1. JOSUE ARLEGUI vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES GIL AND BEATRIZ GENGUYON, [G.R. No.

126437, March 6, 2002]

FACTS: Residential Apartment Unit no. 15 was leased for more than 20 years by Serafia Real Estate, Inc. to spouses
Gil and Beatriz. In 1984, Alberto Barretto (one of the owners of Serafia) informed the tenants of the apartment bldg.
That Serfia and its assets had already been assigned and transferred to A.B. Barretto. The tenants formed an
organization called Barretto Apartment Tenant Association to represent them in negotiations with A.B. Barretto
Enterprises for the purchase of the apartment units. Josue Arlegui was elected vice president and Mateo Tan Lu as
auditor of the association. Genguyons were later surprised to learn that the unit they were leasing had been sold to
Mateo Tan Lu. Genguyons continued to occupy the premises and paid rentals. They were then informed that Mateo Tan
sold the apartment to Josue Arlegui. Arlegui demanded Genguyons to vacate the premises.
ISSUE: Whether or not a constructive trust existed
HELD: The petitioner denies that a constructive trust was created and maintains that there was no fraud committed.
He neither received money from the Genguyons, nor was he unjustly enriched. However, the records show that the
Genguyons, along with the other tenants and members of the association, contributed money to enable the officers to
negotiate with the Barrettos. Besides, constructive trusts do not only arise out of fraud or duress, but also by abuse of
confidence, in order to satisfy the demands of justice.
The petitioner also argues that the Genguyons failed to prove the existence of an implied or constructive
trust. We disagree. There is ample documentary and testimonial evidence to establish the existence of a fiduciary
relationship between them, and that petitioners subsequent acts betrayed the trust and confidence reposed on him.
It is further argued that no implied trust, as defined under Article 1456 of the New Civil Code, was created
because the petitioner did not acquire the subject property through mistake or fraud. Nevertheless, the absence of
fraud or mistake on the part of the petitioner does not prevent the court from ruling that an implied or constructive
trust was created nonetheless.
A constructive trust, otherwise known as a trust ex maleficio, a trust ex delicto, a trust de son tort, an
involuntary trust, or an implied trust, is a trust by operation of law which arises contrary to intention and in invitum,
against one who, by fraud, actual or constructive, by duress or abuse of confidence, by commission of wrong, or by
any form of unconscionable conduct, artifice, concealment, or questionable means, or who in any way against equity
and good conscience, either has obtained or holds the legal right to property which he ought not, in equity and good
conscience, hold and enjoy. It is raised by equity to satisfy the demands of justice. However, a constructive trust does
not arise on every moral wrong in acquiring or holding property or on every abuse of confidence in business or other
affairs; ordinarily such a trust arises and will be declared only on wrongful acquisitions or retentions of property of
which equity, in accordance with its fundamental principles and the traditional exercise of its jurisdiction or in
accordance with statutory provision, takes cognizance. It has been broadly ruled that a breach of confidence, although
in business or social relations, rendering an acquisition or retention of property by one person unconscionable against
another, raises a constructive trust.
*There was a breach of trust by the officers. SC annulled the sale of the apartment and ordered Arlegui to
execute deed of conveyance to Genguyon spouses.
2. Philippine National Bank vs Court of Appeals et al, G.R. No. L-27155, May 18, 1978
Facts:Rita Tapnio owes PNB an amount of P2,000.00. The amount is secured by her sugar crops about to be harvested
including her export quota allocation worth 1,000 piculs. The said export quota was later dealt by Tapnio to a certain
Jacobo Tuazon at P2.50 per picul or a total of P2,500. Since the subject of the deal is mortgaged with PNB, the latter
has to approve it. The branch manager of PNB recommended that the price should be at P2.80 per picul which was the
prevailing minimum amount allowable. Tapnio and Tuazon agreed to the said amount. And so the bank manager
recommended the agreement to the vice president of PNB. The vice president in turn recommended it to the board of
directors of PNB.
However, the Board of Directors wanted to raise the price to P3.00 per picul. This Tuazon does not want hence he backed out
from the agreement. This resulted to Tapnio not being able to realize profit and at the same time rendered her unable to pay her
P2,000.00 crop loan which would have been covered by her agreement with Tuazon.
Eventually, Tapnio was sued by her other creditors and Tapnio filed a third party complaint against PNB where she alleged
that her failure to pay her debts was because of PNBs negligence and unreasonableness.
ISSUE: Whether or not Tapnio is correct.

HELD: Yes. In this type of transaction, time is of the essence considering that Tapnios sugar quota for said year needs
to be utilized ASAP otherwise her allotment may be assigned to someone else, and if she cant use it, she wont be
able to export her crops. It is unreasonable for PNBs board of directors to disallow the agreement between Tapnio and
Tuazon because of the mere difference of 0.20 in the agreed price rate. What makes it more unreasonable is the fact

that the P2.80 was recommended both by the bank manager and PNBs VP yet it was disapproved by the board.
Further, the P2.80 per picul rate is the minimum allowable rate pursuant to prevailing market trends that time. This
unreasonable stand reflects PNBs lack of the reasonable degree of care and vigilance in attending to the matter. PNB
is therefore negligent.
While petitioner had the ultimate authority of approving or disapproving the proposed lease since the quota
was mortgaged to the Bank, the latter certainly cannot escape its responsibility of observing, for the protection of the
interest of private respondents, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand
in approving or disapproving the lease of said sugar quota. The law makes it imperative that every person must in the
exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty
and good faith, 4 this petitioner failed to do. Certainly, it knew that the agricultural year was about to expire, that by
its disapproval of the lease private respondents would be unable to utilize the sugar quota in question. In failing to
observe the reasonable degree of care and vigilance which the surrounding circumstances reasonably impose,
petitioner is consequently liable for the damages caused on private respondents. Under Article 21 of the New Civil
Code, any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. The afore-cited provisions on human relations were
intended to expand the concept of torts in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of
moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically provide in the statutes. 5
A corporation is civilly liable in the same manner as natural persons for torts, because generally speaking, the
rules governing the liability of a principal or master for a tort committed by an agent or servant are the same whether
the principal or master be a natural person or a corporation, and whether the servant or agent be a natural or artificial
person. All of the authorities agree that a principal or master is liable for every tort which it expressly directs or
authorizes, and this is just as true of a corporation as of a natural person, a corporation is liable, therefore, whenever a
tortious act is committed by an officer or agent under express direction or authority from the stockholders or members
acting as a body, or, generally, from the directors as the governing body.
3. HEDY GAN y YU v. THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.[G.R.

HONORABLE
No.

COURT OF
L-44264.

APPEALS and
September

the

PEOPLE
19,

OF THE
1988.]

Doctrine: EMERGENCY RULE. A corollary rule is what is known in the law as the emergency rule. "Under that rule,
one who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best means
that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently
and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is
brought
about
by
his
own
negligence."
Prior Proceedings: CFI Manila- Gan was convicted of Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence, CA- Judgment modified,
Homicide
thru
simple
imprudence,
SCReversed
the
decision
of
CA,
acquitted
Gan.
Facts: Hedy Gan was driving a Toyota car along North Bay Boulevard, Tondo, Manila. While in front of house no. 694 of
North Bay Boulevard, there were two vehicles, a truck and a jeepney parked on one side of the road, one following the
other about two to three meters from each other. As the car driven by the accused approached the place where the
two vehicles were parked, there was a vehicle coming from the opposite direction, followed by another which tried to
overtake and bypass the one in front of it and thereby encroached the lane of the car driven by the accused. To avoid a
head-on collision with the oncoming vehicle, the defendant swerved to the right and as a consequence, the front
bumper of the Toyota Crown Sedan hit an old man who was about to cross the boulevard from south to north, pinning
him against the rear of the parked jeepney. The force of the impact caused the parked jeepney to move forward hitting
the rear of the parked truck ahead of it. The pedestrian was injured, the Toyota Sedan was damaged on its front, the
jeep suffered damages on its rear and front parts, and the truck sustained scratches at the wooden portion of its rear.
The body of Isidoro Casino was immediately brought to the hospital but was (pronounced) dead on arrival.
Issue: Did the CA erred in holding that when the petitioner saw a car travelling directly towards her, she should have
stepped on the brakes immediately or in swerving her vehicle to the right should have also stepped on the brakes or
lessened her speed, to avoid the death of a pedestrian?
Held: YES. The test for determining whether or not a person is negligent in doing an act whereby injury or damage
results to the person or property of another is this: Would a prudent man in the position of the person to whom
negligence is attributed foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course about to be
pursued? If so, the law imposes the duty on the doer to take precaution against its mischievous results and the failure
to
do
so
constitutes
negligence.

Applying the emergency rule (as defined above), petitioner is not guilty of the crime. The amount of time
afforded to the petitioner to react to the situation she was in should be taken into account for it is undeniable that the
suggested course of action presupposes sufficient time for appellant to analyze the situation confronting her and to
ponder on which of the different courses of action would result in the least possible harm to herself and to others.

Under the circumstances narrated by petitioner, we find that the appellate court is asking too much from a
mere mortal like the petitioner who in the blink of an eye had to exercise her best judgment to extricate herself from a
difficult and dangerous situation caused by the driver of the overtaking vehicle. Petitioner certainly could not be
expected to act with all the coolness of a person under normal conditions. The danger confronting petitioner was real
and imminent, threatening her very existence. She had no opportunity for rational thinking but only enough time to
heed the very powerful instinct of self-preservation.
Also, the respondent court itself pronounced that the petitioner was driving her car within the legal limits. We
therefore rule that the "emergency rule" enunciated above applies with full force to the case at bar and consequently
absolve petitioner from any criminal negligence in connection with the incident under consideration.

4. United States vs Juanillo [G.R. No. L-7255, October 3, 1912]

FACTS: This is an appeal by Teodoro Juanillo from a sentence imposed by the Honorable J.S. Powell, judge of the Court
of First Instance at Iloilo, condemning him to one year and one day of presidio correccional, to the payment of P1,000
to the heirs of the deceased, Ponciano Leal, to the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to
the payment of the costs of the cause, for the crime of negligent homicide(imprudencia temeraria con homicidio).
It is admitted that Ponciano Leal was killed on the public highway while going from the town of Pavia to Santa
Barbara, Province of Iloilo, at about 4 o'clock on the afternoon of April 23, 1911, by being struck by an automobile, of
which the appellant was the chauffeur. The contention of the prosecution is that the death of the deceased was due to
the reckless insists that the unfortunate occurrence was purely an accident. The prosecution presented four witnesses
and the defense six, including the appellant.
The first witness, Pedro Latoja, 18 years of age, an ordinary laborer, a resident of Lambunao, testified that Juan
Labrila, Ponciano Leal, and he, were walking abreast along the road toward Santa Barbara on the afternoon in
question. Nicolas Agraviado testified that he had just passed the deceased and his companions going in the opposite
direction when the automobile passed him.
Becker testified that he saw some men in the road at a distance of about 300 yards ahead of the automobile;
that at that time the chauffeur put on his brakes, used his exhaust, and blew his horn; that when they got up to within
about 30 feet of the men some of them having gone to the right and some to the left the deceased, being on the
right, started to run across to the left side of the road to join his companions; that the deceased did not clear the
machine and was struck by some part of the left side of the machine, knocked down, and died soon thereafter.
In view of all the admitted facts and circumstances, and the reasonableness of the stories told by the
defendant and his witnesses we are fully satisfied that the trial court was justified in accepting the testimony of Latoja,
Abrila, and Agraviado as to how the collision took place. This being true, the deceased was killed just a little to the left
of the center of the road. Just before the machine struck him he had been walking abreast heard the blowing of the
horn or any other warning whatever until the machine was so close that Latoja and Labrila barely had time to make
escape, while the deceased, being on the left, did not have the sufficient time.
ISSUE: Counsel for the appellant insists that the court erred, first, in taking judicial notice of the power of stopping
appliances of automobiles; and second, in its conception of reckless negligence as applied to the rights of vehicles and
parties on foot on public highways.
RULING: It is generally held that the rights and duties of pedestrians and vehicles are equal. Each may use the
highway, and each must exercise such care and prudence as the circumstances demand. (20 L. R. A., n. s., 32 [232],
Note.) Owners of automobiles have the same rights in the streets and highways that pedestrians and drivers of horses
have. Automobile drivers or the drivers of animals are not to use the means of locomotion without regard to the rights
of others having occassion to travel on the highway. While an automobile is a lawful means of conveyance and has
equal rights upon the roads with pedestrians, horses, and carriages, its use cannot be lawfully countenanced unless
accompanied with that degree of prudence in management and consideration for the rights of others which is
consistent with safety.
Judge Cooley, in his work on Torts (3d ed.), 1324, defines negligence to be: The failure to observe for the protection of
the interests of another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand,
whereby such other person suffers injury.
Negligence is want of care required by the circumstances. It is a relative or comparative, not an absolute term,
and its application depends upon the situation of the parties, and the degree of care and vigilance which the
circumstances reasonably impose. Where the danger is great a high degree of care is necessary, and the failure to
observe it is a want of ordinary care under the circumstances. (Ahern vs. Oregon Tel. Co., 24 Ore. 276.) The operator of
an automobile is bound to exercise care in proportion to the varying danger and risks of the highway and
commensurate with the dangers naturally incident to the use of such vehicle. He is obliged to take notice of the
conditions before him, and if it is apparent that by any particular method of proceeding he is liable to work an injury, it
is his duty to adopt some other or safer method if within reasonable care and prudence he can do so. In determining

the degree of care an operator of an automobile should use, when on the highway, it is proper to take into
consideration the place, presence or absence of other travelers, the speed of the automobile, its size, appearance,
manner of movement, and the amount of noise it makes, and anything that indicates unusual or peculiar danger.
In the case of Indiana Springs Co. vs. Brown (165 Ind., 465), it was said:The quantum of care required is to be
estimated by the exigencies of the particular situation; that is, by the place, presence or absence of other vehicles and
travelers; . . . whether the conveyance and power used are common or new to the road.
Also, the degree of care required to be exercised varies with the capacity of the person endangered to care for
himself. Thus, it has been held not to be negligence per se in a boy of six to play on the highway, where an automobile
came up on him under circumstances which produced fright and terror, and thus caused an error of judgment by which
the boy ran in front of the automobile. (Thies vs. Thomas, 77 N. Y. Supp., 276.) and inApperson vs. Lazaro (Ind. App.),
87 N. E., 97, where an automobile approached an infirm person from the rear at a high rate of speed and startled him
so that in order to avoid the injury he jumped aside and was struck by the automobile, the court said that the conduct
of the operator of the automobile was an unreasonable abridgment of the pedestrian's right to the road.
The testimony of all the parties in the case at bar as to the surrounding conditions of this occurrence was to
the effect that the road on which they were traveling was dotted with simple rural folk. It was Sunday afternoon and
the road connected two rather populous towns that were close together.
Under such conditions appellant being in charge of the powerful machine, capable of doing great damage if
not skillfully manipulated, was bound to use a high degree of care to avoid injuring these native farmers, who had a
common right to the highway. A driver of an automobile, under such circumstances, is required to use a greater degree
of care than drivers of animals, for the reason that the machine is capable of greater destruction, and furthermore, it is
absolutely under the power and control of the driver; whereas, a horse or other animal can and does to some extent
aid in averting an accident. It is not pleasant to be obliged to slow down automobiles to accommodate persons riding,
driving, or walking. It is probably more agreeable to send the machine along and let the horse or person get out of the
way in the best manner possible; but it is well to understand, if this course is adopted and an accident occurs, that the
automobile driver will be called upon to account for his acts. An automobile driver must at all times use all the care
and caution which a careful and prudent driver would have exercised under the circumstances. The appellant was
aware of and is chargeable with the knowledge that the deceased and his companions were simple country people and
were lacking in the capacity to appreciate and to guard against the dangers of an automobile driven at a high rate of
speed, and he was bound to enlarge to a commensurate extent the degree of vigilance and care necessary to avoid
injuries which the use of his machine made more imminent.
In the case reported in volume 53 of the Criminal Jurisprudence of the supreme court of Spain, p. 157 (decision
of October 1, 1894), it appeared that the driver of a public vehicle attempted to pass a street car and for that purpose
turned to the right. In doing so he collided with an omnibus moving to the opposite direction, the vehicle striking the
omnibus in front. As a result one of the passengers who was on the front platform of the omnibus and who had one of
his legs sticking out from the side of the omnibus was injured. It was held that the defendant was guilty of reckless
negligence for the reason that the collision was the result of his violation of the municipal ordinance under which he
should have turned to the left instead of turning to the right, thereby attempting to pass between the curb of the
street and the omnibus, where there was hardly room enough for both vehicles between the sidewalk and the street
car.
The negligence of the defendant in the case at bar consisted in his failure to recognize the great injury that
would accrue to the deceased from the collision. He had no right, it seems to us, after he saw the deceased and his
companions walking in the road ahead of him to continue at so great a speed, at the eminent hazard of colliding with
the deceased. Great care was due from him by reason of the deadliness of the machine he was propelling along the
highway. When one comes through the highways with a machine of such power as an automobile, it is incumbent upon
the driver to use great care not to drive against or over pedestrians. An automobile is much more dangerous than a
street car or even a railway car. These are propelled along the fixed rails and all the traveling public has to do to be
safe is to keep off the track. But the automobile can be turned as easily as an individual, and for this reason is far more
dangerous to the traveling public than either the street car or the railway train. We do not feel at liberty, under the
evidence, to say that this defendant was free from reckless negligence. In failing to so check the speed of his machine
when he saw the deceased in front of him to give him sufficient control to avert the injury or to stop it entirely, when
he knew that if he continued at the same speed at which he was going he would collide with the deceased, not only
shows negligence but reckless negligence in a marked degree.
5. PICART vs. SMITH, JR., G.R. No. L-12219, March 15, 1918
FACTS: On the Carlatan Bridge in La Union. Picart was riding on his pony over said bridge. Before he had gotten half
way across, Smith approached from the opposite direction in an automobile. As the defendant neared the bridge he
saw a horseman on it and blew his horn to give warning of his approach. He continued his course and after he had
taken the bridge he gave two more successive blasts, as it appeared to him that the man on horseback before him was
not observing the rule of the road.
Picart saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals. However, being perturbed by the novelty of
the apparition or the rapidity of the approach, he pulled the pony closely up against the railing on the right side of the

bridge instead of going to the left. He says that the reason he did this was that he thought he did not have sufficient
time to get over to the other side. As the automobile approached, Smith guided it toward his left, that being the proper
side of the road for the machine. In so doing the defendant assumed that the horseman would move to the other side.
Seeing that the pony was apparently quiet, the defendant, instead of veering to the right while yet some distance
away or slowing down, continued to approach directly toward the horse without diminution of speed. When he had
gotten quite near, there being then no possibility of the horse getting across to the other side, the defendant quickly
turned his car sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the horse; but in so doing the automobile passed in such close
proximity to the animal that it became frightened and turned its body across the bridge, got hit by the car and the limb
was broken. The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some violenceAs a result of its injuries the horse died. The
plaintiff received contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness and required medical attention for several
days.
From a judgment of the CFI of La Union absolving Smith from liability Picart has appealed.
ISSUE: Whether Smith was guilty of negligence such as gives rise to a civil obligation to repair the damage done
HELD: The judgment of the lower court must be reversed, and judgment is here rendered that the Picart recover of
Smith damages
YES. The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows:
Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that person would have used in the same situation? If not,
then he is guilty of negligence. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the
personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or
negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that. The question as to what
would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of course be always determined in the light of
human experience and in view of the facts involved in the particular case.
Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a result of the course actually pursued?
If so, it was the duty of the actor to take precautions to guard against that harm. Reasonable foresight of harm,
followed by ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to
exist. Stated in these terms, the proper criterion for determining the existence of negligence in a given case is this:
Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an
effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing conduct or guarding against its
consequences.
Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present case we think that negligence is clearly
established. A prudent man, placed in the position of the defendant, would in our opinion, have recognized that the
course which he was pursuing was fraught with risk, and would therefore have foreseen harm to the horse and the
rider as reasonable consequence of that course. Under these circumstances the law imposed on the Smith the duty to
guard against the threatened harm.
It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty of antecedent
negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But as we have already stated, Smith was also negligent;
and in such case the problem always is to discover which agent is immediately and directly responsible. It will be noted
that the negligent acts of the two parties were not contemporaneous, since the negligence of the defendant
succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under these circumstances the law is that the
person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the
consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other party.
6. Barredo vs Garcia and Almario
FACTS: At about 1:30am on May 3, 1936, Fontanillas taxi collided with a kalesa thereby killing the 16 year old
Faustino Garcia. Faustinos parents filed a criminal suit against Fontanilla and reserved their right to file a separate civil
suit. Fontanilla was eventually convicted. After the criminal suit, Garcia filed a civil suit against Barredo the owner of
the taxi (employer of Fontanilla). The suit was based on Article 1903 of the civil code (negligence of employers in the
selection of their employees). Barredo assailed the suit arguing that his liability is only subsidiary and that the
separate civil suit should have been filed against Fontanilla primarily and not him.
ISSUE: Whether or not Barredo is just subsidiarily liable.
HELD: No. He is primarily liable under Article 1903 which is a separate civil action against negligent employers. Garcia
is well within his rights in suing Barredo. He reserved his right to file a separate civil action and this is more
expeditious because by the time of the SC judgment Fontanilla is already serving his sentence and has no property. It
was also proven that Barredo is negligent in hiring his employees because it was shown that Fontanilla had had
multiple traffic infractions already before he hired him something he failed to overcome during hearing. Had Garcia
not reserved his right to file a separate civil action, Barredo would have only been subsidiarily liable. Further, Barredo
is not being sued for damages arising from a criminal act (his drivers negligence) but rather for his own negligence in
selecting his employee (Article 1903).

7. Elcano vs Hill, 77 SCRA 100 May 26, 1977

FACTS: Reginald Hill, a minor, caused the death of Agapito (son of Elcano). Elcano filed a criminal case against
Reginald but Reginald was acquitted for lack of intent coupled with mistake. Elcano then filed a civil action against
Reginald and his dad (Marvin Hill) for damages based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Hill argued that the civil action
is barred by his sons acquittal in the criminal case; and that if ever, his civil liability as a parent has been extinguished
by the fact that his son is already an emancipated minor by reason of his marriage.
ISSUE: Whether or not Marvin Hill may be held civilly liable under Article 2180.
HELD: Yes. The acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case does not bar the filing of a separate civil action. A separate
civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or
acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if accused is actually charged also criminally, to recover
damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the
awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3,
Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability
for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the
criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly
stated, culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law.
While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil Code),
and under Article 397, emancipation takes place by the marriage of the minor child, it is, however, also clear that
pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus Emancipation by
marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate parental authority over the childs person. It shall enable the
minor to administer his property as though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real
property without the consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the
assistance of his father, mother or guardian. Therefore, Article 2180 is applicable to Marvin Hill the SC however
ruled since at the time of the decision, Reginald is already of age, Marvins liability should be subsidiary only as a
matter of equity.
8. German Garcia Et Al., V. The Hon. Mariano M. Florido Et Al. (1973), Gr No L-35095
Lessons Applicable: Elements of Quasi- Delict (Torts and Damages)
FACTS:August 4, 1971: German C. Garcia, Chief of the Misamis Occidental Hospital, his wife, Luminosa L. Garcia, and
Ester Francisco, bookkeeper of the hospital, hired and boarded a PU car owned and operated by Marcelino Inesin, and
driven by respondent, Ricardo Vayson, for a round-trip from Oroquieta City to Zamboanga City for the purpose of
attending a conference. On August 4, 1971 9:30 a.m.: While the PU car was negotiating a slight curve on the national
highway at 21 km, it collided with an oncoming passenger bus owned and operated by the Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and
driven by Pedro Tumala. Garcia et al. sustained various physical injuries which necessitated their medical treatment
and hospitalization. Garcia et al. filed an action for damages against both drivers and their owners for driving in
a reckless, grossly negligent and imprudent manner in gross violation of traffic rules and without due regard to the
safety of the passengers aboard the PU car
The RTC dismissed the case because it is not quasi-delict because there is a violation of law or traffic rules or
regulations for excessive speeding
ISSUE: Whether Garcia et al. can still file a civil action for quasi-delict despite having a criminal action.
HELD: YES. Decision appealed reversed and set aside, and the court a quo is directed to proceed with the trial of the
case essential averments for a quasi-delictual action under Articles 2176-2194 of the New Civil Code are present,
namely:
a) Act or omission of the private respondents;
b) Presence of fault or negligence or the lack of due care in the operation of the passenger bus No. 25 by Pedro Tumala
resulting in the collision of the bus with the passenger car;
c) Physical injuries and other damages sustained by as a result of the collision;
d) Existence of direct causal connection between the damage or prejudice and the fault or negligence of private
respondents;
e) The absence of pre-existing contractual relations between the parties
Violation of traffic rules is merely descriptive of the failure of said driver to observe for the protection of the
interests of others, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, which failure
resulted in the injury on petitioners. Petitioners never intervened in the criminal action instituted by the Chief of Police
against respondent Pedro Tumala, much less has the said criminal action been terminated either by conviction or
acquittal of said accused
It is, therefore, evident that by the institution of the present civil action for damages, petitioners have in effect
abandoned their right to press recovery for damages in the criminal case, and have opted instead to recover them in
the present civil case. Petitioners have thereby foreclosed their right to intervene therein, or one where reservation to

file the civil action need not be made, for the reason that the law itself (Article 33 of the Civil Code) already makes the
reservation and the failure of the offended party to do so does not bar him from bringing the action, under the peculiar
circumstances of the case, We find no legal justification for respondent court's order of dismissal
9. Porfirio P. Cinco V. Hon. Mateo Canonoy Et Al. (1979), G.R. No. L-33171 May 31, 1979
Laws Applicable: Rule 111, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, Art. 31 and Article 2176 of the Civil Code; Lessons
Applicable: Quasi-delict (Torts and Damages)
FACTS:Petitioner filed a complaint in the City Court for recovery of damages on account of
a vehicular accident involving his car and a jeepney driven by respondent Romeo Hilot and operated by respondents
Valeriana Pepito and Carlos Pepito. Subsequently, a criminal case was filed against the driver. At the pre-trial of the
civil case counsel for the respondents moved for the suspension of the civil action pending determination of the
criminal case invoking Section 3(b), Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. The City Court granted the motion and ordered the
suspension of the civil case. Petitioner elevated the matter on certiorari to the Court of First Instance, alleging that the
City Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in suspending the civil action for being contrary to law and
jurisprudence. The Court of First Instance dismissed the petition; hence, this petition to review on certiorari.
ISSUE:Whether or not there can be an independent civil action for damages to property during the pendency of the
criminal
action.
HELD:The Supreme Court held that an action for damages based on Articles 2176 and 2180 of the New Civil Code is
quasi-delictual in character which can be prosecuted independently of the criminal action.Where the plaintiff made
essential averments in the complaint that it was the driver's fault or negligence in the operation of the jeepney which
caused the collision between his automobile and said jeepney; that plaintiff sustained damages because of the
collision; that a direct causal connection exists between the damage he suffered and the fault or negligence of the
defendant-driver and where the defendant-operator in their answer, contended, among others, that they observed due
diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees, a defense peculiar to actions based on quasi-delict , such
action is principally predicated on Articles 32176 and 2180 of the New Civil Code which is quasi-delictual in nature and
character. Liability being predicated on quasi-delict , the civil case may proceed as a separate and independent court
action as specifically provided for in Article 2177.
Section 3 (b), Rule 111 of the Rules of Court refers to "other civil actions arising from cases not included in
Section 2 of the same rule" in which, "once the criminal action has been commenced, no civil action arising from the
same offense can be prosecuted and the same shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be found, until final
judgment in the criminal proceeding has been rendered". The civil action referred to in Section 2(a) and 3(b), Rule 11
of the Rules of Court which should be suspended after the criminal action has been instituted is that arising from the
criminal offense and not the civil action based on quasi delict.
The concept of quasi-delict enunciated in Article 2176 of the New Civil Code is so broad that it
includes not only injuries to persons but also damage to property. It makes no distinction between "damage to
persons" on the one hand and "damage to property" on the other. The word "damage" is used in two concepts: the
"harm" done and "reparation" for the harm done. And with respect to "harm" it is plain that it includes both injuries to
person
and
property
since
"harm"
is
not
limited
to
personal but also to property injuries. An example of quasi-delict in the law itself which includes damage to property in
Article 2191(2) of the Civil Code which holds proprietors responsible for damages caused by excessive smoke which
may be harmful "to person or property". Respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in upholding the decision of
the city courtsuspending the civil action based on quasi-delict until after the criminal action is finally terminated.
10. MENDOZA V. ARRIETA [91 S 113], G.R. No. L-32599, June 29, 1979
FACTS: A three- way vehicular accident occurred involving a car owned and driven by petitioner Edgardo Mendoza, a
private jeep owned and driven by respondent Rodolfo Salazar, and a gravel and sand truck owned by respondent
Felipino Timbol and driven by Freddie Montoya. As a consequence of said mishap, two separate Informations for
Reckless Imprudence Causing Damage to Property were filed against Rodolfo Salazar and Freddie Montoya with the CFI
of Bulacan. The trial Court absolved jeep-owner-driver Salazar of any liability, civil and criminal, in view of its findings
that the collision between Salazars jeep and petitioners car was the result of the former having been bumped from
behind by the truck driven by Montoya. Neither was petitioner awarded damages as he was not a complainant against
truck-driver Montoya but only against jeep-owner-driver Salazar. After the termination of the criminal cases, petitioner
filed a civil case against respondents Salazar and Timbol for the damages sustained by his car as a result of the
collision involving their vehicles.
ISSUE:Whether or not the lower court in dismissing petitioners complaint for damages based on quasi-delict against
private respondents.
HELD:Insofar as Timbol is concerned the answer is yes. The respondent Judge wrongfully sustained Timbols
allegations that the civil suit is barred by the prior joint judgment in a criminal case filed against him, wherein no
reservation to file a separate civil case was made by petitioner and where the latter actively participated in the trial
and tried to prove damages against Salazar only. For petitioner's cause of action against Timbol in the civil case is
based on quasi-delict. Respondent Judge committed reversible error when he dismissed the civil suit against the truck-

owner, as said case may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
Article 31 of the Civil Code provides that, When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or
omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and
regardless of the result of the latter. Timbols submission that petitioner's failure to make a reservation in the criminal
action of his right to file an independent civil action, as required under section 2, Rule 111, Rules of Court, bars the
institution of such separate civil action is untenable. For inasmuch as Article 31 (in relation to Articles 2176 and 2177)
of the Civil Code creates a civil liability distinct and different from the civil action arising from the offense of negligence
under the Revised Penal Code, no reservation is required to be made in the criminal case. And so, to reiterate, the civil
case filed against Timbol is not barred by the fact that petitioner failed to reserve, in the criminal action, his right to file
an independent civil action based on quasi-delict.
But insofar as Salazar is concerned the answer is no. Inasmuch as civil liability co-exists with criminal
responsibility in negligence cases, the offended party has the option between an action for enforcement of civil liability
based on culpa criminal under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and an action for recovery of damages based on
culpa aquiliana under Article 2177 of the Civil Code. The action for enforcement of civil liability based on culpa criminal
under section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court is deemed simultaneously instituted with the criminal action, unless
expressly waived or reserved for separate application by the offended party. The circumstances attendant to the
criminal case yields the conclusion that petitioner had opted to base his cause of action against Salazar on culpa
criminal and not on culpa aquiliana as evidenced by his active participation and intervention in the prosecution of the
criminal suit against said Salazar. The latter's civil liability continued to be involved in the criminal action until its
termination. Such being the case, there was no need for petitioner to have reserved his right to file a separate civil
action as his action for civil liability was deemed impliedly instituted in the criminal case.
Salazar cannot be held civilly liable for damages sustained by petitioners car for considering that the collision
between the jeep driven by him and the car owned and driven by Mendoza was the result of the hitting on the rear of
the jeep by the truck driven by Montoya, it cannot be said that Salazar was at fault. Hence, the right of petitioner to
claim damages from Salazar did not arise. Accordingly, inasmuch as petitioner's cause of action as against jeep-ownerdriver Salazar is ex- delictu, founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, the civil action must be held to have
been extinguished in consonance with Section 3(c) which provides that, Extinction of the penal action does not carry
with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from
which the civil right arise did not exist
Citing Garcia v. Florido, "As we have stated at the outset, the same negligent act causing damages may
produce a civil liability arising from crime or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual. The former is
a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and independent negligenc, having always had its own
foundation and individuality. Some legal writers are of the view that in accordance with Article 31, the civil action
based upon quasi-delict may proced independently of the criminal proceeding for criminal negligence and regardless
of the result of the latter. Hence, the proviso in Section 2 of Rule 111 (requiring reservation of civil actions) with
reference to Articles 32, 33, and 34 of the Civil Code, is contrary to the letter and spirit of the said articles, for these
articles were drafted and are intended to constitute as exceptions to the general rule stated in what is now Section 1 of
Rule 111. The proviso, which is procedura, may also be regarded as an unauthorized amendment of substantive law,
Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code, which do not provide for the reservation required in the proviso."
However, a civil action for damages against the owner-driver of the jeep would not prosper because civil
liability arising from crime co-exists with criminal liability in criminal cases. Hence, the offended party had the option
to prosecute on civil liability arising from crime or from quasi-delict. His active participation in the criminal case implies
that he opted to recover the civil liability arising from crime. Hence, since the acquittal in the criminal case, which was
not based on reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages can no longer be instituted.
11. Barredo vs. Garcia and Almario (73 Phil. 607)
Torts and Damages Civil Liability from Quasi Delicts vs Civil Liability from Crimes
Facts: At about 1:30am on May 3, 1936, Fontanillas taxi collided with a kalesa thereby killing the 16 year old
Faustino Garcia. Faustinos parents filed a criminal suit against Fontanilla and reserved their right to file a separate civil
suit. Fontanilla was eventually convicted. After the criminal suit, Garcia filed a civil suit against Barredo the owner of
the taxi (employer of Fontanilla). The suit was based on Article 1903 of the civil code (negligence of employers in the
selection of their employees). Barredo assailed the suit arguing that his liability is only subsidiary and that the
separate civil suit should have been filed against Fontanilla primarily and not him.
ISSUE: Whether or not Barredo is just subsidiarily liable.
HELD: No. He is primarily liable under Article 1903 which is a separate civil action against negligent employers. Garcia
is well within his rights in suing Barredo. He reserved his right to file a separate civil action and this is more
expeditious because by the time of the SC judgment Fontanilla is already serving his sentence and has no property. It
was also proven that Barredo is negligent in hiring his employees because it was shown that Fontanilla had had
multiple traffic infractions already before he hired him something he failed to overcome during hearing. Had Garcia
not reserved his right to file a separate civil action, Barredo would have only been subsidiarily liable. Further, Barredo

is not being sued for damages arising from a criminal act (his drivers negligence) but rather for his own negligence in
selecting his employee (Article 1903).
Some of the differences between crimes under the Penal Code are:1. That crimes affect the public interest,
while quasi-delitos are only of private concern.; 2. That consequently, the Penal Code punishes or corrects the
criminal act, while the Civil Code, by means of indemnification, merely repairs the damage.; 3. That delicts are not as
broad as quasi-delicts, because for the former are punished only if there is a penal law clearly covering them, while the
latter, cuasi-delitos, include all acts in which any kind of fault or negligence intervenes. However, it should be
noted that not all violations of the penal law produce civil responsibility, such as begging in contravention of
ordinances, violation of the game laws, infraction of the rules of traffic when nobody is hurt.
The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the separate individuality of cuasi-delitos or culpa aquiliana
under the Civil Code. Specifically they show that there is a distinction between civil liability arising from criminal
negligence (governed by the Penal Code) and responsibility for fault or negligence under Articles 1902 to 1910 of the
Civil Code, and that the same negligent act may produce either a civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal
Code, or a separate responsibility for fault or negligence under Articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code, and that the
same negligent act may produce either a civil liability arising from a crime under the penal Code, or a separate
responsibility for fault or negligence under Articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Still more concretely the authorities
above cited render it inescapable to conclude that the employer in this case the defendant-petitioner is
primarily and directly liable under Article 1903 of the Civil Code.
12. Jose Cangco vs Manila Railroad Co. [G.R. No. L-12191 ]
FACTS: On January 20, 1915, Cangco was riding the train of Manila Railroad Co (MRC). He was an employee of the
latter and he was given a pass so that he could ride the train for free. When he was nearing his destination at about
7pm, he arose from his seat even though the train was not at full stop. When he was about to alight from the train
(which was still slightly moving) he accidentally stepped on a sack of watermelons which he failed to notice due to the
fact that it was dim. This caused him to lose his balance at the door and he fell and his arm was crushed by the train
and he suffered other serious injuries. He was dragged a few meters more as the train slowed down.
It was established that the employees of MRC were negligent in piling the sacks of watermelons. MRC raised as
a defense the fact that Cangco was also negligent as he failed to exercise diligence in alighting from the train as he did
not wait for it to stop.
ISSUE: Whether or not Manila Railroad Co is liable for damages.
HELD: Yes. Alighting from a moving train while it is slowing down is a common practice and a lot of people are doing
so every day without suffering injury. Cangco has the vigor and agility of young manhood, and it was by no means so
risky for him to get off while the train was yet moving as the same act would have been in an aged or feeble person.
He was also ignorant of the fact that sacks of watermelons were there as there were no appropriate warnings and the
place was dimly lit.
The Court also elucidated on the distinction between the liability of employers under Article 2180 and their
liability for breach of contract [of carriage]:
But, if the master has not been guilty of any negligence whatever in the selection and direction of the servant,
he is not liable for the acts of the latter, whatever done within the scope of his employment or not, if the damage done
by the servant does not amount to a breach of the contract between the master and the person injured.
The liability arising from extra-contractual culpa is always based upon a voluntary act or omission which,
without willful intent, but by mere negligence or inattention, has caused damage to another.
These two fields, figuratively speaking, concentric; that is to say, the mere fact that a person is bound to
another by contract does not relieve him from extra-contractual liability to such person. When such a contractual
relation exists the obligor may break the contract under such conditions that the same act which constitutes the
source of an extra-contractual obligation had no contract existed between the parties.
Whether negligence occurs an incident in the course of the performance of a contractual undertaking or in
itself the source of an extra-contractual undertaking obligation, its essential characteristics are identical.Vinculum
Juris: (def) It means an obligation of law, or the right of the obligee to enforce a civil matter in a court of law.
13. Air France vs Rafael Carrascoso
FACTS: In March 1958, Rafael Carrascoso and several other Filipinos were tourists en route to Rome from Manila.
Carrascoso was issued a first class round trip ticket by Air France. But during a stop-over in Bangkok, he was asked by
the plane manager of Air France to vacate his seat because a white man allegedly has a better right than him.
Carrascoso protested but when things got heated and upon advise of other Filipinos on board, Carrascoso gave up his
seat and was transferred to the planes tourist class.

After their tourist trip when Carrascoso was already in the Philippines, he sued Air France for damages for the
embarrassment he suffered during his trip. In court, Carrascoso testified, among others, that he when he was forced to
take the tourist class, he went to the planes pantry where he was approached by a plane purser who told him that he
noted in the planes journal the following:First-class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and
that the captain refused to intervene. The said testimony was admitted in favor of Carrascoso. The trial court
eventually awarded damages in favor of Carrascoso. This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Air France is assailing the decision of the trial court and the CA. It avers that the issuance of a first class ticket
to Carrascoso was not an assurance that he will be seated in first class because allegedly in truth and in fact, that was
not the true intent between the parties.Air France also questioned the admissibility of Carrascosos testimony
regarding the note made by the purser because the said note was never presented in court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Air France is liable for damages and on what basis.
HELD: Yes. It appears that Air Frances liability is based on culpa-contractual and on culpa aquiliana.
Culpa Contractual: There exists a contract of carriage between Air France and Carrascoso. There was a
contract to furnish Carrasocoso a first class passage; Second, That said contract was breached when Air France failed
to furnish first class transportation at Bangkok; and Third, that there was bad faith when Air Frances employee
compelled Carrascoso to leave his first class accommodation berth after he was already, seated and to take a seat in
the tourist class, by reason of which he suffered inconvenience, embarrassments and humiliations, thereby causing
him mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation, resulting in moral damages.
The Supreme Court did not give credence to Air Frances claim that the issuance of a first class ticket to a
passenger is not an assurance that he will be given a first class seat. Such claim is simply incredible.
Culpa Aquiliana: Here, the SC ruled, even though there is a contract of carriage between Air France and
Carrascoso, there is also a tortuous act based on culpa aquiliana. Passengers do not contract merely for transportation.
They have a right to be treated by the carriers employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration.
They are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from such
employees. So it is, that any rule or discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the
latter an action for damages against the carrier. Air Frances contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public duty.
The stress of Carrascosos action is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the Air
France a case of quasi-delict. Damages are proper.
HELD: 2: Yes. The testimony of Carrascoso must be admitted based on res gestae. The subject of inquiry is not the
entry, but the ouster incident. Testimony on the entry does not come within the proscription of the best evidence rule.
Such testimony is admissible. Besides, when the dialogue between Carrascoso and the purser happened, the impact of
the startling occurrence was still fresh and continued to be felt. The excitement had not as yet died down. Statements
then, in this environment, are admissible as part of the res gestae. The utterance of the purser regarding his entry in
the notebook was spontaneous, and related to the circumstances of the ouster incident. Its trustworthiness has been
guaranteed. It thus escapes the operation of the hearsay rule. It forms part of the res gestae.
14.Singson vs BPI [23 SCRA 1117]
FACTS: Singson, was one of the defendants in a civil case, in which judgment had been rendered sentencing him and
his co-defendants therein Lobregat and Villa-Abrille & Co., to pay a sum of money to the plaintiff therein. Said
judgment became final and executory as only against Ville-Abrille for its failure to file an appeal. A writ of garnishment
was subsequently served upon BPI in which the Singsons had a current account insofar as Villa-Abrilles credits
against the Bank were concerned.
Upon receipt of the said Writ of Garnishment, a clerk of the bank, upon reading the name of the Singson in the
title of the Writ of Garnishment as a party defendants, without further reading the body and informing himself that said
garnishment was merely intended for the deposits of defendant Villa-Abrille & Co., et al, prepared a letter informing
Singson of the garnishment of his deposits by the plaintiff in that case.
Subsequently, two checks issued by the plaintiff Julian C. Singson, one in favor of B. M. Glass Service and
another in favor of the Lega Corporation, were dishonored by the bank. B. M. Glass Service then wrote to Singson that
the check was not honored by BPI because his account therein had already been garnished and that they are now
constrained to close his credit account with them.
Singson wrote to BPI, claiming that his name was not included in the Writ of Execution and Notice of
Garnishment, which was served upon the bank. The defendants lost no time to rectify the mistake that had been
inadvertently committed.Thus this action for damages.
ISSUE:Whetherthe existence of a contract between the parties bars a plaintiffs claim for damages based on torts?
HELD: NO. The existence of a contract between the parties does not bar the commission of a tort by the one against
the order and the consequent recovery of damages therefore. Indeed, this view has been, in effect, reiterated in a

comparatively recent case. Thus, in Air France vs. Carrascoso, involving an airplane passenger who, despite his firstclass ticket, had been illegally ousted from his first-class accommodation and compelled to take a seat in the tourist
compartment, was held entitled to recover damages from the air-carrier, upon the ground of tort on the latters part,
for, although the relation between a passenger and a carrier is contractual both in origin and nature the act that
breaks the contract may also be a tort.
In view, however, of the facts obtaining in the case at bar, and considering, particularly, the circumstance, that
the wrong done to the plaintiff was remedied as soon as the President of the bank realized the mistake he and his
subordinate employee had committed, the Court finds that an award of nominal damages the amount of which need
not be proven in the sum of P1,000, in addition to attorneys fees in the sum of P500, would suffice to vindicate
plaintiffs rights.
15.LUIS MA. ARANETA vs. ANTONIO R. DE JOYA [G.R. No. L-25172/ May 24, 1974]
FACTS:Sometime in November 1952 the respondent, then general manager of the Ace Advertising, proposed to the
board of directors that an employee, Ricardo Taylor, be sent to the United States to take up special studies in
television. The board, however, failed to act on the proposal. Nevertheless, in September 1953 the respondent sent
Taylor abroad. J. Antonio Araneta, a company director, inquired about the trip and was assured by the respondent that
Taylor's expenses would be defrayed not by the company but by other parties. This was thereafter confirmed by the
respondent in a memorandum.
While abroad, from September 1, 1953 to March 15, 1954, Taylor continued to receive his salaries. The
petitioner signed three of these checks on November 27, December 15 and December 29, 1953. The others were
signed by either the respondent, or Vicente Araneta (company treasurer) who put up part of the bill connected with
Taylor's trip and also handed him letters for delivery in the United States. The Ace Advertising disbursed P5,043.20, all
told, on account of Taylor's travel and studies.
On August 23, 1954 the Ace Advertising filed a complaint with the court of first instance of Manila against the
respondent for recovery of the total sum disbursed to Taylor, alleging that the trip was made without its knowledge,
authority or ratification. The respondent, in his answer, denied the charge and claimed that the trip was nonetheless
ratified by the company's board of directors, and that in any event under the by-laws he had the discretion, as general
manager, to authorize the trip which was for the company's benefit.
A 3rd-party complaint was also filed by the respondent against Vicente Araneta, the petitioner and Ricardo
Taylor. The respondent proved that Vicente Araneta, as treasurer of the firm, signed a check representing the
company's share of the transportation expense of Taylor to the United States, and that a series of payroll checks from
September 15, 1953 to December 31, 1953, inclusive, which included the salaries of Taylor, was signed by Vicente
Araneta and the petitioner who is a vice-president of the company. Both Aranetas disowned any personal liability,
claiming that they signed the checks in good faith as they were approved by the respondent..
On April 13, 1964 the trial court rendered judgment ordering the respondent to pay the Ace Advertising "the
sum of P5,043.20 with interest at the legal rate from August 23, 1954 until full payment," and dismissing the 3rd-party
complaint.
The respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals, which on August 2, 1965, rendered a decision affirming the trial
court's judgment in favor of the Ace Advertising but reversing the dismissal of the 3rd-party complaint. The appellate
court found as a fact that Taylor's trip had been neither authorized nor ratified by the company.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioner is guilty of a quasi-delict as held below.
HELD: It is our view, and we so hold, that the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be upheld. The petitioner's
assertion that he signed the questioned payroll checks in good faith has not been substantiated, he in particular not
having testified or offered testimony to prove such claim. Upon the contrary, in spite of his being a vice-president and
director of the Ace Advertising, the petitioner remained passive, throughout the period of Taylor's stay abroad,
concerning the unauthorized disbursements of corporate funds for the latter. This plus the fact that he even approved
thrice payroll checks for the payment of Taylor's salary, demonstrate quite distinctly that the petitioner neglected to
perform his duties properly, to the damage of the firm of which he was an officer. The fact that he was occupying a
contractual position at the Ace Advertising is of no moment. The existence of a contract between the parties, as has
been repeatedly held by this Court, constitutes no bar to the commission of a tort by one against the other and the
consequent recovery of damages.
16. C. S. GILCHRIST vs. E. A. CUDDY, ET AL., [G.R. No. 9356. February 18, 1915]
FACTS: Cuddy was the owner of the film Zigomar and that on the 24th of April he rented it to C. S. Gilchrist for a week
for P125, and it was to be delivered on the 26th of May, the week beginning that day. A few days prior to this Cuddy
sent the money back to Gilchrist, which he had forwarded to him in Manila, saying that he had made other
arrangements with his film. The other arrangements was the rental to these defendants Espejo and his partner for
P350 for the week and the injunction was asked by Gilchrist against these parties from showing it for the week
beginning the 26th of May.

From the findings of fact it is clear that Cuddy, a resident of Manila, was the owner of the "Zigomar;" that
Gilchrist was the owner of a cinematograph theater in Iloilo; that in accordance with the terms of the contract entered
into between Cuddy and Gilchrist the former leased to the latter the "Zigomar" for exhibition in his (Gilchrist's) theater
for the week beginning May 26, 1913; and that Cuddy willfully violated his contract in order that he might accept the
appellants' offer of P350 for the film for the same period.
Espejo admitted that he knew that Cuddy was the owner of the film. He received a letter from his agents in
Manila dated April 26, assuring him that he could not get the film for about six weeks. The arrangements between
Cuddy and the appellants for the exhibition of the film by the latter on the 26th of May were perfected after April 26,
90 that the six weeks would include and extend beyond May 26. The appellants must necessarily have known at the
time they made their offer to Cuddy that the latter had booked or contracted the film for six weeks from April 26.
Gilchrist thereupon resorted to the Court of First Instance for the issuance of preliminary injunction against
appellants.CFI produced an injunction restraining the defendants from exhibiting the film in question in their theater
during
the
period
specified
in
the
contract
of
Cuddy
with
Gilchrist
ISSUES: Whether the injunction was properly granted and whether Cuddy is liable for damages to Gilchrist
HELD: Yes. It is of the opinion that the circumstances justified the issuance of that injunction in the discretion of the
court.
Ratio: Gilchrist was facing the immediate prospect of diminished profits by reason of the fact that the appellants had
induced Cuddy to rent to them the film Gilchrist had counted upon as his feature film. It is quite apparent that to
estimate with any degree of accuracy the damages which Gilchrist would likely suffer from such an event would be
quite difficult if not impossible. If he allowed the appellants to exhibit the film in Iloilo, it would be useless for him to
exhibit it again, as the desire of the public to witness the production would have been already satisfied. In this
extremity, the appellee applied for and was granted, as we have indicated, a mandatory injunction against Cuddy
requiring him to deliver the Zigomar to Gilchrist, and a preliminary injunction against the appellants restraining them
from exhibiting that film in their theater during the week he (Gilchrist) had a right to exhibit it. These injunctions saved
the plaintiff harmless from damages due to the unwarranted interference of the defendants, as well as the difficult task
which would have been set for the court of estimating them in case the appellants had been allowed to carry out their
illegal plans. As to whether or not the mandatory injunction should have been issued, we are not, as we have said,
called upon to determine.
Yes. Cuddy is liable for damages to Gilchrist.
Ratio: Although the defendants did not, at the time their contract was made, know the identity of the plaintiff as the
person holding the prior contract but did know of the existence of a contract in favor of someone. In the case at bar
the only motive for the interference with the Gilchrist - Cuddy contract on the part of the appellants was a desire to
make a profit by exhibiting the film in their theater. There was no malice beyond this desire; but this fact does not
relieve them of the legal liability for interfering with that contract and causing its breach. It is, therefore, clear, under
the above authorities, that they were liable to Gilchrist for the damages caused by their acts, unless they are relieved
from such liability by reason of the fact that they did not know at the time the identity of the original lessee (Gilchrist)
of the film.
Article 1902 of that code provides that a person who, by act or omission, causes damages to another when
there is fault or negligence, shall be obliged to repair the damage do done. There is nothing in this article which
requires as a condition precedent to the liability of a tort-feasor that he must know the identity of a person to whom he
causes damages. In fact, the chapter wherein this article is found clearly shows that no such knowledge is required in
order that the injured party may recover for the damage suffered.
One who buys something which he knows has been sold to some other person can be restrained from using
that thing to the prejudice of the person having the prior and better right.
Chief Justice Wells:"Everyone has a right to enjoy the fruits and advantages of his own enterprise, industry,
skill and credit. He has no right to be free from malicious and wanton interference, disturbance or annoyance. If
disturbance or loss comes as a result of competition or the exercise of like rights by others, it is damnum absque
injuria, unless some superior right by contract or otherwise is interfered with
"One who wrongfully interferes in a contract between others, and, for the purpose of gain to himself induces
one of the parties to break it, is liable to the party injured thereby; and his continued interference may be ground for
an injunction where the injuries resulting will be irreparable."
17. PICART vs. SMITH, JR., G.R. No. L-12219, March 15, 1918
FACTS: On the Carlatan Bridge in La Union. Picart was riding on his pony over said bridge. Before he had gotten half
way across, Smith approached from the opposite direction in an automobile. As the defendant neared the bridge he
saw a horseman on it and blew his horn to give warning of his approach. He continued his course and after he had

taken the bridge he gave two more successive blasts, as it appeared to him that the man on horseback before him was
not observing the rule of the road.
Picart saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals. However, being perturbed by the novelty of
the apparition or the rapidity of the approach, he pulled the pony closely up against the railing on the right side of the
bridge instead of going to the left. He says that the reason he did this was that he thought he did not have sufficient
time to get over to the other side. As the automobile approached, Smith guided it toward his left, that being the proper
side of the road for the machine. In so doing the defendant assumed that the horseman would move to the other side.
Seeing that the pony was apparently quiet, the defendant, instead of veering to the right while yet some distance
away or slowing down, continued to approach directly toward the horse without diminution of speed. When he had
gotten quite near, there being then no possibility of the horse getting across to the other side, the defendant quickly
turned his car sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the horse; but in so doing the automobile passed in such close
proximity to the animal that it became frightened and turned its body across the bridge, got hit by the car and the limb
was broken. The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some violenceAs a result of its injuries the horse died. The
plaintiff received contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness and required medical attention for several
days.
From a judgment of the CFI of La Union absolving Smith from liability Picart has appealed.
ISSUE: Whether Smith was guilty of negligence such as gives rise to a civil obligation to repair the damage done
HELD: The judgment of the lower court must be reversed, and judgment is here rendered that the Picart recover of
Smith damages
YES. The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows:
Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that person would have used in the same situation? If not,
then he is guilty of negligence. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the
personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or
negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that. The question as to what
would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of course be always determined in the light of
human experience and in view of the facts involved in the particular case.
Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a result of the course actually pursued?
If so, it was the duty of the actor to take precautions to guard against that harm. Reasonable foresight of harm,
followed by ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to
exist. Stated in these terms, the proper criterion for determining the existence of negligence in a given case is this:
Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an
effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing conduct or guarding against its
consequences.
Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present case we think that negligence is clearly
established. A prudent man, placed in the position of the defendant, would in our opinion, have recognized that the
course which he was pursuing was fraught with risk, and would therefore have foreseen harm to the horse and the
rider as reasonable consequence of that course. Under these circumstances the law imposed on the Smith the duty to
guard against the threatened harm.
It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty of antecedent
negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But as we have already stated, Smith was also negligent;
and in such case the problem always is to discover which agent is immediately and directly responsible. It will be noted
that the negligent acts of the two parties were not contemporaneous, since the negligence of the defendant
succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under these circumstances the law is that the
person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the
consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other party.
18. Bustamante V. CA [G.R. No. 89880 February 6, 1991]
Lessons Applicable: Last Clear Chance (Torts and Damages)
FACTS: On April 20, 1983 6:30 am, a collision occurred between a 1947 model gravel and sand truck driven
by Montesiano and owned by Del Pilar and a Mazda passenger bus driven Susulin along the national road at Calibuyo,
Tanza, Cavite. The front left side portion (barandilla) of the body of the truck sideswiped the left side wall of the
passenger bus, ripping off the wall from the driver's seat to the last rear seat.
Several passengers of the bus were thrown out and died as a result of the injuries they sustained:Rogelio
Bustamante, 40, husband of Emma Adriano Bustamante and father of Rossel, Gloria, Yolanda, Ericson, and Ederic, all
surnamed Bustamante; Maria Corazon Jocson, 16, daughter of spouses Salvador and Patria Jocson; Jolet C. Ramos, 16,
daughter of spouses Jose and Enriqueta Ramos; Enrico Himaya, 18, son of spouses Narciso and Adoracion Himaya; and
Noel Bersamina, 17, son of spouses Jose and Ma. Commemoracion Bersamina.The bus was registered in the name of
Novelo but was owned and/or operated as a passenger bus jointly by Magtibay and Serrado

Before the collision, the cargo truck and the passenger bus were approaching each other, coming from the
opposite directions of the highway. While the truck was still about 30 meters away, Susulin, the bus driver, saw the
front wheels of the vehicle wiggling. He also observed that the truck was heading towards his lane. Not minding this
circumstance due to his belief that the driver of the truck was merely joking, Susulin shifted from fourth to third gear in
order to give more power and speed to the bus, which was ascending the inclined part of the road, in order to overtake
or pass a Kubota hand tractor being pushed by a person along the shoulder of the highway
The RTC rendered a decision that the liability of the two drivers for their negligence must be solidary. The Court
of Appeals granted the appeal of the owner and driver of the sand and gravel truck.
ISSUE: Whether the last clear chance can apply making the bus negligent in failing to avoid the collision and his act in
proceeding to overtake the hand tractor was the proximate cause of the collision making him solely liable.
HELD: NO. The petition is granted.
The doctrine of last clear chance means that even though a person's own acts may have placed him in a
position of peril, and an injury results, the injured person is entitled to recovery. A person who has the last clear chance
or opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent or that of a third person
imputed to the opponent is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the accident. Since the case
at bar is not a suit between the owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles but a suit brought by the heirs of the
deceased passengers against both owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles the court erred in absolving the owner
and driver of the cargo truck from liability
19. Phoenix Construction v. IAC
Facts: At about 1:30 a.m. on November 15, 1975, private respondent Leonardo Dionisio was on his way home from
cocktails and dinner meeting with his boss. He was proceeding down General Lacuna Street when he saw a Ford dump
truck parked askew, partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic, with no lights or early warning reflector devices. The
truck was driven earlier by Armando Carbonel, a regular driver of the petitioner company. Dionisio tried to swerve his
car to the left, but it was too late. He suffered some physical injuries and nervous breakdown. Dionision filed an action
for damages against Carbonel and Phoenix Insurance. Petitioners countered the claim by imputing the accident to
respondents own negligence in driving at high speed without curfew pass and headlights, and while intoxicated. The
trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of private respondent.
Issue:Whether the collision was brought about by the way the truck was parked, or by respondents own negligence.
Held: We find that private respondent Dionisio was unable to prove possession of a valid curfew pass during the night
of the accident and that the preponderance of evidence shows that he did not have such a pass during that night. It is
the petitioners' contention that Dionisio purposely shut off his headlights even before he reached the intersection so as
not to be detected by the police in the police precinct which he (being a resident in the area) knew was not far away
from the intersection. We believe that the petitioners' theory is a more credible explanation than that offered by
private respondent Dionisio, i.e., that he had his headlights on but that, at the crucial moment, these had in some
mysterious if convenient way malfunctioned and gone off, although he succeeded in switching his lights on again at
"bright" split seconds before contact with the dump truck. We do not believe that this evidence is sufficient to show
that Dionisio was so heavily under the influence of liquor as to constitute his driving a motor vehicle per se an act of
reckless imprudence. The conclusion we draw from the factual circumstances outlined above is that private
respondent Dionisio was negligent the night of the accident. He was hurrying home that night and driving faster than
he should have been. Worse, he extinguished his headlights at or near the intersection of General Lacuna and General
Santos Streets and thus did not see the dump truck that was parked askew and sticking out onto the road lane.
Nonetheless, we agree with the Court of First Instance and the Intermediate Appellate Court that the legal and
proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio's injuries was the wrongful or negligent manner in which the dump
truck was parked in other words, the negligence of petitioner Carbonel. The collision of Dionisio's car with the dump
truck was a natural and foreseeable consequence of the truck driver's negligence.
The distinctions between "cause" and "condition" which the 'petitioners would have us adopt have already
been "almost entirely discredited. If the defendant has created only a passive static condition which made the damage
possible, the defendant is said not to be liable. But so far as the fact of causation is concerned, in the sense of
necessary antecedents which have played an important part in producing the result it is quite impossible to distinguish
between active forces and passive situations, particularly since, as is invariably the case, the latter are the result of
other active forces which have gone before. Even the lapse of a considerable time during which the "condition"
remains static will not necessarily affect liability. "Cause" and "condition" still find occasional mention in the decisions;
but the distinction is now almost entirely discredited. So far as it has any validity at all, it must refer to the type of case
where the forces set in operation by the defendant have come to rest in a position of apparent safety, and some new
force intervenes. But even in such cases, it is not the distinction between "cause" and "condition" which is important
but the nature of the risk and the character of the intervening cause.
We believe, secondly, that the truck driver's negligence far from being a "passive and static condition" was
rather an indispensable and efficient cause. The improper parking of the dump truck created an unreasonable risk of

injury for anyone driving down General Lacuna Street and for having so created this risk, the truck driver must be held
responsible. In our view, Dionisio's negligence, although later in point of time than the truck driver's negligence and
therefore closer to the accident, was not an efficient intervening or independent cause.
The defendant cannot be relieved from liability by the fact that the risk or a substantial and important part of
the risk, to which the defendant has subjected the plaintiff has indeed come to pass. Foreseeable intervening forces
are within the scope original risk, and hence of the defendant's negligence. The courts are quite generally agreed that
intervening causes which fall fairly in this category will not supersede the defendant's responsibility. Thus, a defendant
who blocks the sidewalk and forces the plaintiff to walk in a street where the plaintiff will be exposed to the risks of
heavy traffic becomes liable when the plaintiff is run down by a car, even though the car is negligently driven; and one
who parks an automobile on the highway without lights at night is not relieved of responsibility when another
negligently drives into it. We hold that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory," that the
"immediate and proximate cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due care" and that consequently
respondent Dionisio may recover damages though such damages are subject to mitigation by the courts.
Petitioners also ask us to apply what they refer to as the "last clear chance" doctrine. The common law notion
of last clear chance permitted courts to grant recovery to a plaintiff who had also been negligent provided that the
defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the casualty and failed to do so. Accordingly, it is difficult to see what
role, if any, the common law last clear chance doctrine has to play in a jurisdiction where the common law concept of
contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery by the plaintiff, has itself been rejected, as it has been in Article
2179 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Under Article 2179, the task of a court, in technical terms, is to determine
whose negligence - the plaintiff's or the defendant's - was the legal or proximate cause of the injury. The relative
location in the continuum of time of the plaintiff's and the defendant's negligent acts or omissions, is only one of the
relevant factors that may be taken into account. Of more fundamental importance are the nature of the negligent act
or omission of each party and the character and gravity of the risks created by such act or omission for the rest of the
community. Our law on quasi-delicts seeks to reduce the risks and burdens of living in society and to allocate them
among the members of society. To accept the petitioners' pro-position must tend to weaken the very bonds of society.
We believe that the demands of substantial justice are satisfied by allocating most of the damages on a 20-80
ratio. Thus, 20% of the damages awarded by the respondent appellate court, except the award of P10,000.00 as
exemplary damages and P4,500.00 as attorney's fees and costs, shall be borne by private respondent Dionisio; only
the balance of 80% needs to be paid by petitioners Carbonel and Phoenix who shall be solidarity liable therefor to the
former. The award of exemplary damages and attorney's fees and costs shall be borne exclusively by the petitioners.
Phoenix is of course entitled to reimbursement from Carbonel. 18 We see no sufficient reason for disturbing the
reduced award of damages made by the respondent appellate court.
20. Pantranco North Express, Inc. V. Maricar
Lessons Applicable: Last Clear Chance (Torts and Damages)

Baesa

[G.R.

79050-51,

November

14,

1989]

FACTS:Spouses Baesa, their 4 children, the Ico spouses and their son and 7 other people boarded a passenger jeep
driven by David Ico to go to a picnic in Isabela, to celebrate the 5th wedding anniversary of the Baesa spouses. While
they were proceeding towards Malalam River at a speed of about 20 kph, a speeding PANTRANCO bus from Aparri, on a
route to Manila, encroached on the jeepneys lane while negotiating a curve, and collided with it.
As a result, the entire Baesa family, except for their daughter Maricar Baesa, as well as David Ico, died, and the
rest suffered from injuries. Maricar Baesa, through her guardian filed separate actions for damages arising from quasidelict against PANTRANCO.
PANTRANCO alleged David Ico's negligence as a proximate cause of the accident and invoked the defense of
due diligence in the selection and supervision of its driver. The RTC ruled in favor of favor of Baesa andthe Court of
Appealsupheld .
ISSUE: Whether the last clear chance applies thereby making David Ico who had the chance to avoid the collision
negligent in failing to utilize with reasonable care and competence.
HELD: NO.Generally, the last clear change doctrine is invoked for the purpose of making a defendant liable to a
plaintiff who was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence, although it may also be raised as a defense to defeat claim
for damages. For the last clear chance doctrine to apply, it is necessary to show that the person who allegedly has the
last opportunity to avert the accident was aware of the existence of the peril, or should, with exercise of due care,
have been aware of it. There is nothing to show that the jeepney driver David Ico knew of the impending danger.
When he saw at a distance that the approaching bus was encroaching on his lane, he did not immediately
swerve the jeepney to the dirt shoulder on his right since he must have assumed that the bus driver will return the bus
to its own lane upon seeing the jeepney approaching form the opposite direction.
Even assuming that the jeepney driver perceived the danger a few seconds before the actual collision, he had
no opportunity to avoid it. Last clear chance doctrine can never apply where the party charged is required to act
instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand after the peril is or should
have been discovered.

21. Rakes v. The Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Company

FACTS: M.H. Rakes was a black man working as a laborer for Atlantic Gulf in the early 1900s. One day, they were
working in the companys yard and they were transporting heavy rails using two cars (karitons?); each car carrying the
opposite ends of the rails. The cars were pulled by rope from the front and other workers are pushing the cars from
behind. There were no side guards installed on the sides of the cars but the rails were secured by ropes. The track
where the cars move were also weakened by a previous typhoon. It was alleged that Atlantics foreman was notified of
said damage in the tracks but the same were left unrepaired. While the cars were being moved and when it reached
the depressed portion of the track, and while Rakes was beside one of the cars, the ropes gave in and the rails slipped
thereby crushing his leg and causing it to be amputated. Rakes sued Atlantic Gulf and he won; he was awarded 5,000
pesos for damages ($2,500).
Atlantic assailed the decision of the lower court alleging that they specifically ordered their workers to be
walking only before or after the cars and not on the side of the cars because the cars have no side guards to protect
them in case the rails would slip. Atlantic also alleged that Rakes should be suing the foreman as it was him who
neglected to have the tracks repaired; that Rakes himself was negligent for having known of the depression on the
track yet he continued to work.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atlantic is civilly liable.
HELD: Yes. Rakes as per the evidence could not have known of the damage in the track as it was another employee
who swore he notified the foreman about said damage. Further, his lack of caution in continuing to work is not of a
gross nature as to constitute negligence on his part. On the other hand though, Rakes contributory negligence can be
inferred from the fact that he was on the side of the cars when in fact there were orders from the company barring
workers from standing near the side of the cars. His disobedient to this order does not bar his recovery of damages
though; the Supreme Court instead reduced the award of damages from 5,000 pesos to 2,500 pesos.
In this case, the SC also elucidated the two kinds of culpa which are: Culpa as substantive and independent,
which on account of its origin arises in an obligation between two persons not formerly bound by any other obligation;
may be also considered as a real source of an independent obligation (extra-contractual or culpa aquiliana).
Culpa as an incident in the performance of an obligation which cannot be presumed to exist without the other,
and which increases the liability arising from the already existing obligation (contractual or culpa contractual).
22. TOMAS BERNAL and FORTUNATA ENVERSO, vs. J. V. HOUSE and TACLOBAN ELECTRIC and ICE PLANT,
LTD. [G.R. No. L-30741, January 30, 1930]
FACTS: On the evening of April 10, 1925, the procession of Holy Friday was held in Tacloban, Leyte. Fortunata Enverso
with her daughter Purificacion Bernal came from another municipality to attend the religious celebration. After the
procession was over, the woman and her daughter, accompanied by two other persons by the names of Fausto and
Elias, passed along a public street named Gran Capitan. The little girl was allowed to get a short distance in advance of
her mother and her friends. When in front of the offices of the Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., and automobile
appeared from the opposite direction which so frightened the child that she turned to run, with the result that she fell
into the street gutter. At that time there was hot water in this gutter or ditch coming from the Electric Ice Plant of J.V.
House. When the mother and her companions reached the child, they found her face downward in the hot water. Her
clothes were immediately removed and, then covered with a garment, the girl was taken to the provincial hospital.
There she was attended by the resident physician, Dr. Victoriano A. Benitez. Despite his efforts, the child died that
same night at 11:40 o'clock.
The defense was that the hot water was permitted to flow down the side of the street Gran Captain with the
knowledge and consent of the authorities; that the cause of death was other than the hot water; and that in the death
the plaintiffs contributed by their own fault and negligence. The trial judge, however, failed to sustain their theory of
the case, except as to the last mentioned special defense. Although the trial judge made the findings of fact
hereinbefore outlined, he nevertheless was led to order the dismissal of the action because of the contributory
negligence of the plaintiffs.
ISSUE: Who can recover damages for the obligation, and against whom the action will lie.
HELD: It is from this point that a majority of the court depart from the stand taken by the trial judge. The mother and
her child had a perfect right to be on the principal street of Tacloban, Leyte, on the evening when the religious
procession was held. There was nothing abnormal in allowing the child to run along a few paces in advance of the
mother. No one could foresee the coincidence of an automobile appearing and of a frightened child running and falling
into a ditch filled with hot water. The doctrines announced in the much debated case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and
Pacific Co. ([1907], 7 Phil., 359), still rule. Article 1902 of the Civil Code must again be enforced. The contributory
negligence of the child and her mother, if any, does not operate as a bar to recovery, but in its strictest sense could
only result in reduction of the damages.
The plaintiffs are Tomas Bernal and Fortunata Enverso. The latter was the mother of Purificacion Bernal and the
former was the natural father, who had never legally recognized his child. The daughter lived with the mother, and

presumably was supported by her. Under these facts, recovery should be permitted the mother but not the father. As
to the defendants, they are J.V. House and the Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., J.V. House was granted a franchise by
Act No. 2700 of the Philippine Legislature approved on March 9, 1917. He only transferred this franchise formally to the
Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd. on March 30, 1926, that is, nearly a year after the death of the child Purificacion
Bernal. Under these facts, J.V. House is solely responsible.
The result will, therefore, be to accept the findings of fact made by the trial judge; to set aside the legal deductions
flowing from those facts; to hold that the death of the child Purificacion Bernal was the result of fault and negligence in
permitting hot water to flow through the public streets, there to endanger the lives of passers-by who were
unfortunately enough to fall into it; to rule that the proper plaintiff is the mother Fortunata Enverso and not the natural
father Tomas Bernal; to likewise rule that the person responsible to the plaintiff is J.V. House and not the entity the
Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd.; and finally to adjudge that the amount of recovery, without the tendering of special
proof, should be fixed, as in other cases, at P1,000.
23.MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, , vs. SOTERO REMOQUILLO, in his own behalf and as guardian of the
minors MANUEL, BENJAMIN, NESTOR, MILAGROS, CORAZON, CLEMENTE and AURORA, all surnamed
MAGNO, SALUD MAGNO, and the COURT OF APPEALS [G.R. No. L- 8328. May 18, 1956.]
FACTS: On August 22, 1950, Efren Magno went to the 3-story house of Antonio Pealoza, his stepbrother, located on
Rodriguez Lanuza Street, Manila, to repair a media agua said to be in a leaking condition. The media agua was just
below the window of the third story. Standing on said media agua, Magno received from his son thru that window a
3 X 6 galvanized iron sheet to cover the leaking portion, turned around and in doing so the lower end of the iron
sheet came into contact with the electric wire of the Manila Electric Company (later referred to as the Company) strung
parallel to the edge of the media agua and 2 1/2 feet from it, causing his death by electrocution. His widow and
children fled suit to recover damages from the company. After hearing, the trial court rendered judgment in their favor.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the latter affirmed the judgment with slight modification.
ISSUE: Who can recover damages for the obligation, and against whom the action will lie.
HELD: After a careful study and discussion of the case and the circumstances surrounding the same, we are inclined to
agree to the contention of Petitioner Company that the death of Magno was primarily caused by his own negligence
and in some measure by the too close proximity of the media agua or rather its edge to the electric wire of the
company by reason of the violation of the original permit given by the city and the subsequent approval of said illegal
construction of the media agua. We fail to see how the Company could be held guilty of negligence or as lacking in
due diligence. Although the city ordinance called for a distance of 3 feet of its wires from any building, there was
actually a distance of 7 feet and 2 3/4 inches of the wires from the side of the house of Pealoza.
In fixing said one meter width for the media agua the city authorities must have wanted to preserve the
distance of at least 3 feet between the wires and any portion of a building. Unfortunately, however, the house owner
disregarding the permit, exceeded the one meter fixed by the same by 17 3/8 inches and leaving only a distance of 2
1/2 feet between the Media agua as illegally constructed and the electric wires. And added to this violation of the
permit by the house owner, was its approval by the city through its agent, possibly an inspector. Surely we cannot lay
these serious violations of a city ordinance and permit at the door of the Company, guiltless of breach of any ordinance
or regulation. The Company cannot be expected to be always on the lookout for any illegal construction which reduces
the distance between its wires and said construction, and after finding that said distance of 3 feet had been reduced,
to change the stringing or installation of its wires so as to preserve said distance. It would be much easier for the City,
or rather it is its duty, to be ever on the alert and to see to it that its ordinances are strictly followed by house owners
and to condemn or disapprove all illegal constructions. Of course, in the present case, the violation of the permit for
the construction of the media agua was not the direct cause of the accident. It merely contributed to it.
Consequently, we may not hold said company as guilty of negligence or wanting in due diligence in failing to
insulate said wires. As to their proximity to the house it is to be supposed that distance of 3 feet was considered
sufficiently safe by the technical men of the city such as its electrician or engineer. Of course, a greater distance of say
6 feet or 12 feet would have increased the margin of safety but other factors had to be considered such as that the
wires could not be strung or the posts supporting them could not be located too far toward the middle of the street.
Thus, the real cause of the accident or death was the reckless or negligent act of Magno himself. When he was called
by his stepbrother to repair the media agua just below the third story window, it is to be presumed that due to his
age and experience he was qualified to do so. Perhaps he was a tinsmith or carpenter and had training and experience
for the job. So, he could not have been entirely a stranger to electric wires and the danger lurking in them. But
unfortunately, in the instant care, his training and experience failed him, and forgetting where he was standing,
holding the 6-feet iron sheet with both hands and at arms length, evidently without looking, and throwing all prudence
and discretion to the winds, he turned around swinging his arms with the motion of his body, thereby causing his own
electrocution.
But even assuming for a moment that under the facts of the present case the Defendant electric company
could be considered negligent in installing its electric wires so close to the house and media agua in question, and in
failing to properly insulate those wires (although according to the unrefuted claim of said company it was impossible to
make the insulation of that kind of wire), nevertheless to hold the Defendant liable in damages for the death of Magno,

such supposed negligence of the company must have been the proximate and principal cause of the accident, because
if the act of Magno in turning around and swinging the galvanized iron sheet with his hands was the proximate and
principal cause of the electrocution, then his heirs may not recover.
For a better understanding of the rule on remote and proximate cause with respect to injuries, we find the
following citation helpful:A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause did
nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there
intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of
the injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed
in the condition except because of the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an
independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the circumstances which result in injury because
of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause. (45 C.J. pp. 931-332.).
We realize that the stringing of wires of such high voltage (3,600 volts), uninsulated and so close to houses is a
constant source of danger, even death, especially to persons who having occasion to be near said wires, do not adopt
the necessary precautions.
24. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: In the early morning hours of October 27, 1978, at the height of typhoon "Kading", a massiveflood covered the
towns near Angat Dam, particularly the town of Norzagaray, causing several deaths andthe loss and destruction of
houses, farms, plants, working animals and other properties of the peopleresiding near the Angat River. Private
respondents blamed the sudden rush of water to the reckless andimprudent opening of all the three (3) floodgates of
the Angat Dam spillway, without prior warning to the people living near or within the vicinity of the dam. In view of
these, an action for damages was filed byrespondents. The trial court ruled in favor of the latter. Likewise the Court of
Appeals affirmed with said decision. Hence, a petition for review on certiorari was instituted by the National Power
Corporation(NPC) and Benjamin Chavez, Plant Superintendent of NPC.
Petitioners denied private respondents' allegations and, by way of defense, contended that theyhave
maintained the water in the Angat Dam at a safe level and that the opening of the spillways wasdone gradually and
after all precautionary measures had been taken. Petitioner NPC further contendedthat it had always exercised the
diligence of a good father in the selection of its officials and employeesand in their supervision. It also claimed that
written warnings were earlier sent to the towns concerned,and that there was no direct causal relationship between
the alleged damages suffered by the respondentsand the acts and omissions attributed to the former. That it was the
respondents who assumed the risk of residing near the Angat River, and even assuming that respondents suffered
damages, the cause was dueto a fortuitous event and such damages are of the nature and character of
damnumabsqueinjuria, hence,respondents have no cause of action against them
ISSUE: Whether petitioners can escape civil liability by invoking force majeure as the proximate cause of the loss and
damage.
HELD: No. Petitioners cannot escape liability because their negligence is the proximate cause of the lossand damage.
Act of God or force majeure, by definition, are extraordinary events not foreseeable or avoidable, events that
could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, are inevitable. It is therefore notenough that the event should not
have been foreseen or anticipated, as is commonly believed, but it must be one impossible to foresee or to avoid.
As a general rule, no person shall be responsible for thoseevents which could not be foreseen or which though
foreseen, were inevitable. However, the principle embodied in the act of God doctrine strictly requires that the act
must beoccasioned solely by the violence of nature. Human intervention is to be excluded from creating or entering
into the cause of the mischief. When the effect is found to be in part the result of the participation of man, whether
due to his active intervention or neglect or failure to act, the whole occurrence is thenhumanized and removed from
the rules applicable to the acts of God. Generally it cannot be said that damage, injury or loss is due to an act of God
where it wascaused merely by excessive or heavy rainfall, storms and to weather conditions which are not unusual
incharacter, those which could have been reasonably anticipated or where the injury complained of is due rather to the
negligence or mismanagement of man than to the disturbance of the elements or where such damage, injury or loss
might have been mitigated or prevented by diligence exercised after the occurrence
In the case at bar, although the typhoon "Kading" was an act of God, petitioners cannotescapeliability because
their negligence was the proximate cause of the loss and damage. The Court of Appealsfound that the defendants
failed to take the necessary safeguards to prevent the danger that the AngatDam posed in a situation of such nature
as that of typhoon "Kading". The representative of the PAGASA who testified in these proceedings, Justo Iglesias, Jr.,
stated that based on their records the rainfallon October 26 and 27, 1978 is classified only as moderate, and could not
have caused flash floods. He testified the flash floods exceeds 50 millimeters/hr and lasts for at least 2 hrs. Despite the
announcements of the newspaper, the water level in the dam was maintained at its maximum from Oct 21 until
midnight of Oct 26

When negligence concurs with the act of God producing a loss, such person is not exempt from liability by
showing the immediate use of the damage was the act of God. To be exempt he must be free from any previous
negligence where the loss may have been occasioned.
25. Spouses Africa, et al vs Caltex Philippines, Boquiren and the Court of Appeals [16 SCRA 448]
FACTS: In March 1948, in Rizal Avenue, Manila, a tank truck was hosing gasoline into the underground storage of
Caltex. Apparently, a fire broke out from the gasoline station and the fire spread and burned several houses including
the house of Spouses Bernabe and Soledad Africa. Allegedly, someone (a passerby) threw a cigarette while gasoline
was being transferred which caused the fire. But there was no evidence presented to prove this theory and no other
explanation can be had as to the real reason for the fire. Apparently also, Caltex and the branch owner (Mateo
Boquiren) failed to install a concrete firewall to contain fire if in case one happens.
ISSUE: Whether or not Caltex and Boquiren are liable to pay for damages.
HELD: Yes. This is pursuant to the application on the principle of res ipsa loquitur(the transaction speaks for itself)
which states: where the thing which caused injury, without fault of the injured person, is under the exclusive control
of the defendant and the injury is such as in the ordinary course of things does not occur if he having such control use
proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of the explanation, that the injury arose from defendants
want of care. The gasoline station, with all its appliances, equipment and employees, was under the control of Caltex
and Boquiren. A fire occurred therein and spread to and burned the neighboring houses. The persons who knew or
could have known how the fire started were Boquiren, Caltex and their employees, but they gave no explanation
thereof whatsoever. It is a fair and reasonable inference that the incident happened because of want of care.
Note that ordinarily, he who charges negligence shall prove it. However, res ipsa loquitur is the exception
because the burden of proof is shifted to the party charged of negligence as the latter is the one who had exclusive
control of the thing that caused the injury complained of.
26.

THE

UNITED

STATES,

v.

MARIANO

CRAME, [G.R.

No.

10181.

March

2,

1915]

FACTS: On or about the 10th day of February, 1914, in the city of Manila, the said Mariano Crame, being then and
there the chauffeur of a motor vehicle, did then and there unlawfully, with reckless imprudence and in violation of the
regulations, conduct and drive the said motor vehicle along Calle Herran in said city, without using reasonable care
and diligence to prevent injury to persons and property and without paying any attention to the pedestrians occupying
and crossing said street, thus colliding with, running over, and by his neglect and imprudence in the management and
lack of control thereof, causing the said automobile guided and conducted by the said accused as aforesaid, to knock
down, drag, and run over the body of one George B. Coombs, a private in the United States Army, who was then and
there occupying and crossing the said Calle Herran, thereby causing injuries, wounds, and bruises upon the person of
the said George B. Coombs, which said injuries, wounds, and bruises have deranged the mental faculties of the said
George B. Coombs and have incapacitated him, the said George B. Coombs, from further performance of his duties as
a soldier of the said United States Army.
It appears from the evidence that on the night of the 10th of February, 1914, between 11 and 12 oclock, the
accused, Mariano Crame, a duly-licensed chauffeur, was driving an automobile, in which, at the time, were Thomas M.
Bill, a sailor belonging to the United States Navy, and Indalecio Rabonsa, an apprentice to the accused who, at the
time of the accident, was sitting at his side on the front seat. The automobile driven by Stuart was a modern Cadillac
with high-powered electric lights.
Relative to the injuries resulting to Coombs from the accident, it appears that he received a heavy blow in the
lower part of the back of the head which caused ecchymosis and coagulation of blood. As a result of the blow he was
rendered unconscious and has since remained in a state of great mental debility, with severe pains in the head, almost
complete loss of memory, being unable to remember anything that occurred during the accident and, at times,
forgetting
the
names
and
countenances
of
his
most
intimate
friends.
The learned trial court convicted the accused of the crime of producing serious physical injuries by imprudencia
temeraria.
ISSUE: Who can recover damages for the obligation, and against whom the action will lie.
HELD: We are satisfied from an examination of the record that the conclusions of the trial court are more than
sustained. The accused did not see the soldier whom he ran down until it was too late, although the street at that point
was brilliantly lighted; he did not sound his horn or give notice of his approach in any other manner; he did not apply
the brake or make any effort whatever to stop; he was traveling on the wrong side of the street at the time of the
collision.
In defense of the accused, counsel says: "At what distance did the accused see the soldier? From the
testimony of the accused and the witness Rabonsa which is all the proof there is in the record in this respect it is
inferred that neither the chauffeur nor his companion saw the soldier at a sufficient distance to permit them to lose
time in useless or at least doubtful maneuvers.

This argument is, in our judgment, not a strong one. The fact that the accused did not see the soldier until the
machine was very close to him is strong evidence of inattention to duty. Besides, it is in close proximity to McKinley
Junction and there are a number of electric lights in and about the waiting station located at that point. Under such
circumstances there is no reason why the accused did not see the soldier long before he had reached the position in
the street where he was struck down. He was walking in an open, level, and thoroughly lighted street for many feet
before he was hit by the automobile; and the fact that the accused, under such circumstances, did not see him is
strong evidence that he was negligent.
While it is true that the law does not draw an inference of negligence from the mere showing that there was a
collision between a man and an automobile on a public street but that negligence must be proved, nevertheless, we
believe it to be the rule that testimony that plaintiff, while driving on the right-hand side of a wide road, was overtaken
by an automobile which struck the hind wheel of his wagon, establishes a case of negligence. (Salminen v. Ross, 185
Fed., 997.) And a bicyclist has the burden of disproving his negligence when he rides up behind an- other who is
walking where he has a right to walk and, without giving any warning, strikes him with his vehicle. (Myers v. Hinds, 110
Mich., 300.) And we have held in the case of Chapman v. Underwood (27 Phil. Rep., 374), that where, in an action to
recover damages for having been run down by defendants automobile, it appeared that the automobile, at the time
the injury was produced, was being driven on the wrong side of the street, the burden of proof was on defendant to
establish that the accident occurred through other causes than his negligence.
There is no evidence in the case which shows negligence on the part of the injured soldier. The mere fact that
he was run down by an automobile does not signify that he was negligent. At the time he was struck he was, speaking
from the direction in which the accused was driving the automobile at the time, on the right-hand side of the street
where he had a right to be and where the law fully protected him from vehicles traveling in the direction in which the
accused was driving at the time of the injury.
The injured soldier cannot be held to have been negligent except upon evidence establishing that fact. The
beggar on his crutches has the same right to the use of the streets of the city as has the man in his automobile. Each
is bound to the exercise of ordinary care for his own safety, and the prevention of injury to others, in the use thereof.
(Millsaps v. Brogdon, 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) , 1177.) This is especially true when we take into consideration the assertion of
the accused that, by reason of the position of the street-car tracks, he was unable to take the left-hand side of the
street, which is the side which the law requires him to take, but that it was necessary for him to pass in the middle of
the street or a little to the right of the middle in order to make a safe passage for the automobile and its passengers.
We regard it as clear from the record that the accused was driving much faster than he claims he was or else
he was negligent in not watching the street for foot passengers, or in the handling of his automobile. There is
something wrong when a chauffeur runs over a man who is in plain view of the automobile for a long distance before
the point of the accident is reached. No negligence on the part of the injured person has been shown. Whichever way
the case is looked at, whether from the viewpoint of the failure to see the soldier in time to avoid the accident or
failure to stop or give warning by horn or whistle, it is clear that the learned trial court was right when it held that the
accused was guilty of negligence.
We have held in the case of Wright v. Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co. (28 Phil. Rep., 122):
"Mere intoxication is not negligence, nor does the mere fact of intoxication establish a want of ordinary care. It is but a
circumstance to be considered with the other evidence tending to prove negligence. It is the general rule that it is
immaterial whether a man is drunk or sober if no want of ordinary care or prudence can be imputed to him, and no
greater degree of care is required to be exercised by an intoxicated man for his own protection than by a sober one. If
ones conduct is characterized by a proper degree of care and prudence, it is immaterial whether he is drunk or sober.
27.LAYUGAN V IAC [167 SCRA 363, November 14, 1968]
FACTS: Plaintiff Pedro Layugan testified that while in Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya, he and a companion were repairing the
tire of their cargo truck which was parked along the right side of the National Highway. Defendant's truck driven
recklessly by Daniel Serrano bumped the plaintiff, that as a result, plaintiff was injured and hospitalized. Due to said
injuries, his left leg was amputated so he had to use crutches to walk.
Defendant Godofredo Isidro admitted his ownership of the vehicle involved in the accident driven by Daniel
Serrano. Defendant said that the plaintiff was merely a bystander, not a truck helper being a brother-in-law law of the
driver of said truck; that the truck allegedly being repaired was parked, occupying almost half of the right lane towards
Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, right after the curve; that the proximate cause of the incident was the failure of the driver of
the parked truck in installing the early warning device.
Daniel Serrano, defendant driver, said that he knew the responsibilities of a driver; that before leaving, he
checked the truck. The truck owner used to instruct him to be careful in driving. He bumped the truck being repaired
by Pedro Layugan, plaintiff, while the same was at a stop position. From the evidence presented, it has been
established clearly that the injuries sustained by the plaintiff was caused by defendant's driver, Daniel Serrano.
Serrano also testified that, When I was a few meters away, I saw the truck which was loaded with round logs. I

stepped on my foot brakes but it did not function with my many attempts. I have (sic) found out later that the fluid
pipe on the rear right was cut that's why the breaks did not function.
Plaintiff points to the negligence of the defendant driver while Isidro points to the driver of parked truck as
negligent, and says that absent such proof of care, it would, under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, evoke the
presumption of negligence on the part of the driver of the parked cargo truck as well as his helper, the petitioner
herein, who was fixing the flat tire of the said truck.
ISSUES: Whether the defendant driver Serrano was negligentand whether the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies in
this case.
HELD: NO- (Procedural) Ratio Findings of fact are entitled to great respect and will not ordinarily be disturbed by this
Court unless it falls down under the exceptions provided by the Court to merit review of the facts.
Reasoning- This is a question of fact. But this case is an exception since: 1) the finding are grounded entirely
on speculation, surmise, or conjecture; 2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken, 3) the judgment is based on
misapprehension of facts; 4) CA findings are contrary to those of the trial court; 5) the said findings of fact are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; and 6) when the findings of fact of the Court
of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted on record. Hence, SC entertained review of
the factual question.
(Substantive) Ratio The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be
stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an
ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
Reasoning [1] Negligence defined. Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man,
guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of
something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do; [2] Applying the definition and the test, it is clear that
the absence or want of care of Daniel Serrano has been established by clear and convincing evidence. Whether cargo
truck was parked along the road or on half the shoulder of the road is immaterial taking into account the warning
device consisting of the lighted kerosene lamp placed 3-4m from the back of the truck. But despite this warning, the
Isuzu truck drivenby Serrano, still bumped the rear of the parked cargo truck. As a direct consequence of such accident
Layugan sustained injuries on his left forearm and left foot.
2. NO. Note that for our purposes this was not raised as an issue in this case. Therefore this only Obiter Dicta. But as
far as were concerned and relevant to our discussion in the outline, I formulated it in an issue-type. This is what the
Court actually said in the case to prove its just obiter, and its relevant to the main issue on negligence: At this
juncture, it may be enlightening and helpful in the proper resolution of the issue of negligence to examine the doctrine
of Res ipsa loquitur.
Obiter: [1] What is the doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur? Two ways to put it: (a) This doctrine is stated thus:
"Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant, and the accident is such
as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords
reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care,
and (b) According to Blacks Law dictionary, Res ipsa loquitur. The thing speaks for itself Rebuttable presumption or
inference that defendant was negligent, which arises upon proof that instrumentality causing injury was in defendant's
exclusive control, and that the accident was one which ordinarily does not happen in absence of negligence. Res ipsa
loquitur is rule of evidence whereby negligence of alleged wrongdoer may be inferred from mere fact that accident
happened provided character of accident and circumstances attending it lead reasonably to belief that in absence of
negligence it would not have occurred and that thing which caused injury is shown to have been under management
and control of alleged wrongdoer.
In our jurisdiction, and the way we apply it in cases, particularly in the law of negligence: Res ipsa loquitur as a
rule of evidence is peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established
without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. The doctrine is not a rule of substantive
law but merely a mode of proof or a mere procedural convenience. The doctrine merely determines and regulates what
shall be prima facie evidence thereof and facilitates the burden of plaintiff of proving a breach of the duty of due care.
The doctrine can be invoked when and only when, under the circumstances involved, direct evidence is absent and not
readily available. So, it is inapplicable where plaintiff has knowledge and testifies or presents evidence as to the
specific act of negligence which is the cause of the injury, or where theres direct evidence as to the precise cause of
the accident and all the facts and circumstances attendant on the occurrence clearly appear. And once the actual
cause of injury is established beyond controversy, no presumptions will be involved and the doctrine becomes
inapplicable when the circumstances show that no inference of defendant's liability can reasonably be made, whatever
the source of the evidence.
In this case it is inapplicable because it was established by clear and convincing evidence the negligence of
the defendant driver.
28. Teague vs. Fernandez

Facts: The Realistic institute which was owned by M. teague is a vocational school for hair and beauty. It is situated
on the second floor of a building in Quiapo Manila.
One unfortunate afternoon, a fire broke out in a store which was ten meters away from the Institute. Upon
seeing the fire, some students shouted Fire fire which ensued panic. The instructors told the students not to rush and
to go down the stairs two at a time. The panic, however, could not be subdued and the students, with the exception of
the few who made use of fire-escapes kept on rushing and pushing their way through the stairs, thereby causing
stampede therein.
Indeed, no part of the Gil-Armi Building caught fire. But, after the panic was over, four students, including
Lourdes Fernandez, a sister of plaintiffs-appellants, were found dead and several others injured on account of the
stampede.
The deceased's five brothers and sisters filed an action for damages against Mercedes M. Teague as owner and
operator of Realistic Institute. The Court of First Instance of Manila found for the defendant and dismissed the case.
The plaintiffs thereupon appealed to the Court of Appeals, which by a divided vote of 3 to 2 (a special division of five
members having been constituted) rendered a judgment of reversal and sentenced the defendant to pay damages to
the plaintiffs
The case came up to the Supreme Court on a petition for review filed by the defendant.
The decision of the appellate court declared that the defendant, was negligent and that such negligence was
the proximate cause of the death of Lourdes Fernandez. This finding of negligence is based primarily on the fact that
the provision of Section 491 Of the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila had not been complied with in connection
with the construction and use of the Gil-Armi building where the petitioner's vocational school was housed.
Issue: WON the violation of the ordinance is the proximate cause of the death of Lourdes Fernandez
Held: SC affirmed lower court's decision (yes)
Ratio: The general principle is that the violation of a statute or ordinance is not rendered remote as the cause of an
injury by the intervention of another agency if the occurrence of the accident, in the manner in which it happened, was
the very thing which the statute or ordinance was intended to prevent." To consider the violation of the ordinance as
the proximate cause of the injury does not portray the situation in its true perspective; it would be more accurate to
say that the overcrowding at the stairway was the proximate cause and that it was precisely what the ordinance
intended to prevent by requiring that there be two stairways instead of only one. Under the doctrine of the cases cited
by the respondents, the principle of proximate cause applies to such violation.
29. Del Prado v. Meralco
Facts: Teodorico Florenciano, Meralcos motorman, was driving the companys street car along Hidalgo Street. Plaintiff
Ignacio Del Prado ran across the street to catch the car. The motorman eased up but did not put the car into complete
stop. Plaintiff was able to get hold of the rail and step his left foot when the car accelerated. As a result, plaintiff
slipped off and fell to the ground. His foot was crushed by the wheel of the car. He filed a complaint for culpa
contractual.
Issues: (1) Whether the motorman was negligent; (2) Whether Meralco is liable for breach of contract of carriage; (3)
Whether there was contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff
Held: (1) We may observe at the outset that there is no obligation on the part of a street railway company to stop its
cars to let on intending passengers at other points than those appointed for stoppage. Nevertheless, although the
motorman of this car was not bound to stop to let the plaintiff on, it was his duty to do no act that would have the
effect of increasing the plaintiff's peril while he was attempting to board the car. The premature acceleration of the car
was, in our opinion, a breach of this duty.
(2) The relation between a carrier of passengers for hire and its patrons is of a contractual nature; and a failure
on the part of the carrier to use due care in carrying its passengers safely is a breach of duty (culpa contractual).
Furthermore, the duty that the carrier of passengers owes to its patrons extends to persons boarding the cars as well
as to those alighting therefrom.
Where liability arises from a mere tort (culpa aquiliana), not involving a breach of positive obligation, an
employer, or master, may exculpate himself by proving that he had exercised due diligence to prevent the damage;
whereas this defense is not available if the liability of the master arises from a breach of contractual duty (culpa
contractual). In the case before us the company pleaded as a special defense that it had used all the diligence of a
good father of a family to prevent the damage suffered by the plaintiff; and to establish this contention the company
introduced testimony showing that due care had been used in training and instructing the motorman in charge of this
car in his art. But this proof is irrelevant in view of the fact that the liability involved was derived from a breach of
obligation.

(3) It is obvious that the plaintiff's negligence in attempting to board the moving car was not the proximate
cause of the injury. The direct and proximate cause of the injury was the act of appellant's motorman in putting on the
power prematurely. Again, the situation before us is one where the negligent act of the company's servant succeeded
the negligent act of the plaintiff, and the negligence of the company must be considered the proximate cause of the
injury. The rule here applicable seems to be analogous to, if not identical with that which is sometimes referred to as
the doctrine of "the last clear chance." In accordance with this doctrine, the contributory negligence of the party
injured will not defeat the action if it be shown that the defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable care and
prudence, have avoided the consequences of the negligence of the injured party. The negligence of the plaintiff was,
however, contributory to the accident and must be considered as a mitigating circumstance.
32. MANILA ELECTRIC CO. vs. REMOQUILLO, et als.
Facts: Efren Magno went to repair a media agua of the house pf his brother-in-law. While making the repair, a
galvanized iron roofing which was holding came into contact with the electric wire of the petitioner Manila Electric Co.
strung parallel to the edge of the media agua and 2 1/2 feet from it. He was electrocuted and died as a result
thereof. In an action for damages brought by the heirs of Magno against manila Electric Co. the CA awarded damages
to the heirs of Magno and that the company was at fault and guilty of negligence because although the electric wire
had been installed long before the construction of the house the electric company did not exercise due diligence.
Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether Manila Electric Co., is guilty of negligence.
HELD: The decision of the Court of Appeals was reversed.
Ratio: A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause did nothing more
than furnish the condition or give rise to the occassion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened
between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury,
even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or occassion.
31.

Taylor

V.

Manila

Electric

Railroad

and

Light

Co.

[G.R.

No.

L-4977,

March

22,

1910]

FACTS: September 30, 1905 Sunday afternoon: David Taylor, 15 years of age, the son of a mechanical engineer, more
mature than the average boy of his age, and having considerable aptitude and training in mechanics with a boy
named Manuel Claparols, about 12 years of age, crossed the footbridge to the Isla del Provisor, for the purpose of
visiting Murphy, an employee of the defendant, who and promised to make them a cylinder for a miniature engine.
After leaving the power house where they had asked for Mr. Murphy, they walked across the open space in the
neighborhood of the place where the company dumped in the cinders and ashes from its furnaces. They found some
twenty or thirty brass fulminating caps scattered on the ground. These caps are approximately of the size and
appearance of small pistol cartridges and each has attached to it 2 long thin wires by means of which it may be
discharged by the use of electricity. They are intended for use in the explosion of blasting charges of dynamite, and
have in themselves a considerable explosive power. The boys picked up all they could find, hung them on stick, of
which each took end, and carried them home. After crossing the footbridge, they met Jessie Adrian, less than 9 years
old, and they went to Manuel's home. The boys then made a series of experiments with the capstrust the ends of the
wires into an electric light socket - no resultbreak the cap with a stone failedopened one of the caps with a knife, and
finding that it was filled with a yellowish substance they got matches.
David held the cap while Manuel applied a lighted match to the contents. An explosion followed, causing more
or less serious injuries to all threeJessie, who when the boys proposed putting a match to the contents of the cap,
became frightened and started to run away, received a slight cut in the neck Manuel had his hand burned and
wounded. David was struck in the face by several particles of the metal capsule, one of which injured his right eye to
such an extent as to the necessity its removal by the surgeons.
The Trial Court held that Manila Electric Railroad And Light Company liable.
ISSUES: Whether the elements of quasi-delict to make Manila Electric Railroad And Light Company liable and whether
Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co. sufficiently proved that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a
family to avoid the damage.

HELD: Reversing the judgment of the court below:

ART. 1089 Obligations are created by law, by contracts, by quasi-contracts, and illicit acts and omissions or by
those in which any kind of fault or negligence occurs; ART. 1902 A person who by an act or omission causes damage to
another when there is fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done; ART. 1903 The obligation
imposed by the preceding article is demandable, not only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of the
persons for whom they should be responsible. The father, and on his death or incapacity the mother, is liable for the
damages caused by the minors who live with them.

Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for damages caused by their
employees in the service of the branches in which the latter may be employed or on account of their duties.
The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned therein prove that they
employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage.
ART. 1908 The owners shall also be liable for the damage caused 1)by the explosion of machines which may
not have been cared for with due diligence, and for kindling of explosive substances which may not have been placed
in a safe and proper place. In order to establish his right to a recovery, must establish by competent evidence:
Damages to the plaintiff: Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally, or some person for
whose acts it must respond, was guilty.
The connection of cause and effect between the negligence and the damage. While we hold that the entry
upon the property without express invitation or permission would not have relieved Manila Electric from responsibility
for injuries incurred, without other fault on his part, if such injury were attributable to his negligence, the negligence in
leaving the caps exposed on its premises was not the proximate cause of the injury received cutting open the
detonating cap and putting match to its contents was the proximate cause of the explosion and of the resultant
injuries inflicted
Manila Electric is not civilly responsible for the injuries thus incurred
Two years before the accident, David spent 4 months at sea, as a cabin boy on one of the interisland
transports. Later he took up work in his father's office, learning mechanical drawing and mechanical engineering.
About a month after his accident he obtained employment as a mechanical draftsman and continued in that
employment for 6 months at a salary of P2.50 a day; and it appears that he was a boy of more than average
intelligence, taller and more mature both mentally and physically than most boys of 15. The series of experiments
made by him in his attempt to produce an explosion, as described by Jessie who even ran away
True, he may not have known and probably did not know the precise nature of the explosion which might be
expected from the ignition of the contents of the cap, and of course he did not anticipate the resultant injuries which
he incurred; but he well knew that a more or less dangerous explosion might be expected from his act, and yet he
willfully, recklessly, and knowingly produced the explosion. It would be going far to say that "according to his maturity
and capacity" he exercised such and "care and caution" as might reasonably be required of him, or that defendant or
anyone else should be held civilly responsible for injuries incurred by him under such circumstances.
The law fixes no arbitrary age at which a minor can be said to have the necessary capacity to understand and
appreciate the nature and consequences of his own acts, so as to make it negligence on his part to fail to exercise due
care and precaution in the commission of such acts; and indeed it would be impracticable and perhaps impossible so
to do, for in the very nature of things the question of negligence necessarily depends on the ability of the minor to
understand the character of his own acts and their consequences.
He was sui juris in the sense that his age and his experience qualified him to understand and appreciate the
necessity for the exercise of that degree of caution which would have avoided the injury which resulted from his own
deliberate act; and that the injury incurred by him must be held to have been the direct and immediate result of his
own willful and reckless act, so that while it may be true that these injuries would not have been incurred but for the
negligence act of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises, nevertheless plaintiff's own act was the
proximate and principal cause of the accident which inflicted the injury.
The rule of the Roman law was: Quod quis ex culpa sua damnum sentit, non intelligitur sentire (just thing is
that a man should suffer the damage which comes to him through his own fault, and that he cannot demand
reparation therefore from another). Negligence is not presumed, but must be proven by him who alleges it.
32. Ong Yui vs. Court of Appeals (91 SCRA 223)
Facts: On august 26, 1967, Ong Yiu was a fare paying passenger of respondent PAL from Mactan, Cebu to Butuan City
wherein he was scheduled to attend a trial. As a passenger, he checked in one piece of luggae, blue maleta for which
he was issued a claim ticket. Upon arrival at Butuan City, petitioner claimed his luggage but it could not be found. PAL
Butuan sent a message to PAL Cebu which in turn sent a message to PAL Manila that same afternoon. PAL Manila
advised PAL Cebu that the luggage has been overcarried to Manila and that it would be forwarded to PAL Cebu that
same day. PAL Cebu then advised PAL Butuan that the luggage will be forwarded the following day, on scheduled
morning flight. This message was not received by PAL Butuan as all the personnel had already gone for the day.
Meanwhile, Ong Yiu was worried about the missing luggage because it contained vital documents needed for the trial
the next day so he wired PAL Cebu demanding delivery of his luggage before noon that next day or he would hold PAL
liable for damages based on gross negligence. Early morning, petitioner went to the Butuan Airport to inquire about
the luggage but did not wait for the arrival of the morning flight at 10:00am which carried his luggage. A certain
Dagorro, a driver of a colorum car, who also used to drive the petitioner volunteered to take the luggage to the
petitioner. He revealed that the documents were lost. Ong Yiu demanded from PAL Cebu actual and compensatory
damages as an incident of breach of contract of carriage.

Issue: Whether or not PAL is guilty of only simple negligence and not gross negligence and whether the doctrine of
limited liability doctrine applies in the instant case?
Held: PAL had not acted in bad faith. It exercised due diligence in looking for petitioners luggage which had been
miscarried. Had petitioner waited or caused someone to wait at the airport for the arrival of the morning flight which
carried his luggage, he would have been able to retrieve his luggage sooner. In the absence of a wrongful act or
omission or fraud, the petitioner is not entitled to moral damages. Neither is he entitled to exemplary damages absent
any proof that the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless manner.
The limited liability applies in this case. On the presumed negligence of PAL, its liability for the loss however, is
limited on the stipulation written on the back of the plane.
Ticket which is P100 per baggage. The petitioner not having declared a greater value and not having called the
attention of PAL on its true value and paid the tariff therefore. The stipulation is printed in reasonably and fairly big
letters and is easily readable. Moreso, petitioner had been a frequent passenger of PAL from Cebu to Butuan City and
back and he being a lawyer and a businessman, must be fully aware of these conditions.
33. GEO. W. DAYWALT vs. LA CORPORACION DE LOS PADRES AGUSTINOS RECOLETOS, ET AL. [ G.R. No. L13505, February 4, 1919]
FACTS: In the year 1902, Teodorica Endencia, an unmarried woman, resident in the Province of Mindoro, executed a
contract whereby she obligated herself to convey to Geo. W. Daywalt, a tract of land situated in the barrio of Mangarin,
municipality of Bulalacao, now San Jose, in said province. It was agreed that a deed should be executed as soon as the
title to the land should be perfected by proceedings in the Court of Land Registration and a Torrens certificate should
be produced therefore in the name of Teodorica Endencia. The parties, however, met immediately upon the entering of
this decree and made a new contract with a view to carrying their original agreement into effect
Accordingly, upon October 3, 1908, the parties entered into still another agreement, superseding the old, by
which Teodorica Endencia agreed upon receiving the Torrens title to the land in question, to deliver the same to the
Hongkong and Shanghai Bank in Manila.
The defendant, La Corporacion de los Padres Recoletos, is a religious corporation, with its domicile in the city of
Manila. Said corporation was formerly the owner of a large tract of land, known as the San Jose Estate, on the island of
Mindoro, which was sold to the Government of the Philippine Islands in the year 1909. The same corporation was at
this time also the owner of another estate on the same island immediately adjacent to the land which Teodorica
Endencia had sold to Geo. W. Daywalt; and for many years the Recoletos Fathers had maintained large herds of cattle
on the farms referred to. Their representative, charged with management of these farms, was father Isidoro Sanz,
himself a members of the order.
As Teodorica still retained possession of said property Father Sanz entered into an arrangement with her
whereby large numbers of cattle belonging to the defendant corporation were pastured upon said land during a period
extending from June 1, 1909, to May 1, 1914.
ISSUE: The first issue is whether a person who is not a party to a contract for the sale of land makes himself liable for
damages to the vendee, beyond the value of the use and occupation, by colluding with the vendor and maintaining
him in the effort to resist an action for specific performance. The second is whether the damages which the plaintiff
seeks to recover under this head are too remote and speculative to be the subject of recovery.
Held: As preliminary to a consideration of the first of these questions, we deem it well it dispose of the contention that
the members of the defendants corporation, in advising and prompting Teodorica Endencia not to comply with the
contract of sale, were actuated by improper and malicious motives. The trial court found that this contention was not
sustained, observing that while it was true that the circumstances pointed to an entire sympathy on the part of the
defendant corporation with the efforts of Teodorica Endencia to defeat the plaintiff's claim to the land
Malice in some form is generally supposed to be an essential ingredient in cases of interference with contract
relations. But upon the authorities it is enough if the wrong-doer, having knowledge of the existence of the contract
relations, in bad faith sets about to break it up. Whether his motive is to benefit himself or gratify his spite by working
mischief to the employer is immaterial. Malice in the sense of ill-will or spite is not essential.
This brings us to the decision made by this court in Gilchrist vs. Cuddy (29 Phil. Rep., 542). It there appeared
that one Cuddy, the owner of a cinematographic film, let it under a rental contract to the plaintiff Gilchrist for a
specified period of time. Upon appeal to this court it was in effect held that the injunction was not improperly granted,
although the defendants did not, at the time their contract was made, know the identity of the plaintiff as the person
holding the prior contract but did know of the existence of a contract in favor of someone. It was also said arguendo,
that the defendants would have been liable in damages under article 1902 of the Civil Code, if the action had been
brought by the plaintiff to recover damages.
Article 1902 of the Civil Code declares that any person who by an act or omission, characterized by fault or
negligence, causes damage to another shall be liable for the damage so done. Ignoring so much of this article as

relates to liability for negligence, we take the rule to be that a person is liable for damage done to another by any
culpable act; and by "culpable act" we mean any act which is blameworthy when judged by accepted legal standards.
Article 1257 of the Civil Code declares that contracts are binding only between the parties and their privies. In
conformity with this it has been held that a stranger to a contract has no right of action for the non- fulfillment of the
contract except in the case especially contemplated in the second paragraph of the same article. (Uy Tam and Uy
Yet vs. Leonard, 30 Phil. Rep., 471.) As observed by this court in Manila Railroad Co. vs. Compaia Transatlantica, R. G.
No. 11318 (38 Phil. Rep., 875), a contract, when effectually entered into between certain parties, determines not only
the character and extent of the liability of the contracting parties but also the person or entity by whom the obligation
is exigible. The same idea should apparently be applicable with respect to the person against whom the obligation of
the contract may be enforced; for it is evident that there must be a certain mutuality in the obligation, and if the
stranger to a contract is not permitted to sue to enforce it, he cannot consistently be held liable upon it.
Whatever may be the character of the liability which a stranger to a contract may incur by advising or
assisting one of the parties to evade performance, there is one proposition upon which all must agree. This is, that the
stranger cannot become more extensively liable in damages for the nonperformance of the contract than the party in
whose behalf he intermeddles. To hold the stranger liable for damages in excess of those that could be recovered
against the immediate party to the contract would lead to results at once grotesque and unjust. In the case at bar, as
Teodorica Endencia was the party directly bound by the contract, it is obvious that the liability of the defendant
corporation, even admitting that it has made itself coparticipant in the breach of the contract, can in no even exceed
hers. This leads us to consider at this point the extent of the liability of Teodorica Endencia to the plaintiff by reason of
her failure to surrender the certificate of title and to place the plaintiff in possession.
It should in the first place be noted that the liability of Teodorica Endencia for damages resulting from the
breach of her contract with Daywalt was a proper subject for adjudication in the action for specific performance which
Daywalt instituted against her in 1909 and which was litigated by him to a successful conclusion in this court, but
without obtaining any special adjudication with reference to damages. Indemnification for damages resulting from the
breach of a contract is a right inseparably annexed to every action for the fulfillment of the obligation (art. 1124, Civil
Code); and its is clear that if damages are not sought or recovered in the action to enforce performance they cannot
be recovered in an independent action. As to Teodorica Endencia, therefore, it should be considered that the right of
action to recover damages for the breach of the contract in question was exhausted in the prior suit.
The damages ordinarily and normally recoverable against a vendor for failure to deliver land which he has
contracted to deliver is the value of the use and occupation of the land for the time during which it is wrongfully
withheld. And of course where the purchaser has not paid the purchaser money, a deduction may be made in respect
to the interest on the money which constitutes the purchase price. Substantially the same rule holds with respect to
the liability of a landlord who fails to put his tenant in possession pursuant to contract of lease.
The extent of the liability for the breach of a contract must be determined in the light of the situation in
existence at the time the contract is made; and the damages ordinarily recoverable are in all events limited to such as
might be reasonable are in all events limited to such as might be reasonably foreseen in the light of the facts then
known to the contracting parties.
The discussion contained in the opinion of the court in that case leads to the conclusion that the damages
recoverable in case of the breach of a contract are two sorts, namely, (1) the ordinary, natural, and in a sense
necessary damage; and (2) special damages.
Ordinary damages is found in all breaches of contract where the are no special circumstances to distinguish
the case especially from other contracts. The consideration paid for an unperformed promise is an instance of this sort
of damage. In all such cases the damages recoverable are such as naturally and generally would result from such a
breach, "according to the usual course of things." In case involving only ordinary damage no discussion is ever
indulged as to whether that damage was contemplated or not. This is conclusively presumed from the immediateness
and inevitableness of the damage, and the recovery of such damage follows as a necessary legal consequence of the
breach. Ordinary damage is assumed as a matter of law to be within the contemplation of the parties.
Special damage, on the other hand, is such as follows less directly from the breach than ordinary damage. It is
only found in case where some external condition, apart from the actual terms to the contract exists or intervenes, as
it were, to give a turn to affairs and to increase damage in a way that the promisor, without actual notice of that
external condition, could not reasonably be expected to foresee. Concerning this sort of damage, Hadley vs.Baxendale
(1854) [supra] lays down the definite and just rule that before such damage can be recovered the plaintiff must show
that the particular condition which made the damage a possible and likely consequence of the breach was known to
the defendant at the time the contract was made.
In the preceding discussion we have considered the plaintiff's right chiefly against Teodorica Endencia; and
what has been said suffices in our opinion to demonstrate that the damages laid under the second cause of action in
the complaint could not be recovered from her, first, because the damages laid under the second cause of action in
the complaint could not be recovered from her, first, because the damages in question are special damages which
were not within contemplation of the parties when the contract was made, and secondly, because said damages are
too remote to be the subject of recovery. This conclusion is also necessarily fatal to the right of the plaintiff to recover

such damages from the defendant corporation, for, as already suggested, by advising Teodorica not to perform the
contract, said corporation could in no event render itself more extensively liable than the principle in the contract.
Our conclusion is that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed, and it is so ordered, with costs
against the appellant.
34. Lopez V. Pan American World Airways (1966)
Facts: Reservation for first class accommodation in Pan American Airlines from Tokyo to San Francisco was made by
Delfin Faustino for then Senator Fernando Lopez and company. First class tickets were issued and paid for. The party
left Manila for Tokyo as scheduled. Senator Lopez requested Minister Busuego to contact the airlines regarding their
accommodation. However, they were informed that there was no accommodation for them. Because of some urgent
matters to attend to in San Francisco, they were constrained to take the tourist flight under protest.
Issues: (1) Whether the defendant acted in bad faith for deliberate refusal to comply with its contract to provide firstclass accommodation to the plaintiff; (2) Whether moral and exemplary damages should be awarded
Held: (1) From the evidence of defendant it is in effect admitted that defendant - through its agents - first cancelled
plaintiffs, reservations by mistake and thereafter deliberately and intentionally withheld from plaintiffs or their travel
agent the fact of said cancellation, letting them go on believing that their first class reservations stood valid and
confirmed. In so misleading plaintiffs into purchasing first class tickets in the conviction that they had confirmed
reservations for the same, when in fact they had none, defendant wilfully and knowingly placed itself into the position
of having to breach its a foresaid contracts with plaintiffs should there be no last-minute cancellation by other
passengers before flight time, as it turned out in this case. Such actuation of defendant may indeed have been
prompted by nothing more than the promotion of its self-interest in holding on to Senator Lopez and party as
passengers in its flight and foreclosing on their chances to seek the services of other airlines that may have been able
to afford them first class accommodations. All the time, in legal contemplation such conduct already amounts to action
in bad faith. For bad faith means a breach of a known duty through some motive of interest or ill-will.
At the time plaintiffs bought their tickets, defendant, therefore, in breach of its known duty, made plaintiffs
believe that their reservation had not been cancelled. Such willful-non-disclosure of the cancellation or pretense that
the reservations for plaintiffs stood - and not simply the erroneous cancellation itself - is the factor to which is
attributable the breach of the resulting contracts. And, as above-stated, in this respect defendant clearly acted in bad
faith.
(2) First, then, as to moral damages. As a proximate result of defendant's breach in bad faith of its contracts
with plaintiffs, the latter suffered social humiliation, wounded feelings, serious anxiety and mental anguish. For
plaintiffs were travelling with first class tickets issued by defendant and yet they were given only the tourist class. At
stop-overs, they were expected to be among the first-class passengers by those awaiting to welcome them, only to be
found among the tourist passengers. It may not be humiliating to travel as tourist passengers; it is humiliating to be
compelled to travel as such, contrary to what is rightfully to be expected from the contractual undertaking.
The rationale behind exemplary or corrective damages is, as the name implies, to provide an example or
correction for public good. Defendant having breached its contracts in bad faith, the court, as stated earlier, may
award exemplary damages in addition to moral damages. In view of its nature, it should be imposed in such an amount
as to sufficiently and effectively deter similar breach of contracts in the future by defendant or other airlines. In this
light, we find it just to award P75,000.00 as exemplary or corrective damages.
35. Zulueta vs. Pan American World Airways [4 SCRA 397]
Facts: Plaintiff Zulueta, his wife and daughter were passengers aboard defendants plane from Honolulu to Manila.
Upon reaching Wake Island the passengers were advised that they could disembark for a stopover for about 30
minutes. Plaintiff went to the toilet at the terminal building but finding it full walked 200 yards away. Upon returning he
told an employee of the defendant that they almost made him miss the flight because of a defective announcing
system. He had a discussion with either the plan captain or the terminal manager. He was told that they would open
his bags which he refused and he warned them of the consequences. Just the same they opened his bags and found
nothing prohibited. They forced him to go out of the plane and left him at Wake Island. His wife had to send him money
and he was able to leave Wake Island and return to Manila thru Honolulu and Tokyo after two days. This action was to
recover damages from the defendant.
Issue: Whether moral damages may be recovered.
Held: The records amply establish plaintiffs right to recover both moral and exemplary damages. Indeed, the rude
and rough reception plaintiff received at the hands of Sitton or Captain Zentner when the latter met him at the ramp
(What in the hell do you think you are? Get on that plane); the menacing attitude of Zentner or Sitton and the
supercilious manner in which he had asked plaintiff to open his bags (open your bag, and when told that a fourth bag
was missing, I dont give a damn); the abusive language and highly scornful reference to plaintiffs as monkeys by one
of PAN AMs employees (who turning to Mrs. Zulueta remarked, will you pull these three monkeys out of here?); the
unfriendly attitude, the ugly stares and unkind remarks to which plaintiffs were subjected, and their being cordoned by

men in uniform as if they were criminals, while plaintiff was arguing with Sitton; the airline officials refusal to allow
plaintiff to board the plane on the pretext that he was hiding a bomb in his luggage and their arbitrary and highhanded decision to leave him in Wake; Mrs. Zuluetas having suffered a nervous breakdown for which she was
hospitalized as a result of the embarrassment, insults and humiliations to which plaintiffs were exposed by the conduct
of PAN AMs employees; Mrs. Zulueta having suffered shame, humiliation and embarrassment for the treatment
received by her parents at the airport all these justify an award for moral damages resulting from mental anguish,
serious anxiety, wounded feelings, moral shock, and social humiliation thereby suffered by plaintiffs. Plaintiffs were
awarded Pesos 500,000.00 and moral damages, Pesos 200,000.00 exemplary damages, Pesos 75,000.00 attorneys
fees and Pesos 5,502.85 actual damages.
36. HUGO BORROMEO vs. THE MANILA ELECTRIC RAILROAD AND LIGHT CO. [G.R. No. L-18345, December
5, 1922]
FACTS: On the evening of April 10, 1920, electric car No. 203 of the defendant company was running along M. H. del
Pilar Street of the city of Manila, and on arriving at the intersection of that street and Isaac Peral it stopped to receive
passenger. At that moment the plaintiff approached the car with his two children, 12 and 16 years old, respectively,
and putting his two children on board the car first, he proceeded to follow, but in attempting to board he fell off and
was dragged some distance by the car, one of the rear wheels passing over his left foot. As a result of this accident,
plaintiff's left foot was amputated, making it necessary for him to use an artificial foot in order to be able to walk.
The plaintiff brought this action to recover from the defendant damages for the injury sustained by him by
reason of the accident.
ISSUE: Who can recover damages for the obligation, and against whom the action will lie.
HELD: The defendant's appeal having been dismissed, and the only error assigned by the plaintiff having reference to
the amount of the damages to which he is entitled, we accept the finding of the trial court that the defendant is liable,
and that plaintiff's fall was due entirely to the car having been suddenly set in motion at the moment that the plaintiff
was about to board it, but without having gained a sure footing on the running board, and that the subsequent loss of
his left foot was due to the carelessness and negligence of the defendant's employees in charge of car No. 203. We are
convinced, moreover, that this finding is supported by the evidence.
However, the trial court has not allowed the plaintiff anything for the loss of his left foot, which has
incapacitated him from following his profession and we believe that this is an error. The obligation to indemnify for
injury caused by negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code, includes the two kinds of damages specified in article
1106 of the same Code; to wit, damages for the loss actually sustained and for the profit which the injured party may
have failed to realized.
It appears that at the time of the accident, the plaintiff was chief engineer of the merchant steamer San
Nicolas . It also appears that the plaintiff, who is 45 years old, has been engaged in this profession for sixteen years
(since 1904), and that he knows no other profession whereby he can earn his living. It is evident that this damage
must also be indemnified. Taking into account the age of the plaintiff and the salary he derived from this profession
from the exercise of which he has been deprived, we fix this future damage at P2,000.
The judgment appealed from is modified as regards the plaintiff's appeal, and he is allowed, besides the
amount awarded him in the judgment, the sum of P2,000, without special pronouncement as to costs.
37. Juana Soberano and Jose Soberano) vs. Manila Railroad Co. (MRR), The Benguet Auto Line (BAL), and
Santiago Caccam [G.R. No. L-19407]
Facts: In the moring of March 8, 1955 in Cabugao, Ilocos Sur, Juana Soberano boarded the Baguio bound Bus No. 155
of the Benguet Auto Line (BAL), a subsidiary of Manila Railroad Company (MRR), driven by Santiago Caccam. She
brought with her 3,024 chicken eggs to be sold in Baguio and some personal belongings. Along Naguilian Road, 3 km
from Baguio, the bus hit a stone embankment causing it to fall into a 65-foot deep precipice, resulting in the death of 2
passengers and serious physical injuries to Juana with the loss of all her belongings. She sustained comminuted
fracture in the left mandible near the articulation, cracked fracture in the right temporal bone, crushed fractures, both
scapular, and fracture in the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th ribs.
She was confined in the Baguio General Hospital until April 14, 1955 and was transferred to the National Orthopedic
Hospital where she stayed until June 6, 1955. Her injuries left her permanently disfigured and partially disabled as she
walks with a stiff neck and her arms have partly lost their full freedom. Caccam was criminally charged in the CFI of
Baguio. Juana Soberano did not intervene, filing a formal reservation to file a separate civil action for damages and
indemnity against MRR and BAL. Because of the loss of the eggs and her personal effects, Juana demanded from the
defendant the value of P370.66, of which MRR paid P300. MRR also paid the daily expenses, allowances, subsistence,
hospitalization, medical fees and medicines of Juana Soberano as well as the services fees of her caretaker. MRR
offered to settle the case extrajudicially, offering P5,000, but the spouses rejected the offer, filing a civil action against
the defendant companies and Caccam with damages with total sum of P76,757.76.

The Court of First Instance in Baguio ordered defendant to pay the plaintiffs and her husband the sum of P5,070.60 and
to pay the costs. The complaint with respect to Caccam was dismissed. The spouses appealed, mainly contending
whether the award for damages was adequate.
Issues: Whether or not the following damages should be awarded: (1) expenses and attorneys fees in connection
with Juana Soberano attending as a witness in the criminal case (2) moral damages to Jose Soberano (3) moral
damages to Juana Soberano (4) attorneys fees; and (5) compensatory damages with unearned profts.
Ruling: Upon the first issue it is the contention of the Soberanos that the lower court, instead of dismissing their
complaint against Caccam, should have priorly declared him in default for failure to file an answer to the complaint. It
is true that Caccam did not file any answer to the complaint; but it is also true that the plaintiffs did not move to
declare him in default
The complaint against Caccam was therefore properly dismissed. He was not a party to the contract; he was a mere
employee of the BAL. The parties to that contract are Juana Soberano, the passenger, and the MRR and its subsidiary,
the BAL, the bus owner and operator, respectively; and consequent to the inability of the defendant companies to
carry Juana Soberano and her baggage and personal effects securely and safely to her destination as imposed by law
(art. 1733, in relation to arts. 1736 and 1755, N.C.C.), their liability to her becomes direct and immediate.
The Soberanos initially contend that the lower court erred in disallowing their claim of P200, representing the expenses
of Juana Soberano in attending as a witness in the criminal case and attorney's fees incurred in connection therewith.
It may be argued that the Soberanos could not have recovered this sum in the criminal case because Juana Soberano
expressly filed a formal reservation to institute a separate civil action for damages, but such reservation did not
preserve whatever rights they had against Caccam on the basis of the latter's imprudence. The reservation is
ineffective as to Caccam as it did not include him among those against whom their rights had been reserved. And the
Soberanos not having intervened in the criminal case, this claim must be considered as having been impliedly
adjudicated in the criminal case, and cannot therefore be ventilated in the present action.
The Soberanos next contend that the lower court erred in denying their claim for moral damages in the sum of
P15,000, for the physical suffering, mental anguish, serious anxiety and fright they suffered as a consequence of the
mishap. The lower court denied this claim on the strength of the oft-reiterated ruling of this Court that moral damages
cannot be recovered against the employer in actions based on a breach of contract of carriage in the absence of
malice, fraud, or bad faith.
The lower court rightly denied the claim for moral damages as far as Jose Soberano is concerned. In case of physical
injuries, moral damages are recoverable only by the party injured and not by his next of kin, unless there is express
statutory provision to the contrary (Strebel v. Figueras, L-4722, Dec. 29, 1954; Araneta et al. v. Arreglado, et al., L11394, Sept. 9, 1958). In this case it was Juana Soberano, not her husband Jose, who sustained the bodily injuries.
With respect to the claim of Juana Soberano for moral damages, the rule is well-settled in this jurisdiction that in cases
of breach of contract of carriage, moral damages are recoverable only "where the defendant has acted fraudulently or
in bad faith" (art. 2220, N.C.C.), and the terms fraud and bad faith have reference to "wanton, reckless, oppressive,
malevolent conduct", or, in the very least, to "negligence so gross as to amount to malice." (Fores Miranda, L-12163,
March 4, 1959; Necesito, etc. v. Paras,et al., L-10605-10606, June 30, 1958).
The absence of fraud, malice, or bad faith on the part of the defendant companies justifies the denial of Juana
Soberano's claim for moral damages as well as the denial of the claim for exemplary damages (art. 2232, N.C.C.).
The third claim for attorney's fees was also properly denied by the lower court. The Soberanos aver that they
were obliged to file a separate civil action for damages against the defendant companies. This claim is predicated
upon paragraphs (2) and (5) of article 2208 of the New Civil Code, which provide that attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation may be recovered when the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third
persons or incur expenses to protect his interest, or when the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in
refusing to satisfy the plaintiff's plainly valid, just and demandable claim. It will be observed that the defendant
companies offered to settle the case by offering to the Soberanos the additional sum of P5,000. The Soberanos,
however, rejected the offer and proceeded to court to recover damages in the total sum of P76,757.76. It was not,
therefore, the defendant companies that compelled the Soberanos to litigate, or to incur expenses in connection with
the litigation instituted by them. The Soberanos went to court after rejecting the defendant companies' offer of
settlement. The latter can not likewise be considered to have acted in gross and evident bad faith in not satisfying the
claim of the Soberanos, because, as the lower court puts it, the Soberanos "have asked for too much", and the

"defendant was justified in resisting this action." We are not without precedent on this point. We now come to the
claim for additional unpaid allowances of Juana Soberano while she was undergoing medical and dental treatment in
Manila and Quezon City, in the total sum of P600. In our view, this claim has merit.
We come finally to the claim for loss of earning capacity in the total sum of P50,000, based upon the expectancy that
Juana Soberano, who was 37 years old at the time of the accident, would live for 20 more years and be able to earn an
average annual income of P2,500. On this point, the lower court found that "Juana Soberano suffered greatly and that
her injuries left her permanently disfigured and partially disabled as she walks with a stiff neck and her arms have
partly lost their full freedom." The appellants contend that the award is inadequate. We agree.
This Court, in three cases, allowed in one, and increased in the two others, the amount of compensatory damages.
In Borromeo v. Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co., 44 Phil. 165 (1922), this Court awarded P2,000 in future damages
to the plaintiff therein, after finding that due to the accident, wherein Borromeo's left foot was passed over by the rear
wheels of the electric car of the defendant company and had to be amputated, he had to use an artificial foot in order
to be able to walk; that he could no longer be employed as a marine engineer which he had been for sixteen years;
that at the time of the accident he was a chief engineer with a monthly salary of P375; and that because he knew of no
other profession, his incapacity had put an end to his activities and had destroyed his principal source of professional
earnings in the future. to the original state; and that because of the injury, the boy had suffered greatly.
Considering all the facts detailed above, this Court is of the opinion that the sum of P5,000 in compensatory damages
awarded to her for loss of earning capacity is inadequate; the amount should be increased to P15,000.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is modified to read as follows: "Judgment is therefore rendered ordering
the Manila Railroad Company to pay to the plaintiffs (1) P600 representing the balance of the unpaid allowances due to
Juana Soberano in connection with her stay in a private house in Quezon City during the period of her medical
treatment; (2) P15,000 for loss of earning capacity; and (3) P45.36 for unrealized profits, all of these sums to earn
interest at the legal rate from November 25, 1960." Costs against the defendants-appellees.
38. SOFRONIO G. ALCANTARA, ET AL., vs. PATRICIO SURRO and MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY [G.R. No. L4555, July 23, 1953]
FACTS: This is an action to recover damages for wrongful death. The plaintiffs are the legitimate children and heirs of
the deceased Hermenegildo L. Co namely, Lolita, Hermenegildo Jr., Carlos, Eduardo, Romeo and Manuel, who were 13,
11, 9, 8, 6 and 5 years old respectively at the time of his death, and are now represented by their judicial guardians
Sofronio G. Alcantara and Cornelia L. Co. (Exhibit A). The defendant Patricio Surro was a chauffeur of the Manila
Electric Company.
Surro was charged with and convicted of the crime of homicide through reckless imprudence in the Court of
First Instance of Manila for having caused the death of the late Hermenegildo L. Co on November 24, 1945 (Criminal
Case No. 72534). Before the hearing, the private prosecutor, in behalf of the heirs of the offended party, reserved their
right to institute a separate civil action for damages.
It was admitted that on or about November 24, 1945, the defendant Manila Electric Company was engaged in
the business of land transportation in the City of Manila. (Exhibit BB.)
ISSUE: Who can recover damages for the obligation, and against whom the action will lie.
HELD: In this jurisdiction, the civil liability arising from crimes is governed by the provisions of the Revised Penal Code.
Under article 104, this liability includes restitution, reparation of the damage caused, and indemnification for
consequential damages. And under Article 107, indemnification for consequential damages includes not only those
caused the injured party, but also those suffered by his family or by a third person by reason of the crime.
Again, Commonwealth Act No. 284 provides that the civil liability for the death of a person shall be fixed by the
competent court at a reasonable sum, upon consideration of the pecuniary situation of the party liable and other
circumstances; but it shall in no case be less than P2,000. And under this statute, it has been the uniform policy of this
Court to award to the heirs of the deceased in criminal cases as a matter of course an indemnity in the amount of
P2,000. After liberation, this policy has been liberalized, and since then up to the present the amount of indemnity
awarded in criminal cases as a matter of right and without the necessity of proof was generally fixed at P6,000.
(People vs. Amansec, 80 Phil., 424.)In addition, we may cite cases wherein this Court awarded certain indemnity for
patrimonial and moral damages to injured persons considering their physical condition and their social standing (Lilius
vs. Manila Railroad Company, 59 Phil., 758; Castro vs. Acro Taxicab Co., Inc., G.R. No. 49155; Layda vs. Court of
Appeals, 90 Phil. 724).

The determination of the indemnity to be awarded to the heirs of a deceased person has therefore no fixed
basis. Much is left to the discretion of the court considering the moral and material damages involved, and so it has
been said that "There can be no exact or uniform rule for measuring the value of a human life and the measure of
damages cannot be arrived at by precise mathematical calculation, but the amount recoverable depends on the
particular facts and circumstances of each case. The life expectancy of the deceased or of the beneficiary, whichever
is shorter, is an important factor." (25 C.J.S. 1241.)Other factors that are usually considered are: (1) pecuniary loss to
plaintiff or beneficiary (25 C.J.S. 1243-1250); (2) loss of support (25 C.J.S., 1250-1251); (3)loss of service (25 C.J.S.
1251-1255); (4) loss of society (25 C.J.S. 1254-1255); (5) mental suffering of beneficiaries (25 C.J.S., 1258-1259); and
(6) medical and funeral expenses (25 C.J.S., 1254-1260).
We therefore find that the factors considered by the lower court in determining the indemnity under
consideration are reasonable and within the realm sanctioned bylaw and precedents. The only thing to be determined
is whether they had been properly applied to the particular case under consideration.
The rule is that "The introduction of mortality tables is not absolutely essential to prove the life expectancy of
a deceased or his beneficiary, and if introduced they are not conclusive, and the jury are not bound by them. The value
of these tables when applied to a particular case, it is said, must depend largely upon other circumstances, such as the
state of health, habits, and the manner of life, and the social condition of the person injured." (25 C.J.S., 1299-1300.)
This is what the lower court has done.
As regards the claim of plaintiffs-appellants that the lower court erred in not considering the bonus which the
corporation in which the deceased was employed has re-solved to award to its deserving officers and employees, it
should be noted that the resolution granting said bonus was intended to apply only to the profits earned up to
September 30, 1945. Moreover, the granting of bonus is merely a privilege which may be given depending upon the
financial condition of the employer and the behavior and conduct of the employee and it cannot be claimed as a
matter of right, and so we believe that the lower a court acted rightly in not considering such bonus as a factor in
determining the indemnity in this case. (Philippine Education Company, Inc. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 92 Phil.,
381.).
The other items awarded to the plaintiffs such as the sum of P5,000 as moral and "patrimonial" damages for
their physical and moral sufferings, and the sum of P2,155 as actual expenses, should not be disturbed since they are
supported by proof and precedents.
39. Villa Rey Transit v. CA
Facts: On March 17, 1960, Policronio Quintos, Jr. was riding the petitioners bus, when the said bus frontally hit the
rear side of a bullcart filled with hay. The protruding end of the bamboo pole at the rear of the cart penetrated the
windshield of the bus and landed at Policronios face. He died of traumatic shock due to cerebral injuries. Private
respondents are sisters and surviving heirs of the deceased. They brought this action against Villa Rey Transit for
breach of contract of carriage. The trial court found that the death was caused by the negligence of the bus driver, for
whom petitioner was liable under the contract of carriage with the deceased.
Issues: (1) The number of years to be used as basis of computationand (2) The rate at which the losses sustained by
respondents should be fixed
Held: (1) The determination of the indemnity to be awarded to the heirs of a deceased person has no fixed basis.
Much is left to the discretion of the court considering the moral and material damages involved, and so it has been
said that "(t)here can be no exact or uniform rule for measuring the value of a human life and the measure of damages
cannot be arrived at by precise mathematical calculation, but the amount recoverable depends on the particular facts
and circumstances of each case. The life expectancy of the deceased or of the beneficiary, whichever is shorter, is an
important factor.' Other factors that are usually considered are: (1) pecuniary loss to plaintiff or beneficiary; (2) loss of
support; (3) loss of service; (4) loss of society; (5) mental suffering of beneficiaries; and (6) medical and funeral
expenses."

Thus, life expectancy is, not only relevant, but, also, an importantelement in fixing the amount recoverable by
private respondents herein. Although it is not the sole element determinative of said amount, no cogent reason has
been given to warrant its disregard and the adoption, in the case at bar, of a purely arbitrary standard, such as a fouryear rule. In short, the Court of Appeals has not erred in basing the computation of petitioner's liability upon the life
expectancy of Policronio Quintos, Jr.
(2) With respect to the rate at which the damages shall be computed, petitioner impugns the decision
appealed from upon the ground that the damages awarded therein will have to be paid now, whereas most of those
sought to be indemnified will be sufferedyears later. This argument is basically true, and this is, perhaps, one of the
reasons why the Alcantara case points out the absence of a "fixed basis" for the ascertainment of the damages
recoverable in litigations like the one at bar. Just the same, the force of the said argument of petitioner herein is offset
by the fact that, although payment of the award in the case at bar will have to take place upon the finality of the
decision therein, the liability of petitioner herein had been fixed at the rate only of P2,184.00 a year, which is the

annual salary of Policronio Quintos, Jr. at the time of his death, as a young "training assistant" in the Bacnotan Cement
Industries, Inc. In other words, unlike the Alcantara case, on which petitioner relies, the lower courts did not consider,
in the present case, Policronio's potentiality and capacity to increase his future income. Indeed, upon the conclusion of
his training period, he was supposed to have a better job and be promoted from time to time, and, hence, to earn
more, if not considering the growing importance of trade, commerce and industry and the concomitant rise in the
income level of officers and employees therein much more.
Damages consist, not of the full amount of his earnings, but of the support, they received or would have
received from him had he not died in consequence of the negligence of petitioner's agent. In fixing the amount of that
support, We must reckon with the "necessary expenses of his own living", which should be deducted from his earnings.
Only net earnings, not gross earning, are to be considered that is, the total of the earnings less expenses necessary in
the creation of such earnings or income and less living and other incidental expenses.
All things considered, We are of the opinion that it is fair and reasonable to fix the deductible living and other
expenses of the deceased at the sum of P1,184.00 a year, or about P100.00 a month, and that, consequently, the loss
sustained by his sisters may be roughly estimated at P1,000.00 a year or P33,333.33 for the 33-1/3 years of his life
expectancy. To this sum of P33,333.33, the following should be added: (a) P12,000.00, pursuant to Arts. 104 and 107 of
the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 2206 of our Civil Code, as construed and applied by this Court; (b)
P1,727.95, actually spent by private respondents for medical and burial expenses; and (c) attorney's fee, which was
fixed by the trial court, at P500.00, but which, in view of the appeal taken by petitioner herein, first to the Court of
Appeals and later to this Supreme Court, should be increased to P2,500.00. In other words, the amount adjudged in
the decision appealed from should be reduced to the aggregate sum of P49,561.28, with interest thereon, at the legal
rate, from December 29, 1961, date of the promulgation of the decision of the trial court.