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University of Cebu Banilad

College of Law
Banilad, Cebu City

Case Digests for Legal


Medicine

Submitted by:
Mahinay, Shammah Rey C.
M4

Submitted to:
Atty. Empaces

July 2016

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. NIXON MALAPO,


accused-appellant
Facts: Malapo was accused of raping
Amalia Trinidad on September, 1991
at Salvacion, Iriga City and as a result
she has become pregnant and
delivered a baby at the Iriga City
Puericulture Center.
Amalia Trinidad had been under the
care and custody of Nenita No since
1978 when Amalia was just seven
years old. It appears that Amalia is a
retardate who was a former ward of
the Elsie Gaches Village institution.
Accused-appellant
submitted
as
documentary evidence a medical
certificate showing that the alleged
victim gave birth to a full-term male
baby on May 18, 1992. He argues that
if Amalia had been raped in
September of 1991, she could not
have been delivered of her baby on
May 18, 1992.
Issue: Whether or not the accuseds
contention has merit.
Held: No, the contention has no
merit.
A textbook on pediatrics states that
Infants delivered before the thirtyseventh week of gestation with a birth
weight of less than 2,500 grams
(American) or 2,275 grams (Filipino)
are considered premature. An infant
can therefore be considered a fullterm baby if it weighs more than
2,275 grams even if it is born before
the thirty-seventh week which is less
than 9.3 months. Since according to
the medical certificate Amalias baby
weighed 2.4 kilograms or 2,400
grams, it was a full-term baby even if
it was born before the normal
gestation period.
Article 166
provides:

of

the

Family

Code

Legitimacy of a child may be


impugned only on the following
grounds:
(1)
That
it
was
physically
impossible for the husband to
have sexual intercourse with his
wife within the first 120 days of
the 300 days which immediately
preceded the birth of the child
because of:
(a) the physical incapacity of the
husband
to
have
sexual
intercourse with his wife;
(b) the fact that the husband and
wife were living separately in such
a way that sexual intercourse was
not possible; or
(c) serious illness of the husband,
which
absolutely
prevented
sexual intercourse;
(2) That it is proved that for
biological or other scientific
reasons, the child could not have
been that of the husband, except
in the instance provided in the
second paragraph of Article 164; .
..

In the case at bar, it can be inferred


that conception occurred at or about
the time that accused-appellant is
alleged to have committed the crime,
i.e., within 120 days from the
commission
of
the
offense
in
September 1991. Pursuant to Art. 166
of the Family Code, accused-appellant
can overcome the presumption that
Amalias child was begotten as a
result of her having been raped in
September 1991 only if he can show
either
that
it
was
physically
impossible for him to have sexual
intercourse because of impotence or
serious
illness
which
absolutely
prevents him from having sexual
intercourse or that Amalia had sexual
intercourse
with
another
man.
However, accused-appellant has not
shown either of these.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALBERTO MEDINA y


CATUD, accused-appellant.
Facts: Medina was accused of
stabbing and killing Andres M. Dalisay
with a balisong in the abdominal
region on May 20, 1991.
From June to October of 1982,
accused-appellant was confined at the
National Mental Hospital. Ms. Lourdes
Palapal, the Records Officer of the
National Center for Mental Health
(formerly,
the
National
Mental
Hospital) testified on the documents
issued by their office relative to the
confinement of accused-appellant for
schizophreniform disorder during that
period.
Dr. Teresita Adigue, a Doctor of
Psychology,
and
an
accredited
psychologist of the Philippine National
Police testified that on January 20,
1992,
she
administered
a
psychological evaluation on accusedappellant. Dr. Adigue testified that
based on the evaluation of accusedappellant, the latter has been shown
to be suffering from depression and
was exhibiting homicidal tendencies,
and that he did not know the
difference between right and wrong.
On cross-examination, the witness
affirmed that a person suffering from
depression may be insane.
Issue: Whether or not the accused
should be acquitted on the ground of
insanity.
Held: Dr. Adigues testimony failed to
establish legal insanity on the part of
the appellant. After examining the
appellant on January 20, 1992, or four
months prior to the incident, and after
conducting the Draw-a-Person Test,
the Thematic Apperception Test and
the Hand Test, she reported the
results of her examination as follows:
VII. TEST RESULTS/EVALUATIONS
Psychological test results revealed
that subjects mental activity is
functioning on the normal level at

the time of evaluation. He can


comprehend instructions fast and
[was] never hesitant to take the
said examinations.
With regards to some dominant
personality factors, test results
revealed also the fact that subject
is suffering only from mild
depression because of problems
he had encountered in life and in
things around him. He had also
developed negative reactions and
outlook in life, therefore the
undersigned concluded that he
has some emotional disturbances.

Such results do not prove the alleged


insanity of the appellant. Art. 12, par.
1 of the Revised Penal Code, requires
a complete deprivation of rationality
in committing the act; i.e., that the
accused be deprived of reason, that
there
be
no
consciousness
of
responsibility for his acts, or that there
be complete absence of the power to
discern. More relevantly, said report
does not support the claim that
appellant could not distinguish right
from wrong.
In the present case, Dr. Adigues
testimony did not establish complete
deprivation of appellants reason.
Consequently, appellant cannot claim
exemption from criminal liability under
Art. 12, par. 1 of the Revised Penal
Code.
Alternatively, appellant argues that
his condition should merit, at the very
least, the appreciation of a mitigating
circumstance under Art. 13, par. 9 of
the Code. In the instant case,
however, the defense miserably failed
to establish the deprivation of the
appellants will when he stabbed his
victim. Appellant testified that he
thought the victim was going to pull
out a weapon, thus he beat him to the
draw and stabbed him with his
balisong. This statement shows that
he did not suffer any deprivation of
2

reason or discernment. While the


victim appeared to him as a devil with
horns, such perceptual distortion
occurred only after he had dealt the

fatal blows on the victim. The Court


cannot, therefore, appreciate this
mitigating circumstance in his favor.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CELESTINO


BONOAN Y CRUZ, defendant-appellant.
Facts: Bonoan as accused of stabbing
Carlos Guison on the different parts of
his body with a knife, thereby
inflicting upon him the following
injuries, to wit:
"One stab wound at the right
epigastric region penetrating one
cm. into the superior surace of
the right lobe of the liver; and
three
non-penetrating
stab
wounds located respectively at
the posterior and lateral lumbar
region, and left elbow", which
directly caused the death of the
said Carlos Guison three days
afterwards.

On January 16, 1935, the case was


called for the arraignment of the
accused.
The
defense
counsel
forthwith objected to the arraignment
on the ground that the defendant had
dementia prcox and was at the time
confined in the Psychopatic Hospital.
On January 21, 1936, Dr. Fernandez
reported to the court that the
defendant could be discharged from
the hospital and appear for trial, as he
was "considered a recovered case."
Summoned
by
the
court,
Dr.
Fernandez, appeared and testified
that the accused "had recovered from
the disease."
After trial, the lower court found the
defendant guilty of the offense
charged in the information abovequoted and sentenced him to life
imprisonment, to indemnify the heirs
of the deceased in the sum of P1,000,
and to pay the costs.
Issue: Whether or not the court erred
in
finding
that
the
evidence
establishes that the accused has had
dementia
only
occasionally
and
intermittently and has not had it

immediately prior to the commission


of the defense.
Held: Yes, the accused is exempted
from criminal liability.
The defense set up being that of
insanity, the only question to be
determined in this appeal is whether
or not the defendant-appellant was
insane at the time of the commission
of the crime charged.
To prove motive and premeditation
and, indirectly, mental normlacy of
the accused at the time of the
commission
of
the
crime,
the
prosecution called on policeman
Damaso Arnoco. Arnoco testified that
upon
arresting
the
defendantappellant he inquired from the latter
for the reason for the assault and the
defendant-appellant replied that the
deceased Guison owed him P55 and
would pay; that appellant bought the
knife for 55 centavos in Tabora Street
and that for two days he had been
watching for Guison in order to kill
him. Such kind of evidence is not
necessarily proof of the sanity of the
accused during the commission of the
offense, is clear from what Dr. Sydney
Smith, Regius Professor of Forensic
Medicine, University of Edinburg, said
in his work on Forensic Medicine, that
in the type of dementia prcox, "the
crime is usually preceded by much
complaining and planning. In these
people,
homicidal
attacks
are
common, because of delusions that
they are being interfered with sexually
or that their property is being taken."
In view of the foregoing, we are of the
opinion that the defendant-appellant
was demented at the time he
perpetrated
the
serious
offense
charged in the information and that
3

consequently he
criminal liability.

is

exempt

from

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARIO BASCO y


SALAO, accused-appellant.
Facts: Basco is accused of shooting
Rolando Buenavetura with a gun on
the different parts of his body,
inflicting mortal gunshot wounds
which were the direct and immediate
cause of his death.
The medical report found three
gunshot wounds in the deceased.
The defense, however, had a different
version of the events. According to
accused-appellant, he went home to
avoid further altercation with Rolando
Buenaventura, Sr. However, realizing
that he was at fault, he went to
Rolandos
house
intending
to
apologize. When he was at the
doorstep of the house, Rolando
emerged pointing a gun at him.
Fearing that Rolando might shoot him,
he grappled for possession of the gun,
and suddenly the gun fell and went
off, after which he left immediately.

Issue: Whether or not the privileged


mitigating circumstance of incomplete
self-defense should be appreciated.
Held: We find the appeal without
merit.
It is an established fact that the
deceased Rolando Buenaventura, Sr.
sustained three gunshot wounds, as
evidenced by the post mortem
findings.
We agree with the trial court that if
indeed accused-appellant and the
deceased grappled for the possession
of the gun, and the gun fell and
accidentally fired, it is impossible that
the deceased would sustain three
gunshot wounds. The location and
presence of several gunshot wounds
on the body of the victim is physical
evidence that eloquently refutes
accused-appellants
allegation
of
accidental firing.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ABELARDO


FORMIGONES, defendant-appellant.
Facts: The accused was charged with
parricide.
On December 28, 1946, late in the
afternoon, Julia, wife of the accused,
was sitting at the head of the stairs of
the house. The accused, without any
previous
quarrel
or
provocation
whatsoever, took his bolo from the
wall of the house and stabbed his
wife, Julia, in the back, the blade
penetrating the right lung and causing
a severe hemorrhage resulting in her
death not long thereafter. The blow
sent Julia toppling down the stairs to
the ground, immediately followed by
the accused who, taking her up in his
arms, carried her up the house, laid
her on the floor of the living room and
then lay down beside her. In this

position he was found by the people


who came in response to the shouts
for help made by his eldest daughter,
Irene Formigones, who witnessed and
testified to the stabbing of her mother
by her father.
His counsel presented the testimony
of two guards of the provincial jail
where Abelardo was confined to the
effect that his conduct there was
rather strange and that he behaved
like an insane person; that sometimes
he would remove his clothes and go
stark naked in the presence of his
fellow prisoners; that at times he
would remain silent and indifferent to
his surroundings; that he would
refused to take a bath and wash his
clothes until forced by the prison
4

authorities; and that sometimes he


would sing in chorus with his fellow
prisoners, or even alone by himself
without being asked; and that once
when the door of his cell was opened,
he suddenly darted from inside into
the prison compound apparently in an
attempt to regain his liberty.
Issue: Whether or not the accused
could be exempted from criminal
liability due to embicility.
Held: No, the court ruled that the
accused is not an embicile.
According to the very witness of the
defendant, Dr. Francisco Gomez, who
examined him, it was his opinion that
Abelardo was suffering only from
feeblemindedness and not imbecility

and that he could distinguish right


from wrong.
In order that a person could be
regarded as an imbecile within the
meaning of article 12 of the Revised
Penal Code so as to be exempt from
criminal liability, he must be deprived
completely of reason or discernment
and freedom of the will at the time of
committing the crime.
As to the strange behaviour of the
accused during his confinement,
assuming that it was not feigned to
stimulate
insanity,
it
may
be
attributed
either
to
his
being
feebleminded or eccentric, or to a
morbid mental condition produced by
remorse at having killed his wife.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CRISPINO


MANCAO and CIRIACO AGUILAR, defendants-appellants.
Facts: Crispino Mancao and Ciriaco
Aguilar were charged with homicide of
Roberto Villela and was convicted by
the Court of First Instance of Cebu to
fourteen years, eight months and one
day reclusion tempora.
The appellants allege that the lower
court erred in not holding that the
accused Ciriaco Aguilar is mentally
deficient and is, therefore, not
criminally liable.
Issue: Whether or not there is merit
to the contention.

Held: No. The defense of lack of free


will of the accused Ciriaco Aguilar,
who is an epileptic, cannot be
sustained. While Ciriaco Aguilar, as an
epileptic, was susceptible to nervous
attacks that may momentarily deprive
him of his mental faculties and lead
him to unconsciously attempt to take
his own life and the lives of others,
nevertheless, it has not been shown
that he was under the influence of an
epileptic fit before, during, and
immediately after the aggression.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs.


POTENCIANO TANEO, defendant-appellant.
Facts: On the day of the commission
of the crime, the defendant had a
severe stomachache which made it
necessary for him to go to bed. It was
then when he fell asleep. While
sleeping, he suddenly got up, left the
room bolo in hand and, upon meeting
his wife who tried to stop him, he
wounded her in the abdomen.
Potenciano
Taneo
attacked
Fred
Tanner and Luis Malinao and tried to

attack his father after which he


wounded himself. Potenciano's wife
who was then seven months pregnant,
died five days later as a result of her
wound, and also the foetus which was
asphyxiated in the mother's womb.
The defendant states that when he fell
asleep, he dreamed that Collantes
was trying to stab him with a bolo
while Abadilla held his feet, by reason
5

of which he got up; and as it seemed


to him that his enemies were inviting
him to come down, he armed himself
with a bolo and left the room. At the
door, he met his wife who seemed to
say to him that she was wounded.
Then he fancied seeing his wife really
wounded and in desperation wounded
himself. As his enemies seemed to
multiply around him, he attacked
everybody that came his way.
Issue: Whether or not the accused
should be exempt from criminal
liability.
Held: Yes, the defendant acted while
in a dream and his acts, with which he
is charged, were not voluntary in the
sense of entailing criminal liability.
The
evidence
shows
that
the
defendant not only did not have any
trouble with his wife, but that he loved
her dearly. Neither did he have any

dispute with Tanner and Malinao, or


have any motive for assaulting them.
Under the special circumstances of
the case, in which the victim was the
defendant's own wife whom he dearly
loved, and taking into consideration
the fact that the defendant tried to
attack also his father, in whose house
and under whose protection he lived,
besides attacking Tanner and Malinao,
his guests, whom he himself invited as
may be inferred from the evidence
presented, the court found not only a
lack of motives for the defendant to
voluntarily
commit
the
acts
complained of, but also motives for
not committing said acts.
Doctor Serafica, an expert witness in
this case, is also of the same opinion.
The doctor stated that considering the
circumstances of the case, the
defendant acted while in a dream,
under the influence of an hallucination
and not in his right mind.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JUAN N.


GIMENA, defendant-appellant.
Facts: Gimena is charged with the
crime of parricide for killing his wife.
The justice of the peace asked the
defendant why he had attacked his
wife and received the answer that it
was because she had given the sum of
P2.70 to one Apolinar Sereno whom
he, the defendant, suspected of illicit
relations with the wife.
The
appellant's argument in his favor is
that
he
was
in
a
state
of
somnambulism when he attacked his
wife.
Issue: Whether or not the appellant
should be exempted from criminal
liability.
Held: No, the court does not think
that this theory can serve as a
defense in the present case.

By order of the trial court the


defendant
was
placed
under
observation for some time by Dr. Luis
B. Gomez, but the doctor apparently
did not discover any somnambulism
on the part of the defendant. A
defense of that character must be
proven and such proof is lacking in
this case.
The defense that the offense charged
was committed by the accused during
the prevalence of or in a state of
somnambulism has been recognized;
but the latest holding of courts is to
the effect that it does not constitute a
defense other than that embraced in a
plea of insanity.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ERIC BAID Y OMINTA,


accused-appellant.
Facts: Baid was charged of the crime
of rape against Nieva Garcia y Saban,

a mental patient suffering from


schizophrenia confined at the Holy
6

Spirit Clinic in Cubao, Quezon City


where the accused-appellant was a
nurse-aide of said clinic.
It is contended that as complainant is
a schizophrenic, her testimony should
not have been given credence by the
trial court.
Issue: Whether or not the contention
has merit.
Held: Notwithstanding her mental
illness, complainant showed that she
was qualified to be a witness, i.e., she
could perceive and was capable of
making known her perceptions to
others. Her testimony indicates that
she could understand questions
particularly relating to the incident
and could give responsive answers to
them.
To warrant a conviction for rape under
paragraph (2) of Art. 335, a woman
need not be proven as completely
insane or deprived of reason. The
phrase "deprived of reason" has been
construed to include those suffering
from mental abnormality or deficiency
or some form of mental retardation,

those who are feebleminded although


coherent.
That the complainant was suffering
from schizophrenia at the time of the
rape is shown by the fact that she was
in the clinic precisely because of such
illness and by her behavior at the trial,
during which she would smile for no
reason at all while answering the
questions. Though she may not have
totally lost her memory, it was shown
that she was suffering from an
impairment of judgment, which made
her incapable of giving, an intelligent
consent to the sexual act. It has been
held that where the rape victim is
feeble-minded, the force required by
the statute is the sexual act itself.
Even
assuming
then
that
the
complainant consented to have sexual
intercourse with accused-appellant,
the copulation would fall under the
third paragraph of Art. 335 of the
Revised Penal Code in view of the fact
that complainant was mentally ill.
Sexual intercourse with an insane,
deranged, or mentally deficient,
feebleminded, or idiotic woman is
rape.

EL PUEBLO DE FILIPINAS, querellante-apelado, contra ANASTACIA


LACENA, acusado-apelante.
Hacia las 3 de la madrugada del 16 de
agosto de 1938, Marciano Dante se
desperto sobresaltado porque su
mujer, la acusada apelante, que
estaba enferma de unas calenturas, le
dijo: "Patay ka ngayon" (Vas a morir
ahora), clavandole en el abdomen un
par de tijeras. La herida producida fue
la causa de la peritonitis aguda de que
mas tarde fallecio el lesionado.
Se ha probado que, el dia del suceso,
atacada de fiebre alta, la apelante
deliraba y acometia a cualquiera de
los que vivSan con ella en la casa. En
el analisis de su sangre, verificado el
12 de octubre de 1938, se hallo que
padecia de plasmodium falcifarum o
malaria maligna, enfermedad que
produce perturbacion en el sistema

nervioso,
causando
entre
otras
complicaciones
mania
aguda,
melancolia y locura excepcional, a
veces, porque su comun secuela es la
neuralgia.
Las circunstancias en que la apelante
asesto y dio el tijeratazo a su marido,
revelan que ejecuto tal acto en
momentos que padecia de locura a
consecuencia de su enfermidad, y por
tanto, de acuerdo con lo dispuesto en
el articulo 12, parrafo 1. del Codigo
Penal Revisado, no ha incurrido en
responsabilidad criminal. El testimonio
del Juez de Paz, Sr. Jose Y. Baldos, al
efecto de que Marciano Dante le dijo
que su esposa, probablemente se
habia regaado porque no se le habia
podido dar de comer, por haberse el
7

quedado
dormido,
creemos
que
carece de valor, por estar basado en
una simple conietura del occiso, y por
no constar semejante extremo en la

declaracion ante mortem prestada por


el mismo.
Se revoca la sentencia apelada y se
absuelve a la acusada de la querella,
con las costas de oficio. Asi se ordena.

JOEL JIMENEZ, plaintiff-appellee, vs. REMEDIOS CAIZARES, defendant.


Republic of the Philippines, intervenor-appellant.
Facts:
Joel Jimenez prays for a
decree annulling his marriage to the
defendant
Remedios
Caizares
contracted on 3 August 1950 before a
judge of the municipal court of
Zamboanga City, upon the ground
that the office of her genitals or
vagina was to small to allow the
penetration of a male organ or penis
for copulation; that the condition of
her genitals as described above
existed at the time of marriage and
continues to exist; and that for that
reason he left the conjugal home two
nights and one day after they had
been married. On 14 June 1955 the
wife was summoned and served a
copy of the complaint. She did not file
an answer.

Issue: Whether or not the marriage in


question may be annulled on the
strength only of the lone testimony of
the husband who claimed and
testified that his wife was and is
impotent.
Held: The lone testimony of the
husband that his wife is physically
incapable of sexual intercourse is
insufficient to tear asunder the ties
that have bound them together as
husband and wife. Whether the wife is
really impotent cannot be deemed to
have been satisfactorily established,
becase from the commencement of
the proceedings until the entry of the
decree she had abstained from taking
part therein.

JOSELITA SALITA, petitioner, vs. HON. DELILAH MAGTOLIS, in her capacity


as Judge of the RTC, Quezon City, Br. 107, and ERWIN ESPINOSA,
respondents.
Facts: Erwin Espinosa, 32, and
Joselita Salita, 22, were married at the
Roman Catholic Church in Ermita,
Manila, on 25 January 1986. A year
later, their union turned sour. They
separated
in
fact
in
1988.
Subsequently,
Erwin
sued
for
annulment on the ground of Joselitas
psychological incapacity.
Erwin specified that
. . . at the time of their marriage,
respondent (Joselita Salita) was
psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital
obligations of their marriage in
that
she
was
unable
to
understand
and
accept
the
demands made by his profession
that of a newly qualified Doctor
of Medicine upon petitioners
time and efforts so that she

frequently complained of his lack


of attention to her even to her
mother,
whose
intervention
caused petitioner to lose his job.

Still Joselita was not contented with


the Bill of Particulars. She argued that
the "assertion (in the Bill of
Particulars) is a statement of legal
conclusion made by petitioners
counsel and not an averment of
ultimate facts, as required by the
Rules of Court, from which such a
conclusion may properly be inferred.
Issue: Whether or not the allegations
in the in the Bill of Particulars of the
petition for annulment of marriage is
sufficient.
Held: The Bill of Particulars filed by
private respondent is sufficient to
state a cause of action, and to require
8

more details from private respondent


would be to ask for information on
evidentiary matters. It would be
unreasonable, if not unfeeling, to
document
each
and
every
circumstance of marital disagreement.
True, the complaining spouse will have
to prove his case, but that will not
come until trial begins.
Suffice it to say that Mme. Justice
Sempio-Diy, formerly of the Court of
Appeals and a member of the Civil
Code Revision Committee that drafted
the Family code, explains The
Committee did not give any examples

of psychological incapacity for fear


that the giving of examples would
limit the applicability of the provision
under the principle of ejusdem
generis. Rather, the Committee would
like the judge to interpret the
provision on a case-to-case basis,
guided by experience, the findings of
experts
and
researchers
in
psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals which,
although not binding on the civil
courts, may be given persuasive
effect since the provision was taken
from Canon Law.

CHI MING TSOI, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI,
respondents.
Facts: Plaintiff seeks annulment on the
grounds of psychological incapacity. Their
marriage was not consummated on their
wedding night and on subsequent nights.

The
plaintiff
claims,
that
the
defendant is impotent, a closet
homosexual as he did not show his
penis. She said, that she had observed
the defendant using an eyebrow
pencil and sometimes the cleansing
cream of his mother. And that,
according to her, the defendant
married her, a Filipino citizen, to
acquire or maintain his residency
status here in the country and to
publicly maintain the appearance of a
normal man.

Issue: Whether or not the refusal of


private respondent to have sexual
communion with petitioner is a
psychological incapacity.
Held: One of the essential marital
obligations under the Family Code is
"To procreate children based on the
universal principle that procreation of
children through sexual cooperation is
the basic end of marriage." Constant
non- fulfillment of this obligation will
finally destroy the integrity or
wholeness of the marriage. In the case
at bar, the senseless and protracted
refusal of one of the parties to fulfill
the above marital obligation is
equivalent to psychological incapacity.

DANILO A. AURELIO, Petitioner, versus VIDA MA. CORAZON P. AURELIO,


Respondent.
Facts: On May 9, 2002, respondent
filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 94, a
Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage. In her petition, respondent
alleged that both she and petitioner
were psychologically incapacitated of
performing and complying with their
respective
essential
marital
obligations
Said
psychological
incapacity was manifested by lack of
financial support from the husband;

his lack of drive and incapacity to


discern the plight of his working wife.
The husband exhibited consistent
jealousy and distrust towards his wife.
The wife on the other hand, is effusive
and displays her feelings openly and
freely. Her feelings change very
quickly from joy to fury to misery to
despair, depending on her day-to-day
experiences.
Her
tolerance
for
boredom was very low. She was

emotionally immature; she cannot


stand frustration or disappointment.

clinically identified the same as the


root causes.

Issue: Whether or not the allegations

Second, the petition likewise alleged


that the illness of both parties was of
such grave a nature as to bring about
a disability for them to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. The
psychologist reported that respondent
suffers from Histrionic Personality
Disorder with Narcissistic Features.
Petitioner,
on
the other
hand,
allegedly
suffers
from
Passive
Aggressive (Negativistic) Personality
Disorder. The incapacity of both
parties to perform their marital
obligations was alleged to be grave,
incorrigible and incurable.

contained in the petition are sufficient for


the court to declare nullity of marriage.

Held: Yes. Petitioner contends that


the petition failed to comply with
three of the Molina guidelines,
namely: that the root cause of the
psychological incapacity must be
alleged in the complaint; that such
illness must be grave enough to bring
about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of
marriage; and that the non-complied
marital obligation must be stated in
the petition.
First, contrary to petitioners assertion,
the Court finds that the root cause of
psychological incapacity was stated
and alleged in the complaint. The
family backgrounds of both petitioner
and respondent were discussed in the
complaint as the root causes of their
psychological incapacity. Moreover, a
competent and expert psychologist

Lastly, this Court also finds that the


essential marital obligations that were
not complied with were alleged in the
petition. As can be easily gleaned
from the totality of the petition,
respondents allegations fall under
Article 68 of the Family Code which
states that the husband and the wife
are obliged to live together, observe
mutual love, respect and fidelity, and
render mutual help and support.

EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE, Petitioner, versus ROWENA ONG GUTIERREZ


YU-TE, Respondent
Facts: Edward and Rowena eloped
when they were still in college and
Rowenas uncle brought them to a
court for marriage. The two then
continued to stay at her uncles place
where Edward was treated like a
prisoner. He was not allowed to go out
unaccompanied.
Her
uncle
also
showed Edward his guns and warned
the latter not to leave Rowena. After a
month, Edward escaped from the
house of Rowenas uncle, and stayed
with his parents. His family then hid
him from Rowena and her family
whenever they telephoned to ask for
him. After almost four years, or on
January 18, 2000, Edward filed a
petition before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 106, for
the annulment of his marriage to

Rowena on the basis of the latters


psychological incapacity.
Issue: Whether or not
is null and void.

the marriage

Held:

Yes. The seriousness of the


diagnosis and the gravity of the disorders
considered, the Court, in this case, finds
as decisive the psychological evaluation
made by the expert witness; and, thus,
rules that the marriage of the parties is
null and void on ground of both parties
psychological incapacity
The psychological assessment produced
the findings that both parties are afflicted
with personality disorders dependent
personality disorder for petitioner, and
narcissistic and antisocial personality
disorder for respondent.

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Dependent personality disorder is a


personality disorder characterized by
a
pattern
of
dependent
and
submissive behavior. Such individuals
usually
lack
self-esteem
and
frequently belittle their capabilities;
they fear criticism and are easily hurt
by others comments. At times they
actually bring about dominance by
others
through
a
quest
for
overprotection.
Antisocial
includes a

personality
disorder
consistent pattern of

behavior that is intolerant of the


conventional behavioral limitations
imposed by a society, an inability to
sustain a job over a period of years,
disregard for the rights of others
(either through exploitiveness or
criminal behavior), frequent physical
fights and, quite commonly, child or
spouse abuse without remorse and a
tendency to blame others. There is
often a facade of charm and even
sophistication that masks disregard,
lack of remorse for mistreatment of
others and the need to control others.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus DANILO CRUZ y


CULALA, Accused-Appellant.
Facts: Cruz was accused of illegal
possession of drugs through a buybust operation. The accused alleges
that the court gravely erred in giving
credence to the prosecution witnesses
materially inconsistent testimonies
and in convicting the accusedappellant for violation of Sections 5
and 11 of Republic Act No. 9165
despite the failure of the prosecution
to
overthrow
the
constitutional
presumption of innocence in his favor.
Issue: Whether or not the contention
has merit.
Held: No.
A buy-bust operation is a form of
entrapment that is resorted to for
capturing
persons
who
are

predisposed to commit crimes. The


operation is legal and has been
proved to be an effective method of
apprehending drug peddlers, provided
due regard to constitutional and legal
safeguards is undertaken.
The facts categorically show a typical
buy-bust operation as a form of
entrapment. The police officers
conduct was within the acceptable
standards for the fair and honorable
administration of justice. What is
more, the prosecution presented the
specimens examined the core of the
corpus delicto in court, as well as
Physical Science Report No. D-747-03,
which
clearly
states
that
the
specimens were found positive for
shabu.

ARNEL L. AGUSTIN, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND MINOR


MARTIN JOSE PROLLAMANTE, REPRESENTED BY HIS MOTHER/GUARDIAN
FE ANGELA PROLLAMANTE, respondents.
Facts: Respondents Fe Angela and her
son Martin Prollamante sued Martins
alleged biological father, petitioner
Arnel L. Agustin, for support and
support pendente lite before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon
City, Branch 106.

Petitioner refuses to recognize Martin


as his own child and denies the
genuineness and authenticity of the
childs birth certificate which he
purportedly signed as the father. He
also claims that the order and
resolution of the trial court, as
affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
effectively converted the complaint
11

for support to a petition for


recognition, which is supposedly
proscribed by law. According to
petitioner, Martin, as an unrecognized
child, has no right to ask for support
and must first establish his filiation in
a separate suit under Article 283 in
relation to Article 265 of the Civil Code
and Section 1, Rule 105 of the Rules of
Court.
Issues: Whether or not the contention
has merit.

The assailed resolution and order did


not convert the action for support into
one for recognition but merely allowed
the respondents to prove their cause
of action against petitioner who had
been denying the authenticity of the
documentary
evidence
of
acknowledgement. But even if the
assailed
resolution
and
order
effectively integrated an action to
compel recognition with an action for
support, such was valid and in
accordance with jurisprudence.

Held: The petitioners contentions are


without merit.

JESSE U. LUCAS, Petitioner, versus JESUS S. LUCAS, Respondent.


Facts: On July 26, 2007, petitioner,
Jesse U. Lucas, filed a Petition to
Establish Illegitimate Filiation (with
Motion for the Submission of Parties to
DNA Testing) before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 72, Valenzuela
City.
Petitioner
narrated
that,
sometime in 1967, his mother, Elsie
Uy (Elsie), migrated to Manila from
Davao and stayed with a certain Ate
Belen (Belen) who worked in a
prominent nightspot in Manila. On one
occasion, Elsie got acquainted with
respondent, Jesus S. Lucas, at Belens
workplace,
and
an
intimate
relationship developed between the
two. Elsie eventually got pregnant
and, on March 11, 1969, she gave
birth to petitioner, Jesse U. Lucas.
Respondent
allegedly
extended
financial
support
to
Elsie
and
petitioner for a period of about two
years. When the relationship of Elsie
and respondent ended, Elsie refused
to accept respondents offer of support
and decided to raise petitioner on her
own. While petitioner was growing up,
Elsie made several attempts to
introduce petitioner to respondent,
but all attempts were in vain.

Issue: Whether or not a prima facie


showing necessary before a court can
issue a DNA testing order
Held: During the hearing on the
motion for DNA testing, the petitioner
must present prima facie evidence or
establish a reasonable possibility of
paternity.
The Rule on DNA Evidence provides
the prescribed parameters on the
requisite elements for reliability and
validity (i.e., the proper procedures,
protocols,
necessary
laboratory
reports, etc.), the possible sources of
error, the available objections to the
admission of DNA test results as
evidence as well as the probative
value
of
DNA
evidence.
Notwithstanding these, it should be
stressed that the issuance of a DNA
testing order remains discretionary
upon the court. The court may, for
example, consider whether there is
absolute necessity for the DNA
testing.
If
there
is
already
preponderance
of
evidence
to
establish paternity and the DNA test
result would only be corroborative, the
court may, in its discretion, disallow a
DNA testing.

ANTONIO PERLA, Petitioner, vs. MIRASOL BARING and RANDY PERLA,


Respondents.
12

Facts: Respondent Mirasol Baring


(Mirasol) and her then minor son,
Randy (collectively respondents), filed
before the RTC a Complaint for
support against Antonio.
Issue: Whether or not the petition can
prosper.
Held: No. All told, it is clear that
respondents
failed
to
establish
Randys
illegitimate
filiation
to
Antonio. Hence, the order for Antonio
to support Randy has no basis.
Respondents presented the Certificate
of Live Birth of Randy identifying
Antonio as the father. However, said
certificate has no probative value to
establish Randys filiation to Antonio
since the latter had not signed the
same. It is settled that "a certificate of
live birth purportedly identifying the
putative father is not competent

evidence of paternity when there is no


showing that the putative father had a
hand in the preparation of said
certificate."
It is well to stress that as plaintiff,
Mirasol has the burden of proving her
affirmative allegation that Antonio is
the father of her son Randy. She must
rely on the strength of her evidence
and not on the weakness of the
defense. As Randy was born on
November 11, 1983, it was incumbent
upon Mirasol to prove that she had
sexual intercourse with Antonio prior
to the usual period of pregnancy or
nine months before the birth of Randy.
This crucial period therefore is during
the early part of the first quarter of
1983. However, nothing from Mirasols
testimony indicates that she had
sexual intercourse with Antonio during
that time.

IN RE: THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FOR REYNALDO DE VILLA (detained


at the New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City) REYNALDO DE VILLA,
petitioner, JUNE DE VILLA, petitioner-relator, vs. THE DIRECTOR, NEW
BILIBID PRISONS, respondent.
Facts: This is a petition for the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus
under Rule 102 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner Reynaldo de Villa, joined by
his son, petitioner-relator June de Villa,
seeks a two-fold relief: First, that
respondent Director of Prisons justify
the basis for the imprisonment of
petitioner Reynaldo de Villa; and
second, that petitioner be granted a
new trial. These reliefs are sought on
the basis of purportedly exculpatory
evidence, gathered after performing
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing
on samples allegedly collected from
the petitioner and a child born to the
victim of the rape.
Issue: Whether or not the writ should
be granted.
Held: If an individuals liberty is
restrained via some legal process, the
writ of habeas corpus is unavailing.

Concomitant to this principle, the writ


of habeas corpus cannot be used to
directly assail a judgment rendered by
a competent court or tribunal which,
having duly acquired jurisdiction, was
not deprived or ousted of this
jurisdiction through some anomaly in
the conduct of the proceedings.
Thus, notwithstanding its historic
function as the great writ of liberty,
the writ of habeas corpus has very
limited
availability
as
a
postconviction remedy.
Even with all of the compelling and
persuasive
scientific
evidence
presented by petitioner and his
counsel, we are not convinced that
Reynaldo de Villa is entitled to
outright
acquittal.
The
Solicitor
General reiterates, and correctly so,
that the pregnancy of the victim has
never been an element of the crime of
13

rape. Therefore, the DNA evidence has


failed to conclusively prove to this
Court that Reynaldo de Villa should be
discharged. Although petitioner claims
that conviction was based solely on a
finding of paternity of the child

Leahlyn, this is not the case. Our


conviction was based on the clear and
convincing testimonial evidence of the
victim, which, given credence by the
trial court, was affirmed on appeal.

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