiffs complaint against Cu Unjieng e Hijos et al
Mabalacat Sugar Co., Inc., owner of the sugar central situated in Mabalacat, Pampanga, obtained from the
defendants, Cu Unjieng e Hijos, a loan secured by a first mortgage constituted on two parcels and land with all its
buildings, improvements, sugar-cane mill, steel railway, telephone line, apparatus, utensils and whatever forms part or
is necessary complement of said sugar-cane mill, steel railway, telephone line, now existing or that may in the future
exist is said lots.
Shortly after said mortgage had been constituted, the Mabalacat Sugar Co., Inc., decided to increase the capacity of
its sugar central by buying additional machinery and equipment, so that instead of milling 150 tons daily, it could
produce 250. The estimated cost of said additional machinery and equipment was approximately P100,000. B.A.
Green, president of said corporation, proposed to the plaintiff, B.H. Berkenkotter, to advance the necessary amount
for the purchase of said machinery and equipment, promising to reimburse him as soon as he could obtain an
additional loan from the mortgagees, the herein defendants Cu Unjieng e Hijos. Berkenkotter agreed to the said
proposition and delivered to him a total sum of P25,750. Berkenkotter had a credit of P22,000 against said
corporation for unpaid salary. With the loan of P25,750 and said credit of P22,000, the Mabalacat Sugar Co., Inc.,
purchased the additional machinery and equipment now in litigation.
B.A. Green, president of the Mabalacat Sugar Co., Inc., applied to Cu Unjieng e Hijos for an additional loan of
P75,000 offering as security the additional machinery and equipment acquired by said B.A. Green and installed in the
sugar central after the execution of the original mortgage deed, together with whatever additional equipment acquired
with said loan. B.A. Green failed to obtain said loan.
Appellants contention: the installation of the machinery and equipment claimed by him in the sugar central of the
Mabalacat Sugar Company, Inc., was not permanent in character inasmuch as B. A. Green, in proposing to him to
advance the money for the purchase thereof, that in case B. A. Green should fail to obtain an additional loan from the
defendants Cu Unjieng e Hijos, said machinery and equipment would become security therefor.
ISSUE: (1) Whether or not the lower court erred in declaring that the additional machinery and equipment, as
improvement incorporated with the central are subject to the mortgage deed executed in favor of the defendants Cu
Unjieng e Hijos.
(2) WON the installation of the machinery and equipment claimed by the plaintiff in the sugar central of the
Mabalacat Sugar Comp. Inc was not permanent in character.
(3) WON the sale of the M&E in question by the purchaser vest the creditor defendant the ownership of
such.
HELD: No error was committed by trial court. The additional machinery and equipment are included in the first
mortgage.
Article 334, paragraph 5, of the Civil Code gives the character of real property to machinery, liquid containers,
instruments or implements intended by the owner of any building or land for use in connection with any industry or
trade being carried on therein and which are expressly adapted to meet the requirements of such trade or industry.
If the installation of the machinery and equipment in question in the central of the Mabalacat Sugar Co., Inc.,
in lieu of the other of less capacity existing therein, for its sugar industry, converted them into real property
by reason of their purpose, it cannot be said that their incorporation therewith was not permanent in

character because, as essential and principal elements of a sugar central, without them the sugar central
would be unable to function or carry on the industrial purpose for which it was established. Inasmuch as the
central is permanent in character, the necessary machinery and equipment installed for carrying on the
sugar industry for which it has been established must necessary be permanent.
(2) The fact that the purchaser of the new machinery and equipment has bound himself to the person
supplying him the purchase money to hold them as security for the payment of the latters credit and
to refrain from mortgaging or otherwise encumbering them does not alter the permanent character of
the incorporation of the said M&E with the central
(3) The sale of the M&E in question by the purchaser who was supplied the purchase money as loan, to
the person who supplied the money, after the incorporation thereof with the mortgaged sugar central
does not vest the creditor with ownership of the said M&E but simply the right of redemption.
MAKATI LEASING AND FINANCE CORP VS WEAREVER TEXTILE MILLS INC
GR No. L-58469
May 16, 1983
FACTS
Wearever Textile Mills, Inc. executed a chattel mortgage contract in favor of Makati Leasing and
Finance Corporation covering certain raw materials and machinery. Upon default, Makati Leasing fi led
a petition for judicial foreclosure of the properties mortgaged. Acting on Makati Leasings application
for replevin, the lower court issued a writ of seizure. Pursuant thereto, the sheriff enforcing the seizure
order seized the machinery subject matter of the mortgage. In a petition for certiorari and prohibition,
the Court of Appeals ordered the return of the machinery on the ground that the same can-not be the
subject of replevin because it is a real property pursuant to Article415 of the new Civil Code, the same
being attached to the ground by means of bolts and the only way to remove it from Wearever textiles
plant would be to drill out or destroy the concrete fl oor. When the motion for reconsideration of Makati
Leasing was denied by the Court of Appeals, Makati Leasing elevated the matter to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE
Whether the machinery in suit is real or personal property from the point of view of the parties.
HELD
There is no logical justification to exclude the rule out the present case from the application of the
pronouncement in Tumalad v Vicencio, 41 SCRA 143. If a house of strong materials, like what was
involved in the Tumalad case, may be considered as personal property for purposes of
executing a chattel mortgage thereon as long as the parties to the contract so agree and no
innocent third party will be prejudiced thereby, there is absolutely no reason why a machinery, which
is movable in its nature and becomesimmobilized only by destination or purpose, may not be likewise
treated as such. This is really because one who has so agreed is estopped from the denying the
existence of the chattel mortgage.
In rejecting petitioners assertion on the applicability of the Tumalad doctrine, the CA lays stress on the
fact that the house involved therein was built on a land that did not belong to the owner of such house.
But the law makes no distinction with respect to the ownership of the land on which the
house is built and We should not lay down distinctions not contemplated by law.
It must be pointed out that the characterization by the private respondent is indicative of the
intention and impresses upon the property the character determined by the parties. As stated
in Standard Oil Co. of New York v. Jaramillo, 44 Phil. 630, it is undeniable that the parties to a contract
may, by agreement, treat as personal property that which by nature would be a real property as long
as no interest of third parties would be prejudiced thereby.

The status of the subject matter as movable or immovable property was not raised as an issue before
the lower court and the CA, except in a supplemental memorandum in support of the petition filed in
the appellate court. There is no record showing that the mortgage has been annulled, or that steps
were taken to nullify the same. On the other hand, respondent has benefited from the said contract.
Equity dictates that one should not benefit at the expense of another.
As such, private respondent could no longer be allowed to impugn the efficacy of the chattel mortgage
after it has benefited therefrom.
Therefore, the questioned machinery should be considered as personal property.
FAUSTO RUBIO VS FLORENTINO RIVERA
FACTS:
Rubiso filed a complaint against Rivera for the recovery of a pilot boat. He alleged that he is the
rightful owner of a pilot boat, which was stranded and recovered by Rivera. The latter refused to
return the said boat as he alleged too that he was the owner thereof. It was known that the original
owners of the boat had secretly sold the pilot boat to Rivera on an earlier date than the sale in a public
auction to Rubiso. Nonetheless, material is the fact that the entry into the customs registry of the sale
of the boat was later than the recording of the sale to Rubiso.
HELD:
The requisite of registration in the registry, of the purchase of the vessel, is necessary and
indispensable in order that the purchasers rights may be maintained against a third person.
Such registration is required both by the Code of Commerce and Act 1900. It is undeniable, ergo,
that Rivera doesnt have a better right than Rubiso over the pilot boat.
Ships and vessels, whether moved by steam or by sail, partake, to a certain extent of the
nature and conditions of real property, on account of their value and importance in world commerce;
and for this, the provisions of the Code of Commerce are nearly identical with Article 1473 of the CC.
UNITED STATES VS IGNACIO CARLOS
Facts:
Ignacio Carlos has been a consumer of electricity furnished by the Manila Electric Railroad and Light
Company for a building containing the residence of the accused and 3other residences.
Representatives of the company believing that more light is consumed than what is shown in the
meter installed an additional meter on the pole outside Carlos house to compare the actual
consumption and found out that the latter used a jumper. Further, a jumper was found in a drawer of a
small cabinet in the room of the defendants house were the meter was installed. In the absence of any
explanation for Carlos possession of said device, the presumption raised was that Carlos was the
owner of the device whose only use was to deflect the current from the meter. Thus he was charged
with the crime of LARCENEY amounting to 2,273KW of electric power worth909.20 pesos
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court erred in declaring that the electrical energy may be stolen.
Held:

It is true that electricity is no longer, as formerly, regarded by electricians as a fluid, but its
manifestation and effects, like those of gas,may be seen and felt. The true test of what is a proper
subject of larceny seems to be not whether the subject is corporeal, but whether itis capable of
appropriation by another than the owner. The court ruled that electricity, the same as gas, is a
valuable article of merchandise, bought and sold like other personal property and is capable of
appropriation by another. It is also susceptible of being severed from a mass or larger quantity, and of
being transported from place to place. So no error was committed by the trial court in holding that
electricity is a subject of larceny.
HEMNANI VS EXPORT CONTROL COMMITTEE
FACTS:
On August 28, 1952, petitioner requested permission from the Export Control Committee, to ship to his
Hudson Sedan, Model 1949, Motor No. 48149039, valued at P4,500, to Osaka, Japan, on board the S. S.
President Wilson, "to be used in connection with his business thereat." The respondent Committee
approved the request on the same day, on condition that petitioner would file a bond equal to the
value of the car, to guarantee the return of the same in the Philippines within six months from the date
of its shipment.
On August 29, 1952, petitioner posted with the Filipinas Compaia de Seguros a surety bond (Annex A)
in the sum of P4,500 in favor of the Republic of the Philippines (Bureau of Customs), guaranteeing that
the Hudson Sedan car would be re-exported back to the Philippines from Japan within six months from
the execution of the bond. Accordingly, petitioner took the car in question to Osaka, Japan, on August
29, 1952, but failed to bring it back to the Philippines as promised. Instead petitioner filed two requests
for extension of six months each to be followed to re-export the car back to the Philippines until March
1, 1954, alleging that he was still on a business tour and it would be impracticable to return the car on
time. Notwithstanding the two extensions given him by the respondent the car in question was not
brought back in the Philippines.
On February 24, 1954, Atty. Teotimo A. Roja, requested the respondent to order the cancellation of the
surety bond of P4,500 that he and the Filipinas Compaia de Seguros (Bond No. 27914) had executed,
alleging that it would be impracticable and expensive to return the car to Manila, considering its
dilapidated condition and utility in Japan, but the respondent denied said request, though at its
meeting held on February 24, 1954 it decided to reduce the liability under the bond to P2,250.00 for
the reason that this was the value that the car would have at the state it was then if it were brought
back in the Philippines, thus allowing a depreciation of 15 per cent each year.
ISSUE: WON the appellants car in question is personal effect and therefore not subject to statutory or
reglementary prohibition against exportation.
HELD: The word "personal" used with "effects" much restrict its meaning, and certainly (that meaning,
cannot be understanding without any qualifying words Includes only such tangible property as attends
the person.
Among the articles the exportation of which is prohibited according to said Executive Order are:
IV. Imported Machinery (light and heavy), mechanical, electrical, agricultural, construction,
engineering, andtransportation equipment of all types, including surplus equipment, spare
parts, accessories, wires and other allied articles, except those already approved by the
Bureau of Customs or NICA or order Government agencies as well as licenses covered in
section 2 herein.

It is undisputed that petitioner's car is covered with the term "transportation equipment of all
types" and not as "personal effects", as counsel would want to classify it. Petitioner's car was
admittedly brought by him to Osaka, Japan, "to be used in connection with his business" (p. 16,
Record on Appeal) , and that when he asked for extension of time to re-export the motor
vehicle back to the Philippines, his reason was that he was still on a business tour, (p. 17,
Record on Appeal).
If by personal effects of passengers in transit transportation equipment used in one's business
were included, then it would be a simple matter to defeat the intention of the law, that is, to
promote the economic and industrial development of the country. To seal any possible
loophole, the Executive Order made it clear that exportation of all articles included in the list is
prohibited irrespective of the use for which they were intended.
The cardinal rule in the interpretation of law is to ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent and
the intention of the Legislature in enacting a law is part of the law itself, and is to be followed and
applied, where ascertainable, in construing apparently conflicting provisions. These principles of
statutory construction are more true in the case at bar because the wording of the law is too plain and
clear.
STROCHECKER VS RAMIREZ
FACTS:
The half-interest in the business (Antigua Botica Ramirez) was mortgaged with Fidelity & Surety Co. on
10 March 1919, and registered in due time in the registry of property, while another mortgage was
made with Ildefonso Ramirez on 22 September 1919 and registered also in the registry. Raised in the
lower court, the trial court declared the mortgage of Fidelity & Surety Co. entitled to preference over
that of Ildefonso Ramirez and another mortgage by Concepcion Ayala. Ayala did not appeal, but
Ramirez did.
ISSUE:
(1)Whether or not half-interest over a business is a movable property (2) Which of the mortgages here
in question must be given preference

RULING: (1)Yes.
1. Interest in business may be subject of mortgage With regard to the nature of the property
mortgaged which is one-half interest in the business, such interest is a personal property capable of
appropriation and not included in the enumeration of real properties in articles 335 of the Civil Code,
and may be the subject of mortgage. All personal property may be mortgaged. (Sec. 7, Act 1508.)

2. Description of mortgage property sufficient The description contained in the document is sufficient.
The law (sec. 7, Act 1508) requires only a description of the mortgaged property shall be such as to
enable the parties to the mortgage, or any other person, after reasonable inquiry and investigation, to
identify the same. In the case at bar, his half interest in the drug business known as Antigua Botica
Ramirez, located at Calle Real Nos. 123 and 125, District of Intramuros, Manila Philippine Islands" is
sufficient.

3. Article 1922 (1-3) of the Civil Code applicable only to mortgage property in possession Numbers 1,
2, and 3 of the article 1922 of the Civil Code are not applicable as neither the debtor, nor himself, is in
possession of the property mortgaged, which is, and since the registration of the mortgage has been,
legally in possession of the surety company
4. Stipulation about personal property not a mortgage upon property - In no way can the mortgage
executed be given effect as of the date of the sale of the store in question; as there was a mere
stipulation about personal security during said date, but not a mortgage upon property, and much less
upon the property in question.
(2) the appellant cannot deny the preferential character of the mortgage in favor of the Fidelity and
Surety Co, because in the very document executed in his favor it was stated that the mortgage was a
second mortgage, subordinate to the one made in favor of the Fidelity & Surety Co,
HARTY VS MUNICIPALITY OF VICTORIA
FACTS:
On 17 January 1908, the representative of Monsignor Jeremiah J. Harty, archbishop of the Roman
Catholic Church, as the legal administrator of the properties and rights of the Catholic Church within
the archbishopric of Manila, filed a written complaint in the CFI Tarlac against the municipality of
Victoria, alleging that the parish of the said town had been and was then the owner of a parcel of land
within the said municipality, known as the plaza of the church of Victoria; that it had acquired said
parcel of land more than 60 years previously, and had continued to possess the same ever since up to
1901, in which year the municipality unlawfully and forcibly seized the said property, claiming to be
entitled thereto and retaining it to the present day. On 15 June 1908, the trial court rendered judgment,
holding that the parish of Victoria of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church, had a better right to the
possession of the land described in the complaint, and sentenced the Municipality to vacate the same
and to pay the costs. To said judgment the representative of the Municipality excepted and moved for
a new trial on the ground that it was contrary to the weight of the evidence, and he notified the court
that, if his motion were overruled, he would appeal to the Supreme Court. The motion for a new trial
was overruled; the Municipality excepted, and presented the corresponding bill of exceptions which,
after receipt of a copy had been acknowledged by the adverse party, was approved. On 1 September,
the Municipality was ordered to furnish bond in the sum of P1,000 to insure the fulfillment of the
judgment in the event that it should be totally or partially affirmed. To said order the Municipality
excepted, but furnished the bond as directed by the court. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment
appealed from, and held that the whole of the land not occupied by the church of the town of Victoria
and its parish house, is a public plaza of the said town, of public use, and that in consequence thereof,
the Municipality is absolved of the complaint without any special ruling as to the costs of both
instances.
ISSUES:
(1) WON the parish of Victoria is te rightful owner of the land in question
(2) WON the land in question can be subject of prescription
(3) WON the procured trees set out in the plaza constitute an act of private ownership
HELD:

(1) The SC held that the whole of the land not occupied by the church of the town of Victoria and
its parish home is a public plaza of the said town of public use
Art 339 of the Civil Code reads: Property of public ownership is:
1. That destined to the public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports, and bridges
constructed by the State, and banks, shores, roadsteads, and that of a similar character.
Article 344 of said code also reads:
Property for public use in provinces and in towns comprises the provincial and town roads, the
squares, streets, fountains, and public waters, the promenades, and public works of general
service supported by the said towns or provinces.
Although the late Tanedo donated the land now occupied by the church to the church and not
to the parish curate. There are good gorunds to suppose that the late Vicente Tanedo ddonated
the land now occupied by the church and parish house in said municipality for religious
purposes or to the church but not to the parish curate,
Proper proof is lacking that the donation affirmed by the said Tanedo comprehend the whole
tract of land which at the present time constitute the plaza. Even though all the remaining
space of land which now form the great plaza of the town of Victoria had been owned by
Tanedo, it must be presumed that he waived his right thereto for the benefit fo the
townspeople since all the residents have enjoyed the use of the said plaza.
(2) Plazas destined for public is use not subject to prescription pursuant to Art 1936 of the civil
code
(3) No, both the curates and the Gobernadorcillo of the said town procured fuit trees and plant to
be set out in the plaza does not constitute an act of private ownership but evidences the public
use thereof , or perhaps the intention to improve the land and embellish the said plaza for the
benefit of the townspeople.
CITY OF MANILA VS INSULAR GOVERNMENT
FACTS:

The city of Manila filed a petition in the Court of Land Registration for the registration of a certain
parcel or tract of land situated in Paco, a district of the said city. The said city alleged that it was
the absolute owner of the said land; that said land was assessed by the city of Manila in the sum of
$1,780; that there existed no liens of whatever character against said land; that the land was
unoccupied; that the said city obtained title to the said land by reason of being the successor to all
the rights and actions of the old city of Manila (ayuntamiento de Manila), to which said property
formerly belonged.

The Insular Government opposed the inscription of the said land to the petitioners name upon the
ground that the land in question is the property of the Government of the United States under the
control of the Insular Government.

One of the examiners of titles of the Court of Land Registration made an examination of the title
claimed by the petitioner and reported to the judge of the Court of Land Registration the

application filed by the city of Manila is not accompanied by any document relative to its alleged
ownership; that in the office of the register of deeds there is no record of any act or contract
opposing the claim of the applicant; nor does there appear, from the investigations held, any fact
contrary to those quoted in the application; and that the city of Manila, in order to acquire title to
the land above mentioned, must show the ownership which the former ayuntamiento had over said
land. Therefore, the examiner was of the opinion that the title of the City of Manila is defective and
cannot be registered.

The cause was duly brought on for trial and during the trial of said cause the petitioner attempted
to establish that the old city of Manila, its predecessor, had rented said land, had received rents
therefor, and in a general way had administered the same.

The respondent maintained that the land in question was public land, belonging to the Central
Government and the same had never been granted to any person or corporation or municipality by
the Spanish Government.

The judge of the said court granted the registration of the rest of said described property in favor
of the city.

Against this order the respondent gave notice of his intention to appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the questioned property is owned by the city of Manila.

HELD:

No. The Supreme Court ruled that the mere renting of property and receiving the rent therefor
cannot, of themselves, in the absence of other proof, support a claim of ownership of such
property.

One of the earliest provisions of law relating to the rights of pueblos in the insular possessions of
the Spanish Government is that of settlements and pueblos of natives.

Article 53 of the Ordinances of Good Government indicates that 1) that the King continued to be
the absolute owner of said lands; 2) that the pueblos were only given the mere usufruct of the
same; 3) that the King might at any time annul such grant; and 4) that a designation, of the
particular land so granted, was a necessary prerequisite for the holding of the same for the
purposes indicated, by the said pueblo.

The municipalities of the Philippine Islands are not entitled, by right, to any part of the public
domain for use as communal lands. The Spanish law provided that the usufruct of a portion of the
public domain adjoining municipal territory might be granted by the Government for communal
purposes, upon proper petition, but, until granted, no rights therein passed to the municipalities,
and, in any event, the ultimate title remained in the sovereign.

The petitioner herein not having presented proof showing that the land in question had been
granted to it by the former sovereign in these Islands, and not having shown that it was entitled to
said lands by virtue of some law of the present sovereign of these Islands, the Court of Land

Registration was not empowered to grant the registration of said lands in favor of said petitioner.
The judgment, therefore, of the lower court is hereby reversed.
TUFELIX VS OLAGUERA
FACTS It was alleged that on September 30, 1911, plaintiff acquired at a public sale held in execution
of a judgment rendered against Ricardo Pardo y Pujol, a piece of property situated in the municipality
of Guinobatan, consisting of a frame building of strong materials with a galvanized-iron roof, erected
on a parcel of land belonging to that municipality and intended for a public market. The plaintiff also
acquired at the sale all the right, interest, title, and participation in the said property that appertained
or might appertain to Pardo y Pujol. The said building was constructed by virtue of a concession
granted by the former Spanish government to Ricardo Pardo y Cabaas, father of the judgment
debtor. On January 2, 1912, the said building was totally destroyed by an accidental fire. For several
months thereafter the municipal council of Guinobatan negotiated with plaintiff for the purchase of his
rights in the said concession but such could not be brought to a conclusion because the municipal
council had allegedly acted deceitfully, fraudulently, and in bad faith for the sole purpose of beguiling,
deceiving, and prejudicing plaintiff in order to prevent him from exercising his right to reconstruct the
burned market building and utilize it in accordance with the terms of the said concession. The
defendant municipal council with the other defendant, Francisco Olaguera, had authorized the latter to
take possession of all the land and to occupy the same with booths or stores for the sale of groceries
and other merchandise, for billiard tables, and other analogous. The plaintiff proposed to construct
another public market building on the same land, but that the defendants had prevented him from
using the land and reconstructing thereon the said public market building, and refused to recognize
plaintiff's right and to vacate the land that had been occupied by the burned edifice. After filing a
petition before the CFI of Albay, the provincial fiscal alleged as a ground for the demurrer that in no
part of the instrument of concession did it appear that the privilege granted to the father of the
judgment debtor had likewise been granted to his successors or assignees, and that therefore such
rights and actions could not be conveyed to nor be acquired by any other person. It was alleged that
the building was completely destroyed by fire and that if plaintiff's right to the possession of the land
was conditioned by the existence thereon of the said market building, such right had terminated by the
disappearance of the building.
ISSUE Whether a the subject building on land belonging to the municipality of Guinobatan which was
intended for a public market, by virtue of a concession could be attached and sold for the payment of a
certain debt owed by Ricardo Pardo y Pujol to a third person who had obtained a final judgment.
RULING No. The land on which the building was erected and which is referred to in the foregoing
articles of the concession granted by the Government of the former sovereignty belongs to the
municipality of Guinobatan. Although the building was constructed at the expense and with the money
of the grantee, Ricardo Pardo y Cabaas, it is, nevertheless, the property of the state or of the said
municipality, and was temporarily transferred to the grantee, Pardo y Cabaas, in order that he
might enjoy the usufruct of its floor space for forty years, but on the termination of this period the said
right of usufruct was to cease and the building was to belong finally and absolutely to the state or the
municipality in representation thereof. For these reasons, there is no question that the building and the
land, on which it was erected, since they did not belong to the grantee, nor do they belong to his son
and heir, Ricardo Pardo y Pujol, could not be attached or sold for the payment of a debt contracted by
the latter. The concession granted by the former Spanish Government is personal and transferable only
by inheritance, and in no manner could it be conveyed as a special personal privilege to another and a
third person. Ricardo Pardo y Pujol is bound to pay his debts and his property can be attached on
petition of his creditors. However, his personal privilege of usufruct in the floor space of the public
market building of Guinobatan cannot be attached like any ordinary right, because that would mean
that a person who has contracted with the state to furnish a service of a public character would be
substituted, for another person who took no part in the contract, and that the regular course of a

public service would be disturbed by the more or less legal action of the creditors of a grantee, to the
prejudice of the state and the public interests. It is indeed true that the building erected out of the
private funds of the grantee, however, judging from the agreement between him and the Government
authorities, he was granted the right to usufruct in the floor space of the said building in order that,
during the period of forty years, he might reimburse himself for and collect the value of the building
constructed by him. So, if neither the land nor the building in question belongs to Pardo y Pujol, it is
evident that they could not be attached or sold at public auction to satisfy his debt and, consequently,
the attachment and sale of the said Government property executed on petition of the creditor of the
said Pardo y Pujol are notoriously illegal, null and void, and the acquisition of the property by plaintiff
confers upon him no right whatever based on the said concession. The usufruct of the floor space of
the public market of Guinobatan, granted to Ricardo Pardo y Pujol's father was not subject to
attachment on account of its being of a public character. The only right to which the creditor was
entitled was to petition for the attachment of the income and proceeds obtained from the use of the
floor space of the market, but he did not avail himself of this right. Therefore, the order of dismissal
appealed is in accordance with law and the merits of the case.
G.R. No. L-6098 August 12, 1911 THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, plaintiff-appellee,
ALDECOA AND COMPANY, defendant-appellant.

vs.

FACTS The Attorney-General filed a written complaint in the CFI of Surigao against the firm of Aldecoa&
Co., alleging that the defendant, a mercantile copartnership company with a branch office in Surigao,
continues to operate as such mercantile copartnership company under the name of Aldecoa& Co.,;
that the said defendant, knowing that it had no title or right whatever to two adjoining parcels of land
has been occupying them illegally for the past seventeen years, more or less, having constructed on
the land a wharf, located along the railroad, and built warehouses of light material for the storage of
coal all for its exclusive use and benefit. These lands, situated in Surigao, belonged to the late
Spanish Government in the Philippines and are now the property of the Government of the United
States and were placed under the control of the Insular Government Since the year 1901, the
defendant has been requested repeatedly by the Attorney-General, in representation of the Insular
Government, to recognize the latter's right of dominion over the same and to deliver to it the said
property, and that, by reason of such demands, Aldecoa& Co. agreed to return the land, but that later,
after several delays, it concluded by persisting in its attempt illegally to continue occupying the said
land and refused to return it to the Insular Government. The defendant alleged that it held and
possessed, as owner, and had full and absolute dominion over, the lands claimed by the plaintiff. CFI
rendered judgment and found that the land in question was public land and belonged to the State, and
ordered the defendant to return it to the plaintiff.
ISSUE Whether the subject lands as claimed by the defendant is a part of the public dominion.
RULING Yes. It is incontrovertible that the land in question is of the public domain and belongs to the
State, inasmuch as at the present time it is partly shore land and in part, was such formerly, and now
is land formed by the action of the sea. On the supposition that Aldecoa& Co. commenced to occupy
the land and shore herein concerned, prior to the enforcement of the Civil Code in these Islands, it is
unquestionable that the issue must be determined in accordance with the provisions of the Law of
Waters of August 3, 1866, inasmuch as the shores, as well as the lands united thereto by the
accretions and alluvium deposits produced by the action of the sea, are of the public use and domain.
All this said land, together with the adjacent shore, belongs to the public domain and is intended for
public uses. Thus, the defendant, in construction on the two aforementioned parcels of land a retaining
wall, a pier or wharf, a railway, and warehouses for the storage of coal, for its exclusive use and
benefit, did all this without due and competent authority and has been illegally occupying the land
since 1901. Aldecoa& Co. endeavored to prove that the land, consisting of the two united parcels,
belonged to them in fee simple, on account of their having begun to occupy it through a verbal permit
from the then politico-military governor of Surigao. The said permit was a verbal authorization to
occupy the land on condition that the defendant should later on prepare title deeds thereto, and that

this authorization was granted for the purpose of furnishing facilities to, and benefiting the merchants
of Surigao, in view of the backward condition of things in those regions at the time. It is certain,
however, that Aldecoa& Co. did not obtain or solicit permission from the Government to establish
themselves there and erect thereon their buildings and works, nor did they endeavor to obtain any title
of ownership to the said land. Defendant has not proven that it obtained for itself, in conformity with
the provisions of the said Law of Waters. The Civil Code, which went into effect in these Islands on
December 7, 1889, confirms the provisions of the said Law of Waters. The shores and the lands
reclaimed from the sea, while they continue to be devoted to public uses and no grant whatever has
been made of any portion of them to private persons, remain a part of the public domain and are for
public uses, and, until they are converted into patrimonial property of the State. Inasmuch as, being
dedicated to the public uses, they are not subject of commerce among men, in accordance with the
provision of the Civil Code. The record does not disclose that Aldecoa& Co. had obtained from the
Spanish Government of the Philippines the requisite authorization legally to occupy the said two
parcels of land of which they now claim to be the owners. Wherefore, the occupation or possession
which the allege they hold is a mere detainer that can merit from the law no protection such as is
afforded only to the person legally in possession.
TANTOCO VS MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF ILOILO
FACTS:

The plaintiff sued the municipal council of Iloilo for the amount of P42,966.40 being the
purchase price of the two strips of land which the municipality had appropriated for street
widening
On account of lack of funds the municipality was unable to pay the said judgement, wherefore
the plaintiff has a writ of execution issued against the property of the said municipality
The sheriff attached two auto rucks used for street sprinkling, one police patrol automobile,
police stations on Mabini street and the concrete structures used as markets
After notice of the sale of the said property the provincial fiscal of Iloilo file a motion which the
CFI praying that the attachment on the property be dissolved, that the said attachment be null
and void being illegal and violative of the rights of the defendant municipality
The CFI declared the attachment levied upon the said properties of the defendant municipality
null and void.

ISSUE: WON the property levied upon is exempt from execution

HELD: It is evident that the movable and immovable property of a municipality, necessary for
governmental purpose, may not be attached and sold for the payment of a judgment against the
municipality. The supreme reason for this rule is the character of the public use to which such kind of
property is devoted. The necessity for government service justifies that the property of public of the
municipality be exempt from execution just as it is necessary to exempt certain property of private
individuals in accordance with section 452 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
KER & CO. VS AR CAUDEN
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS VS CONSORCIA CABANGIS
FACTS: In 1986, A owned a parcel of land, but because of the action of the waves of Manila Bay, part
of said land was gradually submerged in the sea. It remained submerged until 1912 when the
government decided to make the necessary dredging to reclaim the land from the sea. As soon as the
land had been recovered A took possession of it.
ISSUE: To which does the ownership of the reclaimed land belong to?

HELD: The government owns the reclaimed land in the sense that it has become property of public
dominion, because in letting it remained submerged, A may be said to have abandoned the same.
Having become part of the sea or the seashore, it became property for public use. When the
government took steps to make it land again, its status as public dominion remained unchanged;
therefore, A is not entitled to the land.
.
MONTANO VS THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT ET AL
Facts: :
Isabelo Montano presented a petition to the Court of Land Registration for the inscription of a piece of
land in the barrio of Libis, municipality of Caloocan, used as a fishery having a superficial area of
10,805 square meters, and bounded as set out in the petition; its value according to the last
assessment being $505.05, United States currency. This petition was opposed by the Solicitor-General
in behalf of the Director of Lands, and by the entity known asObras Pias de la Sagrada Mitra, the
former on the ground that the land in question belonged to the Government of the United States, and
the latter, that it was the absolute owner of all the dry land along the eastern boundary of the said
fishery. The Court of Land Registration in its decision of December 1, 1906, dismissed the said
oppositions without costs and decreed, after a general entry by default, the adjudication and
registration of the property described in the petition, in favor of Isabelo Montano y Marcial. From this
decision only counsel for the Director of Public Lands appealed to this court. and precisely Isabelo
Montano sought title thereon on the strength of 10 years' occupation pursuant to paragraph 6, section
5 of Act 926 of the Philippine Commission
Issue: Whether or not the land in question can be acquired by Montano
Held:
Accordingly, "government land" and "public domain" are not synonymous items. The first includes not
only the second, but also other lands of the Government already reserved or devoted to public use or
subject to private right. In other words, the Government owns real estate which is part of the "public
lands" and other real estate which is not part thereof. Government property was of two kinds first,
that of public use or service, said to be of public ownership, and second, that of having a private
character or use. (Civil Code, arts. 339 and 340.) Lands of the first class, while they retain their public
character are inalienable. Those of the second are not. Therefore, there is much real property
belonging to the Government which is not affected by statutes for the settlement, prescription or sale
of public lands. Examples in point are properties occupied by public buildings or devoted to municipal
or other governmental uses.
It is settled that the general legislation of Congress in respect to public lands does not extend to tide
lands. It provided that the scrip might be located on the unoccupied and unappropriated public lands.
As said inNewhall vs. Sanger(92 U.S. 761, 763.) A marshland which is inundated by the rise of tides
belong to the State and is not susceptible to appropriation by occupation, has no application in the
present case inasmuch as in said case the land subject matter of the litigation was not yet titled
DREAM VILLAGE NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION, INC., represented by its Incumbent
President, GREG SERIEGO, Petitioner,
vs.
BASES DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, Respondent.
The United States of America (USA) purchased the subject land early in the American colonial period,
to be converted into the military reservation known as Fort William Mckinley, Transfer Certificate of

Title (TCT) No. 192 was issued in the name of the USA to cancel OCT No. 291.
On December 6, 1956, the USA formally ceded Fort William Mckinley to the Republic of the Philippines
(Republic), and on September 11, 1958, TCT No. 2288 was cancelled and replaced by TCT No. 61524,
this time in the name of the Republic.
On October 16, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino issued Proclamation No. 172 amending
Proclamation No. 2476 by limiting to Lots 1 and 2 of the survey Swo-13-000298 the areas in Western
Bicutan open for disposition.
Now charging the BCDA of wrongfully asserting title to Dream Village and unlawfully subjecting its
members to summary demolition, resulting in unrest and tensions among the residents, on November
22, 1999, the latter filed a letter-complaint with the COSLAP to seek its assistance in the verification
survey of the subject property, which they claimed is covered by Proclamation No. 172. They also claim
that they have been occupying the area for thirty (30) years "in the concept of owners continuously,
exclusively and notoriously for several years,"
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE AREA OCCUPIED BY DREAM VILLAGE IS SUSCEPTIBLE OF ACQUISITION BY
PRESCRIPTION
In Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic, it was pointed out that from the moment R.A. No. 7227 was
enacted, the subject military lands in Metro Manila became alienable and disposable. However, it was
also clarified that the said lands did not thereby become patrimonial, since the BCDA law makes the
express reservation that they are to be sold in order to raise funds for the conversion of the former
American bases in Clark and Subic.
The Court noted that the purpose of the law can be tied to either "public service" or "the development
of national wealth" under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code, such that the lands remain property of the
public dominion, albeit their status is now alienable and disposable. The Court then explained that it is
only upon their sale to a private person or entity as authorized by the BCDA law that they become
private property and cease to be property of the public dominion
Under Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529, it is provided that
before acquisitive prescription can commence, the property sought to be registered must not only be
classified as alienable and disposable, it must also be expressly declared by the State that it is no
longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth, or that the property has
been converted into patrimonial
.
Absent such an express declaration by the State, the land remains to be property of public dominion
For as long as the property belongs to the State, although already classified as alienable or disposable,
it remains property of the public dominion if when it is "intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth.
The above proclamations notwithstanding, Fort Bonifacio remains property of public dominion of the
State, because although declared alienable and disposable, it is reserved for some public service or for
the development of the national wealth, in this case, for the conversion of military reservations in the
country to productive civilian uses.Needless to say, the acquisitive prescription asserted by Dream
Village has not even begun to run.
Moreover, it is a settled rule that
lands under a Torrens title cannot be acquired by prescription or adverse possession
.
Section 47 of P.D. No. 1529, the Property Registration Decree, expressly provides that no title to
registered land in derogation of the title of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or
adverse possession.
And, although the registered landowner may still lose his right to recover the possession of his

registered property by reason of laches,nowhere has Dream Village alleged or proved laches, which
has been defined as such neglect or omission to assert a right, taken in conjunction with lapse of time
and other circumstances causing prejudice to an adverse party, as will operate as a bar in equity.