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Mark E. Coyne
Steven G. Sanders [ARGUED]
Office of United States Attorney
970 Broad Street Rm. 700
Newark, NJ 07102
Counsel for Appellant
Lawrence S. Lustberg [ARGUED]
Gibbons
One Gateway Center
Newark, NJ 07102
Counsel for Appellee
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OPINION OF THE COURT
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JORDAN, Circuit Judge.
Paul Bergrin, a former federal prosecutor and
prominent defense attorney, was indicted in the United States
District Court for the District of New Jersey on numerous
charges, including violations of the Racketeering Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Reasoning that the
RICO charges were inappropriate in light of the disparate
nature of the substantive crimes that serve[d] as the
racketeering predicates, the District Court dismissed them.
United States v. Bergrin, 707 F. Supp. 2d 503, 511 (D.N.J.
2010). The government appealed that decision and we
reversed, observing that the concerns of the District Court
were either endemic to RICO prosecutions or involve[d] the
application of irrelevant legal standards. United States v.
Bergrin, 650 F.3d 257, 274 (3d Cir. 2011).
Facts
2.
i.
Procedural History
1.
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4.
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(Id. at 23-26.)
That evening, the government filed a motion asking
the Court to reconsider its decision to exclude evidence of the
Pozo Plot and the Esteves Plot. As the government argued
the next morning in support of its motion, one might perceive
an inherent tension between the ruling that the Pozo Plot
was based on insufficient proof because we dont have a
tape and the ruling that the Esteves Plot was too prejudicial
because we do have a tape. (Id. at 36, 37.) The District
Court was not persuaded, however, and reaffirmed its
rulings. 16
5.
Closing Arguments and the Jurys
Verdict
At a subsequent conference about jury instructions,
Bergrin successfully requested that the jury be told it is a
defense to the charges in the Indictment that the defendants
acts constituted lawful and legitimate legal representation of a
client. (D.N.J. ECF doc. no. 09-369, no. 327, at 46; see Joint
App. at 4024-25 (Bergrins request).) Then, in summation, he
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had testified in the trial on the Kemo Murder Counts, and that
it would warrant a sentence that would reflect the severity of
[those other charges], the Court suggested that the
government should not spend the taxpayers money to come
in here, put on [the Kemo Murder Counts] evidence again,
[and] stand behind those kinds of witnesses again when [the
government did not] have to do it. (Id. at 4460.)
In response to those concerns, the government invited
the Court to dismiss the RICO counts if it believed that Mr.
Bergrin [could not] get a fair trial as presently
constituted. (Id. at 4458.) The Court, however, refused to
dismiss the Indictments RICO counts, stating that it had
already [done] that once because at the time I still was
concerned about the RICO allegations, quite frankly, mostly
for the same reason. (Id.)
7.
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Discussion
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the Pozo Plot and the Esteves Plot in the retrial on the Kemo
Murder Counts, and in ordering the drug-trafficking and
Esteves Plot counts to be severed. It also contends that this
case should be reassigned to another district judge. Bergrin
of course disagrees, but spends the bulk of his efforts arguing
that we lack jurisdiction to entertain any of the governments
arguments.
We begin by addressing the jurisdictional issue.
A.
Jurisdiction
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B.
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Kellogg, 510 F.3d 188, 197 (3d Cir. 2007) (noting that if
judicial self-restraint is ever desirable, it is when a Rule 403
analysis of a trial court is reviewed by an appellate tribunal
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). In general, a
Rule 403 decision will not be reversed unless the analysis
[undertaken] and resulting conclusion is arbitrary or
irrational. Id. (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). Here, unfortunately, the District Courts Rule 403
analysis was arbitrary, in that it was based on the same legally
flawed credibility determination that led the Court to
conclude that Pozos testimony was inadmissible without
independent corroboration.
Pozo, as the District Court saw it, would be another
witness, a drug dealer who is claiming at some point some
conversation occurred. (Joint App. at 25.) Assessing his
proffered testimony in that light, the Court characterized it as
having a minimum degree [of persuasiveness] with
respect to intent. (Id.) An assumption about how the jury
would view Pozos credibility was, however, an improper
basis for discounting his testimonys probative value. See
United States v. Welsh, 774 F.2d 670, 672 (4th Cir. 1986)
([A]s a general rule, the credibility of a witness has nothing
to do with whether or not his testimony is probative with
respect to the fact which it seeks to prove.); 22 Charles Alan
Wright & Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., Federal Practice and
Procedure 5214 (4th ed. 1996) ([I]t seems relatively clear
that in the weighing process under Rule 403 the judge cannot
consider the credibility of witnesses.). And that errant
starting point likewise tainted the Courts conclusion that the
jury would be confused by Pozos testimony indicating that
Bergrin told him to take out a cooperating witness. The
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C.
Reassignment
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Conclusion
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