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*** IR THEORY TOOLBOX***

*** IR THEORY TOOLBOX***........................................................................................ 1


Neo-Realism/Offensive Realism.................................................................................. 2
True......................................................................................................................... 3
-Empirics.............................................................................................................. 4
-China................................................................................................................... 7
A2-Defensive Realism........................................................................................ 11
A2-Peace-Conflict Good...................................................................................... 12
A2-Liberalism..................................................................................................... 14
A2-Trade/Interdependence.................................................................................16
A2-US Hegemony............................................................................................... 18
A2-Attack on US................................................................................................. 19
A2-American Bias............................................................................................... 20
Scholarship-Mearsheimer...................................................................................22
Answers.................................................................................................................... 24
Realism Wrong...................................................................................................... 25
-General............................................................................................................. 26
-China................................................................................................................. 30
Immoral (Liberalism).......................................................................................... 33
Not Real World.................................................................................................... 35
Non-Unique........................................................................................................ 38
A2-China Hegemony.......................................................................................... 39
A2-China War..................................................................................................... 41
A2-Mearsheimer................................................................................................. 44
Liberalism/Internationalism...................................................................................... 46
US Order-Locked In................................................................................................ 47
-General............................................................................................................. 48
-Military.............................................................................................................. 53
-Latent Power/Incentives.................................................................................... 55
-China................................................................................................................. 57
A2-Fatigue.......................................................................................................... 63
Liberalism-Locked in.............................................................................................. 64
-Alliances............................................................................................................ 65
-World Improving................................................................................................ 66
2

-China................................................................................................................. 68
A2 Hard PowerNeed Legitimacy......................................................................73
Cooperation Good................................................................................................. 75
-Generic............................................................................................................. 76
-Nuclear Security................................................................................................ 79
Liberalism+Realism............................................................................................ 80
US Hegemony Good.............................................................................................. 81
-Extinction.......................................................................................................... 82
-GPW.................................................................................................................. 84
-Laundry List...................................................................................................... 88
-Soft Power......................................................................................................... 89
Global Governmen/Cosmot Good.......................................................................91
Constructivism................................................................................................... 95
Answers.................................................................................................................... 98
-Not Locked In.................................................................................................... 99
Heg Unsustainable.............................................................................................. 101
-General........................................................................................................... 102
-Military............................................................................................................ 107
-China Rise....................................................................................................... 109
Containment Good........................................................................................... 113
A2-Interdependece........................................................................................... 114
A2-Cosmopolitinism......................................................................................... 115

Neo-Realism/Offensive Realism

True

-Empirics
Realism is the best theoretical rubric for making foreign policy
decisionsempirics
WALT 16-Robert and Rene Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University, PhD and MA in
Political Science @ UC-Berkeley [Stephen, What Would a Realist World Have Looked Like? Foreign Policy, 1/8/2016,
http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/01/08/what-would-a-realist-world-have-looked-like-iraq-syria-iran-obama-bush-clinton/,
DKP]
Heres a puzzle for all you students of U.S. foreign policy: Why is a distinguished and well-known approach to foreign policy confined
to the margins of public discourse, especially in the pages of our leading newspapers, when its recent track record is arguably
superior to the main alternatives? I refer, of course, to realism. Im not suggesting that realism and realists are completely
marginalized these days after all, youre reading a realist right now but the public visibility and policy influence of the realist
perspective is disproportionately small when compared either to liberal internationalism (among Democrats) or neoconservatism (in
the GOP). This situation is surprising insofar as realism is a well-established tradition in the study of foreign affairs, and realists like
George Kennan, Hans Morgenthau, Reinhold Niebuhr, Walter Lippmann, and others said many smart things about U.S. foreign policy
in the past. Realism also remains a foundational perspective in the academic study of international affairs and with good reason. At
a minimum, youd think this sophisticated body of thought would have a prominent place in debates on foreign policy and that card-

realisms
predictions over the past 25 years are clearly better than the claims of liberals and
neoconservatives, which have dominated U.S. foreign policymaking since the Cold War ended. Yet
time and time again, presidents have pursued the liberal/neocon servative agenda and
carrying realists would be a visible force inside the Beltway and in the world of punditry. Furthermore,

ignored the counsels of realism. Similarly, major media outlets have shown little inclination to give realists a prominent platform

The results, alas, speak for themselves. When the Cold War
ended, the United States was on good terms with all of the worlds major powers, al Qaeda was a minor nuisance, a genuine
peace process was underway in the Middle East, and America was enjoying its unipolar moment. Power politics was
supposedly becoming a thing of the past, and humankind was going to get busy getting rich in a globalized
from which to disseminate their views.

world where concerns about prosperity, democracy, and human rights would increasingly dominate the international political

Liberal values were destined to spread to every corner of the globe, and if that process
Fast forward to today. Relations with
Russia and China are increasingly confrontational; democracy is in retreat in Eastern
Europe and Turkey; and the entire Middle East is going from bad to worse. The U nited
States has spent hundreds of billions of dollars fighting in Afghanistan for 14 years, and the
Taliban are holding their own and may even be winning. Two decades of U.S. mediation have left the IsraeliPalestinian peace process in tatters. Even the E uropean Union perhaps the clearest embodiment of
liberal ideals on the planet is facing unprecedented strains for which there is no easy remedy. All of
which raises the following counterfactual: Would the U nited States and the world be
better off today if the last three presidents had followed the dictates of realism , instead of
letting liberals and neocons run the show? The answer is yes. To remind you: Realism sees power as the
centerpiece of political life and sees states as primarily concerned with ensuring
their own security in a world where theres no world government to protect them from others. Realists believe
military power is essential to preserving a states independence and autonomy, but
they recognize it is a crude instrument that often produces unintended
consequences. Realists believe nationalism and other local identities are powerful
and enduring; states are mostly selfish; altruism is rare; trust is hard to come by;
and norms and institutions have a limited impact on what powerful states do. In short, realists
have a generally pessimistic view of international affairs and are wary of efforts to remake the world
agenda.

didnt move fast enough, American power would help push it along.

according to some ideological blueprint, no matter how appealing it might be in the abstract. Had Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and
Barack Obama been following the realist playbook, how would U.S. foreign policy since 1993 been different? First, and most

had Bush listened to Brent Scowcroft, Colin Powell, or some other notable realists, he would not
have invaded Iraq in 2003. Bush would have focused solely on eliminating al Qaeda, instead of getting bogged down in
obviously,

several hundred thousand dead Iraqis


would still be alive. Irans regional influence would be substantially smaller, and the
Islamic State would not exist. Thus, rejecting sound realist advice has cost the U.S.
taxpayer several trillion dollars, along with the obvious human price and the resulting
geopolitical chaos. Second, had American leaders embraced the wisdom of realism, the United States would not
have pushed NATO expansion in the 1990s or would have limited it to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic.
Realists understood that great powers are especially sensitive to configurations of
power on or near their borders, and thus experts such as George Kennan warned that NATO expansion would inevitably
poison relations with Russia. Expanding NATO didnt strengthen the alliance; it just committed
the United States to defend a group of weak and hard-to-defend protectorates that were far
from the United States but right next door to Russia. Ladies and gentlemen: This is a textbook combination of
both hubris and bad geopolitics. A better alternative was the original Partnership for Peace, which sought to
Iraq. Thousands of U.S. soldiers would not have been killed or wounded, and

build constructive security ties with former Warsaw Pact members, including Russia. Unfortunately, this sensible approach was
abandoned in the idealistic rush to expand NATO, a decision reflecting liberal hopes that the security guarantees entailed by

Realists also understood that trying to bring Georgia


or Ukraine into the West was likely to prompt a harsh reaction from Moscow and that
membership would never have to be honored.

Russia had the capacity to derail these efforts if it wished. Ukraine would still be a mess if realists had been in charge of U.S. foreign
policy, but

Crimea would still be part of Ukraine and the fighting that has taken place in eastern

Ukraine since 2014 would probably not have occurred. Had Clinton, Bush, and Obama listened to realists, in
short, relations with Russia would be significantly better and Eastern Europe would probably be more secure. Third, a president

Instead of
pledging to contain Iran and Iraq simultaneously, a realist would have taken
advantage of their mutual rivalry and used each to balance the other. Dual
containment committed the United States to opposing two countries that were bitter rivals, and it forced
Washington to keep large ground and air forces in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. This long-term
military presence became one of Osama bin Ladens major grievances and thus helped
put the United States on the road to the 9/11 attacks. A realist approach to Persian Gulf politics
would have made that attack less likely, though of course not impossible. Fourth, realists also
warned that trying to nation-build in Afghanistan was a fools errand especially after the invasion of
Iraq allowed the Taliban to regroup and correctly predicted that Obamas 2009 surge was not going
to work. Had Obama listened to the realists, the United States would have cut its losses in Afghanistan a long time ago and the
outcome would be no different than what we are going to get anyway. Countless lives and vast sums of
money would have been saved, and the United States would be in a stronger strategic position today. Fifth, for
realists, the nuclear deal with Iran shows what the U nited States can accomplish when it engages
in tough-minded but flexible diplomacy. But Washington might have gotten an even better deal
had Bush or Obama listened to the realists and conducted serious diplomacy back
when Irans nuclear infrastructure was much smaller. Realists repeatedly warned that Iran would
following the realist playbook would not have embraced the strategy of dual containment in the Persian Gulf.

never agree to give up its entire enrichment capacity and that threatening Tehran with military force would only increase its desire

it might have
halted Irans nuclear development at a much lower level. More adroit U.S. diplomacy might even
for a latent weapons capability. Had the United States shown more flexibility earlier as realists advised

have forestalled the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2005 and moved the two countries toward a more constructive

realists of various stripes have been


critical of Americas special relationship with Israel and warned that it was harmful to both countries.
Contrary to the smears directed at them by some of Israels more ardent defenders, this position did not stem from
any intrinsic hostility to Israels existence or to the idea that the United States and Israel should cooperate when their
interests align. Rather, it stemmed from the belief that unconditional U.S. support for
Israel was undermining Americas image in the world, making the terrorism problem
worse, and allowing Tel Aviv to continue its self-destructive effort to create a greater Israel at
relationship. Perhaps not, but the United States could hardly have done worse. Sixth,

the expense of the Palestinians. Realists also argued that achieving a two-state solution between Israel and the Palestinians required

that the United States pressure both sides instead of acting as Israels lawyer. At this point, can anyone seriously question the

Obama listened to his more realistic


advisors (e.g., Robert Gates), he would not have helped topple Muammar al-Qaddafi in Libya,
creating yet another failed state in the process. Qaddafi was a despicable ruler, to be sure, but advocates of
accuracy of this view, given the repeated failures of alternative approaches? Finally, had

humanitarian intervention both exaggerated the risk of genocide and underestimated the disorder and violence that would follow

A realist would also have warned Obama not to say Assad


must go or to draw a red line about the use of chemical weapons. Not because Bashar alAssad should be defended or because chemical weapons are legitimate instruments of war, but because U.S. vital
interests were not involved and it was clear from the beginning that Assad and his associates had little choice but to
the collapse of Qaddafis thugocracy.

try to cling to power by any means necessary. For realists, the overriding task was to end the civil war quickly and with as little loss

the
Syrian civil war might repeat, might have been shut down before so many lives were
lost and the country was irretrievably broken. In short, had realists been at the helm of
U.S. foreign policy over the past 20 years, it is likely that a number of costly debacles would
have been avoided and some important achievements would have been realized. One might question some of these
claims, but on the whole realists have a much better track record than those who keep
insisting the United States has the right, responsibility, and wisdom to manage virtually
every important global issue, and who have repeatedly urged Washington to take actions that now look foolish.
of life as possible, even if that required doing business with a brutal tyrant. Had Obama listened to realists a few years ago,

-China
The world is anarchical, competitive, and dangerousthe rise
of China is textbook offensive realism
LI 16-assistant professor and Chenhui Research Fellow in the School of Advanced International and Area Studies
at East China Normal University, PhD in political science from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
[Xiaoting, Applying offensive realism to the rise of China: structural incentives and Chinese diplomacy toward the
neighboring states, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific Volume 16 (2016) 241-271, DKP]

From the standpoint of offensive realism, international politics is anarchical,


highly competitive, and inherently dangerous. To enhance their own security,
states must maximize their relative power against potential rivals. In this structurally
induced competition, great powers regard each other with the deepest suspicion
and look constantly for opportunities to augment their own positions vis--vis peer
competitors. Historically, the commonest way of power maximization was expansion and territorial
conquest, since land is a critical source of a states latent power (i.e. its wealth and population, which undergird its military
prowess). Indeed,

before

the end of

World War II, all great powers including the United States had

followed

more or less an expansionist course in their bids for regional hegemony (Mearsheimer, 2014 [2001],
especially Chapters 2 and 6). This is not to say, however, that great powers will adopt expansionist policies under any

Assuming states to be rational actors, offensive realism expects them to


behave strategically toward their external environment. In effect, a great power should consider carefully
not only the preferences and possible countermoves of other states but also the immediate and long-term
consequences of its own actions. Accordingly, great powers should avoid taking offensive actions
that will likely entail more costs than benefits and hence weaken their strategic positions in the long run
(Mearsheimer, 2014[2001], pp. 31, 3637). Thus, great powers are not mindless aggressors so bent on
gaining power that they charge headlong into losing wars or pursue Pyrrhic victories. Instead, they should be
prudent power-maximizers who understand the game of when to raise and when to fold
(Mearsheimer, 2014[2001], pp. 37, 40). Central to this game are two factors the balance of power and
geography, the first being a key structural variable and the second a structural
modifier in realist terminology (Taliaferro, 2000, p. 137). When the local balance works against it, for example, a great power is
circumstances.

well-advised not to take the offensive, but to defend the existing balance from threats by its more powerful rivals. With a marked
increase in its relative advantages, it may then seize opportunities to shift the balance in its favor, if and when the benefits outweigh
the costs and risks. Furthermore, a great power without a strong navy should take into account the stopping power of water, or the
difficulty of projecting power overseas (Mearsheimer, 2014[2001], pp. 23, 37, 140145). In short, great powers should act within
the limits of what is possible or feasible. They could, of course, sometimes ignore those limits and act unwisely, but only at their own

The United States has been the sole regional hegemon in the last two centuries, largely because
it encountered no serious local or external balancers during its ascendance (Elman, 2004). In contrast,
all other contenders for regional dominance, from Napoleonic France to Imperial Japan to Nazi Germany, had
brought about their destruction by overextension in the face of multiple adversaries. In todays
world, seeking hegemony through foreign conquests is a plainly foolhardy enterprise, not only
because of the prohibitive costs, but because the United States, having acquired preponderant power in
international politics, would not tolerate a rivals control of either Europe or Asia (Mearsheimer,
2014[2001], pp. 364365, 367368). From the preceding discussion, it follows logically that, until it achieves parity with
the United States, a materially weaker PRC should have more incentives to fold than to
raise, i.e. to eschew overt hegemonic pursuits , rather than initiate a premature contest for regional
supremacy. After all, despite its impressive growth, China still lags considerably behind America in
economic, military, and technological strength and lacks the material wherewithal to establish a
Sinocentric order (Beckley, 2011; Nye, 2012). Meanwhile, China faces probably the most challenging
geopolitical environment in the world, because it has too many neighbors to contend with
peril.

most of those neighbors are capable of turning a


conflict with China into a costly war of attrition for Beijing, thereby sapping its strength and diminishing its
security. Under the circumstances, to invade and subdue Chinas periphery would be both
beyond current Chinese means and politically suicidal , for such attempts are bound to provoke the
formation of a counterbalancing coalition, to the detriment of the PRCs long-term interests (Fravel, 2010).1 Besides, territorial
expansion is nowadays hardly essential to a great powers economic growth or wealth creation,
(Nathan and Scobell, 2012, p. 5). When push comes to shove,

which depends increasingly on the globalized market, production, and finance, and Chinas rise largely confirms this pattern (Brooks,

offensive realism indicates that when


a rising power is not yet capable of dominating its home region, its principal objective
would be to hinder the extension of other great powers influence in its neighborhood. Given
the enduring SinoAmerican strategic distrust since the founding of the PRC, this means, unsurprisingly, that Beijing was
and still is preoccupied most of the time with the task of preventing Washington
from gaining influence in Asia at Chinas expense (Friedberg, 2011; Lieberthal and Wang, 2012). To
attain that goal, the PRC obviously needs more friends than foes among its
neighbors. Strategically, a friendly neighborhood could shield China from direct threats
posed by the American colossus, by impeding or restricting US presence in Asia (e.g. by declining to provide
Washington with military bases, overflight rights, or onshore support). It would also enable Beijing to
concentrate on economic and military buildup, in preparation for an ultimate power
transition vis--vis Washington. Conversely, a hostile neighborhood would not only strengthen the US position and influence
2005; Rosecrance, 2006; Kirshner, 2007). In the meantime, the logic of

against China but draw Beijing into constant conflicts and deflect its attention and resources from the priority of economic
development. Meanwhile, Chinas neighbors may wish to avoid an inimical relationship with Beijing too, in the absence of

offensive realism recognizes that


balancing is not a clearly preferred strategy even in an unbalanced regional system (Mearsheimer,
demonstrable Chinese hostility toward their sovereign independence. In theory,

2014[2001], p. 160; for a neoclassical theory of underbalancing in international politics, see Schweller, 2008). Admittedly,

balancing a rising state involves significant opportunity costs as well as the forfeit of
possible gains from cooperation with that state (Chan, 2012, ch. 24). Geopolitically, Chinas neighbors are
acutely aware that America is an ocean away, whereas China has long dominated
Asias mainland a fact that often compels its neighbors to adjust their national policies with some appreciation of Chinese
interests and preferences (Ross, 1999, 2006; Womack, 2006). Moreover, in regional politics, some Asian
countries perhaps pay more attention to each other, than to China (e.g. India vs. Pakistan,
North Korea vs. South Korea, or Vietnam vs. its weaker neighbors). By maintaining constructive relations with the PRC, they could

In the early nineteenth century,


European great powers had adopted a similar opportunistic attitude toward the
ascendance of the United States, because they were busily competing against each
other and wished to have America serve as a future ally (Elman, 2004). In addition, Southeast Asian nations
have been traditionally reluctant to conclude formal alliances with the United States, for fear of
compromising their own autonomy and freedom of maneuver (Acharya, 2011, 2014). Instead, they prefer an informal
preserve a potential point of leverage against their local adversaries.

balance-of-influence strategy, by granting all major powers a stake in the regional order and allowing them to balance each other

this approach finds support in a key tenet of offensive


realism, which cautions that alliances are but marriages of convenience and
inherently unreliable (Mearsheimer, 2014[2001], p. 33). Since states can change their allies but not their neighbors, it is
thus understandable that many Asian countries, despite their support of the US rebalance
policy, remain reluctant to choose between Washington and Beijing (for details, see Berteau
et al., 2014). Logically, therefore, offensive realism does not necessarily preclude the
possibility of a pragmatic bargain between China and its neighbors, presupposing that
both sides are strategic players. That is, anxious to forestall US-led containment or encirclement,
Beijing might seek to promote amicable and cooperative relations with neighboring
states, in exchange for their agreement not to join forces with Washington against China. Indeed, it is often observed that a
long-standing goal of Chinese diplomacy is to solidify friendly ties with neighboring countries,
(Goh, 2008; Ciorciari, 2010). Implicitly,

10

so as to buffer China against real or perceived US pressures (Goldstein, 2005; Shambaugh, 2005; Nathan and Scobell, 2012; Sutter,

it is not unthinkable
that Beijing would sometimes show restraint and even offer concessions in territorial
disputes with its neighbors, for the double purposes of signaling its cooperative intent and
undercutting the rationale for US involvement. Theoretically, offensive realism does not
disapprove of one great power making concessions to others, so long as those concessions help it
2012). In particular, since good-neighborly relations consist foremost in secure and settled borders,

concentrate resources against the more menacing foes (Mearsheimer, 2014[2001], pp. 164165). On closer examination, much of
Chinas peripheral territory is of limited economic and military value, which might have made it easier for Beijing to make certain

offensive realism would


anticipate that accommodation and goodwill is only part of the picture in
the PRCs relationship to its neighbors. Conceivably, while Beijing could reward some
neighbors for their cooperation in preventing an antagonistic great power from encircling China, it could also punish
others for their noncooperation. Offering concessions to any and all would make no practical
sense, for it only signals weakness, invites contempt, and emboldens an adversary to demand more. Instead,
through calculated strikes at unbending foes, a rising state could demonstrate to its
neighbors that it is not a paper tiger and defying its ascendance has a price, thereby deterring further challenges to its
interests. Furthermore, as Chinas relative capabilities continue to grow apace, the local
balance of power and geography will cease to pose insurmountable obstacles to the flexing of
Chinese muscles. The PRCs rapid military modernization , for example, has enabled the
progressive expansion of Chinas maritime defense perimeter , enhancing Beijings ability to
frustrate or complicate American intervention in a major conflict on Chinas periphery (Montgomery, 2014). In contrast, many
Asian states are worried that US budgetary constraints would erode Washingtons
strategic preponderance in the Asia-Pacific, leaving them unable to withstand Chinas burgeoning power
(Johnson et al., 2014, pp. 3943). This is not to imply, however, that a materially stronger China will
attempt to conquer the rest of Asia, which offensive realism considers unlikely as well as infeasible (Mearsheimer,
2014[2001], p. 370). Rather, the point is that Beijing will possess great coercive means
economic, military, and diplomatic to influence the foreign policy choices of its neighbors and to push harder for
territorial compromises (Fravel, 2010, pp. 512518, 523524). Nevertheless,

a distinct sphere of influence. In this process, the PRC might offer sweeter carrots to those cooperative neighbors, as even a
superpower needs friends and partners to cope with potential rivals more effectively. Yet meanwhile, it could also wield heavier

offensive realism
suggests that China has strong and structurally driven incentives to
diminish the influence of other great powers (especially an adversarial one) in its home region
sticks against those uncooperative neighbors, to discourage noncompliance with its wishes. In sum,

and that these incentives may lead Beijing to act both cooperatively and coercively toward its neighbors, depending on the latters
readiness to accommodate Chinas rise and/or keep a cautious distance from external powers. Admittedly, that a states powerseeking strategy is often complex and contingent upon varying circumstances is not a novel tenet in realist theory. Like
Mearsheimer, classical realists such as E. H. Carr (1964, pp. 112, 145) and Hans Morgenthau (1978, pp. 1011) also perceived
international politics as an endless struggle for power, which is nevertheless moderated by the necessity to exercise power
prudently to attain ones ends. Theoretically, this line of thinking is consistent with the above propositions about how a rising state
should approach its neighbors, both to secure their support and to compel their awe.

Struggle for control is inevitableChina will continue the


carrot and stick diplomacy
LI 16-assistant professor and Chenhui Research Fellow in the School of Advanced International and Area Studies
at East China Normal University, PhD in political science from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
[Xiaoting, Applying offensive realism to the rise of China: structural incentives and Chinese diplomacy toward the
neighboring states, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific Volume 16 (2016) 241-271, DKP] edited for gendered
language

This study employs offensive realism to provide a baseline for assessing Beijing's
strategic choices in dealing with regional neighbors. In theory, when an ascending power is not yet
capable of dominating its home region, it would strive foremost to prevent external
powers from extending their influence in its neighborhood. To attain that goal, it will likely adopt a
11

carrots-and-sticks strategy, by rewarding some neighbors and punishing others according to their readiness to
accommodate its ascendance and keep a cautious distance from external powers. Empirically, this study records in detail that
Beijing has long sought the assistance of its neighbors in turning away a rival great
power from China's periphery, often by offering territorial concessions as a reward for such assistance. Nonetheless, Beijing is
much less likely to compromise with those neighbors whom it suspects of collaborating with external powers against China: indeed,

it tends to punish those alleged pawns in order to flout their external sponsors and show who is the
resident strongman [strongperson] in Asia. Restraint and assertiveness, in other words, are
not inversely related (i.e. as one side grows, the other shrinks) in Chinese foreign policy behavior. Rather, they
are two sides of the same coin and serve the same overriding purpose of countering
adversarial (especially US) influences in China's neighborhood. Since the PRC has
pursued this carrots-and-sticks diplomacy with remarkable consistency to date, there is good
reason to think that little will change in the future. Thus, the basic assumptions of offensive realism
ring true: fundamentally, great-power politics is still a struggle for power and
influence, and conflicts of interest among those titans are genuine and not just a
result of unfortunate misunderstanding. And, to explain those conflicts, it is necessary to
accord a certain causal significance to the structural incentives that push great
powers to compete against each other in the first place.

Offensive realism is the best way to analyze pivot to Asia


Hendriks 15-political science master, Leiden University [Thirza, master thesis - Rebalancing great power
politics: a new cold war between the US and ChinaAH]

Offensive realism is the ideal tool to analyze the US pivot towards the Asia-Pacific for
several reasons. First of all, offensive realism is pessimistic. It does not predict the durability of US hegemony like
defensive realists, since it argues that new great powers will merge to offset US
power (Layne, 2002). It is now clear that such a great power has merged , namely China. Another key concept
in explaining US behavior is the offensive realist notion of potential hegemon . China is the
only great power that can possibly achieve hegemony . Defensive realists argue (Waltz,
1979) that states are only interested in maximizing power until a certain point when it becomes a status
quo power concerned with balancing. However, in explaining the pivot, Hillary Clinton (2011) points out that the United
States wants to lead. This assumes that the United States is still interested in maximizing its power and that it has no intention to solely become a status quo
power concerned with balancing. Indeed, this 11 thesis will show that the US pivot towards the Asia-Pacific
region is an answer to Chinas acquired position as a potential hegemon . It should be noted that

Mearsheimer (2001) argues that because of what he calls the stopping power of water, a state can only achieve regional hegemony and not global hegemony. Christopher Layne (2012)
argues, and I agree, that this is a flaw in Mearsheimers theory. To me, it is odd that Mearsheimer uses the example of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan, since the example also showed

Since great powers always seek to maximize


its powers, global hegemony fits in the very logic of offensive realism. Therefore, I
will ;adopt the criticism of Christopher Layne and recognize the US as a global
hegemony, not just a regional one. In attributing the concept of potential hegemony to China, I will refer to regional hegemony though.
This because a state first must attain regional hegemony in order to bid for global
hegemony. Since China is no regional hegemon yet, I will refer to China as a
potential regional hegemon.
that troops can be easily transported and that water doesnt have to be an obstacle.

12

A2-Defensive Realism
Defensive realism is overly-optimisticstructural factors
guarantee and inevitable conflict over control of East Asia
LI 16-assistant professor and Chenhui Research Fellow in the School of Advanced International and Area Studies
at East China Normal University, PhD in political science from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
[Xiaoting, Applying offensive realism to the rise of China: structural incentives and Chinese diplomacy toward the
neighboring states, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific Volume 16 (2016) 241-271, DKP]

Carr, Morgenthau, and their adherents believed that a


dominating great power could placate a rising competitor and moderate the latters
foreign policy by making sufficient concessions to accommodate its interests (Kirshner, 2012, pp.
6569). On this point, offensive realism would probably retort: if a reigning power like
America has an abiding interest in preserving its primacy over any regional competitors, and
if a latecomer like China has an equally dogged determination to vitiate and ultimately
eliminate the US sway over its periphery, there seems to be little room for resolving this
fundamental clash of interest. Consequently, offensive realism predicts a
greater likelihood of conflict between Beijing on the one hand and Washington and its
Asian allies on the other. In this regard, the differences between defensive and offensive
realism are striking too. Implicitly, defensive realism considers international politics a
more peaceful arena wherein the top priority of states is not to maximize power, but to
preserve security. Accordingly, states are well-advised to maintain a posture of selfrestraint and avoid unnecessarily aggressive or provocative actions that could impact their security negatively
(Waltz, 1979, pp. 126127; see also Taliaferro, 2000). From this perspective, it is in the best
interest of a rising state like China to come to terms with American hegemony , as well
as to pursue moderate policies toward all its neighbors. Likewise, Washington and its partners should
keep signaling their restraint and reassurance to Beijing, to avert a security dilemma
Unlike Mearsheimer, however,

in which uncertainties about each others intentions prevent purely security seeking nations from cooperating to

In the offensive
realist view, however, the Achilles heel of this defensive realist prediction lies in its
failure to see that for an ascending power, security does not always consist in the
maintenance of the status quo. Rather, given the lasting strategic distrust between Beijing and
Washington, the PRC might find it more advisable to improve its long-term security
position by seeking a gradual reduction of American influence in Asia and forging a
new status quo in its own favor. If that is the case, then SinoAmerican relations may face
stormy times ahead, as the United States obviously has no intention of abandoning its Asian
allies and partners to their fate and letting China hold the reins in this vitally important region. Viewed
in this light, offensive realism becomes readily falsifiable in regard to the behavior of a
rising China. The theory would be invalid if the PRC customarily welcomes, not just in words but in deeds, a
sustain a mutually acceptable status quo order (for this view, see Johnston, 2003, 2013).

sustained US presence and leadership role in Asias security architecture, or if process-tracing reveals that Beijing
frequently offers territorial compromises to the neighboring countries without considering the question of having

Perusing the empirical record of


Chinese foreign policy from the 1950s onward, however, the next section will show that
offensive realism appears to find much sustenance in the PRCs regional
diplomacy, as manifested particularly by Beijings strategy of treating friends and
foes differently in territorial disputes.
the concerned countries keep the United States at arms length.

13

A2-Peace-Conflict Good
Peace fractures unity ethnic conflicts, less effective
bureaucracies and ineffective tax systems
Walt 16 Robert and Renee Belfer Professorship in International Affairs @ Harvard University's John F. Kennedy
School of Government, PhD and MA in Political Science @ UC-Berkeley, Fellow in the American Academy of Arts and
Science [Stephen, The Case Against Peace, Foreign Policy, June 17, 2016, http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/06/17/thecase-against-peace-syria-europe-brexit-donald-trump,SCJ]
There may be some truth in each of these claims, but they all overlook an even more important explanation for the fractious state of
contemporary politics: peace. Dont get me wrong: I think peace is wonderful, and I wish more politicians talked about it openly and

prolonged periods of peace may also have a downside : They allow


divisions within different societies to grow and deepen. Even worse, they may eventually
drive the world back toward war. I wish I could claim this was my original idea, but this explanation for our
did more to further it. But

present divisions has been around for quite a while. Indeed, 20 years ago, political scientist Michael Desch published a fascinating
article in the academic journal International Organization, titledWar and Strong States, Peace and Weak States? Drawing on the

war (and
external threats more generally) were perhaps the single-most important factor
explaining the emergence of strong, centralized states and cohesive national
polities. In particular, the pressures of international competition forced rival states to
develop effective bureaucracies, efficient systems of taxation, and formidable
armies, and it also encouraged the promotion of patriotism and a dampening of
internal divisions. When the wolf is at the door, domestic quarrels are put aside in
order to deal with the more immediate danger. Unfortunately, this argument also implies that the
arrival of peace can have a negative effect on national unity. Desch quotes sociologist George
earlier work of Max Weber, Otto Hintze, George Simmel, Charles Tilly, Lewis Coser, and others, Desch argued that

Simmel approvingly: A groups complete victory over its enemies is thus not always fortunate in a sociological sense. Victory lowers
the energy which guarantees the unity of the group; and the dissolving forces, which are always at work, gain hold. Does the
historical record support this view? Desch thought so. In his words: Variation in the intensity of the international security
competition also affected the cohesion of many states. From the end of the Napoleonic wars and the Treaty of Versailles in 1815 until
the Crimean War of 1853-1856, the external threat environment facing European states became relatively benign. The period
between 1815 and 1853 witnessed an unprecedented breakdown in state cohesion manifested in a series of internal upheavals in
various European states. He also saw a similar pattern in U.S. history. By 1850, he noted: [T]he external threat environment facing
the United States had become quite benign. At the same time, long-standing internal tensions reemerged in the United States. By
the election of 1860, the country was so divided that Republican Abraham Lincoln was elected with little more than a third of the
vote and three other parties did quite well. It is reasonable to conclude that the American Civil War was in part the result of the
breakdown of national cohesion due to the changing external threat environment. The two world wars, by contrast, helped create
the modern American federal state and were a powerful source of national unity, a trend reinforced even more by the subsequent
Cold War. In Deschs view, The cold war was the perfect type of threat. It never escalated to a major war although it was serious
enough to be a unifying factor. The end of the Cold War removed this source of unity, however, and as Nils Petter Gleditsch, John
Mueller, Steven Pinker, and Joshua Goldstein have all argued, the level of conflict (and external threat) in the world has been

growing internal
disunity and a weakening of state effectiveness, although the strength of these
tendencies varies widely around the world. States that mobilize power through
market mechanisms appear to be more robust than those that do so through
coercive extraction, and there is also a ratchet effect when states go stronger.
declining (until a recent modest uptick). The result, as Desch foresaw two decades ago, has been

Because bureaucracies and institutions created at one point in time rarely go out of business as soon as their original rationale

a decline in external threats does


not necessarily cause modern states to shrink all the way back to their pre-threat
proportions. But as we are now seeing, it can make their internal politics far more divisive. Taken together, these arguments
led Desch to some striking predictions, including: First, the viability of multiethnic states facing a less
challenging external security environment will certainly decrease [T]hose that
survive will have to cope with a much higher level of ethnic separatism and
demands for autonomy. States with deep ethnic, social, or linguistic cleavages
facing a more benign threat environment should find it harder to maintain cohesion.
disappears, and because modern states do more than just prepare for war,

14

Key cases to watch here are Israel (secular versus religious Jews and the Jewish majority versus the Arab minority), multiethnic Arab
states such as Syria (Alawites) and Jordan (Palestinians), Afghanistan (various political factions), much of black Africa (tribal), and
especially South Africa (Zulus and whites). [T]he

longer the period of reduced international security


competition, the more likely are developed states to be plagued by the rise of
narrow sectoral, rather than broad encompassing, interest groups. [The United States is] now
witnessing significant challenges to federal authority, a growing consensus on the need to cut spending to balance the federal
budget, serious efforts to eliminate cabinet departments and other federal agencies, skepticism about a state-dominated industrial
policy, and a Republican-controlled Congress committed to, and so far successful, in its efforts to limit the growth of the American
state. Sounds about right to me. Although some of Deschs predictions were not fully borne out, his article anticipated many of the
fissiparous tendencies that characterize political life in the United States, Europe, and parts of the developing world. At a minimum,
his crystal ball has performed much better than Frank Fukuyamas belief that we had reached the end of history, or the late
Samuel P. Huntingtons forecast of a looming clash of civilizations. Not so fast, I hear you say. What about al Qaeda and the
threat that states face from violent extremism of all sorts? Didnt 9/11 actually produce an upsurge of national unity in the United
States along with the creation of state structures like the Department of Homeland Security? And doesnt the growing political
rancor in the face of the dangers posed by al Qaeda, the Islamic State, or even Putins Russia cast serious doubt on Deschs
argument? Dont shocking events like the recent attacks in Orlando, Florida, give us reason to put aside our differences and pull
together once again? It would be nice to think so, but I have my doubts. The threat from al Qaeda and its ilk is just not serious
enough to galvanize the national unity that a genuine international rivalry produces. The attacks of 9/11 were a shock, of course,
and so were the Boston Marathon bombings, the shootings at Fort Hood, and this latest outrage in Orlando. And, yes, the George W.
Bush administration was able to exploit the initial post-9/11 reaction to take the country into a foolish war and to ramp up executive
authority in various ways. But Americans soon adjusted, mostly because the actual threat proved (fortunately) to be smaller than
many feared in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. Domestic terrorism continues to shock us, but its hard to rally the nation over the
long term when the risk of dying in a terrorist incident is still about 1 chance in 4 million each year. In this, still mostly benign,
environment, narrow interests remain free to pursue their particular agendas. Moreover, international terrorism is also the shadowy,
hard-to-measure danger that can turn a nations fears inward and magnify domestic divisions. When a hostile group uses terrorism,
and is able to attract a handful of supporters abroad, it inevitably triggers fears of fifth columns or lone wolves or even some
vast and well-orchestrated plot to attack us here at home. Contemporary Islamophobia is a perfect illustration of this sort of
concern, and it is precisely this thinking Donald Trump has exploited in his unexpected march to the Republican presidential
nomination. In short, if the U.S.-Soviet Cold War was the perfect threat for generating national unity, terrorism is perhaps the
worst type of danger for holding the United States together. Its not fearsome enough to bring a new Greatest Generation to the
fore, and politicians eager to play on our worst fears can easily exploit it in ways that are more likely to divide than to unite the

Reducing external
dangers turns out to have a downside: The less threatened we are by the outside
world, the more prone we are to ugly quarrels at home. Even worse, peace may even
contain the seeds of its own destruction. As we are now seeing in the Middle East,
the collapse of unity and state authority can easily trigger violent internal conflicts
that eventually drag outside powers back in. Yet the obvious solution looking for some external
bogeyman to rally against is hardly appealing either. The result, alas, may be a recurring cycle of
conflict where periods of peace give way to new sources of tension and division. I
country. If Desch is right and I think he is the implications are both ironic and disheartening.

suppose you might say this disturbing possibility is part of what makes me a realist.

15

A2-Liberalism
Liberalism is wrong in the current world order no
commitment to liberal values, nationalism trump liberal
values, and leaders who exploit liberal values
Walt 16 - Robert and Renee Belfer Professorship in International Affairs @ Harvard University's John F.
Kennedy School of Government, PhD and MA in Political Science @ UC-Berkeley, Fellow in the American Academy of
Arts and Sciences [Stephen, The Collapse of the Liberal World Order, Foreign Policy, June 26 2016,
http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/06/26/the-collapse-of-the-liberal-world-order-european-union-brexit-donald-trump/,
SCJ]

liberalisms defenders oversold the product. We were told that if


dictators kept falling and more states held free elections, defended free speech,
implemented the rule of law, and adopted competitive markets, and joined the EU
and/or NATO, then a vast zone of peace would be created, prosperity would
spread, and any lingering political disagreements would be easily addressed within
the framework of a liberal order. When matters didnt go quite so smoothly, and
when some groups in these liberal societies were in fact harmed by these
developments, a degree of backlash was inevitable. It didnt help that elites in many liberal countries
The first problem was that

made some critical blunders, including the creation of the euro, the invasion of Iraq, the misguided attempt to nation-build in
Afghanistan, and the 2008 financial crisis. These and other mistakes helped undermine the legitimacy of the post-Cold War order,

Efforts to spread a
liberal world order also faced predictable opposition from the leaders and groups
who were directly threatened by our efforts. It was hardly surprising that Iran and Syria did what they could
open the door to illiberal forces, and left some segments of society vulnerable to nativist appeals.

to thwart U.S. efforts in Iraq, for example, because the George W. Bush administration had made it clear these regimes were on its
hit list, too. Similarly, is it that hard to fathom why Chinese and Russian leaders find Western efforts to spread liberal values

Liberals also forgot that successful


liberal societies require more than the formal institutions of democracy. They also
depend on a broad and deep commitment to the underlying values of a liberal
society, most notably tolerance. As events in Iraq, Afghanistan, and several other
places demonstrate, however, writing a constitution, forming political parties, and
holding free and fair elections wont produce a genuinely liberal order unless
individuals and groups in society also embrace the key liberal norms as well. This
sort of cultural and normative commitment cannot be developed overnight or injected from
outside, and certainly not with drones, special forces, and other instruments of violence. It is also
abundantly clear that post-Cold War liberals underestimated the role of nationalism and other
forms of local identity, including sectarianism, ethnicity, tribal bonds, and the like.
threatening, or why they have taken various steps to forestall them?

They assumed that such atavistic attachments would gradually die out, be confined to apolitical, cultural expressions, or be adroitly

it turns out that many people in many


places care more about national identities, historic enmities, territorial symbols, and
traditional cultural values than they care about freedom as liberals define it. And if
the Brexit vote tells us anything, its that some (mostly older) voters are more easily swayed by such
appeals than by considerations of pure economic rationality (at least until they feel the
consequences). We may think our liberal values are universally valid, but sometimes
other values will trump them (no pun intended). Such traditional sentiments will loom especially large when social
balanced and managed within well-designed democratic institutions. But

change is rapid and unpredictable, and especially when once-homogeneous societies are forced to incorporate and assimilate

Liberals can talk all they


want about the importance of tolerance and the virtues of multiculturalism (and I happen
to agree with them), but the reality is that blending cultures within a single polity has never
people whose backgrounds are different and have to do so within a short span of time.

16

been smooth or simple. The resulting tensions provide ample grist for populist
leaders who promise to defend traditional values (or make the country great again). Nostalgia
aint what it used to be, but it can still be a formidable political trope. Most important of all,
liberal societies are in trouble today because they are vulnerable to being hijacked by
groups or individuals who take advantage of the very freedoms upon which liberal
societies are based. As Donald Trump has been proving all year (and as Jean-Marie Le Pen, Recep Erdogan, Geert Wilders,
and other political entrepreneurs have shown in the past), leaders or movements whose commitment to
liberal principles is at best skin-deep can take advantage of the principles of open
society and use it to rally a popular following. And there is nothing about a
democratic order that ensures such efforts will invariably fail. Deep down, I think this explains
why so many people in the United States and in Europe are desperate to keep Uncle Sam fully engaged in Europe. Its not so much
the fear of a declining but assertive Russia; its their fear of Europe itself. Liberals want Europe to remain peaceful, tolerant,
democratic and embedded within the EU framework, and theyd like to pull countries like Georgia or Ukraine more fully into Europes
democratic circle eventually. But deep down, they just dont trust the Europeans to manage this situation, and they fear it will all go
south if the American pacifier is removed. For all of liberalisms supposed virtues, at the end of the day its defenders cannot shake
the suspicion that its European version is so delicate that it requires indefinite American support. Who knows? Maybe theyre right.
But unless you think the United States has infinite resources and a limitless willingness to subsidize other wealthy states defenses,
then the question is: what other global priorities are liberals prepared to sacrifice in order to preserve whats left of the European
order?

17

A2-Trade/Interdependence
They mistake glitter for goldsecurity concerns will always outweigh, especially for
weaker states trying to balance against China
LI 16-assistant professor and Chenhui Research Fellow in the School of Advanced International and Area Studies
at East China Normal University, PhD in political science from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
[Xiaoting, Applying offensive realism to the rise of China: structural incentives and Chinese diplomacy toward the
neighboring states, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific Volume 16 (2016) 241-271, DKP]

According to international relations theory, economic interdependence and intergovernmental organizations serve the vital purposes of
promoting cooperation and preventing conflict among nations. In a voluminous literature, scholars maintain that economic and trade
linkages create a common interest in preserving peace, whereas international institutions enable states to advance collaboration and settle disputes amicably
(for a classical study that expounds these views, see Russett and Oneal, 2001). Indeed, owing to the phenomenal expansion of Chinese trade and participation in
international organizations in the last three decades, it

is often noted that the PRC is no longer an unruly, revolutionary actor in international
society, but adopts a more restrained and collaborative approach in global and regional affairs (Johnston, 2003, 2008; Kang, 2007; Kent,
2007; Foot and Walter, 2011; Chan, 2012). In some aspects, Beijing's periphery diplomacy seems in accord with this thesis. Overall, PRC leaders and elites recognize
that the costs would far exceed the benefits if China resumes a posture of unyielding militancy in the international system. In addressing domestic audiences, senior
PRC diplomats often underscore the fact that China now shares a wide range of common interests with its neighbors and that it is unwise to jeopardize those interests
by militarizing China's remaining maritime-territorial disputes (Qi, 2010; Wu, 2011, 2014). Even the PLA's naval strategists endorse a generally cautious approach
toward the South China Sea dispute, for fear that armed conflict would derail China's economic growth (which relies heavily on foreign trade) and foreclose the
possibility of lucrative joint development (Goldstein, 2011). Meanwhile, however, it is worth bearing in mind that great powers usually possess multiple means to
achieve the same end: when economic weapons suffice to accomplish its purposes, a stronger state tends not to employ the more hazardous military weapon (Carr,
1964, p. 132). Nowadays, the gigantic Chinese economy has furnished Beijing with a formidable array of economic weapons: i.e. the

PRC could punish


its perceived adversaries, not by military force, but by the application of such economic pressure as denial of access
to the Chinese market, imposition of trade sanctions, or interruption of economic assistance or cooperation. Indeed, the coercive
elements of Beijing's economic diplomacy have caused growing anxieties among China's neighbors (Reeves and
Pardo, 2013; Glaser, 2014b). Similarly, it is not uncommon for great powers to twist the rules of international
institutions to suit their national interests. Various scholars, for instance, observe that some international institutions leave Beijing with
considerable room for tactical evasions (Kent, 2007; Foot and Walter, 2011; Schweller and Pu, 2011). Regarding the South
China Sea disputes, Chinese maneuvers have prevented the ASEAN's regional structures from playing a
stronger role (Johnson et al., 2014, p. 42). Meanwhile, despite its interest in promoting military confidence-building measures, the PRC has
deployed an increasing number of civil marine-surveillance vessels to defend its claims in the East and South China Seas,
which looks equally intimidating to other claimants and increases the likelihood of incidents or crises
(Swaine and Fravel, 2011; Fravel, 2013). From a longer-term perspective, however, Beijing's gains from those endeavors
may be self-defeating, because they demonstrate that the PRC , like other great powers, would not hesitate to use its
power to get its way. For China's neighbors, this might well be a sobering reminder that they have to hedge their
bets against future dangers. International politics, after all, is a self-help arena wherein states can never be certain of
each other's intentions (Mearsheimer, 2014[2001], p. 31). Even if a rising power acts with exemplary self-control today, its
weaker neighbors will still worry about its future behavior. If its actions are less than exemplary, the neighboring countries can hardly be
blamed for taking necessary precautions. When the weaker states cannot effectively balance a potential hegemon in their own region,
they have to consider introducing external helpmates as a strategic counterweight. To be sure, while doing so, they may still wish to
avoid conflict with the rising state in their midst, much less to precipitate a confrontation between that state and external powers. For, in any such conflicts, they will
unavoidably find themselves in the frontline and take the brunt of battle, the costs of which they are perhaps loath to bear. Instead, their ideal strategy is to have both
the rising state and external powers participate in the construction of an open and inclusive regional order, with malice toward none and benefit for all. For states of
lesser stature, this approach would put them in the desirable position of being able to garner reassurance and support from all major powers, while avoiding
overreliance upon and domination by any one of them. Implicitly, these calculations are part and parcel of the aforementioned balance-of-influence strategy adopted
by most Southeast Asian nations, which encourages all great powers to contribute collaboratively to regional peace, stability, and prosperity, rather than covet
privileged positions or exclusive spheres of influence (Acharya, 2004, 2014; Goh, 2008; Ciorciari, 2010). In

theory, therefore, China's long-term


goal of excluding US influence from Asian affairs is unachievable , since it plainly contradicts the neighboring countries' interests
and preferences. Fundamentally, those interests are structurally induced too, because , as Kenneth Waltz (1997, p. 915) vividly
put it, international politics abhors unbalanced power just as nature abhors a vacuum. For its weaker neighbors,
China's rising power warrants both solicitous attention and intent alertness, and to join hands with Beijing
18

against Washington is not in their interests any more than the reverse. When the chips are down, they are
unlikely to snap to attention at Beijing's peremptory command to push America out of Asia ; nor, for that matter,
would Washington stand aside and permit Beijing to demolish its primacy in Asia. Presently, many Chinese elites seem well aware of this. In
August 2014, even the Global Times, a quasi-official PRC newspaper known for its fiery anti-Americanism, admitted in an editorial that
while America is incapable of forming a united front to contain China, China is just as incapable of
mobilizing East Asian countries to clear the region of US influence. 5Consequently, some PRC strategists begin to espouse a
new vision of Chinese leadership in Asia, undergirded by Beijing's provision of such public goods as peace, security, and prosperity for the region. Yan Xuetong
(2011, 2013), an eminent scholar and advisor to the PRC government, avers that this emphasis on leadership rather than hegemony not only corresponds with
traditional Chinese advocacy of moral and humane authority in international relations but portrays a new path to regional primacy that will attract willing followers. In
part, China's post-2013 periphery diplomacy appears to edge in this direction, as manifested by greater PRC efforts to fuel regional economic growth and build trust
with regional neighbors (Glaser, 2014b; Johnson et al., 2014; Ruan, 2014). Nevertheless,

China's neighbors are unlikely to mistake


glitter for gold and take China's self-estimation at face value. Historically, despite its imposing exterior, ancient China's
benevolent hegemony did not preclude the stratagems of coercion and domination, and claims about
Chinese exceptionalism are but a mixture of facts and myths (Zhang, 2013; Chong, 2014). Likewise, even optimistic
assessments of the PRC's regional diplomacy do not take the benignity of Chinese intentions for granted (e.g. see Acharya,
2004, 2014). Tellingly, despite their desires to benefit economically from China's rise, many Asian states continue
to gravitate toward the United States for security cooperation (Berteau et al., 2014; Chong and Hall, 2014). In sum, the Chinese
dream of regional primacy faces lasting and ineluctable limits, which are embedded in Asia's unique
geopolitical structures. If Beijing is willing to live with that, it may still find ways, as before 2009, of dissuading its neighbors from aligning with other
great powers to check or contain China's rise. If, however, Beijing attempts to compel wider Asian acquiescence in Chinese
supremacy, it will find the odds loaded heavily against the PRC, and Mearsheimer's prediction of a
counterbalancing coalition might triumph with a vengeance against a China trapped in not-so-splendid
isolation.

19

A2-US Hegemony
Global hegemony only perpetuates mass economic spending
and death
Mearsheimer 14 - R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of
Political Science at the University of Chicago [John, America Unhinged The Burden
of Responsibility January/February 2014,
http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/America%20Unhinged.pdf, CSS]

The pursuit of global domination, however, has other costs that are far more daunting.
The economic costs are hugeespecially the warsand there are significant human
costs as well. After all, thousands of Americans have died in Afghanistan and Iraq, and
many more have suffered egregious injuries that will haunt them for the rest of their
lives. Probably the most serious cost of Washingtons interventionist policies is the growth of a nationalsecurity state that threatens to undermine the liberal-democratic values that lie at the
heart of the American political system. Given these significant costs, and given that the United States
has no vital interests at stake in Egypt and Syria, let alone the capacity for fixing the problems afflicting those
countries, it should adopt a handsoff policy toward them. American leaders would do well to honor the
principle of self-determination when dealing with Cairo and Damascus, and with many other countries around the
world as well.

20

A2-Attack on US
No one would go to war with the U.S. thousands of nuclear
weapons that deter war, and two oceans that deter any form of
invasion
Mearsheimer 14 - R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of
Political Science at the University of Chicago [John, America Unhinged The Burden
of Responsibility January/February 2014,
http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/America%20Unhinged.pdf, CSS]

the
United States has thousands of nuclear weapons, which are the ultimate deterrent
and go a long way toward guaranteeing a states survival. No adversary is going to
invade America and threaten its survival, because that opponent would almost
certainly end up getting vaporized. In essence, two giant oceans and thousands of
nuclear weapons today shield the United States. Moreover, it faces no serious threats
in its own neighborhood, as it remains a regional hegemon in the Western
Hemisphere. Finally, the United States faces no greatpower rival of any real
consequence. In fact, most strategists I know believe it has been operating in a unipolar world since the Cold
War ended, which is another way of saying America is the only great power on the planet; it has no peers. Others
believe China and Russia are legitimate great powers and the world is multipolar. Even so,
those two great powers are especially weak when compared to the mighty United States. In addition, they have
hardly any power-projection capability, which means they cannot seriously threaten
the American homeland.
If the case for isolationism was powerful before Pearl Harbor, it is even more compelling today. For starters,

21

A2-American Bias
IR scholarship is not American-centric and even if it is, thats
good
MEARSHEIMER 16-R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science @ University of
Chicago, member of the Committee of International Relations @ U. of Chicago, PhD in government/international
relations @ Cornell, M.A. in International Relations @ USC, fellow @ Harvards Center for International Affairs,
Whitney H. Shepardson fellow @ The Council on Foreign Relation [John, A GLOBAL DISCIPLINE OF IR? Benign
Hegemony, International Studies Review (2016) 18, 147169, DKP]

It is often said that the international relations (IR) scholarly community is too American-centric
and needs to broaden its horizons. I disagree. In the mid-1970s, Stanley Hoffmann called IR an
American social science. That label was appropriate then, and it is still appropriate
today especially with regard to the all important ideas and theories that dominate discourse in our discipline. This
situation is not likely to change significantly anytime soon and for entirely
legitimate and defensible reasons. To be clear, the issue here is not about the
makeup of the IR scholarly community as there is an abundance of scholars from
outside the borders of the United States who study world politics. It is clear from just perusing the program for the
International Studies Associations annual conference that IR scholars live in a global village. This
diversitywhich is all for the goodis likely to grow with time as increasing numbers of young people from
around the world go to college and study IR. In short, American scholars do not have great influence because of their numbers. Nor
do Americans dominate the field because the subjects that concern them are privileged over the interests of scholars from other

the issues that concern IR students are the same almost


everywhere. Nuclear proliferation, democracy promotion, and economic
interdependenceto pick just three topics among manyhardly concern the United States alone or even just the great
powers. Virtually every country cares about those subjects and countless others, although
they might approach them in different ways. North Korea and the U nited States, for example, might think
differently about the virtues of nuclear proliferation, but both care greatly about the issue. It is
in the realm of methods, and especially theory, where US scholars dominate the study of IR. The
analytical frameworks and causal stories that researchers from other countries
employ in their work are associated in large part with American academia. For instance,
the key names associated with the three most important bodies of IR theoryconstructivism,
liberalism, and realismare closely tied to scholars at American universities. And the few
influential IR theorists who do not teach at US universities are mostly British or are at
countries. In fact,

least associated with British schools. Thus, one could argue that it is really Anglo-Saxon scholars who dominate the IR discourse. The
importance of theory for studying international politics cannot be underestimated as there is no way we can make sense of the
infinitely complicated world around us without theories. The fact that the United States is home to the worlds leading theorists is
what allows its IR community to control the commanding heights of the field. The dominance of American-based scholars is
reinforced by the fact that they have developed a rich variety of theories that are very useful for comprehending the politics of the
international system. This means, however, there is not a lot of room for new theories or even major twists on existing theories. To
be sure, this is not to say that there is no room for new theories, especially when it comes to middle-range theories. Plus, there is
always room to refine existing theories. Still, there are limited opportunities in 2015 for scholars outside the United Statesas well
inside itto develop wholly new theories. If this were 1945, the situation would be markedly different. The extent to which American
theories cast a giant shadow over the IR field is reflected in how undergraduate and graduate students outside of the United States

Wherever I speak abroad regardless of the subjectthe


comments and questions from students are virtually the same ones I get when I talk
on American campuses. Indeed, students inside and outside of the U nited States seem to
read the same articles and books and for the most part employ the same concepts
and arguments. I might add that as a realist, I feel intellectually more at home in
Beijing than Washington because Chinese scholars and policymakers tend to be
more sympathetic to realism than their American counterparts. So, when I speak
talk and think about international politics.

22

in China where there is a deep fascination with American IR theoriesI sometimes start my talks by
saying, It is good to be back among my people. And I do not speak one word
of Chinese, although I do speak the same language as my Chinese interlocutors when we talk
about the basic realities of international politics. American dominance in IR is reinforced by the fact that many
talented undergraduates from around the world come to the United States for graduate training, where they are taught that the
theories and methods that dominate the intellectual landscape on American campuses are essential tools for being a first-rate
scholar. Most of them go on to have successful careersoften not only in the United States but also in other countrieswhere they

One sometimes hears the argument that there


is a hegemonic discourse in IR and that the Americans who control it actively
work to suppress new ideas generated by outsiders. In other words, there would be a
richer and more diverse menu of IR theories were it not for American gatekeepers policing the
discourse. This claim is wrong and easy to refute. For starters, just ask yourself:
where are the ideas that are being suppressed? Where is the evidence that American
academics have prevented others from pushing forward new ideas about international politics? In fact, there is
none. And please remember that we live in the age of the Internet, where it is
almost impossible to stop new ideasparticularly good onesfrom reaching a wide audience. Beside, the
scholarly world places a high premium on creating innovative arguments, especially
if they challenge conventional wisdoms and even if they make prominent scholars angry. Finally, the
American IR community is international and liberal at its core , which makes it hard to believe
purvey the ideas they learned in graduate school.

serious scholars in that world would be interested in protecting a hegemonic discourse, much less be capable of organizing to
achieve that end.

Even if a few scholars played politics and attempted to marginalize a novel idea they
disliked, other scholars would intervene to promote and engage with it , particularly if it shed new
light on an important problem. One might argue that focusing on culture , as an explanatory variable,
would allow non-Americans to offer new theories and broaden horizons within IR. For example, a number
of scholars and public intellectuals have claimed that China has a Confucian culture, which they maintain has had a profound
influence on its past foreign policy and will continue to do so in the future. For example, this is a key element in Henry Kissingers

But cultural arguments of this sort have been


swishing around in American academia for decades. During the Cold War , for instance,
more than a few American scholars maintained that there was a Soviet strategic
culture that mattered greatly for explaining Moscows behavior. All this is to say that cultural
2011 book On China, and it is clearly a legitimate argument.

arguments do not offer a new way of broadening our intellectual vista in IR. American dominance of the IR discourse is likely to
diminish somewhat in the decades ahead as scholars from other countries become increasingly engaged in trying to develop new
theories and refine existing ones. After all, Americans do not have a special aptitude for doing theory, and the United States has not

Britain and Germany dominated intellectual discourse in IR


before World War II, and US preeminence did not emerge until after 1945. Moreover, when Americans got seriously
always ruled the theoretical roost.

involved in IR scholarship, their theories bore a remarkable resemblance to those developed in Europe. Just think of the profound
influence of Immanuel Kant and Hans Morgenthauboth Germans on IR theory in the United States. What this tells us is that

those non-American IR scholars who become leading theorists at some future point will
stand on the shoulders of American academics, much the way Americas
leading lights have stood on the shoulders of their European predecessors. This is
the way scholarship advances.

23

Scholarship-Mearsheimer
Offensive realism is not a panacea, but provides a nuanced
template for understanding the rise of China
-this card includes really good indicts of Mearsheimer, but concludes offensive
realism is true
LI 16-assistant professor and Chenhui Research Fellow in the School of Advanced International and Area Studies
at East China Normal University, PhD in political science from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
[Xiaoting, Applying offensive realism to the rise of China: structural incentives and Chinese diplomacy toward the
neighboring states, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific Volume 16 (2016) 241-271, DKP]

offensive realism stands out for its pessimism


that the rise of China will lead to an intense security competition in Asia. For years,
Mearsheimer (2005, 2010, 2014, 2014[2001]) predicts consistently that as the Peoples Republic of China (PRC)
becomes more powerful, it will declare a Chinese version of the Monroe Doctrine, try
to reduce the US military presence in the Asia-Pacific, and settle territorial disputes with neighboring countries in its own favor. Furthermore, he
predicts that Beijings ambitions will frighten most of its neighbors and compel them
to join a US-led balancing coalition, leaving Asia ripe for conflict and even war. In recent years,
there are indeed signs of growing tensions between the PRC and some of its neighbors. Concerned with
Beijings increasing assertiveness, some Asian states already begin to upgrade their
cooperation with the United States, which declared in January 2012 its intention of rebalancing
toward the Asia-Pacific (US Department of Defense, 2012, p. 2). Against this backdrop, Mearsheimers predication
seems to have come true. Or does it? On careful review, the evidence looks more
complicated. Some US experts at the prestigious Center for Strategic and International Studies, for example, report that
most countries in Northeast and Southeast Asia support both the US rebalance and
a constructive Sino American relationship. Given their growing economic and political
ties with China, those countries wish to avoid choosing between Washington and Beijing, but to maintain
positive relations with both sides (Berteau et al., 2014). For its part, the PRC leadership seems to realize that
Chinas diplomatic assertiveness since 2009 has damaged its reputation and interests considerably. Thus,
since late 2013, Beijing has placed a renewed premium on a good-neighborly diplomacy,
to preserve a benign external environment for Chinas development (Shi, 2013; Johnson et al., 2014; Ruan, 2014). From one
perspective, the absence of overt conflict between China and its neighbors indicates a defeat for
offensive realism. David Shambaugh (2005, p. 94), for instance, contends that Mearsheimer
overstates Beijings hegemonic ambitions and, relatedly, its neighbors readiness to isolate or
contain China (see also Kang, 2007; Kirshner, 2012). Noting the PRCs frequent compromises in territorial disputes,
In contemporary international relations theory, John Mearsheimers

Taylor Fravel (2008, p. 308) questions Mearsheimers claim that great powers are primed for expansion and aggression. More recently, Amitav Acharya

Mearsheimer overlooks how a rising China is constrained by a unique


set of regional conditions, especially the local equilibrium of power, economic interdependence, and regional institutions, which would
prevent the PRC from playing power politics in Asia. To these criticisms, Mearsheimer (2014[2001], p. 362) responds by
emphasizing that his theory focuses not on the present or even the immediate future but
on the distant future when China becomes much more powerful than it is today. In fairness,
this response falls short of meeting his own criteria that [a] theorys ability to
predict the future is based on its ability to explain the past (Mearsheimer, 2014[2001], p. 6). Apparently,
if the past is misunderstood, the future cannot be correctly foreseen. Thus, if offensive realism is to withstand the
aforementioned criticisms, it is critically important to provide an explanation, in its
own theoretical terms, of why Chinas relations with its neighbors have not become
(2014, p. 171) argues that

24

unrelentingly grim, or why both sides seem capable of demonstratin g a degree of resilient
practicality in dealing with each other. This study, therefore, seeks to reexamine the nuance of
offensive realism as a guide for understanding Chinas strategic interactions with its
neighbors, an issue with momentous implications for international peace and security. In theory, offensive realism does not
expect states to act like mindless aggressors or relentless balancers. Rather, it
expects them to pay close attention to geography and the local power balance, and
to act strategically after weighing the costs, benefits, and feasibility of their actions. Logically, these arguments could also bolster the
contention that some form of mutual accommodation may be possible between a rising if
prudent China and its wary but pragmatic neighbors. In particular, it is not unthinkable
that, fearing containment by an adversarial great power, a materially weaker PRC might show
restraint and even offer concessions in certain territorial disputes, in exchange for some neighbors cooperation in limiting the extension of that
adversarys influence in Chinas vicinity. Nevertheless, in the offensive realist view, such accommodation is
only part of the picture. Conceivably, while China could reward some neighbors for their
cooperation, it could also punish others for their noncooperation, to signal that defying its ascendance has a price. Moreover, as
its relative capabilities grow, the PRC will inevitably compete harder against US
influence in Asia and possess greater coercive means against those noncooperative neighbors. As will be
detailed, Beijings carrots-and-sticks strategy is manifested foremost in its management
of territorial disputes from the 1950s onward and has acquired fresh content in recent years despite Chinas enmeshment in the regional
economic and institutional order. Ultimately, however, the underlying logic of realist theory implies that
Beijings long-term goal of excluding Washington from Asian affairs is unachievable
and that rivalry and conflict would ensue if the PRC goes too far in forcing the issue.
In short, offensive realism is not an analytical straightjacket. If construed properly, it provides a
plausible, parsimonious explanation of Chinas penchant for both restraint and
assertiveness toward regional neighbors. This study makes this argument in four steps. The first section uses the framework of offensive
realism to outline theoretically the broad possibilities of Chinese diplomacy toward neighboring states. Utilizing primary and secondary PRC sources, the
second section then demonstrates that the preceding theoretical expectations find much support in available evidence on the making of Chinese foreign
policy. Afterward, the third section contemplates why hopes of Chinese primacy may be chimerical in Asias geopolitical structures, on the grounds that
unbalanced power breeds fear and compels its potential targets to take necessary precautions. The last section concludes with a discussion of how the
findings matter to theory and policy

25

Answers

26

Realism Wrong

27

-General
Realism is inherently flawedignores the role of ideology and
culture while making up facts to support their preposterous
claimsUkraine proves
-indicts of Kissinger, Mearsheimer, Cohen, Walt
-card is overly long but can be strategically chopped
MOTYL 15-professor of political science at Rutgers University, Newark, PhD in Political Science @ Columbia
[Alexander, The Surrealism of Realism: Misreading the War in Ukraine, January/February 2015,
http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/surrealism-realism-misreading-war-ukraine, DKP]
Second, focusing as they do on interests,

realists also prefer not to take ideology, culture,

and norms into account, while Ukraine experts do not see how ignoring these matters can possibly enhance
understanding of the conflict. Putins neo-imperial ideology, his stated determination to make
Russia great again, his conviction that all Russian speakers are Russians deserving of the
Russian states protection, and his belief that Ukraine is an artificial state with no right to exist
appear to be part and parcel of his pursuit of authoritarianism and empire and his adoption of a
hegemonic policy toward Russias near abroad. The realist case for ignoring ideology would be
stronger if Putins ideological message were not so openly rooted in Russias cultural
heritage. As his high popularity ratings suggest, Putins ideology resonates with, and may even be a product
of, Russian political culture. Realisms disregard of norms also leads it to
misunderstand the Revolution in Dignity. That, Ukraine experts will insist, was overwhelmingly about
self-respect and self-empowerment. Participants assert that they took part in the
mass marches or manned the barricades because they objected to the Yanukovych regimes daily
assaults on their humanity and identity. Economic issues were irrelevant to their struggle.
Today as well, most Ukrainians will insist that their struggle against Russia is not about
the economic advantages of being associated with the European Union but rather about their right
to self-determination, both as individuals and as a people. Once again, in ignoring ideology,
culture, and norms, realism appears to be ignoring the two most
important developments within Russia and Ukraine. The former abandoned democratic norms at
precisely the time that the latter embraced them. Can these parallel and intersecting movements be considered as irrelevant to the

experts are not so sure about the bedrock assumption of the


realists that statesor, more precisely, their elitesalways act rationally. Yanukovych
seemed determined to undermine his own power and did little to promote Ukraines
state interests. Putin appears obsessed, sometimes bizarrely so, with Russian state interests,
but its not at all clear just how annexing Crimea made Russia stronger. Nor is it
clear how destroying one-third of the Donbas in eastern Ukraine benefited Russia or Putin.
Nor, finally, is it clear just how Russias interests have been enhanced by the imposition
of Western sanctions. If this is rationality, then the term is evidently so broad as to
encompass self-destructive behavior. Another salient factor of realisms flawed
approach to the Russo-Ukrainian war is this: ignorance about Ukraine. Realists are not the only scholars who
have been, or are, ignorant about Ukraine. That ignorance is wide and deep, affecting virtually
every aspect of Americanand more generally Westernintellectual life. Knowledge about Ukraine has
war? Finally, Ukraine

been, and to a large degree still is, confined to a small coterie of specialists, almost none of whom specializes in international
relations theory or is committed to the realist worldview. Until recently,

realists had good reason to ignore

Ukraine.

After Kyiv gave up its nuclear weapons in 1994, Ukraine became at best a second- or third-rate power in the shadow of
the significantly larger, richer, and more powerful Russia. Russia was interesting to realists, all the more so as it had nuclear

28

weapons and posed a threat of sorts to the United States. Ukraine was boringat least until Russias invasion of Crimea
in March 2014 and the outbreak of war a few months later. As soon as Ukraine became a security issue for Russia, it also became a

The war confronted realists with an explanatory and policy task for
which they were wholly unprepared. Few could read Russian; my guess is that none knows Ukrainian. The
number of realists with an adequate understanding of Ukrainian history, politics,
culture, and economics could probably be counted on the fingers of one hand if that.
Nonetheless, there was a need to stake out a position concerning its conflict with
Russia that affirmed the realist position. As a result, realists evinced a woefully
embarrassing ignorance about elementary facts regarding Ukraine. Consider the following, from
security issue for realists.

Henry Kissingers March 5th op-ed in the Washington Post: The West must understand that, to Russia, Ukraine can never be just a
foreign country. Russian history began in what was called Kievan-Rus. The Russian religion spread from there. Ukraine has been part
of Russia for centuries, and their histories were intertwined before then. Some of the most important battles for Russian freedom,
starting with the Battle of Poltava in 1709, were fought on Ukrainian soil. Any Ukraine expert could have told Kissinger that Russian
history did not begin only in Kyivan (or Kievan) Rus. It began in many places, including Russia itself. The Russian religion did not
spread from what was called Kievan-Rus. What spread was Orthodox Christianity, and it spread from Constantinople. True, Ukraine
has been part of Russia for centuries, but it has been no less a part of the Mongol empire, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the Polish
Commonwealth, the Habsburg Empire, and the Ottoman Empire. The Battle of Poltava was fought by two empires, the Swedish and
Russian, and had nothing to do with Russian freedom or independence. In addition,

realists grasped at prefab

analytic approaches to Ukraine. Two examples will convey the point. Ukraine is allegedly deeply divided into
two irreconcilable and homogeneous blocs: western Ukraine speaks Ukrainian, supports the West, and detests Russia; eastern

That there are gradations, shadings, and


nuances in these divisions is irrelevant. That deep divisions must be politically
decisive is also taken for granted. Another bromide is that Ukraine is artificial,
consisting of territories and populations that were cobbled together in the course of several decades. Just what makes
Ukraine more artificial than France, Italy, Germany, the United States, Russia, or Great Britain remains
unarticulated. Just why Ukraines ethno-cultural and linguistic diversity should be more of a problem than any other
countrys also remains unexplored in realist accounts. Stephen F. Cohen nicely illustrates both clichs in a
Ukraine speaks Russian, detests the West, and supports Russia.

Nation article about fallacies concerning Ukraine: Fallacy No. 2: There exists a nation called Ukraine and a Ukrainian people
who yearn to escape centuries of Russian influence and to join the West. Fact: As every informed person knows, Ukraine is a country
long divided by ethnic, linguistic, religious, cultural, economic and political differencesparticularly its western and eastern regions,
but not only. When the current crisis began in 2013, Ukraine had one state, but it was not a single people or a united nation. Some
of these divisions were made worse after 1991 by corrupt elite, but most of them had developed over centuries. Unlike realists who
come out of international relations, Cohen should know better. Hes a lifelong student of the Soviet Union and Russia;
he speaks Russian. Alternatively, it may be his lifelong Russocentrism that blinds him to the Ukrainian side of things. Finally,

given their ignorance about Ukraine and inability to read its native texts , and given their
susceptibility to bromides as a substitute for knowledge, realists naturally tend to accept the
narratives of the country they believe matters most in the Russo-Ukrainian
conflictRussia. Thus, realists generally accept at face value Russian claims that NATO
is a threat to Russia. Just how a feeble alliance that lost its sense of purpose after the
end of the Cold War and that consists of countries that have slashed their defense budgets, cannot
imagine going to war anywhere, and would almost certainly never send troops to save Estonia,
say, from a Russian takeover could be a threat to anybody is unclear. Faced with that obvious objection, most
realists say that, although the alliance may not be objectively threatening, the
Russians perceive it differently and their perception is itself a reality. To illustrate this point, consider John
Mearsheimers empirically preposterous claims, in a recent issue of Foreign Affairs, about
why Ukraine is the Wests fault when he says that the taproot of the trouble is
NATO enlargement, the central element of a larger strategy to move Ukraine out of Russias orbit and integrate it into the
West. What larger strategy? Western policymakers have certainly been open to Ukraines efforts to
move westwards, but they have at best been consistently noncommittal about Ukraines actually joining any
key Western institutions such as the European Union and NATO. Mearsheimer goes on to claim that the EUs
expansion eastward and the Wests backing of the pro-democracy movement in Ukrainebeginning with the Orange
Revolution in 2004were critical elements, too. Ask Ukrainian democrats and theyll tell you that the Wests
29

backing of Ukrainian democracy has been lackadaisical and spotty. Who in the West
refused to cooperate with President Kuchma when he turned authoritarian? Who in the West denounced the criminal Yanukovych
regime? And who in the West did not succumb to Ukraine fatigue after 2008precisely the period when Ukrainian democracy most

Since the mid-1990s, he writes, Russian


leaders have adamantly opposed NATO enlargement, and in recent years, they have made it clear
that they would not stand by while their strategically important neighbor turned into a Western
bastion. Bastion? Can Mearsheimer be serious? Ally or partner perhaps. But bastion? He
needed Western support? Mearsheimer doesnt stop there.

continues: For Putin, the illegal overthrow of Ukraines democratically elected and pro-Russian presidentwhich he rightly labeled a
coupwas the final straw. He responded by taking Crimea, a peninsula he feared would host a NATO naval base, and working to

The ignorance in these two sentences is


simply astounding. For starters, democratic theoryand especially its Lockean variant, which
served as the justification for the American coup against the British crown in 1776 easily justifies popular
rebellions against dictators. Coups are never the handiwork of hundreds of
thousands of people, as every political scientist should know: they are the results of secret plots by
small cabals, usually based in the military. As any Ukraine expert could tell Mearsheimer, there
was no such thing in Ukraine. Most disturbing is the second sentence, which reveals
Mearsheimers ignorance of elementary facts about NATO. How could NATO
establish a base in Crimea when Ukraine is not a member of NATOand has zero chances of
becoming one anytime soon? Finally, realists engage in the worst kind of
evidentiary cherry-picking, citing only those Russian claims that support realism,
while ignoring the many others that do not. Most egregious is their
misinterpretation of Putin. As the above quotation from Mearsheimer demonstrates, realists insist that
Russias annexation of Crimea was a defensive reaction to the Wests attempts to transform Ukraine into a
bastion. But Putin, in all his explanations of the annexation, has consistently emphasized first, that
Crimea is historically Russian; second, that it holds a revered place in Russian memory
and culture; and third, that the Russian population in Crimea was under direct threat from
the fascists who had engineered the coup in Kyiv and therefore needed protecting. Indeed, Russias Federation Council
explicitly authorized on March 1st the use of force in defense of Russians and Russian speakers anywhere. Are Putins antirealist justifications delusional? Is he really a realist , as the realists insist, who doesnt know
it? Or is he, as Ukraine experts would claim, being quite frank about his imperial intentions and
aspirations to reestablish Russian glory? The reason realists feel that they have the
authority to pronounce on a country like Ukraine, with which they are only slightly acquainted, lies in their
belief that realism holds the answers to all inter-state relations in all places and at all
timesfrom Thucydides to today. As a Theory of Everything, realism doesnt need to know the
unique facts about countries and their people. All it needs to know is what it assumes to be a
priori true: that all states are rational actors pursuing their materially defined national interests and no contrary fact about
Ukraine or Russia could possibly place that assumption in question. Not surprisingly, realists and Ukraine experts differ
on what Western policy toward Ukraine and Russia should be. And their disagreements are anything but
academic. Realists generally reject all appeals to justice, fairness, liberation, and the like and
destabilize Ukraine until it abandoned its efforts to join the West.

insist that Russia will and should have its way in a struggle that affects its immediate national interests more than it does those of

As a result, the West should seek to accommodate Russia and convince


Ukraine to accept some form of subservienc e to its neighbor. As Mearsheimers writing partner, Stephen
the West.

Walt, wrote for Foreign Policy in March: Its easy to understand why Ukraine wants to jump in bed with the European Union and
NATO; what is not so obvious is why sharing the covers and pillows with Ukraine is something we should want to do. A country with a
bankrupt economy, modest natural resources, sharp ethnic divisions, and a notoriously corrupt political system is normally not seen
as a major strategic asset. Furthermore, the fact that US courtship of Ukraine happens to make Russian President Vladimir Putin
angry is not a good argument for embracing Kiev eithersimply put, Russia is the more important country. And a long-term
squabble isnt in Washingtons or Moscows long-term interest. Such a statement is diametrically opposed to the assumptions of

the roots of the conflict lie in the clash between


Russian and Ukrainian regime types, and their history, culture, ideology, and values;
that Russias regime, imperial ambitions, and ideology pose a threat to the West as much as they
Ukraine experts, who generally emphasize that

30

threaten Ukraine; and that Russia cannot be accommodatednot because thats normatively bad, but because doing so would

Russia can only be stopped, by means of the


Wests support of Ukrainian independence, security, and stabilitynot because thats the morally right
thing to do, but because its easier to stop Russia in the Donbas than in Silesia. The
choice for policymakers is simple: Whom should they trust morearea specialists who claim to
know their country of interest well or grand theoreticians who believe that their
theory is, was, and always will be right? The megalomania of realism should
caution policymakers against hewing too closely to a Theory of Everything that
rests its boastful claims of omniscience on empirical knowledge of nothing.
Theory should inform and enlighten; it should suggest new ways of seeing and understanding. But it can be useful if
and only if it is grounded in actual facts. Assumptions about reality cannot
trump knowledge of reality.
upend the world order and affect the security and survival of the West.

Neorealism is overly simplistic it doesnt take into account


tension fluctuation
Lapeyre 13 - Segolene is a U3 student completing an Honours BA in Middle Eastern Studies with a Minor
concentration in Political Science at McGill University. [Segelone China and Japan in Anarchy: A Neorealist and
Constructivist Explanation of the Kurihara Island Conflict McGill International Review November 30 2013, CSS]
The neorealist theory of anarchy is best explained in Mearsheimers Anarchy and the Struggle for Power, and can
be applied to the conflict between China and Japan over the Kurihara Islands. Drawing from the static assumption
that states are rational actors and the main players of system-level political interaction, Mearsheimer describes the
international system as inherently anarchic, characterized by security competition and war.[4] For neorealists, the
structure in which China and Japan interact is itself defined in terms of anarchydevoid of central authority
forming a self-help system in which perceptions of imperfect information shape the reaction of rational actors. This
definition of anarchy is quite simplistic: anarchy being a constant, the identity of the actors plays a minimal role in

neorealism does not take into account the domestic


or historical background of the actors involved . Further, anarchy fosters an atmosphere of
the structure of the system. In other words,

suspicion and hostility: not only do they [states] look for opportunities to take advantage of one another, they also

China and Japan


anticipate an end to a conflict that does inflict gains or losses on either party; thus,
both actors perceive the islands as a relative gain they seek to acquire. Lastly, anarchy in
work to ensure that other states do not take advantage of them.[5] Interacting in anarchy,

neo-realist theory encompasses three crucial elements: relative standing extant from the security dilemma, power
as potential or actual, and sovereignty as tied to the autonomy of states domestic political order. The neo-realist
discourse understands the security dilemma and the subsequent issue of relative standing as central to its
definition of anarchy: security is understood relative to other actors capabilities. Because of the competitive nature
of anarchy, any states attempt to increase its own security will threaten anothers safety and exacerbate a cycle of
suspicion fueled by biased perceptions. The security dilemma yields a suboptimal outcome because self-interested
actions lead to unintended consequences; this provides a strong incentive for states to adopt uncooperative

The neorealist explanation of the Kurihara Island conflict would argue that
as two regional powers, neither China nor Japan want to decrease their relative
standing or sovereignty in East Asia. This is a rather simplistic explanation of the
conflict, as neorealism heavily emphasizes security issues as a constant condition of
anarchy and neglects to explain what caused the shift from a balanced to a tense
system. Thus, neorealism partially explains why China sent military forces to the
islands: as a response to Japans official claim to sovereignty over the islands, as an attempt to deter Japan from
policies.[6]

confrontation, or from reaffirming its former claim; and as a demonstration of Chinese power over Japanese policy.
In this way, understanding this conflict transcends who acquires the islands and highlights the reputations and
statuses at stake, which neorealism only explains in terms of security and threats. In line with the concept of
competitive anarchy, whichever state backs down in this dispute will be perceived as the weaker onetherefore,
both Japan and China are island-racing and escalating tensions. The issue with defining anarchy in terms of the

neorealism neither takes into account fluctuations from peace to


tensions, nor explains in what way Japan will respond to the increasing hostility.
security dilemma is that

31

32

-China
Realism wrong in the context of Chinaempirics, opportunity costs to
counter-balancing, economics
HSIUNG 15-Professor of Politics @ NYU, PhD in Political Science @ Columbia [James, Utility vs. Inadequacy of
Realist IR Theory: Assessing Chinas Rise, (review), International Studies Review (2015) 17, 132137, DKP]

Chans work can be considered as a separate discourse on both the rich contributions
and debilitating limitations (p. 3), even ill-effect s, of balance-of-power theory, but
uses Chinaor to be more exact, its treatment by the balancing the-orists (especially as translated into US
policy)as an empirical illustration of his critique. In doing so, he makes some th ought-provoking
constructive points on these limits or even unintended, self-defeating effects. Due
to space con-straints, we focus on only the most potent parts of Chans critique. First, the cl aim of
structural determinism is hardly sustainable. According to structural realism (or
neorealism), states are positional, not atomic, in an anarchical system whose units
(states) are variably endowed with resources and power capabilities. Their instinct for
survival is directly attuned to how power distrib-utes (in other words, configures) across the system, and to the
strategic impera-tive of alliance making against an overwhelming power, to counter the powe rimbalance (or

If that logic be true, then Chinas neighbors should be driven by this


structural imbalance to counteract its rise. But, the non-occurrence of this outcome,
he notes, is intriguing since there is no regional security community that may dampen
the impulse to balance (Chapter 3). Second, ideas/concepts such as balance can be and are used in
confusing and inconsistent ways. In reality, states do not conform to the expectations of
balance-of-power theories. Instead of other states (including China) balancing against US
hegemonic power, it is the United States that is trying to balance against China, the rising
balance deficit).

powerwhen the latter does not even possess 80% of the United States military power, a threshold held by the
power-transition theory to be necessary if a rising power is going to challenge the hegemon (p.223f).Third, Chans
discourse makes additional scattered critiquing commentarieson both balancing theory and the policies it has

neither historical outcomes nor historical processes have


generally con-formed to balance-of-power theories. One example is that hierarchy has
repeatedly triumphed over anarchy, as found in instances in which Rome, the QinDynasty, the Inca
inspired. On theory, it arguesthat

Empire, imperi al China, Britain, and the United States have, atone time or another, successfully established

due to their
emphasis on armaments and alliances, balancing policies entail significant
opportunity costs and can trigger a spiral of competition and self-defeating
consequences (p.224). Fourth, although without invoking the term geoeconomics, Chan at times is
implying a distinction between, and a possible mix of, geopolitical conflict and what may be
considered geoeconomic cooperation in the post-Cold War age of economic globalization. For example,
invoking Scott Kastners (2009) study,Chan highlights th e expanding trade across the Taiwan Strait
as a paradigmatic example of how economic interdependence can thrive even
between ostensible(geopolitical) adversaries (p. 99). While Asian states have turned away
from (geo-political) balancing policies as traditionally pre scribed by balance-of-power theories, Chan notes,
they have pursued a policy emphasizing economic performance at home and an
intensifying economic integration with the mam-moth China market.
regional or global heg emony, acondition contrary to anarchy. On policy, Chan claims that

33

Realism fails to explain China risedoesnt assume unique


political and cultural influences
Hudda 15 Student at University of Hong Kong getting a degree in E-IR [Nabil Interpreting the Rise of
China: Realist and Liberalist Perspectives E-International Relations Students, April 3, 2015, http://www.eir.info/2015/04/03/interpreting-the-rise-of-china-realist-and-liberalist-perspectives/, CSS]
While there are different types of Realism,[6] proponents such as Kenneth Waltz and Hans J. Morgenthau agree on
the pessimistic assumption that human nature is selfish and the international system is anarchic.[7] That is, it lacks
a governing authority above and beyond the state. This lacuna leaves self-interested sovereign statesthe central
actors in world politicscompeting for power and security.[8] This competition is a zero-sum game in that states
seek to take advantage of any possible means to achieve relative gains. Since states often fail to cooperate in the
Realist self-help system,[9] survival depends on the struggle for power and security, which can ultimately lead to
conflict.[10] In a world where perceptions matter,[11] Chinas actions are in some quarters perceived as Realist.
Those who argue a realist perspective when interpreting Chinas rise look to several distinctive examples. Two of
these will be analysed in this paper: military expansionism and historical analogy. Realist interpretations have been
bolstered by Xi Jinpings declaration of a China Dream resulting in the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,
[12] as well as retired Peoples Liberation Army Colonel Liu Mingfus directives that China needs to take over from
the United States as the worlds greatest military power.[13] However ,

through a comprehensive
illustration of these two facets of Realist concern (military expansionism and historical analogy),
we will see that Realism cannot fully account for them . Chinas unprecedented economic
growth has been coupled with the worlds largest military build-up[14] via a huge expansion of military spending
and technological advancement. This would superficially adhere to Realist interpretations of a China that wants to
change the international system and obtain global hegemony.[15] Statistics compiled by Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) confirm Chinas dramatic increase in military expenditure; during the
period 20032012, its military expenditure increased by 175 per cent, significantly more than any other state listed
in SIPRIs Yearbook[16]. In monetary terms, SIPRI states that Chinas annual defence spending rose from over $30
billion in 2008 (when it became the second largest military spender) to almost $170 billion in 2010. Furthermore,
estimates published by The Economist in 2012 show that, if recent trends continue, Chinas military spending could
overtake Americas after 2035.[17] In addition, Chinas military expansion has led it to be more confident in its
military capacities and more assertive in their use. Realist interpretations are reinforced by the Taiwan AntiSecession Law.[18] Furthermore, Jia Xiudongs[19] comment in response to Taiwanese independenceWe will use
whatever means we have to prevent it happening[20]shows Chinas military capabilities go well beyond
Taiwan, helping to strengthen realist interpretations of Chinas rise. A Pentagon senior defence officials opinion
that the balance of cross-Strait military forces continues to shift in the mainlands favour supports this.[21]

solely Realist interpretations of Chinas rise through a military perspective


would constitute an oversimplification and exaggeration of reality. As SIPRI figures show in
Nevertheless,

terms of military expenditure as a percentage of GDP, Chinas (2 per cent) military expenditure is less than half that
of the United States (4.4 per cent) and lower than that of the UK (2.5 per cent), Russia (4.4 per cent), France (2.3
per cent), India (2.5 per cent), and Saudi Arabia (8.9 per cent). Thus, As a percentage of GDP, Chinese military
expenditures do not appear to have reached levels where one could conclude that the Chinese economy is being
militarised and mobilised to balance against US power.[22] In addition, data listing military spending as a
percentage of the world share shows Chinas 5.5% representing spending of 89.8$bn remains significantly behind

While Chinas increased military


assertiveness has been highlighted, it is also important to note its diverse role in the
international community. For example, Chinas troop deployment for UN Peacekeeping Operations has
the United Statess 45.7% representing 739.3$bn [23].

seen a twenty-fold increase since 2000,[24] and in 2012, Chinas troop contributions to peacekeeping operations
outnumbered those of all permanent members of the UN Security Council.[25] While there may be vested interests

the level of cooperation and integration exhibited by its increasing role


in UN peacekeeping missionswhich seek global peace and securitysuggests states are not
only self-interested, as Realist theory would advocate. Hence, to use only Realist
interpretations of Chinas rise provides too narrow a view, as it does not explain the
full extent of Chinas rise through military aspirations. Another important empirical illustration
at stake for China,

of the Realist interpretation of Chinas rise is the United States response to Chinas military expansion. US Defence
Department figures evidence the considerable military presence of the United States in the Asia-Pacifica region
blighted by territorial rights and surrounding resource-rich waters[26]. As part of a response which the United
States calls a pivot or rebalance[27] towards the Asia-Pacific region, there have been efforts to bolster
Americas military presence in the region. This has resulted in increased naval assets in Singapore, a full marine
task force in Australia planned by 2016, increased troop and hardware deployment in South Korea, a new military

34

access agreement with the Philippines, and a commitment that 60 per cent of US Navy assets will be deployed to
the Asia-Pacific region by 2020.[28] The pivot or rebalance towards the Asia-Pacific region seems to align with the
Realist Thucydides Trap cited earlier. As Thucydides puts it, It was the rise of Athens and the fear that this
inspired in Sparta that made war inevitable.[29] In other words: The dynamic inherent when a rapidly rising power
(China) becomes more confident, a ruling power (US) fears losing its edge, and entangling alliances on each side
drive the parties towards war.[30] History seems to support the tendency for war: In 11 of 15 cases since 1500 in
which a rising power rivalled a ruling power, the outcome was war.[31] If we consider John Mearsheimers
argument valid, China will respond to the American build-up by pushing the United States out of Asia, in much the
way the US pushed the European great powers out of the Western Hemisphere.[32] One view is that China will
come up with its own version of the Monroe Doctrine as Japan did in the 1930s.[33] However, it is problematic to
use the Thucydides Trap and Mearsheimers predictions to assess Chinas rise through Realist interpretations.
Although former US Defence Secretary Robert Gates comments that the US pivot isnt about China at all, his
clarification that it is more about our relationships with the rest of Asia suggests a much more balanced approach

President Obama compliments the positive role that


China can play: from reducing tensions on the Korean peninsula to preventing
proliferation [to] seeking more opportunities for cooperation with Beijing [which will
then Realists would claim.[34] In addition,

include] greater communication [between militaries in order to] promote understanding and avoid

This weakens the case for the use of Realist interpretations in


relation to the rise of Chinanot entirely, but enough to conclude that a fully Realist
interpretation of Chinas rise is inadequate. Elements highlighted by Mr Bates and President
miscalculation.[35]

Obama, cooperation, communication and reducing tension, in addition to the actual visit of Chinas top
military commander General Chen Bingde to the United States in order to improve military ties,[36] decrease the
likelihood of falling into the Thucydides Trap. It can be argued that Mearsheimers arguments, based on historical
analogies, are too weak to hold merit in this discussion. How can historical analogies from an American experience
predict what China, a country with a contrasting and unique history and culture, will do today? Analogical
arguments are not causes or explanations; they tend to haphazardly pick and choose the similarities to focus on,
while ignoring potentially important differences.[37]

35

Immoral (Liberalism)
Realism is immoralignores suffering, accepts genocide, and
causes conflicts to become worse
-indicts Walt
COHEN 16-foreign editor @ NYT, MA in History and French @ Balliol College, Oxford University [Roger, The
Limits of American Realism, New York Times, 1/11/2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/12/opinion/the-limits-ofamerican-realism.html?_r=0, DKP]

Is realism really, really what America wants as the cornerstone of its foreign policy? Stephen M.
Walt, a professor of international affairs at Harvard University, has an eloquent ode to realism in Foreign Policy magazine. He
argues that, with realism as the bedrock of its approach to the world over the past quarter century, the
United States would have fared far better. Realists, he reminds us, have a generally
pessimistic view of international affairs and are wary of efforts to remake the world
according to some ideological blueprint. Pessimism is a useful source of prudence in both international and
personal affairs. Walts piece makes several reasonable points. But he omits the major European confli ct of
the period under consideration the wars of Yugoslavias destruction, in which some
140,000 people were killed and millions displaced. Realists had a field day with that
carnage, beginning with former Secretary of State James Bakers early assessment that, We dont have a dog in
that fight. This view was echoed by various self-serving assessments from the Clinton White
House that justified inaction through the portrayal of the Balkans as the locus of millennial feuds neither comprehensible
nor resolvable. True, discerning a vital American national interest in places with names like Omarska was not obvious, even if the

The realpolitik case for


intervention was flimsy. Sarajevo was not going to break America, less even than Raqqa today. The moral
case was, however, overwhelming, beginning with the Serbian use in 1992 of concentration
camps to kill Bosnian Muslim men deemed threatening, and expel Muslim women and
children. These methods culminated at Srebrenica in 1995 with the Serbian slaughter of about 8,000 male
inhabitants. In the three-year interim, while realists rationalized restraint, Serbian shelling of
Sarajevo blew up European women and children on a whim. Only when President
Clinton changed his mind and NATO began concerted bombing was a path opened
to ending the war. I covered that conflict and its resolution. For my baby-boomer generation, spared Europes repetitive
bloodshed by American military and strategic resolve, it was a pivotal experience. After that, no hymn to realism
pure and simple could ever be persuasive. Walt calls me a liberal internationalist; Ill take that as an
honorable badge. He describes the expansion eastward of NATO after the end of the Cold War as a
textbook combination of both hubris and bad geopolitics that needlessly poisoned
relations with Russia. This argument is in fact a textbook example of the cynicism
and smallness inherent in realism. Guaranteeing security as the basis for a liberal
order in nations from Poland to Estonia emerging from the trauma of the Soviet Imperium
amounts to a major American strategic achievement. (Baker was instrumental in it, proof he was more
than a Walt-school realist.) Ask any Pole, Lithuanian or Romanian if they think America erred. Realists tend to dismiss
human suffering; its just the way of the world. Hundreds of millions of people in Europe were
ushered from totalitarian misery to democratic decency under the protection of the United
States and its allies. A debt incurred at Yalta was repaid. European peace and security were
extended, an American interest. There is little doubt that President Vladimir Putin would today have
overrun at least one of the Baltic countries, absent their NATO membership. Putin
has created havoc precisely in the no mans lands Georgia and Ukraine rather than in
wars upset the European peace America had committed to maintaining since 1945.

36

the NATO lands. Russias interest, post-1990, was in the dismemberment of the European-American bond, most potently
expressed in NATO. That was the real problem. The United States, almost alone among nations, is also an idea.
Excise the notion of the global extension of liberty and its guarantees from American
policy and something very meager remains. Putin is a fierce, opportunistic realist. But Americans
Donald Trump notwithstanding do not want that dish on their tables. They especially do not want it after the
Syrian debacle. Walt argues that realists would have dissuaded President Obama from saying
President Bashar al-Assad must go and setting a red line. But the problem was not that uttering
these words was unrealistic. It was that failing to follow up on them was feckless. Syria has illustrated
the limits of White House realism. Realism has dictated nonintervention as hundreds of
thousands were killed, millions displaced, and Islamic State emerged. Realism has
been behind acquiescence to Assads barrel-bomb brutality. If Iraq illustrated disastrous American
pursuit of an ideological blueprint, Syria has demonstrated a disastrous vacuum of American
ideas. Realism is an essential starting point for American foreign policy. It was absent on Iraq: The result was mayhem that, as
Walt rightly says, cost America several trillion dollars. Realism brought the Iran nuclear accord, a signal achievement. More of it

But this is more a time to acknowledge the limits of realism as a


means to deal with the evil of ISIS, the debacle of Syria, or the desperate European refugee crisis than to cry out for
more, or suggest that it is underrepresented in American discourse.
might help on Israel-Palestine.

37

Not Real World


Realism isnt useful in practiceits overly restrictive, lacks
consensus, and nobody actually cares
-includes Walt indict
DREZNER 16-professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts
University [Daniel, You know its hard out there for a foreign policy realist, Washington Post, 4/13/2016,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2016/04/13/you-know-its-hard-out-there-for-a-foreign-policyrealist/, DKP]

Lets tell a tale of two Stephen Walt columns. In the first one, he argued vehemently that no
matter what some might say, Donald Trump is not a realist. It closed with this parenthetical: Theres a final reason to
question whether Trump is a realist. Many people think President Barack Obamas views on foreign policy reflect a realist
perspective and cite his recent Atlantic interview as supporting evidence. Given how critical Trump is of Obama, its hard to see how
both of them could qualify for the realist label. Ill address the question of Obamas realism next week. And six days passed, and
lo, Walt argued vehemently that , no matter what some might say Obama is no realist: In short,
Obama did not in fact run a realist foreign policy, because he doesnt fully embrace a realist worldview, didnt appoint many (any?)
realists to key positions, and never really tried to dismantle the bipartisan consensus behind the grand strategy of liberal hegemony.
As Ive noted before, a genuinely realist foreign policy would have left Afghanistan promptly in 2009, converted our special
relationships in the Middle East to normal ones, explicitly rejected further NATO expansion, eschewed regime change and other
forms of social engineering in foreign countries such as Libya or Syria, and returned to the broad strategy of restrained offshore
balancing that served the United States so well in the past. Now I may be just a simple country international relations scholar, but I

You cant argue that Trump isnt a realist because Obama is a


realist in Column A and then disavow Obamas association with realism in Column B.
Indeed, Walts assessment of Obama focuses on the noisy aspects of his foreign policy
(Libya) at the expense of his more long-lasting moves (the rebalancing to East Asia). Its a
surprisingly non-realist assessment. In both of his columns, Walt makes the perfect
the enemy of the good when it comes to realism. By his extremely stringent
criteria, there will only be a realist president if that elected official got a PhD in international
relations from the University of Chicago and then hired the ghost of George Kennan to be secretary
of state. Its too restrictive. By these criteria, George W. Bush was not a neoconservative
and no president has been a liberal internationalist. The world is a messy place, and no
politician will ever pursue a policy that is fully consistent with a theoretical
paradigm. Yet that appears to be the realists threshold for labeling a leader a realist. Both Trumps campaign staff and
know that dog wont hunt.

Obama himself have made statements averring their sympathy with the realist worldview. Other commentators have also noted
that, in their own ways, Trump and Obama seem pretty realist. So why, in a world when realists constantly bemoan their
marginalized influence over American foreign policy, arent realists embracing these politically powerful patrons? I dont have a

Realists have spent


a century building up a theoretical edifice to explain how the world works. Indeed, one of the
problems with discussing whether someone is a realist is that there are so many academic variations
of realism classical realism, offensive realism, defensive realism, structural neorealism, neoclassical realism that one
begins to wonder whether anyone is a realist anymore. At the same time, realists
also offer normative prescriptions of what to do about American foreign policy. But sometimes these
two approaches to realism do not mesh well. Both Trump and Obamas realist-friendly statements expose this
contradiction. The second is anthropological. In my close field observation of modern academic realists, Ive noticed that their
favorite intellectual position in the world is to be ostracized and right. That is to say, realists
like to believe themselves to be speaking deep powerful truths at the same time
that no one actually listens to them. Its the ideal intellectual posture to hold,
because it means that a realist can make bold pronouncements that have no real world
impact because, ostensibly, no one cares what they say. If, God forbid, real-live politicians started
definitive answer to this question, but let me offer three possible hypotheses. The first is theoretical.

38

Better to remain
cloistered and right and to get ones hair mussed. The third is political. As Ive said before, the most realist-friendly
politicians in recent years have not been the most admired leaders. True, Obama is pretty popular at this
point, but that has little to do with his foreign policy. And to be fair, it seems that non-realists have been the most
eager to label Trump as a realist. So there are good and valid political reasons that realists
want to disassociate themselves and their worldview from these individuals. I dont doubt that realists disapprove
doing what they advocated, theyd have real power and responsibility on their hands, which is scary.

of either Trump or Obama. I just dont think theyre doing it for realist reasons.

Offensive realism is too divorced from its original tenants to be


politically useful
WRIGHT 16-Director, Project on International Order and Strategy, Fellow, Foreign Policy, Center on the United
States and Europe, Project on International Order and Strategy @ Brookings [Thomas, Realisms utopia: Why
academic realism almost never works in Washington, Brookings, 1/13/2016, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/orderfrom-chaos/posts/2016/01/13-washington-academic-realism-wright, DKP]

Walts asked What would a realist world have looked like? He argued that
realism has a much better track record over the past two decades than liberal
internationalism or neo-conservatism. The article has generated considerable
debate among foreign policy types in recent days. Walt is an exceptional theoretician who has
Last week in Foreign Policy magazine, Stephen

influenced generations of international relations students. He is justified in pointing out that realists recognized the dangers of
invading Iraq and challenges of nation-building when many others did not. This is a part of the long tradition of realist opposition to
wars of choice on the periphery of the global chessboard. This aspect of his message often resonates in Americaeven in
Washington. After all, the American people elected a president in 2008 who agreed with realists about Iraq, and many more
policymakers have come around since. The lack of support for a full-scale intervention in Syria is a further sign that Washington is a

Realism is a broad church with much insight


to offer for U.S. foreign policy. However, one of the reasons it is not more influential
is that the people who actually think about realist doctrine for a livingthat is, academic realists,
including Walthave gone in a strategic direction that would abruptly overturn six
decades of American foreign policy tradition. The core foreign policy belief of modern
academic realism, as it has developed since the Cold War, is that the United States is relatively safe
and secure given its geographical position, its large arsenal of nuclear weapons, and the absence of a potential hegemonic
challenger overseas. Realists believe that Americas vast array of overseas commitments
and interventions poses the greatest threat to U.S. interests. These commitments,
they say, are prohibitively expensive, entrap the United States in unnecessary wars, needlessly
aggravate other countries in ways that threaten the United States, and encourage free riding by socalled allies as they let the American taxpayer pay for everyone elses security. Consequently, these realists are
arguing for a radical overhaul of U.S. strategy. Realists widely regard MIT Professor Barry Posens book
"Restraint" as the most sophisticated and coherent description of a realist foreign policy. In it, he argues that the United States
should replace NATO with a new more limited security cooperation agreement
without a mutual defense clause like Article V. He further advocates for dramatically reducing the U.S.
commitment to Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea, as well as reducing U.S.
involvement in the Middle East. Academic realists across the board widely support his recommendations, and
some would go further. This is something truly new and revolutionary. If there is a core
foreign policy principle in Washington, it is the sanctity of U.S. alliances and the
U.S.-led international order as a whole. Democrats and Republicans alike want to
strengthen alliances, even as they differ over burden-sharing and other issues. No one in the
establishment favors large-scale retrenchment from what have come to be recognized as vital interests
for over 60 years. Interestingly, this was a core belief of academic realists not too long ago, as well. Posen himself was of this
little more realist than before. Undoing Americas global role

view immediately after the Cold War. But it is this principle that academic realists have now made their primary target. They

39

believe that if the United States pulls back from the world, others will be forced to do
what the United States currently provides. Japan and other states in Asia will do more to balance China. European
countries will reverse their defense cuts. This, in the view of realists, will enhance security competition in some regions, particularly
in East Asiawhile that may be unfortunate for the people who live there, it will work to the benefit of the United States, or so the

For realists, the United States only has to worry about East Asia,
Europe, or the Middle East if a rival power is poised to dominate there. The sheer physics of
argument goes. Balancing act

balancing mean this is very unlikely to happenbut if it did, there would be enough time to intervene and tip the balance against

one leading realist explicitly make this point at a conference a couple of years ago (it was under the
Chatham House rule, allowing me to share the insight but not identify the speaker). He argued that the United States
should look to the 1930s as a model: allow other states to duke it out and intervene
only later on, when absolutely necessary, and under favorable conditions. The 1930s is not typically depicted
as a model, and there are easy points to be scored there. But there is a much more fundamental issue at
stake: Manipulating regional insecurity is a core goal of the strategy commonly
called off-shore balancing. The off-shore power (in this case, the United States) should
encourage disunity and rivalry between regional actors and take advantage of the opportunities it
provides. This strategy could not be further from the mainstream in Washington. For over seven decades, the United
States has sought to reduce regional security competition in Western Europe and Asia.
One purpose of the Cold War alliances was to exert U.S. control over allies, to
prevent them from aggravating their democratic neighbors. Thus, the United States provides
security to Japan so it will not build capabilities that worry South Korea or others.
This was also originally one of the reasons for NATO. Since the Cold War, even after the
Soviet threat disappeared, the United States has gone to extraordinary lengths to
promote regional integration and cooperation in Asia and Europe. Academic realists believe
that many of these steps, including NATO expansion, were mistakes. When it is put to them
that if the Baltics were not in NATO today, Russia may have invaded, their response
is that the United States has no interests there. A new generation of realism Back in the era of Henry
Kissinger, realism was about preservation of the international equilibrium. It was
about incremental change from within the system, rather than revolutionary acts. This advice provided
the rival. I heard

guidance for how to handle rivals who sought to upset the balance and for exercising restraint oneself. For Kissingerian realists,

the most important aspect of U.S. alliances is that they exist and are widely
accepted as a cornerstone of a legitimate international order. Realism today is unrecognizable
from its antecedents. It proposes to voluntarily dissolve an order that is quite
popular in Europe and Asia on the basis of an untested theory. To disband or greatly weaken
Americas traditional alliances, either tacitly or formally, would be a revolutionary act. It
would surely shake the equilibrium. Classical realists would have recoiled at such an
experiment. Modern-day realists embrace the prospect of chaos and uncertainty . It is
academic realism's new direction, more than anything else, that has detached it from the policy debate in Washington.

Academics often discuss how to be policy-relevant, but now they find themselves in
an unusual position. They are writing on topics that are relevant and of great interest to
policymakers, but their ideas on alliances and retrenchment are so far out of the political
mainstream to ensure that they will be cast aside. The great irony is that post-Iraq, there
appears to be a market in Washington for classical pragmatic realism that provides a prudent way of
strengthening and preserving the U.S.-led international order, including particularly reducing somewhat the U.S. commitment in the
Middle East. Chasing the revolution,

few if any in the academy feel it is a call worth their while

answering.

40

Non-Unique
No uniquenessevery presidential candidate is definitively
anti-realist
ROVNER 16-John G. Tower Distinguished Chair in International Politics and National Security at Southern
Methodist University, where he also serves as director of the Security and Strategy Program [Joshua, Daniel
Drezner says Donald Trump is the champion of foreign policy realism. Hes wrong. Its Barack Obama., The
Washington Post, 2/11/2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/02/11/daniel-dreznersays-donald-trump-is-a-champion-of-foreign-policy-realism-hes-wrong-its-barack-obama/, DKP]

The next president is likely to bring back a liberal internationalist approach to


foreign policy. Almost all the current candidates , with the exception of Trump and perhaps Bernie
Sanders, say they will deploy U.S. forces more often. The establishment Republican contenders are
historically hawkish. Anti-establishment Republicans accuse the administration of signaling U.S. weakness and

Trumps eagerness to pick fights suggests that Drezners analysis


he is unfamiliar with realist wisdom about how U.S. belligerence will make
other states more belligerent in response. His calls for a strong military a very, very strong military
suggest a defense budget far beyond what an1y realist would support . On the
Democratic side, Hillary Clinton remains the face of internationalism, though her policies
may be more hawkish than Bill Clintons were. She famously voted for the Iraq War while in
the Senate, and as secretary of state she pushed the president to intervene in Libya and
lobbied for more active support for Syrian rebels. Sanders is more cautious, especially about
emboldening its enemies.
notwithstanding

intervening in the Middle East; his approach appears similar to Obamas. But Sanderss broader strategic
preferences are still unclear, as his campaign has focused overwhelmingly on domestic issues. After the election,

the U.S. turn to realism is likely to end. Given increasing public disapproval for
Obamas restraint, the next president may be pushed into one conflict or another.
The president himself has begun laying the groundwork for a more aggressive
strategy in the next administration, especially in his rhetoric about the Islamic State. He also
deployed an Army division headquarters to Iraq, which could accommodate many more than the 3,400 personnel
currently in Iraq and Syria, and recently called to quadruple U.S. military spending in Europe. The White House may
view these as temporary moves to placate domestic critics so that it can refocus diplomatic attention and military

it is increasingly hard to believe that the next administration will


carry on with the presidents grand strategy , given continued regional instability, the pressures of
domestic politics and the candidates statements. Realism may be in power now, but its victory
will almost certainly be fleeting.
resources on Asia. But

41

A2-China Hegemony
Structural geopolitical factors prevent Chinese bid for
hegemonyUS rise is a flawed comparison
-indicts Mearsheimers China rise argument
STEINSSON 14-Researcher at University of Iceland - Hskli slands,

MA in International Affairs, First-Class


Honours with Distinction @ University of Iceland [Sverrir, John Mearsheimers Theory of Offensive Realism and the
Rise of China, 3/6/2014, http://www.e-ir.info/2014/03/06/john-mearsheimers-theory-of-offensive-realism-and-therise-of-china/, DKP]

The flawed thinking that underlies Mearsheimers argument is one that


has been pervasive in the IR literature. Some scholars (Waltz 1959, 160; Mearsheimer 2001, 21)
argue that states go to war when the expected utility of war is greater than the expected
utility of not going to war (in effect, when the benefits exceed the costs). Such behavior would ultimately make states analogous
to compulsive gamblers (Fearon 1995, 388) though, as they repeatedly put everything on the line until they inevitably lose it all. If
we accept that a state has a 60% chance to succeed in each war it starts (which Mearsheimer (2001, 38) claims that the success
rate for aggression is), the state may win a few wars in succession but once the state inevitably loses a war, it puts its survival at
stake. So even if we accept Mearsheimers quantitative analysis, going to war every time it is deemed beneficial undermines a

Mearsheimers claim that offensive


action succeeds in 60% of cases is, however, misleading as he only counts individual wars , even
though they may be part of one bid for regional hegemony (Mearsheimer 2001, 39). For instance, Napoleonic France, Nazi
Germany and Imperial Japan all appear to be success stories, as they won more wars than they lost.
The glaring problem with this to any student of history is that once they lost, they were
ultimately destroyed. Their territorial integrity and domestic autonomy, the essence
of survival according to Mearsheimer (2001, 31), were lost. In fact, of all the bidders for regional
hegemony, there is only one successful state: the United States. Mearsheimer consequently admits that
states survival in a way that defensive security-seeking behavior would not.

only one in five states have succeeded in bidding for regional hegemony and that while it is not an impressive success rate the
American case illustrates that it is possible to achieve regional hegemony (Mearsheimer 2001, 212-213). In earlier writings, the
success rate is even more dire, as Mearsheimer (1990, 19) included not only Vilhelmine Germany, Napoleonic France, the United
States, Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan (the five bidders for hegemony listed in Mearsheimer (2001)) but also the Habsburg
Empire under Charles V, Spain under Philip II and France under Louis XIV. The success rate could therefore arguably be as poor as
one in eight. The Poster Child for Offensive Realism What does the the rise of the United States, the poster child for offensive

The US rise to regional hegemony (a


is important to offensive realism (it is,
after all, the case that shows that it is possible to achieve regional hegemony) and Mearsheimer repeatedly uses
it as a model for what will China will do (2005, 2006a, 161-162; 2010, 389-390). However, there are
clear limits to the comparison. Important factors are left out of
Mearsheimers telling of the US rise to regional hegemony. These factors illustrate why China cannot imitate
Uncle Sam. Chinas backyard simply does not look the same as the US did when it rose to
regional hegemony. First, there were no credible indigenous balancers to the US in Northern America
(native tribes, as well as future Mexican and Canadian states posed no credible threat to the US). Second, the European
great powers lacked sufficient incentives to prevent US expansion. The European
powers, consumed with power politics in Europe, prioritized power maximization at home
over containment of the United States in the Western hemisphere. Colin Elmans (2004) examination of the
Louisiana Purchase (1803), which doubled the territory of the US and gave the it an open path of expansion to the South
and West, illustrates this. Due to complex geopolitical reasons, Louisiana had become a geopolitical burden for France
realism, tell us about Mearsheimers theory and its application to the rise of China?
position of dominance and military superiority in the Western hemisphere)

(Elman 2004, 568-570). Consequently, its options were to hold onto Louisiana, sell the territory to the US, sell part of it to the US or
sell it all to Spain (Elman 2004, 571). By holding onto Louisiana, Frances position in the European distribution of capabilities would
have worsened, as it would have likely encountered a UK-US alliance in a war over the territory (which would have drained Frances
resources), but it would have contained the US (Elman 2004, 572). Selling the territory to Spain or part of it to the US would have
partly contained the US but only slightly improved Frances position in the European distribution of capabilities (Elman 2004, 572-

42

573). The option that France took was to sell the entire territory to the US at a hefty price, which significantly improved Frances
position in the Europe (as it lost a geopolitical burden and got paid handsomely for it) but did nothing whatsoever to contain the US

The reason why the US became a hegemon is therefore not due to


balancing inefficiencies as Mearsheimer argues but due to the absence of balancers
in the region. The same should therefore not apply to China which has balancers in
the region. In Chinas backyard there are currently two great powers (Russia and Japan), one emerging
giant (India) and at least two militarily adept stat es (South Korea and Vietnam), as well as a
foreign balancer (the United States) which has the capabilities to project military power
across the world and provide military support to Chinas neighbors. Both Russia and
India have nuclear weapons, and Japan and South Korea could likely develop them
quickly if they needed to. In contrast to US expansion, it would be suicidal for China to make a
bid for regional hegemony in such a neighborhood.
(Elman 2004, 571-572).

Even if tensions rise, MAD prevents escalation


-indicts Mearsheimer
STEINSSON 14-Researcher at University of Iceland - Hskli slands,

MA in International Affairs, First-Class


Honours with Distinction @ University of Iceland [Sverrir, John Mearsheimers Theory of Offensive Realism and the
Rise of China, 3/6/2014, http://www.e-ir.info/2014/03/06/john-mearsheimers-theory-of-offensive-realism-and-therise-of-china/, DKP]
A second major point that Mearsheimer makes against a peaceful rise is that we cannot know for sure that Chinas military
capabilities are meant solely for defensive purposes (Mearsheimer 2010, 383-384), which is an entirely legitimate point and one

what Mearsheimer fails to note is that the nature of some of


nuclear weapons, should decrease the intensity
of the insecurity created by others offensive military capabilities (Jervis 1978, 205-209). After all, the possession
of nuclear weapons deters external aggression and makes China safer. A doctrine of
mutually assured destruction (MAD) effectively ensures that China cannot make a bid for
hegemony. Russia, India and the US already have nuclear weapons, and South Korea
and Japan are capable of developing them quickly. Any Chinese bid for hegemony and external
aggression would make some states target their nuclear weapons on China while other
states would start developing them . Similarly, a nuclear China deters any other state,
even the sole hegemon, from compromising Chinas survival. M utually assured destruction
therefore alleviates the insecurity that China and its neighbors face as Chinas power grows.
Credible nuclear deterrence renders uncertainty about the nature of other states
military capabilities irrelevant.
which I will not challenge. However,

Chinas and other great powers weapons, specifically

43

A2-China War
Even if they win the world is inherently anarchy, China still has
zero incentive to risk waralso Mearsheimer is useless
-takes out any great power war impact, read with caution
STEINSSON 14-Researcher at University of Iceland - Hskli slands,

MA in International Affairs, First-Class


Honours with Distinction @ University of Iceland [Sverrir, John Mearsheimers Theory of Offensive Realism and the
Rise of China, 3/6/2014, http://www.e-ir.info/2014/03/06/john-mearsheimers-theory-of-offensive-realism-and-therise-of-china/, DKP]
A third point that Mearsheimer makes against a peaceful rise is that past and current behavior cannot be a reliable indicator of
future behavior, which makes Chinas peaceful behavior in recent decades irrelevant (Mearsheimer 2010, 384-385). Clearly, past

given that states are rational, concerned


with survival and power maximizers, it does not make sense that they should not
use past behavior as a way to calculate the severity of the threat posed by another
states existence. After all, it would be foolhardy to argue that there are not varying degrees by which states consider
each other threats and that these judgments are made partly as a result of past relations (Wendt 1995, 78-79). Mearsheimer
also pays no heed to the importance of showing consistency and reliability in
international relations. Considering that Chinas peaceful behavior has given it
strengthened relations across the world, membership in international organizations and
beneficial treaties, it is flawed to suggest that past behavior is irrelevant. Erratic and
hostile behavior does not attract friends. For China to start to engage in erratic expansionist
behavior would compromise all that has been built up in recent decades. If the world
community were to contain and isolate China, hostile Chinese behavior would make
sense, as there would be no incentives for China to play along. However, as the
world has opened to China with open arms, which has allowed China to increase its power and security, one
finds it hard to understand why China would take the first steps to break this up .
Mearsheimer certainly does not provide an internally coherent, logical
argument for why China would do so. Preemptive American aggression does not
make much sense either. First, due to the unlikelihood of a rational China bidding for
regional hegemony (for reasons that I have outlined above). Second, because China, even as a regional
hegemon, does not threaten American regional hegemony . Mearsheimer proposes that China
behavior cannot be a perfect indicator of future behavior. However,

will meddle in the US backyard which would compromise its status as regional hegemon. However, as Kirshner (2012, 65) notes,

China could meddle in the US backyard whether China is a regional hegemon or


not. Even if China were to try to undermine the US position as regional hegemon,
hegemony (as defined by Mearsheimer) should be robust enough to cope with such attacks.
Tang (2008, 461-462) also notes that neither the US nor China can engage in preemptive
unilateral aggression without appearing unreliable and threatening, which loses
them allies and carries heavy diplomatic costs. This precludes preemptive offensive
action by either party. For rational, security-seeking states that consider the costs
and benefits and pursue the strategy most likely to ensure a states survival, neither China nor the US in
Mearsheimers prediction actually appear to consider the costs and benefits and they do not appear to
prioritize survival above all else. Like Waltz, Mearsheimer does not fully flesh out how his
assumptions lead to the conclusion that states engage in aggressive behavior.
Mearsheimer only assumes that states are security-seekers. The conflicts that he
concludes result from his assumptions are a tragedy in which security-seeking states are brought into
conflict even though they do not want to. However, there is absolutely no reason why security-seeking
44

states should resort to aggression as a consequence of there being anarchy in the


international system and uncertainty regarding others states intentions and capabilities . Just as how the Waltzian
train never gets out of the station (Mearsheimer 2006c, 231), referring to Waltzs failure to assume that a threat
needed to exist for balance-of-power to emerge (Schweller 1996, 91-92), the theory that was supposed to
correct Waltzs flaws does not seem to do so either. While Mearsheimer (2001) is fairly ambiguous as to
the relationship between aggression and his assumptions, Mearsheimer (2006b, 121-122) clears it up by explicitly stating that his
theory does not assume that states are aggressive and that aggression is simply a logical consequence of his assumptions.

While anarchy leads to uncertainty about others intentions and fear about ones survival, there is
no reason why states should make the first hostile move even if there is an
intense security dilemma. While anarchy means that there is nothing to prevent war, there is no cause
for why a security-seeking state that fears other states intentions and capabilities should resort
to aggression. At no point is it clear that security-seeking states would always respond to the possibility of war by
becoming aggressive. If anything, fear is more likely to result in a defensive response. As Jack
Donnelly notes, fear is an essentially defensive motive; the central aim is to preserve what one already
has rather than to act offensively and preemptively (Donnelly 2000, 44). Pashakhanlous (2013, 207)
examination of the psychology literature on fear confirms that individuals tend to
respond to fear with defensive behavior. Aggression is not the logical consequence of fear that Mearsheimer
claims it is. Conclusion If states were irrational, if leaders of states were less concerned about a states survival than their own bank
accounts or re-election prospects, if states were assumed to be aggressive or if power maximization was inherent in mans nature,
one could understand the tendency to risk it all for hegemony. Rational, security-seeking states not assumed to be aggressive

Assuming that China is a


rational, security-seeking actor, does the prospect of a bid for dominance in Asia seem likely to enhance its
(Mearsheimer 2006b, 121-122) have no reason to engage in such bids, however.

chances of survival, given the well-known historical precedent of such revisionist behavior? After all, only one in five states (or
perhaps one in eight) have successfully bid for hegemony. That sole hegemon achieved hegemony under circumstances that do not
apply at all to China today. A nascent United States found itself on a continent without any serious indigenous challengers and
contained only by European powers that prioritized politics in Europe over US containment. China finds itself surrounded by regional
and external balancers, some of which have nuclear weapons. Given the unlikelihood that China will bid for hegemony and
compromise its security, does the prospect of strangling the Confucian baby in its cradle (Kirshner 2012, 61) seem likely to
enhance the US survival? Since a rational, security-seeking China has no reason to pursue hegemony, it would not seem as if the

Ultimately,
Mearsheimers theory is internally incoherent, as the conclusions he draws
contradict the assumptions he makes and, consequently, his assumptions cannot
logically lead to the conclusion that states will bid for hegemony. Mearsheimers
theory of offensive realism therefore does not provide a logically coherent basis for
the view that the rise of China will be unpeaceful. This is not to say that Chinas rise will turn out
peacefully. Mearsheimers theory may very well predict how the rise of China will turn out, but since it fails to explain why
in a logically coherent fashion, the theory is useless.
US, being a rational, security-seeking state, would have any incentive to crush China or otherwise provoke it.

Even if realism is true, US-China war is unlikely and unproven


counter balancing, institutions, interdependence
MACDONALD 15-MA in IR @ University of Victoria, former officer in the Canadian Armed Forces [Adam,
Analyzing Chinas Rise in International Relations Theory: Neo-Realism Part 1, CDA Institute,
https://www.cdainstitute.ca/en/blog/entry/analyzing-china-s-rise-in-international-relations-theory-neo-realism-part-1,
DKP]

Since its inception Neo-Realism has been the preeminent theory in IR studies , with much
of the discipline largely configured either in support or opposition to its theoretical projections and applications. Its founder Kenneth

Waltz constructed the theory to identify the unchanging casual factor accounting for
the regularity of war and conflict within international politics. This factor did not reside at the
level of leaders or the internal characteristics of states, but the anarchic structure of the
international realm (the absence of a reigning hegemonic authority). According to Neo-Realism, states
must provide for their own security in a self-help system, where mistrust and uncertainty
dominate. The relative distribution of material capabilities, particularly military power
45

cluster into poles the number of great powers whose configurations and interactions
largely determine the content of the international system. Great powers, furthermore, are locked in a
competition to build capabilities and alliance- making in order to balance against each
other. The resulting Balance of Power (BOP) is the most important consideration governing the
external behaviour of great powers in managing their relations. With the end of the Cold War, however,
and the emergence of the American unipolar concert, characterized by the marginalization of great power rivalry,
raised questions on the relevancy of Neo- Realism theory. Many realists argued forcefully
that un-polarity was an unsustainable configuration and that multipolarity and BOP logic would rematerialize, led by China by virtue of its size. Two decades later, realists assert that China , in
accordance with BOP logic, is expanding its power and interests by building a powerful military ,
specifically navy, as well as designing new economic and political rgime under its leadership in order to
diminish the power and potential threat of the US. BOP logic also explains the closer relationship
developing between Beijing and Moscow, largely based on a mutual desire to balance
against the US. As the BOP continues to shifts, however, other states will join the United
States to balance China, as is happening throughout South and East Asia. BOP logic, however, does not by itself explain
why balancing is being applied to China. If it is only a matter of the distribution of power , as Waltz
asserts, one would expect that states would be joining with China t o balance the US, in order to
dilute American power to a level commensurate with other great powers. In response to this apparent
anomaly, scholar Stephen Walt argues that it is the perceptions of what a rising state like
China will do with its newfound and growing power that is the issue. Chinas actions in
regional disputes such as in the East and South China Seas, therefore, are motivating others to ensure
the US maintains their regional, specifically military, presence. China will oppose these
developments, evident in Beijings commonly held view that the recent US Rebalance to
the region is specifically designed to contain its rise. Fueled by such uncertainty, Beijing
will continue to translate economic power into military assets intended to neutralize
American power projection, generating a sustained security dilemma between the two.
However, whether this will lead to war is a contested subject for many realists. For Waltz, while
intense security competition will continue to dominate international politics, the presence of nuclear weapons
has for now inhibited the excesses stemming from structural anarchy. In other words,
great power war is virtually inconceivable. Charles Glaser argues that interdependence
and institutions (often dismissed by realists as unimportant) have become interests in and of
themselves for both the US and China, which shall limit the extent of their security competition. Hugh
White argues for a Concert of Asia to be created and accepted by China and the
US, necessitating the construction of a strategic understanding with Japan, Russia, and India to
stem the excesses of great power competition if East Asia, and the international system at large, are to
(underpinned by economic power),

remain functional and prosperous.

Mearsheimer is wrong about war with Chinaoverly deterministic, ignores


empirics, self-defeating
MACDONALD 15-MA in IR @ University of Victoria, former officer in the Canadian Armed Forces [Adam,
Analyzing Chinas Rise in International Relations Theory: Neo-Realism Part 1, CDA Institute,
https://www.cdainstitute.ca/en/blog/entry/analyzing-china-s-rise-in-international-relations-theory-neo-realism-part-1,
DKP]

Others in the realist camp, though, think war and conflict are inevitable. Offensive
realists, specifically John Mearsheimer, argue adamantly that Chinas rise, regardless of any other factor,
will result in great power war with the US. For Mearsheimer, states do not just seek
security but power maximization by becoming regional hegemons and stunting others
46

China, therefore, will not be happy with just getting


rich under the current order but will seek to remove the US presence in Asia and build a new
system under its own auspicious. Such immutable laws of power, Mearsheimer asserts, have resulted
in what he calls the tragedy of great power politics, and as a result he aggressively promotes the US
to contain the rise of China to prevent such an eventuality. Mearsheimers theory, whose deterministic
assertions leave little room for states to behave in non- aggressive, power
maximizing ways, has been roundly criticized not only by his fellow international relations
theorists but also a host of historians who argue that there is virtually no case study to which
it is applicable. For example, why would the US allow China (and a host of other emerging powers) to prosper
and meaningful participated under the international system post-Cold War instead of applying
sanctions and deploying military blockades? Importantly, Waltz asserts his theory is
focused on explaining regularities in international politics over time, not specific foreign
policies of states which sometimes do not always act in accordance with BOP logic; anarchy shapes and
shoves but does not determine state behaviour. For example, despite Chinas impressive
military modernization efforts, Beijing still spends a relatively small amount of its potential
on these projects, especially compared to the US and Russia. Also, why does China retain a small
nuclear arsenal rather than racing for parity with the US and Russia to guarantee its survival at a
strategic level? Neo-Realism cannot answer these questions.
attempts to establish their own spheres of dominance.

47

A2-Mearsheimer
Mearsheimer is Useless flawed analogies, US centric approach, and fallacies
Liu 10 PhD candidate in Department of Politics and International Studies @ University of Cambridge
[Qianqian, Chinas Rise and Regional Strategy: Power, Interdependence and Identity,2010,
https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/bitstream/handle/1810/255468/201004-article7.pdf?sequence=1,SCJ ]

Mearsheimers argument seems problematic. His conclusion that China will threaten
the US is simply based upon historical analogies from the American experience .
While Mearsheimers theory of offensive realism might be powerful to explain the
foreign policy of the US, it does not mean that his theory can fully explain the whole
picture of contemporary Chinese foreign policy and regional strategy. As Johnston (2003,
p.28) suggests, historical analogies are analogies, not causes or explanations. Analogical
arguments tend to haphazardly pick and choose the similarities to focus on while
ignorin g potentially important differences. Actually states have their distinctive
characteristics which will differentiate themselves from others. Some typical characteristics
of Chinese foreign policy are influenced by Chinas unique historical experience. For
instance, the perception of how the Chinese views Chinas position in the world is a controversially mixed attitude of China being
both a great power and a weak power. On the one hand, due to its size, culture and history, China views itself as a great power. The

China tries to shape


itself as a great power in the world. China wants to demonstrate to the world that it
could be a great power economically and politically, and perhaps finally achieve the
same position as the US (Kurlantzi ck 2007, p.42). Meanwhile, Daguo guanxi [the great power relations] is always the
most importa nt issue in Chinas approach to foreign policy (Peoples Daily 16 March 2009). On the other hand, many
Chinese think that China is still weak economically and politically . A lot of areas, especially the
western part of China, are still undeveloped. In some occasions, such as Chinas application for the
WTO membership, Chinese leaders requested special privilege s due to its economic
underdevelopment.
rise of China is often described by many Chinese as daguo jueqi [the rise of a great power].

Offensive realism only leads to more destruction through the


pursuit of hegemony
Kirshner 12 - Professor of Government and Director of the Reppy Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies
at Cornell University [Jonathan The tragedy of offensive realism: Classical realism and the rise of China March
2012, European Journal of International Relations, http://ejt.sagepub.com/content/18/1/53.short, CSS]

Mearsheimer concludes that states, motivated to ensure their


own security, will recognize that the safest position in the system is one of regional
hegemony. (Global hegemony would be safer but is essentially unattainable. Here the classical realist agrees
as George F. Kennan argued, no people is great enough to establish world hegemony [Lukacs, 2007: 48].) Only a
regional hegemon is secure in the knowledge that it will not be conquered by
others. Thus, given the anarchic nature of the international system, states that can plausibly make bids for
From these assumptions,

regional hegemony will do so, as a matter of their own assessment of their best chances for survival. States quickly
understand that the best way to ensure their survival is to be the most powerful state in the system; only a
misguided state would pass up an opportunity to be the hegemon in the system (Mearsheimer, 2001: 2, 3, 33, 55).

The fatal flaw in Mearsheimers argument, however, is in his failure to distinguish


between being a hegemon and bidding for hegemony. It may indeed be that the ideal situation
is to be the hegemon in the system. But according to his theory, survival is the number one goal of great powers
(Mearsheimer, 2001: 34, 46). The central question for a great power mulling a bid for hegemony, therefore, is not If

48

I was the hegemon, will I be more likely to survive? It is, If I make a bid for hegemony, will I be more likely to
survive? And here the answer should be obvious to any rational great power (and, again, assumption five assumes

bidding for hegemony is one of the few and rare paths to


destruction for a great power. Most great powers are extremely likely to survive; most great powers that
great power rationality)

bid for hegemony do not. In contemporary practice, the facts on the ground expose this basic contradiction of
Mearsheimers argument, rooted in assumptions about the primacy of the survival goal and of rationality. Is Chinas
survival really in jeopardy if it does not aggressively bid to dominate all of Asia? Will the US not survive if it fails
to reach across the Pacific in an effort to strangle the Confucian baby in its cradle? What exactly threatens the
survival of these great powers? Given their military establishments, their nuclear deterrents, their economic might,
their continental size, and their vast populations is their survival really imperiled if they do not act as offensive
realists? Or is it only imperiled if they irrationally act as offensive realists, pushing the few chips that hold the
prospects for their destruction across the poker table in a reckless bet to win it all? But the problem is more general

Only a power with a complete ignorance of history would be eager to


embark upon a bid for hegemony, if survival was its main goal . After all, most states in
than that.

modern history that have bid for hegemony with one exceptional exception have antagonized their neighbors
and eventually elicited an encircling coalition that, indeed, utterly destroyed them, leading to the loss of their
territorial integrity and the autonomy of their domestic political order, the two things Mearsheimer says states hold
most dear. And this occurs for reasons that do not surprise realists, who assume that states have a primal
preference not to be pushed around, and, thus, when they are able, will resist efforts by would-be hegemons to

This ignorance and resulting catastrophic error on the part of would-be


hegemons seems at odds with Mearsheimers assumption of rationality. But it is
rooted in his structuralism, which cannot allow for history, or learning. Classical realists
dominate them.

would expect states to understand that throwing their weight around not to mention a bid for hegemony might
be self-defeating; whereas states, acting as structural realists expect them to, will make the same foolish choices
over and over again. Referring to European history, Raymond Aron (1966: 72) observed the self-defeating nature of
this sort of excess ambition, which invariably excites:

49

Liberalism/Internationalism

50

US Order-Locked In

51

-General
US international order locked inmassive economic,
technological, and military advantagesChina isnt even close
BROOKS* and WOHLFORTH** 16-*Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, PhD @
Yale, **Daniel Webster Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, PhD and MA in Political Science @ Yale
[Stephen, William, The Once and Future Superpower-Why China Wont Overtake the United States, Foreign Affairs,
May/June 2016, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2016-04-13/once-and-future-superpower, DKP]

is the United States run as the worlds sole superpower coming to an


end? Many say yes, seeing a rising China ready to catch up to or even surpass the United States in
the near future. By many measures, after all, Chinas economy is on track to become the worlds biggest, and even if its
Ater two and a half decades,

growth slows, it will still outpace that of the United States for many years. Its coffers overflowing, Beijing has used its new wealth to
attract friends, deter enemies, modernize its military, and aggressively assert sovereignty claims in its periphery. For many,

But this is wishful, or


fearful, thinking. Economic growth no longer translates as directly into military
power as it did in the past, which means that it is now harder than ever for rising powers to rise
and established ones to fall. And Chinathe only country with the raw potential to become a true global peer
of the United Statesalso faces a more daunting challenge than previous rising states because of how
far it lags behind technologically. Even though the United States economic dominance has eroded from
its peak, the countrys military superiority is not going anywhere, nor is the globespanning alliance structure that constitutes the core of the existing liberal
international order (unless Washington unwisely decides to throw it away). Rather than expecting a
power transition in international politics, everyone should start getting used to a world
in which the United States remains the sole superpower for decades to come. Lasting
preeminence will help the United States ward off the greatest traditional international danger, war
between the worlds major powers. And it will give Washington options for dealing with
nonstate threats such as terrorism and transnational challenges such as climate change. But it will also
therefore, the question is not whether China will become a superpower but just how soon.

impose burdens of leadership and force choices among competing priorities, particularly as finances grow more straitened. With
great power comes great responsibility, as the saying goes, and playing its leading role successfully will require Washington to

In forecasts of Chinas
future power position, much has been made of the countrys pressing domestic challenges: its slowing
economy, polluted environment, widespread corruption, perilous financial markets,
nonexistent social safety net, rapidly aging population, and restive middle class. But
as harmful as these problems are, Chinas true Achilles heel on the world stage is something
else: its low level of technological expertise compared with the United States. Relative to past rising
powers, China has a much wider technological gap to close with the leading power. China may
export container after container of high-tech goods, but in a world of globalized production, that doesnt
reveal much. Half of all Chinese exports consist of what economists call processing trade,
meaning that parts are imported into China for assembly and then exported afterward. And the vast majority of
these Chinese exports are directed not by Chinese firms but by corporations from more developed
countries. When looking at measures of technological prowess that better reflect the national origin of the expertise, Chinas
true position becomes clear. World Bank data on payments for the use of intellectual property, for
example, indicate that the United States is far and away the leading source of
innovative technologies, boasting $128 billion in receipts in 2013more than four times as much as
the country in second place, Japan. China, by contrast, imports technologies on a massive scale yet received less than
$1 billion in receipts in 2013 for the use of its intellectual property. Another good indicator of the technological
gap is the number of so-called triadic patents, those registered in the United States, Europe, and Japan. In 2012, nearly
14,000 such patents originated in the United States, compared with just under 2,000 in China. The distribution of highly
display a maturity that U.S. foreign policy has all too often lacked. THE WEALTH OF NATIONS

52

influential articles in science and engineeringthose in the top one percent of citations, as measured by the National
Science Foundationtells the same story , with the United States accounting for almost half of these articles, more than
eight times Chinas share. So does the breakdown of Nobel Prizes in Physics, Chemistry, and Physiology or
Medicine. Since 1990, 114 have gone to U.S.-based researchers. China-based researchers have received two. Precisely because the

GDP, greatly
underestimates the true economic gap between the two countries. For one thing, the immense
destruction that China is now wreaking on its environment counts favorably toward its
GDP, even though it will reduce economic capacity over time by shortening life spans
and raising cleanup and health-care costs. For another thing, GDP was originally designed to
measure mid-twentieth-century manufacturing economies, and so the more knowledgebased and globalized a countrys production is, the more its GDP underestimates its
economys true size. A new statistic developed by the UN suggests the degree to which GDP inflates Chinas relative
Chinese economy is so unlike the U.S. economy, the measure fueling expectations of a power shift,

power. Called inclusive wealth, this measure represents economists most systematic effort to date to calculate a states wealth.
As a UN report explained, it counts a countrys stock of assets in three areas: (i) manufactured capital (roads, buildings, machines,
and equipment), (ii) human capital (skills, education, health), and (iii) natural capital (sub-soil resources, ecosystems, the

the United States inclusive wealth comes to almost $144 trillion4.5


times Chinas $32 trillion. The true size of Chinas economy relative to the United States may lie somewhere in between
atmosphere). Added up,

the numbers provided by GDP and inclusive wealth, and admittedly, the latter measure has yet to receive the same level of scrutiny
as GDP. The problem with GDP, however, is that it measures a flow (typically, the value of goods and services produced in a year),

Gauging an economy by its GDP is like


judging a company by its quarterly profits, without ever peeking at its balancesheet. Because inclusive wealth measures the pool of resources a government can
conceivably draw on to achieve its strategic objectives, it is the more useful metric when
thinking about geopolitical competition. But no matter how one compares the size of the U.S. and Chinese
economies, it is clear that the United States is far more capable of converting its
resources into military might. In the past, rising states had levels of
technological prowess similar to those of leading ones. During the late nineteenth and early
whereas inclusive wealth measures a stock. As The Economist put it,

twentieth centuries, for example, the United States didnt lag far behind the United Kingdom in terms of technology, nor did
Germany lag far behind the erstwhile Allies during the interwar years, nor was the Soviet Union backward technologically compared

This meant that when these challengers rose


economically, they could soon mount a serious military challenge to the dominant power.
Chinas relative technological backwardness today, however, means that even if its
economy continues to gain ground, it will not be easy for it to catch up
militarily and become a true global strategic peer, as opposed to a merely a major player in
with the United States during the early Cold War.

its own neighborhood.

US hegemony is locked in internationallyfreedom of


movement, economic power, alliances
NYE 15- distinguished service professor and former dean of the Harvard Kennedy School of Government
[Joseph, American hegemony or American primacy, World Finance,
4/30/15,http://www.worldfinance.com/home/american-hegemony-or-american-primacy, MHS]

No country in modern history has possessed as much global military power as the US. Yet
some analysts now argue that the US is following in the footsteps of the UK, the last global hegemon
to decline. This historical analogy, though increasingly popular, is misleading. Britain was never as
dominant as the US is today. To be sure, it maintained a navy equal in size to the next two fleets combined, and its
empire, on which the sun never set, ruled over a quarter of humankind. But there were major differences in the
relative power resources of imperial Britain and contemporary America. By the outbreak of
53

Britain ranked only fourth among the great powers in terms of military personnel,
fourth in terms of GDP, and third in military spending. The British Empire was ruled in large part
through reliance on local troops. Of the 8.6 million British forces in WWI, nearly a third came from the overseas empire. That
made it increasingly difficult for the government in London to declare war on behalf
of the empire when nationalist sentiments began to intensify. By World War II, protecting the empire
had become more of a burden than an asset. The fact that the UK was situated so close to powers like
World War I,

Germany and Russia made matters even more challenging. $17.78TRN US GDP 2015 (CURRENT PRICES) Power hungry For all the

the fact is that the US does not have colonies that it must
administer, and thus has more freedom to manoeuvre than the UK did. And, surrounded by
unthreatening countries and two oceans, it finds it far easier to protect itself. That
brings us to another problem with the global hegemon analogy: the confusion over what
hegemony actually means. Some observers conflate the concept with imperialism; but
the US is clear evidence that a hegemon does not have to have a formal empire.
loose talk of an American empire,

Others define hegemony as the ability to set the rules of the international system; but precisely how much influence over this
process a hegemon must have, relative to other powers, remains unclear. Still others consider hegemony to be synonymous with
control of the most power resources. But, by this definition, 19th century Britain which at the height of its power in 1870 ranked
third (behind the US and Russia) in GDP and third (behind Russia and France) in military expenditures could not be considered

the
Soviet Union balanced US military power for more than four decades. Though the US had
disproportionate economic clout, its room for political and military manoeuvre was
constrained by Soviet power. Fact and fiction Some analysts describe the post-1945 period as a US-led hierarchical
hegemonic, despite its naval dominance. Similarly, those who speak of American hegemony after 1945 fail to note that

order with liberal characteristics, in which the US provided public goods while operating within a loose system of multilateral rules
and institutions that gave weaker states a say. They point out that it may be rational for many countries to preserve this institutional

the US-led international order could


outlive Americas primacy in power resources, though many others argue that the emergence of new
powers portends this orders demise. But, when it comes to the era of supposed US hegemony,
there has always been a lot of fiction mixed in with the facts. It was less a global order than a
group of like-minded countries, largely in the Americas and Western Europe, which comprised less than half of the
framework, even if American power resources decline. In this sense,

world. And its effects on non-members including significant powers like China, India, Indonesia, and the Soviet bloc were not
always benign. Given this, the US position in the world could more accurately be called a half-hegemony. Of course, America did
maintain economic dominance after 1945: the devastation of WWII in so many countries meant that the US produced nearly half of

from a
political or military standpoint, the world was bipolar, with the Soviet Union balancing Americas
global GDP. That position lasted until 1970, when the US share of global GDP fell to its pre-war level of one-quarter. But,

power. Indeed, during this period, the US often could not defend its interests: the Soviet Union acquired nuclear weapons;
communist takeovers occurred in China, Cuba, and half of Vietnam; the Korean War ended in a stalemate; and revolts in Hungary
and Czechoslovakia were repressed. A new era Against this background, primacy seems like a more accurate description of a

The
question now is whether the era of US primacy is coming to an end. Given the
unpredictability of global developments, it is, of course, impossible to answer this question definitively. The rise of
transnational forces and non-state actors, not to mention emerging powers like China, suggests that there are big
changes on the horizon. But there is still reason to believe that , at least in the first half of this
century, the US will retain its primacy in power resources and continue to play the
central role in the global balance of power. In short, while the era of US primacy is not over, it is set to
countrys disproportionate (and measurable) share of all three kinds of power resources: military, economic, and soft.

change in important ways. Whether or not these changes will bolster global security and prosperity remains to be seen.

Hegemony is still strongdecline exaggerated


Babones 15 - an associate professor of sociology and social policy at the University of Sydney.

He is a
comparative sociologist who writes on comparative international development and on quantitative methods for the
social sciences. (Salvatore, American Hegemony Is Here to Stay, The National Interest, 6/11/15,
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/american-hegemony-here-stay-13089 )

54

IS RETREAT from global hegemony in Americas national interest? No idea


has percolated more widely over the past decadeand none is more
bogus. The United States is not headed for the skids and there is no
reason it should be. The truth is that America can and should seek to
remain the worlds top dog. The idea of American hegemony is as old as Benjamin Franklin, but has its
practical roots in World War II. The United States emerged from that war as the dominant economic, political and technological
power. The only major combatant to avoid serious damage to its infrastructure, its housing stock or its demographic profile, the
United States ended the war with the greatest naval order of battle ever seen in the history of the world. It became the postwar
home of the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. And, of course, the United States had the bomb.
America was, in every sense of the word, a hegemon. Hegemony is a word used by social scientists to describe leadership within a
system of competing states. The Greek historian Thucydides used the term to characterize the position of Athens in the Greek world
in the middle of the fifth century BC. Athens had the greatest fleet in the Mediterranean; it was the home of Socrates and Plato,
Sophocles and Aeschylus; it crowned its central Acropolis with the solid-marble temple to Athena known to history as the Parthenon.
Athens had a powerful rival in Sparta, but no one doubted that Athens was the hegemon of the time until Sparta defeated it in a
bitter twenty-seven-year war. Americas only global rival in the twentieth century was the Soviet Union.
The Soviet Union never produced more than about half of Americas total national output. Its nominal allies in Eastern Europe were
in fact restive occupied countries, as were many of its constituent republics. Its client states overseas were at best partners of
convenience, and at worst expensive drains on its limited resources. The Soviet Union had the power to resist American hegemony,

When the Soviet Union


finally disintegrated in 1991, American hegemony was complete. The United States sat at the top of
but not to displace it. It had the bomb and an impressive space program, but little else.

the international system, facing no serious rivals for global leadership. This unipolar moment lasted a mere decade. September

2001, signaled the emergence of a new kind of threat to global stability, and the ensuing rise of
China and reemergence of Russia put paid to the era of unchallenged American
leadership. Now, Americas internal politics have deadlocked and the U.S. government shrinks from playing the role of global
policeman. In the second decade of the twenty-first century, American
hegemony is widely perceived to be in terminal decline. Or so the story
goes. In fact, reports of the passing of U.S. hegemony are greatly
exaggerated. Americas costly wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were relatively minor affairs
considered in long-term perspective. The strategic challenge posed by China has also been
exaggerated. Together with its inner circle of unshakable English-speaking
allies, the United States possesses near-total control of the worlds seas,
skies, airwaves and cyberspace, while American universities, think tanks
and journals dominate the world of ideas. Put aside all the alarmist punditry.
American hegemony is now as firm as or firmer than it has ever been, and
will remain so for a long time to come. THE MASSIVE federal deficit, negative
credit-agency reports, repeated debt-ceiling crises and the 2013 government shutdown all
created the impression that the U.S. government is bankrupt, or close to it. The U.S. economy imports half a
11,

trillion dollars a year more than it exports. Among the American population, poverty rates are high and ordinary workers wages
have been stagnant (in real terms) for decades. Washington seems to be paralyzed by perpetual gridlock. On top of all this, strategic
exhaustion after two costly wars in Afghanistan and Iraq has substantially degraded U.S. military capabilities. Then, at the very

If economic power
forms the long-term foundation for political and military power, it would seem that
America is in terminal decline. But policy analysts tend to have short
memories. Cycles of hegemony run in centuries, not decades (or seasons).
When the United Kingdom finally defeated Napoleon at Waterloo in 1815, its national resources were
completely exhausted. Britains public-debt-to-GDP ratio was over 250 percent, and early nineteenth-century
governments lacked access to the full range of fiscal and financial tools that are available today. Yet the British Century
was only just beginning. The Pax Britannica and the elevation of Queen Victoria to become empress of India were just
around the corner. By comparison, Americas current public-debt-to- GDP ratio of less than 80 percent is
relatively benign. Those with even a limited historical memory may remember the day in January 2001 when the then
moment the military needed to regroup, rebuild and rearm, its budget was hit by sequestration.

chairman of the Federal Reserve, Alan Greenspan, testified to the Senate Budget Committee that if current policies remain in place,
the total unified surplus will reach $800 billion in fiscal year 2011. . . . The emerging key fiscal policy need is to address the
implications of maintaining surpluses. As the poet said, bliss was it in that dawn to be alive! Two tax cuts, two wars and one
financial crisis later, Americas budget deficit was roughly the size of the projected surplus that so worried Greenspan.

55

Hegemony sustainableUS crushes in every major factor


Bremmer 15-Global Research Professor @ New York University, PhD and MA in Political Science @ Stanford
University, president and founder of Eurasia Group [Ian, These Are the 5 Reasons Why the U.S. Remains the
Worlds Only Superpower, Time, 5/28/2015, http://time.com/3899972/us-superpower-status-military/, DKP]

A superpower is a country that wields enough military, political and economic might to convince nations in all parts of the world to

Pundits have rushed to label China the next superpower and so


rumors of Americas decline have been greatly
exaggerated. In the key categories of power, the U.S. will remain dominant
for the foreseeable future. These facts show why America is still the worlds only
superpower, and why that wont change anytime soon. 1. Economics Chinas economy
is growing at an impressive rate. But its not just the size of an economy that mattersits also the
quality. According to the World Bank, GDP per capita in the US was $53,042 in 2013; in China it
was just $6,807. In other words, little of Chinas dramatic economic growth is finding its way
into the pockets of Chinese consumersthe byproduct of an economy driven by massive state-owned enterprises rather
than private industry. Chinas headline growth may be higher, but its the U.S. economy thats allowing its citizens
to grow along with it. And crucially, the American economy remains the bedrock of the
global financial system. Over 80% of all financial transactions worldwide are
conducted in dollars, as are 87% of foreign currency market transactions. As long as the world
continues to place such faith in Americas currency and overall economic stability,
the U.S. economy remains the one to beat. Americas military superiority
remains unrivaledfull stop. The US accounts for 37% of global military spending, and spends
more than four times what China, the worlds No. 2 spender, does on its military. The U.S. dominates
across land, sea, air and space. Americas Middle East misadventures gave the U.S.
military a black eye, but the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan speak more to the
changing nature of warfare than declining U.S. military superiority. Terrorists and guerilla
do things they otherwise wouldnt.

have many ordinary Americansbut the

fighters give conventional military powers fits by design. The U.S. must ultimately learn to scale down to better meet those

conventional military strength might not deter terrorists, it still does a


terrific job of deterring hostile nations. Political power comes in many dimensions. For the U.S., foreign
aid is an effective way to cement its political clout globally. In 2013, the U.S. doled out $32.7
billion in financial assistance; second was the UK at $19 billion. Turns out that money buys strong political
cooperation from countries in need. But in order to have political power abroad, you must first have
stability at home. The U.S. has the oldest working national constitution in the world, as
well as strong institutions and rule of law to accompany it. While far from perfect, the governing
document created by Americas founding fathers has evolved along with its people. The numbers show the
enduring attraction of this system: 45 million people living in the U.S. today were born in a foreign
country. That is more than four times higher than the next highest country. For many people around
the world, America remains the ideal place to start a new life. Of the 9 largest tech
companies in the world, 8 are based in the U.S. Give the growing importance of the technology sector,
thats a big deal. For decades America worried about energy dependency, yet today America is the worlds No. 1
producer of oil and natural gas, in large part due to the development of hydraulic fracturing, a product of public
research and private energy. Americas research universities and scientific institutions are best
in class, allowing the nation to focus its ingenuity where its needed most. And America is spending the money to keep its
challenges. Nevertheless, while

comparative advantage intact: 30% of all research and development dollars are spent in the U.S. 5. Culture/Lifestyle In 2012,
Americans spent $370 million on pet costumes. Earlier this year the Fury 325 opened up in North Carolina, claiming the title of
worlds tallest rollercoasteruntil 2016, when the next giga coaster is scheduled to open in Orlando, Florida. In the most recent

56

These stats may


seem disconnected, but together they point to the fact that Americans continue to
enjoy a quality of life unmatched by the rest of the world. When you combine this
with Americas strength across the board in economics, military, political influence
and innovation, it is no wonder that the U.S. enjoys its privileged position in the
world today. Superpower indeed.
Charities Aid Foundation survey, Americans ranked #1 internationally when it came to helping strangers.

57

-Military
The gap in military capacity between the US and China is
massive and would take decades for it to become even
somewhat close
BROOKS* and WOHLFORTH** 16-*Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, PhD @
Yale, **Daniel Webster Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, PhD and MA in Political Science @ Yale
[Stephen, William, The Once and Future Superpower-Why China Wont Overtake the United States, Foreign Affairs,
May/June 2016, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2016-04-13/once-and-future-superpower, DKP]

The technological and economic differences between China and the U nited States wouldnt matter
much if all it took to gain superpower status were the ability to use force locally. But what
makes the United States a superpower is its ability to operate globally, and the
bar for that capability is high. It means having what the political scientist Barry Posen has called command
of the commonsthat is, control over the air, space, and the open sea, along with the
necessary infrastructure for managing these domains. When one measures the 14 categories
of systems that create this capability (everything from nuclear attack submarines to satellites to transport
aircraft), what emerges is an overwhelming U.S. advantage in each area, the
result of decades of advances on multiple fronts. It would take a very long
time for China to approach U.S. power on any of these fronts, let alone all of
them. For one thing, the United States has built up a massive scientific and industrial base.
China is rapidly enhancing its technological inputs , increasing its R & D spending and its numbers of
graduates with degrees in science and engineering. But there are limits to how fast any country can
leap forward in such matters, and there are various obstacles in Chinas waysuch as a lack of
effective intellectual property protections and inefficient methods of allocating
capitalthat will be extremely hard to change given its rigid political system. Adding to the difficulty,
China is chasing a moving target. In 2012, the United States spent $79 billion on military R
& D, more than 13 times as much as China s estimated amount, so even rapid Chinese
advances might be insufficient to close the gap. Then there are the decades the
United States has spent procuring advanced weapons systems, which have grown only
more complex over time. In the 1960s, aircraft took about five years to develop, but by the 1990s, as the number of parts
and lines of code ballooned, the figure reached ten years. Today, it takes 15 to 20 years to design
and build the most advanced fighter aircraft, and military satellites can take even
longer. So even if another country managed to build the scientific and industrial
base to develop the many types of weapons that give the United States command of the commons, there would be
a lengthy lag before it could actually possess them. Even Chinese defense
planners recognize the scale of the challenge. Command of the commons also requires the ability to
supervise a wide range of giant defense projects. For all the hullabaloo over the evils of the
military-industrial complex and the waste, fraud, and abuse in the Pentagon, in the United States,
research labs, contractors, and bureaucrats have painstakingly acquired this
expertise over many decades, and their Chinese counterparts do not yet have
it. This kind of learning by doing experience resides in organizations, not in
individuals. It can be transferred only through demonstration and instruction, so
cybertheft or other forms of espionage are not an effective shortcut for
acquiring it. Chinas defense industry is still in its infancy, and as the scholar Richard
Bitzinger and his colleagues have concluded, Aside from a few pockets of excellence such as ballistic missiles, the Chinese
58

military-industrial complex has appeared to demonstrate few capacities for


designing and producing relatively advanced conventional weapon systems. For
example, China still cannot mass-produce high-performance aircraft engines , despite the
immense resources it has thrown at the effort, and relies instead on second-rate Russian models. In
other areas, Beijing has not even bothered competing. Take undersea warfare. China is poorly equipped for
antisubmarine warfare and is doing very little to improve. And only now is the
country capable of producing nuclear-powered attack submarines that are
comparable in quietness to the kinds that the U.S. Navy commissioned in the 1950s.
Since then, however, the U.S. government has invested hundreds of billions of dollars
and six decades of effort in its current generation of Virginia-class submarines , which have
achieved absolute levels of silencing. Finally, it takes a very particular set of skills and infrastructure to
actually use all these weapons. Employing them is difficult not just because the weapons
themselves tend to be so complex but also because they typically need to be used in a
coordinated manner. It is an incredibly complicated endeavor , for example, to deploy a
carrier battle group; the many associated ships and aircraft must work together in real time. Even systems that
may seem simple require a complex surrounding architecture in order to be truly effective.
Drones, for example, work best when a military has the highly trained personnel to
operate them and the technological and organizational capacity to rapidly gather, process, and
act on information collected from them. Developing the necessary infrastructure to
seek command of the commons would take any military a very long time. And since
the task places a high premium on flexibility and delegation, Chinas centralized
and hierarchical forces are particularly ill suited for it.

59

-Latent Power/Incentives
Even if China somehow acquires the latent capabilities to
become hegemonic they have no incentive to challenge the US
orderalso heg is sweet
BROOKS* and WOHLFORTH** 16-*Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, PhD @
Yale, **Daniel Webster Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, PhD and MA in Political Science @ Yale
[Stephen, William, The Once and Future Superpower-Why China Wont Overtake the United States, Foreign Affairs,
May/June 2016, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2016-04-13/once-and-future-superpower, DKP]
In the 1930s alone, Japan escaped the depths of depression and morphed into a rampaging military machine,
Germany transformed from the disarmed loser of World War I into a juggernaut capable of conquering Europe, and
the Soviet Union recovered from war and revolution to become a formidable land power. The next decade saw the
United States own sprint from military also-ran to global superpower, with a nuclear Soviet Union close on its heels.

few seriously anticipate another world war, or even another cold war, but
many observers argue that these past experiences reveal just how quickly countries can
become dangerous once they try to extract military capabilities from their economies. But what is
taking place now is not your grandfathers power transition . One can debate
whether China will soon reach the first major milestone on the journey from great power
to superpower: having the requisite economic resources. But a giant economy
alone wont make China the worlds second superpower, nor would overcoming the
next big hurdle, attaining the requisite technological capacity. After that lies the
challenge of transforming all this latent power into the full range of systems
needed for global power projection and learning how to use them. Each of these steps
is time consuming and fraught with difficulty. As a result, China will, for a long time,
continue to hover somewhere between a great power and a superpower. You might call it an
emerging potential superpower: thanks to its economic growth, China has broken free from the great-power
pack, but it still has a long way to go before it might gain the economic and
technological capacity to become a superpower. Chinas quest for superpower
status is undermined by something else, too: weak incentives to make the
sacrifices required. The United States owes its far-reaching military capabilities to
the existential imperatives of the Cold War. The country would never have borne the burden it did
Today,

had policymakers not faced the challenge of balancing the Soviet Union, a superpower with the potential to
dominate Eurasia. (Indeed, it is no surprise that two and a half decades after the Soviet Union collapsed, it is Russia

China faces nothing like


the Cold War pressures that led the United States to invest so much in its military. The United States
is a far less threatening superpower than the Soviet Union was: however
aggravating Chinese policymakers find U.S. foreign policy, it is unlikely to
engender the level of fear that motivated Washington during the Cold War.
Stacking the odds against China even more, the United States has few incentives to
give up power, thanks to the web of alliances it has long boasted. A list of U.S. allies
reads as a whos who of the worlds most advanced economies , and these partners have
lowered the price of maintaining the United States superpower status. U.S. defense spending stood at
that possesses the second-greatest military capability in the world.) Today,

around three percent of GDP at the end of the 1990s, rose to around five percent in the next decade on account of

has now fallen back to close to three percent.


Washington has been able to sustain a global military capacity with
relatively little effort thanks in part to the bases its allies host and the top-end
weapons they help develop. Chinas only steadfast ally is North Korea, which is
the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and

60

often more trouble than it is worth. Given the barriers thwarting Chinas path to
superpower status, as well as the low incentives for trying to overcome them, the
future of the international system hinges most on whether the United States continues to
bear the much lower burden of sustaining what we and others have called deep engagement, the
globe-girdling grand strategy it has followed for some 70 years. And barring some odd change of
heart that results in a true abnegation of its global role (as opposed to overwrought, politicized charges
sometimes made about its already having done so), Washington will be well positioned for
decades to maintain the core military capabilities, alliances, and commitments that
secure key regions, backstop the global economy, and foster cooperation on
transnational problems. The benefits of this grand strategy can be difficult to discern, especially in light of
the United States foreign misadventures in recent years. Fiascos such as the invasion of Iraq stand
as stark reminders of the difficulty of using force to alter domestic politics abroad. But power
is as much about preventing unfavorable outcomes as it is about causing favorable
ones, and here Washington has done a much better job than most Americans appreciate. For a largely satisfied
power leading the international system, having enough strength to deter or block challengers is in fact more

A crucial objective of
U.S. grand strategy over the decades has been to prevent a much more dangerous
world from emerging, and its success in this endeavor can be measured largely by the
absence of outcomes common to history: important regions destabilized by severe
security dilemmas, tattered alliances unable to contain breakout challengers, rapid
weapons proliferation, great-power arms races, and a descent into competitive
economic or military blocs. Were Washington to truly pull back from the world, more of
these challenges would emerge, and transnational threats would likely loom even
larger than they do today. Even if such threats did not grow, the task of addressing them would
become immeasurably harder if the United States had to grapple with a much less
stable global order at the same time. And as difficult as it sometimes is today for the United States to pull
together coalitions to address transnational challenges, it would be even harder to do so if the
country abdicated its leadership role and retreated to tend its garden, as a growing number of
valuable than having the ability to improve ones position further on the margins.

analysts and policymakersand a large swath of the publicare now calling for.

61

-China
US is overwhelmingly more powerful than China despite a
closing gap, aggressiveness and overreaction only risks
unnecessary conflict and instability
BROOKS* and WOHLFORTH** 16-*Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, PhD @
Yale, **Daniel Webster Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, PhD and MA in Political Science @ Yale
[Stephen, William, The Once and Future Superpower-Why China Wont Overtake the United States, Foreign Affairs,
May/June 2016, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2016-04-13/once-and-future-superpower, DKP]

Ever since the Soviet Unions demise, the United States dramatic power advantage over
other states has been accompanied by the risk of self-inflicted wounds , as occurred in
Iraq. But the slippage in the United States economic position may have the beneficial effect of
forcing U.S. leaders to focus more on the core mission of the countrys grand
strategy rather than being sucked into messy peripheral conflicts. Indeed, that has
been the guiding logic behind President Barack Obamas foreign policy. Nonetheless, a world
of lasting U.S. military preeminence and declining U.S. economic dominance will
continue to test the United States capacity for restraint, in four main ways. First is the
temptation to bully or exploit American allies in the pursuit of self-interested gain. U.S. allies are
dependent on Washington in many ways, and leaning on them to provide favors in returnwhether
approving of controversial U.S. policies, refraining from activities the United States opposes, or agreeing to lopsided
terms in mutually beneficial dealsseems like something only a chump would forgo. (Think of the Republican
presidential candidate Donald Trumps frequent claims that the United States always loses in its dealings with

But the basic


contract at the heart of the contemporary international order is that if its members
put aside the quest for relative military advantage, join a dense web of institutional
networks, and agree to play by common rules, then the U nited States will not take
advantage of its dominance to extract undue returns from its allies. It would be asking
too much to expect Washington to never use its leverage to seek better deals, and a wide
foreigners, including crucial allies, and that he would restore the countrys ability to win.)

range of presidentsincluding John F. Kennedy, Ronald Reagan, George W. Bush, and Obamahave done so at
various times.

But if Washington too often uses its power to achieve narrowly self-interested
rather than to protect and advance the system as a whole, it will run a real risk
of eroding the legitimacy of both its leadership and the existing order.
Second, the United States will be increasingly tempted to overreact when other states
namely, Chinause their growing economic clout on the world stage. Most of the
recent rising powers of note, including Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union, were stronger
militarily than economically. China, by contrast, will for decades be stronger
economically than militarily. This is a good thing , since military challenges to
global order can turn ugly quickly. But it means that China will mount economic challenges
instead, and these will need to be handled wisely. Most of Chinas efforts along these
lines will likely involve only minor or cosmetic alterations to the existing order,
important for burnishing Beijings prestige but not threatening to the orders basic arrangements
or principles. Washington should respond to these gracefully and with
forbearance, recognizing that paying a modest price for including Beijing
within the order is preferable to risking provoking a more fundamental
challenge to the structure in general. The recent fracas over the Asian Infrastructure
gains,

62

Investment Bank is a good example of how not to behave.

China proposed the AIIB in 2013 as a


means to bolster its status and provide investment in infrastructure in Asia. Although its criteria for loans might turn

it is not likely to do major harm to the region or undermine


the structure of the global economy. And yet the United States responded by launching a public
diplomatic campaign to dissuade its allies from joining. They balked at U.S. opposition
out to be less constructive than desired,

and signed up eagerly. By its reflexive opposition both to a relatively constructive Chinese initiative and to its allies

Washington created an unnecessary zero-sum battle that ended


in a humiliating diplomatic defeat. (A failure by the U.S. Congress to pass the Trans-Pacific Partnership
participation in it,

as negotiated, meanwhile, would be an even greater fiasco, leading to serious questions abroad about U.S. global

Third, the United States will still face the temptation that always accompanies power,
to intervene in places where its core national interests are not in play (or to expand the
leadership.)

definition of its core national interests so much as to hollow out the concept). That temptation can exist in the midst
of a superpower strugglethe

United States got bogged down in Vietnam during the Cold War, as did
it clearly exists today, at a time when the United States has no peer
rivals. Obama has carefully guarded against this temptation. He attracted much criticism for
elevating Dont do stupid stuff to a grand-strategic maxim. But if doing stupid stuff
the Soviet Union in Afghanistanand

threatens the United States ability to sustain its grand strategy and associated global presence, then he had a
point. Missing, though, was a corollary: Keep your eye on the ball. And for nearly seven decades, that has meant
continuing Washingtons core mission of fostering stability in key regions and keeping the global economy and

Finally, Washington will need to avoid adopting overly


aggressive military postures even when core interests are at stake , such as
with Chinas increasingly assertive stance in its periphery. It is true that Beijings
anti-access/area-denial capabilities have greatly raised the costs and risks of
operating U.S. aircraft and surface ships (but not submarines) near China. How Washington
wider order humming.

should respond to Beijings newfound local military capability, however, depends on what Washingtons strategic

To regain all the military freedom of action the United States enjoyed during its
would indeed be difficult, and the actions
necessary would increase the risk of future confrontations. Yet if Washingtons goals
are more limitedsecuring regional allies and sustaining a favorable institutional and economic orderthen
the challenge should be manageable. By adopting its own area-denial strategy, for example, the
United States could still deter Chinese aggression and protect U.S. allies despite
Chinas rising military power. Unlike the much-discussed Air-Sea Battle doctrine for a Pacific conflict,
this approach would not envision hostilities rapidly escalating to strikes on the Chinese
mainland. Rather, it would be designed to curtail Chinas ability during a conflict to
operate within what is commonly known as the first island chain, encompassing parts of Japan, the Philippines,
goals are.

extraordinary dominance throughout the 1990s

and Taiwan. Under this strategy, the United States and its allies would employ the same mix of capabilitiessuch as
mines and mobile antiship missilesthat China itself has used to push U.S. surface ships and aircraft away from its

And it could turn the tables and force China to compete in areas where it
remains very weak, most notably, undersea warfare. The premise of such a strategy is that
even if China were able to deny U.S. surface forces and aircraft access to the area
near its coast, it would not be able to use that space as a launching pad for
projecting military power farther during a conflict. Chinas coastal waters, in this scenario,
would turn into a sort of no mans sea, in which neither state could make much use of surface ships
or aircraft. This would be a far cry from the situation that prevailed during the 1990s ,
coast.

when China could not stop the worlds leading military power from enjoying unfettered access to its airspace and
ocean right up to its territorial border. But the change needs to be put in perspective :

it is only natural that


after spending tens of billions of dollars over decades, China has begun to reverse this
unusual vulnerability, one the United States would never accept for itself. While this area-denial strategy
would help solve a long-term problem, it would do little to address the most immediate challenge from China: the
military facilities it is steadily building on artificial islands in the South China Sea. There is no easy answer, but

63

Washington should avoid too aggressive a reaction, which could spark a


conflict. After all, these small, exposed islands arguably leave the overall military
balance unchanged, since they would be all but impossible to defend in a conflict.
Chinas assertiveness may even be backfiring. Last year, the Philippinesreal islands
with extremely valuable basing facilitieswelcomed U.S. forces back onto its shores after a 24-year
absence. And the United States is now in talks to base long-range bombers in Australia.
To date, the Obama administration has chosen to conduct so-called freedom-of-navigation operations in order to
contest Chinas maritime claims. But as the leader of the order it largely shaped,

the United States has many

other arrows in its quiver. To place the burden of escalation on China, the United Statesor, even better, its
alliescould take a page from Chinas playbook and ramp up quasi-official research voyages in the area.

Another asset Washington has is international law. Pressure is mounting on


China to submit its territorial disputes to arbitration in international courts, and if
Beijing continues to resist doing so, it will lose legitimacy and could find itself a
target of sanctions and other diplomatic punishments. And if Beijing tried to extract
economic gains from contested regions, Washington could facilitate a process along
the lines of the proportional punishment strategy it helped make part of the World Trade
Organization: let the Permanent Court of Arbitration, in The Hague, determine the gains of Chinas illegal actions,
place a temporary tariff on Chinese exports to collect exactly that much revenue while the sovereignty claims are
being adjudicated, and then distribute them once the matter is settled before the International Court of Justice.
Whatever approach is adopted, what matters for U.S. global interests is not the islands themselves or the nature of

Although China can pose


problems without catching up, in the words of the political scientist Thomas Christensen, the
bottom line is that the United States global position gives it room to
maneuver. The key is to exploit the advantages of standing on the
defensive: as a raft of strategic thinkers have pointed out, challenging a settled
status quo is very hard to do.
the claims per se but what these provocations do to the wider order.

Even if the US influence declines, the US will still be dominant


combination of hard and soft power too overwhelming
Chinas not a threat
Pazzanese* 15 a Harvard Staff Writer [Christina, America, still at top, Harvard Gazette, 3/17/2015,
http://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2015/03/america-still-at-top/, DKP] *Interviews and cites Joseph Nye,
distinguished service professor and former dean of the Harvard Kennedy School of Government

With the worlds largest army, a population four times that of the United States, and an
economy that outpaces Americas, it often may seem that this is Chinas world and
were all just living in it. But in a new essay, political scientist Joseph Nye, Ph.D. 64, says la Mark Twain that the rumors of
Americas demise are grossly exaggerated. In Is the American Century Over? Nye, a
Harvard University Distinguished Service Professor and former dean of Harvard Kennedy School (HKS), answers that
question with a qualified no, suggesting that while the United States will not enjoy the
unfettered authority to shape world events that it did in the 20th century, few others nations,
not even China, will assemble the economic and military hard power along with the
soft power of influence a term Nye famously coined to assume the leadership role. The essay
summarizes Nyes work since his 1990 book, Bound to Lead, in which he challenged the notion, popularly advanced by British
historian Paul Kennedys Lead: The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, that America is in decline and its era as a global superpower
is over. Nye sat down with the Gazette to talk about why he thinks the United States will hold onto its political perch, and what
events or policies could threaten that status.

GAZETTE: Explain what you mean by the American Century and why has it

been fashionable to declare that the U.S. as the superpower is over? NYE: Henry R. Luce, the former editor of Time and Life,
proclaimed the American Century in 1941. He proclaimed it because he wanted to get America involved in World War II, and he

64

particularly wanted America to be central to the global balance of power. So I use the term American Century in terms of what
Luce proclaimed, and ask the question whether in 2041 the Americans will be central to the global balance of power. My conclusion
is yes, but it wont be in the same way that Luce expected. Americans have a long history of believing theyre in decline. And it
tells you more about our psychology than about our reality. In the 1960s and 70s, we thought the Russians or the Soviets were 10

many people think the Chinese


are 10 feet tall. What I try to do is to show that reflects trends and moods of
psychology more than it reflects the realities of world politics. The latest trend of
belief that the United States is in decline really starts with the Great Recession of 2008, where people see the
declining economy as something thats going to go on for a long time, or forever, rather
than a cyclical change. GAZETTE: You say Americas dominance is not necessarily a direct result of economic
feet tall. Then, in the 1980s, we thought the Japanese were 10 feet tall. And today,

power or military might and that we still have significant soft-power advantages over other countries, including China. What are

NYE: Soft
power is the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or
payment. Its an important component of Americas role in the world. It doesnt
replace the hard power of military capability or economic capability, but it can be
whats sometimes called a force multiplier, something that, if used in a smart way with
your hard power, can make you more powerful by having hard and soft power
reinforce each other. If we were to turn inward, to be less accepting of the rest of the world, [or] if we were to, in
some of those advantages, and how might we lose our ability to influence world events in the coming years?

contrast, overextend ourselves as I think we did in the Iraq War, we could damage that soft power and undercut our ability to help
lead coalitions and networks and alliances that are necessary for being able to provide leadership in the world. GAZETTE:
What challenges does Chinas largely internal political focus and the increasing upward mobility of many more of its citizens pose for

China is that theyve raised hundreds of millions of people out of poverty and developed a large
middle class. The bad news is they havent figured out how to bring that middle class into
political participation. What we know is that when countries get to about $10,000-per-capita
income, there are increased demands for participation. China hasnt quite figured out
how to accommodate that. So thats one problem they face, what you might call the
political transition. Another problem they face is a demographic transition. Chinas
population is getting older as a result of the one-child policy. And many Chinese say they fear
theyre going to grow old before they grow rich. A third problem is: Can they adapt
their growth model, which has been heavily reliant upon export industries based along the coast, and become
more innovative and more oriented toward their domestic market? Their plans are to do that,
but they havent yet fully accomplished that. They may be able to do this thats sometimes called the
middle-income trap, that you reach a certain level on the growth model thats worked so far, and then you dont
it?

NYE:

The good news for

develop the institutions and the capacity for innovation that take you to the next level.

China rise not guaranteedpolitical instability, corruption,


human rights violations, and potential economic crisis all
prevent ascension
Cohen and Xu 14- Cohen the Interviewee: a professor of law at New York University School of Law, an
expert in Chinese law, a senior fellow for Asia Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, and serves as "of
counsel" at the international law firm Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP, Xu the Interviewer: received a
Bachelor of Arts in Comparative Literature at New York University. She has worked as a Writer, Editor and Producer
for the Council on Foreign Relations in New York; as a Reporter and a Photographer for the Wall Street Journal/Dow
Jones, New York and Elan Magazine, New York. She is the Co-Founder of Brownstone Magazine at New York
University and a News Assistant for the Financial Times in Beijing, China. [Jerome and Beina, Chinas Rights
Struggle Twenty-Five Years After Tiananmen, council on foreign relations, 6/2/14, http://www.cfr.org/china/chinasrights-struggle-twenty-five-years-after-tiananmen/p33055, MHS]

65

Chinese authorities are marking the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Tiananmen


Square massacre with crackdowns on civil and political liberties . CFR Adjunct Senior Fellow
Jerome A. Cohen, a longtime expert on legal and human rights issues in China, says the occasion
demonstrates that the country's economic gains have not translated into greater
freedoms. Cohen says the ruling Communist Party appears to be responsive to concerns
about the environment, labor protections, and corruption, but deep reforms are
needed. "The failure to develop and use institutions to give vent to the growing sophistication and demands of
the increasingly educated populace will create the greatest threat," he says. What is the legacy of June 4 in China

The lesson of the past twenty-five years seems to be that economic and social
progress, enactment of better legislation, improvements in legal institutions, and
reformist official policy statements do not guarantee either the enjoyment of civil
and political rights or the protection of political and religious activists and their
lawyers against the arbitrary exercise of state and party power. This is not to say
that no legal progress is being made in related areas of human rights. The government
today?

has been rounding up activists ahead of the anniversary, including notable figures like free-speech lawyer Pu

How does this year's crackdown compare to those of prior anniversaries?


This year's crackdown on civil and political liberties is worse than any other in
recent memory, i.e., since the post-June 4 terror began to moderate in the mid-1990s. It seems to be
part of President Xi Jinping's broader plan to instill centrally controlled discipline in the
country and to gather unchallenged power in his own hands , brooking no political criticism or
opposition. are there any areas in which you see the Communist Party allowing greater
public opinion or legal redress? In some areas where the opinions of very large numbers of people are
Zhiqiang.

involvedrather than the opinions of a smaller, better educated, democratic political/human rights eliteXi seems
willing to keep an ear to the ground and respond with at least modest flexibility and the appearance of tolerance.
Environmental and labor protection are two such areas where, unless there is some government response, there

Corruption is also very high on the general public agenda, and


the regime is trying to show progress. There is also some evidence of progress
regarding invidious social discrimination, such as that against women . Topics like the
environment and Uighur rights have recently garnered increased attention and citizen outrage. In your view,
which issue poses the greatest threat to the government's authority? The most
immediate internal threats to the Chinese Communist Party , apart from a possible
economic crisis, appear to be Tibet and Xinjiang. In the medium term, I believe the environment
and labor are very serious threats, as is corruption . Long term, however, the failure to develop
could be massive unrest.

and use institutions to give vent to the growing sophistication and demands of the increasingly educated populace
will create the greatest threat. Repression can only work in the short run, and is gradually creating more, not less,
discontent. Topics like the environment and Uighur rights have recently garnered increased attention and citizen
outrage. In your view, which issue poses the greatest threat to the government's authority? The most immediate
internal threats to the Chinese Communist Party, apart from a possible economic crisis, appear to be Tibet and
Xinjiang. In the medium term, I believe the environment and labor are very serious threats, as is corruption. Long
term, however, the failure to develop and use institutions to give vent to the growing sophistication and demands of
the increasingly educated populace will create the greatest threat. Repression can only work in the short run, and is
gradually creating more, not less, discontent. There seems to be inconsistency in the Party's message about rights.
While Xi has declared that nobody is above the law (manifested in his crackdown on corruption), constitutional
activists like Xu Zhiyong are nonetheless detained and sentenced. What's behind this? Regarding political and civil

Constitutional provisions and legislation


are improving, as is some of the leaders' rhetoric regarding rights. But practice
often blatantly disregards these legislated improvements, and there is a growing
danger of police lawlessness. Although Xi and other leaders preach that no one is above
the law, it is obvious that politics are still in command when it comes to
investigating corruption. How else could families such as Li Peng's and Wen Jiabao's escape the net, and
rights, there is a bipolarity between theory and practice.

even Xi's family? And why is there such extended difficulty for the Party to decide what to do about [former

66

At the UN Human Rights Council in March, the U nited


States and European Union made the rare move of denouncing China's silencing of
activists. Will international pressureand that from the United Statesmove the needle in
any meaningful way? International pressure must be kept up. In the short run, since
China gained admission to the WTO and has become more economically powerful, it appears to have little
favorable impact. But in the longer run, it will prove helpful, although domestic
political considerations will always outweigh world opinion .
domestic security chief] Zhou Yongkang?

China no threat to US heg-several internal issues


Jerome A Cohen, 6-17-2015-Professor of Law @ NYU, JD @ Yale Law School, specializes in Chinese legal
studies [China's Futureand Our Own, USALI, http://www.cfr.org/china/chinas-future-our-own/p36645

Despite its remarkable recent achievements, China's economic, social and political
problems are many and growing. It is possible that Beijing's performance may now
have peaked. Its accumulating problems and failure to develop a political system
adequate to deal with them may soon be seen, both inside and outside the country,
to constrict its further progress and the deployment of its impressive assets. Many a
Chinese leader must think it a cruel twist of fate that a regime that has done so much to improve the living
standards of hundreds of millions of people should be so obviously frightened about its continuing viability. Yet the 2
Communist Party can be seen as a victim of its own successes as well as its apparent failures. No country can
modernize as rapidly as China without suffering the enormous consequences of immense social change. Rather
than basking in the gratitude of a contented nation, Xi Jinping and his colleagues have revealed themselves to all
the world as cats on a hot tin roof. Their pomp and propaganda at home and abroad cannot conceal their fear of
overthrow or disintegration. Their attempt to limit the impact of Western values, ideas, institutions and practices,
embodied in the current draft legislation to restrict foreign cooperation in education, civic affairs and politics, is a
deeply embarrassing and shameful public confession of the fragility of their system. Having benefitted from several
decades of the "open policy" initiated by Deng Xiaoping, his fear-mongering successors now want to cut off the
"ideological infiltration" they believe threatens their "democratic dictatorship". If successful, this new policy will
inhibit China's ability to respond to domestic and global demands. As my colleague Ira Belkin recently noted, "It's a
bad 1960s policy for a 2015 challenge. Because of the system's non-transparency, Xi Jinping knows far better than

Staggering pollution, massive


corruption, labor unrest, unfair land transfers, growing income inequality, arbitrary
bureaucracy, ethnic tensions and invidious social discriminations, increasing
persecution of human rights lawyers and civil society reformers, a Party-dominated
judiciary, and ever greater curbs on social gatherings, journalism, the Internet and
social media are fuelling discontent and resentment that a now significantly
troubled economy and an anticipated stock market crash can ignite .
we do the vulnerabilities underlying China's formidable achievements.

China rise is peaceful no pursuit of hegemony


Kirshner 12 - Professor of Government and Director of the Reppy Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies
at Cornell University [Jonathan The tragedy of offensive realism: Classical realism and the rise of China March
2012, European Journal of International Relations, http://ejt.sagepub.com/content/18/1/53.short, CSS]

China lives in a very crowded neighborhood. It shares a very long border with
Russia, with whom, Mearsheimer notes, it has fought in the past; which he codes as a great power; and which
has a very large nuclear force. Japan is also very close by. Mearsheimer also codes Japan as a great
power; and he notes the mutual suspicion between the two states (Mearsheimer, 2001: 375, 3812, 393, 396). If
frightened or provoked, Japan has the capability to develop an independent nuclear
The answer is obvious.

67

force, and it is difficult to imagine a realist account that would not expect them to
do so in such circumstances. China also borders India, a very large, rising, nuclear-armed state, also with
whom China has fought in the past, and which has a latent economic potential similar even to that of Chinas own.
China also borders Vietnam, not a great power, but no pushover, and yet another state with whom China has fought
in living memory. A unified (and also nuclear-capable) Korea would be another regional player sharing a border with

there is no good reason to believe that if China is a rational actor


motivated primarily to survive, it would embark upon a bid for hegemony . Realists
China. In sum,

would expect such a bid to elicit hostile responses from its great and regional power neighbors, and contribute to
nuclear proliferation of a kind that China would prefer not to see. The fundamental realist question, always,
remains, Is my national interest better or worse off by pursuing this course of action?;

with regard to

China, and an aggressive bid for hegemony, the answer is an obvious no. It is worth noting that
classical realists cannot rule out that China would not be so ambitious (or so foolish) as to give it a try; it is simply
that such behavior cannot be accounted for by the logic of offensive realism.

68

A2-Fatigue
Polls show public is pro defense spendingif anything they are
worried about cuts
McCarthy 15-American demographer, professor of history at the University of Louisville, in Louisville,
Kentucky, He holds an honorary doctorate from Boazii University, Turkey, and is a board member of the Institute
of Turkish Studies [Justin, Americans Split on Defense Spending, Gallup, 2/20/15,
http://www.gallup.com/poll/181628/americans-split-defense-spending.aspx, MHS]

For the past decade, Americans have been more likely to say the U.S.
government spends too much on defense rather than too little, but today, a slim margin separates
WASHINGTON, D.C. --

these views. While the 32% of Americans saying the country is spending too much is about average for recent
years, the 34% saying "too little" is the highest since 2001. These findings from Gallup's Feb. 8-11 World Affairs poll

as both President Barack Obama and congressional Republicans are seeking to


increase defense spending amid threats from the Islamic State , but are not in agreement on
how to fund the increases. The U.S. has long held the distinction of having the largest
military budget of any nation, and the 2014 budget nearly matched the spending of
the 10 next-largest national military budgets . Twenty-nine percent of Americans feel the U.S.
come

budget's size is "about right." The latest figures show the closest margin between "too much" and "too little" in 10
years, and a shift from last year, when there was a nine-percentage-point margin in the direction of "too much"

Americans' views on the size of the defense budget have fluctuated greatly
over time, but the public has generally been more likely to say the government
spends too much. As many as 50% or more shared this view in the Vietnam War era of the late 1960s and
spending.

early 1970s, as well as in 1990, after the end of the Cold War and a long military buildup under President Ronald
Reagan. There have been a few times in Gallup's 46-year trend when Americans thought there was too little rather
than too much spending on defense. These include 2000-2002, spanning the end of the Clinton administration and
the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and January 1981 -- just months after the nation elected Reagan, who made U.S. military
weakness a major theme of his presidential campaign. Over the course of Reagan's administration, he oversaw a

All Parties Show Increase in Percentage Saying U.S.


Spends "Too Little" Since 2011, the belief that the U.S. is spending too little on
defense has grown within each party group, but more so among Republicans (16
points) and independents (12 points) than Democrats (eight points). More than half of
Republicans (56%) today believe the U.S. is spending too little on the military -- far more
35% increase in military spending.

than is true among independents (33%) and Democrats (17%). Gallup has historically found this to be the case

More Americans Now Say Military "Not Strong Enough" A


separate question in the poll asked Americans to assess the U.S. military's strength.
Forty-four percent say it is "not strong enough," while 42% say it is "about right"
and another 13% believe it is "stronger than it needs to be ." Those views have
changed significantly from 2012, when Gallup last asked the question. At that time, a much smaller
32% said U.S. national defense was not strong enough, with 54% believing it was
about right. Bottom Line Having witnessed multipronged international turmoil throughout the past year -when it comes to military spending.

particularly from the Islamic State -- Obama and the GOP-controlled Congress may be able to find some common
ground on increases in military spending, which would have the support of a growing number of Americans. Last
month, Gallup found Americans were generally satisfied with U.S. military strength, but their level of satisfaction is
down from the past two years and well below where it was after 9/11 and in the early stages of the Iraq war.
Combined with the February increase in the percentage saying the U.S. military is not strong enough, public opinion
seems to favor increases in defense spending. Though the White House and congressional Republicans may
struggle to agree on how big these increases should be and how they are funded, they can each lean on growing
support for an increase within their respective parties. Survey Methods Results for this Gallup poll are based on
telephone interviews conducted Feb. 8-11, 2015, on the Gallup U.S. Daily survey, with a random sample of 837

69

adults, aged 18 and older, living in all 50 U.S. states and the District of Columbia. For results based on the total
sample of national adults, the margin of sampling error is 4 percentage points at the 95% confidence level. All
reported margins of sampling error include computed design effects for weighting. Each sample of national adults
includes a minimum quota of 50% cellphone respondents and 50% landline respondents, with additional minimum
quotas by time zone within region. Landline and cellular telephone numbers are selected using random-digit-dial
methods.

70

Liberalism-Locked in

71

-Alliances
US not in decline but even if it was, alliances lock in the liberal
order
NYE 16-distinguished service professor and former dean of the Harvard Kennedy School of Government, PhD in
Political Science @ Harvard, Rhodes Scholar at Oxford University's Exeter College [Joseph, How Trump Would
Weaken America, 5/11/2016, Harvard Belfer Center,
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/26611/how_trump_would_weaken_america.html?breadcrumb=
%2Fregion%2F130%2Fasia%3Fpage%3D4, DKP]

While the US has had bitter partisan differences over disastrous interventions in
developing countries such as Vietnam and Iraq, there is a bedrock of consensus on its
alliance system and not just among those who make and think about foreign policy. Opinion polls show
popular majorities in support of Nato and the US-Japan alliance. Nonetheless, for the first time in 70 years, a major

Alliances not only reinforce US


power; they also maintain geopolitical stability for example, by slowing the dangerous
proliferation of nuclear weapons. While US presidents and defence secretaries have
sometimes complained about its allies' low levels of defence spending, they have
always understood that alliances are best viewed as stabilising commitments like
friendships, not real-estate transactions. Unlike the constantly shifting alliances of convenience that
characterised the nineteenth century, modern American alliances have sustained a
relatively predictable international order. In some cases, such as Japan, hostcountry support even makes it cheaper to station troops overseas than in the US.
US presidential candidate is calling this consensus into question.

And yet Trump extols the virtues of unpredictability a potentially useful tactic when bargaining with enemies, but

Americans often complain about free riders, without


recognising that the US has been the one steering the bus. It is not impossible that
a new challenger say, Europe, Russia, India, Brazil, or China surpasses the US in the coming
decades and takes the wheel. But it is not likely, either. Among the features that distinguish
the US from "the dominant great powers of the past ," according to the distinguished British
strategist Lawrence Freedman, is that "American power is based on alliances rather than
colonies." Alliances are assets; colonies are liabilities. A narrative of American
decline is likely to be inaccurate and misleading. More important, it holds
dangerous policy implications if it encourages countries like Russia to engage in
adventurous policies, China to be more assertive with its neighbours, or the US to
overreact out of fear. America has many problems, but it is not in absolute
decline, and it is likely to remain more powerful than any single state for the
foreseeable future. The real problem for the US is not that it will be overtaken by China
or another contender, but that a rise in the power resources of many others both states
and non-state actors will pose new obstacles to global governance. The real challenge
will be entropy the inability to get work done. Weakening America's alliances, the likely
result of Trump's policies, is hardly the way to "make America great again." America
will face an increasing number of new transnational issues that require it to exercise power
with others as much as over others. And, in a world of growing complexity, the most connected
states are the most powerful. As Anne-Marie Slaughter has put it, "diplomacy is social capital; it depends
a disastrous approach to reassuring friends.

on the density and reach of a nation's diplomatic contacts." The US, according to Australia's Lowy Institute, tops the
ranking of countries by number of embassies, consulates, and missions. The US has some 60 treaty allies; China
has few. The Economist magazine estimates that of the world's 150 largest countries, nearly 100 lean toward the
US, while 21 lean against it.

Contrary to claims that the "Chinese century" is at hand,


72

we have not entered a post-American world. The US remains central to the


workings of the global balance of power , and to the provision of global public goods. But
American preeminence in military, economic, and soft-power terms will not look like it once did.
The US share of the world economy will fall, and its ability to wield influence and organise action will become
increasingly constrained.

More than ever, America's ability to sustain the credibility of its


alliances as well as establish new networks will be central to its global success.

73

-World Improving
Liberalism makes the world better and will continue to be
locked in despite Chinas rise
WYNE 16-Nonresident Fellow with the Atlantic Councils Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security,
Former Research Assistant, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs [Ali, The world is getting better. Why
dont we believe it? Harvard Belfer Center, originally published in the Washington Post, 1/26/2016,
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/26231/world_is_getting_better_why_dont_we_believe_it.html?
breadcrumb=%2Fregion%2F130%2Fasia%3Fpage%3D13, DKP]

It would seem entirely reasonable to conclude that the world has taken several turns for the
worse since President George H.W. Bush delivered his famous new world order address. The United Nations
estimates that more than 250,000 people have perished in Syrias civil war, and another million or so have been injured. With vast
swathes of the Middle East collapsing, the Islamic State continues to wreak havoc, increasingly inspiring and coordinating attacks
outside the region. There are now more forcibly displaced people worldwide than there have been at any point since World War II.
Russias incursions into Ukraine have challenged Europes post-Cold War peace, and North Korea has conducted its fourth nuclear
test. Pope Francis summarized many observers judgments when he lamented that after the second failure of another world war,

Still, we would be
remiss to discount how much progress has been made in the quarter-century since Bushs speech.
According to the World Bank, the rate of extreme poverty fell from 37 percent in 1990 to about 10
percent last year. The Food and Agriculture Organization reports that the rate of undernourishment fell from
18.6 percent to 10.9 percent during that same window. A major study by the University of Washingtons Institute of Health
Metrics and Evaluation found that life expectancy increased by 5.8 years for men and 6.6 years
for women between 1990 and 2013. Doctors have made extraordinary strides in reducing the
mortality rates of polio, measles and malaria. And the threat of a nuclear war, as well as that of a
war between great powers, has declined significantly. It is easy to discount all that is going well: We
tend to overestimate how good the good ol days were, the media disproportionately
covers bad news, and contemporary progress is occurring amid profound uncertainty about the evolution of world order.
While the United States remains the worlds lone superpower, it is no longer as preeminent
as it was in the immediate aftermath of the Soviet Unions implosion. In addition, it has to sustain an increasingly
challenging balance of competitive and cooperative dynamics with China (whose
perhaps one can speak of a third war, one fought piecemeal, with crimes, massacres, destruction.

resurgence underpins a broader, eastward shift in the center of global gravity). While the two countries political systems,

each is convinced of its own


exceptionalism. The evolution of their relationship as uncertain as it is
consequential is occurring against the backdrop of fundamental changes in each
of the worlds principal strategic theaters. The Middle East is undergoing a
cataclysmic transformation, and it is anyones guess as to how the evolving tapestry of relations among the regions
governments, political outfits and militant organizations will resolve itself in the coming decades. A range of
phenomenons among them unfavorable demographics, resurgent populism and Russian revanchism are testing
Europes cohesion. And while transatlantic ties have long anchored the postwar order, Americas rebalance
to the Asia-Pacific raises questions about their durability. And in the Asia-Pacific itself, what has been called
the contest of the century is unfolding between the U nited States and China: Chinas
understandings of history and approaches to foreign policy are fundamentally different,

neighbors are doing their utmost to strengthen their security ties with the former while reaping the fruits of the latters economic

The architecture of any new world order will (appropriately) have to accommodate
the redistribution of power among states and the growing sway of non-state actors. We will see a more
equitable balance of voting shares within the main postwar institutions (among them the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund), the establishment of parallel and supplementary institutions (such as the Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank), the reconfiguration of long-standing alliances and enmities, the further
blurring of the divide between wartime and peacetime fighting, and so forth. It would be premature to infer,
however, that there is a coherent alternative to the postwar liberal order in the
ascent.

74

offing. No less than the chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee of Chinas National Peoples Congress, Fu Ying, observes
that while China is dissatisfied and ready to criticize, it is not ready to propose a
new design. . . . We need to come up with more specific ideas, to reassure others
and advance our common interests. Democracy and democratic values continue to
strengthen globally, even if incrementally and haltingly. Globalization continues to sputter along,
and the progression of initiatives such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership, and Chinas One Belt, One Road undertaking not to mention the
proliferation of regional economic organizations and institutions suggests that economic
interdependence worldwide will continue to grow. The structure of world order stands to
grow more complex; the ownership of its evolution, more contested. Still, Foreign Affairs Editor Gideon Rose reminds us that the
postwar system has outwitted, outplayed, and outlasted every rival for threequarters of a century. That it will be strained and renegotiated , therefore, does not
necessarily imply that it will disappear.

75

-China
Despite increasing power, China wont significantly challenge
liberal institutions, trade, and norms
KANG 15-Professor of International Relations and Business @ USC, Director of USC Korean Studies Institute,
Director of USC Center for International Studies [David, China, Hegemony, and Leadership in East Asia, Responding to Chinas Rise:
US and EU Strategies, The Political Economy of the Asia Pacific, 2015, DKP]

Today, as China increasingly appears poised to return to its position as the most powerful country in East Asia, there is a
corresponding question about whether or not China can enjoy the legitimacy that it once held, or even whether it may attempt to

as China has grown increasingly powerful and self-confi dent,


there is intense speculation about how it might live and act in a modern,
Westphalian world. This chapter has argued that while China may develop a strong military and rich economy, and
while being rich and strong may make China a great power of some type, in and of
itself this will do little to allay regional fears or make China a leader in East Asia. Most
become a hegemon once again. That is,

notable are questions about whether China can adjust itself to the Western international norms and rules that have come to

China will attempt to challenge the USs position as global hegemon.


Capitalism, democracy, human rights, and other ideas have now become accepted
as the international norms and rules of the game. While contemporary countries can choose not to follow these
norms, to ignore them is to step clearly outside accepted boundaries of contemporary
dominate the globe, and whether

international relations. For example, today few authoritarian states trumpet their authoritarianism with pride; almost all claim to be
some form of democracy and justify their rule based on some special need or circumstance. Similarly, few human rights violators do
so with pride; they tend to rationalize their abuses with some other justifi cation. As the twenty-fi rst century begins, it is not yet

The Chinese government and people, with a different history, an


have not yet completely accepted or
internalized these Westphalian ideas. Yet to date China has neither provoked the
same type of fear and balance of power politics, nor has it challenged the existing
order, in the way that some scholars predicted three decades ago when China began its economic
reforms. The region as a whole has adjusted to Chinas increasing economic and
political clout, and has moved closer to China economically, diplomatically, and
even politically. For example, although in the 1970s China was relatively isolated and had few
diplomatic relationships with states in the region, today China has normalized its relations with every
country in the region and has joined numerous multilateral and international institutions such as
the WTO and the UN. In economic terms, within a generations time, China has eclipsed the US as the main
trading partner of every country in the region, including longtime US allies Japan and
clear how China will fi t into this system.

authoritarian political system, and current tensions with other countries,

South Korea, and USChina economic relations are now deeply intertwined.

Chinas rise wont cause conflict multilaterial systems,


tolerant practices, and global interconnectedness
Ikenberry 14 Professor of Politics and International Affiars @ Princeton University, PhD @ The
University of Chicago, former professor @ University of Pennslvania [John, The Rise of China and the Future of
Liberal World Order, Chatham House, May 7
2014,www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_document/20140507RiseofChina.pdf, SCJ]

the rise of China and other non-Western developing states is creating new constituencies
for an updated and reformed, open, multilateral system, as opposed to new hostile
voices seeking to build something that would be antithetical to openness and rule of
law. The struggle today is over authority, in my view, over who sits at the table, who decides over rights and privileges in the
Put differently,

global political hierarchy. Its not about contrasting ideologies of order and certainly not rival models of modernity. Why do I argue
this? I think what I can do to try to make my point and then add the qualifications and speculations at the end is to simply list what I

76

think are the reasons why power transition this time around may be different than those transitions of the past that have led to the

The first argument I would make is kind of the big


argument really about the old order the order that China is rising up and seeing. We dont talk about this in our
grand narratives of rise and decline. We assume that the old order is simply synonymous to the
old lead state, so when it weakens that order will weaken. But thats not true.
Theres actually a larger infrastructure of order that isnt totally under the control of
the lead state. This order that China faces, and that is far-flung and multidimensional and multi-layered, is an order that is
kind of drama and violence that makes us all worried.

different from past orders. Ive written a book that tries to make that argument but my summary point is that compared to past
international orders that rising states have confronted, this order is easier to join and harder to overturn .
It is an order that does a lot of work and that facilitates a variety of dynamics that I want to mention, and then in some sense
editorialize by saying the more it can do this, the better. The more it does this, the more China will see that its an order that is easy
to join and hard to overturn. Four characteristics. Integration capacity : this order has absorbed a lot of states
over the last 60-70 years, starting with Germany and Japan, which flipped on a dime, if you will, and became junior partners,
regional leaders, second and third largest economies in the world. Then cohortsand generations of states that have followed in the

Secondly, shared
leadership. There is a lot of forums and platforms for leadership : the G5, G7, G8 (back to G7),
decades that followed. So there is an integration capacity here that has to be acknowledged.

the G20. These are all elastic, G kind of leadership coalitions. Of course, the more formal multilateral institutions that allow for

Thirdly, sharing the spoils of modernity, certainly


compared to old European empires of the past. This is an order that has much more vertical and
various configurations of states around the table.

horizontal movement of wealth and trade and technology and benefits of advancement. Indeed, thats why were here talking about

China has found a way to exploit this order in a good way


ultimately that is to say, trade and invest its way to a high-growth position. So
spreading the spoils of modernity compared to past orders, this is something you have to acknowledge. Finally,
accommodating difference. This is the one that is in some sense the most difficult for this old liberal order to do but
its there already. Different development strategies coexist even today, even as we kind of
bump and bruise each other as we pursue different ideologies of development. Theres
the rise of China, because

at least three. Theres the famous, or if you will infamous, neo-liberal or laissez-faire fundamentalist kind of approach. You think of
Thatcher and Reagan. Theres what others would call embedded liberal or social democratic model more tied to social safety net,
safeguards on economic insecurity, the welfare state, contingent trade, adjustment assistance and so forth. Thirdly, developmental
statism. This is what East Asia did. This is what Japan and South Korea and other countries in Southeast Asia pursued. There was a
kind of grudging acknowledgement in the West that this was a strategy and we could accommodate it. In many ways, thats the
strategy that China has seen as a possible model. Ezra Vogels big thick book on Deng Xiaoping mentions this that Deng at that
point was looking at Japan and Korea and saying, we got to get in on this. So not an old Western liberal model but a model where the
state and a more developmental kind of model nonetheless is accommodated. The second argument about why there is more
formidable characteristics to this order than often thought is that China and non-Western rising states want what liberal

If you strip away the American and Western hegemonic aspect to it,
underneath that is the basic features of a modern system that they want. Those
features are two-fold. One is openness. Youve got to have an open system. You cant be a great power in the
21st century and live inside a narrow, closed bloc or sphere. Im afraid Putin is going to learn this the hard way. Openness,
access to trade, investment, technology this is integral to the foreign relations of
all the rising non-Western states. Secondly, rules and institutions that provide
safeguards and governance mechanisms for rising states. Thats where we often find the clash but
internationalism offers.

the clash is not really about the nature of having rules themselves. Rules, such as WTO rules or rules about use of force which, of
course, are not fully articulated or followed nonetheless provide protections for rising states, weak or strong, along the way. When
you think about the rise of liberal, rule of law order in Europe in the modern era, yes, there were arguments about it that came from
a normative view about the role of the individual and the state society, the state individual, the Lockean kind of vision. But even in
the Lockean vision, it was also about securing your property, property rights. Its about protecting your equities. Its about being
able to know that tomorrow what you have today will still be yours. So rules and rule-based order is a tool for those who have things
or think they are going to get things, to put them in a position so they can keep what they have and protect what they have against
in the case of China states that might envy them or want to discriminate against them in the face of their success. So this is one
reading, if you will, of Western liberalism that offers it as a more universal type of functional kind of logic, that gets in the way of the
arguments that, well, rising states just dont like what we in the West cherish as our values, because theres something else there.

Thirdly, China and rising non-Western states are not a bloc. On the one hand, all are capitalist and most are
democratic. Yet onthe other hand, they have different geopolitical interests in energy, in trade, in security. Brazil is a great example
of this. They are as worried about China, the currency exchange rate, and the new discourse in Brazil about de-industrialization
thanksto China the loss of industrial jobs to China and the new kind of dependency on China on the side of resources. Its not the
United States thats the old state that is in some sense pushing Brazil down now; it has a more complex set of worries and
relationships. You see this in the way the US and Brazil interact. Its definitely a love-hate relationship. Obama was there, met with

77

Dilma in 2013, and he asked her: what is your agenda? Dilma said: infrastructure, clean energy, education, science and technology.
Reportedly I wasnt there Obama said: well, thats my agenda. That strikes me as interesting because were not simply across
ideological divides. In some sense the rising non-Western states are experiencing in their own way the problems that the old West,
Europe and the United States, are facing which is to say, problems: inequality, fiscal problems, the fraying of the social contract,
questions about immigration, questions about how to sustain growth, infrastructure. These are 21st-century problems. Its almost as
if weve come to the 21st century and its not war that we worry about, its just simply being able to sustain modern life in these big

The problems are problems that we share.


The fourth reason that builds on that really is that in an important way, the rise of China is the wrong
thing to look at. Its not the rise of China. Theres something broader going on.
Theres a broader global transformation. If you simply talkabout China, and I guess youd say Im preoccupied
cities that we live in. Increasingly, thats where the world lives.

with China because it is the most dramatic (in some sense the swing) state, but theres a broader global transformation that is going
on. What Ive recently started to call it is the rise of a global middle class, of democracies many of them troubled democracies but
democracies, across regions, across civilizations, across developmental divides. India, Brazil, but not just the BRICS also Mexico,
Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey, Australia and Canada. Theres a broad array of states that are moving up in one sense or another

they are seeking a voice. They want to have a say in


Secondly, they are engaging in whatI would call stakeholder
strategies of diplomacy pushing for more multilateral cooperation, influencing
world politics through agenda-setting, bridge-building, coalition diplomacy. South Korea is
and are exhibiting characteristics we can identify. Number one,
their region and more broadly.

a great example of this. Its the first country to be a beneficiary of ODA that now is a donor. It has hosted the G20. It has hosted the
Global Security Summit. It has this ideology of Global Korea. I go to Korea a lot and Im fascinated by this country that has found a
way to punch above its weight, to engage in what we used to call middle-power diplomacy. Australia and Canada are the iconic
examples of this. But its kind of the rising choir that wanted an international order of a certain sort that both the United States and
Europe and China are going to have to accommodate. Its those states that will say: we want more China, or we want more West, or

Finally, there is no grand authoritarian model, Chinese


authoritarian model, of modernity. I would stake my flag on this one. That is to say, China is doing well but its
we want less of one or the other.

not a model. The great historians of rise and decline, from Paul Kennedy and others, are all in some sense noting at these various
moments of the inflection point of world politics that the rising state in some sense has the kind of not monopoly, but the vanguard
role of defining what it means to be modern and make it to the next level of advancement. If China were to acquire this, and
certainly in our lifetime it could get to that point, but now it doesnt. Whilethe US and the West have clearly disappointed
themselves and the world by showing their weaknesses and dysfunctions and troubles in trying to sustain their own models that
may be true most clearly and dramatically after 2008, in the case of the United States its

not clear that China will


assume that vanguard role. If it doesnt, it means that its going to be a much more muddled future than simply the
replacement of one great power with another

Chinese Assimilation into international system solves and is


peaceful
Ikenberry 11- Professor of Politics and International Affairs @ Princeton University, PhD @ The University
of Chicago, former professor @ University of Pennsylvania [John, One World Order Possible? The Rise of China, the
West, and the Future of Liberal Internationalism, Centre on Asia and Globalization, 2011, SCJ]
Although the old American-led hegemonic system is passing away,

what is striking about liberal

internationalism is its durability.

The last decade has brought remarkable upheavals in the global system the
emergence of new powers, financial crises, a global recession, and bitter disputes among allies over American unipolar ambitions.

Despite these upheavals, liberal international order as an organizational logic of world


politics has proven resilient. It is still in demand. Appealing alternatives to an open and rule-based
order have simply not crystallized. On the contrary, the rise of non-Western powers and the growth of economic and
security interdependence are creating new constituencies and pressures for liberal international order.2I want to make five

the rise of China will not be accompanied by an agenda for a


transformation of the deep principles of international order. China is not a revisionist
power. It does not have big or contrarian ideas about the organization of world politics. Nor will it as it grows in power and
wealth. It will want more authority within the existing international order , and it will seek to
alter the mix of rules and principles and institutions that constitute this order. But it
will not be a purveyor of a successor order. The fact of the matter is that China cannot become
a part of the modern world on its own terms. The opposite is more likely the case China will
become influential and successful to the extent is works within and through existing
rules and institutions. Second, the existing international order is a massive and formidable
arguments. First,

78

system, significantly different than previous international orders that rising states in those earlier eras encountered. It is
wider and deeper. It is more integrated and institutionalized. It is an order that is rooted in the
deep structures of modern industrial society. A rising China does not just face the U nited States or the West.
It faces a massive and far-flung global system of capitalism and democracy that
continues to expand and integrate. This liberal international order is easy to join and hard to
overturn. To a remarkable extent, China is already in this order. Indeed, Chinas participation in this order most notably in
the worlds trading system has allowed it to achieve its remarkable growth and progress. In this sense, China is already a

Third, in depicting this system, it is important to


there is the bedrock of the modern
international order: the Westphalian system of sovereign states organized around a group of leading
powers. On this foundation, liberal international order has been built. Liberal international order
stakeholder in the liberal international order and it will become more so.
distinguish between different levels or layers. At the deepest level,

itself can and has varied in character. And in the 20thcentury, liberal states have made repeated efforts to built, expand, and

liberal international order is order that is open and at least


loosely rule-based, and as such, it can be contrasted with order that is organized
into rival blocs or exclusive regional spheres. But liberal international order itself
can be organized in different ways. As noted, American-led liberal hegemonic order has begun to wane. But
the more general and universal organizing rules and principles of the existing
international order are still deeply entrenched.Fourth, a Chinese alternative to this
liberal logic of order is simply not sustainable . There is a serious question what such an alternative would
actually be or who would join it. The Chinese themselves have not offered one. But an alternative order a Beijing model
reform this order. Generally speaking,

would seemingly be one organized around more or less exclusive blocs, spheres of influence, and mercantilist networks. It

would be an illiberal order.

It would be less open, less rule-based, and dominated by arrays of state-to-state ties. But
organized on a global scale, such a system would not advance the interests of any of the major states, including China. The Beijing
model only works when one or a few states opportunistically exploit an open system of markets. Raised to the level of a world
organizational type, it breaks down. One or a few states can exploit an open system but if everyone does, it is no longer an open
system and everyone suffers.

Finally, the coming divide in world politics is not between the


United States (and the West) and China, but between proponents of open, rulebased international order and assorted opponents. The struggle is between those whowant to renew
and expand todays system of multilateral governance arrangements which America championed for most of the postwar period
and those that want to move to some sort of less cooperative order built on spheres of influence and power balances.

These

fault lines do not map onto geography nor do they split Asia and the West.

Chinas rise can be peaceful realism is wrong


Trautsch 15 PhD in Cultural History, Teaches at Freie Universitat Berlin [Jasper, Who's afraid of China? Neoconservative, realist and liberal-internationalist assessments of american power, the future of the West and the coming new world
order, Global Affairs, September 11 2o15,SCJ]
Just as Brzezinski sees America in relative decline, Kupchan (2012), in No ones world: The West, the rising rest, and the coming

the West, which he defines to comprise Europe and the United States, is on
the wane and that power will be more widely distributed Global power around the
globe in the twenty-first century. According to Kupchan, a multi-polar world order, however,
must not necessarily result in international anarchy and armed struggle , as Kagan and
Brzezinski warned. Kupchan suggests that the West and the rising rest can find a consensus on the rules
governing international conduct and on rudimentary definitions of legitimacy that
are compatible with various forms of government. In the first part, Kupchan analyses how the West
global turn, argues that the dominance of

achieved global dominance between 1500 and 1800, arguing that the political fragmentation of Europe opened up political space for
the emerging middle class. Europes religious fragmentation resulting from the Reformation, moreover, led to religious tolerance and

developments, Kupchan explains, ultimately paved the way to


modern liberal democracy. He thus claims that the West followed a particular path to liberal democracy that could
the separation of state and church. Both

not be simply replicated in other parts of the world. In the second part, Kupchan argues that the centralized and hierarchical
institutions of political control in the Ottoman Empire and China prevented socioeconomic dynamism and technological innovation.
As a result, Europe and later America came to dominate most parts of the world between 1800 and 2000. Making the same
argument as Kagan, Kupchan reminds us that the spread of this western order was not due to the universal appeal of western
ideals and principles but due to the Wests economic and military dominance. In the third and fourth part, Kupchan draws

79

conclusions from these historical insights for the future world order warning that the Wests material dominance of the world is

Chinas and Russias cultures,


for example, are, according to Kupchan, more communitarian and paternalistic than the Wests
making it unlikely for western individualism to gain a foothold there. The Islamic World,
about to disappear and that rising powers will not follow the western path of development.

moreover, has failed to produce a Reformation such that the separation of state and religion has yet to be achieved. In Africa, ethnic
rivalries prevent the emergence of stable states, while the economic inequalities in Latin America, which result from the colonial
legacy, make that region prone to left-wing, anti-western populism.

Liberalism true in the context of China Relations increased


economic ties decrease conflict
Hudda 15 Teaching Assistant @ The University of Hong Kong, MA of Science in China & Globalization @
Kings College London, BA in China Studies & Global Studies @ University of Hong Kong [Nabil, Interpreting the
Rise of China: Realist and Liberalist Perspectives,E-International Relations Students,April 3,2015,http://www.eir.info/2015/04/03/interpreting-the-rise-of-china-realist-and-liberalist-perspectives/,SCJ]
In contrast to realist assumptions, Liberalist ones are optimistic in that they assume human nature is fundamentally good and that
conflict can be avoided. Realism and Liberalism both concur on the existence of an anarchic international system, but for Liberalists,
this can be mitigated. For Liberalists, sovereign states are not the only central actors in world politics. Individuals, interest groups,
and intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations all have an influence on states. While Realism virtually denies the
possibility of cooperation, this notion underpins Liberalism. Since the consequences of using military power often outweigh the

states have a vested interest in engaging in cooperation. Cooperation can lead


to absolute gains: a winwin situation for all. The next section will focus on interdependence (in particular,
economic interdependence) when assessing Liberalist perspectives on the rise of China because it
seems to be one of the strongest strands (if not the strongest strand) in the Liberalist armament. Richard N.
benefits,

Cooper defines economic interdependence as the sensitivity of economic activity between multiple nations in relation to economic
developments within those nations.[40] Economic activity tends to refer to international transactions such as trade (imports and

Intense economic activity results in an increased


number of ties and greater influence among the nations that engage in such
economic activity. Consequently, economic interdependence lessens the likelihood
of conflict as one economy becomes more bound to another. As David Starr Jordan puts it when
exports) and foreign direct investment (FDI).[41]

referring to the likelihood of European conflict, it is a beacon for economic interdependence: What shall we say of the Great War of
Europe, ever threatening, ever impending, and which never comes? We shall say that it will never come. Humanly speaking, it is
impossible.[42] Figure 9 As the graph shows, Chinas overseas direct investment or FDI has risen significantly. The darker line
Chinese FDI flow into the world, including Asiashows an increase of nearly $75 billion. Using the economic interdependence
notions above, this increase in FDI should lead to a decrease in the likelihood of conflict and can, in fact, foster greater cooperation
amongst states. In addition, Chinas trade interaction with the rest of the world accounts for nearly 50 per cent of its GDP.[43] This
shows an intertwined economic relationship between the nations economy and the global economy. Conflict would undermine this
economic relationship and result in universal losses and repercussions. Furthermore, China is now an active member in a range of
regional and international organisations, institutions and frameworks. Xi Jinping correctly points out that China contributes to,
and is a proactive member of, the G20, The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), The United Nations Security Council, the

adds that
there is a further need to seek common ground on issues of common interests in
pursuit of winwin progress,[45] which not only denigrates the Realist
interpretation of Chinas rise, but wholly supports the Liberalist interpretation.
Through Chinas participation in such organisations, the encouragement of
cooperation ensues, ensuring all participants are awarded a share of winnings,
meaning that they are less likely to engage in conflict with one another.
Shanghai Cooperative Organization and The BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) mechanism.[44] He

80

A2 Hard PowerNeed Legitimacy


Hegemony requires legitimacy, consent and normsrealist
explanation of primacy is insufficient and unsustainable
KANG 15-Professor of International Relations and Business @ USC, Director of USC Korean Studies Institute,
Director of USC Center for International Studies [David, China, Hegemony, and Leadership in East Asia, Responding to Chinas Rise:
US and EU Strategies, The Political Economy of the Asia Pacific, 2015, Pg. 30-31, DKP]

Indeed, though the Westphalian system is comprised of formally equal units, we see substantial hierarchy even
today. For example, any mention of leadership in international relations is an implicit recognition of this form of
hierarchy. 8 After all, leadership necessarily implies that there are followers and that there is a rank order placing

Followers and leaders are not equal in voice, responsibility, standing, or


Leaders must take more responsibility than do followers, and the leader has more
right or ability to set the course of action for the future than do followers. Thus, debate about the
future of US leadership or questions about Japanese or European leadership implies a hierarchy of
states. It follows then that hegemony is one type of hierarchy. Hegemony arises from the
acceptance some states have for the leadership and greater responsibility,
influence, and role of another state. 9 The simple fact of a states material
preponderance connotes only primacy or unipolarity, and hegemony implies more
than mere size. Hegemony is the legitimate infl uence and authority of one state
over other states, where one actor has the power to shape the rules of
international politics according to its own interests. 10 Although realists often equate
primacy with hegemony, an alternative formulation of hegemony emphasizes the
social, or recognized , status of hegemony. 11 For example, John Ikenberry and Charles Kupchan
note that although material incentives are one way that hegemons assert control over
other nations, the exercise of powerand hence the mechanism through which
compliance is achievedinvolves the projection by the hegemon of a set of norms and
their embrace by leaders in other nations. 12 As Jonathan Joseph observes, The concept of
hegemony is normally understood as emphasizing consent in contrast to reliance on
the use of force. Hegemony is thus a social phenomenon that requires both a social
order that secondary states accept and a credible commitment on the part of the dominant state not
to exploit the secondary states if they accept the dominant states authority. 14 That is, crafting a
set of norms and rules that are viewed as legitimate by secondary states is an integral
task for the dominant state. As Michael Mastanduno notes, The most durable order is one
in which there exists a meaningful consensus on the right of the hegemonic state to
lead, as well as the social purposes it projects. 15 This consensual view of
hegemony focuses on why secondary states would defer to the hegemon rather than the
structural position of the hegemon itself. 16 Hegemony is a form of power itself, and derives
in part from the values or norms that a state projects, not merely from the states military might
and economic wealth. As David Lake argues, Pure coercive commandsof the form do this, or dieare
not authoritative. Authority relations must contain some measure of legitimacy an
leaders above followers.
influence.

obligation, understood by both parties, for B to comply with the wishes of A. 17 Norms and beliefs are not
epiphenomenal to material power; that is, they are more than a convenient velvet glove over an iron fi st. 18

Legitimacy in itself is a form of power, but it derives from the values or norms a state projects, not
necessarily from the states military might and economic wealth. 19 As Ian Hurd argues: The relation of coercion,
self-interest, and legitimacy to each other is complex, and each is rarely found in anything like its pure, isolated
form the diffi culties attending to an attempt to prove that a rule is or is not accepted by an actor as legitimate
are real, but they do not justify either abandoning the study or assuming ex ante that it does not exist. 20
Dominant states, like individual leaders, lead through a combination of bullying, bribing, and inspiring. 21 Although

81

coercion can substitute for legitimacy in certain instances and for a short while, they are intertwined as well.
Legitimacy is stronger when backed by coercive capacity, and coercion seen as legitimate is also more effective. 22
Lake notes that despite their clear analytic differences, political authority and coercion are hard to distinguish in
practice there is no bright line separating the In sum, hegemony is a form of hierarchy that involves more than
material power; it also involves a set of normsa social orderthat secondary states fi nd legitimate, thus making
it a social system as well. Legitimacy itself is distinct from material power, and although the two are intertwined,

These distinctions are important in


helping us categorize and explain the different patterns of international relations
found in East Asia. se two analytic concepts. 23
legitimacy grows out of the social purpose a state projects.

82

Cooperation Good

83

-Generic
Chinas rise is inevitable but integration into the global
system ensures peace and US leadership Hard line stances
ensure conflict
Ikenberry 8 Professor of Politics and International Affairs @ Princeton University, PhD @ The University of
Chicago, former professor @ University of Pennsylvania [John, Integrating a Rising China into a Declining Western
Order, Atlantic Community, Article Summary, January/February 2008, http://www.atlanticcommunity.org/index.php/Global_Must_Read_Article/Integrating_a_Rising_China_into_a_Declining_Western_Order,
SCJ]
With Chinas economy predicted to double over the next decade and surpass the United States economic leadership by 2020

there is no question that China is on the rise. The question is not if or how Chinas
rise can be thwarted, claims G. John Ikenberry in Foreign Affairs, but rather how to ensure that the
current Western order remains the dominant one. According to Ikenberry, Chinas rise will bring US
global dominance to an end. There are, however, two potential courses that Chinas rise could take: one which involves China

China
integrates into the Western order, whether or not the US remains on top. This is the
goal the US needs to be aiming for. Although Chinas rise undoubtedly signifies the end of the United States
unipolar moment, it is not just the United States that China faces. Instead, China will be up against a Western
order which the United States just so happens to have led; a deeply rooted,
integrated, rule-based system that is easy to join but hard to overturn. Ikenberry argues
that the US has the potential to integrate China (and eventually other rising countries
as well) into this system, but only by strengthening the existing order before China
is in a position to overthrow it. This postwar order is unique in that it has allowed economic growth
and power to a wide variety of stakeholders, and thus could potentially adapt to a more
powerful China. There are three aspects of the Western order which make it difficult to
overthrow, and if reinforced, could secure the interests of both rising powers and declining ones through their integration into
the system. Through non-discrimination and an open market, the barriers to economic
participation are low and the benefits high, allowing for states to expand their
economic and political goals within the order. Coalition based leadership allows for
shifts in the balance of power between states without affecting the overall order.
Deeply rooted rules and institutions lay the basis for cooperation. Strengthening the rule-based
aspect of the Western system promotes shared authority and discourages fragmentation into minilateral arrangements. It is
this strong framework of rules and institutions that has already begun to facilitate
Chinas integration. In fact, China has been using these international institutions to achieve its very rise in global status
overtaking the US and upsetting the existing international order, potentially leading to war, the other in which

as it becomes increasingly aware that it cant become a world power without joining the World Trade Organization and integrating
into the globalized capitalist system. In other words, the road to the East runs through the West, should the West decide to unite in

the United States needs to ask itself what


kind of international order it would like to see in place when it is less powerful and
reestablish itself as the top supporter of the global system of governance. The key
to a future that is favorable for both the US and Europe is an open, rule-based order that
strengthening this system. Rather than fight the inevitable,

binds states by securing their interests through integration.

US influence in the region is inevitableits just a question of


cooperation
KANG 15-Professor of International Relations and Business @ USC, Director of USC Korean Studies Institute,
Director of USC Center for International Studies [David, China, Hegemony, and Leadership in East Asia, Responding to Chinas Rise:
US and EU Strategies, The Political Economy of the Asia Pacific, 2015, Pg. 32-33, DKP]

84

China has a long way to go before becoming a leader, and even


farther to go to become a hegemon. Although China may already be or may soon
becomethe largest economic and military power in East Asia, it has virtually no
cultural or political legitimacy as a leading state. T he difference between China at the height of
its hegemony fi ve centuries ago and China today is most clearly refl ected in the fact that nobody today
thinks China is still the civilizational center of the world. Although China may have been the
source of a long-lasting civilization in East Asia in the distant past, today it has no more civilizational
infl uence than does modern Greece. That is, ancient Greek ideas and innovations had a central infl
By these criteria, then,

uence on Western civilization, and Greek conceptsdemocracy, algebra, philosophycontinue to be infl uential
today. Yet contemporary Greece has no discernible soft power, and few people look for Greek leadership in

few contemporary East Asia states or peoples look to


China for cultural innovation or for practical solutions to present problems, and
although China self-consciously promotes its own soft power, the real question is
whether other states and peoples will accept it. 52 Can China ever return to its position of
international relations. In the same way,

centuries earlier as a center of cultural and political innovation, where other states admiringly look to China as
model, guide, and inspiration? There is grudging respect for Chinese economic accomplishments over the past
three decades, to be sure. But there is just as much wariness about Chinese cultural and political beliefs. Will
Chinese nationalism become brittle, confrontational, insecure, and defensive? Or will it eventually return to the selfconfi dence of centuries ago? The Chinese peopleas evidenced by the hysterical response to protests about Tibet
in the spring and summer of 2008show that they are far from comfortable with their own position in the world and
how others perceive them. Will the Chinese Communist Party cling to its power indefi nitely, or will it eventually fi
nd a way to craft some type of peaceful transition from authoritarianism? If nationalism and identities are truly
socially constructed, then we must ask whether there is an alternative conception of Chinese nationalism and
identity that might emerge in the future. At present, the dominant Chinese narrative is one of defensiveness and
insecurity with regards to Japan and the West; this narrative emphasizes Chinas weakness, past humiliation, and
eagerness to reclaim Chinas rightful place in the world. Such a narrative is naturally a bit unsettling for Chinas
neighbors and for other countries around the world, such as the US. Yet there are alternative narratives possible
certainly the Chinese leadership has attempted to reframe Chinas identity as one of a peaceful, unique power. 53
Although much debated and often dismissed, that such a narrative has received so much attention shows that it
must be a realistic enough possibility for scholars and policymakers to at least consider whether such a peaceful
rise is possible. Other narratives include an historical narrative, one that emphasizes Chinas peaceful relations with
its neighbors ( tianxia ). Note that the question is not whether this narrative is historically accurate but whether
Chinese people today come to adopt this narrative and use it to guide their views of themselves and their relations
with their neighbors. It is impossible to predict how Chinese beliefs about themselves and their place and role in the
world will evolve, and it will depend on an enormous number of factors: how the Chinese Communist Party responds
to changing domestic and international circumstances; whether domestic economic growth continues for the next
few decades or whether China experiences an economic crisis of some kind; domestic Chinese actions towards its
own people; how society changes, given the one-child policy, increasing education and foreign travel, and all the
inequalities in China itself; and how specifi c incidents with other regional and global actors are resolved. On the
part of other East Asian states, how and whether they accept China will depend on their own beliefs about
themselves and their relations with China. For example, although few Japanese fear another great power war in East
Asia, the Japanese are used to seeing themselves as the regional leader and as the most important Asian country.
Whether Japan can adjust to an increasingly important China, and how the two countries come to view each other,
will have enduring repercussions for regional stability. Will Japan and China be co-leaders in East Asia? Will Japan
accede to being second to China, as it did centuries ago? As to Korea and Vietnam, recent history has radically
altered their relations with China, despite their long histories as close followers of China. New nationalist histories in
both Korea and Vietnam no longer emphasize their cultural debt to China, but rather emphasize their difference
with and, in some ways, superiority to China. Whether these two countries can live comfortably in the shadow of
China, or whether they seek equal status, and how they manage their relations with the US and Europe will be

Given the changes in the international system and the


central place of the US, there is almost no chance that China will become the
unquestioned hegemon in East Asia. Too much has changed for that to happen, and
the USeven as it adjusts to changing circumstancesis not going to disappear from the region.
The US remains too central, and too powerful, and US (and Western) ideals have
become too deeply embedded in the region , for the US not to be important. Perhaps the
most important question is whether the US and China can come to some type of
accommodation and agreement on each others roles and their relations with each other. While to date
central to stability in the future.

85

the US and China are working to accommodate each other and stabilize their
relations, that process is far from complete. How these two countries manage East
Asian leadership, the status they give to each other, and how other regional countries come
to view them will be central aspects to whether or not the future of East Asian
international relations is increasingly stable.

Withdrawal is Needed Chinese will have more incentive to


enter international liberal system
Leng 13 Deputy Director of Institute of Political Science of Academia Sinica, Professor of Political Science at National
Chengchi University, PhD in Government and Foreign Affairs from University of Virginia [Tse-Kang,Paradox of Political Realism: The
Taiwanese and Chinese Perceptions on the Rise of China Compared, Journal of Contemporary China Studies, 2013, SCJ]
Recently, there have been noteworthy efforts by Taiwanese academics to use constructivism in analyzing international relations in
China. Adopting the constructivist approach, Taiwanese scholars try to analyze the changes and continuity of the Chinese identity
from a third party role. In general, these Taiwanese academics take a more optimistic position on the rise of a new Chinese
identity in international society. For instance, Kun-hsuan Chiu and Wei- en Tan argue that the

Chinese theory of the


harmonious world reflects the fact that the Chinese identify themselves as a
junior power or late comer in the international system. The Chinese perceive the
need to cooperate with the United States in the interdependent international
system. The harmony-oriented Chinese self-identification presents China with a
more active role in traditional as well as human security issues based on the
principle of equality and mutual-benefits. Chiu and Tan even allege that the harmonious world
thesis has been deeply embedded in the value system of Chinese leaders following the
rise of Chinas comprehensive power in the international arena. 16 The normative approach to study the rise of China can be found
in Chen Mu- mins works. Chen indicates that the international society should help change the perception of the Chinese leaders on

If the Chinese leaders believe that the anti-Chinese security threats


are diminishing, the Chinese will have stronger incentives to accommodate to
international rules and norms. The highlight of Chinas more positive perception of
international participation was during the mid-1990s. This also coincided with softer
policies toward Taiwan, as reflected in Jiang Zemins eight points of national
unification released in January 1995.
national security threats.

86

-Nuclear Security
Cooperation goodnuclear security
ZHANG 16-Senior Research Associate with the Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard Universitys Belfer
Center for Science and International Affairs [Hui, Towards Deeper U.S.-China Nuclear Security Cooperation,
Huffington Post, 3/31/2016, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/carnegie-corporation-of-new-york/towards-deeper-uschina-n_b_9583404.html, DKP]

China and the United States have made remarkable strides in cooperating on nuclear
security mattersin every area except the one that arguably matters most: the military sector.
On March 18, shortly before Chinese President Xi Jinping arrived in Washington for the 2016 Nuclear Security
Summit at the end of the month, the two countries opened a Center of Excellence on Nuclear Security in Beijing. As
the largest and most advanced such center in the Asia-Pacific region, it will be a unique forum for exchanging
technical information, sharing best practices, developing training courses and promoting technical collaboration to

Bilateral cooperation has


included visits by Chinese technicians to U.S. facilities to observe security and
accounting approaches, in-depth training workshops against insider threats,
designing physical protection systems, steps to strengthen security culture and
more. Last year, China completed a project to convert one of its research reactors from
using bomb-ready highly enriched uranium to a safer lower grade, also a product of
cooperation with the United States. However, the defense laboratories and facilities that
control most of Chinas weapons-usable fissile materialsand all its nuclear
weapons - have not formally participated in these recent exchanges, because
cooperation was cut off following U.S. charges of Chinese spying in the 1990s. This is a critical gap
in Chinas nuclear security that should be addressed immediately. Individuals from some Chinese nuclear
enhance nuclear security throughout the region and even worldwide.

institutions have reportedly participated in some joint workshops and discussions, and the China Atomic Energy
Authority, which regulates both the civilian and military sectors, does participate. But

deeper cooperation

would significantly enhance global nuclear security progress.

The two governments


conducted a lab-to-lab program of cooperation from 1995 to 1998. It was designed to help create interest in China
in stronger security systems by demonstrating a modern systems advantages for material protection, control and
accounting. But in 1999, the Cox Committee Report alleged Chinese espionage at U.S. nuclear weapons

Since then, direct nuclear security and control


cooperation on Chinas military materials, facilities and nuclear weapons has not
even been discussed. The problem appears to be purely political. As a condition for
laboratories, and the program ended.

restarting the lab-to-lab program, Beijing asked Washington to agree that the program was legal and mutually
beneficial. Washington instead proposed a number of statements focusing more on the future, which have not been

The impasse has stalled more focused work related to the defense
sector that deals with nuclear weapons and the most sensitive nuclear materials. Key to a deeper
satisfactory to Beijing.

relationship would be renewed lab-to-lab cooperation, strengthening Chinas security culture and exchanging visits

The rising threat of


nuclear terrorism should be great enough for abandoning past political disputes. At
at actual military nuclear materials and weapons sites, starting with less sensitive ones.

the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, President Xi noted that increased cooperation on nuclear security in any country

the biggest threat to U.S. security is


the possibility that terrorists might obtain a nuclear weapon. The three previous
Nuclear Security Summits combined with recent Islamic State attacks have raised
nuclear security to the top of the agenda facing world leaders. It is time for Beijing
and Washington to overcome their political differences in order to extend their
cooperation on nuclear security to the military sector.
benefits all countries. And President Obama has declared that

87

88

Liberalism+Realism
Realism and Liberalism in isolation fail only a combination of
both make up for the inconsistences creating the best
framework to evaluate China
Hudda 15 Student at University of Hong Kong getting a degree in E-IR [Nabil
Interpreting the Rise of China: Realist and Liberalist Perspectives E-International
Relations Students, April 3, 2015, http://www.e-ir.info/2015/04/03/interpreting-therise-of-china-realist-and-liberalist-perspectives/, CSS]
Overall, Realism and Liberalism offer us valuable theoretical insight into interpreting the rise of China. This research

simple analysis and


interpretation of the rise of China through Realism and Liberalism in isolation is
inadequate and provides an incomplete perspective. Realist theory offers
interpretations of Chinas rise that focus on its pursuit of power and security in an
international anarchic system. In this system, self-interested states such as China compete in a zero-sum
paper does not conclude that these theories are redundant, but does assert that

game environment. Several empirical examples in this paper support this narrow Realist interpretation, but not to a
full extent. Competing empirical evidence based on Liberal theory contradicts the narrow realist interpretation. A
Liberal scenario is one where the anarchic element of an international system can be diluted. In contrast to a Realist
view, cooperation means that a winwin situation for all is a possibility and conflict is not inevitablein fact, it can be
prevented. The implication is that in the interpretation of Chinas rise, these two theories must be analysed in
combination with each othernot in opposition to each other. Indeed, the complex correlations between power

Using both
theories in combination will lead to a more comprehensive and more accurate
interpretation of Chinas rise, but since all proponents of these theories use history
to characterise and interpret present or future discourse, speculations tend to be
too simplistic. Although debatable and undefined in this paper, perhaps the theories evaluated could be
and interest defy analytic capture by any one paradigm.[50] However, this is not enough.

combined with Chinese characteristics in order to get a better interpretation of Chinas rise. This combination
could include taking into account Chinas own unique culture, civilisation and historical backdrop, in addition to
being more inclusive when it comes to interpretations. That is, current interpretations of Chinas rise need to
include a more diverse range of literature that includes significant Chinese sources. In relation to current policy
regarding interpretations of Chinas rise, I would hope for increased cooperation where there is common ground to
avoid miscalculations and misperceptions. More importantly, issues of dispute need to be handled with more care,
and within designated frameworks. This is important in order to avoid the extremes of Realism, but also address the
failings of Liberalism.

89

US Hegemony Good

90

-Extinction

91

Collapse of hegemony causes rapid extinction


Barnett 11, Professor, Warfare Analysis and Research Dept U.S. Naval War College [Thomas, World Politics
Review, The New Rules: Leadership Fatigue Puts U.S., and Globalization, at Crossroads, 3/7/2011,
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/8099/the-new-rules-leadership-fatigue-puts-u-s-and-globalization-atcrossroads, DKP]

Americans that we stand at a crossroads in our


continuing evolution as the world's sole full-service
superpower. Unfortunately, we are increasingly seeking change without cost, and
shirking from risk because we are tired of the responsibility . We don't know who we are
Events in Libya are a further reminder for

anymore, and our president is a big part of that problem. Instead of leading us, he explains to us. Barack Obama
would have us believe that he is practicing strategic patience. But many experts and ordinary citizens alike have
concluded that he is actually beset by strategic incoherence -- in effect, a man overmatched by the job. It is worth

We live in a time of arguably the greatest structural change


in the global order yet endured, with this historical moment's most amazing feature
being its relative and absolute lack of mass violence. That is something to consider when Americans
first examining the larger picture:

contemplate military intervention in Libya, because if we do take the step to prevent larger-scale killing by
engaging in some killing of our own, we will not be adding to some fantastically imagined global death count
stemming from the ongoing "megalomania" and "evil" of American "empire." We'll be engaging in the same sort of
system-administering activity that has marked our stunningly successful stewardship of global order since World

As the guardian of globalization, the U.S. military has been


the greatest force for peace the world has ever known. Had America been
removed from the global dynamics that governed the 20th century, the mass
murder never would have ended. Indeed, it's entirely conceivable there would now be
no identifiable human civilization left, once nuclear weapons entered the killing
equation. But the world did not keep sliding down that path of perpetual
war. Instead, America stepped up and changed everything by ushering in our nowperpetual great-power peace. We introduced the international liberal trade order
known as globalization and played loyal Leviathan over its spread. What resulted was the
collapse of empires, an explosion of democracy, the persistent spread of human
rights, the liberation of women, the doubling of life expectancy , a roughly 10-fold increase in
adjusted global GDP and a profound and persistent reduction in battle deaths from
state-based conflicts.
War II. Let me be more blunt:

92

-GPW

93

US leadership promotes global peacestatus quo


retrenchment proves hegemony solves conflict
Bresler, 6-24Professor Emeritus of Public Policy @ Penn State-Harrisburg [Obama-led US withdrawal has
destabilized the world, 6/24/2015, Lancaster Online, http://lancasteronline.com/opinion/columnists/obama-led-uswithdrawal-has-destabilized-the-world/article_1c73c828-19d4-11e5-ab00-d32898937e9a.html, DKP]

American leadership need not mean involvement in endless wars. Past history gives us examples. The
Marshall Plan allowed worn-torn allied governments to provide their people with
political stability and economic development. NATO was an effort to build Western
European unity, end the quarrels that had produced two world wars, and deter Soviet aggression. The
United Nations, disappointing in many ways, was a vehicle for broad international efforts against
disease, illiteracy and regional wars. The I nternational Monetary Fund, World Bank and the
General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs were designed to facilitate international trade, prevent
currency wars and assist in economic development. These i nitiatives prevented another
great power war, achieved a large degree of European reconciliation, and eased the transition
for post-colonial countries in Africa and Asia. None would have happened without
strong and persistent American leadership. The U.S. negotiated a series of defense
treaties with more than 35 nations, designed to deter aggression , that also eased their burden
of self-defense and allowed them to place more resources into the reconstruction of their economies. In the Middle East,
the Arab States and Israel saw the U.S. as an honest broker , assisting in the negotiation of peace
treaties between Israel and Egypt and Israel and Jordan. During the Obama administration there has
been a steady American retreat from world leadership. NATO is far less effective.
Allies such as Israel, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Egypt, the Baltic States and Iraq
are no longer confident of American support. Hence, China, Russia and Iran are
asserting hegemonic claims. The world is now torn by devolution and fractionalization. The forces of
global and regional cooperation are in disrepair. The U nited Nations stands helpless
against Russian aggression, civil war in Syria and Libya and atrocities by the Islamic State
across the Middle East and North Africa; the European Union is facing possible revolts and threats of
secession by the United Kingdom and Greece and waning allegiance in much of Europe; and NATO offers Ukraine
no more than its good wishes as Russian President Vladimir Putins military swallows the
country bit by bit. Our allies are far from steadfast. Their governments are weaker,
and vivid world leaders are hard to find among them. Putin, the insane leaders of the Islamic State and the Iranian mullahs have put
fear in the hearts of our allies. Why are these second- and third-rate powers able to intimidate their neighbors far more effectively
than did the far more powerful Soviet Union? Our democratic allies in Europe, lacking a clear sense of direction, are ruled by
unstable coalitions. Even Germany, perhaps the strongest of our European allies, refuses to confront Putin in his efforts to destabilize

When the Obama administration made concession after concession to the


Iranians over its nuclear program, our negotiating partners in Europe lost any interest in taking
serious steps to keep Iran out of the nuclear club. In the Middle East tribalism and religious
fanaticism have left Iraq, Syria, Libya and Yemen virtually ungovernable. Iraq, left to
its won devices by Obamas withdrawal after American troops sacrificed so much to establish a nascent
democracy, is now falling apart. In Egypt, a military regime is trying to forcibly contain the boiling pot that is the Muslim
Brotherhood. Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf States, feeling abandoned by Obamas
rush to a nuclear agreement with Iran, are sensing the quicksand beneath their feet.
Warlordism and radical Islam plague the economically depressed countries of sub-Saharan Africa. A combination of
devolution and chaos becomes normal state of affairs absent a strong centripetal
leadership. In the last half of the 20th century, America provided that force with
Ukraine.

94

persuasion, assistance, assurance and trust. As the Obama administration allows the U.S.
to slip into the shadows world politics, the danger of war increases.

US Primacy prevents Great Power Wars Anything else


escalates and goes nuclear
Ikenberry, 14 [Gilford John Ikenberry is a theorist of international relations and
United States foreign policy, and a professor of Politics and International Affairs in
the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton
University, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, May/June 2014, The Illusion of
Geopolitics The Enduring Power of the Liberal Order, Foreign Affairs,
https://www.foreignaffairs.org/articles/china/2014-04-17/illusion-geopolitics]

Since the end of the Cold War, he argues, the


United States has ignored geopolitical issues involving territory and spheres of
influence and instead adopted a Pollyannaish emphasis on building the global order.
But this is a false dichotomy. The United States does not focus on issues of global order, such as arms
control and trade, because it assumes that geopolitical conflict is gone forever; it undertakes such efforts
precisely because it wants to manage great-power competition. Order
building is not premised on the end of geopolitics; it is about how to answer the big
questions of geopolitics. Indeed, the construction of a U.S.-led global order did not begin with the end of the Cold War;
it won the Cold War. In the nearly 70 years since World War II, Washington has undertaken sustained
efforts to build a far-flung system of multilateral institutions, alliances, trade
agreements, and political partnerships . This project has helped draw countries into the United States orbit. It
Mead also mischaracterizes the thrust of U.S. foreign policy.

has helped strengthen global norms and rules that undercut the legitimacy of nineteenth-century-style spheres of influence, bids for
regional domination, and territorial grabs. And it has given the United States the capacities, partnerships, and principles to confront

these are
the tools of U.S. leadership, and they are winning, not losing, the twenty-firstcentury struggles over geopolitics and the world order. THE GENTLE GIANT In 1904, the English
todays great-power spoilers and revisionists, such as they are. Alliances, partnerships, multilateralism, democracy --

geographer Halford Mackinder wrote that the great power that controlled the heartland of Eurasia would command the WorldIsland and thus the world itself. For Mead, Eurasia has returned as the great prize of geopolitics. Across the far reaches of this

China, Iran, and Russia are seeking to establish their spheres of


influence and challenge U.S. interests, slowly but relentlessly attempting to
dominate Eurasia and thereby threaten the United States and the rest of the
world. This vision misses a deeper reality. In matters of geopolitics (not to mention demographics, politics, and ideas), the
supercontinent, he argues,

United States has a decisive advantage over China, Iran, and Russia. Although the United States will no doubt come down from the
peak of hegemony that it occupied during the unipolar era, its power is still unrivaled. Its wealth and technological advantages
remain far out of the reach of China and Russia, to say nothing of Iran. Its recovering economy, now bolstered by massive new
natural gas resources, allows it to maintain a global military presence and credible security commitments. Indeed, Washington

According to a study led by the political


scientist Brett Ashley Leeds, the United States boasts military partnerships with
more than 60 countries, whereas Russia counts eight formal allies and China has
just one (North Korea). As one British diplomat told me several years ago, China doesnt seem to do
alliances. But the United States does, and they pay a double dividend: not only do alliances provide a global platform for the
enjoys a unique ability to win friends and influence states.

projection of U.S. power, but they also distribute the burden of providing security. The military capabilities aggregated in this U.S.-

Then there are the


nuclear weapons. These arms, which the United States, China, and Russia all
possess (and Iran is seeking), help the United States in two ways . First, thanks to
led alliance system outweigh anything China or Russia might generate for decades to come.

95

the logic of mutual assured destruction, they radically reduce the


likelihood of great-power war. Such upheavals have provided opportunities for past great powers, including
the United States in World War II, to entrench their own international orders. The atomic age has robbed China
and Russia of this opportunity. Second, nuclear weapons also make China and Russia
more secure, giving them assurance that the United States will never invade. Thats a
good thing, because it reduces the likelihood that they will resort to desperate
moves, born of insecurity, that risk war and undermine the liberal order.
Geography reinforces the United States other advantages. As the only great power not surrounded by other great powers, the
country has appeared less threatening to other states and was able to rise dramatically over the course of the last century without
triggering a war. After the Cold War, when the United States was the worlds sole superpower, other global powers, oceans away, did
not even attempt to balance against it. In fact, the United States geographic position has led other countries to worry more about
abandonment than domination. Allies in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East have sought to draw the United States into playing a
greater role in their regions. The result is what the historian Geir Lundestad has called an empire by invitation. The United States
geographic advantage is on full display in Asia. Most countries there see China as a greater potential danger -- due to its proximity,

Except for the United States, every major power in the


world lives in a crowded geopolitical neighborhood where shifts in power routinely
provoke counterbalancing -- including by one another. China is discovering this
dynamic today as surrounding states react to its rise by modernizing their militaries
and reinforcing their alliances. Russia has known it for decades, and has faced it
most recently in Ukraine, which in recent years has increased its military spending
and sought closer ties to the EU. Geographic isolation has also given the United States reason to champion
if nothing else -- than the United States.

universal principles that allow it to access various regions of the world. The country has long promoted the open-door policy and the
principle of self-determination and opposed colonialism -- less out of a sense of idealism than due to the practical realities of keeping
Europe, Asia, and the Middle East open for trade and diplomacy. In the late 1930s, the main question facing the United States was

would need to exist as a great power in a world of


empires, regional blocs, and spheres of influence. World War II made the answer clear: the countrys
how large a geopolitical space, or grand area, it

prosperity and security depended on access to every region. And in the ensuing decades, with some important and damaging
exceptions, such as Vietnam, the United States has embraced postimperial principles.

It was during these postwar


years that geopolitics and order building converged. A liberal international
framework was the answer that statesmen such as Dean Acheson, George Kennan,
and George Marshall offered to the challenge of Soviet expansionism. The system
they built strengthened and enriched the United States and its allies, to the
detriment of its illiberal opponents. It also stabilized the world economy and established
mechanisms for tackling global problems. The end of the Cold War has not changed the logic behind this project. Fortunately, the
liberal principles that Washington has pushed enjoy near-universal appeal, because they have tended to be a good fit with the
modernizing forces of economic growth and social advancement. As the historian Charles Maier has put it, the United States surfed
the wave of twentieth-century modernization. But some have argued that this congruence between the American project and the
forces of modernity has weakened in recent years. The 2008 financial crisis, the thinking goes, marked a world-historical turning
point, at which the United States lost its vanguard role in facilitating economic advancement. Yet even if that were true ,

it

hardly follows that China and Russia have replaced the United States as the
standard-bearers of the global economy. Even Mead does not argue that China, Iran, or Russia offers the
world a new model of modernity. If these illiberal powers really do threaten Washington and the rest of the liberal capitalist world,
then they will need to find and ride the next great wave of modernization. They are unlikely to do that.

96

-Laundry List
US military hegemony is the best thing since sliced bread
(although it arguably came before that)
Michle Flournoy and Janine Davidson 2012 Obamas New Global Posture
Co-Founder of the Center for a New American Security and former U.S.
Undersecretary of Defense for Policy. JANINE DAVIDSON is a Professor at George
Mason University and former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Plans,
http://www.saintjoehigh.com/ourpages/auto/2012/10/5/54579209/120708%20Obama_s%20New%20Global%20Posture.pdf

Tough economic times have often been met in the United States by calls for a more modest foreign policy. But

despite the global economic downturn, in today's interdependent world, retrenchment would
be misguided. The United States' ability to lead the international community is still
invaluable and unmatched. Its economy is still by far the largest, most developed, and most dynamic in
the world. Its military remains much more capable than any other. The United States' network of alliances and

its soft power reflects the sustained


appeal of American values. The United States should not reduce its overseas
engagement when it is in a position to actively shape the global environment to
secure its interests. Preserving the United States' unique standing and leadership will require
revitalizing the American economy, the foundation of the nation's power. It will also require smart
partnerships ensures that the country rarely has to act alone. And

engagement with the rest of the world to create the conditions that are essential to economic recovery and growth,
namely, stability and uninterrupted trade. For decades, those have been underwritten by the forward engagement

sustained U.S. military presence in


Europe and Asia, along with healthy diplomatic and economic ties to allies there, has reaped decades
of peace and prosperity for the United States and the world . Bringing most of those forces
of U.S. forces and by robust networks of alliances. For example, a

home would be detrimental to U.S. national security and economic recovery. Nevertheless, fundamental changes in
the international strategic environment have brought the United States to a strategic inflection point, requiring a
recalibration of the United States' global military posture. The rise of China and India is shifting the power dynamics
in Asia and the world at large. Transnational threats, such as terrorism and proliferation, pose new collective

the maritime, air, space, and cyberspace domains -- are


increasingly congested and contested. And with the end of the Iraq war and the planned 2014 transition in
Afghanistan, the United States is nearing the end of a decade of ground wars in the Middle East and South Asia . In
response to these changes, in 2009 the Obama administration launched a major review of the
U.S. global military posture to determine how to make it more strategically sound ,
operationally resilient, and politically sustainable. The review is ongoing but has already yielded a number
challenges. The global commons --

of new initiatives, such as a shift away from the Cold War orientation of U.S. forces in Europe and a reinvigoration of
the United States' partnerships in Asia. These moves reflect the fact that with the war in Iraq over and the transition
in Afghanistan under way, the United States must focus American leadership on addressing emerging threats and
preventing conflict and on securing a better future through partnership and engagement.

97

-Soft Power
Soft power is crucial to ensuring effectiveness and
sustainabilityempirics
BURNETT 15 - the editor of The World Tonight, a BBC News program [Alistair, China, Russia and the US
Juggle Soft and Hard Power, YaleGlobal Online, 1/8/2015, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/china-russia-and-usjuggle-soft-and-hard-power, DKP]

This year has seen marked resurgence in the use of hard power by states in pursuit
of national interests. The US return to military action in Iraq and direct intervention in Syria,
Russias annexation of Crimea and destabilization of eastern Ukraine and Chinas
assertion of its territorial claims in the East and South China seas are just three examples of major
powers turning to force and coercion to achieve strategic aims. Yet, not so long ago, talk in
diplomatic, academic and journalistic circles focused on the growing importance of soft power in
international relations. In recent years, governments consider how to boost soft power , investing heavily
in tools like international broadcasting and cultural institutes to win friends abroad. China has spent billions expanding
LONDON:

China Central TVs broadcasts in English and other languages and opening 450 Confucius Institutes around the world teaching
Chinese language and culture. It has even invested in trying to create global pop star Jia Ruhan. Russia has expanded its
international TV news station, RT. The US continues to fund international broadcasting started during the Cold War. These are all
efforts to influence the views of people in other countries, winning them over to a way of thinking so they will pressure their
governments even in authoritarian states to fall into line with new policies.

The US is considered the world

leader in soft and hard power, and theres no doubt American culture is attractive to many around the world
consider the numbers wanting to migrate there and who wear baseball caps, eat American-style fast food, listen to American music

Much of the global attractiveness of the US has little to do with


its government, and photographs of anti-American protesters in the Middle East in jeans and T-shirts demonstrate how its
and watch Hollywood movies.

possible to like American culture and dislike Washingtons policies. The US is considered a leader in soft and hard power its culture
is attractive to many around the world. But while the US has accumulated a lot of this soft power without having to spend a cent,
relying instead on the sheer attractiveness of American society, the government still takes steps to manipulate attitudes. One little
publicized effort is how the Pentagon influences its on-screen image through its film liaison office which can save Hollywood

But do events of the


past year suggest that in a world where the global balance of power is shifting and
countries really want their own way, they turn to old-fashioned hard power? Harvard Professor Joe Nye
who coined the term soft power argues it is not a binary choice. He developed on his original definition of power
producers millions in special effects by providing hardware and personnel on approved scripts.

by identifying a third way states could convince others to do what they wanted with smart power basically wielding a mix of

United States, Russia and China have conducted themselves through this lens
shows all three are trying with varying levels of success to use smart power. Before using military force in Iraq
hard and soft power. Looking at how the

and Syria against Islamic State, the Obama administration utilized soft power to maximize impact of the use of its hard power.

Washington was keen that its intervention was not seen as unilateral action by
aggressive Christian states against Muslims, so it portrayed IS as an enemy of fellow
Muslims. Washington also emphasizes it intervenes in Iraq at the invitation of Baghdad and has been successful in building a
coalition including leading Sunni Arab states to carry out airstrikes in Syria. So far the campaign has slowed IS down. Events of the

Russias
campaign to take Crimea and destabilize the eastern part of the country has been called hybrid warfare
because of its mix of diplomacy, TV and social media propaganda about the threat to Russian speakers from
past year may suggest that countries are turning to hard power as the global balance of power shifts. In Ukraine,

Ukrainian nationalists, and use of irregular and disguised forces designed for ambiguity long enough to achieve Russian objectives.
In the case of Crimea, annexed with little fighting, acute observers of Russian policy see this as an effective use of smart power.
Stalemate in eastern Ukraine suggests it may be less effective there. Beijings attempt to use smart power has met with mixed

China claims waters also claimed by the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan. It
has spent recent years reassuring neighbors its not a threat despite its growing
economic and military strength. But, earlier this year, China sent an oil exploration vessel into an area Vietnam
results. In the South China Sea,

98

also claims leading to clashes between Chinese and Vietnamese ships. Tensions with the Philippines emerged after Chinese ships
tried to block Filipino efforts to resupply a garrison of marines on a disputed atoll. The result was anti-Chinese riots in Vietnam,
diplomatic protests by the Philippines, and both countries establishing closer military ties with the United States.

Attractiveness is a result of complex interplay of what a country can offer and how
the offer is perceived. The long-term effectiveness of the return to hard power is
probably more dependent on the military and economic strength of the United States, Russia
and China than their international image. Russia will probably hang on to Crimea because
Ukraine is the weaker state and shows no real appetite to get it back. Chinas economic preponderance
in the South China Sea region means its neighbors, while not rolling over, will probably meet it more
than halfway in the resolving the maritime disputes. The US battle with whats now called IS really goes back to the 2003
Iraq invasion which allowed jihadis to get a foothold in the country by presenting themselves as the resistance to infidel invaders.
The extremists extended their power to western Iraq and Syria after 2011 when the Syrian civil war broke out and US troops left
Iraq. Ultimately, defeating IS depends on a political solution in Syria and an Iraqi government truly inclusive of Sunnis as well as

In all these cases though, soft power is being deployed in subtle ways to
attract support by trying to shape the narrative by portraying rivals and enemies
as acting outside shared global norms and values. The United States claims to defend Muslims from the
Shias and Kurds.

Islamic extremism; Russia says it defends Russian-speakers from Ukrainian nationalists; and China describes itself as a rising, but

success of these attempts depends not just on the language and imagery used by
officials, but also on whether the media and other opinion- formers adopt similar language and imagery. Wielding soft
peace-loving nation. The

and smart power is also complicated because one countrys attractiveness to another is a result of a complex interplay of what a
country has to offer and how the offer is perceived. For instance, the United States has appeal in a country like Burma, because
many people there want democratic elections and free speech after decades of repression, while many Pakistanis dislike the United
States, regarding it as a country that doesnt respect their sovereignty while also killing many of citizens in its anti-terror operations.

99

Global Governmen/Cosmot Good


Global government would be the best conflict mitigateUS
hegemony should phase out in favor of unification
Chase-Dunn and Inoue 12 [Christopher, sociologist best known for his
contributions to world-systems theory, Hiroko, Research Assistant at the Institute of
Research on World-Systems, Sociology Education: Ph.D. Accelerating democratic
global state formation]
A legitimate global government would provide due process even to those who are
widely considered to be terrorists. In order to have sufficient capability to resolve
conflicts among the great powers, the U.N. would also need the legal ability to
collect taxes, such as the proposed Tobin Tax on international financial transactions .
With such capability, and with additional legitimacy produced by meaningful democratization, the
U.N. would be in a much better position to effectively mediate the conflicts that are likely
to emerge in the coming multipolar structure of interstate power. There is an existing global military
apparatus that has been erected by the United States, composed of 865 facilities in
40 countries and overseas U.S. territories (Johnson, 2010: 183). Chalmers Johnson, an intrepid critic of
imperial U.S. foreign policy, decries the effects that hegemony, and especially the shift toward
unilateral militarism, has had on the quality of democracy within the United States . In
order to prevent the permanent transition from a republic to an empire, Johnson proposes that the U.S. global military apparatus
should be sold back to the countries in which the bases and other facilities are located. This would also provide revenues that could

the contention that


hegemony has not been good for democracy in the U.S. The rapid expansion of
income inequality since the 1970s, for instance, has produced a polity that is
increasingly reminiscent of Imperial Rome. Neoliberal economic policies have
combined with neoconservative use of military power to undermine the middle class
and the political process. And so we concur with Johnson, and, furthermore , it is
suggested that the neo- liberal globalization project should be added to the list of
causes. We also agree with Johnson that dismantling the empire would be a good thing for both
the world and for the U.S. But it is doubtful that the culture and the dependencies that have been created can be
be used to revitalize the physical infrastructure of the U.S. The authors of this article agree with

rapidly changed. And so a slightly different version of Johnsons radical proposal is offered that can help with the issue of the
instability of a multipolar world, while also helping the United States move in a more healthy direction.

Would benefit the Global South


Chase-Dunn and Inoue 12 [Christopher, sociologist best known for his
contributions to world-systems theory, Hiroko, Research Assistant at the Institute of
Research on World-Systems, Sociology Education: Ph.D. Accelerating democratic
global state formation]
The most important powers are held by the Security Council. The permanent members of the Security Council are the powers that
won World War II. The Security Council can veto proposals to reform the structure of the U.N., which it has done repeatedly since the

the United Nations would have to


become more democratic by adding a parliament, broadening control of the
Security Council and increasing the powers of the General Assembly and a new
Peoples Parliament. Such a global authority would be widely viewed as representing
the interests of the people of world and would be more strongly supported by those
from the Global South. But there is another grave deficit at the U.N. It does not have the capacity to effectively help
formation of the U.N. in 1945. In order to be a legitimate global authority,

100

The main weakness is with regard to the U.N.s


ability to resolve major conflicts and to enforce decisions that are made. In order to
be able to resolve major conflicts among powerful national states, the U.N.
Peacekeeping Forces would have to be superior to those military forces that might
choose to oppose it. It is usual to consider global governance without discussing Max Webers definition of a state as
humanity meet the challenges of the 21st century.

most importantly a monopoly of legitimate violence. Yet ignoring the issue of military power and security will not help us through
the coming period of great power rivalry. The United Nations is not a state by Webers definition. Rather, a near monopoly of global

This is the de facto world state, but


without legitimacy according to broadly accepted definitions of democratic control .
violent capability is held by the armed forces of the United States.

The President of the United States is the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. armed forces. But s/he is not elected by the peoples of the
world. So U.S. military power is not legitimate, especially when it is exercised unilaterally, as it was during the Bush administration.
The Obama administrations approach has been better in some cases, as demonstrated in the successful multilateral support for

But this stealthy soft power approach is not likely to be successful


in providing a structure for resolving potential conflicts that are likely to emerge
among the great powers during a long period of slowly declining U.S. hegemony . And
opposition forces in Libya.

the new approach has not been consistent. The eradication of Osama bin Laden was another instance of unilateral use of military

A legitimate global government would provide due process even to those who
are widely considered to be terrorists. In order to have sufficient capability to resolve
conflicts among the great powers, the U.N. would also need the legal ability to
collect taxes, such as the proposed Tobin Tax on international financial transactions.
With such capability, and with additional legitimacy produced by meaningful
democratization, the U.N. would be in a much better position to effectively mediate
the conflicts that are likely to emerge in the coming multipolar structure of
interstate power.
force.

People have changed most are looking for a more globalized


cosmopolitan world
Zinoun 13 [Katrin, freelance journalist
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/03/2013329153430436405.htmlAH]
There are global communities who are overcoming cultural differences and working on
problems that will affect all of us. At the World Social Forum in Tunis, for example, participants from all over the

This goal in
mind, global citizens do not think about the cultural traits that might separate them
- rather, they try to come up with solutions for a common problem. Global citizens
Let me return to my question from the beginning, whether we are beyond
cosmopolitanism. If cosmopolitanism is merely an elitist Westernised perspective, then it cannot solve
world are thinking about how they can help to create initiatives that deal with global problems.

problems for "the rest" and we should therefore overcome it. If it is not able to see through the lens of the "others",
how can it understand their problems? On the other side, a farmer from Africa or a fishermen from India could
hardly be called a cosmopolitan, even though he might have internet access occasionally. And even if he was able
to be part of a global virtual community which fights for the rights of farmers or fishermen, he would not be able to
travel and experience other cultures, as the cosmopolitan does. Additionally, we have to consider the inequality of
internet access. Then, how can the farmer or fishermen contribute to a world community? I understand a global
citizen as a person who sees the global scale of a local problem and who does something to counteract it. In order
to form a global community we can perform small steps. There is no need to find universal characteristics that exist
in all cultures worldwide. A global community can form around a basic value that all cultures share, such as freedom

All citizens (maybe not all governments though) agree on the fact, that they need
to be free to express their thoughts . Around this single idea, global communities are evolving. They
are not elitist or Westernised. They are carried by global citizens, who might not be
able to jet from metropolis to metropolis, but who do have - at least occasionally internet access. And they use it to express their thoughts. Thoughts about the issues they face in their local
of expression.

communities. So people from other communities in other places might be able to relate to those problems and find

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I think it is not important what you call a person, whether


it is cosmopolitan or global citizen. What matters more is the action they take. Are
they merely exaggerating cultural differences or are they genuinely trying to find
common ground? For us to be a world community we need much more common
ground. We need to find those lines that break through borders of nation states,
languages or religions. Those lines of shared values will unite humanity.
a common denominator. In the end,

A world Government is unlikely and could possibly never


happen
Cabrera 14 [Luis, political theory at the University of Birmingham in the UK
https://aeon.co/essays/could-a-world-government-actually-workAH]
In my own view, the current global system looks less like the pre-1789 US than a present-day developing country, a
pyramid with the relatively rich at the top and a broad base of people leading much more precarious lives. But

the functional argument put forth by Goodin and


others makes a good deal of sense to me. Consider how policymakers have sought, especially in the
whether the historical parallel fits or not,

past century, to develop regional organisations in Europe, Latin America, North America, Africa and elsewhere; not

Taken
together, these shadow the structure and functions of the domestic state. Global
policymakers might reject the world state ideal in their public statements, but
pragmatic efforts at world state building are well underway. That said, my
suspicion is that it will take a good bit longer than 200 years to reach something
that would be broadly recognised as a global government . After all, it took more than 300
years, from the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, for the world to be (almost) fully populated by
sovereign states, as opposed to kingdoms and colonies . The EU remains the only deeply
to mention international courts and ministry-like international welfare, security and economic organisations.

integrated regional entity, though economic integration projects are underway in virtually every region, and global
governance institutions, while proliferating, remain only shallowly empowered.

Will it take five centuries

to form a world government? A millennium? My usual answer is 800 years, though I must admit I
havent fully worked out the progression. Part of me suspects that never might be the right answer,
but even if full world government is never realised, a rights-based approach to
integration gives us reason to be optimistic. If the ultimate purpose of governing
institutions is to promote rights protections, and higher-level institutions can be
made to serve this purpose through social and political struggle, then the more
world government that emerges, the better.

A cosmopolitan system could help solve a lot of modern


problems
Dvorsky 12 [George, Canadian bioethicist, transhumanist, and futurist. He is a
contributing editor at io9 and producer of the Sentient Developments blog and
podcast http://io9.gizmodo.com/5969802/when-will-we-finally-have-a-worldgovernmentAH]
To help us better understand this issue, we contacted sociologist James Hughes from Trinity College in Connecticut.

Hughes, an ardent supporter of global government, feels that it's an idea whose time has come.
"We need world government for the same reason that we need government in
general," he told us. "There are a number of things what we can agree are
collective goods that individuals, markets, voluntary organizations, and local
102

governments aren't able to produce and which can only be provided through the
collective action of states." Hughes, whose thinking was significantly influenced by the Star Trekian
vision of a global-scale liberal democracy, argues that there a number of things that only a
world government is capable of doing like ending nuclear proliferation, ensuring
global security, intervening to end genocide, and defending human rights. He also
believes that it will take a global regime to finally deal with climate change, and that
it's the best chance we have to launch civilization-scale projects, including the
peaceful and controlled colonization of the solar system. The trick, he says, is to get
there. But by all accounts, it appears that we're on our way.

There is a World government coming now


Snyder 15 [Michael, Professor and Chair of Genetics Director, Stanford Center for
Genomics and Personalized Medicine Co-Principal Investigator at Center for Personal
Dynamic Regulomes, http://www.infowars.com/moving-toward-a-one-worldgovernment-a-one-world-economy-and-a-one-world-religion/AH]
Thanks to a series of interlocking treaties and international agreements, the
governance of this planet is increasingly becoming globalized and centralized , but
most people dont seem alarmed by this at all. In the past 30 days, we have seen some of the biggest steps
toward a one world government, a one world economy and a one world religion that
we have ever witnessed, but these events have sparked very little public discussion or debate. So please
share this article with as many people as you can. We need to wake people up about this before it is too late. From

the United Nations launched a new universal agenda


for humanity. Those are not my words, they actually come directly out of the core
document for this new agenda. The Pope traveled to New York City to give the address that kicked off
September 25th to September 27th,

this conference, thus giving his considerable endorsement to this new plan. Virtually every nation on the entire
planet willingly signed up for the 17 goals that are included in this plan, but this stunning turn of events made very
few international headlines.

103

Constructivism
Constructivism is the best framework to approach China
Lapeyre 13 - Segolene is a U3 student completing an Honours BA in Middle Eastern Studies with a Minor
concentration in Political Science at McGill University. [Segelone China and Japan in Anarchy: A Neorealist and
Constructivist Explanation of the Kurihara Island Conflict McGill International Review November 30 2013, CSS]

Constructivism as an international behavior theory , best developed in Wendts Anarchy is What


States Make of It, offers an alternative explanation of anarchy that more accurately
explains the Kurihara Island conflict as rooted in the post-Cold War atmosphere . Unlike
neo-realism, constructivism proposes a transient and subjective conception of anarchy
that can help policy-makers understand the depth of international conflicts . Wendt
argues that anarchy is a social construct, not an inherent characteristic of the international system. He further

the
anarchy between China and Japan is not innately conflict driven, but rather
constructed by the shared interactions of the two actors . This contextualizes the Kurihara
claims that self-help and power politics do not follow either logically or causally from anarchy:[10]

Island conflict as an issue constructed by China and Japan as a competitive one extant from the Cold War era: the
bipolarity of the system produced a competitive atmosphere from which optimism that cooperation is possible
faded with the development of the Cold War. The anarchic competition of this time was characterized and
exacerbated by the ideological conflict between communist and democratic theory. In other words, China and Japan
believe in this type of competitive anarchy not because the system is inherently competitive but because of the

the international system in which China and Japan


interact is anarchic because these actors constructed this institution of competition
through interaction: self-help and power-politics are institutions, not essential features of anarchy.[11] To
bipolarity of the Cold War system. Further,

understand constructivist anarchy more thoroughly requires an explication of collective ideals and identity;
socialization and interaction; and sovereignty as an institution. Constructivists propose the idea of collective ideals
constructed through socialization as the basis of identity and preference in the international system. Unlike neo-

constructivism states the identities of the actors are defined by states


participation in the system that determines the common norm: identity exists only
within a specific, socially-constructed worldeach identity is an inherently social
definition. Further, conceptions of self and interest tend to mirror the practices of significant others over
realism,

time. The predation in the Cold Wars anarchy of two generated a self-help system: the effect of predationwill
force others with whom it comes into contact to defend themselves. This explains how China and Japan
constructed their systems competitive anarchy: both actors mirrored the competitive behavior of the United States
and Soviet Union in the Cold-War era, which has prevailed in current times despite the recent fall of the Soviet
Union.[12]

Constructivism true in the context of China national identity


proves
Goldingay 14 Masters in International Relations with a Focus on International law and Security Studies
[Kent, WHICH INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORIE(S) BEST EXPLAIN THE RISE OF CHINA IN THE INTERNATIONAL
SYSTEM?, 2014, http://kentgoldingay.com/2014/04/04/which-international-relation-theories-best-explain-the-rise-ofchina-in-the-international-system/, SCJ]

Constructivism and state identity has also served as a prominent paradigm for
understanding the rise of China within the international system. Theoretically,
Constructivism can be understood as the identity of a state shaping international
behaviours, as apposed to any fixed material interest (Qingxin and Blyth 2013). Chinas international identity,
since 1949, has shifted across three major planes Qin (as cited in Qingxin and Blyth 2013). Revisionism was the
dominant force prior to the 1970s, spurring China to reject the existing world order and attempt to alter it in their favour. Throughout

104

the
1980s that China has embraced its own identity as a status quo state, supporting
and integrating into the world order as it stands (Qingxin and Blyth 2013). Qin Yaqing dissects Chinas
the 1970s China moved to focus more on internal matters, separating themselves form the outside world. Finally, it was from

remodeling, explaining that China then altered its attitudes towards the prevailing world order, identifying the existing order as

China
continued to increase its interaction with other states, absorbing itself into the
international community including its rules and norms. Meng Honghua goes on to argue that
China has experienced a slow acknowledgement of the significance of possessing a
favourable image within international institutions with respect to achieving their
own self-constructed national interests Meng (as cited in Qingxin and Blyth 2013). Consequently, China
has become a major stakeholder in the international community Qin (as cited in Qingxin and Blyth 2013) and Chinas
incorporation into the world economy has left it as a direct beneficiary of the
existing international order (Qingxin and Blyth 2013) and has contributed significantly to Chinas rapid economic
growth in recent years (Qingxin and Blyth 2013). The theory of Constructivism provided China with
the lens necessary to enable and encourage China to pursue a state identity
favourable within the international community, allowing Chinese economic
development to advance and the state to progress to the prominent position it
presently commands.
facilitating the necessary conditions to advance Chinese economic development Qin (as cited in Qingxin and Blyth 2013).

By looking at China in a constructivist view we stop looking at them pessimistically


as the US and there allies do now and look at China as an optimistic presence in the
International world
Leng 13 [Tse-Kang, Paradox of Political Realism: The Taiwanese and Chinese
Perceptions on the Rise of China ComparedAH]
Taiwanese academics to use constructivism in
analyzing international relations in China. Adopting the constructivist approach, Taiwanese
Recently, there have been noteworthy efforts by

scholars try to analyze the changes and continuity of the Chinese identity from a third party role. In general,

take a more optimistic position on the rise of a new Chinese


identity in international society. For instance, Kun-hsuan Chiu and Weien Tan argue that the
Chinese theory of the harmonious world reflects the fact that the Chinese identify
themselves as a junior power or late comer in the international system . The
Chinese perceive the need to cooperate with the United States in the interdependent international system. The
harmony-oriented Chinese self-identification presents China with a more active role
in traditional as well as human security issues based on the principle of equality and
mutual-benefits. Chiu and Tan even allege that the harmonious world thesis has been
deeply embedded in the value system of Chinese leaders following the rise of Chinas
these Taiwanese academics

comprehensive power in the international arena.16 The normative approach to study the rise of China can be found

Chen indicates that the international society should help change


the perception of the Chinese leaders on national security threats. If the Chinese
leaders believe that the anti-Chinese security threats are diminishing, the Chinese
will have stronger incentives to accommodate to international rules and norms. The
in Chen Mumins works.

highlight of Chinas more positive perception of international participation was during the mid-1990s. This also
coincided with softer policies toward Taiwan, as reflected in Jiang Zemins eight points of national unification
released in January 1995.17 The combination of classical and constructivist approaches of power politics on the rise

Chu and Huang


emphasize the conflicts and cooperation on ideas and culture, instead of power, as
the central stage of Sino-American relations. They also presume the rationality of
Chinese leaders in the reform era to revise the power or material-centered
of China is also utilized by Yun-han Chu and Min-hua Huang in their work on the rise of China.

105

approaches to Chinese national security threats. Under such a logical inference,


Chinese leaders tend to regard the peaceful evolution strategies from the Western
world as a clear and present threat than a power imbalance in the international
system. Such theses, according to Chu and Huang, match the constructivist arguments that
identity comes before interests. Hence, the Chinese solution to cope with the US
threats is to search for Chinas domestic cohesion to smash the China Threat
attempts from abroad. By contrast, the US policies toward the rise of China are to
attract Chinese intellectuals and elite groups with cultural diplomacy, and thus lead
China towards integration with Western civilization .18

China has a different outlook when it comes to environmental


issues they dont complete what they say do to core
principals
Leng 13 [Tse-Kang, Paradox of Political Realism: The Taiwanese and Chinese
Perceptions on the Rise of China ComparedAH]
Chinas more active participation in non-traditional security affairs has also attracted
the attention of academics. On the topic of global environmental politics, Ho-Ching Lee indicates
that Chinese climate change diplomacy is rooted in the long-standing principle of
Qiutong Cunyi ( approaching common ground and reconciling differences ). To
China, engaging in a process of participation does not necessarily mean committing
to any responsibilities; Chinese participation in the international environmental
agreements does not equal a Chinese commitment on reducing emissions .21 Similar
ideas on the Chinese rationality and pragmatism in international environmental affairs co uld be found in
the literature of Taiwanese academics. To them, ideological factors play minor roles in determining
Chinas policies toward environmental organization as China regains the status of a major power and consolidates
confidence in the global system. For instance, Kuo-cheng

Song argues that in the early stage of global


environmental participation, China adopted a more defensive policy to resist outside
intervention in its domestic economic policies. As China gradually accumulates confidence in
economic development and environmental governance, it deems the compliance with international environmental
norms an opportunity for domestic economic transition and innovation. Such pragmatism eventually leads to the
change of Chinese foreign policy and domestic implementation of emission reduction.22 By the same token, Yi-ren

China regards itself as the


leader of the developing world, adopting more cooperative instead of confrontational policies
would help alleviate the global skepticism on the rise of China and attractive more
foreign direct investments in environmental business. 23
Shi stresses Chinese pragmatism in international environmental negotiations. Although

106

Answers

107

-Not Locked In
Liberalism not locked in and wont beonly a transition away
from hegemony now can prevent catastrophic collapse
Layne 14- PhD is Robert M. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security at the George Bush School of
Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University [Christopher, Zombie hegemony: Will Americas postWorld War II liberal international order remain intact?, Chinese Social Sciences Today, 5/21/14,
http://www.csstoday.com/Item/748.aspx, MHS]

In todays world, the prevailing international orderinstitutions, rules, and normscontinues to be the Pax Americana that emerged

How will the rise of China (and the rest) and


Americas decline affect the international order in coming years? The surprising answer
according to top U.S. foreign policy scholars is not much. Fareed Zakaria, G. John Ikenberry, and
Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wolfforth have articulated what can best be thought of as a theory
of painless American decline, or, in other words, zombie U.S. hegemony. USs
lock-in strategy, a doubtful claim Zakaria, Ikenberry, and Brooks and Wohlforth all argue that for the
moment, the U.S. remains dominant in international politics. But, of course, the important issue is not
in World War IIs wake. What are the Pax Americanas future prospects?

the distribution of power in the international system today but what it will be in 2025, 2030, or 2035. Here however, Zakaria,
Ikenberry, and Brooks & Wohlforth all believe that the Pax Americanas key featuresits institutions, rules, and normscan survive
intact even as the material foundations of American hegemony wither. How can the U.S. pull off this neat trick? By leveraging the
primacy, it enjoys today to hedge against tomorrows decline by locking-in the Pax Americana. The underlying assumption of this
lock-in strategy is that by involving new powers in the current structure and making them responsible stakeholders, the U.S. can
bind those new powers to the current architecture, thus securing its own influence. What Zakaria, Ikenberry, and Brooks &
Wohlforth are claiming is that the United States can be a zombie hegemony: even if the material foundations of U.S. hegemony

In other words, institutions and ideas will trump hard


power. This is a very doubtful proposition. Indeed, it is a form of magical
thinking. By unpacking the lock-in strategy, we can see how deeply flawed
and internally contradictory it is. So what happens over the next decade or two as todays
American military and economic advantages wither? For their part, Brooks Wohlforth try to
extricate themselves from this logical cul-de-sac (dead end) by claiming that U.S. hegemony will
long endure. But really, it wont. And they know it. Brooks and Wohlforth admit that it will
only last for another twenty years (they were writing this in 2008). Emerging powers share
different sets of values. This is where the lock-in strategy comes into play. Brooks & Wohlforth claim that the U.S. still
atrophy during the next decade or two.

has a preponderance of power in international politics that it should use to revise the international order and to reshape legitimacy
standards, and economic globalization. As they see it, the United States should take advantage of what they call the twenty years
opportunity it now has. Zakaria suggests that the U.S. can remain at the apex of international politics for a long time to come by

The common thread in these arguments is that, by


reforming or revising the inter-national system, the U.S. can ensure the liberal
international order like a zombie. The argument that the U.S. should reform or revise the international order has
strengthening and reforming international institutions.

two objectives. One is to maintain as much residual U.S. influence over international outcomes as possible. The other is to make it
attractive for other statesespecially rising powers like Chinato embed themselves willingly in the liberal international order. This
can be done by altering the international orders institutions, rules, and norms enough to co-opt the rising powers and integrate

While foreign policy analysts like Brooks, Ikenberry, Wolfforth, and Zakaria talk the talk
about reform of the international order, it is far from evident that theyor more
importantly, U.S. policymakersare ready to walk the walk with respect to reform because that
would mean accepting a smaller American role. There is little reason to believe that the U nited States
actually would champion the kind of reforms that would be needed to embed rising
powers like China into the current international order. The U.S. has long been
accustomed to being top dog in the international order. While there certainly have been occasional major frictions
them into the system.

with Western Europe and Japan since World War II, they have never seriously challenged Americas leadership role in the

108

international system. Moreover, Western Europe and Japanor so it is assertedshare common values with the U.S. They also are
on a level plane with the United States in economic, political and social development. These states have every reason to buttress

It is very different with the rising powers , however. States


like China and India simply lack the kind of connections to the U.S. that Europe and
Japan have forged. Chinas political and economic systems differ greatly from the
United States. And, as might be expected from states that have been on the receiving end
of American hegemony, and European and Japanese imperialism, China, India, and the emerging
powers in the developing world ascribe to a different set of norms and values.
American leadership and validate its legitimacy.

109

Heg Unsustainable

110

-General
Hegemony fails and destabilizes regional powers no impact
to the transition turns case disregard their fearmongering
Posen 14 Ford International Professor of Political Science at MIT and the director of MIT's Security Studies
Program (Barry, Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy, Cornell University Press, p. 60-62, June 24,
2014)

Partisans of Liberal Hegemony might accept some of the factual statements above but would argue
that the good the strategy has achieved far outweighs the bad. As noted in the introduction,
partisans assume that liberal democracy, human rights, market economies, free trade, nuclear
nonproliferation, middle and great powers that do not take responsibility for their own security, and U.S.
political and military hegemony are all mutually causative, and all lead ineluctably
to a vast improvement in the security and welfare of others, and hence to the U.S.
security position. 124 They also posit that the world is fragile; damage to one of these good
things will lead to damage to other good things, so the United States must defend all. The fragile and
interconnected argument is politically effective. By accident or design, the argument derives an
inherent plausibility due to the inevitable limits of our substantive knowledge, fear,
uncertainty, liberal ideology, and U.S. national pride. Most targets of the argument
do not know enough about the world to argue with experts who claim these
connections; the chain of posited connections always leads to danger for the United States, and fear is a
powerful selling tool. Once fear is involved, even low-probability chains of causation can be made to
seem frightening enough to do something about, especially if you believe your country has overwhelming power. It
is pleasant to believe that the spread of U.S. values such as liberty and democracy
depend on U.S. power and leadership. The argument does not stand close
scrutiny. First, it obscures the inherently strong security position of the United
States, which I have already reviewed. The economic, geographic, demographic, and
technological facts supporting this point are seldom discussed , precisely because they
are facts. It takes very large events abroad to significantly threaten the
United States, and more moderate strategies can address these possibilities at
lower costs. Typical Liberal Hegemony arguments for any new project take the form of
domino theory. One small untended problem is expected easily and quickly to produce
another and another until the small problems become big ones, or the collection of
problems becomes overwhelming. Whether these connections are valid in any particular
case will always be open to debate. Even if the connections are plausible , however, it is
unlikely given the inherent U.S. security position that the United States need
prop up the first domino. It has the luxury of waiting for information and
choosing the dominos it wishes to shore up, if any. Second, proponents of Liberal
Hegemony often elide the difference between those benefits of the strategy that flow to
others, and those that flow to the United States. Individually, it is surely true that cheapriders and reckless-drivers like the current situation because of the welfare,
security, or power gains that accrue to them. United States commitments may make the
international politics of some regions less exciting than would otherwise be the case. The United States,
however, pays a significant price and assumes significant risks to provide these
111

benefits to others, while the gains to the United States are exaggerated because
the United States is inherently quite secure. Third, Liberal Hegemonists argue that U.S.
commitments reduce the intensity of regional security competitions, limit the
spread of nuclear weaponry, and lower the general odds of conflict, and that this helps
keep the United States out of wars that would emerge in these unstable regions. This
chain of interconnected benefits is not self-evident. United States activism does
change the nature of regional competitions; it does not necessarily suppress
them. For example, where U.S. commitments encourage free-riding, this
attracts coercion, which the United States must then do more to deter. Where the
United States encourages reckless driving, it produces regional instability. United
States activism probably helps cause some nuclear proliferation, because some states will
want nuclear weapons to deter an activist United States. When the United States makes
extended deterrence commitments to discourage prolif eration, the U.S. military is
encouraged to adopt conventional and nuclear military strategies that are themselves
destabilizing. Finally, as is clear from the evidence of the last twenty years, the
United States ends up in regional wars in any case. Fourth, one key set of
interconnections posited by Liberal Hegemonists is that between U.S. security
provision, free trade, and U.S. prosperity. This is a prescriptive extension of
hegemonic stability theory, developed by economist Charles Kindleberger from a
close study of the collapse of global liquidity in 1931 and the ensuing great depression. 125 Professor
Kindleberger concluded from this one case that a global system of free trade and finance would more easily survive
crises if there was a leader, a hegemon with sufficient economic power such that its policies could save a
system in crisis, which would also have the interest and the will to do so, precisely because it was so strong. 126
Subsequent theorists, such as Robert Gilpin, extended this to the idea that a global economic and security hegemon
would be even better. 127 Robert Keohane, and later John Ikenberry, added to this theory the notion that a liberal
hegemon would be still better, because it would graft transparent and legitimate rules onto the hegemonic system,
which would make it more acceptable to the subjects and hence less costly to run. 128 A comprehensive rebuttal

this theory has fallen into


desuetude in the study of international politics in the last twenty years. Proponents did not produce
a clear, consolidated version of the theory that integrated economics, security, and
institutional variables in a systematic way that gives us a sense of their relative
importance and interdependence , and how they work in practice. The theory is
difficult to test because there are only two cases : nineteenth- and early twentieth-century
Britain, and postWorld War II United States, and they operated in very different ways under
very different conditions. Finally, testing of narrow versions of the theory did not show
compelling results. 129 These problems should make us somewhat skeptical about
making the theory the basis for U.S. grand strategy.
of hegemonic stability theory is beyond the scope of this book. But

Heg unsustainablefalling behind in tech, innovation,


economics, and educationother countries smell blood in the
water
Kinzer 15- a United States author, journalist and academic. A former newspaper reporter, the veteran New
York Times correspondent has filed stories from more than fifty countries on five continents [Stephen, Take a trip
abroad, see the US in decline, The Boston Globe, 6/20/15, https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2015/06/20/taketrip-abroad-see-decline/OdWqsydaqtHDYaGwfqS3IP/story.html, MHS]

TRAVEL is broadening, but not always in a positive way. For Americans it has an
increasingly painful edge. Too often it leaves us with a disconcerting sense that our
FOREIGN

112

country is falling behind. In a world where competition comes increasingly from other countries, this bodes ill for our
national future. Last month I visited four countries that might seem to have little in common: Turkey, Iran, Germany,
and the Netherlands. All four are intently focused on global competition. Countries
like these will be eating Americas lunch in the future if we proceed as we are today.
Germany and the Netherlands have highly successful, innovation-based economies
that live from exports. Turkey is laser-focused on its goal of becoming one of the worlds 10 richest countries within a
decade. Iran has suffered under decades of economic sanctions but is a young and vibrant society, poised to join the world market

For Americans, traveling in these countries


is sobering because it forces us to confront an unpleasant truth: An increasing
number of nations do things better than we do . In an earlier age that might not have mattered because
with a vengeance if sanctions are eased which may soon happen.

the United States commands such a huge land mass with such lavish resources, and because our political primacy was all but

After the end of the Cold War, the US entered into a period of relative
geopolitical decline. This was inevitable. Never again will we be as dominant in as
many ways as we were during our most powerful days. Globalization has liberated the energies
of people around the world. The global economy is more competitive than it has
been at any time in living memory. This is clear to any American who travels. Our history of power
and prosperity has made us complacent while other countries plan more carefully
for the future. Turkey, Iran, Germany, and the Netherlands are among countries that
smell our blood in the water. One of the most striking differences between those
countries and the US is in physical infrastructure . Highways, bridges, electric grids, and transit systems
unchallenged. It matters now.

are modern and carefully maintained. Public art enlivens neighborhoods. It is difficult to find clusters of poverty and deprivation like

The other huge difference, less visible but even more important
over the long run, is primary and secondary education . One of Americas chronic problems, steadily
those in many American cities.

becoming more acute, is the emergence of a large class of poorly educated, low-skilled citizens unequipped to compete in the
modern economy. Our society does not provide equal access to good education . Students in other
countries now regularly outperform Americans on standardized tests. This is a waste of our human resources and a bad omen for
our future. In infrastructure and precollege education, just as in energy policy, environmental protection, and other areas, the United
States no longer leads the world. One reason is that many Americans seem unable to grasp the connection between taxes and
services. We want a country that is number one, but rebel at the idea of paying for it. Financing a country is no different from
financing any other enterprise: You get what you pay for. All four of the countries I happened to visit follow the high-tax/high-service
model of government. Americans are deeply divided over whether this model is right for us. Perhaps the individualist strain in our
collective DNA makes some other approach more appropriate. No society, however, survives long when great private wealth thrives
alongside public squalor. While Americans argue about how to deal with our national challenges, other countries are surging forward.
To see this happening, travel abroad and look around.

113

Heg unsustainable and retrenchment inevitableeven if US


power is still strong, too many commitments cause
overstretch, instability, and rapid relative decline
Patrick J Buchanan, 6-9-2015-senior advisor to U.S. Presidents Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, and Ronald
Reagan, MA in Journalism @ Georgetown University, author, political commentator ["BUCHANAN: U.S. military
commitments unsustainable," Ashbury Park Press,
http://www.app.com/story/opinion/columnists/2015/06/09/buchanan-us-military-commitmentsunsustainable/28748377/

Toward the end of the presidency of George H.W. Bush, America stood alone at the
top of the world the sole superpower. After five weeks of shock and awe and 100 hours of
combat, Saddams army had fled Kuwait back up the road to Basra and Bagdad. Our Cold War adversary was
breaking apart into 15 countries. The Berlin Wall had fallen. Germany was reunited. The captive nations of Central
and Eastern Europe were breaking free. Bush I had mended fences with Beijing after the 1989 massacre in

The president declared the


coming of a new world order. And neocons were chattering about a new unipolar
world and the benevolent global hegemony of the United States. Consider now
the world our next president will inherit. North Korea , now a nuclear power ruled by a 30something megalomaniac, is fitting ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads. China has
emerged as the great power in Asia, entered claims to all seas around her, and is
building naval and air forces to bring an end to a U.S. dominance of the western
Pacific dating to 1945. Vladimir Putin is modernizing Russian missiles, sending ships
and planes into NATO waters and air space, and supporting secessionists in Eastern
Ukraine. The great work of Nixon and Reagan to split China from Russia in the
Heartland of Halford Mackinders World Island, then to make partners of both
has been undone. China and Russia are closer to each other and more antagonistic
toward us than at any time since the Cold War. Terrorists from al-Qaida and its offspring and the
Tiananmen Square. Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin were friends.

Islamic Front run wild in Libya, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Nigeria and Somalia. Egypt is ruled by a dictatorship that came to

Japan is moving to rearm to meet the menace of North Korea and


China, while NATO is but a shadow of its former self. Only four of 28 member nations
now invest 2 percent of their GDP in defense. With the exception of the Soviet
Union, some geostrategists contend, no nation, not defeated in war, has ever
suffered so rapid a decline in relative power as the United States. What are the causes of
power in a military coup.

American decline? Hubris, ideology, bellicosity and stupidity all played parts. Toward Russia, which had lost an
empire and seen its territory cut by a third and its population cut in half, we exhibited imperial contempt, shoving
NATO right up into Moscows face and engineering color-coded revolutions in nations that had been part of the
Soviet Union and its near-abroad. Blowback came in the form of an ex-KGB chief who rose to power promising to
restore the national greatness of Mother Russia, protect Russians wherever they were, and stand up to the arrogant

Our folly with China was in deluding ourselves into believing that by
throwing open U.S. markets to goods made in China, we would create a partner in
prosperity. What we got, after $4 billion in trade deficits with Beijing, was a gutted
U.S. manufacturing base and a nationalistic rival eager to pay back the West for
past humiliations. China wants this to be the Chinese Century, not the Second American Century. Is that too
Americans.

difficult to understand? But it was in the Middle East that the most costly blunders were committed. Believing liberal
democracy to be the wave of the future, that all peoples, given the chance, would embrace it, we invaded Iraq,
occupied Afghanistan and overthrew the dictator of Libya. So doing, we unleashed the demons of Islamic

Yet though
Americas relative economic and military power today is not what it was in 1992,
our commitments are greater. We are now obligated to defend Eastern Europe and
fanaticism, tribalism, and a Sunni-Shiite sectarian war now raging from North Africa to the Near East.

114

the Baltic republics against a resurgent Russia, South Korea against the North, Japan
and the Philippines against a surging China. We bomb jihadists daily in Iraq and
Syria, support a Saudi air war in Yemen, and sustain Kabul with 10,000 U.S. troops in
its war with the Taliban. Our special forces are all over the Middle East and Africa.
And if the neocons get back into power in 2017, U.S. arms will start flowing to Kiev,
that war will explode, and the Tomahawks and B-2s will be on the way to Iran. Since
1992, the U.S. has been swamped with Third World immigrants, here legally and illegally, many of whom have
moved onto welfare rolls. Our national debt has grown larger than our GDP. And we have run $11 trillion in trade

Thousands of U.S. soldiers have died, tens of


thousands have been wounded, trillions of dollars have been expended in these
interventions and wars. Our present commitments are unsustainable. Retrenchment
is an imperative.
deficits since Bush I went home to Kennebunkport.

115

-Military
Military readiness low nowbudget cuts, appeasement, war
fatiguesoft power cant replace hard power
CARAFANO 15-director of the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies and the deputy
director of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies at The Heritage Foundation, PhD
in Diplomatic History @ Georgetown University, MA in Strategic Studies @ the US Army War College, MA in British
and Early Modern European History @ Georgetown University, BS in National Security and Public Affairs @
Westpoint, Adjunct Professor @ the Institute for World Politics [James Jay, Obamas Cuts leave every military
branch weaker than on 9/11 The heritage foundation 6/5/15
http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2015/6/obama-cuts-leave-military-weaker, DKP ]

A "tiger mom" might go ballistic if her child came home with a "needs improvement" on his kindergarten report card. But most
adults wouldn't panic. They know there is time to get the kid up to standard before the deadline for that Harvard application falls

sub-par grade for military preparedness ought to be an


immediate concern. Today, despite our multibillion dollar investment, America's
military is not all that great. That was the finding of a two-year research effort by a
team of analysts at The Heritage Foundation. "The Index of U.S. Military Strength" grades the armed forces. The ranking
this year? Marginal. Heritage is not alone. Every single service chief issued a similar
warning this spring, when testifying at the annual readiness hearing before Congress. For example, Army
Chief of Staff Gen. Raymond T. Odierno declared the "Army cannot fulfill its role in the defense
strategy" if all cuts required under the Budget Control Act of 2011 are fully implemented. The other services raise red
flags, as well. The Marine Corps, for instance, is running about two-thirds the number of
battalions it has historically needed to meet day-to-day operational demands. Indeed, by the time President
Barack Obama leaves office, every branch of the U.S. military will be smaller than it was on 9/11. Does that
make sense? Is the world safer for America today than it was on September 10 , 2001? When the U.S.
military lacks the capacity and capabilities to protect all its vital interests, the country is worse off. It is just that
simple. Few dispute that today's U.S. military is comparatively smaller and less capable to
handle the missions assigned to the Pentagon - especially given the variety of active adversaries and
due. Defending America is different. A

competitors. But some argue that this is no big deal. After all, they say, nobody really wants to fight World War III with the United

Moscow, Tehran and Beijing don't want to


get into a fighting war with the United States. Even al-Qaida and the Islamic State don't
really want to mess with us. They would actually prefer that the U.S. not repeat the
large-scale military interventions mounted against them during the Bush administration. Yes, everyone would
prefer to win without fighting. Sadly, diminishing American military might plays directly
into our opponents' preferences as well as their strategy. Potential adversaries
can add. As U.S. relative power declines, the Pentagon becomes
increasingly unable to deal with more than one problem at a time. They know, for
example, that if Washington becomes absorbed in a Middle East crisis, it will have less
capacity and appetite to intervene elsewhere. If the U.S. lacks the means to win,
then an enemy's answer is a lot easier: Just demonstrate the ability to make sure
America knows wars will be messy. That will convince Washington the best course is
to just back off. As problems grow and the Pentagon loses more capacity to deal with them, decision-makers in
the U.S. will become increasingly risk-averse. Adversaries will exploit America's
indecision and reluctance to engage. This administration has tried to make up for
shaving military power by adding a double dose of diplomacy. Their efforts have
States. That's probably right. But this rejoinder misses the point.

116

demonstrated that hard and soft power are not interchangeable. Adding a
diplomatic initiative is no substitute for dumping a division. The Russian reset , for
insistence, didn't deter Russian adventurism in Europe. Deliberate self-weakening in the
face of an aggressive adversary invites aggression. Military and diplomacy work better when they
wisely complement each other. Washington doesn't need more war-mongering. But it does need a responsibly sized and capable
military - one that realistically matches the needs of a global power with global interests. Pairing the right armed forces with the
right foreign policy is the best answer.

Heg unsustainablemilitary and tech edge eroding


ECONOMIST 15- ECONOMIST.COM [Why America's military is losing its edge, ECONOMIST.COM,
6/11/15, http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2015/06/economist-explains-9, MHS]

AMERICA'S ability to project power on behalf of its own interests and in defence of
its allies has been the bedrock of the rules-based international order since the end of the
second world war. Critical to that effort has been the role of technology in maintaining a
military edge over potential adversaries through the first and second offset
strategies. In the 1950s it offset the Soviet Unions numerical advantage in conventional forces by accelerating its lead in
nuclear weapons. From the late-1970s, after the Soviets closed the gap in nuclear capability, America began making investments in
emerging technologies that led to the ability to look deep and shoot deep with precision guided munitions. For the next quarter of

Now, that decisive military edge is being eroded. Why?


The same technologies that made America and the West militarily dominant have
proliferated to potential foes. In particular, precision-guided missiles are widely and
cheaply available. Rather than investing in the next generation of high-tech weapons to stay far ahead of military
a century American military dominance was assured.

competitors, the Pentagon has been focused more on the very different demands of counter-insurgency operations in Iraq and

While America has been distracted, China has been busy developing
asymmetric capabilities specifically designed to counter Americas power in the West
Pacific. For over two decades its been investing double-digit defence budgets in an arsenal of highly-accurate, submarines,
Afghanistan.

sophisticated integrated air defence systems (IADS) and advanced cyber capabilities. All with the aim of making it too dangerous for
American carriers to operate close enough to fly their tactical aircraft or cruise missiles. The Chinese call it winning a local war in

Americas military establishment has shown little appetite for


axing much-cherished legacy programmes to pay for the game-changing new
stuff, such as stealthy, long-range strike drones able to survive in the most contested airspace. For example, the Pentagon has
high-tech conditions. Meanwhile,

committed to buy 2,500 semi-stealthy F-35 fighter jets even though their limited combat radius reduces their usefulness in many
war-fighting scenarios. Meanwhile the navy persists with 11 fabulously expensive but increasingly vulnerable carriers when
underwater vehicles both manned and unmanned may be better equipped to tackle enemies with advanced area denial capabilities.
Getting career airmen and sailors to give up their toys isnt the only cultural challenge. These days the scientific and technological
developments that will help sharpen Americas military edge, such as artificial intelligence for unmanned systems, are as likely to
come from the consumer tech companies in Silicon Valley as the traditional defense industry. Just how these two very different
cultures will mesh creatively remains to be seen. America is determined to regain its military edge through a third offset strategy.
But even if the political will and technical brilliance can be summoned up again, dominance will require continuous effort and
innovation because technology proliferates so much faster these days. In part that is thanks to a previous project the Pentagons
Defence Advanced Projects Agency helped into being, the internet.

117

-China Rise
Chinese hegemony inevitableits all over for the US
BURMAN 15-former head of CBC News and Al Jazeera English, teaches journalism at Ryerson University [Tony,
Clash of titans heats up in the South China Sea; China and U.S. vie for regional hegemony, The Toronto Star,
6/6/2015, LexisNexis, DKP]

When the history of this century is finally written, its leading headline will
likely be the emergence of China as the world's dominant superpower.
China has already overtaken the United States as the world's largest economy. What is
unknown, of course, is how it will happen, and how the United States will respond, as this epic
transformation gradually takes shape. This makes the rising tensions in Asia's South China Sea so
revealing. It may be a first glimpse into how this colossal 21st-century rivalry will
unfold. Over the past 18 months, China has been dredging sand from the bottom of the
South China Sea and building artificial islands in waters claimed by several Asian nations. Others have
built similar islands to reinforce territorial claims , but none to the extent of China. In its defence, China has
stubbornly asserted that this is within its rights to "safeguard our own sovereignty." But the United States, prodded by its rattled

Carter, the U.S. secretary of defence, warned against the


"militarization" of the area and said America would continue to exercise its "freedom
of navigation" in international waters. He called for an "immediate and lasting halt" to all landAsian allies, said it would not be intimidated. Ashton

reclamation projects in the South China Sea. Although the potential for danger remains, what is reassuring about this dispute so far
is that both governments appear to want to cool the rhetoric. Their actions have been measured and restrained. They seem to

these two
rivals need to find a way to manage their competing interests in the years and
decades ahead. But that will not be easy. The possibility that an incident could
escalate into a dangerous conflict is real. The U.S. military has yet to test
China's territorial claims around the artificial islands, but that is certain to happen. Last month, a
U.S. television crew aboard an American surveillance plane captured a tense radio
exchange between the U.S. aircraft and Chinese forces. According to the CNN video, a voice can be heard telling the
realize that the last thing the world needs now is a deepening rift between China and the United States. Instead,

Americans: "This is the Chinese navy . . . This is the Chinese navy . . . Please go away . . . to avoid misunderstanding." But

however restrained the Chinese and American governments are with each
other, they both have to deal with powerful hardliners at home. And in the
United States, these voices have been loud. Conservative and Republican commentators unrelenting proponents of the "be afraid, be very afraid" approach to foreign policy have seized on this dispute as further "retreat" by the Obama administration. China's
growing influence is also cited as a reason for increasing America's military forces ,
even though the U.S. is far ahead of everyone in military spending. What seems to infuriate these critics is
the notion that China wants primacy in its own backyard, just as the U nited States has
exercised its primacy in much of the rest of the world. The conservative Wall Street Journal, which sees
rising "dangers in a world where authoritarians grow in power," added this in a May 25 editorial: "Perhaps the greatest
long-term regional threat (to the United States) is a rising China with its rapid economic
growth and desire to restore the Middle Kingdom to what its leaders see as their rightful
dominance in East Asia." Some analysts argue there are parallels between the imperial
ambitions of China today and those of Kaiser's Germany a century ago on the eve of the
First World War. But I share the view of U.S. foreign affairs analyst Robert D. Kaplan, who compares present-day China with the
United States in the early 20th century when it effectively ejected Europe from the Caribbean and went on to dominate the
hemisphere. In his book Asia's Cauldron: The South China Sea and the End of a Stable Pacific, Kaplan writes that

the
118

Chinese are seeking to reduce American influence in Asia with the strategic aim to "exercise
de facto hegemony over their own Asian Mediterranean." If one looks at America's actions in
the past century, should we expect anything different from China?

Balance of power shift inevitableChina usurping the US


Layne 14-PhD is Robert M. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security at the George Bush School of
Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University [Christopher, US must acknowledge Chinas ambition,
The Boston Globe, 8/26/15, http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2014/08/26/avoid-conflict-must-acknowledgechina-ambition/sNHyMDZR7rtXwUi1bqpx8K/story.html, MHS]

ONE HUNDRED years ago this month, Britain declared war on Germany. And though the issues of that era may seem irrelevant now,
the pre-war tensions between those two nations can actually help us understand where todays Sino-American relationship is
headed. After all, though history never repeats itself exactly, as Mark Twain famously observed, it does rhyme. Or to put it another
way, clear patterns recur when two rival nations are locked in a cycle of rise and decline. Throughout history, those power

the US-China relationship is in just such a transition.


China clearly is on the rise. It has surpassed the U nited States as the worlds leading
manufacturing state, the leading trading state, and the leading exporter. Indeed,
according to one World Bank measure, China already has overtaken the United
States as the worlds largest economy . That nations growing wealth is financing a big buildup of its military
capabilities and fueling its geopolitical ambitions. When power transitions occur, great powers
eventually face what students of great-power dynamics relations call the Carr
Moment. In The Twenty Years Crisis, his classic study of international relations, British scholar Edward Hallett Carr focused
on a crucial issue in great-power politics: When the balance of power is shifting, how can a
declining nations desire to preserve the status quo be reconciled with an ascending
rivals desire to revise the world order to reflect its rising power? The Carr Moment
comes at the point when the declining power must decide whether to accede to that
revision or try to preserve the prevailing order. Standing firm means risking war. But accommodating the
transitions have almost invariably resulted in war and

rising power forces the fading hegemon to come to terms with its decline. This was Britains choice during the years leading up to
1914. Although it is tempting for historians to conclude that war between Britain and Germany was inevitable, there was serious
debate among the British foreign policy establishment in the decade or so before the war about whether to contain or conciliate
Germany. In a January 1907 memorandum, Sir Eyre Crow, a senior Foreign Office official, made the case for containment. Crowe
argued that the Anglo-German rivalry resulted from a fundamental opposition of interests. Accommodating Germany, he
maintained, would only whet the expansionist appetite of a nation whose ultimate goal was to supplant the British Empire. As he
saw it, war with Germany could be avoided only by submitting to Berlins demands and thus forfeiting Britains leading power
status or amassing enough power to deter Berlin. Lord Thomas Sanderson, who had recently retired as permanent undersecretary
of state, rebutted Crowe. As a latecomer to the world stage, a unified Germany was understandably impatient to realize various
long-suppressed aspirations, he said. From Berlins perspective, the British Empire must appear in the light of some huge giant
sprawling over the globe, with gouty fingers and toes stretching in every direction, which cannot be approached without eliciting a
scream. Sanderson understood that refusing to accommodate Berlins aspirations risked conflict, but Crowes view prevailed and

Over the next few decades, powerful


forces will push the United States and China toward confrontation. The Carr question of
our time: Will the United States, the declining hegemon in East Asia, try to preserve a
status quo that no longer reflects actual power in the region or accommodate the
demands of a rising China? As long as the United States and China remain committed to
their current ambitions and strategies, the potential for future conflict is high. Avoiding
in August of 1914 Britain and Germany found themselves at war.

conflict will depend much more on the United States than on China. But today the spirit of Sir Eyre Crowe pervades the American

The United States professes benevolence toward China, but refuses to


make any significant concessions to Chinas ambitions. Washington will likely have
the last clear chance to avoid the looming Sino-American conflict by undertaking
a policy of strategic adjustment in East Asia. But Americas political culture and sense
of national identity will make doing so difficult . So will the fact that when US policymakers look to history
foreign-policy community.

for guidance, the default option is to invoke the lessons of the pre-World War II era, and not those of the run-up to World War I.
Thats a mistake. If the United States wants to avoid a future collision with China, it must eschew Crowes counsel and embrace
Sandersons. Thats the real lesson of World War I.

119

A US China war is inevitable


MUKHOPADHYAY 15 SOUNAK, A writer and editor for the International Business Times. (June 24, 2015,
War Inevitable Between US, China: Russian, Chinese Media, http://www.ibtimes.com/war-inevitable-between-uschina-russian-chinese-media-1982123)

Chinese and Russian media have started suggesting the possibility of a China-U.S.
war. While the national news agency in China calls it inevitable, a Russian
news agency listed a number of indications that it said proved the two nations
were heading toward a military conflict. Clearly, there has been growing diplomatic
tension between China and the United States. And according to reports, both countries have been
spending lots of money on military preparations. China's Xinhua News Agency reported that the present
political situation put a question mark on building peaceful coexistence between
China and the U.S. The situation has many people pondering how the two countries can avoid 'Thucydides's
trap' -- the notion an established power becomes so anxious about the rise of a new power that a struggle leading
to war becomes inevitable, Xinhua reported. US China relations The flags of the United States and China flutter on
a light post in Beijing's Tiananmen Square ahead of a welcoming ceremony for U.S. President Barack Obama, Nov.
12, 2014. PHOTO: REUTERS/PETAR KUJUNDZIC Russia's Pravda reported that China had conducted a number of
military exercises simulating an attack against Taiwan. Since the U.S. is committed to protecting Taiwan, a real
conflict of this nature would almost certainly involve the United States the Russian news agency predicted. The
U.S. government blames

Beijing for theft of the personal data of some 14 million U.S.


government workers. According to U.S. authorities, it was an act of war. The U.S.
says the breach also has compromised background information about intelligence
and military personnel. Pravda gives 11 harbingers that apparently demonstrate that China and the
United States will be involved in a war soon. According to the Russian agency, China has
developed a "carrier killer" missile specifically designed for destroying U.S. aircraft
carriers. The Chinese navy is also developing ballistic missile submarines that are
extremely quiet.

A US China WWIII will happen before 2020


Farrell 15 Paul B, was an investment banker with Morgan Stanley; executive vice president of the
Financial News Network; executive vice president of Mercury Entertainment Corp; and associate editor of the Los
Angeles. (July 8, 2015, World War III with China dead ahead, http://www.marketwatch.com/story/4th-of-julyfireworks-world-war-iii-with-china-dead-ahead-2015-07-03)
World War III? OK, so youre distracted by Trump vs. Christie? By Wall Street hyping a bull-market recovery? So we

WWIII really is getting


closer. At the launch of the Iraq War, the Bush team warned us of the mother of all
national security issues ... by 2020 there is little doubt that something drastic is
happening ... warfare defining human life. Pentagon generals are planning ahead for that 2020. But most
forget war, theyre over there, nightly news clips of faraway killer bombs. Wrong,

Americans are more interested in their next gadget. Wake up. USA Today headline: CIA veteran Morell: ISIS next
test could be a 9/11-style attack. That warnings from an insider with George W. Bush in 2001 when hijacked
airliners hit the World Trade Center. Twice acting CIA director, says USA Todays Susan Page. With Obama in the
situation room when word came Navy Seal Team Six had killed Osama bin Laden. Morells new book, The Great
War of Our Time: The CIAs Fight Against Terrorism From Al Qaida to ISIS, makes clear America is already fighting
World War III today. Worse, WWIII will go on for decades, for as far as I can see, says the CIA insider. Yes, WWIII is

by Peter Singer
and August Cole. Singers one of Washingtons pre-eminent futurists. Hes now
walking the Pentagon halls with an ominous warning for Americas military leaders: World War III
with China is coming. In fact, even Americas advanced new F-35 fighter jets may
be blown from the sky by their Chinese-made microchips and Chinese hackers
easily could worm their way into the militarys secretive intelligence service ... and
the Chinese Army may one day occupy Hawaii. Speculation? No, the Journals Dion Nissenbaum
hot news with the Pentagon brass. The Wall Street Journal just reviewed The Ghost Fleet

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Chinese hackers have already got into White House computers, defense
industry plans and millions of secret U.S. government files. Singers written authoritative
reminded us

books on Americas reliance on private military contractors, cybersecurity and the Defense Departments growing
dependence on robots, drones and technology, and why that puts national security at high risk. Military Times
correspondent Lawrence Korb, a Naval War College veteran called Ghost Fleet a realistic scenario of what might
happen if a brewing Cold War with China and Russia ever turns hot. New World War: Forget Big Oil? Buy more

Yes, WWIII is closing in, getting hotter. Last year it almost ignited
with Chinas takeover of disputed islands in the South China Sea. Truth is,
Americans love war. Yes, wars cost money. Add huge debt. New taxes. Still, were
macho, we love war. Why else let the military budget burn 48% of your tax dollars?
Why ignore Nixon staffer and historian Kevin Phillipss warning that most great nations, at the peak of
their economic power, become arrogant, wage great world wars at great cost,
wasting vast resources, taking on huge debt, ultimately burning themselves out.
military defense stocks?

Admit it, we love war. Marine Corps posters grabbed me as a kid. Trained me in aviation weapons systems. Five
years ago I couldnt resist Erik Sofges edgy fast-paced thriller, Chinas Secret War Plan, a frontrunner of Morells
CIA War Against Terrorism and Singers Ghost Fleet. In Popular Mechanics: One of my favorites as a kid working
in a small-town magazine store. Yes, popular, part of Americas DNA since the Revolutionary War. Sofges WWIII
fast-paced thriller begins on Aug. 9, 2015, 0400, a moment predicted years ago, yet ironically right about the
upcoming GOP presidential primary debates. Chinas war against Taiwan starts in the early morning 1,200 cruise
and ballistic missiles rise from heavy vehicles on the Chinese mainland ... Taiwans modest missile defense network,
a scattered deployment of I-Hawk and Patriot interceptors slams into dozens of incoming warheads a futile
gesture ... The mass raid overwhelms the defenses as hundreds of Chinese warheads blast the islands military

Taiwanese troops mobilize in downtown


Taipei, take up positions on the beaches facing China, just 100 miles to the west.
But they know what the world knows: This is no longer Taiwans fight. This is a battle
between an old superpower and a new one. Warrior mind-set sabotages our superpower status
bases and airports. Taiwans air force is grounded

and economy Yes, this is how WWIII starts, between an aging war-lovng America, versus the worlds rapidly
emerging superpower, China, with a population thats one billion larger than America by 2050. China, an economy

Chinas the new superpower, an enemy planning as


we waste economic resources. Chinese seem to have taken the lead in this new arms race, warns
40% of the worlds GDP, versus GDP 14%.

Sofge: When Rand released a report in 2000 describing the potential outcome of a Sino-American conflict over
Taiwan, the United States won the war handily. Nine years later, the nonpartisan think tank revised its analysis,
accounting for Beijings updated air force, its focus on cyber warfare and its ability to use ballistic missiles to take
out American satellites. Rands 2009 conclusion: The

United States would ultimately lose an air


war, and an overall conflict would be more difficult and costly than many had
imagined. Ouch. The Bush team said the Iraq-Afghan Wars would make America stronger. Yet ended as a
example of Kevin Phillips warning, in whats now our biggest foreign policy blunder in history. Sofge captures the
insanity of Americas war plans: This WWIII scenario lasted 24 hours, weakens our economy, our superpower status,
indirectly handing victory to China. And now, our irrational, neocon war-brain wants new wars with Iran, Russia, you
name it. Yes folks, America loves war, in that mind-set we will take on trillions new debt, questionable victories.
Powerful new war strategies: Cyberattacks on the 4th of July Future warriors: New army of hackers, tech geeks,
game players, search-engine geniuses. Today Chinese compete, using Google, Facebook, X-Box technology,
cyberwarriors, trained by war-loving generals. The Pentagon knows: Theyll add trillions to our budgets, taxes and
deficits, preparing for future cyberwars, before combat . Read Sofges 2010 Chinas Secret War Plan thriller, read
Singers Ghost Fleet see how America could lose WWIII to China ... in less than a day. Leaders on both sides
have macho egos, love war, make irrational plan, disregard long-term costs. Americas ego was losing Pentagon war
games to China five years ago, says Sofge Singer now reinforces that threat of a China triggered WWIII.
Unfortunately, our wars are weakening America. Were closing in on the Bush Pentagons dire prophesy: By 2020,
warfare will define human life. So our general spend trillions to prepare us for anything, anyone, anytime. Why? We
love war!

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Containment Good
Chinas rise causes conflict containment is the only realistic
strategy
Whyte 13 MA in international relations @ University of Bristol [Alexander, Interpreting the Rise of China, EInternational Relations Students, February 13 2013, http://www.e-ir.info/2013/02/13/interpreting-the-rise-of-china/,
SCJ]

Mearsheimer (2010) expects China to first of all pursue regional hegemony; China
will want to make sure that it is so powerful that no state in Asia has the
wherewithal to threaten it. Chinas neighbours will eventually join American-led balancing coalition designed to check
Chinas rise, much of the way Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and even China, joined forces with the United States to contain

does not tell an optimistic


story about the prospects for peace in the Asia-Pacific region. For him, international
politics is a nasty and dangerous business and no amount of good can ameliorate
the intense security competition that sets in when an aspiring hegemon appears in
Eurasia (Mearsheimer, 2010, p.396). Chinas regional rise is of particular concern to political
theorists. There is a the hostile China threat rhetoric, arguing that Chinas emergence as a regional
hegemon in North East Asia will be the most dangerous scenario the United States
might face in the early 21st century (Liu, 2004, cited in Stivachtis, 2007, p.92). China is in many ways
mimicking Americas own emergence as a great power; the largest and potentially most powerful state in Asia, is seeking a
more assertive political, military, and economic role in the region, and even
challenging Americas present dominance in East Asia (Layne, 2008, p.18). Mearsheimer
(2010) echoes Laynes argument, expecting a much more powerful China to try to
push the United States out of the Asia-Pacific region , in a similar to fashion to how the United States
the Soviet Union during the Cold War (Mearsheimer, 2010, p.391). Mearsheimer (2010)

pushed the European great powers out of the Western Hemisphere in the 19th Century (Mearsheimer, 2010, p.389). While it they

so, the competitive interactions that lead to greater instability


could gain strength quite rapidly. Christensen (1999) describes the East Asia region as
characterized by major shifts in the balance of power, skewed distributions of
economic and political power within and between countries, political and cultural
heterogeneity, growing but still relatively low levels of intraregional economic
interdependence, anemic security institutionalization, and widespread territorial
disputes that combine natural resource issues with postcolonial nationalism
may only just be beginning to do

(Christensen, 1999, p.49). Moreover, Christensen posits that the security dilemma theory states that, in an uncertain and anarchic

mistrust between two or more potential adversaries can lead each


side to take precautionary and defensively motivated measures that are perceived
as offensive threats (Ibid, p.50). Friedberg (1994) argues that this security dilemma is an amplifier of
anxieties, in which the defensive exertions of the participants stimulate each other
and feed back upon themselves. A multi-sided competition in high technology
power-projection capabilities is underway; therefore needless to say, this scenario is
fraught with uncertainties and dangers (Friedberg, 1994, pp.28-29).
international system,

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A2-Interdependece
Interdependence is an overly simplistic analysis of China
cultural and political issues can overwhelm
Hudda 15 Student at University of Hong Kong getting a degree in E-IR [Nabil Interpreting the Rise of
China: Realist and Liberalist Perspectives E-International Relations Students, April 3, 2015, http://www.eir.info/2015/04/03/interpreting-the-rise-of-china-realist-and-liberalist-perspectives/, CSS]

Liberalism is made up of several interrelated concepts and strands, including the Kantian Triangle,[38]
international institutions, interdependence, and the Democratic Peace Theory,[39] as explored by scholars such
as Michael Boyle and Andrew Moravcsik. In contrast to realist assumptions, Liberalist ones are optimistic in that
they assume human nature is fundamentally good and that conflict can be avoided. Realism and Liberalism both
concur on the existence of an anarchic international system, but for Liberalists, this can be mitigated. For
Liberalists, sovereign states are not the only central actors in world politics. Individuals, interest groups, and
intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations all have an influence on states. While Realism virtually
denies the possibility of cooperation, this notion underpins Liberalism. Since the consequences of using military
power often outweigh the benefits, states have a vested interest in engaging in cooperation. Cooperation can lead
to absolute gains: a winwin situation for all. The next section will focus on interdependence (in particular, economic
interdependence) when assessing Liberalist perspectives on the rise of China because it seems to be one of the

economic
interdependence as the sensitivity of economic activity between multiple nations in
relation to economic developments within those nations .[40] Economic activity tends to
strongest strands (if not the strongest strand) in the Liberalist armament. Richard N. Cooper defines

refer to international transactions such as trade (imports and exports) and foreign direct investment (FDI).[41]
Intense economic activity results in an increased number of ties and greater influence among the nations that

economic interdependence lessens the


likelihood of conflict as one economy becomes more bound to another. As David Starr
engage in such economic activity. Consequently,

Jordan puts it when referring to the likelihood of European conflict, it is a beacon for economic interdependence:
What shall we say of the Great War of Europe, ever threatening, ever impending, and which never comes? We shall
say that it will never come. Humanly speaking, it is impossible.[42] As the graph shows, Chinas overseas direct
investment or FDI has risen significantly. The darker lineChinese FDI flow into the world, including Asiashows an
increase of nearly $75 billion. Using the economic interdependence notions above, this increase in FDI should lead
to a decrease in the likelihood of conflict and can, in fact, foster greater cooperation amongst states. In addition,
Chinas trade interaction with the rest of the world accounts for nearly 50 per cent of its GDP.[43] This shows an
intertwined economic relationship between the nations economy and the global economy. Conflict would
undermine this economic relationship and result in universal losses and repercussions. Furthermore, China is now
an active member in a range of regional and international organisations, institutions and frameworks. Xi Jinping
correctly points out that China contributes to, and is a proactive member of, the G20, The Asia Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC), The United Nations Security Council, the Shanghai Cooperative Organization and The BRICS
(Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) mechanism.[44] He adds that there is a further need to seek
common ground on issues of common interests in pursuit of winwin progress,[45] which not only denigrates the
Realist interpretation of Chinas rise, but wholly supports the Liberalist interpretation. Through Chinas participation
in such organisations, the encouragement of cooperation ensues, ensuring all participants are awarded a share of

using economic
interdependence as an example to show the absolute interpretation of Chinas rise
is vulnerable. It undermines and oversimplifies the frictions that economic
interdependence causes between nations. High levels of economic interdependence
has the ability, as Samuel Huntington notes in The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order, to
act as war-inducing and not peace-inducing as Liberalists would argue.[46] For example, it
fails to account for the deterioration in SinoJapanese relations which has
undermined economic interdependence. Territorial disputes over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands,
as well as Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abes visit to the controversial and sensitive Yasukuni
Shrine, have had a severe effect on bilateral ties and economic interdependence.[ 47]
To quantify this, trade between China and Japan decreased by 3.9 per cent in 2012 followed by a
winnings, meaning that they are less likely to engage in conflict with one another. However,

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further 5.1 per cent drop in 2013. In addition, Chinas FDI in Japan fell by 23.5 per cent during the same period.[48]

Chinas new provocative air-defence identification zone over the East China Sea
testament to Huntingtons predications?[49]
Is

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A2-Cosmopolitinism
Cosmopolitanism cant end capitalism and patriotism nothing
is solved in a cosmopolitan world
Vidmar-Horvat 13 [Ksenija, Associate Professor at Dept. of Sociology, Faculty
of Arts, University of Ljubljana
http://www.querelles.de/index.php/qjb/article/view/3/5AH]
13 Martha Nussbaums influential essay Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism (1994), which can be linked to Kristevas
arguments, presents a further problem .

Rejecting patriotism, Nussbaum writes that the ideals


of justice and equality would be better served by an ideal that is in any case more
adequate to our situation in the contemporary world, namely the very old ideal of
the cosmopolitan, the person whose primary allegiance is to the community of
human beings in the entire world (Nussbaum 1994: I). A response to Richard Rortys call in "The New
York Times" earlier in the same year for the revitalisation of patriotism and national pride in the US, Nussbaums
essay should of course be understood within the parameters of a specific polemical debate. However, the political

Nussbaums idea has left an imprint on the way the discussion of


the relationship between patriotism and cosmopolitanism has been framed in public
discourse. That is, cosmopolitanism is usually imagined to be a democratic
alternative to the parochialism and narrow-mindedness of nationalism and is thus
seen as nationalisms other. However, by emphasising the shifting bond of
belonging and the de-territorialisation of identity, cosmopolitan discourse is also
easily seen as unpatriotic, as having no regard for the homeland or for the history
and memory of the community which occupies the lands of the nation-state. In a way,
context notwithstanding,

cosmopolitanism and nationalism become opposing parties in the definition of patriotism and, with the
cosmopolitans not being seriously concerned with the issues of national identification, the latter especially is
deemed ineligible as legitimate agent in the formulation of public culture. By engaging in global politics of
belonging and citizenshipthe politics which re-examines the maps of civilisational and cultural constellations of
modernity (Delanty 2005, 2010)it (wrongly) appears as a party which arguments are irrelevant to local politics:
cosmopolitans are both above and beyond the national concern. Or, to conclude with Varsamopolou, suffice it to
say that, if nationalism is an obstacle to cosmopolitanism, to regress into a new or nostalgic imperialism cannot be
the answer (Varsamopolou 2009: 27). Because in the popular perception cosmopolitanism is associated mainly
with the elites, it is easily regarded as alienated from the general public. It tends to have an aura of insensitivity to
the real issues and problems of ordinary people. It becomes synonymous with an intellectual fashion and cultural

By pointing to
these general misperceptions, I am not seeking to downplay the structural links
between cosmopolitanism and capitalism. As Amy Pason observes (drawing on the work of Emma
Goldman), it is the rich that benefit from notions of cosmopolitanism and the poor
die after being duped into believing in patriotism (Pason 2008: 16). In Goldmans words, for
surely it is not the rich who contribute to patriotism. They are cosmopolitans,
perfectly at home in every land (Goldman, quoted in Pason 2008: 17). In this sense,
cosmopolitanism can be seen as a faade for the interconnected systems of
oppression (ibid.) which reproduce themselves through wars, imperial violence and
state terror. However, in its capacity to attract the negative stigma of privilege and leisure that is linked to selftrend which is reserved for the few, whose concerns do not resonate with those of the masses.

preoccupied elites, the critical potentials of cosmopolitanism which are relevant to the public and to the everyday

by creating associations
between cosmopolitanism and elites as natural allies, the critique actually
reinforces the hegemonic work of capitalism, which differentiates between the duped, to be
governed as passive subjects at home, and the enlightened, who feel at home in
structures of global governance.
life of the national community, get lost from public sight. In other words,

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