Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
-China................................................................................................................. 68
A2 Hard PowerNeed Legitimacy......................................................................73
Cooperation Good................................................................................................. 75
-Generic............................................................................................................. 76
-Nuclear Security................................................................................................ 79
Liberalism+Realism............................................................................................ 80
US Hegemony Good.............................................................................................. 81
-Extinction.......................................................................................................... 82
-GPW.................................................................................................................. 84
-Laundry List...................................................................................................... 88
-Soft Power......................................................................................................... 89
Global Governmen/Cosmot Good.......................................................................91
Constructivism................................................................................................... 95
Answers.................................................................................................................... 98
-Not Locked In.................................................................................................... 99
Heg Unsustainable.............................................................................................. 101
-General........................................................................................................... 102
-Military............................................................................................................ 107
-China Rise....................................................................................................... 109
Containment Good........................................................................................... 113
A2-Interdependece........................................................................................... 114
A2-Cosmopolitinism......................................................................................... 115
Neo-Realism/Offensive Realism
True
-Empirics
Realism is the best theoretical rubric for making foreign policy
decisionsempirics
WALT 16-Robert and Rene Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University, PhD and MA in
Political Science @ UC-Berkeley [Stephen, What Would a Realist World Have Looked Like? Foreign Policy, 1/8/2016,
http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/01/08/what-would-a-realist-world-have-looked-like-iraq-syria-iran-obama-bush-clinton/,
DKP]
Heres a puzzle for all you students of U.S. foreign policy: Why is a distinguished and well-known approach to foreign policy confined
to the margins of public discourse, especially in the pages of our leading newspapers, when its recent track record is arguably
superior to the main alternatives? I refer, of course, to realism. Im not suggesting that realism and realists are completely
marginalized these days after all, youre reading a realist right now but the public visibility and policy influence of the realist
perspective is disproportionately small when compared either to liberal internationalism (among Democrats) or neoconservatism (in
the GOP). This situation is surprising insofar as realism is a well-established tradition in the study of foreign affairs, and realists like
George Kennan, Hans Morgenthau, Reinhold Niebuhr, Walter Lippmann, and others said many smart things about U.S. foreign policy
in the past. Realism also remains a foundational perspective in the academic study of international affairs and with good reason. At
a minimum, youd think this sophisticated body of thought would have a prominent place in debates on foreign policy and that card-
realisms
predictions over the past 25 years are clearly better than the claims of liberals and
neoconservatives, which have dominated U.S. foreign policymaking since the Cold War ended. Yet
time and time again, presidents have pursued the liberal/neocon servative agenda and
carrying realists would be a visible force inside the Beltway and in the world of punditry. Furthermore,
ignored the counsels of realism. Similarly, major media outlets have shown little inclination to give realists a prominent platform
The results, alas, speak for themselves. When the Cold War
ended, the United States was on good terms with all of the worlds major powers, al Qaeda was a minor nuisance, a genuine
peace process was underway in the Middle East, and America was enjoying its unipolar moment. Power politics was
supposedly becoming a thing of the past, and humankind was going to get busy getting rich in a globalized
from which to disseminate their views.
world where concerns about prosperity, democracy, and human rights would increasingly dominate the international political
Liberal values were destined to spread to every corner of the globe, and if that process
Fast forward to today. Relations with
Russia and China are increasingly confrontational; democracy is in retreat in Eastern
Europe and Turkey; and the entire Middle East is going from bad to worse. The U nited
States has spent hundreds of billions of dollars fighting in Afghanistan for 14 years, and the
Taliban are holding their own and may even be winning. Two decades of U.S. mediation have left the IsraeliPalestinian peace process in tatters. Even the E uropean Union perhaps the clearest embodiment of
liberal ideals on the planet is facing unprecedented strains for which there is no easy remedy. All of
which raises the following counterfactual: Would the U nited States and the world be
better off today if the last three presidents had followed the dictates of realism , instead of
letting liberals and neocons run the show? The answer is yes. To remind you: Realism sees power as the
centerpiece of political life and sees states as primarily concerned with ensuring
their own security in a world where theres no world government to protect them from others. Realists believe
military power is essential to preserving a states independence and autonomy, but
they recognize it is a crude instrument that often produces unintended
consequences. Realists believe nationalism and other local identities are powerful
and enduring; states are mostly selfish; altruism is rare; trust is hard to come by;
and norms and institutions have a limited impact on what powerful states do. In short, realists
have a generally pessimistic view of international affairs and are wary of efforts to remake the world
agenda.
didnt move fast enough, American power would help push it along.
according to some ideological blueprint, no matter how appealing it might be in the abstract. Had Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and
Barack Obama been following the realist playbook, how would U.S. foreign policy since 1993 been different? First, and most
had Bush listened to Brent Scowcroft, Colin Powell, or some other notable realists, he would not
have invaded Iraq in 2003. Bush would have focused solely on eliminating al Qaeda, instead of getting bogged down in
obviously,
build constructive security ties with former Warsaw Pact members, including Russia. Unfortunately, this sensible approach was
abandoned in the idealistic rush to expand NATO, a decision reflecting liberal hopes that the security guarantees entailed by
Russia had the capacity to derail these efforts if it wished. Ukraine would still be a mess if realists had been in charge of U.S. foreign
policy, but
Crimea would still be part of Ukraine and the fighting that has taken place in eastern
Ukraine since 2014 would probably not have occurred. Had Clinton, Bush, and Obama listened to realists, in
short, relations with Russia would be significantly better and Eastern Europe would probably be more secure. Third, a president
Instead of
pledging to contain Iran and Iraq simultaneously, a realist would have taken
advantage of their mutual rivalry and used each to balance the other. Dual
containment committed the United States to opposing two countries that were bitter rivals, and it forced
Washington to keep large ground and air forces in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. This long-term
military presence became one of Osama bin Ladens major grievances and thus helped
put the United States on the road to the 9/11 attacks. A realist approach to Persian Gulf politics
would have made that attack less likely, though of course not impossible. Fourth, realists also
warned that trying to nation-build in Afghanistan was a fools errand especially after the invasion of
Iraq allowed the Taliban to regroup and correctly predicted that Obamas 2009 surge was not going
to work. Had Obama listened to the realists, the United States would have cut its losses in Afghanistan a long time ago and the
outcome would be no different than what we are going to get anyway. Countless lives and vast sums of
money would have been saved, and the United States would be in a stronger strategic position today. Fifth, for
realists, the nuclear deal with Iran shows what the U nited States can accomplish when it engages
in tough-minded but flexible diplomacy. But Washington might have gotten an even better deal
had Bush or Obama listened to the realists and conducted serious diplomacy back
when Irans nuclear infrastructure was much smaller. Realists repeatedly warned that Iran would
following the realist playbook would not have embraced the strategy of dual containment in the Persian Gulf.
never agree to give up its entire enrichment capacity and that threatening Tehran with military force would only increase its desire
it might have
halted Irans nuclear development at a much lower level. More adroit U.S. diplomacy might even
for a latent weapons capability. Had the United States shown more flexibility earlier as realists advised
have forestalled the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2005 and moved the two countries toward a more constructive
the expense of the Palestinians. Realists also argued that achieving a two-state solution between Israel and the Palestinians required
that the United States pressure both sides instead of acting as Israels lawyer. At this point, can anyone seriously question the
humanitarian intervention both exaggerated the risk of genocide and underestimated the disorder and violence that would follow
try to cling to power by any means necessary. For realists, the overriding task was to end the civil war quickly and with as little loss
the
Syrian civil war might repeat, might have been shut down before so many lives were
lost and the country was irretrievably broken. In short, had realists been at the helm of
U.S. foreign policy over the past 20 years, it is likely that a number of costly debacles would
have been avoided and some important achievements would have been realized. One might question some of these
claims, but on the whole realists have a much better track record than those who keep
insisting the United States has the right, responsibility, and wisdom to manage virtually
every important global issue, and who have repeatedly urged Washington to take actions that now look foolish.
of life as possible, even if that required doing business with a brutal tyrant. Had Obama listened to realists a few years ago,
-China
The world is anarchical, competitive, and dangerousthe rise
of China is textbook offensive realism
LI 16-assistant professor and Chenhui Research Fellow in the School of Advanced International and Area Studies
at East China Normal University, PhD in political science from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
[Xiaoting, Applying offensive realism to the rise of China: structural incentives and Chinese diplomacy toward the
neighboring states, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific Volume 16 (2016) 241-271, DKP]
before
the end of
World War II, all great powers including the United States had
followed
more or less an expansionist course in their bids for regional hegemony (Mearsheimer, 2014 [2001],
especially Chapters 2 and 6). This is not to say, however, that great powers will adopt expansionist policies under any
well-advised not to take the offensive, but to defend the existing balance from threats by its more powerful rivals. With a marked
increase in its relative advantages, it may then seize opportunities to shift the balance in its favor, if and when the benefits outweigh
the costs and risks. Furthermore, a great power without a strong navy should take into account the stopping power of water, or the
difficulty of projecting power overseas (Mearsheimer, 2014[2001], pp. 23, 37, 140145). In short, great powers should act within
the limits of what is possible or feasible. They could, of course, sometimes ignore those limits and act unwisely, but only at their own
The United States has been the sole regional hegemon in the last two centuries, largely because
it encountered no serious local or external balancers during its ascendance (Elman, 2004). In contrast,
all other contenders for regional dominance, from Napoleonic France to Imperial Japan to Nazi Germany, had
brought about their destruction by overextension in the face of multiple adversaries. In todays
world, seeking hegemony through foreign conquests is a plainly foolhardy enterprise, not only
because of the prohibitive costs, but because the United States, having acquired preponderant power in
international politics, would not tolerate a rivals control of either Europe or Asia (Mearsheimer,
2014[2001], pp. 364365, 367368). From the preceding discussion, it follows logically that, until it achieves parity with
the United States, a materially weaker PRC should have more incentives to fold than to
raise, i.e. to eschew overt hegemonic pursuits , rather than initiate a premature contest for regional
supremacy. After all, despite its impressive growth, China still lags considerably behind America in
economic, military, and technological strength and lacks the material wherewithal to establish a
Sinocentric order (Beckley, 2011; Nye, 2012). Meanwhile, China faces probably the most challenging
geopolitical environment in the world, because it has too many neighbors to contend with
peril.
which depends increasingly on the globalized market, production, and finance, and Chinas rise largely confirms this pattern (Brooks,
against China but draw Beijing into constant conflicts and deflect its attention and resources from the priority of economic
development. Meanwhile, Chinas neighbors may wish to avoid an inimical relationship with Beijing too, in the absence of
2014[2001], p. 160; for a neoclassical theory of underbalancing in international politics, see Schweller, 2008). Admittedly,
balancing a rising state involves significant opportunity costs as well as the forfeit of
possible gains from cooperation with that state (Chan, 2012, ch. 24). Geopolitically, Chinas neighbors are
acutely aware that America is an ocean away, whereas China has long dominated
Asias mainland a fact that often compels its neighbors to adjust their national policies with some appreciation of Chinese
interests and preferences (Ross, 1999, 2006; Womack, 2006). Moreover, in regional politics, some Asian
countries perhaps pay more attention to each other, than to China (e.g. India vs. Pakistan,
North Korea vs. South Korea, or Vietnam vs. its weaker neighbors). By maintaining constructive relations with the PRC, they could
balance-of-influence strategy, by granting all major powers a stake in the regional order and allowing them to balance each other
10
so as to buffer China against real or perceived US pressures (Goldstein, 2005; Shambaugh, 2005; Nathan and Scobell, 2012; Sutter,
it is not unthinkable
that Beijing would sometimes show restraint and even offer concessions in territorial
disputes with its neighbors, for the double purposes of signaling its cooperative intent and
undercutting the rationale for US involvement. Theoretically, offensive realism does not
disapprove of one great power making concessions to others, so long as those concessions help it
2012). In particular, since good-neighborly relations consist foremost in secure and settled borders,
concentrate resources against the more menacing foes (Mearsheimer, 2014[2001], pp. 164165). On closer examination, much of
Chinas peripheral territory is of limited economic and military value, which might have made it easier for Beijing to make certain
a distinct sphere of influence. In this process, the PRC might offer sweeter carrots to those cooperative neighbors, as even a
superpower needs friends and partners to cope with potential rivals more effectively. Yet meanwhile, it could also wield heavier
offensive realism
suggests that China has strong and structurally driven incentives to
diminish the influence of other great powers (especially an adversarial one) in its home region
sticks against those uncooperative neighbors, to discourage noncompliance with its wishes. In sum,
and that these incentives may lead Beijing to act both cooperatively and coercively toward its neighbors, depending on the latters
readiness to accommodate Chinas rise and/or keep a cautious distance from external powers. Admittedly, that a states powerseeking strategy is often complex and contingent upon varying circumstances is not a novel tenet in realist theory. Like
Mearsheimer, classical realists such as E. H. Carr (1964, pp. 112, 145) and Hans Morgenthau (1978, pp. 1011) also perceived
international politics as an endless struggle for power, which is nevertheless moderated by the necessity to exercise power
prudently to attain ones ends. Theoretically, this line of thinking is consistent with the above propositions about how a rising state
should approach its neighbors, both to secure their support and to compel their awe.
This study employs offensive realism to provide a baseline for assessing Beijing's
strategic choices in dealing with regional neighbors. In theory, when an ascending power is not yet
capable of dominating its home region, it would strive foremost to prevent external
powers from extending their influence in its neighborhood. To attain that goal, it will likely adopt a
11
carrots-and-sticks strategy, by rewarding some neighbors and punishing others according to their readiness to
accommodate its ascendance and keep a cautious distance from external powers. Empirically, this study records in detail that
Beijing has long sought the assistance of its neighbors in turning away a rival great
power from China's periphery, often by offering territorial concessions as a reward for such assistance. Nonetheless, Beijing is
much less likely to compromise with those neighbors whom it suspects of collaborating with external powers against China: indeed,
it tends to punish those alleged pawns in order to flout their external sponsors and show who is the
resident strongman [strongperson] in Asia. Restraint and assertiveness, in other words, are
not inversely related (i.e. as one side grows, the other shrinks) in Chinese foreign policy behavior. Rather, they
are two sides of the same coin and serve the same overriding purpose of countering
adversarial (especially US) influences in China's neighborhood. Since the PRC has
pursued this carrots-and-sticks diplomacy with remarkable consistency to date, there is good
reason to think that little will change in the future. Thus, the basic assumptions of offensive realism
ring true: fundamentally, great-power politics is still a struggle for power and
influence, and conflicts of interest among those titans are genuine and not just a
result of unfortunate misunderstanding. And, to explain those conflicts, it is necessary to
accord a certain causal significance to the structural incentives that push great
powers to compete against each other in the first place.
Offensive realism is the ideal tool to analyze the US pivot towards the Asia-Pacific for
several reasons. First of all, offensive realism is pessimistic. It does not predict the durability of US hegemony like
defensive realists, since it argues that new great powers will merge to offset US
power (Layne, 2002). It is now clear that such a great power has merged , namely China. Another key concept
in explaining US behavior is the offensive realist notion of potential hegemon . China is the
only great power that can possibly achieve hegemony . Defensive realists argue (Waltz,
1979) that states are only interested in maximizing power until a certain point when it becomes a status
quo power concerned with balancing. However, in explaining the pivot, Hillary Clinton (2011) points out that the United
States wants to lead. This assumes that the United States is still interested in maximizing its power and that it has no intention to solely become a status quo
power concerned with balancing. Indeed, this 11 thesis will show that the US pivot towards the Asia-Pacific
region is an answer to Chinas acquired position as a potential hegemon . It should be noted that
Mearsheimer (2001) argues that because of what he calls the stopping power of water, a state can only achieve regional hegemony and not global hegemony. Christopher Layne (2012)
argues, and I agree, that this is a flaw in Mearsheimers theory. To me, it is odd that Mearsheimer uses the example of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan, since the example also showed
12
A2-Defensive Realism
Defensive realism is overly-optimisticstructural factors
guarantee and inevitable conflict over control of East Asia
LI 16-assistant professor and Chenhui Research Fellow in the School of Advanced International and Area Studies
at East China Normal University, PhD in political science from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
[Xiaoting, Applying offensive realism to the rise of China: structural incentives and Chinese diplomacy toward the
neighboring states, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific Volume 16 (2016) 241-271, DKP]
in which uncertainties about each others intentions prevent purely security seeking nations from cooperating to
In the offensive
realist view, however, the Achilles heel of this defensive realist prediction lies in its
failure to see that for an ascending power, security does not always consist in the
maintenance of the status quo. Rather, given the lasting strategic distrust between Beijing and
Washington, the PRC might find it more advisable to improve its long-term security
position by seeking a gradual reduction of American influence in Asia and forging a
new status quo in its own favor. If that is the case, then SinoAmerican relations may face
stormy times ahead, as the United States obviously has no intention of abandoning its Asian
allies and partners to their fate and letting China hold the reins in this vitally important region. Viewed
in this light, offensive realism becomes readily falsifiable in regard to the behavior of a
rising China. The theory would be invalid if the PRC customarily welcomes, not just in words but in deeds, a
sustain a mutually acceptable status quo order (for this view, see Johnston, 2003, 2013).
sustained US presence and leadership role in Asias security architecture, or if process-tracing reveals that Beijing
frequently offers territorial compromises to the neighboring countries without considering the question of having
13
A2-Peace-Conflict Good
Peace fractures unity ethnic conflicts, less effective
bureaucracies and ineffective tax systems
Walt 16 Robert and Renee Belfer Professorship in International Affairs @ Harvard University's John F. Kennedy
School of Government, PhD and MA in Political Science @ UC-Berkeley, Fellow in the American Academy of Arts and
Science [Stephen, The Case Against Peace, Foreign Policy, June 17, 2016, http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/06/17/thecase-against-peace-syria-europe-brexit-donald-trump,SCJ]
There may be some truth in each of these claims, but they all overlook an even more important explanation for the fractious state of
contemporary politics: peace. Dont get me wrong: I think peace is wonderful, and I wish more politicians talked about it openly and
present divisions has been around for quite a while. Indeed, 20 years ago, political scientist Michael Desch published a fascinating
article in the academic journal International Organization, titledWar and Strong States, Peace and Weak States? Drawing on the
war (and
external threats more generally) were perhaps the single-most important factor
explaining the emergence of strong, centralized states and cohesive national
polities. In particular, the pressures of international competition forced rival states to
develop effective bureaucracies, efficient systems of taxation, and formidable
armies, and it also encouraged the promotion of patriotism and a dampening of
internal divisions. When the wolf is at the door, domestic quarrels are put aside in
order to deal with the more immediate danger. Unfortunately, this argument also implies that the
arrival of peace can have a negative effect on national unity. Desch quotes sociologist George
earlier work of Max Weber, Otto Hintze, George Simmel, Charles Tilly, Lewis Coser, and others, Desch argued that
Simmel approvingly: A groups complete victory over its enemies is thus not always fortunate in a sociological sense. Victory lowers
the energy which guarantees the unity of the group; and the dissolving forces, which are always at work, gain hold. Does the
historical record support this view? Desch thought so. In his words: Variation in the intensity of the international security
competition also affected the cohesion of many states. From the end of the Napoleonic wars and the Treaty of Versailles in 1815 until
the Crimean War of 1853-1856, the external threat environment facing European states became relatively benign. The period
between 1815 and 1853 witnessed an unprecedented breakdown in state cohesion manifested in a series of internal upheavals in
various European states. He also saw a similar pattern in U.S. history. By 1850, he noted: [T]he external threat environment facing
the United States had become quite benign. At the same time, long-standing internal tensions reemerged in the United States. By
the election of 1860, the country was so divided that Republican Abraham Lincoln was elected with little more than a third of the
vote and three other parties did quite well. It is reasonable to conclude that the American Civil War was in part the result of the
breakdown of national cohesion due to the changing external threat environment. The two world wars, by contrast, helped create
the modern American federal state and were a powerful source of national unity, a trend reinforced even more by the subsequent
Cold War. In Deschs view, The cold war was the perfect type of threat. It never escalated to a major war although it was serious
enough to be a unifying factor. The end of the Cold War removed this source of unity, however, and as Nils Petter Gleditsch, John
Mueller, Steven Pinker, and Joshua Goldstein have all argued, the level of conflict (and external threat) in the world has been
growing internal
disunity and a weakening of state effectiveness, although the strength of these
tendencies varies widely around the world. States that mobilize power through
market mechanisms appear to be more robust than those that do so through
coercive extraction, and there is also a ratchet effect when states go stronger.
declining (until a recent modest uptick). The result, as Desch foresaw two decades ago, has been
Because bureaucracies and institutions created at one point in time rarely go out of business as soon as their original rationale
14
Key cases to watch here are Israel (secular versus religious Jews and the Jewish majority versus the Arab minority), multiethnic Arab
states such as Syria (Alawites) and Jordan (Palestinians), Afghanistan (various political factions), much of black Africa (tribal), and
especially South Africa (Zulus and whites). [T]he
Reducing external
dangers turns out to have a downside: The less threatened we are by the outside
world, the more prone we are to ugly quarrels at home. Even worse, peace may even
contain the seeds of its own destruction. As we are now seeing in the Middle East,
the collapse of unity and state authority can easily trigger violent internal conflicts
that eventually drag outside powers back in. Yet the obvious solution looking for some external
bogeyman to rally against is hardly appealing either. The result, alas, may be a recurring cycle of
conflict where periods of peace give way to new sources of tension and division. I
country. If Desch is right and I think he is the implications are both ironic and disheartening.
suppose you might say this disturbing possibility is part of what makes me a realist.
15
A2-Liberalism
Liberalism is wrong in the current world order no
commitment to liberal values, nationalism trump liberal
values, and leaders who exploit liberal values
Walt 16 - Robert and Renee Belfer Professorship in International Affairs @ Harvard University's John F.
Kennedy School of Government, PhD and MA in Political Science @ UC-Berkeley, Fellow in the American Academy of
Arts and Sciences [Stephen, The Collapse of the Liberal World Order, Foreign Policy, June 26 2016,
http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/06/26/the-collapse-of-the-liberal-world-order-european-union-brexit-donald-trump/,
SCJ]
made some critical blunders, including the creation of the euro, the invasion of Iraq, the misguided attempt to nation-build in
Afghanistan, and the 2008 financial crisis. These and other mistakes helped undermine the legitimacy of the post-Cold War order,
Efforts to spread a
liberal world order also faced predictable opposition from the leaders and groups
who were directly threatened by our efforts. It was hardly surprising that Iran and Syria did what they could
open the door to illiberal forces, and left some segments of society vulnerable to nativist appeals.
to thwart U.S. efforts in Iraq, for example, because the George W. Bush administration had made it clear these regimes were on its
hit list, too. Similarly, is it that hard to fathom why Chinese and Russian leaders find Western efforts to spread liberal values
They assumed that such atavistic attachments would gradually die out, be confined to apolitical, cultural expressions, or be adroitly
change is rapid and unpredictable, and especially when once-homogeneous societies are forced to incorporate and assimilate
16
been smooth or simple. The resulting tensions provide ample grist for populist
leaders who promise to defend traditional values (or make the country great again). Nostalgia
aint what it used to be, but it can still be a formidable political trope. Most important of all,
liberal societies are in trouble today because they are vulnerable to being hijacked by
groups or individuals who take advantage of the very freedoms upon which liberal
societies are based. As Donald Trump has been proving all year (and as Jean-Marie Le Pen, Recep Erdogan, Geert Wilders,
and other political entrepreneurs have shown in the past), leaders or movements whose commitment to
liberal principles is at best skin-deep can take advantage of the principles of open
society and use it to rally a popular following. And there is nothing about a
democratic order that ensures such efforts will invariably fail. Deep down, I think this explains
why so many people in the United States and in Europe are desperate to keep Uncle Sam fully engaged in Europe. Its not so much
the fear of a declining but assertive Russia; its their fear of Europe itself. Liberals want Europe to remain peaceful, tolerant,
democratic and embedded within the EU framework, and theyd like to pull countries like Georgia or Ukraine more fully into Europes
democratic circle eventually. But deep down, they just dont trust the Europeans to manage this situation, and they fear it will all go
south if the American pacifier is removed. For all of liberalisms supposed virtues, at the end of the day its defenders cannot shake
the suspicion that its European version is so delicate that it requires indefinite American support. Who knows? Maybe theyre right.
But unless you think the United States has infinite resources and a limitless willingness to subsidize other wealthy states defenses,
then the question is: what other global priorities are liberals prepared to sacrifice in order to preserve whats left of the European
order?
17
A2-Trade/Interdependence
They mistake glitter for goldsecurity concerns will always outweigh, especially for
weaker states trying to balance against China
LI 16-assistant professor and Chenhui Research Fellow in the School of Advanced International and Area Studies
at East China Normal University, PhD in political science from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
[Xiaoting, Applying offensive realism to the rise of China: structural incentives and Chinese diplomacy toward the
neighboring states, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific Volume 16 (2016) 241-271, DKP]
According to international relations theory, economic interdependence and intergovernmental organizations serve the vital purposes of
promoting cooperation and preventing conflict among nations. In a voluminous literature, scholars maintain that economic and trade
linkages create a common interest in preserving peace, whereas international institutions enable states to advance collaboration and settle disputes amicably
(for a classical study that expounds these views, see Russett and Oneal, 2001). Indeed, owing to the phenomenal expansion of Chinese trade and participation in
international organizations in the last three decades, it
is often noted that the PRC is no longer an unruly, revolutionary actor in international
society, but adopts a more restrained and collaborative approach in global and regional affairs (Johnston, 2003, 2008; Kang, 2007; Kent,
2007; Foot and Walter, 2011; Chan, 2012). In some aspects, Beijing's periphery diplomacy seems in accord with this thesis. Overall, PRC leaders and elites recognize
that the costs would far exceed the benefits if China resumes a posture of unyielding militancy in the international system. In addressing domestic audiences, senior
PRC diplomats often underscore the fact that China now shares a wide range of common interests with its neighbors and that it is unwise to jeopardize those interests
by militarizing China's remaining maritime-territorial disputes (Qi, 2010; Wu, 2011, 2014). Even the PLA's naval strategists endorse a generally cautious approach
toward the South China Sea dispute, for fear that armed conflict would derail China's economic growth (which relies heavily on foreign trade) and foreclose the
possibility of lucrative joint development (Goldstein, 2011). Meanwhile, however, it is worth bearing in mind that great powers usually possess multiple means to
achieve the same end: when economic weapons suffice to accomplish its purposes, a stronger state tends not to employ the more hazardous military weapon (Carr,
1964, p. 132). Nowadays, the gigantic Chinese economy has furnished Beijing with a formidable array of economic weapons: i.e. the
against Washington is not in their interests any more than the reverse. When the chips are down, they are
unlikely to snap to attention at Beijing's peremptory command to push America out of Asia ; nor, for that matter,
would Washington stand aside and permit Beijing to demolish its primacy in Asia. Presently, many Chinese elites seem well aware of this. In
August 2014, even the Global Times, a quasi-official PRC newspaper known for its fiery anti-Americanism, admitted in an editorial that
while America is incapable of forming a united front to contain China, China is just as incapable of
mobilizing East Asian countries to clear the region of US influence. 5Consequently, some PRC strategists begin to espouse a
new vision of Chinese leadership in Asia, undergirded by Beijing's provision of such public goods as peace, security, and prosperity for the region. Yan Xuetong
(2011, 2013), an eminent scholar and advisor to the PRC government, avers that this emphasis on leadership rather than hegemony not only corresponds with
traditional Chinese advocacy of moral and humane authority in international relations but portrays a new path to regional primacy that will attract willing followers. In
part, China's post-2013 periphery diplomacy appears to edge in this direction, as manifested by greater PRC efforts to fuel regional economic growth and build trust
with regional neighbors (Glaser, 2014b; Johnson et al., 2014; Ruan, 2014). Nevertheless,
19
A2-US Hegemony
Global hegemony only perpetuates mass economic spending
and death
Mearsheimer 14 - R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of
Political Science at the University of Chicago [John, America Unhinged The Burden
of Responsibility January/February 2014,
http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/America%20Unhinged.pdf, CSS]
The pursuit of global domination, however, has other costs that are far more daunting.
The economic costs are hugeespecially the warsand there are significant human
costs as well. After all, thousands of Americans have died in Afghanistan and Iraq, and
many more have suffered egregious injuries that will haunt them for the rest of their
lives. Probably the most serious cost of Washingtons interventionist policies is the growth of a nationalsecurity state that threatens to undermine the liberal-democratic values that lie at the
heart of the American political system. Given these significant costs, and given that the United States
has no vital interests at stake in Egypt and Syria, let alone the capacity for fixing the problems afflicting those
countries, it should adopt a handsoff policy toward them. American leaders would do well to honor the
principle of self-determination when dealing with Cairo and Damascus, and with many other countries around the
world as well.
20
A2-Attack on US
No one would go to war with the U.S. thousands of nuclear
weapons that deter war, and two oceans that deter any form of
invasion
Mearsheimer 14 - R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of
Political Science at the University of Chicago [John, America Unhinged The Burden
of Responsibility January/February 2014,
http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/America%20Unhinged.pdf, CSS]
the
United States has thousands of nuclear weapons, which are the ultimate deterrent
and go a long way toward guaranteeing a states survival. No adversary is going to
invade America and threaten its survival, because that opponent would almost
certainly end up getting vaporized. In essence, two giant oceans and thousands of
nuclear weapons today shield the United States. Moreover, it faces no serious threats
in its own neighborhood, as it remains a regional hegemon in the Western
Hemisphere. Finally, the United States faces no greatpower rival of any real
consequence. In fact, most strategists I know believe it has been operating in a unipolar world since the Cold
War ended, which is another way of saying America is the only great power on the planet; it has no peers. Others
believe China and Russia are legitimate great powers and the world is multipolar. Even so,
those two great powers are especially weak when compared to the mighty United States. In addition, they have
hardly any power-projection capability, which means they cannot seriously threaten
the American homeland.
If the case for isolationism was powerful before Pearl Harbor, it is even more compelling today. For starters,
21
A2-American Bias
IR scholarship is not American-centric and even if it is, thats
good
MEARSHEIMER 16-R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science @ University of
Chicago, member of the Committee of International Relations @ U. of Chicago, PhD in government/international
relations @ Cornell, M.A. in International Relations @ USC, fellow @ Harvards Center for International Affairs,
Whitney H. Shepardson fellow @ The Council on Foreign Relation [John, A GLOBAL DISCIPLINE OF IR? Benign
Hegemony, International Studies Review (2016) 18, 147169, DKP]
It is often said that the international relations (IR) scholarly community is too American-centric
and needs to broaden its horizons. I disagree. In the mid-1970s, Stanley Hoffmann called IR an
American social science. That label was appropriate then, and it is still appropriate
today especially with regard to the all important ideas and theories that dominate discourse in our discipline. This
situation is not likely to change significantly anytime soon and for entirely
legitimate and defensible reasons. To be clear, the issue here is not about the
makeup of the IR scholarly community as there is an abundance of scholars from
outside the borders of the United States who study world politics. It is clear from just perusing the program for the
International Studies Associations annual conference that IR scholars live in a global village. This
diversitywhich is all for the goodis likely to grow with time as increasing numbers of young people from
around the world go to college and study IR. In short, American scholars do not have great influence because of their numbers. Nor
do Americans dominate the field because the subjects that concern them are privileged over the interests of scholars from other
least associated with British schools. Thus, one could argue that it is really Anglo-Saxon scholars who dominate the IR discourse. The
importance of theory for studying international politics cannot be underestimated as there is no way we can make sense of the
infinitely complicated world around us without theories. The fact that the United States is home to the worlds leading theorists is
what allows its IR community to control the commanding heights of the field. The dominance of American-based scholars is
reinforced by the fact that they have developed a rich variety of theories that are very useful for comprehending the politics of the
international system. This means, however, there is not a lot of room for new theories or even major twists on existing theories. To
be sure, this is not to say that there is no room for new theories, especially when it comes to middle-range theories. Plus, there is
always room to refine existing theories. Still, there are limited opportunities in 2015 for scholars outside the United Statesas well
inside itto develop wholly new theories. If this were 1945, the situation would be markedly different. The extent to which American
theories cast a giant shadow over the IR field is reflected in how undergraduate and graduate students outside of the United States
22
in China where there is a deep fascination with American IR theoriesI sometimes start my talks by
saying, It is good to be back among my people. And I do not speak one word
of Chinese, although I do speak the same language as my Chinese interlocutors when we talk
about the basic realities of international politics. American dominance in IR is reinforced by the fact that many
talented undergraduates from around the world come to the United States for graduate training, where they are taught that the
theories and methods that dominate the intellectual landscape on American campuses are essential tools for being a first-rate
scholar. Most of them go on to have successful careersoften not only in the United States but also in other countrieswhere they
serious scholars in that world would be interested in protecting a hegemonic discourse, much less be capable of organizing to
achieve that end.
Even if a few scholars played politics and attempted to marginalize a novel idea they
disliked, other scholars would intervene to promote and engage with it , particularly if it shed new
light on an important problem. One might argue that focusing on culture , as an explanatory variable,
would allow non-Americans to offer new theories and broaden horizons within IR. For example, a number
of scholars and public intellectuals have claimed that China has a Confucian culture, which they maintain has had a profound
influence on its past foreign policy and will continue to do so in the future. For example, this is a key element in Henry Kissingers
arguments do not offer a new way of broadening our intellectual vista in IR. American dominance of the IR discourse is likely to
diminish somewhat in the decades ahead as scholars from other countries become increasingly engaged in trying to develop new
theories and refine existing ones. After all, Americans do not have a special aptitude for doing theory, and the United States has not
involved in IR scholarship, their theories bore a remarkable resemblance to those developed in Europe. Just think of the profound
influence of Immanuel Kant and Hans Morgenthauboth Germans on IR theory in the United States. What this tells us is that
those non-American IR scholars who become leading theorists at some future point will
stand on the shoulders of American academics, much the way Americas
leading lights have stood on the shoulders of their European predecessors. This is
the way scholarship advances.
23
Scholarship-Mearsheimer
Offensive realism is not a panacea, but provides a nuanced
template for understanding the rise of China
-this card includes really good indicts of Mearsheimer, but concludes offensive
realism is true
LI 16-assistant professor and Chenhui Research Fellow in the School of Advanced International and Area Studies
at East China Normal University, PhD in political science from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
[Xiaoting, Applying offensive realism to the rise of China: structural incentives and Chinese diplomacy toward the
neighboring states, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific Volume 16 (2016) 241-271, DKP]
Taylor Fravel (2008, p. 308) questions Mearsheimers claim that great powers are primed for expansion and aggression. More recently, Amitav Acharya
24
unrelentingly grim, or why both sides seem capable of demonstratin g a degree of resilient
practicality in dealing with each other. This study, therefore, seeks to reexamine the nuance of
offensive realism as a guide for understanding Chinas strategic interactions with its
neighbors, an issue with momentous implications for international peace and security. In theory, offensive realism does not
expect states to act like mindless aggressors or relentless balancers. Rather, it
expects them to pay close attention to geography and the local power balance, and
to act strategically after weighing the costs, benefits, and feasibility of their actions. Logically, these arguments could also bolster the
contention that some form of mutual accommodation may be possible between a rising if
prudent China and its wary but pragmatic neighbors. In particular, it is not unthinkable
that, fearing containment by an adversarial great power, a materially weaker PRC might show
restraint and even offer concessions in certain territorial disputes, in exchange for some neighbors cooperation in limiting the extension of that
adversarys influence in Chinas vicinity. Nevertheless, in the offensive realist view, such accommodation is
only part of the picture. Conceivably, while China could reward some neighbors for their
cooperation, it could also punish others for their noncooperation, to signal that defying its ascendance has a price. Moreover, as
its relative capabilities grow, the PRC will inevitably compete harder against US
influence in Asia and possess greater coercive means against those noncooperative neighbors. As will be
detailed, Beijings carrots-and-sticks strategy is manifested foremost in its management
of territorial disputes from the 1950s onward and has acquired fresh content in recent years despite Chinas enmeshment in the regional
economic and institutional order. Ultimately, however, the underlying logic of realist theory implies that
Beijings long-term goal of excluding Washington from Asian affairs is unachievable
and that rivalry and conflict would ensue if the PRC goes too far in forcing the issue.
In short, offensive realism is not an analytical straightjacket. If construed properly, it provides a
plausible, parsimonious explanation of Chinas penchant for both restraint and
assertiveness toward regional neighbors. This study makes this argument in four steps. The first section uses the framework of offensive
realism to outline theoretically the broad possibilities of Chinese diplomacy toward neighboring states. Utilizing primary and secondary PRC sources, the
second section then demonstrates that the preceding theoretical expectations find much support in available evidence on the making of Chinese foreign
policy. Afterward, the third section contemplates why hopes of Chinese primacy may be chimerical in Asias geopolitical structures, on the grounds that
unbalanced power breeds fear and compels its potential targets to take necessary precautions. The last section concludes with a discussion of how the
findings matter to theory and policy
25
Answers
26
Realism Wrong
27
-General
Realism is inherently flawedignores the role of ideology and
culture while making up facts to support their preposterous
claimsUkraine proves
-indicts of Kissinger, Mearsheimer, Cohen, Walt
-card is overly long but can be strategically chopped
MOTYL 15-professor of political science at Rutgers University, Newark, PhD in Political Science @ Columbia
[Alexander, The Surrealism of Realism: Misreading the War in Ukraine, January/February 2015,
http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/surrealism-realism-misreading-war-ukraine, DKP]
Second, focusing as they do on interests,
and norms into account, while Ukraine experts do not see how ignoring these matters can possibly enhance
understanding of the conflict. Putins neo-imperial ideology, his stated determination to make
Russia great again, his conviction that all Russian speakers are Russians deserving of the
Russian states protection, and his belief that Ukraine is an artificial state with no right to exist
appear to be part and parcel of his pursuit of authoritarianism and empire and his adoption of a
hegemonic policy toward Russias near abroad. The realist case for ignoring ideology would be
stronger if Putins ideological message were not so openly rooted in Russias cultural
heritage. As his high popularity ratings suggest, Putins ideology resonates with, and may even be a product
of, Russian political culture. Realisms disregard of norms also leads it to
misunderstand the Revolution in Dignity. That, Ukraine experts will insist, was overwhelmingly about
self-respect and self-empowerment. Participants assert that they took part in the
mass marches or manned the barricades because they objected to the Yanukovych regimes daily
assaults on their humanity and identity. Economic issues were irrelevant to their struggle.
Today as well, most Ukrainians will insist that their struggle against Russia is not about
the economic advantages of being associated with the European Union but rather about their right
to self-determination, both as individuals and as a people. Once again, in ignoring ideology,
culture, and norms, realism appears to be ignoring the two most
important developments within Russia and Ukraine. The former abandoned democratic norms at
precisely the time that the latter embraced them. Can these parallel and intersecting movements be considered as irrelevant to the
been, and to a large degree still is, confined to a small coterie of specialists, almost none of whom specializes in international
relations theory or is committed to the realist worldview. Until recently,
Ukraine.
After Kyiv gave up its nuclear weapons in 1994, Ukraine became at best a second- or third-rate power in the shadow of
the significantly larger, richer, and more powerful Russia. Russia was interesting to realists, all the more so as it had nuclear
28
weapons and posed a threat of sorts to the United States. Ukraine was boringat least until Russias invasion of Crimea
in March 2014 and the outbreak of war a few months later. As soon as Ukraine became a security issue for Russia, it also became a
The war confronted realists with an explanatory and policy task for
which they were wholly unprepared. Few could read Russian; my guess is that none knows Ukrainian. The
number of realists with an adequate understanding of Ukrainian history, politics,
culture, and economics could probably be counted on the fingers of one hand if that.
Nonetheless, there was a need to stake out a position concerning its conflict with
Russia that affirmed the realist position. As a result, realists evinced a woefully
embarrassing ignorance about elementary facts regarding Ukraine. Consider the following, from
security issue for realists.
Henry Kissingers March 5th op-ed in the Washington Post: The West must understand that, to Russia, Ukraine can never be just a
foreign country. Russian history began in what was called Kievan-Rus. The Russian religion spread from there. Ukraine has been part
of Russia for centuries, and their histories were intertwined before then. Some of the most important battles for Russian freedom,
starting with the Battle of Poltava in 1709, were fought on Ukrainian soil. Any Ukraine expert could have told Kissinger that Russian
history did not begin only in Kyivan (or Kievan) Rus. It began in many places, including Russia itself. The Russian religion did not
spread from what was called Kievan-Rus. What spread was Orthodox Christianity, and it spread from Constantinople. True, Ukraine
has been part of Russia for centuries, but it has been no less a part of the Mongol empire, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the Polish
Commonwealth, the Habsburg Empire, and the Ottoman Empire. The Battle of Poltava was fought by two empires, the Swedish and
Russian, and had nothing to do with Russian freedom or independence. In addition,
analytic approaches to Ukraine. Two examples will convey the point. Ukraine is allegedly deeply divided into
two irreconcilable and homogeneous blocs: western Ukraine speaks Ukrainian, supports the West, and detests Russia; eastern
Nation article about fallacies concerning Ukraine: Fallacy No. 2: There exists a nation called Ukraine and a Ukrainian people
who yearn to escape centuries of Russian influence and to join the West. Fact: As every informed person knows, Ukraine is a country
long divided by ethnic, linguistic, religious, cultural, economic and political differencesparticularly its western and eastern regions,
but not only. When the current crisis began in 2013, Ukraine had one state, but it was not a single people or a united nation. Some
of these divisions were made worse after 1991 by corrupt elite, but most of them had developed over centuries. Unlike realists who
come out of international relations, Cohen should know better. Hes a lifelong student of the Soviet Union and Russia;
he speaks Russian. Alternatively, it may be his lifelong Russocentrism that blinds him to the Ukrainian side of things. Finally,
given their ignorance about Ukraine and inability to read its native texts , and given their
susceptibility to bromides as a substitute for knowledge, realists naturally tend to accept the
narratives of the country they believe matters most in the Russo-Ukrainian
conflictRussia. Thus, realists generally accept at face value Russian claims that NATO
is a threat to Russia. Just how a feeble alliance that lost its sense of purpose after the
end of the Cold War and that consists of countries that have slashed their defense budgets, cannot
imagine going to war anywhere, and would almost certainly never send troops to save Estonia,
say, from a Russian takeover could be a threat to anybody is unclear. Faced with that obvious objection, most
realists say that, although the alliance may not be objectively threatening, the
Russians perceive it differently and their perception is itself a reality. To illustrate this point, consider John
Mearsheimers empirically preposterous claims, in a recent issue of Foreign Affairs, about
why Ukraine is the Wests fault when he says that the taproot of the trouble is
NATO enlargement, the central element of a larger strategy to move Ukraine out of Russias orbit and integrate it into the
West. What larger strategy? Western policymakers have certainly been open to Ukraines efforts to
move westwards, but they have at best been consistently noncommittal about Ukraines actually joining any
key Western institutions such as the European Union and NATO. Mearsheimer goes on to claim that the EUs
expansion eastward and the Wests backing of the pro-democracy movement in Ukrainebeginning with the Orange
Revolution in 2004were critical elements, too. Ask Ukrainian democrats and theyll tell you that the Wests
29
backing of Ukrainian democracy has been lackadaisical and spotty. Who in the West
refused to cooperate with President Kuchma when he turned authoritarian? Who in the West denounced the criminal Yanukovych
regime? And who in the West did not succumb to Ukraine fatigue after 2008precisely the period when Ukrainian democracy most
continues: For Putin, the illegal overthrow of Ukraines democratically elected and pro-Russian presidentwhich he rightly labeled a
coupwas the final straw. He responded by taking Crimea, a peninsula he feared would host a NATO naval base, and working to
insist that Russia will and should have its way in a struggle that affects its immediate national interests more than it does those of
Walt, wrote for Foreign Policy in March: Its easy to understand why Ukraine wants to jump in bed with the European Union and
NATO; what is not so obvious is why sharing the covers and pillows with Ukraine is something we should want to do. A country with a
bankrupt economy, modest natural resources, sharp ethnic divisions, and a notoriously corrupt political system is normally not seen
as a major strategic asset. Furthermore, the fact that US courtship of Ukraine happens to make Russian President Vladimir Putin
angry is not a good argument for embracing Kiev eithersimply put, Russia is the more important country. And a long-term
squabble isnt in Washingtons or Moscows long-term interest. Such a statement is diametrically opposed to the assumptions of
30
threaten Ukraine; and that Russia cannot be accommodatednot because thats normatively bad, but because doing so would
suspicion and hostility: not only do they [states] look for opportunities to take advantage of one another, they also
neo-realist theory encompasses three crucial elements: relative standing extant from the security dilemma, power
as potential or actual, and sovereignty as tied to the autonomy of states domestic political order. The neo-realist
discourse understands the security dilemma and the subsequent issue of relative standing as central to its
definition of anarchy: security is understood relative to other actors capabilities. Because of the competitive nature
of anarchy, any states attempt to increase its own security will threaten anothers safety and exacerbate a cycle of
suspicion fueled by biased perceptions. The security dilemma yields a suboptimal outcome because self-interested
actions lead to unintended consequences; this provides a strong incentive for states to adopt uncooperative
The neorealist explanation of the Kurihara Island conflict would argue that
as two regional powers, neither China nor Japan want to decrease their relative
standing or sovereignty in East Asia. This is a rather simplistic explanation of the
conflict, as neorealism heavily emphasizes security issues as a constant condition of
anarchy and neglects to explain what caused the shift from a balanced to a tense
system. Thus, neorealism partially explains why China sent military forces to the
islands: as a response to Japans official claim to sovereignty over the islands, as an attempt to deter Japan from
policies.[6]
confrontation, or from reaffirming its former claim; and as a demonstration of Chinese power over Japanese policy.
In this way, understanding this conflict transcends who acquires the islands and highlights the reputations and
statuses at stake, which neorealism only explains in terms of security and threats. In line with the concept of
competitive anarchy, whichever state backs down in this dispute will be perceived as the weaker onetherefore,
both Japan and China are island-racing and escalating tensions. The issue with defining anarchy in terms of the
31
32
-China
Realism wrong in the context of Chinaempirics, opportunity costs to
counter-balancing, economics
HSIUNG 15-Professor of Politics @ NYU, PhD in Political Science @ Columbia [James, Utility vs. Inadequacy of
Realist IR Theory: Assessing Chinas Rise, (review), International Studies Review (2015) 17, 132137, DKP]
Chans work can be considered as a separate discourse on both the rich contributions
and debilitating limitations (p. 3), even ill-effect s, of balance-of-power theory, but
uses Chinaor to be more exact, its treatment by the balancing the-orists (especially as translated into US
policy)as an empirical illustration of his critique. In doing so, he makes some th ought-provoking
constructive points on these limits or even unintended, self-defeating effects. Due
to space con-straints, we focus on only the most potent parts of Chans critique. First, the cl aim of
structural determinism is hardly sustainable. According to structural realism (or
neorealism), states are positional, not atomic, in an anarchical system whose units
(states) are variably endowed with resources and power capabilities. Their instinct for
survival is directly attuned to how power distrib-utes (in other words, configures) across the system, and to the
strategic impera-tive of alliance making against an overwhelming power, to counter the powe rimbalance (or
powerwhen the latter does not even possess 80% of the United States military power, a threshold held by the
power-transition theory to be necessary if a rising power is going to challenge the hegemon (p.223f).Third, Chans
discourse makes additional scattered critiquing commentarieson both balancing theory and the policies it has
Empire, imperi al China, Britain, and the United States have, atone time or another, successfully established
due to their
emphasis on armaments and alliances, balancing policies entail significant
opportunity costs and can trigger a spiral of competition and self-defeating
consequences (p.224). Fourth, although without invoking the term geoeconomics, Chan at times is
implying a distinction between, and a possible mix of, geopolitical conflict and what may be
considered geoeconomic cooperation in the post-Cold War age of economic globalization. For example,
invoking Scott Kastners (2009) study,Chan highlights th e expanding trade across the Taiwan Strait
as a paradigmatic example of how economic interdependence can thrive even
between ostensible(geopolitical) adversaries (p. 99). While Asian states have turned away
from (geo-political) balancing policies as traditionally pre scribed by balance-of-power theories, Chan notes,
they have pursued a policy emphasizing economic performance at home and an
intensifying economic integration with the mam-moth China market.
regional or global heg emony, acondition contrary to anarchy. On policy, Chan claims that
33
through a comprehensive
illustration of these two facets of Realist concern (military expansionism and historical analogy),
we will see that Realism cannot fully account for them . Chinas unprecedented economic
growth has been coupled with the worlds largest military build-up[14] via a huge expansion of military spending
and technological advancement. This would superficially adhere to Realist interpretations of a China that wants to
change the international system and obtain global hegemony.[15] Statistics compiled by Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) confirm Chinas dramatic increase in military expenditure; during the
period 20032012, its military expenditure increased by 175 per cent, significantly more than any other state listed
in SIPRIs Yearbook[16]. In monetary terms, SIPRI states that Chinas annual defence spending rose from over $30
billion in 2008 (when it became the second largest military spender) to almost $170 billion in 2010. Furthermore,
estimates published by The Economist in 2012 show that, if recent trends continue, Chinas military spending could
overtake Americas after 2035.[17] In addition, Chinas military expansion has led it to be more confident in its
military capacities and more assertive in their use. Realist interpretations are reinforced by the Taiwan AntiSecession Law.[18] Furthermore, Jia Xiudongs[19] comment in response to Taiwanese independenceWe will use
whatever means we have to prevent it happening[20]shows Chinas military capabilities go well beyond
Taiwan, helping to strengthen realist interpretations of Chinas rise. A Pentagon senior defence officials opinion
that the balance of cross-Strait military forces continues to shift in the mainlands favour supports this.[21]
terms of military expenditure as a percentage of GDP, Chinas (2 per cent) military expenditure is less than half that
of the United States (4.4 per cent) and lower than that of the UK (2.5 per cent), Russia (4.4 per cent), France (2.3
per cent), India (2.5 per cent), and Saudi Arabia (8.9 per cent). Thus, As a percentage of GDP, Chinese military
expenditures do not appear to have reached levels where one could conclude that the Chinese economy is being
militarised and mobilised to balance against US power.[22] In addition, data listing military spending as a
percentage of the world share shows Chinas 5.5% representing spending of 89.8$bn remains significantly behind
seen a twenty-fold increase since 2000,[24] and in 2012, Chinas troop contributions to peacekeeping operations
outnumbered those of all permanent members of the UN Security Council.[25] While there may be vested interests
of the Realist interpretation of Chinas rise is the United States response to Chinas military expansion. US Defence
Department figures evidence the considerable military presence of the United States in the Asia-Pacifica region
blighted by territorial rights and surrounding resource-rich waters[26]. As part of a response which the United
States calls a pivot or rebalance[27] towards the Asia-Pacific region, there have been efforts to bolster
Americas military presence in the region. This has resulted in increased naval assets in Singapore, a full marine
task force in Australia planned by 2016, increased troop and hardware deployment in South Korea, a new military
34
access agreement with the Philippines, and a commitment that 60 per cent of US Navy assets will be deployed to
the Asia-Pacific region by 2020.[28] The pivot or rebalance towards the Asia-Pacific region seems to align with the
Realist Thucydides Trap cited earlier. As Thucydides puts it, It was the rise of Athens and the fear that this
inspired in Sparta that made war inevitable.[29] In other words: The dynamic inherent when a rapidly rising power
(China) becomes more confident, a ruling power (US) fears losing its edge, and entangling alliances on each side
drive the parties towards war.[30] History seems to support the tendency for war: In 11 of 15 cases since 1500 in
which a rising power rivalled a ruling power, the outcome was war.[31] If we consider John Mearsheimers
argument valid, China will respond to the American build-up by pushing the United States out of Asia, in much the
way the US pushed the European great powers out of the Western Hemisphere.[32] One view is that China will
come up with its own version of the Monroe Doctrine as Japan did in the 1930s.[33] However, it is problematic to
use the Thucydides Trap and Mearsheimers predictions to assess Chinas rise through Realist interpretations.
Although former US Defence Secretary Robert Gates comments that the US pivot isnt about China at all, his
clarification that it is more about our relationships with the rest of Asia suggests a much more balanced approach
include] greater communication [between militaries in order to] promote understanding and avoid
Obama, cooperation, communication and reducing tension, in addition to the actual visit of Chinas top
military commander General Chen Bingde to the United States in order to improve military ties,[36] decrease the
likelihood of falling into the Thucydides Trap. It can be argued that Mearsheimers arguments, based on historical
analogies, are too weak to hold merit in this discussion. How can historical analogies from an American experience
predict what China, a country with a contrasting and unique history and culture, will do today? Analogical
arguments are not causes or explanations; they tend to haphazardly pick and choose the similarities to focus on,
while ignoring potentially important differences.[37]
35
Immoral (Liberalism)
Realism is immoralignores suffering, accepts genocide, and
causes conflicts to become worse
-indicts Walt
COHEN 16-foreign editor @ NYT, MA in History and French @ Balliol College, Oxford University [Roger, The
Limits of American Realism, New York Times, 1/11/2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/12/opinion/the-limits-ofamerican-realism.html?_r=0, DKP]
Is realism really, really what America wants as the cornerstone of its foreign policy? Stephen M.
Walt, a professor of international affairs at Harvard University, has an eloquent ode to realism in Foreign Policy magazine. He
argues that, with realism as the bedrock of its approach to the world over the past quarter century, the
United States would have fared far better. Realists, he reminds us, have a generally
pessimistic view of international affairs and are wary of efforts to remake the world
according to some ideological blueprint. Pessimism is a useful source of prudence in both international and
personal affairs. Walts piece makes several reasonable points. But he omits the major European confli ct of
the period under consideration the wars of Yugoslavias destruction, in which some
140,000 people were killed and millions displaced. Realists had a field day with that
carnage, beginning with former Secretary of State James Bakers early assessment that, We dont have a dog in
that fight. This view was echoed by various self-serving assessments from the Clinton White
House that justified inaction through the portrayal of the Balkans as the locus of millennial feuds neither comprehensible
nor resolvable. True, discerning a vital American national interest in places with names like Omarska was not obvious, even if the
36
the NATO lands. Russias interest, post-1990, was in the dismemberment of the European-American bond, most potently
expressed in NATO. That was the real problem. The United States, almost alone among nations, is also an idea.
Excise the notion of the global extension of liberty and its guarantees from American
policy and something very meager remains. Putin is a fierce, opportunistic realist. But Americans
Donald Trump notwithstanding do not want that dish on their tables. They especially do not want it after the
Syrian debacle. Walt argues that realists would have dissuaded President Obama from saying
President Bashar al-Assad must go and setting a red line. But the problem was not that uttering
these words was unrealistic. It was that failing to follow up on them was feckless. Syria has illustrated
the limits of White House realism. Realism has dictated nonintervention as hundreds of
thousands were killed, millions displaced, and Islamic State emerged. Realism has
been behind acquiescence to Assads barrel-bomb brutality. If Iraq illustrated disastrous American
pursuit of an ideological blueprint, Syria has demonstrated a disastrous vacuum of American
ideas. Realism is an essential starting point for American foreign policy. It was absent on Iraq: The result was mayhem that, as
Walt rightly says, cost America several trillion dollars. Realism brought the Iran nuclear accord, a signal achievement. More of it
37
Lets tell a tale of two Stephen Walt columns. In the first one, he argued vehemently that no
matter what some might say, Donald Trump is not a realist. It closed with this parenthetical: Theres a final reason to
question whether Trump is a realist. Many people think President Barack Obamas views on foreign policy reflect a realist
perspective and cite his recent Atlantic interview as supporting evidence. Given how critical Trump is of Obama, its hard to see how
both of them could qualify for the realist label. Ill address the question of Obamas realism next week. And six days passed, and
lo, Walt argued vehemently that , no matter what some might say Obama is no realist: In short,
Obama did not in fact run a realist foreign policy, because he doesnt fully embrace a realist worldview, didnt appoint many (any?)
realists to key positions, and never really tried to dismantle the bipartisan consensus behind the grand strategy of liberal hegemony.
As Ive noted before, a genuinely realist foreign policy would have left Afghanistan promptly in 2009, converted our special
relationships in the Middle East to normal ones, explicitly rejected further NATO expansion, eschewed regime change and other
forms of social engineering in foreign countries such as Libya or Syria, and returned to the broad strategy of restrained offshore
balancing that served the United States so well in the past. Now I may be just a simple country international relations scholar, but I
Obama himself have made statements averring their sympathy with the realist worldview. Other commentators have also noted
that, in their own ways, Trump and Obama seem pretty realist. So why, in a world when realists constantly bemoan their
marginalized influence over American foreign policy, arent realists embracing these politically powerful patrons? I dont have a
38
Better to remain
cloistered and right and to get ones hair mussed. The third is political. As Ive said before, the most realist-friendly
politicians in recent years have not been the most admired leaders. True, Obama is pretty popular at this
point, but that has little to do with his foreign policy. And to be fair, it seems that non-realists have been the most
eager to label Trump as a realist. So there are good and valid political reasons that realists
want to disassociate themselves and their worldview from these individuals. I dont doubt that realists disapprove
doing what they advocated, theyd have real power and responsibility on their hands, which is scary.
of either Trump or Obama. I just dont think theyre doing it for realist reasons.
Walts asked What would a realist world have looked like? He argued that
realism has a much better track record over the past two decades than liberal
internationalism or neo-conservatism. The article has generated considerable
debate among foreign policy types in recent days. Walt is an exceptional theoretician who has
Last week in Foreign Policy magazine, Stephen
influenced generations of international relations students. He is justified in pointing out that realists recognized the dangers of
invading Iraq and challenges of nation-building when many others did not. This is a part of the long tradition of realist opposition to
wars of choice on the periphery of the global chessboard. This aspect of his message often resonates in Americaeven in
Washington. After all, the American people elected a president in 2008 who agreed with realists about Iraq, and many more
policymakers have come around since. The lack of support for a full-scale intervention in Syria is a further sign that Washington is a
view immediately after the Cold War. But it is this principle that academic realists have now made their primary target. They
39
believe that if the United States pulls back from the world, others will be forced to do
what the United States currently provides. Japan and other states in Asia will do more to balance China. European
countries will reverse their defense cuts. This, in the view of realists, will enhance security competition in some regions, particularly
in East Asiawhile that may be unfortunate for the people who live there, it will work to the benefit of the United States, or so the
For realists, the United States only has to worry about East Asia,
Europe, or the Middle East if a rival power is poised to dominate there. The sheer physics of
argument goes. Balancing act
balancing mean this is very unlikely to happenbut if it did, there would be enough time to intervene and tip the balance against
one leading realist explicitly make this point at a conference a couple of years ago (it was under the
Chatham House rule, allowing me to share the insight but not identify the speaker). He argued that the United States
should look to the 1930s as a model: allow other states to duke it out and intervene
only later on, when absolutely necessary, and under favorable conditions. The 1930s is not typically depicted
as a model, and there are easy points to be scored there. But there is a much more fundamental issue at
stake: Manipulating regional insecurity is a core goal of the strategy commonly
called off-shore balancing. The off-shore power (in this case, the United States) should
encourage disunity and rivalry between regional actors and take advantage of the opportunities it
provides. This strategy could not be further from the mainstream in Washington. For over seven decades, the United
States has sought to reduce regional security competition in Western Europe and Asia.
One purpose of the Cold War alliances was to exert U.S. control over allies, to
prevent them from aggravating their democratic neighbors. Thus, the United States provides
security to Japan so it will not build capabilities that worry South Korea or others.
This was also originally one of the reasons for NATO. Since the Cold War, even after the
Soviet threat disappeared, the United States has gone to extraordinary lengths to
promote regional integration and cooperation in Asia and Europe. Academic realists believe
that many of these steps, including NATO expansion, were mistakes. When it is put to them
that if the Baltics were not in NATO today, Russia may have invaded, their response
is that the United States has no interests there. A new generation of realism Back in the era of Henry
Kissinger, realism was about preservation of the international equilibrium. It was
about incremental change from within the system, rather than revolutionary acts. This advice provided
the rival. I heard
guidance for how to handle rivals who sought to upset the balance and for exercising restraint oneself. For Kissingerian realists,
the most important aspect of U.S. alliances is that they exist and are widely
accepted as a cornerstone of a legitimate international order. Realism today is unrecognizable
from its antecedents. It proposes to voluntarily dissolve an order that is quite
popular in Europe and Asia on the basis of an untested theory. To disband or greatly weaken
Americas traditional alliances, either tacitly or formally, would be a revolutionary act. It
would surely shake the equilibrium. Classical realists would have recoiled at such an
experiment. Modern-day realists embrace the prospect of chaos and uncertainty . It is
academic realism's new direction, more than anything else, that has detached it from the policy debate in Washington.
Academics often discuss how to be policy-relevant, but now they find themselves in
an unusual position. They are writing on topics that are relevant and of great interest to
policymakers, but their ideas on alliances and retrenchment are so far out of the political
mainstream to ensure that they will be cast aside. The great irony is that post-Iraq, there
appears to be a market in Washington for classical pragmatic realism that provides a prudent way of
strengthening and preserving the U.S.-led international order, including particularly reducing somewhat the U.S. commitment in the
Middle East. Chasing the revolution,
answering.
40
Non-Unique
No uniquenessevery presidential candidate is definitively
anti-realist
ROVNER 16-John G. Tower Distinguished Chair in International Politics and National Security at Southern
Methodist University, where he also serves as director of the Security and Strategy Program [Joshua, Daniel
Drezner says Donald Trump is the champion of foreign policy realism. Hes wrong. Its Barack Obama., The
Washington Post, 2/11/2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/02/11/daniel-dreznersays-donald-trump-is-a-champion-of-foreign-policy-realism-hes-wrong-its-barack-obama/, DKP]
intervening in the Middle East; his approach appears similar to Obamas. But Sanderss broader strategic
preferences are still unclear, as his campaign has focused overwhelmingly on domestic issues. After the election,
the U.S. turn to realism is likely to end. Given increasing public disapproval for
Obamas restraint, the next president may be pushed into one conflict or another.
The president himself has begun laying the groundwork for a more aggressive
strategy in the next administration, especially in his rhetoric about the Islamic State. He also
deployed an Army division headquarters to Iraq, which could accommodate many more than the 3,400 personnel
currently in Iraq and Syria, and recently called to quadruple U.S. military spending in Europe. The White House may
view these as temporary moves to placate domestic critics so that it can refocus diplomatic attention and military
41
A2-China Hegemony
Structural geopolitical factors prevent Chinese bid for
hegemonyUS rise is a flawed comparison
-indicts Mearsheimers China rise argument
STEINSSON 14-Researcher at University of Iceland - Hskli slands,
only one in five states have succeeded in bidding for regional hegemony and that while it is not an impressive success rate the
American case illustrates that it is possible to achieve regional hegemony (Mearsheimer 2001, 212-213). In earlier writings, the
success rate is even more dire, as Mearsheimer (1990, 19) included not only Vilhelmine Germany, Napoleonic France, the United
States, Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan (the five bidders for hegemony listed in Mearsheimer (2001)) but also the Habsburg
Empire under Charles V, Spain under Philip II and France under Louis XIV. The success rate could therefore arguably be as poor as
one in eight. The Poster Child for Offensive Realism What does the the rise of the United States, the poster child for offensive
(Elman 2004, 568-570). Consequently, its options were to hold onto Louisiana, sell the territory to the US, sell part of it to the US or
sell it all to Spain (Elman 2004, 571). By holding onto Louisiana, Frances position in the European distribution of capabilities would
have worsened, as it would have likely encountered a UK-US alliance in a war over the territory (which would have drained Frances
resources), but it would have contained the US (Elman 2004, 572). Selling the territory to Spain or part of it to the US would have
partly contained the US but only slightly improved Frances position in the European distribution of capabilities (Elman 2004, 572-
42
573). The option that France took was to sell the entire territory to the US at a hefty price, which significantly improved Frances
position in the Europe (as it lost a geopolitical burden and got paid handsomely for it) but did nothing whatsoever to contain the US
43
A2-China War
Even if they win the world is inherently anarchy, China still has
zero incentive to risk waralso Mearsheimer is useless
-takes out any great power war impact, read with caution
STEINSSON 14-Researcher at University of Iceland - Hskli slands,
will meddle in the US backyard which would compromise its status as regional hegemon. However, as Kirshner (2012, 65) notes,
While anarchy leads to uncertainty about others intentions and fear about ones survival, there is
no reason why states should make the first hostile move even if there is an
intense security dilemma. While anarchy means that there is nothing to prevent war, there is no cause
for why a security-seeking state that fears other states intentions and capabilities should resort
to aggression. At no point is it clear that security-seeking states would always respond to the possibility of war by
becoming aggressive. If anything, fear is more likely to result in a defensive response. As Jack
Donnelly notes, fear is an essentially defensive motive; the central aim is to preserve what one already
has rather than to act offensively and preemptively (Donnelly 2000, 44). Pashakhanlous (2013, 207)
examination of the psychology literature on fear confirms that individuals tend to
respond to fear with defensive behavior. Aggression is not the logical consequence of fear that Mearsheimer
claims it is. Conclusion If states were irrational, if leaders of states were less concerned about a states survival than their own bank
accounts or re-election prospects, if states were assumed to be aggressive or if power maximization was inherent in mans nature,
one could understand the tendency to risk it all for hegemony. Rational, security-seeking states not assumed to be aggressive
chances of survival, given the well-known historical precedent of such revisionist behavior? After all, only one in five states (or
perhaps one in eight) have successfully bid for hegemony. That sole hegemon achieved hegemony under circumstances that do not
apply at all to China today. A nascent United States found itself on a continent without any serious indigenous challengers and
contained only by European powers that prioritized politics in Europe over US containment. China finds itself surrounded by regional
and external balancers, some of which have nuclear weapons. Given the unlikelihood that China will bid for hegemony and
compromise its security, does the prospect of strangling the Confucian baby in its cradle (Kirshner 2012, 61) seem likely to
enhance the US survival? Since a rational, security-seeking China has no reason to pursue hegemony, it would not seem as if the
Ultimately,
Mearsheimers theory is internally incoherent, as the conclusions he draws
contradict the assumptions he makes and, consequently, his assumptions cannot
logically lead to the conclusion that states will bid for hegemony. Mearsheimers
theory of offensive realism therefore does not provide a logically coherent basis for
the view that the rise of China will be unpeaceful. This is not to say that Chinas rise will turn out
peacefully. Mearsheimers theory may very well predict how the rise of China will turn out, but since it fails to explain why
in a logically coherent fashion, the theory is useless.
US, being a rational, security-seeking state, would have any incentive to crush China or otherwise provoke it.
Since its inception Neo-Realism has been the preeminent theory in IR studies , with much
of the discipline largely configured either in support or opposition to its theoretical projections and applications. Its founder Kenneth
Waltz constructed the theory to identify the unchanging casual factor accounting for
the regularity of war and conflict within international politics. This factor did not reside at the
level of leaders or the internal characteristics of states, but the anarchic structure of the
international realm (the absence of a reigning hegemonic authority). According to Neo-Realism, states
must provide for their own security in a self-help system, where mistrust and uncertainty
dominate. The relative distribution of material capabilities, particularly military power
45
cluster into poles the number of great powers whose configurations and interactions
largely determine the content of the international system. Great powers, furthermore, are locked in a
competition to build capabilities and alliance- making in order to balance against each
other. The resulting Balance of Power (BOP) is the most important consideration governing the
external behaviour of great powers in managing their relations. With the end of the Cold War, however,
and the emergence of the American unipolar concert, characterized by the marginalization of great power rivalry,
raised questions on the relevancy of Neo- Realism theory. Many realists argued forcefully
that un-polarity was an unsustainable configuration and that multipolarity and BOP logic would rematerialize, led by China by virtue of its size. Two decades later, realists assert that China , in
accordance with BOP logic, is expanding its power and interests by building a powerful military ,
specifically navy, as well as designing new economic and political rgime under its leadership in order to
diminish the power and potential threat of the US. BOP logic also explains the closer relationship
developing between Beijing and Moscow, largely based on a mutual desire to balance
against the US. As the BOP continues to shifts, however, other states will join the United
States to balance China, as is happening throughout South and East Asia. BOP logic, however, does not by itself explain
why balancing is being applied to China. If it is only a matter of the distribution of power , as Waltz
asserts, one would expect that states would be joining with China t o balance the US, in order to
dilute American power to a level commensurate with other great powers. In response to this apparent
anomaly, scholar Stephen Walt argues that it is the perceptions of what a rising state like
China will do with its newfound and growing power that is the issue. Chinas actions in
regional disputes such as in the East and South China Seas, therefore, are motivating others to ensure
the US maintains their regional, specifically military, presence. China will oppose these
developments, evident in Beijings commonly held view that the recent US Rebalance to
the region is specifically designed to contain its rise. Fueled by such uncertainty, Beijing
will continue to translate economic power into military assets intended to neutralize
American power projection, generating a sustained security dilemma between the two.
However, whether this will lead to war is a contested subject for many realists. For Waltz, while
intense security competition will continue to dominate international politics, the presence of nuclear weapons
has for now inhibited the excesses stemming from structural anarchy. In other words,
great power war is virtually inconceivable. Charles Glaser argues that interdependence
and institutions (often dismissed by realists as unimportant) have become interests in and of
themselves for both the US and China, which shall limit the extent of their security competition. Hugh
White argues for a Concert of Asia to be created and accepted by China and the
US, necessitating the construction of a strategic understanding with Japan, Russia, and India to
stem the excesses of great power competition if East Asia, and the international system at large, are to
(underpinned by economic power),
Others in the realist camp, though, think war and conflict are inevitable. Offensive
realists, specifically John Mearsheimer, argue adamantly that Chinas rise, regardless of any other factor,
will result in great power war with the US. For Mearsheimer, states do not just seek
security but power maximization by becoming regional hegemons and stunting others
46
47
A2-Mearsheimer
Mearsheimer is Useless flawed analogies, US centric approach, and fallacies
Liu 10 PhD candidate in Department of Politics and International Studies @ University of Cambridge
[Qianqian, Chinas Rise and Regional Strategy: Power, Interdependence and Identity,2010,
https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/bitstream/handle/1810/255468/201004-article7.pdf?sequence=1,SCJ ]
Mearsheimers argument seems problematic. His conclusion that China will threaten
the US is simply based upon historical analogies from the American experience .
While Mearsheimers theory of offensive realism might be powerful to explain the
foreign policy of the US, it does not mean that his theory can fully explain the whole
picture of contemporary Chinese foreign policy and regional strategy. As Johnston (2003,
p.28) suggests, historical analogies are analogies, not causes or explanations. Analogical
arguments tend to haphazardly pick and choose the similarities to focus on while
ignorin g potentially important differences. Actually states have their distinctive
characteristics which will differentiate themselves from others. Some typical characteristics
of Chinese foreign policy are influenced by Chinas unique historical experience. For
instance, the perception of how the Chinese views Chinas position in the world is a controversially mixed attitude of China being
both a great power and a weak power. On the one hand, due to its size, culture and history, China views itself as a great power. The
regional hegemony will do so, as a matter of their own assessment of their best chances for survival. States quickly
understand that the best way to ensure their survival is to be the most powerful state in the system; only a
misguided state would pass up an opportunity to be the hegemon in the system (Mearsheimer, 2001: 2, 3, 33, 55).
48
I was the hegemon, will I be more likely to survive? It is, If I make a bid for hegemony, will I be more likely to
survive? And here the answer should be obvious to any rational great power (and, again, assumption five assumes
bid for hegemony do not. In contemporary practice, the facts on the ground expose this basic contradiction of
Mearsheimers argument, rooted in assumptions about the primacy of the survival goal and of rationality. Is Chinas
survival really in jeopardy if it does not aggressively bid to dominate all of Asia? Will the US not survive if it fails
to reach across the Pacific in an effort to strangle the Confucian baby in its cradle? What exactly threatens the
survival of these great powers? Given their military establishments, their nuclear deterrents, their economic might,
their continental size, and their vast populations is their survival really imperiled if they do not act as offensive
realists? Or is it only imperiled if they irrationally act as offensive realists, pushing the few chips that hold the
prospects for their destruction across the poker table in a reckless bet to win it all? But the problem is more general
modern history that have bid for hegemony with one exceptional exception have antagonized their neighbors
and eventually elicited an encircling coalition that, indeed, utterly destroyed them, leading to the loss of their
territorial integrity and the autonomy of their domestic political order, the two things Mearsheimer says states hold
most dear. And this occurs for reasons that do not surprise realists, who assume that states have a primal
preference not to be pushed around, and, thus, when they are able, will resist efforts by would-be hegemons to
would expect states to understand that throwing their weight around not to mention a bid for hegemony might
be self-defeating; whereas states, acting as structural realists expect them to, will make the same foolish choices
over and over again. Referring to European history, Raymond Aron (1966: 72) observed the self-defeating nature of
this sort of excess ambition, which invariably excites:
49
Liberalism/Internationalism
50
US Order-Locked In
51
-General
US international order locked inmassive economic,
technological, and military advantagesChina isnt even close
BROOKS* and WOHLFORTH** 16-*Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, PhD @
Yale, **Daniel Webster Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, PhD and MA in Political Science @ Yale
[Stephen, William, The Once and Future Superpower-Why China Wont Overtake the United States, Foreign Affairs,
May/June 2016, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2016-04-13/once-and-future-superpower, DKP]
growth slows, it will still outpace that of the United States for many years. Its coffers overflowing, Beijing has used its new wealth to
attract friends, deter enemies, modernize its military, and aggressively assert sovereignty claims in its periphery. For many,
impose burdens of leadership and force choices among competing priorities, particularly as finances grow more straitened. With
great power comes great responsibility, as the saying goes, and playing its leading role successfully will require Washington to
In forecasts of Chinas
future power position, much has been made of the countrys pressing domestic challenges: its slowing
economy, polluted environment, widespread corruption, perilous financial markets,
nonexistent social safety net, rapidly aging population, and restive middle class. But
as harmful as these problems are, Chinas true Achilles heel on the world stage is something
else: its low level of technological expertise compared with the United States. Relative to past rising
powers, China has a much wider technological gap to close with the leading power. China may
export container after container of high-tech goods, but in a world of globalized production, that doesnt
reveal much. Half of all Chinese exports consist of what economists call processing trade,
meaning that parts are imported into China for assembly and then exported afterward. And the vast majority of
these Chinese exports are directed not by Chinese firms but by corporations from more developed
countries. When looking at measures of technological prowess that better reflect the national origin of the expertise, Chinas
true position becomes clear. World Bank data on payments for the use of intellectual property, for
example, indicate that the United States is far and away the leading source of
innovative technologies, boasting $128 billion in receipts in 2013more than four times as much as
the country in second place, Japan. China, by contrast, imports technologies on a massive scale yet received less than
$1 billion in receipts in 2013 for the use of its intellectual property. Another good indicator of the technological
gap is the number of so-called triadic patents, those registered in the United States, Europe, and Japan. In 2012, nearly
14,000 such patents originated in the United States, compared with just under 2,000 in China. The distribution of highly
display a maturity that U.S. foreign policy has all too often lacked. THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
52
influential articles in science and engineeringthose in the top one percent of citations, as measured by the National
Science Foundationtells the same story , with the United States accounting for almost half of these articles, more than
eight times Chinas share. So does the breakdown of Nobel Prizes in Physics, Chemistry, and Physiology or
Medicine. Since 1990, 114 have gone to U.S.-based researchers. China-based researchers have received two. Precisely because the
GDP, greatly
underestimates the true economic gap between the two countries. For one thing, the immense
destruction that China is now wreaking on its environment counts favorably toward its
GDP, even though it will reduce economic capacity over time by shortening life spans
and raising cleanup and health-care costs. For another thing, GDP was originally designed to
measure mid-twentieth-century manufacturing economies, and so the more knowledgebased and globalized a countrys production is, the more its GDP underestimates its
economys true size. A new statistic developed by the UN suggests the degree to which GDP inflates Chinas relative
Chinese economy is so unlike the U.S. economy, the measure fueling expectations of a power shift,
power. Called inclusive wealth, this measure represents economists most systematic effort to date to calculate a states wealth.
As a UN report explained, it counts a countrys stock of assets in three areas: (i) manufactured capital (roads, buildings, machines,
and equipment), (ii) human capital (skills, education, health), and (iii) natural capital (sub-soil resources, ecosystems, the
the numbers provided by GDP and inclusive wealth, and admittedly, the latter measure has yet to receive the same level of scrutiny
as GDP. The problem with GDP, however, is that it measures a flow (typically, the value of goods and services produced in a year),
twentieth centuries, for example, the United States didnt lag far behind the United Kingdom in terms of technology, nor did
Germany lag far behind the erstwhile Allies during the interwar years, nor was the Soviet Union backward technologically compared
No country in modern history has possessed as much global military power as the US. Yet
some analysts now argue that the US is following in the footsteps of the UK, the last global hegemon
to decline. This historical analogy, though increasingly popular, is misleading. Britain was never as
dominant as the US is today. To be sure, it maintained a navy equal in size to the next two fleets combined, and its
empire, on which the sun never set, ruled over a quarter of humankind. But there were major differences in the
relative power resources of imperial Britain and contemporary America. By the outbreak of
53
Britain ranked only fourth among the great powers in terms of military personnel,
fourth in terms of GDP, and third in military spending. The British Empire was ruled in large part
through reliance on local troops. Of the 8.6 million British forces in WWI, nearly a third came from the overseas empire. That
made it increasingly difficult for the government in London to declare war on behalf
of the empire when nationalist sentiments began to intensify. By World War II, protecting the empire
had become more of a burden than an asset. The fact that the UK was situated so close to powers like
World War I,
Germany and Russia made matters even more challenging. $17.78TRN US GDP 2015 (CURRENT PRICES) Power hungry For all the
the fact is that the US does not have colonies that it must
administer, and thus has more freedom to manoeuvre than the UK did. And, surrounded by
unthreatening countries and two oceans, it finds it far easier to protect itself. That
brings us to another problem with the global hegemon analogy: the confusion over what
hegemony actually means. Some observers conflate the concept with imperialism; but
the US is clear evidence that a hegemon does not have to have a formal empire.
loose talk of an American empire,
Others define hegemony as the ability to set the rules of the international system; but precisely how much influence over this
process a hegemon must have, relative to other powers, remains unclear. Still others consider hegemony to be synonymous with
control of the most power resources. But, by this definition, 19th century Britain which at the height of its power in 1870 ranked
third (behind the US and Russia) in GDP and third (behind Russia and France) in military expenditures could not be considered
the
Soviet Union balanced US military power for more than four decades. Though the US had
disproportionate economic clout, its room for political and military manoeuvre was
constrained by Soviet power. Fact and fiction Some analysts describe the post-1945 period as a US-led hierarchical
hegemonic, despite its naval dominance. Similarly, those who speak of American hegemony after 1945 fail to note that
order with liberal characteristics, in which the US provided public goods while operating within a loose system of multilateral rules
and institutions that gave weaker states a say. They point out that it may be rational for many countries to preserve this institutional
world. And its effects on non-members including significant powers like China, India, Indonesia, and the Soviet bloc were not
always benign. Given this, the US position in the world could more accurately be called a half-hegemony. Of course, America did
maintain economic dominance after 1945: the devastation of WWII in so many countries meant that the US produced nearly half of
from a
political or military standpoint, the world was bipolar, with the Soviet Union balancing Americas
global GDP. That position lasted until 1970, when the US share of global GDP fell to its pre-war level of one-quarter. But,
power. Indeed, during this period, the US often could not defend its interests: the Soviet Union acquired nuclear weapons;
communist takeovers occurred in China, Cuba, and half of Vietnam; the Korean War ended in a stalemate; and revolts in Hungary
and Czechoslovakia were repressed. A new era Against this background, primacy seems like a more accurate description of a
The
question now is whether the era of US primacy is coming to an end. Given the
unpredictability of global developments, it is, of course, impossible to answer this question definitively. The rise of
transnational forces and non-state actors, not to mention emerging powers like China, suggests that there are big
changes on the horizon. But there is still reason to believe that , at least in the first half of this
century, the US will retain its primacy in power resources and continue to play the
central role in the global balance of power. In short, while the era of US primacy is not over, it is set to
countrys disproportionate (and measurable) share of all three kinds of power resources: military, economic, and soft.
change in important ways. Whether or not these changes will bolster global security and prosperity remains to be seen.
He is a
comparative sociologist who writes on comparative international development and on quantitative methods for the
social sciences. (Salvatore, American Hegemony Is Here to Stay, The National Interest, 6/11/15,
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/american-hegemony-here-stay-13089 )
54
the international system, facing no serious rivals for global leadership. This unipolar moment lasted a mere decade. September
2001, signaled the emergence of a new kind of threat to global stability, and the ensuing rise of
China and reemergence of Russia put paid to the era of unchallenged American
leadership. Now, Americas internal politics have deadlocked and the U.S. government shrinks from playing the role of global
policeman. In the second decade of the twenty-first century, American
hegemony is widely perceived to be in terminal decline. Or so the story
goes. In fact, reports of the passing of U.S. hegemony are greatly
exaggerated. Americas costly wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were relatively minor affairs
considered in long-term perspective. The strategic challenge posed by China has also been
exaggerated. Together with its inner circle of unshakable English-speaking
allies, the United States possesses near-total control of the worlds seas,
skies, airwaves and cyberspace, while American universities, think tanks
and journals dominate the world of ideas. Put aside all the alarmist punditry.
American hegemony is now as firm as or firmer than it has ever been, and
will remain so for a long time to come. THE MASSIVE federal deficit, negative
credit-agency reports, repeated debt-ceiling crises and the 2013 government shutdown all
created the impression that the U.S. government is bankrupt, or close to it. The U.S. economy imports half a
11,
trillion dollars a year more than it exports. Among the American population, poverty rates are high and ordinary workers wages
have been stagnant (in real terms) for decades. Washington seems to be paralyzed by perpetual gridlock. On top of all this, strategic
exhaustion after two costly wars in Afghanistan and Iraq has substantially degraded U.S. military capabilities. Then, at the very
If economic power
forms the long-term foundation for political and military power, it would seem that
America is in terminal decline. But policy analysts tend to have short
memories. Cycles of hegemony run in centuries, not decades (or seasons).
When the United Kingdom finally defeated Napoleon at Waterloo in 1815, its national resources were
completely exhausted. Britains public-debt-to-GDP ratio was over 250 percent, and early nineteenth-century
governments lacked access to the full range of fiscal and financial tools that are available today. Yet the British Century
was only just beginning. The Pax Britannica and the elevation of Queen Victoria to become empress of India were just
around the corner. By comparison, Americas current public-debt-to- GDP ratio of less than 80 percent is
relatively benign. Those with even a limited historical memory may remember the day in January 2001 when the then
moment the military needed to regroup, rebuild and rearm, its budget was hit by sequestration.
chairman of the Federal Reserve, Alan Greenspan, testified to the Senate Budget Committee that if current policies remain in place,
the total unified surplus will reach $800 billion in fiscal year 2011. . . . The emerging key fiscal policy need is to address the
implications of maintaining surpluses. As the poet said, bliss was it in that dawn to be alive! Two tax cuts, two wars and one
financial crisis later, Americas budget deficit was roughly the size of the projected surplus that so worried Greenspan.
55
A superpower is a country that wields enough military, political and economic might to convince nations in all parts of the world to
fighters give conventional military powers fits by design. The U.S. must ultimately learn to scale down to better meet those
comparative advantage intact: 30% of all research and development dollars are spent in the U.S. 5. Culture/Lifestyle In 2012,
Americans spent $370 million on pet costumes. Earlier this year the Fury 325 opened up in North Carolina, claiming the title of
worlds tallest rollercoasteruntil 2016, when the next giga coaster is scheduled to open in Orlando, Florida. In the most recent
56
57
-Military
The gap in military capacity between the US and China is
massive and would take decades for it to become even
somewhat close
BROOKS* and WOHLFORTH** 16-*Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, PhD @
Yale, **Daniel Webster Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, PhD and MA in Political Science @ Yale
[Stephen, William, The Once and Future Superpower-Why China Wont Overtake the United States, Foreign Affairs,
May/June 2016, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2016-04-13/once-and-future-superpower, DKP]
The technological and economic differences between China and the U nited States wouldnt matter
much if all it took to gain superpower status were the ability to use force locally. But what
makes the United States a superpower is its ability to operate globally, and the
bar for that capability is high. It means having what the political scientist Barry Posen has called command
of the commonsthat is, control over the air, space, and the open sea, along with the
necessary infrastructure for managing these domains. When one measures the 14 categories
of systems that create this capability (everything from nuclear attack submarines to satellites to transport
aircraft), what emerges is an overwhelming U.S. advantage in each area, the
result of decades of advances on multiple fronts. It would take a very long
time for China to approach U.S. power on any of these fronts, let alone all of
them. For one thing, the United States has built up a massive scientific and industrial base.
China is rapidly enhancing its technological inputs , increasing its R & D spending and its numbers of
graduates with degrees in science and engineering. But there are limits to how fast any country can
leap forward in such matters, and there are various obstacles in Chinas waysuch as a lack of
effective intellectual property protections and inefficient methods of allocating
capitalthat will be extremely hard to change given its rigid political system. Adding to the difficulty,
China is chasing a moving target. In 2012, the United States spent $79 billion on military R
& D, more than 13 times as much as China s estimated amount, so even rapid Chinese
advances might be insufficient to close the gap. Then there are the decades the
United States has spent procuring advanced weapons systems, which have grown only
more complex over time. In the 1960s, aircraft took about five years to develop, but by the 1990s, as the number of parts
and lines of code ballooned, the figure reached ten years. Today, it takes 15 to 20 years to design
and build the most advanced fighter aircraft, and military satellites can take even
longer. So even if another country managed to build the scientific and industrial
base to develop the many types of weapons that give the United States command of the commons, there would be
a lengthy lag before it could actually possess them. Even Chinese defense
planners recognize the scale of the challenge. Command of the commons also requires the ability to
supervise a wide range of giant defense projects. For all the hullabaloo over the evils of the
military-industrial complex and the waste, fraud, and abuse in the Pentagon, in the United States,
research labs, contractors, and bureaucrats have painstakingly acquired this
expertise over many decades, and their Chinese counterparts do not yet have
it. This kind of learning by doing experience resides in organizations, not in
individuals. It can be transferred only through demonstration and instruction, so
cybertheft or other forms of espionage are not an effective shortcut for
acquiring it. Chinas defense industry is still in its infancy, and as the scholar Richard
Bitzinger and his colleagues have concluded, Aside from a few pockets of excellence such as ballistic missiles, the Chinese
58
59
-Latent Power/Incentives
Even if China somehow acquires the latent capabilities to
become hegemonic they have no incentive to challenge the US
orderalso heg is sweet
BROOKS* and WOHLFORTH** 16-*Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, PhD @
Yale, **Daniel Webster Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, PhD and MA in Political Science @ Yale
[Stephen, William, The Once and Future Superpower-Why China Wont Overtake the United States, Foreign Affairs,
May/June 2016, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2016-04-13/once-and-future-superpower, DKP]
In the 1930s alone, Japan escaped the depths of depression and morphed into a rampaging military machine,
Germany transformed from the disarmed loser of World War I into a juggernaut capable of conquering Europe, and
the Soviet Union recovered from war and revolution to become a formidable land power. The next decade saw the
United States own sprint from military also-ran to global superpower, with a nuclear Soviet Union close on its heels.
few seriously anticipate another world war, or even another cold war, but
many observers argue that these past experiences reveal just how quickly countries can
become dangerous once they try to extract military capabilities from their economies. But what is
taking place now is not your grandfathers power transition . One can debate
whether China will soon reach the first major milestone on the journey from great power
to superpower: having the requisite economic resources. But a giant economy
alone wont make China the worlds second superpower, nor would overcoming the
next big hurdle, attaining the requisite technological capacity. After that lies the
challenge of transforming all this latent power into the full range of systems
needed for global power projection and learning how to use them. Each of these steps
is time consuming and fraught with difficulty. As a result, China will, for a long time,
continue to hover somewhere between a great power and a superpower. You might call it an
emerging potential superpower: thanks to its economic growth, China has broken free from the great-power
pack, but it still has a long way to go before it might gain the economic and
technological capacity to become a superpower. Chinas quest for superpower
status is undermined by something else, too: weak incentives to make the
sacrifices required. The United States owes its far-reaching military capabilities to
the existential imperatives of the Cold War. The country would never have borne the burden it did
Today,
had policymakers not faced the challenge of balancing the Soviet Union, a superpower with the potential to
dominate Eurasia. (Indeed, it is no surprise that two and a half decades after the Soviet Union collapsed, it is Russia
around three percent of GDP at the end of the 1990s, rose to around five percent in the next decade on account of
60
often more trouble than it is worth. Given the barriers thwarting Chinas path to
superpower status, as well as the low incentives for trying to overcome them, the
future of the international system hinges most on whether the United States continues to
bear the much lower burden of sustaining what we and others have called deep engagement, the
globe-girdling grand strategy it has followed for some 70 years. And barring some odd change of
heart that results in a true abnegation of its global role (as opposed to overwrought, politicized charges
sometimes made about its already having done so), Washington will be well positioned for
decades to maintain the core military capabilities, alliances, and commitments that
secure key regions, backstop the global economy, and foster cooperation on
transnational problems. The benefits of this grand strategy can be difficult to discern, especially in light of
the United States foreign misadventures in recent years. Fiascos such as the invasion of Iraq stand
as stark reminders of the difficulty of using force to alter domestic politics abroad. But power
is as much about preventing unfavorable outcomes as it is about causing favorable
ones, and here Washington has done a much better job than most Americans appreciate. For a largely satisfied
power leading the international system, having enough strength to deter or block challengers is in fact more
A crucial objective of
U.S. grand strategy over the decades has been to prevent a much more dangerous
world from emerging, and its success in this endeavor can be measured largely by the
absence of outcomes common to history: important regions destabilized by severe
security dilemmas, tattered alliances unable to contain breakout challengers, rapid
weapons proliferation, great-power arms races, and a descent into competitive
economic or military blocs. Were Washington to truly pull back from the world, more of
these challenges would emerge, and transnational threats would likely loom even
larger than they do today. Even if such threats did not grow, the task of addressing them would
become immeasurably harder if the United States had to grapple with a much less
stable global order at the same time. And as difficult as it sometimes is today for the United States to pull
together coalitions to address transnational challenges, it would be even harder to do so if the
country abdicated its leadership role and retreated to tend its garden, as a growing number of
valuable than having the ability to improve ones position further on the margins.
analysts and policymakersand a large swath of the publicare now calling for.
61
-China
US is overwhelmingly more powerful than China despite a
closing gap, aggressiveness and overreaction only risks
unnecessary conflict and instability
BROOKS* and WOHLFORTH** 16-*Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, PhD @
Yale, **Daniel Webster Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, PhD and MA in Political Science @ Yale
[Stephen, William, The Once and Future Superpower-Why China Wont Overtake the United States, Foreign Affairs,
May/June 2016, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2016-04-13/once-and-future-superpower, DKP]
Ever since the Soviet Unions demise, the United States dramatic power advantage over
other states has been accompanied by the risk of self-inflicted wounds , as occurred in
Iraq. But the slippage in the United States economic position may have the beneficial effect of
forcing U.S. leaders to focus more on the core mission of the countrys grand
strategy rather than being sucked into messy peripheral conflicts. Indeed, that has
been the guiding logic behind President Barack Obamas foreign policy. Nonetheless, a world
of lasting U.S. military preeminence and declining U.S. economic dominance will
continue to test the United States capacity for restraint, in four main ways. First is the
temptation to bully or exploit American allies in the pursuit of self-interested gain. U.S. allies are
dependent on Washington in many ways, and leaning on them to provide favors in returnwhether
approving of controversial U.S. policies, refraining from activities the United States opposes, or agreeing to lopsided
terms in mutually beneficial dealsseems like something only a chump would forgo. (Think of the Republican
presidential candidate Donald Trumps frequent claims that the United States always loses in its dealings with
range of presidentsincluding John F. Kennedy, Ronald Reagan, George W. Bush, and Obamahave done so at
various times.
But if Washington too often uses its power to achieve narrowly self-interested
rather than to protect and advance the system as a whole, it will run a real risk
of eroding the legitimacy of both its leadership and the existing order.
Second, the United States will be increasingly tempted to overreact when other states
namely, Chinause their growing economic clout on the world stage. Most of the
recent rising powers of note, including Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union, were stronger
militarily than economically. China, by contrast, will for decades be stronger
economically than militarily. This is a good thing , since military challenges to
global order can turn ugly quickly. But it means that China will mount economic challenges
instead, and these will need to be handled wisely. Most of Chinas efforts along these
lines will likely involve only minor or cosmetic alterations to the existing order,
important for burnishing Beijings prestige but not threatening to the orders basic arrangements
or principles. Washington should respond to these gracefully and with
forbearance, recognizing that paying a modest price for including Beijing
within the order is preferable to risking provoking a more fundamental
challenge to the structure in general. The recent fracas over the Asian Infrastructure
gains,
62
and signed up eagerly. By its reflexive opposition both to a relatively constructive Chinese initiative and to its allies
as negotiated, meanwhile, would be an even greater fiasco, leading to serious questions abroad about U.S. global
Third, the United States will still face the temptation that always accompanies power,
to intervene in places where its core national interests are not in play (or to expand the
leadership.)
definition of its core national interests so much as to hollow out the concept). That temptation can exist in the midst
of a superpower strugglethe
United States got bogged down in Vietnam during the Cold War, as did
it clearly exists today, at a time when the United States has no peer
rivals. Obama has carefully guarded against this temptation. He attracted much criticism for
elevating Dont do stupid stuff to a grand-strategic maxim. But if doing stupid stuff
the Soviet Union in Afghanistanand
threatens the United States ability to sustain its grand strategy and associated global presence, then he had a
point. Missing, though, was a corollary: Keep your eye on the ball. And for nearly seven decades, that has meant
continuing Washingtons core mission of fostering stability in key regions and keeping the global economy and
should respond to Beijings newfound local military capability, however, depends on what Washingtons strategic
To regain all the military freedom of action the United States enjoyed during its
would indeed be difficult, and the actions
necessary would increase the risk of future confrontations. Yet if Washingtons goals
are more limitedsecuring regional allies and sustaining a favorable institutional and economic orderthen
the challenge should be manageable. By adopting its own area-denial strategy, for example, the
United States could still deter Chinese aggression and protect U.S. allies despite
Chinas rising military power. Unlike the much-discussed Air-Sea Battle doctrine for a Pacific conflict,
this approach would not envision hostilities rapidly escalating to strikes on the Chinese
mainland. Rather, it would be designed to curtail Chinas ability during a conflict to
operate within what is commonly known as the first island chain, encompassing parts of Japan, the Philippines,
goals are.
and Taiwan. Under this strategy, the United States and its allies would employ the same mix of capabilitiessuch as
mines and mobile antiship missilesthat China itself has used to push U.S. surface ships and aircraft away from its
And it could turn the tables and force China to compete in areas where it
remains very weak, most notably, undersea warfare. The premise of such a strategy is that
even if China were able to deny U.S. surface forces and aircraft access to the area
near its coast, it would not be able to use that space as a launching pad for
projecting military power farther during a conflict. Chinas coastal waters, in this scenario,
would turn into a sort of no mans sea, in which neither state could make much use of surface ships
or aircraft. This would be a far cry from the situation that prevailed during the 1990s ,
coast.
when China could not stop the worlds leading military power from enjoying unfettered access to its airspace and
ocean right up to its territorial border. But the change needs to be put in perspective :
63
other arrows in its quiver. To place the burden of escalation on China, the United Statesor, even better, its
alliescould take a page from Chinas playbook and ramp up quasi-official research voyages in the area.
With the worlds largest army, a population four times that of the United States, and an
economy that outpaces Americas, it often may seem that this is Chinas world and
were all just living in it. But in a new essay, political scientist Joseph Nye, Ph.D. 64, says la Mark Twain that the rumors of
Americas demise are grossly exaggerated. In Is the American Century Over? Nye, a
Harvard University Distinguished Service Professor and former dean of Harvard Kennedy School (HKS), answers that
question with a qualified no, suggesting that while the United States will not enjoy the
unfettered authority to shape world events that it did in the 20th century, few others nations,
not even China, will assemble the economic and military hard power along with the
soft power of influence a term Nye famously coined to assume the leadership role. The essay
summarizes Nyes work since his 1990 book, Bound to Lead, in which he challenged the notion, popularly advanced by British
historian Paul Kennedys Lead: The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, that America is in decline and its era as a global superpower
is over. Nye sat down with the Gazette to talk about why he thinks the United States will hold onto its political perch, and what
events or policies could threaten that status.
GAZETTE: Explain what you mean by the American Century and why has it
been fashionable to declare that the U.S. as the superpower is over? NYE: Henry R. Luce, the former editor of Time and Life,
proclaimed the American Century in 1941. He proclaimed it because he wanted to get America involved in World War II, and he
64
particularly wanted America to be central to the global balance of power. So I use the term American Century in terms of what
Luce proclaimed, and ask the question whether in 2041 the Americans will be central to the global balance of power. My conclusion
is yes, but it wont be in the same way that Luce expected. Americans have a long history of believing theyre in decline. And it
tells you more about our psychology than about our reality. In the 1960s and 70s, we thought the Russians or the Soviets were 10
power or military might and that we still have significant soft-power advantages over other countries, including China. What are
NYE: Soft
power is the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or
payment. Its an important component of Americas role in the world. It doesnt
replace the hard power of military capability or economic capability, but it can be
whats sometimes called a force multiplier, something that, if used in a smart way with
your hard power, can make you more powerful by having hard and soft power
reinforce each other. If we were to turn inward, to be less accepting of the rest of the world, [or] if we were to, in
some of those advantages, and how might we lose our ability to influence world events in the coming years?
contrast, overextend ourselves as I think we did in the Iraq War, we could damage that soft power and undercut our ability to help
lead coalitions and networks and alliances that are necessary for being able to provide leadership in the world. GAZETTE:
What challenges does Chinas largely internal political focus and the increasing upward mobility of many more of its citizens pose for
China is that theyve raised hundreds of millions of people out of poverty and developed a large
middle class. The bad news is they havent figured out how to bring that middle class into
political participation. What we know is that when countries get to about $10,000-per-capita
income, there are increased demands for participation. China hasnt quite figured out
how to accommodate that. So thats one problem they face, what you might call the
political transition. Another problem they face is a demographic transition. Chinas
population is getting older as a result of the one-child policy. And many Chinese say they fear
theyre going to grow old before they grow rich. A third problem is: Can they adapt
their growth model, which has been heavily reliant upon export industries based along the coast, and become
more innovative and more oriented toward their domestic market? Their plans are to do that,
but they havent yet fully accomplished that. They may be able to do this thats sometimes called the
middle-income trap, that you reach a certain level on the growth model thats worked so far, and then you dont
it?
NYE:
develop the institutions and the capacity for innovation that take you to the next level.
65
The lesson of the past twenty-five years seems to be that economic and social
progress, enactment of better legislation, improvements in legal institutions, and
reformist official policy statements do not guarantee either the enjoyment of civil
and political rights or the protection of political and religious activists and their
lawyers against the arbitrary exercise of state and party power. This is not to say
that no legal progress is being made in related areas of human rights. The government
today?
has been rounding up activists ahead of the anniversary, including notable figures like free-speech lawyer Pu
involvedrather than the opinions of a smaller, better educated, democratic political/human rights eliteXi seems
willing to keep an ear to the ground and respond with at least modest flexibility and the appearance of tolerance.
Environmental and labor protection are two such areas where, unless there is some government response, there
and use institutions to give vent to the growing sophistication and demands of the increasingly educated populace
will create the greatest threat. Repression can only work in the short run, and is gradually creating more, not less,
discontent. Topics like the environment and Uighur rights have recently garnered increased attention and citizen
outrage. In your view, which issue poses the greatest threat to the government's authority? The most immediate
internal threats to the Chinese Communist Party, apart from a possible economic crisis, appear to be Tibet and
Xinjiang. In the medium term, I believe the environment and labor are very serious threats, as is corruption. Long
term, however, the failure to develop and use institutions to give vent to the growing sophistication and demands of
the increasingly educated populace will create the greatest threat. Repression can only work in the short run, and is
gradually creating more, not less, discontent. There seems to be inconsistency in the Party's message about rights.
While Xi has declared that nobody is above the law (manifested in his crackdown on corruption), constitutional
activists like Xu Zhiyong are nonetheless detained and sentenced. What's behind this? Regarding political and civil
even Xi's family? And why is there such extended difficulty for the Party to decide what to do about [former
66
Despite its remarkable recent achievements, China's economic, social and political
problems are many and growing. It is possible that Beijing's performance may now
have peaked. Its accumulating problems and failure to develop a political system
adequate to deal with them may soon be seen, both inside and outside the country,
to constrict its further progress and the deployment of its impressive assets. Many a
Chinese leader must think it a cruel twist of fate that a regime that has done so much to improve the living
standards of hundreds of millions of people should be so obviously frightened about its continuing viability. Yet the 2
Communist Party can be seen as a victim of its own successes as well as its apparent failures. No country can
modernize as rapidly as China without suffering the enormous consequences of immense social change. Rather
than basking in the gratitude of a contented nation, Xi Jinping and his colleagues have revealed themselves to all
the world as cats on a hot tin roof. Their pomp and propaganda at home and abroad cannot conceal their fear of
overthrow or disintegration. Their attempt to limit the impact of Western values, ideas, institutions and practices,
embodied in the current draft legislation to restrict foreign cooperation in education, civic affairs and politics, is a
deeply embarrassing and shameful public confession of the fragility of their system. Having benefitted from several
decades of the "open policy" initiated by Deng Xiaoping, his fear-mongering successors now want to cut off the
"ideological infiltration" they believe threatens their "democratic dictatorship". If successful, this new policy will
inhibit China's ability to respond to domestic and global demands. As my colleague Ira Belkin recently noted, "It's a
bad 1960s policy for a 2015 challenge. Because of the system's non-transparency, Xi Jinping knows far better than
China lives in a very crowded neighborhood. It shares a very long border with
Russia, with whom, Mearsheimer notes, it has fought in the past; which he codes as a great power; and which
has a very large nuclear force. Japan is also very close by. Mearsheimer also codes Japan as a great
power; and he notes the mutual suspicion between the two states (Mearsheimer, 2001: 375, 3812, 393, 396). If
frightened or provoked, Japan has the capability to develop an independent nuclear
The answer is obvious.
67
force, and it is difficult to imagine a realist account that would not expect them to
do so in such circumstances. China also borders India, a very large, rising, nuclear-armed state, also with
whom China has fought in the past, and which has a latent economic potential similar even to that of Chinas own.
China also borders Vietnam, not a great power, but no pushover, and yet another state with whom China has fought
in living memory. A unified (and also nuclear-capable) Korea would be another regional player sharing a border with
would expect such a bid to elicit hostile responses from its great and regional power neighbors, and contribute to
nuclear proliferation of a kind that China would prefer not to see. The fundamental realist question, always,
remains, Is my national interest better or worse off by pursuing this course of action?;
with regard to
China, and an aggressive bid for hegemony, the answer is an obvious no. It is worth noting that
classical realists cannot rule out that China would not be so ambitious (or so foolish) as to give it a try; it is simply
that such behavior cannot be accounted for by the logic of offensive realism.
68
A2-Fatigue
Polls show public is pro defense spendingif anything they are
worried about cuts
McCarthy 15-American demographer, professor of history at the University of Louisville, in Louisville,
Kentucky, He holds an honorary doctorate from Boazii University, Turkey, and is a board member of the Institute
of Turkish Studies [Justin, Americans Split on Defense Spending, Gallup, 2/20/15,
http://www.gallup.com/poll/181628/americans-split-defense-spending.aspx, MHS]
For the past decade, Americans have been more likely to say the U.S.
government spends too much on defense rather than too little, but today, a slim margin separates
WASHINGTON, D.C. --
these views. While the 32% of Americans saying the country is spending too much is about average for recent
years, the 34% saying "too little" is the highest since 2001. These findings from Gallup's Feb. 8-11 World Affairs poll
budget's size is "about right." The latest figures show the closest margin between "too much" and "too little" in 10
years, and a shift from last year, when there was a nine-percentage-point margin in the direction of "too much"
Americans' views on the size of the defense budget have fluctuated greatly
over time, but the public has generally been more likely to say the government
spends too much. As many as 50% or more shared this view in the Vietnam War era of the late 1960s and
spending.
early 1970s, as well as in 1990, after the end of the Cold War and a long military buildup under President Ronald
Reagan. There have been a few times in Gallup's 46-year trend when Americans thought there was too little rather
than too much spending on defense. These include 2000-2002, spanning the end of the Clinton administration and
the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and January 1981 -- just months after the nation elected Reagan, who made U.S. military
weakness a major theme of his presidential campaign. Over the course of Reagan's administration, he oversaw a
than is true among independents (33%) and Democrats (17%). Gallup has historically found this to be the case
particularly from the Islamic State -- Obama and the GOP-controlled Congress may be able to find some common
ground on increases in military spending, which would have the support of a growing number of Americans. Last
month, Gallup found Americans were generally satisfied with U.S. military strength, but their level of satisfaction is
down from the past two years and well below where it was after 9/11 and in the early stages of the Iraq war.
Combined with the February increase in the percentage saying the U.S. military is not strong enough, public opinion
seems to favor increases in defense spending. Though the White House and congressional Republicans may
struggle to agree on how big these increases should be and how they are funded, they can each lean on growing
support for an increase within their respective parties. Survey Methods Results for this Gallup poll are based on
telephone interviews conducted Feb. 8-11, 2015, on the Gallup U.S. Daily survey, with a random sample of 837
69
adults, aged 18 and older, living in all 50 U.S. states and the District of Columbia. For results based on the total
sample of national adults, the margin of sampling error is 4 percentage points at the 95% confidence level. All
reported margins of sampling error include computed design effects for weighting. Each sample of national adults
includes a minimum quota of 50% cellphone respondents and 50% landline respondents, with additional minimum
quotas by time zone within region. Landline and cellular telephone numbers are selected using random-digit-dial
methods.
70
Liberalism-Locked in
71
-Alliances
US not in decline but even if it was, alliances lock in the liberal
order
NYE 16-distinguished service professor and former dean of the Harvard Kennedy School of Government, PhD in
Political Science @ Harvard, Rhodes Scholar at Oxford University's Exeter College [Joseph, How Trump Would
Weaken America, 5/11/2016, Harvard Belfer Center,
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/26611/how_trump_would_weaken_america.html?breadcrumb=
%2Fregion%2F130%2Fasia%3Fpage%3D4, DKP]
While the US has had bitter partisan differences over disastrous interventions in
developing countries such as Vietnam and Iraq, there is a bedrock of consensus on its
alliance system and not just among those who make and think about foreign policy. Opinion polls show
popular majorities in support of Nato and the US-Japan alliance. Nonetheless, for the first time in 70 years, a major
And yet Trump extols the virtues of unpredictability a potentially useful tactic when bargaining with enemies, but
on the density and reach of a nation's diplomatic contacts." The US, according to Australia's Lowy Institute, tops the
ranking of countries by number of embassies, consulates, and missions. The US has some 60 treaty allies; China
has few. The Economist magazine estimates that of the world's 150 largest countries, nearly 100 lean toward the
US, while 21 lean against it.
73
-World Improving
Liberalism makes the world better and will continue to be
locked in despite Chinas rise
WYNE 16-Nonresident Fellow with the Atlantic Councils Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security,
Former Research Assistant, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs [Ali, The world is getting better. Why
dont we believe it? Harvard Belfer Center, originally published in the Washington Post, 1/26/2016,
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/26231/world_is_getting_better_why_dont_we_believe_it.html?
breadcrumb=%2Fregion%2F130%2Fasia%3Fpage%3D13, DKP]
It would seem entirely reasonable to conclude that the world has taken several turns for the
worse since President George H.W. Bush delivered his famous new world order address. The United Nations
estimates that more than 250,000 people have perished in Syrias civil war, and another million or so have been injured. With vast
swathes of the Middle East collapsing, the Islamic State continues to wreak havoc, increasingly inspiring and coordinating attacks
outside the region. There are now more forcibly displaced people worldwide than there have been at any point since World War II.
Russias incursions into Ukraine have challenged Europes post-Cold War peace, and North Korea has conducted its fourth nuclear
test. Pope Francis summarized many observers judgments when he lamented that after the second failure of another world war,
Still, we would be
remiss to discount how much progress has been made in the quarter-century since Bushs speech.
According to the World Bank, the rate of extreme poverty fell from 37 percent in 1990 to about 10
percent last year. The Food and Agriculture Organization reports that the rate of undernourishment fell from
18.6 percent to 10.9 percent during that same window. A major study by the University of Washingtons Institute of Health
Metrics and Evaluation found that life expectancy increased by 5.8 years for men and 6.6 years
for women between 1990 and 2013. Doctors have made extraordinary strides in reducing the
mortality rates of polio, measles and malaria. And the threat of a nuclear war, as well as that of a
war between great powers, has declined significantly. It is easy to discount all that is going well: We
tend to overestimate how good the good ol days were, the media disproportionately
covers bad news, and contemporary progress is occurring amid profound uncertainty about the evolution of world order.
While the United States remains the worlds lone superpower, it is no longer as preeminent
as it was in the immediate aftermath of the Soviet Unions implosion. In addition, it has to sustain an increasingly
challenging balance of competitive and cooperative dynamics with China (whose
perhaps one can speak of a third war, one fought piecemeal, with crimes, massacres, destruction.
resurgence underpins a broader, eastward shift in the center of global gravity). While the two countries political systems,
neighbors are doing their utmost to strengthen their security ties with the former while reaping the fruits of the latters economic
The architecture of any new world order will (appropriately) have to accommodate
the redistribution of power among states and the growing sway of non-state actors. We will see a more
equitable balance of voting shares within the main postwar institutions (among them the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund), the establishment of parallel and supplementary institutions (such as the Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank), the reconfiguration of long-standing alliances and enmities, the further
blurring of the divide between wartime and peacetime fighting, and so forth. It would be premature to infer,
however, that there is a coherent alternative to the postwar liberal order in the
ascent.
74
offing. No less than the chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee of Chinas National Peoples Congress, Fu Ying, observes
that while China is dissatisfied and ready to criticize, it is not ready to propose a
new design. . . . We need to come up with more specific ideas, to reassure others
and advance our common interests. Democracy and democratic values continue to
strengthen globally, even if incrementally and haltingly. Globalization continues to sputter along,
and the progression of initiatives such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership, and Chinas One Belt, One Road undertaking not to mention the
proliferation of regional economic organizations and institutions suggests that economic
interdependence worldwide will continue to grow. The structure of world order stands to
grow more complex; the ownership of its evolution, more contested. Still, Foreign Affairs Editor Gideon Rose reminds us that the
postwar system has outwitted, outplayed, and outlasted every rival for threequarters of a century. That it will be strained and renegotiated , therefore, does not
necessarily imply that it will disappear.
75
-China
Despite increasing power, China wont significantly challenge
liberal institutions, trade, and norms
KANG 15-Professor of International Relations and Business @ USC, Director of USC Korean Studies Institute,
Director of USC Center for International Studies [David, China, Hegemony, and Leadership in East Asia, Responding to Chinas Rise:
US and EU Strategies, The Political Economy of the Asia Pacific, 2015, DKP]
Today, as China increasingly appears poised to return to its position as the most powerful country in East Asia, there is a
corresponding question about whether or not China can enjoy the legitimacy that it once held, or even whether it may attempt to
notable are questions about whether China can adjust itself to the Western international norms and rules that have come to
international relations. For example, today few authoritarian states trumpet their authoritarianism with pride; almost all claim to be
some form of democracy and justify their rule based on some special need or circumstance. Similarly, few human rights violators do
so with pride; they tend to rationalize their abuses with some other justifi cation. As the twenty-fi rst century begins, it is not yet
South Korea, and USChina economic relations are now deeply intertwined.
the rise of China and other non-Western developing states is creating new constituencies
for an updated and reformed, open, multilateral system, as opposed to new hostile
voices seeking to build something that would be antithetical to openness and rule of
law. The struggle today is over authority, in my view, over who sits at the table, who decides over rights and privileges in the
Put differently,
global political hierarchy. Its not about contrasting ideologies of order and certainly not rival models of modernity. Why do I argue
this? I think what I can do to try to make my point and then add the qualifications and speculations at the end is to simply list what I
76
think are the reasons why power transition this time around may be different than those transitions of the past that have led to the
different from past orders. Ive written a book that tries to make that argument but my summary point is that compared to past
international orders that rising states have confronted, this order is easier to join and harder to overturn .
It is an order that does a lot of work and that facilitates a variety of dynamics that I want to mention, and then in some sense
editorialize by saying the more it can do this, the better. The more it does this, the more China will see that its an order that is easy
to join and hard to overturn. Four characteristics. Integration capacity : this order has absorbed a lot of states
over the last 60-70 years, starting with Germany and Japan, which flipped on a dime, if you will, and became junior partners,
regional leaders, second and third largest economies in the world. Then cohortsand generations of states that have followed in the
Secondly, shared
leadership. There is a lot of forums and platforms for leadership : the G5, G7, G8 (back to G7),
decades that followed. So there is an integration capacity here that has to be acknowledged.
the G20. These are all elastic, G kind of leadership coalitions. Of course, the more formal multilateral institutions that allow for
horizontal movement of wealth and trade and technology and benefits of advancement. Indeed, thats why were here talking about
at least three. Theres the famous, or if you will infamous, neo-liberal or laissez-faire fundamentalist kind of approach. You think of
Thatcher and Reagan. Theres what others would call embedded liberal or social democratic model more tied to social safety net,
safeguards on economic insecurity, the welfare state, contingent trade, adjustment assistance and so forth. Thirdly, developmental
statism. This is what East Asia did. This is what Japan and South Korea and other countries in Southeast Asia pursued. There was a
kind of grudging acknowledgement in the West that this was a strategy and we could accommodate it. In many ways, thats the
strategy that China has seen as a possible model. Ezra Vogels big thick book on Deng Xiaoping mentions this that Deng at that
point was looking at Japan and Korea and saying, we got to get in on this. So not an old Western liberal model but a model where the
state and a more developmental kind of model nonetheless is accommodated. The second argument about why there is more
formidable characteristics to this order than often thought is that China and non-Western rising states want what liberal
If you strip away the American and Western hegemonic aspect to it,
underneath that is the basic features of a modern system that they want. Those
features are two-fold. One is openness. Youve got to have an open system. You cant be a great power in the
21st century and live inside a narrow, closed bloc or sphere. Im afraid Putin is going to learn this the hard way. Openness,
access to trade, investment, technology this is integral to the foreign relations of
all the rising non-Western states. Secondly, rules and institutions that provide
safeguards and governance mechanisms for rising states. Thats where we often find the clash but
internationalism offers.
the clash is not really about the nature of having rules themselves. Rules, such as WTO rules or rules about use of force which, of
course, are not fully articulated or followed nonetheless provide protections for rising states, weak or strong, along the way. When
you think about the rise of liberal, rule of law order in Europe in the modern era, yes, there were arguments about it that came from
a normative view about the role of the individual and the state society, the state individual, the Lockean kind of vision. But even in
the Lockean vision, it was also about securing your property, property rights. Its about protecting your equities. Its about being
able to know that tomorrow what you have today will still be yours. So rules and rule-based order is a tool for those who have things
or think they are going to get things, to put them in a position so they can keep what they have and protect what they have against
in the case of China states that might envy them or want to discriminate against them in the face of their success. So this is one
reading, if you will, of Western liberalism that offers it as a more universal type of functional kind of logic, that gets in the way of the
arguments that, well, rising states just dont like what we in the West cherish as our values, because theres something else there.
Thirdly, China and rising non-Western states are not a bloc. On the one hand, all are capitalist and most are
democratic. Yet onthe other hand, they have different geopolitical interests in energy, in trade, in security. Brazil is a great example
of this. They are as worried about China, the currency exchange rate, and the new discourse in Brazil about de-industrialization
thanksto China the loss of industrial jobs to China and the new kind of dependency on China on the side of resources. Its not the
United States thats the old state that is in some sense pushing Brazil down now; it has a more complex set of worries and
relationships. You see this in the way the US and Brazil interact. Its definitely a love-hate relationship. Obama was there, met with
77
Dilma in 2013, and he asked her: what is your agenda? Dilma said: infrastructure, clean energy, education, science and technology.
Reportedly I wasnt there Obama said: well, thats my agenda. That strikes me as interesting because were not simply across
ideological divides. In some sense the rising non-Western states are experiencing in their own way the problems that the old West,
Europe and the United States, are facing which is to say, problems: inequality, fiscal problems, the fraying of the social contract,
questions about immigration, questions about how to sustain growth, infrastructure. These are 21st-century problems. Its almost as
if weve come to the 21st century and its not war that we worry about, its just simply being able to sustain modern life in these big
with China because it is the most dramatic (in some sense the swing) state, but theres a broader global transformation that is going
on. What Ive recently started to call it is the rise of a global middle class, of democracies many of them troubled democracies but
democracies, across regions, across civilizations, across developmental divides. India, Brazil, but not just the BRICS also Mexico,
Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey, Australia and Canada. Theres a broad array of states that are moving up in one sense or another
a great example of this. Its the first country to be a beneficiary of ODA that now is a donor. It has hosted the G20. It has hosted the
Global Security Summit. It has this ideology of Global Korea. I go to Korea a lot and Im fascinated by this country that has found a
way to punch above its weight, to engage in what we used to call middle-power diplomacy. Australia and Canada are the iconic
examples of this. But its kind of the rising choir that wanted an international order of a certain sort that both the United States and
Europe and China are going to have to accommodate. Its those states that will say: we want more China, or we want more West, or
not a model. The great historians of rise and decline, from Paul Kennedy and others, are all in some sense noting at these various
moments of the inflection point of world politics that the rising state in some sense has the kind of not monopoly, but the vanguard
role of defining what it means to be modern and make it to the next level of advancement. If China were to acquire this, and
certainly in our lifetime it could get to that point, but now it doesnt. Whilethe US and the West have clearly disappointed
themselves and the world by showing their weaknesses and dysfunctions and troubles in trying to sustain their own models that
may be true most clearly and dramatically after 2008, in the case of the United States its
The last decade has brought remarkable upheavals in the global system the
emergence of new powers, financial crises, a global recession, and bitter disputes among allies over American unipolar ambitions.
78
system, significantly different than previous international orders that rising states in those earlier eras encountered. It is
wider and deeper. It is more integrated and institutionalized. It is an order that is rooted in the
deep structures of modern industrial society. A rising China does not just face the U nited States or the West.
It faces a massive and far-flung global system of capitalism and democracy that
continues to expand and integrate. This liberal international order is easy to join and hard to
overturn. To a remarkable extent, China is already in this order. Indeed, Chinas participation in this order most notably in
the worlds trading system has allowed it to achieve its remarkable growth and progress. In this sense, China is already a
itself can and has varied in character. And in the 20thcentury, liberal states have made repeated efforts to built, expand, and
would seemingly be one organized around more or less exclusive blocs, spheres of influence, and mercantilist networks. It
It would be less open, less rule-based, and dominated by arrays of state-to-state ties. But
organized on a global scale, such a system would not advance the interests of any of the major states, including China. The Beijing
model only works when one or a few states opportunistically exploit an open system of markets. Raised to the level of a world
organizational type, it breaks down. One or a few states can exploit an open system but if everyone does, it is no longer an open
system and everyone suffers.
These
fault lines do not map onto geography nor do they split Asia and the West.
the West, which he defines to comprise Europe and the United States, is on
the wane and that power will be more widely distributed Global power around the
globe in the twenty-first century. According to Kupchan, a multi-polar world order, however,
must not necessarily result in international anarchy and armed struggle , as Kagan and
Brzezinski warned. Kupchan suggests that the West and the rising rest can find a consensus on the rules
governing international conduct and on rudimentary definitions of legitimacy that
are compatible with various forms of government. In the first part, Kupchan analyses how the West
global turn, argues that the dominance of
achieved global dominance between 1500 and 1800, arguing that the political fragmentation of Europe opened up political space for
the emerging middle class. Europes religious fragmentation resulting from the Reformation, moreover, led to religious tolerance and
not be simply replicated in other parts of the world. In the second part, Kupchan argues that the centralized and hierarchical
institutions of political control in the Ottoman Empire and China prevented socioeconomic dynamism and technological innovation.
As a result, Europe and later America came to dominate most parts of the world between 1800 and 2000. Making the same
argument as Kagan, Kupchan reminds us that the spread of this western order was not due to the universal appeal of western
ideals and principles but due to the Wests economic and military dominance. In the third and fourth part, Kupchan draws
79
conclusions from these historical insights for the future world order warning that the Wests material dominance of the world is
moreover, has failed to produce a Reformation such that the separation of state and religion has yet to be achieved. In Africa, ethnic
rivalries prevent the emergence of stable states, while the economic inequalities in Latin America, which result from the colonial
legacy, make that region prone to left-wing, anti-western populism.
Cooper defines economic interdependence as the sensitivity of economic activity between multiple nations in relation to economic
developments within those nations.[40] Economic activity tends to refer to international transactions such as trade (imports and
referring to the likelihood of European conflict, it is a beacon for economic interdependence: What shall we say of the Great War of
Europe, ever threatening, ever impending, and which never comes? We shall say that it will never come. Humanly speaking, it is
impossible.[42] Figure 9 As the graph shows, Chinas overseas direct investment or FDI has risen significantly. The darker line
Chinese FDI flow into the world, including Asiashows an increase of nearly $75 billion. Using the economic interdependence
notions above, this increase in FDI should lead to a decrease in the likelihood of conflict and can, in fact, foster greater cooperation
amongst states. In addition, Chinas trade interaction with the rest of the world accounts for nearly 50 per cent of its GDP.[43] This
shows an intertwined economic relationship between the nations economy and the global economy. Conflict would undermine this
economic relationship and result in universal losses and repercussions. Furthermore, China is now an active member in a range of
regional and international organisations, institutions and frameworks. Xi Jinping correctly points out that China contributes to,
and is a proactive member of, the G20, The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), The United Nations Security Council, the
adds that
there is a further need to seek common ground on issues of common interests in
pursuit of winwin progress,[45] which not only denigrates the Realist
interpretation of Chinas rise, but wholly supports the Liberalist interpretation.
Through Chinas participation in such organisations, the encouragement of
cooperation ensues, ensuring all participants are awarded a share of winnings,
meaning that they are less likely to engage in conflict with one another.
Shanghai Cooperative Organization and The BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) mechanism.[44] He
80
Indeed, though the Westphalian system is comprised of formally equal units, we see substantial hierarchy even
today. For example, any mention of leadership in international relations is an implicit recognition of this form of
hierarchy. 8 After all, leadership necessarily implies that there are followers and that there is a rank order placing
obligation, understood by both parties, for B to comply with the wishes of A. 17 Norms and beliefs are not
epiphenomenal to material power; that is, they are more than a convenient velvet glove over an iron fi st. 18
Legitimacy in itself is a form of power, but it derives from the values or norms a state projects, not
necessarily from the states military might and economic wealth. 19 As Ian Hurd argues: The relation of coercion,
self-interest, and legitimacy to each other is complex, and each is rarely found in anything like its pure, isolated
form the diffi culties attending to an attempt to prove that a rule is or is not accepted by an actor as legitimate
are real, but they do not justify either abandoning the study or assuming ex ante that it does not exist. 20
Dominant states, like individual leaders, lead through a combination of bullying, bribing, and inspiring. 21 Although
81
coercion can substitute for legitimacy in certain instances and for a short while, they are intertwined as well.
Legitimacy is stronger when backed by coercive capacity, and coercion seen as legitimate is also more effective. 22
Lake notes that despite their clear analytic differences, political authority and coercion are hard to distinguish in
practice there is no bright line separating the In sum, hegemony is a form of hierarchy that involves more than
material power; it also involves a set of normsa social orderthat secondary states fi nd legitimate, thus making
it a social system as well. Legitimacy itself is distinct from material power, and although the two are intertwined,
82
Cooperation Good
83
-Generic
Chinas rise is inevitable but integration into the global
system ensures peace and US leadership Hard line stances
ensure conflict
Ikenberry 8 Professor of Politics and International Affairs @ Princeton University, PhD @ The University of
Chicago, former professor @ University of Pennsylvania [John, Integrating a Rising China into a Declining Western
Order, Atlantic Community, Article Summary, January/February 2008, http://www.atlanticcommunity.org/index.php/Global_Must_Read_Article/Integrating_a_Rising_China_into_a_Declining_Western_Order,
SCJ]
With Chinas economy predicted to double over the next decade and surpass the United States economic leadership by 2020
there is no question that China is on the rise. The question is not if or how Chinas
rise can be thwarted, claims G. John Ikenberry in Foreign Affairs, but rather how to ensure that the
current Western order remains the dominant one. According to Ikenberry, Chinas rise will bring US
global dominance to an end. There are, however, two potential courses that Chinas rise could take: one which involves China
China
integrates into the Western order, whether or not the US remains on top. This is the
goal the US needs to be aiming for. Although Chinas rise undoubtedly signifies the end of the United States
unipolar moment, it is not just the United States that China faces. Instead, China will be up against a Western
order which the United States just so happens to have led; a deeply rooted,
integrated, rule-based system that is easy to join but hard to overturn. Ikenberry argues
that the US has the potential to integrate China (and eventually other rising countries
as well) into this system, but only by strengthening the existing order before China
is in a position to overthrow it. This postwar order is unique in that it has allowed economic growth
and power to a wide variety of stakeholders, and thus could potentially adapt to a more
powerful China. There are three aspects of the Western order which make it difficult to
overthrow, and if reinforced, could secure the interests of both rising powers and declining ones through their integration into
the system. Through non-discrimination and an open market, the barriers to economic
participation are low and the benefits high, allowing for states to expand their
economic and political goals within the order. Coalition based leadership allows for
shifts in the balance of power between states without affecting the overall order.
Deeply rooted rules and institutions lay the basis for cooperation. Strengthening the rule-based
aspect of the Western system promotes shared authority and discourages fragmentation into minilateral arrangements. It is
this strong framework of rules and institutions that has already begun to facilitate
Chinas integration. In fact, China has been using these international institutions to achieve its very rise in global status
overtaking the US and upsetting the existing international order, potentially leading to war, the other in which
as it becomes increasingly aware that it cant become a world power without joining the World Trade Organization and integrating
into the globalized capitalist system. In other words, the road to the East runs through the West, should the West decide to unite in
84
uence on Western civilization, and Greek conceptsdemocracy, algebra, philosophycontinue to be infl uential
today. Yet contemporary Greece has no discernible soft power, and few people look for Greek leadership in
centuries earlier as a center of cultural and political innovation, where other states admiringly look to China as
model, guide, and inspiration? There is grudging respect for Chinese economic accomplishments over the past
three decades, to be sure. But there is just as much wariness about Chinese cultural and political beliefs. Will
Chinese nationalism become brittle, confrontational, insecure, and defensive? Or will it eventually return to the selfconfi dence of centuries ago? The Chinese peopleas evidenced by the hysterical response to protests about Tibet
in the spring and summer of 2008show that they are far from comfortable with their own position in the world and
how others perceive them. Will the Chinese Communist Party cling to its power indefi nitely, or will it eventually fi
nd a way to craft some type of peaceful transition from authoritarianism? If nationalism and identities are truly
socially constructed, then we must ask whether there is an alternative conception of Chinese nationalism and
identity that might emerge in the future. At present, the dominant Chinese narrative is one of defensiveness and
insecurity with regards to Japan and the West; this narrative emphasizes Chinas weakness, past humiliation, and
eagerness to reclaim Chinas rightful place in the world. Such a narrative is naturally a bit unsettling for Chinas
neighbors and for other countries around the world, such as the US. Yet there are alternative narratives possible
certainly the Chinese leadership has attempted to reframe Chinas identity as one of a peaceful, unique power. 53
Although much debated and often dismissed, that such a narrative has received so much attention shows that it
must be a realistic enough possibility for scholars and policymakers to at least consider whether such a peaceful
rise is possible. Other narratives include an historical narrative, one that emphasizes Chinas peaceful relations with
its neighbors ( tianxia ). Note that the question is not whether this narrative is historically accurate but whether
Chinese people today come to adopt this narrative and use it to guide their views of themselves and their relations
with their neighbors. It is impossible to predict how Chinese beliefs about themselves and their place and role in the
world will evolve, and it will depend on an enormous number of factors: how the Chinese Communist Party responds
to changing domestic and international circumstances; whether domestic economic growth continues for the next
few decades or whether China experiences an economic crisis of some kind; domestic Chinese actions towards its
own people; how society changes, given the one-child policy, increasing education and foreign travel, and all the
inequalities in China itself; and how specifi c incidents with other regional and global actors are resolved. On the
part of other East Asian states, how and whether they accept China will depend on their own beliefs about
themselves and their relations with China. For example, although few Japanese fear another great power war in East
Asia, the Japanese are used to seeing themselves as the regional leader and as the most important Asian country.
Whether Japan can adjust to an increasingly important China, and how the two countries come to view each other,
will have enduring repercussions for regional stability. Will Japan and China be co-leaders in East Asia? Will Japan
accede to being second to China, as it did centuries ago? As to Korea and Vietnam, recent history has radically
altered their relations with China, despite their long histories as close followers of China. New nationalist histories in
both Korea and Vietnam no longer emphasize their cultural debt to China, but rather emphasize their difference
with and, in some ways, superiority to China. Whether these two countries can live comfortably in the shadow of
China, or whether they seek equal status, and how they manage their relations with the US and Europe will be
85
the US and China are working to accommodate each other and stabilize their
relations, that process is far from complete. How these two countries manage East
Asian leadership, the status they give to each other, and how other regional countries come
to view them will be central aspects to whether or not the future of East Asian
international relations is increasingly stable.
86
-Nuclear Security
Cooperation goodnuclear security
ZHANG 16-Senior Research Associate with the Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard Universitys Belfer
Center for Science and International Affairs [Hui, Towards Deeper U.S.-China Nuclear Security Cooperation,
Huffington Post, 3/31/2016, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/carnegie-corporation-of-new-york/towards-deeper-uschina-n_b_9583404.html, DKP]
China and the United States have made remarkable strides in cooperating on nuclear
security mattersin every area except the one that arguably matters most: the military sector.
On March 18, shortly before Chinese President Xi Jinping arrived in Washington for the 2016 Nuclear Security
Summit at the end of the month, the two countries opened a Center of Excellence on Nuclear Security in Beijing. As
the largest and most advanced such center in the Asia-Pacific region, it will be a unique forum for exchanging
technical information, sharing best practices, developing training courses and promoting technical collaboration to
institutions have reportedly participated in some joint workshops and discussions, and the China Atomic Energy
Authority, which regulates both the civilian and military sectors, does participate. But
deeper cooperation
restarting the lab-to-lab program, Beijing asked Washington to agree that the program was legal and mutually
beneficial. Washington instead proposed a number of statements focusing more on the future, which have not been
The impasse has stalled more focused work related to the defense
sector that deals with nuclear weapons and the most sensitive nuclear materials. Key to a deeper
satisfactory to Beijing.
relationship would be renewed lab-to-lab cooperation, strengthening Chinas security culture and exchanging visits
the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, President Xi noted that increased cooperation on nuclear security in any country
87
88
Liberalism+Realism
Realism and Liberalism in isolation fail only a combination of
both make up for the inconsistences creating the best
framework to evaluate China
Hudda 15 Student at University of Hong Kong getting a degree in E-IR [Nabil
Interpreting the Rise of China: Realist and Liberalist Perspectives E-International
Relations Students, April 3, 2015, http://www.e-ir.info/2015/04/03/interpreting-therise-of-china-realist-and-liberalist-perspectives/, CSS]
Overall, Realism and Liberalism offer us valuable theoretical insight into interpreting the rise of China. This research
game environment. Several empirical examples in this paper support this narrow Realist interpretation, but not to a
full extent. Competing empirical evidence based on Liberal theory contradicts the narrow realist interpretation. A
Liberal scenario is one where the anarchic element of an international system can be diluted. In contrast to a Realist
view, cooperation means that a winwin situation for all is a possibility and conflict is not inevitablein fact, it can be
prevented. The implication is that in the interpretation of Chinas rise, these two theories must be analysed in
combination with each othernot in opposition to each other. Indeed, the complex correlations between power
Using both
theories in combination will lead to a more comprehensive and more accurate
interpretation of Chinas rise, but since all proponents of these theories use history
to characterise and interpret present or future discourse, speculations tend to be
too simplistic. Although debatable and undefined in this paper, perhaps the theories evaluated could be
and interest defy analytic capture by any one paradigm.[50] However, this is not enough.
combined with Chinese characteristics in order to get a better interpretation of Chinas rise. This combination
could include taking into account Chinas own unique culture, civilisation and historical backdrop, in addition to
being more inclusive when it comes to interpretations. That is, current interpretations of Chinas rise need to
include a more diverse range of literature that includes significant Chinese sources. In relation to current policy
regarding interpretations of Chinas rise, I would hope for increased cooperation where there is common ground to
avoid miscalculations and misperceptions. More importantly, issues of dispute need to be handled with more care,
and within designated frameworks. This is important in order to avoid the extremes of Realism, but also address the
failings of Liberalism.
89
US Hegemony Good
90
-Extinction
91
anymore, and our president is a big part of that problem. Instead of leading us, he explains to us. Barack Obama
would have us believe that he is practicing strategic patience. But many experts and ordinary citizens alike have
concluded that he is actually beset by strategic incoherence -- in effect, a man overmatched by the job. It is worth
contemplate military intervention in Libya, because if we do take the step to prevent larger-scale killing by
engaging in some killing of our own, we will not be adding to some fantastically imagined global death count
stemming from the ongoing "megalomania" and "evil" of American "empire." We'll be engaging in the same sort of
system-administering activity that has marked our stunningly successful stewardship of global order since World
92
-GPW
93
American leadership need not mean involvement in endless wars. Past history gives us examples. The
Marshall Plan allowed worn-torn allied governments to provide their people with
political stability and economic development. NATO was an effort to build Western
European unity, end the quarrels that had produced two world wars, and deter Soviet aggression. The
United Nations, disappointing in many ways, was a vehicle for broad international efforts against
disease, illiteracy and regional wars. The I nternational Monetary Fund, World Bank and the
General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs were designed to facilitate international trade, prevent
currency wars and assist in economic development. These i nitiatives prevented another
great power war, achieved a large degree of European reconciliation, and eased the transition
for post-colonial countries in Africa and Asia. None would have happened without
strong and persistent American leadership. The U.S. negotiated a series of defense
treaties with more than 35 nations, designed to deter aggression , that also eased their burden
of self-defense and allowed them to place more resources into the reconstruction of their economies. In the Middle East,
the Arab States and Israel saw the U.S. as an honest broker , assisting in the negotiation of peace
treaties between Israel and Egypt and Israel and Jordan. During the Obama administration there has
been a steady American retreat from world leadership. NATO is far less effective.
Allies such as Israel, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Egypt, the Baltic States and Iraq
are no longer confident of American support. Hence, China, Russia and Iran are
asserting hegemonic claims. The world is now torn by devolution and fractionalization. The forces of
global and regional cooperation are in disrepair. The U nited Nations stands helpless
against Russian aggression, civil war in Syria and Libya and atrocities by the Islamic State
across the Middle East and North Africa; the European Union is facing possible revolts and threats of
secession by the United Kingdom and Greece and waning allegiance in much of Europe; and NATO offers Ukraine
no more than its good wishes as Russian President Vladimir Putins military swallows the
country bit by bit. Our allies are far from steadfast. Their governments are weaker,
and vivid world leaders are hard to find among them. Putin, the insane leaders of the Islamic State and the Iranian mullahs have put
fear in the hearts of our allies. Why are these second- and third-rate powers able to intimidate their neighbors far more effectively
than did the far more powerful Soviet Union? Our democratic allies in Europe, lacking a clear sense of direction, are ruled by
unstable coalitions. Even Germany, perhaps the strongest of our European allies, refuses to confront Putin in his efforts to destabilize
94
persuasion, assistance, assurance and trust. As the Obama administration allows the U.S.
to slip into the shadows world politics, the danger of war increases.
has helped strengthen global norms and rules that undercut the legitimacy of nineteenth-century-style spheres of influence, bids for
regional domination, and territorial grabs. And it has given the United States the capacities, partnerships, and principles to confront
these are
the tools of U.S. leadership, and they are winning, not losing, the twenty-firstcentury struggles over geopolitics and the world order. THE GENTLE GIANT In 1904, the English
todays great-power spoilers and revisionists, such as they are. Alliances, partnerships, multilateralism, democracy --
geographer Halford Mackinder wrote that the great power that controlled the heartland of Eurasia would command the WorldIsland and thus the world itself. For Mead, Eurasia has returned as the great prize of geopolitics. Across the far reaches of this
United States has a decisive advantage over China, Iran, and Russia. Although the United States will no doubt come down from the
peak of hegemony that it occupied during the unipolar era, its power is still unrivaled. Its wealth and technological advantages
remain far out of the reach of China and Russia, to say nothing of Iran. Its recovering economy, now bolstered by massive new
natural gas resources, allows it to maintain a global military presence and credible security commitments. Indeed, Washington
projection of U.S. power, but they also distribute the burden of providing security. The military capabilities aggregated in this U.S.-
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universal principles that allow it to access various regions of the world. The country has long promoted the open-door policy and the
principle of self-determination and opposed colonialism -- less out of a sense of idealism than due to the practical realities of keeping
Europe, Asia, and the Middle East open for trade and diplomacy. In the late 1930s, the main question facing the United States was
prosperity and security depended on access to every region. And in the ensuing decades, with some important and damaging
exceptions, such as Vietnam, the United States has embraced postimperial principles.
it
hardly follows that China and Russia have replaced the United States as the
standard-bearers of the global economy. Even Mead does not argue that China, Iran, or Russia offers the
world a new model of modernity. If these illiberal powers really do threaten Washington and the rest of the liberal capitalist world,
then they will need to find and ride the next great wave of modernization. They are unlikely to do that.
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-Laundry List
US military hegemony is the best thing since sliced bread
(although it arguably came before that)
Michle Flournoy and Janine Davidson 2012 Obamas New Global Posture
Co-Founder of the Center for a New American Security and former U.S.
Undersecretary of Defense for Policy. JANINE DAVIDSON is a Professor at George
Mason University and former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Plans,
http://www.saintjoehigh.com/ourpages/auto/2012/10/5/54579209/120708%20Obama_s%20New%20Global%20Posture.pdf
Tough economic times have often been met in the United States by calls for a more modest foreign policy. But
despite the global economic downturn, in today's interdependent world, retrenchment would
be misguided. The United States' ability to lead the international community is still
invaluable and unmatched. Its economy is still by far the largest, most developed, and most dynamic in
the world. Its military remains much more capable than any other. The United States' network of alliances and
engagement with the rest of the world to create the conditions that are essential to economic recovery and growth,
namely, stability and uninterrupted trade. For decades, those have been underwritten by the forward engagement
home would be detrimental to U.S. national security and economic recovery. Nevertheless, fundamental changes in
the international strategic environment have brought the United States to a strategic inflection point, requiring a
recalibration of the United States' global military posture. The rise of China and India is shifting the power dynamics
in Asia and the world at large. Transnational threats, such as terrorism and proliferation, pose new collective
of new initiatives, such as a shift away from the Cold War orientation of U.S. forces in Europe and a reinvigoration of
the United States' partnerships in Asia. These moves reflect the fact that with the war in Iraq over and the transition
in Afghanistan under way, the United States must focus American leadership on addressing emerging threats and
preventing conflict and on securing a better future through partnership and engagement.
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-Soft Power
Soft power is crucial to ensuring effectiveness and
sustainabilityempirics
BURNETT 15 - the editor of The World Tonight, a BBC News program [Alistair, China, Russia and the US
Juggle Soft and Hard Power, YaleGlobal Online, 1/8/2015, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/china-russia-and-usjuggle-soft-and-hard-power, DKP]
This year has seen marked resurgence in the use of hard power by states in pursuit
of national interests. The US return to military action in Iraq and direct intervention in Syria,
Russias annexation of Crimea and destabilization of eastern Ukraine and Chinas
assertion of its territorial claims in the East and South China seas are just three examples of major
powers turning to force and coercion to achieve strategic aims. Yet, not so long ago, talk in
diplomatic, academic and journalistic circles focused on the growing importance of soft power in
international relations. In recent years, governments consider how to boost soft power , investing heavily
in tools like international broadcasting and cultural institutes to win friends abroad. China has spent billions expanding
LONDON:
China Central TVs broadcasts in English and other languages and opening 450 Confucius Institutes around the world teaching
Chinese language and culture. It has even invested in trying to create global pop star Jia Ruhan. Russia has expanded its
international TV news station, RT. The US continues to fund international broadcasting started during the Cold War. These are all
efforts to influence the views of people in other countries, winning them over to a way of thinking so they will pressure their
governments even in authoritarian states to fall into line with new policies.
leader in soft and hard power, and theres no doubt American culture is attractive to many around the world
consider the numbers wanting to migrate there and who wear baseball caps, eat American-style fast food, listen to American music
possible to like American culture and dislike Washingtons policies. The US is considered a leader in soft and hard power its culture
is attractive to many around the world. But while the US has accumulated a lot of this soft power without having to spend a cent,
relying instead on the sheer attractiveness of American society, the government still takes steps to manipulate attitudes. One little
publicized effort is how the Pentagon influences its on-screen image through its film liaison office which can save Hollywood
by identifying a third way states could convince others to do what they wanted with smart power basically wielding a mix of
United States, Russia and China have conducted themselves through this lens
shows all three are trying with varying levels of success to use smart power. Before using military force in Iraq
hard and soft power. Looking at how the
and Syria against Islamic State, the Obama administration utilized soft power to maximize impact of the use of its hard power.
Washington was keen that its intervention was not seen as unilateral action by
aggressive Christian states against Muslims, so it portrayed IS as an enemy of fellow
Muslims. Washington also emphasizes it intervenes in Iraq at the invitation of Baghdad and has been successful in building a
coalition including leading Sunni Arab states to carry out airstrikes in Syria. So far the campaign has slowed IS down. Events of the
Russias
campaign to take Crimea and destabilize the eastern part of the country has been called hybrid warfare
because of its mix of diplomacy, TV and social media propaganda about the threat to Russian speakers from
past year may suggest that countries are turning to hard power as the global balance of power shifts. In Ukraine,
Ukrainian nationalists, and use of irregular and disguised forces designed for ambiguity long enough to achieve Russian objectives.
In the case of Crimea, annexed with little fighting, acute observers of Russian policy see this as an effective use of smart power.
Stalemate in eastern Ukraine suggests it may be less effective there. Beijings attempt to use smart power has met with mixed
China claims waters also claimed by the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan. It
has spent recent years reassuring neighbors its not a threat despite its growing
economic and military strength. But, earlier this year, China sent an oil exploration vessel into an area Vietnam
results. In the South China Sea,
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also claims leading to clashes between Chinese and Vietnamese ships. Tensions with the Philippines emerged after Chinese ships
tried to block Filipino efforts to resupply a garrison of marines on a disputed atoll. The result was anti-Chinese riots in Vietnam,
diplomatic protests by the Philippines, and both countries establishing closer military ties with the United States.
Attractiveness is a result of complex interplay of what a country can offer and how
the offer is perceived. The long-term effectiveness of the return to hard power is
probably more dependent on the military and economic strength of the United States, Russia
and China than their international image. Russia will probably hang on to Crimea because
Ukraine is the weaker state and shows no real appetite to get it back. Chinas economic preponderance
in the South China Sea region means its neighbors, while not rolling over, will probably meet it more
than halfway in the resolving the maritime disputes. The US battle with whats now called IS really goes back to the 2003
Iraq invasion which allowed jihadis to get a foothold in the country by presenting themselves as the resistance to infidel invaders.
The extremists extended their power to western Iraq and Syria after 2011 when the Syrian civil war broke out and US troops left
Iraq. Ultimately, defeating IS depends on a political solution in Syria and an Iraqi government truly inclusive of Sunnis as well as
In all these cases though, soft power is being deployed in subtle ways to
attract support by trying to shape the narrative by portraying rivals and enemies
as acting outside shared global norms and values. The United States claims to defend Muslims from the
Shias and Kurds.
Islamic extremism; Russia says it defends Russian-speakers from Ukrainian nationalists; and China describes itself as a rising, but
success of these attempts depends not just on the language and imagery used by
officials, but also on whether the media and other opinion- formers adopt similar language and imagery. Wielding soft
peace-loving nation. The
and smart power is also complicated because one countrys attractiveness to another is a result of a complex interplay of what a
country has to offer and how the offer is perceived. For instance, the United States has appeal in a country like Burma, because
many people there want democratic elections and free speech after decades of repression, while many Pakistanis dislike the United
States, regarding it as a country that doesnt respect their sovereignty while also killing many of citizens in its anti-terror operations.
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rapidly changed. And so a slightly different version of Johnsons radical proposal is offered that can help with the issue of the
instability of a multipolar world, while also helping the United States move in a more healthy direction.
100
most importantly a monopoly of legitimate violence. Yet ignoring the issue of military power and security will not help us through
the coming period of great power rivalry. The United Nations is not a state by Webers definition. Rather, a near monopoly of global
The President of the United States is the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. armed forces. But s/he is not elected by the peoples of the
world. So U.S. military power is not legitimate, especially when it is exercised unilaterally, as it was during the Bush administration.
The Obama administrations approach has been better in some cases, as demonstrated in the successful multilateral support for
the new approach has not been consistent. The eradication of Osama bin Laden was another instance of unilateral use of military
A legitimate global government would provide due process even to those who
are widely considered to be terrorists. In order to have sufficient capability to resolve
conflicts among the great powers, the U.N. would also need the legal ability to
collect taxes, such as the proposed Tobin Tax on international financial transactions.
With such capability, and with additional legitimacy produced by meaningful
democratization, the U.N. would be in a much better position to effectively mediate
the conflicts that are likely to emerge in the coming multipolar structure of
interstate power.
force.
This goal in
mind, global citizens do not think about the cultural traits that might separate them
- rather, they try to come up with solutions for a common problem. Global citizens
Let me return to my question from the beginning, whether we are beyond
cosmopolitanism. If cosmopolitanism is merely an elitist Westernised perspective, then it cannot solve
world are thinking about how they can help to create initiatives that deal with global problems.
problems for "the rest" and we should therefore overcome it. If it is not able to see through the lens of the "others",
how can it understand their problems? On the other side, a farmer from Africa or a fishermen from India could
hardly be called a cosmopolitan, even though he might have internet access occasionally. And even if he was able
to be part of a global virtual community which fights for the rights of farmers or fishermen, he would not be able to
travel and experience other cultures, as the cosmopolitan does. Additionally, we have to consider the inequality of
internet access. Then, how can the farmer or fishermen contribute to a world community? I understand a global
citizen as a person who sees the global scale of a local problem and who does something to counteract it. In order
to form a global community we can perform small steps. There is no need to find universal characteristics that exist
in all cultures worldwide. A global community can form around a basic value that all cultures share, such as freedom
All citizens (maybe not all governments though) agree on the fact, that they need
to be free to express their thoughts . Around this single idea, global communities are evolving. They
are not elitist or Westernised. They are carried by global citizens, who might not be
able to jet from metropolis to metropolis, but who do have - at least occasionally internet access. And they use it to express their thoughts. Thoughts about the issues they face in their local
of expression.
communities. So people from other communities in other places might be able to relate to those problems and find
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past century, to develop regional organisations in Europe, Latin America, North America, Africa and elsewhere; not
Taken
together, these shadow the structure and functions of the domestic state. Global
policymakers might reject the world state ideal in their public statements, but
pragmatic efforts at world state building are well underway. That said, my
suspicion is that it will take a good bit longer than 200 years to reach something
that would be broadly recognised as a global government . After all, it took more than 300
years, from the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, for the world to be (almost) fully populated by
sovereign states, as opposed to kingdoms and colonies . The EU remains the only deeply
to mention international courts and ministry-like international welfare, security and economic organisations.
integrated regional entity, though economic integration projects are underway in virtually every region, and global
governance institutions, while proliferating, remain only shallowly empowered.
to form a world government? A millennium? My usual answer is 800 years, though I must admit I
havent fully worked out the progression. Part of me suspects that never might be the right answer,
but even if full world government is never realised, a rights-based approach to
integration gives us reason to be optimistic. If the ultimate purpose of governing
institutions is to promote rights protections, and higher-level institutions can be
made to serve this purpose through social and political struggle, then the more
world government that emerges, the better.
Hughes, an ardent supporter of global government, feels that it's an idea whose time has come.
"We need world government for the same reason that we need government in
general," he told us. "There are a number of things what we can agree are
collective goods that individuals, markets, voluntary organizations, and local
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governments aren't able to produce and which can only be provided through the
collective action of states." Hughes, whose thinking was significantly influenced by the Star Trekian
vision of a global-scale liberal democracy, argues that there a number of things that only a
world government is capable of doing like ending nuclear proliferation, ensuring
global security, intervening to end genocide, and defending human rights. He also
believes that it will take a global regime to finally deal with climate change, and that
it's the best chance we have to launch civilization-scale projects, including the
peaceful and controlled colonization of the solar system. The trick, he says, is to get
there. But by all accounts, it appears that we're on our way.
this conference, thus giving his considerable endorsement to this new plan. Virtually every nation on the entire
planet willingly signed up for the 17 goals that are included in this plan, but this stunning turn of events made very
few international headlines.
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Constructivism
Constructivism is the best framework to approach China
Lapeyre 13 - Segolene is a U3 student completing an Honours BA in Middle Eastern Studies with a Minor
concentration in Political Science at McGill University. [Segelone China and Japan in Anarchy: A Neorealist and
Constructivist Explanation of the Kurihara Island Conflict McGill International Review November 30 2013, CSS]
the
anarchy between China and Japan is not innately conflict driven, but rather
constructed by the shared interactions of the two actors . This contextualizes the Kurihara
claims that self-help and power politics do not follow either logically or causally from anarchy:[10]
Island conflict as an issue constructed by China and Japan as a competitive one extant from the Cold War era: the
bipolarity of the system produced a competitive atmosphere from which optimism that cooperation is possible
faded with the development of the Cold War. The anarchic competition of this time was characterized and
exacerbated by the ideological conflict between communist and democratic theory. In other words, China and Japan
believe in this type of competitive anarchy not because the system is inherently competitive but because of the
understand constructivist anarchy more thoroughly requires an explication of collective ideals and identity;
socialization and interaction; and sovereignty as an institution. Constructivists propose the idea of collective ideals
constructed through socialization as the basis of identity and preference in the international system. Unlike neo-
time. The predation in the Cold Wars anarchy of two generated a self-help system: the effect of predationwill
force others with whom it comes into contact to defend themselves. This explains how China and Japan
constructed their systems competitive anarchy: both actors mirrored the competitive behavior of the United States
and Soviet Union in the Cold-War era, which has prevailed in current times despite the recent fall of the Soviet
Union.[12]
Constructivism and state identity has also served as a prominent paradigm for
understanding the rise of China within the international system. Theoretically,
Constructivism can be understood as the identity of a state shaping international
behaviours, as apposed to any fixed material interest (Qingxin and Blyth 2013). Chinas international identity,
since 1949, has shifted across three major planes Qin (as cited in Qingxin and Blyth 2013). Revisionism was the
dominant force prior to the 1970s, spurring China to reject the existing world order and attempt to alter it in their favour. Throughout
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the
1980s that China has embraced its own identity as a status quo state, supporting
and integrating into the world order as it stands (Qingxin and Blyth 2013). Qin Yaqing dissects Chinas
the 1970s China moved to focus more on internal matters, separating themselves form the outside world. Finally, it was from
remodeling, explaining that China then altered its attitudes towards the prevailing world order, identifying the existing order as
China
continued to increase its interaction with other states, absorbing itself into the
international community including its rules and norms. Meng Honghua goes on to argue that
China has experienced a slow acknowledgement of the significance of possessing a
favourable image within international institutions with respect to achieving their
own self-constructed national interests Meng (as cited in Qingxin and Blyth 2013). Consequently, China
has become a major stakeholder in the international community Qin (as cited in Qingxin and Blyth 2013) and Chinas
incorporation into the world economy has left it as a direct beneficiary of the
existing international order (Qingxin and Blyth 2013) and has contributed significantly to Chinas rapid economic
growth in recent years (Qingxin and Blyth 2013). The theory of Constructivism provided China with
the lens necessary to enable and encourage China to pursue a state identity
favourable within the international community, allowing Chinese economic
development to advance and the state to progress to the prominent position it
presently commands.
facilitating the necessary conditions to advance Chinese economic development Qin (as cited in Qingxin and Blyth 2013).
scholars try to analyze the changes and continuity of the Chinese identity from a third party role. In general,
comprehensive power in the international arena.16 The normative approach to study the rise of China can be found
highlight of Chinas more positive perception of international participation was during the mid-1990s. This also
coincided with softer policies toward Taiwan, as reflected in Jiang Zemins eight points of national unification
released in January 1995.17 The combination of classical and constructivist approaches of power politics on the rise
105
106
Answers
107
-Not Locked In
Liberalism not locked in and wont beonly a transition away
from hegemony now can prevent catastrophic collapse
Layne 14- PhD is Robert M. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security at the George Bush School of
Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University [Christopher, Zombie hegemony: Will Americas postWorld War II liberal international order remain intact?, Chinese Social Sciences Today, 5/21/14,
http://www.csstoday.com/Item/748.aspx, MHS]
In todays world, the prevailing international orderinstitutions, rules, and normscontinues to be the Pax Americana that emerged
the distribution of power in the international system today but what it will be in 2025, 2030, or 2035. Here however, Zakaria,
Ikenberry, and Brooks & Wohlforth all believe that the Pax Americanas key featuresits institutions, rules, and normscan survive
intact even as the material foundations of American hegemony wither. How can the U.S. pull off this neat trick? By leveraging the
primacy, it enjoys today to hedge against tomorrows decline by locking-in the Pax Americana. The underlying assumption of this
lock-in strategy is that by involving new powers in the current structure and making them responsible stakeholders, the U.S. can
bind those new powers to the current architecture, thus securing its own influence. What Zakaria, Ikenberry, and Brooks &
Wohlforth are claiming is that the United States can be a zombie hegemony: even if the material foundations of U.S. hegemony
has a preponderance of power in international politics that it should use to revise the international order and to reshape legitimacy
standards, and economic globalization. As they see it, the United States should take advantage of what they call the twenty years
opportunity it now has. Zakaria suggests that the U.S. can remain at the apex of international politics for a long time to come by
two objectives. One is to maintain as much residual U.S. influence over international outcomes as possible. The other is to make it
attractive for other statesespecially rising powers like Chinato embed themselves willingly in the liberal international order. This
can be done by altering the international orders institutions, rules, and norms enough to co-opt the rising powers and integrate
While foreign policy analysts like Brooks, Ikenberry, Wolfforth, and Zakaria talk the talk
about reform of the international order, it is far from evident that theyor more
importantly, U.S. policymakersare ready to walk the walk with respect to reform because that
would mean accepting a smaller American role. There is little reason to believe that the U nited States
actually would champion the kind of reforms that would be needed to embed rising
powers like China into the current international order. The U.S. has long been
accustomed to being top dog in the international order. While there certainly have been occasional major frictions
them into the system.
with Western Europe and Japan since World War II, they have never seriously challenged Americas leadership role in the
108
international system. Moreover, Western Europe and Japanor so it is assertedshare common values with the U.S. They also are
on a level plane with the United States in economic, political and social development. These states have every reason to buttress
109
Heg Unsustainable
110
-General
Hegemony fails and destabilizes regional powers no impact
to the transition turns case disregard their fearmongering
Posen 14 Ford International Professor of Political Science at MIT and the director of MIT's Security Studies
Program (Barry, Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy, Cornell University Press, p. 60-62, June 24,
2014)
Partisans of Liberal Hegemony might accept some of the factual statements above but would argue
that the good the strategy has achieved far outweighs the bad. As noted in the introduction,
partisans assume that liberal democracy, human rights, market economies, free trade, nuclear
nonproliferation, middle and great powers that do not take responsibility for their own security, and U.S.
political and military hegemony are all mutually causative, and all lead ineluctably
to a vast improvement in the security and welfare of others, and hence to the U.S.
security position. 124 They also posit that the world is fragile; damage to one of these good
things will lead to damage to other good things, so the United States must defend all. The fragile and
interconnected argument is politically effective. By accident or design, the argument derives an
inherent plausibility due to the inevitable limits of our substantive knowledge, fear,
uncertainty, liberal ideology, and U.S. national pride. Most targets of the argument
do not know enough about the world to argue with experts who claim these
connections; the chain of posited connections always leads to danger for the United States, and fear is a
powerful selling tool. Once fear is involved, even low-probability chains of causation can be made to
seem frightening enough to do something about, especially if you believe your country has overwhelming power. It
is pleasant to believe that the spread of U.S. values such as liberty and democracy
depend on U.S. power and leadership. The argument does not stand close
scrutiny. First, it obscures the inherently strong security position of the United
States, which I have already reviewed. The economic, geographic, demographic, and
technological facts supporting this point are seldom discussed , precisely because they
are facts. It takes very large events abroad to significantly threaten the
United States, and more moderate strategies can address these possibilities at
lower costs. Typical Liberal Hegemony arguments for any new project take the form of
domino theory. One small untended problem is expected easily and quickly to produce
another and another until the small problems become big ones, or the collection of
problems becomes overwhelming. Whether these connections are valid in any particular
case will always be open to debate. Even if the connections are plausible , however, it is
unlikely given the inherent U.S. security position that the United States need
prop up the first domino. It has the luxury of waiting for information and
choosing the dominos it wishes to shore up, if any. Second, proponents of Liberal
Hegemony often elide the difference between those benefits of the strategy that flow to
others, and those that flow to the United States. Individually, it is surely true that cheapriders and reckless-drivers like the current situation because of the welfare,
security, or power gains that accrue to them. United States commitments may make the
international politics of some regions less exciting than would otherwise be the case. The United States,
however, pays a significant price and assumes significant risks to provide these
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benefits to others, while the gains to the United States are exaggerated because
the United States is inherently quite secure. Third, Liberal Hegemonists argue that U.S.
commitments reduce the intensity of regional security competitions, limit the
spread of nuclear weaponry, and lower the general odds of conflict, and that this helps
keep the United States out of wars that would emerge in these unstable regions. This
chain of interconnected benefits is not self-evident. United States activism does
change the nature of regional competitions; it does not necessarily suppress
them. For example, where U.S. commitments encourage free-riding, this
attracts coercion, which the United States must then do more to deter. Where the
United States encourages reckless driving, it produces regional instability. United
States activism probably helps cause some nuclear proliferation, because some states will
want nuclear weapons to deter an activist United States. When the United States makes
extended deterrence commitments to discourage prolif eration, the U.S. military is
encouraged to adopt conventional and nuclear military strategies that are themselves
destabilizing. Finally, as is clear from the evidence of the last twenty years, the
United States ends up in regional wars in any case. Fourth, one key set of
interconnections posited by Liberal Hegemonists is that between U.S. security
provision, free trade, and U.S. prosperity. This is a prescriptive extension of
hegemonic stability theory, developed by economist Charles Kindleberger from a
close study of the collapse of global liquidity in 1931 and the ensuing great depression. 125 Professor
Kindleberger concluded from this one case that a global system of free trade and finance would more easily survive
crises if there was a leader, a hegemon with sufficient economic power such that its policies could save a
system in crisis, which would also have the interest and the will to do so, precisely because it was so strong. 126
Subsequent theorists, such as Robert Gilpin, extended this to the idea that a global economic and security hegemon
would be even better. 127 Robert Keohane, and later John Ikenberry, added to this theory the notion that a liberal
hegemon would be still better, because it would graft transparent and legitimate rules onto the hegemonic system,
which would make it more acceptable to the subjects and hence less costly to run. 128 A comprehensive rebuttal
TRAVEL is broadening, but not always in a positive way. For Americans it has an
increasingly painful edge. Too often it leaves us with a disconcerting sense that our
FOREIGN
112
country is falling behind. In a world where competition comes increasingly from other countries, this bodes ill for our
national future. Last month I visited four countries that might seem to have little in common: Turkey, Iran, Germany,
and the Netherlands. All four are intently focused on global competition. Countries
like these will be eating Americas lunch in the future if we proceed as we are today.
Germany and the Netherlands have highly successful, innovation-based economies
that live from exports. Turkey is laser-focused on its goal of becoming one of the worlds 10 richest countries within a
decade. Iran has suffered under decades of economic sanctions but is a young and vibrant society, poised to join the world market
the United States commands such a huge land mass with such lavish resources, and because our political primacy was all but
After the end of the Cold War, the US entered into a period of relative
geopolitical decline. This was inevitable. Never again will we be as dominant in as
many ways as we were during our most powerful days. Globalization has liberated the energies
of people around the world. The global economy is more competitive than it has
been at any time in living memory. This is clear to any American who travels. Our history of power
and prosperity has made us complacent while other countries plan more carefully
for the future. Turkey, Iran, Germany, and the Netherlands are among countries that
smell our blood in the water. One of the most striking differences between those
countries and the US is in physical infrastructure . Highways, bridges, electric grids, and transit systems
unchallenged. It matters now.
are modern and carefully maintained. Public art enlivens neighborhoods. It is difficult to find clusters of poverty and deprivation like
The other huge difference, less visible but even more important
over the long run, is primary and secondary education . One of Americas chronic problems, steadily
those in many American cities.
becoming more acute, is the emergence of a large class of poorly educated, low-skilled citizens unequipped to compete in the
modern economy. Our society does not provide equal access to good education . Students in other
countries now regularly outperform Americans on standardized tests. This is a waste of our human resources and a bad omen for
our future. In infrastructure and precollege education, just as in energy policy, environmental protection, and other areas, the United
States no longer leads the world. One reason is that many Americans seem unable to grasp the connection between taxes and
services. We want a country that is number one, but rebel at the idea of paying for it. Financing a country is no different from
financing any other enterprise: You get what you pay for. All four of the countries I happened to visit follow the high-tax/high-service
model of government. Americans are deeply divided over whether this model is right for us. Perhaps the individualist strain in our
collective DNA makes some other approach more appropriate. No society, however, survives long when great private wealth thrives
alongside public squalor. While Americans argue about how to deal with our national challenges, other countries are surging forward.
To see this happening, travel abroad and look around.
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Toward the end of the presidency of George H.W. Bush, America stood alone at the
top of the world the sole superpower. After five weeks of shock and awe and 100 hours of
combat, Saddams army had fled Kuwait back up the road to Basra and Bagdad. Our Cold War adversary was
breaking apart into 15 countries. The Berlin Wall had fallen. Germany was reunited. The captive nations of Central
and Eastern Europe were breaking free. Bush I had mended fences with Beijing after the 1989 massacre in
Islamic Front run wild in Libya, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Nigeria and Somalia. Egypt is ruled by a dictatorship that came to
American decline? Hubris, ideology, bellicosity and stupidity all played parts. Toward Russia, which had lost an
empire and seen its territory cut by a third and its population cut in half, we exhibited imperial contempt, shoving
NATO right up into Moscows face and engineering color-coded revolutions in nations that had been part of the
Soviet Union and its near-abroad. Blowback came in the form of an ex-KGB chief who rose to power promising to
restore the national greatness of Mother Russia, protect Russians wherever they were, and stand up to the arrogant
Our folly with China was in deluding ourselves into believing that by
throwing open U.S. markets to goods made in China, we would create a partner in
prosperity. What we got, after $4 billion in trade deficits with Beijing, was a gutted
U.S. manufacturing base and a nationalistic rival eager to pay back the West for
past humiliations. China wants this to be the Chinese Century, not the Second American Century. Is that too
Americans.
difficult to understand? But it was in the Middle East that the most costly blunders were committed. Believing liberal
democracy to be the wave of the future, that all peoples, given the chance, would embrace it, we invaded Iraq,
occupied Afghanistan and overthrew the dictator of Libya. So doing, we unleashed the demons of Islamic
Yet though
Americas relative economic and military power today is not what it was in 1992,
our commitments are greater. We are now obligated to defend Eastern Europe and
fanaticism, tribalism, and a Sunni-Shiite sectarian war now raging from North Africa to the Near East.
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the Baltic republics against a resurgent Russia, South Korea against the North, Japan
and the Philippines against a surging China. We bomb jihadists daily in Iraq and
Syria, support a Saudi air war in Yemen, and sustain Kabul with 10,000 U.S. troops in
its war with the Taliban. Our special forces are all over the Middle East and Africa.
And if the neocons get back into power in 2017, U.S. arms will start flowing to Kiev,
that war will explode, and the Tomahawks and B-2s will be on the way to Iran. Since
1992, the U.S. has been swamped with Third World immigrants, here legally and illegally, many of whom have
moved onto welfare rolls. Our national debt has grown larger than our GDP. And we have run $11 trillion in trade
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-Military
Military readiness low nowbudget cuts, appeasement, war
fatiguesoft power cant replace hard power
CARAFANO 15-director of the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies and the deputy
director of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies at The Heritage Foundation, PhD
in Diplomatic History @ Georgetown University, MA in Strategic Studies @ the US Army War College, MA in British
and Early Modern European History @ Georgetown University, BS in National Security and Public Affairs @
Westpoint, Adjunct Professor @ the Institute for World Politics [James Jay, Obamas Cuts leave every military
branch weaker than on 9/11 The heritage foundation 6/5/15
http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2015/6/obama-cuts-leave-military-weaker, DKP ]
A "tiger mom" might go ballistic if her child came home with a "needs improvement" on his kindergarten report card. But most
adults wouldn't panic. They know there is time to get the kid up to standard before the deadline for that Harvard application falls
competitors. But some argue that this is no big deal. After all, they say, nobody really wants to fight World War III with the United
116
demonstrated that hard and soft power are not interchangeable. Adding a
diplomatic initiative is no substitute for dumping a division. The Russian reset , for
insistence, didn't deter Russian adventurism in Europe. Deliberate self-weakening in the
face of an aggressive adversary invites aggression. Military and diplomacy work better when they
wisely complement each other. Washington doesn't need more war-mongering. But it does need a responsibly sized and capable
military - one that realistically matches the needs of a global power with global interests. Pairing the right armed forces with the
right foreign policy is the best answer.
AMERICA'S ability to project power on behalf of its own interests and in defence of
its allies has been the bedrock of the rules-based international order since the end of the
second world war. Critical to that effort has been the role of technology in maintaining a
military edge over potential adversaries through the first and second offset
strategies. In the 1950s it offset the Soviet Unions numerical advantage in conventional forces by accelerating its lead in
nuclear weapons. From the late-1970s, after the Soviets closed the gap in nuclear capability, America began making investments in
emerging technologies that led to the ability to look deep and shoot deep with precision guided munitions. For the next quarter of
competitors, the Pentagon has been focused more on the very different demands of counter-insurgency operations in Iraq and
While America has been distracted, China has been busy developing
asymmetric capabilities specifically designed to counter Americas power in the West
Pacific. For over two decades its been investing double-digit defence budgets in an arsenal of highly-accurate, submarines,
Afghanistan.
sophisticated integrated air defence systems (IADS) and advanced cyber capabilities. All with the aim of making it too dangerous for
American carriers to operate close enough to fly their tactical aircraft or cruise missiles. The Chinese call it winning a local war in
committed to buy 2,500 semi-stealthy F-35 fighter jets even though their limited combat radius reduces their usefulness in many
war-fighting scenarios. Meanwhile the navy persists with 11 fabulously expensive but increasingly vulnerable carriers when
underwater vehicles both manned and unmanned may be better equipped to tackle enemies with advanced area denial capabilities.
Getting career airmen and sailors to give up their toys isnt the only cultural challenge. These days the scientific and technological
developments that will help sharpen Americas military edge, such as artificial intelligence for unmanned systems, are as likely to
come from the consumer tech companies in Silicon Valley as the traditional defense industry. Just how these two very different
cultures will mesh creatively remains to be seen. America is determined to regain its military edge through a third offset strategy.
But even if the political will and technical brilliance can be summoned up again, dominance will require continuous effort and
innovation because technology proliferates so much faster these days. In part that is thanks to a previous project the Pentagons
Defence Advanced Projects Agency helped into being, the internet.
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-China Rise
Chinese hegemony inevitableits all over for the US
BURMAN 15-former head of CBC News and Al Jazeera English, teaches journalism at Ryerson University [Tony,
Clash of titans heats up in the South China Sea; China and U.S. vie for regional hegemony, The Toronto Star,
6/6/2015, LexisNexis, DKP]
When the history of this century is finally written, its leading headline will
likely be the emergence of China as the world's dominant superpower.
China has already overtaken the United States as the world's largest economy. What is
unknown, of course, is how it will happen, and how the United States will respond, as this epic
transformation gradually takes shape. This makes the rising tensions in Asia's South China Sea so
revealing. It may be a first glimpse into how this colossal 21st-century rivalry will
unfold. Over the past 18 months, China has been dredging sand from the bottom of the
South China Sea and building artificial islands in waters claimed by several Asian nations. Others have
built similar islands to reinforce territorial claims , but none to the extent of China. In its defence, China has
stubbornly asserted that this is within its rights to "safeguard our own sovereignty." But the United States, prodded by its rattled
reclamation projects in the South China Sea. Although the potential for danger remains, what is reassuring about this dispute so far
is that both governments appear to want to cool the rhetoric. Their actions have been measured and restrained. They seem to
these two
rivals need to find a way to manage their competing interests in the years and
decades ahead. But that will not be easy. The possibility that an incident could
escalate into a dangerous conflict is real. The U.S. military has yet to test
China's territorial claims around the artificial islands, but that is certain to happen. Last month, a
U.S. television crew aboard an American surveillance plane captured a tense radio
exchange between the U.S. aircraft and Chinese forces. According to the CNN video, a voice can be heard telling the
realize that the last thing the world needs now is a deepening rift between China and the United States. Instead,
Americans: "This is the Chinese navy . . . This is the Chinese navy . . . Please go away . . . to avoid misunderstanding." But
however restrained the Chinese and American governments are with each
other, they both have to deal with powerful hardliners at home. And in the
United States, these voices have been loud. Conservative and Republican commentators unrelenting proponents of the "be afraid, be very afraid" approach to foreign policy have seized on this dispute as further "retreat" by the Obama administration. China's
growing influence is also cited as a reason for increasing America's military forces ,
even though the U.S. is far ahead of everyone in military spending. What seems to infuriate these critics is
the notion that China wants primacy in its own backyard, just as the U nited States has
exercised its primacy in much of the rest of the world. The conservative Wall Street Journal, which sees
rising "dangers in a world where authoritarians grow in power," added this in a May 25 editorial: "Perhaps the greatest
long-term regional threat (to the United States) is a rising China with its rapid economic
growth and desire to restore the Middle Kingdom to what its leaders see as their rightful
dominance in East Asia." Some analysts argue there are parallels between the imperial
ambitions of China today and those of Kaiser's Germany a century ago on the eve of the
First World War. But I share the view of U.S. foreign affairs analyst Robert D. Kaplan, who compares present-day China with the
United States in the early 20th century when it effectively ejected Europe from the Caribbean and went on to dominate the
hemisphere. In his book Asia's Cauldron: The South China Sea and the End of a Stable Pacific, Kaplan writes that
the
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Chinese are seeking to reduce American influence in Asia with the strategic aim to "exercise
de facto hegemony over their own Asian Mediterranean." If one looks at America's actions in
the past century, should we expect anything different from China?
ONE HUNDRED years ago this month, Britain declared war on Germany. And though the issues of that era may seem irrelevant now,
the pre-war tensions between those two nations can actually help us understand where todays Sino-American relationship is
headed. After all, though history never repeats itself exactly, as Mark Twain famously observed, it does rhyme. Or to put it another
way, clear patterns recur when two rival nations are locked in a cycle of rise and decline. Throughout history, those power
rising power forces the fading hegemon to come to terms with its decline. This was Britains choice during the years leading up to
1914. Although it is tempting for historians to conclude that war between Britain and Germany was inevitable, there was serious
debate among the British foreign policy establishment in the decade or so before the war about whether to contain or conciliate
Germany. In a January 1907 memorandum, Sir Eyre Crow, a senior Foreign Office official, made the case for containment. Crowe
argued that the Anglo-German rivalry resulted from a fundamental opposition of interests. Accommodating Germany, he
maintained, would only whet the expansionist appetite of a nation whose ultimate goal was to supplant the British Empire. As he
saw it, war with Germany could be avoided only by submitting to Berlins demands and thus forfeiting Britains leading power
status or amassing enough power to deter Berlin. Lord Thomas Sanderson, who had recently retired as permanent undersecretary
of state, rebutted Crowe. As a latecomer to the world stage, a unified Germany was understandably impatient to realize various
long-suppressed aspirations, he said. From Berlins perspective, the British Empire must appear in the light of some huge giant
sprawling over the globe, with gouty fingers and toes stretching in every direction, which cannot be approached without eliciting a
scream. Sanderson understood that refusing to accommodate Berlins aspirations risked conflict, but Crowes view prevailed and
conflict will depend much more on the United States than on China. But today the spirit of Sir Eyre Crowe pervades the American
for guidance, the default option is to invoke the lessons of the pre-World War II era, and not those of the run-up to World War I.
Thats a mistake. If the United States wants to avoid a future collision with China, it must eschew Crowes counsel and embrace
Sandersons. Thats the real lesson of World War I.
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Chinese and Russian media have started suggesting the possibility of a China-U.S.
war. While the national news agency in China calls it inevitable, a Russian
news agency listed a number of indications that it said proved the two nations
were heading toward a military conflict. Clearly, there has been growing diplomatic
tension between China and the United States. And according to reports, both countries have been
spending lots of money on military preparations. China's Xinhua News Agency reported that the present
political situation put a question mark on building peaceful coexistence between
China and the U.S. The situation has many people pondering how the two countries can avoid 'Thucydides's
trap' -- the notion an established power becomes so anxious about the rise of a new power that a struggle leading
to war becomes inevitable, Xinhua reported. US China relations The flags of the United States and China flutter on
a light post in Beijing's Tiananmen Square ahead of a welcoming ceremony for U.S. President Barack Obama, Nov.
12, 2014. PHOTO: REUTERS/PETAR KUJUNDZIC Russia's Pravda reported that China had conducted a number of
military exercises simulating an attack against Taiwan. Since the U.S. is committed to protecting Taiwan, a real
conflict of this nature would almost certainly involve the United States the Russian news agency predicted. The
U.S. government blames
Americans are more interested in their next gadget. Wake up. USA Today headline: CIA veteran Morell: ISIS next
test could be a 9/11-style attack. That warnings from an insider with George W. Bush in 2001 when hijacked
airliners hit the World Trade Center. Twice acting CIA director, says USA Todays Susan Page. With Obama in the
situation room when word came Navy Seal Team Six had killed Osama bin Laden. Morells new book, The Great
War of Our Time: The CIAs Fight Against Terrorism From Al Qaida to ISIS, makes clear America is already fighting
World War III today. Worse, WWIII will go on for decades, for as far as I can see, says the CIA insider. Yes, WWIII is
by Peter Singer
and August Cole. Singers one of Washingtons pre-eminent futurists. Hes now
walking the Pentagon halls with an ominous warning for Americas military leaders: World War III
with China is coming. In fact, even Americas advanced new F-35 fighter jets may
be blown from the sky by their Chinese-made microchips and Chinese hackers
easily could worm their way into the militarys secretive intelligence service ... and
the Chinese Army may one day occupy Hawaii. Speculation? No, the Journals Dion Nissenbaum
hot news with the Pentagon brass. The Wall Street Journal just reviewed The Ghost Fleet
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Chinese hackers have already got into White House computers, defense
industry plans and millions of secret U.S. government files. Singers written authoritative
reminded us
books on Americas reliance on private military contractors, cybersecurity and the Defense Departments growing
dependence on robots, drones and technology, and why that puts national security at high risk. Military Times
correspondent Lawrence Korb, a Naval War College veteran called Ghost Fleet a realistic scenario of what might
happen if a brewing Cold War with China and Russia ever turns hot. New World War: Forget Big Oil? Buy more
Yes, WWIII is closing in, getting hotter. Last year it almost ignited
with Chinas takeover of disputed islands in the South China Sea. Truth is,
Americans love war. Yes, wars cost money. Add huge debt. New taxes. Still, were
macho, we love war. Why else let the military budget burn 48% of your tax dollars?
Why ignore Nixon staffer and historian Kevin Phillipss warning that most great nations, at the peak of
their economic power, become arrogant, wage great world wars at great cost,
wasting vast resources, taking on huge debt, ultimately burning themselves out.
military defense stocks?
Admit it, we love war. Marine Corps posters grabbed me as a kid. Trained me in aviation weapons systems. Five
years ago I couldnt resist Erik Sofges edgy fast-paced thriller, Chinas Secret War Plan, a frontrunner of Morells
CIA War Against Terrorism and Singers Ghost Fleet. In Popular Mechanics: One of my favorites as a kid working
in a small-town magazine store. Yes, popular, part of Americas DNA since the Revolutionary War. Sofges WWIII
fast-paced thriller begins on Aug. 9, 2015, 0400, a moment predicted years ago, yet ironically right about the
upcoming GOP presidential primary debates. Chinas war against Taiwan starts in the early morning 1,200 cruise
and ballistic missiles rise from heavy vehicles on the Chinese mainland ... Taiwans modest missile defense network,
a scattered deployment of I-Hawk and Patriot interceptors slams into dozens of incoming warheads a futile
gesture ... The mass raid overwhelms the defenses as hundreds of Chinese warheads blast the islands military
and economy Yes, this is how WWIII starts, between an aging war-lovng America, versus the worlds rapidly
emerging superpower, China, with a population thats one billion larger than America by 2050. China, an economy
Sofge: When Rand released a report in 2000 describing the potential outcome of a Sino-American conflict over
Taiwan, the United States won the war handily. Nine years later, the nonpartisan think tank revised its analysis,
accounting for Beijings updated air force, its focus on cyber warfare and its ability to use ballistic missiles to take
out American satellites. Rands 2009 conclusion: The
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Containment Good
Chinas rise causes conflict containment is the only realistic
strategy
Whyte 13 MA in international relations @ University of Bristol [Alexander, Interpreting the Rise of China, EInternational Relations Students, February 13 2013, http://www.e-ir.info/2013/02/13/interpreting-the-rise-of-china/,
SCJ]
Mearsheimer (2010) expects China to first of all pursue regional hegemony; China
will want to make sure that it is so powerful that no state in Asia has the
wherewithal to threaten it. Chinas neighbours will eventually join American-led balancing coalition designed to check
Chinas rise, much of the way Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and even China, joined forces with the United States to contain
pushed the European great powers out of the Western Hemisphere in the 19th Century (Mearsheimer, 2010, p.389). While it they
(Christensen, 1999, p.49). Moreover, Christensen posits that the security dilemma theory states that, in an uncertain and anarchic
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A2-Interdependece
Interdependence is an overly simplistic analysis of China
cultural and political issues can overwhelm
Hudda 15 Student at University of Hong Kong getting a degree in E-IR [Nabil Interpreting the Rise of
China: Realist and Liberalist Perspectives E-International Relations Students, April 3, 2015, http://www.eir.info/2015/04/03/interpreting-the-rise-of-china-realist-and-liberalist-perspectives/, CSS]
Liberalism is made up of several interrelated concepts and strands, including the Kantian Triangle,[38]
international institutions, interdependence, and the Democratic Peace Theory,[39] as explored by scholars such
as Michael Boyle and Andrew Moravcsik. In contrast to realist assumptions, Liberalist ones are optimistic in that
they assume human nature is fundamentally good and that conflict can be avoided. Realism and Liberalism both
concur on the existence of an anarchic international system, but for Liberalists, this can be mitigated. For
Liberalists, sovereign states are not the only central actors in world politics. Individuals, interest groups, and
intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations all have an influence on states. While Realism virtually
denies the possibility of cooperation, this notion underpins Liberalism. Since the consequences of using military
power often outweigh the benefits, states have a vested interest in engaging in cooperation. Cooperation can lead
to absolute gains: a winwin situation for all. The next section will focus on interdependence (in particular, economic
interdependence) when assessing Liberalist perspectives on the rise of China because it seems to be one of the
economic
interdependence as the sensitivity of economic activity between multiple nations in
relation to economic developments within those nations .[40] Economic activity tends to
strongest strands (if not the strongest strand) in the Liberalist armament. Richard N. Cooper defines
refer to international transactions such as trade (imports and exports) and foreign direct investment (FDI).[41]
Intense economic activity results in an increased number of ties and greater influence among the nations that
Jordan puts it when referring to the likelihood of European conflict, it is a beacon for economic interdependence:
What shall we say of the Great War of Europe, ever threatening, ever impending, and which never comes? We shall
say that it will never come. Humanly speaking, it is impossible.[42] As the graph shows, Chinas overseas direct
investment or FDI has risen significantly. The darker lineChinese FDI flow into the world, including Asiashows an
increase of nearly $75 billion. Using the economic interdependence notions above, this increase in FDI should lead
to a decrease in the likelihood of conflict and can, in fact, foster greater cooperation amongst states. In addition,
Chinas trade interaction with the rest of the world accounts for nearly 50 per cent of its GDP.[43] This shows an
intertwined economic relationship between the nations economy and the global economy. Conflict would
undermine this economic relationship and result in universal losses and repercussions. Furthermore, China is now
an active member in a range of regional and international organisations, institutions and frameworks. Xi Jinping
correctly points out that China contributes to, and is a proactive member of, the G20, The Asia Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC), The United Nations Security Council, the Shanghai Cooperative Organization and The BRICS
(Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) mechanism.[44] He adds that there is a further need to seek
common ground on issues of common interests in pursuit of winwin progress,[45] which not only denigrates the
Realist interpretation of Chinas rise, but wholly supports the Liberalist interpretation. Through Chinas participation
in such organisations, the encouragement of cooperation ensues, ensuring all participants are awarded a share of
using economic
interdependence as an example to show the absolute interpretation of Chinas rise
is vulnerable. It undermines and oversimplifies the frictions that economic
interdependence causes between nations. High levels of economic interdependence
has the ability, as Samuel Huntington notes in The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order, to
act as war-inducing and not peace-inducing as Liberalists would argue.[46] For example, it
fails to account for the deterioration in SinoJapanese relations which has
undermined economic interdependence. Territorial disputes over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands,
as well as Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abes visit to the controversial and sensitive Yasukuni
Shrine, have had a severe effect on bilateral ties and economic interdependence.[ 47]
To quantify this, trade between China and Japan decreased by 3.9 per cent in 2012 followed by a
winnings, meaning that they are less likely to engage in conflict with one another. However,
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further 5.1 per cent drop in 2013. In addition, Chinas FDI in Japan fell by 23.5 per cent during the same period.[48]
Chinas new provocative air-defence identification zone over the East China Sea
testament to Huntingtons predications?[49]
Is
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A2-Cosmopolitinism
Cosmopolitanism cant end capitalism and patriotism nothing
is solved in a cosmopolitan world
Vidmar-Horvat 13 [Ksenija, Associate Professor at Dept. of Sociology, Faculty
of Arts, University of Ljubljana
http://www.querelles.de/index.php/qjb/article/view/3/5AH]
13 Martha Nussbaums influential essay Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism (1994), which can be linked to Kristevas
arguments, presents a further problem .
cosmopolitanism and nationalism become opposing parties in the definition of patriotism and, with the
cosmopolitans not being seriously concerned with the issues of national identification, the latter especially is
deemed ineligible as legitimate agent in the formulation of public culture. By engaging in global politics of
belonging and citizenshipthe politics which re-examines the maps of civilisational and cultural constellations of
modernity (Delanty 2005, 2010)it (wrongly) appears as a party which arguments are irrelevant to local politics:
cosmopolitans are both above and beyond the national concern. Or, to conclude with Varsamopolou, suffice it to
say that, if nationalism is an obstacle to cosmopolitanism, to regress into a new or nostalgic imperialism cannot be
the answer (Varsamopolou 2009: 27). Because in the popular perception cosmopolitanism is associated mainly
with the elites, it is easily regarded as alienated from the general public. It tends to have an aura of insensitivity to
the real issues and problems of ordinary people. It becomes synonymous with an intellectual fashion and cultural
By pointing to
these general misperceptions, I am not seeking to downplay the structural links
between cosmopolitanism and capitalism. As Amy Pason observes (drawing on the work of Emma
Goldman), it is the rich that benefit from notions of cosmopolitanism and the poor
die after being duped into believing in patriotism (Pason 2008: 16). In Goldmans words, for
surely it is not the rich who contribute to patriotism. They are cosmopolitans,
perfectly at home in every land (Goldman, quoted in Pason 2008: 17). In this sense,
cosmopolitanism can be seen as a faade for the interconnected systems of
oppression (ibid.) which reproduce themselves through wars, imperial violence and
state terror. However, in its capacity to attract the negative stigma of privilege and leisure that is linked to selftrend which is reserved for the few, whose concerns do not resonate with those of the masses.
preoccupied elites, the critical potentials of cosmopolitanism which are relevant to the public and to the everyday
by creating associations
between cosmopolitanism and elites as natural allies, the critique actually
reinforces the hegemonic work of capitalism, which differentiates between the duped, to be
governed as passive subjects at home, and the enlightened, who feel at home in
structures of global governance.
life of the national community, get lost from public sight. In other words,
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