THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
LARRY LAVAPIE, SIMEON LACHANO, ARNOLD BUATES, SANTOS SAN PASCUAL, SR., SANTOS SAN PASCUAL, JR., REY SAN PASCUAL,
BENIGNO CATINA, JR. and SEVERAL DOES, accused.
LARRY LAVAPIE and SANTOS SAN PASCUAL, SR., accused-appellants.
BUENA, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision1 dated December 16, 1996, of the Regional Trial Court of Iriga City, Branch 36,2 finding accused-appellants
Larry Lavapie and Santos San Pascual, Sr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, sentencing each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim, Sonny Sierva, jointly and severally, the amount of P7,000.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00 as death
indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages, and to pay the costs.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Accused-appellants Larry Lavapie and Santos San Pascual, Sr., together with Simeon Lachano, Arnold Buates, Santos San Pascual, Jr., Rey San
Pascual, Benigno Catina, Jr. and several Does, were charged in an information which reads:
"That on or about the 29th day of March, 1989, at Sitio Tastas, Barangay San Vicente, (Buraburan) Municipality of Buhi, Province of Camarines Sur,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, armed with bolos, with intent to kill and with treachery and evident
premeditation, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and hack with said bolos one Sonny Sierva, thereby inflicting upon the latter [a] mortal wound which directly caused his death, to the
damage and prejudice of his heirs in the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), plus other forms of damages that may be proven in court.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW."3
Upon their arraignment on October 17, 1989, accused Larry Lavapie and Rey San Pascual pleaded not guilty. 4 Subsequently, or on January 29,
1990, the other accused Benigno Catina. Jr., Santos San Pascual, Sr. and Santos San Pascual, Jr. also pleaded not guilty.5 Accused Simeon
Lachano, likewise, pleaded not guilty on July 16, 1991.6 Accused Arnold Buates remained at large.
At the trial, the prosecution presented the following witnesses against accused Larry Lavapie, Rey San Pascual, Benigno Catina, Jr., Santos San
Pascual, Sr. and Santos San Pascual, Jr. Dr. Alicia M. Mercurio, Jenny Cordial, Enrico Sierva, Domingo Samonte, Rogelio Sierva and Sgt. Jaime
Patiam. The following witnesses, on the other hand, testified against accused Simeon Lachano Erlinda Sierva and Rogelio Sierva. In their
defense, all of the six (6) accused, who were brought before the jurisdiction of the trial court, testified in court, in addition to Felix Lavapie, Juan
Bongais and Loreto Camasis.
For the prosecution, eyewitness Domingo Samonte testified that on March 29, 1989, at around 11 p.m., he came from the dance hall in San Vicente
with Rogelio Sierva and the victim Sonny Sierva.7 While on their way, Rogelio and Sonny talked with some ladies, then, Rogelio went home ahead,
and left Domingo and Sonny behind.8 While approaching Rogelio's house, Domingo and Sonny noticed a group of persons coming towards them.
Domingo stepped backwards towards Sonny. Sonny focused the flashlight, which he was holding, on accused-appellant Santos San Pascual, Sr.
and accused-appellant Larry Lavapie, who was then holding a bolo. Accused-appellant Santos San Pascual, Sr. suddenly held the hands of Sonny
behind his back, while accused-appellant Larry Lavapie hacked Sonny.9 Domingo testified that Sonny was hit on the neck, the same witness
pointing to the left side of his neck.10 When Sonny fell on the ground, Domingo ran towards some pili trees. Then, Domingo saw two (2) persons, a
boy and a girl, who were following them and holding a torch which they used to lighten the fallen body of Sonny. Domingo, however, was not able to
recognize these two (2) persons. On cross-examination, Domingo testified that when he witnessed the hacking incident, there were other persons
at the scene of the crime but he was not able to recognize them.11 Domingo further recounted that after he saw the hacking incident, he ran
towards the back of a pili tree and stayed there until dawn of the following day.12 At dawn, he proceeded to his house in Buraburan.13 He did not
report the incident to anybody else but a certain friend and his wife. Domingo also admitted that when accused-appellant Santos San Pascual, Sr.
held the hands of Sonny behind the latter's back, he did not tell Santos San Pascual, Sr. to stop but just took a step backwards.14
Jenny Cordial, a 15-year-old ward of Sonny Sierva's aunt, testified that on March 29, 1989, at around 11 p.m., she and Rico Sierva15 came from a
dance in San Vicente, Buraburan and were on their way home when they came upon the body of Sonny Sierva lying on the middle of the road.16
They recognized Sonny Sierva because Cordial was then holding a torch.17 Cordial and Enrico Sierva came upon Sonny Sierva, who was lying
prostrate on the road, with a hack wound on the neck, and was almost beheaded.18 At that instance, Cordial saw accused-appellant Larry Lavapie,
who was holding a bolo, standing at a distance of about five (5) to six (6) meters from the body of Sonny Sierva.19 Aside from accused-appellant
Larry Lavapie, Cordial also saw other persons at the scene of the crime but she was not able to recognize them. Thereafter, Cordial and Enrico
Sierva ran away and went home to inform the father of Sonny Sierva of what happened but they were told by his wife that Rogelio Sierva was also
hacked. Incidentally, while on cross-examination, the prosecutor informed the trial court that Cordial actually grew up under the care of Rogelio
Sierva's sister. Cordial testified on cross-examination that when she and Enrico Sierva saw the body of Sonny Sierva lying on the road, they were
only about one (1) meter away from the body. When they saw accused-appellant Larry Lavapie, he was holding a bolo which was pointed
downwards. Cordial clearly recognized accused-appellant Larry Lavapie because she was then holding a torch. Cordial described the bolo held by
accused-appellant Larry Lavapie as "shiny and sharp," and "clear and clean."20 Cordial also noticed that the other persons, who were at scene of
the crime, were standing still, facing the body of Sonny Sierva, about a meter away from accused-appellant Larry Lavapie, and that some of these
persons were smoking.21 Cordial did not recognize these other persons because according to her "it was dark."22 On further cross-examination,
she estimated these other persons at the scene of the crime to number about seven (7) persons.
Enrico Sierva, 15-year-old cousin of the victim, Sonny Sierva, testified that on March 29, 1989, at around 11 p.m., he and Jenny Cordial came from
a dance in San Vicente, Buhi and were on their way home. Near the house of the victim's father, Rogelio Sierva, they saw a man lying prostrate on
the road. They went closer to the body and saw that the said man sustained a hack wound on the neck. They recognized the man lying on the road
as Sonny Sierva.23 Glancing around, Enrico saw accused-appellant Larry Lavapie holding a bolo and standing by the road with accused-appellant
Santos San Pascual, Sr.24 According to Enrico, both accused-appellants were at a distance of about five (5) to six (6) meters away from him when
he saw them. He also saw other persons at the scene of the crime but he was not able to recognize them because they were in a "dark place."25
Thereafter, he and Jenny Cordial ran towards the house of Rogelio Sierva, located about 30 meters away, and informed Rogelio's wife, Erlinda
Velasco, that her son was lying dead on the road. Erlinda Velasco told them that her husband was also hacked and was being brought to a hospital.
On cross-examination, Enrico Sierva testified that he told his uncle, Rogelio Sierva, that it was the group of accused-appellant Larry Lavapie who
hacked Sonny Sierva,26 and that accused-appellants Larry Lavapie and Santos San Pascual, Sr. were there.27 Enrico further testified that the
torch they were carrying on the night of March 29, 1989 was made of a round bottle of gin.
Dr. Alicia M. Mercurio, Municipal Health Officer of Buhi II, Camarines Sur, conducted the autopsy on the body of Sonny Sierva and prepared an
autopsy report28 dated April 25, 1989, with the following findings:
"Lesions:

"Incised wound at the neck, right side cutting the whole neck structure with a portion of the skin only on the left side holding it in place about 3 in.
long.
"Cause of Death Incised wound, neck (almost whole neck) with secondary hemorrhage (massive)."29
Dr. Mercurio explained that due to the hack wound (or incised wound) sustained by the victim, Sonny Sierva, the victim's head was almost severed
from the body, with only three (3) inches of flesh on the left side of the neck, connecting the neck to the body.30 According to Dr. Mercurio, the hack
wound could have been caused by a sharp instrument like a very sharp bolo. Dr. Mercurio further opined that the victim could have died at around 1
or 2 a.m. of March 30, 1989.
Rogelio Sierva, father of the victim, Sonny Sierva, testified that on March 29, 1989, at around 11 p.m., he came from a dance in Buraburan, San
Vicente, together with his son, Sonny Sierva and his brother-in-law, Felix Buendia.31 On their way home, they passed by the house of a certain
Teresita Gaite, where Sonny Sierva was left behind with his friends. Rogelio and Felix proceeded on their way home. When they were already near
his house, Rogelio saw six (6) of the seven (7) identified accused.32 Rogelio continued to testify that he was hacked on his right ear by accused
Arnold Buates. Rogelio and Felix then ran towards Rogelio's house. When Rogelio was about to open the door of his house, he was hacked on the
right arm by accused Santos San Pascual, Jr. Rogelio then entered the house and got a bolo but his assailants already retreated to the place where
he was first hacked. Thereafter, Rogelio sought the assistance of his brother, Silvestre Sierva, whose house was located about 20 meters away,33
and requested that he be brought to a hospital. On their way to the hospital, they saw Sonny Sierva, who was almost beheaded, lying on the road.
When Rogelio discovered that Sonny was already dead, they proceeded to the San Vicente Assistance Center and reported the hacking incident.
Afterwards, they proceeded to the Mediatrix Hospital where Rogelio was treated for his wounds. Rogelio also testified that he spent more or less
P7,000.00 which he incurred due to the death of Sonny Sierva.34 On cross-examination, Rogelio admitted that he was previously charged for the
attempted rape of the daughter of accused Santos San Pascual, Sr.35
Because accused Simeon Lachano was arrested only after the prosecution had already presented the foregoing witnesses against the five (5) other
accused, the prosecution presented anew, Rogelio Sierva and an additional witness, Erlinda Sierva, to testify against accused Simeon Lachano.
Erlinda Sierva, mother of the victim, Sonny Sierva, testified that she spent less than P10,000.00 as burial and funeral expenses on account of the
death of Sonny Sierva.36
Rogelio Sierva, in testifying against accused Simeon Lachano, merely reiterated his previous testimony against the five (5) other accused.
For the defense, on the other hand, all of the six (6) accused, who were brought before the jurisdiction of the trial court, testified together with Felix
Lavapie, Juan Bongais and Loreto Camasis.
Accused-appellant Larry Lavapie, in his defense, interposed denial and alibi. Lavapie testified that on March 29, 1989, at around 8 p.m., he was at a
dance in San Vicente, Buhi,37 with accused Santos San Pascual, Jr., a certain Santiago Sanorjo and Danny Belardo.38 Lavapie, Santos San
Pascual, Jr., Santiago Sanorjo39 and Danny Belardo left the dance hall at past 11:30 p.m. and went to the barn of Santiago Sanorjo, arriving thereat
at around 1 a.m.40 They slept in the said barn and went to their respective houses on the following day.
Accused Santos San Pascual, Jr. corroborated the testimony of accused-appellant Larry Lavapie that they attended a dance in San Vicente, Buhi.
They left the dance hall at past 12 midnight41 and went to the house of Santiago Sanorjo where they slept until 6 o'clock of the following
morning.42
Juan Bongais testified that in the evening of March 29, 1989, he was at a dance in San Vicente, Buraburan. He arrived at the dance at 7 p.m. and
left at about 12:30 a.m. of the following day.43 He left the dance with Jenny Cordial, Rico Sierva and Liza San Pascual.44 On their way home, they
met Rogelio Sierva who was hacked and being carried by Dionesio Coronel and Felicito Conas. They continued walking for several meters until
they came upon the dead body of Sonny Sierva, lying on the road.45 On cross-examination, Bongais testified that when they were about to leave
the dance at around 12:30 a.m. of March 30, 1989, accused-appellant Larry Lavapie and his co-accused Santos San Pascual, Jr. were still at the
dancing hall.46
Accused-appellant Santos San Pascual, Sr., likewise, claimed denial and alibi. San Pascual, Sr. testified that in the evening of March 29, 1989, he
was resting in his house in sitio Tastas, Labawon, Buhi.47 He slept at 7 p.m. and awoke at 5 o'clock of the following day.48 San Pascual, Sr. further
claimed that Rogelio Sierva, father of the victim, was actuated by ill-motive to implicate him in this crime, i.e., he filed a complaint against Rogelio
for the attempted rape of his daughter, Gina San Pascual.49 On cross-examination, San Pascual, Sr. testified that sitio Labawon is adjacent to
barangay San Vicente.
The three (3) other accused, Rey San Pascual, Simeon Lachano and Benigno Catina, Jr., likewise, interposed denial and alibi in their respective
testimonies before the trial court.
On January 23, 1997, the trial court rendered a Decision dated December 16, 1996, finding accused-appellants Larry Lavapie and Santos San
Pascual, Sr. guilty of murder qualified by treachery. The four (4) other accused, Santos San Pascual, Jr., Rey San Pascual, Benigno Catina, Jr. and
Simeon Lachano were acquitted for insufficiency of evidence. The dispositive part of the said Decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds
"1.
The accused, Larry Lavapie and Santos San Pascual, Sr., guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal[s] of the crime of murder defined
and penalized under Article [2]48 of the Revised Penal Code, prior to its amendment by Rep. Act No. 7659, as charged in the information, and there
being no generic aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, [the Court] hereby sentences the said accused to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua; to pay, jointly and severally the heirs of the deceased, Sonny Sierva, spouses Rogelio and Erlinda Sierva the following:
a)

P7,000.00 as actual damages,

b)

P50,000.00 as death indemnity,

c)

P50,000.00 as moral damages, and to pay the costs;

"2.
[T]he [other] accused, Santos San Pascual, Jr., Rey San Pascual, Benigno Catina, Jr., and Simeon Lachano, not guilty of the crime
charged in the information and [the Court] hereby acquits them thereof for insufficiency of evidence. The bonds posted for their provisional liberty
are hereby ordered cancelled and released.
"With respect to the accused, Arnold Buates, who was never brought to the jurisdiction of this [C]ourt, let the records of this case be sent to the
archives to be revived as soon as this [C]ourt acquires jurisdiction over [the] said accused.

"SO ORDERED."50
In convicting accused-appellants, Larry Lavapie and Santos San Pascual, Sr., the trial court relied primarily on the testimony of prosecution witness
Domingo Samonte that accused-appellant Larry Lavapie was the one who hacked Sonny Sierva on the neck with the use of a bolo while accusedappellant Santos San Pascual, Sr. was at the back of Sonny Sierva, holding the latter's hands.51 The trial court also relied heavily on the testimony
of prosecution witness Jenny Cordial that she saw accused-appellant Larry Lavapie, standing about five (5) meters away from the dead body of
Sonny Sierva; and on the testimony of prosecution witness Enrico Sierva that he saw accused-appellants, Larry Lavapie and Santos San Pascual,
Sr., standing five (5) meters away from the dead body of Sonny Sierva.52 The trial court further maintained that Jenny Cordial's description of
Sonny Sierva's body when they came upon it, lying prostrate on the road, was supported by the medical findings stated in the autopsy report of Dr.
Alicia M. Mercurio.53 The trial court rejected the defenses of denial and alibi raised by accused-appellants, and ruled that denial and alibi cannot
prevail over positive identification, and that accused-appellants' alibi was not corroborated by any credible and disinterested witness.54 In ruling that
the killing was qualified by treachery, the trial court explained that accused-appellants awaited, in ambush, for their victim;"55 and that the
suddenness of the attack on Sonny Sierva and the fact that his hands were being held at his back by accused-appellant Santos San Pascual, Sr.
while he was hacked by accused-appellant Larry Lavapie, rendered him "helpless to put up any defense."56 The trial court also found that
conspiracy attended the commission of the crime, based on the fact that ". . .they [accused-appellants] are related to each other (uncle and
nephew) and from their concerted acts in killing Sonny Sierva."57
On February 3, 1997, accused-appellants filed a Motion for New Trial, alleging that prosecution witnesses, Jenny Cordial and Domingo Samonte
retracted their respective testimonies.58 However, in an Order dated March 12, 1997, the trial court denied the foregoing motion, for lack of merit.59
Hence, this appeal.
In their appellant's brief, accused-appellants raise a lone assignment of error:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE RETRACTION OF PROSECUTION WITNESS[ES] JENNY CORDIAL AND DOMINGO
SAMONTE [AS] NEWLY-DISCOVERED EVIDENCE WHICH SHALL JUSTIFY THE HOLDING OF A NEW TRIAL.
We find merit in this appeal.
The conviction of accused-appellants by the trial court was predicated primarily on the testimony of prosecution witness Domingo Samonte who
"positively identified [accused-appellant] Larry Lavapie as the one who hacked Sonny Sierva with a bolo at his neck while accused[-appellant]
Santos San Pascual, Sr., was at the rear of Sonny Sierva, holding his hands;"60 and on the testimonies of the two (2) witnesses who arrived at the
scene of the crime shortly after the hacking incident occurred Jenny Cordial, who "saw accused[-appellant] Larry Lavapie standing about five [5]
meters away from the dead body of Sonny Sierva"61 and Enrico Sierva, who "saw and recognized the same accused[-appellant] Larry Lavapie and
accused[-appellant] Santos San Pascual, Sr., standing [five] 5 meters away from the dead body of Sonny Sierva."62 According to the trial court,
Jenny Cordial's description of the condition of Sonny Sierva's body when they came upon it, ". . . is supported by the medical findings" as stated in
the autopsy report.63 Furthermore, the trial court observed that accused-appellants failed to show "any improper motive on the part of the said
witnesses to falsely testify against them."64
While it is settled to the point of being elementary that on the issue of credibility of witnesses, appellate courts will not disturb the findings arrived at
by the trial court, which was certainly in a better position to rate the credibility of the witnesses after hearing them and observing their deportment
and manner of testifying during the trial; this rule stands absent any showing that certain facts and circumstances of weight and value have been
overlooked, misinterpreted or misapplied by the trial court which, if considered, would affect the result or outcome of the case.65 After a careful
review of the records of this case, particularly, the testimonies of prosecution witnesses, the Court finds that significant facts and circumstances
were overlooked and disregarded by the trial court, which, if properly considered, would have affected the result of this case. The records show that
there are strong and cogent reasons that justify a departure from the trial court's findings.
In the case at bar, prosecution eyewitness Domingo Samonte testified that accused-appellant Larry Lavapie suddenly hacked Sonny Sierva, hitting
the latter on his neck; Samonte demonstrated by pointing to the left side of his neck, thus:
"PROSECUTOR:
"Q:

All right. You said Larry Lavapie suddenly hacked Sonny Sierva[,] was Sonny Sierva hit?

[WITNESS DOMINGO SAMONTE]:

"A:

Yes, sir.

"Q:

Where was he hit?

"A:

He was hit on his neck. (Witness pointing to the left side of his neck.)

"Q:

After Sonny Sierva was hacked by Larry Lavapie[,] what happened to Sonny Sierva, Mr. Samonte?

"A:

He fell down, sir."66 (Emphasis supplied.)

The foregoing testimony of Samonte is belied by the physical evidence that the deceased, Sonny Sierva sustained an "incised wound at the neck,
right side cutting the whole neck structure with a portion of the skin only on the left side holding it in place about 3 in. long."67 (Emphasis supplied.)
While Samonte categorically testified that Sonny Sierva was hacked on the neck, at the same time, Samonte demonstrated by pointing to the left
side of his neck; the autopsy report clearly revealed that Sonny Sierva was hacked on the right side of his neck and not on the left side. This
material inconsistency, consequently, casts a serious doubt on the testimony of Samonte. As we have ruled in People vs. Vasquez,68 since the
physical evidence on record runs counter to the testimonial evidence of the prosecution witnesses, conclusions as to physical evidence should
prevail. It bears reiteration that physical evidence is that mute but eloquent manifestations of truth which rate high in our hierarchy of trustworthy
evidence.69 In the light of the physical evidence obtaining in this case, contrary to oral assertions cannot normally prevail. Greater credence is
given to physical evidence as evidence of the highest order because it speaks more eloquently than a hundred witnesses.70
Moreover, Samonte's claim that on March 29, 1989, at around 11 p.m., he came from the dance hall in San Vicente with Rogelio Sierva and the
victim Sonny Sierva,71 and that while on their way, Rogelio and Sonny talked with some ladies, then, Rogelio went ahead, leaving Domingo and
Sonny behind,72 was even contradicted by Rogelio's (one of Samonte's alleged companions on that fateful night) testimony on two (2) different
instances,73 that on March 29, 1989, at about 11 p.m., he was with his son, Sonny Sierva and his brother-in-law, Felix Buendia,74 without any
reference to the alleged presence of Samonte, thus:
"ROGELIO SIERVA'S FIRST TESTIMONY WHICH WAS TAKEN ON AUGUST 16, 1990:

"PROSECUTOR:
"Q:

Mr. Sierva, on March 29, 1990 [should be 1989] at about 11 o'clock in the evening, where were you?

[WITNESS ROGELIO SIERVA]:

"A:

We came from a dance at Sitio Buraburan, San Vicente, Buhi, Camarines Sur.

"Q:

You said we, who were your companions during that time[,] Mr. Sierva?

"A:

My son Sonny Sierva and my brother-in-law, Felix Buendia.

"Q:
While you together with your late son Sonny Sierva and your brother-in-law Felix Buendia were on your way home from centro Buraburan,
Buhi, Camarines Sur, do you recall of any incident that happened?
"A:

Yes, sir."75 (Emphasis supplied.)

"ROGELIO SIERVA'S SECOND TESTIMONY WHICH WAS TAKEN ON AUGUST 5, 1993:

"PROSECUTOR:
"Q:

Mr. Sierva, where were you on March 29, 1989 at about 11 o'clock in the evening?

[WITNESS ROGELIO SIERVA]:

"A:

I was then at San Vicente, Buraburan, Buhi, Camarines Sur.

"Q:

Why did you happen to be there, Mr. Sierva during the aforesaid date and time?

"A:

I accompanied my son to the dancing hall.

"Q:

Where was this dancing hall?

"A:

At Centro San Vicente, Bura-buran.

"Q:

What were you doing at the aforesaid place during the aforesaid date and time?

"A:

I was watching the dance.

"Q:

Who were with you, if any, during that time, Mr. Sierva?

"A:

My son and my brother-in-law.

"xxx

xxx

xxx"

"Q:

After watching the dance, what did you do, if any?

"A:

We went home.

"Q:

You said "we went home". Who were with you?

"A:

My brother-in-law and my son.

"Q:

What is the name of your brother-in-law?

"A:

Felix Buendia.

"Q:
While you were on your way home together with your brother-in-law and your son Sonny Sierva, do you recall of any incident that
happened, Mr. Sierva?
"A:

Yes, sir."76 (Emphasis supplied.)

Certainly, the foregoing testimonies of Rogelio Sierva, which we find to be consistent on material points, further cast serious doubt on the veracity of
Samonte's testimony.
In addition, we find Samonte's response to the occurrence to be contrary to ordinary human experience and behavior. If indeed Samonte was
present at the scene of the crime when the victim, Sonny Sierva, whose hands were held at the back by accused-appellant Santos San Pascual,
Sr., was hacked on the neck by accused-appellant Larry Lavapie, while the other accused, numbering at least five (5), were apparently merely
observing the incident; it was then unnatural and against common experience that Samonte ran away towards some pili trees and simply stayed
there until dawn of the following day, even as he had already seen a boy and a girl discovered the fallen body of Sonny Sierva shortly after the
incident occurred. Considering the testimonies of prosecution witnesses, Jenny Cordial and Enrico Sierva, that after discovering the dead body of
Sonny Sierva lying prostrate on the ground, and seeing the several accused standing near the dead body of Sonny Sierva, they were able to run
away and go to Rogelio Sierva's house to report what they saw, without the several accused following them or even attempting to threaten them in
any way, it appears that the several accused posed no threat to Samonte, which could have forced him to remain near some pili trees. It is also
perplexing why Samonte did not see, inform or seek the help of Rogelio Sierva, Felix Buendia, Silvestre Sierva and an unidentified person, who
also happened to come upon the dead body of Sonny Sierva while on their way to the hospital. This Court finds occasion, at this point, to apply a
long-held doctrine that to be credible, testimonial evidence should come not only from the mouth of a credible witness but it should also be credible,
reasonable and in accord with human experience.77 While we take judicial notice that eyewitnesses to a crime are often reluctant to report the
incident, the Court finds the response of Samonte to the occurrence contrary to human experience, and his testimony not credible, thus, we reject
his testimony.

In view of the resulting lack of positive identification, accused-appellants' conviction or acquittal would now depend primarily on the sufficiency of the
circumstantial evidence against them, based on the testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses, particularly, Jenny Cordial and Enrico Sierva.
Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides that circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (1) there is more than one
circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce
a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
In the instant case, prosecution witness Jenny Cordial testified that she saw accused-appellant Larry Lavapie, who was holding a bolo, standing at
a distance of about five (5) to six (6) meters from the body of Sonny Sierva;78 while prosecution witness Enrico Sierva testified that after he
recognized the man lying on the road as Sonny Sierva, he saw accused-appellant Larry Lavapie with a bolo, standing by the road, with accusedappellant Santos San Pascual, Sr.79 The above circumstance, in the absence of other corroborative evidence, does not satisfy the requirements
under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court nor point with moral certainty to the guilt of accused-appellants. As we have consistently held, the
mere presence of accused-appellants at the locus criminis cannot be solely interpreted to mean that they committed the killing. The mere presence
of accused appellants at the crime scene, without more, is inadequate to support the conclusion that, indeed, they committed the crime.80 We also
observe that as testified by prosecution witness Jenny Cordial, the bolo allegedly held by accused-appellant Larry Lavapie was "shiny and sharp,"
and "clear and clean."81 If indeed it was accused-appellant Larry Lavapie who hacked Sonny Sierva on the neck, the bolo, which he allegedly used
in hacking Sonny Sierva, would not have been "clear and clean." It should also be noted that aside from the two (2) accused-appellants, there were
at least five (5) other persons who were at the scene of the crime, and who could have been responsible for the killing, but unfortunately, they were
not recognized by prosecution witnesses, Jenny Cordial and Enrico Sierva. According to Jenny Cordial, the other persons, numbering about seven
(7), who were at the scene of the crime, standing still and facing the body of Sonny Sierva, were only about a meter away from accused-appellant
Larry Lavapie,82 but she was not able to recognize them because "it was dark."83 In corroboration, Enrico Sierva testified that both accusedappellants were at a distance of about five (5) to six (6) meters away from him when he saw them; and that he also saw other persons at the scene
of the crime but he was not able to recognize them because they were in a "dark place."84
In resume, considering the evidence for the prosecution and the attendant circumstances, the Court entertains reasonable doubt as to the
culpability of accused-appellants.
WHEREFORE, for failure of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused-appellants are guilty of the crime charged, the
Decision dated December 16, 1996, of Branch 36 of the Regional Trial Court of Iriga City in Criminal Case No. IR-2639 is hereby REVERSED AND
SET ASIDE. The accused-appellants are ACQUITTED, and their immediate release from confinement is ordered unless some other lawful cause
warrants their further detention.
The Director of Prisons is DIRECTED to implement this Decision and to report to this Court immediately the action taken hereon within five (5) days
from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 195567

November 25, 1993

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS), petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES RAUL and ESPERANZA LEUTERIO, respondents.
The Legal Services Group for petitioner.
Jaime M. Posadas for private respondents.

PUNO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari to set aside the Decision of the 10th Division of the Court of Appeals ordering the petitioner GSIS to execute
a Final Deed of Sale in favor of the spouses Raul and Esperanza Leuterio involving a house and lot in the GSIS Village, Project 8-C, Quezon City. 1
The facts show that on December 18, 1963, the petitioner GSIS conducted a lottery draw for the allocation of lots and housing units in Project 8-C
of GSIS Village. Private respondent Esperanza Leuterio won and was issued a Certificate of Acknowledgment to purchase the subject house and
lot 2 on December 27, 1963. In 1965, the parties entered into a Deed of Conditional Sale evidencing the conveyance of the subject property and all
improvements thereon to the Leuterio spouses for the purchase price of P19,740.00, payable over a fifteen-year period, in 180 equal monthly
installments of P168.53 each. Paragraph 11 of the Deed of Conditional Sale provides:
Upon the full payment by the Vendee of the purchase price of the lot and dwelling/improvement above referred to together with all the interest due
thereon, taxes and other charges and upon his faithful compliance with all the conditions of the Contract, the Vendor agrees to execute in favor of
the Vendee, or his/their heirs and successors-in-interest a final Deed of Sale of the aforementioned land and dealing/improvements. . . . 3
Three years elapsed before the Deed was notarized, and a copy of the same was given to the private respondents.
After the land development and housing construction of Project 8-C were completed in 1966, petitioner's Board of Trustees increased the purchase
price indicated in the Deed of Conditional Sale covering houses and lots therein. The new price was based on the alleged final cost of construction
of the GSIS Village. It is noted that, on the face of the Leuterio's Conditional Deed of Sale is the marginal notation "subject to adjustment pending
approval of the Board of Trustees." The Leuterio spouses alleged that this notation was not in the Deed when they signed the same in 1965.
Resolving this factual issue, the trial court found that the appended words were inserted into the document without the knowledge or consent of the
Leuterio spouses. This finding of fact went undisturbed on appeal to the respondent court. 4
Sometime in the early 1970's, a group (not including the Leuterios) of conditional vendees of houses and lots in Project 8-C of GSIS Village brought
suit 5 against herein petitioner, questioning the increase in purchase price. They likewise wrote a "A Plea For Justice" to then President Ferdinand
E. Marcos, requesting for a directive to petitioner's management to "accept payments of amortization installments on the original amounts stated in
the Deed(s) of Conditional Sale."
As a result, the Office of the President created a three-man Ad Hoc committee, composed of representatives of the Office of the President, the
petitioner System, and the GSIS Village Association. The committee found that the final cost of the Village justified a higher price range for the
houses and lots in the project.
Based on the ad hoc committee's findings, the petitioner System, with the approval of its Board of Trustees, increased the purchase prices of the
houses and lots in the GSIS Village.
On May 30, 1973, however, then Presidential Executive Assistant Jacobo C. Clave, through a memorandum, advised petitioner that then President
Marcos has approved the "Plea" and wanted its "immediate implementation." The attempt by petitioner to have the presidential endorsement
reconsidered was denied on December 18, 1980.
Meanwhile, after years of diligently paying the monthly amortizations 6 and real estate taxes on the subject property, the private respondents
spouses informed 7 petitioner that the payments 8 for the property had been completed, and hence, the execution of an absolute deed of sale in
their favor was in order. No action on the matter was taken by petitioner.
The instant case was initiated on May 20, 1984 in the RTC of Manila, Br. 11, with the filing of a Complaint for Specific Performance With Damages
to compel petitioner to execute in private respondents' favor, the final Deed of Sale over the subject property. 9 The trial court found for the
Leuterios.
On January 24, 1992, the Court of Appeals 10, in its impugned Decision, upheld the trial court solely on the basis of estoppel. It held that petitioner
cannot increase the price of the subject house and lot after it failed, through the years, to protest against private respondents' P200.00-amortization
or to require the payment by them of bigger monthly installments. 11
Petitioner now urges the setting aside of the impugned Decision of the Court of Appeals, alleging that it erred in:
I.

. . . HOLDING THAT THE PETITIONER GSIS IS ESTOPPED FROM ENFORCING THE ADJUSTMENT OF THE SELLING PRICE.

II.
. . . NOT HOLDING THAT THE SPOUSES LEUTERIO MUST BE BOUND BY THE RECOMMENDATION MADE BY THE AD HOC
COMMITTEE
III.
UNITS.

. . . FAILING TO CONSIDER THE JUSTIFICATION FOR THE ADJUSTMENT IN THE SELLING PRICE OF THE LOTS AND HOUSING

IV.
. . . AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT WHICH ORDERED THE PETITIONER GSIS TO EXECUTE THE FINAL DEED
OF SALE. 12
Upon the other hand, private respondents, in their Comment, 13 contend that the Petition only raises in factual issues, which cannot be settled by
this Court in the instant proceedings. They further contend that no reversible errors were committed by the Court of Appeals in its impugned
Decision.
We find no merit in the petition, but for reasons different from those espoused by the respondent Court of Appeals.

The decisive issue really involves a question of fact whether or not the spouses Leuterio agreed to the notation "subject to adjustment pending
approval of the Board of Trustees" appearing on the margin of the parties' Conditional Deed of Sale. If there was no agreement, the Leuterio
spouses are only obligated to pay the purchase price of P19,740.00 as stipulated in the main body of the Conditional Deed of Sale.
Trite to state, this Court is not a trier of facts. In a multitude of cases, we have laid down the unbending rule that findings of fact of lower courts are
binding on us unless they are marred by manifest errors. The pleadings before us do not demonstrate that the trial court grossly erred when it found
that the purchase price agreed upon by the parties was P19,740.00 and this agreement was not made subject to any posterior event or condition.
This finding of fact was based on the explicit testimony of private respondent Raul Leuterio that when he and his wife signed the Deed of
Conditional Sale in 1965, the notation "subject to adjustment pending approval of the Board of Trustees" was not in the Deed. 14 Likewise, the
Answer of petitioner to the Complaint of the private respondents admitted the non-existence of this notation at the time the Deed of Conditional Sale
was signed, albeit, it called the omission an honest mistake. 15 We quote paragraph 5 of said answer, viz:
5.
The omission of the marginal notation reading "(x) subject to adjustment pending approval of the Board of Trustees" (Annexes B to B-1-b
of the Complaint) on the Deed of Conditional Sale signed by the plaintiffs, as alleged in paragraph VII of the Complaint, must have been an honest
mistake on the part of the clerk who typed the document.
This was also confirmed by the petitioner in the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari where it is alleged that ". . . the respondents-spouses
Leuterio were not required to sign a new contract as provided in Resolution No. 966 but instead, the words 'subject to adjustment pending approval
of the Board of Trustees' were inserted in the Deed of Conditional Sale executed in 1965." Petitioner is bound by these judicial admission.
Quite clearly, therefore, the purchase price mutually agreed upon by the parties was P19,740.00. The spouses Leuterio did not give their consent
for petitioner to make a unilateral upward adjustment of this purchase price depending on the final cost of construction of the subject house and lot.
It is illegal for petitioner to claim this prerogative, for Article 1473 of the Civil Code provides that "the fixing of the price can never be left to the
discretion of one of the contracting parties. . . ."
We also reject petitioner's contention that the spouses Leuterio are bound by the recommendation of the ad hoc committee as this was set aside by
then President Ferdinand E. Marcos. 16 The rejection was communicated by then Presidential Assistant Jacobo Clave to petitioner in a
Memorandum dated May 30, 1973. 17 Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied by the former President thru Presidential
Assistant Joaquin Venus, in a letter dated December 18, 1990. 18
Next, petitioner would impress on us the need to adjust the purchase price of the spouses' house and lot in view of the change in the final cost of
construction. If petitioner failed to factor this increase in the cost of the construction in the purchase price of the subject house and lot, it has nobody
to blame but itself and it alone should suffer the loss. To be sure, given the expertise of its technical people, it has no reason to be shortsighted. In
any event, our law on contracts does not excuse a party from specifically performing his obligation on the ground that he made a bad business
judgment.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition for review on certiorari is DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 186459

September 1, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
NITA EUGENIO Y PEJER, Appellant.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Nita Eugenio y Pejer (appellant) was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City1 for violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act
No. 9165 (R.A. No. 9165) or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, allegedly committed as follows:2
On or about May 13, 2003 in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, not being lawfully authorized by law, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver and give away to PO1 Aldrin Mariano, a police poseur-buyer, one (1) heat-sealed
transparent plastic sachet containing three (3) centigrams (0.03 gram) of white crystalline substance, which was found positive to the test for
methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, in violation of the said law.
Contrary to law. (underscoring supplied)
From the evidence for the prosecution, the following version is culled:
On the night of May 13, 2003, at around 7:30 p.m., a confidential informant reported to PO1 Aldrin Mariano (PO1 Mariano), officer-on-duty at the
Pasig City Hall Detachment, that one alias "Aruba" was selling shabu at Vicper Compound, Malinao, Pasig City.
P/Sr. Insp. Chief Rodrigo Villaruel at once formed a buy-bust team to conduct an operation composed of, among others, PO3 Amilassan Salisa as
team leader, and PO1 Mariano as poseur-buyer. PO1 Mariano, who was given two one hundred peso bills bearing Serial Numbers BT219634 and
XN547078 to be used as buy-bust money, wrote his initials "ARM" thereon at the lower left portion.
The operation was recorded in the police blotter and coordinated with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) which gave it control
number NOC-1305-03-10.3
At around 8:00 in the evening, the team, together with the confidential informant, proceeded to the residence of appellant who was standing in front
of her house. The informant at once introduced PO1 Mariano as buyer. As appellant inquired how much, PO1 Mariano handed her the two marked
bills upon which appellant drew out one substance-filled sachet from the "outside wall" of her house. At that instant, PO1 Mariano removed his cap,
the pre-arranged signal for the team members to, as they did, close in.
PO1 Mariano then held appellants arm, identified himself as a police officer, and apprised her of her constitutional rights as he retrieved from her
the buy-bust money. He thereafter marked "EXH-A arm/05/13/03" on the substance-filled sachet "sold" to him by appellant.
The buy-bust team brought appellant to the Rizal Medical Center for physical check-up and later to the police detachment office where P/Sr. Insp.
Chief Villaruel prepared the following memorandum of May 13, 20034 addressed to the Chief of the Eastern Police District Crime Laboratory Office,
requesting the conduct of laboratory examination on the seized substance-filled sachet to determine the presence of dangerous drugs and their
weight:
1. Respectfully forwarded to your good office herewith/attached (sic) submitted specimen for laboratory examination to wit:
NATURE OF OFFENSE
VIOLATION OF RA 9165
NAME OF SUSPECT
NITA EUGENIO Y PEJER,
57 years old, widow,
Res. At Vicper Compound,
Malinao, Pasig City
D.T.P.O. On or about 8:30 PM 13 May
2003 at Vicper Compound,
Malinao, Pasig City
ARRESTING OFFICER
Elements of Mayors Special
Action Team/ City Hall
Detachment, Pasig City
Police Station represented by
PO1 Aldrin Mariano
SPECIMEN SUBMITTED
One (1) heat sealed
transparent plastic sachet
containing undetermined
amount of suspected "shabu"
Marked EXH A ARM
05/13/03
2. Request acknowledge (sic) receipt.5 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Acting on the above-quoted memorandum, P/Sr. Insp. Annalee R. Forro, Forensic Chemical Officer of the Eastern Police District Crime Laboratory
Office, who received the sachet, conducted on the same night of May 13, 2003, at around 8:33 P.M, a laboratory examination of the contents of the
sachet, the result of which she recorded in Chemistry Report No. D-889-03E6 wherein she concluded that the substance inside the sachet weighed
0.03 gram and was positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.
Hence, the filing of the Information against appellant.
Denying the charge against her, appellant gave the following version:
On May 11, 2003, while fetching water from a nearby well, she was, in the presence of family and neighbors, accosted by police officers who
brought her to the police station. At the station, she was questioned whether she knew one "Baylene Ramba," to which she replied in the negative.
She was later surprised to learn that an Information for violation of R.A. 9165 had been filed against her.

Finding for the prosecution, the trial court, by Decision of May 31, 2005, convicted appellant, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused NITA EUGENIO y Pejer @ Aruba GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of Sec. 5, Art.
II of R.A. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 and imposes upon her the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT
and to pay a fine of Php500,000.00
SO ORDERED.7 (underscoring supplied)
By Decision of September 16, 2008,8 the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision.
In affirming the trial courts rejection of appellants defense, the appellate court held:
. . . As correctly observed by the trial court, the claim that accused-appellant was arrested without reason is not supported by evidence. Not one of
the alleged witnesses to the unlawful arrest, including accused-appellants own daughter, was presented to corroborate the claim. Hence, the court
a quo is correct in considering the defense incredible for being self-serving and uncorroborated.9 (underscoring supplied)
In her present appeal, appellant claims, in the main, that there was failure to follow the requirements of Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165, hence, it
compromised the integrity and evidentiary value of the allegedly seized item.
Sec. 21 of R.A. No 9165 provides:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled
Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of
all dangerous drugs, plant sources or dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the persons/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; x x x (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Appellant specifically claims that no physical inventory and photographing of the specimen took place. Respecting the required conduct of an
inventory, since only one sachet was seized, failure to comply therewith may understandably have been rendered unnecessary.
As for the required photograph of the seized item, a reading of the testimony of PO1 Mariano confirms the prosecutions failure to follow such
requirement:
Atty. Ronatay:
Q: Are you aware that it is required under the dangerous drugs law that in case of the buy-bust operation, the subject specimen their (sic) must be a
picture taken on the subject specimen?
A: What I said is that impossible, we have a buy-bust to verify.
Atty. Ronatay:
Your Honor, I think the answer is not responsive to the question. We moved (sic) to strike that out and the witness to answer the question.
Court: Answer the question.
Witness:
A: Not yet maam.
Atty. Ronatay:
Q: How many times have you been engaged in buy-bust operation?
A: More or less ten maam.
Q: And in those ten cases, was there ever an occasion that the subject specimen, there was a picture taken on that subject specimen?
A: None, maam.
Q: Are you also aware Mr. witness that under the dangerous drugs law, it is standard operating procedure that in cases of operation specifically in a
buy-bust operation, there has also be (sic) a presence of the media?
A: I do not know, maam.
Q: In this case was there a media present at the time of the operation?
A: None maam.
Q: Are you also aware that under the dangerous drugs law, it is required that there has to be coordination with the Local Brgy.?
A: None maam.10 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Failing to comply with the provision of Section 2 of R.A. No. 9165 does not necessarily doom the case for the prosecution, however. People v.
Pringas enlightens:
Non-compliance by the apprehending/buy-bust team with Section 21 is not fatal as long as there is justifiable ground therefor, and as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the confiscated/seized items, are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team. Its non-compliance will
not render an accused's arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the

integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.11
(citation omitted, emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
The Courts pronouncement in Pringas is based on the provision of Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations12 of R.A. No. 9165
reading:
x x x Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said
items; (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Clearly, it was necessary for the prosecution to prove that the integrity and evidentiary value of the shabu was preserved.
As reflected in the above-quoted Memorandum of P/Sr. Insp. Chief Villaruel, the time of operation was "on or about 8:30 P.M., 13 May 2003." If the
allegedly seized substance-filled sachet was confiscated at 8:30 p.m., it is highly improbable that it was received at the Crime Laboratory at 8:33
P.M or a mere three minutes after the seizure, given that appellant was after his arrest first brought to a hospital for physical check-up.
Doubt is thus engendered on whether the object evidence subjected to laboratory examination and presented in court is the same as that allegedly
"sold" by appellant. In fine, the prosecution failed to prove the integrity and evidentiary value of the 0.03 gram specimen.
Parenthetically, unlike in Pringas, the defense in the present case questioned early on, during the cross examination of PO1 Mariano, the failure of
the apprehending officers to comply with the inventory and photographing requirements of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165. And the defense raised it
again during the offer of evidence by the prosecution, thus:
Atty. Ronatay:
xxxx
Exh. C - we object to its admission as well as the purpose for which they are being offered for being planted evidence, your honor. 13 (underscoring
supplied)
The prosecution having failed to discharge the burden of establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the burden of the evidence
did not shift to the defense to thus leave it unnecessary to pass upon the defense evidence even if it were considered weak. Appellants acquittal
based on reasonable doubt is then in order.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant, Nita Eugenio y Pejer, is ACQUITED for
failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director of the Bureau of Corrections for Women, Mandaluyong City who is directed to cause the
immediate release of appellant, unless she is being lawfully held for another cause, and to inform this Court of action taken within ten (10) days
from notice.
SO ORDERED.

10

G.R. No. 181037

January 19, 2009

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
SAIDAMEN MACATINGAG y NAMRI alias SAI, Appellant.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
For review is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01487, which affirmed in toto the June 16, 2005 Decision2 of the
Regional Trial Court of San Pablo, Laguna, Branch 32 in Criminal Case No. 14730-SP(04), finding appellant Saidamen Macatingag y Namri guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, also known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002."
In its Brief for the Appellee,3 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) presents the prosecutions version of the facts as follows:
On January 17, 2004, about 8:00 oclock in the morning, the members of the Philippine National Police (PNP) in Camp Vicente Lim in Canlubang,
Calamba City formed a buy-bust team because of a report from a confidential informant about the drug pushing activities of a certain "Sai," who
later turned out to be appellant. The team was composed of P/Sr. Insp. Julius Cesar V. Ablan, as leader, and PO3 Marino A. Garcia as the poseurbuyer and PO3 Danilo Leona as the arresting officer, as well as two police officers. After discussing the buy-bust procedure including the prearranged signal which is the removal of PO3 Garcias cap, and the preparation of two P500.00 bills initialed with "MAG," the police authorities
immediately proceeded to the target area at the vicinity of Phase I, Villa Antonio, San Pablo City.
Upon arriving thereat about 11:30 oclock in the morning of that day, PO3 Garcia and the confidential informant waited for appellant at the entrance
gate of Villa Antonio Subdivision in San Pablo City. Some twenty (20) minutes later, appellant arrived sporting black pants and dark gray t-shirt. PO3
Garcia was introduced to appellant as the prospective buyer. Appellant, on the other hand, asked PO3 Garcia about the money amounting to
P52,500.00. PO3 Garcia then pulled out an envelope containing the two P500.00 bills with the boodle money from his pocket, and demanded the
drugs. Appellant thereafter pulled out from his pocket one plastic sachet and handed it to PO3 Garcia. Immediately upon giving appellant the
marked money, PO3 Garcia lost no time in giving the pre-arranged signal to PO3 Leona. PO3 Leona thereupon hurriedly seized from appellant the
marked money, while PO3 Garcia recovered the plastic sachet containing suspected shabu from appellant. The policemen thereafter brought
appellant to their station in Canlubang, Calamba City. PO3 Garcia marked the seized plastic sachet with markings "A" and "MAG" representing his
initials, and the date and time of arrest. After making an inventory on the seized suspected shabu, the police authorities requested for the laboratory
examination thereof with the PNP Crime Laboratory.
The seized suspected sachet of shabu was shown positive for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride weighing 25.23 grams per Chemistry Report No.
D-54-04 issued by P/Insp. Lorna R. Tria, Forensic Chemical Officer of PNP Crime Laboratory.4
On January 19, 2004, appellant was charged with Violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165,5 in an Information6 that reads:
That on or about January 17, 2004, in the City of San Pablo, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
accused above-named, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell 25.23 grams of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), a
dangerous drug, without being authorized by law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.7
Appellant pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.8 He maintained that he was at home with his wife on January 17, 2004 when four armed men
suddenly entered their house, seized his money, placed handcuffs on his wrists, and forcibly brought him to the police headquarters in Bgy.
Canlubang. He averred that he was not allowed to talk with anybody when he was incarcerated for two days and that he was alone during the
preliminary investigation. Thereafter, he was transferred to the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP) in San Pablo City, where he was
formally charged with selling shabu.
On June 16, 2005, the trial court rendered judgment convicting appellant of Violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, accused SAIDAMEN MACATINGAG Y NAMRI alias "SAI" is found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act 9165 also known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002", and there being no mitigating circumstance, accused is hereby sentenced to suffer a penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and a fine of
FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00), and to pay the costs.
The effects of the crime are ordered confiscated in favor of the government. The custodian of the shabu subject of the case is hereby ordered to
submit the same to the Dangerous Drugs Board for proper disposition within 48 hours from receipt of a copy of this judgment and the latter is given
48 hours from receipt of the same to submit an acknowledgment receipt to this Court to form part of the records of this case.
SO ORDERED.9
The trial court found that all the elements of the crime charged were present and proven beyond reasonable doubt by the evidence of the
prosecution and the testimonies of the poseur-buyer and the arresting officer who are presumed to have performed their duties regularly. It
disregarded the allegations of the defense that appellant was a victim of a frame-up and that he was not arrested pursuant to a valid buy-bust
operation.
On July 31, 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision which affirmed in toto the ruling of the trial court. The appellate court held
that the constitutional right of appellant against warrantless arrest and search was not violated; that appellant failed to assail the legality of the arrest
and the seizure of the sachet of shabu prior to his arraignment or at any stage in the proceedings of the trial court; that the arrest was pursuant to a
buy-bust operation which is a valid form of entrapment of felons in the execution of their criminal plan; and that the search conducted on appellant
was incidental to a lawful arrest.10 The appellate court also gave more weight and credence to the testimonies of the members of the buy-bust
team because they were not shown to have been impelled by ill-motives in testifying against appellant.
Hence, this petition.11
Appellant avers that the trial court and the Court of Appeals gravely erred in giving undue credence to the testimonies of the police officers and in
upholding the presumption of regularity in the performance of their official functions. He also assails the validity of his arrest because the police

11

officers were not armed with any warrant when he was arrested. Finally, he assails the propriety of the chain of custody of the shabu allegedly
seized from him due to the non-observation of Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.12
The elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs are (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and consideration; and
(2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that
the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti.13
These elements have been proven to be present in the instant case. PO3 Garcia who acted as the poseur-buyer, categorically testified about the
buy-bust operation from the time he was introduced by the informant to appellant as the buyer of the shabu; to the time when appellant agreed to
the sale; to the actual exchange of the marked money and the heat-sealed sachet containing a white crystalline substance; and until the
apprehension of appellant, to wit:
A I myself together with confidential informant just walked, as well as the area and waited the poseur at the agreed place situated at the vicinity of
entrance of Villa Antonio, San Pablo City.
Q You were waiting for the suspects at the entrance of Villa San Antonio and then what else transpired next?
A After more or less 20 minutes of waiting maam we saw a man wearing a black pants and dark gray t-shirts arrived in our position, it was
introduced our confidential informant, he was introduced our confidential that as the poseur, likewise I was also introduced as the seller, [sic] I was
also introduced by the confidential informant as the buyer.
Q Who are the supposed to be the buyer, you were introduced as a buyer?
A Yes, maam.
FISCAL LAGMAN
Q And this suspect who was the seller, is he present in Court today?
A Yes, maam.
Q Would you kindly point to him?
A The 6th man from the Steel Cabinet.
INTERPRETER
Makikitayo, anong pangalan mo?
ACCUSED
Saidamen Macatingag po.
xxxx
FISCAL LAGMAN
Q So, after the introductions were made what happened?
A The seller identified the money, maam, which is amounting to P52,500.00.
FISCAL LAGMAN
Q What did you do?
A I immediately pull out from my pocket the envelope which is contained the 2 pieces of P500 bills and the bodol money as agreed amount of
P52,500. Likewise as also the seller if it has a dangerous drugs, maam.
Q And then what happened?
A I immediately pulled out 1 plastic sachet from his pocket and handed it over to me maam.
Q One (1) plastic sachet was handed to you?
A Yes, maam.
Q After you handed that money?
A No, maam we handed first to me the sachet and he demanded the payment of sachet, maam.
xxxx
FISCAL LAGMAN
Q What happened after the exchanged of the money and plastic sachet?
A After I gave him the buy bust money as agreed upon before we discovered as the bodol money, I immediately executed the pre-arranged signal
which is remove my cap, maam.
Q After you removed your cap, what happened?
A I saw PO3 Leona arrived and assisted me, after the arresting.

12

Q While you were arresting this Saidamen, this accused, what did you do as a matter of procedure, what did you tell him?
A We informed him the constitutional rights, maam. PO2 Leona was able to recovered this custody control of bodol money.
xxxx
Q So, after that, where did you bring Saidamen?
A We immediately brought him at our office at Camp Vicente Lim, Canlubang, Laguna together with confiscated pieces of evidence for proper
disposition.
Q You said that you were able to buy 1 plastic sachet of shabu that was supposed to be worth of P52,500, would you be able to identify the plastic
sachet if you will be shown to you?
A Yes, maam.
Q What markings did you place if any?
A I put my exhibit A, my initials, the date and time of arrest included the month and year, maam.
Q I am showing to you exhibit F, would you kindly tell us if this is the one that you brought from Saidamen Macatingag?
A Yes, maam.14
PO3 Leona, the back-up arresting officer during the buy-bust operation corroborated PO3 Garcias testimony, thus:
Q After you placed yourself 10 meters a way from the house, from the site and likewise Marino Garcia and the informant and the fence near the site,
what happened thereafter?
A I saw a person came out from that way near the hollow blocks fence wearing black pants and green t-shirt and I saw they were talking with our
confidential informant.
FISCAL COMILANG
Q Could you see the person who just arrived and talked with your confidential informant on said occasion, is he in Court?
A Yes, sir.
Q Could you please point to him if he is present?
INTERPRETER
Witness pointed to a person who gave us his name as Saidamen Macatingag.
FISCAL COMILANG
Q Now, Mr. Witness after the confidential informant and the accused had a conversation what did if any transpired after this conversation?
A After 30 minutes I saw the pre-arranged signal that this PO3 Marino Garcia will remove his cap.
Q You mean to say or to impress this court that Mr. Witness that the informant and Mr. Garcia were together when they had a transaction with the
accused?
A Yes, sir because the confidential informant introduced Mr. Marino Garcia to the accused.
xxxx
FISCAL COMILANG
Q After you saw PO3 Marino Garcia removed his cap, what did you do after that?
A I went to the area to help PO3 Garcia.
Q What if any did you find out after helping PO3 Marino Garcia?
A I arrested Saidamen and I removed from him the 2 pieces of P500 the bodol money.
xxxx
Q Now after recovering that 2 P500 bills from the accused what will be, were you able to recover?
A I recovered from the accused the money and it was SPO3 Marino Garcia who recovered the 25 grams of shabu conducted.15
Prosecutions involving illegal drugs depend largely on the credibility of the police officers who conducted the buy-bust operation.16 It is a
fundamental rule that findings of the trial courts which are factual in nature and which involve credibility are accorded respect when no glaring
errors; gross misapprehension of facts; or speculative, arbitrary, and unsupported conclusions can be gathered from such findings. The reason for
this is that the trial court is in a better position to decide the credibility of witnesses, having heard their testimonies and observed their deportment
and manner of testifying during the trial. The rule finds an even more stringent application where said findings are sustained by the Court of
Appeals.17
The testimonies of police officers Garcia and Leona, and the sachet of shabu sold by appellant sufficiently proved the crime charged. Moreover, the
prosecution was able to establish that the substance recovered from appellant was indeed shabu.18

13

In view of these testimonies and evidence of the prosecution, appellants denial must fail. The Court has consistently stressed that denial, like alibi,
is a weak defense that becomes even weaker in the face of positive identification of the accused by prosecution witnesses.19 Moreover, appellant
failed to adduce clear and convincing evidence to overturn the presumption that the arresting officers regularly performed their duties. It was not
shown, by any satisfactory degree of proof, that said policemen were impelled by ill-motives to testify against him. There is, therefore, no basis to
suspect the veracity of their testimonies.
With regard to the validity of his arrest, evidence shows that appellant was the subject of a buy-bust operation. In this jurisdiction, the conduct of a
buy-bust operation is a common and accepted mode of apprehending those involved in illegal sale of prohibited or regulated drugs. It has been
proven to be an effective way of unveiling the identities of drug dealers and of luring them out of obscurity.20 It catches the violator in flagrante
delicto and the police officers conducting the operation are not only authorized but duty-bound to apprehend the violator and to search him for
anything that may have been part of or used in the commission of the crime.21
Finally, this Court likewise finds no merit in appellants contention that the police officers failed to comply with the guidelines on the chain of custody
and disposition of the seized sachet of shabu as provided in Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. Testimonies of prosecution witnesses
convincingly state that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized item was properly preserved by the apprehending officers. P03 Garcia
testified that he marked the sachet of shabu with his initials, and the date and time of appellants arrest.22 PO3 Leona confirmed that he had seen
PO3 Garcia mark the same sachet of shabu sold by appellant; that a letter of request for the examination of said sachet was made; and such
request was received by the regional crime laboratory office. Thus:
Q Were you able to see that the shabu was actually was you said that recovered PO3 Marino Garcia from the accused?
A Yes, sir.
COURT
Q Did you put your initial in the specimen?
A I was only accompanied Marino Garcia in bringing to the crime lab.
FISCAL COMILANG
Q Since you have seen Mr. Witness the actual shabu was taken from the accused, do you know if Mr. Garcia placed any reference on the said
article, if any?
A Yes, sir, the initial of Marino Garcia.
Q What is that initial?
A MAG.
Q Mr. Witness, why do you know that police officer Marino Garcia actually placed his initial on the said specimen or item?
A Everytime that we conducted the buy bust, it is our SOP to place the marking.
Q Mr. Witness I will show you that item confiscated Marino Garcia from the accused on the alleged of the item, could you identify it?
A Yes, sir.
Q I will show to you now the plastic sachet big plastic sachet which contained white crystalline substance, could you please tell us what is the
relationship of this item from that item allegedly taken by Marino Garcia from the accused on which marking was placed?
A This is the item which is recovered from the accused. Mr. Garcia placed his initial.
Q What is MAG?
A MAG referred to Marino A. Garcia.
xxxx
Q After the specimen and the accused were transferred to the investigator of Regional director what happened to the accused and the specimen?
A The investigator prepared a paper for the filing of theand prepared a letter request for the examination.
Q Would you specify what are those documents prepared by the investigator as pre-requisite of filing of this case?
A We prepared the letter request for the crime lab request for the accused we first report to the effectdid not suffer physical injury.
xxxx
Q Do you know if this document was actually received by the addressee?
A Yes, sir, because I was with them.
Q What proof that this document was actually received by the addressee?
A There was a stamp marked of receipt, sir.23
As can be gleaned from the foregoing, the seized sachet of shabu was immediately marked for proper identification and, thereafter, forwarded to the
Crime Laboratory for examination. The Chemistry Report of the Regional Crime Laboratory Office stated that the specimen submitted by the
apprehending officers indeed bore the marking "Exh A MAG 171200-01-14" and that the same gave positive result to the tests for the presence of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride. Forensic Chemical Officer Tria confirmed on the witness stand that she examined the specimen submitted by the
PDEA and that she was the one who prepared the Chemistry Report No. D-54-04.24

14

It is thus evident that the identity of the corpus delicti has been properly preserved and established by the prosecution. Besides, the integrity of the
evidence is presumed to be preserved unless there is a showing of bad faith, ill will, or proof that the evidence has been tampered with. The
appellant in this case has the burden to show that the evidence was tampered or meddled with to overcome a presumption of regularity in the
handling of exhibits by public officers and a presumption that public officers properly discharge their duties.25 Appellant failed to discharge such
burden.
This Court has held that non-compliance with Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 will not render an accuseds arrest illegal or the items
seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.26
In People of the Philippines v. Del Monte,27 it was held that:
Under Section 3 of Rule 128 of the Rules of Court, evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or these
rules. For evidence to be inadmissible, there should be a law or rule which forbids its reception. If there is no such law or rule, the evidence must be
admitted subject only to the evidentiary weight that will accorded it by the courts. One example is that provided in Section 31 of Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court wherein a party producing a document as genuine which has been altered and appears to be altered after its execution, in a part
material to the question in dispute, must account for the alteration. His failure to do so shall make the document inadmissible in evidence. This is
clearly provided for in the rules.
We do not find any provision or statement in said law or in any rule that will bring about the non-admissibility of the confiscated and/or seized drugs
due to non-compliance with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. The issue therefore, if there is non-compliance with said section, is not of
admissibility, but of weight evidentiary merit or probative value to be given the evidence. The weight to be given by the courts on said
evidence depends on the circumstances obtaining in each case.28
All told, We see no reason to disturb the findings of the trial court that appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal sale of a dangerous
drug, as defined and penalized in Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. Under said provision, the illegal sale of any dangerous drug, regardless of
its quantity and purity, is punishable by life imprisonment to death and a fine of P500,000.00 to P10,000,000.00.
For illegally selling 25.23 grams of shabu, and there being no modifying circumstance alleged in the Information, the trial court, as sustained by the
Court of Appeals, correctly imposed the penalty of life imprisonment in accordance with Article 63 (2) of the Revised Penal Code29 and a fine of
P500,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01487 dated July 31, 2007, sustaining
the conviction of appellant Saidamen Macatingag y Namri for violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, and imposing upon him the
penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of P500,000.00 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

15

G.R. No. 181831

March 29, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee - versus - RODNIE ALMORFE y SEDENTE and RYAN ALMORFE y VALLESTER, Appellants.
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Appellants Rodnie Almorfe y Sedente (Rodnie) and Ryan Almorfe y Vallester (Ryan) were convicted of violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic
Act No. 9165 (The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act) by the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 70. Appellant Rodnie was further convicted
of violation of Section 11 of the same law.

The Information against appellants for violation of Section 5 (Crim. Case No. 13116-D) reads:[1]
xxxx
On or about November 27, 2003 in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, conspiring and confederating
together, and both of them mutually helping and aiding one another, not being lawfully authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously sell, deliver and give away to PO1 Janet Sabo y Ampuhan, a police poseur-buyer, one (1) heat sealed transparent plastic sachet
containing three (3) centigrams (0.03 gram) of white crystalline substance, which was found positive to the test for methylamphetamine
hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, in violation of said law.
xxxx

The Information against appellant Rodnie for violation of Section 11 of the same law (Crim. Case No. 13117-D) reads:[2]
xxxx
On or about November 27, 2003 in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, not being lawfully authorized by law
to possess any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and under his custody and control two
(2) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing two (2) centigrams (0.02 gram) each, of white crystalline substance, which were found positive
to the test for methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, in violation of said law.
xxxx
Culled from the records of the case is the following version of the prosecution:
At about 7:00 oclock in the evening of November 27, 2003, an informant personally reported to the Pasig Police Station about the rampant selling of
shabu in Callejon 64, Purok 6, Villa Antonio, Brgy. Bambang, Pasig by a certain Taga, prompting a team belonging to the Mayors Special Action
Team of Pasig City to conduct a buy-bust operation at the target area.
The team was composed of PO1 Aldrin Mariano, P01 Roland Panis, PO2 San Andres, PO3 Salisa and PO1 Janet Sabo (Janet).
Together with the informant, the team members, in coordination with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency, repaired to and arrived at the target
area at around 8:30 p.m. of the same day, November 27, 2003. After the service vehicle bearing the team members parked along Akasya St., in a
vacant lot,[3] a lengthy street [with many alleys intersecting it],[4] Janet, together with the informant, at once proceeded to the target address about
50 meters away, leaving behind the other team members inside the vehicle.
On reaching the target address, the informant nodded at one of two men standing in front thereof who turned out to be Rodnie a.k.a. Taga. Rodnie
at once asked the informant what their purpose was, to which the informant replied Iiskor kami. Rodnie then asked Magkano?, and the informant
answered Dos, pare which means P200 in the drug trade.
Janet, who was designated as poseur-buyer, gave the pre-marked P200 (in five P20 and two P50 bills) to Rodnie who placed them inside his
pocket. Rodnie thereupon took out a black plastic container[5] from his pants back pocket from which container he drew two plastic sachets which
he, however, returned to the container.
Rodnie thereafter parted with some of the money bills to his companion who turned out to be his co-appellant Ryan, whom he asked Akina yung
binigay ko sa yo kanina. Ryan at once gave Rodnie a sachet of shabu which Rodnie in turn gave to Janet. At that instant, Janet executed the prearranged signal to the other members of the team who swooped down on appellants and arrested them. Janet then and there seized the money
and the two plastic sachets inside the black plastic container in Rodnies possession, and affixed her signature thereon, as well as on the plastic
sachet subject of the sale.
The contents of the three sachets were found positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride by the Eastern Police District Crime Laboratory Office,
[6] hence, the indictment of appellants.
During the pre-trial, the parties stipulated on, inter alia, the existence but not the source of the three plastic sachets; and the due execution and
genuineness of the result of the examination of the specimens to thus dispense with the testimony of the Forensic Chemist P/Insp. Lourdeliza
Gural-Cejes[7] who examined and found the contents of the sachets to be positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride.[8]
Upon the other hand, appellants gave the following version:
On November 27, 2003, as he was assisting his wife who was about to give birth, Rodnie saw his cousin Ryan being pushed by Janet and four
other companions towards his house. Once inside the house, Janet frisked Ryan and Rodnie. The members of the team soon took money inside
Rodnies pocket and searched his house which yielded nothing. Appellants were, however, handcuffed and brought to the police station.[9]

16

Appellants neighbor, Aida Soriano (Aida), corroborated appellants version.[10]

By Decision of July 29, 2005,[11] Branch 70 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig convicted both appellants in the first case and appellant Rodnie in
the second case, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
In Criminal Case No. 13116-D filed against Rodnie Almorfe and Ryan Almorfe for violation of Section 5, Article II, Republic Act 9165 (Illegal Sale of
Shabu), they are hereby sentenced to LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to solidarily pay a Fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00).
In Criminal Case No. 13117-D filed only against Rodnie Almorfe for violation of Section 11, Article II, Republic Act 9165 (Illegal Possession of
Shabu), said accused is hereby sentenced to Twelve (12) Years and One (1) Day to Twenty (20) Years and to pay a Fine of Three Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00). (underscoring supplied)

On appeal, the appellate court, by Decision of August 30, 2007,[12] affirmed that of the trial courts. It discredited appellants claim of frame-up in the
absence of proof of ill-motive on the part of the arresting officers to falsely accuse them, aside from the fact that the officers are presumed to have
regularly performed their official duty.
The appellate court discredited too the testimony of Aida which it found to be laced with several inconsistencies vis--vis those of appellants.
Hence, the present appeal, appellants assigning as sole error of the appellate court their conviction despite the failure of the prosecution to prove
that the shabu submitted for laboratory examination is the same one allegedly taken from them.

Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 charts the procedure on the custody and disposition of confiscated, seized, and/or surrendered dangerous drugs, given
the severity of the penalties imposed for violations of said law, viz:
Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. - The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of
dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments, paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated,
seized and or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;
During the cross-examination of Janet, appellants counsel elicited the following testimony:[13]
Q: Now, madam witness, these two (2) accused were being charged of violating Section 5 and Section 11, of Republic Act 9165. And it is presumed
that you know R.A. 9165?
A: Section 5 is the only case we filed against them, sir.
Q: During the inventory, did you secure the presence of the media team?
A: We did not conduct an inventory, sir.
Q: You did not conduct an inventory with regard to this case?
A: We just marked the sachets right then and there for purposes of not alternating the sachets we recovered from them, sir.
[Defense counsel]
Atty. Sorongon:
But the law provides, your Honor, that it should be inventoried.
COURT:
Let the Court decide on that matter. You have already established that there was no inventory.
x x x x (italics and underscoring supplied)
Oddly, from the above-quoted testimony of alleged poseur buyer Janet, she clarified that they filed a case against appellants only for violation of
Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165. Appellant Rodnie was, however, additionally indicted for violation of Section 11.
Respecting the teams non-compliance with the inventory, not to mention the photograph, requirement of R.A. No. 9165, the same does not
necessarily render void and invalid the seizure of the dangerous drugs. There must, however, be justifiable grounds to warrant exception therefrom,
and provided that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/s.[14]
For the saving clause to apply, it is important that the prosecution should explain the reasons behind the procedural lapses[15] and that the integrity
and value of the seized evidence had been preserved:
x x x [N]on-compliance with the strict directive of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 is not necessarily fatal to the prosecutions case; police procedures in
the handling of confiscated evidence may still have lapses, as in the present case. These lapses, however, must be recognized and explained in
terms of their justifiable grounds and the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence seized must be shown to have been preserved. [16] (italics
in the original)

17

The presentation of the drugs which constitute the corpus delicti of the offenses,[17] calls for the necessity of proving beyond doubt that they are the
same seized objects. This function is performed by the chain of custody requirement as defined in Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board
Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002,[18] which requirement is necessary to erase all doubts as to the identity of the seized drugs by establishing its
movement from the accused, to the police, to the forensic chemist, and finally to the court.[19]

In the present case, even if the requirement to conduct an inventory were to be excused, given that there were only three sachets confiscated, the
prosecution just the same failed to discharge its burden. Although Janet identified Exhibits C-1, C-2 and C-3 as the drugs seized from appellants
which she claimed to have marked immediately after the bust, she did not disclose the name of the investigator to whom she turned them over. And
there is no showing if that same investigator was the one who turned the drugs over to the forensic chemist, or if the forensic chemist whose name
appears in the physical science report[20] was the one who received them from that investigator, or where the drugs were kept for safekeeping after
the chemical test was conducted up to the time they were presented in court.

It bears recalling that while the parties stipulated on the existence of the sachets, they did not stipulate with respect to their source.

People v. Sanchez[21] teaches that the testimony of the forensic chemist which is stipulated upon merely covers the handling of the specimen at
the forensic laboratory and the result of the examination, but not the manner the specimen was handled before it came to the possession of the
forensic chemist and after it left his possession.

While a perfect chain of custody is almost always impossible to achieve, an unbroken chain becomes indispensable and essential in the
prosecution of drug cases owing to its susceptibility to alteration, tampering, contamination and even substitution and exchange.[22] Hence, every
link must be accounted for.

In fine, the prosecution failed to account for every link of the chain starting from its turn over by Janet to the investigator, and from the latter to the
chemist.

As for the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty relied upon by the courts a quo, the same cannot by itself overcome the
presumption of innocence nor constitute proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.[23]

Parenthetically, the following testimony of Janet raises a nagging doubt regarding the buy-bust version of the prosecution:

Q: So, you were fifty (50) meters away from your companions, where did you meet the accused?
A: We entered Callejon 64, and they were standing by in front of their house where there was a lighted post, sir.
Q: Madam witness, you stated that you entered Callejon 64, which is an alley, and you left your vehicle fifty (50) meters away from Callejon 64. Was
your vehicle parked perpendicularly to Callejon 64 or, was it parked parallel to Callejon 64?
A: We parked in one of those alleys named Akasya, when you make a turn, there was a creek. And after that, there were several other alleys, and
there is a two-way street and then after that, there were alleys again, sir.
Q: From the place where you parked your service vehicle, you have to enter into different streets before arriving at the house of the accused, am I
correct?
A: Yes, sir, when we parked, we walked straight, and when we reached the street, we walked again. After that, was an alley, Callejon 64, sir.
Q: Will you agree with me, madam witness, that you have to turn from one street to another before arriving at Callejon 64? You testified that awhile
ago, will you agree with me?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Then, you stated during the direct examination, madam witness, that before you alighted from your vehicle, there is this agreement of the prearranged signal?
A: Yes, sir.[24] (underscoring supplied)

18

Given Janets description of the target address and the location of her fellow team members, how could the latter have seen Janet execute the prearranged signal to draw them to close in and arrest appellants?

Just as the lack of showing whether the team confiscated the black container allegedly brought out by Rodnie containing two sachets raises a
nagging doubt. If it did, why was it not presented? If it did not, why? That was an object evidence which could have lent credibility to the
prosecutions version.

WHEREFORE, the August 30, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. H.C. No. 02178 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE for failure of the
prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of appellants Rodnie Almorfe y Sedente and Ryan Almorfe y Vallester who are
accordingly hereby ACQUITTED of the crimes charged against them and ordered immediately RELEASED from custody, unless they are being held
for some other lawful cause.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ORDERED to forthwith implement this decision and to INFORM this Court, within five days from receipt
hereof, of the action taken.
Let a copy of this decision be forwarded to the PNP Director and the Director General of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency for information
and guidance. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

19

G.R. No. 171406

April 4, 2011

ASIAN TERMINALS, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
MALAYAN INSURANCE, CO., INC., Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Once the insurer pays the insured, equity demands reimbursement as no one should benefit at the expense of another.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the July 14, 2005 Decision2 and the February 14, 2006
Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA G.R. CV No. 61798.
Factual Antecedents
On November 14, 1995, Shandong Weifang Soda Ash Plant shipped on board the vessel MV "Jinlian I" 60,000 plastic bags of soda ash dense
(each bag weighing 50 kilograms) from China to Manila.4 The shipment, with an invoice value of US$456,000.00, was insured with respondent
Malayan Insurance Company, Inc. under Marine Risk Note No. RN-0001-21430, and covered by a Bill of Lading issued by Tianjin Navigation
Company with Philippine Banking Corporation as the consignee and Chemphil Albright and Wilson Corporation as the notify party.5
On November 21, 1995, upon arrival of the vessel at Pier 9, South Harbor, Manila,6 the stevedores of petitioner Asian Terminals, Inc., a duly
registered domestic corporation engaged in providing arrastre and stevedoring services,7 unloaded the 60,000 bags of soda ash dense from the
vessel and brought them to the open storage area of petitioner for temporary storage and safekeeping, pending clearance from the Bureau of
Customs and delivery to the consignee.8 When the unloading of the bags was completed on November 28, 1995, 2,702 bags were found to be in
bad order condition.9
On November 29, 1995, the stevedores of petitioner began loading the bags in the trucks of MEC Customs Brokerage for transport and delivery to
the consignee.10 On December 28, 1995, after all the bags were unloaded in the warehouses of the consignee, a total of 2,881 bags were in bad
order condition due to spillage, caking, and hardening of the contents.11
On April 19, 1996, respondent, as insurer, paid the value of the lost/ damaged cargoes to the consignee in the amount of P643,600.25.12
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On November 20, 1996, respondent, as subrogee of the consignee, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 35, a Complaint13
for damages against petitioner, the shipper Inchcape Shipping Services, and the cargo broker MEC Customs Brokerage.14
After the filing of the Answers,15 trial ensued.
On June 26, 1998, the RTC rendered a Decision16 finding petitioner liable for the damage/loss sustained by the shipment but absolving the other
defendants. The RTC found that the proximate cause of the damage/loss was the negligence of petitioners stevedores who handled the unloading
of the cargoes from the vessel.17 The RTC emphasized that despite the admonitions of Marine Cargo Surveyors Edgar Liceralde and Redentor
Antonio not to use steel hooks in retrieving and picking-up the bags, petitioners stevedores continued to use such tools, which pierced the bags
and caused the spillage.18 The RTC, thus, ruled that petitioner, as employer, is liable for the acts and omissions of its stevedores under Articles
217619 and 2180 paragraph (4)20 of the Civil Code.21 Hence, the dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered ordering defendant Asian Terminal, Inc. to pay plaintiff Malayan Insurance Company, Inc. the sum of
P643,600.25 plus interest thereon at legal rate computed from November 20, 1996, the date the Complaint was filed, until the principal obligation is
fully paid, and the costs.
The complaint of the plaintiff against defendants Inchcape Shipping Services and MEC Customs Brokerage, and the counterclaims of said
defendants against the plaintiff are dismissed.
SO ORDERED.22
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed23 to the CA but the appeal was denied. In its July 14, 2005 Decision, the CA agreed with the RTC that the
damage/loss was caused by the negligence of petitioners stevedores in handling and storing the subject shipment.24 The CA likewise rejected
petitioners assertion that it received the subject shipment in bad order condition as this was belied by Marine Cargo Surveyors Redentor Antonio
and Edgar Liceralde, who both testified that the actual counting of bad order bags was done only after all the bags were unloaded from the vessel
and that the Turn Over Survey of Bad Order Cargoes (TOSBOC) upon which petitioner anchors its defense was prepared only on November 28,
1995 or after the unloading of the bags was completed.25 Thus, the CA disposed of the appeal as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated June 26, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 35, in Civil Case No. 96-80945 is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects.
SO ORDERED.26
Petitioner moved for reconsideration27 but the CA denied the same in a Resolution28 dated February 14, 2006 for lack of merit.
Issues
Hence, the present recourse, petitioner contending that:
1. RESPONDENT-INSURER IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE RELIEF GRANTED AS IT FAILED TO ESTABLISH ITS CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST
HEREIN PETITIONER SINCE, AS THE ALLEGED SUBROGEE, IT NEVER PRESENTED ANY VALID, EXISTING, ENFORCEABLE INSURANCE
POLICY OR ANY COPY THEREOF IN COURT.
2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT THE TOSBOC & RESBOC WERE ADOPTED AS
COMMON EXHIBITS BY BOTH PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT.

20

3. CONTRARY TO TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE ON RECORD, VARIOUS DOCUMENTATIONS WOULD POINT TO THE VESSELS LIABILITY AS
THERE IS, IN THIS INSTANT CASE, AN OVERWHELMING DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE TO PROVE THAT THE DAMAGE IN QUESTION WERE
SUSTAINED WHEN THE SHIPMENT WAS IN THE CUSTODY OF THE VESSEL.
4. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT ADJUDGED HEREIN DEFENDANT LIABLE DUE TO [THE] FACT THAT THE
TURN OVER SURVEY OF BAD ORDER CARGOES (TOSBOC) WAS PREPARED ONLY AFTER THE COMPLETION OF THE DISCHARGING
OPERATIONS OR ON NOVEMBER 28, 1995. THUS, CONCLUDING THAT DAMAGE TO THE CARGOES WAS DUE TO THE IMPROPER
HANDLING THEREOF BY ATI STEVEDORES.
5. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT TAKING JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THE CONTRACT FOR CARGO HANDLING
SERVICES BETWEEN PPA AND ATI AND APPLYING THE PERTINENT PROVISIONS THEREOF AS REGARDS ATIS LIABILITY.29
In sum, the issues are: (1) whether the non-presentation of the insurance contract or policy is fatal to respondents cause of action; (2) whether the
proximate cause of the damage/loss to the shipment was the negligence of petitioners stevedores; and (3) whether the court can take judicial
notice of the Management Contract between petitioner and the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) in determining petitioners liability.
Petitioners Arguments
Petitioner contends that respondent has no cause of action because it failed to present the insurance contract or policy covering the subject
shipment.30 Petitioner argues that the Subrogation Receipt presented by respondent is not sufficient to prove that the subject shipment was insured
and that respondent was validly subrogated to the rights of the consignee.31 Thus, petitioner submits that without proof of a valid subrogation,
respondent is not entitled to any reimbursement.32
Petitioner likewise puts in issue the finding of the RTC, which was affirmed by the CA, that the proximate cause of the damage/loss to the shipment
was the negligence of petitioners stevedores.33 Petitioner avers that such finding is contrary to the documentary evidence, i.e., the TOSBOC, the
Request for Bad Order Survey (RESBOC) and the Report of Survey.34 According to petitioner, these documents prove that it received the subject
shipment in bad order condition and that no additional damage was sustained by the subject shipment under its custody.35 Petitioner asserts that
although the TOSBOC was prepared only after all the bags were unloaded by petitioners stevedores, this does not mean that the damage/loss was
caused by its stevedores.36
Petitioner also claims that the amount of damages should not be more than P5,000.00, pursuant to its Management Contract for cargo handling
services with the PPA.37 Petitioner contends that the CA should have taken judicial notice of the said contract since it is an official act of an
executive department subject to judicial cognizance.38
Respondents Arguments
Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the non-presentation of the insurance contract or policy was not raised in the trial court. Thus, it cannot
be raised for the first time on appeal.39 Respondent likewise contends that under prevailing jurisprudence, presentation of the insurance policy is
not indispensable.40 Moreover, with or without the insurance contract or policy, respondent claims that it should be allowed to recover under Article
123641 of the Civil Code.42 Respondent further avers that "the right of subrogation has its roots in equity - it is designed to promote and to
accomplish justice and is the mode which equity adopts to compel the ultimate payment of a debt by one who in justice, equity and good
conscience ought to pay."43
Respondent likewise maintains that the RTC and the CA correctly found that the damage/loss sustained by the subject shipment was caused by the
negligent acts of petitioners stevedores.44 Such factual findings of the RTC, affirmed by the CA, are conclusive and should no longer be
disturbed.45 In fact, under Section 146 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari.47
As to the Management Contract for cargo handling services, respondent contends that this is outside the operation of judicial notice.48 And even if
it is not, petitioners liability cannot be limited by it since it is a contract of adhesion.49
Our Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.
Non-presentation of the insurance contract or policy is not fatal in the instant case
Petitioner claims that respondents non-presentation of the insurance contract or policy between the respondent and the consignee is fatal to its
cause of action.
We do not agree.
First of all, this was never raised as an issue before the RTC. In fact, it is not among the issues agreed upon by the parties to be resolved during the
pre-trial.50 As we have said, "the determination of issues during the pre-trial conference bars the consideration of other questions, whether during
trial or on appeal."51 Thus, "[t]he parties must disclose during pre-trial all issues they intend to raise during the trial, except those involving
privileged or impeaching matters. x x x The basis of the rule is simple. Petitioners are bound by the delimitation of the issues during the pre-trial
because they themselves agreed to the same."52
Neither was this issue raised on appeal.53 Basic is the rule that "issues or grounds not raised below cannot be resolved on review by the Supreme
Court, for to allow the parties to raise new issues is antithetical to the sporting idea of fair play, justice and due process."54
Besides, non-presentation of the insurance contract or policy is not
necessarily fatal.55 In Delsan Transport Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,56 we ruled that:
Anent the second issue, it is our view and so hold that the presentation in evidence of the marine insurance policy is not indispensable in this case
before the insurer may recover from the common carrier the insured value of the lost cargo in the exercise of its subrogatory right. The subrogation
receipt, by itself, is sufficient to establish not only the relationship of herein private respondent as insurer and Caltex, as the assured shipper of the
lost cargo of industrial fuel oil, but also the amount paid to settle the insurance claim. The right of subrogation accrues simply upon payment by the
insurance company of the insurance claim.
The presentation of the insurance policy was necessary in the case of Home Insurance Corporation v. CA (a case cited by petitioner) because the
shipment therein (hydraulic engines) passed through several stages with different parties involved in each stage. First, from the shipper to the port

21

of departure; second, from the port of departure to the M/S Oriental Statesman; third, from the M/S Oriental Statesman to the M/S Pacific Conveyor;
fourth, from the M/S Pacific Conveyor to the port of arrival; fifth, from the port of arrival to the arrastre operator; sixth, from the arrastre operator to
the hauler, Mabuhay Brokerage Co., Inc. (private respondent therein); and lastly, from the hauler to the consignee. We emphasized in that case that
in the absence of proof of stipulations to the contrary, the hauler can be liable only for any damage that occurred from the time it received the cargo
until it finally delivered it to the consignee. Ordinarily, it cannot be held responsible for the handling of the cargo before it actually received it. The
insurance contract, which was not presented in evidence in that case would have indicated the scope of the insurers liability, if any, since no
evidence was adduced indicating at what stage in the handling process the damage to the cargo was sustained.57 (Emphasis supplied.)
In International Container Terminal Services, Inc. v. FGU Insurance Corporation,58 we used the same line of reasoning in upholding the Decision of
the CA finding the arrastre contractor liable for the lost shipment despite the failure of the insurance company to offer in evidence the insurance
contract or policy. We explained:
Indeed, jurisprudence has it that the marine insurance policy needs to be presented in evidence before the trial court or even belatedly before the
appellate court. In Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. v. Regis Brokerage Corp., the Court stated that the presentation of the marine insurance policy was
necessary, as the issues raised therein arose from the very existence of an insurance contract between Malayan Insurance and its consignee, ABB
Koppel, even prior to the loss of the shipment. In Wallem Philippines Shipping, Inc. v. Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc., the Court ruled
that the insurance contract must be presented in evidence in order to determine the extent of the coverage. This was also the ruling of the Court in
Home Insurance Corporation v. Court of Appeals.
However, as in every general rule, there are admitted exceptions. In Delsan Transport Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the Court stated that the
presentation of the insurance policy was not fatal because the loss of the cargo undoubtedly occurred while on board the petitioners vessel, unlike
in Home Insurance in which the cargo passed through several stages with different parties and it could not be determined when the damage to the
cargo occurred, such that the insurer should be liable for it.
As in Delsan, there is no doubt that the loss of the cargo in the present case occurred while in petitioners custody. Moreover, there is no issue as
regards the provisions of Marine Open Policy No. MOP-12763, such that the presentation of the contract itself is necessary for perusal, not to
mention that its existence was already admitted by petitioner in open court. And even though it was not offered in evidence, it still can be considered
by the court as long as they have been properly identified by testimony duly recorded and they have themselves been incorporated in the records of
the case.59
Similarly, in this case, the presentation of the insurance contract or policy was not necessary. Although petitioner objected to the admission of the
Subrogation Receipt in its Comment to respondents formal offer of evidence on the ground that respondent failed to present the insurance contract
or policy,60 a perusal of petitioners Answer61 and Pre-Trial Brief62 shows that petitioner never questioned respondents right to subrogation, nor
did it dispute the coverage of the insurance contract or policy. Since there was no issue regarding the validity of the insurance contract or policy, or
any provision thereof, respondent had no reason to present the insurance contract or policy as evidence during the trial.
Factual findings of the CA, affirming the RTC, are conclusive and binding
Petitioners attempt to absolve itself from liability must likewise fail.
Only questions of law are allowed in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Thus, it is not our duty "to review,
examine, and evaluate or weigh all over again the probative value of the evidence presented,"63 especially where the findings of both the trial court
and the appellate court coincide on the matter.64 As we have often said, factual findings of the CA affirming those of the RTC are conclusive and
binding, except in the following cases: "(1) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when there is grave abuse of
discretion; (3) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the [CA] is based on
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the [CA], in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions
of both appellant and appellee; (6) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (7) when
the [CA] manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion; and (8) when the findings of fact of the [CA] are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on
record."65 None of these are availing in the present case.
Both the RTC and the CA found the negligence of petitioners stevedores to be the proximate cause of the damage/loss to the shipment. In
disregarding the contention of petitioner that such finding is contrary to the documentary evidence, the CA had this to say:
ATI, however, contends that the finding of the trial court was contrary to the documentary evidence of record, particularly, the Turn Over Survey of
Bad Order Cargoes dated November 28, 1995, which was executed prior to the turn-over of the cargo by the carrier to the arrastre operator ATI,
and which showed that the shipment already contained 2,702 damaged bags.
We are not persuaded.
Contrary to ATIs assertion, witness Redentor Antonio, marine cargo surveyor of Inchcape for the vessel Jinlian I which arrived on November 21,
1995 and up to completion of discharging on November 28, 1995, testified that it was only after all the bags were unloaded from the vessel that the
actual counting of bad order bags was made, thus:
xxxx
The above testimony of Redentor Antonio was corroborated by Edgar Liceralde, marine cargo surveyor connected with SMS Average Surveyors
and Adjusters, Inc., the company requested by consignee Chemphil Albright and Wilson Corporation to provide superintendence, report the
condition and determine the final outturn of quantity/weight of the subject shipment. x x x
xxxx
Defendant-appellant ATI, for its part, presented its claim officer as witness who testified that a survey was conducted by the shipping company and
ATI before the shipment was turned over to the possession of ATI and that the Turn Over Survey of Bad Order Cargoes was prepared by ATIs Bad
Order (BO) Inspector.
Considering that the shipment arrived on November 21, 1998 and the unloading operation commenced on said date and was completed on
November 26, 1998, while the Turn Over Survey of Bad Order Cargoes, reflecting a figure of 2,702 damaged bags, was prepared and signed on
November 28, 1998 by ATIs BO Inspector and co-signed by a representative of the shipping company, the trial courts finding that the damage to
the cargoes was due to the improper handling thereof by ATIs stevedores cannot be said to be without substantial support from the records.
We thus see no cogent reason to depart from the ruling of the trial court that ATI should be made liable for the 2,702 bags of damaged shipment.
Needless to state, it is hornbook doctrine that the assessment of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court,

22

which had the opportunity to observe the demeanor, conduct or attitude of the witnesses. The findings of the trial court on this point are accorded
great respect and will not be reversed on appeal, unless it overlooked substantial facts and circumstances which, if considered, would materially
affect the result of the case.
We also find ATI liable for the additional 179 damaged bags discovered upon delivery of the shipment at the consignees warehouse in Pasig. The
final Report of Survey executed by SMS Average Surveyors & Adjusters, Inc., and independent surveyor hired by the consignee, shows that the
subject shipment incurred a total of 2881 damaged bags.
The Report states that the withdrawal and delivery of the shipment took about ninety-five (95) trips from November 29, 1995 to December 28, 1995
and it was upon completion of the delivery to consignees warehouse where the final count of 2881 damaged bags was made. The damage
consisted of torn/bad order condition of the bags due to spillages and caked/hardened portions.
We agree with the trial court that the damage to the shipment was caused by the negligence of ATIs stevedores and for which ATI is liable under
Articles 2180 and 2176 of the Civil Code. The proximate cause of the damage (i.e., torn bags, spillage of contents and caked/hardened portions of
the contents) was the improper handling of the cargoes by ATIs stevedores, x x x
xxxx
ATI has not satisfactorily rebutted plaintiff-appellees evidence on the negligence of ATIs stevedores in the handling and safekeeping of the
cargoes. x x x
xxxx
We find no reason to disagree with the trial courts conclusion. Indeed, from the nature of the [damage] caused to the shipment, i.e., torn bags,
spillage of contents and hardened or caked portions of the contents, it is not difficult to see that the damage caused was due to the negligence of
ATIs stevedores who used steel hooks to retrieve the bags from the higher portions of the piles thereby piercing the bags and spilling their contents,
and who piled the bags in the open storage area of ATI with insufficient cover thereby exposing them to the elements and [causing] the contents to
cake or harden.66
Clearly, the finding of negligence on the part of petitioners stevedores is supported by both testimonial and documentary evidence. Hence, we see
no reason to disturb the same.
Judicial notice does not apply
Finally, petitioner implores us to take judicial notice of Section 7.01,67 Article VII of the Management Contract for cargo handling services it entered
with the PPA, which limits petitioners liability to P5,000.00 per package.
Unfortunately for the petitioner, it cannot avail of judicial notice.
Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provide that:
SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. A court shall take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and
territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts
of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial
departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions.1avvphi1
SEC. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. A court may take judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable of
unquestionable demonstration or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions.
The Management Contract entered into by petitioner and the PPA is clearly not among the matters which the courts can take judicial notice of. It
cannot be considered an official act of the executive department. The PPA, which was created by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 857, as
amended,68 is a government-owned and controlled corporation in charge of administering the ports in the country.69 Obviously, the PPA was only
performing a proprietary function when it entered into a Management Contract with petitioner. As such, judicial notice cannot be applied.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed July 14, 2005 Decision and the February 14, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 61798 are hereby AFFIRMED.

23

G.R. No. 172607

April 16, 2009

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appelle,

vs.
RUFINO UMANITO, Appellant.
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
In our Resolution dated 26 October 2007, this Court resolved, for the very first time, to apply the then recently promulgated New Rules on DNA
Evidence (DNA Rules)1 in a case pending before us this case. We remanded the case to the RTC for reception of DNA evidence in accordance
with the terms of said Resolution, and in light of the fact that the impending exercise would be the first application of the procedure, directed Deputy
Court Administrator Reuben Dela Cruz to: (a) monitor the manner in which the court a quo carries out the DNA Rules; and (b) assess and submit
periodic reports on the implementation of the DNA Rules in the case to the Court.
To recall, the instant case involved a charge of rape. The accused Rufino Umanito (Umanito) was found by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Bauang, La Union, Branch 67 guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. Umanito was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and ordered to indemnify the private complainant in the sum of P50,000.00. On appeal, the Court of Appeals offered the judgment of the
trial court. Umanito appealed the decision of the appellate court to this court.
In its 2007 Resolution, the Court acknowledged "many incongruent assertions of the prosecution and the defense."2 At the same time, the alleged
1989 rape of the private complainant, AAA, had resulted in her pregnancy and the birth of a child, a girl hereinafter identified as "BBB." In view of
that fact, a well as the defense of alibi raised by Umanito, the Court deemed uncovering of whether or not Umanito is the father of BBB greatly
determinative of the resolution of the appeal. The Court then observed:
x x x With the advance in genetics and the availability of new technology, it can now be determined with reasonable certainty whether appellant is
the father of AAA's child. If he is not, his acquittal may be ordained. We have pronounced that if it can be conclusively determined that the accused
did not sire the alleged victim's child, this may cast the shadow of reasonable doubt and allow his acquittal on this basis. If he is found not to be the
father, the finding will at least weigh heavily in the ultimate decision in this case. Thus, we are directing appellant, AAA and her child to submit
themselves to deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing under the aegis of the New Rule on DNA Evidence (the Rules), which took effect on 15 October
2007, subject to guidelines prescribed herein.3
The RTC of Bauang, La Union, Branch 67, presided by Judge Ferdinand A. Fe, upon receiving the Resolution of the Court on 9 November 2007,
set the case for hearing on 27 November 20074 to ascertain the feasibility of DNA testing with due regard to the standards set in Sections 4(a), (b),
(c) and (e) of the DNA Rules. Both AAA and BBB (now 17 years old) testified during the hearing. They also manifested their willingness to undergo
DNA examination to determine whether Umanito is the father of BBB.5
A hearing was conducted on 5 December 2007, where the public prosecutor and the counsel for Umanito manifested their concurrence to the
selection of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) as the institution that would conduct the DNA testing. The RTC issued an Order on even date
directing that biological samples be taken from AAA, BBB and Umanito on 9 January 2008 at the courtroom. The Order likewise enjoined the NBI as
follows:
In order to protect the integrity of the biological samples, the [NBI] is enjoined to strictly follow the measures laid down by the Honorable Supreme
Court in the instant case to wit:
Moreover, the court a quo must ensure that the proper chain of custody in the handling of the samples submitted by the parties is adequately borne
in the records, i.e.; that the samples are collected by a neutral third party; that the tested parties are appropriately identified at their sample
collection appointments; that the samples are protected with tamper tape at the collection site; that all persons in possession thereof at each stage
of testing thoroughly inspected the samples for tampering and explained his role in the custody of the samples and the acts he performed in relation
thereto.
The DNA test result shall be simultaneously disclosed to the parties in Court. The [NBI] is, therefore, enjoined not to disclose to the parties in
advance the DNA test results.
The [NBI] is further enjoined to observe the confidentiality of the DNA profiles and all results or other information obtained from DNA testing and is
hereby ordered to preserve the evidence until such time as the accused has been acquitted or served his sentence.6
Present at the hearing held on 9 January 2008 were AAA, BBB, counsel for Umanito, and two representatives from the NBI. The RTC had
previously received a letter from the Officer-in-Charge of the New Bilibid Prisons informing the trial court that Umanito would not be able to attend
the hearing without an authority coming from the Supreme Court.7 The parties manifested in court their willingness to the taking of the DNA sample
from the accused at his detention center at the New Bilibid Prisons on 8 February 2008.8 The prosecution then presented on the witness stand NBI
forensic chemist Mary Ann Aranas, who testified on her qualifications as an expert witness in the field of DNA testing. No objections were posed to
her qualifications by the defense. Aranas was accompanied by a laboratory technician of the NBI DNA laboratory who was to assist in the extraction
of DNA.
DNA samples were thus extracted from AAA and BBB in the presence of Judge Fe, the prosecutor, the counsel for the defense, and DCA De la
Cruz. On 8 February 2008, DNA samples were extracted from Umanito at the New Bilibid Prisons by NBI chemist Aranas, as witnessed by Judge
Fe, the prosecutor, the defense counsel, DCA De la Cruz, and other personnel of the Court and the New Bilibid Prisons.9
The RTC ordered the NBI to submit the result of the DNA examination within thirty (30) days after the extraction of biological samples of Umanito,
and directed its duly authorized representatives to attend a hearing on the admissibility of such DNA evidence scheduled for 10 March 2008. The
events of the 28 March 2008 hearing, as well as the subsequent hearing on 29 April 2008, were recounted in the Report dated 19 May 2008
submitted by Judge Fe. We quote therefrom with approval:
2. That as previously scheduled in the order of the trial court on 09 January 2008, the case was set for hearing on the admissibility of the result of
the DNA testing.
At the hearing, Provincial Prosecutor Maria Nenita A. Opiana, presented Mary Ann T. Aranas, a Forensic Chemist of the National Bureau of
Investigation who testified on the examination she conducted, outlining the procedure she adopted and the result thereof. She further declared that
using the Powerplex 16 System, Deoxyribonuncleic acid analysis on the Buccal Swabs and Blood stained on FTA paper taken from [AAA], [BBB],
and Rufino Umanito y Millares, to determine whether or not Rufino Umanito y Millares is the biological father of [BBB], showed that there is a
Complete Match in all of the fifteen (15) loci tested between the alleles of Rufino Umanito y Milalres and [BBB]; That based on the above findings,

24

there is a 99.9999% probability of paternity that Rufino Umanito y Millares is the biological father of [BBB] (Exhibits "A" and series and "B" and
series).
After the cross-examination of the witness by the defense counsel, the Public Prosecutor offered in evidence Exhibits "A" and sub-markings,
referring to the Report of the Chemistry Division of the National Bureau of Investigation, Manila on the DNA analysis to determine whether or not
Rufino Umanito y Millares is the biological father of [BBB] and Exhibit "B" and sub-markings, referring to the enlarged version of the table of Exhibit
"A," to establish that on the DNA examination conducted on [AAA], [BBB] and the accused Rufino Umanito for the purpose of establishing paternity,
the result is 99.9999% probable. Highly probable.
The defense did not interpose any objection, hence, the exhibits were admitted.
1. That considering that under Section 9, A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC, if the value of the Probability of Paternity is 99.9% or higher, there shall be a
disputable presumption of paternity, the instant case was set for reception of evidence for the accused on April 29, 2008 to controvert the
presumption that he is the biological father of [BBB].
During the hearing on April 29, 2008, the accused who was in court manifested through his counsel that he will not present evidence to dispute the
findings of the Forensic Chemistry Division of the National Bureau of Investigation.
The DNA samples were collected by the forensic chemist of the National Bureau of Investigation whose qualifications as an expert was properly
established adopting the following procedure:
a) The subject sources were asked to gargle and to fill out the reference sample form. Thereafter, the chemists informed them that buccal swabs will
be taken from their mouth and five (5) droplets of blood will also be taken from the ring finger of their inactive hand;
b) Pictures of the subject sources were taken by the NBI Chemist;
c) Buccal swabs were taken from the subject sources three (3) times;
d) Subject sources were made to sign three (3) pieces of paper to serve as label of the three buccal swabs placed inside two (2) separate
envelopes that bear their names;
e) Blood samples were taken from the ring finger of the left hand of the subject sources;
f) Subject sources were made to sign the FTA card of their blood samples.
The buccal swabs and the FTA cards were placed in a brown envelope for air drying for at least one hour.
g) Finger prints of the subject sources were taken for additional identification;
h) The subject sources were made to sign their finger prints.
i) Atty. Ramon J. Gomez, Deputy Court Administrator Reuben dela Cruz and Prosecutor Maria Nenita A. Oplana, in that order, were made to sign as
witnesses to the reference sample forms and the finger prints of the subject sources.
j) After one hour of air drying, the Buccal Swabs and the FTA papers were placed inside a white envelope and sealed with a tape by the NBI
Chemists;
k) The witnesses, Atty. Ramon J. Gomez, Deputy Court Administrator Reuben dela Cruz, Prosecutor Maria Nenita A. Opiana including the NBI
Chemist, affixed their signatures on the sealed white envelope;
l) The subjects sources were made to sign and affix their finger prints on the sealed white envelope;
m) The chemists affixed their signatures on the sealed envelope and placed it in a separate brown envelope;
n) The subjects sources were made to affix their finger prints on their identification places and reference forms.
The same procedure was adopted by the Forensic Chemists of the NBI in the taking of DNA samples from the accused, Rufino Umanito at the New
Bilibid Prison in the afternoon of February 8, 2008.
Mary Ann Aranas, the expert witness testified that at the NBI the sealed envelope was presented to Ms. Demelen dela Cruz, the supervisor of the
Forensic Chemistry Division to witness that the envelope containing the DNA specimens was sealed as it reached the NBI. Photographs of the
envelope in sealed form were taken prior to the conduct of examination.
With the procedure adopted by the Forensic Chemist of the NBI, who is an expert and whose integrity and dedication to her work is beyond
reproach the manner how the biological samples were collected, how they were handled and the chain of custody thereof were properly established
the court is convinced that there is no possibility of contamination of the DNA samples taken from the parties.
At the Forensic Laboratory of the National Bureau of Investigation, the envelopes containing the DNA samples were opened and the specimens
were subjected to sampling, extraction, amplification and analysis. Duplicate analysis were made. The Forensic Chemist, Mary Ann Aranas caused
the examination of the blood samples and the buccal swabs were separately processed by Mrs. Demelen dela Cruz.
In order to arrive at a DNA profile, the forensic chemists adopted the following procedure: (1) Sampling which is the cutting of a portion from the
media (swabs and FTA paper); (2) then subjected the cut portions for extraction to release the DNA; (3) After the DNA was released into the
solution, it was further processed using the formarine chain reaction to amplify the DNA samples for analysis of using the Powerplex 16 System,
which allows the analysis of 16 portions of the DNA samples. The Powerplex 16 System are reagent kits for forensic purposes; (3) After the target,
DNA is multiplied, the amplified products are analyzed using the genetic analyzer. The Powerplex 16 System has 16 markers at the same time. It is
highly reliable as it has already been validated for forensic use. It has also another function which is to determine the gender of the DNA being
examined.
Mary Ann Aranas, the Forensic Chemist, in her testimony explained that the DNA found in all cells of a human being come in pairs except the
mature red blood cells. These cells are rolled up into minute bodies called "chromosomes," which contain the DNA of a person. A human has 23
pairs of chromosomes. For each pair of chromosome, one was found to have originated from the mother, the other must have came from the father.
Using the Powerplex 16 System Results, the variable portions of the DNA called "loci," which were used as the basis for DNA analysis or typing

25

showed the following: under "loci" D3S1358, the genotype of the locus of [AAA] is 15, 16, the genotype of [BBB] is 15, 16, one of the pair of alleles
must have originated and the others from the father. The color for the allele of the mother is red while the father is blue. On matching the allele
which came from the mother was first determined [AAA], has alleles of 15 or 16 but in the geno type of [BBB], 15 was colored blue because that is
the only allele which contain the genotype of the accused Rufino Umanito, the 16 originated from the mother, [AAA]. In this marker [BBB] has a
genotype of 15, 16, 16 is from the mother and 15 is from the father.
The whole process involved the determination which of those alleles originated from the mother and the rest would entail looking on the genotype or
the profile of the father to determine if they matched with those of the child.
In the analysis of the 16 loci by the Forensic Chemists, amel on the 13th row was not included because this is the marker that determines the
gender of the source of the loci. The pair XX represents a female and XY for a male. Rufino Umanito has XY amel and [BBB] and [AAA] have XX
amel. For matching paternity purposes only 15 loci were examined. Of the 15 loci, there was a complete match between the alleles of the loci of
[BBB] and Rufino (Exhibits "A" and "B").
To ensure reliable results, the Standard Operating Procedure of the Forensic Chemistry Division of the NBI in paternity cases is to use buccal
swabs taken from the parties and blood as a back up source.
The said Standard Operating Procedure was adopted in the instant case.
As earlier mentioned, DNA samples consisted of buccal swabs and blood samples taken from the parties by the forensic chemists who adopted
reliable techniques and procedure in collecting and handling them to avoid contamination. The method that was used to secure the samples were
safe and reliable. The samples were taken and handled by an expert, whose qualifications, integrity and dedication to her work is unquestionable,
hence, the possibility of substitution or manipulation is very remote.
The procedure adopted by the DNA section, Forensic Chemistry Division of the National Bureau of Investigation in analyzing the samples was in
accordance with the standards used in modern technology. The comparative analysis of DNA prints of the accused Rufino Umanito and his alleged
child is a simple process called parentage analysis which was made easier with the use of a DNA machine called Genetic Analyzer. To ensure a
reliable result, the NBI secured two (2) DNA types of samples from the parties, the buccal swabs as primary source and blood as secondary source.
Both sources were separately processed and examined and thereafter a comparative analysis was conducted which yielded the same result.
The National Bureau of Investigation DNA Section, Forensic Division is an accredited DNA testing laboratory in the country which maintains a
multimillion DNA analysis equipment for its scientific criminal investigation unit. It is manned by qualified laboratory chemists and technicians who
are experts in the field, like Mary Ann Aranas, the expert witness in the instant case, who is a licensed chemists, has undergone training on the
aspects of Forensic Chemistry fro two (2) years before she was hired as forensic chemists of the NBI and has been continuously attending training
seminars, and workshops which are field related and who has handled more than 200 cases involving DNA extraction or collection or profiling.
The accused did not object to the admission of Exhibits "A" and "B" inclusive of their sub-markings. He did not also present evidence to controvert
the results of the DNA analysis.
Section 6. A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC provides that: "If the value of the Probability of Paternity is 99.9% or higher, there shall be a disputable presumption
of paternity.
DNA analysis conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation Forensic Division on the buccal swabs and blood stained on FTA paper taken from
[AAA], [BBB] and Rufino Umanito y MillAres for DNA analysis to determine whether or not Rufino Umanito y Millares is the biological father of [BBB]
gave the following result:
"FINDINGS:
Deoxyribonuncleic acid analysis using the
Powerplex 16 System conducted on the
above-mentioned, specimens gave the
following profiles;
xxx
xxx
There is a COMPLETE MATCH in all the fifteen (15) loci tested between the alleles of Rufino Umanito y Millares and [BBB].
REMARKS:
Based on the above findings, there is a
99.9999% Probability of Paternity that
Rufino Umanito y Millares is the biological
Father of [BBB]"
Disputable presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence (Rule 131, Section 3, Rules of
Court).
The disputable presumption that was established as a result of the DNA testing was not contradicted and overcome by other evidence considering
that the accused did not object to the admission of the results of the DNA testing (Exhibits "A" and "B" inclusive of sub-markings) nor presented
evidence to rebut the same.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the trial court rules that based on the result of the DNA analysis conducted by the National Bureau of
Investigation, Forensic Division, RUFINO UMANITO y MILLARES is the biological father of [BBB].10
Umanitos defense of alibi, together with his specific assertion that while he had courted AAA they were not sweethearts, lead to a general theory on
his part that he did not engage in sexual relations with the complainant. The DNA testing has evinced a contrary conclusion, and that as testified to
by AAA, Umanito had fathered the child she gave birth to on 5 April 1990, nine months after the day she said she was raped by Umanito.
Still, Umanito filed a Motion to Withdraw Appeal dated 16 February 2009. By filing such motion, Umanito is deemed to have acceded to the rulings
of the RTC and the Court of Appeals finding him guilty of the crime of rape, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and the
indemnification of the private complainant in the sum of P50,000.00. Given that the results of the Court-ordered DNA testing conforms with the
conclusions of the lower courts, and that no cause is presented for us to deviate from the penalties imposed below, the Court sees no reason to
deny Umanitos Motion to Withdraw Appeal. Consequently, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 15 February 2006 would otherwise
be deemed final if the appeal is not withdrawn.1avvphi1
WHEREFORE, the Motion to Withdraw Appeal dated 16 February 2009 is GRANTED. The instant case is now CLOSED and TERMINATED.
SO ORDERED.

26

G.R. No. 172693

November 21, 2007

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
RICARDO SOLANGON1 @ KA RAMIL, appellant.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On February 7, 2000, an Information was filed against appellant Ricardo Solangon, Apolonio Haniel and other John Does, the accusatory portion of
which reads as follows:
That on or about March 26, 1992 at around 4:30 oclock in the afternoon, more or less, in Sitio Calamintao, Barangay Alacaak, Sta. Cruz,
Occidental Mindoro, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, in band, conspiring, confederating
and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnapped for ransom one Libertador F. Vidal @ Ador, while
the latter was in the aforesaid place and was forcibly taken away to Sitio Tuoyan, Barangay Balao, Abra de Ilog, Occidental Mindoro where the said
accused with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength, killed the said victim Libertador F. Vidal resulting
to his untimely death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
Only appellant Solangon was arrested while the rest of the accused remain at large. During arraignment, Solangon pleaded not guilty.3
The facts of the case as summarized by the Court of Appeals are as follows:
During the 1992 local elections, Libertador F. Vidal alias Ador was a mayoralty candidate for the municipality of Sta. Cruz, Occ. Mindoro. On March
26, 1992, he was in the company of his sister Eden Vidal and other candidates for board members in the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. They were on
their way home aboard four (4) vehicles from a campaign trail at Sitio Calamintao, Alakaac, Sta. Cruz, Occ. Mindoro. When they reached Balao
river, they were blocked by seven (7) armed men, including appellant alias Ka Ramil, who introduced themselves allegedly as members of New
Peoples Army (NPA). The latter ordered the campaigners to alight from their vehicles down to the river and commanded them to fall in line. While
the alleged rebels aimed their guns at Adors group, one Ka Emil asked "who is Ador Vidal?" When Ador identified himself, appellant immediately
tied his hands behind his back with a nylon rope. The appellants group then demanded campaign permit fee of P50,000.00 and for the release of
Ador. Apparently failing in the negotiation, appellants group forcibly abducted Ador and took him to a mountain.
After a week, or on April 4, 1992, heeding the earlier instruction of the bandits, Marilou Vidal, Adors wife, with Rodrigo Alcantara and Lando
Mendoza, delivered the ransom money to appellants group at a far place in Brgy. Kurtinganan, Sta. Cruz, Occ. Mindoro. When they asked the
whereabouts of Ador, the appellant said that Ador would be home the following night. However, appellants group did not honor their promise. Since
then, Adors relatives had never seen him alive.
On July 9, 1999, at about 3:00 p.m., appellant was arrested by the PNP Mobile Group, Mamburao, Occ. Mindoro while inside a bus going to San
Jose, Occ. Mindoro. According to prosecution witness SPO2 Nelson Soquilon, he first met appellant on July 26, 1999 at the police barracks in
Mamburao, Occ. Mindoro. There, appellant was investigated by P/Insp. Edilberto Ama. P/Insp. Ama instructed Soquilon and 13 other policemen to
accompany appellant to a remote place where Adors skeleton could be found, as earlier pointed by appellant. At the mountainous area of Brgy.
Balao, Abra de Ilog, Occ. Mindoro, at which the policemen were unaware of the exact whereabouts of Ador, appellant dug about two (2) feet. A
cadaver, including maong jacket and shorts believed to be that of Ador were found and retrieved.
Thereafter, Adors relatives requested Dr. Edison Tan, Municipal Health Officer of Mamburao, Occ. Mindoro to arrange the skeleton. Adors relatives
were certain that the remains belonged to Ador, after recognizing his forehead, chin and lower dentures. The exact cause of death could not be
determined. On July 28, 1999, the relatives of the victim brought the latters skeleton to the house of Eden Vidal. On July 30, 1999, Adors body was
finally laid to rest.
Appellants defense is alibi. He also denied being a member of the NPA. He claims that on March 26, 1992, he was in Sitio Langka, Abra de Ilog,
Occ. Mindoro planting coconut trees; that in the years 1992 and 1993, he was just farming in their place and sometimes went to his sister who
previously stayed in San Jose then transferred to Sablayan; that he is "tagalog" but his wife belongs to the minority; that on July 9, 1999 at about
3:00 p.m., as he was on board a bus from Abra de Ilog, at Stop Over restaurant in Brgy. 9, Mamburao, Occ. Mindoro, some soldiers boarded the
bus with their long firearms pointed to him; that he was surprised as he just wanted to go to Sablayan to borrow palay seedlings; and that he was
suddenly arrested and brought to the barracks.4
On August 31, 2004, the Regional Trial Court of Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, Branch 44, rendered a Decision finding appellant guilty of the
complex crime of kidnapping with murder. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the guilt of the accused, Ricardo Solangon, in the commission of offense in the information, has been
established with proof beyond reasonable doubt, it is hereby imposes upon him the mandatory penalty of death, and ordered him to pay the heirs of
Libertador Vidal the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages and costs of
the suit.
With the findings of guilt on Ricardo Solangon and the imposition of sentence upon him, the "Motion for Reconsideration" filed by him, thru Public
Attorneys Office which seeks to reconsider the Order of this Court dated June 17, 2004 denying his release on recognizance is hereby DENIED for
being moot and academic.
Since Ricardo Solangon has been classified or recognized as political offender under the Oslo Agreement entered into between the Negotiating
Panel of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GNP) and the Negotiating Panel of the National Democratic Front of the Philippines
(NDFP), the Court opines that the executive branch of the government that should now grant him a pardon or executive clemency in compliance
with its commitment toward Peace Progress.
In view of the imposition of the death penalty upon Ricardo Solangon @ Ka Ramil, let the original folio of this case, together with the evidence, oral
and documentary, be forthwith elevated to the Honorable Supreme Court for automatic review.
SO ORDERED.5
Appellant appealed to the Court of Appeals contending that, granting arguendo that he participated in the abduction of Libertador, such act will not
constitute the crime of kidnapping because it is absorbed in the crime of rebellion penalized under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code. He

27

alleged that the skeletal remains were not properly identified as Libertadors for failure of the prosecution to subject the skeletal remains to DNA or
dental analysis. He also alleged that his confession could not be used against him as it was made during custodial investigation and under duress.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision of the trial court that appellant committed the complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with murder with
the modification that appellant could not be considered a political offender.6 The appellate court held that the kidnapping of Libertador, a mere
mayoralty candidate, without evidence to indicate public uprising or taking arms against the government, and without any evidence of removing
allegiance therefrom, does not constitute rebellion. It found that the kidnapping was done for the purpose of coercing the victim and his relatives to
pay campaign money. It also noted that the acts of killing and burying the victim were incidental and could have been used only as means to compel
the payment of the ransom money and to avoid the discovery of the crime. The appellate court likewise held that DNA examination was no longer
necessary as the relatives of the victim had identified the same as Libertadors; and that appellants act of voluntarily leading the police in retrieving
the victims body was not a confession but a strong indicium of guilt.
Hence, this petition.
The abduction and killing of Libertador happened on March 26, 1992 or prior to the date of effectivity of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659 or The Death
Penalty Law on December 31, 1993. As held in People v. Ramos:7
Prior to 31 December 1993, the date of effectivity of RA No. 7659, the rule was that where the kidnapped victim was subsequently killed by his
abductor, the crime committed would either be a complex crime of kidnapping with murder under Art. 48 of The Revised Penal Code, or two (2)
separate crimes of kidnapping and murder. Thus, where the accused kidnapped the victim for the purpose of killing him, and he was in fact killed by
his abductor, the crime committed was the complex crime of kidnapping with murder under Art. 48 of The Revised Penal Code, as the kidnapping of
the victim was a necessary means of committing the murder. On the other hand, where the victim was kidnapped not for the purpose of killing him
but was subsequently slain as an afterthought, two (2) separate crimes of kidnapping and murder were committed. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the applicable rule when the abduction and killing happened before December 31, 1993, as in the present case, is:
a) Where the accused kidnapped the victim for the purpose of killing him, and he was in fact killed by his abductor, the crime committed was the
complex crime of kidnapping with murder under Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code, as kidnapping of the victim was a necessary means of
committing the murder.
b) Where the victim was kidnapped not for the purpose of killing him but was subsequently slain as an afterthought, two (2) separate crimes of
kidnapping and murder were committed.
The trial court found that "the kidnapping was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim."8 Similarly, the Court of Appeals noted
that the obvious purpose of Libertadors abduction "was to coerce him to pay campaign money"9 and that "the acts of killing and burying him were
incidental and could have been used only as a means absolutely to compel the payment of the ransom money, and to avoid the discovery of the
crime."10 However, both courts found that the crime committed was the complex crime of kidnapping with murder.
We do not agree. We find that two separate crimes of kidnapping for ransom and murder were committed.
The present case falls under paragraph (b) of the foregoing rule that where the victim was kidnapped not for the purpose of killing him but was
subsequently slain as an afterthought, two (2) separate crimes of kidnapping and murder were committed.
In the instant case, the records clearly show the elements of kidnapping, to wit: On March 26, 1992, appellant together with six (6) other armed men
abducted Libertador for the purpose of extorting ransom money. They blocked Libertadors convoy and demanded payment of campaign fee.
However, when the payment was not forthcoming right away, they hogtied Libertador and brought him to the mountains. On April 4, 1992,
Libertadors relatives paid the ransom money of P50,000.00 to appellants group at Brgy. Kurtingan, Sta. Cruz, Occidental Mindoro, but the latter
reneged on its promise to release Libertador and killed him instead.
As regards the crime of murder, it is true that there is no direct evidence of the actual killing of the victim. Nevertheless, direct evidence of the
commission of the crime is not the only matrix whereby the trial court may draw its conclusions and findings of guilt. It is settled that conviction may
be based on circumstantial evidence provided that the following requisites must concur: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from
which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt. Circumstantial evidence is of a nature identically the same with direct evidence. It is equally direct evidence of minor facts of such a nature
that the mind is led intuitively or by a conscious process of reasoning to the conviction that from them some other fact may be inferred. No greater
degree of certainty is required when the evidence is circumstantial than when it is direct. In either case, what is required is that there be proof
beyond reasonable doubt that the crime was committed and that the accused committed the crime.11
The evidence is replete with details to prove that appellant and his at-large co-accused were responsible for the abduction and death of the victim.
These are:
a) On March 26, 1992, appellant together with six (6) other armed men, introducing themselves to be members of the New Peoples Army (NPA),
blocked the convoy of the victim and demanded payment of a campaign fee of P50,000.00;
b) When the amount was not produced right away, they hogtied the victim with a nylon rope and brought him to the mountains;
c) Despite payment of the ransom money, the victim was not released and was never seen alive again;
d) After his arrest, appellant disclosed to the authorities the place where they buried the victim at Brgy. Balao, Abra de Ilog, Occidental Mindoro, and
thereat they recovered the skeleton of Libertador from a shallow grave; and
e) The victims relatives were certain that the remains belonged to Libertador.
While the combination of said circumstances is insufficient to establish the qualifying circumstance of treachery, considering the absence of
eyewitness to the actual killing of the victim; however, it is enough to sustain the guilt of appellant for the crime of murder qualified by abuse of
superior strength, which was alleged in the information and proved during trial. This qualifying circumstance is present where there is proof of gross
physical disparity between the protagonists or when the force used by the assailant is out of proportion to the means available to the victim.12
In the case at bar, there was superiority not only in strength but in number as well. The lone victim was unarmed and was hogtied by seven (7)
armed men who demonstrably abused their excessive force which was out of proportion to the defenses available to the deceased.
Evident premeditation cannot be considered in the instant case. The careful selection of an ideal site wherein to block the convoy of vehicles may
have been premeditated so that the kidnapping of the victim would be carried out successfully; but the same cannot be said as regards the killing. It

28

is not enough that evident premeditation is suspected or surmised, but criminal intent must be evidenced by notorious outward acts evincing
determination to commit the crime. In order to be considered an aggravation of the offense, the circumstance must not merely be "premeditation"; it
must be "evident premeditation."
The penalty for kidnapping for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code is
death. However, the imposition of the death penalty has been prohibited in view of the passage of R.A. No. 9346, An Act Prohibiting the Imposition
of the Death Penalty in the Philippines. Thus, in lieu thereof, the penalty of reclusion perpetua should be imposed on appellant, without eligibility for
parole.13
On the other hand, as the crime was committed prior to the amendment of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code by R.A. No. 7659, the appropriate
penalty for Murder is reclusion temporal in its maximum period, to death. Under Article 64 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, in cases in which the
penalties prescribed by law contain three periods, whether it be a single divisible penalty or composed of three different penalties, and there are
neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances that attended the commission of the crime, the penalty prescribed by law in its medium period
shall be imposed, which in this case is reclusion perpetua. The Indeterminate Sentence Law is not applicable when the penalty actually imposed is
reclusion perpetua.
Actual damages may be awarded representing the amount of ransom paid. In People v. Morales14 and People v. Ejandra,15 the Court awarded
actual damages representing the amounts of the ransom paid. In the instant case, the heirs of the victim are entitled to the award of P50,000.00 as
actual damages, which is equivalent to the amount of the ransom paid. The heirs of the victim are also entitled to civil indemnity in the amount of
P50,000.00. In People v. Yambot,16 the Court awarded civil indemnity of P50,000.00 after finding the accused guilty of the crime of kidnapping for
ransom aside from ordering the return of the amount of the ransom. In addition, the heirs of the victim are also entitled to an award of moral
damages in the amount of P50,000.00. In People v. Baldogo17 and People v. Garcia,18 the Court affirmed the awards of moral damages in the
amounts of P100,000.00 and P200,000.00, respectively, predicated on the fact that the victims suffered serious anxiety and fright when they were
kidnapped.
Thus, for the crime of kidnapping for ransom, appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole pursuant
to R.A. No. 9346 and to pay the heirs of Libertador Vidal the amounts of P50,000.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and
P50,000.00 as moral damages; and for the crime of murder, appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs
of the victim the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages in line with prevailing jurisprudence.19
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed with modification the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, Branch 44, finding appellant guilty of the complex crime of kidnapping with murder is MODIFIED.
Appellant Ricardo Solangon is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of two separate crimes of kidnapping for ransom and murder.
For the crime of kidnapping for ransom, appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole pursuant to
R.A. No. 9346 and to pay the heirs of Libertador Vidal the amounts of P50,000.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and
P50,000.00 as moral damages.
For the crime of murder, appellant is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim the
amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.

29

G.R. No. 171713

December 17, 2007

ESTATE OF ROGELIO G. ONG, petitioner,

vs.
Minor JOANNE RODJIN DIAZ, Represented by Her Mother and Guardian, Jinky C. Diaz, respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure assailing (1) the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
dated 23 November 2005 and (2) the Resolution2 of the same court dated 1 March 2006 denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration in CA-G.R.
CV No. 70125.
A Complaint3 for compulsory recognition with prayer for support pending litigation was filed by minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz (Joanne), represented by
her mother and guardian, Jinky C. Diaz (Jinky), against Rogelio G. Ong (Rogelio) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac City. In her
Complaint, Jinky prayed that judgment be rendered:
(a) Ordering defendant to recognize plaintiff Joanne Rodjin Diaz as his daughter.
(b) Ordering defendant to give plaintiff monthly support of P20,000.00 pendente lite and thereafter to fix monthly support.
(c) Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff attorneys fees in the sum of P100,000.00.
(d) Granting plaintiff such other measure of relief as maybe just and equitable in the premises.4
As alleged by Jinky in her Complaint in November 1993 in Tarlac City, she and Rogelio got acquainted. This developed into friendship and later
blossomed into love. At this time, Jinky was already married to a Japanese national, Hasegawa Katsuo, in a civil wedding solemnized on 19
February 1993 by Municipal Trial Court Judge Panfilo V. Valdez.5
From January 1994 to September 1998, Jinky and Rogelio cohabited and lived together at Fairlane Subdivision, and later at Capitol Garden, Tarlac
City.
From this live-in relationship, minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz was conceived and on 25 February 1998 was born at the Central Luzon Doctors Hospital,
Tarlac City.
Rogelio brought Jinky to the hospital and took minor Joanne and Jinky home after delivery. Rogelio paid all the hospital bills and the baptismal
expenses and provided for all of minor Joannes needs recognizing the child as his.
In September 1998, Rogelio abandoned minor Joanne and Jinky, and stopped supporting minor Joanne, falsely alleging that he is not the father of
the child.
Rogelio, despite Jinkys remonstrance, failed and refused and continued failing and refusing to give support for the child and to acknowledge her as
his daughter, thus leading to the filing of the heretofore adverted complaint.
After summons had been duly served upon Rogelio, the latter failed to file any responsive pleading despite repeated motions for extension,
prompting the trial court to declare him in default in its Order dated 7 April 1999. Rogelios Answer with Counterclaim and Special and Affirmative
Defenses was received by the trial court only on 15 April 1999. Jinky was allowed to present her evidence ex parte on the basis of which the trial
court on 23 April 1999 rendered a decision granting the reliefs prayed for in the complaint.
In its Decision6 dated 23 April 1999, the RTC held:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Ordering defendant to recognize plaintiff as his natural child;
2. Ordering defendant to provide plaintiff with a monthly support of P10,000.00 and further
3. Ordering defendant to pay reasonable attorneys fees in the amount of P5,000.00 and the cost of the suit.
On 28 April 1999, Rogelio filed a motion to lift the order of default and a motion for reconsideration seeking the courts understanding, as he was
then in a quandary on what to do to find a solution to a very difficult problem of his life.7
On 29 April 1999, Rogelio filed a motion for new trial with prayer that the decision of the trial court dated 23 April 1999 be vacated and the case be
considered for trial de novo pursuant to the provisions of Section 6, Rule 37 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.8
On 16 June 1999, the RTC issued an Order granting Rogelios Motion for New Trial:
WHEREFORE, finding defendants motion for new trial to be impressed with merit, the same is hereby granted.
The Order of this court declaring defendant in default and the decision is this court dated April 23, 1999 are hereby set aside but the evidence
adduced shall remain in record, subject to cross-examination by defendant at the appropriate stage of the proceedings.
In the meantime defendants answer is hereby admitted, subject to the right of plaintiff to file a reply and/or answer to defendants counterclaim
within the period fixed by the Rules of Court.
Acting on plaintiffs application for support pendente lite which this court finds to be warranted, defendant is hereby ordered to pay to plaintiff
immediately the sum of P2,000.00 a month from January 15, 1999 to May 1999 as support pendente lite in arrears and the amount of P4,000.00
every month thereafter as regular support pendente lite during the pendency of this case.9
The RTC finally held:
The only issue to be resolved is whether or not the defendant is the father of the plaintiff Joanne Rodjin Diaz.

30

Since it was duly established that plaintiffs mother Jinky Diaz was married at the time of the birth of Joanne Rodjin Diaz, the law presumes that
Joanne is a legitimate child of the spouses Hasegawa Katsuo and Jinky Diaz (Article 164, Family Code). The child is still presumed legitimate even
if the mother may have declared against her legitimacy (Article 167, Ibid).
The legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on the following grounds provided for in Article 166 of the same Code. Paragraph 1 of the said
Article provides that there must be physical impossibility for the husband to have sexual intercourse with the wife within the first 120 days of the 300
days following the birth of the child because of
a) physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife;
b) husband and wife were living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse was not possible;
c) serious illness of the husband which prevented sexual intercourse.
It was established by evidence that the husband is a Japanese national and that he was living outside of the country (TSN, Aug. 27, 1999, page 5)
and he comes home only once a year. Both evidence of the parties proved that the husband was outside the country and no evidence was shown
that he ever arrived in the country in the year 1997 preceding the birth of plaintiff Joanne Rodjin Diaz.
While it may also be argued that plaintiff Jinky had a relationship with another man before she met the defendant, there is no evidence that she also
had sexual relations with other men on or about the conception of Joanne Rodjin. Joanne Rodjin was her second child (see Exh. "A"), so her first
child, a certain Nicole (according to defendant) must have a different father or may be the son of Hasegawa K[u]tsuo.
The defendant admitted having been the one who shouldered the hospital bills representing the expenses in connection with the birth of plaintiff. It
is an evidence of admission that he is the real father of plaintiff. Defendant also admitted that even when he stopped going out with Jinky, he and
Jinky used to go to motels even after 1996. Defendant also admitted that on some instances, he still used to see Jinky after the birth of Joanne
Rodjin. Defendant was even the one who fetched Jinky after she gave birth to Joanne.
On the strength of this evidence, the Court finds that Joanne Rodjin is the child of Jinky and defendant Rogelio Ong and it is but just that the latter
should support plaintiff.10
On 15 December 2000, the RTC rendered a decision and disposed:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring Joanne Rodjin Diaz to be the illegitimate child of defendant Rogelio Ong with plaintiff Jinky
Diaz. The Order of this Court awarding support pendente lite dated June 15, 1999, is hereby affirmed and that the support should continue until
Joanne Rodjin Diaz shall have reached majority age.11
Rogelio filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied for lack of merit in an Order of the trial court dated 19 January 2001.12 From the
denial of his Motion for Reconsideration, Rogelio appealed to the Court of Appeals. After all the responsive pleadings had been filed, the case was
submitted for decision and ordered re-raffled to another Justice for study and report as early as 12 July 2002.13
During the pendency of the case with the Court of Appeals, Rogelios counsel filed a manifestation informing the Court that Rogelio died on 21
February 2005; hence, a Notice of Substitution was filed by said counsel praying that Rogelio be substituted in the case by the Estate of Rogelio
Ong,14 which motion was accordingly granted by the Court of Appeals.15
In a Decision dated 23 November 2005, the Court of Appeals held:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby GRANTED. The appealed Decision dated December 15, 2000 of the Regional
Trial Court of Tarlac, Tarlac, Branch 63 in Civil Case No. 8799 is hereby SET ASIDE. The case is hereby REMANDED to the court a quo for the
issuance of an order directing the parties to make arrangements for DNA analysis for the purpose of determining the paternity of plaintiff minor
Joanne Rodjin Diaz, upon consultation and in coordination with laboratories and experts on the field of DNA analysis.
No pronouncement as to costs.16
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated 1 March 2006.
In disposing as it did, the Court of Appeals justified its Decision as follows:
In this case, records showed that the late defendant-appellant Rogelio G. Ong, in the early stage of the proceedings volunteered and suggested
that he and plaintiffs mother submit themselves to a DNA or blood testing to settle the issue of paternity, as a sign of good faith. However, the trial
court did not consider resorting to this modern scientific procedure notwithstanding the repeated denials of defendant that he is the biological father
of the plaintiff even as he admitted having actual sexual relations with plaintiffs mother. We believe that DNA paternity testing, as current
jurisprudence affirms, would be the most reliable and effective method of settling the present paternity dispute. Considering, however, the untimely
demise of defendant-appellant during the pendency of this appeal, the trial court, in consultation with out laboratories and experts on the field of
DNA analysis, can possibly avail of such procedure with whatever remaining DNA samples from the deceased defendant alleged to be the putative
father of plaintiff minor whose illegitimate filiations is the subject of this action for support.17
Hence, this petition which raises the following issues for resolution:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DID NOT DISMISS RESPONDENTS COMPLAINT FOR COMPULSORY
RECOGNITION DESPITE ITS FINDING THAT THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED FAILED TO PROVE THAT ROGELIO G. ONG WAS HER FATHER.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DID NOT DECLARE RESPONDENT AS THE LEGITIMATE CHILD OF JINKY
C. DIAZ AND HER JAPANESE HUSBAND, CONSIDERING THAT RESPONDENT FAILED TO REBUT THE PRESUMPTION OF HER
LEGITIMACY.
III

31

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT REMANDED THE CASE TO THE COURT A QUO FOR DNA ANALYSIS
DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT IS NO LONGER FEASIBLE DUE TO THE DEATH OF ROGELIO G. ONG.18
Petitioner prays that the present petition be given due course and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 23, 2005 be modified, by
setting aside the judgment remanding the case to the trial court for DNA testing analysis, by dismissing the complaint of minor Joanne for
compulsory recognition, and by declaring the minor as the legitimate child of Jinky and Hasegawa Katsuo.19
From among the issues presented for our disposition, this Court finds it prudent to concentrate its attention on the third one, the propriety of the
appellate courts decision remanding the case to the trial court for the conduct of DNA testing. Considering that a definitive result of the DNA testing
will decisively lay to rest the issue of the filiation of minor Joanne, we see no reason to resolve the first two issues raised by the petitioner as they
will be rendered moot by the result of the DNA testing.
As a whole, the present petition calls for the determination of filiation of minor Joanne for purposes of support in favor of the said minor.
Filiation proceedings are usually filed not just to adjudicate paternity but also to secure a legal right associated with paternity, such as citizenship,
support (as in the present case), or inheritance. The burden of proving paternity is on the person who alleges that the putative father is the
biological father of the child. There are four significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action which parties have to face: a prima facie
case, affirmative defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the putative father and child.20
A child born to a husband and wife during a valid marriage is presumed legitimate.21 As a guaranty in favor of the child and to protect his status of
legitimacy, Article 167 of the Family Code provides:
Article 167. The children shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced
as an adulteress.
The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor of legitimacy. We explained the rationale of this rule in the recent case of
Cabatania v. Court of Appeals22:
The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in the statute but is based on the broad principles of natural justice and the
supposed virtue of the mother. The presumption is grounded on the policy to protect the innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.
The presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is not conclusive and consequently, may be overthrown by evidence to the contrary. Hence,
Article 255 of the New Civil Code23 provides:
Article 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the celebration of the marriage, and before three hundred days following its
dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.
Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the physical impossibility of the husbands having access to his wife within
the first one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the birth of the child.
This physical impossibility may be caused:
1) By the impotence of the husband;
2) By the fact that husband and wife were living separately in such a way that access was not possible;
3) By the serious illness of the husband.24
The relevant provisions of the Family Code provide as follows:
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
There had been divergent and incongruent statements and assertions bandied about by the parties to the present petition. But with the
advancement in the field of genetics, and the availability of new technology, it can now be determined with reasonable certainty whether Rogelio is
the biological father of the minor, through DNA testing.
DNA is the fundamental building block of a persons entire genetic make-up. DNA is found in all human cells and is the same in every cell of the
same person. Genetic identity is unique. Hence, a persons DNA profile can determine his identity.25
DNA analysis is a procedure in which DNA extracted from a biological sample obtained from an individual is examined. The DNA is processed to
generate a pattern, or a DNA profile, for the individual from whom the sample is taken. This DNA profile is unique for each person, except for
identical twins.
Everyone is born with a distinct genetic blueprint called DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid). It is exclusive to an individual (except in the rare occurrence of
identical twins that share a single, fertilized egg), and DNA is unchanging throughout life. Being a component of every cell in the human body, the
DNA of an individuals blood is the very DNA in his or her skin cells, hair follicles, muscles, semen, samples from buccal swabs, saliva, or other body
parts.
The chemical structure of DNA has four bases. They are known as A (Adenine), G (guanine), C (cystosine) and T (thymine). The order in which the
four bases appear in an individuals DNA determines his or her physical make up. And since DNA is a double stranded molecule, it is composed of
two specific paired bases, A-T or T-A and G-C or C-G. These are called "genes."

32

Every gene has a certain number of the above base pairs distributed in a particular sequence. This gives a person his or her genetic code.
Somewhere in the DNA framework, nonetheless, are sections that differ. They are known as "polymorphic loci," which are the areas analyzed in
DNA typing (profiling, tests, fingerprinting). In other words, DNA typing simply means determining the "polymorphic loci."
How is DNA typing performed? From a DNA sample obtained or extracted, a molecular biologist may proceed to analyze it in several ways. There
are five (5) techniques to conduct DNA typing. They are: the RFLP (restriction fragment length polymorphism); "reverse dot blot" or HLA DQ a/Pm
loci which was used in 287 cases that were admitted as evidence by 37 courts in the U.S. as of November 1994; DNA process; VNTR (variable
number tandem repeats); and the most recent which is known as the PCR-([polymerase] chain reaction) based STR (short tandem repeats) method
which, as of 1996, was availed of by most forensic laboratories in the world. PCR is the process of replicating or copying DNA in an evidence
sample a million times through repeated cycling of a reaction involving the so-called DNA polymerize enzyme. STR, on the other hand, takes
measurements in 13 separate places and can match two (2) samples with a reported theoretical error rate of less than one (1) in a trillion.
Just like in fingerprint analysis, in DNA typing, "matches" are determined. To illustrate, when DNA or fingerprint tests are done to identify a suspect
in a criminal case, the evidence collected from the crime scene is compared with the "known" print. If a substantial amount of the identifying
features are the same, the DNA or fingerprint is deemed to be a match. But then, even if only one feature of the DNA or fingerprint is different, it is
deemed not to have come from the suspect.
As earlier stated, certain regions of human DNA show variations between people. In each of these regions, a person possesses two genetic types
called "allele," one inherited from each parent. In [a] paternity test, the forensic scientist looks at a number of these variable regions in an individual
to produce a DNA profile. Comparing next the DNA profiles of the mother and child, it is possible to determine which half of the childs DNA was
inherited from the mother. The other half must have been inherited from the biological father. The alleged fathers profile is then examined to
ascertain whether he has the DNA types in his profile, which match the paternal types in the child. If the mans DNA types do not match that of the
child, the man is excluded as the father. If the DNA types match, then he is not excluded as the father.26
In the newly promulgated rules on DNA evidence it is provided:
SEC. 3 Definition of Terms. For purposes of this Rule, the following terms shall be defined as follows:
xxxx
(c) "DNA evidence" constitutes the totality of the DNA profiles, results and other genetic information directly generated from DNA testing of biological
samples;
(d) "DNA profile" means genetic information derived from DNA testing of a biological sample obtained from a person, which biological sample is
clearly identifiable as originating from that person;
(e) "DNA testing" means verified and credible scientific methods which include the extraction of DNA from biological samples, the generation of DNA
profiles and the comparison of the information obtained from the DNA testing of biological samples for the purpose of determining, with reasonable
certainty, whether or not the DNA obtained from two or more distinct biological samples originates from the same person (direct identification) or if
the biological samples originate from related persons (kinship analysis); and
(f) "Probability of Parentage" means the numerical estimate for the likelihood of parentage of a putative parent compared with the probability of a
random match of two unrelated individuals in a given population.
Amidst the protestation of petitioner against the DNA analysis, the resolution thereof may provide the definitive key to the resolution of the issue of
support for minor Joanne. Our articulation in Agustin v. Court of Appeals27 is particularly relevant, thus:
Our faith in DNA testing, however, was not quite so steadfast in the previous decade. In Pe Lim v. Court of Appeals (336 Phil. 741, 270 SCRA 1),
promulgated in 1997, we cautioned against the use of DNA because "DNA, being a relatively new science, (had) not as yet been accorded official
recognition by our courts. Paternity (would) still have to be resolved by such conventional evidence as the relevant incriminating acts,verbal and
written, by the putative father."
In 2001, however, we opened the possibility of admitting DNA as evidence of parentage, as enunciated in Tijing v. Court of Appeals [G.R. No.
125901, 8 March 2001, 354 SCRA 17]:
x x x Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have
now the facility and expertise in using DNA test for identification and parentage testing. The University of the Philippines Natural Science Research
Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis
is based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person has two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and the other from the father. The DNA from the
mother, the alleged father and child are analyzed to establish parentage. Of course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as
evidence is still open to challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA
evidence. For it was said, that courts should apply the results of science when competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject
said results is to deny progress.
The first real breakthrough of DNA as admissible and authoritative evidence in Philippine jurisprudence came in 2002 with out en banc decision in
People v. Vallejo [G.R. No. 144656, 9 May 2002, 382 SCRA 192] where the rape and murder victims DNA samples from the bloodstained clothes of
the accused were admitted in evidence. We reasoned that "the purpose of DNA testing (was) to ascertain whether an association exist(ed) between
the evidence sample and the reference sample. The samples collected (were) subjected to various chemical processes to establish their profile.
A year later, in People v. Janson [G.R. No. 125938, 4 April 2003, 400 SCRA 584], we acquitted the accused charged with rape for lack of evidence
because "doubts persist(ed) in our mind as to who (were) the real malefactors. Yes, a complex offense (had) been perpetrated but who (were) the
perpetrators? How we wish we had DNA or other scientific evidence to still our doubts."
In 2004, in Tecson, et al. v. COMELEC [G.R. Nos. 161434, 161634 and 161824, 3 March 2004, 424 SCRA 277], where the Court en banc was
faced with the issue of filiation of then presidential candidate Fernando Poe, Jr., we stated:
In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic
codes obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to. A positive match
would clear up filiation or paternity. In Tijing v. Court of Appeals, this Court has acknowledged the strong weight of DNA testing...
Moreover, in our en banc decision in People v. Yatar [G.R. No. 150224, 19 May 2004, 428 SCRA 504], we affirmed the conviction of the accused for
rape with homicide, the principal evidence for which included DNA test results. x x x.

33

Coming now to the issue of remand of the case to the trial court, petitioner questions the appropriateness of the order by the Court of Appeals
directing the remand of the case to the RTC for DNA testing given that petitioner has already died. Petitioner argues that a remand of the case to
the RTC for DNA analysis is no longer feasible due to the death of Rogelio. To our mind, the alleged impossibility of complying with the order of
remand for purposes of DNA testing is more ostensible than real. Petitioners argument is without basis especially as the New Rules on DNA
Evidence28 allows the conduct of DNA testing, either motu proprio or upon application of any person who has a legal interest in the matter in
litigation, thus:
SEC. 4. Application for DNA Testing Order. The appropriate court may, at any time, either motu proprio or on application of any person who has a
legal interest in the matter in litigation, order a DNA testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing and notice to the parties upon a showing of the
following:
(a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;
(b) The biological sample: (i) was not previously subjected to the type of DNA testing now requested; or (ii) was previously subjected to DNA testing,
but the results may require confirmation for good reasons;
(c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique;
(d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new information that is relevant to the proper resolution of the case; and
(e) The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may consider as potentially affecting the accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing.
From the foregoing, it can be said that the death of the petitioner does not ipso facto negate the application of DNA testing for as long as there exist
appropriate biological samples of his DNA.
As defined above, the term "biological sample" means any organic material originating from a persons body, even if found in inanimate objects, that
is susceptible to DNA testing. This includes blood, saliva, and other body fluids, tissues, hairs and bones.29
Thus, even if Rogelio already died, any of the biological samples as enumerated above as may be available, may be used for DNA testing. In this
case, petitioner has not shown the impossibility of obtaining an appropriate biological sample that can be utilized for the conduct of DNA testing.
And even the death of Rogelio cannot bar the conduct of DNA testing. In People v. Umanito,30 citing Tecson v. Commission on Elections,31 this
Court held:
The 2004 case of Tecson v. Commission on Elections [G.R. No. 161434, 3 March 2004, 424 SCRA 277] likewise reiterated the acceptance of DNA
testing in our jurisdiction in this wise: "[i]n case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would be difficult to obtain,
DNA testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead parent could
be resorted to."
It is obvious to the Court that the determination of whether appellant is the father of AAAs child, which may be accomplished through DNA testing, is
material to the fair and correct adjudication of the instant appeal. Under Section 4 of the Rules, the courts are authorized, after due hearing and
notice, motu proprio to order a DNA testing. However, while this Court retains jurisdiction over the case at bar, capacitated as it is to receive and act
on the matter in controversy, the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts and does not, in the course of daily routine, conduct hearings. Hence, it would
be more appropriate that the case be remanded to the RTC for reception of evidence in appropriate hearings, with due notice to the parties.
(Emphasis supplied.)
As we have declared in the said case of Agustin v. Court of Appeals32:
x x x [F]or too long, illegitimate children have been marginalized by fathers who choose to deny their existence. The growing sophistication of DNA
testing technology finally provides a much needed equalizer for such ostracized and abandoned progeny. We have long believed in the merits of
DNA testing and have repeatedly expressed as much in the past. This case comes at a perfect time when DNA testing has finally evolved into a
dependable and authoritative form of evidence gathering. We therefore take this opportunity to forcefully reiterate our stand that DNA testing is a
valid means of determining paternity.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 November 2005 and its Resolution
dated 1 March 2006 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

34

G.R. No. 179712

June 27, 2008

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
EFREN MAGLENTE y CERVANTES, accused-appellant.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Appellant Efren Maglente y Cervantes assails the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated 27 June 2007 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02181, affirming
the Decision2 dated 5 September 2005 of Branch 76 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Mateo, Rizal, in Criminal Case No. 6295. The RTC
found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the rape of his fourteen-year old daughter.
On 29 July 2002, an Information3 was filed before the RTC charging appellant with Rape under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A, in relation to number 1
of paragraph 6 of Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8369.4 The information against him reads:
That on or about the 13th day of July 2002, in the Municipality of Rodriguez, Province of Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of the
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being the parent/biological father of AAA5 (victim) exercising and taking advantage of his moral
authority, ascendancy and influence over the said victim and by means of violence and intimidation, with lewd intent to cause or gratify his sexual
desire, abuse and maltreat complainant AAA, a minor, 14 years of age, with attendant, aggravating circumstances of Treachery, Abuse of Superior
Strength, Nighttime, Craft and Abuse of Confidence, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the said
complainant against her will and without her consent which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of said child as a human
being.
On 5 September 2002, appellant, with the assistance of counsel de oficio, was arraigned and pleaded "Not guilty." Thereafter, pre-trial conference
was held, and trial ensued accordingly.6
Evidence for the prosecution consisted of the testimonies of private complainant, her aunt CCC and a medico-legal officer, Police Senior Inspector
Ruby Grace Sabino.7
Private complainant testified that the appellant, her biological father, had subjected her to sexual abuse as early as 1997, when she was still nine
years old, until 13 July 2002, when she reached 14 years of age. She attested that she kept silent about her fathers abuse as he was constantly
threatening her not to tell anyone. She narrated that the last rape occurred on 13 July 2002. While she was sleeping in their house in XXX St., XXX,
XXX City, the accused lay by her side and removed all her clothing. Thereafter, he placed himself on top of her body and inserted his penis into her
vagina. For twenty minutes, her father raped her and, all the while, touched her private parts. As a result of her fathers molestation, she became
pregnant and delivered a baby boy on 1 October 2002, which she gave up for adoption. On cross-examination, private complainant testified that
she was willing to have her baby undergo DNA testing but its whereabouts was unknown to her.8
CCC testified that private complainant is her niece and the daughter of appellant and BBB, the witness sister. She confronted her niece about the
gossip she had heard about the latters pregnancy, after her suspicions were confirmed by private complainants weight gain and other physical
changes indicating pregnancy. Private complainant burst into tears and confided in her that she was impregnated by appellant. The witness then
assisted private complainant in filing a complaint against her brother-in-law.9
Medico-Legal Officer Police Senior Inspector Ruby Grace Sabino, who conducted a forensic chemical interview with private complainant on 19 July
2002, testified that private complainant divulged to her that she was sexually abused by her father when she was in Grade IV and had since done
so, the last of which occurred in the evening sometime in July 2002. After the witness examined private complainant, the results showed that she
was pregnant. Senior Police Inspector Sabino also observed a total absence of hymenal tissue and injuries at 4:00, 5:00 and 6:00. She presented a
document entitled Clock Face as Reference (Exhibit J), which states that: "In general, any irregularities such as lacerations, tears, abrasions that
are found on the posterior hymenbetween 3 and 9 oclock, the bottom half of the clockare more suspicious. Because of the biomechanics of
fingering and vaginal penetration, injuries between 3 and 9 are more specific for abuse than other injuries."10 According to her, the absence of
hymenal tissue and the lacerations may have been caused by the entry of a penis into the private complainants genitals. Both the disclosures of
the victim and the physical findings indicate that sexual abuse took place sometime in July 2002. After the examination, witness issued a provisional
Medico-Legal Report (Exhibit K) followed by an official report, designated as Medico-Legal Report No. 0267-07-19-02 (Exhibit D.)11
Prosecution filed its Formal Offer of Evidence.12 The Sworn Statements of the private complainant and her aunt CCC were marked as Exhibits "A"
and "B." The private complainants Certificate of Live Birth was also marked as Exhibit "E" to prove her minority and the father-daughter relationship
between the appellant and private complainant.
On the part of the defense, only the appellant testified. The appellant admitted that private complainant is his daughter, but denied that he molested
her. He claimed that before he was detained, he did not even know that private complainant was pregnant, much less who impregnated her. He
maintained that he seldom stayed in their house, where he and his children resided with other members of his wifes family, since he often went out
to look for a job. He also averred that his relationship with his in-laws was strained because of their opinion that he is lazy. On cross-examination,
he admitted that while he did not have a close relationship with the private complainant, they had no previous quarrel.13
In a Decision dated 5 September 2005, the RTC decreed that the accused was guilty without reasonable doubt. The RTC gave full credence to the
testimony of the private complainant. It recognized that at her early age, private complainant could easily mistake the date that her father had last
raped her to be the date she conceived, resulting in the unwanted pregnancy and the birth of her child. Moreover, such miscalculation is not
seriously incongruent to her narration that her father had been raping her since she was nine years old. The trial court further noted that private
complainants testimony was corroborated by the findings of the examining physician. On the other hand, the RTC remained unconvinced by the
appellants barefaced denial and his failure to ascribe any ill motive on the part of the private complainant in filing the rape case against him. The
qualifying circumstances, i.e., the minority of the private complainant and the parent-daughter relationship between the appellant and private
complainant, were adequately proved. Hence, the RTC imposed the single indivisible penalty of death and ordered the appellant to indemnify the
private complainant for moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00, indemnity ex delicto in the amount of P50,000.00, and the costs of suit.14
According to the dispositive part of the Decision dated 5 September 2005:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused EFREN MAGLENTE Y CERVANTES GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of RAPE as defined and penalized under Art. 266-A par. 1 in relation to Art. 266-B 6th par. No.1 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended in further relation to R.A. 8367 and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of DEATH and to indemnify the private
complainant AAA in the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity ex-delicto in addition to the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages and to pay the
costs.
Let the records of this case be forwarded to the Court of Appeals for automatic review.

35

Accused Efren Maglente y Cervantes is hereby ordered to be committed to the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City for service of sentence.15
The appellant filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02181.16
The Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the trial court that the appellant was guilty beyond reasonable doubt. It pronounced that the private
complainants testimony and her demeanor during her testimony demonstrated the truth of her statements. Private complainants delay in reporting
the alleged abuse was attributed by the appellate court to the sense of helplessness and fear engendered by the perpetrators close relationship to
the victim. Furthermore, it ruled that the DNA test of the private complainants child is not indispensable to the prosecution for rape, especially since
the private complainant no longer knew the whereabouts of her child. However, in view of the effectivity of Republic Act No. 9346 entitled "An Act
Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines,"17 it amended the penalty imposed by the RTC to reclusion perpetua. It also modified
the damages awarded by the trial court by increasing the award for civil indemnity to P75,000.00, and moral damages to P75,000.00; and adding an
award of exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 due to the qualifying circumstance of minority and relationship.18 In the Decision dated
27 June 2007, the fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court in Crim. Case No. 6295 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Efren Maglente y Cervantes is
sentenced to reclusion perpetua with no possibility of parole. Appellant is further ORDERED to indemnify AAA in the amount of P75,000 as civil
indemnity, P75,000 as moral damages and P25,000 as exemplary damages.19
Hence, the present petition where the appellant reiterates the sole assignment of error, to wit:
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT FOR THE CRIME
OF RAPE.
After carefully examining the records of this case, this Court finds that this appeal must be denied.
In the crime of rape, the credibility of the private complainants testimony is determinative of the outcome of rape cases for the reason that when an
alleged victim of rape says that she was violated, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has been inflicted on her, and so long as
her testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the basis thereof.20
In the present case, private complainant categorically testified that she was raped by her own father. She recounted her horrible and traumatic
ordeal in the following manner:
Q:

Miss Witness, could you please tell us where you were sometime July 13, 2002, at past 12:00 midnight?

A:

I was in our house, sir.

Q:

What is the address of your house?

A:

XXX St., XXX, XXX, sir.

Q:

Tell us, what was your present condition then on July 13, 2002?

A:

None, sir.

Q:

What do you mean by none?

A:

I was just sleeping then, sir.

Q:

While you were sleeping did you continue to sleep up to the following morning of that date?

A:

No, sir.

Q:

What made you awakened?

A:

He lay beside me, sir.

Q:

You were referring to whom?

A:

To my father, sir.

Q:

When he lay beside you what caused you to wake up?

A:

He was undressing me, sir.

Q:

What were you wearing then?

A:

I cannot remember anymore but it was a T-shirt and shorts, sir.

Q:

And what did he remove?

A:

All, sir.

Q:

After removing all your clothes what did he do next, if any?

A:

He went on top of me, sir.

Q:

Was he clothed when he went on top of you?

A:

No, sir.

Q:

When he went on top of you what else did he do, if any?

36

A:

He inserted his penis into my vagina, sir.

Q:

And what did you do?

A:

I got mad, sir.

Q:

Thereafter what did he do after inserting his penis into your private part?

A:

He returned beside my sister, sir.

Q:

How long did that take place, the insertion of his penis into your vagina?

A:

It took long, sir.

Q:

In terms of minutes, how many minutes?

A:

About twenty (20) minutes, sir.

Q:

In that span of twenty (20) minutes what was he doing?

A:

He inserted his penis into my vagina, sir.

Q:

After inserting his penis what else did he do, if he did anything?

A:

He touched my private parts, sir.

Q:

How many rooms does your house have?

A:

Two (2), sir.

Q:

At that time how old were you, July 13, 2002?

A:

Fourteen (14), sir.

Q:

You said that it took twenty (20) minutes and after that where did he go to?

A:

He returned beside my sister and slept again, sir.

PROS. GONZALES:
May we make it of record that the witness is crying.
Q:

Is July 13, 2002 the first time that your father did this to you?

A:

No, sir.

Q:

When was the first time that he did it to you, if you could remember?

A:

Since 1997, sir.21

When the offended party is a young and immature girl testifying against a parent, courts are inclined to lend credence to her version of what
transpired.22 Youth and immaturity are given full weight and credit.23 Incestuous rape is not an ordinary crime that can be easily invented because
of its heavy psychological toll.24 It is unlikely that a young woman of tender years would be willing to concoct a story which would subject her to a
lifetime of gossip and scandal among neighbors and friends and even condemn her father to death. 25
Undergoing all of the humiliating and invasive procedures for the casethe initial police interrogation, the medical examination, the formal charge,
the public trial and the cross-examinationproves to be the litmus test for truth, especially when endured by a minor who gives her consistent and
unwavering testimony on the details of her ordeal. 26 Despite the serious anguish she suffered in relating her traumatic experience, private
complainant gave her testimony in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and candid manner and was considered by the trial court to be
worthy of belief. It is a matter of judicial cognizance that the tears that were spontaneously shed by a rape victim during her testimony are an
indication of credibility.27
Appellant contends that the private complainants narration was too sweeping and bereft of details. In assessing the testimony of the private
complainant, it would be unfair to apply the standards used for adults. It should be viewed as a narration of a minor who barely understands sex and
sexuality.28
Notwithstanding the absence of any reference to violence or intimidation employed upon private complainant in the latters testimony, this Court is
convinced that the appellant is nevertheless guilty as charged. When a father commits the odious crime of rape against his own daughter, his moral
ascendancy or influence over the latter substitutes for violence and intimidation. The absence of violence or offer of resistance would not affect the
outcome of the case because the overpowering and overbearing moral influence of the father over his daughter takes the place of violence and
offer of resistance required in rape cases committed by an accused who did not have blood relationship with the victim.29
On cross-examination, private complainants testimony simply, but sufficiently, expresses how her intense fear of the accused motivated her actions:
Q:

You did not make any attempt to stop that by way of telling your parent or auntie or your teachers?

A:

No, sir.

Q:

Why?

A:

I was afraid of him, sir.

Q:

You were in school, you were away from him, what made you afraid of him?

37

A:

Because he told me not to tell it to anybody, sir.30

Appellant mistakenly argues that every charge of rape from the time private complainant alleged that appellant started raping her when she was still
nine years old until 13 July 2002 when she was fourteen years old is a distinct and separate crime, which needs to be proved. Such argument is
misplaced since the appellant was charged in the Information only with the rape which occurred on 13 July 2002, not the previous rapes that
occurred before that date. Private complainants testimony on that particular incident was found sufficient by the trial court, and was corroborated by
the findings of the medico-legal officer. Thereafter, appellant was convicted of the rape which occurred on 13 July 2002, and not of the rapes that
occurred before that time.
Appellant insists on assailing the petitioners testimony by minutely examining circumstances surrounding her pregnancy. He points out that the
alleged rape on 13 July 2002 did not cause her pregnancy, since she was already six months pregnant at that time. Moreover, appellant claims that
while he was willing to undergo a DNA test, private complainant had concealed the whereabouts of the child.
It is clear from the testimony of the private complainant that she was willing to have her child undergo the DNA examination, but that she no longer
knew of its whereabouts, to wit:
Q. Madam Witness, the reason why we are asking for the whereabouts of your child is for the purpose of having an examination of your child and
of the accused thru a test because if it be proven that the childs and your fathers blood have the same nature and character and it will yield the
same result it will be for your favor, that is why we are asking the whereabouts of your child for the conduct of DNA test.
A.

I want my child to undergo a DNA test but I really dont know the whereabouts of my child, sir.31

It should also be noted that during the pre-trial on 25 September 2002, appellant had not mentioned anything about a DNA test. Soon thereafter, on
1 October 2002, the child was born. Still, the subject of the DNA test was not brought up by the appellant. It was only after six months had elapsed
since the child was born and was already adopted by strangers, that the appellant began to ask private complainant about the childs whereabouts.
The records fail to show that the appellant had employed any of the court processes available to him to compel private complainant to reveal the
identity of the person who had arranged the adoption, and thereby trace the whereabouts of the child. After the lack of interest consistently shown
by the appellant to locate the child, he cannot now be allowed to impute any reluctance to conduct the DNA test to the private complainant.
Be that as it may, even if the DNA test were conducted and it established that appellant had not fathered the private complainants child, it would still
be inconclusive to prove that appellant was not guilty of having raped private complainant on 13 July 2002. Appellant cannot obtain an acquittal
based on the circumstances of private complainants pregnancy. Impregnation is not an element of rape. Even the proof that the child was fathered
by another man does not show that the appellant is not guilty. For the conviction of an accused, the pregnancy of the victim is not required to be
proved, since it is sufficient that the prosecution establish beyond reasonable doubt, as it had in this case, that the accused had forced sexual
relations with the victim.32
After examining the records, this Court finds that nowhere in the private complainants testimony and her Sworn Statement before the police officers
did she attribute her pregnancy to her last rape on 13 July 2002, the incident for which appellant is charged. Nonetheless, even assuming that she
had made such statement, her pregnancy could have been caused by an earlier rape as this would be consistent with her testimony that she had
been abused since she was nine years old until she was fourteen years old. Given her immaturity, she is not expected to possess the knowledge
which will allow her to identify which rape had caused her pregnancy.
Settled is the rule that the date of the occurrence of the rape is not an essential element of the commission of rape.33 Inconsistencies and
discrepancies in details which are irrelevant to the elements of the crime are not grounds for acquittal.34 As long as the inaccuracies concern only
minor matters, the same do not affect the credibility of witnesses. Truth-telling witnesses are not always expected to give error-free testimonies
considering the lapse of time and treachery of human memory. Inaccuracies may even suggest that the witnesses are telling the truth and have not
been rehearsed.35
In People v. Acala,36 the Court held that the fact that the victim was confused when she executed her first sworn affidavit and forgot the dates of
commission of the other rapes should not be taken against her since it would be unfair to judge the action of a child who had undergone traumatic
experiences by the norms of behavior expected of mature individuals under either the same or normal circumstances. The effects of the fear and
intimidation instilled in the minds of victims of incestuous rapes cannot be tested by any hard and fast rule, so that they must be viewed in the light
of the victims perception and judgment not only at the time of the commission of the crime, but also at the time immediately after.
Appellant claims that the reason he was falsely implicated for the rape of his daughter is simply because his in-laws disliked him. He attributes the
aloofness of his in-laws to his inability to find work. There is nothing novel in the dubious defense that familial discord and influence caused the
private complainant to file a case for rape against her own father.37 The claimed ill motives of the appellants in-laws were not even established by
the testimony of impartial witnesses. That such a motive drove his in-laws to cause private complainant to accuse him falsely of rape is speculative
and unsubstantiated. Where the charges against the appellant involve a heinous offense, a minor disagreement, even if true, does not amount to a
sufficient justification for dragging a young girls honor to a merciless public scrutiny that a rape trial brings in its wake.38
Absent any showing, or even an allegation, of any improper motive on the part of the victim to falsely testify against or implicate the accused in the
commission of the crime, the logical conclusion is that no such improper motive exists, and that the testimony is worthy of full faith and credence.39
In the present case, appellant testified that although he and the private complainant never shared a close relationship, no disagreements or quarrels
had come between them.
Ultimately, the resolution of the case hinges on the credibility of the victims testimonythe determination of which is a matter best undertaken by
the trial judge, who has the advantage of having observed, firsthand, the demeanor of the witnesses on the stand, and, therefore, is in a better
position to form an accurate impression and conclusion. Absent any showing that certain facts of value have clearly been overlooked, which if
considered could affect the result of the case, or that the trial courts findings are clearly arbitrary, the conclusions reached by the court of origin
must be respected and the judgment rendered affirmed.40
The trial court assessed the testimony of private complainant thus:
The victims brief but candid and straightforward narration of how she was raped by her father bears the earmarks of credibility. Her testimony
though simple, remained consistent and firm in her denunciation of the accused, her very own father, who habitually raped her in a span of many
years. Her poor recollection of some minor particulars may even be due to her conscious attempt to erase all memories of her dreadful experiences
in the hands of her father. It is possible that she was already resigned to just suffer in silence. It is only due to an unhidden truth (pregnancy) that
she was forced to reveal the history of sexual abuse committed on her by her father.41
There is no compelling reason to doubt the veracity of and deviate from the findings of the trial court. The findings of a trial court, when affirmed by
the Court of Appeals are accorded with great weight.42 Thus, the same should be deemed conclusive and binding on this Court.

38

Furthermore, private complainants testimony was corroborated by Senior Police Inspector Sabino whose medico-legal examination confirmed that
there were lacerations in her posterior hymen at 4:00, 5:00, and 6:00, which the repeated act of forced sex causes.
Appellants argument that the delay in reporting rape incidents runs contrary to human experience is erroneous. In similar cases,43 this Court has
consistently held that delay in reporting an incident of rape is not necessarily an indication that the charge is fabricated. Delay could be attributed to
the private complainants tender age and the appellants threats. Indeed, a rape victims actions are oftentimes influenced by fear, rather than
reason. In incestuous rape, this fear is magnified because the victim usually lives under the same roof as the perpetrator or is at any rate subject to
his dominance because of their blood relationship.44 Furthermore, it is entirely possible for a rape victim to go through what psychologists describe
as a "state of denial" which is a way of coping with the overwhelming emotional stress of an extremely shocking event. While in that state of denial,
the victim refuses either to accept reality or to allow the occurrence to "sink in." The offender should not be allowed to take advantage of these
horrific consequences that render a victim unnaturally silent for periods of time and use them in his defense.45
In her Sworn Statement dated 20 July 2002, given before police officers, private complainant narrates that:
T

Bakit ngayon mo lamang naisipang magreklamo?

S - Sa dahilang ako po ay natakot sa kanya at isa pa ay sinasabihan po niya ako na wag daw po akong magsusumbong dahil mabibitay daw
po siya at magiging kaawa-awa daw po kaming magkapatid pag siya ay nawala, marami pa daw po siyang pangarap sa akin at papatayin daw niya
si nanay.46
The bare denial proffered by appellant cannot outweigh the positive and consistent testimony of complainant. Denial, when unsubstantiated by clear
and convincing evidence, as in this case is negative and self-serving evidence, which deserves no greater evidentiary value than the testimony of
credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.47 Denial is an inherently weak defense, which becomes even weaker in the face of positive
identification by the victim of the appellant as the violator of her honor.48 The prosecution, with testimonial and medical evidence, effectively
discharged its burden of proving appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The concurrence of the minority of the private complainant and her relationship to appellant, as alleged in the Information, was sufficiently shown by
the prosecution. The Certificate of Live Birth, marked as Exhibit "E" adequately proved that the private complainant was 14 years old on 13 July
2002, when the last rape occurred. The prosecution also established the father-daughter relationship between appellant and private complainant.
Moreover, the relationship between appellant and private complainant is admitted by the appellant. Therefore, the aforementioned qualifying
circumstances justify the imposition of the death penalty, in accordance with Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
However, the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346 entitled "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines" prohibited the
imposition of Death Penalty. The proper penalty to be imposed on appellant in this case is provided under Section 2, paragraph (a) of said law
which prescribes that the penalty of reclusion perpetua be imposed when the law violated makes use of the nomenclatures of penalties under the
Revised Penal Code.
Civil indemnity is mandatory upon the finding of the fact of rape. If the crime of rape is committed or effectively qualified by any of the circumstances
under which death penalty is authorized by law, the indemnity for the victim shall be P75,000.00.49 Moral damages may additionally be awarded in
the amount of P75,000.00,50 as well as exemplary damages of P25,000.00.51
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 27 June 2007 in CA-GR. CR-H.C. No. 02181 is
AFFIRMED in toto. Appellant Efren Maglente y Cervantes is found GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of qualified rape. He is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and he is ordered to pay AAA the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages
and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

39

G.R. No. 164266

July 23, 2008

NOVER BRYAN SALVADOR y DE LEON, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioner Nover Bryan Salvador y De Leon, assailing the
Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1 dated February 26, 2004 which affirmed the Regional Trial Court2 (RTC) Decision3 dated October 26, 2001.
Likewise assailed is the appellate courts Resolution4 dated July 6, 2004 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The facts of the case follow:
Spouses Ernesto and Margarita Zuiga had three daughters, namely: Marianne, Mary Ann and the victim Arlene. Mary Ann was married to the
petitioner herein. The Zuiga family, including Mary Ann and the petitioner were living together at 550 Coloong I, Valenzuela City. Their residence
had three bedrooms one for the Zuiga spouses; the other for Marianne and Arlene; and the last for Mary Ann and the petitioner.
On September 20, 1997, the Zuiga spouses, together with Marianne, went to Bulacan to attend the wake of Ernestos mother; while Mary Ann with
her new born child, and Arlene, stayed at their Valenzuela home. Petitioner, at that time, asked permission to attend a birthday party.5
At about 9:00 in the evening, petitioner, accompanied by Eduardo Palomares, returned home to get some karaoke tapes to be used at the birthday
party. They thereafter went back to the party and stayed there until 12 midnight before heading back home.
At 4:30 in the morning, the following day, the Zuiga spouses and Marianne arrived home. They opened the main door which was then locked. After
preparing for sleep, Marianne proceeded to the room which she was sharing with Arlene. There she saw Arlene, who suffered stab wounds, already
dead. After seeing Arlenes body, the Zuiga spouses rushed to the room of Mary Ann and the petitioner. While Mary Ann proceeded to Arlenes
room, petitioner stayed at the sala and cried. He was later seen embracing Mary Ann and telling her that he was innocent.6
At around 5:00 in the morning, police investigators arrived. The police found no forcible entry into the house; no valuables were missing; and no
bloodstains in other parts of the house except Arlenes room. They likewise discovered, on top of the kitchen table, petitioners underwear (briefs),
gray t-shirt and short pants.7 They further found hair strands on Arlenes bed. These pieces of evidence were brought to the laboratory for
examination.
On September 21, 1997, Dr. Noel Minay (Dr. Minay), a medico-legal of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) conducted an autopsy of the
deceased.8 He found that Arlene suffered 21 stab wounds produced by a pointed instrument, one side of which was sharp like a balisong or a
kitchen knife. He further declared the possibility that Arlene struggled with the assailant before she died.9
The NBI Forensic Biologist also examined petitioners briefs, t-shirt and short pants, and found that the briefs and shirt were positive of type "O"
human blood, Arlenes blood type.10 The NBI Forensic Chemist, subsequently, conducted DNA Analysis on the following specimens:
1. One (1) dirty white Hanford brief[s];
2. One (1) light gray t-shirt with DKNY print infront;
3. Several strands of hair allegedly recovered in the bedroom of [the] victim;
4. Buccal swabs taken from the following:
a. ERNESTO ZUIGA (victims father)
b. MARGARITA ZUIGA (victims mother)
c. NOVER BRYAN SALVADOR (suspect)11
The examination of specimen no. 1 yielded a negative result for the presence of human DNA; while specimen nos. 2, 3, and 4 a-c, yielded positive
results.12
Petitioner was thus charged with Homicide in an Information dated April 8, 1998, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 20th day of September, 1997, in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, without any justifiable cause and with deliberate intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault
and stab one ARLENE ZUIGA, hitting on the different parts of her body, which led to the death of said Arlene Zuiga.
CONTRARY TO LAW.13
The aforementioned facts were established during the prosecutions presentation of evidence. It was further testified to by the witnesses that
petitioner owned a knife otherwise known as balisong, which he usually brought every time he went out. Ill motive was shown by petitioners
previous act of peeping through the bathroom and Arlenes room on two occasions while she was taking a bath and while she was inside the room
with Marianne.
For his part, all that the petitioner could offer was bare denial of the accusations against him.
On October 26, 2001, the RTC rendered a Decision finding the petitioner guilty of homicide. The dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused NOVER BRYAN SALVADOR y DE LEON guilty beyond reasonable doubt and as
principal of the crime of homicide as defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, without any attending mitigating or
aggravating circumstance, and, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, hereby sentences him to an indeterminate penalty of EIGHT (8) YEARS,
EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, as minimum, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of
reclusion temporal, as maximum. The accused is further sentence (sic) to indemnify Spouses Ernesto and Margarita Zuiga the amount of

40

P50,000.00 for the death of Arlene Zuiga and another amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages, both without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency. The accused is further sentenced to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.14
The RTC considered the following circumstantial evidence sufficient to establish petitioners guilt:
(1) The perpetrator did not use any force or destroy any portion of the house to get inside the house. This implies that the perpetrator is an occupant
of the house. The accused was, during the time material to this case, residing with his in-laws. The allegation of the accused that the main door of
the house was open when he returned to get the tape is difficult to believe. It is unthinkable that the remaining occupants of the house, namely,
Arlene and Mary Ann, who are both female, would not take the necessary precaution for their own protection such as locking the door of the house.
It is as difficult to suppose that the perpetrator of the crime would go to the house where his intended victim was sleeping without being sure that he
could gain entry to the house or have the necessary instruments to open the door.
(2) There were no personal belongings missing in the house. This shows that the person who entered the room of the victim had no intention to
steal. This fact can better be appreciated if we consider the evidence that the accused was caught many times peeping at Arlene during her lifetime;
and that [bloodstains] were found not in the short pants of the accused but in his Hanford brief and T-shirt.
(3) The absence of [bloodstains] or spots in any other part of the house except the room of the victim. This indicates that the assailant must have
cleaned the traces of blood inside the house. The facility and time to clean the area is more available to an assailant who was an occupant of the
house or a member of the household.
(4) Prior to and up to the date of the commission of the crime on September 20 or 21, 1997[,] the accused was seen by his parents-in-law Ernesto
and Margarita Zuiga and her sister-in-law Marianne and his friend Dondy Hiponia in many occasions to have in [his] possession a balisong" or
"beinte (sic) nueve." A "balisong" or "beinte (sic) nueve" is the tagalong name for a knife with folding blade. There is no reason for the Court to doubt
the testimonies of said witnesses. Being close relatives and friend of the accused[,] they have no motive to fabricate a story against the accused or
to implicate him to the commission of the crime charged. The claim of the accused that his father-in-law Ernesto Zuiga is trying to implicate him
[for] the killing of Arlene because his father-in-law disapproved his marrying Mary Ann, and that he accompanied his mother-in-law to the house of
the mistress of his father-in-law is not supported by the facts of the case. The accused was allowed to stay in the house of the Zuigas, an
indication that he was acceptable to the family. The alleged mistress of Ernesto was not shown to exist, nor her supposed address revealed by the
accused. The disappearance of said bladed weapon and the denial by the accused that he ever owned the same are intriguing because, according
to expert testimony, the stab wounds sustained by the victim were produced by a pointed instrument one side of which is sharp like a "balisong" or
"beinte (sic) nueve."
(5) The presence of human blood with type "O" in the t-shirt and brief of the accused, the finding that the blood type of the victim belongs to groupd
(sic) "O," and the circumstance that the accused had suffered no scratches or wound from which to come blood to stain his T-shirt and brief are
revealing and could only lead to the conclusion that the victim was the source of the blood found in the T-shirt and brief of the accused.
(6) The conclusion arrived at by Magsipoc that the DNA Profile of the [bloodstain] in the light gray t-shirt and the DNA Profile on the hair strands
could come from the accused and the victim.
(7) The unusual behavior of the accused after the discovery of the dead body of Arlene betrayed the accused. Ernesto and Margarita Zuiga
testified that soon after the discovery of the death of Arlene[,] they immediately went to the room of the accused and his wife Mary Ann; that it took
Margarita a hard time to awaken the accused; and that upon being awakened, the accused did not get (sic) inside the room where Arlene was and
instead stayed and cried in the sala telling his wife that he was innocent even if nobody yet at that time was pointing to him as the suspect. The
actuation of the accused then was that of a perpetrator of the crime with troubled conscience.15
On appeal, the CA affirmed petitioners conviction.16 Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari anchored on the following grounds:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT THE MOST CONVINCING
EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION IS THE RESULT OF THE DNA ANALYSIS CONDUCTED BY THE NBI FORENSIC CHEMIST.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT BY MEANS OF
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, IT WAS PROVEN AND ESTABLISHED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS
THE ONE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DEATH OF ARLENE ZUIGA.
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT FINDING ACCUSED
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF HOMICIDE.17
The petition lacks merit.
Direct evidence of the crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. The rules of evidence allow a
trial court to rely on circumstantial evidence to support its conclusion of guilt. Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which proves a fact or series
of facts from which the facts in issue may be established by inference. At times, resort to circumstantial evidence is imperative since to insist on
direct testimony would, in many cases, result in setting felons free and deny proper protection to the community.18
Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, provides that circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if the following requisites are complied
with:
(1) There is more than one circumstance;
(2) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(3) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.19
All the circumstances must be consistent with one another, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time
inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent. Thus, conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld, provided that the

41

circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion that points to the accused, to the exclusion
of all others, as the guilty person.20
In the present case, both the trial and appellate courts considered these pieces of evidence in finding petitioners guilt: 1) the non-employment of
force in entering the scene of the crime; 2) no missing personal belongings; 3) the absence of bloodstains in other parts of the house except
Arlenes room; 4) petitioners ownership of a balisong, the same weapon used in stabbing the victim; 5) the presence of type "O" human blood on
petitioners T-shirt and briefs; 6) the positive result of the DNA analysis using the bloodstains found in petitioners shirt and briefs; and 7) petitioners
unusual behavior after the discovery of the victims lifeless body.21
In his appeal before the CA and likewise in this present petition, petitioner questions the sufficiency of each and every circumstance enumerated
above. He specifically points out the inconsistent findings of the NBI Forensic Chemist and those of the NBI Forensic Biologist.22 As to the
circumstance that there was no forcible entry to the house, he insists that the main door was not locked; and he, in fact, faults Arlene for not locking
the door to her bedroom.23 Petitioner adds that the connection between the alleged "peeping incident" and intent to kill was so remote; and thus
insufficient to convict him.24 He also persuades this Court to give credence to his testimony that he owned a samurai (double-bladed knife) and not
a balisong (single-bladed) which thus negates his authorship of the crime, since it would be contrary to the medico-legals findings that the weapon
used was an instrument one side of which was sharp.25 Petitioner further asserts that the absence of scratches, wounds and bruises on his body
were more consistent with his innocence rather than his guilt, if we follow the courts conclusion that Arlene had a chance to struggle with him prior
to his death.26 Lastly, petitioner claims that if we were to believe the prosecutions version, it would be hard to imagine that Mary Ann (petitioners
wife), who was then in the other room, was not awakened.27
Prior to the fateful night when Arlenes lifeless body was discovered, several witnesses saw petitioner in possession of a balisong. The NBI autopsy
report, in turn, stated that the wounds sustained by Arlene were inflicted with the use of a weapon only one side of which was sharp (such as a
balisong). After the discovery of the crime, the balisong was nowhere to be found. Hence, the trial court was correct in its conclusion that the
balisong previously seen in petitioners possession was the very weapon used in stabbing the victim. While petitioner admitted owning a different
kind of weapon, he failed to produce it in court. As such, it remained a self-serving allegation that cannot be considered to exonerate him from
liability.
As to petitioners shirt and briefs, as correctly held by the trial court (and as affirmed by the appellate court), they were found to be stained with type
"O" blood (the victims blood type). Instead of questioning the absence of proof that he was not of the same blood type as the victim, petitioner
should have presented evidence that he indeed has type "O" blood. The fact remains that petitioner offered no explanation why his shirt and briefs
contained bloodstains. It is, therefore, correct to conclude that they were stained with the victims blood.
Moreover, the absence of scratches and bruises on petitioners body parts does not negate the trial courts conclusion that the victim had the
chance to struggle with the petitioner. This is so because, at the time the petitioner attacked the victim between 1:00 and 4:00 in the morning, she
was most likely asleep and was only awakened by the petitioner; she was, therefore, not in a position to offer strong resistance. This explains why
such struggle produced no bruises and scratches.
The presence of petitioners wife inside the house at that time does not likewise negate the commission of the crime. Considering that his wife was
a nursing mother who definitely had sleepless nights, she could not be expected to be conscious of everything that happened outside her room.
More importantly, intent to kill was duly established by the witnesses when they testified relative to the "peeping incident." Although there was no
evidence or allegation of sexual advances, such incident manifested petitioners evil motive. It is a rule in criminal law that motive, being a state of
mind, is established by the testimony of witnesses on the acts or statements of the accused before or immediately after the commission of the
offense, deeds or words that may express it or from which his motive or reason for committing it may be inferred.28 Motive and intent may be
considered one and the same, in some instances, as in the present case.
Lastly, the DNA analysis made by the NBI expert placed the petitioner at the scene of the crime.1avvphi1 Such evidence was considered, together
with the other circumstances discussed earlier. The individual pieces of evidence may not be sufficient to point to the accused as the author of the
crime. However, when taken together, they are more than enough to establish beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner committed the crime of
homicide. We would like to emphasize at this point that the peculiarity of circumstantial evidence is that the guilt of the accused cannot be deduced
from scrutinizing just one particular piece of evidence. It is more like a puzzle which, when put together, reveals a remarkable picture pointing
towards the conclusion that the accused is the author of the crime.29
The prosecutions evidence, especially the testimonies of the witnesses who happen to be the victims relatives, was not weakened by the fact of
such relationship. The Court notes that petitioner himself is a relative of the witnesses, albeit by affinity, being the husband of the victims sister. It is
unnatural for a relative, who is interested in vindicating the crime, to accuse somebody else other than the real culprit. For her/him to do so is to let
the guilty go free.30 Where there is nothing to indicate that witnesses were actuated by improper motives on the witness stand, their positive
declarations made under solemn oath deserve full faith and credence.31
We also reiterate the well-settled rule that this Court accords great weight and a high degree of respect to factual findings of the trial court,
especially when affirmed by the CA, as in the present case. Here, the RTC was unequivocally upheld by the CA, which was clothed with the power
to review whether the trial courts conclusions were in accord with the facts and the relevant laws.32 The credibility given by the trial courts to
prosecution witnesses is an important aspect of evidence which appellate courts can rely on, because of the trial courts unique opportunity to
observe the witnesses, particularly their demeanor, conduct, and attitude, during the direct and cross-examination by counsels.33
In view of the foregoing, petitioner was correctly convicted of homicide punishable by reclusion temporal. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
the minimum of the indeterminate penalty, absent any modifying circumstances, shall be taken from the full range of prision mayor and the
maximum of which shall be taken from the medium period of reclusion temporal.34 Specifically, the indeterminate penalty that should be imposed is
within the range of 6 years and 1 day to 12 years of prision mayor, as minimum; to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months of
reclusion temporal, as maximum. Hence, a modification of the penalty imposed by the trial court is in order. Instead of 8 years, 8 months and 1 day,
the minimum term of the indeterminate penalty shall be 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor;35 while the maximum term shall be that imposed by the
trial court.
An appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for review. It then becomes the duty of this Court to correct any error in the
appealed judgment, whether or not included in the assignment of errors.36
We affirm the award of P50,000.00 by way of indemnity ex delicto to the Zuiga spouses. When death occurs as a result of a crime, the heirs of the
deceased are entitled to such amount as indemnity for death without need of any evidence or proof of damages.37 The court likewise correctly
awarded P50,000.00 as moral damages because of their mental anguish and moral suffering caused by Arlenes death.
The trial and appellate courts did not award actual damages, obviously because the victims heirs failed to present proof of the expenses they
incurred. However, it has been repeatedly held by this Court that where the amount of actual damages cannot be determined because of the
absence of receipts to prove the same, temperate damages may be fixed at P25,000.00.38

42

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 26, 2004 in CA-G.R. CR
No. 26048 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Petitioner Nover Bryan Salvador y De Leon is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal, as maximum. In addition to civil indemnity and moral damages, petitioner is ordered to pay spouses Ernesto and Margarita Zuiga the
sum of P25,000.00 as temperate damages.
SO ORDERED.

43

G. R. No. 172326

January 19, 2009

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff

vs.
ALFREDO PASCUAL Y ILDEFONSO Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Under review is the Decision1 dated December 9, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR.-HC No. 01493 finding accused-appellant
Alfredo Pascual y Ildefonso alias BOYET guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with Homicide and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of death. Said decision affirmed that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 211, Mandaluyong City, albeit with the modification that
granted an additional award of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity to the heirs of the deceased-victim.
The conviction of accused-appellant stemmed from an Amended Information2 dated February 23, 2001, filed with the RTC for the crime designated
as Rape with Homicide and Robbery, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 25th day of December 2000 in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with lewd designs, by the use of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, lie and have
carnal knowledge of one LORELYN PACUBAS y TAMAYO, against the latters will and consent.
During the occasion or by reason of the rape with intent to kill and taking advantage of superior strength, covered the face of said victim with a
pillow, thus suffocating her which ultimately led to her instantaneous death. Likewise, during or on occasion of the rape with intent to gain and by
means of force, violence and intimidation employed upon the person of Lorelyn Pacubas y Tamayo, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, steal and carry away the following, to wit:
a). one (1) gold necklace with pendant
b). one (1) pair of gold earring
c). college ring
d). Seiko ladys wristwatch
all in the total amount of P10,000.00 more or less, belonging to victim Lorelyn Pacubas y Tamayo, to the damage and prejudice of the latter.
When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial thereafter ensued.
During trial, the prosecution presented seven (7) witnesses; namely, Rodolfo Jundos, Jr. and Arlene Gorospe, both neighbors of the victim; Eduardo
Velasco, a friend of the victims sister; Police officers (PO)2 Fernando Aguilan and Police Inspector (P/Insp.) Russel Leysa; Dr. Felimon Porciuncula,
Jr., the Philippine National Police (PNP) medico-legal officer; and Lorenza Pacubas, the victims mother. The prosecutions version of the facts, as
narrated in the decision under review, follows:
The incident xxx happened in a room at the second floor of House No. 724, Ballesteros St., Barangay New Zaniga, Mandaluyong City. The sketch
of the house (Exh. A, p. 148 Records) shows it has three (3) rooms; on the first floor, one occupied by Arlene Gorospe and family (exh. A-1); the
second, by Alfredo Pascual and his family (Exh. A-2); and the third is the residence of Rodolfo Jundos, Jr. and his family. On the second floor is
another room occupied by the family of the victim Lorelyn Pacubas y Tamayo (alias Ling-Ling) and her siblings.
Last December 24, 2000, at around 10:00 oclock in the evening, Rodolfo Jundos, Jr. was preparing to celebrate noche buena with his son and the
accused-appellant, Alfredo Pascual who was with Christopher, his 2-year old youngest child. Alfredo Pascual appeared to have had liquor already.
For three (3) instances, the accused would ask permission to go inside the house as he was already sleepy and drunk but nonetheless will return
10 to 15 minutes later, twice still with the child and only to continue drinking every time he returned. On the third time, he was without the child
anymore and partake (sic) of liquor until 1:00 oclock a.m. when he left, leaving Rodolfo Jundos, Jr. alone just outside the aforesaid house at 724
Ballesteros St. (Exh. A-8). Twenty (20) minutes later, Divina Pascual, appellants wife, came out the house looking for her husband. When informed
that the latter had already left, Divina started looking for him inside the house and later in the billiard hall 10 or 15 minutes away. Moments later,
Divina went passed (sic) the place where Rodolfo Jundos, Jr. was drinking, rushing upstairs to the second floor of the house. Soon after, Jundos
saw Divina chasing Alfredo running out towards the gate at the same time asked (sic) Jundos for help saying Kuya, tulungan mo ako, si Boyet
(referring to Alfredo Pascual)). Thinking that Alfredo Pascual was making trouble, Rodolfo Jundos, Jr. joined the chase but could not catch up as
Alfredo was running very fast. So Divina told him to instead go upstairs as the accused might have done something wrong to Ling-ling (Lorelyn)
[T.S.N. pp. 4-11, October 24, 2002]. Rodolfo Jundos, Jr. is the husband of appellants older sister, Laarni.
Together, Jundos and Divina rushed to the second floor. As the place was dark, they switched on the light and there they saw Ling-ling (Lorelyn
Pacubas) flat on her back on the floor almost naked with arms and legs open, her panty and shorts down to her ankle and t-shirt pulled up above
the breast with blood on the right breast. They tried to wake up Ling-ling but the latter was already dead. Rodolfo Jundos, Jr. was shocked at what
he saw. Divina got hysterical and repeatedly told Arlene Gorospe what happened (T.S.N., supra, pp. 11-14). It did not take long before policemen
from the Southern Command (SOCO) arrived.
That same morning Rodolfo Jundos, Jr. gave his statement before PO2 Fernando Aguilan (Exh. C, p. 150 Records) and so did Divina Gorospe
Pascual (Exh. D, p. 151). Arlene Gorospe likewise executed his Sinumpaang Salaysay that same day, December 25, 2000, before Police Inspector
Efren Pascua Jugo. (Exh. B, p. 149, Records) It was this witness Arlene Gorospe who prepared the sketch (Exh. A, p. 148, Records). Later in (sic)
that fateful morning, police investigators appeared in (sic) the scene of the incident and took pictures of the place and the victim while still lying on
the floor (Exhs. E, E-1 to E-7 and F-1 to F-5 xxx, p. 152, Records).
After proper police investigation and coordination, the victim, Lorelyn Pacubas, was brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory, for autopsy and the
examination of the blood found in the place of the incident (Medico Legal Report No. S 056 00, Exh. M, p. 162, Records). The printed underwear
with suspected seminal stains was likewise examined. Medico-Legal Report No. R-007-00 (Exh. N, p. 163, Records) reveal absence of semen. In
Medico-Legal Report No. M 932 00 (Exh. O, p. 164, Records), it was determined that the cause of death was asphyxia by smothering. The same
report gave the following postmortem findings on the injuries sustained by the victim:
POSTMORTEM FINDINGS

44

Fairly developed, fairly nourished, female cadaver in rigor mortis with postmortem lividity at the dependent portions of the body. Conjunctivae are
pale. Lips and nailbeds are cyanotic.
HEAD
1) Lacerated wound, upper lip, measuring 0.8 x 0.5 cm, along the anterior midline.
2) Contusion, right cheek, measuring 5 x 4 cm, 7 cm from the anterior midline.
TRUNK
1) Contusion, right pectoral region, measuring 3 x 2 cm, 11 cm from the anterior midline.
2) Lacerated wound, right nipples, measuring 0.6 x 0.1 cm.
3) Contusion, right pectoral region, measuring 5 x 4 cm, 10 cm from the anterior midline.
4) Contusion, sternal region, measuring 3 x 1 cm, along the anterior midline.
5) Contusion, left inguinal region, measuring 5 x 3.5 cm, 10 cm from the anterior midline.
The stomach is full of partially digested food particles.
EXTREMITY
1) Contusion, proximal 3rd of the right forearm measuring 4 x 2 cm, 4 cm lateral to its posterior midline.
2) Contusion, right ring finger, measuring 0.5 x 0.3 cm.
LARYNX, TRACHEA AND ESOPHAGUS
The larynx, trachea and esophagus are markedly congested and cyanotic with petechial hemorrhages.
xxx xxx xxx
GENITAL
There is abundant growth of pubic hair, labia majora are full, convex and co-aptated with pinkish brown labia minora presenting in between. On
separating the same disclosed a fleshy type hymen with deep healed lacerations at 3, 6 and 9 oclock positions with an abraded posterior
fourchette, measuring 1 x 0.4 cm.
Vaginal and peri urethral smears are POSITIVE for spermatozoa.
xxx xxx xxx
CONCLUSION:
Cause of death is Asphyxia by smothering. (p. 164, Records)
with the corresponding location of the said wounds on the attached sketches of the head (Exh. P, p. 165, Records) and the human body in the
anatomical sketch (Exh. Q, p. 166, Records).3 (Emphasis ours)
Accused-appellant denied the charges against him. He alleged that on December 24, 2000, he was drinking with Rodolfo Jundos, Jr. and the latters
son outside their residence from 10:00 p.m. until 1:00 a.m. of December 25, 2000. When he came home, he had a fight with his wife Divina Pascual
(Divina) because the latter allegedly wouldnt permit him to go to a friends house in Sta. Mesa, Manila, as he was already drunk. Nonetheless, so
accused-appellant claims, he still went to Sta. Mesa and stayed at his friends house for more or less six days.4 Upon learning from his wife that
Lorelyn Pacubas was raped and killed and that he was the suspect therein, he requested his wife to contact and coordinate with Major Pealosa for
his voluntary surrender. On cross-examination, accused-appellant admitted that he knew Lorelyn Pacubas was staying alone on the second floor of
the house on that fateful night, as her two (2) other siblings had already gone home to the province.5 Moreover, he admitted having called his wife
on December 25, 2000, and was then told about the crime which happened to Lorelyn Pacubas and that he was the suspect thereof.6
Defense witness Carlito Santos (Carlito) corroborated accused-appellants testimony of having stayed in his house for six (6) days. Carlito testified
that at about 2:00 oclock in the early morning of December 25, 2000, accused-appellant arrived at his (Carlitos) house and told the witness that he
(accused-appellant) had a fight with his wife, Divina.7
Another defense witness, Aida Viloria-Magsipoc, forensic chemist of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), testified on the result of the DNA
analysis which she conducted on the specimens submitted by the trial court consisting of the victims vaginal smear and panty. According to her, no
DNA sample from the suspect was present on the aforesaid specimens.8 On cross-examination, she declared that based on DNA testing, she could
not determine if a woman was raped or not. She further declared that in this case, it was possible that the stained vaginal smear prevented a
complete and good result for the DNA profiling. Upon being questioned by the court, the forensic chemist confirmed that DNA testing on the subject
specimens was inconclusive and that the result was not good, as the specimens submitted, i.e., the stained vaginal smear and the dirty white panty,
had already undergone serological analysis.9
In a decision10 dated March 11, 2004, the trial court rendered judgment, as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding accused, ALFREDO PASCUAL Y ILDEFONSO alias BOYET GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with
Homicide, under the circumstances prescribed in Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, absent any modifying circumstance to
aggravate or mitigate criminal liability, the court hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of DEATH.
He is also ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of Php63,000.00 as actual damages; the amount of Php50,000.00 as moral damages;
the amount of Php25,000.00 as exemplary damages; Php28,000.00 as burial expenses and the amount of Php250,000.00 for loss of earnings.
Additional actual expenses incurred not supported by receipts are denied pursuant to Article 2199 of the Civil Code.

45

In so far as the charge of robbery is concerned, the same is hereby ordered DISMISSED, it appearing that the valuables and other personal
belongings of the victim are intact.
The accused is likewise ordered to pay the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.11
The case was directly elevated to this Court for automatic review. However, in a Resolution12 dated July 26, 2005 and pursuant to our ruling in
People v Mateo13 the case was transferred to the CA.
In its Decision14 dated December 9, 2005, the CA affirmed with modification the trial courts decision. Dispositively, the CA decision reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that the heirs of Lorelyn Pacubas is further
awarded the amount of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, in addition to the other damages in the lower courts judgment. Costs de officio.
SO ORDERED.
In view of the foregoing, accused-appellant comes again to this Court for a final review of his case.
In a Resolution15 dated June 13, 2006, the Court required the parties to file their respective supplemental briefs, if they so desired. In their
respective Manifestations,16 the parties waived the filing of supplemental briefs and instead merely adopted their earlier briefs before the CA.
Two (2) questions present themselves for resolution in this case. First, was the circumstantial evidence presented against the accused-appellant
sufficient for his conviction? Second, does the result of the DNA examination entitle the accused-appellant to an acquittal?
We answer the first question in the affirmative.
It is settled that in the special complex crime of rape with homicide, both the rape and the homicide must be established beyond reasonable doubt.
17 In this regard, we have held that the crime of rape is difficult to prove because it is generally unwitnessed and very often only the victim is left to
testify for herself. It becomes even more difficult when the complex crime of rape with homicide is committed because the victim could no longer
testify. Thus, in crimes of rape with homicide, as here, resort to circumstantial evidence is usually unavoidable.18
Considering that no one witnessed the commission of the crime charged herein, the weight of the prosecutions evidence must then be appreciated
in light of the well-settled rule that an accused can be convicted even if no eyewitness is available, as long as sufficient circumstantial evidence is
presented by the prosecution to prove beyond doubt that the accused committed the crime. 19
Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the existence of the main fact may be inferred according
to reason and common experience.20 Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if
the following requisites concur:
(a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have been established; and (c) the combination of all
the circumstances is such as to warrant a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Verily, for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all the circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with
the hypothesis that accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational
hypothesis except that of guilt.21 Thus, a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be sustained only when the circumstances
proved form an unbroken chain which leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the culprit.
Here, the circumstances testified to by the prosecution witnesses lead to the inevitable conclusion that the accused-appellant is the author of the
crime charged.
The chain of events that led to the subject unfortunate incident was candidly narrated by Rodolfo Jundos, Jr. Said witness testified that on
December 24, 2000 at 10:00 p.m., he, together with his family and other relatives, was preparing for their small celebration outside the house; that
accused-appellant (who appeared to be already drunk) was also there together with his 2-year-old child; that accused-appellant stayed with them
up to 1:00 a.m. of December 25; that during the course of his stay with the group, accused-appellant left twice to go inside the house but kept on
coming back to continue drinking; that when accused-appellant left for the third time, he did not come back anymore leaving him (Jundos) alone as
his son, Christopher, also left to go to some other place.22 Some 20 minutes later, accused-appellants wife, Divina, asked him about the
whereabouts of the accused-appellant and he instructed her to look for her husband in several places. Having failed to locate accused-appellant,
Divina went back inside the house.23 What transpired next can be gleaned from the following pertinent portions of Jundos testimony:
"Q - When you are still on that particular place where you are drinking alone, do you remember any unusual incident that happened?
A - Yes sir.
Q - What is that incident?
A - Nong umuwi na po si Divina sa kanila nong sinabi nya na napapagod na sya, maya-maya po ay nakita ko si Divina na nag-tatatakbo, dumaan
po doon sa harap ko at nag-tatatakbo patungong itaas po.
Q - Itaas ng?
A - Second floor sir.
xxx
Q - And what happened after Divina went up stairs of the second floor?
A - Nakita ko po na naghahabulan si Divina at yong asawa nya si Alfredo Pascual.
Q - Did you see where did they came from?
A - Hindi ko po nakita kong saan sila naggaling, ang nakita ko lang dito po sa gilid ko papuntang gate.

46

Q - So, you see them coming out of that building and proceeding towards the gate?
A - Yes sir.
Q - And who was ahead?
A - Alfredo Pascual sir.
Q - And what was Divina doing at that time?
A - Shes chasing Alfredo Pascual.
Q - Did you hear her saying something?
A - Yes sir.
Q - What [did] she say?
A - Humihingi po sya sa akin ng tulong, sabi nya po, kuya tulongan mo ako si Boyet kasi ang palayaw po ni Alfredo Pascual e Boyet.
Q - And what was your interpretation then when you heard her asking for your help, this Divina, the wife of the accused?
A - Ang pagkaintindi ko po na humihingi si Divina ng tulong, akala ko po nagwala kasi lasing po, kaya humihingi po ng tulong yong asawa, kaya
(po) ako poy tumakbo doon at naki-nakipaghabol po sa kanila.
Q - And what happened next after that?
A - Tumakbo rin po ako at nakihabol rin ako sa kanila, pero nong nandoon na po ako sa kalsada, yong street po naming Ballesteros, nasa
kalagitnaan na po ako, nakita ko na po si Divina at sinalubong na po ako, ang sabi sa akin, kuya hindi na maabutan kasi mabilis tumakbo tulungan
mo nalang ako, samahan mo ako, aakyat tayo sa taas kasi baka kung anong ginawa nya don kay Ling-Ling, the victim in this case.
Q - So, what did you do when Divina ask for your assistance?
A - Sinamahan ko po, umakyat po kami sa second floor at nakita namin sa second floor, madilim, parang walang sindi ang mga ilaw.
Q - What was the condition of the door going inside the second floor when you went up?
A - Open sir.
Q - And did you and Divina do when you were already (inside) in the second floor?
A - Hinanap po nami yong mga switches, kasi ako po bihirang bihira po akong makaakyat don kaya sabi ko kay Divina hanapin natin yong switch
kasi hindi ko kabisado rito, yon kinakapa po naming kong saan po yong mga switches, habang kinakapa po naming yong mga switches tapos
pinupukpok ko po yong dingding tapos nag-tatawag po ako ng pangalan ni Ling-Ling, Ling saan ka naroon.
Q - And then what happened next?
A - Yan po habang hinahanap po naming yong mga switches at kinakatok po naming yong mga dingding bigla pong sumigaw si Divina na kuya
halika dito ng marining ko po na tinatawag yong pangalan ko e lumapit po ako kung saan sya naroon.
Q - What happened next?
A - Nandon po sya sa loob ng kwarto, bukas po yong pinto, doon nakita ko po si Ling-Ling, yong biktima.
Q - Where was the victim at the first time or instance that you saw her at that particular time?
A - At the floor sir.
Q - What was the physical appearance of the victim when you first saw her?
A - When I first saw the victim she was lieing (sic) in the floor with open arms (sic) and open legs and her short and panty was already loose off
down to her ankle and her (the) shirt is up.
Q - Up to where?
A - Nakataas po, labas ang kanyang didi at nakita ko pong may dugo sa gilid.
Q - Where did you find the blood?
A - On her left side breast sir.
Q - On that particular instance, when heard Divina calling for help, was there already light inside that house?
A - There was a light sir.
Q - Where was that light coming from?
A - Came from the ceiling.
Q - Inside the room where Divina found the body of the victim?
A - Yes sir.

47

xxx
Q - When you first enter that room where you find the body of the victim Lorelyn Bacubas, what was the condition of the room?
A - Nakita ko po na magulo yong kama tapos yong drawer na lagayan ng mga damit kasi salamin po yong ibaba may mga basag po at may mga
patak ng dugo.
Q - What else did you find?
A - May scissor po sa left side ng braso nya, sa gilid po.
xxx
Q - What did you do when you saw the victim in this case already sprawled on the floor?
A - Nung nakita na naming hindi na gumagalaw si Ling-Ling at ang pagkaalam namin ay patay na, bumaba na po kami.
xxx
Q - After you went down, what did you do next?
A - Pag-baba po namin ni Divina, tumakbo po kami don sa pinto, sa bahay po ng bayaw ko at humingi po kami ng tulong.
Q - Who is your brother-in-law?
A - Arleen Gorospe sir.
xxx
Q - What did you do with Arleen Gorospe?
A - Pag-bukas po ng pinto, una pong pumasok si Divina at nag-hysterical na nagsisigaw na Manang Rose, yong asawa po ni Arleen Gorospe, si
Ling-Ling ginahasa at pinatay ni Boyet.
Q - And what next happened?
A - Sinalaysay po ni Divina, pero ako poy na shock at napaupo na lang ako sa sopa, umakyat din po si Arleen sa taas at may tumawag na rin ng
pulis.24 (Emphasis Ours)
Arlene Gorospe corroborated the testimony of Jundos that in the early morning of December 25, 2000, Jundos and the accused-appellants wife,
Divina, knocked at his door to inform him of the incident after which he immediately proceeded upstairs and saw the victim naked and lifeless with
her t-shirt pulled up.25
Prior to the discovery of her dead body, Jundos also testified that the victim was alone in her room on the second floor of the house.26 This fact was
known to accused-appellant who admitted as much in his cross-examination.27 Eduardo Velasco, who used to visit the sister of the victim and have
drinks with accused-appellant, testified that the latter confided to him his love for the victim.28
PO2 Fernando Aguilan and P/Insp. Russel Leysa testified that upon arrival at the place where the subject incident happened on December 25, 2000
at about 2:30 a.m., they found the lifeless body of the victim lying on the floor naked, with bloodstain on her clothes and appearing lifeless.29 The
police also found at the scene of the crime the victims belongings scattered all over the place.
Dr. Felimon Porciuncula, who conducted the post-mortem examination on the cadaver of the victim on the morning of December 25, 2000, testified
that the victim died of asphyxia by smothering. The doctor also testified that apart from contusions, hymenal lacerations were discovered on the
body at 3, 6 and 9 oclock positions, but there is an abrasion or abrated posterior meaning that the injury was fresh30 or was inflicted right before
the death of the victim.31 Dr. Porciuncula further testified that spermatozoa was found in the vagina of the victim.32
Furthermore, the statements of accused-appellants wife, Divina, immediately after the fateful incident all the more convince the Court as to
accused-appellants guilt. Part of the res gestae and admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule were Divinas utterances to
Gorospe after seeing the dead and raped body of the victim, i.e., May nagyari sa itaas at galing doon si Boyet, and her subsequent narration of
seeing the accused-appellant going out of the victims room and running away therefrom.33
In People v Cantonjos34the Court held that:
Res gestae utterances refer to those exclamations and statements made by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately
before, during, or after the commission of the crime, when the circumstances are such that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or
utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement.
A declaration is deemed part of the res gestae and thus admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites
concur: (1) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or
devise; and (3) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances.
The aforementioned requisites are present in this case. The res gestae or the startling event is the rape and death of the victim. The statements of
Divina to Gorospe were made spontaneously and before she had the time to contrive or devise such declarations, and said statements all
concerned the occurrence in question or the immediately attending circumstances thereof.
In the absence of evidence that the witnesses for the prosecution were actuated by improper motive, the presumption is that they were not so
actuated and their testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit.35
Here, accused-appellant claimed that at 2 oclock on the morning of December 25, 2000, he was at his friends house in Sta. Mesa, having left his
house in Mandaluyong because of a quarrel with his wife, Divina. Prosecution witness Jundos testimony, however, positively placed the accusedappellant near the scene of the crime at the same time on December 25, 2000. Surely, between the positive assertions of the prosecution witness
and the negative averments of accused-appellant, the former indisputably deserve more credence and evidentiary weight.36

48

Thus, accused-appellants twin defenses of denial and alibi pale in the light of the array of circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution.
Equally damning is accused-appellants failure to prove with clear and convincing evidence that he was at another place at the time the crime was
committed or to demonstrate the impossibility of his presence at the scene of the crime when the same was committed.
Denial is intrinsically a weak defense and must be supported by strong evidence of non-culpability in order to be credible. Correspondingly, courts
view the defense of alibi with suspicion and caution, not only because it is inherently weak and unreliable, but also because it can be fabricated
easily. 37
Furthermore, this Court cannot ignore the positive testimony on record that accused-appellant was seen running away from the scene of the crime
immediately before the discovery thereof. If accused-appellant was as innocent as he claimed to be, he should have immediately cleared himself of
suspicion. Instead, accused-appellant stayed at his friends house for six or seven days, despite having learned from his wife he was a suspect in
the crime. Undoubtedly, accused-appellants flight is an indication of his guilt or of a guilty mind. Indeed, the wicked man flees though no man
pursueth, but the righteous are as bold as a lion.38
Accused-appellant makes much of the result of the DNA analysis conducted by the NBI that his profile was not in the victims vaginal smear. Hence,
he argues he is innocent of the crime charged.
In People v Yatar, we held that in assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should consider, inter alia, the following factors: how the
samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples,
whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.39
Here, while the DNA analysis of the victims vaginal smear showed no complete profile of the accused-appellant, the same is not conclusive
considering that said specimen was already stained or contaminated which, according to the forensic chemist, Aida Villoria-Magsipoc, deters a
complete and good result for DNA profiling. She explained in her testimony that generally, with the vaginal smear, they could see if there is a male
profile in the smear. However in this case, when they received the vaginal smear on the stained slide, the same had already undergone serological
analysis. Hence, according to the chemist, the DNA testing conducted on the specimen subject of this case was inconclusive.40 In light of this
flawed procedure, we hold that the result of the DNA examination does not entitle accused-appellant to an acquittal.
Viewed in its entirety, the evidence in this case inevitably leads to the conclusion that accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
special complex crime of Rape with Homicide.
Rape with Homicide under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Republic Act (R.A.) 7659, provides that when by reason or on the
occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death. However, in view of the subsequent passage of R.A. No. 9346, entitled
An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of the Death Penalty in the Philippines, which was signed into law on June 24, 2006, the Court is mandated to
impose on the accused-appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
We likewise affirm the CAs additional award of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity pursuant to current jurisprudence41 that in cases of rape with
homicide, civil indemnity in the amount of P100,000.00 should be awarded to the heirs of the victim. As to moral damages, recent jurisprudence
allows the amount of P75,000.00 to be awarded in cases of rape with homicide.42 Thus, the P50,000.00 award given by the court below as moral
damages should be increased to P75,000.00. The P25,000.00 exemplary damages, however, should be deleted because under Article 2230 of the
New Civil Code, exemplary damages in criminal cases may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances, and there is none in this case. The rest of the awards given by the trial court are affirmed.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the CA in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 01493 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant is
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to
pay the heirs of the victim, Lorelyn Pacubas, the amounts of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, P63,000.00 as actual
damages, P28,000.00 as burial expenses and P250,000.00 for loss of earnings.
No costs.

49

G.R. No. 172607

April 16, 2009

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appelle,

vs.
RUFINO UMANITO, Appellant.
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
In our Resolution dated 26 October 2007, this Court resolved, for the very first time, to apply the then recently promulgated New Rules on DNA
Evidence (DNA Rules)1 in a case pending before us this case. We remanded the case to the RTC for reception of DNA evidence in accordance
with the terms of said Resolution, and in light of the fact that the impending exercise would be the first application of the procedure, directed Deputy
Court Administrator Reuben Dela Cruz to: (a) monitor the manner in which the court a quo carries out the DNA Rules; and (b) assess and submit
periodic reports on the implementation of the DNA Rules in the case to the Court.
To recall, the instant case involved a charge of rape. The accused Rufino Umanito (Umanito) was found by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Bauang, La Union, Branch 67 guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. Umanito was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and ordered to indemnify the private complainant in the sum of P50,000.00. On appeal, the Court of Appeals offered the judgment of the
trial court. Umanito appealed the decision of the appellate court to this court.
In its 2007 Resolution, the Court acknowledged "many incongruent assertions of the prosecution and the defense."2 At the same time, the alleged
1989 rape of the private complainant, AAA, had resulted in her pregnancy and the birth of a child, a girl hereinafter identified as "BBB." In view of
that fact, a well as the defense of alibi raised by Umanito, the Court deemed uncovering of whether or not Umanito is the father of BBB greatly
determinative of the resolution of the appeal. The Court then observed:
x x x With the advance in genetics and the availability of new technology, it can now be determined with reasonable certainty whether appellant is
the father of AAA's child. If he is not, his acquittal may be ordained. We have pronounced that if it can be conclusively determined that the accused
did not sire the alleged victim's child, this may cast the shadow of reasonable doubt and allow his acquittal on this basis. If he is found not to be the
father, the finding will at least weigh heavily in the ultimate decision in this case. Thus, we are directing appellant, AAA and her child to submit
themselves to deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing under the aegis of the New Rule on DNA Evidence (the Rules), which took effect on 15 October
2007, subject to guidelines prescribed herein.3
The RTC of Bauang, La Union, Branch 67, presided by Judge Ferdinand A. Fe, upon receiving the Resolution of the Court on 9 November 2007,
set the case for hearing on 27 November 20074 to ascertain the feasibility of DNA testing with due regard to the standards set in Sections 4(a), (b),
(c) and (e) of the DNA Rules. Both AAA and BBB (now 17 years old) testified during the hearing. They also manifested their willingness to undergo
DNA examination to determine whether Umanito is the father of BBB.5
A hearing was conducted on 5 December 2007, where the public prosecutor and the counsel for Umanito manifested their concurrence to the
selection of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) as the institution that would conduct the DNA testing. The RTC issued an Order on even date
directing that biological samples be taken from AAA, BBB and Umanito on 9 January 2008 at the courtroom. The Order likewise enjoined the NBI as
follows:
In order to protect the integrity of the biological samples, the [NBI] is enjoined to strictly follow the measures laid down by the Honorable Supreme
Court in the instant case to wit:
Moreover, the court a quo must ensure that the proper chain of custody in the handling of the samples submitted by the parties is adequately borne
in the records, i.e.; that the samples are collected by a neutral third party; that the tested parties are appropriately identified at their sample
collection appointments; that the samples are protected with tamper tape at the collection site; that all persons in possession thereof at each stage
of testing thoroughly inspected the samples for tampering and explained his role in the custody of the samples and the acts he performed in relation
thereto.
The DNA test result shall be simultaneously disclosed to the parties in Court. The [NBI] is, therefore, enjoined not to disclose to the parties in
advance the DNA test results.
The [NBI] is further enjoined to observe the confidentiality of the DNA profiles and all results or other information obtained from DNA testing and is
hereby ordered to preserve the evidence until such time as the accused has been acquitted or served his sentence.6
Present at the hearing held on 9 January 2008 were AAA, BBB, counsel for Umanito, and two representatives from the NBI. The RTC had
previously received a letter from the Officer-in-Charge of the New Bilibid Prisons informing the trial court that Umanito would not be able to attend
the hearing without an authority coming from the Supreme Court.7 The parties manifested in court their willingness to the taking of the DNA sample
from the accused at his detention center at the New Bilibid Prisons on 8 February 2008.8 The prosecution then presented on the witness stand NBI
forensic chemist Mary Ann Aranas, who testified on her qualifications as an expert witness in the field of DNA testing. No objections were posed to
her qualifications by the defense. Aranas was accompanied by a laboratory technician of the NBI DNA laboratory who was to assist in the extraction
of DNA.
DNA samples were thus extracted from AAA and BBB in the presence of Judge Fe, the prosecutor, the counsel for the defense, and DCA De la
Cruz. On 8 February 2008, DNA samples were extracted from Umanito at the New Bilibid Prisons by NBI chemist Aranas, as witnessed by Judge
Fe, the prosecutor, the defense counsel, DCA De la Cruz, and other personnel of the Court and the New Bilibid Prisons.9
The RTC ordered the NBI to submit the result of the DNA examination within thirty (30) days after the extraction of biological samples of Umanito,
and directed its duly authorized representatives to attend a hearing on the admissibility of such DNA evidence scheduled for 10 March 2008. The
events of the 28 March 2008 hearing, as well as the subsequent hearing on 29 April 2008, were recounted in the Report dated 19 May 2008
submitted by Judge Fe. We quote therefrom with approval:
2. That as previously scheduled in the order of the trial court on 09 January 2008, the case was set for hearing on the admissibility of the result of
the DNA testing.
At the hearing, Provincial Prosecutor Maria Nenita A. Opiana, presented Mary Ann T. Aranas, a Forensic Chemist of the National Bureau of
Investigation who testified on the examination she conducted, outlining the procedure she adopted and the result thereof. She further declared that
using the Powerplex 16 System, Deoxyribonuncleic acid analysis on the Buccal Swabs and Blood stained on FTA paper taken from [AAA], [BBB],
and Rufino Umanito y Millares, to determine whether or not Rufino Umanito y Millares is the biological father of [BBB], showed that there is a
Complete Match in all of the fifteen (15) loci tested between the alleles of Rufino Umanito y Milalres and [BBB]; That based on the above findings,

50

there is a 99.9999% probability of paternity that Rufino Umanito y Millares is the biological father of [BBB] (Exhibits "A" and series and "B" and
series).
After the cross-examination of the witness by the defense counsel, the Public Prosecutor offered in evidence Exhibits "A" and sub-markings,
referring to the Report of the Chemistry Division of the National Bureau of Investigation, Manila on the DNA analysis to determine whether or not
Rufino Umanito y Millares is the biological father of [BBB] and Exhibit "B" and sub-markings, referring to the enlarged version of the table of Exhibit
"A," to establish that on the DNA examination conducted on [AAA], [BBB] and the accused Rufino Umanito for the purpose of establishing paternity,
the result is 99.9999% probable. Highly probable.
The defense did not interpose any objection, hence, the exhibits were admitted.
1. That considering that under Section 9, A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC, if the value of the Probability of Paternity is 99.9% or higher, there shall be a
disputable presumption of paternity, the instant case was set for reception of evidence for the accused on April 29, 2008 to controvert the
presumption that he is the biological father of [BBB].
During the hearing on April 29, 2008, the accused who was in court manifested through his counsel that he will not present evidence to dispute the
findings of the Forensic Chemistry Division of the National Bureau of Investigation.
The DNA samples were collected by the forensic chemist of the National Bureau of Investigation whose qualifications as an expert was properly
established adopting the following procedure:
a) The subject sources were asked to gargle and to fill out the reference sample form. Thereafter, the chemists informed them that buccal swabs will
be taken from their mouth and five (5) droplets of blood will also be taken from the ring finger of their inactive hand;
b) Pictures of the subject sources were taken by the NBI Chemist;
c) Buccal swabs were taken from the subject sources three (3) times;
d) Subject sources were made to sign three (3) pieces of paper to serve as label of the three buccal swabs placed inside two (2) separate
envelopes that bear their names;
e) Blood samples were taken from the ring finger of the left hand of the subject sources;
f) Subject sources were made to sign the FTA card of their blood samples.
The buccal swabs and the FTA cards were placed in a brown envelope for air drying for at least one hour.
g) Finger prints of the subject sources were taken for additional identification;
h) The subject sources were made to sign their finger prints.
i) Atty. Ramon J. Gomez, Deputy Court Administrator Reuben dela Cruz and Prosecutor Maria Nenita A. Oplana, in that order, were made to sign as
witnesses to the reference sample forms and the finger prints of the subject sources.
j) After one hour of air drying, the Buccal Swabs and the FTA papers were placed inside a white envelope and sealed with a tape by the NBI
Chemists;
k) The witnesses, Atty. Ramon J. Gomez, Deputy Court Administrator Reuben dela Cruz, Prosecutor Maria Nenita A. Opiana including the NBI
Chemist, affixed their signatures on the sealed white envelope;
l) The subjects sources were made to sign and affix their finger prints on the sealed white envelope;
m) The chemists affixed their signatures on the sealed envelope and placed it in a separate brown envelope;
n) The subjects sources were made to affix their finger prints on their identification places and reference forms.
The same procedure was adopted by the Forensic Chemists of the NBI in the taking of DNA samples from the accused, Rufino Umanito at the New
Bilibid Prison in the afternoon of February 8, 2008.
Mary Ann Aranas, the expert witness testified that at the NBI the sealed envelope was presented to Ms. Demelen dela Cruz, the supervisor of the
Forensic Chemistry Division to witness that the envelope containing the DNA specimens was sealed as it reached the NBI. Photographs of the
envelope in sealed form were taken prior to the conduct of examination.
With the procedure adopted by the Forensic Chemist of the NBI, who is an expert and whose integrity and dedication to her work is beyond
reproach the manner how the biological samples were collected, how they were handled and the chain of custody thereof were properly established
the court is convinced that there is no possibility of contamination of the DNA samples taken from the parties.
At the Forensic Laboratory of the National Bureau of Investigation, the envelopes containing the DNA samples were opened and the specimens
were subjected to sampling, extraction, amplification and analysis. Duplicate analysis were made. The Forensic Chemist, Mary Ann Aranas caused
the examination of the blood samples and the buccal swabs were separately processed by Mrs. Demelen dela Cruz.
In order to arrive at a DNA profile, the forensic chemists adopted the following procedure: (1) Sampling which is the cutting of a portion from the
media (swabs and FTA paper); (2) then subjected the cut portions for extraction to release the DNA; (3) After the DNA was released into the
solution, it was further processed using the formarine chain reaction to amplify the DNA samples for analysis of using the Powerplex 16 System,
which allows the analysis of 16 portions of the DNA samples. The Powerplex 16 System are reagent kits for forensic purposes; (3) After the target,
DNA is multiplied, the amplified products are analyzed using the genetic analyzer. The Powerplex 16 System has 16 markers at the same time. It is
highly reliable as it has already been validated for forensic use. It has also another function which is to determine the gender of the DNA being
examined.
Mary Ann Aranas, the Forensic Chemist, in her testimony explained that the DNA found in all cells of a human being come in pairs except the
mature red blood cells. These cells are rolled up into minute bodies called "chromosomes," which contain the DNA of a person. A human has 23
pairs of chromosomes. For each pair of chromosome, one was found to have originated from the mother, the other must have came from the father.
Using the Powerplex 16 System Results, the variable portions of the DNA called "loci," which were used as the basis for DNA analysis or typing

51

showed the following: under "loci" D3S1358, the genotype of the locus of [AAA] is 15, 16, the genotype of [BBB] is 15, 16, one of the pair of alleles
must have originated and the others from the father. The color for the allele of the mother is red while the father is blue. On matching the allele
which came from the mother was first determined [AAA], has alleles of 15 or 16 but in the geno type of [BBB], 15 was colored blue because that is
the only allele which contain the genotype of the accused Rufino Umanito, the 16 originated from the mother, [AAA]. In this marker [BBB] has a
genotype of 15, 16, 16 is from the mother and 15 is from the father.
The whole process involved the determination which of those alleles originated from the mother and the rest would entail looking on the genotype or
the profile of the father to determine if they matched with those of the child.
In the analysis of the 16 loci by the Forensic Chemists, amel on the 13th row was not included because this is the marker that determines the
gender of the source of the loci. The pair XX represents a female and XY for a male. Rufino Umanito has XY amel and [BBB] and [AAA] have XX
amel. For matching paternity purposes only 15 loci were examined. Of the 15 loci, there was a complete match between the alleles of the loci of
[BBB] and Rufino (Exhibits "A" and "B").
To ensure reliable results, the Standard Operating Procedure of the Forensic Chemistry Division of the NBI in paternity cases is to use buccal
swabs taken from the parties and blood as a back up source.
The said Standard Operating Procedure was adopted in the instant case.
As earlier mentioned, DNA samples consisted of buccal swabs and blood samples taken from the parties by the forensic chemists who adopted
reliable techniques and procedure in collecting and handling them to avoid contamination. The method that was used to secure the samples were
safe and reliable. The samples were taken and handled by an expert, whose qualifications, integrity and dedication to her work is unquestionable,
hence, the possibility of substitution or manipulation is very remote.
The procedure adopted by the DNA section, Forensic Chemistry Division of the National Bureau of Investigation in analyzing the samples was in
accordance with the standards used in modern technology. The comparative analysis of DNA prints of the accused Rufino Umanito and his alleged
child is a simple process called parentage analysis which was made easier with the use of a DNA machine called Genetic Analyzer. To ensure a
reliable result, the NBI secured two (2) DNA types of samples from the parties, the buccal swabs as primary source and blood as secondary source.
Both sources were separately processed and examined and thereafter a comparative analysis was conducted which yielded the same result.
The National Bureau of Investigation DNA Section, Forensic Division is an accredited DNA testing laboratory in the country which maintains a
multimillion DNA analysis equipment for its scientific criminal investigation unit. It is manned by qualified laboratory chemists and technicians who
are experts in the field, like Mary Ann Aranas, the expert witness in the instant case, who is a licensed chemists, has undergone training on the
aspects of Forensic Chemistry fro two (2) years before she was hired as forensic chemists of the NBI and has been continuously attending training
seminars, and workshops which are field related and who has handled more than 200 cases involving DNA extraction or collection or profiling.
The accused did not object to the admission of Exhibits "A" and "B" inclusive of their sub-markings. He did not also present evidence to controvert
the results of the DNA analysis.
Section 6. A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC provides that: "If the value of the Probability of Paternity is 99.9% or higher, there shall be a disputable presumption
of paternity.
DNA analysis conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation Forensic Division on the buccal swabs and blood stained on FTA paper taken from
[AAA], [BBB] and Rufino Umanito y MillAres for DNA analysis to determine whether or not Rufino Umanito y Millares is the biological father of [BBB]
gave the following result:
"FINDINGS:
Deoxyribonuncleic acid analysis using the
Powerplex 16 System conducted on the
above-mentioned, specimens gave the
following profiles;
xxx
xxx
There is a COMPLETE MATCH in all the fifteen (15) loci tested between the alleles of Rufino Umanito y Millares and [BBB].
REMARKS:
Based on the above findings, there is a
99.9999% Probability of Paternity that
Rufino Umanito y Millares is the biological
Father of [BBB]"
Disputable presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence (Rule 131, Section 3, Rules of
Court).
The disputable presumption that was established as a result of the DNA testing was not contradicted and overcome by other evidence considering
that the accused did not object to the admission of the results of the DNA testing (Exhibits "A" and "B" inclusive of sub-markings) nor presented
evidence to rebut the same.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the trial court rules that based on the result of the DNA analysis conducted by the National Bureau of
Investigation, Forensic Division, RUFINO UMANITO y MILLARES is the biological father of [BBB].10
Umanitos defense of alibi, together with his specific assertion that while he had courted AAA they were not sweethearts, lead to a general theory on
his part that he did not engage in sexual relations with the complainant. The DNA testing has evinced a contrary conclusion, and that as testified to
by AAA, Umanito had fathered the child she gave birth to on 5 April 1990, nine months after the day she said she was raped by Umanito.
Still, Umanito filed a Motion to Withdraw Appeal dated 16 February 2009. By filing such motion, Umanito is deemed to have acceded to the rulings
of the RTC and the Court of Appeals finding him guilty of the crime of rape, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and the
indemnification of the private complainant in the sum of P50,000.00. Given that the results of the Court-ordered DNA testing conforms with the
conclusions of the lower courts, and that no cause is presented for us to deviate from the penalties imposed below, the Court sees no reason to
deny Umanitos Motion to Withdraw Appeal. Consequently, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 15 February 2006 would otherwise
be deemed final if the appeal is not withdrawn.1avvphi1
WHEREFORE, the Motion to Withdraw Appeal dated 16 February 2009 is GRANTED. The instant case is now CLOSED and TERMINATED.
SO ORDERED.

52

53

G.R. No. 185709

February 18, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
MICHAEL A. HIPONA, Appellant.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Michael A. Hipona (appellant) was convicted by Decision of September 10, 20021 of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 18
with "Rape with Homicide (and Robbery)" [sic]. His conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals by Decision of January 28, 2008.2
The Second Amended Information charged appellant together with Romulo Seva, Jr. and one John Doe with Robbery with Rape and Homicide as
follows:
That on or about June 12, 2000 at 1:00 oclock dawn at District 3, Isla Copa, Consolation, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating together, and mutually helping one another, by means of
force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with the offended party (AAA) who is the Aunt of
accused Michael A. Hipona, she being the younger sister of the accuseds mother and against her will, that on occasion of the said rape, accused,
with evident premeditation, treachery and abuse of superior strength, and dwelling, with intent to kill and pursuant to their conspiracy, choked and
strangulated said AAA which strangulation resulted to the victims untimely death. That on the said occasion the victims brown bag worth
P3,800.00; cash money in the amount of no less than P5,000.00; and gold necklace were stolen by all accused but the gold necklace was later on
recovered and confiscated in the person of accused Michael A. Hipona.3 (emphasis and underscoring in the original)
The following facts are not disputed.
AAA4 was found dead on the morning of June 12, 2000 in her house in Isla Copa, Consolation, Cagayan de Oro City. She was raped, physically
manhandled and strangled, which eventually led to her death. Her furniture and belongings were found strewn on the floor. AAAs necklace with two
heart-shaped pendants bearing her initials and handbag were likewise missing.
Upon investigation, the local police discovered a hole bored into the lawanit wall of the comfort room inside AAAs house, big enough for a person of
medium build to enter. The main electrical switch behind a "shower curtain" located at the "back room" was turned off, drawing the police to infer
that the perpetrator is familiar with the layout of AAAs house.
SPO1 Bladimir Agbalog of the local police thus called for a meeting of AAAs relatives during which AAAs sister BBB, who is appellants mother,
declared that her son-appellant had told her that "Mama, Im sorry, I did it because I did not have the money," and he was thus apologizing for AAAs
death. BBB executed an affidavit affirming appellants confession.5
On the basis of BBBs information, the police arrested appellant on June 13, 2000 or the day after the commission of the crime. He was at the time
wearing AAAs missing necklace. When on even date he was presented to the media and his relatives, appellant apologized but qualified his
participation in the crime, claiming that he only acted as a look-out, and attributed the crime to his co-accused Romulo B. Seva, Jr. (Seva) alias
"Gerpacs" and a certain "Reypacs."
A day after his arrest or on June 14, 2000, appellant in an interview which was broadcasted, when asked by a radio reporter "Why did you do it to
your aunt?," answered "Because of my friends and peers." When pressed if he was intoxicated or was on drugs when he "did it," appellant
answered that he did it because of his friends and of poverty.
Appellants co-accused Seva was later arrested on July 9, 2000, while "Reypacs" remained at large.
Appellant entered a plea of not guilty while Seva refused to enter a plea, hence, the trial court entered a "not guilty" plea on his behalf.
Post mortem examination of AAA revealed the following findings:
Rigor mortis, generalized, Livor mortis, back, buttocks, flanks, posterior aspect of neck and extremities (violaceous).
Face, markedly livid. Nailbeds, cyanotic. With extensive bilateral subconjunctival hemorrhages and injections. Petecchial hemorrhages are likewise,
noted on the face and upper parts of neck.
ABRASIONS, with fibrin: curvilinear; three (3) in number; measuring 1.1x0.4 cms., 0.8x0.3 cms., and 0.6x0.1 cm.; within an area of 2.8x1.1 cms. at
the left side of the neck, antero-lateral aspect.
HEMATOMAS, violaceous; hemispherical in shapes, highly characteristic of bite marks: 3.5 x 0.4 cms. and 4.1x1.4 cms.; located at the right lower
buccal region, lateral and medial aspects, respectively.
SOFT TISSUE DEFECT, with irregular edges; 2.5 x 2.7 cms.; left thigh, distal 3rd, medial aspect; involving only the skin and underlying adipose
tissues; with an approximate depth of 1.6 cms.
ABRASIONS, with fibrin, curvilinear in shapes; 0.6x0.3 cm. and 0.5x0.3cm., right upper eyelid; 0.4x0.2 cms. and 0.3x 0.2 cms, right upper arm,
distal 3rd, medial aspect; 0.5x0.3 cm., right forearm, proximal 3rd, medial aspect; 0.7x0.3 cm., left elbow; 0.5x0.2 cm., left forearm, middle 3rd,
posterior aspect.
HEMATOMA, violaceous: 2.2x2.5 cms., right upper arm, middle 3rd, medial aspect
DEPRESSED FRACTURE, body of thyroid cartilage, lateral aspects, bilateral.
PETECCHIAL HEMORRHAGES, subpleural, bilateral, and sub-epicardial.
xxxx
GENITAL FINDINGS:

54

Subject is menstruating. Pubic hairs, fully grown, abundant. Labiae majora and minora, both coaptated. Vestibular mucosa, pinkish, smooth.
Hymen, short, thin with COMPLETE, FRESH HYMENAL LACERATION (with fibrin and fresh reddish soft blood clot) at 6:00 oclock position, and
extending to the posterior aspect of vestibular mucosa up to the area of fourchette. Hymenal orifice originally annular, admits a glass tube of 2.5
cms. diameter with moderate resistance. Vaginal rugosities, prominent. Cervix, firm. Uterus, small.
VVVVVVVVVVV
CAUSE OF DEATH: Asphyxia by strangulation (manual).
REMARKS: Genital injury noted, age of which is compatible with sexual intercourse(s) with man/men on or about June 11-12 2000.6 (underscoring
supplied)
Albeit appellants mother BBB refused to take the witness stand, SPO1 Agbalog and Consuelo Maravilla, another relative of appellant, testified on
BBBs declaration given during the meeting of relatives.
Appellant refused to present evidence on his behalf while Seva presented evidence to controvert the evidence on his alleged participation in the
crime.
By Decision of September 10, 2002, the trial court, after considering circumstantial evidence, viz:
Based on the foregoing circumstances, specially of his failure to explain why he was in possession of victims stolen necklace with pendants, plus
his confession to the media in the presence of his relatives, and to another radio reporter "live-on-the-air" about a day after his arrest, sealed his
destiny to perdition and points to a conclusion beyond moral certainty that his hands were soiled and sullied by blood of his own Aunt.7
(underscoring supplied),
found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of "Rape with Homicide (and Robbery)." [sic]. It acquitted Seva. Thus the trial court disposed:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds accused MICHAEL HIPONA GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of a special complex
crime of Rape with Homicide (and Robbery) punishable under Articles 266-A and 266-B, of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 8353,
and after taking into account the generic aggravating circumstance of dwelling, without a mitigating circumstance, accused MICHAEL HIPONA is
hereby sentenced and SO ORDERED to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH by lethal injection, plus the accessory penalties. He is hereby SO
ORDERED to pay the heirs the sum of One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos, as indemnity. Another One Hundred Thousand
(P100,000.00) Pesos, as moral damages. In order to further give accused Michael Hipona a lesson that would serve as a warning to others, he is
also directed and SO ORDERED to pay another Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos, as exemplary damages.
For failure on the part of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused Romulo Seva, Jr., beyond reasonable doubt, it is SO ORDERED that he
should be acquitted and it is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged, and is hereby released from custody unless detained for other legal ground.
Pursuant to Section 22 of R.A. 7659, and Section 10 of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court, let the entire record be forwarded to the Supreme Court for
automatic review."8 (emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)
On elevation of the records of the case, the Court, following People v. Mateo,9 referred the same to the Court of Appeals.
Appellant maintains that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.10
As stated early on, the Court of Appeals sustained appellants conviction. It, however, modified the penalty11 imposed, and the amount of damages
awarded by the trial court. Thus the appellate court, by the challenged Decision of January 28, 2008, disposed:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the lower court is hereby AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
1. That the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua;
2. That appellant is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of AAA the following: the sum of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity; P75,000.00 as moral damages;
and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.12 (underscoring supplied)
The records of the case were elevated to this Court in view of the Notice of Appeal filed by appellant. Both the People and appellant manifested that
they were no longer filing any supplemental briefs.
The appeal is bereft of merit.
For circumstantial evidence to suffice to convict an accused, the following requisites must concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the
facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.13
The confluence of the following established facts and circumstances sustains the appellate courts affirmance of appellants conviction: First,
appellant was frequently visiting AAA prior to her death, hence, his familiarity with the layout of the house; second, appellant admitted to his
relatives and the media that he was present during commission of the crime, albeit only as a look-out; third, appellant was in possession of AAAs
necklace at the time he was arrested; and fourth, appellant extrajudicially confessed to the radio reporter that he committed the crime due to his
peers and because of poverty.
Appellant argues that he should only be held liable for robbery and not for the complex crime of "Rape with Homicide (and Robbery)" [sic]. He cites
the testimony of prosecution witness Aida Viloria-Magsipoc, DNA expert of the National Bureau of Investigation, that she found the vaginal smears
taken from AAA to be negative of appellants DNA.
Appellants argument fails. Presence of spermatozoa is not essential in finding that rape was committed, the important consideration being not the
emission of semen but the penetration of the female genitalia by the male organ.14 As underlined above, the post-mortem examination of AAAs
body revealed fresh hymenal lacerations which are consistent with findings of rape.
Not only does appellants conviction rest on an unbroken chain of circumstantial evidence. It rests also on his unbridled admission to the media.
People v. Andan instructs:

55

Appellants confessions to the media were likewise properly admitted. The confessions were made in response to questions by news reporters, not
by the police or any other investigating officer. We have held that statements spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters on a televised
interview are deemed voluntary and are admissible in evidence.15 (underscoring supplied)
Appellant argues, however, that the questions posed to him by the radio broadcaster were vague for the latter did not specify what crime was being
referred to when he questioned appellant. But, as the appellate court posited, appellant should have qualified his answer during the interview if
indeed there was a need. Besides, he had the opportunity to clarify his answer to the interview during the trial. But, as stated earlier, he opted not to
take the witness stand.1avvphi1
The Court gathers, however, that from the evidence for the prosecution, robbery was the main intent of appellant, and AAAs death resulted by
reason of or on the occasion thereof. Following Article 294(1)16 and Article 62(1)117 of the Revised Penal Code, rape should have been
appreciated as an aggravating circumstance instead.18
A word on the amount of exemplary damages awarded. As the Court finds the award of P100,000 exemplary damages excessive, it reduces it to
P25,000, in consonance with prevailing jurisprudence.19
WHEREFORE, the Decision of January 28, 2008 of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant, Michael A. Hipona
is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Robbery with Homicide under Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code. He is accordingly sentenced to
reclusion perpetua. And the award of exemplary damages is reduced to P25,000. In all other respects, the Decision is affirmed.
SO ORDERED.

56

G.R. No. 185708

September 29, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
JUANITO CABIGQUEZ y ALASTRA, Appellant.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
On appeal is the Decision1 dated July 9, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA), Mindanao Station, which affirmed the Decision2 dated October 29,
2003 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 18 finding appellant Juanito Cabigquez y Alastra (Cabigquez) and Romulo
Grondiano y Soco (Grondiano) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery (Criminal Case No. 2001-816), and also convicting appellant Cabigquez
of rape (Criminal Case No. 2001-815), both crimes committed against private complainant AAA,3 a 43-year old widow and mother of ten (10)
children. Grondiano decided to withdraw his appeal before the appellate court.4 Hence, this review shall consider only Cabigquezs appeal.
Below are the facts, as culled from the records of both the trial and appellate courts.
In the evening of March 26, 2001, AAA and her three minor children BBB, CCC, and DDD5 slept inside AAAs small sari-sari store which was
annexed through the exterior balcony of her house at Purok 1-A, Tablon in Cagayan de Oro City. AAAs head was close to the door, while a cabinet
stood at her right side. She left the 50-watt incandescent bulb on as they slept through the night.6
At around 3:30 a.m., March 27, 2001, AAA was awakened when clothes fell on her face. When she looked up, she saw a man whose face was
covered with a handkerchief and wearing a camouflage jacket and cycling shorts. He immediately poked a gun at her. AAA shouted "Ayyy!," rousing
her three children from sleep.7 Despite the cover on the burglars face, BBB was able to identify him as Romulo Grondiano, one of their neighbors,
based on the hanging mole located below his left eye.8 Armed with a stainless handgun,9 Grondiano ordered AAA and her children to lie face
down.10 Though stricken with fear, BBB noticed that Grondiano had a companion who stayed at the balcony keeping watch.11 Grondiano then
ransacked the store, taking with him P3,000.00 cash from the cabinet and P7,000.00 worth of grocery items. Before he left, Grondiano pointed the
gun at AAAs back and warned them not to make any noise.12
As soon as Grondiano left the store, the other man entered. BBB identified the man as appellant Juanito Cabigquez as the latter did not conceal his
face. Armed with Grondianos gun, Cabigquez stripped AAA of her short pants and underwear, placed a pillow on her lower abdomen and mounted
her from behind. He lifted and twisted one of her legs and pinned the other. AAA shouted "Ayaw!" (No!), but offered no further resistance. Cabigquez
inserted his penis into AAAs vagina, and proceeded to ravish her in full view of her children, and even as the latter cried for mercy. Before he left,
Cabigquez threatened to kill AAA and her children if they would tell anyone about the incident.13
Afraid for their lives, AAA and her children remained prostrate on the floor even after the two malefactors had left. Shortly thereafter, they decided to
proceed to the house of AAAs older son, EEE, and asked for help. AAA failed to disclose to her son the identities of the two men. Meanwhile, BBB,
fearing retaliation from the two men, decided not to divulge the identities of Cabigquez and Grondiano to her mother and brother.14
That same morning, March 27, 2001, AAA reported the incident to the Puerto Police Station. No criminal complaint, however, was filed since AAA
was still uncertain of the identities of the two men. AAA was physically examined by Dr. Cristilda O. Villapae and Dr. Riman Ricardo, resident
physicians at the Northern Mindanao Medical Center.15 Dr. Villapaes examination revealed that the smear recovered from AAAs vagina was
positive for spermatozoa,16 while Dr. Ricardo found a two-centimeter contusion on AAAs left hand dorsum.17
On May 24, 2001, Cabigquez was arrested for possession of illegal drugs.18 Grondiano was likewise arrested on May 26, 2001 also for possession
of illegal drugs.19 With the two men incarcerated, and now certain of their safety, BBB finally mustered the courage to reveal the identities of
Cabigquez and Grondiano to her mother.20
On July 18, 2001, two Informations were filed against Cabigquez and Grondiano, viz:
Criminal Case No. 2001-816 (For: Robbery)
The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses JUANITO CABIGQUEZ y ALASTRA, alias "DODOY", and ROMULO GRONDIANO y SOCO,
alias "Molok", of the crime they committed, as follows:
That on March 27, 2001, at more or less 3:30 oclock in the early morning in a store located at Purok 1-A, Barangay Tablon, Cagayan de Oro City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and helping with one another,
with intent to gain and violence or intimidation of persons, did then and there wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously take, rob and carry away cash
Php3,000.00 and assorted [grocery] stocks valued Php7,000.00 all in all amounting to Php10,000.00, owned by and belonging to one [AAA], in the
following manner: that accused Romulo Grondiano intimidated the offended party with a gun pointed to her and her three children and ordered them
to lay on the floor with face down and then took, robbed and carried away the aforementioned valuable personal things while Juanito Cabigquez y
Alastra acting/serving as lookout at the door of the store, to the damage and prejudice of the offended party, in the total sum of Php10,000.00,
Philippine Currency.
Contrary to and in violation to Article 294, par. 5, of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.21
Criminal Case No. 2001-815 (For: Rape)
The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses, JUANITO CABIGQUEZ Y ALASTRA ALIAS "DODOY", of the crime of RAPE that he committed
as follows:
That on March 27, 2001, at more or less 3:30 oclock or thereabout, in the early morning, at Purok 1A, Tablon, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a gun, and with the use thereof, by means of force, and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledged (sic) of the offended party [AAA], against her will [and] in
the presence and full view of her children.
Contrary to and in violation to (sic) Article 266-A (Formerly under Art. 335) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 8353.22
Both accused pleaded not guilty to the charges.23 During the trial, Cabigquez admitted that on the night of March 26, 2001, he slept in the house of
Leonila Omilao, a neighbor of Cabigquez and AAA.24 He admitted that he did not have any quarrel with AAA and found no possible reason why
AAA would file the complaints and testify against him.25 Omilao herself testified that Cabigquez was in her house on the night of the incident and

57

even saw the latter sleeping in the kitchen. During Omilaos cross-examination, however, the trial court noted Silvina Cabigquez, appellants
daughter, coaching Omilao in her answers.26
On October 21, 2002, the trial court, on motion by the defense, ordered the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in Manila to conduct a
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analysis on the sperm taken from AAAs vagina. On May 21, 2003, NBI Forensic Chemist III Aida Viloria Magsipoc
testified that the sample collected from AAA did not match Cabigquezs DNA profile since the specimen submitted to them were mere vaginal
discharges from AAA.27
On October 29, 2003, the trial court rendered judgment convicting Cabigquez and Grondiano of the crimes charged. The dispositive portion of said
decision reads:
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds accused JUANITO CABIGQUEZ GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape
under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, punishable under Article 266-B of the same Code, and there being one aggravating circumstance
[the used (sic) of a deadly weapon (firearm)] without a[ny] mitigating circumstance, accused JUANITO CABIGQUEZ is hereby sentenced and is SO
ORDERED to suffer the supreme penalty of Death by lethal injection, including its accessory penalties. He is further directed and is SO ORDERED
to pay the victim the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as indemnity, plus another TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS
(P25,000.00), as moral damages. Pursuant to Section 22 of R.A. 7659 and Section 10 of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court, let the entire record of this
case be forwarded to the Supreme Court for automatic review.
FURTHERMORE, the Court likewise finds accused JUANITO CABIGQUEZ and ROMULO GRONDIANO GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
Crime of Robbery punishable under paragraph 5 of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, and [there] being no aggravating nor mitigating
circumstance, and after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, accused JUANITO CABIGQUEZ and ROMULO GRONDIANO are hereby
sentenced and are SO ORDERED to serve the [penalty of] imprisonment of TWO (2) YEARS, TEN (10) MONTHS AND TWENTY (20) DAYS OF
PRISION CORRECCIONAL, as the MINIMUM, to SIX (6) YEARS, ONE (1) MONTH AND ELEVEN (11) DAYS OF PRISION MAYOR, as the
MAXIMUM, including its accessory penalties, plus further SO ORDERED to pay the stolen items and cash in the sum of TEN THOUSAND PESOS
(P10,000.00).
SO ORDERED. Cagayan de Oro City, October 29, 2003.28
The records of the case were elevated to this Court on automatic review. Pursuant to our ruling in People v. Mateo,29 the case was referred to the
CA.
In his appeal, appellant maintained his defense of alibi and denial. He questioned the accuracy and credibility of BBBs testimony given her failure
to immediately divulge the identity of the perpetrators after the incident. Appellant also noted that AAAs lone interjection, while she was allegedly
being raped by him, can hardly be considered as a manifest resistance.30 The defense also argued that the prosecution failed to establish
conspiracy since BBB did not actually see that Cabigquez was on the balcony while the robbery was being committed.31
By Decision dated July 9, 2008, the CA upheld the RTC in convicting appellant of both crimes of robbery and rape. The CA found BBBs testimony
candid and not prompted by ill-motive. As to BBBs failure to promptly implicate Grondiano and Cabigquez for the crimes, the appellate court ruled
that this cannot be taken against her in the light of serious threats made by said accused on their family. The alleged contradictions in the
testimonies of AAA and BBB were likewise not fatal to the case of the prosecution as they bear no materiality to the commission of the crime. The
CA also noted that the accused were able to consummate their criminal acts without any physical resistance from the victims who could not even
cry loudly because they were ordered at gunpoint not to make any noise. It rejected the defense of alibi put up by Cabigquez in view of his
admission that he stayed at a house within the vicinity of AAAs store.32
The CA thus decreed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed October 29, 2003 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Misamis Oriental, 10th Judicial
Region, Branch 18, Cagayan de Oro City, convicting Juanito A. Cabigquez, the lone appellant before Us, for the crimes of Robbery and Rape, is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that Juanito A. Cabigquez is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for the crime
of Rape.
SO ORDERED.33
Before this Court, appellant Cabigquez reiterates the following arguments:
I.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE FAILURE OF
THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THEIR GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE INCREDIBLE AND INCONSISTENT TESTIMONY OF
THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES.
III.
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS COMMITTED ROBBERY, THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN ORDERING
THEM TO PAY THE COMPLAINANT P10,000.00 AS ACTUAL DAMAGES.
IV.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS CONSPIRACY IN THE CASE AT BAR.34
We sustain the ruling of the CA.
The factual findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the appellate court, indubitably prove that appellant raped AAA even if the specimen obtained from
the vaginal swabs and submitted to the NBI failed to match appellants DNA profile. Rape is committed by a man who shall have carnal knowledge
of a woman through force, threat or intimidation.35 The commission of rape was clearly shown by testimonial and documentary evidence; the
defense submits that it is the identity of the perpetrator which is not duly established.

58

For purposes of criminal investigation, DNA identification is indeed a fertile source of both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence.36 In this case,
however, the result of the DNA test is rendered inconclusive to exculpate or inculpate the appellant since the sample tested by the NBI merely
contained vaginal discharges. In the laboratory test earlier conducted by Dr. Villapae on the vaginal swab obtained from AAAs genitalia, the
presence of spermatozoa was confirmed. This notwithstanding, the totality of evidence satisfactorily established that it was indeed appellant who
raped AAA.
AAAs daughter, BBB, who witnessed the entire incident which happened inside their store on the night in question, positively identified appellant as
the one who raped her mother against the latters will by threatening her and her children with a handgun he was then carrying. BBBs unflinching
and consistent testimony, when taken together with Dr. Villapaes findings and AAAs own declarations in court, provides sufficient basis for the
conviction of appellant for rape.
Quoted herein are the relevant portions of BBBs testimony on direct examination as to her identification of appellant as her mothers rapist, viz:
Q Now, [BBB], you said that you are 13 years old and you said a while ago you sworn that you will tell the truth, can you remember that?
A Yes, sir.
Q Okay now, are you going to tell the truth and nothing but the truth before this Honorable Court?
A Yes, sir I will tell the truth.
Q Do you know what will happen to you if you tell a lie in court?
A Yes, sir I will be imprisoned.
Q Do you want to be imprisoned?
A No, sir.
Q So, you will tell the truth nothing but the truth?
A Yes, sir.
Q Do you know accused Romulo Grondiano?
A Yes, sir because he is our neighbor.
xxxx
Q Do you also know accused Juanito Cabigquez who is accused for rape and co-accused in robbery?
A Yes, sir he is also our neighbor.
Q For how long have you known Juanito Cabigquez before March 27, 2001?
A Since I came that age of reason I already knew Juanito Cabigquez.
Q Is Juanito Cabigquez also a resident of Purok 1-A at Tablon?
A Yes, sir.
Q Do you also know the nickname of Juanito Cabigquez?
A Its Dodoy.
Q If Juanito Cabigquez is inside this courtroom, can you point to him?
A Note: Witness pointed to a person who when asked of his name identified himself as Juanito Cabigquez.
Q Okay, on March 27, 2001 at about 3:30 early in the morning, do you remember where were you?
A I was inside our store sleeping together with our mother.
Q Aside from you and your mother, who were other persons who were with you?
A Together with my two (2) siblings.
xxxx
Q Now, while you were sleeping together with your mother and your two (2) younger siblings at that time, what happened?
xxxx
A The three (3) of us were awakened because of the shout of our mother.
Q Who is that us?
A I together with my two (2) siblings.
Q Your mother also woke up?
A Yes, sir.

59

Q Now, after you were awakened by the shout of your mother, what did you observe, if there was any?
A I saw my mother knelt down and I came nearer and then I embraced her because I thought she was dreaming but I saw Romulo Grondiano with a
gun.
xxxx
Q Alright, what happened while you saw accused Romulo Grondiano already at the door of your store of your mother holding a gun and your
mother was kneeling?
A He ordered us to lay face down.
Q After Romulo Grondiano ordered you to lay face down, what did you, your mother and your two (2) siblings do?
A I let my mother lay face down.
Q How about you?
A I also lay face down.
Q How about your two (2) younger siblings?
A They also lay face down.
Q Alright, while the four (4) of you were lying face down, what did you observe?
A I noticed that he had a companion who is at our balcony.
Q How were you able to notice that he has a companion?
A Because we had a chair made of bamboo and then if somebody or a person hit it, it will sound.
xxxx
Q Now, after Romulo Grondiano took all those things that you have enumerated a while ago, where did Romulo Grondiano go?
A He pointed a gun at my mothers back and then ordered us not to move.
xxxx
Q Alright, after Romulo Grondiano told you, your mother and your two (2) younger siblings not to move, where did Romulo Grondiano go?
A He went to the balcony and then Juanito Cabigquez replaced him (Romulo) in going up, he (Juanito) went inside our store.
xxxx
Q Alright, you testified a while ago that after Romulo Grondiano went inside your store he passed by the balcony of your house, then co-accused
Juanito Cabigquez came in, where did Juanito Cabigquez come in?
A He entered in our store.
Q The same store where you, your mother and two (2) younger siblings were staying at that time?
A Yes, sir.
Q How were you able to recognize that it was Juanito Cabigquez who came in?
A Because I saw him.
Q When you saw Juanito Cabigquez, were you still lying face down or were you already sitting?
A I was already lying face down.
Q How were you able to see him?
A Because I looked back at the door because I thought that Romulo Grondiano already left but then I saw Juanito Cabigquez came in and replaced
Romulo Grondiano.
Q This Juanito Cabigquez who came in after Romulo Grondiano went out, is he the same Juanito Cabigquez the co-accused for robbery and
accused in rape case?
A Yes, sir.
Q If he is inside this courtroom, can you point him again?
A Note: Witness pointed again to a person who when asked of his name identified himself as Juanito Cabigquez.
Q After Juanito Cabigquez came in inside the store, what did you observe?
A He removed the shortpants of my mother and then he got the pillow of my mother and placed it under her abdomen.
xxxx

60

Q Now, what was the position of your mother when Juanito Cabigquez took off the shortpants of your mother?
A She was still lying face down.
Q What was the position of your mother when Juanito Cabigquez put the pillow under her abdomen?
A She was still lying face down.
Q By the way, when Juanito Cabigquez entered the store, was the light still on?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, you said that your mother shouted when Juanito Cabigquez came in. My question is, when did your mother actually shout?
A When Juanito Cabigquez was removing the shortpants of my mother.
COURT: (to the witness)
Q Can you tell the Court what kind of shout your mother did?
A My mother shouted "ay!"
PROS. M. NOLASCO: (contg.)
Q Now, was Juanito able to take off the shortpants of your mother?
A Yes, sir because it was a gartered shortpants.
Q Now, how about the panty of your mother?
A It was removed together with the shortpants.
Q Now, after the shortpants and panty of your mother were taken off and the pillow was placed under her abdomen, what next did you observe?
A Juanito Cabigquez mounted on my mother.
Q And then, what did Juanito do when he mounted to your mother?
A He did a push and pull motion.
Q How about your two (2) younger siblings, were they still awake at that time?
A Yes, sir, they were crying.
Q How about you?
A I also cried.
Q When you noticed that he (Juanito Cabigquez) entered your store, was he carrying a gun?
xxxx
A He was bringing a gun.
xxxx
Q Can you demonstrate the length of the gun that you saw?
A The gun which Juanito Cabigquez was bringing was the same gun Romulo brought.
Q How about your mother while Juanito Cabigquez was already mounted on her and make a push and pull motion, what did your mother do?
A My mother was crying.
xxxx
Q You said that you, your mother and your two (2) younger siblings were crying while Juanito Cabigquez mounted on your mother and made a push
and pull motion, what happened after that?
A He pointed his gun at the back of my mother and then told us not to tell to anybody because they will return and kill us.
Q Now, after Juanito Cabigquez warned you not to tell anybody otherwise they will return and kill you, what did Juanito Cabigquez do?
A He went up to the balcony.
xxxx
Q How about Juanito Cabigquez, when he entered your store of your mother and raped your mother, what was he wearing?
A He was wearing a white t-shirt and maong pants.
COURT: (to the witness)

61

Q Was it long or short?

A Long pants.
x x x x 37 (Emphasis supplied.)
Appellant asserts that it is significant that AAA herself did not recognize him and his co-accused despite her familiarity with them as they were her
customers in her store. It was pointed out that the identification of the perpetrators was supplied solely by her daughter BBB, who should not have
been given any credence in view of her inconsistent declarations such as when she testified that when she woke up, her mother was kneeling
contrary to the latters testimony that when clothes fell on her face, she was awakened and that her mother shouted but a gun was pointed to her.
Moreover, BBB saw the accused several times after the alleged crimes transpired and yet she did not manifest any alarm even when they reported
the matter to the police; it was only after the accused were detained that their identities were revealed. In the light of serious discrepancies in the
testimonies of prosecution witnesses, appellant maintains that BBBs identification of the perpetrators of robbery and rape was unreliable and
doubtful.38
We are not persuaded.
While it is true that the most natural reaction for victims of crimes is to strive to remember the faces of their assailants and the manner in which the
craven acts are committed,39 in this case, AAA cannot be faulted for failing to recognize appellant as her rapist though the latter was their neighbor.
It must be recalled, as narrated by AAA and BBB, they were all still lying face down when appellant suddenly entered the store right after his coaccused Grondiano exited through the balcony taking the loot with him. BBB recounted that her mother was still lying face down when appellant
removed her mothers short pants and panty, placed a pillow below her abdomen and then proceeded to rape her. It was BBB who had the
opportunity to look at this second person who entered their house because she looked back at the door thinking that Grondiano (the one who first
entered the store) already left, but then appellant immediately came in after Grondiano. Although AAA was able to shout at that time, she could not
move because she was afraid that her three children, who were already crying, will be harmed.40
As to the alleged inconsistency in the position of her mother when accused Grondiano entered their store, the same is inexistent considering that
AAA was relating the exact moment when she woke up and realized the presence of an intruder because clothes fell on her face, while BBB who
was awakened by the shout of her mother, simply described her mother then already in a kneeling position as she woke up first. BBB had thought
her mother was just dreaming but then she saw Grondiano already inside the house with a gun.
Neither would BBBs delay in revealing the identities of the perpetrators to the police taint her identification of appellant as the one who raped her
mother and conspirator of Grondiano in robbing their store. Failure to immediately reveal the identity of a perpetrator of a felony does not affect,
much less impair, the credibility of witnesses, more so if such delay is adequately explained.41 BBB sufficiently explained her action in not
immediately divulging to her mother and brother nor reporting to the police whom she saw inside their house that early morning of March 27, 2001.
She was afraid that the assailants would make good their threat that they will return and kill their family if they reported the incident to anybody. But
when a couple of months later appellant and his co-accused Grondiano were arrested on drug charges, BBB finally felt it was safe to come out in
the open and inform the police of the identities of the two men who robbed their house, one of whom subsequently raped her mother (appellant).
Appellant cannot seek acquittal on the basis of the negative result of the DNA test on the specimen conducted by the NBI.
A positive DNA match is unnecessary when the totality of the evidence presented before the court points to no other possible conclusion, i.e.,
appellant raped the private offended party. A positive DNA match may strengthen the evidence for the prosecution, but an inconclusive DNA test
result may not be sufficient to exculpate the accused, particularly when there is sufficient evidence proving his guilt. Notably, neither a positive DNA
match of the semen nor the presence of spermatozoa is essential in finding that rape was committed. The important consideration in rape cases is
not the emission of semen but the penetration of the female genitalia by the male organ.42
Moreover, it is evident that the rape of AAA was committed in the presence and in full view of her three minor children. Thirteen (13)-year old BBB,
as well as her two minor siblings who were present at the time when the rape was committed, was already old enough to sense the bestiality being
committed against their own mother.43 Such circumstance, as recited in the last portion of the Information for Criminal Case No. 2001-815 is, by
itself, sufficient to qualify the rape under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code,44 as amended. Consequently, the CA was correct in affirming the
conviction of appellant for qualified rape.
With respect to the charge of robbery, we find no merit in appellants argument that the prosecution failed to establish that he conspired with coaccused Grondiano in stealing goods from private complainants store. He asserts that there was no proof that he was outside the store when the
crime of robbery was being committed; private complainant and her daughter merely surmised that another person was outside the store because
of a creaking sound created by a bamboo chair, but they actually did not see that person or if there was indeed that person.451avvphi1
On this issue, we hold that the CA correctly ruled that conspiracy was sufficiently proven by circumstantial evidence on record, thus:
We also find that the trial court correctly appreciated conspiracy against Cabigquez with respect [to] the crime of robbery. There is conspiracy when
two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Direct proof of previous agreement to
commit a crime is not necessary. Conspiracy may be shown through circumstantial evidence, deduced from the mode and manner in which the
offense was perpetrated, or inferred upon the acts of the accused themselves when such lead to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and
community of interest.
Neither [AAA] nor [BBB] saw Cabigquez acting as a lookout outside the store. However, the creaking sound coming from the balcony and the fact
that [BBB] saw Cabigquez go inside the store, as soon as Grondiano left, reasonably verify a discernment that someone stood by outside and close
to the stores entrance during the looting, and that such person was Cabigquez. The fact that only Grondiano concealed his face reasonably
indicates a prior agreement between the two (2) malefactors for Cabigquez to act as a lookout in the commission of robbery. After raping [AAA],
Cabigquez also warned of killing [AAA and her children] if they told anyone about the incident, which threat contributed to the common sentiment of
concealing both crimes of robbery and rape. These circumstances sufficiently establish a joint purpose and design, and a community of interest,
between Cabigquez and Grondiano, in committing the crime of robbery.46
On the matter of actual damages awarded by the trial court, appellant questions the amount thereof, insisting there was no basis for the actual cost
of the items taken from the store.
We find no reversible error committed by the CA in sustaining such award. In People v. Martinez,47 this Court ruled that the trial court has the power
to take judicial notice of the value of stolen goods because these are matters of public knowledge or capable of unquestionable demonstration.
Judicial cognizance, which is based on considerations of expediency and convenience, displace evidence since, being equivalent to proof, it fulfills
the object which the evidence is intended to achieve. Surely, matters like the value of the appliances, canned goods and perfume are undeniably
within public knowledge and easily capable of unquestionable demonstration.48 Here, what is involved are common goods for everyday use and
ordinary stocks found in small sari-sari stores like private complainants store, i.e., milk, soap, coffee, sugar, liquor and cigarettes. The RTC was

62

thus correct in granting the reasonable amount of P10,000.00 as computed by the private complainant representing the value of stolen merchandise
from her store.
Further, the Court deems it proper to adjust the sums awarded as civil indemnity, moral and exemplary damages. Applying prevailing jurisprudence,
the private complainant is entitled to P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.49
Lastly, the death penalty imposed on appellant was correctly modified to reclusion perpetua, in view of the passage of Republic Act No. 9346,
entitled "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines."50 Notwithstanding the reduction of the penalty imposed on appellant,
he is not eligible for parole following Section 3 of the said law, which provides:
SEC. 3. Persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of
this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the Decision dated July 9, 2008 of the Court of Appeals, Mindanao Station in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
00409 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS in that the penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed on appellant in Criminal Case No. 2001-815 for
qualified rape is herein clarified as without eligibility for parole, and the appellant is ordered to pay the private complainant P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
With costs against the appellant.
SO ORDERED.

63

G.R. No. 176389

December 14, 2010

ANTONIO LEJANO, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 176864
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
HUBERT JEFFREY P. WEBB, ANTONIO LEJANO, MICHAEL A. GATCHALIAN, HOSPICIO FERNANDEZ, MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ, PETER
ESTRADA and GERARDO BIONG, Appellants.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
Brief Background
On June 30, 1991 Estrellita Vizconde and her daughters Carmela, nineteen years old, and Jennifer, seven, were brutally slain at their home in
Paraaque City. Following an intense investigation, the police arrested a group of suspects, some of whom gave detailed confessions. But the trial
court smelled a frame-up and eventually ordered them discharged. Thus, the identities of the real perpetrators remained a mystery especially to the
public whose interests were aroused by the gripping details of what everybody referred to as the Vizconde massacre.
Four years later in 1995, the National Bureau of Investigation or NBI announced that it had solved the crime. It presented star-witness Jessica M.
Alfaro, one of its informers, who claimed that she witnessed the crime. She pointed to accused Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio "Tony Boy" Lejano,
Artemio "Dong" Ventura, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio "Pyke" Fernandez, Peter Estrada, Miguel "Ging" Rodriguez, and Joey Filart as the culprits.
She also tagged accused police officer, Gerardo Biong, as an accessory after the fact. Relying primarily on Alfaro's testimony, on August 10, 1995
the public prosecutors filed an information for rape with homicide against Webb, et al.1
The Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City, Branch 274, presided over by Judge Amelita G. Tolentino, tried only seven of the accused since
Artemio Ventura and Joey Filart remained at large.2 The prosecution presented Alfaro as its main witness with the others corroborating her
testimony. These included the medico-legal officer who autopsied the bodies of the victims, the security guards of Pitong Daan Subdivision, the
former laundrywoman of the Webbs household, police officer Biongs former girlfriend, and Lauro G. Vizconde, Estrellitas husband.
For their part, some of the accused testified, denying any part in the crime and saying they were elsewhere when it took place. Webbs alibi
appeared the strongest since he claimed that he was then across the ocean in the United States of America. He presented the testimonies of
witnesses as well as documentary and object evidence to prove this. In addition, the defense presented witnesses to show Alfaro's bad reputation
for truth and the incredible nature of her testimony.
But impressed by Alfaros detailed narration of the crime and the events surrounding it, the trial court found a credible witness in her. It noted her
categorical, straightforward, spontaneous, and frank testimony, undamaged by grueling cross-examinations. The trial court remained unfazed by
significant discrepancies between Alfaros April 28 and May 22, 1995 affidavits, accepting her explanation that she at first wanted to protect her
former boyfriend, accused Estrada, and a relative, accused Gatchalian; that no lawyer assisted her; that she did not trust the investigators who
helped her prepare her first affidavit; and that she felt unsure if she would get the support and security she needed once she disclosed all about the
Vizconde killings.
In contrast, the trial court thought little of the denials and alibis that Webb, Lejano, Rodriguez, and Gatchalian set up for their defense. They paled,
according to the court, compared to Alfaros testimony that other witnesses and the physical evidence corroborated. Thus, on January 4, 2000, after
four years of arduous hearings, the trial court rendered judgment, finding all the accused guilty as charged and imposing on Webb, Lejano,
Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, and Rodriguez the penalty of reclusion perpetua and on Biong, an indeterminate prison term of eleven years, four
months, and one day to twelve years. The trial court also awarded damages to Lauro Vizconde.3
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision, modifying the penalty imposed on Biong to six years minimum and twelve years
maximum and increasing the award of damages to Lauro Vizconde.4 The appellate court did not agree that the accused were tried by publicity or
that the trial judge was biased. It found sufficient evidence of conspiracy that rendered Rodriguez, Gatchalian, Fernandez, and Estrada equally
guilty with those who had a part in raping and killing Carmela and in executing her mother and sister.
On motion for reconsideration by the accused, the Court of Appeals' Special Division of five members voted three against two to deny the motion,5
hence, the present appeal.
On April 20, 2010, as a result of its initial deliberation in this case, the Court issued a Resolution granting the request of Webb to submit for DNA
analysis the semen specimen taken from Carmelas cadaver, which specimen was then believed still under the safekeeping of the NBI. The Court
granted the request pursuant to section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence6 to give the accused and the prosecution access to scientific evidence that
they might want to avail themselves of, leading to a correct decision in the case.
Unfortunately, on April 27, 2010 the NBI informed the Court that it no longer has custody of the specimen, the same having been turned over to the
trial court. The trial record shows, however, that the specimen was not among the object evidence that the prosecution offered in evidence in the
case.
This outcome prompted accused Webb to file an urgent motion to acquit on the ground that the governments failure to preserve such vital evidence
has resulted in the denial of his right to due process.
Issues Presented
Accused Webbs motion to acquit presents a threshold issue: whether or not the Court should acquit him outright, given the governments failure to
produce the semen specimen that the NBI found on Carmelas cadaver, thus depriving him of evidence that would prove his innocence.
In the main, all the accused raise the central issue of whether or not Webb, acting in conspiracy with Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada,
Rodriguez, Ventura, and Filart, raped and killed Carmela and put to death her mother and sister. But, ultimately, the controlling issues are:

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1. Whether or not Alfaros testimony as eyewitness, describing the crime and identifying Webb, Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez,
and two others as the persons who committed it, is entitled to belief; and
2. Whether or not Webb presented sufficient evidence to prove his alibi and rebut Alfaros testimony that he led the others in committing the crime.
The issue respecting accused Biong is whether or not he acted to cover up the crime after its commission.
The Right to Acquittal
Due to Loss of DNA Evidence
Webb claims, citing Brady v. Maryland,7 that he is entitled to outright acquittal on the ground of violation of his right to due process given the States
failure to produce on order of the Court either by negligence or willful suppression the semen specimen taken from Carmela.
The medical evidence clearly established that Carmela was raped and, consistent with this, semen specimen was found in her. It is true that Alfaro
identified Webb in her testimony as Carmelas rapist and killer but serious questions had been raised about her credibility. At the very least, there
exists a possibility that Alfaro had lied. On the other hand, the semen specimen taken from Carmela cannot possibly lie. It cannot be coached or
allured by a promise of reward or financial support. No two persons have the same DNA fingerprint, with the exception of identical twins.8 If, on
examination, the DNA of the subject specimen does not belong to Webb, then he did not rape Carmela. It is that simple. Thus, the Court would have
been able to determine that Alfaro committed perjury in saying that he did.
Still, Webb is not entitled to acquittal for the failure of the State to produce the semen specimen at this late stage. For one thing, the ruling in Brady
v. Maryland9 that he cites has long be overtaken by the decision in Arizona v. Youngblood,10 where the U.S. Supreme Court held that due process
does not require the State to preserve the semen specimen although it might be useful to the accused unless the latter is able to show bad faith on
the part of the prosecution or the police. Here, the State presented a medical expert who testified on the existence of the specimen and Webb in
fact sought to have the same subjected to DNA test.
For, another, when Webb raised the DNA issue, the rule governing DNA evidence did not yet exist, the country did not yet have the technology for
conducting the test, and no Philippine precedent had as yet recognized its admissibility as evidence. Consequently, the idea of keeping the
specimen secure even after the trial court rejected the motion for DNA testing did not come up. Indeed, neither Webb nor his co-accused brought up
the matter of preserving the specimen in the meantime.
Parenthetically, after the trial court denied Webbs application for DNA testing, he allowed the proceeding to move on when he had on at least two
occasions gone up to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court to challenge alleged arbitrary actions taken against him and the other accused.11
They raised the DNA issue before the Court of Appeals but merely as an error committed by the trial court in rendering its decision in the case.
None of the accused filed a motion with the appeals court to have the DNA test done pending adjudication of their appeal. This, even when the
Supreme Court had in the meantime passed the rules allowing such test. Considering the accuseds lack of interest in having such test done, the
State cannot be deemed put on reasonable notice that it would be required to produce the semen specimen at some future time.
Now, to the merit of the case.
Alfaros Story
Based on the prosecutions version, culled from the decisions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals, on June 29, 1991 at around 8:30 in the
evening, Jessica Alfaro drove her Mitsubishi Lancer, with boyfriend Peter Estrada as passenger, to the Ayala Alabang Commercial Center parking
lot to buy shabu from Artemio "Dong" Ventura. There, Ventura introduced her to his friends: Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio "Tony Boy" Lejano,
Miguel "Ging" Rodriguez, Hospicio "Pyke" Fernandez, Michael Gatchalian, and Joey Filart. Alfaro recalled frequently seeing them at a shabu house
in Paraaque in January 1991, except Ventura whom she had known earlier in December 1990.
As Alfaro smoked her shabu, Webb approached and requested her to relay a message for him to a girl, whom she later identified as Carmela
Vizconde. Alfaro agreed. After using up their shabu, the group drove to Carmelas house at 80 Vinzons Street, Pitong Daan Subdivision, BF Homes,
Paraaque City. Riding in her car, Alfaro and Estrada trailed Filart and Rodriguez who rode a Mazda pick-up and Webb, Lejano, Ventura,
Fernandez, and Gatchalian who were on a Nissan Patrol car.
On reaching their destination, Alfaro parked her car on Vinzons Street, alighted, and approached Carmelas house. Alfaro pressed the buzzer and a
woman came out. Alfaro queried her about Carmela. Alfaro had met Carmela twice before in January 1991. When Carmela came out, Alfaro gave
her Webbs message that he was just around. Carmela replied, however, that she could not go out yet since she had just arrived home. She told
Alfaro to return after twenty minutes. Alfaro relayed this to Webb who then told the group to drive back to the Ayala Alabang Commercial Center.
The group had another shabu session at the parking lot. After sometime, they drove back but only Alfaro proceeded to Vinzons Street where
Carmela lived. The Nissan Patrol and the Mazda pick-up, with their passengers, parked somewhere along Aguirre Avenue. Carmela was at their
garden. She approached Alfaro on seeing her and told the latter that she (Carmela) had to leave the house for a while. Carmela requested Alfaro to
return before midnight and she would leave the pedestrian gate, the iron grills that led to the kitchen, and the kitchen door unlocked. Carmela also
told Alfaro to blink her cars headlights twice when she approached the pedestrian gate so Carmela would know that she had arrived.
Alfaro returned to her car but waited for Carmela to drive out of the house in her own car. Alfaro trailed Carmela up to Aguirre Avenue where she
dropped off a man whom Alfaro believed was Carmelas boyfriend. Alfaro looked for her group, found them, and relayed Carmelas instructions to
Webb. They then all went back to the Ayala Alabang Commercial Center. At the parking lot, Alfaro told the group about her talk with Carmela. When
she told Webb of Carmelas male companion, Webbs mood changed for the rest of the evening ("bad trip").
Webb gave out free cocaine. They all used it and some shabu, too. After about 40 to 45 minutes, Webb decided that it was time for them to leave.
He said, "Pipilahan natin siya [Carmela] at ako ang mauuna." Lejano said, "Ako ang susunod" and the others responded "Okay, okay." They all left
the parking lot in a convoy of three vehicles and drove into Pitong Daan Subdivision for the third time. They arrived at Carmelas house shortly
before midnight.
Alfaro parked her car between Vizcondes house and the next. While waiting for the others to alight from their cars, Fernandez approached Alfaro
with a suggestion that they blow up the transformer near the Vizcondes residence to cause a brownout ("Pasabugin kaya natin ang transformer na
ito"). But Alfaro shrugged off the idea, telling Fernandez, "Malakas lang ang tama mo." When Webb, Lejano, and Ventura were already before the
house, Webb told the others again that they would line up for Carmela but he would be the first. The others replied, "O sige, dito lang kami,
magbabantay lang kami."
Alfaro was the first to pass through the pedestrian gate that had been left open. Webb, Lejano, and Ventura followed her. On entering the garage,
Ventura using a chair mounted the hood of the Vizcondes Nissan Sentra and loosened the electric bulb over it ("para daw walang ilaw"). The small

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group went through the open iron grill gate and passed the dirty kitchen. Carmela opened the aluminum screen door of the kitchen for them. She
and Webb looked each other in the eyes for a moment and, together, headed for the dining area.
As she lost sight of Carmela and Webb, Alfaro decided to go out. Lejano asked her where she was going and she replied that she was going out to
smoke. As she eased her way out through the kitchen door, she saw Ventura pulling out a kitchen drawer. Alfaro smoked a cigarette at the garden.
After about twenty minutes, she was surprised to hear a womans voice ask, "Sino yan?" Alfaro immediately walked out of the garden to her car.
She found her other companions milling around it. Estrada who sat in the car asked her, "Okay ba?"
After sitting in the car for about ten minutes, Alfaro returned to the Vizconde house, using the same route. The interior of the house was dark but
some light filtered in from outside. In the kitchen, Alfaro saw Ventura searching a ladys bag that lay on the dining table. When she asked him what
he was looking for, he said: "Ikaw na nga dito, maghanap ka ng susi." She asked him what key he wanted and he replied: "Basta maghanap ka ng
susi ng main door pati na rin ng susi ng kotse." When she found a bunch of keys in the bag, she tried them on the main door but none fitted the
lock. She also did not find the car key.
Unable to open the main door, Alfaro returned to the kitchen. While she was at a spot leading to the dining area, she heard a static noise (like a
television that remained on after the station had signed off). Out of curiosity, she approached the masters bedroom from where the noise came,
opened the door a little, and peeked inside. The unusual sound grew even louder. As she walked in, she saw Webb on top of Carmela while she lay
with her back on the floor. Two bloodied bodies lay on the bed. Lejano was at the foot of the bed about to wear his jacket. Carmela was gagged,
moaning, and in tears while Webb raped her, his bare buttocks exposed.
Webb gave Alfaro a meaningful look and she immediately left the room. She met Ventura at the dining area. He told her, "Prepare an escape. Aalis
na tayo." Shocked with what she saw, Alfaro rushed out of the house to the others who were either sitting in her car or milling on the sidewalk. She
entered her car and turned on the engine but she did not know where to go. Webb, Lejano, and Ventura came out of the house just then. Webb
suddenly picked up a stone and threw it at the main door, breaking its glass frame.
As the three men approached the pedestrian gate, Webb told Ventura that he forgot his jacket in the house. But Ventura told him that they could not
get in anymore as the iron grills had already locked. They all rode in their cars and drove away until they reached Aguirre Avenue. As they got near
an old hotel at the Tropical Palace area, Alfaro noticed the Nissan Patrol slow down. Someone threw something out of the car into the cogonal area.
The convoy of cars went to a large house with high walls, concrete fence, steel gate, and a long driveway at BF Executive Village. They entered the
compound and gathered at the lawn where the "blaming session" took place. It was here that Alfaro and those who remained outside the Vizconde
house learned of what happened. The first to be killed was Carmelas mother, then Jennifer, and finally, Carmella. Ventura blamed Webb, telling
him, "Bakit naman pati yung bata?" Webb replied that the girl woke up and on seeing him molesting Carmela, she jumped on him, bit his shoulders,
and pulled his hair. Webb got mad, grabbed the girl, pushed her to the wall, and repeatedly stabbed her. Lejano excused himself at this point to use
the telephone in the house. Meanwhile, Webb called up someone on his cellular phone.
At around 2:00 in the morning, accused Gerardo Biong arrived. Webb ordered him to go and clean up the Vizconde house and said to him, "Pera
lang ang katapat nyan." Biong answered, "Okay lang." Webb spoke to his companions and told them, "We dont know each other. We havent seen
each otherbaka maulit yan." Alfaro and Estrada left and they drove to her fathers house.12
1. The quality of the witness
Was Alfaro an ordinary subdivision girl who showed up at the NBI after four years, bothered by her conscience or egged on by relatives or friends to
come forward and do what was right? No. She was, at the time she revealed her story, working for the NBI as an "asset," a stool pigeon, one who
earned her living by fraternizing with criminals so she could squeal on them to her NBI handlers. She had to live a life of lies to get rewards that
would pay for her subsistence and vices.
According to Atty. Artemio Sacaguing, former head of the NBI Anti-Kidnapping, Hijacking, and Armed Robbery Task Force (AKHAR) Section, Alfaro
had been hanging around at the NBI since November or December 1994 as an "asset." She supplied her handlers with information against drug
pushers and other criminal elements. Some of this information led to the capture of notorious drug pushers like Christopher Cruz Santos and
Orlando Bacquir. Alfaros tip led to the arrest of the leader of the "Martilyo gang" that killed a police officer. Because of her talent, the task force gave
her "very special treatment" and she became its "darling," allowed the privilege of spending nights in one of the rooms at the NBI offices.
When Alfaro seemed unproductive for sometime, however, they teased her about it and she was piqued. One day, she unexpectedly told Sacaguing
that she knew someone who had the real story behind the Vizconde massacre. Sacaguing showed interest. Alfaro promised to bring that someone
to the NBI to tell his story. When this did not happen and Sacaguing continued to press her, she told him that she might as well assume the role of
her informant. Sacaguing testified thus:
ATTY. ONGKIKO:
Q. Atty. Sacaguing, how did Jessica Alfaro become a witness in the Vizconde murder case? Will you tell the Honorable Court?
xxxx
A. She told me. Your Honor, that she knew somebody who related to her the circumstances, I mean, the details of the massacre of the Vizconde
family. Thats what she told me, Your Honor.
ATTY. ONGKIKO:
Q. And what did you say?
xxxx
A. I was quite interested and I tried to persuade her to introduce to me that man and she promised that in due time, she will bring to me the man,
and together with her, we will try to convince him to act as a state witness and help us in the solution of the case.
xxxx
Q. Atty. Sacaguing, were you able to interview this alleged witness?
WITNESS SACAGUING:
A. No, sir.

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ATTY. ONGKIKO:
Q. Why not?
WITNESS SACAGUING:
A. Because Jessica Alfaro was never able to comply with her promise to bring the man to me. She told me later that she could not and the man
does not like to testify.
ATTY. ONGKIKO:
Q. All right, and what happened after that?
WITNESS SACAGUING:
A. She told me, "easy lang kayo, Sir," if I may quote, "easy lang Sir, huwag kayong"
COURT:
How was that?
WITNESS SACAGUING:
A. "Easy lang, Sir. Sir, relax lang, Sir, papapelan ko, papapelan ko na lang yan."
xxxx
ATTY. ONGKIKO:
Q. All right, and what was your reaction when Ms. Alfaro stated that "papapelan ko na lang yan?"
WITNESS SACAGUING:
A. I said, "hindi puwede yan, kasi hindi ka naman eye witness."
ATTY. ONGKIKO:
Q. And what was the reply of Ms. Alfaro?
WITNESS SACAGUING:
A. Hindi siya nakakibo, until she went away.
(TSN, May 28, 1996, pp. 49-50, 58, 77-79)
Quite significantly, Alfaro never refuted Sacaguings above testimony.
2. The suspicious details
But was it possible for Alfaro to lie with such abundant details some of which even tallied with the physical evidence at the scene of the crime? No
doubt, yes.
Firstly, the Vizconde massacre had been reported in the media with dizzying details. Everybody was talking about what the police found at the crime
scene and there were lots of speculations about them.
Secondly, the police had arrested some "akyat-bahay" group in Paraaque and charged them with the crime. The police prepared the confessions
of the men they apprehended and filled these up with details that the evidence of the crime scene provided. Alfaros NBI handlers who were doing
their own investigation knew of these details as well. Since Alfaro hanged out at the NBI offices and practically lived there, it was not too difficult for
her to hear of these evidentiary details and gain access to the documents.
Not surprisingly, the confessions of some members of the Barroso "akyat bahay" gang, condemned by the Makati RTC as fabricated by the police to
pin the crime on them, shows how crime investigators could make a confession ring true by matching some of its details with the physical evidence
at the crime scene. Consider the following:
a. The Barroso gang members said that they got into Carmelas house by breaking the glass panel of the front door using a stone wrapped in cloth
to deaden the noise. Alfaro could not use this line since the core of her story was that Webb was Carmelas boyfriend. Webb had no reason to
smash her front door to get to see her.
Consequently, to explain the smashed door, Alfaro had to settle for claiming that, on the way out of the house, Webb picked up some stone and, out
of the blue, hurled it at the glass-paneled front door of the Vizconde residence. His action really made no sense. From Alfaros narration, Webb
appeared rational in his decisions. It was past midnight, the house was dark, and they wanted to get away quickly to avoid detection. Hurling a
stone at that glass door and causing a tremendous noise was bizarre, like inviting the neighbors to come.
b. The crime scene showed that the house had been ransacked. The rejected confessions of the Barroso "akyat-bahay" gang members said that
they tried to rob the house. To explain this physical evidence, Alfaro claimed that at one point Ventura was pulling a kitchen drawer, and at another
point, going through a handbag on the dining table. He said he was looking for the front-door key and the car key.
Again, this portion of Alfaros story appears tortured to accommodate the physical evidence of the ransacked house. She never mentioned Ventura
having taken some valuables with him when they left Carmelas house. And why would Ventura rummage a bag on the table for the front-door key,
spilling the contents, when they had already gotten into the house. It is a story made to fit in with the crime scene although robbery was supposedly
not the reason Webb and his companions entered that house.

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c. It is the same thing with the garage light. The police investigators found that the bulb had been loosened to turn off the light. The confessions of
the Barroso gang claimed that one of them climbed the parked cars hood to reach up and darken that light. This made sense since they were going
to rob the place and they needed time to work in the dark trying to open the front door. Some passersby might look in and see what they were
doing.
Alfaro had to adjust her testimony to take into account that darkened garage light. So she claimed that Ventura climbed the cars hood, using a
chair, to turn the light off. But, unlike the Barroso "akyat-bahay" gang, Webb and his friends did not have anything to do in a darkened garage. They
supposedly knew in advance that Carmela left the doors to the kitchen open for them. It did not make sense for Ventura to risk standing on the cars
hood and be seen in such an awkward position instead of going straight into the house.
And, thirdly, Alfaro was the NBIs star witness, their badge of excellent investigative work.lavvphil After claiming that they had solved the crime of the
decade, the NBI people had a stake in making her sound credible and, obviously, they gave her all the preparations she needed for the job of
becoming a fairly good substitute witness. She was their "darling" of an asset. And this is not pure speculation. As pointed out above, Sacaguing of
the NBI, a lawyer and a ranking official, confirmed this to be a cold fact. Why the trial court and the Court of Appeals failed to see this is mystifying.
At any rate, did Alfaro at least have a fine memory for faces that had a strong effect on her, given the circumstances? Not likely. She named Miguel
"Ging" Rodriguez as one of the culprits in the Vizconde killings. But when the NBI found a certain Michael Rodriguez, a drug dependent from the
Bicutan Rehabilitation Center, initially suspected to be Alfaros Miguel Rodriguez and showed him to Alfaro at the NBI office, she ran berserk,
slapping and kicking Michael, exclaiming: "How can I forget your face. We just saw each other in a disco one month ago and you told me then that
you will kill me." As it turned out, he was not Miguel Rodriguez, the accused in this case.13
Two possibilities exist: Michael was really the one Alfaro wanted to implicate to settle some score with him but it was too late to change the name
she already gave or she had myopic vision, tagging the wrong people for what they did not do.
3. The quality of the testimony
There is another thing about a lying witness: her story lacks sense or suffers from inherent inconsistencies. An understanding of the nature of things
and the common behavior of people will help expose a lie. And it has an abundant presence in this case.
One. In her desire to implicate Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, and Filart, who were supposed to be Webbs co-principals in the crime,
Alfaro made it a point to testify that Webb proposed twice to his friends the gang-rape of Carmela who had hurt him. And twice, they (including, if
one believes Alfaro, her own boyfriend Estrada) agreed in a chorus to his proposal. But when they got to Carmelas house, only Webb, Lejano,
Ventura, and Alfaro entered the house.
Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, and Rodriguez supposedly stayed around Alfaros car, which was parked on the street between Carmelas house
and the next. Some of these men sat on top of the cars lid while others milled on the sidewalk, visible under the street light to anyone who cared to
watch them, particularly to the people who were having a drinking party in a nearby house. Obviously, the behavior of Webbs companions out on
the street did not figure in a planned gang-rape of Carmela.
Two. Ventura, Alfaros dope supplier, introduced her for the first time in her life to Webb and his friends in a parking lot by a mall. So why would she
agree to act as Webbs messenger, using her gas, to bring his message to Carmela at her home. More inexplicably, what motivated Alfaro to stick it
out the whole night with Webb and his friends?
They were practically strangers to her and her boyfriend Estrada. When it came to a point that Webb decided with his friends to gang-rape Carmela,
clearly, there was nothing in it for Alfaro. Yet, she stuck it out with them, as a police asset would, hanging in there until she had a crime to report,
only she was not yet an "asset" then. If, on the other hand, Alfaro had been too soaked in drugs to think clearly and just followed along where the
group took her, how could she remember so much details that only a drug-free mind can?
Three. When Alfaro went to see Carmela at her house for the second time, Carmella told her that she still had to go out and that Webb and his
friends should come back around midnight. Alfaro returned to her car and waited for Carmela to drive out in her own car. And she trailed her up to
Aguirre Avenue where she supposedly dropped off a man whom she thought was Carmelas boyfriend. Alfaros trailing Carmela to spy on her
unfaithfulness to Webb did not make sense since she was on limited errand. But, as a critical witness, Alfaro had to provide a reason for Webb to
freak out and decide to come with his friends and harm Carmela.
Four. According to Alfaro, when they returned to Carmelas house the third time around midnight, she led Webb, Lejano, and Ventura through the
pedestrian gate that Carmela had left open. Now, this is weird. Webb was the gang leader who decided what they were going to do. He decided and
his friends agreed with him to go to Carmelas house and gang-rape her. Why would Alfaro, a woman, a stranger to Webb before that night, and
obviously with no role to play in the gang-rape of Carmela, lead him and the others into her house? It made no sense. It would only make sense if
Alfaro wanted to feign being a witness to something she did not see.
Five. Alfaro went out of the house to smoke at the garden. After about twenty minutes, a woman exclaimed, "Sino yan?" On hearing this, Alfaro
immediately walked out of the garden and went to her car. Apparently, she did this because she knew they came on a sly. Someone other than
Carmela became conscious of the presence of Webb and others in the house. Alfaro walked away because, obviously, she did not want to get
involved in a potential confrontation. This was supposedly her frame of mind: fear of getting involved in what was not her business.
But if that were the case, how could she testify based on personal knowledge of what went on in the house? Alfaro had to change that frame of
mind to one of boldness and reckless curiosity. So that is what she next claimed. She went back into the house to watch as Webb raped Carmela
on the floor of the masters bedroom. He had apparently stabbed to death Carmelas mom and her young sister whose bloodied bodies were
sprawled on the bed. Now, Alfaro testified that she got scared (another shift to fear) for she hurriedly got out of the house after Webb supposedly
gave her a meaningful look.
Alfaro quickly went to her car, not minding Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, and Filart who sat on the car or milled on the sidewalk. She
did not speak to them, even to Estrada, her boyfriend. She entered her car and turned on the engine but she testified that she did not know where
to go. This woman who a few minutes back led Webb, Lejano, and Ventura into the house, knowing that they were decided to rape and harm
Carmela, was suddenly too shocked to know where to go! This emotional pendulum swing indicates a witness who was confused with her own lies.
4. The supposed corroborations
Intending to provide corroboration to Alfaros testimony, the prosecution presented six additional witnesses:
Dr. Prospero A. Cabanayan, the NBI Medico-Legal Officer who autopsied the bodies of the victims, testified on the stab wounds they sustained14
and the presence of semen in Carmelas genitalia,15 indicating that she had been raped.

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Normal E. White, Jr., was the security guard on duty at Pitong Daan Subdivision from 7 p.m. of June 29 to 7 a.m. of June 30, 1991. He got a report
on the morning of June 30 that something untoward happened at the Vizconde residence. He went there and saw the dead bodies in the masters
bedroom, the bag on the dining table, as well as the loud noise emanating from a television set.16
White claimed that he noticed Gatchalian and his companions, none of whom he could identify, go in and out of Pitong Daan Subdivision. He also
saw them along Vinzons Street. Later, they entered Pitong Daan Subdivision in a three-car convoy. White could not, however, describe the kind of
vehicles they used or recall the time when he saw the group in those two instances. And he did not notice anything suspicious about their coming
and going.
But Whites testimony cannot be relied on. His initial claim turned out to be inaccurate. He actually saw Gatchalian and his group enter the Pitong
Daan Subdivision only once. They were not going in and out. Furthermore, Alfaro testified that when the convoy of cars went back the second time
in the direction of Carmelas house, she alone entered the subdivision and passed the guardhouse without stopping. Yet, White who supposedly
manned that guardhouse did not notice her.
Surprisingly, White failed to note Biong, a police officer, entering or exiting the subdivision on the early morning of June 30 when he supposedly
"cleaned up" Vizconde residence on Webbs orders. What is more, White did not notice Carmela arrive with her mom before Alfaros first visit that
night. Carmela supposedly left with a male companion in her car at around 10:30 p.m. but White did not notice it. He also did not notice Carmela
reenter the subdivision. White actually discredited Alfaros testimony about the movements of the persons involved.
Further, while Alfaro testified that it was the Mazda pick-up driven by Filart that led the three-vehicle convoy,17 White claimed it was the Nissan
Patrol with Gatchalian on it that led the convoy since he would not have let the convoy in without ascertaining that Gatchalian, a resident, was in it.
Security guard White did not, therefore, provide corroboration to Alfaros testimony.1avvphi1
Justo Cabanacan, the security supervisor at Pitong Daan Subdivision testified that he saw Webb around the last week of May or the first week of
June 1991 to prove his presence in the Philippines when he claimed to be in the United States. He was manning the guard house at the entrance of
the subdivision of Pitong Daan when he flagged down a car driven by Webb. Webb said that he would see Lilet Sy. Cabanacan asked him for an ID
but he pointed to his United BF Homes sticker and said that he resided there. Cabanacan replied, however, that Pitong Daan had a local sticker.
Cabanacan testified that, at this point, Webb introduced himself as the son of Congressman Webb. Still, the supervisor insisted on seeing his ID.
Webb grudgingly gave it and after seeing the picture and the name on it, Cabanacan returned the same and allowed Webb to pass without being
logged in as their Standard Operating Procedure required.18
But Cabanacan's testimony could not be relied on. Although it was not common for a security guard to challenge a Congressmans son with such
vehemence, Cabanacan did not log the incident on the guardhouse book. Nor did he, contrary to prescribed procedure, record the visitors entry
into the subdivision. It did not make sense that Cabanacan was strict in the matter of seeing Webbs ID but not in recording the visit.
Mila Gaviola used to work as laundry woman for the Webbs at their house at BF Homes Executive Village. She testified that she saw Webb at his
parents house on the morning of June 30, 1991 when she got the dirty clothes from the room that he and two brothers occupied at about 4.a.m.
She saw him again pacing the floor at 9 a.m. At about 1 p.m., Webb left the house in t-shirt and shorts, passing through a secret door near the
maids quarters on the way out. Finally, she saw Webb at 4 p.m. of the same day.19
On cross-examination, however, Gaviola could not say what distinguished June 30, 1991 from the other days she was on service at the Webb
household as to enable her to distinctly remember, four years later, what one of the Webb boys did and at what time. She could not remember any
of the details that happened in the household on the other days. She proved to have a selective photographic memory and this only damaged her
testimony.
Gaviola tried to corroborate Alfaro's testimony by claiming that on June 30, 1991 she noticed bloodstains on Webb's t-shirt.20 She did not call the
attention of anybody in the household about it when it would have been a point of concern that Webb may have been hurt, hence the blood.
Besides, Victoria Ventoso, the Webbs' housemaid from March 1989 to May 1992, and Sgt. Miguel Muoz, the Webbs' security aide in 1991, testified
that Gaviola worked for the Webbs only from January 1991 to April 1991. Ventoso further testified that it was not Gaviola's duty to collect the clothes
from the 2nd floor bedrooms, this being the work of the housemaid charged with cleaning the rooms.
What is more, it was most unlikely for a laundrywoman who had been there for only four months to collect, as she claimed, the laundry from the
rooms of her employers and their grown up children at four in the morning while they were asleep.
And it did not make sense, if Alfaros testimony were to be believed that Webb, who was so careful and clever that he called Biong to go to the
Vizconde residence at 2 a.m. to clean up the evidence against him and his group, would bring his bloodied shirt home and put it in the hamper for
laundrywoman Gaviola to collect and wash at 4 a.m. as was her supposed habit.
Lolita De Birrer was accused Biongs girlfriend around the time the Vizconde massacre took place. Birrer testified that she was with Biong playing
mahjong from the evening of June 29, 1991 to the early morning of June 30, when Biong got a call at around 2 a.m. This prompted him, according
to De Birrer, to leave and go to BF. Someone sitting at the backseat of a taxi picked him up. When Biong returned at 7 a.m. he washed off what
looked like dried blood from his fingernails. And he threw away a foul-smelling handkerchief. She also saw Biong take out a knife with aluminum
cover from his drawer and hid it in his steel cabinet.21
The security guard at Pitong Daan did not notice any police investigator flashing a badge to get into the village although Biong supposedly came in
at the unholy hour of two in the morning. His departure before 7 a.m. also remained unnoticed by the subdivision guards. Besides, if he had cleaned
up the crime scene shortly after midnight, what was the point of his returning there on the following morning to dispose of some of the evidence in
the presence of other police investigators and on-lookers? In fact, why would he steal valuable items from the Vizconde residence on his return
there hours later if he had the opportunity to do it earlier?
At most, Birrers testimony only established Biongs theft of certain items from the Vizconde residence and gross neglect for failing to maintain the
sanctity of the crime scene by moving around and altering the effects of the crime. Birrers testimony failed to connect Biong's acts to Webb and the
other accused.
Lauro Vizconde testified about how deeply he was affected by the loss of her wife and two daughters. Carmella spoke to him of a rejected suitor she
called "Bagyo," because he was a Paraaque politicians son. Unfortunately, Lauro did not appear curious enough to insist on finding out who the
rejected fellow was. Besides, his testimony contradicts that of Alfaro who testified that Carmela and Webb had an on-going relation. Indeed, if Alfaro
were to be believed, Carmela wanted Webb to come to her house around midnight. She even left the kitchen door open so he could enter the
house.
5. The missing corroboration

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There is something truly remarkable about this case: the prosecutions core theory that Carmela and Webb had been sweethearts, that she had
been unfaithful to him, and that it was for this reason that Webb brought his friends to her house to gang-rape her is totally uncorroborated!
For instance, normally, if Webb, a Congressmans son, courted the young Carmela, that would be news among her circle of friends if not around
town. But, here, none of her friends or even those who knew either of them came forward to affirm this. And if Webb hanged around with her, trying
to win her favors, he would surely be seen with her. And this would all the more be so if they had become sweethearts, a relation that Alfaro tried to
project with her testimony.
But, except for Alfaro, the NBI asset, no one among Carmelas friends or her friends friends would testify ever hearing of such relationship or ever
seeing them together in some popular hangouts in Paraaque or Makati. Alfaros claim of a five-hour drama is like an alien page, rudely and
unconnectedly inserted into Webb and Carmelas life stories or like a piece of jigsaw puzzle trimmed to fit into the shape on the board but does not
belong because it clashes with the surrounding pieces. It has neither antecedent nor concomitant support in the verifiable facts of their personal
histories. It is quite unreal.
What is more, Alfaro testified that she saw Carmela drive out of her house with a male passenger, Mr. X, whom Alfaro thought the way it looked was
also Carmelas lover. This was the all-important reason Webb supposedly had for wanting to harm her. Again, none of Carmelas relatives, friends,
or people who knew her ever testified about the existence of Mr.X in her life. Nobody has come forward to testify having ever seen him with
Carmela. And despite the gruesome news about her death and how Mr. X had played a role in it, he never presented himself like anyone who had
lost a special friend normally would. Obviously, Mr. X did not exist, a mere ghost of the imagination of Alfaro, the woman who made a living
informing on criminals.
Webbs U.S. Alibi
Among the accused, Webb presented the strongest alibi.
a. The travel preparations
Webb claims that in 1991 his parents, Senator Freddie Webb and his wife, Elizabeth, sent their son to the United States (U.S.) to learn the value of
independence, hard work, and money.22 Gloria Webb, his aunt, accompanied him. Rajah Tours booked their flight to San Francisco via United
Airlines. Josefina Nolasco of Rajah Tours confirmed that Webb and his aunt used their plane tickets.
Webb told his friends, including his neighbor, Jennifer Claire Cabrera, and his basketball buddy, Joselito Orendain Escobar, of his travel plans. He
even invited them to his despedida party on March 8, 1991 at Faces Disco along Makati Ave.23 On March 8,1991, the eve of his departure, he took
girlfriend Milagros Castillo to a dinner at Bunchums at the Makati Cinema Square. His basketball buddy Rafael Jose with Tina Calma, a blind date
arranged by Webb, joined them. They afterwards went to Faces Disco for Webb's despedida party. Among those present were his friends Paulo
Santos and Jay Ortega.24
b. The two immigration checks
The following day, March 9, 1991, Webb left for San Francisco, California, with his Aunt Gloria on board United Airlines Flight 808.25 Before
boarding his plane, Webb passed through the Philippine Immigration booth at the airport to have his passport cleared and stamped. Immigration
Officer, Ferdinand Sampol checked Webbs visa, stamped, and initialed his passport, and let him pass through.26 He was listed on the United
Airlines Flights Passenger Manifest.27
On arrival at San Francisco, Webb went through the U.S. Immigration where his entry into that country was recorded. Thus, the U.S. Immigration
Naturalization Service, checking with its Non-immigrant Information System, confirmed Webb's entry into the U.S. on March 9, 1991. Webb
presented at the trial the INS Certification issued by the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service,28 the computer-generated print-out of the USINS indicating Webb's entry on March 9, 1991,29 and the US-INS Certification dated August 31, 1995, authenticated by the Philippine Department
of Foreign Affairs, correcting an earlier August 10, 1995 Certification.30
c. Details of U.S. sojourn
In San Francisco, Webb and his aunt Gloria were met by the latters daughter, Maria Teresa Keame, who brought them to Glorias house in Daly
City, California. During his stay with his aunt, Webb met Christopher Paul Legaspi Esguerra, Glorias grandson. In April 1991, Webb, Christopher,
and a certain Daphne Domingo watched the concert of Deelite Band in San Francisco.31 In the same month, Dorothy Wheelock and her family
invited Webb to Lake Tahoe to return the Webbs hospitality when she was in the Philippines.32
In May 1991, on invitation of another aunt, Susan Brottman, Webb moved to Anaheim Hills, California.33 During his stay there, he occupied himself
with playing basketball once or twice a week with Steven Keeler34 and working at his cousin-in-laws pest control company.35 Webb presented the
companys logbook showing the tasks he performed,36 his paycheck,37 his ID, and other employment papers. On June 14, 1991 he applied for a
driver's license38 and wrote three letters to his friend Jennifer Cabrera.39
On June 28, 1991, Webbs parents visited him at Anaheim and stayed with the Brottmans. On the same day, his father introduced Honesto Aragon
to his son when he came to visit.40 On the following day, June 29, Webb, in the company of his father and Aragon went to Riverside, California, to
look for a car. They bought an MR2 Toyota car.41 Later that day, a visitor at the Brottmans, Louis Whittacker, saw Webb looking at the plates of his
new car.42 To prove the purchase, Webb presented the Public Records of California Department of Motor Vehicle43 and a car plate "LEW
WEBB."44 In using the car in the U.S., Webb even received traffic citations.45
On June 30, 1991 Webb, again accompanied by his father and Aragon,46 bought a bicycle at Orange Cycle Center.47 The Center issued Webb a
receipt dated June 30, 1991.48 On July 4, 1991, Independence Day, the Webbs, the Brottmans, and the Vaca family had a lakeside picnic.49
Webb stayed with the Brottmans until mid July and rented a place for less than a month. On August 4, 1991 he left for Longwood, Florida, to stay
with the spouses Jack and Sonja Rodriguez.50 There, he met Armando Rodriguez with whom he spent time, playing basketball on weekends,
watching movies, and playing billiards.51 In November 1991, Webb met performing artist Gary Valenciano, a friend of Jack Rodriguez, who was
invited for a dinner at the Rodriguezs house.52 He left the Rodriguezs home in August 1992, returned to Anaheim and stayed with his aunt Imelda
Pagaspas. He stayed there until he left for the Philippines on October 26, 1992.
d. The second immigration checks
As with his trip going to the U.S., Webb also went through both the U.S. and Philippine immigrations on his return trip. Thus, his departure from the
U.S. was confirmed by the same certifications that confirmed his entry.53 Furthermore, a Diplomatic Note of the U.S. Department of State with
enclosed letter from Acting Director Debora A. Farmer of the Records Operations, Office of Records of the US-INS stated that the Certification

70

dated August 31, 1995 is a true and accurate statement. And when he boarded his plane, the Passenger Manifest of Philippine Airlines Flight No.
103,54 certified by Agnes Tabuena55 confirmed his return trip.
When he arrived in Manila, Webb again went through the Philippine Immigration. In fact, the arrival stamp and initial on his passport indicated his
return to Manila on October 27, 1992. This was authenticated by Carmelita Alipio, the immigration officer who processed Webbs reentry.56 Upon
his return, in October 1992, Paolo Santos, Joselito Erondain Escobar, and Rafael Jose once again saw Webb playing basketball at the BF's Phase
III basketball court.
e. Alibi versus positive identification
The trial court and the Court of Appeals are one in rejecting as weak Webbs alibi. Their reason is uniform: Webbs alibi cannot stand against
Alfaros positive identification of him as the rapist and killer of Carmela and, apparently, the killer as well of her mother and younger sister. Because
of this, to the lower courts, Webbs denial and alibi were fabricated.
But not all denials and alibis should be regarded as fabricated. Indeed, if the accused is truly innocent, he can have no other defense but denial and
alibi. So how can such accused penetrate a mind that has been made cynical by the rule drilled into his head that a defense of alibi is a hangmans
noose in the face of a witness positively swearing, "I saw him do it."? Most judges believe that such assertion automatically dooms an alibi which is
so easy to fabricate. This quick stereotype thinking, however, is distressing. For how else can the truth that the accused is really innocent have any
chance of prevailing over such a stone-cast tenet?
There is only one way. A judge must keep an open mind. He must guard against slipping into hasty conclusion, often arising from a desire to quickly
finish the job of deciding a case. A positive declaration from a witness that he saw the accused commit the crime should not automatically cancel
out the accuseds claim that he did not do it. A lying witness can make as positive an identification as a truthful witness can. The lying witness can
also say as forthrightly and unequivocally, "He did it!" without blinking an eye.
Rather, to be acceptable, the positive identification must meet at least two criteria:
First, the positive identification of the offender must come from a credible witness. She is credible who can be trusted to tell the truth, usually based
on past experiences with her. Her word has, to one who knows her, its weight in gold.
And second, the witness story of what she personally saw must be believable, not inherently contrived. A witness who testifies about something she
never saw runs into inconsistencies and makes bewildering claims.
Here, as already fully discussed above, Alfaro and her testimony fail to meet the above criteria.
She did not show up at the NBI as a spontaneous witness bothered by her conscience. She had been hanging around that agency for sometime as
a stool pigeon, one paid for mixing up with criminals and squealing on them. Police assets are often criminals themselves. She was the
prosecutions worst possible choice for a witness. Indeed, her superior testified that she volunteered to play the role of a witness in the Vizconde
killings when she could not produce a man she promised to the NBI.
And, although her testimony included details, Alfaro had prior access to the details that the investigators knew of the case. She took advantage of
her familiarity with these details to include in her testimony the clearly incompatible act of Webb hurling a stone at the front door glass frames even
when they were trying to slip away quietlyjust so she can accommodate this crime scene feature. She also had Ventura rummaging a bag on the
dining table for a front door key that nobody needed just to explain the physical evidence of that bag and its scattered contents. And she had
Ventura climbing the cars hood, risking being seen in such an awkward position, when they did not need to darken the garage to force open the
front doorjust so to explain the darkened light and foot prints on the car hood.
Further, her testimony was inherently incredible. Her story that Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, and Filart agreed to take their turns
raping Carmela is incongruent with their indifference, exemplified by remaining outside the house, milling under a street light, visible to neighbors
and passersby, and showing no interest in the developments inside the house, like if it was their turn to rape Carmela. Alfaros story that she agreed
to serve as Webbs messenger to Carmela, using up her gas, and staying with him till the bizarre end when they were practically strangers, also
taxes incredulity.
To provide basis for Webbs outrage, Alfaro said that she followed Carmela to the main road to watch her let off a lover on Aguirre Avenue. And,
inexplicably, although Alfaro had only played the role of messenger, she claimed leading Webb, Lejano, and Ventura into the house to gang-rape
Carmella, as if Alfaro was establishing a reason for later on testifying on personal knowledge. Her swing from an emotion of fear when a woman
woke up to their presence in the house and of absolute courage when she nonetheless returned to become the lone witness to a grim scene is also
quite inexplicable.
Ultimately, Alfaros quality as a witness and her inconsistent, if not inherently unbelievable, testimony cannot be the positive identification that
jurisprudence acknowledges as sufficient to jettison a denial and an alibi.
f. A documented alibi
To establish alibi, the accused must prove by positive, clear, and satisfactory evidence57 that (a) he was present at another place at the time of the
perpetration of the crime, and (b) that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.58
The courts below held that, despite his evidence, Webb was actually in Paraaque when the Vizconde killings took place; he was not in the U.S.
from March 9, 1991 to October 27, 1992; and if he did leave on March 9, 1991, he actually returned before June 29, 1991, committed the crime,
erased the fact of his return to the Philippines from the records of the U.S. and Philippine Immigrations, smuggled himself out of the Philippines and
into the U.S., and returned the normal way on October 27, 1992. But this ruling practically makes the death of Webb and his passage into the next
life the only acceptable alibi in the Philippines. Courts must abandon this unjust and inhuman paradigm.
If one is cynical about the Philippine system, he could probably claim that Webb, with his fathers connections, can arrange for the local immigration
to put a March 9, 1991 departure stamp on his passport and an October 27, 1992 arrival stamp on the same. But this is pure speculation since
there had been no indication that such arrangement was made. Besides, how could Webb fix a foreign airlines passenger manifest, officially filed in
the Philippines and at the airport in the U.S. that had his name on them? How could Webb fix with the U.S. Immigrations record system those two
dates in its record of his travels as well as the dates when he supposedly departed in secret from the U.S. to commit the crime in the Philippines
and then return there? No one has come up with a logical and plausible answer to these questions.
The Court of Appeals rejected the evidence of Webbs passport since he did not leave the original to be attached to the record. But, while the best
evidence of a document is the original, this means that the same is exhibited in court for the adverse party to examine and for the judge to see. As
Court of Appeals Justice Tagle said in his dissent,59 the practice when a party does not want to leave an important document with the trial court is

71

to have a photocopy of it marked as exhibit and stipulated among the parties as a faithful reproduction of the original. Stipulations in the course of
trial are binding on the parties and on the court.
The U.S. Immigration certification and the computer print-out of Webbs arrival in and departure from that country were authenticated by no less
than the Office of the U.S. Attorney General and the State Department. Still the Court of Appeals refused to accept these documents for the reason
that Webb failed to present in court the immigration official who prepared the same. But this was unnecessary. Webbs passport is a document
issued by the Philippine government, which under international practice, is the official record of travels of the citizen to whom it is issued. The
entries in that passport are presumed true.60
The U.S. Immigration certification and computer print-out, the official certifications of which have been authenticated by the Philippine Department
of Foreign Affairs, merely validated the arrival and departure stamps of the U.S. Immigration office on Webbs passport. They have the same
evidentiary value. The officers who issued these certifications need not be presented in court to testify on them. Their trustworthiness arises from
the sense of official duty and the penalty attached to a breached duty, in the routine and disinterested origin of such statement and in the publicity of
the record.61
The Court of Appeals of course makes capital of the fact that an earlier certification from the U.S. Immigration office said that it had no record of
Webb entering the U.S. But that erroneous first certification was amply explained by the U.S. Government and Court of Appeals Justice Tagle stated
it in his dissenting opinion, thus:
While it is true that an earlier Certification was issued by the U.S. INS on August 16, 1995 finding "no evidence of lawful admission of Webb," this
was already clarified and deemed erroneous by no less than the US INS Officials. As explained by witness Leo Herrera-Lim, Consul and Second
Secretary of the Philippine Embassy in Washington D.C., said Certification did not pass through proper diplomatic channels and was obtained in
violation of the rules on protocol and standard procedure governing such request.
The initial request was merely initiated by BID Commissioner Verceles who directly communicated with the Philippine Consulate in San Francisco,
USA, bypassing the Secretary of Foreign Affairs which is the proper protocol procedure. Mr. Steven Bucher, the acting Chief of the Records
Services Board of US-INS Washington D.C. in his letter addressed to Philip Antweiler, Philippine Desk Officer, State Department, declared the
earlier Certification as incorrect and erroneous as it was "not exhaustive and did not reflect all available information." Also, Richard L. Huff, CoDirector of the Office of Information and privacy, US Department of Justice, in response to the appeal raised by Consul General Teresita V. Marzan,
explained that "the INS normally does not maintain records on individuals who are entering the country as visitors rather than as immigrants: and
that a notation concerning the entry of a visitor may be made at the Nonimmigrant Information system. Since appellant Webb entered the U.S. on a
mere tourist visa, obviously, the initial search could not have produced the desired result inasmuch as the data base that was looked into contained
entries of the names of IMMIGRANTS and not that of NON-IMMIGRANT visitors of the U.S..62
The trial court and the Court of Appeals expressed marked cynicism over the accuracy of travel documents like the passport as well as the domestic
and foreign records of departures and arrivals from airports. They claim that it would not have been impossible for Webb to secretly return to the
Philippines after he supposedly left it on March 9, 1991, commit the crime, go back to the U.S., and openly return to the Philippines again on
October 26, 1992. Travel between the U.S. and the Philippines, said the lower courts took only about twelve to fourteen hours.
If the Court were to subscribe to this extremely skeptical view, it might as well tear the rules of evidence out of the law books and regard suspicions,
surmises, or speculations as reasons for impeaching evidence. It is not that official records, which carry the presumption of truth of what they state,
are immune to attack. They are not. That presumption can be overcome by evidence. Here, however, the prosecution did not bother to present
evidence to impeach the entries in Webbs passport and the certifications of the Philippine and U.S. immigration services regarding his travel to the
U.S. and back. The prosecutions rebuttal evidence is the fear of the unknown that it planted in the lower courts minds.
7. Effect of Webbs alibi to others
Webbs documented alibi altogether impeaches Alfaro's testimony, not only with respect to him, but also with respect to Lejano, Estrada, Fernandez,
Gatchalian, Rodriguez, and Biong. For, if the Court accepts the proposition that Webb was in the U.S. when the crime took place, Alfaros testimony
will not hold together. Webbs participation is the anchor of Alfaros story. Without it, the evidence against the others must necessarily fall.
CONCLUSION
In our criminal justice system, what is important is, not whether the court entertains doubts about the innocence of the accused since an open mind
is willing to explore all possibilities, but whether it entertains a reasonable, lingering doubt as to his guilt. For, it would be a serious mistake to send
an innocent man to jail where such kind of doubt hangs on to ones inner being, like a piece of meat lodged immovable between teeth.
Will the Court send the accused to spend the rest of their lives in prison on the testimony of an NBI asset who proposed to her handlers that she
take the role of the witness to the Vizconde massacre that she could not produce?
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the Decision dated December 15, 2005 and Resolution dated January 26, 2007 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. 00336 and ACQUITS accused-appellants Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio Lejano, Michael A. Gatchalian,
Hospicio Fernandez, Miguel Rodriguez, Peter Estrada and Gerardo Biong of the crimes of which they were charged for failure of the prosecution to
prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. They are ordered immediately RELEASED from detention unless they are confined for another lawful
cause.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director, Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City for immediate implementation. The Director of the
Bureau of Corrections is DIRECTED to report the action he has taken to this Court within five days from receipt of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.

72

G.R. No. 188705

March 2, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
FEDERICO LUCERO, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Before this Court on appeal is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00469-MIN dated December 17, 2008, which
upheld the conviction of accused Federico Lucero in Criminal Case No. 10849, decided by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 30 in Tagum City
on April 20, 2005.
Before the RTC, the accused was charged with the crime of Rape with Homicide in an Information dated July 31, 1997, which reads as follows:
That on or about June 7, 1997, in the Municipality of Tagum, Province of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, by means of force and intimidation, armed with a knife, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge of AAA,2 an eighteen (18) year old girl, against her will, and on the occasion of said rape, the said accused, with intent to kill, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab the said AAA, thereby inflicting upon her wounds which caused her death, and
further causing actual, moral and compensatory damages to the heirs of the victim.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
On October 14, 1997, the accused, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded "not guilty" at his arraignment.4
The Case for the Prosecution
The prosecution presented Alejandro Jao (Jao); Anastacio Langgoy (Langgoy); Police Officer 2 Galileo Gurrea (PO2 Gurrea); Dr. Ricardo M.
Rodaje (Dr. Rodaje), National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Medico-Legal Officer; and Dimpna D. Bermejo-Dulay (Dulay), NBI Regional Chemist as
witnesses.
Jao, Purok Leader of XXX in Tagum, Davao del Norte, testified that on June 6, 1997, at around 11:00 p.m., he saw the accused and a certain Digoy
Tewok drinking outside the Olympic Battery Shop, along the National Highway, where the accused was employed as a cook. He noticed that the
accused was wearing green short pants.5 About 10 meters from where the accused was drinking, Jao saw the victim, AAA, a certain May Laribas,
and his daughter looking at pictures in an album, inside the purok hut.6 He then told his daughter and her companions to go home, as there were
people drinking in the area, especially since he knew that the accused was attracted to AAA. His daughter and her companions left after that, and
Jao and his wife slept in their store.7
At around 2 oclock the next morning, Jao was awakened by his daughters shouting that someone had entered the room of AAA. He went outside
the store and saw his daughter coming from the direction of AAAs house, followed by the accused being chased by a neighbor, Langgoy. Jaos
daughter pushed him inside the store, and then the accused, wearing only white briefs, with something covering the top of his head, ran by, at a
distance of six feet. The area was lighted by a 40-watt fluorescent lamp, which was about seven meters from accused. Jao did not join the chase,
and instead went to check on AAA. AAAs uncle, BBB, also went into her house and shouted that AAA had a stab wound on her breast.8 AAA was
then brought to the Tagum Doctors Hospital where she was declared "dead on arrival."
At 3:00 a.m. on June 7, 1997, Jao saw the accused come out of the Patalinghug Funeral Homes, after which he proceeded to his room in his place
of work. Jao said that the accused was barefoot, his feet were muddy, and he wore the same green short pants Jao saw him wearing the night
before.9 Later on, Jao peeped through a hole in the wall of the room of the accused, and he saw the latter washing his green short pants, all the
while looking in different directions. At 11 oclock that morning, in the Olympic Battery Shop, Jao, along with the police, saw scratches on the back of
the accused when he took off his shirt. Half an hour later, Jao accompanied the police and a radio reporter to the room of the accused, where upon
questioning, the accused said that the knife he used in killing AAA was at the left side of his beds headboard. Jao recovered the knife, which he
later identified during his testimony in court.10
Langgoy testified that, at around 2:30 a.m. on June 7, 1997, he was awakened by a voice calling for help, and that it was from AAA, who lived five
meters from his house.11 He rushed to her house, but when he tried to enter it, his hands were held by someone inside, so he stepped back. Then
someone came out of the house, and Langgoy identified him as the accused, Lucero, who was clad only in his underwear, with his green short
pants covering the top of his head and his forehead. Langgoy gave chase but was unable to catch the accused, so he went back to the house of the
victim, who had by that time been brought to the hospital. Langgoy claimed to have recognized the accused by the light of the 40-watt fluorescent
lamp nearby. He was also familiar with the accused and his particular green shorts, since they were close neighbors, with their houses being only
four meters apart.12
PO2 Gurrea testified that at 8:00 a.m. on June 7, 1997, he was told to investigate an incident at XXX, Tagum, Davao del Norte. When he got to the
area, the people he interviewed told him that there had been a commotion in AAAs house, and that the suspect was a short, stout, bowlegged man
who wore only briefs and carried a knife. PO2 Gurrea went back to the police station, but told the witnesses to report to him at his office if they saw
the suspect. At 11:00 a.m., PO2 Gurrea was told that the suspect had woken up. Along with Senior Police Officer 1 (SPO1) Judil Chavez, SPO1
Wenifredo Rivas, and SPO2 Eric Baloyo, PO2 Gurrea went to the Olympic Battery Shop and saw the accused paring vegetables. He invited the
accused to the police station where the accused admitted killing AAA, but denied raping her. They then accompanied the accused back to XXX,
where, in the house of the accused, he saw a bloodied white t-shirt. He asked the accused where he had placed the knife used in killing the victim,
and the accused pointed to the bottom of his bed. They found the knife after turning the bed over. The accused was then told to take off his shirt,
and when he did so, PO2 Gurrea and Purok Leader Jao saw scratches on the back and right thigh of the accused.13
Dr. Rodaje, NBI Medico Legal Officer, prepared the autopsy on the body of the victim, and found several stab wounds and contusions, with one stab
wound penetrating the heart, causing her death.14 His examination also found hymenal lacerations, after which he performed the vaginal swabbing
to see if there was still seminal fluid in the vaginal canal.15 The findings in the autopsy report indicated the following injuries:
Contusion, temporal region, left, 7.0 x 8.0 cm.
Contused-abrasions: nose, left side, 0.9 x 1.0 cm.; face, right side, 0.3 x 0.4 cm.; thigh, middle third, antero-lateral aspect, right, 9.5 x 10.0 cm.
Hematoma, frontal region, right, 2.0 x 2.4 cm.
Incised wound, hand, postero-lateral aspect, left, 4.0 cm.; palmar region, left, 2.3 cm.;

73

Hymenal laceration, complete at [4:00 and 7:00] position corresponding to the face of a watch, edges are edematous and with clotted blood.
STAB WOUNDS, modified by suturing and embalming.
1. Roughly spindle-shaped, 1.2 cm.; edges are clean-cut, oriented horizontally, lateral extremity is sharp, medial extremity is blunt located at the
right, shoulder, 26.0 cm. above the right elbow, directed backward, downward and medially, involving the soft tissues only with an approximate
depth of 3.0 cm.
2. Roughly spindle-shaped, 3.0 cm., edges are clean-cut, oriented horizontally, lateral extremity is sharp, medial extremity is blunt located at the
infra-mammary region, 4.5 cm. from anterior median line, directed backward, upward, and medially, involving the soft tissues, cutting the sternum,
penetrating the left ventricle with an approximate depth of 4.5 cm.
3. Roughly spindle-shaped, 1.5 cm. edges are clean-cut, oriented horizontally, lateral extremity is sharp, medial extremity is blunt. Located at the
supra-mammary region, 20.0 cm. from anterior median line directed backward, upward, and laterally, involving the soft tissues only, with an
approximate depth of 2.4 cm.
xxxx
CAUSE OF DEATH: STAB WOUNDS16
He then submitted the swab specimen to Dulay, NBI Regional Chemist, who found the specimen positive for the presence of seminal stains.17
The Case for the Defense
The accused testified in his defense, saying that he had been a resident of XXX, Tagum, Davao del Norte since February 2, 1997, and that he had
been invited by the police for questioning at 11:00 a.m. on June 7, 1997.18 He had been slicing ampalaya in the kitchen when the police arrived,
and when he asked what they wanted with him, he was told to just accompany them to the police station. He put down his knife, but PO2 Gurrea
picked it up, and then the accused was brought to the police station. He was handcuffed and brought to the comfort room where he was told that if
he did not admit to killing AAA, he would be beaten to death. He was also subjected to electric shock. He then confessed to the killing, even if he did
not commit the crime. The accused stated that he was not informed of his right to remain silent or to be assisted by counsel. After his confession, he
was mauled by AAAs brother and father. He was then brought back to his rented room, which PO2 Gurrea searched, finding a knife which he
brought back to the police station, along with the accused. The accused was then locked in a prison cell where the other prisoners beat him up. The
next day, he was visited by his elder brother, Dionisio Lucero, to whom he said that he wanted to be medically examined, but Dionisio was told by
the police not to interfere in the case.19
Dionisio testified that he visited his brother, the accused, on June 8, 1997, and noticed that his brothers face was swollen. The accused told him to
go to the Chief of Police so that Dionisio could bring him to a doctor, but Dionisio was not allowed to do so, and instead went home. On crossexamination, Dionisio testified that he did not believe his brother was tortured.20
The Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court found that there was no proof of maltreatment or torture on the part of the police to elicit the confession of the accused. It further held
that enough circumstantial evidence was presented to prove the guilt of the accused.
After deliberating upon the evidence, the trial court rendered its Decision finding the accused guilty in Criminal Case No. 10849, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
In View Of All The Foregoing, the Court finds accused Federico Lucero guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with Homicide and he
is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH and to pay the heirs of the victim AAA P75,000.00 civil indemnity; P50,000.00 moral damages
and P25,000.00 exemplary damages.
Conformably with the Decision promulgated on 7 July 2004 in G.R. No. 147678-87, entitled People [v.] Efren Mateo y Garcia, upon finality of this
Decision, let all the pertinent records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the Court of Appeals, Cagayan de Oro City for intermediate review.
SO ORDERED.21
The Ruling of the Appellate Court
In his appeal to the CA, the accused questioned the identification of him made by witnesses Jao and Langgoy, and assailed the trial courts
appreciation of the allegedly illegally-obtained evidence.
The CA found that enough circumstantial evidence was present to convict the accused. Even so, it held that the extrajudicial confession made by
the accused to PO2 Gurrea was inadmissible since the accused was deprived of his right to counsel when he was questioned. The bloodied shirt
and knife that were found in the room of the accused were also held to be inadmissible, being "fruits of the poisonous tree."22 The CA followed the
trial court in finding that there was no proof of maltreatment or torture, and that the brother of the accused did not believe the allegations of
torture.23
Even as the CA upheld the accuseds conviction, it found it proper to modify the award of damages. The amount of the award of civil indemnity was
increased to PhP 100,000 and that of moral damages increased to PhP 75,000, in line with current judicial policy. Temperate damages were
awarded, as there was no proof of the actual amount of loss. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated April 20, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, 11th Judicial Region, Branch 30, Tagum City, in
Criminal Case No. 10849, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. As modified, appellant is hereby SENTENCED to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua with no possibility of parole. He is ORDERED to indemnify the heirs of AAA the amounts of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity;
P75,000.00 as moral damages; P25,000.00 as temperate damages; and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.24
Hence, we have this appeal.
The Ruling of this Court

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In his appeal, Lucero questions the positive identification made by witnesses Jao and Langgoy. He insists that the witnesses were unable to see the
face of the perpetrator, and identification was made solely on the basis of the green short pants worn by the suspect. He also claims that Jao did not
immediately report the identity of the perpetrator to the police, and that this casts doubt on the witness credibility. In his defense, he also claims that
a DNA test should have been done to match the spermatozoa found in the victims body to a sample taken from him, and that since no DNA test
was done, he cannot be linked to the crime.
The appeal is without merit.
The CA correctly disregarded the confession by accused-appellant Lucero, as well as the evidence gained by searching his room.
Among the evidence considered by the RTC during the trial were a blood-stained white t-shirt and knife found in the room of accused-appellant.
However, these items were the result of a search conducted after accused-appellant had been questioned without the presence of counsel, nor had
accused-appellant been apprised of his rights.
The testimony of PO2 Gurrea is quite informative:
Q It was you who conducted the investigation?
A Yes, sir.
xxxx
Q When you investigated the accused, you did not inform the accused that he had the right to remain silent? Did you?
A No, sir. We did not inform him of his right, but we directly questioned him.
Q And also, you did not inform the accused that whatever he would answer to your question that he would give will be used against him in the court
of law? Did you?
A I did not tell him.
Q And also, you did not inform the accused at that time that he would have the right to get counsel of his own choice?
A We did not inform him.
Q And also, you did not inform the accused that he would have the right not to be compelled to answer any of your question? Did you?
A No, sir. When we asked, he immediately answered the question.25
Accused-appellant was not informed of his rights, nor was there a waiver of said rights. Thus, the information elicited is inadmissible, and the
evidence garnered as the result of that interrogation is also inadmissible. This parallels Aballe v. People,26 wherein the accused in that case was
questioned without the presence of counsel, and later produced the weapon used in killing the victim, also making an extrajudicial confession
admitting his guilt. In that particular case, it was held, "Together with the extrajudicial confession, the fatal weapon is but a fruit of a constitutionally
infirmed interrogation and must consequently be disallowed."27
It is clear that the questioning of accused-appellant was made in violation of Section 12(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:
Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one.
These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
Thus, the trial court erred in considering the knife and bloodied t-shirt when they are inadmissible, which is what the CA correctly concluded.
But even if the confession and evidence gathered as a result of it are disregarded, the evidence that remains still supports the result of the
conviction of accused-appellant.
Here, there are no direct witnesses to the crime. But even if no one saw the commission of the crime, accused-appellant may still be pinned down
as the perpetrator. As held in Salvador v. People:
Direct evidence of the crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. The rules of evidence allow a
trial court to rely on circumstantial evidence to support its conclusion of guilt. Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which proves a fact or series
of facts from which the facts in issue may be established by inference. At times, resort to circumstantial evidence is imperative since to insist on
direct testimony would, in many cases, result in setting felons free and deny proper protection to the community.28
In this particular case, with this particular crime, it is the circumstantial evidence that comes into play to reach a conclusion. In People v. Pascual, it
was held:
It is settled that in the special complex crime of rape with homicide, both the rape and the homicide must be established beyond reasonable doubt.
In this regard, we have held that the crime of rape is difficult to prove because it is generally unwitnessed and very often only the victim is left to
testify for herself. It becomes even more difficult when the complex crime of rape with homicide is committed because the victim could no longer
testify. Thus, in crimes of rape with homicide, as here, resort to circumstantial evidence is usually unavoidable.29
Under Sec. 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence shall be sufficient for conviction when the following requisites are complied
with: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proved; and (3) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
Salvador also held:
All the circumstances must be consistent with one another, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time
inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent. Thus, conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld, provided that the
circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion that point to the accused, to the exclusion of
all others, as the guilty person.30

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Setting aside the knife and the bloodied t-shirt recovered from the room of accused-appellant, the CA and the RTC relied on several circumstances
to justify the conviction, to wit:
(1) On June 6, 1997, at around 11:00 p.m., Jao saw accused-appellant, wearing green short pants, and a certain Digoy Tewok drinking outside the
Olympic Battery Shop.
(2) On June 7, 1997, at around 2:00 a.m., Jao saw his daughter coming from the direction of AAAs house, followed by accused-appellant, who was
being chased by Langgoy. Accused-appellant wore white briefs with something covering his head. Jao recognized accused-appellant from a
distance of six feet, and the lighting came from a 40-watt fluorescent lamp about seven meters away from accused-appellant.
(3) At around 3:00 a.m. on June 7, 1997, Jao saw accused-appellant come out of the Patalinghug Funeral Homes and proceed to his place of
employment. Accused-appellant was barefoot, his feet were muddy, and he wore the same green short pants he had been wearing the night before.
Accused-appellant also asked for water since he was thirsty.
(4) Sometime in the morning of June 7, 1997, through a hole in the wall of the room of accused-appellant, Jao saw accused-appellant washing his
green short pants, seemingly restless and wary.
(5) At around 11:00 a.m. on June 7, 1997, Jao saw scratches on the back and right thigh of accused-appellant, after accused-appellant was told to
take his shirt off by the police.
(6) Langgoy was awakened by a voice calling for help, and he recognized the voice as that of AAA. When he went to AAAs house, which was five
meters from his, and tried to enter it, his hands were held by someone inside the house. When he stepped back, and the one who had held his
hands came out, Langgoy recognized the person as accused-appellant, who was wearing only briefs and with green short pants covering his head.
Langgoy gave chase, but was unable to catch him.
(7) Langgoy positively identified accused-appellant by the light of a 40-watt fluorescent lamp nearby, and was familiar with accused-appellant as
they were neighbors, with their houses only four meters apart.
(8) A post-mortem examination of AAAs body revealed that she had had sexual intercourse, as found by NBI Medico-Legal Officer Dr. Rodaje. Dr.
Rodaje found hymenal lacerations on AAAs hymen at 4 oclock and 7 oclock positions, with the edges of the hymen being swollen and with clotted
blood. The conclusion that AAA had had sexual intercourse was supported by the findings of NBI Regional Chemist Dulay, from a vaginal swabbing
from AAA that gave positive results for seminal stains.
The aforementioned circumstances lead to the inescapable conclusion that accused-appellant is guilty.
Positive identification of accused-appellant was made by Langgoy, and he remained unshaken in his testimony, even under cross-examination. He
related his version of the events of June 7, 1997, as follows:
Q At about 2:30 in the morning of June 7, 1997, please tell the Court where you were and what were you doing?
A I was sleeping at that particular time.
Q In that house which you said situated at [XXX]?
A Yes, sir.
Q While sleeping, tell us if anything transpired?
A During that time and date, somebody called-up for help.
Q Where did that voice come from, if you know?
A The voice came from the residence of [AAA].
xxxx
Q What did you do immediately after hearing that voice shouting for help?
A I immediately ran to the door of the house of [AAA] and I noticed that somebody held my two hands.
Q What did you do at the door of the house of [AAA]?
A I wanted to open the door so that I can help her, but I cannot enter.
xxxx
Q You said that you noticed somebody was touching your hand when you were trying to open the door of [AAA]s house, what happened after that?
A When I stepped backward, somebody was rushing out of the house and ran away.
Q What made you [step] backward since your intention was to get inside the house?
A I stepped backward because somebody held my hands.
xxxx
Q Alright, you said that somebody went out of the house of [AAA] passing that door in which you wanted to get entrance, what did you do after that?
A I chased the person who went out of the door.
Q What did you do when you were following that person? Were you walking or running?
A I ran, sir.

76

Q To what direction did that person go?

A Towards [XXX], sir.
Q What can you say on the visibility of that place of that path where that person was running and when you were chasing?
A There was a portion of the path which was lighted and there was also a portion which was dark.
Q Since you said that there was a portion of that path which was lighted, tell us if you can describe to the Court the build or attire of that person?
A I observed that the person whom I chased was robust, no clothing except his brief and with a green short pants placed on his head.
Q What kind of short pants, if you can tell us, that was placed on his head?
A Colored green short pants which is usually being used by basketball players.
Q Can you tell us who that person was?
A He was Lucero.
Q What made you conclude that it was Federico Lucero, the person you chased from inside the house of [AAA]?
A I positively identified that it was Federico Lucero, even if I have not seen his face, because he was wearing that green short pants and he, being
bowlegged.
Q You described to the Court the colored green short pants that was placed on his head; tell us if that was the first time you saw that short pants.
A I often saw him wearing that green short pants.
Q Where had you been seeing Federico Lucero usually wear that green short pants, which you said placed on his head?
A I always saw him wearing that short pants almost everyday, because we were just neighbors.31
During cross-examination, Langgoy was steadfast in his identification of accused-appellant as the person he chased, in spite of the attempts of the
defense to shake him.
The defense claims that Langgoy admitted that he was unable to see the face of accused-appellant, as it was covered by the short pants.
Langgoys testimony under cross-examination belies that.1avvphi1 His clarification reads as follows:
Q Did he cover a part of his face?
A On the part of the head.
Q Did he cover his face?
A Yes, sir.
Q Which part of his face was covered?
A Only his forehead.
Q Forehead?
A His forehead, sir.
xxxx
Q Are you telling us that you saw the green short pants covering his face, arent you?
A Yes, sir.
Q But you did not see the face?
A I saw him only once. After that, he ran away.
Q Are you telling us that you saw the face of the accused only once?
A Yes, sir.
Q Do you remember that you testified on direct-examination that you did not see the face? Do you still remember that?
A I did not say that I did not see his face. I was not asked that question.32
Langgoys testimony was that he saw the face of accused-appellant once, at the time when the short pants covered the top of the perpetrators
face, as well as his forehead. At no time during direct examination was the witness asked if he saw Luceros face. Langgoy made no categorical
statement that he had not seen the face of accused-appellant, contrary to what the defense has stated. As to his statement during direct
examination, "even if I have not seen his face,"33 which the defense latched onto as an admission, it cannot be interpreted to mean that he could
not recognize the person he chased. In the context of Langgoys testimony, it means that he could rely on other familiar characteristics for
identification, namely the bowleggedness and the green short pants, that it was not necessary for him to see the persons face to identify him. Add
to that Langgoys maintaining that accused-appellant was the perpetrator, and his clarifying description of the person he chased, there was indeed
positive identification.

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Langgoys testimony dovetails with that of Jao, and serves to identify accused-appellant as the one who ran from AAAs house. Their descriptions of
the man they saw running away match, even if Langgoy was the only one who saw accused-appellants face. Their testimonies place accusedappellant at the scene of the crime, and pinpoint him as the person leaving the house where AAAs body was found. This identification, along with
the condition and actuations of accused-appellant after AAAs body was found, indicates that accused-appellant was the one who raped and killed
AAA.
Even as the circumstances lead to the inevitable conclusion that accused-appellant committed the crime, he claims that since spermatozoa was
found on the deceased, a DNA test should have been conducted by the prosecution so as to erase all doubts as to the identity of the perpetrator.
It is not for accused-appellant to determine which evidence or testimony the prosecution should present. In Loguinsa, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan (5th
Division), the Court stated, "Section 5, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure expressly provides that all criminal action shall be
prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal and what prosecution evidence should be presented during the trial depends solely upon the
discretion of the prosecutor."34 The DNA test is not essential, while there exists other evidence pinning down accused-appellant as the perpetrator.
Indeed, if he honestly thought that the DNA test could have proved his innocence, he could have asked for the conduct of said test during his trial,
instead of belatedly raising it on appeal, and attempting to dictate upon the prosecution what course of actions it should have undertaken.
In support of his argument, accused-appellant would debunk the identification by witnesses by citing People v. Faustino, which stated:
The identification of an accused by an eyewitness is a vital piece of evidence and most decisive of the success or failure of the case for the
prosecution. But even while significant, an eyewitness identification, which authors not infrequently would describe to be "inherently suspect," is not
as accurate and authoritative as the scientific forms of identification evidence like by fingerprint or by DNA testing.35 x x x
While a DNA test might have been more conclusive, the cited case did not mandate DNA testing in place of eyewitness testimony. In that particular
case, scientific forms of identification were held to be preferable over eyewitness testimony, as pictures of the accused were what were presented
for identification, so the testimony of the witness was tainted. The holding of a DNA test was never in issue.
In his defense, accused-appellant claims to have been sleeping in the early hours of June 7, 1997.36 He was awakened by the cry of AAAs aunt at
4:00 a.m.37 He then went to AAAs house and listened to people around the area talking about who might have killed AAA.38 He says that he later
went to work and was at work when the police arrived and invited him to the police station.39
Accused-appellant denies that he committed the crime, and offers up his version of events. He was unable to present any corroborating witnesses
to testify that he did, indeed, go to AAAs house after the crime was committed. All accused-appellant presented is his bare denial that he committed
the crime. In People v. Alarcon, We held, "Denial, if unsupported by clear and convincing evidence, is negative and self-serving evidence, which
deserves no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the testimonies of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative
matters."40
The witnesses Jao and Langgoy testified that accused-appellant was the person they saw leaving the scene of the crime. There is no reason for
them to falsely identify accused-appellant, no motive presented for them to lie. In People v. Bringas, We held, "As a rule, absent any evidence
showing any reason or motive for prosecution witnesses to perjure, the logical conclusion is that no such improper motive exists, and their
testimonies are thus worthy of full faith and credit."41 In the same case, We also stated, "In fine, when the credibility of witnesses is in issue, the
trial courts assessment is accorded great weight unless it is shown that it has overlooked a certain fact or circumstance of weight which the lower
court may have overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated and which, if properly considered, would alter the results of the case."42 No facts or
circumstances of substance were presented that the trial court overlooked, misunderstood, or misappreciated, which would necessitate a review of
the findings of fact.
The elements of rape with homicide are present. Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. (RA) 7659, reads as follows:
Art. 335. When and how rape is committed.Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
xxxx
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death.
xxxx
People v. Villarino held, "In the special complex crime of rape with homicide, the following elements must concur: (1) the appellant had carnal
knowledge of a woman; (2) carnal knowledge of a woman was achieved by means of force, threat or intimidation; and (3) by reason or on occasion
of such carnal knowledge by means of force, threat or intimidation, the appellant killed a woman."43
The prosecution was able to prove that accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of the victim, as per the post-mortem findings of Dr. Rodaje and
the vaginal swabbings examined by NBI Regional Chemist Dulay. Dr. Rodaje found hymenal lacerations from his examination of AAAs body. In
People v. Payot, Jr., it was held, "Hymenal lacerations, whether healed or fresh, are the best evidence of forcible defloration."44 Dulays findings
that there were seminal stains serve to bolster the conclusion that rape was committed.
As to the presence of force or intimidation, the several injuries and stab wounds suffered by AAA are mute but eloquent statements of the violence
inflicted upon her, resulting in her death. Thus, the elements of the crime of rape with homicide are all present.
The RTC correctly convicted accused-appellant of the crime of rape with homicide, which, at the time of the offense, was penalized under Art. 335
of the Code, before it was amended by RA 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, and was punishable by death. The CA correctly modified the penalty in
accordance with Sec. 2 of RA 9346 or "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines," said section reading as follows:
SEC. 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed.
(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code; or

78

(b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does not make use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code.
The penalty meted out was thus reduced to reclusion perpetua. Furthermore, Sec. 3 of RA 9346 provides, "Persons convicted of offenses punished
with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligibile for parole under Act
No. 4103, known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended."
The CA was correct in modifying the penalty, in accordance with the law.
As to the award of damages, the RTC ordered accused-appellant to pay the heirs of AAA PhP 75,000 as civil indemnity, PhP 50,000 as moral
damages, and PhP 25,000 as exemplary damages. The award of damages was modified by the CA, with PhP 100,000 as civil indemnity, PhP
75,000 as moral damages, and PhP 25,000 retained as exemplary damages. In addition, the CA awarded PhP 25,000 as temperate damages.
In line with current jurisprudence,45 We reduce the award of civil indemnity to PhP 75,000 and maintain the award of PhP 75,000 as moral
damages, but increase the award of exemplary damages to PhP 30,000. The award of temperate damages is proper, following Art. 2224 of the Civil
Code, which states, "Temperate or moderate damages, which are more than nominal but less than compensatory damages, may be recovered
when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount can not, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty."
Furthermore, the damages assessed in this case shall be subject to interest at six percent (6%).46
WHEREFORE, the CA Decision dated December 17, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00469-MIN is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to the
damages. Accused-appellant Federico Lucero is ordered to indemnify the heirs of AAA the amounts of PhP 75,000 as civil indemnity; PhP 75,000
as moral damages; PhP 25,000 as temperate damages; and PhP 30,000 as exemplary damages, all with interest at the legal rate of six percent
(6%) per annum from the finality of this Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.

79

G.R. No. 190710

June 6, 2011

JESSE U. LUCAS, Petitioner,

vs.
JESUS S. LUCAS, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Is a prima facie showing necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing order? In this petition for review on certiorari, we address this question to
guide the Bench and the Bar in dealing with a relatively new evidentiary tool. Assailed in this petition are the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1 dated
September 25, 2009 and Resolution dated December 17, 2009.
The antecedents of the case are, as follows:
On July 26, 2007, petitioner, Jesse U. Lucas, filed a Petition to Establish Illegitimate Filiation (with Motion for the Submission of Parties to DNA
Testing)2 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 72, Valenzuela City. Petitioner narrated that, sometime in 1967, his mother, Elsie Uy (Elsie),
migrated to Manila from Davao and stayed with a certain "Ate Belen (Belen)" who worked in a prominent nightspot in Manila. Elsie would oftentimes
accompany Belen to work. On one occasion, Elsie got acquainted with respondent, Jesus S. Lucas, at Belens workplace, and an intimate
relationship developed between the two. Elsie eventually got pregnant and, on March 11, 1969, she gave birth to petitioner, Jesse U. Lucas. The
name of petitioners father was not stated in petitioners certificate of live birth. However, Elsie later on told petitioner that his father is respondent.
On August 1, 1969, petitioner was baptized at San Isidro Parish, Taft Avenue, Pasay City. Respondent allegedly extended financial support to Elsie
and petitioner for a period of about two years. When the relationship of Elsie and respondent ended, Elsie refused to accept respondents offer of
support and decided to raise petitioner on her own. While petitioner was growing up, Elsie made several attempts to introduce petitioner to
respondent, but all attempts were in vain.
Attached to the petition were the following: (a) petitioners certificate of live birth; (b) petitioners baptismal certificate; (c) petitioners college
diploma, showing that he graduated from Saint Louis University in Baguio City with a degree in Psychology; (d) his Certificate of Graduation from
the same school; (e) Certificate of Recognition from the University of the Philippines, College of Music; and (f) clippings of several articles from
different newspapers about petitioner, as a musical prodigy.
Respondent was not served with a copy of the petition. Nonetheless, respondent learned of the petition to establish filiation. His counsel therefore
went to the trial court on August 29, 2007 and obtained a copy of the petition.
Petitioner filed with the RTC a Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the Case. Hence, on September 3, 2007, the RTC, finding the petition to be
sufficient in form and substance, issued the Order3 setting the case for hearing and urging anyone who has any objection to the petition to file his
opposition. The court also directed that the Order be published once a week for three consecutive weeks in any newspaper of general circulation in
the Philippines, and that the Solicitor General be furnished with copies of the Order and the petition in order that he may appear and represent the
State in the case.
On September 4, 2007, unaware of the issuance of the September 3, 2007 Order, respondent filed a Special Appearance and Comment. He
manifested inter alia that: (1) he did not receive the summons and a copy of the petition; (2) the petition was adversarial in nature and therefore
summons should be served on him as respondent; (3) should the court agree that summons was required, he was waiving service of summons and
making a voluntary appearance; and (4) notice by publication of the petition and the hearing was improper because of the confidentiality of the
subject matter.4
On September 14, 2007, respondent also filed a Manifestation and Comment on Petitioners Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the Case.
Respondent reiterated that the petition for recognition is adversarial in nature; hence, he should be served with summons.
After learning of the September 3, 2007 Order, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration.5 Respondent averred that the petition was not in due
form and substance because petitioner could not have personally known the matters that were alleged therein. He argued that DNA testing cannot
be had on the basis of a mere allegation pointing to respondent as petitioners father. Moreover, jurisprudence is still unsettled on the acceptability
of DNA evidence.
On July 30, 2008, the RTC, acting on respondents motion for reconsideration, issued an Order6 dismissing the case. The court remarked that,
based on the case of Herrera v. Alba,7 there are four significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action which the parties have to face: a
prima facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the putative father and the child. The court
opined that petitioner must first establish these four procedural aspects before he can present evidence of paternity and filiation, which may include
incriminating acts or scientific evidence like blood group test and DNA test results. The court observed that the petition did not show that these
procedural aspects were present. Petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case considering that (a) his mother did not personally declare that she
had sexual relations with respondent, and petitioners statement as to what his mother told him about his father was clearly hearsay; (b) the
certificate of live birth was not signed by respondent; and (c) although petitioner used the surname of respondent, there was no allegation that he
was treated as the child of respondent by the latter or his family. The court opined that, having failed to establish a prima facie case, respondent had
no obligation to present any affirmative defenses. The dispositive portion of the said Order therefore reads:
WHEREFORE, for failure of the petitioner to establish compliance with the four procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action in his petition, his
motion for the submission of parties to DNA testing to establish paternity and filiation is hereby denied. This case is DISMISSED without prejudice.
SO ORDERED.8
Petitioner seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration to the Order dated July 30, 2008, which the RTC resolved in his favor. Thus, on October 20,
2008, it issued the Order9 setting aside the courts previous order, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Order dated July 30, 2008 is hereby reconsidered and set aside.
Let the Petition (with Motion for the Submission of Parties to DNA Testing) be set for hearing on January 22, 2009 at 8:30 in the morning.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.10

80

This time, the RTC held that the ruling on the grounds relied upon by petitioner for filing the petition is premature considering that a full-blown trial
has not yet taken place. The court stressed that the petition was sufficient in form and substance. It was verified, it included a certification against
forum shopping, and it contained a plain, concise, and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which petitioner relies on for his claim, in accordance
with Section 1, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court. The court remarked that the allegation that the statements in the petition were not of petitioners
personal knowledge is a matter of evidence. The court also dismissed respondents arguments that there is no basis for the taking of DNA test, and
that jurisprudence is still unsettled on the acceptability of DNA evidence. It noted that the new Rule on DNA Evidence11 allows the conduct of DNA
testing, whether at the courts instance or upon application of any person who has legal interest in the matter in litigation.
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration of Order dated October 20, 2008 and for Dismissal of Petition,12 reiterating that (a) the petition was
not in due form and substance as no defendant was named in the title, and all the basic allegations were hearsay; and (b) there was no prima facie
case, which made the petition susceptible to dismissal.
The RTC denied the motion in the Order dated January 19, 2009, and rescheduled the hearing.13
Aggrieved, respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, questioning the Orders dated October 20, 2008 and January 19, 2009.
On September 25, 2009, the CA decided the petition for certiorari in favor of respondent, thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED for being meritorious. The assailed Orders dated October 20, 2008 and
January 19, 2009 both issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 172 of Valenzuela City in SP. Proceeding Case No. 30-V-07 are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the case docketed as SP. Proceeding Case No. 30-V-07 is DISMISSED.14
The CA held that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of respondent, as no summons had been served on him. Respondents
special appearance could not be considered as voluntary appearance because it was filed only for the purpose of questioning the jurisdiction of the
court over respondent. Although respondent likewise questioned the courts jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition, the same is not
equivalent to a waiver of his right to object to the jurisdiction of the court over his person.
The CA remarked that petitioner filed the petition to establish illegitimate filiation, specifically seeking a DNA testing order to abbreviate the
proceedings. It noted that petitioner failed to show that the four significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action had been met. The CA
further held that a DNA testing should not be allowed when the petitioner has failed to establish a prima facie case, thus:
While the tenor [of Section 4, Rule on DNA Evidence] appears to be absolute, the rule could not really have been intended to trample on the
substantive rights of the parties. It could have not meant to be an instrument to promote disorder, harassment, or extortion. It could have not been
intended to legalize unwarranted expedition to fish for evidence. Such will be the situation in this particular case if a court may at any time order the
taking of a DNA test. If the DNA test in compulsory recognition cases is immediately available to the petitioner/complainant without requiring first the
presentation of corroborative proof, then a dire and absurd rule would result. Such will encourage and promote harassment and extortion.
xxxx
At the risk of being repetitious, the Court would like to stress that it sees the danger of allowing an absolute DNA testing to a compulsory recognition
test even if the plaintiff/petitioner failed to establish prima facie proof. x x x If at anytime, motu proprio and without pre-conditions, the court can
indeed order the taking of DNA test in compulsory recognition cases, then the prominent and well-to-do members of our society will be easy prey for
opportunists and extortionists. For no cause at all, or even for [sic] casual sexual indiscretions in their younger years could be used as a means to
harass them. Unscrupulous women, unsure of the paternity of their children may just be taking the chances-just in case-by pointing to a sexual
partner in a long past one-time encounter. Indeed an absolute and unconditional taking of DNA test for compulsory recognition case opens wide the
opportunities for extortionist to prey on victims who have no stomach for scandal.15
Petitioner moved for reconsideration. On December 17, 2009, the CA denied the motion for lack of merit.16
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner raises the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RESOLVED THE ISSUE OF LACK OF JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON
OF HEREIN RESPONDENT ALBEIT THE SAME WAS NEVER RAISED IN THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI.
I.A
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT JURISDICTION WAS NOT ACQUIRED OVER THE PERSON
OF THE RESPONDENT.
I.B
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO REALIZE THAT THE RESPONDENT HAD ALREADY SUBMITTED
VOLUNTARILY TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT A QUO.
I.C
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT ESSENTIALLY RULED THAT THE TITLE OF A PLEADING, RATHER THAN
ITS BODY, IS CONTROLLING.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT ORDERED THE DISMISSAL OF THE PETITION BY REASON OF THE
MOTION (FILED BY THE PETITIONER BEFORE THE COURT A QUO) FOR THE CONDUCT OF DNA TESTING.
II.A
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT ESSENTIALLY RULED THAT DNA TESTING CAN ONLY BE ORDERED
AFTER THE PETITIONER ESTABLISHES PRIMA FACIE PROOF OF FILIATION.
III.

81

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WITH ITS MISPLACED RELIANCE ON THE CASE OF HERRERA VS. ALBA,
ESPECIALLY AS REGARDS THE FOUR SIGNIFICANT PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF A TRADITIONAL PATERNITY ACTION.17
Petitioner contends that respondent never raised as issue in his petition for certiorari the courts lack of jurisdiction over his person. Hence, the CA
had no legal basis to discuss the same, because issues not raised are deemed waived or abandoned. At any rate, respondent had already
voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court by his filing of several motions asking for affirmative relief, such as the (a) Motion for
Reconsideration of the Order dated September 3, 2007; (b) Ex Parte Motion to Resolve Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated November 6,
2007; and (c) Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated October 20, 2008 and for Dismissal of Petition. Petitioner points out that respondent
even expressly admitted that he has waived his right to summons in his Manifestation and Comment on Petitioners Very Urgent Motion to Try and
Hear the Case. Hence, the issue is already moot and academic.
Petitioner argues that the case was adversarial in nature. Although the caption of the petition does not state respondents name, the body of the
petition clearly indicates his name and his known address. He maintains that the body of the petition is controlling and not the caption.
Finally, petitioner asserts that the motion for DNA testing should not be a reason for the dismissal of the petition since it is not a legal ground for the
dismissal of cases. If the CA entertained any doubt as to the propriety of DNA testing, it should have simply denied the motion.18 Petitioner points
out that Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence does not require that there must be a prior proof of filiation before DNA testing can be ordered. He
adds that the CA erroneously relied on the four significant procedural aspects of a paternity case, as enunciated in Herrera v. Alba.19 Petitioner
avers that these procedural aspects are not applicable at this point of the proceedings because they are matters of evidence that should be taken
up during the trial.20
In his Comment, respondent supports the CAs ruling on most issues raised in the petition for certiorari and merely reiterates his previous
arguments. However, on the issue of lack of jurisdiction, respondent counters that, contrary to petitioners assertion, he raised the issue before the
CA in relation to his claim that the petition was not in due form and substance. Respondent denies that he waived his right to the service of
summons. He insists that the alleged waiver and voluntary appearance was conditional upon a finding by the court that summons is indeed
required. He avers that the assertion of affirmative defenses, aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, cannot be considered
as waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over such person.
The petition is meritorious.
Primarily, we emphasize that the assailed Orders of the trial court were orders denying respondents motion to dismiss the petition for illegitimate
filiation. An order denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order which neither terminates nor finally disposes of a case, as it leaves
something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits. As such, the general rule is that the denial of a motion to dismiss
cannot be questioned in a special civil action for certiorari, which is a remedy designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment.
Neither can a denial of a motion to dismiss be the subject of an appeal unless and until a final judgment or order is rendered. In a number of cases,
the court has granted the extraordinary remedy of certiorari on the denial of the motion to dismiss but only when it has been tainted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.21 In the present case, we discern no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial
court in denying the motion to dismiss.
The grounds for dismissal relied upon by respondent were (a) the courts lack of jurisdiction over his person due to the absence of summons, and
(b) defect in the form and substance of the petition to establish illegitimate filiation, which is equivalent to failure to state a cause of action.
We need not belabor the issues on whether lack of jurisdiction was raised before the CA, whether the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of
respondent, or whether respondent waived his right to the service of summons. We find that the primordial issue here is actually whether it was
necessary, in the first place, to serve summons on respondent for the court to acquire jurisdiction over the case. In other words, was the service of
summons jurisdictional? The answer to this question depends on the nature of petitioners action, that is, whether it is an action in personam, in
rem, or quasi in rem.
An action in personam is lodged against a person based on personal liability; an action in rem is directed against the thing itself instead of the
person; while an action quasi in rem names a person as defendant, but its object is to subject that person's interest in a property to a corresponding
lien or obligation. A petition directed against the "thing" itself or the res, which concerns the status of a person, like a petition for adoption,
annulment of marriage, or correction of entries in the birth certificate, is an action in rem.22
In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for the court to validly try and decide the case. In a proceeding
in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court, provided that the latter
has jurisdiction over the res. Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (a) by the seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought
into actual custody of the law, or (b) as a result of the institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of the court is recognized and made
effective. 23
The herein petition to establish illegitimate filiation is an action in rem. By the simple filing of the petition to establish illegitimate filiation before the
RTC, which undoubtedly had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition, the latter thereby acquired jurisdiction over the case. An in rem
proceeding is validated essentially through publication. Publication is notice to the whole world that the proceeding has for its object to bar
indefinitely all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort to the right sought to be established.24 Through publication, all interested
parties are deemed notified of the petition.
If at all, service of summons or notice is made to the defendant, it is not for the purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction, but merely for
satisfying the due process requirements.25 This is but proper in order to afford the person concerned the opportunity to protect his interest if he so
chooses.26 Hence, failure to serve summons will not deprive the court of its jurisdiction to try and decide the case. In such a case, the lack of
summons may be excused where it is determined that the adverse party had, in fact, the opportunity to file his opposition, as in this case. We find
that the due process requirement with respect to respondent has been satisfied, considering that he has participated in the proceedings in this case
and he has the opportunity to file his opposition to the petition to establish filiation.
To address respondents contention that the petition should have been adversarial in form, we further hold that the herein petition to establish
filiation was sufficient in form. It was indeed adversarial in nature despite its caption which lacked the name of a defendant, the failure to implead
respondent as defendant, and the non-service of summons upon respondent. A proceeding is adversarial where the party seeking relief has given
legal warning to the other party and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it.27 In this petitionclassified as an action in remthe notice
requirement for an adversarial proceeding was likewise satisfied by the publication of the petition and the giving of notice to the Solicitor General, as
directed by the trial court.
The petition to establish filiation is sufficient in substance. It satisfies Section 1, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, which requires the complaint to contain
a plain, concise, and direct statement of the ultimate facts upon which the plaintiff bases his claim. A fact is essential if it cannot be stricken out

82

without leaving the statement of the cause of action inadequate.28 A complaint states a cause of action when it contains the following elements: (1)
the legal right of plaintiff, (2) the correlative obligation of the defendant, and (3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right.29
The petition sufficiently states the ultimate facts relied upon by petitioner to establish his filiation to respondent. Respondent, however, contends that
the allegations in the petition were hearsay as they were not of petitioners personal knowledge. Such matter is clearly a matter of evidence that
cannot be determined at this point but only during the trial when petitioner presents his evidence.
In a motion to dismiss a complaint based on lack of cause of action, the question submitted to the court for determination is the sufficiency of the
allegations made in the complaint to constitute a cause of action and not whether those allegations of fact are true, for said motion must
hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint.30
The inquiry is confined to the four corners of the complaint, and no other.31 The test of the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint is
whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer of the complaint.32
If the allegations of the complaint are sufficient in form and substance but their veracity and correctness are assailed, it is incumbent upon the court
to deny the motion to dismiss and require the defendant to answer and go to trial to prove his defense. The veracity of the assertions of the parties
can be ascertained at the trial of the case on the merits.33
The statement in Herrera v. Alba34 that there are four significant procedural aspects in a traditional paternity case which parties have to face has
been widely misunderstood and misapplied in this case. A party is confronted by these so-called procedural aspects during trial, when the parties
have presented their respective evidence. They are matters of evidence that cannot be determined at this initial stage of the proceedings, when
only the petition to establish filiation has been filed. The CAs observation that petitioner failed to establish a prima facie casethe first procedural
aspect in a paternity caseis therefore misplaced. A prima facie case is built by a partys evidence and not by mere allegations in the initiatory
pleading.
Clearly then, it was also not the opportune time to discuss the lack of a prima facie case vis--vis the motion for DNA testing since no evidence has,
as yet, been presented by petitioner. More essentially, it is premature to discuss whether, under the circumstances, a DNA testing order is
warranted considering that no such order has yet been issued by the trial court. In fact, the latter has just set the said case for hearing.
At any rate, the CAs view that it would be dangerous to allow a DNA testing without corroborative proof is well taken and deserves the Courts
attention. In light of this observation, we find that there is a need to supplement the Rule on DNA Evidence to aid the courts in resolving motions for
DNA testing order, particularly in paternity and other filiation cases. We, thus, address the question of whether a prima facie showing is necessary
before a court can issue a DNA testing order.
The Rule on DNA Evidence was enacted to guide the Bench and the Bar for the introduction and use of DNA evidence in the judicial system. It
provides the "prescribed parameters on the requisite elements for reliability and validity (i.e., the proper procedures, protocols, necessary laboratory
reports, etc.), the possible sources of error, the available objections to the admission of DNA test results as evidence as well as the probative value
of DNA evidence." It seeks "to ensure that the evidence gathered, using various methods of DNA analysis, is utilized effectively and properly, [and]
shall not be misused and/or abused and, more importantly, shall continue to ensure that DNA analysis serves justice and protects, rather than
prejudice the public."35
Not surprisingly, Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence merely provides for conditions that are aimed to safeguard the accuracy and integrity of the
DNA testing. Section 4 states:
SEC. 4. Application for DNA Testing Order. The appropriate court may, at any time, either motu proprio or on application of any person who has a
legal interest in the matter in litigation, order a DNA testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing and notice to the parties upon a showing of the
following:
(a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;
(b) The biological sample: (i) was not previously subjected to the type of DNA testing now requested; or (ii) was previously subjected to DNA testing,
but the results may require confirmation for good reasons;
(c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique;
(d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new information that is relevant to the proper resolution of the case; and
(e) The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may consider as potentially affecting the accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing.
This Rule shall not preclude a DNA testing, without need of a prior court order, at the behest of any party, including law enforcement agencies,
before a suit or proceeding is commenced.
This does not mean, however, that a DNA testing order will be issued as a matter of right if, during the hearing, the said conditions are established.
In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA testing order, there must be a show cause hearing wherein the applicant must first present
sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case or a reasonable possibility of paternity or "good cause" for the holding of the test. 36 In these
states, a court order for blood testing is considered a "search," which, under their Constitutions (as in ours), must be preceded by a finding of
probable cause in order to be valid. Hence, the requirement of a prima facie case, or reasonable possibility, was imposed in civil actions as a
counterpart of a finding of probable cause. The Supreme Court of Louisiana eloquently explained
Although a paternity action is civil, not criminal, the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is still applicable, and a
proper showing of sufficient justification under the particular factual circumstances of the case must be made before a court may order a
compulsory blood test. Courts in various jurisdictions have differed regarding the kind of procedures which are required, but those jurisdictions have
almost universally found that a preliminary showing must be made before a court can constitutionally order compulsory blood testing in paternity
cases. We agree, and find that, as a preliminary matter, before the court may issue an order for compulsory blood testing, the moving party must
show that there is a reasonable possibility of paternity. As explained hereafter, in cases in which paternity is contested and a party to the action
refuses to voluntarily undergo a blood test, a show cause hearing must be held in which the court can determine whether there is sufficient
evidence to establish a prima facie case which warrants issuance of a court order for blood testing.371avvphi1
The same condition precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect the putative father from mere harassment suits. Thus, during the
hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity.

83

Notwithstanding these, it should be stressed that the issuance of a DNA testing order remains discretionary upon the court. The court may, for
example, consider whether there is absolute necessity for the DNA testing. If there is already preponderance of evidence to establish paternity and
the DNA test result would only be corroborative, the court may, in its discretion, disallow a DNA testing.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated September 25, 2009 and Resolution dated
December 17, 2009 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders dated October 20, 2008 and January 19, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela City are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

84

G.R. No. 183830

October 19, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
DELFIN CALISO, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The decisive question that seeks an answer is whether the identification of the perpetrator of the crime by an eyewitness who did not get a look at
the face of the perpetrator was reliable and positive enough to support the conviction of appellant Delfin Caliso (Caliso).
Caliso was arraigned and tried for rape with homicide, but the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 21, in Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte found him
guilty of murder for the killing of AAA,1 a mentally-retarded 16-year old girl, and sentenced him to death in its decision dated August 19, 2002.2 The
appeal of the conviction was brought automatically to the Court. On June 28, 2005,3 the Court transferred the records to the Court of Appeals (CA)
for intermediate review pursuant to the ruling in People v. Mateo.4 On October 26, 2007,5 the CA, although affirming the conviction, reduced the
penalty to reclusion perpetua and modified the civil awards. Now, Caliso is before us in a final bid to overturn his conviction.
Antecedents
The information dated August 5, 1997 charged Caliso with rape with homicide perpetrated in the following manner:
That on or about the 5th day of June, 1997, at Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge
upon one AAA, who is a minor of 16 years old and a mentally retarded girl, against her will and consent; that on the occasion of said rape and in
furtherance of the accuseds criminal designs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill, and taking advantage of
superior strength, attack, assault and use personal violence upon said AAA by mauling her, pulling her towards a muddy water and submerging her
underneath, which caused the death of said AAA soon thereafter.
CONTRARY to and in VIOLATION of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to R.A. 7659, otherwise known as the "Heinous Crimes
Law".6
At his arraignment on November 12, 1997,7 Caliso pleaded not guilty to the charge.
The records show that AAA died on June 5, 1997 at around 11:00 am in the river located in Barangay Tiacongan, Kapatagan, Lanao Del Norte; that
the immediate cause of her death was asphyxia, secondary to drowning due to smothering; that the lone eyewitness, 34-year old Soledad
Amegable (Amegable), had been clearing her farm when she heard the anguished cries of a girl pleading for mercy: Please stop noy, it is painful
noy!;8 that the cries came from an area with lush bamboo growth that made it difficult for Amegable to see what was going on; that Amegable
subsequently heard sounds of beating and mauling that soon ended the girls cries; that Amegable then proceeded to get a better glimpse of what
was happening, hiding behind a cluster of banana trees in order not to be seen, and from there she saw a man wearing gray short pants bearing the
number "11" mark, who dragged a girls limp body into the river, where he submerged the girl into the knee-high muddy water and stood over her
body; that he later lifted the limp body and tossed it to deeper water; that he next jumped into the other side of the river; that in that whole time,
Amegable could not have a look at his face because he always had his back turned towards her;9 that she nonetheless insisted that the man was
Caliso, whose physical features she was familiar with due to having seen him pass by their barangay several times prior to the incident;10 that after
the man fled the crime scene, Amegable went straight to her house and told her husband what she had witnessed; and that her husband instantly
reported the incident to the barangay chairman.
It appears that one SPO3 Romulo R. Pancipanci declared in an affidavit11 that upon his station receiving the incident report on AAAs death at
about 12:45 pm of June 5, 1997, he and two other officers proceeded to the crime scene to investigate; that he interviewed Amegable who identified
the killer by his physical features and clothing (short pants); that based on such information, he traced Caliso as AAAs killer; and that Caliso gave
an extrajudicial admission of the killing of AAA. However, the declarations in the affidavit remained worthless because the Prosecution did not
present SPO3 Pancipanci as its witness.
Leo Bering, the barangay chairman of San Vicente, Kapatagan, Lanao Del Norte, attested that on the occasion of Calisos arrest and his custodial
interrogation, he heard Caliso admit to the investigating police officer the ownership of the short pants recovered from the crime scene; that the
admission was the reason why SPO3 Pancipanci arrested Caliso from among the curious onlookers that had gathered in the area; that Amegable,
who saw SPO3 Pancipancis arrest of Caliso at the crime scene, surmised that Caliso had gone home and returned to the crime scene thereafter.12
Municipal Health Officer Dr. Joseph G.B. Fuentecilla conducted the post-mortem examination on the body of AAA on June 6, 1997, and found the
following injuries, to wit:
EXTERNAL FINDINGS:
1. The dead body was generally pale wearing a heavily soiled old sleeveless shirt and garter skirts.
2. The body was wet and heavily soiled with mud both nostrils and mouth was filled with mud.
3. The skin of hands and feet is bleached and corrugated in appearance.
4. 2 cm. linear lacerated wound on the left cheek (sic).
5. Multiple small (sic) reddish contusions on anterior neck area.
6. Circular hematoma formation 3 inches in diameter epigastric area of abdomen.
7. Four erythematus linear abrasion of the left cheek (sic).
8. Presence of a 6x8 inches bulge on the back just below the inferior angle of both scapula extending downwards.
9. The body was wearing an improperly placed underwear with the garter vertically oriented to the right stained with moderate amount of yellowish
fecal material.

85

10. Minimal amount of pubic hair in the lower pubis with labia majora contracted and retracted.
11. Theres no swelling abrasion, laceration, blood hematoma formation in the vulva. There were old healed hymenal lacerations at 5 and 9 oclock
position.
12. Vaginal canal admits one finger with no foreign body recovered (sic).
13. Oval shaped contusion/hematoma 6 cm at its greatest diameter anterior surface middle 3rd left thigh.
14. Presence of 2 contusion laceration 1x0.5 cm in size medial aspect left knee.13
Dr. Fuentecilla also conducted a physical examination on the body of Caliso and summed up his findings thusly:
P.E. FINDINGS:
1. Presence of a 7x0.1 cm. horizontally averted linear erythematus contusion left side of neck (Post ).
2. 8x0.2 cm. reddish linear abrasion (probably a scratch mark) from the left midclavicular line extending to the left anterioraxillary line.
3. Presence of 2 erythematus abrasion 3 cmx0.1 cm in average size dorsal surface (probably a scratch mark) middle 3rd left arm.
4. 2.5 cm. abrasion dorsal surface middle and right forearm.
5. Presence of a linear erythematus contusion (probably a scratch mark) 2x7 cm. in average size lateral boarder of scapula extending to left
posterior axillary line.
6. Presence of 2 oblique oriented erythematus contusion (probably a scratch mark) 14x022 cm. and 5x0.2 cm. in size respectively at the upper left
flank of the lower back extending downward to the midline.
7. Presence of 5 linear reddish pressure contusion parallel to each other with an average 5 cm left flank area.14
In his defense, Caliso denied the accusation and interposed an alibi, insisting that on the day of the killing, he plowed the rice field of Alac Yangyang
from 7:00 am until 4:00 pm.
Yangyang corroborated Calisos alibi, recalling that Caliso had plowed his rice field from 8 am to 4 pm of June 5, 1997. He further recalled that
Caliso was in his farm around 12:00 noon because he brought lunch to Caliso. He conceded, however, that he was not aware where Caliso was at
the time of the killing.
Ruling of the RTC
After trial, the RTC rendered its judgment on August 19, 2002, viz:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, accused DELFIN CALISO is hereby sentenced to death and to indemnify the heirs of AAA in
the amount of P50,000.00. The accused is also hereby ordered to pay the said heirs the amount of P50, 000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.15
The RTC found that rape could not be complexed with the killing of AAA because the old-healed hymenal lacerations of AAA and the fact that the
victims underwear had been irregularly placed could not establish the commission of carnal knowledge; that the examining physician also found no
physical signs of rape on the body of AAA; and that as to the killing of AAA, the identification by Amegable that the man she had seen submerging
AAA in the murky river was no other than Caliso himself was reliable.
Nevertheless, the RTC did not take into consideration the testimony of Bering on Calisos extrajudicial admission of the ownership of the short pants
because the pants were not presented as evidence and because the police officers involved did not testify about the pants in court.16 The RTC
cited the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength to raise the crime from homicide to murder, regarding the word homicide in the
information to be used in its generic sense as to include all types of killing.
Ruling of the CA
On intermediate review, the following errors were raised in the brief for the accused-appellant,17 namely:
i. The court a quo gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime of murder despite the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt;
ii. The court a quo gravely erred in giving weight and credence to the incredible and inconsistent testimony of the prosecution witnesses.
iii. The court a quo gravely erred in appreciating the qualifying aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of superior strength and the generic
aggravating circumstance of disregard of sex[; and]
iv. The court a quo gravely erred in imposing the death penalty.
As stated, the CA affirmed Calisos conviction for murder based on the same ratiocinations the RTC had rendered. The CA also relied on the
identification by Amegable of Caliso, despite his back being turned towards her during the commission of the crime. The CA ruled that she made a
positive identification of Caliso as the perpetrator of the killing, observing that the incident happened at noon when the sun had been at its brightest,
coupled with the fact that Amegables view had not been obstructed by any object at the time that AAAs body had been submerged in the water;
that the RTC expressly found her testimony as clear and straightforward and worthy of credence; that no reason existed why Amegable would
falsely testify against Caliso; that Caliso did not prove the physical impossibility for him to be at the crime scene or at its immediate vicinity at the
time of the incident, for both Barangay San Vicente, where AAAs body was found, and Barangay Tiacongan, where the rice field of Yangyang was
located, were contiguous; that the attendant circumstance of abuse of superior strength qualified the killing of AAA to murder; that disregard of sex
should not have been appreciated as an aggravating circumstance due to its not being alleged in the information and its not being proven during
trial; and that the death penalty could not be imposed because of the passage of Republic Act No. 9346, prohibiting its imposition in the Philippines.
The CA decreed in its judgment, viz:

86

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court dated August 19, 2002, finding appellant guilty of Murder, is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that appellant Delfin Caliso is sentenced to reclusion perpetua, and is directed to pay the victims heirs the amount of P50,000.00
as moral damages, as well as the amount of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, in addition to the civil indemnity of P50,000.00 he had been
adjudged to pay by the trial court.
SO ORDERED.18
Issue
The primordial issue is whether Amegables identification of Caliso as the man who killed AAA at noon of July 5, 1997 was positive and reliable.
Ruling
The appeal is meritorious.
In every criminal prosecution, the identity of the offender, like the crime itself, must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, the
first duty of the Prosecution is not to prove the crime but to prove the identity of the criminal, for even if the commission of the crime can be
established, there can be no conviction without proof of identity of the criminal beyond reasonable doubt.19
The CA rejected the challenge Caliso mounted against the reliability of his identification as the culprit by Amegable in the following manner:20
As to the first two errors raised, appellant contends that the testimony of Soledad Amegable was replete with discrepancies. Appellant avers, for
instance, that Soledad failed to see the assailants face. Moreover, considering the distance between where Soledad was supposedly hiding and
where the incident transpired, appellant states that it was inconceivable for her to have heard and seen the incident. According to appellant, witness
Soledad could not even remember if at that time, she hid behind a banana plant, or a coconut tree.
At bench, the incident happened at noon, when the sun was at its brightest. Soledad could very well recognize appellant. Furthermore,
notwithstanding the fact that it was his back that was facing her, she asserted being familiar with the physical features of appellant, considering that
he frequented their barangay. Even during her cross-examination by the defense counsel, Soledad remained steadfast in categorically stating that
she recognized appellant:
Q: Mrs. Amegable, you said during your direct examination that you saw Delfin Caliso, the accused in this case, several times passed by your
barangay, am I correct?
A: Several times.
Q: By any chance prior to the incident, did you talk to him?
A: No, sir.
Q: Are you acquainted with him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Even if he is in his back position?
A: Yes, sir. (Emphasis Supplied)
Given the circumstances as stated above, it was even probable that Soledad caught glimpses of the profile of the appellant at the time of the
incident. She related, in addition, that when the victim was being submerged in the water, there was no object obstructing her view.
The inconsistencies as alleged by appellant, between Soledad Amegables declaration in court and her affidavit, such as the tree or plant from
where she was hiding behind at the time of the incident, are insignificant and cannot negate appellants criminal liability. Her whole attention was
riveted to the incident that was unfolding before her. Besides, any such inconsistencies are minor. Slight contradictions are indicative of an
unrehearsed testimony and could even serve to strengthen the witness credibility. A witness who is telling the truth is not always expected to give a
perfectly concise testimony, considering the lapse of time and the treachery of human memory.
In fact, the testimony of a single eye-witness is sufficient to support a conviction, so long as such testimony is found to be clear and straightforward
and worthy of credence by the trial court. Furthermore, over here, witness Soledad had no reason to testify falsely against appellant.
Besides, the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court, because of its unique opportunity to observe
the witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct and attitude.lawphi1 Findings of the trial court on such matters are binding and
conclusive on the appellate court.
Contrary to the CAs holding that the identification of Caliso based on Amegables recognition of him was reliable, the Court considers the
identification not reliable and beyond doubt as to meet the requirement of moral certainty.
When is identification of the perpetrator of a crime positive and reliable enough for establishing his guilt beyond reasonable doubt?
The identification of a malefactor, to be positive and sufficient for conviction, does not always require direct evidence from an eyewitness; otherwise,
no conviction will be possible in crimes where there are no eyewitnesses. Indeed, trustworthy circumstantial evidence can equally confirm the
identification and overcome the constitutionally presumed innocence of the accused. Thus, the Court has distinguished two types of positive
identification in People v. Gallarde,21 to wit: (a) that by direct evidence, through an eyewitness to the very commission of the act; and (b) that by
circumstantial evidence, such as where the accused is last seen with the victim immediately before or after the crime. The Court said:
xxx Positive identification pertains essentially to proof of identity and not per se to that of being an eyewitness to the very act of commission of the
crime. There are two types of positive identification. A witness may identify a suspect or accused in a criminal case as the perpetrator of the crime
as an eyewitness to the very act of the commission of the crime. This constitutes direct evidence. There may, however, be instances where,
although a witness may not have actually seen the very act of commission of a crime, he may still be able to positively identify a suspect or accused
as the perpetrator of a crime as for instance when the latter is the person or one of the persons last seen with the victim immediately before and
right after the commission of the crime. This is the second type of positive identification, which forms part of circumstantial evidence, which, when
taken together with other pieces of evidence constituting an unbroken chain, leads to only fair and reasonable conclusion, which is that the accused

87

is the author of the crime to the exclusion of all others. If the actual eyewitnesses are the only ones allowed to possibly positively identify a suspect
or accused to the exclusion of others, then nobody can ever be convicted unless there is an eyewitness, because it is basic and elementary that
there can be no conviction until and unless an accused is positively identified. Such a proposition is absolutely absurd, because it is settled that
direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. If resort to
circumstantial evidence would not be allowed to prove identity of the accused on the absence of direct evidence, then felons would go free and the
community would be denied proper protection.22
Amegable asserted that she was familiar with Caliso because she had seen him pass by in her barangay several times prior to the killing. Such
assertion indicates that she was obviously assuming that the killer was no other than Caliso. As matters stand, therefore, Calisos conviction hangs
by a single thread of evidence, the direct evidence of Amegables identification of him as the perpetrator of the killing. But that single thread was
thin, and cannot stand sincere scrutiny. In every criminal prosecution, no less than moral certainty is required in establishing the identity of the
accused as the perpetrator of the crime. Her identification of Caliso as the perpetrator did not have unassailable reliability, the only means by which
it might be said to be positive and sufficient. The test to determine the moral certainty of an identification is its imperviousness to skepticism on
account of its distinctiveness. To achieve such distinctiveness, the identification evidence should encompass unique physical features or
characteristics, like the face, the voice, the dentures, the distinguishing marks or tattoos on the body, fingerprints, DNA, or any other physical facts
that set the individual apart from the rest of humanity.
A witness familiarity with the accused, although accepted as basis for a positive identification, does not always pass the test of moral certainty due
to the possibility of mistake.
No matter how honest Amegables testimony might have been, her identification of Caliso by a sheer look at his back for a few minutes could not be
regarded as positive enough to generate that moral certainty about Caliso being the perpetrator of the killing, absent other reliable circumstances
showing him to be AAAs killer. Her identification of him in that manner lacked the qualities of exclusivity and uniqueness, even as it did not rule out
her being mistaken. Indeed, there could be so many other individuals in the community where the crime was committed whose backs might have
looked like Calisos back. Moreover, many factors could have influenced her perception, including her lack of keenness of observation, her
emotional stress of the moment, her proneness to suggestion from others, her excitement, and her tendency to assume. The extent of such factors
are not part of the records; hence, the trial court and the CA could not have taken them into consideration. But the influence of such varied factors
could not simply be ignored or taken for granted, for it is even a well-known phenomenon that the members of the same family, whose familiarity
with one another could be easily granted, often inaccurately identify one another through a sheer view of anothers back. Certainly, an identification
that does not preclude a reasonable possibility of mistake cannot be accorded any evidentiary force.23
Amegables recollection of the perpetrator wearing short pants bearing the number "11" did not enhance the reliability of her identification of Caliso.
For one, such pants were not one-of-a-kind apparel, but generic. Also, they were not offered in evidence. Yet, even if they had been admitted in
evidence, it remained doubtful that they could have been linked to Caliso without proof of his ownership or possession of them in the moments
before the crime was perpetrated.
Nor did the lack of bad faith or ill motive on the part of Amegable to impute the killing to Caliso guarantee the reliability and accuracy of her
identification of him. The dearth of competent additional evidence that eliminated the possibility of any human error in Amegables identification of
Caliso rendered her lack of bad faith or ill motive irrelevant and immaterial, for even the most sincere person could easily be mistaken about her
impressions of persons involved in startling occurrences such as the crime committed against AAA. It is neither fair nor judicious, therefore, to have
the lack of bad faith or ill motive on the part of Amegable raise her identification to the level of moral certainty.
The injuries found on the person of Caliso by Dr. Fuentecilla, as borne out by the medical certificate dated June 9, 1997,24 did not support the
culpability of Caliso. The injuries, which were mostly mere scratch marks,25 were not even linked by the examining physician to the crime charged.
Inasmuch as the injuries of Caliso might also have been due to other causes, including one related to his doing menial labor most of the time, their
significance as evidence of guilt is nil.
In the absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt as to the identity of the culprit, the accuseds constitutional right to be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved is not overcome, and he is entitled to an acquittal,26 though his innocence may be doubted.27 The constitutional presumption of
innocence guaranteed to every individual is of primary importance, and the conviction of the accused must rest not on the weakness of the defense
he put up but on the strength of the evidence for the Prosecution.28
WHEREFORE, the decision promulgated on October 26, 2007 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE for insufficiency of evidence, and accused-appellant
Delfin Caliso is ACQUITTED of the crime of murder.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City is directed to forthwith release Delfin Caliso from confinement, unless there is another
lawful cause warranting his further detention.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

88

G.R. No. 182457

January 30, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff -Appellee,

vs.
ANTONIO BASALLO y ASPREC, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision1 dated May 11, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02010, entitled People of the Philippines
v. Antonio Basal/a y Asprec, which affirmed with modification the Decision2 dated April 5, 2004 and Order3 dated July 5, 2004 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Agoo, La Union, Branch 32 in Criminal Case No. A-3043. The trial court found appellant Antonio Basallo guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, since the act complained of was committed prior to the amendment of
Article 335 by Republic Act No. 8353 (the Anti-Rape Law of 1997) which reclassified rape as a crime against persons penalized under Articles 266-A
to 266-D of the Revised Penal Code.
We proceed to the factt1al antecedents of the case.
In an Information dated October 25, 1995 filed before Branch 32, RTC of Agoo, La Union, accused-appellant was charged with Rape, thus:
That on or about the 8th day of May, 1995, in the Municipality of Agoo, Province of La Union, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design, did then and there, by means of force and intimidation and against the will and consent of the
aforenamed offended woman, ABC,4 willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the latter, to her damage and prejudice.5
Despite the issuance of a warrant of arrest on February 22, 1996, it was returned unserved as appellant could no longer be found at his given
address and he appeared to have gone into hiding purportedly in Cavite.6
Subsequently, the trial court ordered the archival of the case and issued an Alias Warrant of Arrest dated November 27, 1997 against appellant.7
Appellant remained at large until his arrest by the elements of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Criminal Investigation and Detection Group,
CAR Criminal Investigation and Detection Office on August 15, 1998, more than two years after the original issuance of a warrant of arrest against
him.8
Appellants arraignment was deferred upon his own motion pending reinvestigation of his case. After the dismissal of appellants appeal with the
Department of Justice, he was finally arraigned on November 15, 1999 and he entered a plea of not guilty.9
Upon completion of pre-trial, the trial court issued a Pre-Trial Order dated January 17, 2001, wherein the parties entered into the following
stipulations:
1. That during the time of [sic] the alleged act was committed, the victim was under the employ of the accused as his housekeeper;
2. The identity of the complainant; and
3. The identity of the accused.10
Thereafter, the trial court conducted trial on the merits. The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were summarized in the assailed Court of
Appeals Decision dated May 11, 2007, in this wise:
The victim ABC testified that she is a helper of the accused Antonio Basallo. Accused took her as his helper for the past three (3) years. They are
neighbors and she calls the accused "uncle." As a helper, she cleans the house, washes clothes and takes care of the children. In the afternoon of
08 May 1995, she put said children to sleep. The wife of the accused was in the office. At around 1:00 p.m., while the children were sleeping at the
first floor of the house, accused told her to take his shirt at the second floor of the house. She went inside the first room and took the shirt at the
back of the door panel. After she entered the room, accused also followed her. Accused entered the room and laid on top of her. Then, accused
removed her gartered shortpants and sleeveless blouse. Thereafter, accused removed her panty and bra. While accused was removing her clothes,
she could not move because the former was holding a knife with his right hand. Accused then inserted his penis into her private part. As accused
was inserting his penis into her private part, he was simultaneously kissing her and holding a knife. Accused inserted his penis to her vagina for
thirty minutes. She was told by accused not to report the incident to her mother because the former would kill her. She did not move while accused
was on top of her because he had a knife. After the incident, accused left and told her to take care of the children. She stayed at the house of the
accused for one more week or until 15 May 1995. It was her mother who discovered that she was pregnant. She told her mother that she was
sexually abused by accused, when her mother discovered her pregnancy. Thereafter, her mother brought her to the hospital where she was told
that she was four (4) months pregnant. She was issued a medical certificate when she consulted a doctor. They filed a case against the accused.
She did not talk to accused or the latters wife after she stopped working at their residence. Accused went into hiding. She gave birth on 02 March
1996. The child is now six (6) years old. The experience in the hands of the accused caused her too much pain. Now that she has a child, she is
being despised in the community because she begot a child without a husband. She has no feeling about what other people would say about her
and she is not even ashamed. She only wants to take care of her child.
On cross-examination, ABC testified that she is not related by blood to the accused. She was employed by the accused and his family since she
was twelve (12) years old. She only reached first year high school. During the time of her employment with the Basallos, she did not sleep at the
latters residence at night. She received P20.00 a day for her services. Her house is sixty to seventy meters away from the house of accused. There
are three houses near the house of the accused. However, the family of accused and her family are not close. She was able to work with the family
of accused when the latters wife fetched her. During the Basallos family occasions, her parents are invited. She was never scolded during her stay
at the Basallos residence. Neither her mother and grandmother have any misunderstanding with the wife of the accused. She never had any
boyfriend. She did not confide to her mother because she was afraid. When her mother discovered that she was pregnant, she was angry at her.
Had she not been pregnant, she would not have reported the same to her mother. She also told her mother that she was raped by accused. She
hated the accused for what he had done to her. She is afraid of accused even before the incident because he is a killer. They filed a complaint when
she was already pregnant. She returned to the house of the accused to do chores because she was fetched. When her mother discovered that she
was pregnant, she was not allowed to go back to the house of the accused. Her mother cried when she learned that it was accused who
impregnated her. She never had any sexual experience before the incident on 08 May 1995. The house of accused is made of concrete. If
somebody shouts inside the room, nobody would hear. Accused locked the door of the room, when the latter followed him. However, if somebody
shouted in the window, neighbors would hear. She did not shout because she was afraid and accused put his hand on her mouth. Accused took off
her clothes with both hands and thereafter laid on top of her. She did not kick accused because the latter was armed with a knife. Neither did she
run away because she could not jump out of the window. Accused was wearing a denim short pants and a red t-shirt. Further, it was accused who

89

spread her legs. At first, she attempted to cross her legs but the accused pulled them and spread them apart. She did not make any plea to the
accused that she be spared from the act because she was afraid. Accused kissed her but she did not bite his lips. Moreover, accused fondled and
kissed her breasts. She cried. After the incident, she put on her dress. She did not ask help from the neighbors because nobody was around. She
still returned to the house of the accused the next day to take care of the children because she is afraid of the accused and pitied the children
because nobody would take care of them.
Dr. Alicia Bandonill, the physician who examined ABC, testified that in 1998 she was working at the Doa Gregoria Memorial Hospital where she
was a medical specialist in obstetrics and gynecology. She is a graduate of medicine from the University of Santo Tomas in 1962. She worked as a
resident physician in San Fernando, La Union and later on as a resident physician of Lagawe, Ifugao. Further, she had special training in Ob-Gyne
at the Fabella Medical Center. During her years as a medical professional, she performed more than three hundred pregnancy tests. She examined
ABC on 26 September 1995. Witness presented a two-paged document which was entirely in her handwriting. She issued a pro forma medical
certificate on the medical examination which she conducted on the person of ABC. The latter came to her twice. During the first visit, ABC did not
tell her that she was raped. As per ABCs last menstrual period and the size of the fetus, she found out that ABC is 20-21 weeks pregnant. She also
considered the fetal heartbeat in determining whether ABC is pregnant. With the use of a speculum, she also conducted an internal examination on
ABC in order to see her cervix, vagina and hymen. By conducting an internal examination, she would be able to determine if there were any old
lacerations. She found out that ABC had a "purstring" hymen. Based on the last menstrual period, it could have been that the fertilization of the egg
came 11-14 days after the last menstruation.
On cross-examination, witness testified that of the three hundred (300) cases of pregnancy that she examined, none of them was a case of rape.
However, she has examined more than fifty (50) cases of rape. In her experience, rape victims normally turn up for examination within 24 hours
after the incident. ABC told her that her pregnancy was the result of a rape during the second time when she went to her for examination. Upon
examination, there was no laceration on the hymen of ABC. Neither were there wounds on her body. It is her opinion and based on the examination
she conducted that ABC was a victim of rape. The normal period of pregnancy is up to 40-41 weeks. It is possible but rare that a woman can
conceive for more than 9 months. However, it is a very remote possibility that a woman can give birth on the 11th month. It could be that the
intercourse which made ABC pregnant occurred sometime in June 1995 considering that she gave birth on 02 March 1996. On re-direct
examination, witness testified that the safe period of a woman is from the last menstrual period up to the fifth day. However, there are females who
have shorter or longer menstrual cycles. It is possible that a woman could be fertile on the sixth day from the last menstrual period.
ABCs mother testified that ABC is her third child. Her daughter was born on 19 August 1978. She knew accused for a long time. Accused took her
daughter in his employ when the latter was fifteen years old. Her daughter stayed with the Basallos for two years. Her daughter is a stay-out helper.
Her daughter goes home to their house at night at around 6:00 p.m. However, she does not go home at noontime. She has a grandchild with her
daughter. She knew that her daughter was pregnant when she observed that her abdomen was getting bigger and when the latter did not have her
monthly period. During the fifth month, she brought her daughter to the doctor. However, the doctor refused to give them a medical certificate
because the latter did not want to testify in court. At that time, her daughter did not tell her the truth. She then brought her daughter to the Doa
Gregoria Hospital where she was examined by Dr. Bandonill. Dr. Bandonill found out that her daughter was pregnant. At that time, she inquired who
the father is. She was informed that it was accused who fathered the child. Her daughter told her that accused would kill all of them if her daughter
revealed the matter to anybody. She cried when she learned that the accused forced her daughter. They then went to the police to file charges. She
did not allow her daughter to work with the Basallos anymore. She no longer confronted accused about what happened because they were already
able to file charges. Besides, accused disappeared. As a mother, she felt hurt with what happened. The future of her daughter was ruined as the
latter was not able to go to school anymore. She wants accused to suffer for life. The name of the accused does not appear in the Certificate of Live
Birth of ABCs son because the former would not admit that he is the father. She is also afraid of accused because the latter is a killer. Accused is
known in the community to have killed a lot of people. She allowed her daughter to work for accused because she pitied the latter and believed that
he would not do anything to her daughter.11 (Citations omitted.)
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals condensed the defense evidence as follows:
Accused Antonio Basallo testified that he knows ABC as the latter was employed as caretaker of his children. When ABC filed charges against him,
the former ceased working for his family. He was informed by the barangay captain that a rape charge was filed against him. The charge against
him is a lie because on 08 May 1995, he was appointed as a poll watcher at Barangay Capas. However, he does not have any identification that he
was appointed by Dr. Eriguel to be in charge as such. Before proceeding to Barangay Capas, he first dropped by the house of Dr. Eriguel.
Thereafter, he, together with his brother-in-law Tirso Fangonil, casted (sic) their vote in Brgy. San Julian. He reached Barangay Capas, which is 8 to
10 kilometers away, at around 9:10 in the morning. He rode a passenger jeepney in going to Barangay Capas with Rodolfo Balbalani Dularte driving
the vehicle. After reaching Barangay Capas, he instructed his companions to man the vicinity of the Capas Elementary School, where the voting
took place. At around 12:35 p.m. he, Dularte, Bautista and Tirso Fangonil ate lunch beside the school. After lunch, he smoked some cigarettes and
slept under the tree. However, at around 1:40 p.m. he was awakened by a call in the walkie talkie where Kagawad Marias asked about the
situation in Barangay Capas. He stayed in Barangay Capas the whole night and waited for the canvassing of the ballots. Then, they proceeded to
the Municipal Hall where the ballot boxes were brought. During the election period, he asked his wife and three children to stay with his sister-inlaw, Carol Fangonil. He, on the other hand, would only come home to take a bath and change his clothes. He often stayed in the house of Dr.
Eriguel. He knows ABC but he could not understand why he was accused. As a result of the accusation, he has been detained since 1998 which
caused him to be away from his family.
On cross-examination, accused testified that ABC was their helper until September 1995. ABC would pick up his children and bring the children
home for lunch. He returned to San Juan only on 10 July 1995 for his sons birthday party. ABC stopped working for his family in September 1995
when she filed a case against him. ABC accused him of having raped her because she was confused as to who really was the perpetrator. It was
easy for ABC to point to him because she was working for him. He did not have any occasion to talk with ABC or the latters parents after the latter
filed the charge against him. However, before ABC filed the case, the latter still talked to him.
Rodolfo Dularte testified that he knows the accused as the latter is a friend and companion in going to the cockpit. The accusation of ABC against
accused is not true because he was with him on 08 May 1995. Dr. Eriguel sent him, the accused, Tirso Fangonil and Bonifacio Bautista to Capas to
serve as election watchers. At around 8:30 in the morning, they reached the Capas Elementary School and proceeded to do the rounds in the
school. At around 12:00, they prepared for lunch near the school and ate lunch under a tree. They fell asleep under the tree but he was awakened
by the sound of the walkie talkie of the accused. He woke up the accused. They continued manning their post and stayed in the school until dawn of
09 May 1995. At around 3:00 in the morning, they returned to Agoo after bringing the ballot boxes to the Municipal Hall. He knows that accused and
his family lived in Sta. Barbara, Agoo, La Union.
Tirso Fangonil, brother-in-law of accused, testified that accused stayed in his house in Sta. Barbara. Accused is now detained in the San Fernando
Jail for charges of rape. He and accused were together during the time the accused allegedly raped ABC. They were in the elementary school in
Capas where they served as poll watchers. On 08 May 1995, he and accused casted (sic) their vote and then proceeded to the house of Dr.
Eriguel. He, accused, Dularte and Regacho were assigned by Dr. Eriguel to man the polling precinct in Barangay Capas. Upon reaching Barangay
Capas, they looked around the Capas Elementary School. At around lunch on 08 May 1995, he, the accused and their companions ate lunch at the
school premises. During twilight, they noticed people roaming around the school. They told the accused to inform the headquarters. They left Capas
at around 2:00 in the morning of 09 May 1995. He knows that the accused lives in Sta. Barbara in the house of Carol Fangonil. He is testifying in
favor of the accused because he knew that the former was with him in Capas on 08 May 1995.

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Francisco Fangonil testified that he knows the accused who is the husband of his sister, Patricia. The family of accused lived with him in Sta.
Barbara. ABC is the "caretaker" of his sisters children who went to their house to fetch the children to bring them to school and bring them back
home. Further, ABC is a relative. ABC does not live with his sister. He noticed that when ABC brought the children home, she would often talk about
her crushes and boyfriends. He stayed at home on 08 May 1995 with his mother Isabel, sister Patricia, brother Herminio, Maximo, Eugene, the
children of Patricia and a sister from Manila. At that time, accused was in Capas as the latter was assigned to be a watcher of Dr. Eriguel. On the
night of 08 May 1995, he watched the counting of ballots at the San Julian Elementary School. There, he saw some of his neighbors, ABC and the
latters friends. He even asked ABC who was leading the vice mayoralty race. The latter answered him that it was Dr. Eriguel. When he met ABC,
the latter was her usual self, like she used to when she fetched the children. He did not notice anything unusual with ABC. After 08 May 1995, ABC
went to their house on 15 May 1995 as it was the birthday of the son of the accused. She helped them serve food and washed the dishes. None of
the members of his family called upon ABC to help them. ABC also approached his mother if the latter could hire the former as a laundry woman.
ABC has two friends who are his neighbors. He knows that ABC and her friends go out to the seashore at 6:00 with their boyfriends.
Patricia Basallo, wife of the accused, testified that her family resided in Sta. Barbara after their house was destroyed by an earthquake. After their
house was repaired, they returned home to San Juan. However, in 1996 they returned to her mothers house in Sta. Barbara because they do not
have any companion therein as her husband was busy campaigning for Dr. Eriguel. ABC is their relative because her mother and the formers
grandmother are cousins. ABC took care of her three children and she paid the former P20.00 a day. She was able to know ABCs problems when
the latter shared them with her. She did not mind listening to ABCs problems because she knew her since she was young. She would tell her about
financial problems and her lovelife. There was one time when she got angry with ABC when the latter went out at night and used her as an excuse
to avoid being scolded by her father. On 08 May 1995, she was at home because it was a holiday. Her husband was in the headquarters of Dr.
Eriguel to get the assignment for his election day duties. Her husband was assigned at Brgy. Capas and came back on 09 May 1995. On the
evening of 08 May 1995, they (ABC and her companions) went around the precincts. On that night, ABC was happy. She was laughing with her
companions because Dr. Eriguel was winning. Somebody from the barangay hall informed her that her husband was accused of rape. She was
shocked especially when she heard that ABC was already pregnant. She could not believe that her husband raped ABC because the latter did not
say anything to her in the evening of 08 May 1995. On 15 May 1995, ABC still came to their house to prepare the "blow-out" of the accused. After
15 May 1995, ABC still came to their house once or twice a week to get the laundry of her mother. ABC still fetched her children from school until 24
September 1995. Her family treated ABC well. ABCs accusation against her husband may be an alibi just like those which she would tell her father
when she went out at night. Since her husband was incarcerated, she was the one who raised her children. As a result, she encountered a lot of
hardships in life.12 (Citations omitted.)
After trial on the merits, the trial court convicted appellant of the crime of rape. The dispositive portion of the April 5, 2004 Decision of the trial court
reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Antonio Basallo y Asprec, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. Further, the accused is ordered to pay ABC the amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00)
Pesos as civil indemnity and Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos as moral damages.13
Contesting his conviction, appellant elevated his case to the Court of Appeals which denied his appeal and affirmed with modification the trial court
judgment in a Decision dated May 11, 2007, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated 05 April 2004 and Order dated 05 July 2004 of the
Regional Trial Court of Agoo, La Union, Branch 32 in Crim. Case No. A-3043 finding accused-appellant Antonio Basallo y Asprec guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and denying his motion for reconsideration,
respectively, are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that in addition to the awards of civil indemnity and moral damages in the amount of
Php50,000.00 each, accused-appellant is further ordered to pay private complainant ABC the amount of Php25,000.00 as exemplary damages.14
Thus, appellant filed the present appeal where he puts forward the following assignment of errors:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE CONVICTION OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT CONSIDERING THAT THE
PROSECUTION HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH, BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, THE PRESENCE OF THE TWIN ELEMENTS OF CARNAL
KNOWLEDGE AND FORCE OR INTIMIDATION.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN TAKING "JUDICIAL NOTICE" OF "PSYCHOLOGICAL CONCEPTS" NOWHERE PROVEN OR SHOWN BY
EVIDENCE IN THE TRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS, IN ORDER TO CRAFT ITS OWN "THEORY" TO EXPLAIN THE COMPLAINANTS
BEHAVIOR AFTER THE ALLEGED RAPE INCIDENT.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN IMPOSING CIVIL INDEMNITY EX DELICTO, MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AS THE EVIDENCE
ON RECORD DOES NOT ESTABLISH THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.15
Appellant contends that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He hinges this assertion on the belief that carnal
knowledge and force or intimidation, which are the two indispensable elements of the crime of rape under Article 335(1) of the Revised Penal Code
that the prosecution alleges to be present in this case, were not established with moral certainty. According to him, the following circumstances
found in this case militate against the existence of proof beyond reasonable doubt: (a) the absence of overt and determined resistance by ABC
during the alleged rape incident; (b) the absence of attempts to escape by ABC despite various opportunities; and (c) ABCs conduct subsequent to
the alleged rape incident which was glaringly contradictory to the natural impulses of a woman whose honor and person had been defiled.16
Essentially, the focal issue of this case is whether or not appellants guilt was indeed established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Since the incident of rape at issue happened prior to the enactment of Republic Act No. 8353, the applicable law is the previous definition of rape
under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and

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3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.

According to the foregoing provision, the elements of rape are: (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2) such act was
accomplished through force or intimidation; or when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or when the victim is under 12 years
of age.17 In the case at bar, the prosecution insists that the elements of carnal knowledge and force or intimidation are present.
Time and again, the Court has held that, in rape cases, the accused may be convicted solely on the basis of the testimony of the victim that is
credible, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things.18
On the matter of the credibility of witnesses, recently in People v. Padigos,19 we reiterated a long held principle that the Court gives great weight to
the trial courts assessment. We held that "the trial courts finding of facts is even conclusive and binding if it is not shown to be tainted with
arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence. The wisdom behind this rule is that the trial court had the full
opportunity to observe directly the witnesses deportment and manner of testifying, thus, it is in a better position than the appellate court to properly
evaluate testimonial evidence."20
From a thorough evaluation of the records, the Court finds no fault on the part of the lower courts in relying on the trustworthiness of the victims
testimony. We agree with the assessment of the Court of Appeals that the following portion of ABCs direct testimony was delivered in a clear and
straightforward manner:
(PROSECUTOR LACHICA)
Q At around 1:00 oclock in the afternoon of May 8, 1995, do you still remember where you were?
A Yes sir, I was in their house.
Q Who was there in the house of Antonio Basallo when you were there at around 1:00 oclock in the afternoon of May 8, 1995?
A Nobody sir, except him (witness pointed to the accused who is sitted (sic) inside the courtroom).
Q You pointed to a person, who is that person?
A Antonio Basallo, sir.
Q Now, do you know the reason why the wife of Antonio Basallo was out in that particular date at around 1:00 oclock in the afternoon?
A She went to work in the office.
Q Why, where is she working?
A There at LUELCO sir.
Q Do you know of any reason why the children were not at the house on that particular hour on that particular day of May 8, 1995?
A I let them sleep, the children.
Q You said you let them sleep on that particular hour, where did you let them sleep?
A At the ground floor, first floor.
Q You said you let them sleep on the first floor, do I get right from you that the house is a two storey house?
A Yes, sir.
Q While the children were asleep and only Antonio Basallo was there, do you remember if you were sent anywhere on that particular day?
A No sir.
Q While you were there together with Antonio Basallo, do you remember if anything unusual happened?
A There was unusual incident that happened sir.
Q What is that?
A He sent me to take his shirt and that I went upstairs.
Q Now, you said that you were sent to take the clothes of Antonio Basallo, where is the room of Antonio Basallo located in that house?
A There, upstairs sir.
Q You said you went up to the second floor to get the shirt of Antonio Basallo, what particular place in that second floor where you went to take the
clothes of Antonio Basallo?
A First room.
Q Where in that room did you take the clothes of Antonio Basallo, is there a door panel?
A There is sir.
Q Were you able to enter that room?
A Yes sir, because it was opened.
Q When you entered that room, do you remember any unusual incident that happened?

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A Yes sir, he also entered the room.

Q By the way madam witness, from the time that you became the helper of Antonio Basallo at the age of three until May 8, 1995, how do you call
Antonio Basallo?
A Uncle sir.
Q Why, are you calling him uncle, do you have blood relationship with him?
A I call him uncle because I am in their house and I usually call him by that word "uncle".
Q While on that day May 8, 1995 when you were already inside the room and he entered the room, what happened next?
A He entered the room and laid me down.
Q You said he laid you down, where were you laid down by this Antonio Basallo?
A At their bed sir.
Q When he laid you down on their bed, what did he do next?
A He removed my dress.
Q By the way, what dress were you wearing on that particular day?
A I was wearing usually shorts while inside their house.
Q What is your clothings above?
A Like this sir, sleeveless.
Q When you told this Honorable Court that he removed your clothes or clothings, what particular clothes or clothings did he removed?
A This one sir, like this what I am wearing now. (witness referred to the blouse).
Q How about your shorts?
A My short pants with a garter waist.
Q And so what happened on that gartered shortpants?
A He also removed sir.
Q Aside from your blouse and you shortpants which is gartered, what else was removed if any?
A My bra and my underwear.
Q You said underwear, are you referring to your panty?
A Yes sir.
Q By the way, what was removed if any?
A My short pants sir.
Q What is next?
A My blouse sir.
Q And then, what is next?
A My bra sir.
Q And what was the last?
A My panty sir.
Q While all these things were being removed by the accused, what did you do?
A I could not move anymore because he was holding a knife.
Q With what hand was he holding the knife?
A Right hand sir.
Q With what hand did he removed all your clothings and your underwear?
A His left arm sir.
Q After he removed your panty, what did he do next if any?
A He then raped me.

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Q Madam witness, the word rape is a technical word, will you tell this Honorable Court what he actually did to you?
A He inserted his penis on my private part.
Q When the accused inserted his penis in your private part, what did he do next?
A He was still holding his knife and simultaneously kissing me.
Q Now, how long a time did he insert his penis to your vagina?
A Thirty (30) minutes sir.
Q In all these thirty minutes that his penis was inserted to your vagina, do you remember what he did?
A No more sir, but he told me that if ever you will report to your mother, I will kill you.
Q When the penis was inserted into your vagina, what did you feel?
A Somewhat warm.
Q What else?
A It is painful.
Q Now, within this 30 minutes that he was on top of you and inserted his penis, what did you do?
A I cannot move because he got a knife.
Q Did you try to close your legs?
A No sir.
Q After that 30 minutes, what happened next?
A No more sir, he left.
Q And you were left alone, after you were left, what did you do?
A I still remain at their house because he told me that I still have to take care of the children.21 (Emphases supplied.)
We further affirm the appellate courts conclusion that ABCs testimony upon cross-examination by defense counsel further clarified how she was
cowed into silence by her fear while being violated by appellant. The relevant portion of her testimony reads:
COURT QUESTION:
Q When your mother discovered that you were pregnant, exactly, what words did you tell your mother how you were impregnated?
A Mama, I am already pregnant.
Q Did you tell your mother that exactly which you used the word that you were raped by Mr. Basallo?
A Yes, sir.
Q After that incident of May 8, 1995, did you hate Mr. Basallo for what he have (sic) done to you?
A Yes, sir.
Q Were you afraid of Mr. Basallo?
A Yes, sir.
Q Before that incident, were you afraid of Mr. Basallo?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why were you afraid of Mr. Basallo before that incident?
A Because he is a killer sir.
COURT: Continue counsel.
xxxx
Q When Mr. Basallo locked that door, did you not run? A No, sir.
Q Did you not shout?
A No, sir, because I was afraid.
Q Miss Witness, if ever somebody attempts to box you, what would be your reaction?
PROSECUTOR LACHICA:

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That would be very speculative question Your Honor.

COURT:
Reform the question.
ATTY. VILLANUEVA:
Q ABC, have you encountered any fight before?
A Yes, sir.
Q And during that fight, did somebody attempt to hurt you?
A None, sir.
Q When person attempts to stab you, would you not run?
A I will run, sir.
Q If somebody would attempt to kiss you only, would you not run?
A I will run, sir.
Q Going back to that incident which happened on May 8, 1995 when Mr. Basallo locked the door, you just remain calm, is that correct?
A I was afraid, sir.
Q Did you entertain during that precise moment that Mr. Basallo would attempt to ravish you?
A I did not think that he will harm me.
Q Okey, that was your reaction and in fact when he told you to lie down the bed, you freely lie down the bed also?
A Yes, sir, because I was afraid.
xxxx
Q And during that time when Mr. Basallo undressed both your maong short pants and your blouse, you did not shout, is that correct?
A No, sir, because I was then afraid. He was armed with a knife.
Q You did not kick him?
A No, sir.
Q You did not run away from him?
A I planned to run away but I cannot jump from the window.
Q And when he laid you down, what happened next?
A He raped me, sir.
Q And also what was he wearing during that time?
A He was wearing short.
Q What was the color of his short?
A I think it is maong.
Q How about his clothes, what was he wearing?
A He was wearing red T-shirt.
Q When he laid you down, you did not attempt to run away also, is that correct?
A No, sir, because I was afraid.
Q And when he undressed you, although he was undressing you by both his hands, you did not bother to run away?
A No, sir, because I was afraid.
Q And you did not shout also, is that correct?
A No, sir, because he put his hands on my mouth.
Q But you did not bite his hands which was placed on your mouth, is that correct?
A No, sir.

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Q When he laid you down after which you said that you were raped, did you spread your legs when he penetrated you?
A He was the one who spread my legs.
Q You never attempted to cross your legs when he tried to penetrate you?
A I attempted to cross my legs but he pulled it spreading my legs.
Q And you did not scratch him?
A No, sir.
Q And you did not shout during that time also?
A No, sir.
Q You did not attempt to run away from him also during that time?
A No, sir.
Q You never also asked for help from anybody?
A There was nobody inside, sir.
Q You did not create any noise just to arouse the attention of the children downstairs, is that correct?
A No, sir.
Q And you did not push him back?
A No, sir.
Q And also you did not make any plea that he will be spared from that act?
A I was then afraid, sir.
Q ABC, did Mr. Basallo kiss you during that incident?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did he put his lips into your lips?
A Yes, sir.
Q But you did not bother to bite his lips, is that correct?
A No, sir.
Q How long did the kissing last?
A Just few minutes only.
Q Did he fondle your breast?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did he kiss it?
A Yes, sir.
Q But you never also shout during that time?
A No, sir.
Q And you did not kick him also during that time?
A No, sir.
Q You did not shout also?
A No, sir.
Q In fact you have opportunity to shout also during that time?
A Yes, sir.
Q You did not cry of course?
A I cried, sir.
Q But you did not ask help from the neighbors?
A There was nobody around us, sir.22 (Emphases supplied.)

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On the basis of the foregoing consistent narratives from the victim, it is evident that carnal knowledge and force or intimidation as elements of the
crime of rape were unmistakably present in this instance. This Court has held that the gravamen of the offense of rape is sexual intercourse with a
woman against her will or without her consent.23 We also previously declared that when a victim is threatened with bodily injury as when the rapist
is armed with a deadly weapon, such as a knife or bolo, such constitutes intimidation sufficient to bring the victim to submission to the lustful desires
of the rapist.24 Thus, appellants succeeding in having non-consensual sexual intercourse with ABC through intimidation using a knife plainly
constitutes the crime of rape.
Appellant points out that, if the incident at issue did occur as alleged by ABC, the said sexual encounter should be characterized as consensual
because, as evidenced by her own testimony, she did not perform any overt and determined resistance to her rapist nor did she take advantage of
purported opportunities to escape.
This Court cannot subscribe to such theory. It is settled in jurisprudence that the failure of the victim to shout for help does not negate rape and
even the victims lack of resistance especially when intimidated by the offender into submission does not signify voluntariness or consent.25
Furthermore, we have emphatically ruled that the failure of a rape victim to shout, fight back, or escape from the scoundrel is not tantamount to
consent or approval because the law imposes no obligation to exhibit defiance or to present proof of struggle.26
Appellant also takes issue with ABCs conduct subsequent to the alleged rape incident at issue. He argues that ABCs four-month delay in reporting
the incident to her mother as well as her continuing to work in appellants household during the interregnum is contradictory to human experience
and "the natural impulses of a woman whose honor and person had been defiled."27
Again, this Court cannot accept appellants supposition. Jurisprudence tell us that delay in reporting an incident of rape is not an indication of a
fabricated charge and does not necessarily cast doubt on the credibility of the complainant.28 We also stated in another case that delay and
vacillation in making a criminal accusation does not necessarily impair the credibility of witnesses if such delay is satisfactorily explained.29
In the instant case, appellant instilled the fear of bodily harm in ABCs mind during the rape incident at issue and this fear continued to firmly grip
ABC even after the incident especially since ABC believed, rightly or wrongly, that appellant held a reputation in their community as a "killer." This
fear, coupled in all likelihood with shame, reasonably explained ABCs silence regarding her sordid ordeal at the hands of appellant until she had no
more choice but to admit the truth to her mother when ABCs pregnancy due to the rape could no longer be concealed.
When asked by defense counsel what impelled her to continue working for appellants household despite her avowed fear for appellant after what
happened between them, ABC answered that she pitied appellants children because nobody would take care of them in her absence.30 Appellant
underscores this statement made by ABC as totally incongruous with the natural reaction and mindset of a rape victim. However, this Court cannot
agree with this assertion since fear for a rapist and pity for his children are not mutually exclusive or inconsistent emotional reactions or sentiments.
Moreover, ABC testified that appellant insisted that ABC stay in the house to take care of his children immediately after raping her.31 Having
established that fear pushed ABC to keep silent about the rape incident at issue, it can easily be inferred that it is also that same fear which forced
her to keep on returning to appellants house to work. On this note we reiterate what we declared in a previous ruling which states that human
reactions vary and are unpredictable when facing a shocking and horrifying experience such as sexual assault. Not all rape victims can be expected
to act conformably to the usual expectations of everyone.32
For his defense, appellant puts forth denial and alibi. He insists that he acted as poll watcher in Capas Elementary School at the time the rape was
committed and that he was never in contact with ABC on that fateful day.
This statement deserves scant consideration. It is an established jurisprudential rule that denial and alibi, being negative self-serving defenses,
cannot prevail over the affirmative allegations of the victim and her categorical and positive identification of the accused as her assailant.33
We have held that for alibi to prosper, it is necessary that the accused must prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed and
that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime.34 In one case, we defined physical impossibility as the distance
between the place where the accused was when the crime transpired and the place where it was committed, as well as the facility of access
between the two places.35
In the case at bar, the testimonies of defense witnesses did not rule out the presence of appellant at the place of the commission of the crime. The
distance between Barangay Capas, where appellant was supposedly on poll watching duty at the time of the commission of the crime, and
Barangay San Juan, where the rape incident at issue occurred, is approximately about eight
(8) to ten (10) kilometers and could be traversed by mechanical transport in less than one hour; thus, we can safely conclude that it was not
physically impossible for appellant to be at the locus criminis.
Furthermore, this Court gives less probative weight to a defense of alibi when it is corroborated by friends and relatives. We have held that for alibi
to prosper, it is necessary that the corroboration is credible, the same having been offered preferably by disinterested witnesses.36 In the instant
case, the witnesses for the defense were the wife, friends, and relatives of appellant. It would have been more favorable for appellant if the
corroborating witnesses to his alibi were composed of persons not intimately related to him.
Lastly, the Court cannot turn a blind eye to the fact that appellant went into hiding immediately after the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and he,
in fact, evaded arrest for more than two years. We have consistently ruled that the flight of an accused is competent evidence to indicate his guilt
and flight, when unexplained, is a circumstance from which an inference of guilt may be drawn.37 In the instant case, no compelling reason was
presented by appellant to explain his deliberate evasion of the service of the arrest warrant on his person.
It is also worth noting that appellant filed an Urgent Motion38 dated December 3, 1999 for the issuance of an order by the trial court to direct ABC,
her son allegedly fathered by the appellant, and appellant himself to undergo DNA (Deoxyribonucleic acid) testing or any other medically accepted
tests before the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) or before any accredited medical institution for the purpose of determining whether the
accused is the putative father of ABCs son. The said motion was granted by the trial court during the pre-trial hearing of the case on May 8,
2000.39 The defense counsel was even reminded of this fact by the prosecutor during a subsequent pre-trial hearing of the case on January 11,
2001. The defense counsel claimed that their motion was denied but the trial court rejected his claim by stating that no such denial of the said
motion can be found in the court records.40 It perplexes this Court that appellant did not continue with his initial desire to undergo a paternity test
despite being informed by the trial court that his motion was, in fact, granted and not denied as claimed by his defense counsel. For a man who
vehemently asserts his innocence, it mystifies the mind that appellant would not exhaust all available avenues to prove his innocence especially
DNA testing that would conclusively prove that he is not the father of ABCs son who is alleged to be the fruit of his crime.
In view of the foregoing, we therefore affirm the conviction of appellant for rape.1wphi1 The amount of actual damages and moral damages
awarded by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals which is P50,000.00 each is correct. However, in line with jurisprudence, the award
of exemplary damages should be increased from P25,000.00 to P30,000.00.41

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WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated May 11, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02010, finding appellant
Antonio Basallo guilty in Criminal Case No. A-3043, is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that:
(1) The award of exemplary damages Is increased to Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00); and
(2) Appellant Antonio Basallo is ordered to pay the private offended party interest on all damages awarded at the legal rate of six percent ( 6%) per
annum from the date of finality of this judgment.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

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G.R. No. 208170

August 20, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
PETRUS YAU a.k.a. "John" and "Ricky" and SUSANA YAU y SUMOGBA a.k.a. "Susan", Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the September 7, 2012 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CR-I-IC No. 03446, which affirmed the December
14, 2007 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 214, Mandaluyong City (RTC). in Criminal Case No. MC-04-7923. The RTC found accusedappellant Petrus Yau (Petrus) guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention, as
defined and penalized in Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, (R.A. No. 7659), and convicted
accused-appellant Susana Yau y Sumogba (Susana)as an accomplice to the commission of the same crime.
The Facts
Petrus and Susana were charged with the crime of Kidnapping For Ransom in the Information,3 dated February 13, 2004, the accusatory portion of
which reads:
That on or about January 20, 2004, at around 2:00 P.M. in the vicinity of Shoemart Mega Mall, Mandaluyong City, the abovenamed accused,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with the use of a sleeping substance, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously kidnap and take away ALASTAIR JOSEPH ONGLINGSWAM inthe following manner, to wit: while said ALASTAIR JOSEPH
ONGLINGSWAM was on board a white Toyota taxi cab with plate number PVD-115 being driven by the above-named accused Petrus Yau a.k.a.
"John" and "Ricky" and the taxi cab was travelling along Epifanio Delos Santos (EDSA) Avenue, he suddenly fell unconscious and upon regaining
consciousness he was already handcuffed and in chains inside a house located at B23, L2, Ponsettia St., Camilla Sorrento Homes, Panapaan IV,
Bacoor, Cavite, where he was kept for twenty two (22) days, which house is owned by accused Susana Yau y Sumogba and while therein he was
maltreated; that ransom in the amount of SIX HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS (US$600,000.00) and TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS
(Php20,000.00) for each day of detention was demanded in exchangefor his safe release until he was finally rescued on February 11,2004, by
PACER operatives of the Philippine National Police.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Version of the Prosecution
In the Appellees Brief,4 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) presented the following narration of the kidnapping:
On January 20, 2004, at around 1:30 in the afternoon, private complainant Alastair Onglingswam, who is a practicing lawyer and businessman from
the United States, went out of Makati Shangrila Hotel, where he was billeted, and hailed a white Toyota taxi cab with plate number PVD-115 to take
him from the said hotel to Virra Mall Shopping Center in San Juan, Metro Manila. While the said taxicab was plying along EDSA, and within the
vicinity of SM Megamall, private complainant received a phone call from his associate Kelly Wei in Hong Kong. He noted that while he was on the
phone conversing with his associate, appellant Petrus Yau, whom he noted to have short black hair, a moustache and gold framed eyeglasses,
would from time to time turn to him and talk as if he was also being spoken to. Thereafter, he felt groggy and decided to hang-up his phone. He no
longer knew what transpired except that when he woke up lying down, his head was already covered with a plastic bag and he was handcuffed and
chained.
When private complainant complained that the handcuffs were too tight, a man who was wearing a red mask and introduced himself as "John"
approached him and removed the plastic bag from his head and loosened his handcuff. John informed him that he was being kidnapped for ransom
and that he will be allowed to make phone calls to his family and friends. Hours later, John returned with telephony equipment, tape recorder, phone
and a special antennae cap for the cellphone. With these equipment, private complainant was allowed to call his girlfriend and father and asked
them for the PIN of his ATM cards and for money, however, with instructions not to inform them that he was kidnapped. A day after, he was told by
his captor to call his girlfriend and father to tell them thathe was still alive as well as to reveal to them that he was kidnapped for ransom and his
kidnappers were demanding Six Hundred Thousand Dollars (US$600,000.00) as ransom and Twenty Thousand Pesos (Php20,000.00) a day as
room and board fee.
The private complainants family, girlfriend (Iris Chau) and friends received a text message purportedly from the former informing them that he was
kidnapped and ransom for his liberty was demanded.
On January 21, 2004, the family of the victim informed the United States Embassy in Manila about the situation and a meeting with the
representatives of the Philippine National Police was arranged.
Subsequently, Chau received an email from the purported kidnapper demanding US$2,000.00. Chau then wired US$1,000.00, upon instructions, to
Ong Kwai Ping thru Metro Bank and Trust Company. Likewise, private complainants brother Aaron Onglingswam made eight (8) deposits to Ong
Kwai Pings account in Metro Bank, amounting to Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php200,000.00), to ensure his brothers safety and eventual
release.
During private complainants twenty-two (22) days of captivity, while he was allowed to communicate with his family almost daily to prove that he
was still alive and was served with meals almost five times a day either by John or the other accused Susan Yau, he was also maltreated i.e. beaten
with sticks, made to lay-down biting a piece of wood which was made as target for a rifle.
On February 10, 2004, the PACER received information that a taxi with plate number PVD 115 plying along Bacoor was victimizing passengers.
Upon instructions of P/Supt. Isagani Nerez, members of the Police Anti-Crimeand Emergency Response Task Force (PACER) were ordered to
proceed to Bacoor, Cavite to look for Toyota Corolla White Taxicab with Plate No. PVD 115. On February 11, 2004, at around 4:00 oclock in the
morning, the PACER group proceeded to Bacoor and positioned themselves along Aguinaldo Highway under the overpass fronting SM Bacoor. Not
having caught sight of the taxi, after three hours, the group moved to a different location along the Aguinaldo Highway where they were able to
chance upon the said vehicle. Thus, they followed it, then flagged it down and approached the driver. The driver was asked to scroll down his
window and was told that the vehicle was being used to victimize foreign nationals. Appellant did not offer to make any comment. Hence, this
prompted the officers to ask for his name and since he answered that he was Petrus Yau, a British national, they asked him for his drivers license
and car registration but appellant was not able to produce any. Since he could not produce any drivers license and car registration, they were
supposed to bring him to the police station for investigation, however, when shown a picture of private complainant and asked if he knew him, he
answered that the man is being kept in his house. He was immediately informed that he was being placed under arrest for kidnapping private
complainant Alastair Onglingswam after being informed of his constitutional rights. Thereafter, appellants cellphones, a QTEK Palmtop and Sony

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Erickson were confiscated. Upon instructions of P/Supt. Nerez, [appellant] was brought to the parking lot of SM City Bacoor for a possible rescue
operations of the victim.
Appellant led the team to his house and after opening the gate of his residence, hewas led back to the police car. The rest of the members of
PACER proceeded inside the house and found a man sitting on the floor chained and handcuffed. The man later identified himself as Alastair
Onglingswam.
During the trial of the case, private complainant positively identified Petrus Yau as his captor and the taxi driver. Test conducted by the United States
Federal Bureau of Investigation reveals that the DNA found in the mask used by private complainants captor matched that of appellant Petrus
Yau.5
Version of the Defense
Petrus and Susana denied the accusation, and stated the following in their Brief6 to substantiate their claim of innocence:
Accused Petrus Yau denied having committed the crime. He averred that the supposed kidnap victim coordinated with the police to set up the
subject case against him and his family. He is a British national. He had been in the Philippines for many times since he was 14 years old. He came
to the country in July 2001 for a vacation and had not left since then. On September 2001, he got married to Susana Yau. Prior thereto, he was in
Singapore running some businesses. On January 20, 2004, at around 2:00 oclock in the afternoon (the date and time the victim was kidnapped),
Petrus Yau was at home sleeping.
On February 11, 2004 (the date the victim was allegedly rescued) at around 8:30 9:00 oclock in the morning, he went to his wife Susana in her
shop and got money to be deposited to the Asia Trust Bank. He parked his car outside the bank. After he alighted from his car, three (3) men bigger
than him held his hands: one (1) of them held his neck. They pushed him inside their van. They tied his hands with packing tape, covered his eyes
with the same tape, and his head with a plastic bag. They kicked and beat him until he became unconscious.
When he regained consciousness, he was inside an airconditioned room. His hands were handcuffed and he felt very cold because his body was
wet. His head was still being covered. He shouted asking where he was. People came in and he heard them talking in Tagalog. They kicked him for
about twenty (20) seconds. Later, he was made to sit, as he was lying on the floor. He said that he could not see anything, thus, someone removed
the cover of his head. They accused him of being a kidnapper, to which he replied that he was not. He pleaded to them to allow him to make a call
to the British Embassy, his friends and his wife, but to no avail.
When he was taken into custody, he had his wedding ring, watch and a waist bag containing his British passport, alien certificate, drivers license,
Asia Trust bankbook in the name of Susana Yau, ATM Cards (in his name) of Metrobank, PCI Equitable Bank and Banco de Oro, VISA Card, and
some cash given to him by his wife . He lost those personal properties.
After four (4) to five (5) hours, he was transferred to another room without a window. The following day, he was brought to and detained at the
PACER Custodial Center.
Petrus Yau can speak English but he is better in the Chinese language, both Mandarin and Cantonese. He bought the taxi he was driving in August
2003 for Eighty Five Thousand Pesos (Php85,000.00) for personal use and/or for resale. It had a defective engine (usually overheats), without an
aircon and cannot travel for long journey. He does not drive a taxi to earn a living. He had police friends who told him that he cannot drive a taxi as
an occupation since his drivers license is non-professional.
Sometime on June 2003, he and his wife Susana had a heated argument over his womanizing. Hence, she decided to live separately from him
(though she was pregnant at that time) and moved to another house (Block 5, Lot 4, Tulip Street, Andrea Village, Bacoor, Cavite). Sometimes, she
would visit him.
Petrus claimed that his house does not have a basement, contrary to the victims testimony that he was placed in the basement. He was not in his
house when the police officers allegedly rescued the kidnapped victim. He left his house in good condition in the morning before his arrest. The
white Toyota Corolla taxi he was driving had markings of faded grey, not black, as claimed by Alastair.
During the inquest proceedings, Petrus Yau was not assisted by a counsel and was not informedof his constitutional rights.
Susana Sumogba Yau denied the accusation that she was in the company of the kidnapper every time the latter served Alastairs food (lunch and
dinner). She is legally married to Petrus Yau. They have two (2) children named Charlie and Vivian. On February 11, 2004, she lived at Block 5, Lot
4, Tulips Street, Andrea Village, Bacoor, Cavite, while Petrus Yau lived at Block 23, Lot 2, Ponsettia Street, Sorrento Town Homes, Bacoor, Cavite,
with his girlfriend. Susana and Petrus were separated since June 2003.
On February 11, 2004, she called him to pick up the amount of Php7,000.00 (earnings of her sari-sari store) and to deposit it in her account at Asia
Trust Bank. She would request Petrus to do such errand for her as she does not trust her househelp. Petrus came to her at around 7:00 oclock in
the morning. At around 11:00 oclock a.m. of the same day, four(4) to five (5) policemen arrived at her residence and told her to come with them to
the hospital where Petrus was brought because he met a vehicular accident along Aguinaldo Highway.
Susana, together with her children and helpers, went with them, and rode in their van. They, however, were not brought to the hospital but to an
office. Thereat, Susana saw her husband (almost dead) inside a small room with a one-way mirror. She was not able to talk to him. She, together
with her children and helpers, were detained for three (3) days inside a small room. After three (3) days, her children and helpers were released and
they went home. At that time, she was not provided with the assistance of a counsel.
Susana stated that her husbands name is Petrus Yau. He is not known either as John or Ong Kwai Ping. He is engaged in the business of buying
cars for resale. They owned three (3) houses and lots, all registered in her name. At the time she was taken into custody by the police, she had
withher Five Thousand Pesos cash, Allied Bank passbook and ATM Cards (Allied Bank and Asia Trust Bank), VISA card, passport, wedding ring,
necklace and cellphone, which were taken away by persons whom she does not know.7
The Ruling of the RTC
In its judgment, dated December 14,2007, the RTC convicted Petrus Yau, as principal, of the crime of kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal
detention, and Susana Yau,as an accomplice to the commission thereof. The RTC found the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses credible and
sufficient, with their versions of the incident dovetailing with each other even on minor details. It observed that Petrus failed to rebut his positive
identification by the victim, Alastair and his brother Aaron John Onglingswam (Aaron John), with whom he talked for several times over the phone. It
stated that the circumstantial evidence proffered by the prosecution had adequately reinforced its theory that Petrus was the perpetrator of the
heinous act.

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With respect to Susana, the RTC wrote that she was positively identified by Alastair as the Filipino woman who fed him or accompanied Petrus in
bringing him food during his 22 days of captivity and, for said reason, should be held liable as an accomplice.
The RTC rejected the twin defenses of alibi and frame-up submitted by Petrus and Susana because the same were unsubstantiated by clear and
convincing evidence. The dispositive portion of the said decision states:
WHEREFORE, this court renders judgment finding the accused Petrus Yau GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT as principal of the crime of
kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention and pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the prison term of
RECLUSION PERPETUA. The court also finds the accused Susana Yau GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT as accomplice to the
commission of the crime of kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention and applying to her the benefit of the Indeterminate Sentence Law
wherein her minimum penalty shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree of the imposable penalty of RECLUSION TEMPORAL which is
prision mayor, she is hereby therefore sentenced to suffer the prison term of EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of PRISION MAYOR MINIMUM
AS MINIMUM to TWELVE (12) YEARS and TEN (10) MONTHS of RECLUSION TEMPORAL MINIMUM AS MAXIMUM.Accused are credited in full
of the preventive imprisonment they have already served in confinement.
Further, both accused are sentenced to pay, jointly and severally, the victim ALASTAIR JOSEPH ONGLINGSWAM actual damages of Two Hundred
Seventy Three Thousand and One Hundred Thirty Two Pesos (273, 132.00) plus interest from the filing of the information until full payment, moral
damages of One Million Pesos (1,000,000.00), and exemplary damages of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (200,000.00).
SO ORDERED.8
Unfazed, Petrus and Susana appealed the RTC judgment of conviction before the CA.
The Ruling of the CA
The CA affirmed the conviction of Petrus and Susana.9 The appellate court likewise lent credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses,
who were able to establish with certitude the commission of the crime and the identities of the culprits thereof.
Hence, this appeal.
ASSIGNED ERRORS:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS ILLEGALLY ARRESTED AND AS SUCH, THE
PIECES OF OBJECT EVIDENCE ALLEGEDLY SEIZED ARE INADMISSIBLE.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION OF THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT AS THE
ALLEGED KIDNAPPER.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME
CHARGED.10
Susana insisted that the trial court erred: 1] in not giving credence to her claim that she was living separately with her husband, Petrus Yau; 2] in not
considering that she was not mentioned in the sworn statement executed by Alastair, dated February 12, 2004, even when said victim was asked if
there was another person assisting Petrus in the perpetration of the crime; 3] in not considering the Resolution of the Department of Justice, dated
February 13, 2004, finding probable cause against her because she is the registered owner of the house where Alastair was held captive and not
because she served food on the victim; and 4] in convicting her as an accomplice.11
On September 11, 2013, the Court issued a resolution12 notifying the parties that they could file their respective supplemental briefs if they so
desire. The People of the Philippines, represented by the OSG, opted not to file any supplemental brief, maintaining its positions and arguments in
its brief earlier filed in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03446.13 Petrus filed his Supplemental Brief14 on December 27, 2013 in amplification of his
arguments raised in his brief filed before the CA.
The Courts Ruling
The appeal is bereft of merit.
Encapsulated, the issues herein focus on: (a) the credibility of the prosecution witnesses; (b) the sufficiency of the prosecution evidence to prove
the commission of kidnapping for ransom and the identity of the culprits thereof; and (c) the degree of responsibility of each accusedappellant for
the crime of kidnapping for ransom.
Worth reiterating on the issue of the credibility of the witnesses is the ruling of the Court in People v. Maxion15 that:
The issue raised by accused-appellant involves the credibility of witness, which is best addressed by the trial court, it being in a better position to
decide such question, having heard the witness and observed his demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grueling examination. These are the most
significant factors in evaluating the sincerity of witnesses and in unearthing the truth, especially in the face of conflicting testimonies.Through its
observations during the entire proceedings, the trial court can be expected to determine, with reasonable discretion, whose testimony to accept and
which witness to believe. Verily, findings of the trial court on such matters will not be disturbed on appeal unless some facts or circumstances of
weight have been overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted so as to materially affect the disposition of the case.16
It has been an established rule in appellate review that the trial courts factual findings, such as its assessment of the credibility of the witnesses, the
probative weight of their testimonies, and the conclusions drawn from the factual findings, are accorded great respect and have even conclusive
effect. Such factual findings and conclusions assume even greater weight when they are affirmed by the CA17
In the case at bench, the RTC gavemore weight and credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses compared to those of the
accusedappellants. After a judicious review of the evidence on record, the Court finds no cogent reason to deviate from the factual findings of the
RTC and the CA, and their respective assessment and calibration of the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.

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In every criminal case, the task ofthe prosecution is always two-fold, that is, (1) to prove beyond reasonable doubt the commission of the crime
charged; and (2) to establish with the same quantumof proof the identity of the person or persons responsible therefor, because, evenif the
commission of the crime is a given, there can be no conviction without the identity of the malefactor being likewise clearly ascertained.18 Here, the
prosecution was able to satisfactorily discharge this burden.
Victim Alastair positively identified Petrus as the driver of the white Toyota Corolla taxicab with Plate No. PVD 115 which he boarded before he lost
consciousness on the afternoon ofJanuary 20, 2004. He claimed that while he was conversing with his business associate Kelly Wei over his phone
inside the taxicab, Petrus would turn his face towards him, from time to time, and would talk as if he was being spoken to. Alastair claimed that he
had a good look and an ample opportunity toremember the facial features of the driver as to be able to recognize and identify him in court. It is the
most natural reaction for victims of crimes to strive to remember the faces of their accosters and the manner in which the craven acts are
committed.19
Alastair also recognized the voice behind the red mask used by his kidnapper as belonging to Petrus. It was established that from the first to the
twentieth day of Alastairs captivity,his kidnapper would meet him five times a day and would talk to him for an hour, thus, enabling him to remember
the culprits voice which had a unique tone and noticeable Chinese accent. Alastair declared with certainty that it was the voice of Petrus. Witness
Aaron John insisted that the person who introduced himself as Ong Kwai Ping and with whom he had talked over the phone for three weeks,
demanding necessity money and ransom for the release of his brother Alastair, was Petrus because of the distinct tone of his voice with Chinese
accent. There was no showing that Alastair and Aaron John had any ill motive to falsely testify against Petrus. As a rule, absent any evidence
showing any reason or motive for prosecution witnesses to perjure, the logical conclusion is that no suchimproper motive exists, and their
testimonies are, thus, worthy of full faith and credit.20
Further, the prosecution presented credible and sufficient pieces of circumstantial evidence that led tothe inescapable and reasonable conclusion
that Petrus committed the crime charged. The settled rule is that a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if
the following requisites concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferencesare derived are proven; and (3) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt.21 The corollary rule is that the circumstances
proven must constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others,
as the guilty person.22
The combination of the following established facts and circumstances affirm the findings of guilt by the RTC and the CA:
1] The victim was rescued by the police inside the house owned by Petrus and Susana, located at Block 23, Lot 2, Ponsettia St., Camella Sorrento
Homes, Bacoor, Cavite;
2] The Toyota Corolla white taxicab bearing Plate No. PVD 115, which the victim recalled boarding in going to Virra Mall Greenhills Shopping Center
on the afternoon of January 20, 2004 and where he lost consciousness, was found in the possession of the accused-appellant Petrus on February
11, 2004;
3] The drivers license of Petrus and an ATM card in the name of Ong Kwai Ping were recovered inside the Toyota Corolla taxicab of Petrus Yau;
4] In the house where the victim was rescued, the following evidence were found: one (1) chain with padlock; handcuffs; short broken chain;
checkered pajama; black blazer; one (1) Onesimus black coat; two (2) video camera cartridges, one showing the victim in lying down position and
family footages, and the other one labeled "sex scandal"; eight (8) pieces of cellphones; notebook; two (2) Talk n Tex SIM cards; Globe SIM card;
two (2) Transfer Certificates of Title for two pieces of land in Bacoor, Cavite, under the name of Susana Sumogba; original copy of the
OfficialReceipts and Certificate of Registration of a Suzuki 1993 motorcycle bearing Plate No. 2M9748; business license and mayors permit issued
to Susana Yau; marriage contract of Petrus Yau and Susana Yau; birth certificate of Susana Sumogba; birth certificates of their children; ACR of
Petrus Yau; Meralco bills; Asia Trust deposit slips; five ATM deposit slips; and PLDT bills;
5] Two (2) cellphones, a QTEK Palmtop and a Sony Erickson were found in the possession of Petrus. Incidentally, it was reported that the owner
ofthe QTEK Palmtop cellphone was a certain Jasper Beltran, also a kidnapped victim whose whereabouts had not been known yet; and
6] The DNA examination on the red mask worn by the kidnapper that was recovered inside the house and on the buccal swab taken from Petrus
showed that both DNA profiles matched.23
The Court agrees with the findings of the RTC and the CA that the foregoing pieces of circumstantial evidence, when analyzed and taken together,
definitely lead to no other conclusion than that Petrus was the author of the kidnapping for ransom. When viewed as a whole, the prosecution
evidence effectively established his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The elements of Kidnapping For Ransom under Article 267 of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, are asfollows: (a) intent on the part of the
accused to deprive the victim of his liberty; (b) actual deprivation of the victim of his liberty; and (c) motive of the accused, which is extorting ransom
for the release of the victim.24
All of the foregoing elements were duly established by the testimonial and documentary evidences for the prosecution in the case at bench. First,
Petrus is a private individual. Second, Petrus kidnapped Alastair by using sleeping substance which rendered the latter unconscious while inside a
taxicab driven by the said accused-appellant. Third, Petrus took and detained Alastair inside the house owned by him and Susana Yau in Bacoor,
Cavite, where said victim was handcuffed and chained, and hence, deprived of his liberty. Fourth, Alastair was taken against his will. And fifth,
Petrus made demands for the delivery of a ransomin the amount of US$600,000.00 for the release of the victim.
Anent the criminal liability of eachaccused-appellant, there is no doubt that Petrus is liable as principal of the crime of kidnapping for ransom.
Susana, on the other hand, is liable only as an accomplice to the crime as correctly found by the lower courts. It must be emphasized that there was
no evidence indubitably proving that Susanaparticipated in the decision to commit the criminal act. The only evidence the prosecution had against
her was the testimony of Alastair to the effect that he remembered her as the woman who gave food to him or who accompanied his kidnapper
whenever he would bring food to him every breakfast, lunch and dinner. Jurisprudence25 is instructive of the elements required, in accordance with
Article 18 of the RPC, in order that a person may be considered an accomplice, namely, (1) that there bea community of design; that is, knowing the
criminal design of the principal by direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose; (2) that he cooperates in the execution by previous
or simultaneous act, with the intention of supplying material or moral aid in the execution of the crime in an efficacious way; and (3) that there be a
relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the person charged as accomplice.
In the case at bench, Susana knew of the criminal design of her husband, Petrus, but she kept quiet and never reported the incident to the police
authorities. Instead, she stayed with Petrus inside the house and gave food to the victim or accompanied her husband when he brought food to the
victim. Susana not only countenancedPetrus illegal act, but also supplied him with material and moral aid. It has been held that being present and
giving moral support when a crime is being committed make a person responsible as an accomplice in the crime committed.26 As keenly observed
by the RTC, the act of giving food by Susana to the victim was not essential and indispensable for the perpetration ofthe crime of kidnapping for
ransom but merely an expression of sympathy orfeeling of support to her husband.27 Moreover, this Court is guided by the ruling in People v. De

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Vera,28 where it was stressed that in case of doubt, the participation of the offender will be considered as that of an accomplice rather thanthat of a
principal.
Alastairs positive identification of Susana is not in any bit prejudiced by his failure to mention her name in his sworn statement, dated February 12,
2004. It is well-settled that affidavits, being ex parte, are almost always incomplete and often inaccurate, butdo not really detract from the credibility
of witnesses.29 Oftentimes, the allegationscontained in affidavits involved mere passive mention of details anchored entirely on the investigators
questions. The discrepancies between a sworn statement and a testimony in court do not outrightly justify the acquittal ofan accused, as testimonial
evidence carries moreweight than an affidavit.30 Testimonies given during the trial are more exact and elaborate. Besides, sworn statements are
often executed when an affiants mental faculties are not in such a state as to afford the affiant a fair opportunity of narrating in full the incident
which transpired.31
Given the overwhelming picture of their complicity in the crime, this Court cannot accept the defenses of alibi and frame-up interposed by the
accused-appellants. Alibi is the weakest of all defenses, for it is easy to contrive and difficult to prove. Alibi must be proven by the accused with
clear and convincing evidence; otherwise it cannot prevail over the positive testimonies of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.32
The defense of frame-up, like alibi, has been invariably viewed by this Court with disfavor, for it can easily be concocted but is difficult to
prove.1wphi1 In order to prosper, the defense of frame-up must be proven by the accused with clear and convincing evidence.33 Apart from their
bare allegations, no competent and independent evidence was adduced by the accused-appellants to substantiate their twin defenses of alibi and
frame-up and, thus, remain selfserving and do not merit any evidentiary value. More importantly, nowhere in the records does it show of any
dubious reasons or improper motive that could have impelled the prosecution witnesses, particularly victim Alastair Onglingswam, to falsely testify
and fabricate documentary or object evidence just to implicate accused-appellants in such a heinous crime as kidnapping for ransom. Their only
motive was to see to it that the kidnapper be brought to justice and sentencedwith the appropriate penalty.
As a last-ditch effort to exculpate themselves from any criminal culpability, the accused-appellants questioned the legality of their warrantless
arrests. This too must fail.
Any objection to the procedure followed in the matter of the acquisition by a court of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be opportunely
raised before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived.34 The accused-appellants never objected to or questioned the legality
of their warrantless arrests or the acquisition of jurisdiction by the RTC over their persons before theyentered their respective pleas to the
kidnapping for ransom charge. Considering this lapse and coupled with their full and active participation in the trial of the case, accused-appellants
were deemed to have waived any objection to their warrantless arrests. The accused-appellants voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the RTC
thereby curing whatever defects that might have attended their arrest. It bears stressing that the legality of the arrest affects only the jurisdiction of
the court over their persons.35 Their warrantless arrests cannot, by themselves, be the bases of their acquittal.
Even assuming arguendo that the accused-appellants made a timely objection to their warrantless arrests, jurisprudence is replete with rulings that
support the view that their conviction was proper despite being illegally arrested without a warrant. In People v. Manlulu,36 the Court ruled that the
illegality of the warrantless arrest cannot deprive the State of its right to prosecute the guilty when all other facts on record point to their culpability.
Indeed, the illegal arrest of an accused is not a sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial
free from error.37
With respect to the penalty, the Court finds that the RTC was correct in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetuawithout eligibility of parole against
Petrus as principal in the charge of kidnapping for ransom in view of R.A. No. 9346, prohibiting the death penalty. Also, the Court finds that the
penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and ten (10) months of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, meted out against Susana, an accomplice, to be proper.
The Court also sustains the RTC in awarding actual damages in the amount of 273,132.00 plus interest committed from the filing of the information
until fully paid. As regards the moral damages against the accused-appellants, the Court findsthe award of P1,000,000.00 to be exorbitant. Hence,
the same is being reduced to P200,000.00, as the reasonable compensation for the ignominy and sufferings that Alastair and his family endured
because of the accused-appellants inhumane acts of detaining him in handcuffs and chains, and mentally torturing him and his family to raise the
ransom money. The fact that they suffered the trauma from mental, physical and psychologicalordeal which constitutes the basis for moral damages
under Article 2219 of the Civil Code is too obvious to still require its recital at the trial through the superfluity of a testimonial charade. The Court also
finds the award of exemplary damages to be in order in view of the presence of the qualifying circumstance of demand for ransom, and to serve as
an example and deterrence for the public good. The Court, however, reduces the amount from P200,000.00 to P100,000.00 in line with prevailing
jurisprudence.38
The RTC, however, erred in ruling that Susana was solidarily liable with Petrus for the payment of damages. This is an erroneous apportionment of
the damages awarded because it does not take into account the difference in the nature and degree of participation between the principal, Petrus,
and the accomplice, Susana. The ruling of this Court in People v. Montesclaros39 is instructive on the apportionment of civil liabilities among all the
accusedappellants. The entire amount of the civil liabilities should be apportioned among all those who cooperated in the commission of the crime
according to the degrees of their liability, respective responsibilities and actual participation. Accordingly, Petrus should shoulder a greater share in
the total amount of damages than Susana who was adjudged only as an accomplice.
In fine, the accused-appellants are ordered to pay the victim, Alastair Onglingswam actual damages in the amount of P273, 132.00; moral damages
in the amount of P200,000.00; and exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00, or a total amount of P573, 132.00. Taking into consideration
the degree of their participation, the principal, Petrus, should be liable for two-thirds (2/3) of the total amount of the damages (P573, 132.00 x 213)
or P382,088.00; and the accomplice, Susana, should be ordered to pay the remaining one-third (1/3) or P191,044.00. Specifically, Petrus shall be
liable for actual damages in the amount of P 182,088.00; moral damages in the amount of P133,333.33; and exemplary damages in the amount or
P66,666.6 7; and Susana for the amount of P91,044.00 as actual damages; P66,666.67 as moral damages; and P33,333.33 as exemplary
damages.
WHEREFORE, the September 7, 2012 Decisi0n of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03446 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that
accused-appellants Petrus Yau and Susana Yau y Sumogba are ordered to pay the victim Alastair Joseph Onglingswam moral damages in the
amount of P200,000.00 and exemplary damages in the amount of Pl 00,000.00. The award of actual damages in the amount or P273, 132.00 is
maintained. The civil liabilities of the accused-appellants shall be apportioned as follows:
1] Petrus Yau is directed to pay actual damages in the amount of P182,088.00; moral damages in the amount of P 133,333.33; and exemplary
damages in the amount of P66,666.67; and
2] Susana Yau y Sumogba is directed to pay actual damages in the amount of P91,044.00, moral damages in the amount of P66,666.67 and
exemplary damages in the amount of P33,333.33.
SO ORDERED.

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G.R. No. 207950

September 22, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MARK JASON CHAVEZ y BITANCOR alias "NOY", Accused-appellant.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
Every conviction for any crime must be accompanied by the required moral certainty that the accused has committed the offense charged beyond
reasonable doubt. The prosecution must prove "the offender's intent to take personal property before the killing, regardless of the time when the
homicide [was] actually carried out"1 !n order to convict for the crime of robbery with homicide. The accused may nevertheless be convicted of the
separate crime of homicide once the prosecution establishes beyond reasonable doubt the accused's culpability for the victim's death.
In the information dated November 8, 2006, Mark Jason Chavez y Bitancor (Chavez) was charged with the crime of robbery with homicide:
That on or about October 28, 2006, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with
intent of gain and means of force, violence and intimidation upon the person of ELMER DUQUE y OROS, by then and there, with intent to kill,
stabbing the latter repeatedly with a kitchen knife, thereby inflicting upon him mortal stab wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his
death thereafter, and on the saidoccasion or by reason thereof, accused took, robbed and carried away the following:
One (1) Unit Nokia Cellphone
One (1) Unit Motorola Cellphone
Six (6) pcs. Ladies Ring
Two (2) pcs. Necklace
One (1) pc. Bracelet All of undetermined value and undetermined amount of money, all belonging to said ELMER DUQUE y OROS @ BARBIE to
the damage and prejudice of the said owner/or his heirs, in the said undetermined amount in Philippines currency.
Contrary to law.2
Chavez pleaded not guilty during his arraignment on December 4, 2006. The court proceeded to trial. The prosecution presented Angelo
Peamante (Peamante), P/Chief Inspector Sonia Cayrel (PCI Cayrel), SPO3 Steve Casimiro (SPO3 Casimiro), Dr. Romeo T. Salen (Dr. Salen),
and Raymund Senofa as witnesses. On the other hand, the defense presented Chavez as its sole witness.3
The facts as found by the lower court are as follows.
On October 28, 2006, Peamante arrived home at around 2:45 a.m., coming from work as a janitor in Eastwood City.4 When he was about to go
inside his house at 1326 Tuazon Street, Sampaloc, Manila, he saw a person wearing a black, long-sleeved shirt and black pants and holding
something while leaving the house/parlor of Elmer Duque (Barbie) at 1325 Tuazon Street, Sampaloc, Manila, just six meters across Peamantes
house.5
There was a light at the left side of the house/parlor of Barbie, his favorite haircutter, so Peamante stated that he was able to see the face of
Chavez and the clothes he was wearing.6
Chavez could not close the door of Barbies house/parlor so he simply walked away. However, he dropped something that he was holding and fell
down when he stepped on it.7 He walked away after, and Peamante was not able to determine what Chavez was holding.8 Peamante then
entered his house and went to bed.9
Sometime after 10:00 a.m., the Scene of the Crime Office (SOCO) team arrived, led by PCI Cayrel. She was joined by PO3 Rex Maglansi
(photographer), PO1 Joel Pelayo (sketcher), and a fingerprint technician.10 They conducted an initial survey of the crime scene after coordinating
with SPO3 Casimiro of the Manila Police District Homicide Section.11
The team noted that the lobby and the parlor were in disarray, and they found Barbies dead body inside.12 They took photographs and collected
fingerprints and other pieces of evidence such as the 155 pieces of hair strands found clutched in Barbies left hand.13 They documented the
evidence then turned them over to the Western Police District Chemistry Division. Dr. Salen was called to conduct an autopsy on the body.14
At around 11:00 a.m., Peamantes landlady woke him up and told him that Barbie was found dead at 9:00 a.m. He then informed his landlady that
he saw Chavez leaving Barbies house at 2:45 a.m.15
At around 1:00 p.m., Dr. Salen conducted an autopsy on the body and found that the time of death was approximately 12 hours prior to
examination.16 There were 22 injuries on Barbies body 21 were stab wounds in various parts of the body caused by a sharp bladed instrument,
and one incised wound was caused by a sharp object.17 Four (4) of the stab wounds were considered fatal.18
The next day, the police invited Peamante to the Manila Police Station to give a statement. Peamante described to SPO3 Casimiro the physical
appearance of the person he saw leaving Barbies parlor.19
Accompanied by his mother, Chavez voluntarily surrendered on November 5, 2006 to SPO3 Casimiro at the police station.20 Chavez was then 22
years old.21 His mother told the police that she wanted to help her son who might be involved in Barbies death.22
SPO3 Casimiro informed them ofthe consequences in executing a written statement without the assistance of a lawyer. However, Chavezs mother
still gave her statement, subscribed by Administrative Officer Alex Francisco.23 She also surrendered two cellular phones owned by Barbie and a
baseball cap owned by Chavez.24
The next day, Peamante was again summoned by SPO3 Casimiro to identify from a line-up the person he saw leaving Barbies house/parlor that
early morning of October 28, 2006.25 Peamante immediately pointed to and identified Chavez and thereafter executed his written statement.26
There were no issues raised in relation to the line-up.

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On the other hand, Chavez explained that he was athome on October 27, 2006, exchanging text messages withBarbie on whether they could talk
regarding their misunderstanding.27 According to Chavez, Barbie suspected that he was having a relationship with Barbies boyfriend, Maki.28
When Barbie did not reply to his text message, Chavez decided to go to Barbies house at around 1:00 a.m. of October 28, 2006.29 Barbie allowed
him to enter the house, and he went home after.30
On August 19, 2011, the trial court31 found Chavez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court finds accused MARK JASON CHAVEZ y BITANCOR @ NOY GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Robbery with Homicideand hereby sentences him to suffer the penaltyof reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.
Further, he is ordered to pay tothe heirs of the victim, Elmer Duque y Oros the sum of 75,000.00 as death indemnity and another P75,000 for moral
damages.
SO ORDERED.32
On February 27, 2013, the Court of Appeals33 affirmed the trial courts decision.34 Chavez then filed a notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 124,
Section 13(c) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, elevating the case with this court.35
This court notified the parties tosimultaneously submit supplemental briefs if they so desire. Both parties filed manifestationsthat they would merely
adopt their briefs before the Court of Appeals.36
In his brief, Chavez raised presumption of innocence, considering that the trial court "overlooked and misapplied some facts of substance that could
have altered its verdict."37 He argued that since the prosecution relied on purely circumstantial evidence, conviction must rest on a moral certainty
of guilt on the part of Chavez.38 In this case, even if Peamante saw him leaving Barbies house, Peamante did not specify whether Chavez was
acting suspiciously at that time.39
As regards his mothers statement,Chavez argued its inadmissibility as evidence since his mother was not presented before the court to give the
defense an opportunity for cross-examination.40 He added that affidavits are generally rejected as hearsay unless the affiant appears before the
court and testifies on it.41
Chavez argued that based on Dr. Salens findings, Barbies wounds were caused by two sharp bladed instruments, thus, it was possible that there
were two assailants.42 It was also possible that the assailants committed the crime after Chavez had left Barbies house.43 Given that many
possible explanations fit the facts,that which is consistent with the innocence of Chavez should be favored.44
On the other hand, plaintiff-appellee argued that direct evidence is not indispensable when the prosecution isestablishing guilt beyond reasonable
doubt of Chavez.45 The circumstantial evidence presented before the trial court laid down an unbroken chain of events leading to no other
conclusion than Chavezs acts of killing and robbing Barbie.46
On the argument made by Chavez that his mothers statement was inadmissible as hearsay, plaintiff-appellee explained that the trial court did not
rely on, and did not even refer to, any of the statements made by Chavezs mother.47
Finally, insofar as Chavezs submission that Dr. Salen testified on the possibility that there weretwo assailants, Dr. Salen equally testified on the
possibility that there was only one.48 The sole issue now before us iswhether Chavez is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with
homicide.
We reverse the decisions of the lower courts, but find Chavez guilty of the crime of homicide.
I
Chavez was found guilty of the specialcomplex crime of robbery with homicide under the Revised Penal Code:
Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons Penalties. Any person guilty of robberywith the use of violence against or
intimidation of any person shall suffer:
1) The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed. . . .
49
Chavez invokes his constitutional right to be presumed innocent, especially since the prosecutions evidence is purely circumstantial and a
conviction must stand on a moral certainty of guilt.50
The Rules of Court expressly provides that circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the conviction of
an accused:
SEC. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.51
The lower courts found that the circumstantial evidence laid down by the prosecution led to no other conclusion than the commission by Chavez of
the crime charged:
In the instant case, while there is no direct evidence showing that the accused robbed and fatally stabbed the victim to death, nonetheless, the
Court believes that the following circumstances form a solid and unbroken chain of events that leads to the conclusion, beyond reasonable doubt,
that accused Mark Jason Chavez y Bitancor @ Noy committed the crime charged, vi[z]: first, it has been duly established, as the accused himself
admits, that he went to the parlor of the victim at around 1:00 oclock in the morning of 28 October 2006 and the accused was allowed by the victim
to get inside his parlor as it serves as his residence too; second, the victims two (2) units of cellular phones (one red Nokia with model 3310 and
the other one is a black Motorola) without sim cards and batteries, which were declared as partof the missing personal belongings of the victim,
were handled to SPO3 Steve Casimiro by the mother of the accused, Anjanette C. Tobias on 05 November 2006 when the accused voluntarily
surrendered, accompanied by his mother, at the police station: third, on 28 October 2006 at about 2:45 oclock in the morning, witness Angelo
Peamante, who arrived from his work, saw a person holding and/or carrying something and about toget out of the door of the house of the victim

105

located at 1325 G. Tuazon Street, Sampaloc, Manila, and trying to close the door but the said person was not able to successfully do so. He later
positively identified the said person at the police station as MARK JASON CHAVEZ y BITANCOR @ NOY, the accused herein; and finally, the time
when the accused decided on 27 October 2006 to patch up things with the victim and the circumstances (Dr. Salens testimony that the body of the
victim was dead for more or less twelve (12) hours) when the latter was discovered fatally killed on 28 October 2006 is not a co-incidence.
The prosecution has equally established, based on the same circumstantial evidence, that the accused had indeed killed the victim.52
Factual findings by the trial court on its appreciation of evidence presented by the parties, and even its conclusions derived from the findings, are
generally given great respect and conclusive effect by this court, more so when these factual findings are affirmed by the Court of Appeals.53
Nevertheless, this court has held that "[w]hat is imperative and essential for a conviction for the crime of robbery with homicide is for the prosecution
to establish the offenders intent to take personal property before the killing, regardless of the time when the homicide is actually carried out."54 In
cases when the prosecution failed to conclusively prove that homicide was committed for the purpose of robbing the victim, no accused can be
convicted of robbery with homicide.55
The circumstantial evidence relied on by the lower courts, as quoted previously, do not satisfactorily establish an original criminal design by Chavez
to commit robbery.
At most, the intent to take personal property was mentioned by Chavezs mother in her statement as follows:
Na si Noy na aking anak ay nagtapat sa akin tungkol sa kanyang kinalaman sa pagkamatay ni Barbie at kasabay ang pagbigay sa akin ng
dalawang (2) piraso ng cellular phones na pag/aari [sic] ni Barbie na kanyang kinuha pagka/tapos [sic] ng insidente.
Na ipinagtapat din sa akin ni Noy na ang ginamit na panaksak na isang kutsilyo na gamit namin sabahay ay inihulog niya sa manhole sa tapat ng
aming bahay matapos ang insidente.
At ang isang piraso ng kwintas na kinuha rin nya mula kay Barbie ay naisanla niya sa isang sanglaan sa Quezon City.
Na ang suot niyang tsinelas ay nag/iwan [sic] ng bakas sa pinangyarihan ng insidente. At sya rin ang nakasugat sa kanyang sariling kamay ng [sic]
maganap ang insidente.
Na sinabi niya sa akin na wala siyang intensyon na patayin [sic] si Barbie kundi ay pagnakawan lamang.56 (Emphasis supplied)
However, this statement is considered as hearsay, with no evidentiary value, since Chavezs mother was never presented as a witness during trial
to testify on her statement.57
An original criminal design to take personal property is also inconsistent with the infliction of no less than 21 stab wounds in various parts of
Barbies body.58
The number of stab wounds inflicted on a victim has been used by this court in its determination of the nature and circumstances of the crime
committed.
This may show an intention to ensure the death of the victim. In a case where the victim sustained a total of 36 stab wounds in his front and back,
this court noted that "this number of stab wounds inflicted on the victim is a strong indication that appellants made sure of the success of their effort
to kill the victim without risk to themselves."59
This court has also looked into the number and gravity of the wounds sustained by the victim as indicative ofthe accuseds intention to kill the victim
and not merely to defend himself or others.60
In the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, homicide is committed in order "(a) to facilitate the robbery or the escape of the culprit; (b) to
preserve the possession by the culprit of the loot; (c) to prevent discovery of the commission of the robbery; or (d) to eliminate witnesses to the
commission of the crime."61 21 stab wounds would be overkill for these purposes. The sheer number of stab wounds inflicted on Barbie makes it
difficult to conclude an original criminal intent of merely taking Barbies personal property.
In People v. Sanchez,62 this court found accused-appellant liable for the separate crimes of homicide and theft for failure of the prosecution to
conclusively prove that homicide was committed for the purpose of robbing the victim:
But from the record of this case, we find that the prosecution palpably failed to substantiate its allegations of the presence of criminal design to
commit robbery, independent ofthe intent to commit homicide. There is no evidence showing that the death of the victim occurred by reason or on
the occasion of the robbery. The prosecution was silent on accused-appellants primary criminal intent. Did he intend to kill the victim in order to
steal the cash and the necklace? Or did he intend only to kill the victim, the taking of the latters personal property being merely an afterthought?
Where the homicide is notconclusively shown to have been committed for the purpose of robbing the victim, or where the robbery was not proven at
all, there can be no conviction for robo con homicidio.63
II
This court finds that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of Chavez for the separate crime of homicide.
First, the alibi of Chavez still placeshim at the scene of the crime that early morning of October 28, 2006.
The victim, Elmer Duque, went by the nickname, Barbie, and he had a boyfriend named Maki. Nevertheless, Chavez described his friendship with
Barbie to be "[w]ere like brothers."64 He testified during cross-examination that he was a frequent visitor at Barbies parlor that he cannot recall
how many times he had been there.65 This speaks of a close relationship between Chavez and Barbie.
Chavez testified that he went to Barbies house at 1:00 in the morning of October 28, 2006 to settle his misunderstanding with Barbie who
suspected him of having a relationship with Barbies boyfriend:
MARK JASON CHAVEZ was a friend to the victim, Barbie, for almost three (3) years and the two (2) treated each other like brothers. The latter,
however, suspected Mark Jason of having a relationship with Maki Aover, Barbies boyfriend for six (6) months, which resulted in a
misunderstanding between them. Mark Jason tried to patch things up with Barbie so thru a text message he sent on the evening of 27 October
2006, he asked if they could talk. When Barbie did not reply, he decided to visit him at his parlor at around 1:00 oclock in the morning. Barbie let
him in and they tried to talk about the situation between them. Their rift, however, was not fixed so he decided to gohome. Later on, he learned that
Barbie was already dead.66

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This court has considered motive as one of the factors in determining the presence of an intent to kill,67 and a confrontation with the victim
immediately prior to the victimsdeath has been considered as circumstantial evidence for homicide.68
Second, the number of stab wounds inflicted on Barbie strengthens an intention to kill and ensures his death.The prosecution proved that there was
a total of 22 stab wounds found indifferent parts of Barbies body and that a kitchen knife was found in a manhole near Chavezs house at No. 536,
5th Street, San Beda, San Miguel, Manila.69
The Court of Appeals recitation of facts quoted the statement of Chavezs mother. This provides, among others, her sons confession for stabbing
Barbie and throwing the knife used in a manhole near their house:
Na si Noy na aking anak ay nagtapat sa akin tungkol sa kanyang kinalaman sa pagkamatay ni Barbie at kasabay ang pagbigay sa akin ng
dalawang (2) piraso ng cellular phones na pag/aari [sic] ni Barbie na kanyang kinuha pagka/tapos [sic] ng insidente.
Na ipinagtapat din sa akin ni Noy na ang ginamit na panaksak na isang kutsilyo na gamit namin sa bahay ay inihulog niya sa manhole sa tapat ng
aming bahay matapos ang insidente.
At ang isang piraso ng kwintas nakinuha rin nya mula kay Barbie ay naisanla niya sa isang sanglaan sa Quezon City.
Na ang suot niyang tsinelas ay nag/iwan [sic] ng bakas sa pinangyarihan ng insidente. At sya rin ang nakasugat sa kanyang sariling kamay ng [sic]
maganap ang insidente.
Na sinabi niya sa akin na wala siyang intensyon na patayin [sic] si Barbie kundi ay pagnakawan lamang.70 (Emphasis supplied)
Even if this statement was not taken into account for being hearsay, further investigation conducted still led tothe unearthing of the kitchen knife with
a hair strand from a manhole near Chavezs house.71
Third, no reason exists to disturb the lower courts factual findings giving credence to 1) Peamantes positive identification of Chavez as the person
leaving Barbies house that early morning of October 28, 200672 and 2) the medico-legals testimony establishing Barbies time of death as 12
hours prior to autopsy at 1:00 p.m., thus, narrowing the time of death to approximately 1:00 a.m. of the same day, October 28, 2006.73
All these circumstances taken together establish Chavezs guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of homicide.
III
There is a disputable presumption that "a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer
of the whole act; otherwise, thatthing which a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him."74 Thus, when a person
has possession of a stolen property, hecan be disputably presumed as the author of the theft.75
Barbies missing cellular phones were turned over to the police by Chavezs mother, and this was never denied by the defense.76 Chavez failed to
explain his possession of these cellular phones.77 The Court of Appeals discussed that "a cellular phone has become a necessary accessory, no
person would part with the same for a long period of time, especially in this case as it involves an expensive cellular phone unit, as testified by
Barbies kababayan, witness Raymond Seno[f]a."78
However, with Chavez and Barbies close relationship having been established, there is still a possibilitythat these cellphones were lent to Chavez
by Barbie.
The integrity of these cellphones was also compromised when SPO3 Casimiro testified during cross-examination that the police made no markings
on the cellphones, and their SIM cards were removed.
Q: But you did not place any marking on the cellphone, Mr. witness?
A: No, sir.
Atty. Villanueva: No further questions, Your Honor.
Court: When you received the items,there were no markings also?
Witness: No, Your Honor.
Court: The cellular phones, were they complete with the sim cards and the batteries?
A: Theres no sim card, Your Honor.
Q; No sim card and batteries?
A; Yes, Your Honor.
Q: No markings when you receivedand you did not place markings when these were turned over to the Public Prosecutor, no markings?
A: No markings, Your Honor.79
The other missing items were no longer found, and no evidence was presented to conclude that these weretaken by Chavez. The statement of
Chavezs mother mentioned that her son pawned one of Barbies necklaces ["At ang isang piraso ng kwintas na kinuha rin nya mula kay Barbie ay
naisanla niya sa isang sanglaan sa Quezon City"80 ], but, as earlier discussed, this statement is mere hearsay.
In any case, the penalty for the crime of theft is based on the value of the stolen items.81 The lower court made no factual findings on the value of
the missing items enumerated in the information one Nokia cellphone unit, one Motorola cellphone unit, six pieces ladies ring, two pieces
necklace, and one bracelet.
At most, prosecution witness Raymund Senofa, a town mate of Barbie, testified that he could not remember the model of the Motorola fliptype
cellphone he saw used by Barbie but that he knew it was worth 19,000.00 more or less.82 This amounts to hearsay as he has no personal
knowledge on how Barbie acquired the cellphone or for how much.

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These circumstances create reasonable doubt on the allegation that Chavez stole the missing personal properties of Barbie.
It is contrary to human nature for a mother to voluntarily surrender her own son and confess that her son committed a heinous crime.
Chavez was 22 years old, no longer a minor, when he voluntarily went to the police station on November 5, 2006 for investigation,83 and his mother
accompanied him. SPO3 Casimiro testified that the reason she surrendered Chavez was because "she wanted to help her son"84 and "perhaps the
accused felt that [the investigating police] are getting nearer to him."85 Nevertheless, during cross-examination, SPO3 Casimiro testified:
Q: Regarding the mother, Mr. witness, did I get you right that when the mother brought her son, according to you she tried to help her son, is that
correct?
A: That is the word I remember, sir.
Q: Of course, said help you do notknow exactly what she meant by that?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: It could mean that she is trying to help her son to be cleared from this alleged crime, Mr. witness?
A: Maybe, sir.86
Chavezs mother "turned-over (2) units of Cellular-phones and averred that her son Mark Jason told her that said cellphones belong[ed] to victim
Barbie. . . [that] NOY was wounded in the incident and that the fatal weapon was put in a manhole infront[sic] of their residence."87 The records are
silent on whether Chavez objected to his mothers statements. The records also do not show why the police proceeded to get his mothers
testimony as opposed to getting Chavezs testimony on his voluntary surrender.
At most, the lower court found thatChavezs mother was informed by the investigating officer at the police station of the consequences in executing
a written statement withoutthe assistance of a lawyer.88 She proceeded to give her statement dated November 7, 2006 on her sons confession of
the crime despite the warning.89 SPO3 Casimiro testified during his cross-examination:
Q: Do you remember if anybody assisted this Anjanette Tobias when she executed this Affidavit you mentioned?
A: She was with some neighbors.
Atty. Villanueva
Q: How about a lawyer, Mr. Witness?
A: None, sir.
Q: So, in other words, no lawyer informed her of the consequence of her act of executing an Affidavit?
A: We somehow informed her of what will be the consequences of that statement, sir.
Q: So, you and your police officer colleague at the time?
A: Yes, sir.90
The booking sheet and arrest report states that "when [the accused was] appraised [sic] of his constitutional rights and nature of charges imputed
against him, accused opted to remain silent."91 This booking sheet and arrest report is also dated November 7, 2006, or two days after Chavez,
accompanied by his mother, had voluntarily gone to the police station.
The right to counsel upon being questioned for the commission of a crime is part of the Miranda rights, which require that:
. . . (a) any person under custodial investigation has the right to remain silent; (b) anything he says can and will be used against him in a court of
law; (c) he has the right totalk to an attorney before being questioned and to have his counsel present when being questioned; and (d) if he cannot
afford an attorney, one will be provided before any questioning if he so desires.92
The Miranda rightswere incorporated in our Constitution but were modified to include the statement thatany waiver of the right to counsel must be
made "in writing and in the presence of counsel."93
The invocation of these rights applies during custodial investigation, which begins "when the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into
an unsolved crime but has begun tofocus on a particular suspect taken into custody by the police who starts the interrogation and propounds
questions to the person to elicit incriminating statements."94
It may appear that the Miranda rightsonly apply when one is "taken into custody by the police," such as during an arrest. These rights are intended
to protect ordinary citizens from the pressures of a custodial setting:
The purposes of the safeguards prescribed by Miranda are to ensure that the police do not coerce or trick captive suspects into confessing, to
relieve the "inherently compelling pressures" "generated by the custodial setting itself," "which work to undermine the individuals will to resist," and
as much as possible to free courts from the task of scrutinizing individual cases to try to determine, after the fact, whether particular confessions
were voluntary. Those purposes are implicated as much by in-custody questioning of persons suspected of misdemeanours as they are by
questioning of persons suspected of felonies.95 (Emphasis supplied)
Republic Act No. 743896 expanded the definition of custodial investigation to "include the practice ofissuing an invitation to a person who is
investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed, without prejudice to the liability of the inviting officer for any violation
of law."97
This means that even those who voluntarily surrendered before a police officer must be apprised of their Miranda rights. For one, the same
pressures of a custodial setting exist in this scenario. Chavez is also being questioned by an investigating officer ina police station. As an additional
pressure, he may have been compelled to surrender by his mother who accompanied him to the police station.

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This court, thus, finds that the circumstantial evidence sufficiently proves beyond reasonable doubt that Chavez is guilty of the crime of homicide,
and not the special complex crime of robbery with homicide.
On the service of Chavezs sentence, the trial court issued the order dated November 14, 2006 in that "as prayed for, the said police officer is
hereby ordered to immediately commit accused, Mark Jason Chavez y Bitancor @ Noy to the Manila City Jail and shall be detained thereat pending
trial of this case and/or untilfurther orders from this court."98 The order of commitment dated September 28, 2011 was issued after his trial court
conviction in the decision dated August 19, 2011.
Chavez has been under preventive detention since November 14, 2006, during the pendency of the trial.1wphi1 This period may be credited in the
service of his sentence pursuant to Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended:
ART. 29. Period of preventive imprisonment deducted from term of imprisonment. Offenders or accused who have undergone preventive
imprisonment shall be credited in the service of their sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty, with the full time during which they have
undergone preventive imprisonment if the detention prisoner agrees voluntarily in writing after being informed of the effects thereof and with the
assistance of counsel to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, except in the following cases:
1. When they are recidivists, or have been convicted previously twice or more times of any crime; and
2. When upon being summoned for the execution of their sentence they have failed to surrender voluntarily.
If the detention prisoner does notagree to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, he shall do so in writing with the
assistance of a counsel and shall be credited in the service of his sentence with four-fifths of the time during which he has undergone preventive
imprisonment.
Credit for preventive imprisonment for the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be deducted from thirty (30) years.
Whenever an accused has undergone preventive imprisonment for a period equal to the possible maximum imprisonment of the offense charged to
which he may be sentenced and his case is not yet terminated, he shall be released immediately without prejudice to the continuation of the trial
thereof or the proceeding on appeal, if the same is under review. Computation of preventive imprisonment for purposes of immediate release under
this paragraph shall be the actual period of detention with good conduct time allowance: Provided, however, That if the accused is absent without
justifiable cause at any stage of the trial, the court may motu proprio order the rearrest of the accused: Provided, finally, That recidivists, habitual
delinquents, escapees and persons charged with heinous crimes are excluded from the coverage of this Act. In case the maximum penalty to which
the accused may be sentenced is destierro, he shall be released after thirty (30) days of preventive imprisonment.99
V
Finally, this court laments thatobject evidence retrieved from the scene of the crime were not properly handled, and no results coming from the
forensic examinations were presented to the court. There was no examination of the fingerprints found on the kitchen knife retrieved from the
manhole near the house of Chavez.100 There were no results of the DNA examination done on the hair strands found with the knife and those in
the clutches of the victim. Neither was there a comparison made between these strands of hair and Chavezs. There was no report regarding any
finding of traces of blood on the kitchen knife recovered, and no matching with the blood of the victim or Chavezs. The results of this case would
have been rendered with more confidence at the trial court level had all these been done. In many cases, eyewitness testimony may not be as
reliable or would have been belied had object evidence been properly handled and presented.
We deal with the life of a personhere. Everyones life whether it be the victims or the accuseds is valuable. The Constitution and our laws
hold these lives in high esteem. Therefore, investigations such as these should have been attended with greaterprofessionalism and more
dedicated attention to detail by our law enforcers. The quality of every conviction depends on the evidence gathered, analyzed, and presented
before the courts. The publics confidence on our criminal justice system depends on the quality of the convictions we promulgate against the
accused. All those who participate in our criminal justice system should realize this and take this to heart.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court is MODIFIED. Accused-appellant Mark Jason Chavez y Bitancor alias "Noy" is hereby declared
GUILTYbeyond reasonable doubt of the separate and distinct crime of HOMICIDE. Inasmuch as the commission of the crime was not attended by
any aggravating or mitigating circumstances, accused-appellant Chavez is hereby SENTENCEDto suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from
eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
Accused-appellant Chavez's period of detention shall be deducted if consistent with Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
SO ORDERED.

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G.R. No. 221697

MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, Petitioners,
vs.
COMELEC AND ESTRELLA C. ELAMPARO Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 221698-700
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, Petitioners,
vs.
COMELEC, FRANCISCO S. TATAD, ANTONIO P. CONTRERAS AND AMADO D. VALDEZ Respondents.
CONCURRING OPINION
SERENO, CJ.:
It is important for every Member of this Court to be and to remain professionally indifferent to the outcome of the 2016 presidential election. Whether
it turns out to be for a candidate who best represents one's personal aspirations for the country or who raises one's fears, is a future event we must
be blind to while we sit as magistrates. We are not the electorate, and at this particular juncture of history, our only role is to adjudicate as our
unfettered conscience dictates. We have no master but the law, no drumbeater but reason, and in our hearts must lie only the love for truth and for
justice. This is what the Constitution requires of us.
It is apropos at this point to recall the principles that Justice Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez evoked in her concurring opinion in Tecson v. COMELEC,
1 the landmark case involving as respondent a presidential candidate for 2014, the late Ronald Allan Kelly-Poe:
xxxx
Let it not be forgotten that the historic core of our democratic system is political liberty, which is the right and opportunity to choose those who will
lead the governed with their consent. This right to choose cannot be subtly interfered with through the elimination of the electoral choice. The
present bid to disqualify respondent Poe from the presidential race is a clear attempt to eliminate him as one of the choices. This Court should resist
such attempt. The right to choose is the single factor that controls the ambitions of those who would impose through force or stealth their will on the
majority of citizens. We should not only welcome electoral competition, we should cherish it. Disqualifying a candidate, particularly the popular one,
on the basis of doubtful claims does not result to a genuine, free and fair election. It results to violence. x x x. We have seen Edsa I and Edsa II,
thus, we know that when democracy operates as intended, an aroused public can replace those who govern in a manner beyond the parameters
established by public consent.2
xxxx
When the people vote on May 10 and cast their ballots for President, they will be exercising a sovereign right. They may vote for respondent Poe, or
they may not. When they vote, they will consider a myriad of issues, some relevant, others trivial, including the eligibility of the candidates, their
qualities of leadership, their honesty and sincerity, perhaps including their legitimacy. That is their prerogative. After the election, and only after, and
that is what the Constitution mandates, the election of whoever is proclaimed winner may be challenged in an election contest or a petition for quo
warranto. Where the challenge is because of ineligibility, he will be ousted only if this Court exerts utmost effort to resolve the issue in a manner that
would give effect to the will of the majority, for it is merely sound public policy to cause elective offices to be filled by those who are the choice of the
majority.3
That is what the COMELEC rulings in these cases would have precisely accomplished had they been affirmed: the illegitimate elimination of an
electoral choice, a choice who appears to be one of the frontrunners in all the relevant surveys. For the reasons set forth below, I concur with
Justice Jose Portugal Perez, and am herein expounding in detail the reasons for such concurrence.
With the majority of the Members of the Court declaring, by a vote of 9 as against 6, that petitioner Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares has no legal
impediment to run for the presidency, it is most unfortunate that one of the Dissenting Opinions opens with a statement that tries to cast uncertainty
on an already tense situation. The dissent gives excessive weight to the fact that there are 5 Justices in the minority who believe that petitioner
does not have the qualifications for presidency, while ignoring the reality that there at least 7 Justices who believe that petitioner possesses these
qualifications.
Note that the fallo needed only to dispose of the grant or denial of the petitions and nothing more. Ideally, no further interpretation of the votes
should have been made. Unfortunately, there are attempts to make such an interpretation. We therefore need to look to our internal rules for
clarification on the matter to avoid exacerbating matters.
If we were to apply the rules on voting in the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court, it is clear that the Court decided on the matter of petitioner's
intrinsic qualifications in accordance with Rule 12, Section 1 of these rules:
Section 1.Voting requirements. - (a) All decisions and actions in Court en bane cases shall be made up upon the concurrence of the majority of the
Members of the Court who actually took part in the deliberation on the issues or issues involved and voted on them.
Out of the 12 Members who voted on the substantive question on citizenship, a clear majority of 7 voted in favor of petitioner. As to residency, 7 out
of 13 voted that petitioner complied with the 10-year residency requirement. These votes, as explained in the extended opinions submitted by the
members of the majority, must be respected. Granting therefore that we need to address the question of substantive qualifications of petitioner, she
clearly possesses the qualifications for presidency on the matter of residency and citizenship.
I.
The Proceedings Before the Court
On 28 December 2015, petitioner filed two separate Petitions for Certiorari before this Court assailing the Resolutions dated 23 December 2015 of
the COMELEC En Banc, which ordered the cancellation of her Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for the 2016 presidential elections.4 Both petitions
included a prayer for the issuance of Temporary Restraining Orders (TRO) against the COMELEC.
In the afternoon of 28 December 2015, by my authority as Chief Justice and upon the written recommendation of the Members-in-Charge, the Court
issued two separate orders enjoining COMELEC and its representatives from implementing the assailed Resolutions, pursuant to Section 6(g), Rule
7 of the Supreme Court Internal Rules.5

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The issuance of the TROs was confirmed by the Court En Banc, voting 12-3, in Resolutions dated 12 January 2016. In the same resolutions, the
Court ordered the consolidation of the two petitions.
Oral arguments were then held on the following dates: January 19 and 26; February 2, 9 and 16, 2016. During these proceedings, the parties were
ordered in open court to submit their Memoranda within five days from the conclusion of the oral arguments, after which the consolidated petitions
would be deemed submitted for resolution.
On 29 February 2016, the draft report of the Member-in-Charge was circulated to the Members of the Court. The Court then decided to schedule
the deliberations on the case on 8 March 2016. A reserved date - 9 March 2016 - was also agreed upon, in the event that a decision is not reached
during the 8 March 2016 session.
In keeping with the above schedule, the Members of the Court deliberated and voted on the case on 8 March 2016.
II
COMELEC exceeded its jurisdiction when it ruled on petitioner's qualifications under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.
The brief reasons why the COMELEC exceeded its jurisdiction when it ruled on petitioner's qualifications are as follows.
First, Section 78 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 118, or the Omnibus Election Code (OEC), does not allow the COMELEC to rule on the qualifications of
candidates. Its power to cancel a Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) is circumscribed within the confines of Section 78 of the OEC that provides for a
summary proceeding to determine the existence of the exclusive ground that any representation made by the candidate regarding a Section 74
matter was false. Section 74 requires, among others a statement by the candidate on his eligibility for office. To authorize the COMELEC to go
beyond its mandate and rule on the intrinsic qualification of petitioner, and henceforth, of every candidate, is an outcome clearly prohibited by the
Constitution and by the OEC.
Second, even assuming that the COMELEC may go beyond the determination of patent falsity of the CoC, its decision to cancel petitioner's CoC
must still be reversed. The factual circumstances surrounding petitioner's claims of residency and citizenship show that there was neither intent to
deceive nor false representation on her part. Worse, the COMELEC's unmerited use of this Court's dissenting opinions as if they were
pronouncements of the Court itself6 misleads both the Court and the public, as it evinces a refusal to acknowledge a dissent's proper place - not as
law, but as the personal views of an individual member of this Court. Most egregiously, the COMELEC blatantly disregarded a long line of decisions
by this Court to come up with its conclusions.
The Power of the COMELEC Prior
to Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code
Prior to the OEC, the power of the COMELEC in relation to the filing of CoCs had been described as ministerial and administrative.7 In 1985, the
OEC was passed, empowering the COMELEC to grant or deny due course to a petition to cancel a CoC. The right to file a verified petition under
Section 78 was given to any person on the ground of material representation of the contents of the CoC as provided for under Section 74. Among
the statements a candidate is required to make in the CoC, is that he or she is eligible for the office the candidate seeks.
The fundamental requirements for electoral office are found in the Constitution. With respect to the petitions at hand, these are the natural-born
Filipino citizenship and the 10-year residency requirements for President found under Section 2, Article VII in relation to Section 1, Article IV of the
Constitution.
In the deliberations of the Batasang Pambansa on what would turn out to be Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code or Batas Pambansa Bilang
(BP) 881, the lawmakers emphasized that the fear of partisanship on the part of the COMELEC makes it imperative that it must only be for the
strongest of reasons, i.e., material misrepresentation on the face of the CoC, that the COMELEC can reject any such certificates. Otherwise, to
allow greater power than the quasi-ministerial duty of accepting facially compliant CoCs would open the door for COMELEC to engage in
partisanship; the COMELEC may target any candidate at will. The fear was so real to the lawmakers that they characterized the power to receive
CoCs not only as summary, but initially as, "ministerial." Allow me to quote:
HON. ADAZA. Why should we give the Comelec power to deny or to give due course when the acceptance of the certificate of candidacy is
ministerial?
HON. FERNAN. Iyon na nga ang sinasabi ko eh.
THE CHAIRMAN. Baka iyong residences, this must be summary. He is not a resident of the ano, why will you wait? Automatically disqualified siya.
Suppose he is not a natural born citizen.
HON. ADAZA. No, but we can specify the grounds here. Kasi, they can use this power to expand.
THE CHAIRMAN. Yeah, that is under this article nga.
HON. ADAZA. Iyon na nga, but let's make particular reference. Remember, Nonoy, this is a new provision which gives authority to the Comelec.
This was never there before. Ikansel na natin yan.
HON. GONZALES. At saka the Constitution says, di ba? "The Commission on Election is the sole judge of all the contest." This merely refers to
contest e. Petition fang to give due course e. You will only be declared disqualified.
THE CHAIRMAN. No, no, because, clearly, he is a non-resident. Oh, why can we not file a petition? Supposing he is not a natural born citizen?
Why?
HON. GONZALES. This is a very very serious question. This should be declared only in proper election contest, properly litigated but never in a
summary proceedings.
THE CHAIRMAN. We will not use the word, the phrase "due course", "seeking the cancellation of the Certificate of Candidacy". For example, si
Ading, is a resident of Cebu and he runs in Davao City.
HON. ADAZA. He is a resident of Cebu but he runs in Lapu-Lapu? lkaw, you are already threatening him ah.
THE CHAIRMAN. These are the cases I am sure, that are ...

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HON. ADAZA. I see. No, no, but let us get rid of the provision. This is dangerous.
THE CHAIRMAN. No but, if you know that your opponent is not elected or suppose ...
HON. ADAZA. File the proper petition like before without providing this.
THE CHAIRMAN. But in the mean time, why ...
HON. SITOY. My proposal is to delete the phrase "to deny due course", go direct to "seeking the cancellation of the Certificate of Candidacy."
HON. ASOK. Every Certificate of Candidacy should be presumed accepted. It should be presumed accepted.
THE CHAIRMAN. Suppose on the basis of. ..
HON. SITOY. That's why, my proposal is, "any person seeking the cancellation of a Certificate of Candidacy".
HON. FERNAN. But where are the grounds here?
HON. ADAZA. Noy, let's hold this. Hold muna ito. This is dangerous e.
THE CHAIRMAN. Okay, okay.
HON. GONZALES. Ginagamit lamang ng Comelec ang "before" if it is claimed that a candidate is an official or that his Certificate of Candidacy has
been filed in bad faith, iyon lang. Pero you cannot go to the intrinsic qualifications and disqualifications of candidates.
HON. DELOS REYES. Which are taken up in an ordinary protest.
HON. GONZALES. Dito ba, kasama iyong proceedings sa ... ? What I'm saying is: Kagaya iyong nabanggit kay Nonoy, natural course of margin,
imagine, it will eventually reach the Supreme Court. The moment that the disqualification is pending, lalong lalo na kung may decision ng Comelec
and yet pending pa before the Supreme Court, that already adversely affect a candidate, mabigat na iyan. So, what I'm saying is, on this
disqualification sub-judice, alisin ito except if on the ground that he is a nuisance candidate or that his Certificate of Candidacy has been filed in bad
faith. But if his Certificate of Candidacy appears to be regular and valid on the basis that his certificate has been filed on time, then it should be
given due couse.8
The same concerns were raised when the provision was taken up again:
THE PRESIDING OFFICER. No. 10, the power of the Commission to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. What is the specific
ano, Tessie?
HON. ADAZA. Page 45.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER. Section 71.
HON. ADAZA. Kasi kay Neptali ito and it is also contained in our previous proposal, "Any person seeking to deny due course to or cancel. . . " our
proposal here is that it should not be made to appear that the Commission on Elections has the authority to deny due course to or cancel the
certificate of candidacy. I mean their duty should be ministerial, the acceptance, except in cases where they are nuisance candidates.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER. In case of nuisance, who will determine, hindi ba Comelec iyan?
HON. ADAZA. Iyon na nga, except in those cases, eh. Ito, this covers a provision not only in reference to nuisance candidates.
HON. CUENCO. Will you read the provision?
HON. ADAZA. "Any person seeking due course to or the cancellation ... " because our position here is that these are matters that should be
contained in an election protest or in a quo warranto proceedings, eh. You know, you can be given a lot of problems in the course of the campaign.
HON. ASOK. But we already have a specific provision on this.
HON. ADAZA. (MP Adaza reading the provision.) You know, we should not have this as a provision anymore because whatever matters will be
raised respecting this certificate of candidacy, these are normal issues for protest or quo warranto, eh.
HON. CUENCO. So you now want to remove this power from the Comelec?
HON. ADAZA. This power from the Comelec. This is the new provision, eh. They should not have this. All of us can be bothered, eh.
HON. CUENCO. So in that case how can the Comelec cancel the certificate of candidacy when you said. . .
HON. ADAZA. Only with respect to the nuisance candidates. There is no specific provision.
HON. ASOK. There is already a specific provision for nuisance candidates.
HON. ADAZA. This one refers to other candidates who are not nuisance candidates, but most particularly refers to matters that are involved in
protest and quo warranto proceedings. Why should we expand their other provisions before. You know, you can get bothered.
HON. CUENCO. Everybody will be vulnerable?
HON. ADAZA. Yeah, everybody will be vulnerable, eh.
HON. CUENCO. Even if you are a serious candidate?
HON. ADAZA. Even if you are a serious candidate because, for instance, they will file a petition for quo warranto, they can file a petition to the
Comelec to cancel your certificate of candidacy. These are actually grounds for protest or for quo warranto proceedings.

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xxxx
HON. CUENCO. By merely alleging, for example, that you are a subversive.
HON. ADAZA. Oo, iyon na nga, eh.
xxxx
THE PRESIDING OFFICER. Suppose you are disqualified, you do not have the necessary qualifications, the Comelec can motu propio cancel it.
HON. CUENCO. On what ground, Mr. Chairman?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER. You are disqualified. Let's say, wala kang residence or kuwan ...
HON. ADAZA. Ah, that's the problem.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER. That's why.
HON. ADAZA. We should not allow that thing to crop up within the powers of the Comelec because anyone can create problem for everybody. You
know, that's a proper subject for protest or quo warranto. But not to empower the Comelec to cancel. That's a very dangerous provision. It can
reach all of us.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER. Hindi, if you are a resident pero iyong, let's say a new comer comes to Misamis Oriental, 3 months before and file his
Certificate of Candidacy.
HON. ADAZA. Never mind, file the necessary petition.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER. These are the cases they say, that will be involved.
HON. ADAZA. I think we should kuwan that e.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER. Iyon talagang non-resident and then he goes there and file his certificate, You can, how can anybody stop him, di ba?
HON. ADAZA. No, let me cite to you cases, most people running for instance in the last Batasan, especially in the highly urbanized city, they were
residence in one particular city but actually running in the province. You see, how you can be bothered if you empower the Comelec with this
authority to cancel, there would have been many that would have been cancelled.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER. There were many who tried to beat the deadline.
HON. ADAZA. No, there are many who did not beat the deadline, I know.
HON. LOOD. The matter of point is the word Article 8, Article 8, provides full responsibility for ...
HON. ADAZA. Which one? That's right.
HON. LOOD. That's why it includes full ... (Unintelligible).
HON. ADAZA. No, it's very dangerous. We will be all in serious trouble. Besides, that covered already by specific provisions. So, can we agree.
Anyway it is this new provision which is dangerous.
HON CUENCO. So, you want the entire provision?
HON. LOOD. Unless we make exception.9
The Summary Nature of Proceedings
under Section 78 Only Allow the
COMELEC to Rule on Patent
Material Misrepresentation of Facts
on Residency and Citizenship, not of
Conclusions of Law, and especially,
not in the Absence of Established
Legal Doctrines on the Matter
The original intent of the legislature was clear: to make the denial of due course or cancellation of certificate of candidacy before the COMELEC a
summary proceeding that would not go into the intrinsic validity of the qualifications of the candidate, even to the point of making the power merely
ministerial in the absence of patent defects. There was concern among some other members about giving the COMELEC the power to deny due
course to or cancel outright the certificate of candidacy. As such, the proposal was to remove Section 78 entirely or to lay down specific parameters
in order to limit the power of the COMELEC under the provision. Thus, in interpreting the language of Section 78 as presently crafted, those
intended limitations must be kept in mind. This includes retaining the summary nature of Section 78 proceedings.
Reyes v. Commission on Elections 10 provides an insight into the summary nature of a Section 78 proceeding:
The special action before the COMELEC which was a Petition to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy was a SUMMARY PROCEEDING or one "heard
summarily." The nature of the proceedings is best indicated by the COMELEC Rule on Special Actions, Rule 23, Section 4 of which states that the
Commission may designate any of its officials who are members of the Philippine Bar to hear the case and to receive evidence. COMELEC Rule 17
further provides in Section 3 that when the proceedings are authorized to be summary, in lieu of oral testimonies, the parties may, after due notice,
be required to submit their position paper together with affidavits, counter-affidavits and other documentary evidence; ... and that "[t]his provision
shall likewise apply to cases where the hearing and reception of evidence are delegated by the Commission or the Division to any of its officials .... "
xxxx

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In fact, in summary proceedings like the special action of filing a petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy, oral testimony is
dispensed with and, instead, parties are required to submit their position paper together with affidavits, counter affidavits and other pieces of
documentary evidence.
The Summary nature of Section 78 proceeding implies the simplicity of subject-matter11 as it does away with long drawn and complicated trial-type
litigation. Considering its nature, the implication therefore, is that Section 78 cases contemplate simple issues only. Any issue that is complex would
entail the use of discretion, the exercise of which is reserved to the appropriate election tribunal. With greater reason then, claims of candidate on a
matter of opinion on unsettled questions of law, cannot be the basis for the denial of a CoC.
Section 78 Proceedings Cannot Take
the Place of a Quo Warranto
Proceeding or an Electoral Protest
The danger of the COMELEC effectively thwarting the voter's will was clearly articulated by Justice Vicente V. Mendoza in his separate opinion in
the case involving Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos.12 The Court voted to grant the Rule 64 Petition of Mrs. Marcos to invalidate the COMELEC's
Resolution denying her Amended CoC. Justice Mendoza wanted the Court to do so on the prior threshold issue of jurisdiction, i.e., that the
COMELEC did not have even the power to assume jurisdiction over the petition of Cirilo Montejo because it was in effect a petition for
disqualification. Thus, the COMELEC resolution was utterly void. Justice Mendoza explains Section 78 in relation to petitions for disqualification
under the Constitution and relevant laws. The allegations in the Montejo's petition were characterized, thus:
The petition filed by private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo in the COMELEC, while entitled "For Cancellation and Disqualification," contained no
allegation that private respondent Imelda Romualdez-Marcos made material representations in her certificate of candidacy which were false, it
sought her disqualification on the ground that "on the basis of her Voter Registration Record and Certificate of Candidacy, [she] is disqualified from
running for the position of Representative, considering that on election day, May 8, 1995, [she] would have resided less than ten (10) months in the
district where she is seeking to be elected." For its part, the COMELEC's Second Division, in its resolution of April 24, 1995, cancelled her certificate
of candidacy and corrected certificate of candidacy on the basis of its finding that petitioner is "not qualified to run for the position of Member of the
House of Representatives for the First Legislative District of Leyte" and not because of any finding that she had made false representations as to
material matters in her certificate of candidacy.
Montejo's petition before the COMELEC was therefore not a petition for cancellation of certificate of candidacy under 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code, but essentially a petition to declare private respondent ineligible. It is important to note this, because, as will presently be explained,
proceedings under 78 have for their purpose to disqualify a person from being a candidate, whereas quo warranto proceedings have for their
purpose to disqualify a person from holding public office. Jurisdiction over quo warranto proceedings involving members of the House of
Representatives is vested in the Electoral Tribunal of that body.13
Justice Mendoza opined that the COMELEC has no power to disqualify candidates on the ground of ineligibility, elaborating thus:
In my view the issue in this case is whether the Commission on Elections has the power to disqualify candidates on the ground that they lack
eligibility for the office to which they seek to be elected. I think that it has none and that the qualifications of candidates may be questioned only in
the event they are elected, by filing a petition for quo warranto or an election protest in the appropriate forum, not necessarily in the COMELEC but,
as in this case, in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. That the parties in this case took part in the proceedings in the COMELEC is of
no moment. Such proceedings were unauthorized and were not rendered valid by their agreement to submit their dispute to that body.
The various election laws will be searched in vain for authorized proceedings for determining a candidate's qualifications for an office before his
election. There are none in the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881 ), in the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 (R.A. No. 6646), or in the law
providing for synchronized elections (R.A. No. 7166). There are, in other words, no provisions for pre-proclamation contests but only election
protests or quo warranto proceedings against winning candidates.
To be sure, there are provisions denominated for "disqualification," but they are not concerned with a declaration of the ineligibility of a candidate.
These provisions are concerned with the incapacity (due to insanity, incompetence or conviction of an offense) of a person either to be a candidate
or to continue as a candidate for public office. There is also a provision for the denial or cancellation of certificates of candidacy, but it applies only to
cases involving false representations as to certain matters required by law to be stated in the certificates.14
He then proceeded to cite the three reasons explaining the absence of an authorized proceeding for determining before election the qualifications of
a candidate:
First is the fact that unless a candidate wins and is proclaimed elected, there is no necessity for determining his eligibility for the office. In contrast,
whether an individual should be disqualified as a candidate for acts constituting election offenses (e.g., vote buying, over spending, commission of
prohibited acts) is a prejudicial question which should be determined lest he wins because of the very acts for which his disqualification is being
sought. That is why it is provided that if the grounds for disqualification are established, a candidate will not be voted for; if he has been voted for,
the votes in his favor will not be counted; and if for some reason he has been voted for and he has won, either he will not be proclaimed or his
proclamation will be set aside.
Second is the fact that the determination of a candidate's eligibility, e.g., his citizenship or, as in this case, his domicile, may take a long time to
make, extending beyond the beginning of the term of the office. This is amply demonstrated in the companion case (G.R. No. 120265, Agapito A.
Aquino v. COMELEC) where the determination of Aquino's residence was still pending in the COMELEC even after the elections of May 8, 1995.
This is contrary to the summary character of proceedings relating to certificates of candidacy. That is why the law makes the receipt of certificates of
candidacy a ministerial duty of the COMELEC and its officers. The law is satisfied if candidates state in their certificates of candidacy that they are
eligible for the position which they seek to fill, leaving the determination of their qualifications to be made after the election and only in the event
they are elected. Only in cases involving charges of false representations made in certificates of candidacy is the COMELEC given jurisdiction.
Third is the policy underlying the prohibition against pre-proclamation cases in elections for President, Vice President, Senators and members of the
House of Representatives. (R.A. No. 7166, 15) The purpose is to preserve the prerogatives of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
and the other Tribunals as "sole judges" under the Constitution of the election, returns and qualifications of members of Congress or of the
President and Vice President, as the case may be.15
The legal differentiation between Section 78 vis-a-vis quo warranto proceedings and electoral protests made by Justice Mendoza in the Romualdez
Marcos case was completely adopted, and affirmed by a unanimous Court in Fermin v. COMELEC.16 Fermin v. COMELEC has been affirmed in
Munder v. Commission on Elections, 17 Agustin v. Commission on Elections18 Talaga v. Commission on Elections, 19 Mitra v. Commission on
Elections, 20 Hayundini v. Commission on Elections, 21 Aratea v. Commission on Elections 22 Gonzalez v.Commission on Elections 23 Jalosjos, Jr.
v. Commission on Elections, 24 Dela Cruz v. Commission on Elections, 25 and Maruhom v. COMELEC,26, thus the Mendoza formulation has
become settled doctrine.

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It is clear that what the minority herein is attempting to accomplish is to authorize the COMELEC to rule on the intrinsic qualifications of petitioner,
and henceforth, of every candidate - an outcome clearly prohibited by the Constitution and by the Omnibus Election Code. That this was also the
objective of the minority justices in Tecson v. COMELEC should warn us that the proposal of the minority herein will result in the direct reversal of
the said case.
In Tecson, the COMELEC contended it did not have the jurisdiction to rule on the qualification of Ronald Allan Kelley Poe. The COMELEC stated
that it could only rule that FPJ did not commit material misrepresentation in claiming that he was a natural-born Filipino citizen, there being
substantial basis to support his belief that he was the son of a Filipino. The Court upheld this conclusion of the COMELEC, and in the dispositive
conclusions portion of the Decision held:
(4) But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence
on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his
certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner has utterly failed to substantiate
his case before the Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties to present their position and evidence, and to prove whether or
not there has been material misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC, must not only be material, but also
deliberate and willful.
The Court made two important rulings on this particular point. First, that Mr. Fornier, the petitioner in the COMELEC case to deny Mr. Poe's CoC,
had the burden to prove that Mr. Poe committed material misrepresentation. Second, even assuming that the petitioner therein was able to make
out a prima facie case of material misrepresentation, the evidence on Mister Poe's side preponderated in favor of the conclusion that he did not
make any material misrepresentation. Thus, the COMELEC was correct in saying that there was no basis to grant Fornier's Section 78 petition. Mr.
Poe, We said, did not have to conclusively establish his natural-born citizenship; preponderance of evidence was sufficient to prove his right to be a
candidate for President.
It is absolutely offensive to Our concept of due process for the COMELEC to insist on its own interpretation of an area of the Constitution that this
Court has yet to squarely rule upon, such as the citizenship of a foundling. It was also most unfair of COMELEC to suddenly impose a previously
non-existing formal requirement on candidates-such as a permanent resident visa or citizenship itself-to begin the tolling of the required duration of
residency. Neither statutes nor jurisprudence require those matters. COMELEC grossly acted beyond its jurisdiction by usurping the powers of the
legislature and the judiciary.
Section 78 and Material Misrepresentation
It must be emphasized that all the decisions of the COMELEC where the Court upheld its denial of a CoC on the basis of an alleged
misrepresentation pertaining to citizenship and residency, were all denials on matters of fact that were either uncontroverted, or factual matters that
were proven to be false. None of them had to do with any question of law.
In the following cases, we upheld the COMELEC'S denial of the CoCs: Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC27, (Labo's statement that he was a natural-born
citizen was disproved on the ground that he failed to submit any evidence proving his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship); Abella v .
COMELEC28 (Abella, a candidate for governor of Leyte, and undisputedly a resident of Ormoc City, an independent component city, failed to
establish a new domicile in Kananga, Leyte ); Domino v. Commission on Elections, 29 (the lease contract over a residence in Sarangani Province
failed to produce the kind of permanency necessary to establish abandonment of one's original domicile); Caballero v. Commission on Elections, 30
(petitioner, who had effectively transferred his domicile of choice in Canada, failed to present competent evidence to prove that he was able to reestablish his residence in Uyugan); Jalosjos v. Commission on Elections, 31 (Svetlana Jalosjos, whose domicile of origin was San Juan, Metro
Manila, failed to acquire a domicile of choice in Baliangao, Misamis Occidental, prior to the May 2010 elections); Aquino v. Commission on
Elections, 32 (Aquino, whose domicile of origin was San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac, failed to established a new domicile in the Second District of
Makati City on the mere basis of a lease agreement of a condominium unit); Reyes v. Commission on Elections33 (where petitioner, who previously
admitted that she was a holder of a U.S. passport, failed to submit proof that she reacquired her Filipino citizenship under RA 9225 or that she
maintained her domicile of origin in Boac, Marinduque ); Dumpit-Michelena v. Boado34 (candidate Dumpit-Michelena was not a resident of Agoo, La
Union - voter's registration at Naguilian, La Union and joint affidavit of all barangay officials of San Julian West, Agoo taken as proof that she was
not a resident of the barangay); Hayudini v. Commission on Elections35 (candidate Hayudini was not a resident of South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi - based
on a final RTC Decision ordering the deletion of Hayudini's name in Barangay Bintawlan's permanent list of voters); Velasco v. Commission on
Elections36 (court ruling that he was not a registered voter of Sasmuan, Pampanga); Bautista v. Commission on Elections37 (admission that he
was not a registered voter of Lumbangan, Nasugbu, Batangas where he was running as punong barangay); Ugdoracion, Jr. v. Commission on
Elections38 (admission that he was at the time of the filing of the CoC still a holder of a then valid green card); and Jalosjos v. Commission on
Elections39 (temporary and intermittent stay in a stranger's house does not amount to residence).
In fact, in the only case of material misrepresentation on citizenship where the Supreme Court agreed to a Section 78 denial by the COMELEC, was
in the case of Mr. Ramon L. Labo, Jr. of Baguio City40 who had previously been declared by the Supreme Court itself as not a Filipino citizen.41 In
the Labo case, there was a prior binding conclusion of law that justified the action of the COMELEC in denying the CoC.1wphi1 It is important to
emphasize this considering the dangers of an overly broad reading of the COMELEC's power under Section 78.
A candidate commences the process of being voted into office by filing a certificate of candidacy (CoC). A candidate states in his CoC, among
others, that he is eligible to run for public office, as provided under Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code. Thus:
Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. - The certificate of candidacy shall state that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the
office stated therein and that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component cities,
highly urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence;
his post office address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and
will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities;
that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental
reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge.
As used in Section 74, the word "eligible" means having the right to run for elective public office; that is, having all the qualifications and none of the
ineligibilities.42 The remedy to remove from the electoral ballot, the names of candidates who are not actually eligible, but who still state under oath
in their CoCs that they are eligible to run for public office, is for any person to file a petition under Section 78, which provides:
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. - A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate
of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74
hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall
be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election. (Emphasis supplied)
How Legally Significant is the Intent
to Deceive for a Section 78 OEC

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Petition to Prosper?
It was proposed by Justice Dante O. Tinga in his Dissenting Opinion in Tecson v. COMELEC that the intent to deceive was never contemplated as
an essential element to prove a Section 78 petition.43 The problem with this opinion is that it remains a proposed reversal of a doctrine that remains
firmly entrenched in our jurisprudence. In a long line of cases, starting with Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC44 in 1995, this Court has invariably
held that intent to deceive the electorate is an essential element for a Section 78 petition to prosper.
In Romualdez-Marcos, the Court ruled that it is the fact of the qualification, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy, which ought to be decisive
in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the constitution's qualification requirements. The statement in the certificate of candidacy
becomes material only when there is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a
candidate ineligible.45
This ruling was adopted by the Court in a long line of cases, in which it was ruled that aside from the requirement of materiality, a petition under
Section 78 must also show that there was malicious intent to deceive the electorate as to the candidate's qualifications for public office.
In Salcedo II v. COMELEC, 46 the Court affirmed the decision of the COMELEC denying the petition to cancel the CoC filed by Ermelita Cacao
Salcedo, a candidate for mayor of Sara, Iloilo. Apart from finding that the use of the surname "Salcedo" was not a material qualification covered by
Section 78, the Court also declared that there was no intention on the part of the candidate to mislead or deceive the public as to her identity. We
concluded that, in fact, there was no showing that the voters of the municipality were deceived by Salcedo's use of such surname; consequently, the
COMELEC correctly refused to cancel her CoC.
On the other hand, in Velasco v. COMELEC,47 We upheld the cancellation of the CoC filed by Nardo Velasco because he made a material
misrepresentation as to his registration as a voter. In Our discussion, We emphasized that Velasco knew that his registration as a voter had already
been denied by the RTC, but he still stated under oath in his CoC that he was a voter of Sasmuan.48 This was considered sufficient basis for the
COMELEC to grant the Section 78 petition.49
In Justimbaste v. Commission on Elections, 50 this Court sustained the COMELEC's dismissal of the petition of cancellation filed against Rustico B.
Balderian because there was no showing that he had the intent to deceive the voting public as to his identity when he used his Filipino name,
instead of his Chinese name, in his CoC.
On the other hand, in Maruhom v. COMELEC, 51 We upheld the cancellation of the CoC of Jamela Salic Maruhom because she had subsisting
voter registrations in both the municipalities of Marawi and Marantao in Lanao del Sur. We emphasized that Maruhom deliberately attempted to
conceal this fact from the electorate as it would have rendered her ineligible to run as mayor of Marantao.
The element of intent was again required by this Court in Mitra v COMELEC. 52 In that case, We reversed the ruling of the COMELEC, which
cancelled the CoC filed by Abraham Kahlil B. Mitra because the commission "failed to critically consider whether Mitra deliberately attempted to
mislead, misinform or hide a fact that would otherwise render him ineligible for the position of Governor of Palawan." Upon an examination of the
evidence in that case, We concluded that there was no basis for the COMELEC's conclusion that Mitra deliberately attempted to mislead the
Palawan electorate.
The presence of intent to deceive the electorate was also a controlling factor in the decision of the Court in Panlaqui v. COMELEC. 53 We ruled that
the decision of the Regional Trial Court to exclude Nardo Velasco as a voter did not result in the cancellation of his CoC for mayor of Sasmuan,
Pampanga. Said this Court:
It is not within the province of the RTC in a voter's inclusion/exclusion proceedings to take cognizance of and determine the presence of a false
representation of a material fact. It has no jurisdiction to try the issues of whether the misrepresentation relates to material fact and whether there
was an intention to deceive the electorate in terms of one's qualifications for public office. The finding that Velasco was not qualified to vote due to
lack of residency requirement does not translate into a finding of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise
render him ineligible.
In Gonzales v COMELEC, 54 the Court distinguished between a petition for cancellation under Section 78 and a petition for cancellation under
Section 68 of the OEC, in order to determine whether the petition filed against Ramon Gonzales was filed on time. We declared that a Section 78
petition must pertain to a false representation on a material matter that is made with the deliberate intent to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which
would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. Upon finding these elements in the petition filed against Fernando V. Gonzales, We ruled that the
applicable period for filing the petition is that prescribed under Section 78 i.e. within twenty-five days from the filing of the COC. Since the petition
was filed beyond this period, this Court declared that the COMELEC erred in giving due course to the same.
The requirement of intent was likewise reiterated in Tecson v. COMELEC, 55 Ugdoracion, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, 56 Fermin v. Commission
on Elections, 57 Aratea v. Commission on Elections58 and Talaga v. Commission on Elections. 59
It has been claimed, however, that this Court in Tagolino v. HRET, 60 abandoned this requisite when it stated that "deliberateness of the
misrepresentation, much less one's intent to defraud, is of bare significance in a Section 78 petition as it is enough that the person's declaration of a
material qualification in the [certificate of candidacy] be false." In that case, the Court, using Miranda v. Abaya61 as basis, stated that:
In this relation, jurisprudence holds that an express finding that the person committed any deliberate misrepresentation is of little consequence in
the determination of whether one's CoC should be deemed cancelled or not. What remains material is that the petition essentially seeks to deny
due course to and/or cancel the CoC on the basis of one's ineligibility and that the same be granted without any qualification.62
It is important to note that the statement regarding intent to deceive was only an obiter dictum. The primary issue in both Tagolino and Miranda is
whether a candidate whose certificate of candidacy had been denied due course or cancelled may be validly substituted in the electoral process. In
other words, the cases dealt with the effect of the denial of due course or cancellation of a certificate of candidacy, and not on the validity or
soundness of the denial or cancellation itself.
Furthermore, in Miranda, We clarified the COMELEC's use of the word "disqualified" when granting a petition that prays for the denial of due course
or cancellation of a certificate of candidacy. This Court said:
From a plain reading of the dispositive portion of the Comelec resolution of May 5, 1998 in SPA No. 98-019, it is sufficiently clear that the prayer
specifically and particularly sought in the petition was GRANTED, there being no qualification on the matter whatsoever. The disqualification was
simply ruled over and above the granting of the specific prayer for denial of due course and cancellation of the certificate of candidacy.63
Clearly, the phrase "no qualification" in Miranda, which was essentially echoed in Tagolino, referred to the ruling of the COMELEC to grant the
petition to deny due course to or cancel the certificate of candidacy. It did not refer to the false representation made by the candidate in his
certificate of candidacy.

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At any rate, after Tagolino, We reiterated the requirement of deceit for a Section 78 petition to prosper in four more cases.64 Our most recent
pronouncements in Jalover v. Osmena, 65 reiterated that a petition under Section 78 cannot prosper in a situation where the intent to deceive or
defraud is patently absent, or where no deception of the electorate results. Furthermore, the misrepresentation cannot be the result of a mere
innocuous mistake, but must pertain to a material fact.
Said Justice Arturo D. Brion in the 2014 unanimous Jalover v. Osmena decision:
Separate from the requirement of materiality, a false representation under Section 78 must consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or
hide a fact, which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible." (citing Ugdoracion, Jr. v. Commission on Elections) In other words, it must be
made with the intention to deceive the electorate as to the would-be candidate's qualifications for public office. In Mitra v. COMELEC, we held that
the misrepresentation that Section 78 addresses cannot be the result of a mere innocuous mistake, and cannot exist in a situation where the intent
to deceive is patently absent, or where no deception of the electorate results. The deliberate character of the misrepresentation necessarily follows
from a consideration of the consequences of any material falsity: a candidate who falsifies a material fact cannot run.
Thus, a petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy according to the prevailing decisions of this Court still requires the
following essential allegations: (1) the candidate made a representation in the certificate; (2) the representation pertains to a material matter which
would affect the substantive rights of the candidate (the right to run for the election); and (3) the candidate made the false representation with the
intention to deceive the electorate as to his qualification for public office or deliberately attempted to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would
otherwise render him ineligible.66
Romualdez- Marcos v. COMELEC is again worth recalling.67 We ruled therein that it is the fact of the disqualification, not a statement in a certificate
of candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the constitution's qualification requirements. The
statement in the certificate of candidacy becomes material only when there is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform or hide a
fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible.68
In Mitra v. COMELEC,69 We gave importance to the character of a representation made by a candidate in the certificate of candidacy. This Court
found grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC when it failed to take into account whether there had been a deliberate
misrepresentation in Mitra's certificate of candidacy.70 The COMELEC cannot simply assume that an error in the certificate of candidacy was
necessarily a deliberate falsity in a material representation.71
It must be emphasized that under Section 78, it is not enough that a person lacks the relevant qualification; he must have also made a false
representation of the lack of qualification in the certificate of candidacy.72 The denial of due course to, or the cancellation of the certificate of
candidacy, is not based on the lack of qualifications but on a finding that the candidate made a material representation that is false, which relates to
the qualifications required of the public office the candidate is running for.73
Considering that intent to deceive is a material element for a successful petition under Section 78, a claim of good faith is a valid defense.
Misrepresentation means the act of making a false or misleading assertion about something, usually with the intent to deceive.74 It is not just
written or spoken words, but also any other conduct that amounts to a false assertion.75 A material misrepresentation is a false statement to which
a reasonable person would attach importance in deciding how to act in the transaction in question or to which the maker knows or has reason to
know that the recipient attaches some importance.76
In the sphere of election laws, a material misrepresentation pertains to a candidate's act with the intention to gain an advantage by deceitfully
claiming possession of all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications when the contrary is true.
A material misrepresentation is incompatible with a claim of good faith. Good faith encompasses, among other things, an honest belief, the absence
of malice and the absence of a design to defraud or to seek an unconscionable advantage.77 It implies honesty of intention and honest belief in the
validity of one's right, ignorance of a contrary claim, and absence of intention to deceive another.78
Burden of Proof in Section 78 Proceedings
Section 1, Rule 131 of the Revised Rules on Evidence defines burden of proof as "the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue
necessary to establish his claim" "by the amount of evidence required by law." When it comes to a Section 78 proceeding, it is the petitioner who
has the burden of establishing material misrepresentation in a CoC.79
Since the COMELEC is a quasi-judicial body, the petitioner must establish his case of material misrepresentation by substantial evidence.80
Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.
Burden of proof never shifts.81 It is the burden of evidence that shifts.82 Hence, in a Section 78 proceeding, if the petitioner comes up with a prima
facie case of material misrepresentation, the burden of evidence shifts to the respondent.
In this case, respondents had the burden to establish the following: (1) falsity of the representations made by petitioner with regard to her citizenship
and residence; and (2) intent to deceive or mislead the electorate.
On residence
As will be further discussed below, respondents mainly relied on the representation that petitioner previously made in her 2012 CoC for the position
of Senator to establish the requirements of falsity and intent to deceive. Petitioner, however, has shown by an abundance of substantial evidence
that her residence in the Philippines commenced on 24 May 2005 and that the statement she made in the 2012 CoC was due to honest mistake.
But respondents failed to meet head on this evidence. Hence, they failed to discharge their burden of proving material misrepresentation with
respect to residency.
Furthermore, the COMELEC unreasonably shifted the burden of proof to petitioner, declaring that she had the burden to show that she possessed
the qualifications to run for President. As previously discussed, respondents had the burden to establish the key elements for a Section 78 petition
to prosper.
On citizenship
With respect to the issue of citizenship, respondents leaned heavily on petitioner's admission that she was a foundling. Nevertheless, this did not
establish the falsity of petitioner's claim that she was a natural-born citizen. Presumptions operated profoundly in her favor to the effect that a
foundling is a natural-born citizen. Further, she had a right to rely on these legal presumptions, thus negating the notion of deception on her part.
Thus, respondents failed to discharge their burden of proving material misrepresentation with respect to residency.

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Yet, the COMELEC unfairly placed the burden of proof on petitioner when, for reasons already discussed, the onus properly fell on respondents.
This point will be more comprehensively discussed below.
III.
The COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it cancelled petitioner's 2016 Certificate of Candidacy in the absence of any material
misrepresentation on residency or citizenship.
In my view, the fact that the COMELEC went beyond an examination of the patent falsity of the representations in the CoC is enough to
demonstrate its grave abuse of discretion. I maintain that a Section 78 proceeding must deal solely with "patent defects in the certificates" and not
the question of eligibility or ineligibility. The commission clearly exceeded the limited authority granted to it under Section 78 of the OEC when it
determined petitioner's intrinsic qualifications, not on the basis of any uncontroverted fact, but on questions of law.
With this conclusion, the Court already has sufficient justification to reverse and set aside the assailed COMELEC Resolutions. Consequently, I
believe that it is no longer necessary for us to decide questions pertaining to petitioner's qualifications.
However, given the factual milieu of this case and its significance to the upcoming electoral exercise, I am likewise mindful of the duty of the Court
to allay the doubts created by the COMELEC ruling in the minds of the voting public. Furthermore, the dissents have already gone to the intrinsic
qualification of petitioner as to cast doubt on her viability as a candidate. These positions must be squarely addressed; hence this extended opinion
is inevitable.
Grave Abuse of Discretion
In Mitra v. COMELEC,83 this Court held that COMELEC's use of wrong or irrelevant considerations in the resolution of an issue constitutes grave
abuse of discretion:
As a concept, "grave abuse of discretion" defies exact definition; generally, it refers to "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent
to lack of jurisdiction;" the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform
a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion and hostility. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough; it must be grave. We have held, too, that the use of wrong or irrelevant considerations
in deciding an issue is sufficient to taint a decision-maker's action with grave abuse of discretion.
Closely related with the limited focus of the present petition is the condition, under Section 5, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, that findings of fact of
the COMELEC, supported by substantial evidence, shall be final and non-reviewable. Substantial evidence is that degree of evidence that a
reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion.
In light of our limited authority to review findings of fact, we do not ordinarily review in a certiorari case the COMELEC's appreciation and evaluation
of evidence. Any misstep by the COMELEC in this regard generally involves an error of judgment, not of jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied)
For reasons discussed below, I find that the COMELEC committed a grossly unreasonable appreciation of both the evidence presented by
petitioner to prove her residency, as well the legal standards applicable to her as a foundling. For purposes of clarity, I will discuss residency and
citizenship separately.
In Sabili, 84 we noted that the Court does not ordinarily review the COMELEC's appreciation and evaluation of evidence. However, when the
appreciation and evaluation of evidence is so grossly unreasonable as to turn into an error of jurisdiction, the Court is duty-bound to intervene. In
that case, petitioner was able to show that the COMELEC relied on wrong or irrelevant considerations - like property ownership in another
municipality - in deciding the issue of whether petitioner made a material misrepresentation regarding his residence.
IV.
A. ON RESIDENCY
The COMELEC made two findings as far as petitioner's compliance with the 10-year residency requirement is concerned. First, petitioner committed
a false material representation regarding her residency in her 2016 CoC for President, as shown by her declaration in her 2013 CoC for senator.
Second, petitioner's alien citizenship at the time she allegedly abandoned her domicile in the US was a legal impediment which prevented her from
re-establishing her domicile in the Philippines, considering her failure to obtain an authorization from the Bureau of Immigration as permanent
resident in the country early enough to start the count of the 10-year residency requirement.
These conclusions reveal the failure of the COMELEC to properly appreciate and evaluate evidence, so much so that it overstepped the limits of its
discretion to the point of being grossly unreasonable.
There was no deliberate intent on the
part of petitioner to make a material
misrepresentation as to her residency.
In the assailed Resolutions, the COMELEC had concluded that petitioner committed a false material representation about her residency in her 2016
CoC for president on the basis of her declaration in her 2013 CoC for senator. According to the Commission, this 2012 declaration showed a
deliberate intent to mislead the electorate and the public at large.
Public respondent's conclusions are unjustified. In the first place, the COMELEC misapplied the concepts of admissions and honest mistake in
weighing the evidence presented by petitioner. As will be discussed below, declarations against interest are not conclusive evidence and must still
be evaluated to determine their probative value. Neither does the declaration in her 2013 CoC foreclose the presentation of evidence of petitioner's
good faith and honest belief that she has complied with the 10-year residency requirement for presidential candidates.
Admissions against Interest
Admissions against interest are governed by Section 26, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Sec. 26. Admissions of a party. - The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him.
It is well to emphasize that admissions against interest fall under the rules of admissibility.85 Admissions against interest pass the test of relevance
and competence. They, however, do not guarantee their own probative value and conclusiveness. Like all evidence, they must be weighed and
calibrated by the court against all other pieces at hand. Also, a party against whom an admission against interest is offered may properly refute such
declaration by adducing contrary evidence.86

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To be admissible, an admission must (1) involve matters of fact, and not of law; (2) be categorical and definite; (3) be knowingly and voluntarily
made; and (4) be adverse to the admitter' s interests, otherwise it would be self-serving and inadmissible.87 An admission against interest must
consist of a categorical statement or document pertaining to a matter of fact. If the statement or document pertains to a conclusion of law or
necessitates prior settlement of questions of law, it cannot be regarded as an admission against interest.88
Even a judicial admission, which does not require proof, for judicial admissions under Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court89 But even then,
contrary evidence may be admitted to show that the admission was made through palpable mistake. In Bitong v. CA,90 the Court ruled that
although acts or facts admitted in a pleading do not require proof and can no longer be contradicted, evidence aliunde can be presented to show
that the admission was made through palpable mistake. Said the Court:
A party whose pleading is admitted as an admission against interest is entitled to overcome by evidence the apparent inconsistency, and it is
competent for the party against whom the pleading is offered to show that the statements were inadvertently made or were made under a mistake
of fact. In addition, a party against whom a single clause or paragraph of a pleading is offered may have the right to introduce other paragraphs
which tend to destroy the admission in the paragraph offered by the adversary.
Every alleged admission is taken as an entirety of the fact which makes for the one side with the qualifications which limit, modify or destroy its
effect on the other side. The reason for this is, where part of a statement of a party is used against him as an admission, the court should weigh any
other portion connected with the statement, which tends to neutralize or explain the portion which is against interest.
In other words, while the admission is admissible in evidence, its probative value is to be determined from the whole statement and others intimately
related or connected therewith as an integrated unit.91
COMELEC Conclusions on Admission
against Interest
In the Resolution dated 1 December 2015 of the Second Division in SPA No. 15-001 (Elamparo v. Llamanzares), the COMELEC ruled as follows:
Respondent ran for Senator in the May 13, 2013 Senatorial Elections. In her COC for Senator, she answered "6 years and 6 months" in the space
provided for the candidate's period of residence in the Philippines. Based on her own declaration, respondent admitted under oath that she has
been a resident of the country only since November 2006.
Undeniably, this falls short by 6 months of the required May 2006 commencement of the residence in the Philippines in order for respondent to
qualify as a candidate for President of the Philippines in the May 9, 2016 elections. If we reckon her period of residency from November 2006, as
she herself declared, she will be a resident of the Philippines by May 9, 2016 only for a period of 9 years and 6 months.
As correctly pointed out by petitioner, this sworn statement by respondent is an admission against her interest.
Section 26, Rule 130, Rules of Court (which is of suppletory application) expressly states:
Section 26. Admission of a party. - The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him.
The rationale for the rule was explained by the Supreme Court in Manila Electric Company v. Heirs of Spouses Dionisio Deloy:
Being an admission against interest, the documents are the best evidence which affords the greatest certainty of the facts in dispute. The rationale
for the rule is based on the presumption that no man would declare anything against himself UNLESS SUCH DECLARATION WAS TRUE. Thus, it
is fair to presume that the declaration corresponds to the truth, and it is his fault if it does not.
Respondent's representation in her COC for Senator that she had been a resident of the Philippines for a period of 6 years and 6 months by May
2013 is an admission that is binding on her. After all, she should not have declared it under oath if such declaration was not true.
Respondent's convenient defense that she committed an honest mistake on a difficult question of law, when she stated in her COC for Senator that
her period of residence in the Philippines before May 13, 2013 was 6 years and 6 months, is at best self-serving. It cannot overturn the weight given
to the admission against interest voluntarily made by respondent.
Assuming arguendo that as now belatedly claimed the same was due to an honest mistake, no evidence has been shown that there was an attempt
to rectify the so-called honest mistake. The attempt to correct it in her present COC filed only on October 15, 2015 cannot serve to outweigh the
probative weight that has to be accorded to the admission against interest in her 2013 COC for Senator.
Certainly, it is beyond question that her declaration in her 2013 COC for Senator, under oath at that, that she has been a resident of the Philippines
since November 2006 still stands in the record of this Commission as an official document, which may be given in evidence against her, and the
probative weight and binding effect of which is neither obliterated by the passing of time nor by the belated attempt to correct it in her present COC
for President of the Philippines. Respondent cannot now declare an earlier period of residence. Respondent is already stopped from doing so. If
allowed to repudiate at this late stage her prior sworn declaration, We will be opening the floodgates for candidates to commit material
misrepresentations in their COCs and escape responsibility for the same through the mere expedient of conveniently changing their story in a
subsequent COC. Worse, We will be allowing a candidate to run for President when the COC for Senator earlier submitted to the Commission
contains a material fact or data barring her from running for the position she now seeks to be elected to. Surely, to rule otherwise would be to
tolerate a cavalier attitude to the requirement of putting in the correct data in a COC. In fact, the COC filer, in that same COC, certifies under oath
that the data given are indeed "true and correct".
As shown by the . above-cited Resolution, the COMELEC Second Division regarded the declaration of petitioner in her 2013 certificate of candidacy
for senator - that she had been a resident of the Philippines only since November 2006 - as a binding and conclusive statement that she can no
longer refute. It appeared to confuse admissions against interest with judicial admissions.
However, in the Resolution dated 23 December 2015 of the En Banc, COMELEC conceded that such statement may indeed be overcome by
petitioner through the presentation of competent evidence of greater weight. According to the COMELEC En Banc:
On the allegation that the Second Division chose to rely solely on the declarations of respondent in her 2013 COC: we are not persuaded. Again,
the Second Division was not constrained to mention every bit of evidence it considered in arriving at the assailed Resolution. Concededly, however,
it did put ample attention on Respondent's 2013 COC, but not without good reason.
To recall, Respondent, in her 2013 COC for Senator, indicated, under oath, that her period of residence in the Philippines from May 13, 2013 is "6
years and 6 months." Following this, she became a resident on November 2006. This is entirely inconsistent with her declaration in the present

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2016 COC for president that immediately before the May 9, 2016 elections, she will be a resident of the country for "10 years and 11 months,"
following which she was a resident since May, 2005. -The Second Division struck respondent's arguments mainly on the basis of this contradiction.
Respondent cannot fault the Second Division for using her statements in the 2013 COC against her. Indeed, the Second Division correctly found
that this is an admission against her interest. Being such, it is "the best evidence which affords the greatest certainty of the facts in dispute. The
rationale for the rule is based on the presumption that no man would declare anything against himself unless such declaration was true. Thus, it is
fair to presume that the declaration corresponds with the truth, and it is his fault if it does not."
Moreover, a COC, being a notarial document, has in its favor the presumption of regularity. To contradict the facts stated therein, there must be
evidence that is clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant. In order for a declarant to impugn a notarial document which he himself
executed, it is not enough for him to merely execute a subsequent notarial document. After executing an affidavit voluntarily wherein admissions
and declarations against the affiant's own interest are made under the solemnity of an oath, the affiant cannot just be allowed to spurn them and
undo what he has done.
Yes, the statement in the 2013 COC, albeit an admission against interest, may later be impugned by respondent. However, she cannot do this by
the mere expedient of filing her 2016 COC and claiming that the declarations in the previous one were "honest mistakes". The burden is upon her to
show, by clear, convincing and more than preponderant evidence, that, indeed, it is the latter COC that is correct and that the statements made in
the 2013 COC were done without bad faith. Unfortunately for respondent, she failed to discharge this heavy burden.
As shown by the foregoing, the COMELEC en banc had a proper understanding of an admission against interest - that it is one piece of evidence
that should be evaluated against all other pieces presented before it.
The COMELEC was wrong, however, in ruling that petitioner attempted to overcome the alleged admission against interest merely by filing her 2016
CoC for president. Petitioner submitted severed various many and varied pieces of evidence to prove her declaration in her 2016 certificate of
candidacy for president that as of May 2005, she had definitely abandoned her residence in the US and intended to reside permanently in the
Philippines. They are the following:
1. Petitioner's US passport showing that she returned to the Philippines on 24 May 2005 and from then would always return to the Philippines after
every trip to a foreign country.
2. Email exchanges showing that as early as March 2005, petitioner had begun the process of relocating and reestablishing her residence in the
Philippines and had all of the family's valuable movable properties packed and stored for shipping to the Philippines.
3. School records of petitioner's school-aged children showing that they began attending Philippine schools starting June 2005.
4. Identification card issued by the BIR to petitioner on 22 July 2005.
5. Condominium Certificate of Title covering a unit with parking slot acquired in the second half of 2005 which petitioner's family used as residence
pending the completion of their intended permanent family home.
6. Receipts dated 23 February 2006 showing that petitioner had supervised the packing and disposal of some of the family's household belongings.
7. Confirmation of receipt of the request for change of address sent by the US Postal Service on 28 March 2006;
8. Final settlement of the selling of the family home in the US as of 27 April 2006.
9. Transfer Certificate of Title dated 1 June 2006 showing the acquisition of a vacant lot where the family built their family home.
10. Questionnaire issued by the US Department of State - Bureau of Consular Affairs regarding the possible loss of US citizenship, in which
petitioner answered that she had been a resident of the Philippines since May 2005.
11. Affidavits of petitioner's mother and husband attesting to the decision of the family to move to the Philippines in early 2005 shortly after the death
of petitioner's father.
Unfortunately, the COMELEC En Banc found that these pieces of evidence failed to overcome the probative weight of the alleged admission against
interest. According to the COMELEC, the discrepancy between petitioner's 2013 and 2016 certificates of candidacy only goes to show that she suits
her declarations regarding her period of residency in the Philippines when it would be to her advantage. Hence, her deliberate attempt to mislead,
misinform, or hide the fact of her ineligibility insofar as residency is concerned.
The statement that she would be a resident of the Philippines for six years and six months as of May 2013 (reckoned from November 2006) in her
2013 certificate of candidacy was admittedly made under oath. However, while notarized documents fall under the category of public documents,92
they are not deemed prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.93 Section 23, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 23. Public documents as evidence. - Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer
are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. All other public documents are evidence, even against a third person, of the fact which gave rise
to their execution and of the date of the latter.
Clearly, notarized documents are merely proof of the fact which gave rise to their execution and of the date stated therein.94 They require no further
proof to be admissible, because the certificate of acknowledgement serves as the prima facie evidence of its execution.95
Thus while petitioner's 2013 certificate of candidacy may be presented as proof of its regularity and due execution, it is not prima facie evidence of
the facts stated therein, i.e. the declaration that she essentially became a resident of the Philippines only in November 2006. Furthermore, while a
notarized document carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution and regularity, even such presumption is not
absolute as it may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.96
Thus, where the document or its contents are in question, the person who executed the same may submit contrary evidence to establish the truth of
the matter. In this case, petitioner submitted the above-cited pieces of evidence to prove that her 2016 certificate of candidacy declared the truth
about her residence in the Philippines, and that her declaration in her 2013 certificate of candidacy was the result of an honest mistake.
Honest Mistake
The COMELEC gave scant consideration to petitioner's assertion that she made an honest mistake in her 2013 certificate of candidacy for senator.
The Commission hypothesized that if petitioner truly believed that the period of residency would be counted backwards from the day of filing the

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CoC for Senator in October 2012, she should always reckon her residency from April 2006. The COMELEC observed that the period of residency
indicated in the 2015 CoC for President was reckoned from May 2005. The COMELEC took the alleged unexplained inconsistency as a badge of
intent to deceive the electorate.
To a malicious mind, the assertions of petitioner are nothing but sinister. Considering the contradicting and inconsistent dates alleged before the
COMELEC, an indiscriminate observer may be tempted to think the worst and disbelieve a claim to the common experience of human mistake.
United States v. Ah Chong, 97 has taught generations of lawyers that the question as to whether one honestly, in good faith, and without fault or
negligence fell into the mistake, is to be determined by the circumstances as they appeared to him at the time when the mistake was made, and the
effect which the surrounding circumstances might reasonably be expected to have on his mind, in forming the intent upon which he acted.
In the petitions before us, petitioner explained her mistake in the following manner:
5.268. [Petitioner] committed an honest mistake when she stated in her COC for Senator that her "PERIOD OF RESIDENCE BEFORE MAY 13,
2013" is "6" years and "6" months.
5.268.1. Only a two-year period of residence in the Philippines is required to qualify as a member of the Senate of the Republic of the Philippines.
[Petitioner] sincerely had no doubt that she had satisfied this residence requirement. She even accomplished her COC for Senator without the
assistance of a lawyer. x x x
5.268.2. It is no wonder that [petitioner] did not know that the use of the phrase "Period of Residence in the Philippines before May 13, 2013" in her
COC for Senator, actually referred to the period immediately preceding 13 May 2013, or to her period of residence on the day right before the 13
May 2013 elections. [Petitioner] therefore interpreted this phrase to mean her period of residence in the Philippines as of the submission of COCs in
October 2012 (which is technically also a period "before May 13, 2013").
5.268.3. In terms of abandoning her domicile in the U.S.A. and permanently relocating to the Philippines, nothing significant happened in
"November 2006." Moreover, private respondent was not able to present any evidence which would show that [petitioner] returned to the Philippines
with the intention to reside here permanently only in November 2006. Thus, there would have been no logical reason for [petitioner] to reckon the
start of her residence in the Philippines from this month. Even the COMELEC considered a date other than November 2006 as the reckoning point
of [petitioner's] residence (i.e., August 2006). This date is, of course, not the day [petitioner] established her domicile in the Philippines.
Nonetheless, that even the COMELEC had another date in mind bolsters the fact that [petitioner]'s representation in her COC for Senator regarding
her period of residence was based on her honest misunderstanding of what was asked of her in Item No. 7 of her COC for Senator, and that she
indeed counted backward from October 2012 (instead of from 13 May 2013).
xxxx
When [petitioner] accomplished her COC for Senator, she reckoned her residence in the Philippines from March-April 2006, which is when (to her
recollection at the time she signed this COC) she and her family had substantially wound up their affairs in the U.S.A. in connection with their
relocation to the Philippines. Specifically, March 2006 was when [petitioner] arrived in the Philippines after her last lengthy stay in the U.S.A., and
April 2006 was when she and her husband were finally able to sell their house in the U.S.A. The month of April 2006 is also when [petitioner's]
husband had resigned from his job in the U.S.A. The period between March-April 2006 to September 2012 is around six (6) years and six (6)
months. Therefore, this is the period [petitioner] indicated (albeit, mistakenly) in her COC for Senator as her "Period of Residence in the Philippines
before May 13, 2013."
5.268.7. This erroneous understanding of the commencement of her residence in the Philippines, together with the confusing question in Item No. 7
of her COC for Senator, explains why [petitioner] mistakenly indicated in that COC that her "Period of Residence in the Philippines before May 13,
2013" would be "6" years and "6" months.
5.268.8. [Petitioner] was later advised (only last year, 2015) by legal counsel that the concept of "residence," for purposes of election law, takes into
account the period when she was physically present in the Philippines starting from 24 May 2005, (after having already abandoned her residence in
the U.S.A., coupled with the intent to reside in the Philippines) and not just the period after her U.S.A. residence was sold and when her family was
already complete in the country, after her husband's return. [Petitioner]'s period of residence in her COC for Senator should, therefore, have been
counted.from 24 May 2005, and extended all the way "up to the day before" the 13 May 2013 elections. [Petitioner] realized only last year, 2015,
that she should have stated "7" years and "11" months (instead of "6" years and "6" months) as her period of residence in her COC for Senator.98
(Emphases supplied)
To an open mind, the foregoing explanation proffered by petitioner does not appear to be concocted, implausible, or the product of mere
afterthought. The circumstances as they appeared to her at the time she accomplished her 2013 certificate of candidacy for senator, without the
assistance of counsel, may indeed reasonably cause her to fill up the residency item with the answer "6 years and 6 months." It does not
necessarily mean, however, that she had not been residing in the Philippines on a permanent basis for a period longer than that.
The fact that it was the first time that petitioner ran for public office; that only a two-year period of residence in the country is required for those
running as senator; and that the item in the certificate of candidacy providing "Period of Residence in the Philippines before May 13, 2013" could be
open to an interpretation different from that required, should have been taken into consideration in appreciating whether petitioner made the subject
entry honestly, in good faith, and without fault or negligence.
The surrounding circumstances in this case do not exclude the possibility that petitioner made an honest mistake, both in reckoning her period of
residence in the Philippines as well as determining the proper end period of such residence at the time. That petitioner is running for the highest
public office in the country should not be the only standard by which we weigh her actions and ultimately her mistakes. Not all mistakes are made
with evil motives, in much the same way that not all good deeds are done with pure intentions. Good faith is always presumed, and in the face of
tangible evidence presented to prove the truth of the matter, which is independent of the circumstances that caused petitioner to make that fateful
statement of "6 years and 6 months," it would be difficult to dismiss her contention that such is the result of an honest mistake.
To reiterate, the COMELEC incorrectly applied the rule on admissions in order to conclude that petitioner deliberately misrepresented her
qualifications-notwithstanding a reasonable explanation as to her honest mistake, and despite the numerous pieces of evidence submitted to prove
her claims.
If petitioner honestly believed that she can reckon her residency in the Philippines from May 2005 because she had already relocated to the country
with the intent to reside here permanently, then her statement in her 2016 certificate of candidacy for president cannot be deemed to have been
made with intent to deceive the voting public. The COMELEC has clearly failed to prove the element of deliberate intent to deceive, which is
necessary to cancel certificates of candidacy under Section 78.

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In any case, the single declaration of petitioner in her 2013 certificate of candidacy for senator cannot be deemed to overthrow the entirety of
evidence showing that her residence in the Philippines commenced in May 2005.
Petitioner was able to prove the fact of
the reestablishment of her domicile in
the Philippines since May 2005.
Section 2, Article VII of the Constitution requires that a candidate for president be "a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately
preceding such election." The term residence, as it is used in the 1987 Constitution and previous Constitutions, has been understood to be
synonymous with domicile.99 Domicile means not only the intention to reside in one place, but also personal presence therein coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention.100 It is the permanent home and the place to which one intends to return whenever absent for business or pleasure as
shown by facts and circumstances that disclose such intent.101
Domicile is classified into three: (1) domicile of origin, which is acquired at birth by every person; and (2) domicile of choice, which is acquired upon
abandonment of the domicile of origin; and (3) domicile by operation of law, which the law attributes to a person independently of his residence of
intention.102
Domicile by operation of law applies to infants, incompetents, and other persons under disabilities that prevent them from acquiring a domicile of
choice.103 It also accrues by virtue of marriage when the husband and wife fix the family domicile.104
A person's domicile of origin is the domicile of his parents.105 It is not easily lost and continues even if one has lived and maintained residences in
different places.106 Absence from the domicile to pursue a profession or business, to study or to do other things of a temporary or semi-permanent
nature, and even travels abroad,107 does not constitute loss of residence.108
In contrast, immigration to a foreign country with the intention to live there permanently constitutes an abandonment of domicile in the
Philippines.109 In order to qualify to run for public office in the Philippines, an immigrant to a foreign country must waive such status as manifested
by some act or acts independent of and done prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy.110
A person can have but one domicile at a time.111 Once established, the domicile remains until a new one is acquired.112 In order to acquire a
domicile by choice, there must concur: (a) physical presence in the new place, (b) an intention to remain there (animus manendi), and (c) an
intention to abandon the former domicile (animus non revertendi). 113
Without clear and positive proof of the concurrence of these requirements, the domicile of origin continues.114 In Gallego v. Verra, 115 we
emphasized what must be shown by the person alleging a change of domicile:
The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time. The acts of the person must conform with his purpose.
The change of residence must be voluntary; the residence at the place chosen for the domicile must be actual; and to the fact of residence there
must be added the animus manendi. 116
The question of whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in its conclusion that petitioner failed to meet the durational residency
requirement of 10 years goes into the COMELEC's appreciation of evidence. In Sabili v. COMELEC, 117 we held that:
As a general rule, the Court does not ordinarily review the COMELEC's appreciation and evaluation of evidence. However, exceptions thereto have
been established, including when the COMELEC's appreciation and evaluation of evidence become so grossly unreasonable as to turn into an error
of jurisdiction. In these instances, the Court is compelled by its bounden constitutional duty to intervene and correct the COMELEC's error.118
Sabili was an instance of grossly unreasonable appreciation in evaluation of evidence, very much like the lopsided evaluation of evidence of the
COMELEC in the present case.
Further, in Mitra v. COMELEC,119 we held that COMELEC's use of wrong or irrelevant considerations in the resolution of an issue constitutes grave
abuse of discretion:
As a concept, "grave abuse of discretion" defies exact definition; generally, it refers to "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent
to lack of jurisdiction;" the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform
a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion and hostility. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough; it must be grave. We have held, too, that the use of wrong or irrelevant considerations
in deciding an issue is sufficient to taint a decision-maker's action with grave abuse of discretion.
Closely related with the limited focus of the present petition is the condition, under Section 5, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, that findings of fact of
the COMELEC, supported by substantial evidence, shall be final and non-reviewable. Substantial evidence is that degree of evidence that a
reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion.
In light of our limited authority to review findings of fact, we do not ordinarily review in a certiorari case the COMELEC's appreciation and evaluation
of evidence. Any misstep by the COMELEC in this regard generally involves an error of judgment, not of jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied)
However, before going into a discussion of the evidence submitted by petitioner, a threshold issue must first be resolved: whether petitioner's status
as a visa-free balikbayan affected her ability to establish her residence in the country. I believe that it did not.
The Philippines' Balikbayan Program
On 31 July 1973, President Marcos issued Letter of Instructions No. (LOI) 105120 designating the period from 1 September 1973 to 28 February
1974 as a "Homecoming Season" for Filipinos - and/or their families and descendants - who are now residents or citizens of other countries
(referred to as overseas Filipinos). Due to its overwhelming success,121 the Balikbayan Program was extended. This was further enhanced in 197
4 under LOI 163.122
In 1975, professionals and scientists were targeted in the program by encouraging their return under LOI 210, and then by PD 819. Overseas
Filipino scientists and technicians were being encouraged to come home and apply their knowledge to the development programs of the country,
and to take advantage of the Balikbayan Program. It was also decreed that any overseas Filipino arriving in the Philippines under the Balikbayan
Program shall be authorized to remain in the country for a period of one year from the date of arrival within the extended period.
Pursuant to the stated purpose of LOI 210, P.D. 819123 was issued on 24 October 1975 in recognition of the "need of attracting foreign-based
scientists, professionals, or persons with special skill or expertise who are of 'Filipino descent or origin."124 It was decreed that these persons, who
are licensed to practice their profession, special skill or expertise in their host, adopted or native countries, may practice their profession, special

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skill or expertise while staying in the Philippines either on a temporary or permanent basis, together with their families upon approval by the
Secretary of Health. They are only required to register with the Professional Regulation Commission, regardless of whether or not their special skill
or expertise falls within any of the regulated professions and vocations in the Philippines, and pay the required license fee. They are entitled to all
incentives, benefits and privileges granted to or being enjoyed by overseas Filipinos (balikbayans).
As a means of attracting more "returnees,"125 LOI 1044 provided for additional incentives such as attendance in international scientific
conferences, seminars, meetings along the field of expertise with the travel of the returnees funded by the program at least once per year. Also,
they shall have priority to obtain housing loans from GSIS, SSS and Development Bank of the Philippines to assure their continued stay in the
country.
By virtue of LOI 272-A126, the Balikbayan Program was extended to another period beginning 1 March 1976 to 28 February 1977 featuring the
same incentives and benefits provided by LOI 210. It was again extended to 28 February 1978,127 to 28 February 1979,128 to 29 February
1980,129 and to 28 February 1981.130
On 28 February 1981, President Marcos issued Executive Order No. (EO) 657 extending the Balikbayan Program for overseas Filipinos for a period
of five years beginning 1 March 1981 to 28 February 1986.
Executive Order No. (E.O.) 130131 issued on 25 October 1993 by President Ramos institutionalized the Balik Scientist Program under the
Department of Science and Technology (DOST) but with different features. It defined a Balik Scientist as a science or technology expert who is a
Filipino citizen or a foreigner of Filipino descent, residing abroad and contracted by the national government to return and work in the Philippines
along his/her field of expertise for a short term with a duration of at least one month (Short-Term Program) or long term with a duration of at least
two years (Long-Term Program).
A Balik Scientist under the Short-Term Program may be entitled to free round-trip economy airfare originating from a foreign country to the
Philippines by direct route, and grants-in-aid for research and development projects approved by the Secretary of Science and Technology.
A Balik Scientist under the Long-Term Program and returning new graduates from DOST-recognized science and technology foreign institutions
may be entitled to the following incentives:
1. Free one-way economy airfare from a foreign country to the Philippines, including airfare for the spouse and two minor dependents; and free
return trip economy airfare after completion of two years in the case of Balik Scientists, and three years in the case of new graduates;
2. Duty-free importation of professional instruments and implements, tools of trade, occupation or employment, wearing apparel, domestic animals,
and personal and household effects in quantities and of the class suitable to the profession, rank or position of the persons importing them, for their
own use and not for barter or sale, in accordance with Section 105 of the Tariff and Customs Code;
3. No-dollar importation of motor vehicles;
4. Exemption from payment of travel tax for Filipino permanent residents abroad;
5. Reimbursement of freight expenses for the shipment of a car and personal effects;
6. Reimbursement of the freight expenses for 2-1/2 tons volume weight for surface shipment of a car and personal effects, as well as excess
baggage not exceeding 20 kilograms per adult and 10 kilograms per minor dependent when travelling by air;
7. Housing, which may be arranged through predetermined institutions;
8. Assistance in securing a certificate of registration without examination or an exemption from the licensure requirement of the Professional
Regulation Commission to practice profession, expertise or skill in the Philippines;
9. Grants-in-aid for research and development projects approved by the Secretary of Science and Technology; and
10.Grant of special non-immigrant visas132 under Section 47 (a) (2) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, after compliance with
the requirements therefor.
R.A. 6768,133 enacted on 3 November 1989, instituted a Balikbayan Program under the administration of the Department of Tourism to attract and
encourage overseas Filipinos to come and visit their motherland. Under R.A. 6768, the term balikbayan covers Filipino citizens who have been
continuously out of the Philippines for a period of at least one year; Filipino overseas workers; and former Filipino citizens and their family who had
been naturalized in a foreign country and comes or returns to the Philippines.
The law provided various privileges to the balikbayan:
1. Tax-free maximum purchase in the amount of US$1,000 or its equivalent in other acceptable foreign currencies at Philippine duty-free shops;
2. Access to a special promotional/incentive program provided by the national flag air carrier;
3. Visa-free entry to the Philippines for a period of one year for foreign passport holders, with the exception of restricted nationals;
4. Travel tax exemption;134 and
5. Access to especially designated reception areas at the authorized ports of entry for the expeditious processing of documents.
It is emphasized in the law that the privileges granted thereunder shall be in addition to the benefits enjoyed by the balikbayan under existing laws,
rules and regulations.
R.A. 9174135 dated 7 November 2002 amended R.A. 6768 by extending further the privileges of a balikbayan to include:
1. Kabuhayan shopping privilege through an additional tax-exempt purchase in the maximum amount of US$2,000 or its equivalent in Philippine
peso and other acceptable foreign currencies, exclusively for the purchase of livelihood tools at all government-owned and - controlled/operated
duty-free shops;
2. Access to necessary entrepreneurial training and livelihood skills programs and marketing assistance, including the balikbayan's immediate
family members, under the government's reintegration program; and

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3. Access to accredited transportation facilities that will ensure their safe and convenient trips +upon arrival.
It was again emphasized that the privileges granted shall be in addition to the benefits enjoyed by the balikbayan under existing laws, rules and
regulations.
Balikbayans are not Mere Visitors
As shown by the foregoing discussion, the Balikbayan Program, as conceptualized from the very beginning, envisioned a system not just of
welcoming overseas Filipinos (Filipinos and/or their families and descendants who have become permanent residents or naturalized citizens of
other countries) as short-term visitors of the country, but more importantly, one that will encourage them to come home and once again become
permanent residents of the Philippines.
Notably, the program has no regard at all for the citizenship of these overseas Filipinos. To qualify for the benefits, particularly the exemptions from
the payment of customs duties and taxes on personal effects brought home and tax exemptions for local purchases, all they have to do is prove
their desire to become permanent residents of the Philippines. This is done through the simple expedient of the presentation of the official approval
of change of residence by the authorities concerned in their respective foreign host countries.
As originally intended in the case of the balik scientists, they are also welcome to practice their profession, special skill or expertise while staying in
the Philippines either on temporary or permanent bases. Again, there was no regard for their citizenship considering that the program is open to
both foreign-based Filipinos and those of Filipino origin or descent, as long as they were licensed to practice their profession, special skill or
expertise in their host, adopted or native countries.
Therefore, as far as our immigration laws are concerned with regard to balikbayans, they and their families may reside in the Philippines either on
temporary or permanent bases even though they remain nationals of their host, adopted or native countries. The special treatment accorded to
balikbayans finds its roots in recognition of their status as former Filipinos and not as mere aliens.
Further militating against the notion of balikbayans as mere visitors of the country are the privileges accorded to them under R.A. 9174, the current
balikbayan law. It specifically provides for a Kabuhayan shopping privilege for the purchase of livelihood tools as well as access to the necessary
entrepreneurial training and livelihood skills programs and marketing assistance in accordance with the existing rules on the government's
reintegration program.
Livelihood tools have been defined as "instruments used by hand or by machine necessary to a person in the practice of his or her trade, vocation
or profession, such as hand tools, power tools, precision tools, farm tools, tools for dressmaking, shoe repair, beauty parlor, barber shop and the
like,"136 as well as a computer unit and its accessories.
Access to the reintegration program is one of the social services and family welfare assistance benefits (aside from insurance and health care
benefits, loan guarantee fund, education and training benefits and workers assistance and on-site services) that are available, to Overseas Workers
Welfare Administration (OWWA) members.137 It incorporates community organizing, capability-building, livelihood loans and other social
preparations subject to the policies formulated by the OWWA Board.138
The reintegration program aims to prepare the OFW in his/her return to Philippine society.139 It has two aspects. The first is reintegration
preparedness (On-Site) which includes interventions on value formation, financial literacy, entrepreneurial development training (EDT),
technological skills and capacity building.140 The second is reintegration proper (In-Country) which consists of job referrals for local and overseas
employment, business counselling, community organizing, financial literacy seminar, networking with support institutions and social preparation
programs.141
As the Philippine government's reintegration manager,142 the Department of Labor and Employment National Reintegration Center for OFWs
(NRCO) provides the following services:
1. Develop and support programs and projects for livelihood, entrepreneurship, savings, investments and financial literacy for returning Filipino
migrant workers and their families in coordination with relevant stakeholders, service providers and international organizations;
2. Coordinate with appropriate stakeholders, service providers and relevant international organizations for the promotion, development and the full
utilization of overseas Filipino worker returnees and their potentials;
3. Institute, in cooperation with other government agencies concerned, a computer-based information system on returning Filipino migrant workers
which shall be accessible to all local recruitment agencies and employers, both public and private;
4. Provide a periodic study and assessment of job opportunities for returning Filipino migrant workers;
5. Develop and implement other appropriate programs to promote the welfare of returning Filipino migrant workers;
6. Maintain an internet-based communication system for on-line registration and interaction with clients, and maintain and upgrade computer-based
service capabilities of the NRCO;
7. Develop capacity-building programs for returning overseas Filipino workers and their families, implementers, service providers, and stakeholders;
and
8. Conduct research for policy recommendations and program development.143
While the reintegration program covers only OFWs,144 non-OFW balikbayans can also avail of possible livelihood training in coordination with the
Department of Tourism, the Technology and Livelihood Resource Center and other training institutions.145
R.A. 9174 is the government's latest thrust in its consistent efforts in attracting balikbayans to come home to the Philippines and build a new life
here. Notwithstanding our immigration laws, balikbayans may continue to stay in the Philippines for the long-term even under a visafree entry, which
is extendible upon request. 146
It must be emphasized that none of the Court's previous decisions has ever looked at the very extensive privileges granted to Balikbayan entrants.
Coquilla, Japzon, Caballero, Jalosjos
and the Balikbayan Program

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In ruling that petitioner can only be said to have validly re-established her residency in the Philippines when she reacquired her Philippine
citizenship, the COMELEC invoked the ruling in Coquilla v. COMELEC. 147
In Coquilla, petitioner was a former natural-born citizen and who reacquired Philippine citizenship on November 10, 2000. He was not able to show
by any evidence that he had been a one-year resident of Oras, Eastern Samar prior to the May 14, 2001 local elections. His argument was that he
had been a resident of the said town for two years, but was not able to show actual residence one year from before the said election. Evidence
shows on the contrary that his last trip to the United States, of which he was a former citizen was from July 6 to August 5, 2000. The only evidence
he was able to show was a residence certificate and his bare assertion to his townmates that he intended to have himself repatriated. He did not
make much of a claim, except to advert to the fulfillment of the required residence by cumulating his visits and actual residence. We Court said:
Second, it is not true, as petitioner contends, that he reestablished residence in this country in 1998 when he came back to prepare for the
mayoralty elections of Oras by securing a Community Tax Certificate in that year and by constantly declaring to his townmates of his intention to
seek repatriation and run for mayor in the May 14, 2001 elections. The status of being an alien and a non-resident can be waived either separately,
when one acquires the status of a resident alien before acquiring Philippine citizenship, or at the same time when one acquires Philippine
citizenship. As an alien, an individual may obtain an immigrant visa under 13 of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1948 and an Immigrant Certificate
of Residence (ICR) and thus waive his status as a nonresident. On the other hand, he may acquire Philippine citizenship by naturalization under
C.A. No. 473, as amended, or, if he is a former Philippine national, he may reacquire Philippine citizenship by repatriation or by an act of Congress,
in which case he waives not only his status as an alien but also his status as a non-resident alien.
In the case at bar, the only evidence of petitioners status when he entered the country on October 15, 1998, December 20, 1998, October 16, 1999,
and June 23, 2000 is the statement Philippine Immigration Balikbayan in his 1998-2008 U.S. passport. As for his entry on August 5, 2000, the stamp
bore the added inscription good for one year stay. Under 2 of R.A. No. 6768 (An Act Instituting a Balikbayan Program), the term balikbayan includes
a former Filipino citizen who had been naturalized in a foreign country and comes or returns to the Philippines and, if so, he is entitled, among
others, to a visa-free entry to the Philippines for a period of one (1) year (3(c)). It would appear then that when petitioner entered the country on the
dates in question, he did so as a visa-free balikbayan visitor whose stay as such was valid for one year only. Hence, petitioner can only be held to
have waived his status as an alien and as a non-resident only on November 10, 2000 upon taking his oath as a citizen of the Philippines under R.A.
No. 8171. He lacked the requisite residency to qualify him for the mayorship of Oras, Eastern, Samar.
Note that the record is bare of any assertion, unlike in the case before Us, that Coquilla had bought a residence, relocated all his effects,
established all the necessities of daily living to operationalize the concept of actual residence to show residence for the minimum period of one year.
Even if in fact the period of reckoning for Coquilla were to start from his entry into the country on 5 August 2000, it would still be only nine months;
thus there was not even any necessity to discuss the effect of his having been classified as a Balikbayan when he entered the country in 1998,
1999 and 2000.
The COMELEC tries to assert that its interpretation of the ruling in Coquilla was carried over in Japzon v. COMELEC148 and Caballero v.
COMELEC149 as to bar petitioner's claims on residency. The COMELEC is dead wrong.
In Japzon, private respondent Ty was a natural-born Filipino who left to work in the US and eventually became an American citizen. On 2 October
2005, Ty reacquired his Filipino citizenship by taking his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines in accordance with the provisions of
Republic Act No. (R.A.) 9225.150 Immediately after reacquiring his Philippine citizenship, he performed acts (i.e. applied for a Philippine passport,
paid community tax and secured Community Tax Certificates (CTC) and registered as a voter) wherein he declared that his residence was at
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar. On 19 March 2007, Ty renounced his American citizenship before a notary public. Prior to this, however, Ty had
been bodily present in General Macarthur, Eastern Samar for a more than a year before the May 2007 elections. As such, the Court brushed aside
the contention that Ty was ineligible to run for mayor on the ground that he did not meet the one-year residency requirement. If anything, Japzon
reinforces petitioner's position.
In Caballero, petitioner was a natural-born Filipino who was naturalized as a Canadian citizen. On 13 September 2012, petitioner took his Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines in accordance with the provisions of Republic Act No. 9225. On 1 October 2012, he renounced his
Canadian citizenship. He filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor of Uyugan, Batanes on 3 October 2012.
We ruled that it was incumbent upon petitioner to prove that he made Uyugan, Batanes his domicile of choice upon reacquisition of his Philippine
citizenship. Aside from his failure to discharge this burden, the period reckoned from 13 September 2012 to the May 2013 elections is only nine
months - clearly short of the required one-year residency requirement for mayoralty candidates. Caballero is thus clearly not applicable. Indeed, it is
to be noted that it is only Justice Brion in his Separate Concurring Opinion who opines that a permanent resident visa is required for
reestablishment of domicile to take place, a view not shared by the majority.
Justice Brion needed to state in his Separate Concurring Opinion that a permanent residency visa is necessary for the start of residency for election
purposes is precisely because such view is not found in the Ponencia, hence, contraries to be legally inapplicable.
There are categorical rulings in U.S. state courts that are squarely as all fours with the petition before us. In Elkins v. Moreno, 151 aliens with a nonimmigrant visa were considered as having the legal capacity to change their domiciles. In reaching this conclusion, the US Supreme Court took into
account the intention of Congress when it enacted the terms and restrictions for specific classes of non-immigrants entering the United States:
Although nonimmigrant aliens can generally be viewed as temporary visitors to the United States, the nonimmigrant classification is by no means
homogeneous with respect to the terms on which a nonimmigrant enters the United States. For example, Congress expressly conditioned
admission for some purposes on an intent not to abandon a foreign residence or, by implication, on an intent not to seek domicile in the United
States. Thus, the 1952 Act defines a visitor to the United States as "an alien . . . having a residence in a foreign country which he has no intention of
abandoning" and who is coming to the United States for business or pleasure. Similarly, a nonimmigrant student is defined as "an alien having a
residence in a foreign country which he has no intention of abandoning. . . and who seeks to enter the United States temporarily and solely for the
purpose of pursuing. . . a course of study. . . . " See also (aliens in "immediate and continuous transit"); (vessel crewman "who intends to land
temporarily"); (temporary worker having residence in foreign country "which he has no intention of abandoning").
By including restrictions on intent in the definition of some nonimmigrant classes, Congress must have meant aliens to be barred from these classes
if their real purpose in coming to the United States was to immigrate permanently. x x x.
But Congress did not restrict every nonimmigrant class. In particular, no restrictions on a nonimmigrant's intent were placed on aliens admitted
under 101(a)(15)(G)(iv). Since the 1952 Act was intended to be a comprehensive and complete code, the conclusion is therefore inescapable that,
where as with the G-4 class Congress did not impose restrictions on intent, this was deliberate. Congress' silence is therefore pregnant, and we
read it to mean that Congress, while anticipating that permanent immigration would normally occur through immigrant channels, was willing to allow
nonrestricted nonimmigrant aliens to adopt the United States as their domicile.
Under present law, therefore, were a G-4 alien to develop a subjective intent to stay indefinitely in the United States he would be able to do so
without violating either the 1952 Act, the Service's regulations, or the terms of his visa. Of course, should a G-4 alien terminate his employment with

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an international treaty organization, both he and his family would lose their G-4 status. Nonetheless, such an alien would not necessarily be subject
to deportation nor would he have to leave and re-enter the country in order to become an immigrant.152 (Citations omitted) (Emphasis supplied)
In Toll v. Moreno, 153 the Supreme Court of Maryland applied the ruling in Elkins and held that the ordinary legal standard for the establishment of
domicile may be used even for non-immigrants:
If under federal law a particular individual must leave this country at a certain date, or cannot remain here indefinitely, then he could not become
domiciled in Maryland. Any purported intent to live here indefinitely would be inconsistent with law. It would at most be an unrealistic subjective
intent, which is insufficient under Maryland law to establish domicile.
xxxx
In light of the Supreme Court's interpretation of federal law, it is obvious that nothing inherent in the nature of a G-4 visa would render the holder of
such visa absolutely incapable of establishing a Maryland domicile. Assuming the correctness of the defendant's assertion that most G-4 visa
holders will leave this country, if in a particular case one of these individuals is in a minority and, as shown by objective factors, intends for Maryland
to be his fixed place of abode and intends to remain here indefinitely, he will have satisfied the Maryland standard for establishing domicile in this
State.
The fact that an alien holds a non-immigrant visa is thus not controlling. What is crucial in determining whether an alien may lawfully adopt a
domicile in the country is the restriction placed by Congress on a specific type of non-immigrant visa. So long as the intended stay of a
nonimmigrant does not violate any of the legal restriction, sufficient animus manendi may be appreciated and domicile may be established.
In the case of balikbayans, the true intent of Congress to treat these overseas Filipinos not as mere visitors but as prospective permanent residents
is evident from the letter of the law. While they are authorized to remain in the country for a period of only one year from their date of arrival, the
laws, rules and regulations under the Balikbayan Program do not foreclose their options should they decide to actually settle down in the country. In
fact, the Balikbayan Program envisions a situation where former Filipinos would have been legally staying in the Philippines visa-free for more than
36 months.154 In the case of petitioner Poe, she entered the Philippines visa-free under the Balikbayan program, left for a short while and legally
re-entered under the same program. This is not a case where she abused any Balikbayan privilege because shortly after reentering the country on
11 March 2006,155 she applied for dual citizenship under R.A. 9225.
Based on the foregoing, it was most unfair for COMELEC to declare that petitioner could not have acquired domicile in the Philippines in 2005
merely because of her status as a balikbayan. Her visa (or lack thereof) should not be the sole determinant of her intention to reacquire her domicile
in the Philippines.
Congress itself welcomes the return of overseas Filipinos without requiring any type of visa. Although visa-free entry is for a limited time, the period
is extendible and is not conditioned upon the acquisition of a permanent resident visa. Considering that the law allows a balikbayan to stay in the
Philippines for a certain period even without a visa and to settle in .the country during that period, there is no reason to reject petitioner's intent to reestablish a residence from the date she entered the country. In fact, petitioner's permanent resettlement, as one millions of Filipino who had gone
abroad, is an end-goal of the Balikbayan Program.
If we were to apply the standard for determining the effect of a visa on the ability of petitioner to re-establish her domicile in the Philippines, the U.S.
cases of Elkins v. Moreno and Toll v. Moreno, beg the question: Does her entry as a Balikbayan restrict her from re-establishing her domicile in the
Philippines? The answer would be a resounding NO, for precisely the legislative policy of the Balikbayan Program is to assist in the reintegration of
former Filipino citizen back into the country. The Court must also note that the visa-free entry is good for one year and renewable, even to the extent
of authorizing the Balikbayan to stay much longer. The Balikbayan program is fully compatible and supportive of the re-establishment by a
Balikbayan of her residence in her native land, her domicile of origin.
And this is not a case when petitioner abused the privileges of visa-free entry considering that, a year after her relocation, she immediately took
steps to reacquire her Philippine citizenship
Petitioner was able to prove that she
reacquired her domicile in the Philippines
beginning May 2005.
As discussed, there are only three requisites for a person to acquire a new domicile by choice: (1) residence or bodily presence in the new domicile;
(2) an intention to remain there; and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile.156 In my view, the pieces of evidence submitted by petitioner
sufficiently prove that she re-established her domicile in the Philippines as early as May 2005.
I shall discuss the fulfillment of the requirements in the following order: (1) intention to remain in the new domicile; (2) intention to abandon the old
domicile; and (3) bodily residence in the new domicile.
Intent to Establish a New Domicile
To prove her intent to establish a new domicile in the Philippines on 24 May 2005, petitioner presented the following evidence: (1) school records
indicating that her children attended Philippine schools starting June 2005;157 (2) Taxpayer's Identification Number (TIN) Card,158 showing that
she registered with and secured the TIN from the BIR on 22 July 2005; (3) Condominium Certificates of Title (CCTs) 159 and Tax Declarations
covering Unit 7F and a parking slot at One Wilson Place Condominium, 194 Wilson Street, San Juan, Metro Manila, purchased in early 2005 and
served as the family's temporary residence; (4) Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) 160 in the name of petitioner and her husband issued on 1 June
2006, covering a residential lot in Corinthian Hills, Quezon City in 2006; and (5) registration as a voter on 31 August 2006.
Enrollment of Children in Local Schools
Whether children are enrolled in local schools is a factor considered by courts when it comes to establishing a new domicile. In Fernandez v. HRET,
161 we used this indicium:
In the case at bar, there are real and substantial reasons for petitioner to establish Sta. Rosa as his domicile of choice and abandon his domicile of
origin and/or any other previous domicile. To begin with, petitioner and his wife have owned and operated businesses in Sta. Rosa since 2003. Their
children have attended schools in Sta. Rosa at least since 2005. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
In Blount v. Boston, 162 the Supreme Court of Maryland identified location of the school attended by a person's children as one of the factors in
determining a change of domicile. The discourse is reproduced here:

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Where actual residence and/or place of voting are not so clear or there are special circumstances explaining particular place of abode or place of
voting, court will look to myriad of other factors in deciding person's domicile, such as paying of taxes and statements on tax returns, ownership of
property, where person's children attend school, address at which person receives mail, statements as to residency in contracts, statements on
licenses or governmental documents, where personal belongings are kept, which jurisdiction's banks are utilized, and any other facts revealing
contact with one or the other jurisdiction.163 (Emphasis supplied)
The fact that petitioner's children began their schooling in the Philippines shortly after their arrival in the country in May 2005 is no longer in dispute.
In its Comment, the COMELEC noted this as one of the facts "duly proven" by petitioner.164 By "duly proven," the COMELEC explained during the
oral arguments that the term meant that documentary proof substantiated the pertinent allegation:
CHIEF JUSTICE SERENO:
All right. Let me turn your attention to page 56 of the COMELEC Comment. It says, "the COMELEC noted the following facts as duly proven by the
petitioner. Petitioner's children arrived in the Philippines during the latter half of 2005. Shortly after their arrival, petitioner's children began their
schooling in the country. Petitioner purchased a condominium unit in San Juan City during the second half of 2005. Petitioner and husband started
the construction of their house in 2006. Petitioner and her husband informed the U.S. Postal Service in 2006 of their abandonment of their U. S.
Address." What does the commission mean when it says that these facts are duly proven?
COMMISSIONER LIM:
Your Honor please, the proceeding before the commission was summary. There was a preliminary conference, submission of exhibits, stipulations,
comparison between the originals and the photocopies, and offer of evidence. We considered these facts as non-controverted in the sense that they
are covered by documentary proof, Your Honor. (Emphasis supplied)
Acquisition of a New Residence
The COMELEC, in its Comment, found the following facts to be duly proven: that petitioner purchased a condominium unit in San Juan City during
the second half of 2005, and that petitioner and her husband started the construction of their house in Corinthian Hills in 2006.165 That petitioner
purchased the residential lot in Corinthian Hills is not up for debate. Taken together, these facts establish another indicium of petitioner's
establishment of a new domicile in the Philippines.
Our very own jurisdiction treats acquisition of residential property as a factor indicating establishment of a new domicile. Take the 2012 case of
Jalosjos v. COMELEC, 166 in which we held that Rommel Jalosjos acquired a new domicile in Zamboanga Sibugay:
Jalosjos presented the affidavits of next-door neighbors, attesting to his physical presence at his residence in Ipil. These adjoining neighbors are no
doubt more credible since they have a better chance of noting his presence or absence than his other neighbors, whose affidavits Erasmo
presented, who just sporadically passed by the subject residence. Further, it is not disputed that Jalosjos bought a residential lot in the same village
where he lived and a fish pond in San Isidro, Naga, Zamboanga Sibugay. He showed correspondences with political leaders, including local and
national party-mates, from where he lived. Moreover, Jalosjos is a registered voter of Ipil by final judgment of the Regional Trial Court of
Zamboanga Sibugay. (Emphasis supplied)
It has been argued that the acquisition of a temporary dwelling in Greenhills, the purchase of a residential lot in Corinthian Hills, and the eventual
construction of a house in the latter place do not indicate an intent on the part of petitioner to stay in the country for good. The 2013 case of Jalosjos
v. COMELEC167 has been cited to support this conclusion, as we purportedly held in that case that ownership of a house "does not establish
domicile."
This reading of Jalosjos is not accurate. By no means did Jalosjos rule out ownership of a house or some other property as a factor for establishing
a new domicile. To appreciate the statement in its proper context, the relevant discussion in Jalosjos is quoted below:
Assuming that the claim of property ownership of petitioner is true, Fernandez v. COMELEC has established that the ownership of a house or some
other property does not establish domicile. This principle is especially true in this case as petitioner has failed to establish her bodily presence in the
locality and her intent to stay there at least a year before the elections, to wit:
To use ownership of property in the district as the determinative indicium of permanence of domicile or residence implies that the landed can
establish compliance with the residency requirement. This Court would be, in effect, imposing a property requirement to the right to hold public
office, which property requirement would be unconstitutional. (Emphasis supplied)
As can be seen from the quoted discourse, the case did not throw out ownership of a house as a factor for determining establishment of a new
domicile. Rather, it discarded ownership of a house as a controlling factor for determining establishment of a new domicile.
Even US courts consider acquisition of property as a badge of fixing a new domicile.168 In Hale v. State of Mississippi Democratic EC, 169 the
Supreme Court of Mississippi used acquisition of a new residence as a factor for determining transfer of domicile. In that case, William Stone
sought the Democratic Party nomination for Senate District 10, a district covering parts of Marshall County, including Stone's home in Holly Springs.
Hale argued that Stone was not eligible to run for that office because he did not meet the two-year residency requirement. Specifically, Hale argued
that Stone could not be a resident of Marshall County because Stone .had not abandoned his domicile in Benton County. He had moved to Holly
Springs in October 2013.
The Mississippi Supreme Court ruled that Stone had proven that he established his domicile in Marshall County. It relied, among others, on
acquisition of a home in the new domicile as a factor:
To prove his position that he had changed his domicile from Benton County to Marshall County, Stone provided an abundance of evidence. In
October 2013, Stone rented a house at 305 Peel Lane in Holly Springs, the county seat of Marshall County, and he obtained utility service for the
home. In July 2014, he bought a home at 200 Johnson Park in Holly Springs. Furthermore, he notified the Senate comptroller about his change of
address, and the comptroller sent an e-mail to every member of the Senate informing them of the change.
xxxx
We have held that '[t]he exercise of political rights, admissions, declarations, the acts of purchasing a home and long-continued residency are
circumstances indicative of his intention to abandon his domicile of origin and to establish a new domicile.' Taking into consideration all of these
factors, the circuit court did not err in determining that Stone's domicile has existed in Marshall County since October of 2013. (Emphases supplied
and citations omitted)
Securing a Taxpayer's Identification
Number (TIN) Card

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In his Comment-Opposition to the Petition for Certiorari in G.R. No. 221698-700, private respondent Valdez posited that securing a TIN does not
conclusively establish petitioner's animus manendi in the Philippines.170 He reasons that any person, even a non resident, can secure a TIN. On
this matter, I must agree with him.
Indeed, the 1997 Tax Code mandates all persons required under our tax laws to render or file a return to secure a TIN.171 This would include a
non-resident so long as he or she is mandated by our tax laws to file a return, statement or some other document.172 It is thus correct to say that a
TIN Card does not conclusively evince the notion that petitioner is a resident of the Philippines.
Nevertheless, the significance of the TIN Card lies in the fact that it lists down the address of petitioner as No. 23 Lincoln St. West Greenhills, the
very same address of her mother, Jesusa Sonora Poe, as reflected in the latter's affidavit.173 Therefore, the TIN Card, which was issued on 22 July
2005, corroborates the assertion that petitioner, upon her arrival in 2005, was then staying at her mother's home.
Registration as Voter
Petitioner registered as a voter on 31 August 2006. This speaks loudly of the intent to establish a domicile in the country. In Hale v. State of
Mississippi Democratic EC,174 the Supreme Court of Mississippi considered registering to vote as a factor indicative of the intent to acquire a new
domicile. More importantly, Oglesby v. Williams treats voter registration as one of the two most significant indicia of acquisition of a new domicile.
The Oglesby discussion is informative:
This Court's longstanding view on determining a person's domicile was stated in Roberts, where the Court wrote:
The words reside or resident mean domicile unless a contrary intent is shown. A person may have several places of abode or dwelling, but he can
have only one domicile at a time. Domicile has been defined as the place with which an individual has a settled connection for legal purposes and
the place where a person has his true, fixed, permanent home, habitation and principal establishment, without any present intention of removing
therefrom, and to which place he has, whenever he is absent, the intention of returning. The controlling factor in determining a person's domicile is
his intent. One's domicile, generally, is that place where he intends to be. The determination of his intent, however, is not dependent upon what he
says at a particular time, since his intent may be more satisfactorily shown by what is done than by what is said. Once a domicile is determined or
established a person retains his domicile at such place unless the evidence affirmatively shows an abandonment of that domicile. In deciding
whether a person has abandoned a previously established domicile and acquired a new one, courts will examine and weigh the factors relating to
each place. This Court has never deemed any single circumstance conclusive. However, it has viewed certain factors as more important than
others, the two most important being where a person actually lives and where he votes. Where a person lives and votes at the same place such
place probably will be determined to constitute his domicile. Where these factors are not so clear, however, or where there are special
circumstances explaining a particular place of abode or place of voting, the Court will look to and weigh a number of other factors in deciding a
person's domicile.
Furthermore, this Court has stated that the place of voting is the "highest evidence of domicile." ("the two most important elements in determining
domicile are where a person actually lives and where he votes"); ("Evidence that a person registered or voted is ordinarily persuasive when the
question of domicile is at issue," quoting Comptroller v. Lenderking). Furthermore, actual residence, coupled with voter registration, "clearly create[s]
a presumption that [the person] was domiciled" there. ("[w]here the evidence relating to voting and the evidence concerning where a person actually
lives both clearly point to the same jurisdiction, it is likely that such place will be deemed to constitute the individual's domicile"). In other words, the
law presumes that where a person actually lives and votes is that person's domicile, unless special circumstances explain and rebut the
presumption. (Citations omitted) (Emphases supplied)
This Court, too, shares this reverence for the place of voting as an evidence of domicile. In Templeton v. Babcock, 175 we held as follows:
The finding of the trial court to the effect that the deceased had acquired a domicile in the State of California is in our opinion based upon facts
which sufficiently support said finding. In particular, we are of the opinion that the trial court committed no error in attaching importance to the
circumstance that the deceased had voted in California elections.
Though not of course conclusive of acquisition of domicile, voting in a place is an important circumstance and, where the evidence is scanty, may
have decisive weight. The exercise of the franchise is one of the highest prerogatives of citizenship, and in no other act of his life does the citizen
identify his interests with the state in which he lives more than in the act of voting. (Emphasis supplied)
In sum, the evidence of petitioner substantiates her claim of the intent to establish a new domicile in the country. The enrollment of her children in
local schools since 2005, the family's temporary stay in her mother's home followed by the purchase of the Greenhills condominium unit and the
subsequent establishment of the Corinthian Hills family home, the registration of petitioner as a voter and the issuance1 of a TIN Card in her favor,
collectively demonstrate the conclusion that she has established an incremental transfer of domicile in the country.
Respondent Valdez, however, points out that petitioner currently maintains two residential properties in the US, one purchased in 1992 and the
other in 2008.176 According to him, this is inconsistent with animus manendi.
This argument disregards overwhelming evidence showing that petitioner intended to establish a new domicile in the country. Petitioner has
uprooted her family from Virginia, US to Manila, enrolled her children soon after her arrival in the Philippines, acquired residential properties in the
new domicile - one of which now serves as the current family home - and registered as a voter. These factors all point to one direction: petitioner is
in the country and is here to stay. We cannot disregard these factors, all of which establish a nexus to the new domicile, because of a solitary fact:
the retention of two residential houses in the US. To be sure, it is difficult to justify a conclusion which considers only one contact in the old domicile
and ignores many significant contacts established by the removing person in the new domicile.
Moreover, petitioner only admitted177 that she owns the two houses. She never admitted that she resides in any of them. At best, what can only be
established is that petitioner owns properties classified as residential properties. Undoubtedly, we cannot make a conclusion that petitioner failed to
meet the animus manendi requirement in the absence of proof that petitioner uses one of the properties as a place of abode. In fact, all the
evidence points to the fact that she leaves the Philippines only for brief periods of time; obviously with no intention to reside elsewhere.
It is important to always remember that domicile is in the main a question of intent.178 It requires fact-intensive analysis. Not a single factor is
conclusive. It is the totality of the evidence that must be considered.
Even the US Supreme Court admitted that domicile is a difficult question of fact that its resolution commands a pragmatic and careful approach. In
The District of Columbia v. Murphy, 179 the US High Court remarked:
[T]he question of domicile is a difficult one of fact to be settled only by a realistic and conscientious review of the many relevant (and frequently
conflicting) indicia of where a man's home is and according to the established modes of proof.180
It is interesting to note that the US Supreme Court appended a footnote on the term home in the above quoted statement. Footnote 10 states:

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Of course, this term does not have the magic qualities of a divining rod in locating domicile. In fact, the search for th domicile of any person
capable of acquiring a domicile of choice is llut a search for his "home." See Beale, Social Justice and Business Costs, 49 Harv.L.Rev. 593, 596; 1
Beale, Conflict of Laws, 19.1.181
Now, if we are to adopt the view that petitioner failed to meet the animus manendi requirement on the ground that she maintains two houses in the
US, I pose this question: in our search for peti'tioner's home, are we making a realistic and conscientious review of all the facts?
Additionally, it is not required for purposes of establishing a new domicile that a person must sever all contacts with ,the old domicile."182 I therefore
find nothing wrong with petitioner maintaining residential properties in the old domicile.
It has been further suggested that petitioner's invocation of acquisition of residential property as a factor showing animus manendi does not benefit
her considering that she purchased in 2008 a residential property in the US, which was subsequent to her purchase of the condominium unit and
the residential lot in the Philippines, and that she maintained the one she acquired in 1992. But what is considered for animus manendi purposes as
a factor is acquisition of a house in the new domicile. Acquisition of a house in the old domicile is not a factor for determining animus manendi.
That petitioner still maintains two houses in the US does not negate her abandonment of her US domicile. First, it has, not been shown that
petitioner actually lived in the residential house acquired in 1992. What is clear is that there was only one family home in Virginia, US, and petitioner
had already reestablished her residence in the Philippines before it was even sold.
Second, the residential house acquired in 2008 has no bearing in the cases before us with regard to determining the validity of petitioner's
abandonment of her US domicile, particularly because it was purchased after she had already reacquired her Filipino citizenship. In this regard,
even respondent Valdez claims that "it is only upon her reacquisition of Filipino citizenship on 18 July 2006, that she can be considered to have
established her domicile in the Philippines."183 This concession already leaves no question as to petitioner's abandonment of her US domicile and
intent to reside permanently in the Philippines at the time that the residential house in the US was purchased in 2008.
1. Intent to Abandon the Old Domicile
To prove her intent to abandon her old domicile in the US, petitioner presented the following evidence: ( 1) email exchange1s between petitioner or
her husband and the property movers regarding relocation of their household goods, furniture and vehicles from the US to the Bhilippines; (2)
invoice document showing delivery from the US and to the Philippines of the personal properties of petitioner and her family; (3) acknowledgment of
change of address by the US Postal Service; ( 4) sale lof the family home on 27 April 2006.
Plans to Relocate
In Oglesby v. Williams, 184 the Court of Appeals of Maryland noted that plans for removal show intent to abandon the old domicile. The Court said:
[T]here are many citizens of Maryland who intend to change their domicile upon retirement and may make quite elaborate plans toward fulfilling that
intent by building a retirement home in the place where they intend to retire. Such plans, by themselves, do not prove the abandonment of an
existing domicile, although it is evidence of the intention to do so. Were such planning to be sufficient, the intent requirement would swallow the
requirement of an actual removal to another habitation with the intent to reside there indefinitely. (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, petitioner submitted email exchanges showing that the family began planning to move back to the Philippines as early as March 2005.
Exhibit "6-series" includes an email letter dated 17 March 2005 and sent to petitioner by Karla Murphy on 18 March 2005. Based on the email, Karla
worked at Victory Van, a company engaged in moving personal belongings. Apparently, petitioner had asked for an estimate of moving personal
properties from the US to the Philippines. The email reply reads:
From: Karla Murphy MURPHY@VictoryVan.com
To: gllamanzares gllamanzares@aol.com
Subject: Relocation to Manila Estimate
Date: Fri, 18 Mar 2005
3.17.05
Hi Grace:
Sorry for the delay in getting this to you. I know you are eager to get some rates for budgetary purposes.
I estimate that you have approximately 28,000 lbs of household goods plus your two vehicles. This will necessitate using THREE 40' containers.
You not only have a lot of furniture but many of your pieces plus the toys are very voluminous. We will load the containers from bottom to top not to
waste any space but I sincerely believe you will need two containers just for your household goods.
To provide you with door to door service which would include packing, export wrapping, custom crating for chandeliers, marble top and glass tops,
loading of containers at your residence, US customs export inspection for the vehicles, transportation to Baltimore, ocean freight and documentation
to arrival Manila, customs clearance, delivery, with collection of vehicles from agent in Manila unwrapping and placement of furniture, assisted
unpacking, normal assembly (beds, tables, two piece dressers and china closets), container return to port and same day debris removal based on
three 40' containers, with 28,000 lbs of HHG and two autos will be USD 19,295.
Grace, I predict you will have some questions. I will be out of the office tomorrow and will be in the office all day on Monday. If your questions can't
wait please call me on my cell number at 703 297 27 88.
I'll talk to you soon.
Kind regards and again, thanks for your patience.
Karla (Emphases Supplied)
The email indicates that petitioner was planning to move an estimated 28,000 pounds of household goods plus two vehicles from Virginia, US to
Manila. The email further shows that three forty-foot containers were estimated to be used in the movement of these items.
Twenty-eight thousand pounds of personal properties, including two vehicles, is not difficult to visualize. The exchanges during the oral arguments
held by this Court for this case shows that three forty-foot containers is about the size of a three-storey house. The exchange is quoted below:
CHIEF JUSTICE SERENO:

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Okay. Alright. Now when you come, you see you have thrown out the fact of relocation, continuous schooling, you have thrown that out. May I now
ask you what you did in looking at the e-mail that they submitted dated 18 March 2005. Have you [looked] closely at that e-mail?
COMMISSIONER LIM:
Yes, Your Honor.
CHIEF JUSTICE SERENO:
Okay. Can you tell us what that e-mail said?
COMMISSIONER LIM:
These correspondences, e-mail correspondences evinced a strong desire to bring your belongings here to seemingly on the surface, Your Honor, to
transfer residence here and to inquire about the cost of moving to the Philippines, Your Honor. . .
CHIEF JUSTICE SERENO:
Did you look at the, how much they were planning to move back to the Philippines?
COMMISSIONER LIM:
Well they said they sold their house there already, Your Honor. . .
CHIEF JUSTICE SERENO:
Twenty eight thousand pounds.
COMMISSIONER LIM:
Yes, Your Honor.
CHIEF JUSTICE SERENO:
And the estimate of the forwarding company is that they need three forty foot containers, correct?
COMMISSIONER LIM:
No question as to, no question as to that, Your Honor.
CHIEF JUSTICE SERENO:
Okay. Alright. Including can you look at what a forty foot container looks like. This. (image flashed on the screen) Please look at this Commissioner
Lim.
COMMISSIONER LIM:
I'm quite familiar having been a maritime lawyer in the past. . .
CHIEF JUSTICE SERENO:
Alright. Thank you very much. You see one forty foot container already contains an office, and an entire residence. And then if you put three on top
of the other, okay, . . . (image flashed on the screen)
COMMISSIONER LIM:
Yes, Your Honor.
CHIEF JUSTICE SERENO:
That's already the content of an entire house. And they're talking about glass tops, marble tops, chandeliers, in addition to that two cars and pets. Of
course, it's not in the e-mail.
In other words, even this there is no intention, Commissioner Lim?185
Definitely, the email shows that as early as 18 March 2005, petitioner already had plans to relocate to Manila. It must be stressed that not only
household goods would be moved to Manila, but two vehicles as well. Petitioner was certainly not planning for a short trip. The letter, therefore,
shows the intent of petitioner to abandon her old domicile in the US as early as March of 2005.
Change of Postal Address
Petitioner also adduced as evidence the email of the US Postal Service acknowledging the notice of change of address made by petitioner's
husband. It has been argued that the online acknowledgment merely establishes that petitioner's husband only requested a change of address and
did not notify the US Postal service of the abandonment of the old US address. This reasoning fails to appreciate that a notice of change of address
is already considered an indicium sufficient to establish the intent to abandon a domicile.
The already discussed Hale v. State of Mississippi Democratic EC186 utilized change of postal address as a factor for determining the intent to
abandon a domicile. In the case of Farnsworth v. Jones, 187 the Court of Appeals of North Carolina noted, among others, the failure of the
candidate to change his address. It ruled out the possibility that defendant had actually abandoned his previous residence.
To the contrary, defendant maintained the condominium at Cramer Mountain, ate dinner weekly at the Country Club there, exercised there, and
spent approximately 50% of his time there. He additionally did not change his address to Ashley Arms for postal purposes, or for any other
purposes. He executed a month-to-month lease for a furnished apartment because he wanted to "see what would happen" in the election. Although
defendant acquired a new residence at the Ashley Arms address and expressed his intention to remain there permanently, there is little evidence in
the record to indicate that he was actually residing there. x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
I do agree with the observation that the online acknowledgement never showed that the change of address was from the old US address to the new
Philippine address. To my mind, however, the deficiency is not crucial considering that there are other factors (discussed elsewhere in this opinion)
showing that petitioner's intent was to relocate to the Philippines. What matters as far as the online acknowledgement is concerned is that it
indicates an intent to abandon the old domicile of petitioner.
Sale of Old Residence
Another factor present in this case is the sale of petitioner's family home in the US.
In Imbraguglio v. Bernadas188 decided by the Court of Appeals of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit, Bernard Bernadas filed a "Notice of Candidacy" for the
office of Sheriff of St. Bernard Parish. Petrina Imbraguglio filed a petition objecting to the candidacy of Bernadas on the ground of failure to establish

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residence in the parish. It was found that Bernardas sold his home on Etienne Drive on 23 February 2006. Since 31 August 2006, Bernadas has
lived with his family at a home he purchased at 7011 General Haig Street in New Orleans. The Louisiana appellate court ruled that Bernardas had
abandoned his domicile in the parish by selling his home therein and had not reestablished the same. The Louisiana appellate court held that:
We also find no error in the trial court's finding that the defendant established a new domicile for purposes of La. R.S. 1 $:451.3 (which took effect
on June 8, 2006) by voluntarily selling his home, the only property owned in St. Bernard Parish, and moving to New Orleans without residing
anywhere in St. Bernard Parish for two years preceding the date he filed his notice of candidacy to run for sheriff. (Emphasis supplied)
Location of personal belongings
Another vital piece of evidence is the invoice issued by Victory Van to petitioner indicating the actual delivery of personal property to Manila in
September 2006 and the cost of shipping of the household goods. Pertinent portions of the Invoice dated 13 September 2006 are quoted below:
Hello! As you may have heard from your agent in the Philippines, there was an overflow. Every effort was made to make it fit in the two 40's and all
went except for about 1900 lbs, which will be sent in lift vans. An invoice is attached. Thank you.
xxxx
CUSTOMER:
ORIGIN:
DESTINATION:
Grace Llamanzares
Sterling, VA
Manila, Philippines DATE:
REFERENCE #:
9/13/2006
EXP06020
WEIGHT:
VOLUME:
VOLUME 25,241 lbs
2-40' S-SC
2 - Lift Vans
Overflow LCI,
Shipment (293 Cu
Ft.)
The invoice proves that 25,241 pounds of personal property owned by petitioner and her family were moved from Sterling, Virginia, US to Manila,
Philippines. This proves another factor: the consummation of the previously discussed plan to relocate to Manila. The location of the majority of the
personal belongings matters in the determination of a change in domicile. This factor was used in the already discussed Oglesby and in Bell v. Bell.
189
It must be noted that Bell held that unimportant belongings are not considered in that determination. In that case, the wife sought before a
Pennsylvania court the issuance of an injunction restraining the husband from obtaining a divorce in Nevada. She filed the suit on the ground that
the husband failed to establish a domicile in Nevada' as he once lived in Pennsylvania. Also, he was away from Nevada most of the time since he
worked in Nigeria.
The Pennsylvania Superior Court, in holding that the husband succeeded in establishing a domicile in Nevada, disregarded the fact that the
husband left behind a crate of his clothing at the home in Pennsylvania.
As for the relevancy of the clothing left behind at the Pennsylvania location by Mr. Bell after his departure, we, as did the trial court, find this element
to be "of little moment. That [Mr. Bell] has done without them for so long shows that they are not of particular importance to him." (Emphasis
supplied)
It is worthy to note that the case did not reject movement/ non-movement of personal belongings as a factor for determining domicile. Rather, what
it rejected was unimportant personal properties. Thus, this case, combined with the Oglesby case, provides that movement of properties that are
valuable/important indicates intent to abandon the previous domicile. Another take-away from this case is that when only unimportant belongings
remain in the old domicile, the intent to abandon the old domicile is not diminished.
What is more, it must be emphasized that petitioner donated to the Salvation Army, as shown by Exhibit "15" and Exhibit "15-A," which are receipts
showing donations to the Salvation Army of clothes, books and miscellaneous items. The receipts are dated 23 February 2006. The value of the
personal effects donated was placed by petitioner's husband at USD300.00 and USD575.00,190 certainly little personal items that were even then,
fully disposed.
What can be gleaned from the above facts is that petitioner intended to bring along with her in the Philippines only those items she deemed
important to her, and that those that were left behind were unimportant. It should be stressed that the items donated to charity included books and
clothes, which presumably are not valuable to petitioner; hence, the donations to the Salvation Army. Accordingly, petitioner was able to establish
another factor indicating the intent of petitioner to abandon her old domicile and establish a new domicile in the Philippines.
In sum, there is more than sufficient evidence indicating petitioner's intent to abandon her domicile in the US. Several factors have been
established: plans to transfer to the Philippines, sale of the residence in the old domicile, change of postal address, and relocation of valuable
personal belongings to the new domicile.
2. Actual removal from old
domicile and relocation to
new domicile
The third requirement for establishment of a new domicile is bodily presence in or the actual removal to the new domicile.
In Oglesby v. Williams, 191 the Court of Appeals of Maryland faced the issue of whether Beau H. Oglesby met the two-year residency requirement
to run for State's Attorney for Worcester County in the November 2002 general election. Oglesby admitted that he had been domiciled in Wicomico
County for a period of time beginning in December 1995. He argued, however, that his purchase of real property in Worcester County on 5
September 2000, more than two years before the election, coupled with his intention to be domiciled there, effectively established that he had
changed his domicile to Worcester County.

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We do not question, to be sure, that the appellant intended to make Worcester County his residence, his fixed, permanent home and habitation and,
thus, to abandon his Wicomico County residence. We simply do not believe that the intent was perfected before the appellant moved into the
Worcester County home; the appellant's intent was not actualized until then.
[T]here are many citizens of Maryland who intend to change their domicile upon retirement and may make quite elaborate plans toward fulfilling that
intent by building a retirement home in the place where they intend to retire. Such plans, by themselves, do not prove the abandonment of an
existing domicile, although it is evidence of the intention to do so. Were such planning to be sufficient, the intent requirement would swallow the
requirement of an actual removal to another habitation with the intent to reside there indefinitely.
xxxx
The evidence shows that the appellant established a domicile in Wicomico County in December, 1995 and remained domiciled in that county until,
at the earliest, December, 2000. He voted in the November 7, 2000 election in Wicomico County and he did not move into a residence in Worcester
County until December, 2000. We hold that the appellant did not become a domiciliary of Worcester County until, at the earliest, he actually moved
into his new home on December 20, 2000.
Oglesby makes the date of actual transfer as the reckoning point for the change of domicile. Had the actual removal happened prior to the two-year
period, Oglesby would have satisfied the residency requirement in that case.
Applying the rule to this case, it appears that the intent was actualized in 24 May 2005, the date when petitioner arrived in the Philippines, as
revealed by her US passport bearing a stamp showing her entry in the Philippines. The fact that she arrived here for the purpose of moving back to
the Philippines was not denied by COMELEC during the oral arguments, although it did not recognize the legal implications of such fact.
We must not lose sight of the fact that petitioner registered as a voter in this country on 31 August 2006. Thus, the implication of petitioner having
registered on 31 August 2006 is that she had already been a resident in the country for at least one year as of the day of her registration. The
reason is that the Voter's Registration Act of 1996192 requires among other things that the citizen must have resided in the Philippines for at least
one year.
That being said, the registration of petitioner as voter bolsters petitioner's claim that she concretized her intent to establish a domicile in the country
on 24 May 2005. Take note that if we use 24 May 2005 as the reckoning date for her establishment of domicile in the Philippines, she would have
indeed been a resident for roughly one year and three months as of 31 August 2006, the date she registered as a voter in the Philippines.
Besides, when we consider the other factors previously mentioned in this discussion - the enrolment of petitioner's children shortly after their arrival
in the Philippines, the purchase of the condominium unit during the second half of 2005, the construction of their house in Corinthian Hills in 2006,
the notification of the US Postal Service of petitioner's change of address - there can only be one conclusion: petitioner was here to stay in the
Philippines for good when she arrived in May 2005.
Let me highlight the fact of enrolment of petitioner's children in 2005. This happened shortly after their arrival in the Philippines, which was in May
2005. Taking together the two facts - the arrival of the family in May and the subsequent attendance of the children in local schools the following
month - the logical conclusion that we can derive from them is that petitioner arrived early in May so as to prepare her children's schooling in the
Philippines. Now, given that in May, she already had in mind the attendance of her children in local schools, this indicates that petitioner, at the time
of her arrival already had the intent to be in the country for the long haul.
Lastly, we must not overlook the proximity of her date of arrival in the Philippines in 24 May 2005 to the death of her father in 14 December 2004.
The closeness of the dates confirms the claim of petitioner that the untimely death of her father and the need to give her mother moral support and
comfort. The return to the country, it must be emphasized, happened within one year of the death of petitioner's father. It reflects the motive of
petitioner for her return to the Philippines: the only child had to return to the Philippines as soon as possible so that she could, be with her grieving
mother. More important, this very same motive justifies the acts of relocation she executed, several of which occurred within a year of the death of
her father.
As a result, petitioner's arrival in the Philippines on 24 May 2005 was definitely coupled with both animus manendi and animus non revertendi.
True, petitioner's transfer in this case was incremental. But this Court has already recognized the validity of incremental transfers. In Mitra v.
COMELEC, 193 We stated:
Mitra's feed mill dwelling cannot be considered in isolation and separately from the circumstances of his transfer of residence, specifically, his
expressed intent to transfer to a residence outside of Puerto Princesa City to make him eligible to run for a provincial position; his preparatory
moves starting in early 2008; his initial transfer through a leased dwelling; the purchase of a lot for his permanent home; and the construction of a
house in this lot that, parenthetically, is adjacent to the premises he leased pending the completion of his house. These incremental moves do not
offend reason at all, in the way that the COMELEC's highly subjective non-legal standards do. (Emphasis supplied)
Even the Superior Court of Pennsylvania in Bell v. Bell194 recognized the notion of incremental transfers in a change of domicile:
Intent, being purely subjective, must to a large extent be determined by the acts which are manifestations of that intent. However, it does not follow
from that that the acts must all occur simultaneously with the formation of the intent. Such a conclusion would be contrary to human nature. One
does not move to a new domicile and immediately change church membership, bank account, operator's license, and club memberships. Nor does
he immediately select a neighborhood, purchase a home and buy furniture. All of those acts require varying degrees of consideration and as a
consequence cannot be done hastily nor simultaneously. (Emphases supplied)
The foregoing considered, the COMELEC used a wrong consideration in reaching the conclusion that petitioner failed to meet the durational
residency requirement of 10 years. There is no falsity to speak of in the representation made by petitioner with regard to her residence in the
country. For using wrong or irrelevant considerations in deciding the issue, COMELEC tainted its cancellation of petitioner's 2016 certificate of
candidacy for president with grave abuse of discretion.
Long Residence in the Philippines
We must remember that petitioner and her children would have stayed in the Philippines for 10 years and 11 months by 9 May 2016. For nearly 11
years, her children have studied and spent a substantial part of their formative years here. On this, the case of Hale is again instructive:
We have held that '[t]he exercise of political rights, admissions, declarations, the acts of purchasing a home and long-continued residency are
circumstances indicative of his intention to abandon his domicile of origin and to establish a new domicile.' Taking into consideration all of these
factors, the circuit court did not err in determining that Stone's domicile has existed in Marshall County since October of 2013. (Emphasis supplied
and citations omitted)

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Petitioner's intention to abandon US

domicile was not negated
The COMELEC First Division and the COMELEC En Banc in SPA Nos. 15-002 (DC), 15-007 (DC) and 15-139 (DC) ruled that the fact that
petitioner's husband remained and retained his employment in the US in May 2005 negated her intent to reside permanently in the Philippines.
Furthermore, petitioner travelled frequently to the US using her US passport even after she reacquired her Philippine citizenship. According to the
COMELEC, these show that she has not abandoned her domicile in the US. Respondent Valdez also points to two houses in the US that petitioner
maintains up to the present, and alleges that this fact also negates her alleged intent to reside permanently in the Philippines.
The fact that petitioner's husband was left in the US and retained his employment there should be viewed based on the totality of the circumstances
and the reason for such separation. There is no question that the impetus for petitioner to move back to the Philippines was the death of her father
in December 2004 and the desire to be back in the Philippines and comfort her grieving mother. There is also no question that by May 2005,
petitioner and her children were already living in the Philippines and the children already enrolled in Philippine schools.
Petitioner and her family could not have been expected to uproot their lives completely from the US and finish all arrangements in the span of six
months. One of the spouses had to remain in the US to wind up all logistical affairs. There is also no showing that petitioner is able to readily find a
job in the Philippines upon their return. Again, one of the spouses has to continue earning a living for the family's upkeep and to finance the heavy
cost of relocation. The conjugal decision became clear when it was the husband who kept his employment in the us and came to join his family in
the Philippines only after the sale of the house in the US.
To my mind, that petitioner's husband remained in the US until April 2006 only showed that the family endured a period of separation in order to
rebuild their family life together in the Philippines. The fact that the husband stayed behind should not have been considered in isolation but
contemplated in light of the realities of the situation.
The COMELEC also faults petitioner for travelling to the US "frequently" using her US passport. A closer examination of the factual circumstances at
the time, however, reveals that petitioner had a justifiable reason for doing so.
When petitioner came back to the Philippines in May 2005, she was admittedly still a US citizen. She reacquired her Philippine citizenship on 7 July
2006 under the auspices of Republic Act No. 9225 and became a dual citizen of the Philippines and the US. It was only on 20 October 2010 that
petitioner renounced her US citizenship and became a pure Filipino citizen. Thus, petitioner was a US citizen from May 2005 to 20 October 2010.
Section 215(b) of the US Immigration and Nationality Act provides that "it shall be unlawful for any citizen of the United States to depart from or
enter, or attempt to depart from or enter, the United States unless he bears a valid United States passport." This provision is echoed in Section 53.1
of the US Code of Federal Regulations, unless the US citizen falls under any of the exceptions provided therein.195
Petitioner, as a US citizen, was required by law to use her US passport when travelling to and from the US. Notwithstanding her dual citizenship and
the abandonment of her US domicile, she could not have entered or departed from the US if she did not use her US passport.
In Maquiling v. COMELEC, 196 which I penned for the Court, while we ruled that the use of a foreign passport negates the earlier renunciation of
such foreign citizenship, did not say, however, that the use of a foreign passport after reacquisition of Philippine citizenship and before the
renunciation of the foreign citizenship adversely affects the residency of a candidate for purposes of running in the elections. This case cannot,
therefore, be used as basis to negate petitioner's residency. This Maquiling decision involved Rommel Arnado who was elected Mayor of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in the 2010 elections. He ran also for the 2013 elections for the same post and won again. The Court affirmed the
Maquiling doctrine in the case of Arnado v. COMELEC.197 The doctrine was not expanded in any manner as to affect petitioner's citizenship claim.
The Maquiling doctrine solely has to do with the effect of the continued use of a US passport after the renunciation of US citizenship. In the case of
petitioner, there is absolutely no evidence, which even COMELEC admits, that she used a US passport after she renounced her US citizenship on
20 October 2010. Clearly, Maquiling and Arnado are not relevant to the petitioner's case until new proof can be adduced contradicting the present
state of the evidence on record that petitioner never used her US passport after she renounced her US citizenship.
Taking into account all these pieces of evidence, it cannot be said that petitioner made a false material representation in her 2016 certificate of
candidacy for president as far as her residency is concerned. The totality of these circumstances shows that indeed, she had re-established her
residence in the Philippines for 10 years and 11 months until the day before the elections in May 2016, which is sufficient to qualify her to run for
president in the country. At the very least, it negates a finding of deliberate intention on her part to mislead the electorate with regard to her
residency. Evidently, a single statement in her 2013 certificate of candidacy for senator cannot be deemed to overthrow the entirety of the evidence
on record, which shows that her residence in the Philippines commenced in May 2005.
IV.
B. ON CITIZENSHIP
In the assailed Resolutions, the COMELEC also declared that petitioner made a false material representation when she declared that she was a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines. According to the commission, petitioner's inability to prove her blood relationship to a Filipino parent
precluded her from ever claiming natural-born status under the 1935 Constitution. COMELEC argues, therefore, that her declaration as to her
citizenship must necessarily be considered false.
I find no support whatsoever for these legal conclusions.
Petitioner did not make a false material
representation regarding her citizenship in
her 2016 Certificate of Candidacy for
president.
Considering that there has been no definitive ruling on the citizenship of foundlings, it would be unreasonable and unfair for the COMELEC to
declare that petitioner deliberately misrepresented her status as a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. In fact, the evidence she submitted in
support of her claim of citizenship gives us every reason to accept her assertion of good faith.
In any event, I believe that there is sufficient legal basis to sustain a presumption of citizenship in favor of petitioner notwithstanding the absence of
any physical proof of her filiation. Her natural-born status can be founded from solid interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution.
There was no deliberate attempt to
mislead, misinform, or hide a fact
that would otherwise render her
ineligible.

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Contrary to claims that petitioner committed deliberate misrepresentation when she declared that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen, the following
documents support a finding of good faith on her part:
1. Adoption Decree
The adoption decree issued in favor of petitioner in 1974 allows her to legally claim to be the daughter of Ronald Allan Poe and Jesusa Sonora Poe.
This proposition finds support in statutes and jurisprudence.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals, We held that upon entry of an adoption decree, the law creates a relationship in which adopted children were
declared "born of' their adoptive parents. 198
Congress confirmed this interpretation when it enacted R.A. 8552, which provides that the "adoptee shall be considered the legitimate son/daughter
of the adopter for all intents and purposes and as such is entitled to all the rights and obligations provided 1 by law to legitimate sons/daughter born
to them without discrimination of any kind."199
Apart from obtaining the status of legitimate children, adoptees are likewise entitled to maintain the strict confidentiality of their adoption
proceedings. The provisions of P.D. 603,200 R.A. 85152201 and the Rule on Adoption202 stipulate that all records, books, and papers relating to
the adoption cases in the files of the court, the Department of Social Welfare and Development, or any other agency or institution participating in the
adoption proceedings shall be kept strictly confidential. The records are permanently sealed and may be opened only upon the court's
determination that the disclosure of information to third parties if "necessary" and "for the best interest of the adoptee."203 This grant of
confidentiality would mean very little if an adoptee is required to go beyond this decree to prove her parentage.
2. Certificate of Live Birth
Upon the issuance of an adoption decree, an amended certificate of birth is issued by the civil registrar attesting to the fact that the adoptee is the
child of the adopters by being registered with their surname.204 Like all persons, petitioner has the right to rely on this birth certificate for
information about her identity, status and filiation.
Article 410 of the Civil Code states that the books making up the civil register and all documents relating thereto are considered public documents
and shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein contained.205 As a public document, a registered certificate of live birth enjoys the
presumption of validity.206
Petitioner's birth certificate also has the imprimatur of no less than the Municipal Court of San Juan, Rizal Province.207 In the absence of a
categorical pronouncement in an appropriate proceeding that the decree of adoption is void, the birth certificate and the facts stated therein are
deemed 1egitimate, genuine and rea1.208
Petitioner thus cannot be faulted for relying on the contents of a public document which enjoys strong presumptions of validity under the law. She is
actually obliged to do so because the law does not provide her with any other reference for information regarding her parentage. It must be noted
that records evidencing her former foundling status 'have been sealed after the issuance of the decree of adoption. In Baldos v. Court of Appeals
and Pillazar, 209 We held that it is not for a person to prove the facts stated in his certificate of live birth, but for those who are assailing the
certificate to prove its alleged falsity.
The issuance of an amended certificate without any notation that it is new or amended or issued pursuant to an adoption decree, should not be
taken against petitioner, because it merely complies with the confidentiality provisions found in adoption laws.210 Under Section 16 of the Rule on
Adoption (A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC, 31 July 2002), it shall be the responsibility of the civil registrar where the foundling was registered to annotate the
adoption decree on the foundling certificate, and to prepare and a new birth certificate without any notation that it is a new or amended certificate.
3. Voter's ID
The Voter's ID issued to petitioner likewise prove that she acted in good faith when she asserted that she was a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines. Precisely because of the entries in these documents, Poe could not be expected to claim any citizenship other than that of the
Philippines. Hence, she could not have committed a material misrepresentation in making this declaration.
4. Philippine Passport
In 1996, R.A. 8239 (Philippine Passport Act of 1996) was passed. The law imposes upon the government the duty to issue passport or any travel
document to any citizen of the Philippines or individal who complies with the requirements of the Act.211 "Passport" has been defined as a
document issued by the Philippine government to its citizens and requesting other governments to allow its citizens to pass safely and freely, and in
case of need to give him/her all lawful aid and protection.212
Section 5 of R.A. 8239 states that no passport shall be issued to an applicant unless the Secretary or his duly authorized representative is satisfied
that the applicant is a Filipino citizen who has complied with the requirements. Conversely, a Philippine passport holder like petitioner is presumed
to be a Filipino citizen, considering the presumption of regularity accorded to acts of public officials in the course of their duties. When the claim to
Philippine citizenship is doubtful, only a "travel document" is issued.213 A travel document, in lieu of a passport, is issued to stateless persons who
are likewise permanent residents, or refugees granted such status or asylum in the Philippines.214 If the State considers foundlings to be anything
else but its citizens (stateless persons, for example), it would not have given them passports. However, since the 1950s, the Department of Foreign
Affairs (DFA) has been issuing passports to foundlings.215 A quick look at the official website216 of the DFA would show an enumeration of
supporting documents required of foundlings for the issuance of a Philippine passport; to wit, certificate of foundling authenticated by the Philippine
Statistics Authority, clearance from the Department of Social Work and Development (DSWD), passport of the person who found the applicant, and
letter of authority or endorsement from DSWD for the issuance of passport. The only conclusion that can be made is that foundlings are considered
by the State, or at least by the executive, to be Philippine citizens.
Rule 130, Section 44217 of the Rules of Court has been cited by the Court to support the finding that entries in the passport are presumed true.218
On its face, the Philippine passport issued to Poe on 16 March 2014 indicates her citizenship to be "Filipino." Hence, the COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion in not even considering this as evidence in determining whether Poe intended to deceive the electorate when she
indicated that she was a natural-born Filipino.
5. Bureau of Immigration Order
While findings made by Bureau of Immigration (BI) on the citizenship of petitioner is not conclusive on the COMELEC,219 such negate any notion
of bad faith or malice on the part of petitioner when she made the representation in her CoC that she was a natural-born citizen. At the time, the

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presumption created by the Order was in operation. In effect, petitioner had color of authority to state that she was a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines.
It has been argued that petitioner had obtained the BI order only because she misrepresented herself to have been "born ... to Ronald Allan Kelley
Poe and Jesusa Sonora Poe."220 However, as previously discussed, the potent policy interests221 embedded in the confidentiality of adoption
records fully justifies her decision to write the names of her adoptive parents as indicated in her birth certificate.
6. The Decision of the Senate Electoral Tribunal in SET Case No. 001-05
The SET Decision is a prima facie finding of natural-born citizenship that petitioner can rely on. The fact that the SET Decision was issued later than
the filing by petitioner of her CoC for president does not take away from its validity as another tangible basis of petitioner to validly claim that she
was a natural-born Filipino. It should be borne in mind that the SET Decision is a determination of petitioner's natural-born status as of the time she
was elected and assumed her duties as senator of the Philippines. While the Decision was later in issuance, the application of this ruling by the SET
significantly predates the filing of her 2016 certificate of candidacy for president.
Taken together, the enumerated documents provide petitioner with sufficient basis for her claim of citizenship. She cannot be faulted for relying
upon these pieces of evidence, particularly considering that at the time she made her declaration that she was a natural-born citizen, the
presumption created by these documents has not been overturned.
At any rate, it would be absurd for petitioner to answer "foundling" in every document where her filiation and citizenship is required when her birth
certificate and other official documents provide otherwise. Not only would this defeat the purpose of the degree of confidentiality prescribed by the
law, she would even run the risk of causing offense to her parents whom she would deprive of actual recognition.
Petitioner's honest belief that she was a natural-born citizen is further shown by her constant assertion of her status and is corroborated by official
documents and acts of government issued in her favor. I believe that these documents, at the very least, negate any deliberate intent on her part to
mislead the electorate as to her citizenship qualification.
Legal Significance of Confirmation of Renunciation
It had been posited that petitioner's repatriation as a citizen of the Philippines under R.A. 9225 had been rendered doubtful by her subsequent acts
in 2011, in particular her execution of an Oath/ Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of United States before a Vice Consul of the U.S. Embassy
in the Philippines;222 her completion of a Questionnaire on Information for Determining Possible Loss of U.S. Citizenship;223 and the issuance of a
Confirmation of Loss of Nationality of the United States.224
Suffice it to state that these documents were; executed by petitioner only for the purpose of complying with the requirements of U.S. law. It had no
relevance to petitioner's reacquisition of citizenship under Philippine law. The fact remains that she had already properly renounced her U.S.
citizenship by executing the Affidavit of Renunciation required in Section 5 of R.A. 9225. Any act done thereafter served only to confirm this earlier
renunciation of foreign citizenship.
Respondent validly presumed that
she is a citizen of the Philippines.
The failure of the COMELEC to properly appreciate evidence showing good faith on the part of petitioner is compounded by its narrow-minded
approach to the question of citizenship. There is sufficient basis to support the presumption that foundlings are citizens of the Philippines.
Although the citizenship of foundlings is not expressly addressed by the language of Article IV of the Constitution, Philippine statutes, administrative
regulations and jurisprudence support this conclusion, even in light of the absence of physical proof to establish foundlings filiation.
Moreover, a presumption of foundlings their natural-born status can be established by the deliberations of the 1935 Constitution and the history of
its provisions. These legal authorities and materials serve as sufficient justification for any foundlings good faith belief that she is a natural-born
citizen.
The standard proposed by the COMELEC - physical proof of blood relation to a parent who is a citizen of the Philippines - is an impossible,
oppressive and discriminatory condition. To allow the imposition of this unjust and unreasonable requirement is to sanction a violation of the
Constitution and our obligations under existing international law.
In Philippine law, a foundling refers to a deserted or abandoned infant; or a child whose parents, guardian, or relatives are unknown; or a child
committed to an orphanage or charitable or similar institution with unknown facts of birth and parentage, and registered as such in the Civil
Register.225
The ruling of the COMELEC is premised solely on the admitted fact that petitioner is a foundling. As explained in the assailed Resolutions, petitioner
was found abandoned in the parish church of Jaro, Iloilo, on 3 September 1968 by a certain Edgardo Militar. She was later on legally adopted by
Ronald Allan Poe and Jesusa Sonora Poe. To date, however, her biological parents are unknown.
According to the COMELEC, these circumstances render the citizenship of petitioner questionable. It claims that I since she is unable to establish
the identities of her parents, she is likewise incapable of proving that she is related by blood to a Filipino parent. Accordingly, she cannot be
considered a natural-born Filipino citizen. These arguments are unmeritorious.
Filiation as a matter of legal fiction
Under Philippine law, the parentage of a child is a matter of legal fiction. Its determination relies not on physical proof, but on legal presumptions
and circumstantial evidence. For instance, a child is disputably or conclusively presumed legitimate, i.e. born of two married individuals depending
on the period that elapsed between the birth of that child and the ce1ebration226 or termination227 of the spouses' marriage. The presumption of
the fact of legitimacy is one of the strongest known to the law, and cannot be overthrown except by stronger evidence.228 As the Court explained in
Rodolfo A. Aguilar v. Edna G. Siasat: 229
"There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on sounder morality and more convincing reason than the
presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate. This presumption indeed becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there is physical
impossibility of access between the spouses during the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately precedes the birth of the child due to (a)
the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact that the husband and wife are living separately in such a
way that sexual intercourse is not possible; or (c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevents sexual intercourse. Quite remarkably,
upon the expiration of the periods set forth in Article 170, and in proper cases Article 171, of the Family Code (which took effect on 03 August 1988),

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the action to impugn the legitimacy of a child would no longer be legally feasible and the status conferred by the presumption becomes fixed and
unassailable. (Emphases supplied)
The Family Code also allows paternity and filiation to be established through any of the following methods: (1) record of birth; (2) written admission
of filiation; (3) open and continuous possdssion of the status of a legitimate or an illegitimate child; (4) or other means allowed by the Rules or
special laws.230 Notably, none of these methods requires physical proof of parentage:
(a) The entries in a record of birth depend only on the statements of certain persons identified by law: in general, administrator of the hospital, or in
absence thereof, either of the following: the physician/nurse/midwife/hilot who attended the birth. In default of both, either or both parents shall
cause the registration of the birth; and if the birth occurs in a vessel/vehicle/airplane while in transit, registration shall be the joint responsibility of the
driver/captain/pilot and the parents.231
(b) Filiation may also be proved by an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the
parent concerned. In Aguilar, the Court declared that such due recognition in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of
acknowledgment of the child and requires no further court action.232
(c) With respect to open and continuous possession of the status of children and other means allowed by the Rules of Court, the relevant sections
of Rule 130 provide:
SEC. 39. Act or declaration about pedigree. - The act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another
person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the
two persons is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word "pedigree" includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage,
death, the dates when and the places where these facts occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately
connected with pedigree.
SEC. 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree. - The reputation or tradition existing in a family previous to the controversy, in respect to
the pedigree of any one of its members, may be received in evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by
consanguinity or affinity. Entries in family bibles or other family books or charts, engraving on rings, family portraits and the like, may be received as
evidence of pedigree.
Evidently, there is no legal basis for the standard proposed by the COMELEC and private respondents. Physical or scientific proof of a blood
relationship to a putative parent is not required by law to establish filiation or any status arising therefrom such as citizenship. In fact, this Court has
repeatedly emphasized that DNA evidence is not absolutely essential so long as paternity or filiation may be established by other proof.233 There
is, therefore, no reason to impose this undue burden on petitioner, particularly in light of her situation as a foundling. Instead of requiring foundlings
to produce evidence of their filiation - a nearly impossible condition - administrative agencies, the courts and even Congress have instead
proceeded on the assumption that these children are citizens of the Philippines.
Contemporaneous and subsequent
construction by the legislature, executive
and judicial branches of government
Although the details of their births cannot be established, foundlings are provided legal protection by the state through statutes, rules, issuances
and judicial decisions allowing their adoption. As early as 1901, the Code of Civil Procedure234 recognized that children whose parents are
unknown have a right to be adopted. Failure to identify the parents of the child was not made an obstacle to adoption; instead, the rules allowed a
legal guardian, or the trustees/directors of an orphan asylum, to grant t, e required consent on behalf of the unknown parents. Similar provisions
were included in the subsequent revisions of the Rules of Court in 1940235 and 1964.236
Early statutes also specifically allowed the adoption of foundlings. Act No. 1670 was enacted precisely to provide for the adoption of poor children
who were in the custody of asylums and other institutions. These children included orphans or "any other child so maintained therein whose parents
are unknown":237
SECTION 548. Adoption of child from institution for poor children. - Upon the application of any person to the competent authorities of any asylum
or institution where the poor children are maintained at public expense to adopt any child so maintained therein, it shall be the duty of such
authorities, with the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, to report the fact to the provincial fiscal, or in the City of Manila to the fiscal of the city,
and such official shall thereupon prepare the necessary adoption papers and present the matter to the proper court. The costs of such proceeding,
in court shall be de oficio.
The provisions of Act No. 1670 were substantially included in the Administrative Code of 1916238 and in the Revised Administrative Code of
1911.239
In 1995, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 8043 to establish the rules governing the "Inter-country Adoption of Filipino Children." The adoption of
a foundling was similarly recognized under Section 8 of the statute, which allowed the submission of a foundling certificate to facilitate the intercountry adoption of a child.240 A few years later or in 1998, the law on "Domestic Adoption of Filipino Children" was amended through R.A. 8552.
This time, a specific provision was included to govern the registration of foundlings for purposes of adoption:
SECTION 5. Location of Unknown Parent(s). - It shall be the duty of the Department or the child-placing or child-caring agency which has custody
of the child to exert all efforts to locate his/her unknown biological parent(s). If such efforts fail, the child shall be registered as a foundling and
subsequently be the subject of legal proceedings where he/she shall be declared abandoned.
In 2009, Congress passed R.A. 9523,241 which allowed the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) to declare a child "legally
available for adoption" as a prerequisite for adoption proceedings. Under this statute, foundlings were included in the definition of abandoned
children242 and expressly allowed to be adopted, provided they were first declared by the DSWD as available for adoption.243 Administrative
Order No. 011-09 was adopted by that department in 2009 to implement the statute.244
These enactments and issuances on adoption are significant, because they effectively recognize foundlings as citizens of the Philippines. It must be
emphasized that jurisdiction over adoption cases is determined by the citizenship of the adopter and the adoptee. As explained by this Court in
Spouses Ellis v. Republic,245 the Philippine Civil Code adheres to the theory that jurisdiction over the status of a natural person is determined by
the latter's nationality. This 1uling cites Article 15 of the Civil Code:
ARTICLE 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad.

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The citizenship of a person is a "status" governed by this provision is clear, pursuant to our ruling in Board of Immigration Commissioners v.
Callano. 246 In that case, We applied the nationality rule in Article 15 to determine whether some individuals had lost their Philippine citizenship:
"The question, whether petitioners who are admittedly Filipino citizens at birth subsequently acquired Chinese citizenship under the Chinese Law of
Nationality by reason of recognition or a prolonged stay in China, is a fit subject for the Chinese law and the Chinese court to determine, which
cannot be resolved by a Philippine court without encroaching on the legal system of China. For, the settled rule of international law, affirmed by the
Hague Convention on Conflict of Nationality Laws of April 12, 1930 and by the International Court of Justice, is that." Any question as to whether a
person possesses the nationality of a particular state should be determined in accordance with the laws of that state." (quoted in Salonga, Private
International Law, 1957 Ed., p. l 12) There was no necessity of deciding that question because so far as concern the petitioners' status, the only
question in this proceeding is: Did the petitioners lose their Philippine citizenship upon the performance of certain acts or the happening of certain
events in China? In deciding this question no foreign law can be applied. The petitioners are admittedly Filipino citizens at birth, and their status
must be governed by Philippine law wherever they may be, in conformity with Article 15 (formerly Article 9) of the Civil Code which provides as
follows: "Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, conditions and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad." Under Article IV, Section 2, of the Philippine Constitution, "Philippine citizenship. may be lost or reacquired
m the manner provided by law," which implies that the question of whether a Filipino has lost his Philippine citizenship shall be determined by no
other than the Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
Ellis also discredits the assertion that this Court has no power to determine the citizenship of a foundling based only on presumptions. In that case,
an infant named Baby Rose was abandoned at the Heart of Mary Villa, an institution for unwed mothers. When an American couple, the Spouses
Ellis, later sought to adopt Baby Rose, the Supreme Court presumed the citizenship of the infant for purposes of adoption:
"In this connection, it should be noted that this is a proceedings in rem, which no court may entertain unless it has jurisdiction, not only over the
subject matter of the case an4 over the parties, but also over the res, which is the personal status of Baby Rose as well as that of petitioners herein.
Our Civil Code (Art. 15) adheres to the theory that jurisdiction over the status of a natural person is determined by the latters' nationality. Pursuant to
this theory, we have jurisdiction over the status of Baby Rose, she being a citizen of the Philippines, but not over the status of the petitioners, who
are foreigners. Under our political law, which is patterned after the Anglo-American legal system, we have, likewise, adopted the latter's view to the
effect that personal status, in general, is determined by and/ or subject to the jurisdiction of the domiciliary law (Restatement of the Law of Conflict
of Laws, p. 86; The Conflict of Laws by Beale, Vol. I, p. 305, Vol. II, pp. 713-714). This, perhaps, is the reason why our Civil Code does not permit
adoption by nonresident aliens, and we have consistently refused to recognize the validity of foreign decrees of divorce - regardless of the grounds
upon which the same are based - involving citizens of the Philippines who are not bona fide residents of the forum, even when our laws authorized
absolute divorce in the Philippines. (citations omitted and emphasis supplied)
In the 1976 case Duncan v. CFI of Rizal, 247 the Court again presumed the Philippine citizenship of a foundling for purposes of adoption.
Notwithstanding the refusal of the de facto guardian o reveal the identity of the child's mother, the adoption of the abandoned child was allowed in
order to prevent a "cruel sanction on an innocent child":
Having declared that the child was an abandoned one by an unknown parent, there appears to be no m re legal need to require the written consent
of such parent o the child to the adoption. xxx.
The trial court in its decision had sought refuse in the ancient Roman legal maxim "Dura lexsedlex" to cleanse its hands of the hard and harsh
decision it rendered. While this old adage generally finds apt application in many other legal cases, in adoption of children, however, this should be
softened so as to apply the law with less severity and with compassion and humane understanding, for adoption is more or the benefit of
unfortunate children, particularly those born out of wedlock, than for those born with a silver spoon in their mouths. All efforts or acts designed to
provide homes, love, care and education for unfortunate children, who otherwise may grow from cynical street urchins to hardened criminal
offenders and become serious social problems, should be given the widest latitude of sympathy, encouragement and assistance. The law is not,
and should not be made, an instrument to impede the achievement of a salutary humane policy As often as is legally and lawfully possible, their
texts and intendments should be construed so as to give all the chances for human life to exist - with a modicum promise f a useful and constructive
existence.
. . . If we are now to sustain the decision of the court below, this Tribunal will be doing a graver injustice to all concerned particularly to said
spouses, and worse, it will be imposing a cruel sanction on this innocent child and on all other children who might be similarly situated. We consider
it to be justifiable and more humane to formalize a factual relation, that of parents and son, existing between the herein petitioning spouses and the
minor child baptized by them as Colin Berry Christensen Duncan, than to sustain the hard, harsh and cruel interpretation of he law that was done by
the private respondent court and Judge. It is Our view that it is in consonance with the rue spirit and purpose of the law, and with the policy of the
State, to uphold, encourage and give life and meaning to the existence of family relations.
Although the citizenship of the child in Duncan was not elaborated upon, the Court proceeded to assume jurisdiction over the adoption proceedings.
From this act, it may be inferred that the Court presumed that the child was a Philippine citizen whose status m y be determined by a Philippine
court pursuant to Article 15 of the Civil Code.
The foregoing enactments and decisions prove the contemporaneous and subsequent interpretation of the Constitution b the three branches of
government. It is evident that Congress, certain administrative agencies and even the courts have always proceeded on the assumption that these
children are Filipino citizens in the absence of evidence to the contrary.
The assertion that citizenship cannot be made to rest upon a presumption is contradicted by the previous pronouncements of this Court. In Board of
Commissioners et. al v. Dela Rosa, 248the Court utilized a presumption of citizenship in favor of respondent William Gatchalian on the basis of an
Order of the Bureau of Immigration admitting him as a Filipino citizen.
On March 15, 1973, then Acting Commissioner Nituda issued an Order (Annex "6", counter-petition which affirmed the Board of Special Inquiry No.
1 decision dated July 6, 1961 admitting respondent Gatchalian and others as Filipino citizens; recalled the July 6, 1962 warrant of arrest an
revalidated their Identification Certificates.
The above order admitting respondent as a Filipino citizen is the last official act of the government on the basis of which respondent William
Gatchalian continually exercised the rights of a Filipino citizen to the present. Consequently, the presumption of citizenship lies in favor of
respondent William Gatchalian.
In 2004, a presumption was likewise made y this Court to resolve issues involving the citizenship of presidential candidate Fernando Poe, Jr. in
Tecson v. COMELEC.249 In particular, the presumption that Poe's grandfather had been a resident of San Carlos, Pangasinan, from 1898 to 1902,
entitled him to benefit from the en masse Filipinization effected by the Philippine Bill of 1902. We explained:
The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou would indicate that he died on 11 September 1954, at the age of 84 years, in San Carlos, Pangasinan. It could
thus be assumed that Lorenzo Pou was born sometime in the year 1870 when the Philippines was still a colony of Spain. Petitioner would argue
that Lorenzo Pou was not in the Philippine during the crucial period of from 1898 to 1902 considering that there was no existing record about such

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fact in the Records Management an Archives Office. Petitioner, however, likewise failed to show that Lorenzo Pou was at any other place during the
same period. In his death certificate, the residence of Lorenzo Pou was stated to be San Carlos, Pangasinan. In the absence of any evidence to the
contrary, it should be sound to conclude, or at least to presume, that the place of residence of a person at the time of his death was also his
residence before death. It would be extremely doubtful if the Records Management and Archives Of ice would have had complete records of all
residents of the Philippines from 1898 to 1902.
xxxx
(3) In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave abuse of discretion has been committed by the COMELEC, it is necessary to take on the
matter of whether or not private respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or not the father of private
respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of private
respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou
could only be drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been ho n sometime in the year 1870,
when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of
any other evidence, could have well been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the en masse
Filipinization that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F.
Poe, father of private respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime private respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to
all persons whose fathers e Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate. (Emphasis supplied)
It is reasonable to presume that petitioner is a Filipino citizen, considering that she was found abandoned in Iloilo at a time when the number of
children born to foreigners in the country as but a small fraction of the total number of births in the Philippines.250 without evidence to the contrary,
this presumption must stand in accordance with the rules on evidence.
The Place of Probability in the Rule of Law
Obedience to the rule of law is the bedrock of the Philippine justice system.251 In order to expound and define the true meaning and operation of
these laws, they must first be ascertained by judicial determination, and in order "to produce uniformity in these determinations, they ought to be
submitted, in the last resort, to one supreme tribunal xxx authorized to settle and declare in the last resort a uniform rule f civil justice."252
The rules of evidence, authorized by the Constitution, is a means by which uniformity is instituted in the judicial system whether in courts of law or
administrative agencies granted quasi-adjudicatory power. These rules govern the means of ascertaining the truth respecting a matter of fact.253
It must be emphasized that ascertaining evidence does not entail absolute certainty. Under Rule 128 of the Rules of Court, evidence must only
induce belief in the existence of a fact in issue, thus:
Section 4. Relevancy; collateral matters. - Evidence must have such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or
nonexistence. Evidence on collateral matters shall not be allowed, except when it tends in any reasonable degree to establish the probability or
improbability of the fact in issue. (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, judges are not precluded from drawing conclusions from inferences based on established facts. In the case of Joaquin v. Navarro, 254 the
Court proceeded to discuss this process:255
In speaking of inference the rule can not mean beyond doubt, for "inference is never certainty, but it may be plain enough to justify a finding of fact."
xxxx
"Juries must often reason," says one author, "according to probabilities, drawing an inference that the main fact in issue existed from collateral facts
not directly proving, but strongly tending to prove, its existence. The vital question in such cases is the cogency of the proof afforded by the
secondary facts. How likely, according to experience, is the existence of the primary fact if certain secondary facts exist?" The same author tells us
of a case where "a jury was justified in drawing the inference that the person who was caught firing a shot at an animal trespassing on his land was
the person who fired a shot about an hour before at the same animal also trespassing." That In fact, the circumstances in the illustration leave
greater room for another possibility than do the facts of the case at hand.256 (Emphasis supplied and citations omitted)
This is enshrined in established legal doctrines, including that of probable cause for preliminary investigation,257 probable cause for issuance of a
warrant of arrest,258 substantial evidence,259 preponderance of evidence,260 and character evidence.261
Jurisprudence is replete with cases decided on the basis of probability. For example, the Court affirmed an award of work-related compensation to
an employee who contracted rectal cancer based on a probability, stating thus:
The degree of proof required to establish work connection between the disabling ailment and the working conditions is merely substantial evidence,
or "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion" Probability not certainty is the touchstone in
testing evidence of work-connection. 262 (Emphasis in the original and citations omitted).
In criminal cases, it has also been ruled that "extrajudicial confessions, independently made without collusion, which are identical with each other in
their essential details and are corroborated by other evidence on record, are admissible as circumstantial evidence against the person implicated to
show the probability of the latter's actual participation in the commission of the crime."263
Note that the two cases cited pertain to different quantum of evidence (substantial for administrative and beyond reasonable doubt for criminal), but
both have relied upon probabilities to rule upon n issue. In that sense, it can be concluded that probabilities are considered s essential elements of
the judicial determination of relevant evidence.
While it is true that administrative or quasi-judicial bodies are not bound by the technical rules of procedure in the adjudication of cases, this
procedural rule should not be construed as a lice se to disregard certain fundamental evidentiary rules.264 In the instant case COMELEC refused to
consider evidence that tends to "establish the probability of a fact in issue," which in this case pertains to petitioner's citizenship, claiming that it "did
not and could not show bloodline to a Filipino pare t as required under jus sanguinis."265 This, to my mind, constitutes gross misappreciation of the
facts.
First and foremost, it is admitted that petitioner has typical Filipino features, with her brown eyes, low nasal bridge, black hair, oval-shaped face and
height. This by itself, does not evince belief that as to her definite citizenship, but coupled with other circumstantial evidence-that she was
abandoned as an infant, that the population of Iloilo in 1968 was Filipino266 and there were not international airports in Iloilo a that time-establishes
the probability the she was born of Filipino parents.

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Such probability is further enhanced by the statistics obtained from the Philippine Statistics Authority, showing that 10,558,278 children (99.03%)
were born to Filipino parents while 15,98 (0.07%) were born to foreigners in the Philippines from 1965 to 1975.267 Considering that the e1ection
cases require a mere preponderance of evidence,268 then it can be reasonably concluded that petitioner has fulfilled the requirements of
citizenship under the law. In the words of Justice Tuazon in Joaquin, this conclusion is not airtight but rational; never certain but plain enough to
justify a fact.
The rationale for implementing this policy is simple - to require abandoned children to prove their parentage or status before they are granted
protection would compound their already dire predicament. That requirement would render these unfortunate children even more vulnerable, in
contravention of the declared policy of the State to "defend the right of children to assistance, including proper care an nutrition, and special
protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development."269
Respondent may he considered a natural-born
citizen under the 1935 Constitution.
Having established that foundlings may be presumed citizens of the Philippines, the question now turns to whether they may be considered naturalborn. I believe that this issue may be resolved by utilizing both an originalist and a functionalist approach to the interpretation of the Constitution.
Originalist v. Functionalist Interpretation
In its Memorandum, the COMELEC asserted that foundlings cannot be considered natural-born citizens in light of the principle of inclusion unius est
exclusion alterius.270 This line of reasoning stems from an originalist reading of the Constitution, which is anchored on the principle that
constitutional issues are to be resolved by looking only at the text of the Constitution and at the clear intent of the framers.271 Intentionalism is a
species of originalism. Another species is textualism, which has been described as "that [which] looks to the Constitution's original public
meaning,"272 or "read[s] the language of the Constitution as the man on the street would understand it."273
It is a fallacy, however, to assert that there is only one - originalist/textualist - approach to interpret the Constitution. There are many approaches to
constitutional interpretation, sub-classified into a) originalism v. non-originalism, and b) formalism v. functionalism, among others. In his commentary
on the Philippine Constitution, Bernas enumerated and described at least five modes of constitutional interpretation, i.e. historical approach,274
structural approach,275 doctrinal approach,276 ethical approach,277 and prudential approach.278
In legal scholarship, the functionalist approach appears to be defined most clearly by what it is not - it is not formalism.279 William Eskridge, a
member of the Yale Law School faculty wrote a paper entitled "Relationships between Formalism and Functionalism in Separation of Powers
Cases" in which he distinguished formalism from functionalism:
There are no fewer than three different ways that constitutional formalism and functionalism can be contrasted. One is their apparently different
approach to legal rules and standards. Formalism might be associated with bright-line rules that seek to place determinate, readily enforceable
limits on public actors. Functionalism, at least as an antipode, might be associated with standards or balancing tests that seek to provide publi9
actors with greater flexibility.
Another way of contrasting formalism and functionalism focuses on the reasoning process by which we reach rules or standards. Formalism might
be understood as deduction from authoritative constitutional text, structure, original intent, or all three working together. Functionalism might be
understood as induction from constitutional policy and practice, with practice typically being examined over time. Formalist reasoning promises
stability and continuity of analysis over time; functionalist reasoning promises adaptability and evolution.
Finally and relatedly, formalism and functionalism could be contrasted as emphasizing different goals for law. Formalism might be understood as
giving priority to rule of law values such as transparency, predictability, and continuity in law. Functionalism, in turn, might be understood as
emphasizing pragmatic values like adaptability, efficacy, and justice in law.280
I emphasize that this Court has utilized different approaches to interpreting the Constitution. It is not mandated to fake only an originalist view of the
fundamental law. On the contrary: the Court, through Justice Jose P. Laurel, considered the 1935 Constitution to be a "living constitution.281 This
concept is said to have originated from Missouri v. Holland282 penned by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes:
When we are dealing with words that also are a constituent act, like the Constitution of the United States, we must realize that they have called into
life a being the development of which could not have been foreseen completely by the most gifted of its begetters. It was enough for them to realize
or to hope that they had created an organism; it has taken a century and has cost their successors much sweat and blood to prove that they created
a nation. (Emphasis supplied)
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, in his Notion of Living Constitution, 283 ventured to say that the framers purposely couched the United States
Constitution in general terms:
The framers of the Constitution wisely spoke in general language and left to succeeding generations the task of applying that language to the
unceasingly changing environment in which they would live. Those who framed, adopted, and ratified the Civil War amendments to the Constitution
likewise used what have been aptly described as "majestic generalities" in composing the fourteenth amendment. Merely because a particular
activity may not have existed when the Constitution was adopted, or because the framers could not have conceived of a particular method of
transacting affairs, cannot mean that general language in the Constitution may not be applied to such a course of conduct. Where the framers of the
Constitution have used general language, they have given latitude to those who would later interpret the instrument to make that language
applicable to cases that the framers might not have foreseen. (Emphasis Supplied)
Theorists utilizing the functionalist approach have likened Constitutions to animate beings that can evolve to the extent that they become hardly
recognizable by their framers. In other words, they believe that the Constitution may be interpreted in a manner that goes beyond the original intent
of the persons who crafted the text.
In this case, the use of both the originalist and the functionalist approaches leads to the same result - that petitioner pad sufficient reason to believe
that she is a natural-born citizen despite the admitted fact that she was a foundling.
The Originalist Approach:
Interpretation in accordance with the
intent of the framers
Respondents urge the Court to resolve the citizenship issue in this case by using the originalist approach, i.e. to make an interpretation based
primarily on an examination of the text and the original intent of the framers of the 1935 Constitution. They posit that there was no intent on the part
of the delegates to the 1934 Constitutional Convention to consider foundlings as natural-born citizens, "for had it been so, the text of the provision
would have explicitly stated it."284 In thy opinion, this is a simplistic reading of the Constitution that disregards the intent of the framers.

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Where the terms of the Constitution itself do not reveal the intent of the framers and the rest of the people, extrinsic aids may be resorted to, even
when using an originalist approach. The answer may be provided by the debates or proceedings in the Constitutioqal Convention, the
contemporaneous legislative or executive construction, history, and the effects resulting from the construction contemplated285 Here, the records of
the 1934 Constitutional Convention prove that the framers intended to accord natural-born citizenship to foundlings.
It has been argued that the non-inclusion of a provision on "natural children of a foreign father and a Filipino mother not recognized by the father"
negates the intent to consider foundlings natural-born citizens (or even merely citizens). However, the Court cannot infer the absence of intent to
include foundlings based on that fact alone. Indeed, the transcript of the deliberations during the 1934 Constitutional Convention shows why it was
decided that foundlings were not to be expressly mentioned in Section 1, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution:
Sr. Rafols: For an amendment, I propose that after1 subsection 2, the following is inserted: 'The natural children of a foreign father and a Filipino
mother not recognized by the father.'
El Presidente: We would like to request a clarification from the proponent of the amendment. The gentleman refers to natural children or to any kind
of illegitimate children?
Sr. Rafols: To all kinds of illegitimate children. It also includes natural children of unknown parentage, natural or illegitimate children of unknown
parents.
Sr. Montinola: For clarification. The gentleman said 'of unknown parents.' Current codes consider them Filipino, that is, I refer to the Spanish Code
wherein all children of unknown parentage born in Spanish territory are considered Spaniards, because the presumption is that ~ child of unknown
parentage is the son of a Spaniard. This may be applied in the Philippines in that a child of unknown parentage born in the Philippines is deemed to
be Filipino, and there is no need...
Sr. Rafols: There is a need, because we are relating the conditions that are [required] to be Filipino.
Sr. Montinola: But that is the interpretation of the law, therefore, there is no need for the amendment.
Sr. Rafols: The amendment should read thus: 'Natural or illegitimate of a foreign father and a Filipino mother recognized by one, or the children of
unknown parentage.'
Sr. Briones: The amendment [should] mean children born in the Philippines of unknown parentage.
Sr. Rafols: The son of a Filipina to a foreigner, although this [person] does not recognize the child, is not unknown.
El Presidente: Does the gentleman accept the amendment or not?
Sr. Rafols: I do not accept the amendment because the amendment would exclude the children of a Filipina with a foreigner who does not recognize
the child. Their parentage is not unknown and I think those children of overseas Filipino mother and father [whom the latter] does not recognize,
should also be considered as Filipinos.
El Presidente: The question in order is the amendment to the amendment from the gentleman from Cebu, Mr. Briones. :
Mr. Bulson: Mr. President, don't you think it would be better to leave this matter in the hands of the Legislature? :
Sr. Roxas: Mr. President, my humble opinion is that these cases are few and far between, that the constitution need [not] refer to them. By
international law the principle that children or people born in a country of unknown parents are citizens in this nation is recognized, and it is not
necessary to include a provision on the subject exhaustively.
The delegates appeared to have been convince4 that there was no need to include a binding provision on the subject for the1 following reasons:
the Spanish Civil Code already recognizes foundlings were born of Spanish citizens, and were thus Spanish (Sr. Montinola); that the citizenship of
foundlings could be determined by Congress (Sr. Buslon); that the cases were so few and far between that the Constitution did not need to refer to
them (Sr. Roxas); or international law already recognized children or people born in a country of unknown parents as citizens of that country (Sr.
Roxas).
For these reasons, they believed that it was no long1er necessary to include foundlings among those to be expressly enumerated in the 1935
Constitution. The record is bereft of any proposal by any delegate to deny foundlings Filipino citizenship. It would even appear that those delegates
who spoke could not imagine any other interpretation than that foundlings are to be considered Filipinos.
The textual silence on foundlings in Article IV, Section 1 is consistent with the principle that a good Constitution is brief, comprehensive, and
definite.286 The majority287 of the delegates, being lawyers, must have subscribed to the accepted principle that the Constitution is unavoidably
required to be couched in general language:
It did not suit the purposes of the people, in framing this great charter of our liberties, to provide for minute specifications of its powers or to declare
the means by which those powers should be carried into execution. It was foreseen that this would be a perilous and difficult, if not an impracticable,
task. The instrument was not intended to provide merely for the exigencies of a few years, but was to endure through a long lapse of ages, the
events of which were locked up in the insrutable purposes of Providence. It could not be foreseen what new changes and modifications of power
might be indispensable to effectuate the general objects of the charter, and restrictions and specifications which at the present might seem salutary
might in the end prove the overthrow of the system itself. Hence its powers are expressed in general terms, leaving to the legislature from time to
time to adopt its own means to effectuate legitimate objects and to mould and model the exercise of its powers as its own wisdom and the public
interests, should require.288
The understanding that the Constitution must be brief even as it is broad is evident in Sr. Roxas' statement during the deliberations that cases of
children born of unknown parentage were so "few kind far in between, that the constitution need not refer to them." Notably, no one raised a
comment or an objection in response to Delegate Roxas' remark. The framers might have also accepted, regardless of its veracity, that international
law regards foundlings as citizens of the country where they were found. They may have believed, as a matter of fact, that current codes already
considered children of unknown parents as Filipinos.
What is clear from the deliberations is that the framers could not have intended to place foundlings in limbo, as the social justice principle embodied
in Section 5, Article II of the 1935 Constitution indiscriminately covered "all of the people." Social justice has been defined as "the humanization of
laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be
approximated."289 It means the promotion of the welfare of all the people.290 It is founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence

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among diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social
and economic life. This recognition is consistent with the state's fundamental and paramount objective of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of
all persons and bringing about the greatest good to the greatest number.291
The Functionalist Approach:
Interpretation consistent with natural
justice
The issue of citizenship may also be resolved using the functional approach to constitutional interpretation. Under this method, the Court should
adopt an interpretation that would allow the Constitution to fulfill its purpose.
Taking historical considerations into account, it is beyond cavil that the Constitution would not function as envisioned if we give judicial imprimatur to
the COMELEC's argument. It claims that the 1935 Constitution, as well as the 1973 and 1987 constitutions, excluded foundlings from being citizens
merely on the ground that they could not establish a blood relationship with a Filipino father. This interpretation would likewise go against the
fundamental principle of natural justice.
Mixture of jus soli and jus sanguinis
The history of citizenship laws in the Philippines shows that we have never adopted a purely jus sanguinis regime. Ours is a mixture of elements of
jus soli andjus sanguinis, which we inherited from the Americans and the Spaniards, respectively. In fact, as will be elaborated in the succeeding
section, the concept of "natural-born citizenship" originated from a jus soli jurisdiction.
The COMELEC however, opines that only those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines are considered natural-born citizens under the 1935
Constitution.292 Citing Valles v. Comelec, 293 it argues that natural-born Philippine citizenship is acquired at the moment of birth on the basis of
blood relationship.294This is a gross misreading of the case. The Court in Valles did say that the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship
by virtue of blood relationship, was subsequently retained under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions; however, the Court never stated that jus
sanguinis had ever been the exclusive regime in this jurisdiction. On the contrary, Rosalind Lopez's father, from whom she derived her Philippine
citizenship, was considered by the Court as a Philippine citizen based on his birth in Daet, Camarines Norte, in 1879, a jus soli application: of
citizenship rules.
Far from adhering to an exclusively }us sanguinis regime, at least four modes of acquiring citizenship have operated in the: Philippine jurisdiction
since the turn of the century: jus soli, jus sanguinis, res judicata and naturalization. Jus soli used to predominate but upon the effectivity of the 1935
Constitution,jus sanguinis became the predominating regime.295
Citizenship prior to the 1935 Constitution
The first Civil Code adopted in the Philippines was the Spanish Civil Code,296 which became effective on 18 December 1889. It enumerated who
were Spaniards:
Article 17. The following are Spaniards:
(a) Persons born in Spanish territory,
(b) Children of a Spanish father or mother, even if they were born outside of Spain,
(c) Foreigners who have obtained naturalization papers,
(d) Those who, without such papers, may have become domiciled inhabitants of any town of the Monarchy. (Emphasis supplied)
On 21 January 1899, the Malolos Constitution, which was framed by the national assembly of the first Philippine Republic, was promulgated. All
persons born in the Philippine territory were considered as Filipinos:
Article 6. The following are Filipinos:
1. All persons born in the Philippine territory. A vessel of Philippine registry is considered, for this purpose, as part of Philippine territory.
2. Children of a Filipino father or mother, although born outside of the Philippines.
3. Foreigners who have obtained certification of naturalization.
4. Those who, without such certificate, have acquired a domicile in any town within Philippine territory.
It is understood that domicile is acquired by uninterrupted residence for two years in any locality within Philippine territory, with an open abode and
known occupation, and contributing to all the taxes imposed by the Nation.
The condition of being a Filipino is lost in accordance with law. (Emphasis supplied)
The Malolos Constitution was short-lived and was in force only in the places were the first Philippine Republic had control On 11 April 1899, the
Treaty of Paris between Spain and America took effect. Justice Jose C. Vitug, in Tecson v. Comelec297 implied that between 10 December 1898
when the parties entered into the treaty and 11 April 1899, when it took effect, Spanish civil law remained intact.298
The term "citizens of the Philippine Islands" was introduced a few years later through Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902:
Section 4. That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh clay of April,
eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said Philippine Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and
held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the United States, except such as shall have elected to preserve
their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain signed at Paris
December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight.
Under the Philippine Bill, a citizen of the Philippines was one who was an inhabitant of the Philippines and a Spanish subject on 11 April 1899. The
term inhabitant was taken to include 1) a native-born inhabitant; 2) an inhabitant who was a native of Peninsular Spain; or 3) an inhabitant who
obtained Spanish papers on or before 11 April 1899.299

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Controversy arose on the status of children born in the Philippines from 11 April 1899 to 1 July 1902, during which period no citizenship law was
extant in the Philippines. Weight was given to the view, articulated in jurisprudential writing at the time that the common law principle of jus soli
governed those born in the Philippine Archipelago within that period.300 Jus soli was also known as the principle of territoriality, which was
operative in the United States and England.
In 1916, the Philippine Autonomy Act, also known as the Jones Law, restated virtually the provisions of the Philippine Bill: of 1902 as amended by
the Act of Congress in 1912:301
Section 2. That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine,
and then resided in said Islands, and their children born ;subsequently thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands,
except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the ; Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace
between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight and except such others as have since
become citizens of some other country; Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby authorized to provide for the
acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of the
insular possessions of the United States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who are citizens of the United States, or who
could become citizens of the United States under the laws of the United States, if residing therein."
Under the. Jones Law, native-born inhabitants of the Philippines were deemed to be citizens of the Philippines as of 11 April 1899 if they were (1)
subjects of Spain on 11 April 1899; (2) residing in the Philippines on that date; and (3) since that date, not citizens of some other country.302
Citizenship under the 1935, 1973 and 1987
Constitutions
Article IV, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution provides:
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
1. Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.
2. Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the
Philippine Islands.
3. Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
4. Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
5. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
Items 1 and 4 of the foregoing section show that the 1935 Constitution was not based purely on the jus sanguinis principle. Taking into account the
history of our citizenship provisions, the phrase "those who were citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution"
clearly included those who did not have a single drop of Filipino blood in them. Moreover, "those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents
who, before the adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office" were also automatically considered citizens despite the fact that they
were of foreign blood.
Significantly, the provisions of Section 1 (1) of Article IV of the 1935 Constitution were carried over to the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.303 The only
difference was the reference to the country as Philippines" instead of "Philippine Islands."
Considering the mixture of citizenship regimes currently in force, it is not correct to say that there is an exclusive jus sanguinis principle in place,
and because of that principle, that petitioner is thereby required, regardless of the fact that she is a foundling, to submit proof of her blood
relationship to a Filipino father. To rule otherwise would be to implement a purely jus sanguinis regime contrary to the history of the Constitution.
Functionality in accord with natural justice
As previously explained, the Constitution is meant to advance the fundamental values of the Filipino people, in particular, those articulated in the
Preamble: the promotion of general welfare;304 the creation of a just and humane society;305 and the protection of the blessings of independence
and democracy under a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality, and peace in accordance with the rule of law.306 The Constitution must be
interpreted to allow it to function in accordance with these ideals. Thus, the Court should not construe the citizenship provisions of the 1935
Constitution in a manner that would unjustly deprive foundlings of citizenship and render them stateless.
To emphasize, from the time that the Supreme Court was vested with the power to interpret the law, We have exercised this power in accordance
with what is right and just. Citizenship cases are no exception. In previous cases, the Court has in fact interpreted the law on citizenship in
accordance with natural justice.
In Roa v. Collector,307 We have assumed that the principle of jus soli was applicable. This assumption was affirmed in Torres v. Tan Chim308and
Gallofin v. Ordonez,309 in which this Court held that the principle of jus soli was followed with reference to individuals who were born of Chinese
fathers and Filipino mothers.310
In Talaroc v. Uy, 311 We held that in making jus sanguinis the predominating principle in the determination of Philippine citizenship, the Constitution
did not intend to exclude those who were citizens of the Philippines by judicial declaration at the time of its adoption. We ruled that if, on the
strength of Roa, a person was considered al full-fledged Philippine citizen on the date of the adoption of the Constitution when jus soli was the
prevailing doctrine, that person cannot be divested of Filipino citizenship.312 The Court also stated that "it would be neither fair nor good policy to
hold Uy an alien after he had exercised the privileges of citizenship in the face of legal principles that have the force of law."313
The principles of natural justice were also utilized in other cases to avoid an unfair outcome. In Sale de Porkan v. Yatco,314 We upheld the validity
of a contract over a parcel of land in favor of a "non-Christian inhabitant of the Department of Mindanao and Sulu." The contract was considered
valid despite the lack of approval by the provincial governor of the province where the contract was executed as mandated by the Administrative
Code of Mindanao and Sulu. The Court held:
But if the contract, Exhibit B, is avoided, the result would be just the contrary, for the non-Christian plaintiff-appellant here would be divested of
ownership over the houses which were ceded to him by C de S and which he now possesses. This would defeat the legislative aim and purpose,
destroy substantial equities, and thwart the postulates of natural justice.

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In Van Dorn v. Romillo, 315 We also prevented injustice by freeing a Filipino woman from her marital obligations after she had been divorced by her
foreigner husband:
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to private respondent and still subject to
a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect
and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property.
She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.
Concept of "natural-born" citizenship
The requirement of natural-born citizenship should serve only to deny certain privileges to those who have gone through the process of
naturalization in order to acquire and perfect their citizenship. The concept, originally meant to distinguish those who are "natural-born" from those
who are "foreign-born" in jus soli jurisdictions, cannot: be used to justify the denial of citizenship status to foundlings because of their inability to
prove a certain blood relationship.
"Natural-born" citizenship and jus soli
An examination of the origin of the term "natural-born" reveals that it was lifted by the Philippines from the United States (U.S.) Constitution, which
states:
No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the
Office of the President; neither shall any person be eligible to that Office who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty five Years, and been
fourteen Years a Resident within the United States.316 (Capitalization in the original)
The U.S. Constitution itself does not define the term. However, numerous holdings and references in federal and state cases have clearly indicated
that those born in the United States and subject to its jurisdiction (i.e., not born to foreign diplomats or to occupying military forces), even if they
were born to alien parents, are citizens "at birth" or "by birth," and are "natural born," as opposed to "naturalized," U.S. citizens.317
As a matter of inclusion, it has been held that it is beyond dispute that anyone born on American soil with an American parent is a "natural born
citizen."318 As a matter of exclusion, anyone whose citizenship is acquired after birth as a result of "naturalization" is not a "natural born
citizen."319The meaning of the natural-born citizen clause became politically salient in the U.S. when John McCain became the Republican
nominee for President in September of 2008. He was born in the Panama Canal Zone to parents who were American citizens.320
The phrase "natural-born citizen" found its way to America from England. While there had been no extensive usage of the phrase during the
founding era of the US (1774-1797), it seems clear that it was derived from "natural born subject," which had a technical meaning in English law
and constitutional theory.321 The framers of the US Constitution would have been familiar with Blackstone's Commentaries - which James Madison
(hailed as the "Father of the Constitution") described as "a book which is in every man's hand" - and would have understood that the fundamental
premise of natural-born citizenship was a concept of allegiance to the sovereign at birth .322
Indeed, the English lexicographer Samuel Johnson defined "natural" as "native," which may mean either an "inhabitant" or an "offspring."323 The
conception of natural- born subjects under British law is tied to that of natural allegiance to a sovereign. This conception is based primarily on being
born within the territory subject to the sovereign's rule, but with the addition of others (such as the children of ambassadors or of the sovereigns
themselves) who have a "natural allegiance" to the sovereign.
Blackstone writes:
The first and most obvious division of the people is into aliens and natural-born subjects. Natural-born subjects are such as are born within the
dominions of the crown of England, that is, within the ligeance, or as it is generally called, the allegiance of the king; and aliens, such as are born
out of it. Allegiance is the tie, or ligamen, which binds the subject to the king, in return for that protection which the king affords the subject. The
thing itself, or substantial part of it, is founded in reason and the nature of government; the name and the form are derived to us from our Gothic
ancestors.
xxxx
Allegiance, both express and implied, is however distinguished by the law into two sorts or species, the one natural, the other local; the former
being also perpetual, the latter temporary. Natural allegiance is such as is due from all men born within the king's dominions immediately upon their
birth. For, immediately upon their birth, they are under the king's protection; at a time too, when (during their infancy) they are incapable of
protecting themselves.
xxxx
When I say, that an alien is one who is born out of the king's dominions, or allegiance, this also must be understood with some restrictions. The
common law indeed stood absolutely so; with only a very few exceptions: so that a particular act of parliament became necessary after the
restoration, for the naturalization of children of his majesty's English subjects, born in foreign countries during the late troubles. And this maxim of
the law proceeded upon a general principle, that every man owes natural allegiance where he is born, and cannot owe two such allegiances, or
serve two masters, at once. Yet the children of the king's ambassadors born abroad were always held to be natural subjects: for as the father,
though in a foreign country, owes not even a local allegiance to the prince to whom he is sent; so, with regard to the son also, he was held (by a
kind of postliminium) to be born under the king of England's allegiance, represented by his father, the ambassador.324 (Emphasis supplied)
Based on the foregoing, it appears that the original opposite of the term "natural-born" is not "naturalized," but "foreign-born." The term was meant
to distinguish between those born within a certain territory and those born outside it. Blood or descent was irrelevant. However, because of the
mixture of common law and civil law in our jurisdiction, the original concept of natural-born citizenship seems to have been diluted.
Citizens by Birth v. Citizens by
Naturalization
Irrespective of the origin of the concept, the term "natural-born" was used by the framers of the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions to delineate the
privileges of those who are citizens at birth, from those enjoyed by citizens who are naturalized.
The word "natural-born" appeared thrice in the 1935 Constitution as a qualification for the presidency and vice-presidency, as well as membership in
the Senate and House of Representatives.325 The framers of the 1935 Constitution, however, did not define the term.

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In their commentary on the 1935 Constitution, Taada and Fernando opined that the requirement that a person be a natural-born citizen may be
interpreted to mean that at the time of birth, the candidate was a Filipino citizen; naturalized citizens are excluded.326 Proceeding from this logic,
citizens who did not acquire their Philippine citizenship through naturalization have the citizenship qualification to run for the presidency.
The statements in these commentaries are supported by the deliberations of the framers of the 1935 Constitution. During the 1934 Constitutional
Convention, Delegate Alejandrino proposed to limit eligibility for the presidency and vice-presidency only to Filipino citizens born in the Philippines
of parents who were not naturalized.327 This proposal was shot down. It must be noted, though, that he referred to parents who were "not
naturalized," instead of those who were "natural-born." It may be inferred that the framers of the 1935 Constitution only intended to exclude those
citizens who had been naturalized from occupying certain positions. Another section of the deliberations proceeded in this manner:
Delegate Artadi. - I am going to ask a reconsideration with respect to the matter appearing on page 22-A which treats of the interpretation of the
words, 'natural-born,' because I would like to inform the Assembly that I have had a conversation with some members of the committee ... and they
explained to me that the words, 'natural-born,' do not necessarily mean 'born in the Philippines;' that is to say, translated into Spanish, they mean
that one who possesses all the qualifications to be President of the republic, as it is written, is not necessarily born in the Philippines. So that for
purposes of the record, I would like one of the members of the committee to explain the true interpretation of the words, 'natural-born,' for the
information of the Assembly.
The President. - The delegate from Capiz, Mr. Roxas, may please tell what is the exact equivalent of those words.
Delegate Roxas. - Mr. President, the phrase, 'natural-born citizen' appears in the Constitution of the United States; but the authors say that this
phrase has never been authoritatively interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States in view of the fact that there has never been raised the
question of whether or not an elected President fulfilled this condition. The authors are uniform in the fact that the words, 'natural-born' citizen,'
means a citizen by birth, a person who is a citizen by reason of his birth, and not by naturalization or by a further declaration required by law for
citizenship. In the Philippines, for example, under the provisions of the article on citizenship which we have approved, all those born of a father who
is a Filipino citizen, be they persons born in the Philippines or outside, would be citizens by birth or 'natural-born.
And with respect to one born of a Filipino mother but of a foreign father, the article which we approved about citizenship requires that, upon
reaching the age of majority, this child needs to indicate the citizenship which he prefers, and if he elects Philippine citizenship upon reaching the
age of majority, then he shall be considered a Filipino citizen. According to this interpretation, the child of a Filipino mother with a foreign father
would not be a citizen by birth, because the law or the Constitution requires that he make a further declaration after his birth. Consequently, the
phrase, 'natural-born citizen,' as it is used in the English text means a Filipino citizen by birth, regardless of where he was born.328 (Emphasis
supplied)
The requirement of "natural-born" citizenship was carried over to the 1973 Constitution329 and then to the present Constitution.330 Confirming the
original vision of the framers of the 193 5 Constitution, the 1973 Constitution defined the term as "one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship."331 The 1973 definition was adopted in the present Constitution,
with the added proviso that those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3),332 Section 1 of Article IV, shall be deemed
natural-born citizens:
Art. IV, Section 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or
perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed
natural-born citizens.
Since the term was defined in the negative, it is evident that the term "natural-born citizens" refers to those who do not have to perform any act to
acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. The definition excludes only those who are naturalized. From this interpretation, it may be inferred that
a Filipino citizen who did not undergo the naturalization process is natural-born. As We explained in Bengson III v. House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal: 333
A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a
natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of a separate category for persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship,
subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear: as to such persons, they would either be natural-born or naturalized depending on the
reasons for the loss of their citizenship and the mode prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisition thereof.
In Bengson, We also ruled that private respondent regained his status as a natural-born citizen the moment he reacquired his Filipino citizenship
through repatriation. That part of the Decision will be discussed in further detail in the succeeding sections.
Not Purity of Blood
Naturalized citizens are former aliens or foreigners who had to undergo a rigid procedure, in which they had to adduce sufficient evidence to prove
that they possessed all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to become Filipino citizens as provided by law.334 In contrast, as stated
in the early case Roa v. Collector of Customs, 335 a natural-born citizen is a one who has become such at the moment of birth.
It may be observed from the exchanges during the deliberations on the qualifications of members of the Supreme Court that the concern about the
natural-born requirement was not all about the questionable allegiance of those without Filipino blood, but of those born abroad of Filipino parents.
Delegate Lim expressed his understanding that the requirement was for the President to be "native-born," and his reservations about installing as
magistrates those who are not familiar with the "idiosyncrasies of the people:"
How can we figure out that naturalized citizens could really interpret the purposes of this Constitution including the idiosyncrasies of the people? We
have as a matter of policy adopted the principle that the President of the Commonwealth should be a native born. Our Supreme Court in some
instances has the power much bigger than that of the President by declaring our laws passed by the National Assembly as unconstitutional. That
power makes the Supreme Court the supreme interpreter of our laws of the land, and who else but native born persons, individuals who have been
born in the country, can interpret, as I said, the customs and habits of our people?336
It must be emphasized that natural-born status was never intended to be a measure of the purity of blood. This Court, on reconsideration in Tan
Chong,337 explained why birth alone may not be sufficient basis for the acquisition of citizenship. Some of the important elements that would make
a person living in a country its citizen: youth spent in the country; intimate and endearing association with the citizens among whom they live;
knowledge and pride of the country's past; belief in the greatness and security of its institutions, in the loftiness of its ideas, and in the ability of the
country's government to protect them, their children and their earthy possessions against perils from within and from without; and their readiness to
defend the country against those perils.338
In the same manner, blood relationship alone is not controlling.339 The following groups of people, who technically have no "Filipino blood," were
effectively considered citizens by virtue of Commonwealth Act No. 473 or the "Revised Naturalization Law":

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Section 15. Effect of the Naturalization on Wife and Children. - Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines,
and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.
Minor children of persons naturalized under this law who have been born in the Philippines shall be considered citizens thereof.
A foreign-born minor child, if dwelling in the Philippines at the time of the naturalization of the parent, shall automatically become a Philippine
citizen, and a foreign-born minor child, who is not in the Philippines at the time the parent is naturalized, shall be deemed a Philippine citizen only
during his minority, unless he begins to reside permanently in the Philippines when still a minor, in which case, he will continue to be a Philippine
citizen even after becoming of age.
A child born outside of the Philippines after the naturalization of his parent, shall be considered a Philippine citizen, unless within one year after
reaching the age of majority, he fails to register himself as a Philippine citizen at the American Consulate of the country where he resides, and to
take the necessary oath of allegiance. (Emphasis supplied)
A necessary implication of the above provision is that children born within the Philippines after the naturalization of their parent are unqualifiedly
citizens of the country. This implication holds true even if the naturalized parent is purely of foreign blood. Moreover, because they do not need to
perform any act to acquire Philippine citizenship, they must be considered natural-born citizens by definition.
Like foundlings, these groups are not expressly mentioned in the Constitution. However, by implication of law, they are considered natural-born
citizens despite the absence of a single drop of Filipino blood in them. From this fact, one can draw no other conclusion: that the natural-born
classification has nothing to do with bloodline or birthright.
Foundling not "naturalized in accordance
with law"
It has been argued that a foundling may obtain only naturalized citizenship, because an act is supposedly required to acquire this status, i.e., the
registration of the child as a foundling after an administrative proceeding. In other words, it is contended that the process of registration effectively
amounts to naturalization in accordance with law. This contention is unacceptable for three reasons.
First, the phrase "naturalized in accordance with law" must be understood with reference to the naturalization process provided under naturalization
statutes. In several decisions, this Court has construed the meaning of the expression "in accordance with law" as an allusion to enabling
legislation.340 Hence, naturalization in Article IV, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution, does not refer to just any act, but to the specific procedure for
naturalization prescribed by the legislature. The Court does not have the right to engage in judicial legislation on naturalization when the
Constitution exclusively vests said power in -Congress.
Second, registration is not an act that can be attributed to a foundling. Pursuant to Section 5 of Act No. 3752,341 the person who finds an
abandoned child shall report the place, date and hour of finding and other attendant circumstances to the local civil registrar for purposes of
registration. This prescribed act is in sharp contrast to the naturalization process provided under the Revised Naturalization Law,342 which requires
the applicants to themselves personally and voluntarily perform certain acts to avail of naturalized citizenship. In particular, applicants are required
to (a) file a declaration under oath their bona fide intention to become a citizen of the Philippines;343 (b) file a petition for citizenship with a
competent court;344 (c) participate in a hearing before a competent court;345 and (d) take an oath of allegiance to the Philippines.346 Needless to
state, foundlings do not perform acts equivalent to any of these when they are registered. More often than not, they are not aware of their
circumstances when they are being registered as foundlings.
Third, it is possible to register a foundling by reporting the circumstances of the discovery to the local civil registrar without any administrative
proceeding, if the registration is done prior to the surrender of the custody of the child to the DSWD or an institution.347 It is only when the child is
turned over to the DSWD without having been registered with the local civil registrar that an administrative proceeding is required prior to the
issuance of a Foundling Certificate.348 If a child is already registered by the finder, the administrative proceeding under the Rules of the DSWD349
is followed not for the purpose of allowing that registration, but only to determine whether the child may be declared legally available for adoption.
Petitioner did not lose her natural-born
status when she reacquired Philippine
citizenship under R.A. 9225.
Respondents also question the reacquisition by petitioner of her citizenship under R.A. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of
2003. They claim that only natural-born citizens are allowed to reacquire citizenship under the law. Since petitioner is allegedly not a citizen of the
Philippines, she is not entitled to this privilege.
The premise of petitioner's argument has already been extensively addressed above. For reasons previously explained, petitioner may be
considered a natural-born citizen; hence, she may validly reacquire her citizenship under R.A. 9225. The other arguments raised by respondents
are addressed below.
Adoption Decree and Amended Birth
Certificate
In my view, petitioner was entitled to rely upon the adoption decree issued in her favor and the amended birth certificate issued pursuant thereto.
These documents named Fernando Poe, Jr. and Susan Roces, and no other, as her parents for all intents and purposes. Her reliance on these
documents justifies her belief that she is a natural-born citizen entitled to avail herself of the provisions of R.A. 9225.
It must be emphasized that adoption severs all legal ties between the biological parents and the adoptee and vests those rights in the adopter.350
Section 17 of R.A. 8552, in particular, provides that the "adoptee shall be considered the legitimate son/daughter of the adopter for all intents and
purposes and as such is entitled to all the rights and obligations provided by law to legitimate sons/daughter born to them without discrimination of
any kind." Hence, upon the entry of an adoption decree, the law creates a relationship in which adopted children are deemed "born of" their
adoptive parents:
... The act of adoption fixes a status, viz., that of parent and child. More technically, it is an act by which relations of paternity and affiliation are
recognized as legally existing between persons not so related by nature. It has been defined as the taking into one's family of the child of another as
son or daughter and heir and conferring on it a title to the rights and privileges of such. The purpose of an adoption proceeding is to effect this new
status of relationship between the child and its adoptive parents, the change of name which frequently accompanies adoption being more an
incident than the object of the proceeding. The welfare of the child is the primary consideration in the determination of an application for adoption.
On this part, there is unanimous agreement.

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It is the usual effect of a decree of adoption to transfer from the natural parents to the adoptive parents the custody of the child's person, the duty of
obedience owing by the child, and all other legal consequences and incidents of the natural relation, in the same manner as if the child had been
born of such adoptive parents in lawful wedlock, subject, however, to such limitations and restrictions as may be by statute imposed.351 (Emphasis
supplied)
As proof of this new relationship, an adoptee's original birth certificate is cancelled and sealed in the records of the Civil Registry. Thereafter, an
amended birth certificate is issued in its place "attesting to the fact that the adoptee is the child of the adopter(s)"352 This amended certificate is
issued without any notation that it is new or amended.353 Once issued, this document has the same legal effect as any other birth certificate, and is
entitled to a presumption of validity as a public document.354
Evidently, to require adoptees to go beyond the parentage established in their birth certificates would defeat the purpose of R.A. 8552 in requiring
courts and other institutions to seal adoption records, including the child's original birth certificate, and to maintain the confidentiality of those
papers.355
By these provisions, the legislature clearly intended to protect the privacy of the parties to the adoption, thereby allowing them to avoid the stigma
resulting from the proceedings. The rationale behind these confidentiality provisions was elucidated by the U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, in
Alma Society Incorporated v. Mellon. 356 In that decision, which was later affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court,357 the U.S. Court of Appeals
explained:
Judged by these standards, the New York sealed record statutes do not want constitutional validity. The statutes, we think, serve important
interests. New York Domestic Relations Law s 114 and its related statutes represent a considered legislative judgment that the confidentiality
statutes promote the social policy underlying adoption laws. See In re Anonymous, 89 Misc.2d 132, 133, 390 N.Y.S.2d 779, 781 (Surr.Ct.1976).
Originally, sealing adoption records was discretionary with the court, 1924 N.Y. Laws, ch. 323, s 113, but in 1938 confidentiality of adoption records
became mandatory. 1938 N.Y. Laws, ch. 606 s 114. As late as 1968, the legislature enacted various amendments to increase the assurance of
confidentiality. 1968 N.Y. Laws, ch. 1038. Moreover, the purpose of a related statute, Section 4138 of the Public Health Laws, was to erase the
stigma of illegitimacy from the adopted child's life by sealing his original birth certificate and issuing a new one under his new surname. And the
major purpose of adoption legislation is to encourage natural parents to use the process when they are unwilling or unable to care for their offspring.
New York has established a careful legislative scheme governing when adoption may occur and providing for judicial review, to encourage and
facilitate the social policy of placing children in permanent loving homes when a natural family breaks up. As the court of appeals stated in Scarpetta
v. Spence-Chapin Adoption Service, 28 N.Y.2d 185, 195, 321 N.Y.S.2d 65, 73, Cert. denied, 404 U.S. 805, 321 N.Y.S.2d 65, 269 N.E.2d 787 (1971),
"(i)t cannot be doubted that the public policy of our State is contrary to the disclosure of the names and identities of the natural parents and
prospective adoptive parents to each other." (Footnote omitted.) Forty-two other states, according to the State of New York, require that birth and
adoption records be kept confidential, indicating the importance of the matter of confidentiality. See also Uniform Adoption Act (U.L.A.) s 16(2) (rev.
1969) (adoption records "are subject to inspection only upon consent of the Court and all interested persons; or in exceptional cases, only upon an
order of the Court for good cause shown"). These significant legislative goals clearly justify the State's decision to keep the natural parents' names
secret from adopted persons but not from non-adopted persons. (Emphasis supplied)
Applicability of Bengson v HRET
As to whether petitioner also reacquired her natural-born status, the Court must apply the ruling in Bengson III v. HRET,358 which allowed the
applicant to reacquire not only his citizenship, but also his original natural-born status. In that case, the Court noted that those who reacquire
Philippine citizenship must be considered natural-born or naturalized citizens, since the Constitution does not provide a separate category for them.
Between the two categories, the Court found it more appropriate to consider them natural-born citizens, since they were not required to go through
the tedious naturalization procedure provided under the law:
The present Constitution, however, now considers those born of Filipino mothers before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and who elected
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the majority age as natural-born. After defining who are natural-born citizens, Section 2 of Article IV adds a
sentence: "Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens."
Consequently, only naturalized Filipinos are considered not natural-born citizens. It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the
present Constitution that there are only two classes of citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and (2) those who are naturalized in accordance with
law. A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily
is a natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of a separate category for persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship,
subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear: as to such persons, they would either be natural-born or naturalized depending on the
reasons for the loss of their citizenship and the mode prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisition thereof. As private respondent Cruz was
not required by law to go through naturalization proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such, he
possessed all the necessary qualifications to be elected as member of the House of Representatives.
Although Bengson referred to R.A. 2630 or the repatriation of persons who served in the U.S. Armed Forces,359 a similar process is undergone by
those who reacquire citizenship under R.A. 9225. In previous cases, this Court has also consistently characterized R.A. 9225 as a "repatriation"
statute360 that allows former Filipino citizens to recover their natural-born status.361
Accordingly, the logic used by this Court in Bengson also applies to this case - the procedure provided by R.A. 9225 does not amount to
naturalization; consequently, a citizen who reacquires citizenship under this statute cannot be deemed naturalized.
Determination of natural-born status at birth
When R.A. 9225 provides for the loss, reacquisition and retention of citizenship, it refers only to the fact of citizenship, not natural-born status:
Section 2. Declaration of Policy. - It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country
shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act.
Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. - Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who
have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have re-acquired
Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic:
"I_______________________ , solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey
the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines, and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the
supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily
without mental reservation or purpose of evasion."
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine
citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath. (Emphasis supplied)

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These provisions are consistent with Article IV,362 Section 2 of the 1935 Constitution, which indicates that what may be lost or reacquired is
Philippine citizenship and not natural-born status. These terms were carried over into the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.
The precise character of the citizenship reacquired under the law was no longer made an issue in these provisions, because natural-born status is
determined at the time of birth.363 This characteristic cannot be changed, unless an individual undergoes naturalization in any of the instances
provided by law.364 As will be explained below, the procedure for the reacquisition of citizenship under R.A. 9225 does not amount to
naturalization.
Reacquisition is not naturalization
It has been argued that the taking of an oath under R.A. 9225, as petitioner has done, should be considered as an "act to acquire or perfect
citizenship" under Section 2, Article IV of the present Constitution. As previously discussed, however, there are only two classes of citizens under
the Constitution - those who are natural-born and those who are naturalized. The "act" adverted to in the Constitution must therefore be understood
as pertaining only to the act of naturalization.
The 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions conferred on Congress the power to determine who are naturalized citizens:
1935 CONSTITUTION
ARTICLE IV
Citizenship
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
xxxx
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. (Emphasis supplied)
1973 CONSTITUTION
ARTICLE III
Citizenship
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
xxxx
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. (Emphasis supplied)
1987 CONSTITUTION
ARTICLE IV
Citizenship
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
xxxx
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. (Emphasis supplied)
In compliance with this constitutional mandate, Congress enacted the required enabling statute in 1939 when it passed Commonwealth Act No. 473
or the Revised Naturalization Law. This piece of legislation identifies those who are to be considered naturalized citizens of the country, and it is not
the province of the Court to encroach upon this legislative prerogative. Accordingly, we cannot unilaterally declare those who have availed
themselves of the benefits of R.A. 9225 and similar laws as naturalized citizens. To do so would violate the principle of separation of powers.
It must be emphasized that R.A. 9225 merely discusses the retention and reacquisition of citizenship, not naturalization. As early as 1936, Congress
already treated naturalization as a different species apart from repatriation and other modes that may later be introduced by the national assembly:
Section. 2. How citizenship may be reacquired. - Citizenship may be reacquired:
(1) By naturalization: Provided, That the applicant possess none of the disqualification's prescribed in section two of Act Numbered Twenty-nine
hundred and twenty-seven,
2) By repatriation of deserters of the Army, Navy or Air Corp: Provided, That a woman who lost her citizenship by reason of her marriage to an alien
may be repatriated in accordance with the provisions of this Act after the termination of the marital status; and
(3) By direct act of the National Assembly.365
The reacquisition and retention of citizenship under R.A. 9225 or R.A. 2630366 and repatriation under R.A. 817l367 are different from naturalization
under C.A. 473. Reacquisition, retention, and repatriation are effected by merely taking the necessary oath of allegiance and registering in the
proper civil registry (and in the Bureau of Immigration in accordance with R.A. 8171). On the other hand, naturalization is a tedious process that
begins with the filing of a declaration of intention one year prior to filing a petition for admission to Philippine citizenship and ends with the issuance
of a certificate of naturalization.
Here, petitioner did not have to undergo the process of naturalization in order to reacquire her Philippine citizenship. She only had to follow the
procedure specified in R.A. 9225. In this light, to declare her a naturalized citizen would thus be contrary to law.
To refuse to recognize foundlings as
citizens of the Philippines is to
contravene our obligations under
existing international law.

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The Philippines is obligated by existing customary and conventional international law to recognize the citizenship of foundlings.
Customary International Law
Petitioner asserts that international law in the 1930s granted a foundling the right to acquire a nationality "from birth." In my opinion, she has not
presented sufficient evidence to prove that in 1935, the Philippines was bound by customary international law to recognize foundlings as Philippine
citizens.
It must be remembered that norms of customary international law become binding on the Philippines as part of the law of the land by virtue of the
Incorporation Clause in the Constitution.368 For incorporation to occur, however, two elements369 must be established: (a) widespread and
consistent practice on the part of states; and (b) a psychological element known as the opinio Juris sive necessitatis or a belief on the part of states
that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.370 For evident reasons, a statement made by one of
the framers of the 1935 Constitution and the Hague Convention cannot, by themselves, prove widespread state practice or opinio Juris. Without
more, We cannot declare the existence of a binding norm of customary international law granting citizenship to foundlings in 1935.
I believe, however, that this customary norm exists in international law at present. Although matters of citizenship were traditionally considered to be
within the exclusive jurisdiction of states, contemporary developments indicate that their powers in this area are now "circumscribed by their
obligations to ensure the full protection of human rights."371 In particular, the right of children to acquire a nationality is enshrined in a number of
international372 and regional373 conventions. The presumption of citizenship accorded to foundlings in a state's territory is specifically mentioned
in three conventions: the 1930 Hague Convention,374 the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness375 and the European Convention
on Nationality.376 These treaties, concurred in by various state parties,377 show that on the part of the members of the international community,
there is widespread recognition of the right to nationality of children in general and foundlings in particular.
As important as these international instruments are the actions of states in their own domestic spheres. The International Court of Justice itself has
considered national legislation as sufficient evidence of state practice.378 In this case, a survey of the citizenship laws of 189 countries all over the
world reveals that 165 of these nations consider foundlings as citizens by operation of law. Twenty-three of these states379 grant citizenship to
foundlings in observance of the jus soli principle, or the general grant of citizenship to all individuals born within their territory. Meanwhile, one
hundred forty-two countries380 have enacted foundling statutes to grant citizenship to a child found in their territories if the parents are unknown,
unless there is proof to the contrary. Depending on the rule followed by the state, the foundling is presumed either to have been born in the
territory381 or to have been born to citizens of the state.382
That states have agreed to be bound by these obligations under various conventions and have even enacted domestic legislation to fulfill their
responsibilities under the law of nations indicates their recognition of the binding character of this norm. These acts demonstrate the opinio Juris of
those states, i.e., their recognition that the grant of nationality to foundlings is obligatory under international law.383
In view of the concurrence of these two elements, it is evident that a rule requiring states to accord citizenship to foundlings has crystallized into a
customary norm. The Philippines is therefore bound at present to act in compliance with these obligations.
The ICCPR and the CRC
As a state party to the ICCPR384 and the CRC,385 the Philippines is also obligated to respect the right of every child to acquire a nationality. While
these treaties ostensibly pertain only to a "right to acquire" a nationality, this right has been interpreted as the duty of a state to "grant nationality,"
particularly where there is a link only with the state on whose territory the child was born. As the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Committee
explained:
64. Regardless of the general rules which govern acquisition of nationality, States should ensure that safeguards are in place to ensure that
nationality is not denied to persons with relevant links to that State who would otherwise be stateless. This is of particular relevance in two
situations, at birth and upon State succession. As regards the right to acquire a nationality under article 24, paragraph 3, of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Human Rights Committee stated that "States are required to adopt every appropriate measure ... to
ensure that every child has a nationality when he is born". In this context, birth on the territory of a State and birth to a national are the most
important criteria used to establish the legal bond of nationality. Where there is only a link with the State on whose territory the child was born, this
State must grant nationality as the person can rely on no other State to ensure his or her right to acquire a nationality and would otherwise be
stateless. Indeed, if nationality is not granted in such circumstances then article 24, paragraph 3, of the International Covenant as well as article 7 of
the Convention on the Rights of the Child would otherwise be meaningless. In concrete terms, the circumstance referred to above may arise, for
example, where a child is born on the territory of a State to stateless parents or with respect to foundlings. Given the consequences to the children
concerned, denial of nationality in such instances must be deemed arbitrary.386 (Emphasis supplied)
In its Concluding Observations on Fiji's compliance with the CRC, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child likewise directed states to take all
measures to avoid statelessness in compliance with their obligations under Article 7 of the CRC:
The Committee takes note of article 7 of the Citizens Decree, which stipulates that any infant found abandoned in Fiji is deemed to have been born
in Fiji unless there is evidence to the contrary. However, the Committee is concerned that this stipulation might carry a risk of statelessness for
children of whom it can be proven that they have not been born in Fiji, but whose nationality can nevertheless not be established. [. . .]The
Committee recommends that the State party take all the necessary measures to avoid a child found abandoned in Fiji being stateless.387
Considering these international norms, it is the obligation of the Philippines not only to grant nationality to foundlings, but also to ensure that none of
them are arbitrarily deprived of their nationality. Needless to state, the Court cannot interpret the Constitution in a manner contrary to these
obligations. We cannot sanction a violation of international law.
A declaration that foundlings are stateless
persons would have unconscionable
consequences.
The duty of the Court to interpret the Constitution is impressed with the equally vital obligation to ensure that the fundamental law serves the ends
of justice and promotes the common good. After all, the Constitution is meant to be the legal embodiment of these values, and to be the people's
instrument for the protection of existing natural rights and basic human liberties. As Chief Justice Reynato Puno explained in his Separate Opinion
in Republic v. Sandiganbayan:
But while the constitution guarantees and protects the fundamental rights of the people, it should be stressed that it does not create them. As held
by many of the American Revolution patriots, "liberties do not result from charters; charters rather are in the nature of declarations of pre-existing
rights." John Adams, one of the patriots, claimed that natural rights are founded "in the frame of human nature, rooted in the constitution of the
intellect and moral world." Thus, it is said of natural rights vis-a-vis the constitution:

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. . . (t)hey exist before constitutions and independently of them. Constitutions enumerate such rights and provide against their deprivation or
infringement, but do not create them. It is supposed that all power, all rights, and all authority are vested in the people before they form or adopt a
constitution. By such an instrument, they create a government, and define and limit the powers which the constitution is to secure and the
government respect. But they do not thereby invest the citizens of the commonwealth with any natural rights that they did not before possess.
(Italics supplied)
A constitution is described as follows:
A Constitution is not the beginning of a community, nor the origin of private rights; it is not the fountain of law, nor the incipient state of government;
it is not the cause, but consequence, of personal and political freedom; it grants no rights to the people, but is the creature of their power, the
instrument of their convenience. Designed for their protection in the enjoyment of the rights and powers which they possessed before the
Constitution was made, it is but the framework of the political government, and necessarily based upon the preexisting condition of laws, rights,
habits and modes of thought. There is nothing primitive in it; it is all derived from a known source. It presupposes an organized society, law, order,
propriety, personal freedom, a love of political liberty, and enough of cultivated intelligence to know how to guard against the encroachments of
tyranny.388 (Citations omitted and emphasis supplied)
I believe that disputes involving the Constitution must be resolved with these precepts in mind. As the Constitution is no ordinary legal document,
this Court should strive to give meaning to its provisions not only with reference to its text or the original intention of its framers. Behind the text are
the ideals and aspirations of the Filipino people - their intent to "promote the general welfare;"389 to "build a just and humane society;"390 and to
"secure the blessings of independence and democracy under the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality, and peace."391
Any construction that would derogate from these fundamental values cannot be countenanced.
In this case, a declaration that foundlings are natural-born citizens are unconscionable. First, such a declaration would effectively render all children
of unknown parentage stateless and would place them in a condition of extreme vulnerability.392 As citizenship is "nothing less than the right to
have rights,"393 its deprivation would leave foundlings without any right or measure of protection. During the proceedings of the 1st European
Conference on Nationality, the Senior Legal Adviser of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees explained the nature of the right to
citizenship:
The Right to a Given Nationality in the Avoidance of Statelessness
Citizenship, or nationality, has been described as man's basic right, as, in fact, the right to have rights. Nationality is not only a right of itself, it is a
necessary precursor to the exercise of other rights. Nationality provides the legal connection between an individual and a State, which serves as a
basis for certain rights for both the individual and the State, including the State's entitlement to grant diplomatic protection.394
In the Philippines, a stateless individual is deprived of countless rights and opportunities under the Constitution, statutes and administrative
regulations. These include the rights to suffrage;395 education and training;396 candidacy and occupation of public office and other positions in
government;397 use and enjoyment of natural resources;398 investment;399 ownership and control of certain types of businesses;400 practice of
rofessons;401 engagement in certain occupations;[402 and even participation in legal proceedings involving status, condition and legal capacity.403
Second, a declaration that petitioner is a citizen but is not natural-born is no less odious to foundlings considering the privileges that would be
deemed unavailable to them. These include certain state scholarships404 and a number of government positions requiring natural-born citizenship
as a qualification, i. e. a range of nationa1405 and loca1406 offices, various posts in government commissions,407 corporations,408 banks,409
educational institutions,410 professional regulatory boards411 and the military.412
The repercussions of such a ruling for foundlings currently holding the enumerated positions are too compelling to ignore. A declaration that
individuals of unknown parentage are not Filipinos, or at best naturalized citizens, may lead to their removal from government posts; a demand to
return all emoluments and benefits granted in connection with their offices; and even the end of pension benefits presently being enjoyed by
affected retirees. The proposal for Congress to remedy the unjust situation that would result from an affirmance by this Court of unjust COMELEC
rulings is too odious a solution to even consider. It is not the function of Congress to correct any injustice that would result from this Court's
proposed unhappy ruling on foundlings. Rather, it is this Court's first and foremost duty to render justice to them, as the Constitutions requires
WHEREFORE, I vote to GRANT the consolidated petitions.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice
JARDELEZA, J.:
The Philippine Constitution requires that a person aspiring for the presidency must be a natural- born Filipino citizen and a resident of the
Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding the election.1The question is whether the petitioner, as a foundling and former resident
citizen of the United States (US), satislies these requirements.
I
I first consider the issue lf jurisdiction raised by the parties.
A
Petitioner Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares (Poe) contends that in the absence of any material misrepresentation in her certificate of
candidacy (COC), the public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) had no jurisdiction to rule on her eligibility. She posits that the
COMELEC can only rule on whether she intended to deceive the electorate when she indicated that she was a natural-born Filipino and that she
has been a resident for 10 years and 11 months. For the petitioner, absent such intent, all other attacks on her citizenship and residency are
premature since her qualifications can only be challenged through the post-election remedy of a petition for quo warranto. On the other hand, the
COMELEC argues that since citizenship and residency are material representations in the COC affecting the qualifications for the office of
President, it necessarily had to rule on whether Poe's statements were true. I agree with the COMELEC that it has jurisdiction over the petitions to
cancel or deny due course to a COC. As a consequence, it has the authority to determine therein the truth or falsity of the questioned
representations in Poe's COC.
Section 782 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) allows a person to file a verified petition seeking to deny due course to or cancel a COC
exclusively on the ground that ;my of the material representations it contains, as required under Section 74,3 is false. The representations
contemplated by Section 78 generally refer to qualifications for elective office,4 such as age, residence and citizenship, or possession of naturalborn Filipino status.5 It is beyond question that the issues affecting the citizenship and residence of Poe are within the purview of Section 78. There

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is also no dispute that the COMELEC has jurisdiction over Section 78 petitions. Where the parties disagree is on whether intent to deceive is a
constitutive element for the cancellation of a COC on the ground of false material representation.
The divide may be attributed to the two tracks of cases interpreting Section 78. On the one hand, there is the line originating from Salcedo II v.
COMELEC, decided in 1999, where it was held that "[a]side from the requirement of materiality, a false representation under section 78 must
consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible."6 On the other hand, in the
more recent case of Tagolino v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, we stated that "the ( deliberateness of the misrepresentation, much
less one's intent to defraud, is of bare significance in a Section 78 petition as it is enough that the person's declaration of a material qualification in
the COC be false."7
To reconcile these two cases, it is important to first understand the coverage of Section 78. The provision refers to material representations required
by Section 74 to appear in the COC. In turn, Section 74 provides for the contents of the COC, which includes not only eligibility requirements such
as citizenship, residence, and age, but also other information such as the candidate's name, civil stat us, profession, and political party affiliation.
Section 78 has typically been applied to representations involving eligibility requirements, which we have likened to a quo warranto petition under
Section 253 of the OEC.8
Understated in our jurisprudence, however, are representations mentioned in Section 74 that do not involve a candidate's eligibility. In this regard,
there appears to be a prevailing misconception that the "material representations" under Section 78 are limited only to statements in the COC
affecting eligibility.9 Such interpretation, however, runs counter to the clear language of Section 78, which covers "any material representation
contained therein as required under Section 74." A plain reading of this phrase reveals no decipherable intent to categorize the information required
by Section 74 between material and nonmaterial much less to exclude certain items explicitly enumerated therein from the coverage of Section 78.
Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemus. When the law does not distinguish, neither should the court.10 The more accurate
interpretation, one that is faithful to the text, is that the word "material" describes-not qualifies-the representations required by Section 74. Therefore,
the declarations required of the candidate by Section 74 are all material.11 In enumerating the contents of the COC, Section 74 uses the word
"shall" in reference to non-eligibility related matters, including "the political party to which he belongs," "civil status," "his post office address; for all
election purposes," "his profession or occupation," and "the name by which he has been baptized, or ... registered in the office of the local civil
registrar or any other name allowed under the provisions of existing law or ... his Hadji name after performing the prescribed religious pilgrimage."
The presumption is that the word "shall" in a statute is used in an imperative, and not in a directory, sense.12 The mandatory character of the
provision, coupled with the requirement that the COC be executed under oath,13 strongly suggests that the law itself considers certain noneligibility-related information as material-otherwise, the law could have simply done away with them. What this means relative to Section 78 is that
there are material representations which may pertain to matters not involving a candidate's eligibility.14
It is apparent that the interests sought to be advanced by Section 78 are twofold. The first is to protect the sanctity of the electorate's votes by
ensuring that the candidates whose names appear in the ballots are qualified and thus mitigate the risk or votes being squandered on an ineligible
candidate. The second is to penalize candidates who commit a perjurious act by preventing them from running for public office. This is a policy
judgment by the legislature that those willing to perjure themselves are not fit to hold an elective office, presumable with the ultimate aim of
protecting the constituents from a candidate who committed an act involving moral turpitude.15 In a way, this protectionist policy is not dissimilar to
the underlying principle for allowing a petition for disqualification based on the commission of prohibited acts and election offenses under Section
68. These two considerations, seemingly overlooked in Salcedo, are precisely why the "consequences imposed upon a candidate guilty of having
made a false representation in his certificate of candidacy are grave to prevent the candidate from running or, if elected, from serving, or to
prosecute him for violation of the election laws."16
Therefore, there are two classes of material representations contemplated by Section 78: (l) those that concern eligibility for public office; and (2)
those erstwhile enumerated in Section 74 which do not affect eligibility. Tagolino applies to the former; Salcedo to the latter. This is a logical
distinction once we connect the factual settings of the two cases with the aforementioned state interests. Ironically, Salcedo, oft-cited in Section 78
cases as authority for requiring intent in cases involving eligibility-related representations, actually did not concern a representation in the COC
affecting the candidate's eligibility. Salcedo involved a candidate who used the surname of her husband of a void marriage. Her COC was
challenged on the ground that she had no right l to use such surname because the person she married had a subsisting marriage with another
person. We held that petitioner therein failed to discharge the burden of proving that the alleged misrepresentation regarding th1~ candidate's
surname pertains to a material matter, and that it must equally be proved that there was an intention to deceive the electorate as to the would-be
candidate's qualifications for public office to justify the cancellation of the COC.17 The rationale is that the penalty of removal from the list of
candidates is not commensurate to an honest mistake in respect of a matter not affecting one's eligibility to run for public office. "It could not have
been the intention of the law to deprive a person of such a basic and substantive political right to be voted for a public office upon just any
innocuous mistake."18 Notably, a finding in Salcedo that the candidate had no intention to deceive the electorate when she used her married name,
notwithstanding the apparent invalidity of the marriage, would have been sufficient to arrive at the same conclusion (that is, allowing her to run)
without making a sweeping rule that only matters pertaining to eligibility are material.
By contrast, Tagolino involved a false representation with respect to a candidate's residence and its subsequent effect on the substitution by a
replacement candidate. The false representation affected the one-year residency requirement imposed by the Constitution on members of the
House of Representatives19-in other words, it went into the eligibility of the candidate. "[A]n express; finding that the person committed any
deliberate misrepresentation is of little consequence in the determination of whether one's COC should be deemed cancelled or not."20 It is the fact
of eligibility, not the intent to deceive, that should be decisive in determining compliance with constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications
for public office. This reading is more in accord with the text of Section 78, which does not specify intent as an element for a petition to prosper. In
this context, the term "material misrepresentation" is a misnomer because it implies that the candidate consciously misrepresented himself. But all
Section 78 textually provides is that "any material representation . . . is false." Thus, in resolving a Section 78 petition, truth or falsity ought to be the
definitive test. The COMFLEC's duty, then, is to make findings of fact with respect to the material representations claimed to be false.
The need to apply Tagolino to the first class is highlighted by an inherent gap in Salcedo's analysis, which failed to take into account a situation
where a candidate indicated in good faith that he is eligible when he is in fact not. It is not inconceivable that a child, for example, born in 1977, but
whose parents simulated the birth certificate to make it appear that he was born in 1976, would believe himself to be qualified to run for president in
the 2016 elections. However, if the simulation of birth is proved, and hospital records and family history show that he was indeed born in 1977, then
he would fall short of the minimum age requirement prescribed by the Constitution. If Salcedo is to be followed to a tee, the COMELEC cannot
cancel his COC because he acted in good faith. This would lead to a situation where the portion of the electorate who voted for the ineligible
candidate would face the threat of disenfranchisement should the latter win the elections and face a quo warranto challenge. In the latter
proceeding, not even good faith can cure the inherent defect in his qualifications. Tagolino is therefore preferable in instances involving eligibilityrelated representations because it fills this gap. Indeed the law should not be interpreted to allow for such disastrous consequences.
In fact, in cases involving eligibility-related representations, the Court has never considered intent to deceive as the decisive element, even in those
that relied on Salcedo. In Tecsun v. COMELEC,21 which involved a question on the eligibility of Fernando Poe, Jr. for the 2004 presidential
elections by way of a Section 78 petition, the~ Court determined whether he was a natural born citizen of the Philippine~;. Intent to deceive the
electorate was never discussed. In Ugdoracion v. COMELEC,22 which involved residency, the Court determined that the candidate lost his
residency when he became a US green card holder despite his mistaken belief that he retained his domicile in the Philippines. The candidate-,
invoking the legal definition of domicile, claimed that even if he was physically in the US, he always intended to return the Philippines. The Court,

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placing emphasis on his permanent resident status in the US, merely inferred his intent to deceive when he failed to declare that he was a green
card holder. Then in Jalosjos v. COMELEC,23 also involving residency, the Court found that the claim of domicile was contradicted by the temporary
nature of the candidate's stay. This time, the Court simply deemed that "[w]hen the candidate's claim of eligibility is proven false, as when the
candidate failed to substantiate meeting the required residency in the locality, the representation of eligibility in the COC constitutes a 'deliberate
attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide the fact' of i neligibility."24
The Court owes candor to the public. Inferring or deeming intent to deceive from the fact of falsity is, to me, just a pretense to get around the gap
left by Salcedo, i.e., an ineligible candidate who acted in good faith. I believe the more principled approach is to adopt Tagolino as the controlling
rule. The decision in Agustin v COMELEC25 is a step towards that direction: "[ e ]ven if [the COMELEC] made no finding that the petitioner had
deliberately attempted to mi:-;lead or to misinform as to warrant the cancellation of his COC, the COMELEC could still declare him disqualified for
not meeting the requisite. eligibility .... " Of course, Salcedo remains applicable to cases where the material representation required by Section 74
does not relate to eligibility, st1ch as in Villafuerte v. COMELEC,26 which, similar to Salcedo, involved a candidate's name.27
B
The 1987 Constitution d1'signated the Supreme Court en bane, acting as the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET), as the "sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President."28 Poe argue; that allowing the COMELEC to rule on the
eligibility of the candidate regardless of intent would be tantamount to the usurpation of the PET's authority (and that of the electoral tribunals of
both the Senate and the House of Representatives) as the sole judge of qualifications. This, however, is an incorrect reading of the provision. The
phrase "contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications" is a legal term of art that is synonymous to "election contests." "As used in
constitutional provisions, election contest relates only to statutory contests in which the contestant seeks not only to oust the intruder, but also to
have Himself inducted into the office."29 Thus, an election contest can only contemplate a post-election30 post-proclamation.31 while the power of
electoral tribunals is Exclusive,32 full, clear, and complete,33 it is nonetheless subject to a temporal limitation-their jurisdiction may only be invoked
after the election is held and the winning candidate is proclaimed.34
Notably, the Constitution neither allocates jurisdiction over pre-election controversies involving the eligibility of candidates nor forecloses legislative
provision for such remedy. Absent such constitutional proscription, it is well within the plenary powers of the legislature to enact a law providing for
this type of pre-election remedy, as it did through Section 78.35 In this regard, Poe's statement that the COMELEC essentially arrogated unto itself
the jurisdiction to decide upon the qualifications of candidates is inaccurate. It is Congress that granted the COMELEC such jurisdiction; the
COMELEC only exercised the jurisdiction so conferred. When the COMELEC takes cognizance of a Section 78 petition, its actions are not
repugnant to, but are actually in accord with, its constitutional mandate to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of an election.36 To
be clear, the proceeding under Section 78 is not an election contest and therefore does not encroach upon PET's jurisdiction over election contests
involving the President and Vice-President.
We have already recognized that a Section 78 petition is one instance-the only instance-where the qualifications of a candidate for elective office
can be challenged before an election.37 Although the denial of due course to or the cancellation of the COC is ostensibly based on a finding that
the candidate made a material representation that is false,38 the determination of the factual correctness of the representation necessarily affects
eligibility. Essentially, the ground is lack of eligibility under the pertinent constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public
office,39 similar to a petition for quo warranto which is a species of election contest. "The only difference between the two proceedings is that, under
Section 78, the qualifications for elective office are misrepresented in the COC and the proceedings must be initiated before the elections, whereas
a petition for quo warranto under Section 253 may be brought on the basis of two grounds-(1) ineligibility or (2) disloyalty to the Republic of the
Philippines, and must be initiated within ten days after the proclamation of the election results."40 Put simply, the main distinction is the time the
action is filed.41 If a person fails to file a Section 78 petition within the 25-day period prescribed in the OEC, the election laws afford him another
chance to raise the ineligibility of the candidate by filing a petition for quo warranto.42
The reason why the COMELEC, pursuant to a valid law, is allowed to determine a candidate's constitutional and statutory eligibility prior to the
election is not difficult to fathom. As earlier alluded to, there is legitimate value in shielding the electorate from an ineligible candidate. In addition,
there are sound fiscal considerations supporting this remedy. These include the more efficient allocation of COMELEC's resources, ultimately
funded by taxpayers' money, and a check on unnecessary campaign spending, an activity with minimal economic utility. A contrary ruling could lead
to the de facto disenfranchisement of those who voted for a popular but ineligible candidate. The possibility of a constitutional and political crisis
arising from such a result is one we dare not risk.
II
Article VII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution lays down the eligibility requirements for the office of President:
No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen or the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty
years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election.
Citizenship is determined by the organic law in force at the time of birth.43 When Poe was found in 1968, the 1935 Constitution was still in effect. It
enumerated the following as citizens of the Philippines: (l) those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the 1935
Constitution; (2) those born in the Philippines of foreign parents who, before the adoption of the 1935 Constitution, had been elected to public office;
(3) those whose fathers are citizen of the Philippines; (4) those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of
majority, elect Philippine citizenship; and ( 5) those who are naturalized in accordance with law.44 For obvious reasons, the first two classes are not
applicable to the present controversy. I therefore limit my discussion to the remaining three classes.
The 1987 Constitution defines "natural-born citizens" as those who are Filipino citizens "from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or
perfect their Philippine citizenship."45 Children born of filipino fathers under the 1935 Constitution fall under this category. By express declaration,
the 1987 Constitution also considered those born of Filipino mothers who elect Philippine citizenship by age of majority as natural-born citizens.46
On the other hand, those who become Filipino citizens through the naturalization process are evidently excluded from the constitutional definition.
Therefore, there an two kinds of Filipino citizens recognized under the Constitution: natural born citizens and naturalized citizens.47 Only the
former are eligible to be President of the Philippines .
Poe contends that she is a natural-born citizen because there is a presumption under international law that a foundling is a citizen of the place
where he was born. She further argues that the deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional Convention reveal an intent by the framers to consider
foundlings as Filipino citizens from birth. In any case, she believes that she has proved, by substantial evidence, that she is a natural-born citizen.
The Solicitor General supports the Second and third arguments of Poe.
On the other hand, the COMELEC and private respondents maintain that because she is a foundling whose parentage is unknown, she could not
definitively prove that either her father or mother is a Filipino. They dispute the applicability of international conventions which the Philippines is not
a party to, while those which have been ratified require implementing legislation. Assuming arguendo that she was a natural-born citizen,
respondents are unanimous that she lost such status when she became a naturalized American citizen. Her subsequent repatriation under RA 9225
only conferred upon her Filipino citizenship but not natural-born status.

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I take their arguments in turn.

A
The power of a state to confer its citizenship is derived from its sovereignty. It is an attribute of its territorial supremacy.48 As a sovereign nation, the
Philippines has the inherent right to determine for itself, and according to its own Constitution and laws, who its citizens are49 International law, as a
matter of principle, respects such sovereign determination and recognizes that the acquisition and loss of citizenship fall within the domestic
jurisdiction of each state.50 Domestic rules on citizenship vary greatly from sovereign to sovereign,51 a necessary consequence of divergent
demography, geography, history, and culture among the many states. As explained in the Nottebohm Case:
[T]he diversity of demographic conditions has thus far made it impossible for any general agreement to be reached on the rules relating to
nationality, although the latter by its very nature affects international relations. It has been considered that the best way of making such rules accord
with the varying demographic conditions in different countries is to leave the fixing of such rules to the competence of each State.52
Thus, "[t]here is no rule of international law, whether customary or written, which might be regarded as constituting any restriction of or exception to,
the jurisdiction or [individual states to determine questions of citizenship]."53 The foregoing considerations militate against the formation of
customary law in matters concerning citizenship, at least not one directly enforceable on particular states as advocated by Poe. Accordingly, the
provisions of the 1930 Hague Convention and 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness purportedly conferring birth citizenship upon
foundlings, or creating a presumption thereof, cannot be considered customary.
At this juncture, it may not be amiss to explain that another reason why we judiciously scrutinize an invocation of customary international law based
on treaties the Philippines has not acceded to is out of deference to the President's treaty-ratification power54 and the Senate's treaty-concurring
power.55 The doctrine of separation of powers dictates that, unless the existence of customary international Jaw is convincingly shown, courts of
law should not preempt the executive and legislative branches' authority over the country's foreign relations policy, including the negotiation,
ratification, and approval of treaties.56
In respect of international covenants that the Philippines is a party to, Poe invokes the following which allegedly recognize her right to natural-born
citizenship: the Convent ion on the Rights of the Child (CRC), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). The CRC and the ICCPR both speak of a child's "right to acquire a nationality." A plain reading indicates that
the right simply means that a child shall be given the opportunity to become a Filipino citizen.57 It does not by itself create an enforceable right to
birth citizenship. The obligation imposed upon states parties is for them to either enact citizenship statutes specifically for children or to equally
extend to children the benefits of existing citizenship laws. In the Philippines' case, the Constitution grants birth citizenship to those born of Filipino
parents and our naturalization statutes provide for derivative citizenship of children born of non-Filipino parents.58 The Philippines is, therefore,
compliant with this specific obligation under the CRC and the ICCPR.
The same can be said about the UDHR, even though it uses a slightly different wording.59 Preliminarily, it must be clarified that the UDHR is
technically not a treaty and therefore, it has no obligatory character. Nonetheless, over time, it has become an international normative standard with
binding character as part of the law of nations. In other words, it has acquired the force of customary international law.60 The "right to a nationality"
under the UDHR must be interpreted as being subject to the conditions imposed by domestic law, given the broad scope of the declaration, i.e., it
covers "everyone." A contrary interpretation would effectively amount to an unqualified adoption of the jus soli principle, which would be repugnant
to our constitutional structure. Such interpretation would, in fact, be contrary to the intent of the UDHR itself. The correlative state obligation under
the UDHR is for a state not to withdraw or withhold the benefits of citizenship from whole sections of the population who can demonstrate a genuine
and effective link with the country.61 It does not purport to indiscriminately grant citizenship to any person. Taking into consideration the historical
co11text of the UDHR,62 it may be said that the right, really, is one against statelessness; and the obligation is a negative duty not to create or
perpetuate statelessness.63 It proscribes an arbitrary deprivation of citizenship and an unreasonable discrimination in the operation of naturalization
law against stateless persons.
Finally, the CRC, ICCPR, and UDHR all refrained from imposing a direct obligation to confer citizenship at birth. This must be understood as a
deliberate recognition of sovereign supremacy over matters relating to citizenship. It bears emphasis that none of the instruments concern
themselves with natural-born and naturalized classifications. This is because this distinction finds application only in domestic legal regimes. Ergo, it
is one for each sovereign to make.
B
The 1935 Constitution did not explicitly address the citizenship of foundlings. For the COMELEC and private respondents, the silence means
exclusion, following the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius. They point to the jus sanguinis principle adopted by the Constitution to
conclude that a foundling who cannot establish a definite blood relation to a Filipino parent is not natural-born. For Poe and the Solicitor General,
the deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional Convention indicate the intention to categorize foundlings as citizens and the textual silence "does not
indicate any discriminatory animus against them." They argue that the Constitution does not preclude the possibility that the parents of a foundling
are in fact Filipinos.
In interpreting the silence of the Constitution, the best guide is none other than the Constitution itself.64 As Prof. Laurence Tribe suggests, giving
meaning to constitutional silence involves the twin tasks of articulating the relevant constitutional norns that determine how the silence ought to be
interpreted and propounding principles of statutory construction consistent with these norms.65 There is no question that since 1935, the
Philippines has adhered to the jus sanguinis principle as the primary basis for determining citizenship. Under the 1935 Constitution, a child follows
the citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of birth, although there was a caveat that if only the mother is Filipino, the child has to elect
Philippine citizenship by age of majority. Determining a person's parentage, of course, requires a determination of facts in an appropriate
proceeding. Consequently, to arrive at a correct judgment, the fundamental principles of due process and equal protection66 demand that the
parties be allowed to adduce evidence in support of their contentions, and for the decision-maker to make a ruling based on the applicable quantum
of evidence.
1
The appropriate due process standards that apply to the COMELEC, as a quasi-judicial tribunal, are those outlined in the seminal case of Ang Ti
bay v. Court of Industrial Relations.67 Commonly referred to as the "cardinal primary rights" in administrative proceedings, these include: (1) the
right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof~ (2)
not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to e:tablish the rights which he asserts, but the
tribunal must consider the evidence presented; (3) while the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a
necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision; (4) not only must there be some evidence to
support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be "substantial;" (5) the decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing,
or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected; (6) the tribunal must act on its or his own independent consideration of the
law and facts of the controversy; and ('7) the tribunal should render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the

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various issues involved, and the reasons for the decision rendered.68 The COMELEC failed to comply with the third and fourth requirements when
it first, decided the question of foundlings on a pure question of law, i.e., whether foundlings are natural-born, without making a determination based
on the evidence on record and admissions of the parties of the probability or improbability that Poe was born of Filipino parents; and second, by
concluding that Poe can only prove her parentage thro11gh DNA or other definitive evidence, set a higher evidentiary hurdle than mere substantial
evidence.
The COMELEC's starting position is that foundlings are not natural-born citizens69 unless they prove by DNA or some other definitive evidence70
that either of their biological parents are Filipino citizens. Thus, it limited its inquiry to the question of whether the 1935 Constitution considered
foundlings as natural-born citizens. In effect, the COMELEC has created a conclusive or irrebuttable presumption against foundlings, i.e., they are
not natural-born citizens. This is true notwithstanding the apparently benign but empty opening allowed by the COMELEC. By definition, foundlings
are either "deserted or abandoned ... whose parents, guardian or relatives are unknown," or "committed to an orphanage or charitable or similar
institution with unknown facts of birth and parentage."71 Considering these unusual circumstances common to all foundlings, DNA or other
definitive evidence would, more often than not, not be available. A presumption disputable only by an impossible, even cruel, condition is, in reality,
a conclusive presumption.
In this jurisdiction, conclusive presumptions are looked upon with disfavor on due process grounds. In Dycaico v. Social Security System, the Court
struck down a provision in Republic Act No. 8282 or the Social Security Law "because it presumes a fact which is not necessarily or universally true.
In the United States, this kind of presumption is characterized as an irrebuttable presumption and statutes creating permanent and irrebutable
presumptions have long been disfavored under the due process clause."72 The case involved a proviso in the Social Security Law which
disqualified the survivi11g spouses whose respective marriages to SSS members were contracted after the latter's retirement. The Court found that
this created the presumption that marriages contracted after the retirement date of SSS members were sham and therefore entered into for the sole
purpose of securing the benefits under the Social Security Law. This conclusive presumption violated the due process clause because it deprived
the surviving spouses of the opportunity to disprove the presence of the illicit purpose.
In the earlier case of Government Service Insurance System v. Montesclaros, the Court similarly found as unconstitutional a proviso in Presidential
Decree No. 1146 or the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977 that prohibits the dependent spouse from receiving survivorship
pension if such dependent spouse married the pensioner within three years before the pensioner qualified for the pension. In finding that the proviso
violated the due process and equal protection guarantees, the Court stated that "[t]he proviso is unduly oppressive in outrightly denying a
dependent spouses claim for survivorship pension if the dependent spouse contracted marriage to the pensioner within the three-year prohibited
period," and "[t]here is outright confiscation of benefits due the surviving spouse without giving the surviving spouse an opportunity to be heard."73
The same consideratio11s obtain here. The COMELEC 's approach presumes a fact which is not .necessarily or universally true. Although the
possibility that the parents of a foundling are foreigners can never be discounted, this is not always the case. It appears that because of its
inordinate focus on trying to interpret the Constitution, the COMELEC disregarded the incontrovertible fact that Poe, like any other human being,
has biological parents. Logic tells us that there are four possibilities with respect to the biological parentage of Poe: (1) both her parents are
Filipinos; (2) her father is a Filipino and her mother is a foreigner; (3) her mother is a Filipino and her father is a foreigner; and (4) both her parents
are foreigners. In three of the four possibilities, Poe would be considered as a natural-born citizen.74 In fact, data from the Philippine Statistics
Authority (PSA) suggest that, in 1968, there was a 99.8n% statistical probability that her parents were Filipinos.75 That Poe's parents are unknown
does not automatically discount the possibility that either her father or mother is a citizen of the Philippines. Indeed, the verba legis interpretation of
the constitutional provision on citizenship as applied to foundlings is that they may be born of a Filipino father or mother. There is no presumption for
or against them. The COMELEC's duty under a Section 78 petition questioning a candidate's citizenship qualification is to determine the probability
that her father or mother is a Filipino citizen using substantial evidence. And there lies the second fault of the COMELEC: regardless of who had the
burden of proof, by requiring DNA or other definitive evidence, it imposed a quantum of evidence higher than substantial evidence.
In proceedings before the COMELEC, the evidentiary bar against which the evidence presented is measured is substantial evidence, which is
defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.76 This is the least demanding in the
hierarchy of evidence, as compared to the highest, proof beyond reasonable doubt applicable to criminal cases, and the intermediate,
preponderance of evidence applicable to civil cases.77 When the COMELEC insisted that Poe must present DNA or other definitive evidence, it
effectively subjected her to a higher standard of proof, that of absolute certainty. This is even higher than proof beyond reasonable doubt, which
requires only moral certainty; in criminal cases, neither DNA evidence78 nor direct evidence79 are always necessary to sustain a conviction. The
COMELEC's primary justification is the literal meaning of jus sanguinis, i.e., right of blood. This, however, is an erroneous understanding because
jus sanguinis is a principle of nationality law, not a rule of evidence. Neither is it to be understood in a scientific sense. Certainly, the 1935
Constitution could not have intended that citizenship must be proved by DNA evidence for the simple reason that DNA profiling was not introduced
until 1985.
Since the COMELEC created a presumption against Poe that she was not a natural-born citizen and then set an unreasonably high burden to
overcome such presumption, it unduly deprived her of citizenship, which has been described as "the right to have rights,"80 from which the
enjoyment of all other rights emanates. The Commission on Human Rights (CHR), in its amicus submission, accurately described the bundle of
rights that flow from the possession of citizenship: '' [it is] oftentimes the precursor to other human rights, such as the freedom of movement, right to
work, right to vote and be voted for, access to civil service, right to education, right to social security, freedom from discrimination, and recognition
as a person before the law."81
The purpose of evidence is to ascertain the truth respecting a matter of fact.82 Evidence is relevant when it induces belief in the existence or nonexistence of a fact in issue or tends in any reasonable degree to establish its probability or improbability.83 It is a fundamental requirement in our
legal system that questions of fact must be resolved according to the proof.84 Under the due process clause, as expounded in Ang Tibay, the
COMELEC was duty-bound to consider all relevant evidence before arriving at a conclusion. In the proceedings before the COMELEC, Poe
presented evidence that she is 5 feet 2 inches tall, has brown eyes, low nasal bridge, black hair and an oval-shaped face, and that she was found
abandoned in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo. There are also admissions by the parties that she was abandoned as an infant, that the population of
Iloilo in 1968 was Filipino, and that there were no international airports in Iloilo at that time. Poe's physical features, which are consistent with those
of an ordinary Filipino, together with the circumstances of when and where she was found are all relevant evidence tending to establish the
probability that her parents are Filipinos. Thus, the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it failed or refused to consider these. On the other
hand, the private respondents presented absolutely no evidence before the COMELEC that would tend to establish the improbability that both of
Poe's parents are Filipino citizens, and instead chose to rely solely on the undisputed fact that Poe is a foundling. The COMELEC's stance that "the
probability that [Poe] might be born of a Filipino parent is not sufficient to prove her case"85 is a blatant misunderstanding of the purpose of
evidence. Tribunals, whether judicial or quasi-judicial, do not deal in absolutes, which is why we lay down rules of evidence. The determination of
facts in legal proceedings is but a weighing of probabilities.86 "[A judge] must reason according to probabilities, drawing an inference that the main
fact in issue existed from collateral facts not directly proving, but strongly tending to prove, its existence. The vital question in such cases is the
cogency of the proof afforded by the secondary facts. How likely, according to experience, is the existence of the primary fact if certain secondary
facts exist?"87 This is different from a mere "possibility" that is borne out of pure conjecture without proof.
To my mind, the foregoing evidence, admissions on record, data from the PSA, which we may take judicial notice of,88 showing that 99.55% of the
population of Iloilo province in 1970 were Filipinos89 and that 99.82% of children born in the Philippines in 1968 are natural-born Filipinos,90 and
absence of contrary evidence; adequately support the conclusion that Poe's parents are Filipinos and, consequently, that she is a natural-born

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citizen. If circumstantial evidence is sufficient to establish proof beyond reasonable doubt,91 then it should also be sufficient to hurdle the lower
threshold of substantial evidence, particularly in the present case where there are a number of circumstances in favor of Poe.
2
The COMELEC's unwarranted presumption against Poe, and foundlings in general, likewise violates the equal protection clause. In Dycaico, the
Court ruled that the proviso in the Social Security Law disqualifying spouses who contracted marriage after the SSS members' retirement were
unduly discriminated against, and found that the "nexus of the classification to the policy objective is vague and flimsy."92 In Montesclaros, the
Court considered as "discriminatory and arbitrary" the questioned proviso of the GSIS Act that created a category for spouses who contracted
marriage to GSIS members within three years before they qualified for the pension.93
The COMELEC's de facto conclusive presumption that foundlings are not natural-born suffers from the same vice. In placing foundlings at a
disadvantaged evidentiary position at the start of the hearing then imposing a higher quantum of evidence upon them, the COMELEC effectively
created two classes of children: (1) those who know their biological parents; and (2) those whose biological parents are unknown. As the
COMELEC would have it, those belonging to the first class face no presumption that they are not natural-born and, if their citizenship is challenged,
they may prove their citizenship by substantial evidence. On the other hand, those belonging to the second class, such as Poe, are presumed not
natural-born at the outset and must prove their citizenship with near absolute certainty. To illustrate how the two classes are treated differently, in
Tecson,94 which involved Poe's adoptive father, the COMELEC did not make a presumption that Fernando Poe was not a nat11ral-born citizen.
Instead, it considered the evidence presented by both pa1 ties and ruled that the petition before it failed to prove by substantial evidence that
Fernando Poe was not natural-born. On certiorari, the Court sustained the COMELEC. In this case, the COMELEC presumed that Poe was not
natural-born and failed or refused to consider relevant pieces of evidence presented by Poe. Evidently, the COMELEC's only justification for the
different treatment is that Fernando Poe knew his biological parents, while herein petitioner does not.
I find the COMELEC's classification objectionable on equal protection grounds because, in the first place, it is not warranted by the text of the
Constitution. The maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius is just one of the various rules of interpretation that courts use to construe the
Constitution; it is not the be-all and end-all of constitutional interpretation. We have already held that this maxim should not be applied if it would
result in incongruities and in violation of the equal protection guarantee.95 The more appropriate interpretive rule to apply is the doctrine of
necessary implication, which holds that
No statute can be enacted that can provide all the details involved in its application. There is always an omission that may not meet a particular
situation. What is thought, at the time of enactment, to be an all-embracing legislation may be inadequate to provide for the unfolding events of the
future So-called gaps in the law develop as the law is enforced. One of the rules of statutory construction used to fill in the gap is the doctrine of
necessary implication. The doctrine states that what is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed.96
When the 1935 Constitution referred to "those whose fathers [or mothers] are citizens of the Philippines," it necessarily included foundlings whose
fathers or mothers are Filipino citizens. As previously discussed, the parentage of foundlings may be proved by substantial evidence. Conversely,
foundlings whose parents are both foreigners are excluded from the constitutional provision. This; would be the case if in an appropriate proceeding
there is deficient relevant evidence to adequately establish that either of the parents is a Filipino citizen.
Another useful interpretive rule in cases with equal protection implications is the one embodied in Article 10 of the Civil Code: "In case of doubt in
the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail." "When the statute is silent or
ambiguous, this is one of those fundamental solutions that would respond to the vehement urge of conscience."97 Indeed, it would be most unkind
to the delegates of the 1934 Constitutional Convention to ascribe upon them any discriminatory animus against foundlings in the absence of any
positive showing of such intent. It is conceded that the exact reason why the Convention voted down Sr. Rafols' proposal to explicitly include
"children of unknown parent:;" may never fully be settled. Srs. Montinola, Bulson, and Roxas all had their respective views on why the amendment
was not necessary.98 The parties herein have diametrically opposed interpretations on the proposal: the respondents argue that the fact that the
amendment is defeated should be conclusive-after all, not all delegates expressed their views-and th;1t the deliberations were not submitted to the
people for ratification; Poe contends that the deliberations reveal that rules of international law already considers foundlings as citizens of the place
where they are found, thus making the inclusion unnecessary; and finally, the Solicitor General maintains that the silence may be fully explained in
terms of linguistic efficiency and the avoidance of redundancy. These are all valid points, but I believe the only thing we can unquestionably take
away from the deliberations is that there was at least no intent to consider foundlings as stateless, and consequently deprive them of the
concomitant civil and political rights associated with citizenship.
My second objection is that-as the Solicitor General points out foundlings are a "discrete and insular"99 minority who are entitled to utmost
protection against unreasonable discrimination applying the strict scrutiny standard. According to this standard government action that
impermissibly interferes with the exercise 1if a "fundamental right" or operates to the peculiar class disadvantage of a "suspect class" is presumed
unconstitutional. The burden is on the government to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and that it is
the least restrictive means to protect such interest.100The underlying rationale for the heightened judicial scrutiny is that the political processes
ordinarily relied upon to protect minorities may have broken down.101 Thus, one aspect of the judiciary's role under the equal protection clause is to
protect discrete and insular minorities from majoritarian prejudice or indifference.102
The fundamental right warranting the application of the strict scrutiny standard is the right to a nationality embodied in the UDHR-properly
understood in the context of preventing statelessness and arbitrary denial of citizenship. Citizenship has been described as "man's basic right for it
is nothing less than the right to have rights," and the effects of its loss justly have been called "more serious than a taking of one's property, or the
imposition of a fine or other penalty."103 It is the individual's "legal bond [with the state] having as its basis a social fact of attachment, a genuine
connection of existence, interests and sentiments, together with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties."104 Although the COMELEC primarily
argues that Poe is not natural-horn, its rigid exclusionary approach,105 taken to its logical conclusion, would actually have deprived Poe of her
Filipino citizenship-natural-born or otherwise. This is an infringement of a fundamental right that threatens to deprive foundlings not only of their civil
and political rights under domestic law but also deny them of the state's protection on an international level.
Foundlings also comprise a suspect class under the strict scrutiny analysis. The traditional indicia of "suspectness" are (1) if the class possesses an
"immutable characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth,"106 or (2) when the class is "saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to
such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection
from the majoritarian political process."107 Thus, in the US, suspect classes for equal protection purposes include classifications based on race,
religion, alienage, national origin, and ancestry.108 In the Philippines, the Court has extended the scope to include distinctions based on economic
class and status,109 and period of employment contract.110 Here, the COMELEC's classification is based solely' on the happenstance that
foundlings were abandoned by their biological parents at birth and who, as a class, possess practically no political power.111 The classification is
therefore suspect and odious to a nation committed to a regime of equality.112
Applying the strict scrutiny standard, the COMELEC failed to identify a compelling state interest to justify the suspect classification and infringement
of the foundling fundamental right.113 Indeed, the Solicitor General, appearing as Tribune of the People,114 disagrees with the COMELEC's
position. When the Solicitor General acts as the People's Tribune, it is incumbent upon him to present to the court what he considers would legally
uphold the best interest of the government although it may run counter to the position of 1he affected government office.115 In such instances, the

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Court has considered his opinion and recommendations "invaluable aid[s] in the disposition of the case."116 His opinion that there is no compelling
state interest to justify discrimination against foundlings, while in no way conclusive upon the Court, must be afforded weight.
It may nonetheless be deduced that the interest sought to be protected by the COMELEC is the same as the concern of John Jay, the future first
US Chief Justice, when he suggested to George Washington that it would be wise "to provide a ... strong check into the admission of Foreigners
into the administration of our national government; and to declare expressly that the Command in chief of the American (sic) army shall not be given
to, nor devolve on, any but a natural born Citizen."117 The rationale behind requiring that only natural-born citizens may hold certain high public
offices is to insure that the holders or these high public offices grew up knowing they were at birth citizens of the Philippines. It flows from the
presumption that, in their formative years, they knew they owed from birth their allegiance to the Philippines aid that in case any other country
claims their allegiance, they would be faithful and loyal to the Philippines. This is particularly true to the President who is the commander-in-chief of
the armed forces.118 To be sure this interest is compelling because the Constitution itself demands it. Nonetheless, it can only be used where the
issue involves the bright-line between natural-born and naturalized citizens. It cannot be used as justification in a case where no clear constitutional
line has been drawn, i.e., between foundlings and persons who know their parents. It finds no application in this case where there was absolutely no
evidence, not even an allegation, that Poe's parents were foreign nationals. I simply find the risk that a Manchurian candidate119 was planted by a
foreign sovereign in the form of a foundling too remote to justify an en masse discrimination against all foundlings. If the underlying premise for the
natural-born requirement is that natural-born citizens consider themselves as Filipino citizens since birth, then foundlings surely fit into this category
as well.
In any case, the COMELEC failed to adopt the least restrictive means to protect such interest.120 by imposing a heavy burden upon Poe just
because she was abandoned as an infant with unknown facts of birth and parentage, the COMELEC haphazardly acted without regard to the farreaching consequences to a discrete and insular minority. Needless to say, a more narrowly tailored approach would avoid making a sweeping
presumption. The COMELEC 's fixation with a scientific application of the jus sanguinis principle, as opposed to a legal one guided by rules of
evidence, led to its discriminatory interpretation of the Constitution. It acted with "an evil eye and unequal hand,"121 denying foundlings equal
justice guaranteed by the same fundamental law. This is grave abuse of discretion.
C
The COMELEC and private respondent Amado Valdez both argue that even assuming that Poe was a natural-born citizen; she forever lost such
status when she became a naturalized American in 2001. Her repatriation in 2006 only restored her Filipino citizenship, but not her natural-born
status. They cite as legal basis the constitutional definition of natural-born citizens, i.e., those who are citizens from birth without having to perform
any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship.122 Poe and the Solicitor General refute this by invoking the Court's ruling in Bengson Ill v.
HRET,123 where it was held that the act of repatriation allows a former natural-born citizen to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost
his Philippine citizenship.
The COMELEC and Valdez, without stating it directly, are asking for a reexamination of Bengson. Valdez, on the one hand, frames his argument by
differentiating RA 9225 from Republic Act No. 2630 (RA 2630), the old repatriation law in effect at that time Bengson was decided. He argues that
RA 9225 had a more tedious process than RA 2630. On the other hand, the COMELEC points to the text of RA 9225 noting that it only mentioned
reacquisition of citizenship, not reacquisition of natural-born status. These are, of course, thin attempts to differentiate this case from Bengson. But
the problem is that they never directly question the legal soundness of Bengson. And, to me, this half-hearted challenge is insufficient justification to
depart from stare decisis.
Time and again, the Court has held that it is a very desirable and necessary judicial practice that when a court has laid down a principle of law as
applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases in which the facts are substantially the same.
Absent any powerful countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike.124 The reason why we adhere to judicial precedents is not
only for certainty and predictability in our legal order but equally to have an institutional safeguard for the judicial branch. As articulated by the US
Supreme Court in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
There is a limit to the amount of error that can plausibly be imputed to prior Courts. If that limit should be exceeded, disturbance of prior rulings
would be taken as evidence that justifiable reexamination of principle had given way to drives for particular results in the short term. The legitimacy
of the Court would fade with the frequency of its vacillation.125
In the Philippines, using as reference the cited US case, we have adopted a four-point test to justify deviation from precedent, which include the
determination of: ( 1) whether the older doctrine retained the requirements of "practical workability;" (2) whether the older doctrine had attracted the
kind of reliance that would add a special hardship to the consequences of overruling it and "add inequity to the cost of repudiation;" (3) whether the
related principles of law have developed in a different direction so as to render the older rule "no more than the remnant of an abandoned doctrine;"
and, ( 4 )whether the contextual facts of the older doctrine have so changed a; to deprive the old rule of "significant application or justification."126;
Thus, before we could venture into a full blown reexamination of Bengson, it was necessary for respondents to have shown, at the first instance,
that their case hurdled the foregoing test.
III
It is well settled in election law that residence is synonymous with domicile.127 Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence where, when absent
for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return.128 To establish domicile, three elements must concur: (1) residence or bodily
presence in the new locality; (2) an intention to remain there (animus manendi); and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile (animus non
revertendi ).129
There is no question that Poe has complied with the first requirement. She has been residing in the Philippines together with her children since May
24, 2005, save for brief travels abroad. The point of contention between the parties is whether Poe satisfied the concurrent requisites of animus
manendi et non revertendi. In the proceedings before the COMELEC, Poe presented evidence that: she and her husband enrolled their US-based
children in Philippine schools in June 2005; they purchased a condominium in the second half 2005 which was intended to be used as the family
abode; they made inquiries with property movers as early as March 2005 and actually relocated household. goods, furniture, cars, and other
personal properties to the Philippines during the first half of 2006; she secured a Tax Identification Number from tl1e Bureau of Internal Revenue in
July 2005; her husband notified the US Postal Service that they will no longer be using their former US address in M:.1rch 2006; they sold their
family home in the US in April 2006; her husband resigned from his work in the US to join the family in May 2006; and her application for
reacquisition of Filipino citizenship and her application for derivative citizenship of her minor children, which were subsequently approved on July
18, 2006. The COMELEC, however, relied on the declaration in her 2013 COC for Senator, where she stated that she was a resident for 6 years
and 6 months, which would peg her residency in November 2006. Even if the previous COC was not controlling, the COMELEC determined that the
earliest Poe could have established domicile here was when the BI approved her application to reacquire her Filipino citizenship on July 18, 2006. It
emphasized that when Poe entered the Philippines in May 2005, she did so as a foreign national availing of a balikbayan visa-free entry privilege
valid for one year. In other words, she was a temporary visitor. Citing Coquilla v. COMELEC,130 the COMELEC ruled that Poe should have either
secured an Immigrant Certificate of Residence or reacquired Filipino citizenship to be able to waive her non-resident status.

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Unlike residence which may be proved by mere physical presence, animus manendi et non revertendi refers to a state of mind. Thus, there is no
hard and fast rule to determine a candidate's compliance with the residency requirement.131 Its determination is essentially dependent on evidence
of contemporary and subsequent acts that would tend to establish the fact of intention. Although the appreciation of evidence is made on a case-tocase basis, there are three basic postulates to consider: first that a man must have a residence or domicile somewhere; second, that where once
established it remains until a new one is acquired; and third, a man can have but one domicile at a time.132 In addition, the Court has devised
reasonable standards to guide tribunals in evaluating the evidence.
In Mitra v. COMELEC,133 the Court recognized that the establishment of domicile may be incremental. The Court considered the following
"incremental moves" undertaken by Mitra as sufficient to establish his domicile: (1) his expressed intent to transfer to a residence outside of Puerto
Princesa City to make him eligible for a provincial position; (2) his preparatory moves; (3) the transfer of registration as a voter; ( 4) his initial
transfer through a leased dwelling; (5) the purchase of a lot for his permanent home; and (6) the construction of a house on the said lot which is
adjacent to the premises he was; leasing pending the completion of his house.
In Fernandez v. HRET,134 the Court held that the transfer of domicile must be bona fide. In ruling in favor of the petitioner whose residency was
challenged in a quo warranto proceeding, the Court found that there are real and substantial reasons for Fernandez to establish a new domicile in
Sta. Rosa, Laguna for purposes of qualifying for the May 2007 elections. The ruling was based on a finding that: (a) Fernandez and his wife owned
and operated businesses in Sta. Rosa since 2003; (b) their children attended schools in Sta. Rosa at least since 2005; (c) although ownership of
property should never be considered a requirement for any candidacy, Fernandez purchased residential properties in that city even prior to the May
2007 election; and ( d) Fernandez and his spouse subsequently purchased another lot in April 2007, about a month before election day, where they
have constructed a home for their family's use as a residence.
In Japzon v. COMELEC ',135 also involving residency, the Court ruled that residence is independent of citizenship. The Court found that although
respondent Ty did not automatically reestablish domicile in the Philippines upon reacquisition of citizenship under RA 9225, his subsequent acts
proved his intent to establish ;i new domicile in the Philippines. The Court based its finding on the following circumstances: (a) he applied for a
Philippine passport indicating in his application that his residence in the Philippines was in General Macarthur, Eastern Samar; (b) for the years
2006 and 2007, Ty voluntarily submitted himself to the local tax jurisdiction of General Macarthur by paying community tax and securing CTCs from
the said municipality stating therein his local address; ( c) thereafter, Ty applied for and was registered as a voter in the same municipality; and (d)
Ty had also been bodily present in General Macarthur except for short trips abroad.
In Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC,136 one of the issues presented was an apparent mistake with regard to the period of residency stated in the
COC of Imelda Marcos, which would have made her ineligible. In finding that Marcos was eligible, the Court held that "[i]t is the fact of residence,
not a statement in a ce11ificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the [C]onstitution's
residency qualifications requirement."137
Guided by the foregoing, it is clear to me that Poe has adequately established her animus manendi et non revertendi by substantial evidence. There
are real and substantial reasons for her establishment of domicile in the Philippines. Her father died on December 2004, which Poe claims, was
crucial in her decision to resettle in the Philippines for good. She and her family then began the incremental process of relocating by making
preparatory inquiries with property movers as early as March 2005. She then entered the Philippines in May 2005 and enrolled her children in
Philippine schools for the academic year starting in June 2005. It cannot be overemphasized that it defies logic that one would uproot her children
from US schools and transfer them to schools in a different country if the intent was only to stay here temporarily. The intent to stay in the
Philippines permanently is further reinforced by the purchase of real property to serve as the family abode and relocation of household goods,
furniture, cars, and other personal properties from the US. The sale of their family residence in the US and her husband's arrival in the Philippines to
join the family all but confirmed her abandonment of her US domicile and a definitive intent to remain in the Philippines. Poe has also been
physically present in the Philippines since May 2005, and the fact that she returned after short trips abroad is strongly indicative that she considers
the Philippines as her domicile. Her subsequent act: of acquiring Filipino citizenship for herself and her minor children, renouncing her US
citizenship, and holding public office are all consistent with the intent formed as early as 2005. Although these acts are subsequent to May 2005,
they are relevant because they tend to prove a specific intent formed at an earlier time.138 Taken together, these facts trump an innocuous
statement in her 2013 COC.
The facts that Poe did not renounce her US citizenship until 2010 and used her US passport between 2006 and 2010 do not affect her
establishment of domicile in the Philippines. The circumstance that Poe, after leaving the US and fixing her residence in the Philippines, may have
had what is called a "floating intention" to return to her former domicile upon some indefinite occasion, does not give her the right to claim such
former domicile as her residence. It is her establishment of domicile in the Philippines with the intention of remaining here for an indefinite time that
severed the respondent's domiciliary relation with her former home.139 This is consistent with the basic rule that she could have only one domicile
at a time.
I now discuss the effect of the fact that Poe entered the country in May 2005 as an American citizen under the balikbayan visa-free program. There
is no dispute among the parties that citizenship and residence are distinct concepts. A foreign national can establish domicile here without
undergoing naturalization. Where there is disagreement is whether Poe could have established her domicile in the Philippines in May 2005
considering that her entry was through the balikbayan program, which is valid for one year. Respondents, on the one hand, believe it was not
possible because of the temporary nature of her stay. For them, Poe should have first secured an Immigrant Certificate of Residence or repatriated
earlier than July 2006. On the other hand, Poe contends that to require either would be to add a fourth requisite to the establishment of domicile.
In principle, I agree with the COMELEC's proposition that "a foreigner's capacity to establish her domicile in the Philippines is ... limited by and
subject to regulations and prior authorization by the BID."140 This appears to be based on rulings of US federal courts, which distinguish "lawful"
from "unlawful" domicile.141 The requisites for domicile remain the same, i.e., physical presence, animus manendi, and animus non revertendi. But
"[i]n order to have a 'lawful domicile,' then, an alien must have the ability, under the immigration laws, to form the intent to remain in the [country]
indefinitely.142 The basis for this is the sovereign's inherent power to regulate the entry of immigrants seeking to establish domicile within its
territory. It is not an additional requisite for the establishment of domicile; rather, it is a precondition that capacitates a foreigner to lawfully establish
domicile. This is the import of the statement in Coquilla that "an alien [is] without any right to reside in the Philippines save as our immigration laws
may have allowed him to stay."143
The point of inquiry, therefore, is if, under our immigration laws, Poe has the ability to form the intent to establish domicile. In resolving this issue,
the analysis in the US case of Elkins v. Moreno144 is instructive. In Elkins, the US Supreme Court resolved the question of whether a holder of a
"G-4 visa" (a nonimmigrant visa granted to officers or employees of international treaty organizations and members of their immediate families)
cannot acquire Maryland domicile because such a visa holder is incapable of demonstrating an essential element of domicile-the intent to live
permanently or indefinitely in Maryland (a "legal disability"). In resolving the issue, the US Court analyzed federal immigration laws and found that
where the US Congress intended to restrict a nonimmigrant's capacity to establish domicile, it did so expressly. Since there was no similar
restriction imposed on G-4 aliens, the US Court considered the legislature's silence as pregnant, and concluded tha1 the US Congress, while
anticipating that permanent immigration would normally occur through immigrant channels, was willing to allow non-restricted nonimmigrant aliens
to adopt the US as their domicile.145

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In the Philippines, the primary immigration law is Commonwealth Act No. 613 (CA 613) or the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940. In defining certain
nonimmigrant classes, Congress explicitly limited the purpose for entry into the Philippines. For example, a nonimmigrant student's entry is "solely
for 1he purpose of study."146 In other instances, it uses language that identifies specific purpose and the transient nature of the nonimmigrant's
entry.147 By including such restrictions on intent, it may be deduced that Congress aimed to exclude aliens belonging to these restricted classes if
their real purpose in coming to the Philippines was to immigrate permanently. This is further supported by Section 37(d) of the Act which provides as
ground for deportation the nonimmigrant's violation of any limitation or condition under which he was admitted.
But Congress made no such clear restrictions in Republic Act No. 9174 (RA 9174), which amended Republic Act No. 6768 (RA 6768).148 The law
allows balikbayans who hold foreign passports to enter the Philippines visa-free for a period of one year, except for those considered as restricted
nationals.149 It defines a balikbayan as "a Filipino citizen who has been continuously out of the Philippines for a period of at least one (1) year, a
Filipino overseas worker, or former Filipino citizen and his or her family, as this term is defined hereunder, who had been naturalized in a foreign
country and comes or returns to the Philippines."150 unlike the restricted classes of nonimmigrant's under the Immigration Act, there was no definite
restriction on intent or purpose imposed upon balikbayans, although there was a temporal restriction on the validity of the visa-free entry. Taken
alone, the one-year limit may be interpreted as an implied limitation. However, RA 9174 expressly declared that one of the purposes of establishing
a balikbayan program is to "to enable the balikbayan to become economically self-reliant members of society upon their return to the country."151
To this end, the law instructs government agencies to "provide the necessary entrepreneurial training and livelihood skills programs and marketing
assistance to a balikbayan, including his or her immediate family members, who shall avail of the kabuhuyan program in accordance with the
existing rules on the government's reintegration program."152 This is a clear acknowledgement by Congress that it is possible for a balikbayan to
form the intent needed to establish his domicile in the Philippines. Notably, there are no qualifications, such as acquisition of permanent resident
status or reacquisition of Filipino citizenship, before a balikbayan may avail of the kabuhayan program. Applying the well-established interpretive
rule that a statute must be so construed as to harmonize and give effect to all its provisions whenever possible,153 the one-year visa-free entry
does not create a legal disability which would prevent balikbayans from developing animus manendi.
The amendments introduced by RA 9174 to RA 6768 differentiate the present case from Coquilla In that case, decided prior to the enactment of RA
9174, the Court concluded that a visa-free balikbayan visitor could not have established domicile in the Philippines prior to a waiver of his
nonresident status. This is because under RA 6768, the only declared purpose was "to attract and encourage overseas Filipinos to come and visit
their motherland." Coupled with the one-year visa-free limit, this most likely led to the Court's interpretation that a balikbayan's entry was merely
temporary. However, with the amendments introducing the reintegration provisions, a balikbayan is no longer precluded from developing an intent to
stay permanently in the Philippines; Therefore, Poe, who entered the Philippines after the effectivity of RA 9174, had the ability to establish a lawful
domicile in the Philippines even prior to her reacquisition of Filipino citizenship.
For the foregoing reasons, I vote to GRANT the petitions.

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