From Device to Vice: Social Control and Intergroup Conflict at Rajneeshpuram

Author(s): Carl Latkin

Reviewed work(s):
Source: Sociological Analysis, Vol. 52, No. 4, Religious Movements and Social Movements
(Winter, 1991), pp. 363-377
Published by: Oxford University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3710852 .
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Sociological
Analysis1991, 52:4 363-378

From
Social
Conflict

Device
Control
at

Vice:

to

and

Intergroup
Rajneeshpuram*

Carl Latkin
Johns Hopkins University

the communebuilt by thefollowers

Socialcontroland intergroupconflictat Rajneeshpuram,
was
a
Shree
studied
of
perspective.Both qualitative and
Rajneesh,
from social-psychological
quantitativemethodswere employed.The leadership'scontrolwas facilitated by the newness
of the groupand its beliefsystem.Disciplesbelievedthat the leadershad a specialunderstanding
of Rajneesh'svision and hence were susceptibleto their influence. Structuralcharacteristics,
such as isolation, contributedto the leaders'power and to the conflict with the surrounding
community,as did the methodsof internalcontrol. Within the communitymaladaptivenorms
took on a life of their own and aided in the demise of Rajneeshpuram.

The building of a new community allows researchersto observe a varietyof unusual

social phenomena. The diverse ways that members of unconventional groups interact,
cope, and function in work, play, and religion is not only of academic interest.
Investigations of such communities also help us to understand our own societies; by
standing out in sharp relief to our own practices, these groups give us a vantage point
from which to examine ourselves.
Most new communal societies are short-lived.Kanter (1972) found that the average
life expectancy was a mere five years. In this article we will examine the social-psychological dynamics of the former commune of Rajneeshpuramin Central, Oregon. With
the advantage of hindsight, I will delineate a set of hypotheses on the antecedents
and consequences of social control and intergroup conflict at Rajneeshpuram. Then,
we will analyze, first, both situational and belief factors that interfered with followers'
ability to judge their leaders' and their own behavior, and second, how those factors
allowed the leaders to exert strong social controls. Many of these dynamics led to
and exacerbated the conflict. We will also examine how isolation, fear of assassination,
external threats, status as a minority, and identity abetted the conflict.
Rajneeshpuram is not the only new religious commune in recent years to have
been devastated by conflict (Robbins, 1988). The Jonestown tragedy has left a deep
*I would thank the Center for the Study of Women in Society at the University of Oregon for financial
support,Melissa Katsikis, RichardLittman, and Norman Sundbergfor their helpful commentsand discussions
of the issuesraisedhere, and the peopleof Rajneeshpuram
for their time and humanity.Correspondence
regarding
this article may be addressedto Carl A. Latkin, Johns Hopkins University, Department of Mental Hygiene,
8th Floor, Hampton House, 642 North Broadway, Baltimore, Maryland 21205.

363

364

SOCIOLOGICALANALYSIS

impressionand raisesthe hauntingquestion:Is thereanythinginherentin the beliefs

and structureof new religiousmovementswhichdisposesthemto conflictandviolence?
were idiosyncratic,whereasothers
Some of the causesof the fall of Rajneeshpuram
were cross-situational.The inter- and intragroupconflictswere dynamicprocesses.
As they escalated,the tactics, perceptions,and behaviorschanged. Although it is
impossibleto sortout the linksin the causalchain of the conflict,I will describesome
of the underpinnings.
ON THE RAJNEESHEES
RESEARCH
The Rajneeshees,disciplesof the IndianreligiousleaderShreeRajneesh,who was
also known as Bhagwanand Osho, purchasedthe 64,229-acreBig MuddyRanch in
EasternOregonin July,1981.The Rajneeshees
immediately
begansettingup the Rancho
as
the
(Braun,
later
Ranjeeshcommune,
city-communeof Rajneeshpuram
incorporated
are
called
Rajneeshees,
sannyasins,
followers,who
1984;Mullen,1983).WhatRajneesh's
and neo-sannyasins,developedwas not a smallruralsettlement;by 1985over 4,000
were living on the ranch.
The researchof the Rajneesheesand Rajneeshpuram
upon which this articleis
of
the
the
commune(see Latkin,
basedbeganin 1982.It continuedthrough breakup
1987;Latkinet al. 1987).We collecteda rangeof data on the communeand on the
surveysand individualinterviewsconpublic'sperceptionsof it. Social-psychological
and a statewidesurveyon attitudestowardRajneesheescomductedat Rajneeshpuram
prisethe bulk of the data. We conductedinterviewsthroughoutthe study;however,
the majorityof the interviewsoccurredin late 1985and early 1986.The administrahadhadprolongedcontact
tion of surveysandinterviewsoccurredafterthe investigators
with the Rajneeshees.None of the investigatorswas a Rajneeshee.
and Subjects
InterviewProcedures
Fortyinterviewswere conductedover a six-monthperiodfromNovember 1985
to May 1986. These interviews,rangingfrom one to three hours, were taped. The
majortopics werebackground,daily events, and reactionsto recentstressfulevents.
Subjectsfor the interviewwerevolunteers.While some respondentswerechosen on
the basis of availability,we endeavoredto select individualsfrom a range of work
areas.Many of the interviewstook placeafterthe commune'schiefspokesperson,Ma
andevaluaAnand Sheela,leftthe commune.Thiswas a periodof intenseintrospection
tion afterher departure,and most of the intervieweesexpressedmisgivingsabout,
as well as praisefor, the community.
The interviewswere semistructuredor focused interviews(Denzin, 1978). All
interviewscovereda basicset of questions;however,as individualsvariedin occupations held and in length of residency,there were variationsin the detailsobtained
on each topic. To reducethe possibilityof memorydistortion,probeswereas specific
as possible.One of the morecommonmethodsof analysisis a matrixprocessin which
topicsor symbolicrelationshipsare arrangedon one axisand situationsor individuals

SOCIAL CONTROL AND INTERGROUPCONFLICTAT RAJNEESHPURAM 365

on the other axis (Spradely,1979).A matrixof seven topics was derivedfrom the
interviewscheduleas follows:background,takingSannyas(the initiationceremony),
life on the ranch, Rajneeshphilosophy,languageanalysis,and crimesand power.
AND THE CONFLICT
HISTORYOF RAJNEESHPURAM
Whenthe Rajneeshees
firstarrivedtheymadepeacefuloverturesto the surrounding
communities;nonetheless,withinthe yearthey becameembroiledin battleswith their
neighbors.The principalconflictwas over land use: the ranchland had been zoned
agricultural,and the Rajneesheeswanted to establishservicesand activitiesmore
commonto a town.This conflictquicklyescalatedinto bitterhostility.The Rajneeshees
took an aggressivestance, becameexceedinglylitigious,and sued dozens of groups
and individuals(Androes, 1986).
One of the many manifestationsof hostilitiesarosewhen a local fundamentalist
preacherand his parishioners
protestedRajneesh'sdailydriveinto the townof Madras,
The Rajneesheesrespondedby busing
which is about 50 milesfromRajneeshpuram.
escalatedas did the number
The demonstrations
theirfollowersto counterdemonstrate.
of protesterson each side. They were defusedby the district attorney, with the
Rajneesheesagreeingnot to drive into the town of Madras.
A bombingof a Rajneeshee-owned
hotelin Portlandin Augustof 1983heightened
the increasingdisplayof semiautomaticweapons
the tension, and at Rajneeshpuram
by the commune's"PeaceForce"createda pictureof imminentbattle.Concomitantly,
on the legalfront,the communewas embroiledin a seriesof legalbattles.Suitswere
wasillegally
broughtagainstthe commune,declaringthat the City of Rajneeshpuram
on
and
December
the
State
Court
incorporated,
11, 1985,
Supreme
proclaimedthat
the city'sveryexistencewasa violationof the constitutionalseparationbetweenchurch
and state (Manuto, 1987;Shay, 1985).
Ma Anand Sheela, the de facto commune leader,who had the title of chief
spokespersonand Rajneesh'spersonalsecretary,did littleto fostercooperationor ease
the conflict.Herspeakingstylewassharp,fiery,crude,caustic,arrogant,and defensive.
Her posturenot only inflamedthe hostilitiesbut also helpedbring the media,who
came in droves, to Rajneeshpuram.
Abruptly,on September14, 1985,Ma Anand Sheelaand 15 to 20 otherofficials
left the commune.They wereimmediatelydenouncedby Rajneesh,who accusedthem
of perpetratingseriouscrimesinside and outsidethe commune.It was revealedthat
unbeknownto governmentofficials,and nearlyall communemembers,a secretive
grouphad mastermindeda seriesof illegalactivities,rangingfrom the poisoningof
a saladbar with Salmonellain a nearbycommunity,to wiretappingand attempted
murderwithinthe commune.AfterSheelaand two otherleaderswereextraditedfrom
West Germany,they plea bargainedto a rangeof charges,includingthe attempted
murderof Rajneesh'sphysician,SwamiDevaraj,a.k.a. GeorgeMeredith.According
to a chronologyprovidedby the Officeof the AttorneyGeneral,the blatantlyillegal
and criminalactivities,such as the wiretapping,did not beginuntilthe springof 1984,
three yearsafterRajneeshpuram
began - they did not becomepublicuntil the fall
of 1985.After Sheela'sdepartureRajneeshdeclaredthat his disciplieswereno longer

366

SOCIOLOGICALANALYSIS

requiredto weartheir distinct"colorsof the sunrise"and that his followerswereno

- he did not want to establishan institutionalized
longerto be called"Rajneeshees"
religion.At the time of our study they called themselvesRajneeshees,as did the
and "sannyasins"
public,hence in this paperI will use the appelations"Rajneeshees"
interchangeably.
A month afterSheela'sdeparture,Rajneeshwas arrestedin Charlotte,North
Carolina,as he waspurportedly
fleeingthe country.On November14, 1985,Rajneesh
left the United States in accordancewith a plea bargainon chargesof arranging
fraudulentmarriagesto enableforeigndiscipliesto stay in the United States.About
two weeksafterRajneeshdeparted,communeofficialsdecidedthat Rajneeshpuram
wasno longereconomically
viable,andmemberswereaskedto leaveas soon as possible.
The communewasfinallysold,in Decmeber1988,for4.3 milliondollars(seeFitzGerald,
1986,for a more detailedaccount).In January1990,Rajneeshdied at his ashramin
Poona, Inda.
PROBLEMOF JUDGMENT
Situationalambiguity
At Rajneeshpuram
therewerea numberof dilemmasfacingsannyasins;one was
the questionof which standardsto use in judgingtheir own behaviorand that of
their leaders.The communityprofessedto have a new set of values:beyond good
and evil. Old standardswere not to be trusted- this was a new society, a new
humanity- yet new standardshad not been formulated.The resultwas a paradox:
How do you judgenew behaviorswithoutrelyingon old norms?What are to be the
standardswhen you are changing?Who is to judge these new behaviors?
had a self-generated
Rajneeshpuram
crypticcountenance.In fact it was calledby
inner
"a
school"
for
transformation.The second dilemma
Rajneesh mystery
Rajneesheesfaced was how does one judgeevents or behaviorin a mysteryschool?
They may well have meaningsbeyond rationality.Rulesof logic do not necessarily
apply. If somethingat Rajneeshpuramappearedto be peculiar,such as the busing
in of thousandsof streetpeople,it could be seen as partof this greatand mysterious
lesson.Moreover,the Rajneesheepracticeof focusingon "beingin the here-and-now,"
ratherthan concentratingon goals and on the future,furtherhinderedmembersin
assessingtheirsituation.Thinkingaboutwhy you'redoingwhatyou'redoing- What
are the reasons?Do they make sense?- impliesfocusingon the end-product,the
Thesetwo congoal.Suchplanningfor the futurewasdiscouragedat Rajneeshpuram.
for
made
it
a
new
and
a
school,
society
mystery
problematic sannyasinsto
ceptions,
assessthe behaviorof their own group.This, in turn, gave the leadershipfreedom
in decisionmakingand diminishedthe abilityof Rajneesheesto questiontheirleaders'
bellicoseacts.
A third complicationwas the dilemmaof how to judgeRajneeshhimself.Many
sannyasinsviewedRanjeeshas an enlightenedbeing, one of only a handful,such as
Jesusor Buddha,who had everwalkedon earth.Beingin the presenceof sucha figure
wasa once-in-a-lifetime
opportunity.Howcouldthey- on a lowerlevelof consciousness

SOCIAL CONTROL AND INTERGROUPCONFLICTAT RAJNEESHPURAM

367

- judgehis behavior?Many assumedthat he had a masterplanfor the development

of the commune,one that they simplycouldnot comprehend;consequently,odd and
troublesomepolicieswereeasilyattributable
to suchan unknownmasterplan.It should
be noted that therewas a vast spectrumof viewson Rajneesh'spowers,which ranged
from seeing him as a good friendto reveringhim as a God-likebeing with supernaturalpowers.
Ingroupbias
Both cognitiveand psychologicalbiasesaffectedthe community'sabilityto assess
selfandothers.Rajneeshees
stronglybelievedthat theirgroupwascomposedof superior
in
The
belief
beings.
superiorityof one's own groupis axiomatic;one would not be
likelyto join a groupthat one did not think was superiorin some fashion.In addition, there is a consistentfindingin the intergroupconflictliteraturethat assigning
peopleto groups,even randomly,producesingroupbiases(Tajfel,1981);each group
perceivesitself as superior.Ingroupbias has been found to be strongerin cohesive
groups(Janis,1972),and conflict enhances cohesion (Worcheland Norvell, 1980).
Although belief in the superiorityof one's own groupis a normalproductof social
this processwas exacerbatedby the Rajneeshees'world
cognition,at Rajneeshpuram
view. One of theirprevailingbeliefswas that the worldwas headingtowarddestruction, and implicitly- at timesexplicitly- that the Rajneesheeswerethe only sane
individualsin an otherwiseinsaneworld.Rajneeshhimselftalkedat greatlengthon
how the worldwas in a disastrousstate, and when he beganspeakingpubliclyagain
in 1985 - after three years of silence - he made disparagingcomments about
Oregoniansand other non-Rajneeshees.If othersare stupid,ignorant,and at a lower
level of consciousness,then it makes no sense to listen to them and take their
concernsseriously.
Severalsannyasinsmentionedthat the communedevelopedan airof superiority.
One communemember,who was interviewedseveralmonths afterthe demiseof the
communesaid,"Iguessthat'spartof our arrogance... that we believedin or bought
into, you know, aboutbeingbetterthan whatever,the restof Oregonor humanity."
Becausethe groupbelievedit wassuperior,naturallywhattheydidwaslikewisesuperior,
and so there was no need to scrutinizeor questiontheir actions.This attitudewas
a barrier;it preventedRajneesheesfrom obtainingfeedbackabout their behavior.
Therewas anothermotivefor the disparagingcommentsthat Rajneesheesmade
about governmentofficialsand others.These commentswere, in part, a reactionto
the public'snegativedepictionof them.The mediahad presenteda highlyunfavorable
imageof membersof New ReligiousMovements(van Driel and Richardson,1988).
The Rajneesheeswereportrayedas cult members,freaks,and deviants.These labels
werea threatto theirself-esteem.When self-esteemis threatenedindividualsattempt
to bolstertheir self-concept(Willis,1981).For the Rajneesheesthereweretwo logical
tacticsfordeflectingthe negativelabelsand bolsteringtheirself-esteem:
denigratenonRajneesheesand glamorizetheir own image.They employedboth. The contents of
their weeklynewspaper,The Rajneesh
Times,was an excellentexampleof both. The
paper'ssubheadingread"Theworld'sbest newspaperin the world'sbest city,"while

368

SOCIOLOGICALANALYSIS

manyof the articlesdenouncedand ridiculedOregoniansand othernon-Rajneeshees

for their prejudicesand stupidity.The psychologicalphenomenonof ingroupbias,
combinedwith the Rajneeshees'arroganceand with the group'sattemptto buttress
its self-esteem,led to group-widecondescensionand overconfidence,which impaired
the Rajneeshees'judgmentand helped to alienatethem.
SOCIALCONTROLFACTORS
Freedomand ambiguity
All organizationsdevelopmethodsof makingdecisions,dealingwith conflict,and
checkingdeleteriousbehavior.They may explicitlydrawup and formallyagreeupon
a set of rulesand proceduresto governand regulatebehavior.Rulesand policiesmay
alsoevolveoverthe courseof timewithoutanyexplicitprocessor writtenrecord(Schein,
1985).From the interviews,an interestingpictureemergesof the socializationand
socialcontrolprocessin Rajneeshpuram.
Receptivityto socializationbegan at initiation. It was laterfosteredby the leaderswith variousformsof socialcontrol,including
threateningsannyasinswith expulsion, keeping informationabout the commune
organizationrelativelysecret, and using the concept of "personalgrowth"as a
controllingdevice.
about
knewmorethan non-Rajneeshees
It is reasonableto assumethatRajneeshees
when
that
said
of
those
interviewed
how to be Rajneeshees,yet many
they joined,
althoughthey were intriguedby the movement,they reallydid not understandit.
One woman said she wanted to be a good sannyasinbut did not know how to be
one. There was no rule book outlininghow one aught to act, how one should be.
Paradoxically,this lack of structurebecamea coerciveforce;it madeit easierfor the
leadersto controlbehavior.Freedomfromrulesprovedproblematicin severalways.
Given the lack of agreed-uponbehavioralstandards,it was difficultto judge the
behaviorsof others or to object to what appearedto be inappropriate.This was
exacerbatedby the community'slack of history.As previouslymentioned,members
saw the communeas a model for a new society, so the rules which appliedto the
"old"society did not necessarilyapply in this new setting.
The newnessand accompanyingambiguityheightenedconformity.In a review
of the researchon organizationalconformity,Nemeth and Staw (1989) contend
that ambiguityof performancecriteriacontributesto conformity.At Rajneeshpuram
no one knew what to do, but assumedthat the leadershipdid, and hence followed
their dictates:freedomfrom the past thus gave way to overpoweringsocial control
by the leaders.
Festinger(1950)arguedthat within groupsthere is a generalproclivitytoward
conformity.He postulatedtwo intergroupforces.The firstis the social comparison
process- others'beliefsand perceptionsare used as a guide to validateone's own
views - which restrictschoices and options. A second impetusis that groupsare
motivatedto attaingoalsand, hence, to avoidincapacitatingdiscord- membersare
willingto submitto the will of the groupand its leaders.Both forceswere at work
individuals
at Rajneeshpuram.
Moreover,in ambiguoussettingssuchas Rajneeshpuram,

SOCIALCONTROLAND INTERGROUP
CONFLICT
AT RAJNEESHPURAM369

aremorelikelyto engagein socialcomparisonto assesstheirown behaviors(Schachter

and Singer, 1962). As the Rajneesheeswere eager to build Rajneesh'svisionary
community,they submittedto the will of the group.
socialization
Leadership
This lack of structureand the absenceof a codifiedbelief systemgave those in
powera freehand in designingthe commune'sculture.Those who enteredand found
themselvesin mid-levelleadershippositionsdid not know the "correct"way to lead,
so they would look to othersfor guidance.The most logicalindividualsto copy were
their own superiors- since they assumedthere was a valid reasonfor them to be
supervisors.One woman,who was the commune'smajorluxurycarpurchaser,freely
admittedthat she copied Ma Anand Sheela'saggressiveleadershipstyle. A second
womanalsosaidshe triedto usethe samestyleof leadershipas that of hercoordinator,
but when she went on exchangeto a GermanSannyascommune,this stylewas,much
to her surprise,seen as overlyharshand authoritarian.
A thirdwoman,who described
the leadershipstyle as "straight,"said, "Theother peoplewho werein a positionof
powerhad waysof beingveryhardand verydirectwith people,and I thoughtI needed
to learnthat [method]."Wanous(1980)proposesthat when newcomersenterorganizationsone of the mosteffectivecopingstrategiesis to observeandpracticethe behaviors
of others. This strategywas abundantlyapparentat Rajneeshpuram.
Once norms are established,even arbitraryones, they tend to take on a life of
theirown and becomeresistantto change.New membersaremost susceptibleto the
influencesof groupnorms.Sherif(1966)demonstrated
thatonce peoplemakejudgments
in a groupsettingthey adhereto the group'snormeven afterdepartingfromthe group.
Jacobsand Campbell(1961)foundthat once an arbitrarynormwasinstilledit persisted
even afterold groupmembersexit and new membersare added- providedthat the
old membersdo not all leave at once. In an organizationalcontext, Zucker(1977)
reportedthat normsare most resistantto changein a hierarchicalorganization,less
resistantin a nonhierarchicalorganization,and leastresistantin a nonorganizational
context.It wasby no meansinevitablethatthe strictcontrolsandmethodsof regulating
behaviorevolved as they did at Rajneeshpuram,but once they were in place they
became self-perpetuating.
Ma Anand Sheela'sharshand oftencombativestylewasalsoacceptedand copied
simplybecauseshe wasBhagwan'spersonalsecretary,andmanybelievedthat Bhagwan
directedher to behave the way she did. In the interviews,severalrespondentssaid
that sinceBhagwanpickedSheela,and sincehe is enlightened,theremust have been
a good reasonfor anythingshe did. Furthermore,sincefew communemembersknew
how decisionsweremade,therewereno availablemethodsor processesfor rejecting
or appealinga decision.Oftena requestwouldbe followedby the phrase"thecommune
needsthis."Such a requestwasdifficultto questionor ignore.Indeed,severalstudies
have found that wordinga requestin an impersonalfashion increasescompliance
(Langer,1989).

370

SOCIOLOGICAL
ANALYSIS

Beliefs and control

Besides the above-mentioned socializationprocess, there were several other factors
that allowed the commune to be tightly controlled. One social control device was
the unacceptability of negative feedback. The commune's philosophical emphasis on
enjoying life became expressed as a desire to emphasize the positive in life. On many
occasions this translated into the suppression of legitimate criticism. If one voiced a
criticism, one could be accused of being negative and told that this negativity should
be "dropped."One woman who worked in the central records office gave the following
scenario to describe "negativity":
The firstweek or so I would bickerwith her about it: "Comeon, why don't we do it
[filerecords]this way . . . and it's all clearand you can find this and I'llknow wherethat
is, and if I put this here. .. ." And our coordinator[supervisor]said, "Look,just drop
all that stuff.Justdo it the way she wantsit done."That wasnegativity;havinga creative
idea was being negative.
The Rajneeshee emphasis on being positive had a naive or innocent quality. Most
sannyasins assumed that they were all at Rajneeshpuramfor the same spiritualreasons.
They did not realize that the quest for power and notoriety, not spiritual fulfillment,
may have motivated some of their comrades. This unquestioning demeanor interfered
with their ability to assess accurately the leadership's behavior and motivation.
A third method of social control was what was known as a "device,"a Rajneeshee
method for personal growth. A device is a Buddhist technique for focusing one's energy
on the self in order to learn about the self. For example, an event that one felt to
be upsetting could also be used as a path toward self-understanding. One woman
describes Sheela this way:
And so I sawSheela'sbeinghorribleas sortof a deviceforme - gettingangryat allauthority
figuresin my life. And it's not that I agreedwith her, but I could think, "Boythis makes
me mad, boy that kind of stuff makesme mad, this is a way of knowingmyself."
A classic example of events being explained away as a device was the importation
of several thousand homeless street people to live at Rajneeshpuram before the
November 1984 election. Many saw this act as a device for sannyasins to examine
their prejudices toward the poor.
Self-blameand fear of explusion
Social control was not only externally imposed by the leaders; it was also internalized by the members. Over and over, respondents said that when they would sense
something amiss, they would blame themselves. A typical response was, as one woman
said, "Ifelt uncomfortable, but I didn't know what it was, and since I was not involved
[with the illegal activities]I thought maybe it was me." According to attribution theory
(Heider, 1980), Rajneeshees were making internal attributions for the problems that
they detected. This self-blamewas reinforcedby what was called "cleaningup on people."

CONFLICT
SOCIALCONTROLAND INTERGROUP
AT RAJNEESHPURAM371
This activity was done by the leadership and directed toward others in leadership
positions and also toward subordinates. It entailed criticism, often harsh, of those who
had been critical of the system.
In addition to self blame, those who objected to what was going on around the
commune were told that the problem lay within themselves and was not due to the
leadership. A guard who protected Rajneesh's car by riding next to it with a submachine gun was asked if any commune residents ever objected to his carrying such
a powerful weapon. He responded by saying,
No, not that I know of, not that I can remember.For a lot of people a part of it was
jealousy[ofthe honorof beingone of Rajneesh's
personalguards]andpartof it wasprobably
valid.They didn'treallyunderstandor they didn'tlike the way it wasgoing,but I wasn't
interestedin that, that wasn'tthe concern,if you didn'tparticularlylike it, it wasn'tmy
problem,it was your problem.
Another means of social control was the fear of being asked to leave the commune.
Those who did not like what they saw felt that they had two choices: they could
either toe the line and be allowed to stay with Bhagwan, or they could say what they
honestly thought and be asked to leave. Several individuals expressed the opinion
of one woman who said, "A lot of people were sent away, or they were put into other
positions, and if you wanted to stay here and be with your family and friends and
with Bhagwan, you shut up because these people were in power." A sannyasin who
said that he was prone to get into trouble, stated,
In no uncertaintermsthey madeit clearto certainpeoplethat unlessthat line was toed,
that they would be living somewhereelse. And so people had to look at that and the
main interestwas to live aroundBhagwan,and to be aroundBhagwan.And becausewe
trustedhim, we trustedthem. And it wasfine. And it stillis fine. I meanthere'sno regrets
about anythingthat happenedhere.
This last statement of there being no regrets should be taken seriously. A theme
often expressed by sannyasins is that regrets are futile. One should endeavor to enjoy
whatever one is doing and not dwell on past mistakes. This philosophy, in the context
of work behavior, was translated into the prescriptionthat it was up to each individual
to make work a positive experience. This could be done with the "right approach."
This prescription, however, was contradicted by the practice of giving menial jobs
as punishment to individuals who were a threat to the system or who had been
"negative."
STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS
As the ranch grew so did security. An elaborate system was erected to monitor
and control the street people, including patrolling the grounds and setting up a pass
system based on commune resident status. There were colored bracelets that indicated
whether one was a visitor, a short term resident, or a commune member. Throughout
the ranch there were restrictions on travel that were based on resident status. Even

372

SOCIOLOGICALANALYSIS

though most of the street people stayed at Rajneeshpuram for only a few weeks and
even after 90 percent of the street people had left, these security structures remained.
Once in place they were difficult to dismantle. Furthermore, as the ranch grew it was
impossible to know everyone personally. This growth made it easier for strangers to
slip in undetected and made the securitysystem seem imperative.One can only speculate
as to whether such social controls would have been possible without an enemy, and
whether they would have been accepted without the powerful desire of sannyasins
to be near Bhagwan and without belief in his omniscient powers.

isolation
Physicaland psychological
One of the structural attributes of the conflict was the secluded setting. Due to
their isolation, the typical Rajneeshpuramresidents saw only a restricted range of acts
toward and beliefs about them. In the evenings they saw the television news clips
about themselves. What they did see was most often negative, and some of the media
reportswere factually inaccurate. On weekends fundamentalistChristians from nearby
towns would drive down the main street of Rajneeshpuram, get out of their cars, read
from their Bibles, and make pronouncements about how Rajneesh was the devil and
that Rajneeshees would go to hell. From these limited and skewed samples of observations, the commune members' belief that the outside world was hostile and
antagonistic toward them was strengthened. This limited perspectiveled to the further
alienation of Rajneeshees from the larger society.
Rajneeshees were not only isolated due to their physical location, but they also
began to lose contact with their friends outside of the commune, a psychological isolation. They felt that their friends no longer understood them, and life outside of the
commune seemed distant, not relevant to life at Rajneeshpuram. One example of the
outside losing its relevance was that although The Oregonian, a daily, statewide
newspaper, could be purchased on the ranch, few sannyasins chose to read anything
other than the weekly RajneeshTimes, which had little coverage of state, national,
or international news. What was reported in newspapers was not felt to be relevant
to ranch life. The loss of contact with friends and the media further exacerbated the
problem of judgment. To whom could sannyasins turn for feedback about the community'sbehavior and that of commune officialsbesidesother Rajneeshpuramresidents?
Feedback from outside residents could have helped to alert sannyasins to the
deterioration of inter- and intracommunity affairs. Those sannyasins who continued
to communicate with family and friends said that they did it out of obligation
and that their phone calls and letters were usually superficial. A woman who worked
on Rajneeshpuram's farm commented that if one saw someone writing a lot of
letters, something was wrong with that individual. It indicated that his or her energy
was no longer focused on the ranch. Lack of communication with the outside further
hampered obtaining feedback from the outside and was thus a means of social
control - the leadership became the sole legitimate source of information and of
interpretations.

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373

CONFLICT
The roleof beliefs
Many of the beliefsthat interferedwith sannyasins'judgmentand abettedsocial
controlwerefactorsin the intergroupconflict.The communeleaderscapitalizedon
the beliefthatRajneeshwasan enlightenedbeing.The leadersdemanded,in Rajneesh's
name, obedienceto them, which on occasionincludedhostile acts towardoutsiders
(such as harassingpublicofficialswho cameto examinecity records).What sacrifice
would be too great to make Rajneesh'sdream come true?What did it matter if
they bent or brokea few lawsto build Bhagwan'svision?After all, it isn't everyday
that a Jesusor a Buddhacomesalong.In the Rajneeshees'view an enlightenedbeing
is a phenomenallyrareoccurrence.Again, not all sannyasinsacceptedthe leadership's
prescriptions.Some wereappalledat what they saw and left. Othersquestionedthe
wisdomof the leadership.Often they were asked to leave the commune.
Tittle (1977)found that one of the strongestimpedimentsto engagingin deviant
behavior is fear of social sanctions.Those who consciouslyand explicitlyremove
themselvesfromsocietymayfeellessconstrainedby societalnorms.As the Rajneeshees
professedto carelittleaboutwhatoutsidersthoughtof them,they werelessrestrained
fromengagingin deviantbehavior.In new communities
suchas Rajneeshpuram
creative
and innovativeorganizational
and socialbehaviorscan emerge,yet without
structures
the fear of social sanction - so can deleteriousones.
Anotherprecipitating
beliefs
factor,whichin partstemmedfromthe Rajneeshees'
and in part from their backgrounds,was that the Rajneesheeswould not and did
not play the role of accommodatingnewcomersor of a complacentminority.They
madefew attemptsto fit in or to assimilate.Many of the Rajneesheeshad previously
held professional,high statusoccupations,and they wereusedto beingleaders.They
were not accustomedto either a subordinateor conciliatoryrole. Refusalto accept
this role undoubtedlyexacerbatedtensions.
Conflict was exacerbatedby a prevalentRajneesheebelief in the possibilityof
Rajneesh'sassassination.In an interviewwith the author,Ma Anand Sheelasaidthat
Ranjeesh,on severaloccasions,proclaimedthat he wouldbe assassinated,mostlikely
by one of his own followers.The fearof his assassinationcreatedan atmosphereof
paranoia;no one could be trusted,not even the closestdisciple.As conflictwith the
outsideescalated,the Rajneesheesconstruedthe hostilityas proofthat peoplewere
bent on destroyingRajneesh.In intergroupconflictit is commonto find that each
side'sperceptionsarealteredby the conflict(Pruittand Rubin,1986).Negativeattributes
of the opposingside are magnified,and ambiguousevents are interpretedas hostile.
As the communityfocusedon this perceivedthreatand how to preventit, the
problembecamemagnified.Detailedfileswerekepton hatemail.Phonesweretapped.
Along with guardposts,two largefenceswereconstructedaroundRajneesh'shouse,
and Rajneesh'shouse was guarded and his grounds patrolled.By directingthe
commune'senergiesto this protection,the perceptionof hostilityand conflictwere
broughtto the foregroundof communelife.

374

SOCIOLOGICALANALYSIS

Leadership
The methods of leadership and the ensuing events did not simply result from a
few individuals grabbing the reins of power over night. The group's philosophy, the
lack of initial behavioral standards, the desire to be with Bhagwan all led to a situation in which the leadership steadily amassed great power. The leadership structure,
along with the community's arrogance and the lack of external feedback, provided
fertile ground for the commune's demise. The methods of social control that have
been described do not imply that residents found the work or leaders to be oppressive.
Many of those interviewed had the highest regard for the top leaders. They felt that
they had integrity, tried to do what they perceived to be best for the commune, and
that without them the city would never have been built.
At Rajneeshpuram, the harsh and sometimes oppressive actions of the leaders
that led to such bizarre behaviors as wiretapping and poisonings inside and outside
of the commune cannot be attributed simply to those in power wanting more power
for their personal gain. The leaders saw the outside world, i.e., government officials
on all levels, the media and surrounding communities, as dangerous. To reduce the
external threat, the leaders felt they needed more control and became increasingly
paranoidand coercive.The commune leadersthought that by becoming more aggressive
toward the outside, they would ward off potential enemies - the deterrent theory.
In this atmospherea siege mentalitybegan to develop: criticismwas no longer legitimate.
In a state of war one does not question authority - one obeys. In the interviews it
was revealed that a whole filing system of information on enemies and a catalogue
of all the hostile letters received were developed. This system amplified the perception
of hostilities by focusing attention on the conflict. The increasing fear that hostile
outsiders would infiltrate or invade gave the leadership a rationale for strict control
of the ranch. A tyrannical system was accepted by the members because they thought
that the leaders had some spiritual authority.
It has been shown that external threat increases group cohesion (Wilder and
Shapiro, 1984),which has been hypothesizedto be beneficialfor group survival(Kanter,
1973). This linkage raises the question, did the leadership instigate conflict to build
group cohesion? Was there a conscious manipulation of attitudes toward outsiders
in order to enhance group solidarity?Nesbitt and Wilson (1977) have demonstrated
that we are much less aware of our behavior than we think we are. It is likely that
individuals found the tactics that enhanced solidarity rewarding and effective rather
than having consciously manipulatedthe situation in order to enhance group solidarity.
In addition, intense group loyalty, and the concomitant socialization processes aimed
at achievingloyalty, are not the sole domain of religiousgroups;they have been observed
in a variety of nonreligious organizations (Alder and Alder, 1989).
Group cohesion, however, is not always constructive; it can be deleterious. It can
increase the chances of intergroup conflict and suppress dissension. A constellation
of behavior of highly cohesive groups that results in the suppression of dissent has
been entitled "Groupthink" (anis, 1982). Symptoms include an illusion of invulnerability, unquestioned belief in a group's morality, stereotyped views of opponents,
conformity to pressure, self-censorship, and an illusion of unanimity. Each of these

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375

symptomswas manifestedat Rajneeshpuramas the commune became embroiled

in conflict.
CONCLUSION
The lack of questioningof leaderswas due in part to the failureto understand
the overwhelmingimpactthat situationalstructurehad on behavior- in the present
case,the effecton leadershipbehaviorof a hierarchical,nondemocratic,organization
coupledwith externalhostility.A prevailingassumptionof communememberswas
that "aware"individualswould make good decisionsregardlessof the situationand
regardlessof the organizationalstructure. However, it has been consistently
demonstratedthat strongsituationalforcesmay overpowerpersonalityfactors.The
classicMilgramstudyof obedience(1974)and the Zimbardoprisonstudy(Zimbardo
et al., 1977)clearlyshowthat manipulatinga seeminglyinnocuoussituationcan induce
stable,normalindividualsto engagein aggressiveand potentiallyharmfulbehavior.
Although some sannyasinsfelt they were living under a despoticregime,most
did not - or chose to stay and to be with Bhagwananyway.Still other inhabitants
chose to see the communeas a positive,loving, utopia, and saw Ma Anand Sheela
as a protectorof the commune.This diverstiyof perspectivesis a good exampleof
how one'senvironmentis actively"enacted"
(Weick,1979).The degreeto whichperceptions may be determinedby socialfactorsis furtherevident in that most individuals
at Rajneeshpuram
wereunawareof the dubiousactivitiesgoingon aroundthem. Few
sannyasinsinterpretedevents, such as the busingin of the homelessto increasethe
numberof city residentsin orderto "stuffthe ballot box," as a symptomof corruption; rather,they saw it as some part of the master'splan for utopia.
The Rajneesheessawpoliticsas evil and believedthat politiciansact solelyin their
own self-interest.The idealRajneesheesocietywouldbe freeof politicalinstitutions.
They believedthat if people lived with awarenessand in harmonythere would be
no needforpolitics.Rajneesharguedthat socialchangeis not broughtaboutby changes
in the socialstructureor by a politicalprocess.Changeresultsfrompersonaltransformation;changeis an internalprocess,not externallyimposed.When peoplebecome
more awareand trueto theirnaturetherewill be societaland worldharmony.Only
then willpoliticalproblemsbe solved.Rajneesh'sviewson politicsstem,in part,from
Taoism,Buddhism,and Hinduism.His perspectivedoes not, however,fit well with
Americanpoliticalculture.Indeed,politicalinstitutionsand socialcontrolsareessential for the survivalof any largegroup. It is ironic that the Rajneeshees'antipathy
toward political institutions resulted in the establishmentof a maladaptiveand
authoritarianpoliticalsystem.
The fall of Rajneeshpuram
leadsto severalquestionsabout communesand new
socialorganizations:
If one wantsto createan experimentalsocietyhow muchcontact
should there be with the outsideworld?Too much may stiflechange, and too little
mayresultin the inabilityto judgeinternalbehaviors.Anotherset of questionsconcerns
the Rajneeshees'naivete.There is evidencethat focusingon positivelife events and
beingoptimisticis an effectiveand beneficialcopingstrategy(Lewinsohnet al., 1980);
however,can one emphasizethe positivewithoutbecominggullible?A finalquestion

376

SOCIOLOGICALANALYSIS

is, how have the Rajneesheeschanged?AlthoughRajneeshpuram

collapsedthe gorup
did not disband- they are now back in Poona, India.Did their views and beliefs
Their behavioris not set
change as a resultof their experiencesat Rajneeshpuram?
in stone. Have their methodsof socialcontrolchanged?Whichones have remained?
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