Nuclear Power Strategy Guide

Nuclear Power Strategy Guide
Nuclear Power is Not Inevitable..........................................................................................................................24

Nuclear Power Is Not Inevitable..........................................................................................................................25
Nuclear Power Is Not Inevitable -- Not in Russia...............................................................................................31
Nuclear Power Is Not Inevitable -- Not in India or China...................................................................................32
Nuclear Not Inevitable Ext: Not in the U.S.......................................................................................................33
Nuclear Power Not Inevitable Ext: No Global Nuclear Renaissance................................................................38
Nuclear Power Not Inevitable Ext: No Global Nuclear Renaissance................................................................39
Nuclear Power Not Inevitable Renewables Overtaking....................................................................................40
Nuclear Power Not Inevitable Renewables Overtaking....................................................................................41
Nuclear Wont Expand Without Government Support.........................................................................................42
Nuclear Power Not Inevitable Middle East.......................................................................................................43
Nuclear Power Not Inevitable - Government Support for Nuclear Inadequate Now............................................44
No Breeders Now................................................................................................................................................45
No Fusion Now....................................................................................................................................................46
Nuclear Wont Solve Oil Dependence..................................................................................................................47
Energy Capital Advantage Answers.....................................................................................................................50
1

Energy Capital Advantage Answers Ext: Capital Now......................................................................................55
Energy Grid Advantage Answers.........................................................................................................................56
Energy Grid Advantage Answers.........................................................................................................................57
Nuclear Wont Solve Energy Shortages...............................................................................................................58
Nuclear Doesnt Solve Climate............................................................................................................................59
Nuclear Doesnt Solve Climate............................................................................................................................60
Nuclear Doesnt Solve Climate Ext: Generates CO2........................................................................................61
Nuclear Doesnt Solve Climate Ext: Generates CO2........................................................................................62
Nuclear Doesnt Solve Climate Ext: Parts of the Cycle Increase Emissions.....................................................63
Nuclear Doesnt Solve Climate Ext: Diverts from Renewables........................................................................64
Nuclear Doesnt Solve Climate Ext: Have to Build 1000s of Reactors.............................................................70
The Wall Street Journal, June 30, 2008, p. R1..................................................................................................70
Nuclear Doesnt Solve Climate Ext: Inadequate Reduction..............................................................................71
Nuclear Doesnt Solve Climate Ext: Cant Build Fast Enough.........................................................................75
Nuclear Wont Solve Climate Change.................................................................................................................76
2

Nuclear Wont Solve Climate Change -- More....................................................................................................79
Nuclear Wont Solve Climate Change -- More....................................................................................................80
Building 1500+ Reactors Links Prolif & Accidents............................................................................................81
Gas Shortages Advantage Answers......................................................................................................................82
Medical Isotopes Advantage Answers..................................................................................................................83
Tri City Herald, June 12, 2008, http://www.tri-cityherald.com/901/story/203876.html.....................................83
Competitiveness Advantage Answers..................................................................................................................84
Competitiveness Advantage Answers..................................................................................................................85
U.S. lacks an adequate nuclear workforce to expand......................................................................................85
Competitiveness Advantage Answers Ext: Import From Abroad......................................................................86
Competitiveness Advantage Answers Ext: No Competition.............................................................................87
Business Week, July 7, 2008, p. 24 Nuclears Tangled Economics.................................................................87
No significant nuclear development in Germany............................................................................................87
Canadian Geographic, June 2008, p. 15...............................................................................................................87
Competitiveness Advantage Answers Ext: Purchased from Abroad..................................................................88
Pollution Advantage Answers..............................................................................................................................89
Pollution Advantage Answers..............................................................................................................................90
Milling contaminates food supplies.....................................................................................................................90
Reprocessing causes cancer.................................................................................................................................90
Nuclear Power Increases Nuclear Proliferation....................................................................................................91
Turn Nuclear development undermines global non-proliferation credibility.............................................91
Nuclear Power Increase Nuclear Proliferation.....................................................................................................95
Countries will use CNE as an excuse for weapons development, causing war........................................................95
3

Nuclear power enables proliferation................................................................................................................96
Carr and Fernandes 8.............................................................................................................................................96
Nuclear Power Increases Proliferation.................................................................................................................97
Nuclear power directly spurs global proliferation...........................................................................................97
ISAB 8..................................................................................................................................................................97
Nuclear Power Expansion Causes Proliferation...................................................................................................98
Nuclear Power Expansion Causes Proliferation...................................................................................................99
Nuclear Power Expansion Causes Proliferation.................................................................................................100
AT: IAEA Solves Prolif..................................................................................................................................101
Increasing the facilities that produce uranium risk proliferation................................................................101
New Republic, April 23, 2008, p. 20.................................................................................................................101
AT: New IAEA Protocol Solves.....................................................................................................................102
Nuclear Power Expansion Causes Proliferation Safeguards Wont Solve.......................................................103
AT: U.S. Inspections Solve Prolif..................................................................................................................104
Inside the Pentagon, July 3, 2008....................................................................................................................104
Nuclear Undermines Global Development........................................................................................................105
Nuclear Power Expansion Increases Waste (1NC Module)................................................................................106
Accidents 1NC Module......................................................................................................................................107
Renewable Trade-Off Shell................................................................................................................................108
Renewable Trade-Off Shell................................................................................................................................109
Nuclear Energy Trades-Off With Renewable Energy.........................................................................................110
Nuclear Energy Trades-Off With Renewable Energy.........................................................................................111
Renewable, Not Nuclear Investments Now........................................................................................................112
Renewables Solve Better than Nuclear..............................................................................................................113
Nuclear Energy Is Not Safe................................................................................................................................114
USA TODAY, December 12, 2007, p. 1A..........................................................................................................114
Nuclear Energy Is Not Safe................................................................................................................................115
4

Nuclear Power Leads to Blackouts....................................................................................................................116
Rose, U.S. Public Interest Research Group, 9-1-2003.......................................................................................116
Hauter, Director of the Critical Mass Energy and Environment Program, 2004...............................................116
Nuclear Energy is Costly...................................................................................................................................117
Fusion Fails........................................................................................................................................................118
Nuclear Power Increases Waste..........................................................................................................................119
Terrorism -- Nuclear Power Increases Terrorism Attack & Theft Risks.............................................................120
Seattle Post-Intelligencer, July 18, 2008, p. B6..................................................................................................121
Terrorism Nuclear Power Increases terrorism and Theft Risks.......................................................................124
Terrorism -- Terror Attacks Cause a Melt-down.................................................................................................125
Terror Attack collapses the Nuclear Industry.....................................................................................................126
Terrorism AT: Terrorist Attack Wouldnt Cause An Explosion...........................................................................127
Terrorism -- AT: NRC Says Risk is Low........................................................................................................128
Terrorism -- AT: Reactors Can Withstand Terror Attacks...............................................................................129
Terrorism -- AT: Plant Security Improvements...................................................................................................130
Terrorism -- AT: Low Risk of Terror Attack on Plants.......................................................................................131
Terrorism -- AT: No Risk of Airplane Attack.....................................................................................................132
Terrorism -- AT: Security Prevents An Attack....................................................................................................133
Terrorism -- AT: New Reactor Designs...........................................................................................................134
Nuclear Power Expansion Triggers Accidents...................................................................................................135
Accident Impact Kills Nuclear........................................................................................................................136
The Wall Street Journal, June 30, 2008, p. R1.................................................................................................136
Accident Impact -- Deaths.................................................................................................................................137
Accidents - - High Risk......................................................................................................................................138
5

Accidents High Risk.......................................................................................................................................139
Accidents High Risk.......................................................................................................................................140
Accidents AT: High Safety Standards.............................................................................................................141
Accidents AT: Empirically Denied..................................................................................................................142
Accidents AT: NRC Solves..........................................................................................................................143
Accidents Impacts...........................................................................................................................................144
AT: NRC Regulations Solve...........................................................................................................................145
Nation, May 12, 2008, http://www.thenation.com/doc/20080512/parenti.........................................................151
NRC doesnt provide or require adequate safety..........................................................................................152
Mother Jones, May-June 2008, p. 56................................................................................................................152
AT: New NRC Says Reactors Are Safe..........................................................................................................153
AT: Safeguards Solve.....................................................................................................................................161
AT: New Reactors Are Safe............................................................................................................................162
AT: Safety Incentives Solve...........................................................................................................................163
AT: Passive Safety Features...............................................................................................................................164
6

Nuclear Power Causes Cancer...........................................................................................................................169
New Scientist, May 24, 2008, p. 21...................................................................................................................169
New Scientist, May 21, 2008, p. online.............................................................................................................169
Nuclear Energy Causes Cancer..........................................................................................................................172
Storage Fails Dry Casks Fail...........................................................................................................................173
Storage Fails Yucca Storage Fails...................................................................................................................174
Transmutation of Waste Fails.............................................................................................................................175
Uranium Uranium Overshoot..........................................................................................................................176
Uranium No Uranium Demand Overshoot Now.............................................................................................177
China will meet its own nuclear needs no export potential........................................................................177
AT: China Export Market...............................................................................................................................178
Stephen Thomas, lead author - Professor of Energy Policy, Public Services....................................................178
International Research Unit, Business School, University of.............................................................................178
Nuclear Energy Wont Reduce Oil Demand.......................................................................................................179
Nuclear Power Leads to Nuclear Subs...............................................................................................................180
Deseret News 2-14-2001................................................................................................................................180
Breeder Reactors Fail.........................................................................................................................................181
Nuclear Power Threatens Natives......................................................................................................................182
Waste is Radioactive..........................................................................................................................................183
General Safety Extension...................................................................................................................................184
A2: Nuclear Medicine........................................................................................................................................185
Nuclear Power Destroys the Environment.........................................................................................................186
Solid and Liquid Wastes......................................................................................................................187
7

Uranium mining and milling..............................................................................................................................187
Refining and conversion operations...................................................................................................................187
Power Plant operation........................................................................................................................................187
Water................................................................................................................................................................ 188
2.3.2.1. Radionuclides..........................................................................................................................192
General Solvency Answers................................................................................................................................196
Energy Prices/Spending Links...........................................................................................................................201
Energy Prices/Spending Links...........................................................................................................................202
Stealth K Links..................................................................................................................................................203
Stealth K Links..................................................................................................................................................205
Stealth K Links..................................................................................................................................................206
Cant Solve Before 2015....................................................................................................................................207
Fast Nuclear Power Expansion Bad...................................................................................................................208
Fast/Large Nuclear Power Expansion Leads to Accidents, Terrorism, Proliferation..........................................208
8

Spending Links..................................................................................................................................................209
Subsidies Fail.....................................................................................................................................................210
Massive Expansion Means More Waste.............................................................................................................211
CP Renewables Solve Climate Better.............................................................................................................212
CP Renewables More Cost Effective..............................................................................................................213
CP -- Renewables Cheaper than Nuclear...........................................................................................................214
America Magazine, June 23, 2008, http://www.americamagazine.org/content/article.cfm?article_id=10884. . .214
CP Renewables Nuclear Not More Reliable................................................................................................215
CP - Renewable Energy Counterplan Solves Energy Shortages.........................................................................216
CP -- Efficiency.................................................................................................................................................217
CP -- Efficiency Solves CO2 Better than Nuclear..............................................................................................218
Nuclear Power Increasing Globally................................................................................................................219
Nuclear Power Increasing Now -- Globally.......................................................................................................220
Nuclear Power Increasing Now Globally........................................................................................................222
Electric Utility Week, June 30, 2008, p. 18......................................................................................................224
Globally, 40 new reactors since 96.....................................................................................................................224
World Nuclear Power Increasing Gulf States..................................................................................................226
Nuclear Power Increasing Now China............................................................................................................227
Nuclear Power Increasing Middle East...........................................................................................................228
Nuclear Power Increasing Now -- England........................................................................................................229
Nuclear Power Inevitable U.S.........................................................................................................................230
Nuclear Power Increasing U.S........................................................................................................................231
Popular Mechanics, May 2008, p. 20.................................................................................................................231
9

National Review, June 16, 2008, p. 32 Nuclear Power.................................................................................233
Business Line, July 8, 2008, p. A3.....................................................................................................................233
Business Line, July 8, 2008, p. A3.....................................................................................................................233
Government Acting to Boost Nuclear Now........................................................................................................234
Government Acting to Boost Nuclear Now........................................................................................................235
U.S. conducting Generation IV reactor research now...................................................................................235
Investor Support for Nuclear Now.....................................................................................................................236
Generation IV Solves Oil Dependence..............................................................................................................237
Nuclear Reduces Pollution.................................................................................................................................238
Nuclear Solves NOx Pollution...........................................................................................................................239
Competitiveness Advantage...............................................................................................................................240
Competitiveness Advantage...............................................................................................................................241
Competitiveness Advantage ............................................................................................................................242
Competitiveness Advantage France Leads Now.............................................................................................243
Competitiveness Advantage France Leads Now.............................................................................................244
Accidents Answers.............................................................................................................................................245
CBS 42, July 24, 2008, http://www.cbs42.com/news/local/25823164.html...................................246
Record Searchlight, July 4, 2008, p. A6..........................................................................................................247
A2: Meltdowns/Safety.......................................................................................................................................248
10

Daniel Rislove, Winter, 2007, Wisconsin International Law Journal p. 1082....................................................248
Richmond Times - Dispatch (Virginia), December 10, 2007.............................................................................250
Manila Bulletin, December 9, 2007...................................................................................................................250
Manila Bulletin, December 9, 2007..................................................................................................................251
Manila Bulletin, December 9, 2007...................................................................................................................251
A2: Chernobyl...................................................................................................................................................252
A2: Chernobyl...................................................................................................................................................254
A2: Chernobyl...................................................................................................................................................256
A2: Chernobyl...................................................................................................................................................257
No one will build another reactor like Chernobyl.........................................................................................257
A2: Safety..........................................................................................................................................................258
Nuclear power plant safety increasing............................................................................................................258
A2: Nuclear Costly/Expensive...........................................................................................................................259
Nuclear cost declines will snowball.................................................................................................................261
Nuclear power costs decreasing......................................................................................................................262
New reactor designs have passive safety systems that solve..........................................................................263
Radiation Answers.............................................................................................................................................264
Record Searchlight, July 4, 2008, p. A6..........................................................................................................266
11

A2: Radiation/Cancer........................................................................................................................................267
Larry Foulke, director of nuclear programs, University of Pittsburhg, December 23, 207,................................267
Brattleboro Reformer (Vermont), December 14, 2007.......................................................................................267
Larry Foulke, director of nuclear programs, University of Pittsburhg, December 23, 207,.......................271
Germany doesnt prove that nuclear power causes leukemia.......................................................................272
Brattleboro Reformer (Vermont), December 14, 2007...................................................................................272
Shields solve the cancer risks..........................................................................................................................273
No cancer clusters around nuclear power plans............................................................................................273
Nuclear Power Good for Your Health................................................................................................................274
A2: Renewable Crowd-Out................................................................................................................................276
Low Level Radiation Isnt Bad..........................................................................................................................277
Cancer Answers.................................................................................................................................................278
National Review, June 16, 2008, p. 32 Nuclear Power...................................................................................278
Coal fly ash kills more than 30,000 people/year, nuclear has killed zero.....................................................278
Nuclear Good for the Environment....................................................................................................................279
Nuclear Good for the Environment....................................................................................................................280
Terrorism Answers.............................................................................................................................................281
12

Terrorism Answers No Mobile Chernobyl...................................................................................................285
AT: Attack with an Airplane...........................................................................................................................286
AT: Fuel Rods Radioactive.............................................................................................................................287
Fuel rods become less dangerous as they decay.............................................................................................287
Nuclear Solves Oil Dependence.........................................................................................................................288
HTRs Solve Oil Dependence.............................................................................................................................289
Nuclear Provides Energy Grid Security.............................................................................................................290
Medical Isotopes Advantage..............................................................................................................................291
Medical Isotopes Advantage..............................................................................................................................293
Background........................................................................................................................................................293
Accidents Answers Three Mile Island Specifics.............................................................................................295
Nuclear Plant Security Answers.........................................................................................................................297
Nuclear plant security has increased since 9/11.............................................................................................297
AT: Terror Attacks with Airplanes..................................................................................................................301
Nuclear Proliferation Answers...........................................................................................................................302
A2: Proliferation................................................................................................................................................306
Nuclear power promotes nonproliferation cooperation it boosts establishes new platforms...........................306
A2: Proliferation................................................................................................................................................307
13

A2: Proliferation................................................................................................................................................308
Nigel Hunt, correspondent for Reuters, 3-15-2004...........................................................................................308
A2: Proliferation................................................................................................................................................309
A2: Proliferation................................................................................................................................................310
Dan E. Eastman et al., Director of the Argonne National Laboratory, 12-4-97.................................................310
Peaceful development of nuclear power strengthens nonproliferation credibility..............................................310
Dan E. Eastman et al., Director of the Argonne National Laboratory, 12-4-97.................................................310
A2: Proliferation................................................................................................................................................312
Timothy Walsh, Georgetown University Law and former legislative assistant, fall, 2003................................312
A2: Proliferation................................................................................................................................................313
Expansion of nuclear power mandates strengthening of the nonproliferation regime........................................313
GHT-MR Solves the Prolif Link........................................................................................................................314
Development of GT-MHR reactors boosts U.S. nonproliferation leadership.....................................................314
Harry Bradley et al. Director of the American Nuclear Society, 3-13-2000......................................................314
AT: U.S. Lacks Nuclear Infrastructure to Advance Nuclear Power................................................................315
AT: Reprocessing Bad....................................................................................................................................316
U.S. is already committed to reprocessing......................................................................................................316
Robert Fri, Resources for the Future, April 23, 2008, p. online.........................................................................316
AT: Reprocessing Bad....................................................................................................................................317
Nuclear Cost-Competitive..................................................................................................................................318
Nuclear Solves Climate Better Than Renewables..............................................................................................319
Reprocessing Leads to Terrorism.......................................................................................................................319
Reprocessing Leads to Proliferation..................................................................................................................321
Reprocessing Leads to Proliferation..................................................................................................................322
Solvency Various Incentives...........................................................................................................................323
Solvency Cap & Trade....................................................................................................................................324
Solvency Various Incentives...........................................................................................................................325
14

Solvency Pro Nuclear Regulatory Environment.............................................................................................326
Solvency Incentives to Expand.......................................................................................................................327
Solvency Need to Boost Capital.....................................................................................................................328
Solvency Need to Boost Capital.....................................................................................................................329
Solvency Loan Guarantees Current Guarantees Inadequate.........................................................................331
Solvency Loan Guarantees..............................................................................................................................332
Solvency Subsidies.........................................................................................................................................339
Solvency Production Tax Credit......................................................................................................................340
Solvency Federal Support Critical..................................................................................................................341
Solvency - -Federal Support Critical..................................................................................................................342
Solvency Support Stimulates Private Sector Investment.................................................................................343
Solvency AT: We Dont Have the Technical Know How.............................................................................344
Solvency AT: We Dont Have the Technical Know How.............................................................................345
Solvency AT: Uranium Shortage.................................................................................................................347
Solvency AT: Takes Too Long To Build......................................................................................................348
Solvency Can Build Quickly...........................................................................................................................349
Solvency Solves Climate................................................................................................................................350
Energy Prices DA Link Answers........................................................................................................................351
Free Market DA Answers...................................................................................................................................352
Answers to PICs................................................................................................................................................353
15

Renewables Wont Solve Grid Security.............................................................................................................354
*** Politics ***.................................................................................................................................................355
Politics Nuclear Popular With the Public........................................................................................................356
New Republic, April 23, 2008, p. 20.................................................................................................................356
Nation, May 12, 2008, http://www.thenation.com/doc/20080512/parenti.........................................................356
Politics Congressional Opposition..................................................................................................................357
Politics Public Opposes...................................................................................................................................358
Politics Political Support for Nuclear..............................................................................................................359
MarketWatch, July 17, 2008, p. online...............................................................................................................359
Politics Nuclear Plan Would Be Pushed By Bush...........................................................................................360
** Other ***......................................................................................................................................................361
New Republic, April 23, 2008, p. 2008.............................................................................................................361
*** Reprocessing Bad ***.................................................................................................................................362
Reprocessing FYI..............................................................................................................................................363
AT: Pyroprocessing Good...............................................................................................................................364
Uniqueness Limited Reprocessing Now.........................................................................................................365
Uniqueness CP U.S. Should Pursue a Reprocessing Moratorium...................................................................366
U.S. Reprocessing Leads Nuclear Proliferation.................................................................................................367
U.S. Reprocessing Leads to Proliferation..........................................................................................................373
AT: Sending Fuel Abroad for Reprocessing Solves the Prolif Link...................................................................374
16

AT: Sending Fuel Abroad for Reprocessing Solves the Prolif Link...................................................................375
AT: Fuel Cycle Assurances Solve......................................................................................................................376
AT: IAEA Protocols Solve.................................................................................................................................377
AT: New Reprocessing Technology is Proliferation Resistent...........................................................................378
AT: IAEA Safeguards Solve...............................................................................................................................379
AT: IAEA Safeguards Solve...............................................................................................................................380
AT: External Reprocessing.................................................................................................................................381
AT: Fuel Cycle Limits........................................................................................................................................385
AT: Longer Burning Reduces Proliferation Risks..............................................................................................386
AT: Longer Burning Reduces Proliferation Risks..............................................................................................387
AT: Plutonium Tracking Under GNEP...............................................................................................................389
AT: GNEP Tech is Prolif-Resistant....................................................................................................................390
AT: Pyroprocessing Solves the Proliferation Link.............................................................................................391
AT: GNEP Doesnt Include PUREX..................................................................................................................392
AT: GNEP Supply Restrictions Solve................................................................................................................393
AT: GNEP Supply Restrictions Solve................................................................................................................395
AT: GNEP Provides Nuclear Tech, Solves Motivation for Proliferation............................................................397
Reprocessing Increases Nuclear Terrorism Risks...............................................................................................398
Reprocessing Increases Nuclear Terrorism Risks...............................................................................................399
Energy Price Links.............................................................................................................................................400
Energy Price Links.............................................................................................................................................401
Energy Price Links Expanding Reprocessing Wont Solve Cost Issues..........................................................402
Spending Links..................................................................................................................................................403
Spending Links..................................................................................................................................................404
Reprocessing Wont Solve Waste.......................................................................................................................405
17

Politics Links.....................................................................................................................................................413
Politics Links.....................................................................................................................................................414
*** Reprocessing Good ***..............................................................................................................................415
Plan Remove Reprocessing Restrictions.........................................................................................................416
Domestic Reprocessing Inadequate Now...........................................................................................................417
Global Reprocessing Inevitable.........................................................................................................................418
Reprocessing Solves Electricity Shortages........................................................................................................419
Breeders Solve Waste.........................................................................................................................................420
GNEP Doesnt Causes Prolif/Terrorism.............................................................................................................421
No Proliferation Leadership Now......................................................................................................................425
Reprocessing Solves Waste................................................................................................................................426
*** States Counterplan ***...............................................................................................................................427
States Counterplan Solvency.............................................................................................................................428
CP States Ban Nuclear Power.........................................................................................................................429
*** Waste Disposal/Storage ***........................................................................................................................430
Topicality Incentives.......................................................................................................................................431
Waste Disposal/Storage Increases Nuclear.........................................................................................................432
Waste Disposal/Storage Increases Nuclear.........................................................................................................433
18

Inadequate Storage Now....................................................................................................................................434
Waste piles up, but no storage is available.....................................................................................................434
Inadequate Storage Now....................................................................................................................................435
Solvency NRC Action.....................................................................................................................................436
Solvency Geological Storage..........................................................................................................................437
Solvency Geological Storage..........................................................................................................................438
Solvency No Safe Way to Store......................................................................................................................439
The federal government has not acted on nuclear waste disposal................................................................439
Solvency Dry Cask Storage............................................................................................................................440
Solvency Dry Cask Storage............................................................................................................................441
Solvency Interim Storage................................................................................................................................442
Solvency Deep Ocean Storage........................................................................................................................443
Spending Disadvantage Answers.......................................................................................................................444
Dry Cask Storage Now......................................................................................................................................445
Dry Cask Storage Good.....................................................................................................................................446
Dry Cask Storage Bad Terrorism....................................................................................................................447
Politics Links General Waste..........................................................................................................................448
Politics Link Yucca.........................................................................................................................................449
Plan Open Yucca.............................................................................................................................................450
Yucca good Transportation Safe......................................................................................................................451
Yucca Good AT: Radiation Leaks in Transport............................................................................................452
Yucca Good AT: Radiation Leaks................................................................................................................453
Yucca Good AT: Radiation Leaks................................................................................................................454
Yucca Good Yucca Generally Safe..................................................................................................................455
Yucca Good Central Depository Safest...........................................................................................................456
19

Yucca Good Stops Reprocessing.....................................................................................................................457
Yucca Good AT: Terrorism..........................................................................................................................458
Yucca Bad Shipment Accidents......................................................................................................................459
Yucca Bad Dry Cask Storage Safer.................................................................................................................460
Transmutation Generally Bad............................................................................................................................461
*** Nuclear Power DA Links *** Carbon Tax Link Answers...........................................................................462
Carbon Tax Link Answers..................................................................................................................................463
Carbon Tax Links...............................................................................................................................................464
Financial Post, July 3, 2008, p. P11.................................................................................................................464
Carbon Tax Links...............................................................................................................................................465
Carbon Tax Links...............................................................................................................................................466
Carbon Tax Links...............................................................................................................................................467
Tradable Permits Links Mccain Lieberman....................................................................................................468
Tradable Permits Links......................................................................................................................................469
Carbon Tax Links -- $45....................................................................................................................................470
*** Other ***....................................................................................................................................................471
Uranium Shortages Now....................................................................................................................................472
Amory Lovins Quals.........................................................................................................................................473
*** Specific Reactors ***..................................................................................................................................474
Generation III Reactors Best..............................................................................................................................475
EPR Best............................................................................................................................................................476
EPR Best............................................................................................................................................................477
HPBWRS Best...................................................................................................................................................478
BWRs Bad.........................................................................................................................................................479
PMBR Isnt Safe................................................................................................................................................480
20

IRIS Not Safe.....................................................................................................................................................481
4S Not Safe........................................................................................................................................................482
Generation IV Not Safer....................................................................................................................................483
A2: Nuclear Triggers Proliferation.....................................................................................................................485
A2: Uranium Shortages......................................................................................................................................486
A2: Terrorist Attacks..........................................................................................................................................487
A2: Nuclear Waste.............................................................................................................................................488
Karl S. Coplan , Associate Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law., Fordham Environmental Law
Review, 2006, p. 242-3......................................................................................................................................488
A2: Waste RD&D...........................................................................................................................................489
Research and development can solve waste concerns........................................................................................489
A2: Waste Interim Storage..............................................................................................................................490
Interim storage solves waste concerns...............................................................................................................490
A2: Waste Deep Borehole...............................................................................................................................491
Deep borehole storage solves.............................................................................................................................491
A2: Storage........................................................................................................................................................492
A2: Proliferation................................................................................................................................................493
Daniel Rislove, Winter, 2007, Wisconsin International Law Journal p. 1091-2.................................................493
A2: Terrorism.....................................................................................................................................................495
A2: Environmental Hazards...............................................................................................................................496
A2: Environmental Hazards...............................................................................................................................497
U.S. Influence Solvency....................................................................................................................................498
Oil Disadvantage Links......................................................................................................................................499
Nuclear Better than Renewables........................................................................................................................500
Nuclear Power Net-Beneficial Compared to Coal..............................................................................................501
21

1. The Amount of Uranium Used Is a Tiny Fraction of the Coal Used...............................................................501
2. Nuclear Power Plants Cause No Air or Radiation Pollution...........................................................................502
3. No Greenhouse Gases Are Emitted by Nuclear Power Plants........................................................................502
Open Cycle Good - Expansion...........................................................................................................................503
Open fuel cycles are key to widespread deployment of nuclear power..............................................................503
Open Cycle Good Economy............................................................................................................................504
Open-cycle is economically dominant...............................................................................................................504
Open Cycle Good A2: Waste..........................................................................................................................505
Open cycle solves waste disposal adequately....................................................................................................505
Nuclear System Modeling..................................................................................................................................506
Nuclear system modeling is good......................................................................................................................506
22
Nuclear Power is Not Inevitable

Reported new plants are not new, prospects dim
Amory Lovins, November 8, Rocky Mountain Institute, November 2008, Ambio,

http://www.rmi.org/images/PDFs/Energy/E08-01_AmbioNuclIlusion.pdf
At the end of 2007, the world had 439 operating nuclear stations totaling 372
GW (billion watts) of net generating capacity with an average age of 23 yearsa year
older than the 117 reactors already shut down. The International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) says 31 nuclear units were under construction in 13 countrieseight
more than at the end of 2004, but ~20 fewer than in the late 1990s. All but five
were in Asia or Eastern Europe; yet the Asian Development Bank has never
financed one, and reaffirmed this policy in 2000, nor has the World Bank, with
a minor 1959 exception. Much of the reported activity is not new: of the 31
units listed as under construction, 12 have been so for at least 20 years, some
were started in the 1970s, and two long moribund projects have been re-listed.
Turning ambitions into actual investments, firm orders, and operating plants faces
fundamental obstacles that are now first and foremost economic, since the political
obstacles related to safety, waste, proliferation, etc., can be and in many countries have
been bypassed by fiat. The economic evidence below confirms that new nuclear
power plants are unfinanceable in the private capital market because of their
excessive costs and financial risks and the high uncertainty of both.7 During the
nuclear revival now allegedly underway, no new nuclear project on earth has
been financed by private risk capital, chosen by an open decision process, nor bid
into the worlds innumerable power markets and auctions. No old nuclear plant has been
resold at a value consistent with a market case for building a new one. And two strong
global trends greater transparency in governmental and energy decision-making,
and wider use of competitive power marketsare further dimming nuclear
prospects.
23
Nuclear Power Is Not Inevitable

High costs mean the nuclear renaissance is not inevitable
Amory Lovins, Rocky Mountain Institute, July 21, 2008, http://peakenergy.blogspot.com/2008/07/amorylovins-on-nuclear-power.html
So, nuclear cannot actually deliver the climate or the security benefits claimed for it. Its unrelated to oil. And
its grossly uneconomic, which means the nuclear revival that we often hear about is not actually
happening. Its a very carefully fabricated illusion. And the reason it isnt happening is there are no buyers.
Aff stats absurd nuclear contracted last year and only the plan enables expansion
UPI, July 8, 2008,
http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/Nuke_Watchdog_Warns_About_Nuclear_Power_And_Proliferation_Danger
s_Part_One_999.html
Robinson bluntly says the expansion of civil nuclear energy generation is not just inevitable, it is already under way. "You just have to read the newspapers to see that this is the case," he told United Press
International. The report cites a list prepared by the State Department in 2007 of a dozen countries planning to join the nuclear power club, or "giving serious consideration" to it, within the next 10 years -including the former Soviet Central Asian nations of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan; Islamic giants Indonesia, Egypt and Turkey; and Poland and the Baltic states. Fifteen other nations -- including Algeria,
Ghana, Libya, Malaysia, Syria, Venezuela and Yemen -- have "longer-term plans or studies under way," according to the State Department list. While wealthier countries "can try to buy their way out" of the
looming energy crunch, "the Third World does not have that option," and there are few real alternatives to nuclear power for many countries. "There has proved to be no silver bullet in renewable or other
." The report says there are currently 435 nuclear reactors operating around the world, with 28 new
ones currently under construction. It says 222 more are being planned. "It's a pretty depressing prospect," Robinson concluded. One of the key
alternative energy sources
concerns is the two principal ways of making nuclear fuel -- the enrichment of uranium, for instance, in huge installations of centrifuges; and the reprocessing of spent fuel into plutonium -- can too easily be
used to make weapons-grade material for nuclear bombs. So the panel recommends the United States -- in partnership with other countries that already have the capacity to make fuel, the "supplier nations"
-- volunteer to "provide reliable, economical supplies of fuel to nations undertaking new or additional nuclear energy plants" with tough safeguards to prevent them developing their own capacities. But
Many of those 435 reactors currently operating

are due to be retired in the next 20 to 30 years, points out Henry Sokolski, a proliferation expert who worked for
Wolfowitz in the Bush I administration and currently sits alongside him on the congressionally mandated blue-ribbon
panel examining the threat of terrorist attacks using nuclear material or other weapons of mass destruction. Nuclear
energy is too expensive and too risky to be a commercially viable venture without government support, he told UPI.
"There's a reason no one in the private sector wants to do this with their own money," Sokolski said. "Nuclear power is
a hard sell, literally. ... What the (U.S.) nuclear industry is doing is asking for government handouts, in the form of tax
credits, loan guarantees and insurance caps." Reprocessing is also not economically feasible without government
financial support. "Working with plutonium requires special safety measures which are very expensive," Sokolski said. The idea that new technologies could help make generation or
critics challenge their premise, saying the idea that the growth of nuclear power generation is inevitable is a canard.
Expansion is "not
inevitable, it is contingent" on U.S. policy changes. "Maybe nuclear power won't
expand. It shrank by 2 percent last year," he said.
reprocessing economical is "atomic pie in the sky. The advances required are as far off as making fusion-generation practical, in terms of technology."
Costs will stop nuclear development in the U.S. now

The Wall Street Journal, June 30, 2008, p. R1
Sure, nuclear power generates lots of electricity while producing virtually no carbon dioxide. But it still faces the same
problems that have stymied the development of new nuclear plants for the past 20 years -- exorbitant costs, the risks
of an accident or terrorist attack, the threat of proliferation and the challenge of disposing of nuclear waste. The cost
issue alone will mean that few if any new nuclear power stations will get built in the next few years, at least in the U.S.,
and any that do will require expensive taxpayer subsidies. Instead of subsidizing the development of new plants that
have all these other problems, the U.S. would be better off investing in other ways to meet growing energy demands and
reduce carbon-dioxide emissions.
24

Person power & supply shortages block nuclear expansion
Council on Foreign Relations, August 11, 2008, Challenges for Nuclear Power Expansion,
http://www.cfr.org/publication/16886/nuclear_bottlenecks.html?breadcrumb=%2F
Global construction of nuclear reactors is rising after a decades-long decline. A number of factors account for
this shift, including soaring energy demand in the developing world and the threat of climate change. Most of
the new interest in nuclear is occurring outside the United States. Some U.S. policymakers argue nuclear power
is a vital part of the country's energy future. But despite legislative efforts and a softening of attitudes toward
nuclear power, the U.S. industry has been slow to revive. In fact, nuclear power faces a number of
significant obstacles to expansion worldwide, from manpower shortages to high construction costs.
No net increase in nuclear power
Of the 439 commercial reactors online throughout the world, less than 20 percent started after 1986. The
World Nuclear Association, a private-sector organization, also notes much of the increase in nuclear
capacity over the last decade were from improvements at existing reactorsbetween 1999 and 2006 there
was no net increase in the number of reactors worldwide.
As a percentage of electricity, nuclear power will fall by 2030
In the United States, the industry had twenty-nine reactors (PDF) in the planning stages as of July 2008. The
U.S. Department of Energy says no utility has committed to construction, with the exception of the TVA. The
authority has resumed construction on a second reactor at its Watts Bar plant (it was halted in 1988). That
reactor is expected to come online in 2013. The U.S. Energy Information Agency projects that nuclear
power as a percentage of total electricity in the United States will fall slightly by 2030 (PDF).

Regulations block nuclear expansion
25

Regulations have been a big hurdle for the nuclear industry in the United States. In the United States and
Europe, a growing environmentalist movement in the 1970s and 1980spropelled by two high-profile
accidentshelped spur regulations that made it difficult and expensive to license and build reactors.
Nuclear hasnt recovered from the 1970s crisis
Nation, May 12, 2008, http://www.thenation.com/doc/20080512/parenti
The fact is, nuclear power has not recovered from the crisis that hit it three decades ago with the reactor fire at
Browns Ferry, Alabama, in 1975 and the meltdown at Three Mile Island in 1979. Then came what seemed to be
the coup de grce: Chernobyl in 1986. The last nuclear power plant ordered by a US utility, the TVA's
Watts Bar 1, began construction in 1973 and took twenty-three years to complete. Nuclear power has been
in steady decline worldwide since 1984, with almost as many plants canceled as completed since then.
26

In 2006, the equivalent of only one nuclear plant was added
Let me give you some numbers about whats happening in the marketplace, because thats reality, as far as Im
concerned. I really take markets seriously. 2006, the last full year of data we have, nuclear worldwide added
a little bit of capacity, more than all of it from upgrading old plants, because the new ones they built were
smaller than the retirements of old plants. So they added 1.4 billion watts. Sounds like a lot. Well, its
about one big plants worth worldwide. That was less than photovoltaics, solar cells added in capacity.
It was a tenth what wind power added. It was a thirtieth to a fortieth of what micropower added.
More power from renewables than nuclear in the squo
AMORY LOVINS: Again, its renewables, other than big hydro, plus co-generating electricity and heat together,
usually in industry.
In 2006, micropower, for the first time, produced more electricity worldwide than nuclear did. A sixth of
the worlds electricity is now micropower, a third of the new electricity. In a dozen industrial countries,
micropower makes anywhere from a sixth to over half of all the electricity elsewhere. This is not a fringe
activity anymore.
No new projects have broken ground, two have been shelved
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) expects up to thirty applications to be filed to build atomic plants;
five or six of those proposals are moving through the complicated multi-stage process. But no new atomic
power stations have been fully licensed or have broken ground. And two newly proposed projects have just been
shelved.
27

Investment in renewables, not nuclear, is increasing
Amory Lovins, Rocky Mountain Institute, July 21, 2008, http://peakenergy.blogspot.com/2008/07/amory-lovinson-nuclear-power.html
China, which has the worlds most ambitious nuclear program, by the end of 2006 had seven times that
much capacity in distributed renewables, and they were growing it seven times faster. Take a look at 2007,
in which the US or Spain or China added more wind capacity than the world added nuclear capacity. The US
added more wind capacity last year than weve added coal capacity in the past five years put together. And
renewables, other than big hydro, got last year $71 billion of private capital; nuclear, as usual, got zero. It
is only bought by central planners with a draw on the public purse. What does this tell you? I mean, what part of
the story does anybody who take markets seriously not get?
Nuclears share of energy has declined
International Atomic Energy Agency, July 17, 2008,
http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/2008/npoecd.html
The picture is mixed for nuclear power in the worlds higher income countries, which collectively account for
85% of the worlds nuclear-generated electricity. While some countries produced record amounts of nuclear
electricity last year, nuclears share of overall electricity production dipped slightly.
Nuclear electricity production declined last year
International Atomic Energy agency, July 17, 2008,
http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/2008/npoecd.html
Nuclear power plants provided 21.6% of the electricity generated in OECD countries, as compared to
22.9% in 2006. This was despite record production at nuclear power plants in Finland, Hungary and the United
States, which did not offset reduced output in France, Germany and Japan and plant closures in the Slovak
Republic and the United Kingdom. Total nuclear electricity production was 2172 TWh in 2007, about 3.6%
less than the previous year.
Lack of infrastructure means nuclear is not inevitable in the U.S.
Jack Spencer is Research Fellow in Nuclear Energy in the Thomas A. Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies at The
Heritage Foundation, April 18, 2008, Nuclear Power Critical to Meeting Greenhouse Gas Objectives,
http://www.heritage.org/Research/EnergyandEnvironment/wm1898.cfm
The problem is that no new reactor has been ordered since the mid-1970s, and the country no longer has the
infrastructure to support a nuclear renaissance. Furthermore, although the President agrees that nuclear energy is critical
to meeting the nation's CO2 objectives, promoting nuclear power is hardly a new concept.
28

Nuclear power expansion limited now
Peter Goldschmitt, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Saving the NPT and the Nonproliferation
Regime in an Era of Nuclear Renaissance, July 24, 2008,
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/goldschmidt_testimony_7-24-2008.pdf
In the coming decade, however, the rate of this expansion will be limited by several factors: in some
recipient states, by the lack of an adequate industrial infrastructure, or of a nuclear safety regulatory
regime monitored by a truly independent and experienced control organization; and in supplier states, by
a limited capacity to produce certain types of nuclear equipment, such as reactor vessels. In short, the
world-wide expansion of nuclear electricity production is not going to occur overnight.
29
Nuclear Power Is Not Inevitable -- Not in Russia

Russia wont increase nuclear production
Jim Harding, Nonproliferation Education Center, 2007, Economics of Nuclear Power & Proliferation Risks
in a Carbon Constrained World, http://www.npec-web.org/Essays/20070600-HardingEconomicsNewNuclearPower.pdf
Similarly, while Russia has announced ambitious plans to complete 10 GWe of new nuclear
capacity by 2015, there are many infrastructure challenges associated with this target. Russia has
increased nuclear generation by 3 GWe since 1991. In addition to supply-chain challenges like those
in the US, nuclear power tariffs are much lower than for fossil-fired generation, leaving the
industry without sufficient funds to complete new reactors on schedule.
30
Nuclear Power Is Not Inevitable -- Not in India or China

No net growth in nuclear capacity in the status quo retirements offset additions
The short story is that between 2007-2030, forecasts for OECD + Russia show almost no net
growth in nuclear capacity. Retirements are roughly offset by additions. In base cases, 72-100
percent of net growth occurs elsewhere, mainly India and China. Even so, by 2030, nuclear
represents from 3-6 percent (from 2 percent today) of electric generation in those two nations. By
2030, net additions are at best about 1/7th of one wedge.24 In IEAs advanced case, with delayed
retirements in Europe, about 20% of a wedge is completed by 2030. The pace of scheduled retirements
quickens rapidly in the ensuing years, however, requiring more than a quadrupling of annual additions
to achieve a full wedge by the late 2050s.
31
Nuclear Not Inevitable Ext: Not in the U.S.

Any increase in U.S. nuclear power will be limited
In light of these analyses, what is likely? In the near term, utilities, vendors, sub-suppliers, uranium
miners, and enrichment plant operators, among others, are caught in a classic chicken and egg problem.
Do utilities dare order if capacity does not exist; do vendors expand if orders are not forthcoming?
Between now and 2030, some increase in the US nuclear industry appears probable, given life
extensions of existing capacity, high fossil fuel prices, uncertain costs for carbon capture and
sequestration technologies, and the incentives or subsidies in NEPAct 2005. That increase in
capacity, however, is likely to be quite modest, even in the face of significant, and politically
difficult, controls on carbon.
Cost and regulatory limits to status quo nuclear power
Tom Flaherty is senior vice president, Jim Hendrickson is vice president, and Marco Bruzzano is a principal
with Booz & Company, July 2008, Public Utilities Fortnightly, p. 39
With an unprecedented level of fuel supply insecurity facing the U.S. power industry, nuclear development is reemerging as a cornerstone of America's energy policy. However, uncertain carbon regulation, disrupted and
tight credit markets, long-term natural gas price volatility and rapid alternative technology development,
combined with nuclear's prior history, create plausible scenarios in which nuclear investment might be
prohibitively perilous without broad risk sharing and mitigation strategies.While simplified nuclear
steam supply system (NSSS) designs and innovations in modular construction suggest the potential to build
plants more economically, a confluence of largely uncontrollable forces are pushing preliminary factor cost
estimates upward. These include commodity price escalation, engineering and craft labor shortages and
manufacturing and shipping constraints. Combined with uncertainties about executing engineering and
construction, overnight cost estimates (that exclude the costs of escalation and financing) for proposed plants are
increasing and the range of estimates is wide--between $ 3,000 a kilowatt and $ 4,500/kW, depending on the
dollar date. Cost variability, and consequently financing uncertainty, threatens the overall economic
attractiveness of nuclear development.
32

Wall Street wont invest in nuclear now
Robert Alvarez, Senior Policy Advisor to the US Secretary of Energy 1993-1999, May 2008, False Promises,
http://www.nirs.org/falsepromises.pdf
As for cost, in some instances the price tag for nuclear reactors has run 10 times higher than originally
promised. Despite the recent spate of congressional subsidies, Wall Street is still maintaining its almost 30year moratorium on the financing of new nuclear power plants. At nuclear reactors, smart investors know,
unlike at coal or gas plants, all it takes is a minor mistake, like a poorly welded pipe, to cause a
multibillion-dollar loss. In regions without heavy geothermal activity, the regular heating of the ground by the
sun can be harnessed to heat and cool homes. Geothermal heat pumps (GHPs) operate by transferring heat from
the ground into buildings during the fall and winter, and reversing the process to keep buildings cool during
spring and summer. GHPs can operate more efficiently than the most energy-efficient conventional furnaces on
the market today. The potential energy yield from this simple technology is enormous. It has been estimated that
the geothermal energy stored in the top six miles of the Earths crust contains an estimated 50,000 times the
energy of the worlds known oil and gas resources. It has also been estimated that geothermal energy can meet
100 percent of all electricity needs in 39 developing countries and could serve the needs of 865 million people
around the world.
33

There are no new financed orders

The U.S. experience with 1970s and 1980s nuclear construction was uniquely dismalas Forbes put it,
the largest managerial disaster in U.S. business history, involving $100 billion in wasted investments and
cost overruns, exceeded in magnitude only by the Vietnam War and the then Savings and Loan crisis.
That economic failure is the main reason why no U.S. nuclear plant ordered after 1973 was completed,
and all orders placed since 1978 and 48% of all 253 U.S. orders ever placed were cancelled. Moreover, no
new orders have yet been placed: recent license applications are placeholders in the queue for subsidies,
which are largest for early applicants, but are not orders and are not yet financed.
More evidence concludes no nuclear revival

M. Wald, Plan to Build Reactors Is Running Into Hurdles, N.Y. Times, 5 Dec 2007,
www.nytimes.com/2007/12/05/business/05nuke.html. So far, of three firms seeking U.S. licenses to build and run
five reactors, one firm wants more than a dozen significant changes to a preapproved design, and two propose designs not yet
finally approved. A fourth firm has ordered parts for a plant whose design isnt yet even submitted to
regulators. Regulators had hoped for just 23 standard designs, but there are already five with more on the way.
17 J. Cook, Nuclear follies, 11 Feb 1985.
18 A.B. Lovins, The origins of the nuclear power fiasco, pp. 734 in J. Byrne and D. Rich, eds., The Politics of
Energy Research and Development, Energy Policy Studies, Vol. 3 (Transaction Books, New Brunswick / Oxford),
1986, RMI Publ. #E86-29. 19 Some industry observers emphasize logistical and political constraints that jeopardize any nuclear
revival, e
Lack of financing blocks nuclear power in many states

Further, many countries now expose builders to the risks of free-market competition both with micropower and with efficient use of electricityrather than
shielding investors via traditional utility rate-basing. For example, as soon as big Tokyo customers could choose their supplier, a third of them fled from costly rate-
: high-flying U.S.
merchant (non-utility) builders of combined-cycle gas-fired plants
recently wrote off about $100 billion worth of plants theyd built for
which there was no demand. And in the restructured markets now
operating in nearly half the U.S. states and for more than half its
electricity, developers must build power plants at their own risk or at
the risk of a long-term power-purchasing entity. This exposure to
competition raises financial risk and hence the cost of capital. This
makes it unlikely that we will see much if any investment in nuclear
capacity in those states.
based nuclear-dominated generation to cheaper industrial cogenerators. Enthusiasm is no guarantee of market success
34

Financial markets not willing to invest in nuclear now due to high risks
John Gilbertson, Managing Director, Goldman Sachs, July 16, 2008, Testimony, p. online
The financial markets also recognize that the challenge of new construction is very difficult. The
sponsors of new construction projects will be required to put up large amounts of capital for long leadtime procurement, before the project has been licensed by the NRC and before the construction
schedule has been set. They must do so in an era when the cost of key components is escalating under
the pressure of steep commodity inflation, when the workforce for nuclear construction is significantly
smaller and also older than it once was, and when the global demand for construction services has
multiplied, due to infrastructure growth in emerging economies such as China, India and the Arabian
Gulf. As a result, the project cost estimates provided by suppliers and contractors have risen
dramatically in the past year, and are expected to continue rising. These projects will use technology
designs which are clearly superior to earlier generations, but which have, largely, not yet been built. It
is realistic to expect some disruptions along the way as sponsors, suppliers and contractors move back
up the learning curve. Consequently, in the eyes of lenders and investors, these projects will face the
potential risk of serious delay and cost overruns. UNDERSIZED COMPANIES In the U.S., the
companies who would undertake nuclear new-build are undersized, in comparison to the total size of
each project, in comparison to the leading electric utilities in other regions of the world, and in
comparison to the leading global energy companies who undertake other, similar-sized projects such as
large-scale exploration and development. The U.S. power industry is still highly fragmented, mainly
along state and regional lines, which leaves these companies, even the largest ones, constrained to
assume the magnitude of risk in such a project. Left to their own devices, we expect very few of these
sponsoring companies would elect to pursue nuclear new-build, because their existing capital structure
simply cannot withstand the construction risk. Alternatively, if a sponsor attempted to capitalize such a
construction project through a non-recourse structure, we believe that commercial lenders and
investors would simply be unwilling to put up the money. In the future, we do expect the commercial
markets to become more receptive to nuclear construction finance, but only after several new units
have been constructed and begun to operate successfully.
At best, 5% increase in nuclear power
Peter Bradford, former member of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, September 2007, Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists, http://www.thebulletin.org/roundtable/nuclear-power-climate-change/
Nothing resembling such a massive scaling up of nuclear construction is underway. Indeed, when retirements
are netted against new nuclear plants, the worldwide annual megawatt growth rate is about 5 percent, far under
the 15 percent that a wedge will require.
35

Lack of financing limits nuclear expansion now
Business Week, July 7, 2008, p. 24 Nuclears Tangled Economics
Even $18.5 billion won't guarantee the debt needed to build dozens of reactors, though. And the current limit on the loan
guarantee is just one bottleneck. Only two companies, Japan Steel Works and France's Creusot Forge, a unit of Areva, are
capable of forging key reactor parts such as massive pressure vessels. There are also shortages of contractors with nuclear
certification and of skilled workers--even a lack of potential sites for new reactors. The proposed plants are all next to
existing reactors. Builders of the power plants, utility executives say, are unwilling to commit to fixed prices and fixed
schedules. Most companies want to be paid their actual costs, including overruns, plus a reasonable return, says one CEO.
That's why experts say the much-heralded nuclear "renaissance" will be slow to flower. "I'm not quite sure the number
McCain put out is obtainable," says Adrian Heymer, senior director for new plant deployment at the Nuclear Energy
Institute. "If there are any hiccups in coming in on time or on budget, it will be a struggle to go much beyond the first eight
or 10 plants." Exelon's Rowe adds that the industry can't grow until the government solves the waste problem, either by
opening a proposed storage site in Nevada, or by setting up surface storage facilities around the country. And in the long
run, to cut the amount of waste, he says, "it's very clear that we've got to have a fuel-recycling technology."
No significant nuclear expansion now, and not until 2016

The upcoming election will pull many of these issues into the limelight. The nuclear industry's call for still more
government support will find a more sympathetic ear in McCain than in Senator Barack Obama (D-Ill.). The
presumptive Democratic nominee agrees nuclear energy could help combat global warming, but he says there
are better alternatives. Indeed, many Democrats and renewable power advocates are upset that the playing field
is tilted so far in favor of nukes. Robert Fishman, a veteran utility executive who is now CEO of solar startup
Ausra, says the investment tax credit sought by the solar industry would cost less than 1% of the dollars going to
nukes and fossil fuels. "I don't think we've done a good job laying out to Senator McCain what the renewable
industry can do for the country," Fishman says. So it looks like a few nuclear plants may come online in the
U.S.--some as early as 2016--but not as many as McCain wants.
Poor credit means no nuclear expansion now
Amory Lovins, the chairman and chief scientist of the Rocky Mountain Institute, June 2007, Bulletin of the
Nuclear power is unnecessary and uneconomic, so we needn't debate its safety. As retirements of aging plants
overwhelm construction, global capacity and output will decline (as they did slightly in 2006). Most
independent analysts doubt the private capital market will finance any new nuclear plants. Even in the
United States, where new subsidies would roughly repay the next six units' entire capital cost, Standard &
Poor's said this wouldn't materially improve the builders' credit ratings. I expect this experiment will be
like defibrillating a corpse: It'll jump, but it won't revive.
36
Nuclear Power Not Inevitable Ext: No Global Nuclear Renaissance

Utility company boards wont support nuclear power

Nuclear plants worldwide enjoy unique legal exemption from liability for catastrophic accidents. The
United States even offers its next half-dozen nuclear plants new federal insurance against regulatory
delays, even though meaningful public participation in licensing has already been virtually eliminated. Yet
governments cannot so easily quash uncertainties about what nuclear plants will cost and whether, once
built, they can remain competitive for decades. These uncertainties deter equity investors and drive
developers to high debt ratios that weaken credit ratings. Nuclear Engineering International concludes
that this means there arent many company boards that would give the go-ahead to a new nuclear
plant. So far, no U.S. utilitys board has done so, despite the extraordinary new subsidies described
below.
Licensing demonstrations too slow now
Committee on Review of DOE's Nuclear Energy, Research and Development Program, National Research
Council, National Academy of Sciences, 2008, http://www.nap.edu/catalog/11998.html
USNRC and industry need to improve the presently planned pace of COL reviews, avoiding review of already settled issues and setting a
more challenging schedule. In spite of the substantial effort that USNRC and the industry are devoting to preparing for the COL reviews,
the planned schedules are still too long. Detailed milestones and schedules need to be established at the outset of the COL hearings and
reflected in a binding order issued by the USNRC at the time each application is formally docketed. The ITAAC process needs to be
defined fully and demonstrated to avoid construction delays caused by questions about licensing compliance or by litigation.
Costs means nuclear is dead now

Delaware Online, July 27, 2008, http://www.delawareonline.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?
AID=/20080727/OPINION11/807270312/1004/OPINION
In fact, many former advocates of nuclear power now say nuclear is too expensive to be much of a solution to the country's
long-term energy needs. The utility industry seems eager to switch to nuclear -- the financial industry less so. Aside
from the current credit crisis contracting the flow of investments, many financiers have been scared off by the enormous
risks involved in building new reactors. The Wall Street Journal says the construction costs of a new reactor range
from $5 billion to $12 billion. That will take a long time to pay back. Even with electric deregulation, when many costs
can be passed to consumers, that's a hefty burden. The high costs come from lack of skilled workers, rising prices for
concrete and copper, and the industry's inability to manage building costs. Cost overruns are almost a given. In
addition, bankers and investors are reluctant to put up that much money because of nuclear's safety record. No
matter how the overall industry fares, one serious accident or breech of security will evaporate confidence. The
investors then lose their money. The only alternative would be enormous government subsidies or something akin to a
tax on carbon use so heavy that nuclear construction costs look cheap. It's doubtful taxpayers will accept that when so many
other energy alternatives show promise.
37
Nuclear Power Not Inevitable Ext: No Global Nuclear Renaissance

Many factors have slowed nuclear development
Congressional Research Service, March 7, 2008, Managing the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Policy Implications of
Expanding Global Access to Nuclear Power, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34234.pdf
Commercializing nuclear power has proved far more challenging than first envisioned. World
nuclear capacity had reached about 200 gigawatts during the 1980s, but as confidence in nuclear
power safety declined after accidents at Threemile Island and Chernobyl, the rate of adding new
capacity fell more than 75% during the following decade. Today, nuclear power provides about 368
gigawatts 15% of the worlds electricity generation. Though a significant amount, it is far less than
that projected 50 years ago. High construction and operating costs, safety problems and accidents,
and controversy over nuclear waste disposal slowed the worldwide growth of nuclear power.
Bottlenecks in nuclear power materials now
Jack Spencer is Research Fellow in Nuclear Energy in the Thomas A. Roe Institute for Economic Policy
Studies at The Heritage Foundation, June 2, 2008, Nuclear Power Needed to Minimize McCain-Liebermans
Impact, http://www.heritage.org/Research/EnergyandEnvironment/wm1944.cfm
Global supply is no more promising, especially when one considers that the rest of the world is coming to
similar conclusions about the emerging role of nuclear power in meeting CO2 reductions. The global nuclear
industrial base currently supports 33 reactors under construction (mostly in Asia and Russia) and the
normal operation and maintenance of the world's existing 439 reactors (including those in the U.S.). Even
under today's conditions, bottlenecks emerge within the global supply chain for items such as heavy
forgings, piping, skilled labor, and manufacturing.
Sever manufacturing bottlenecks

Amory Lovins, November 8, Rocky Mountain Institute, 2008, Ambio,
Record and still-rising36 real prices for commodities like steel, copper,
and cement are often blamed for nuclear powers uniquely rapid capitalcost escalation, but do not actually appear to be an factor. The dominant
cause, rather, is severe manufacturing bottlenecks38 and scarcitie of
critical engineering, construction, and management skills that have
decayed during the industrys long order lull. These bottlenecks and
scarcities have put the flagship new-build project Finlands Olkiluoto-3 reactor
at least 24 months behind schedule39 after 28 months construction, at least 50%
over budget (losing the fixed-price builders at least 1.5 billion and customer
twice that), and harshly criticized by the Finnish nuclear safety regulator
38
Nuclear Power Not Inevitable Renewables Overtaking

Micropower has surpassed nuclear power in electricity production

that micropower surpassed nuclear power in 2006 in total electricity
production (each provides one-sixth of the worlds power), surpassed nuclear
generating capacity in 2002, and is growing enormously faster. In 2005, global
micropower provided one-fourth of the worlds new electricity: it added
1014(without or with peaking and standby units) as much capacity and 3as
much output as global nuclear added in the same year. In 2006, nuclear
lost 0.2% or 0.75 GW of net capacity as retirements exceeded new units,
offset this loss by 2.2 GW of upratings for a 1.44-GW net gain, and raised its
output 1.3% through the upratings plus higher capacity factors. Yet in 2006,
micropower added 43.4 GW, or 57.7 GW including peaking and standby units
that can generally be made dispatchable (able to send out power reliably
whenever desired). During 2007, for which cogeneration data are not yet
available, we estimate that distributed renewables added another ~30 GW to
achieve ~222 GW of total capacity116 (60% as much as nuclear), and they are
expanding by ~15% a year117 while nuclear power struggles to expand at all.
Nuclear has been overtaken by competitors

Nuclear growth has indeed been overtaken by some of the technologies
claimed to be least able to do soeven, ignominiously, by the costliest
one, photovoltaics (solar cells). In 2006 worldwide, nuclear power added less net capacity (1.44 GW) than photovoltaics added (1.74 GW), or
one-tenth as much as windpower added (15.1 GW). In 2007, nuclear capacity added or uprated by 2.5 GW of net capacity according to the IAEA or 3.2 GW
according to the World Nuclear Association, while windpower alone added ~20.6 GW, including 5.2 GW in the United States,130 3.5 GW in Spain (now one-tenth
Thus each of those three countries in 2007, and Spain

alone in the past few years, added more windpower capacity than the
world added net nuclear capacity. By spring 2008, global installed
windpower capacity had exceeded the United States 100 GW of
installed nuclear capacity. To be sure, per kW of capacity, a typical well-performing nuclear plant133 produces ~2the electric
wind-powered), and 3.2 GW in China.
output of excellent or ~3that of typical windpower, or ~4that of typical solar photovoltaics, so windpower is adding electrical output only about 23 times faster
than nuclear power. But because cogeneration and many renewables (such as geothermal, small hydro, biomass/ waste-fueled generation, and solar-thermalelectric with thermal storage) produce power quite steadily, micropower as a whole has about a capacity factor of about 0.65, three-fourths of nuclears in the
Moreover,
micropowers output is soaring while nuclears lesser output has nearly
flatlined (Fig. 7) as its capacity stalls out. For example, the European Union during 200007 installed 158 GW of generating capacity (excluding some
United States (or a higher fraction worldwide, since most countries nuclear plants have lower capacities than U.S. ones now do).
distributed resources): 88 GW gas, 47 GW wind, 9.6 GW coal, 4.2 GW oil, 3.1 GW hydro, 1.7 GW biomass, and 1.2 GW nuclear. In 2007 alone, wind added 8.5 GW to
Europes net capacity (40% of the total, exceeding gass 8.2 GW); coal lost 0.8 GW and nuclear lost
1.2 GW. In 2007, the United

39
States added more wind capacity than it had added coal capacity in the
past five years combined.
40
Nuclear Power Not Inevitable Renewables Overtaking

Wind power growing 10 times faster than nuclear power
Business Line, July 13, 2008
While renewable energy generation is picking up rapidly, the prospects for nuclear energy remain uncertain, according
to Worldwatch Institute, a Washington DC-based independent research organisation. Global nuclear power capacity grew
by less than 2,000 MW in 2007, a figure equivalent to just one-tenth of the new wind power installed globally last
year, the institute said in a new report. Global nuclear capacity stands at 372,000 MW, but ranks as the slowest growing
energy sourcejust 0.5 per cent in 2007, compared to wind at 2.7 per cent. By the end of 2007, some 34 nuclear reactors
were being built worldwide, 12of which had been under construction for 20 years or more, the report pointed out,
adding, Asia accounts for the most nuclear power plant construction with 20 new reactors currently under way. India and
China each have six reactors under construction, accounting for 8,130 MW, or more than a quarter of the nuclear capacity
currently being built worldwide. More than 124 reactors have been retired by the commercial nuclear industry since
1964, amounting to a total of 36,800 MW of generating capacity. Issues faced According to the report, construction delays
and cost overruns continue to plague the nuclear industry. Engineering issues too have come to the fore. Cost estimated
for identical Westinghouse-designed nuclear plants more than doubled in 2007 to $12-18 billion, raising questions about the
plants economic viability and doubts as to how many electric utilities would be willing to add liabilities of that scale to
their balance sheets. The US credit rating agency Moodys has cautioned that many utilities are underestimating the
cost of new plants and that nuclear investment could damage their credit ratings.
41
Nuclear Wont Expand Without Government Support

Private sector wont finance nuclear plants now, government support essential
Financial Post, July 3, 2008, p. P11
Whatever the number, nobody in the private market will finance a nuclear plant. Worse, nuclear is uncompetitive with the
market price of any other fuel, from gas to coal. Some say it is also on the brink of becoming uncompetitive with two other
heavily subsidized alternatives, solar and wind. The only way nuclear can be turned into an economically viable option is to
bring in government subsidies, regulations and taxes. This has always been true for nuclear power. To quote from a report
from the Cato Institute a few years ago, "nuclear power has never made economic sense and exists purely as a creature of
government."
42
Nuclear Power Not Inevitable Middle East

No short-term nuclear prospects in the gulf
Petroleum Economist, June 2008, p. online
The GCC's nuclear-power ambitions are a long-term option, not least because the Gulf countries are notable for
their complete lack of actual or proposed nuclear power stations. The only such facility in the Middle East and
North Africa (Mena) region is the one under construction in Iran at Bushehr, due to begin operations later this
year. Outside Iran, only Egypt and Israel have existing proposals for a nuclear power station (one each).
43
Nuclear Power Not Inevitable - Government Support for Nuclear Inadequate Now
Current loan guarantees inadequate for significant nuclear expansion
So risky and expensive, in fact, that building new ones won't happen without hefty government
support. NRG Energy, Dominion, Duke Energy, and six other companies have already leaped to
file applications to construct and operate new plants largely because of incentives Congress has
put in place. The subsidies include a 1.8 cents tax credit for each kilowatt hour of electricity produced,
which could be worth more than $140 million per reactor per year; a $500 million payout for each of
the first two plants built (and $250 million each for the next four) if there are delays for reasons outside
company control; and a total of $18.5 billion in loan guarantees. The latter is crucial, since it shifts the
risk onto the federal government, making it possible to raise capital from skittish banks. "Without the
loan guarantees, I think it would be very difficult for the first wave of plants to move forward," says
David W. Crane, CEO of NRG. Even $18.5 billion won't guarantee the debt needed to build dozens
of reactors, though. And the current limit on the loan guarantee is just one bottleneck. Only two
companies, Japan Steel Works and France's Creusot Forge, a unit of Areva, are capable of
forging key reactor parts such as massive pressure vessels. There are also shortages of
contractors with nuclear certification and of skilled workers--even a lack of potential sites for
new reactors. The proposed plants are all next to existing reactors. Builders of the power plants,
utility executives say, are unwilling to commit to fixed prices and fixed schedules. Most companies
want to be paid their actual costs, including overruns, plus a reasonable return, says one CEO.
44
No Breeders Now
Breeder reactors have been shut-down
Minqi Li, Department of Economics, University of Utah, November 2007, "Peak oil, the rise of China and
India, and the global energy crisis.(Report). ." Journal of Contemporary Asia. 449(23).
A few countries (USA, UK, France, Japan and Russia) have experimented with breeder reactors that use
plutonium (which can be used to make nuclear weapons). With breeder reactors, the lifetime of uranium
resource could be extended by 50-60 times. However, the breeder reactors have much more serious safety and
security problems than the conventional reactors. Plutonium is regarded as the most poisonous material known
on Earth. With an accident, it could explode like an atomic bomb. Liquid sodium, the coolant used by breeder
reactors, explodes on contact with air or water. Because of these problems, breeder reactors are expensive to
build and maintain and are susceptible to long shutdowns. The French Super Phoenix reactor, the world's largest
breeder reactor, operated for less than one year during its ten years of service before it was closed (Boyle et al.,
2003: 454-5; Heinberg, 2003: 134; Trainer, 2005: ch. 9).
45
No Fusion Now
No fusion for 10 years in the status quo
International Atomic Energy Agency, July 21, 2008, Fission or Fusion, Research Will Be Key,
http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/2008/fission.html
Speaking at a session entitled Fusion - Will It Always Be 40 Years Away?, David Campbell, Assistant Deputy
Director General for Fusion Science and Technology for the ITER project, illustrated the likely timetable for
fusion power development. He said that, according to plans, the experimental, multinational ITER facility to be
built in Caradache, France, is expected to be up and running by 2018. After an estimated 20 years of testing, a
model fusion reactor called DEMO will then be built, thus inaugurating the era of fusion power.
No nuclear fusion until 2045
CNN, April, 17, 2008, http://edition.cnn.com/2008/TECH/science/04/17/Nuclear.briefing/index.html
France is currently playing host to the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) at a
site in Cadarache in southern France. The project, which is costing a whopping $12 billion, is a joint
venture between the European Union, the United States, Russia, Japan, South Korea and China and
India. But the first commercial plant is still a long way off. Should everything go smoothly, ITER
predict fusion-powered electricity will be available by 2045.
46
Nuclear Wont Solve Oil Dependence

Even 100% replacement of electricity with nuclear power would only drop oil consumption 2%
Amory Lovins, Rocky Mountain Institute, July 21, 2008, http://peakenergy.blogspot.com/2008/07/amory-lovinson-nuclear-power.html
AMY GOODMAN: Its good to have you with us. Well, talk about nuclear power. Why do you feel its not an
option, given the oil crisis?
AMORY LOVINS: Well, first of all, electricity and oil have essentially nothing to do with each other, and
anybody who thinks the contrary is really ignorant about energy. Less than two percent of our electricity
is made from oil. Less than two percent of our oil makes electricity. Those numbers are falling. And
essentially, all the oil involved is actually the heavy, gooey bottom of the barrel you cant even make mobility
fuels out of anyway.
Nuclear can oil reduce oil consumption when a hydrogen economy is present
Richter, a Nobel laureate, is professor of physics at Stanford and a member of the U.S. Department of Energys Nuclear
Energy Advisory Committee, July 14, 2008, Newsweek, http://www.newsweek.com/id/143681/output/print
Because of its 59 nuclear reactors, which provide fourth fifths of the countrys electricity, France now emits only about half
the greenhouse gas per unit of GDP of the United States (about the world average), which propels France to near the top of
Yales and Columbias Environmental Performance Index (EPI). Nuclear power not only helps insulate France from wild
fluctuations in energy prices, but it also suggests a way to reduce its dependence on oil for cars, trucks and buses: if
and when plug-in hybrid vehicles and hydrogen fuel-cell vehicles are ready to replace todays cars, French drivers
will be able to tap clean energy from their electrical grid.
Nuclear cant work with a hydrogen economy until the distant future
Sharon Squassoni is a senior associate with the Nonproliferation Program at the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, May 2007, Arms Control Today, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_05/squassoni
There is little doubt that nuclear energy will remain an important part of the global energy mix, but it is not the
panacea that many advocates are selling. To begin with, a nuclear renaissance will take too long to have more
than a negligible impact on carbon dioxide emissions that threaten significant climate change in the next decade.
Further, the petroleum-dominated transportation sector, which accounts for 25 percent of world carbon
dioxide emissions, offers few footholds now for nuclear energy substitution. (By contrast, oil only accounted
for 5 percent of the global electricity mix in 2001.) In the distant future, perhaps nuclear energy may
help offset transportation emissions through the production of hydrogen
47

Nuclear wont have an impact on U.S. oil demand
Lionel Beehner, Council on Foreign Relations, 2006 (Chernobyl, Nuclear Power, and Foreign Policy,
http://www.cfr.org/publication/10534/chernobyl_nuclear_power_and_foreign_policy.html)
Some experts say the revival of nuclear power may improve America's energy security and reduce
its dependency on countries like Saudi Arabia for its energy needs. But Ferguson says that any
new nuclear plants built, while reducing the United States' use of coal, would constitute "a drop
in the bucket" in terms of affecting its overall supply, and would have little effect on reducing its
addiction to overseas oil. "Nuclear power is not going to lessen our need for oil unless we do
something to improve the efficiency of trucks and other automobiles," he says
48

Nuclear has no connection to oil

In this time of oil jitters, some political leaders conflate electricity with all
forms of energy and suggest that nuclear power can help relieve oil
dependence. This is fallacious. Nuclear power makes electricity, whose
link to oil is extremely tenuous. Only 1.6% of U.S. electricity in 2007 was
made from oil and 1.6% of U.S. oil made electricity; in the UK in 2006, 1.3%
and 0.8%; globally in 2006, ~7% and ~7%; and falling virtually everywhere.
Nine-tenths of that oil, too, is gooey residual oil from the bottom of
the barrel, not distillate usable for mobility. To the still-unclear extent that
grid electricitys lower energy cost per mile could ultimately justify costly
batteries to replace oil via battery-electric or hybrid-electric cars, renewable
electricity could do the same thing, so the cost comparisons above would apply.
Nuclear cant reduce consumption in the transportation sector
The nuclear industry claims that nuclear power is the only energy source that can effectively replace fossil fuels.
But, building new nuclear facilities does nothing to address the transportation sector, which is responsible
for a large part of GHG emissions. For example, electricity generation in the US is responsible for only 40
percent of the countrys total CO2 emissions. Likewise, transportation is the primary sector responsible
for global oil consumption (corresponding to more than half of the oil consumed worldwide everyday),
generating a full 40 percent of global CO2 emissions. As oil accounts for only seven percent of worldwide
electricity generation, the transportation sector is a major source of GHGs and would not be affected by
any changes in nuclear power generating capacity.
49
Energy Capital Advantage Answers

Turn triggering investment in nuclear causes massive energy distortion

The simplest scorecard for a nuclear revival is how private investors vote with
their dollars. Just distributed renewables (with no cogeneration or negawatts)
attracted $56 billion of private risk capital in 2006 and $71 billion in
2007, growing by tens of percent per year even in a soft economy. New
nuclear power, as usual, got zero private risk capital from the market: its bought
only by central planners drawing ever more heavily on the public purse. Focusing
its immense political powermost major countries electricity policy has for
decades been dominated by nuclear intereststhe nuclear industry is trying
to stem its reverses and turn its fictitious revival into reality by shifting
ever more of its costs from reluctant investors and customers to
unwitting, inattentive, or powerless taxpayers, as recent U.S. history illustrates.
Longstanding pre-2005 U.S. Federal nuclear subsidies totaling ~0.94.6/kWh183 have elicited no nuclear orders since
1973. In 2005, the Chairman of Dominion, an applicant for early nuclear site approval, told The New York Times, We arent
going to build a nuclear plant anytime soon. Stanford & Poors and Moodys would have a heart attack. And my chief
financial officer would, too. Chairman John Rowe at Exelon, the nations largest nuclear operator, expressed similar
skepticism. Desperate for orders, in 2005 the moribund U.S. nuclear industry sought additional federal subsidies, allegedly
for just a few first mover plants to restart itself. It got its subsidies raised to ~4.68.9/kWhi.e., ~6090% of the
projected levelized total cost of new nuclear electricity. These new 2005 subsidies included up to $4 billion in 100% loan
guarantees for up to 80% of project cost for 30 years, and offered the first 6 GWe of new nuclear units an eight-year
1.8/kWh tax credit plus limited insurance against legal or regulatory delays. The U.S. Department of Energys strict draft
rules werent to the industrys liking,1 though, and the market wasnt thrilled either. Standard & Poors predicted that these
new subsidies wouldnt materially raise builders credit ratings, because most of the risks that concerned the capital
markets remained. On 9 January 2006, S&P reiterated that resurgent interest and government encouragement may not
be enough to mitigate the risks associated with operating issues and high capital costs that could hinder credit quality.
[The new 2005 subsidies] may not be substantial enough to sustain credit quality and make [new construction] a practical
strategy. A year later, S&P repeated its concerns about new nuclear plants high construction and operational financial
risks, concluding: Standard & Poors does not anticipate construction of new [U.S.] plants to start in the next few years.
[T]he challengeswill be significant. New nuclear construction, S&P concluded, can be extremely risky, a daunting
proposition, and with operating risk inherently higher than average. In April 2007, the industry asked that Federal
coverage of nuclear loan guarantees be raised from 80% to 100% to stimulate orders, and said even the 90% guarantee
requested by the Department of Energy will probably not be workable.192 A month later, DOE obligingly raised its
guarantee to 90% of proposed 80%-debt financings (several times the leverage of merchant projects), i.e., to ~72% of
total investment; but Wall Street was still unwilling to put its money where the industrys mouth is. On 2 July 2007, six top
investment firms standing to profit from nuclear financings wrote to DOE: We believe many new nuclear construction
projects will have difficulty accessing the capital markets during construction and initial operation without the support of a
federal government loan guarantee. Lenders and investors in the fixed income markets will be acutely concerned about a
number of regulatory and litigation-related risks that are unique to nuclear power, including the possibility of delays in
commercial operations of a completed plant or another Shoreham.194 We believe these risks, combined with the higher
capital costs and longer construction schedules of nuclear plants as compared to other generation
50

facilities, will make lenders unwilling at present to extend long-term credit to such projects in a
form that would be commercially viable. They concluded that 100%-guaranteed debt
was one of the minimum conditions necessary to secure project financing from
lenders and from investors in the fixed income marketsi.e., those investors
were unwilling to assume any of the risk. Responding to this pressure, DOEs final
rule in October abandoned all previous restrictions. It raised the loan guarantee
ceiling to 100% of 80%-debt financings, made the guarantee strippable and
resalable if it didnt exceed 90% of the loan, and even suggested that DOE might
volunteer to give up defaulted Federal debts priority over commercial debt. 195 But
by then, rapid escalation of nuclear costs made the 2005 laws $4-billion loanguarantee total, to be shared with other carbon-free energy projects, insufficient
for even a single nuclear plant.196 DOE also still required borrowers have a
significant equity stake in the project (whatever that might mean). Wall Street
remained unimpressed even with the 100%-guaranteed debt prospect, let alone
the equity. Meanwhile, in July 2007, Senator Domenici (R-NM) had buried in the
Senate Energy Bill an undebated sentence, opposed by the Administrations
Office of Management and Budget, that would let the Secretary of Energy issue
unlimited loan guarantees for clean power generation, which under 1995
legislation would include nuclear power. A New York Times page-one story drew
attention to this little-noticed provision.197 Ultimately the bill failed to gain House
concurrence. But strong industry pressure continued because, as Constellations
CEO told the Times, Without [bigger] loan guarantees, we will not build nuclear
power plants.[C]ost overruns are highly probable. In May 2007, the President
of UniStar Nuclear (a Constellation Energy/ Areva/Bechtel venture) is reported by
Nucleonics Week to have said that a nuclear plant can be financed in the United
States only if the government provides a sufficient level of loan guarantees to
allow utilities to shed the risk of the first few units.198 Private investors
concurred, so in December 2007, Congress tucked into a ~3,500-page omnibus
spending bill199 an additional $18.5 billion of loan guarantees,200 plus $2 billion for
a uranium enrichment venture that the private sector had refused to finance.
Abandoning its initial pretext of pump-priming for just a handful of early plants,
the industry continues today to push for this $18.5 billion to be raised to at least
$50 billion before President Bushs term ends. Taxpayers would thus bear nearly
all of the risks that the private capital market rejects.201 Just the 2007 increases in
U.S. nuclear subsidies are comparable to new plants total capital costs: the new
2007 loan guarantees alone are worth $13 billion for a single plant, or an
additional 4.3/kWh, bringing the total Federal subsidy to 1.62.3private
investment.202 Indeed, under some scenarios, public subsidies on offer to a new
U.S. nuclear plant could now exceed its entire levelized electricity cost.203 Yet the
ante keeps rising, and the quest for market credibility is evidently growing more
difficult, not less: Constellation said in June 2007 that the loan guarantees should
be temporary, meaning that by the time the 5th nuclear plant (of each
technology) has operated for five years, the market will have achieved the
51
necessary level of comfort for the program to terminate.204 That would be well
into the 2020s at best, implying loan guarantees well north of $100 billion. One
would expect the promoters of an allegedly robust and mature technology to risk
more of their own assets on the veracity of their claims. These enterprises are
certainly big enough: the combined ~2004 revenues of the subsidized U.S. firms
exceed the GDP of the worlds 112 poorest nations, so if those firms were a
country, theyd have the worlds 13thbiggest economy.205 Yet without
government handouts even bigger than the current astronomical levels,
the U.S. nuclear revival continues to lack a key element: buyers. And of
course such crony-capitalism interventions that shift risk and its cost from
investors to taxpayers (or customers) do not make those costs go away, but
merely hide, delay, and reallocate them.206 It remains to be seen whether even
these extraordinary market distortions will elicit any orders. NRG, proposing
speculative merchant development of two Texas nuclear units, admitted that its
seeking additional subsidies from the Japanese government to supplement the
stillinadequate U.S. ones.207 In early 2008, advocates expectations of rapid
nuclear orders began to crumble. The capacity-short City of Austin dropped out of
the NRG project,208 a South Carolina project was suspended, and legendary
investor Warren Buffets Mid-America Nuclear Energy abandoned its Idaho project
because it does not make economic sense.209 Bearish market sentiment, too, is
intensifying as the credit crisis unfolds, so more cancellations can be expected.
On 29 January 2008, a discreet blog interview by the Nuclear Energy Institutes
Vice President, Richard J. Myers, sought to start damping down the unrealistic
expectations that the industry had created. He explained210 that the U.S. nuclear
revival, rather than coming in one great escalating surge as previously envisaged,
will instead come in two wavelets: a mere 58 initial plants online in 201516, 211
plus more ordered as those units approach completionif theyre on time and
within budget. He added the sobering observation that in 200607, 28.5 GW of
new coal plants had been announced and 22.3 GW cancelled,212 but he didnt
comment on whether the U.S. nuclear revival might follow a similar course. The
markets jaundiced reaction suggests that it may: that broadly speaking,
governments can have at most as much new nuclear capacity as theyre willing to
pay for, either directly or, in some countries, via parastatal utilities or other
indirect means. Market behavior increasingly suggests that ever more
heroic nuclear subsidies will elicit the same response as defibrillating a
corpse: it will jump, but it wont revive. After a half-century of intense effort
to make nuclear power competitive, the markets verdict is unforgiving. Nuclear
salespeople scour the world for single orders despite lavish and rising
subsidies, while negawatts and micropower struggle to meet exploding
and order-ofmagnitude- larger market demand despite meager R&D
funding214 and generally smaller and decreasing subsidies. 215 This
disparity can be expected to widen as more investors learn about
negawatts and micropowerboth still absent from many official energy
statistics, hence scarcely visible to less sophisticated investorsand as
the market better recognizes their distributed benefits.
52

Turn renewables *more reliable* than current energy sources

That is, such a renewable- based power system, even if solar and wind
form a large fraction of supply, will generally need less storage and
backup capacity than weve already installed and paid for to cope with
the intermittency of large thermal stationswhich fail unpredictably, for
long periods, in billionwatt chunks. A major accident or terrorist attack at
any nuclear plant could cause most or all others in the same country or even in
the world to be shut down, much as all 17 of Tokyo Electric Companys nuclear
units were shut down for checks in 200204 for many months, and some units for
several years after falsified safety data came to light. Natural disaster can also
intervene: a 7-unit Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) nuclear complex, the
largest in the worldoutproduced only by the Itaipu and Three Gorges Dams, and
supplying 67% of Japans powerwas indefinitely shut down by 2006 damage
from an earthquake stronger than its supposedly impossible design basis, and
remains down in spring 2008. Its output is being replaced by recommissioned and
hastily finished oil-, gas-, and coal-fired plants; the operators extra cost in
FY2007 alone was ~$5.6 billion.101 Unlike scheduled outages, many
nuclear units can also fail simultaneously and without warning in
regional blackouts, which necessarily and instantly shut down nuclear
plants for safety. But nuclear physics then makes restart slow and
delicate: certain neutronabsorbing fission products must decay before
there are enough surplus neutrons for stable operation. Thus at the start
of the 14 August 2003 northeast North American blackout, nine U.S. nuclear units
totaling 7,851 MW were running perfectly at 100% output, but after emergency
shutdown, they took two weeks to restart fully. They achieved 0% output on the
first day after the midafternoon blackout, 0.3% the second day, 5.7% the third,
38.4% the fourth, 55.2% the fifth, and 66.8% the sixth. The average capacity loss
was 97.5% for three days, 62.5% for five days, 59.4% for 7 days, and 53.2% for
12 days102 hardly a reliable resource no matter how exemplary its normal
operation. Canadas restart was even rougher, with Toronto teetering for
days on the brink of complete grid failure despite desperate appeals to
turn everything off. This nuclear-physics characteristic of nuclear plants makes
them anti-peakersguaranteed unavailable when theyre most needed
renewablesneed reserves, backups, or storage to achieve a given level of
reliability. Its wrong to count these as a cost for variable renewables but not for
intermittent thermal plants. Every sources economics should duly reflect the
amount of support they require for the desired reliability of retail service.
53

Turn: Federal involvement causes energy volatility
The United States does not need the government to dictate how it produces energy. The federal government is
making the same mistakes that it has made in the past. It is responding to volatility in the energy industry by
consolidating power over its operations through mandates, tax policy, and other control mechanisms.
Federal intervention has caused much of the volatility that consumers currently face. The vehicle and
appliance efficiency standards, renewable portfolio standards, and increased ethanol mandate put in place by the
Energy Independence and Security Act last December are recent examples. Instead of telling consumers and
producers how to generate energy and what sorts of energy to consume, the federal government should step
aside and allow energy producers to get to the business of meeting America's energy demands.
Turn expensive of nuclear development threatens the survival of electric utilities
Public Utilities Fortnightly, July 2008, p. 28
Of course capital costs for other types of power plants also are increasing, but the sheer magnitude of a nuclear
commitment--and the many risks owners will face during a decade-long construction phase--make financing
new nuclear plants a unique challenge. But the challenge for U.S. utilities' balance sheets is all too familiar. The
nuclear renaissance will bring the return of debt-load strain and cash-flow stress After the Enron disaster and the
meltdown of U.S. merchant-power markets, IOUs took the opportunity to rebuild their balance sheets--writing
off bad debt and refinancing expensive bonds with cheaper debt, courtesy of a Federal Reserve in full recessionfighting mode. Since then, utility ratings and capital costs have benefited from relatively stronger balance
sheets--allowing a healthy ascent from the post-Enron stock abyss. The Dow Jones Utilities Index has
risen roughly 150 percent from mid-2002, compared to the Dow Jones Industrials, up about 80 percent.
However, the recent years of relatively light debt loads and strong coverage ratios might be nearing the end-particularly for companies building new nuclear power plants. A Moody's special comment published in May
2007 predicts, "A utility that builds a new nuclear power plant may experience an approximately 25
percent to 30 percent deterioration in cash-flow related credit metrics, effectively reducing [debt coverage
ratios] from roughly 25 percent to the mid-teens."
54
Energy Capital Advantage Answers Ext: Capital Now

Billions invested in renewable energy now, no investor interest in nuclear
China, which has the worlds most ambitious nuclear program, by the end of 2006 had seven times that
much capacity in distributed renewables, and they were growing it seven times faster. Take a look at 2007,
in which the US or Spain or China added more wind capacity than the world added nuclear capacity. The US
added more wind capacity last year than weve added coal capacity in the past five years put together. And
renewables, other than big hydro, got last year $71 billion of private capital; nuclear, as usual, got zero. It
is only bought by central planners with a draw on the public purse. What does this tell you? I mean, what
part of the story does anybody who take markets seriously not get?
Loan guarantees available for many energy projects now
FDCH, June 30, 2008, Regulatory Intelligence Bulletin, p. online DOE Announces Solicitations for $30.5
Billion in Loan Guarantees
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) today announced three solicitations for a total of up to $30.5 billion
in federal loan guarantees for projects that employ advanced energy technologies that avoid, reduce or
sequester air pollutants or greenhouse gas emissions. The three solicitations are in the areas of energy
efficiency, renewable energy and advanced transmission and distribution technologies; nuclear power
facilities; and advanced nuclear facilities for the `front-end' of the nuclear fuel cycle. This marks the second
round of solicitations for DOE's Loan Guarantee Program, which encourages the commercial use of new or
significantly improved energy technologies, and is an important step in paving the way for clean energy
projects.
$48 billion in fossil fuel loan guarantees coming
FDCH, June 30, 2008, Regulatory Intelligence Bulletin, p. online DOE Announces Solicitations for $30.5
Billion in Loan Guarantees
Later this summer, DOE intends to issue a solicitation for loan guarantee applications for advanced fossil
energy projects (up to $8 billion). The authority to issue loan guarantees in the amounts specified in these
solicitations was provided to DOE in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 and is consistent with the
Department's FY 2009 Congressional Budget Request.
55
Energy Grid Advantage Answers

Nuclear power is not a reliable source of electricity
Michael Mariotte, Executive Director, Nuclear Information and Resource Service, May 2008, False
Promises, http://www.nirs.org/falsepromises.pdf
Nuclear power is debilitated by a host of unique and potentially costly and dangerous variability issues.
Key to nuclear reactor operation is constant circulation of coolant in the system; if circulation stops, there
is a relatively small window before nuclear fuel begins to melt from its own atomic heat, as it began to at
Three Mile Island. All nuclear power reactors in the US depend on off-site power for normal operations
and on-site backup power for safety systems in the case of loss of off-site power. Both power systems are
vulnerable to climate conditions such as flooding, hurricanes, tornados and severe storms. In the aftermath
of Hurricane Katrina, the Waterford reactor, located outside New Orleans, was forced to operate on diesel
generators for four days because of instability in the off-site electrical grid. 43 Similarly, the Cooper nuclear
power station in Nebraska was forced to shut down in the 1993 flood, when rising waters collapsed the
dikes and levees around the site. The Davis-Besse nuclear plant in Ohio was hit by a tornado in 1998, which
caused the loss of off-site power used for the cooling system for the irradiated fuel storage pool. Therefore,
nuclear power is in fact seriously affected by climate conditions, and this vulnerability is exacerbated by the
increasing effects of global warming, heightening the inherent safety risks of nuclear reactors. Perhaps the most
poignant way in which nuclear power cannot remedy the climate crisis is the fact that it does not work with hot
water. In recent years elevated temperatures in rivers 46 and even ocean water47 have caused nuclear power
reactors to be taken off-line. Hot water not only may violate the technical specifications for reactor core cooling
(requiring the fission reaction to stop)hot water does not cool the reactor condenserwhich takes the steam
generated from the heat of fission and turns it back into water so the cycle can continue. In other words, the
device simply does not work. The shortcomings of nuclear power reliability were also evident in July 2006,
when, in Sweden, backup generators malfunctioned during a power outage, forcing a shutdown of one of
the reactors at Forsmark. In this incident, two of the facilitys four backup generators malfunctioned when the
plant experienced a major power outage. Plant workers reported to Swedish media that it had come close to a
meltdown. Following the incident, Swedish officials shut down half of Swedens ten nuclear power plants,
triggering record price increases.
56
Energy Grid Advantage Answers

No economy of scale building more plants raises costs
Indeed, there is good historical reason to believe that nuclear powers perceived problems and
actual capital costs tend to increase as it expands. At the height of U.S. nuclear growth, the more
coal or (especially) nuclear plants were built or being built, the more their real cost rose. (Later
costs closely tracked the coal curve but far overshot the nuclear curve.) Statistical testing strongly
suggested an underlying causation thats bad news for nuclear power. It could be even more
troublesome at the scale that the nuclear enterprise would need to achieve to make any
significant dent in climate change. Dr. Tom Cochran has estimated 4 that adding 700 nuclear GWe
worldwideroughly twice todays nuclear capacityand running it for 20502100 would: o add
~1,200 nuclear plants (if they lasted 40 years); o require 15 new enrichment plants (each 8 million
SWU/y); o create 0.97 million tonnes of spent fuel, requiring 14 Yucca Mountains, and containing ~1
million kghundreds of thousands of bombs worthof plutoniumor o require 50 new
reprocessing plants (each 800 TSF/y with a 40-y operating life) to extract that plutonium under, one
hopes, stringent international safeguards; o require ~$12 trillion of investment; and yet o cut the
global average temperature rise by just 0.2C. Similarly daunting numbers were published in 1988 by
RMI researchers Dr. Bill Keepin and Greg Kats.35 They showed that under the demand-growth
assumptions then popular, building a 1- GW reactor every 13 days through 2025 couldnt
reverse CO2 growth, so nuclear power cannot significantly contribute to abating greenhouse
warming, except possibly in scenarios of low energy growth for which the problem is already
largely ameliorated by efficiency improvement. Since 1988, the economic and logistical logic of
non-nuclear investments has only become far more compelling; Dr. Cochran has simply reminded us
of the futility of relying on one dominant and slow option rather than on a diverse and well-balanced
portfolio of quicker options.
57
Nuclear Wont Solve Energy Shortages

At best, nuclear could supply 20% of our energy needs by 2050
Kristin Shrader-Frechette , teaches biological sciences and philosophy at the University of Notre Dame, June 23,
2008, America, Five Myths About Nuclear Energy, p. 12
In addition to being risky, nuclear power is unable to meet our current or future energy needs. Because of safety
requirements and the length of time it takes to construct a nuclear-power facility, the government says
that by the year 2050 atomic energy could supply, at best, 20 percent of U.S. electricity needs; yet by 2020, wind
and solar panels could supply at least 32 percent of U.S. electricity, at about half the cost of nuclear power.
58
Nuclear Doesnt Solve Climate

Nuclear will generate as much carbon dioxide as coal, nuclear industry underestimates
Dr. Benjamin Sovacool , July 15, 2008, Jakarta Post, p. 6 (Dr. Benjamin K. Sovacool is a Research Fellow in the Energy
Governance Program at the Centre on Asia and Globalization, part of the distinguished Lee Kuan Yew School of Public
Policy at the National University of Singapore.
Opponents of nuclear power have responded in kind. In their calculation, Australian researchers have estimated that wind
turbines have one-third the carbon equivalent emissions of nuclear power over their lifecycle and hydroelectric one-fourth
the equivalent emissions. The Oxford Research Group projects that if percentage of world nuclear capacity remains
what it is today, by 2050 nuclear power would generate as much carbon dioxide per kilowatt-hour (kWh) as
comparable gas-fired power stations. One new study published in the August 2008 issue of the peer-reviewed journal
Energy Policy attempts to answer this question by screening 103 lifecycle studies of greenhouse gas equivalent
emissions for nuclear power plants. The study attempts to identify a subset of the most current, original, and
methodologically rigorous studies. Researchers calculated that while the range of emissions for nuclear energy over the
lifetime of a plant reported from qualified studies examined is significant, the mean value is about 66 grams of carbon
dioxide equivalent per kWh (gCO2e/kWh). The frontend component of the nuclear fuel cycle (uranium mining,
milling, and enrichment) is responsible for 38 percent of equivalent emissions. Decommissioning and plant operation,
including the use of fossil-fueled generators to backup nuclear plants when they offline for servicing, account for 35
percent. The backend of the fuel cycle, which includes storing spent fuel and fuel conditioning, account for 15
percent of the emissions, and plant construction is responsible for 12 percent. This
average-66 grams of
carbon dioxide for every kWh-is staggeringly high compared to what the nuclear
industry has reported. It also shows, conclusively, that nuclear energy is in no way "carbon free" or "emissions
free," and that nuclear power is worse than the equivalent carbon emissions over the lifecycle of renewable and small scale
distributed generators. To provide just a rough estimate of how much equivalent carbon dioxide nuclear plants emit over the
course of their lifecycle, a 1,000 MW reactor operating at a 90 percent capacity factor will emit the equivalent of 1,427 tons
of carbon dioxide every day, or 522,323 metric tons of carbon dioxide every year.
Need to build a 1,000 more reactors by 2050 to solve climate

In fact, the sheer number of nuclear plants needed to make a major dent in greenhouse emissions means the industry hasn't
a prayer of turning nuclear power into the solution to global warming. One study from last year determined that to take
a significant contribution toward stabilizing atmospheric carbon dioxide, about 21 new 1,000-megawatt
plants would have to be built each year for the next 50 years, including those needed to replace existing
reactors, all of which are expected to be retired by 2050. That's considerably more than the most ambitious industry growth
projections.
59
Nuclear Doesnt Solve Climate

Plants take too long to build, emit CO2 during the fuel stages
Beyond Nuclear, no date, The Nuclear Power Danger (Beyond Nuclear was founded by Dr. Helen
Caldicott) http://www.beyondnuclear.org/nuclearpower.html
Nuclear power cannot address climate change. Greenhouse gases are emitted throughout the
nuclear fuel chain, from the mining of the necessary fuel - uranium - to its enrichment,
transportation and the construction of nuclear plants. Nuclear plants take too long to build - up
to a dozen years or more. The planet is already in crisis with experts pointing to rapid climate change
already underway and less than ten years left to pre-empt disaster. There is no time to wait for nuclear
plant construction.
Turn Capital intensity of nuclear power crows-out alternatives that solve climate change
What nuclear would do is displace coal, our most abundant domestic fuel. And this sounds good for climate, but
actually, expanding nuclear makes climate change worse, for a very simple reason. Nuclear is incredibly
expensive. The costs have just stood up on end lately. Wall Street Journal recently reported that theyre
about two to four times the cost that the industry was talking about just a year ago. And the result of that
is that if you buy more nuclear plants, youre going to get about two to ten times less climate solution per
dollar, and youll get it about twenty to forty times slower, than if you buy instead the cheaper, faster stuff
that is walloping nuclear and coal and gas, all kinds of central plans, in the marketplace. And those
competitors are efficient use of electricity and whats called micropower, which is both renewables, except
big hydro, and making electricity and heat together.
60
Nuclear Doesnt Solve Climate Ext: Generates CO2

Turn Nuclear dependent on processes that produce substantial CO2
America Magazine, June 23, 2008, http://www.americamagazine.org/content/article.cfm?article_id=10884
While nuclear reactors themselves do not release greenhouse gases, reactors are only part of the nine-stage nuclear
fuel cycle. This cycle includes mining uranium ore, milling it to extract uranium, converting the uranium to
gas, enriching it, fabricating fuel pellets, generating power, reprocessing spent fuel, storing spent fuel at the
reactor and transporting the waste to a permanent storage facility. Because most of these nine stages are
heavily dependent on fossil fuels, nuclear power thus generates at least 33 grams of carbon- equivalent
emissions for each kilowatt-hour of electricity that is produced. (To provide uniform calculations of greenhouse
emissions, the various effects of the different greenhouse gases typically are converted to carbon-equivalent
emissions.) Per kilowatt-hour, atomic energy produces only one-seventh the greenhouse emissions of coal, but twice
as much as wind and slightly more than solar panels.
Nuclear power generation cycle produces CO2
Robert Alvarez,
Senior Policy Advisor to the US Secretary of Energy 1993-1999, May

2008, False Promises, http://www.nirs.org/falsepromises.pdf
While atomic reactions do not emit CO2 or other GHGs, the full fuel cycle of nuclear power generation is
fossil fuel intensive and emits large amounts of these gases. The mining, milling, processing and
transportation of uranium fuel for reactors are all carbon-intensive industries and must be included in
fuel-cycle accounting. In fact, the total emissions of the nuclear fuel cycle are not typically assessed when
compared with other energy alternatives, leading to this common misconception. Indeed, a complete life-cycle
analysis shows that generating electricity from nuclear power emits as much as 20-40 percent of the carbon
dioxide per
61
Nuclear Doesnt Solve Climate Ext: Generates CO2

Uranium mining and milling increases CO2
Dr. Mark Winfield, December 2006, Nuclear Power in Canada: An Examination of Risks, Impacts,
and Sustainability, http://pubs.pembina.org/reports/Nuclear_web.pdf
GHGs contribute to global climate change. These gases include carbon dioxide (CO 2), nitrous oxide (N2O),
ozone, methane (CH4), hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and water vapour. The Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change (IPCC) in 2002 stated, there is new and stronger evidence that most of the warming
observed over the last 50 years is attributable to human activities. A 1998 study based on 1996 data from
uranium mines in Canada concluded that 12.1 tonnes of CO2 are released for every tonne of uranium
concentrate produced. This figure was based on the fact that certain mines obtain power from nearby
hydropower dams, while others are too remote and must rely on on-site diesel generation. If all of the power
consumed at these mines had been generated via fossil fuels (diesel), this figure would increase to 20.7 tonnes of
CO2 for every tonne of uranium concentrate produced. During the milling process, there are additional CO2
releases from acid leaching of the ore, which contains carbonate, and the use of lime, which is used to
neutralize the tailings. In total, milling releases an additional 3.2 tonnes of CO 2 for every tonne of uranium
concentrate produced. These estimates do not appear to include the emissions associated with the
transportation of ore 80 km by truck from the McArthur River mine to the Key Lake site for milling. On the
basis of these estimates the 10.5 kilotonnes of uranium concentrate produced by Canadian uranium mines and
mills in 2003 would have resulted in the release of between 160 and 250 kilotonnes of CO 2. This is roughly
equivalent to the annual GHG emissions from 71,495 cars driving an average of 15,000 km /year. The mining
and milling of lower grade ores would require larger energy inputs as a larger volume of ore needs to be mined
and processed to produce the same amount of uranium concentrate. The result is proportionally higher levels
of emissions of greenhouse gases and other pollutants.
62
Nuclear Doesnt Solve Climate Ext: Parts of the Cycle Increase Emissions
Many parts of the nuclear cycle responsible for substantial CO2 emissions
The study finds that GHG emissions arise at each stage of the nuclear energy cycle, with power plant
construction being the most significant source of releases. Further releases of GHGs occur as a result of
the operation of equipment in the uranium min ing process, the milling of uranium ore, mill tailings
management activities, and refining and conversion operations. The generation of greenhouse gases from
mining and milling operations would increase proportionally with the use of lower grade uranium ores, as
larger amounts of ore would have to be extracted and processed to produce the same amount of ura nium
concentrate. The road transportation of uranium between milling, refining and conversion facilities
results in additional releases. As with criteria air pollutants, the management of waste nuclear fuel along with
other radioactive wastes could involve significant transportation activities, leading to further generation of GHG
emissions. In Canada, total GHG emissions associated with uranium mining, milling, refining, conversion and
fuel fabrication are between 240,000 and 366,000 tonnes of CO 2 per year. Total emissions associated with the
sector, including the emissions associated with power plant construction, are in the range of 468,000 and
594,000 tonnes of CO2 per year, equivalent to the emissions of between 134,000 and 170,000 cars per year. Total
annual GHG emissions that are primarily associated with domestic power production are estimated at between
267,000 and 289,000 tonnes of CO2 per year. This total is almost certainly an underestimate, due to a lack of
complete information. Other recent estimates suggest total GHG emissions associated with nuclear power in
Canada are in the range of at least 840,000 tonnes per year.
63
Nuclear Doesnt Solve Climate Ext: Diverts from Renewables

Nuclear power expansion diverts investment from renewables
Amory Lovins, CEO, Rockey Mountain Institute, September 2005, Nuclear Power: Economics & Climate Protection,
http://www.rmi.org/images/other/Energy/E05-08_NukePwrEcon.pdf
Empirical data also confirm that these competing technologies not only are being deployed an
order of magnitude faster than nuclear power, but ultimately can become far bigger. In the U.S.,
for example, full deployment of these very cost-effective competitors (conservatively excluding all
renewables except windpower, and all cogeneration that uses fresh fuel rather than recovered waste
heat) could provide ~1315 times nuclear powers current 20% share of electric generation all
without significant land-use, reliability, or other constraints. The claim that we need all energy
options has no analytic basis and is clearly not true; nor can we afford all options. In practice,
keeping nuclear power alive means diverting private and public investment from the cheaper
market winnerscogeneration, renewables, and efficiencyto the costlier market loser.
Its linear - -every dollar invested in nuclear worsens climate change through trade-offs
Nuclear power is an inherently limited way to protect the climate, because it makes electricity, whose
generation releases only two-fifths of U.S. CO2 emissions; it must run steadily rather than varying
widely with loads as many power plants must; and its units are too big for many smaller countries or
rural users. But nuclear power is a still less helpful climate solution because its about the slowest
option to deploy (in capacity or annual output added per year)as observed market behavior
confirmsand the most costly. Its higher cost than competitors, per unit of net CO2 displaced, means
that every dollar invested in nuclear expansion will worsen climate change by buying less
solution per dollar. Specifically, every $0.10 spent to buy a single new nuclear kilowatt-hour
(roughly its delivered cost, including its 2004 subsidies, according to the authoritative 2003 MIT
studys findings expressed in 2004 $) could instead have bought 1.2 to 1.7 kWh of windpower
(firmed to be available whenever desired), 0.9 to 1.7+ kWh of gas-fired industrial or ~2.26.5+ kWh
of building-scale cogeneration (adjusted for their CO2 emissions), an infinite number of kWh from waste-heat
cogeneration (since its economic cost is typically negative), or at least several, perhaps upwards of ten, kWh of electrical savings from
more efficient use. In this sense of opportunity costany investment foregoes other outcomes that could have been bought with the
same moneynuclear power is far more carbon-intensive than a coal plant. For these reasons, expanding nuclear power would both
reduce and retard the desired decrease in CO2 emissions. Claims that more nuclear plants are needed to protect Earths climate thus
cannot withstand documented analysis or be reconciled with actual market choices. If you are concerned about climate change, it is
essential to buy the fastest and most effective climate solutions. Nuclear power is just the opposite. Claimed broad green support for
nuclear expansion, if real (which its not), would therefore be unsound and counterproductive. And efforts to revive this moribund
technology, already killed by market competition, only waste time and money.
64

Renewables solve better; future nuclear power expansion relies on carbon-intensive uranium
Government, industry and university studies, like those recently from Princeton, agree that wind turbines and solar
panels already exist at an industrial scale and could supply one-third of U.S. electricity needs by 2020, and the
vast majority of U.S. electricity by 2050not just the 20 percent of electricity possible from nuclear energy by
2050. The D.O.E. says wind from only three states (Kansas, North Dakota and Texas) could supply all U.S.
electricity needs, and 20 states could supply nearly triple those needs. By 2015, according to the D.O.E., solar
panels will be competitive with all conventional energy technologies and will cost 5 to 10 cents per kilowatt hour.
Shell Oil and other fossil-fuel companies agree. They are investing heavily in wind and solar. From an
economic perspective, atomic power is inefficient at addressing climate change because dollars used for more
expensive, higher-emissions nuclear energy cannot be used for cheaper, lower-emissions renewable energy.
Atomic power is also not sustainable. Because of dwindling uranium supplies, by the year 2050 reactors would be
forced to use low-grade uranium ore whose greenhouse emissions would roughly equal those of natural gas.
65

Nuclear is so costly that it will retard alternative energy development

The need for new nuclear build as part of a least-cost portfolio to meet the energy service needs of a dynamic national or global economy is often alleged, but has no analytic foundation. (Extrapolative
projections that dont assess competition between modern options are sleepwalking, not analysis.) Many careful analyses published over the past few decades show the opposite; one of the best was
new nuclear is so costly and slow relative to

its winning competitors that it will retard the provision of energy services. Consider China, which at the end of 2007 got 2% of its electricity
published in 1989, though not implemented, by Swedens Vattenfall. What careful analysis does consistently show is that
from 11 nuclear plants (8.6 GW) and had by far the worlds most ambitious nuclear target40 GW by 2020, exceeding Chinas 2020 windpower goal of 30 GW. Nuclear construction, currently five units
totaling 3.3 GW, seems threefold slower than this schedule would require, but if successful, the 40 GW could offset one-tenth of the worlds plausible retirements of reactors meanwhile passing age 40.146
Chinas impressive and widely heralded nuclear ambitions have been far eclipsed by its little-noticed world
leadership in distributed renewables. By the end of 2006, China had already installed 49 GW of distributed
renewables (excluding an additional 37 GW of big hydro). Thats 7ts nuclear capacity, growing faster. While Chinas
nuclear expansion falters, partly due to escalating construction costs, its renewable expansion is rapidly
accelerating. In 2007, windpower alone grew 3.4 GW (156% more than in 2006) to 6 GW, exceeding the 5-GW
target for 2010. Chinas renewable industries stated in November 2007 that by 2020, 50 GW of windpower is likely
under current policies, and with a supportive policy environment, 122 GW would be feasible5 the Three Gorges
Dams capacity, 4the 2020 windpower target, or 3the 2020 nuclear target.149 Chinas vibrant windpower sector
now includes more than 50 firms, 56% of its 2007 installations were domestically produced, and its starting to
exploit world-class wind resources.1 Chinas installed wind capacity doubled in 2006 alone, and in that year, China was the worlds second biggest investor in renewable power
Yet
investor, the worlds third biggest photovoltaic producer, and the worlds fifth largest windpower installer, rising quickly in all categories. In 2007, Chinas wind capacity grew another 156%; it has more than
doubled in each year since 2004, surpassing even the most optimistic projections. In September 2007, the chair of Chinas National Development and Reform Commission announced an increase of planned
renewable energy investments to RMB 2 trillion ($265 billion). China also plans 200 GW of cogeneration and 328 GW of total hydropower by 2020,151 plus rapid energy efficiency gains sufficient to cap
energy use at twice the 2000 level while GDP quadruples to 2020. Meanwhile, Chinas power market is becoming more competitive and its polity more transparent; both trends bode ill for the Treasuryfinanced state nuclear monopoly. Theres another competitor too: reduced energy intensity. For a quarter-century, China saved energy faster than any other country, lowering its slope of energy growth by
70% during 19802001. That progress was checked and slightly reversed by a 200206 surge in energy- intensive materials production,152 now being reversed. But in 2005, reducing energy intensity,
especially for electricity, became Chinas top strategic priority in the Eleventh Five-Year Plan. In 2007, a new Energy Conservation Law and a flurry of enforcing regulations supported this goal. A January
2008 decree specifies rewards for top provincial officials who meet, and punishments for those who miss, their targets to cut energy intensity; failure brings not only personal perdition but also prohibitions
on new energy-intensive facilities in the offending jurisdiction. All Chinas new nuclear plants are commanded and funded by Beijing, while two-thirds of the new coal plants are bootleg units not
authorized by Beijing. All are meant to meet burgeoning electricity demand that negawatts will increasingly soften and distributed sources will meet. That demand growth is driven largely by construction of
inefficient buildings and factories made from inefficiently produced materials; half the demand growth is due to largely wasted air conditioning and refrigeration. And since Beijing still holds many economic
levers, its easier to take a big bite out of demand than in the even more unruly U.S. economy, where most infrastructure is already built. In principle, a fast-growing economy can reduce its intensity even
. Chinas top priority

on energy efficiency reflects its leaders understanding that unless efficiency is the foundation of growth,
supply-side investments will eat the capital budget and starve end-use investments. On 24 January 2008, the European Union
faster than its service demands rise: even the severalfold-more-efficient United States did so in 2005 2006, reducing its absolute use of coal, oil, gas, and total energy
announced a climate strategy aiming by 2020 to slash CO2 emissions to 20% below the 1990 level, raise energy efficiency 20%, and get 20% of its primary energy from renewables (now 8.5%), displacing
~50 billion of annual oil and gas costs.154 The United States has less coherent policies but comparable or greater energy efficiency opportunities and huge micropower potential: Rocky Mountain
Institute has calculated the U.S. technical potential to save electricity at ~75%4 the 19% nuclear share of power generationat an average cost ~1/kWh, less than nuclear operating cost. The utility
industrys think tank, the Electric Power Research Institute, estimated negawatts potential at only 23 nuclears market share, at an average cost ~3/kWh (even less today)155less than one-fourth of
new nuclears delivered cost (Fig. 1 The U.S. industrial cogeneration potential is at least comparable to current U.S. nuclear capacity, excluding cogeneration potential in buildings, which use two-thirds of
electricity. 156 The U.S. windpower potential on available land is more than twice the entire U.S. annual use of electricity157 (and likewise in Chinathe British figure is ~6 ): worldwide, the global
windpower potential onshore and nearshore, without land-use exclusions, is ~35global electricity demand.Empirical results carefully evaluated for hundreds of utility and business programs validate the
practical potential for saving electricity: Broad programs, especially those emphasizing the relatively costlier and highertransaction- cost measures common in the residential sector (notably home shell
retrofits), tend to cost a few /kWh;159 the U.S. historic average is ~2/kWh. In striking contrast, many programs targeting commercial and industrial savings cost much less, and the best ones cost far less
than 1/kWh.160 Negawatt program costs tend to decline with experience, as shown by evaluations for the three California investor-owned utilities161 and the aggregate of the 79 Pacific Northwest
utilities evaluated by the Northwest Power Planning Council.162 California has generally mild climates, high building and appliance efficiency standards, and a long history of world-class demand-side
management efforts, so other places lacking those attributes should tend to have bigger potential at lower costs. Very detailed bottom-up analyses for Danish buildings163 and for all electricity uses in
Sweden164 and the United States,165 and EPRIs moderately detailed estimate of U.S. potential sav- or below todays broad-based utility program costs. But these studies used 1980s technologies that
generally cost more and saved less than todays. Moreover, few if any of the programs shown use truly modern technologies, and probably none uses modern integrative design techniques that typically
full U.S.
deployment of just three winning competitorsrecovered-waste-heat cogeneration (conservatively excluding
all cogeneration that uses fresh fuel), windpower, and enduse efficiencycould provide ~1315nuclear
powers current 19% share of U.S. electric generation, all without significant land-use, reliability, or other
constraints, and with considerable gains in employment.
tunnel through the cost barrier to achieve very large industrial, commercial, and residential kWh savings at negative marginal cost in most new installations167 and some retrofits.168 Thus
66

Nuclear diverts investment from other energy sources
Nuclear power remains a bad option and one that would divert precious resources from readily available
technologies to reduce greenhouse gases that are both cheaper and can be deployed faster. This updated
report debunks the misleading claims being made about nuclear power and shows why it is not part of the
solution to our energy or climate crises.
Financing nuclear power undermines resource investment in technologies that solve climate
According to NASAs Head Climate Scientist, we have no time to waste in mitigating global climate change and business
as usual will result in a dramatically different planet. Therefore, aggressively tackling this issue will require the fastest,
cheapest and safest solutions, and nuclear power is none of these. The vast amount of money needed to build the
number of reactors necessary to meaningfully address global emissions would divert government subsidies and
private investment from more effective solutions. Analysis by the Rocky Mountain Institute has shown that the
enormous costs of nuclear power per unit of carbon emissions reduced would worsen our ability to mitigate climate
change, as such an amount would be buying less carbon-free energy per dollar spent on nuclear power compared to
the emissions we would save by investing those dollars in solar, wind or energy efficiency. In fact, each
dollar
invested in electric efficiency in the US displaces nearly seven times as much
carbon dioxide as a dollar invested in nuclear power, and nuclear power saves as little as half as
much carbon per dollar as wind power and cogeneration. kilowatt hour (kWh) of a gas-fired system when the whole
system is taken into account These estimates only hold true when high grade uranium ores are available. As uranium
resources become increasingly scarce, recovery of uranium from lower grade ores would result in greater emissions. It has
been shown that a nuclear life-cycle starting with low quality ores (less than 0.02 percent of U3O8 per ton of ore) produces
equal amounts of CO2 as those produced by an equivalent gas-fired power station. Therefore, if nuclear electricity
generation is further deployed, the likely consequence will be that lower grade ores will be required which will result in
increased CO2 emissions. An analysis by the Oko Institute in Germany, based on the database of the GEMIS (Global
Emission Model for Integrated Systems) indicates that a standard size nuclear power plant (1250 MW) will emit some 1.3
million tons of CO2 per year. This emission level makes nuclear power a more polluting alternative, when compared
to electricity saving, cogeneration or renewable energies. Other studies have calculated the amount of emissions from
the nuclear cycle to be in the range of 30-60 grams of CO2 equivalent per kWh.
67

Every dollar invested in nuclear is a dollar less for other solutions

Generating electricity causes two-fifths of U.S. and more than one-third of global fossilfueled CO2
emissions, which in turn are about three-fourths of total CO2 emissions, excluding the additional effects
of other greenhouse gases. Nuclear power addresses only part of the electrical fraction of fossil CO2
emissionsthe fraction of chiefly coal-fired power generation that runs fairly steadily, not at widely
varying output, in grids large enough to accommodate nuclear units size (far too big for many smaller
countries or rural users). Nuclear powers potential climate solution is further restricted by its
inherent slowness of deployment (in capacity or annual output added per year), as confirmed by
market data below. And its higher relative cost than nearly all competitors, per unit of net CO2
displaced, means that every dollar invested in nuclear expansion will worsen climate change by
buying less solution per dollar.
Co-generation and wind more cost-effective

Nuclear power, being the costliest option, delivers less electrical service per dollar than its rivals, so, not
surprisingly, its also a climate-protection loser, surpassing in carbon emissions displaced per dollar only
centralized, non-cogenerating combined-cycle power plants burning natural gas at the relative prices assumed.
Firmed windpower and cogeneration are 1.5 times more cost-effective than nuclear at displacing carbon. So is
efficiency at even an almost unheardof 7/kWh. Efficiency at normally observed costs beats nuclear by a wide margin
for example, by about ten-fold for efficiency costing one cent per kWh. New nuclear power is thus so costly that
shifting a dollar of spending from nuclear to efficiency protects the climate severalfold more than shifting a dollar of
spending from coal to nuclear. Indeed, under plausible assumptions, spending a dollar on new nuclear power instead
of on efficient use of electricity has a worse climate effect than spending that dollar on new coal power! Fig. 4 shows
that making and delivering new nuclear power displaces 1.4 to 11 times less carbon per dollar than doing the same
tasks by using electricity more efficiently or by providing electricity in other, cheaper ways that produce little or no
carbon (windpower, cogeneration, or end-use efficiency, but not including combined-cycle gas-fired power plants).
That is, every dollar spent on new nuclear power will produce 1.411+ times less climate solution than spending
the same dollar on its cheaper competitors. For a power source merely to emit no carbon isnt good enough; it
must also produce the least carbon per dollar, and must do so sooner than its competitors. Thats because, if
climate is a problem, then we must invest judiciously, not indiscriminately, to buy the most solution per dollar
and the most solution per yearbest buys first, not the more the merrier. Buying a costlier and slower
solution, like new nuclear power, will make the climate problem worse than it would have been if wed bought
cheaper, faster options instead.
68
Nuclear Doesnt Solve Climate Ext: Have to Build 1000s of Reactors

Need to build a 1,000 more reactors by 2050 to solve climate
In fact, the sheer number of nuclear plants needed to make a major dent in greenhouse emissions means the industry
hasn't a prayer of turning nuclear power into the solution to global warming. One study from last year determined
that to take a significant contribution toward stabilizing atmospheric carbon dioxide, about 21 new 1,000-megawatt
plants would have to be built each year for the next 50 years, including those needed to replace existing reactors, all
of which are expected to be retired by 2050. That's considerably more than the most ambitious industry growth
projections.
1500-2000 reactors would have to be built in the next decade to solve climate change
A 2003 study by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology on the future of nuclear power determined
that approximately 1500 new nuclear reactors would have to be constructed worldwide by mid-century
for nuclear power to have even a modest impact on the reduction of GHGs. A similar study concluded
that a GHG emission reduction of 20 percent could be accomplished by 2100 if all projected coal power
were displaced by 4900 GW of nuclear energy.19 Likewise, the Institute for Energy and Environmental
Research estimates that it would be necessary to build some 2,000 nuclear power plants of 1,000 MW each
in the next few decades for nuclear power to make a substantial reduction in CO 2 emissions.
3,000 nuclear plants would have to be built to solve climate change
CNN, April, 17, 2008, http://edition.cnn.com/2008/TECH/science/04/17/Nuclear.briefing/index.html
Putting all other arguments aside, critics say that nuclear power is going to provide too little, too late.
Jeremy Rifkin, president of the Foundation on Economic Trends and author of the Hydrogen
Economy, told CNN: "To get any appreciable impact on climate change you have to get 20
percent from renewable energies. For nuclear power to achieve this figure would mean building
3000 nuclear plants -- that's three power plants every 30 days for the next 60 years."
69
Nuclear Doesnt Solve Climate Ext: Inadequate Reduction

Doubling the number of reactors only reduces climate change by 8%
In the UK, the governments advisory panel, the Sustainable Development Commission, found that if the
countrys existing nuclear capacity were doubled, it would only yield an eight percent cut in CO 2 emissions by
2035, and none before 2010. Indeed, the Commission concluded that the risks associated with nuclear power
greatly outweigh its minimal contribution to reducing CO 2 emissions.
Reactors would have to be tripled to solve climate change by 20%
Actually, if we did need nuclear power, wed be in big trouble. The major studiesfrom MIT, from IAEA, from
the Commission on Energy Policyall agree on the big numbers: if nuclear power is to play a meaningful role
in addressing climate and reducing carbon emissions, we need a big nuclear program. In fact, we need to triple
the number of reactors in the United States (currently 104) and probably quadruple or more the number across
the world (currently about 440), all by the year 2050. Doing that would take care of one of the infamous carbon
wedges, meaning that doing so would reduce carbon emissions by about 20 percent. Nuclear industry cant
even build that fast Add up the numbers, and one understands this type of nuclear construction program means a
new reactor coming online somewhere in the world every two weeks from now until 2050. Since there are no
new reactors coming on line in the next two weeks (or virtually any two weeks that you may read these words),
we are falling further and further behind even saving that 20 percent. And, if the nuclear industry were honest, it
would admit it cant possibly build that many new reactors. In fact, as of July 2007, as will be the case every
July for the foreseeable future, the nuclear industry is capable of building only 12 reactors per year worldwide,
because there is only one factory, in Japan, capable of building reactor pressure vessels. Thats a physical limit,
unless and until a new factoryat considerable cost and time to constructcan be built. So the reality is that
the nuclear industry cannot possibly do better than fall far short of even a modest carbon emissions reduction
goal, meaning that its contribution, under under best-case circumstances, becomes negligible at best.
Wed need 1,000 nuclear plants a year for a century to solve warming 100,000 plants!
Mother Jones, May-June 2008, p. 56
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change warns of global mayhem should we fail to cut our carbon
emissions in half by midcentury. For nuclear power to make a significant dent in the U.S. carbon footprint, the
Colorado-based Keystone Center for Science and Public Policy reported last year, we would have to build five
new 1,000 megawatt reactors every year for the next half-century.
70

Enough plants cant be built to solve climate change
While building enough nuclear power plants to minimize the economic impacts of CO2 caps may be desirable,
the reality is that the global industrial base could not support such a project in the U.S., much less the rest of the
world. Thus, the amount of nuclear power required to sustain the optimistic LiebermanWarner economic
projections is impossible to achieve within the timeframes that they would require. This is especially true as the
U.S. has yet to resolve many issues that continue to face the nuclear industry. Using such optimistic nuclear
projections to support an analysis with minimal economic consequences of S. 3036 is therefore completely
unrealistic.
71

Number of reactors inadequate to solve climate
Nuclear Energy Information Service, 2006, Nuclear Climate Fact Sheet,
http://www.nirs.org/factsheets/nukesclimatefact606.pdf
TOO MANY REACTORS; NOT ENOUGH CARBON REDUCTIONS Major studies (from MIT,
Commission on Energy Policy, and International Atomic Energy Agency, for example) agree that about 1,5002,000 large new atomic reactors would have to be built for nuclear power to make any meaningful dent in
greenhouse emissions. Operation of that many new reactors (currently about 440 exist worldwide) would cause
known uranium reserves to run out in just a few decades and force mining of lower-grade uranium, which itself
would lead to higher greenhouse emissions. If all of these reactors were used to replace coal plants, carbon
emissions would drop by about 20% worldwide. If used entirely as new capacity, in the place of sustainable
technologies like wind power, solar power, energy efficiency, etc., carbon emissions actually would increase.
Construction of 1,500 new reactors means opening a new reactor about once every two weeks, beginning today,
for the next 60 yearsan impossible schedule. The worlds nuclear reactor manufacturers currently are capable
of building about half that amount. Since reactors take 6-10 years to build (some U.S. reactors that began
operation in the 1990s took more than 20 years), we are already that long behind schedule and will fall farther
behind. Addressing the climate crisis cannot wait for nuclear power.
100 reactors reduce emissions 6-7%
Lisbeth Grunlond, Union of Concerned Scientists, December 2007, Nuclear Power in a Warming World,
http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/global_warming/Nuclear-Power-in-a-Warming-World.pdf
Today 104 reactors produce some 20 percent of U.S. electricity. If demand for
electricity in 2050 is roughly that of todaybecause energy conservation offsets
increases in demandanother 100 reactors would be required to produce an
additional 20 percent of U.S. electricity in 2050. Because electricity production
contributes roughly a third of U.S. global warming emissions today, those
additional 100 reactors would reduce emissions by 67 percent relative to today.
Recall that to avoid dangerous climate change, the United States and other
industrialized nations will need to reduce emissions at least 80 percent by
midcentury, compared with 2000 levels (which are comparable to todays levels).
Thus an additional 100 reactors would contribute roughly 8 percent of the total
required U.S. reduction (67 percent of the required 80 percent), under the
assumption that efficiency and conservation measures could offset any growth in
electricity demand. (Without additional conservation and efficiency measures,
U.S. electricity consumption is projected to almost double by 2050.)
72

Wed have to build 1,000 plants just to get to a 500 ppm target
Even if a society were ready to absorb the high costs of nuclear power, it hardly makes the most sense as a tool
to quickly combat climate change. These plants take too long to build. A 2004 analysis in Science by Stephen
Pacala and Robert Socolow, of Princeton University's Carbon Mitigation Initiative, estimates that achieving just
one-seventh of the carbon reductions necessary to stabilize atmospheric CO2 at 500 parts per billion would
require "building about 700 new 1,000-megawatt nuclear plants around the world." That represents a huge wave
of investment that few seem willing to undertake, and it would require decades to accomplish.
Even a doubling of nuclear power means less than a 5% reduction in CO2
Jim Green, Australian Energy Science Group, November 2006, Nuclear Power & Climate Change,
http://www.energyscience.org.au/FS03%20Nucl%20Power%20Clmt%20Chng.pdf
A limited response Nuclear power is used almost exclusively for electricity generation. (A very small number of
reactors are used for heat co-generation and desalination.) Electricity is responsible for less than one third of
global greenhouse gas emissions. According to the Uranium Institute, the figure is about 30%. That fact alone
puts pay to the simplistic view that nuclear power alone can solve climate change. According to a senior
energy analyst with the International Atomic Energy Agency, Alan McDonald: Saying that nuclear power can
solve global warming by itself is way over the top. Ian Hore-Lacy from the Uranium Information Centre (UIC)
claims that a doubling of nuclear power would reduce greenhouse emissions in the power sector by 25%.4 That
figure is reduced to a 7.5% reduction if considering the impact on overall emissions rather than just the power
sector. The figure needs to be further reduced because the UIC makes no allowance for the considerable time
that would be required to double nuclear output. Electricity generation is projected to increase over the coming
decades so the contribution of a fixed additional input of nuclear power has a relatively smaller impact. Overall,
it is highly unlikely that a doubling of global nuclear power would reduce emissions by more than 5%.
73
Nuclear Doesnt Solve Climate Ext: Cant Build Fast Enough

Pressure vessels for reactors cannot be produced that quickly
Therefore, expert analyses all agree that nuclear power would require an infeasible schedule, as new reactors
would have to come online every few weeks for the next fifty years to have even a modest impact on GHG
emissionsnew nuclear reactors cannot be built fast enough to address climate change. Indeed, outside of
Russia, whose capacity is perhaps one reactor per year, there currently is only a single forging factory
worldwide capable of producing reactor pressure vesselsand this Japanese factory can produce only 12
vessels per year at maximum capacity. To be able to build sufficient reactors to make a difference in emissions
would first require construction of large new forging factoriesan expensive and financially risky endeavor and
one that further delays the nuclear industrys physical ability to build reactors.
74
Nuclear Wont Solve Climate Change

1200 reactors needed to solve climate change
Michael Mariotte, executive director of the Nuclear Information and Resource Service, November 10, 2007,
Nuclear Power in Response To Climate Change,
http://www.cfr.org/publication/14718/nuclear_power_in_response_to_climate_change.html
Environmental advocates considering reconsidering nuclear power in light of climate change are too late. The
accelerating pace of the climate crisis and the dawning realization that we no longer have the luxury of a
few decades to address the crisis already have made nuclear power an irrelevant technology in terms of
climate. Even if the nuclear industry had solved the safety, radioactive waste, proliferation, cost, and other
issues that ended its first generationand it hasnt solved any of those problemsit wouldnt matter.
What nuclear power can offer for climate is simply too little, too late . The major studies that have looked at
the issueMIT, the National Commission on Energy Policy, etc.generally agree that for nuclear to make a
meaningful contribution to carbon emissions reduction would require reactor construction on a massive
scale: 1,200 to 2,000 new reactors worldwide, 200 to 400 in the United States alone. And that would have to
be done over the next f40 to 50 years.
Even with federal support, plants couldnt be built fast enough to solve climate change
Dr. Charles Ferguson, physicist, April 2007, Fellow for Science & Technology, Council on Foreign
Relations, Nuclear Energy: Balancing Risks and Benefits,
http://www.cfr.org/publication/13104/nuclear_energy.html (He is also a assistant professor in the School of
Foreign Service at Georgetown University and an adjunct lecturer at the Johns Hopkins University, s scientistin-residence at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies of the Monterey Institute of International Studies)
Nuclear Energy: Balancing Benefits and Risks is a sobering and authoritative look at nuclear power. Dr.
Ferguson argues that nuclear energy, despite its attributes, is unlikely to play a major role in the coming
decades in strengthening energy security or in countering the harmful effects of climate change. In
particular, the rapid rate of nuclear reactor expansion required to make even a modest reduction in
global warming would drive up construction costs and create shortages in building materials, trained
personnel, and safety controls.
75

Expanding fast enough to solve climate change would compromise safety
This conventional wisdom possesses some truth, but it oversells the contribution nuclear energy can make
to reduce global warming and strengthen energy security while downplaying the dangers associated with
this energy source. To realistically address global warming, the nuclear industry would have to expand at
such a rapid rate as to pose serious concerns for how the industry would ensure an adequate supply of
reasonably inexpensive reactor-grade construction materials, well-trained technicians, and rigorous safety
and security measures.
China and India swamp the benefits of nuclear development
Dr. Charles Ferguson, physicist, Fellow for Science & Technology, Council on Foreign Relations,
Washington Post, April 30, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/04/27/AR2007042701463.html , also a assistant professor in the School of Foreign
Service at Georgetown University and an adjunct lecturer at the Johns Hopkins University, s scientist-inresidence at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies of the Monterey Institute of International Studies)
But even the proper greenhouse gas price would not allow nuclear energy primarily to pull humanity's feet from
the global fire. Nuclear energy would probably show some growth but not on the scale needed to displace
hundreds of coal-fired plants throughout the world. In the coming years, China, India, and the United States plan
to build more than 800 coal-fired plants. If these plants do not capture greenhouse gases, they would swamp by
more than five times the greenhouse gas savings from the Kyoto Protocol.
Reactors built now wont be finished in time to meet Kyoto targets
Sharon Squassoni, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 2007, Risks and Realities: The New
Nuclear Reality, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_05/squassoni.asp
Moreover, much of that electricity growth will occur in the developing world, specifically in China and India.
Because China and India are not bound to Kyoto Protocol reductions, their decisions on electricity production
may be influenced by other factors, including cost and, in the case of India, a decision by the Nuclear Suppliers
Group to allow nuclear cooperation with a non-NPT state. Significant nuclear expansion will likely occur only
after the time frame of the Kyoto Protocol because new nuclear power reactors will require 10-15 years to
become operational following a decision to build. It is likely to take even longer in "new" nuclear technology
states without existing infrastructure, including a system for regulating nuclear safety. Under the most optimistic
scenario (five years to build), reactors under construction now will not make a significant difference in the time
frame of the Kyoto Protocol.
76

Nuclear cant replace oil, and oil is responsible for 25% of climate change
There is little doubt that nuclear energy will remain an important part of the global energy mix, but it is not the
panacea that many advocates are selling. To begin with, a nuclear renaissance will take too long to have more
than a negligible impact on carbon dioxide emissions that threaten significant climate change in the next decade.
Further, the petroleum-dominated transportation sector, which accounts for 25 percent of world carbon dioxide
emissions, offers few footholds now for nuclear energy substitution. (By contrast, oil only accounted for 5
percent of the global electricity mix in 2001.) In the distant future, perhaps nuclear energy may help offset
transportation emissions through the production of hydrogen.
Nuclear power expansion wont solve climate change
Karl S. Coplan , Associate Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law., Fordham Environmental Law Review, 2006, p. 246-8
In addition to the long-term environmental and economic externalities implicated by the by-products of nuclear power
generation, practical constraints all but preclude reliance on nuclear power as a significant means of reducing greenhouse
gas emissions in the timeframe necessary to mitigate the global climate change impacts of carbon-based energy production.
First, the process of designing, siting, approving, and constructing nuclear power plants takes too long to permit expansion
of nuclear power on the scale that would be necessary. n115 According to the Nuclear Information and Resource Service, up
to 1,000 new reactors would be needed in the United States alone to replace existing reactors that are reaching the end of
their useful life and expand nuclear power generation to the level necessary to meet the Phase I greenhouse gas reductions
contemplated by the Kyoto accords. n116 Given that no new nuclear plants have been built in the United States in the last
twenty years, it is unrealistic to expect that anywhere close to the necessary expansion in nuclear energy generation could
be achieved by the Kyoto accord's 2012 Phase I deadline. n117 Even if the plants could be built in time, there is not enough
nuclear fuel economically available to run them all. According to the Department of Energy, at current rates of
consumption, demand will exceed the readily available supplies and stockpiles of uranium fuel by the year 2014. According
to the Nuclear Information and Resource Service, if nuclear energy generation were expanded as necessary to meet the
Phase I reductions of the Kyoto accords, the existing fuel supply would be exhausted within three to four years. Nuclear
energy would be sustainable only if fuel reprocessing could be perfected to the point where it is economical and safe from
proliferation risks. Nuclear energy advocates foresee a "closed fuel [ cycle" where spent nuclear fuel is reprocessed into
new nuclear fuel, while the extremely poisonous radionuclides and weapons-grade plutonium are magically transmuted into
harmless elements. This particular form of alchemy remains just over the horizon for the nuclear industry, as it has
throughout most of the history of nuclear energy generation. Given these impracticalities of large scale expansion of nuclear
generation capacity, one might ask where the harm lies in increased nuclear generation to the extent possible, in at least
partial mitigation of greenhouse gas impacts. If worldwide nuclear generation capacity is ultimately limited by the
accessible uranium supply, then, one could argue, the impacts of nuclear power will be self-limiting. Unfortunately,
however, resources diverted into nuclear energy development are taken away from other energy technologies more likely to
prove sustainable in the long term. A widespread international commitment to nuclear energy as a substantial means of
reducing greenhouse gas emissions will increase international pressure to engage in high proliferation risk activities such as
plutonium-generating "breeder reactors." And even the short-term use of nuclear power production continues to pile up
spent fuel waste at insecure sites throughout the world, where it will be vulnerable to climate change impacts as well as the
global social unrest that will likely accompany such impacts.
77
Nuclear Wont Solve Climate Change -- More

Nuclear power would have a small impact on climate at-best
Nuclear power may not even be an essential part of the solution to global warming. A widely noted paper
(PDF, 1 MB) by Princeton professors Stephen Pacala and Robert Socolow introduces the useful concept of
a "wedge," defined as any measure that would lead to a global reduction of 25 billion tons of carbon
dioxide emissions relative to business-as-usual over the next 50 years. Under optimistic assumptions, some
seven wedges are needed to avoid dangerous climate change; this number could increase significantly under
less optimistic assumptions. The study provides a list of 15 measures involving technologies that exist today and
could be scaled up to become one or more wedges. Energy efficiency comprises three wedges, alternatives to
business-as-usual transportation account for another four, and increasing natural sinks provides two wedges.
Generating electricity in less carbon intensive ways contributes four wedges. Of the latter, a worldwide tripling
of nuclear power would contribute one wedge at most, and that's if the new plants replace only coal and old
nuclear units.
1,000+ new reactors would be needed to solve climate change
World Information Service on Energy, 2005, Nuclear Power: No Solution to Climate Change,
http://www.nirs.org/mononline/nukesclimatechangereport.pdf
However, in various stages of the nuclear process huge amounts of energy are needed, much more than for
less complex forms of electricity production. Most of this energy comes in the form of fossil fuels, and
therefore nuclear power indirectly emits a relatively high amount of greenhouse gases. Emissions from the
nuclear industry are strongly dependent on the percentage of uranium in the ores used to fuel the nuclear
process, which is expected to decrease dramatically. Recent studies estimate that nuclear power production
causes the emission of just 3 times fewer greenhouse gases than modern natural gas power stations. To
reduce the emissions of the public energy sector according to the targets of the Kyoto Protocol, 72 new
medium sized nuclear plants would be required in the 15 current European nations. These would have to
be built before the end of the first commitment period: 2008-2012. Leaving aside the huge costs this would
involve, it is unlikely that it is technically feasible to build so many new plants in such a short time, given that
only 15 new reactors have been built in the last 20 years. In the U.S, as many as 1,000 new reactors would be
required-- none have been successfully ordered since 1973.
78
Nuclear Wont Solve Climate Change -- More

Nuclear will not eliminate anthropogenic warming
The myth that nuclear power provides a solution to climate change is based on the assumption that the
generation of electricity by nuclear fission does not lead to greenhouse gas emissions. However, even if this
were the case, switching the entire world's electricity production to nuclear would still not solve the
problem. This is because the production of electricity is only one of many human activities that release
greenhouse gases. Others include transport and heating, agriculture, the production of cement and
deforestation. The CO2 released worldwide through electricity production accounts for 9% of total
annual human greenhouse gas emissions (UIC, 2001b).
2,000 new reactors would be needed to substantially slow climate change
Makhijani (2002) estimates that, in order to produce a noticeable reduction in global CO2 emissions, it would
be necessary to build 2000 large new nuclear reactors of 1000 MW each. The U.S. National Commission
on Energy estimates that U.S. reactors would have to double or triple over the next 30-50 years. This
means about 300-400 new reactors, including those to replace reactors which will be retiring during that
period (National Commission on Energy, 2004).
Electricity is a small portion of the climate problem
Electricity generation accounts for just 9% of total human greenhouse gas emissions, and only electricity
production is possible with nuclear energy. For a solution to the climate problem, as research shows over and
over, we should look at the demand side of energy. Less energy should be wasted and sustainable sources should
be developed.
79
Building 1500+ Reactors Links Prolif & Accidents

Building 1500 reactors requires using plutonium in the fuel supply
Operation of 1,500 or more new reactors would require a dozen or more new uranium enrichment plants,
and would result in the production of thousands of tons of plutonium (each reactor produces about 500
pounds of plutonium per year), posing untenable nuclear proliferation threats.
Large scale nuclear expansion massively increases accident and proliferation risks
Nuclear power has significant and inherent risks that we must take into
account when addressing global warming. These risks include a large
release of radiation from a power plant accident or terrorist attack, and
the death of tens of thousands or more from the detonation of a nuclear
weapon made with material obtained from a civilian nuclear power
system. (This report will not consider the risks of dirty bombs, in which a
conventional explosive is used to spread radiological material.) Unless
fundamental changes are made in the way nuclear power is operated and
controlled, a largescale expansion of nuclear power in the United States
or worldwidewould almost certainly increase these risks.
80
Gas Shortages Advantage Answers

Nuclear is not an economical way to displace natural gas

Nuclears potential to displace natural gas is more complex, and of much interest in
Europe after recent signs that Russia can be an unreliable supplier using gas exports for
political leverage. Nuclear power is a slow and very costly way to displace gasfired electricity, and has less domestic content and lower reliability than a
diversified and integrated portfolio of renewable and efficiency resources. For
the main uses of gasheating buildings, water, and industrial processes, and
as a petrochemical feedstocknuclear electricity is unsuitable technically or
economically or both.
81
Medical Isotopes Advantage Answers

DOE regulations prohibit the development of nuclear medicine isotopes plan doesnt change
Tri City Herald, June 12, 2008, http://www.tri-cityherald.com/901/story/203876.html
Department of Energy plans to dispose of uranium 233 could rob the nation of an important source of
isotopes for medical and scientific research, according to a report by the DOE Office of Inspector General. "Should the department elect to proceed as planned, it
may dispose of a national resource that is irreplaceable," the report said. "The potential for isotopes produced from uranium 233 to help save the lives of thousands of American cancer patients is widely
accepted." DOE has uranium 233 at the Idaho National Laboratory and the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Tennessee that can be used to produce actinium 225 and bismuth 213 by first producing thorium
229. "Both actinium and bismuth are extremely rare isotopes that are now being used in clinical trials and cancer research at organizations such as the Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center in New
York," the report said. "Early research results have been promising, showing improved cancer survivability rates." The materials also could have applications in developing proliferation-resistant nuclear
. However,
Congress has directed DOE to end the practice of extracting thorium 229 from uranium 233, which allows
the production of actinium and bismuth. DOE plans to begin preparing the Tennessee inventory for disposal in
2012. In addition, DOE began shipping the Idaho inventory of uranium 233 to the Nevada Test Site for disposal
as waste in January, according to the report. "Once the planned disposal of uranium 233 is complete, the
department will not have the means to increase isotope production to meet the dramatic projections of future
needs for actinium and bismuth," the report said.
power reactor fuel cycles and as an alternative to plutonium 238 for powering flights deep into space, the report said. Uranium 233 also is used in a national nuclear security program
Counterplan - -the U.S. should develop a single reactor capable of producing isotopes for nuclear
medicine 1 reactor is all that is needed, and they have no evidence that the reactors they
incentivize the development of will have any ability to produce medical isotopes
New York Times, December 6, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/06/business/worldbusiness/06reactor.html?
ex=1354597200&en=d3539eba0e00c330&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss
Medical treatments are being delayed or deferred at hospitals worldwide because of the extended
shutdown of a Canadian reactor. The reactor, the Atomic Energy of Canada reactor at Chalk River,
Ontario, near Ottawa, is North Americas only source of the base isotope for technetium-99, a
workhorse of modern medical diagnostic systems. It is injected into patients 20 million times a year in
the United States to create images used in the diagnosis and treatment of a wide variety of illnesses
including heart ailments, cancers and gallbladder problems. The reactor closed on Nov. 18 for
maintenance. It was scheduled to open five days later but remained closed to complete the installation
of safety-related equipment, the company said. On Wednesday, Atomic Energys wholesaler, MDS
Nordion, said it did not expect full production to resume until mid-January. Because the isotopes
created by the reactor decay rapidly, they cannot be stockpiled, which is leading to growing shortages
of the material at medical centers. Adding to the problem is the fact that the Atomic Energy reactor
produces 50 to 80 percent of the worlds supply of molybdenum-99, the isotope that breaks down into
technetium-99. The shortfall has renewed decades-old calls for the United States to develop its
own medical isotope reactors rather than continuing to rely on imported products from a limited
number of producers. This is a bad news story in every sense of the word, said Dr. Alexander J. B. McEwan, the president of the Society of Nuclear Medicine, which is based in
Reston, Va. It means patients are going to suffer. People are going to look at this and say, Why are we so reliant on a single supplier? Dr. Henry D. Royal, a professor of radiology at Washington
University in St. Louis, added: The fundamental problem is that the supply of radiopharmaceuticals is very fragile because we rely on foreign imports, which we have no control over. Several years ago,
government-owned Atomic Energy sold its wholesale distribution and sales business to MDS Nordion, an Ottawa-based company that is owned by MDS, the large Canadian medical services company. (In a
statement, MDS Nordion said that the reactor problem would reduce its quarterly earnings by $8 million to $9 million.) Technetium-99 has a shelf life of six hours, making it impractical to ship over any
distance. In the United States, hospitals usually buy specialized containers of molybdenum-99 known as generators. Those devices, which are mostly sold by Bristol-Myers Squibb and Mallinckrodt, a unit of
Covidien, use a chemical process to separate the technetium-99 just before it is needed for patient tests. Like disposable flashlight batteries, however, the generators eventually run down. The Atomic Energy
reactor shutdown has left some hospitals unable to find replacements.
82
Competitiveness Advantage Answers

Turn There is no nuclear knowledge in the U.S. new plants would have to be imported!
AMY GOODMAN: And yet, well, the media clearly in this country doesnt get it, because it is raised over and
over again by the candidates. I mean, it seems that Senator McCain has a favorite number: a hundred years in
Iraq, also hoping for a hundred more new nuclear power plants. He had said something about, he doesnt want
to lose the knowledge of building, since the last one was built more than thirty years a go; the people are
dying who had built it, so weve got to rush and build them now. AMORY LOVINS: Well, you could say thats
already been lost, in the sense that most of a nuclear plant built now in the US, if there were any, would
have to be imported, which, by the way, means we buy it in weak US dollars, which is part of the incredible
cost escalation weve seen.
Turn nuclear tech bought from foreign subsidiaries
Virginia Business, July 1, 2008, http://www.virginiabusiness.com/index.php/news/article/a-nuclearrenaissance/1091
By 2030, Areva expects to participate in the building of nearly 30 new nuclear plants in the U.S., says
Andrew Cook, the companys senior vice president of sales and marketing. This expansion will provide much
of the space we need to accommodate our growth, the companys CEO, Thomas Christopher, said in a
statement. Areva NP is the North American subsidiary of the Paris-based Areva Group, a leader in the
design and construction of nuclear power plants. The company expects to play a leading role in the nuclear
renaissance with its EPR (Evolutionary Pressurized Reactor) which was submitted to the federal Nuclear
Regulatory Commission for design review late last year.
No uniqueness -- Germany opposes new nuclear development
Energy Biz Journal, July 23, 2008, http://www.energycentral.com/centers/energybiz/ebi_detail.cfm?id=539
Germany is the only industrialized in the G8 to oppose more nuclear development. It says that too many
obstacles stand in the way of future development and the fuel source can therefore do little in the near term to
ease greenhouse gas emissions. In fact, the current national government there plans to phase out its nuclear
plants by 2020.
83
Competitiveness Advantage Answers

U.S. lacks an adequate nuclear workforce to expand
Paul W. Benson, leads the global power, utilities and infrastructure practice of Heidrick & Struggles. He
can be reached at pbenson@heidrick.com. Fred Adair is a partner in the leadership consulting practice of
Heidrick & Struggles, July 2008, Public Utilities Fortnightly, p. 46
On the other hand, just as the industry prepares to expand dramatically over the next decade, it faces a
yawning talent gap. A 2005 study by the Nuclear Energy Institute found that half of the industry's
employees are over 47 years old, and more than a quarter of nuclear workers already are eligible to stop
working. Meanwhile, as the baby boomers retire, there will be far fewer available replacements with
nuclear knowledge.
84
Competitiveness Advantage Answers Ext: Import From Abroad

The U.S. nuclear industry will import from abroad when necessary
Paul W. Benson, leads the global power, utilities and infrastructure practice of Heidrick & Struggles. He
can be reached at pbenson@heidrick.com. Fred Adair is a partner in the leadership consulting practice of
Heidrick & Struggles, July 2008, Public Utilities Fortnightly, p. 46
U.S. utilities might go abroad to find seasoned leadership in countries that have extensive experience with
nuclear power. The European Union has a total of 147 reactors in operation. Among the EU countries, 59 of
those reactors are in France, which relies on nuclear power for 80 percent of its energy. Twenty-three reactors
are in operation in the United Kingdom, and 18 in Germany. Outside the European Union, significant experience
is found in Japan with 55 units, Russia with 31, South Korea with 20, Canada with 18, and India with 16.
No materials or contractors to build reactors with

The industry has deftly shifted from describing the project as plain proof of the superiority of advanced reactors to a normal
case of the unique challenges of building first-of-a-kind plants. But even competitors are palpably anxious that If the
nuclear industry doesnt deliver this time, there wont be a third time, and that Olkiluoto-3 is already contradicting rosy
forecasts and starting to be seen as evidence that the nuclear industry cannot deliver on even one new plant.42 The
construction challenges driving cost escalation are most formidable in the United States, currently the world leader in
nuclear-revival rhetoric. U.S. nuclear manufacturing went from ~400 suppliers and 900 certifications in the 1980s to fewer
than 80 and 200 today (though partly due to consolidation).43 The atrophy is so advanced that some major components are
available and subcontractors are scarce.45 A U.S. utility executive recently remarked that he couldnt recall any imported
components in a nuclear project he ran in the 1980s, while Now 80%is going to have to come from offshore.46 Such
imports dont just challenge safety inspectors (akin to recent issues with some imported drugs); they also help to explain
especially rapid U.S. reactor cost escalation. That 80% estimate, of course, was neither rigorous nor an estimate of a
fraction of total project cost. Yet in the five years through April 2008, the U.S. dollar declined by 27% against the Euro and
by 12% against the yen. Had the dollar held its value as well as the Euro, the price of oil would have been under $70/bbl
rather than $119/bbl.47 The cost of reactor components imported by the United Statesbut not by French/German builders
in Finlandreflects the weak dollar. Nuclear workers are becoming scarce too. Forty percent of those at U.S. plants are
eligible for retirement within the next five years, and only 8% are younger than 32. Two-fifths of Frances reactor operation
and maintenance staff will retire by 2015, and few of the new hires are trained nuclear experts. Meanwhile, nuclear
education is dwindling. Since 1980, U.S. nuclear engineering university programs have declined from 65 to ~29 and have
trouble attracting talented students; the Nuclear Energy Institute says the U.S. now has 1,900 undergraduates and 1,100
graduate students in nuclear engineering programs, but this remains far smaller than needs to offset retirements and staff
proposed growth. In 2002, the UK had no undergraduate course in nuclear engineering.48 The number of German academic
institutions with nuclear courses is expected to drop from 22 in 2000 to 10 in 2005 to 5 in 2010; 46 nuclear diplomas were
granted in 1993, zero in 1998, and only two in the five years ended in 2002.49 As experienced nuclear experts retire, safely
running old plants will be hard enough without staffing new ones. What the World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2007
calls rapid loss of [construction and operating] competence and lack of manufacturing infrastructure isnt the only big
obstacle: The nuclear industry and utilities face challenges in a radically changed industrial environment. Today the sector
has to deal with waste management and decommissioning expenses that far outweigh estimates of the past, it has to
compete with a largely modernized gas and coal sector and with new competitors in the new and renewable energy sector.
85
Competitiveness Advantage Answers Ext: No Competition

Frances nuclear exports collapsing

But McCain may not want to follow the French example too closely. While France's existing 59 atomic
plants are relatively trouble-free, its largest nuclear company, Areva, has run into difficulties building
next-generation reactors in France and Finland. The Finnish project is two years behind schedule and
more than $1.5 billion over budget, while construction of the other plant, in Normandy, was
temporarily halted in late May because of quality concerns. And while France has the world's biggest
fuel-reprocessing program, it still hasn't found a permanent home for a growing pile of highly
radioactive waste that's left over. The waste sits in heavily guarded storage at Areva's La Hague
reprocessing plant.
No significant nuclear development in Germany
Canadian Geographic, June 2008, p. 15
Germany is no shining example of green power, solar or otherwise. More than 60 percent of Germany's
electricity comes from polluting fossil-fuel power plants, mostly coal-fired. Around 30 percent comes from
nuclear power, with most of the balance from wind. However, the German government plans to shut down the
nuclear plants by 2022, which means even more pollution as coal replaces nuclear. Berlin has already asked the
European Union (EU) to allow for the phase-out of nuclear energy when the EU is allocating carbon dioxide
permits to member states as part of its plan to reduce the region's emissions. Obviously, the German government
does not have much faith in its renewables
86
Competitiveness Advantage Answers Ext: Purchased from Abroad

Turn Reactor vessels have to be purchased from Japan
Worldwide forging capacity for pressure vessels, steam generators, and pressurizers is limited to
two qualified companies - Japan Steel Works and Creusot Forge and the reactors builders will be
competing with each other as well as with simultaneous demand for new refinery equipment. Japan
Steel Works prices have increased by 12% in 6 months, with a new 30% down payment requirement.
87
Pollution Advantage Answers

Nuclear emits many dangerous pollutants
Dr. Helen Caldicott, 2005, The Australian, April 15, http://www.commondreams.org/views05/0415-23.htm
In the US, where much of the world's uranium is enriched, including Australia's, the enrichment facility at
Paducah, Kentucky, requires the electrical output of two 1000-megawatt coal-fired plants, which emit large
quantities of carbon dioxide, the gas responsible for 50per cent of global warming. Also, this enrichment
facility and another at Portsmouth, Ohio, release from leaky pipes 93per cent of the chlorofluorocarbon
gas emitted yearly in the US. The production and release of CFC gas is now banned internationally by the
Montreal Protocol because it is the main culprit responsible for stratospheric ozone depletion. But CFC is also a
global warmer, 10,000 to 20,000 times more potent than carbon dioxide. In fact, the nuclear fuel cycle utilises
large quantities of fossil fuel at all of its stages - the mining and milling of uranium, the construction of
the nuclear reactor and cooling towers, robotic decommissioning of the intensely radioactive reactor at
the end of its 20 to 40-year operating lifetime, and transportation and long-term storage of massive
quantities of radioactive waste.
In summary, nuclear power produces, according to a 2004 study by Jan Willem Storm van Leeuwen and Philip
Smith, only three times fewer greenhouse gases than modern natural-gas power stations. Contrary to the nuclear
industry's propaganda, nuclear power is therefore not green and it is certainly not clean. Nuclear reactors
consistently release millions of curies of radioactive isotopes into the air and water each year. These
releases are unregulated because the nuclear industry considers these particular radioactive elements to be
biologically inconsequential. This is not so. These unregulated isotopes include the noble gases krypton,
xenon and argon, which are fat-soluble and if inhaled by persons living near a nuclear reactor, are
absorbed through the lungs, migrating to the fatty tissues of the body, including the abdominal fat pad
and upper thighs, near the reproductive organs. These radioactive elements, which emit high-energy gamma radiation, can mutate the genes in the eggs and
sperm and cause genetic disease. Tritium, another biologically significant gas, is also routinely emitted from nuclear reactors. Tritium is composed of three atoms of hydrogen, which combine with oxygen,
. The dire subject of

massive quantities of radioactive waste accruing at the 442 nuclear reactors across the world is also
rarely, if ever, addressed by the nuclear industry. Each typical 1000-megawatt nuclear reactor
manufactures 33tonnes of thermally hot, intensely radioactive waste per year. Already more than 80,000 tonnes of highly
forming radioactive water, which is absorbed through the skin, lungs and digestive system. It is incorporated into the DNA molecule, where it is mutagenic
radioactive waste sits in cooling pools next to the 103 US nuclear power plants, awaiting transportation to a storage facility yet to be found. This dangerous material will be an attractive target for terrorist
sabotage as it travels through 39 states on roads and railway lines for the next 25 years. But the long-term storage of radioactive waste continues to pose a problem. The US Congress in 1987 chose Yucca
Mountain in Nevada, 150km northwest of Las Vegas, as a repository for America's high-level waste. But Yucca Mountain has subsequently been found to be unsuitable for the long-term storage of high-level
waste because it is a volcanic mountain made of permeable pumice stone and it is transected by 32 earthquake faults. Last week a congressional committee discovered fabricated data about water infiltration
and cask corrosion in Yucca Mountain that had been produced by personnel in the US Geological Survey. These startling revelations, according to most experts, have almost disqualified Yucca Mountain as a
waste repository, meaning that the US now has nowhere to deposit its expanding nuclear waste inventory. To make matters worse, a study released last week by the National Academy of Sciences shows that
the cooling pools at nuclear reactors, which store 10 to 30 times more radioactive material than that contained in the reactor core, are subject to catastrophic attacks by terrorists, which could unleash an
inferno and release massive quantities of deadly radiation -- significantly worse than the radiation released by Chernobyl, according to some scientists. This vulnerable high-level nuclear waste contained in
the cooling pools at 103 nuclear power plants in the US includes hundreds of radioactive elements that have different biological impacts in the human body, the most important being cancer and genetic
. It is important to note that children, old people and

immuno-compromised individuals are many times more sensitive to the malignant effects of radiation
than other people. I will describe four of the most dangerous elements made in nuclear power plants. Iodine 131, which was released at the nuclear accidents at Sellafield in Britain,
diseases. The incubation time for cancer is five to 50 years following exposure to radiation
Chernobyl in Ukraine and Three Mile Island in the US, is radioactive for only six weeks and it bio-concentrates in leafy vegetables and milk. When it enters the human body via the gut and the lung, it
In Belarus more than 2000 children have had their thyroids

removed for thyroid cancer, a situation never before recorded in pediatric literature.
migrates to the thyroid gland in the neck, where it can later induce thyroid cancer.
88
Pollution Advantage Answers

Uranium mining causes massive contamination
Nuclear mining causes genetic deformities
Dr. Helen Haldicott, Medical Implications of Nuclear Power, no date, http://www.sustainablecity.org/articles/nuclear.htm
Uranium is the fuel for atomic reactors. When it is mined from the ground it emits a radioactive gas
called radon which is often inhaled into the lungs of miners where it converts after four days to lead 210
which remains radioactive for more than 100 years. Radiation in the body is carcinogenic (cancer-causing).
It has been discovered in the U.S. that up to 20% of uranium miners die of lung cancer over a twelve to forty
year period of mining. Radium can also be swallowed in the dust, absorbed through the bowel v/all, and laid
down in the bone, where later it can induce bone cancer or leukemia. Gamma radiation (like X rays) is emitted
continuously from the uranium ore. Thus the bodies of uranium miners are exposed, including. Their testicles.
Radiation damage to chromosomes or genes in the sperm can induce congenital deformities or genetic disease in
the next or future generations. It could also cause cancer of the testicle.
Milling contaminates food supplies
After the uranium is mined it is then milled and refined. Thousands of tons of waste (called tailings) are
discarded and left lying in huge heaps on the ground. The tailings generated in the U.S.A. over the next 24
years may produce 45 cases of lung cancer in the world per year for tens of thousands of years. The
causative agent is again the gas radon which is continually emitted from the waste uranium in the tailings.
Tailings also contain radium which is very soluble in water, and in this form is readily concentrated in
plants, animals, fish, and eventually at highest levels, in human beings, if they eat the contaminated food.
Workers at the milling plant will be exposed as well to gamma radiation as described above.
Reprocessing causes cancer
Eventually it is hoped these rods will be transported in caskets to a reprocessing plant where they will be
dissolved in nitric acid. Spent fuel rods from military reactors in England, U.S., U.S.S.R., and elsewhere are
continually reprocessed for retrieval of plutonium.
During reprocessing, the plutonium is removed from the solution and purified in powdered form as plutonium
dioxide. It is used as either fuel for atomic bombs or fuel for breeder nuclear reactors (reactors which breed
plutonium). It is at this point in the fuel cycle that the greatest dangers arise once the plutonium is separated.
Plutonium is an extremely potent cancer producing material, appropriately named after Pluto, the God of
Hell. It enters the body by inhalation of contaminated air, where it is deposited in the lungs. Because of its
potent cancer producing properties the acceptable body dose has been set at less than 1 millionth of a gram (an
invisible particle).
89
Nuclear Power Increases Nuclear Proliferation

Linear more plants means more terror and more prolif
Pursuing nuclear power also perpetuates the myth that increasing atomic energy, and thus increasing uranium
enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing, will increase neither terrorism nor proliferation of nuclear weapons. This
myth has been rejected by both the International Atomic Energy Agency and the U.S. Office of Technology
Assessment. More nuclear plants means more weapons materials, which means more targets, which means a
higher risk of terrorism and proliferation.
Civilian power expansion increases the risk of nuclear fuel cycle materials being used for weapons
Nuclear energy actually increases the risks of weapons proliferation because the same technology used for
civilian atomic power can be used for weapons, as the cases of India, Iran, Iraq, North Korea and Pakistan
illustrate. As the Swedish Nobel Prize winner Hannes Alven put it, The military atom and the civilian atom are
Siamese twins. Yet if the world stopped building nuclear-power plants, bomb ingredients would be harder to
acquire, more conspicuous and more costly politically, if nations were caught trying to obtain them. Their
motives for seeking nuclear materials would be unmasked as military, not civilian.
Turn Nuclear development undermines global non-proliferation credibility

Edward Fadeley of Creswell is ex-president of the Oregon Senate and a former state Supreme Court justice,
Register Guard, July 14, 2008, http://www.registerguard.com/csp/cms/sites/dt.cms.support.viewStory.cls?
cid=123987&sid=5&fid=1
There is also the glaring inconsistency: The United States says Iran should stop enriching radioactive uranium,
which Iran insists is for a nuclear power program. This country also applauds, as do I, the apparent destruction
of a nuclear cooling tower by North Korea. But at the same time, one faction of American leadership says we
should build 45 more nuclear power plants. No wonder our credibility suffers.
90

Large increases in plutonium increase proliferation risks
Scott Shackelford, Indiana University-Bloomington, 2006, Issues in Political Economy, Nuclear

Power: The Nucleus of Energy Independence?, http://org.elon.edu/ipe/shackleford.pdf
This new material is then used to power a different type of reactor, thus creating a full-loop and
eliminating the need to store nuclear waste. Of course, when commercial nuclear power plants are
engineering large amounts of plutonium, there are nuclear weapon proliferation concerns that arise.
Let us not forget that plutonium is the chief ingredient for basic nuclear weapons, and thus countries
involved in making it in mass quantities could intentionally or inadvertently lead to the spread of this
technology, said Brabsen (Brabsen, 2005). Perhaps the greatest worry circulating in national defense
departments and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Brussels is the development of
nuclear weapons on the back of civilian energy programs.
Expanding nuclear power expands proliferation risks
There is an inextricable link between nuclear power and nuclear weapons. The technology for producing nuclear
fuel is the same technology used to produce nuclear weapons materials. Proliferation-resistant technologies
provide some barriers to proliferation, but there is no proliferation-free nuclear technology. Reprocessing and
enrichment activities cannot be safeguarded and international treaty obligations are clearly not enforceable. The
associated dangers cannot be overstated. In fact, a high level panel of international experts convened by the
United Nations Secretary General, identified nuclear proliferation as the number one threat to the international
community, warning of a real danger that we could see a cascade of nuclear proliferation in the near future. 214
The panel recommended the implementation of firm and urgent measures to reduce the risk of a nuclear attack,
whether by State or non-State actors, and recommended States to forego the development of domestic uranium
enrichment and reprocessing facilities.215 Likewise, former Vice-President Al Gore has also expressed his
concerns regarding proliferation risks associated with civilian programs: For eight years in the White House,
every weapons-proliferation problem we dealt with was connected to a civilian reactor program. And if we ever
got to the point where we wanted to use nuclear reactors to back out a lot of coal which is the real issue: coal
then wed have to put them in so many places wed run that proliferation risk right off the reasonability
scale. Reactor-grade plutonium is weapons-usable Plutonium exists only in trace amounts in nature and it is
generated as a by-product of nuclear reactor operations as part of the spent fuel mix. Under normal operating
conditions, reactors produce low concentrations of plutonium-239, the isotope most useful for nuclear weapons.
However, even if reactorgrade plutonium is not the most convenient isotope to effectively build a nuclear bomb,
it can nevertheless be used to make weapons. According to the DOE, Virtually any combination of plutonium
isotopes can be used to make a nuclear weapon. [] In short, reactor-grade plutonium is weapons-usable,
whether by unsophisticated proliferators or by advanced nuclear weapon states.
91

Building thousands of new plants substantially increases proliferation risks
The planned nuclear renaissance raises serious proliferation concerns in an age of terrorism. If 2,000 new
nuclear power plants were built over the next several decades, the stockpiles of commercial plutonium would
increase to some 20,000 metric tons by 2050, presenting uncalculated proliferation risks. 221 Moreover, the Bush
Administration plans to start developing a major international nuclear initiative, the Global Nuclear Energy
Partnership (GNEP), which involves the reprocessing of the spent fuel from nuclear reactors and thus the
separation of plutonium from other nuclear waste contained in the spent fuel mix. These plans should be
regarded with extreme skepticism as they fly in the face of the conventional wisdom, as stated by the British
Royal Society, that the chance that the stocks of [civil] plutonium might, at some stage, be accessed for illicit
weapons production is of extreme concern.222 Likewise, the IPFM, in its recently released report,
acknowledged that the growing global stockpile of civilian plutonium separated from power reactor spent fuel is
a worsening problem because of the Bush Administrations endorsement of reprocessing as part of the GNEP
program, ending 30 years of US opposition to reprocessing because of proliferation concerns. Plutonium
availability increases proliferation risks There are two main proliferation concerns regarding reprocessing and
the separation of plutonium. On one hand, reprocessing increases the risk of plutonium being stolen by nonState agents and used for terrorism. On the other hand, States with access to reprocessing technology can use the
separated plutonium to develop nuclear weapons in very short time periods. Nuclear power wont reduce oil
consumption Increasing the share of nuclear power in the US energy mix would do nothing to reduce our
nations dependency on foreign sources of oil. The US is importing more oil each yearmost of it from the
worlds most unstable regionsincreasing the countrys economical and political vulnerability and making oil
dependency among the largest threats to our economy and national security. In 2005, the US spent some $250
billion in oil imports, which is about $20 billion per month or $25 million per hour.226 The US imports almost 60
percent of the 20 million barrels of oil it consumes daily, and these numbers are projected to go up to 70 percent
by 2025.227 Moreover, with only five percent of the worlds population, and two percent of the worlds oil
reserves, the US consumes about 25 percent of global oil production. 228 As staggering as these numbers may be,
they would not be affected by an expanded reliance on nuclear power because only some three percent of the
electricity produced in the US is from petroleum. 229 As noted by Former NRC Commissioner Peter Bradford,
Nuclear powers only substantial contribution to oil displacement in the US comes in regions in which natural
gas displaced by nuclear power can penetrate further into oils share of the markets, such as space heating in
New England. Indeed, transportation is the sector that accounts for most of US oil consumptionabout twothirds of the countrys oil consumption is used by vehicles, which corresponds to roughly 13 millions barrels a
day. Thus, possible nuclear power development would not have any influence over these statistics.
92

A ten fold increase in nuclear power means thousands of tons of available plutonium and heightened
proliferation risks
Jim Green, Australian Energy Science Group, November 2006, Nuclear Power & Climate Change,
http://www.energyscience.org.au/FS03%20Nucl%20Power%20Clmt%20Chng.pdf Proliferation and security
concerns
A very large increase in nuclear power, of the scale necessary to make a significant dent in greenhouse emissions, would create an
enormous security and non-proliferation challenge. Feiveson 6 calculates that with a ten-fold increase in nuclear output, 700 tonnes of
plutonium would be produced annually sufficient for about 70,000 nuclear weapons (or 3.5 million weapons over a 50-year reactor
lifespan). The UNs Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has considered a scenario involving a ten-fold increase in nuclear power
output over this century, and calculated that this could produce 50-100 thousand tonnes of plutonium. 7 The IPCC concluded that the
security threat would be colossal. Former US Vice President Al Gore said in May 2006 that: For eight years in the White House, every
weaponsproliferation problem we dealt with was connected to a civilian reactor program. And if we ever got to the point where we
wanted to use nuclear reactors to back out a lot of coal ... then wed have to put them in so many places wed run that proliferation risk
right off the reasonability scale.8
New plants increase the demand for uranium enrichment, increasing proliferation risks
By far the greatest risk is the possibility that an expansion of nuclear power will contribute to the proliferation of nuclear
weapons. Plants that enrich uranium for power plants can also be used to enrich for bombs; this is the path Iran is suspected
of taking in developing a weapons program. An ambitious expansion of nuclear power would require a lot more facilities
for enriching uranium, broadening this risk. Facilities for reprocessing spent nuclear fuel for reuse pose the danger that the
material can be diverted for weapons.
Large nuclear power increases massively increases proliferation risks
Spiegel Online, July 4, 2007, http://www.spiegel.de/international/business/0,1518,492404,00.html

According to the report, a spread in the use of nuclear energy will not only lead to proliferation, it
would also up the risks of radioactive material falling into the wrong hands. A huge increase in the
amount of nuclear power stations would increase the number of potential targets for terrorist attacks. A
terrorist group could attack the transport of nuclear material, steal plutonium to build a crude nuclear
weapon or "dirty bomb," fly an aircraft into a power station or infiltrate a power plant to sabotage it
from the inside. Increasing the number of nuclear facilities also inevitably provides terrorists with a
greater number of targets, the research group argues. "Many believe that ... even a small risk of such an
attack is not acceptable."
93
Nuclear Power Increase Nuclear Proliferation

Countries will use CNE as an excuse for weapons development, causing war
NEIS 6 [Nuclear Energy Information Service, Aug. 7, http://www.neis.org/literature/Brochures/weapcon.htm]
If one were to imagine for a moment that commercial nuclear power no longer existed, it would be obvious that the only use a country would then have for its uranium
mining, milling, fuel fabrication and reactors would be to produce nuclear weapons. But because commercial nuclear power does exist, it is sometimes
difficult to tell whether a country is using its reactors for research, or for weapons production. It is precisely this ambiguity which
makes the proliferation of nuclear weapons from so-called "peaceful research" a certainty, and the proliferation of commercial
nuclear reactors worldwide a Trojan Horse for nuclear weapons production. Since World War II there have been several instances where
countries have pieced together nuclear weapons from the fuel from "peaceful research reactors." France, China, and India have done
so. Recently, it was feared that Iraq and North Korea would do likewise, a prospect which was lessened only through the direct threat or actual use of military intervention
as an option. Examination of the list of countries currently building or desiring "peaceful" nuclear reactors and the leaders of those nations does not inspire confidence for
curtailing nuclear proliferation, either. It is not just having nuclear weapons which is a threat to peace. In some instances the mere possession or attempted
construction of research reactors and commercial nuclear plants has been enough to bring on the threat of war . This "provocation" was
enough to justify the Israeli bombing of Iraq's French-built Osirik reactor in 1981, and was one of the alleged reasons for the Gulf War in 1991. The mere inkling that
your neighbor might have the capability to make nuclear weapons suddenly becomes the justification for "pre-emptive strikes," and
perhaps even full- fledged warfare . To be sure there are international agreements and agencies set up to monitor the use of nuclear reactors. The International
Atomic Energy Agency is such an entity. However, not all countries have signed agreements allowing inspections by the IAEA. The IAEA itself admitted that even if
inspections were allowed, it would not be able to tell if a country was using its commercial reactors to produce weapons. It takes about 15 pounds of plutonium239 or uranium-235 to fashion a crude nuclear device . The technology to enrich the isotopes is available for about one million dollars . It
is clearly possible that terrorists could acquire both the isotopes and the technology needed to enrich them. This possibility has surfaced in the news since the breakup of the
Soviet Union, and the subsequent revelation of a thriving "black market" in such materials. But even the most technically advanced nations cannot keep
track of their materials and technology. In an inventory taken between October, 1980, and March, 1981, the U.S. government could not account for
about 55 pounds of plutonium and 159 pounds of uranium from its weapons facilities . The explanation given for this Missing material was
"accounting error" and that the materials were "stuck in the piping."1
94

Nuclear power enables proliferation
Carr and Fernandes 8
[False Promises, Jessie Carr and Dulce Fernandes, adapted by the staff of Nuclear information and resource center,
http://www.nirs.org/falsepromises.pdf]
There is an inextricable link between nuclear power and nuclear weapons. The technology for producing nuclear fuel is the same
technology used to produce nuclear weapons materials. Proliferation-resistant technologies provide some barriers to proliferation, but there is no
proliferation-free nuclear technology. Reprocessing and enrichment activities cannot be safeguarded and international treaty
obligations are clearly not enforceable. The associated dangers cannot be overstated. In fact, a high level panel of international experts convened by the United
Nations Secretary General, identified nuclear proliferation as the number one threat to the international community , warning of a real danger that
we could see a cascade of nuclear proliferation in the near future.214 The panel recommended the implementation of firm and urgent measures to reduce the risk of a
nuclear attack, whether by State or non-State actors, and recommended States to forego the development of domestic uranium enrichment and reprocessing facilities.215
Likewise, former Vice-President Al Gore has also expressed his concerns regarding proliferation risks associated with civilian programs: For eight years in the
White House, every weapons-proliferation problem we dealt with was connected to a civilian reactor program . And if we ever got to the
point where we wanted to use nuclear reactors to back out a lot of coal which is the real issue: coalthen wed have to put them in so many places wed run that
proliferation risk right off the reasonability scale.216 The cornerstone of the international non-proliferation regime, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), leaves
non-nuclear weapons states free to use and develop sensitive technology such as uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing.217 Article IV of the NPT allows
signatories to develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, calling it an inalienable right. The NPT constitutes a Faustian bargain by which non-nuclear weapons
states agree not to develop or acquire nuclear weapons in return for access to nuclear technology. However, the NPT established the right of States parties to withdraw from
the Treaty, providing only a 3-month advance notification to the Security Council. Therefore , this regime allows non-nuclear weapons States to benefit
from the transfer of sensitive nuclear technology while parties to the Treaty and then withdraw in possession of such technology.
North Korea, which withdrew from the Treaty in 2003, is a case in point. Nuclear weapons use either enriched uranium or plutonium to create an
explosion of huge magnitude, equivalent to thousands of tons of TNT. Natural uranium must be enriched to increase the concentration of uranium-235 (the isotope essential
for nuclear weapons), either in low concentrations to produce low enriched uranium, the fuel for power reactors, or in higher concentrations to produce high enriched
uranium that can be used for weapons. The enrichment process constitutes the main barrier to producing weapons grade uranium and as the
technology spreads around the world, so does the risk of state and non-state actors to overcome the technical barriers to producing
uranium suitable for use in nuclear weapons. Indeed, the A. Q. Khan global proliferation network, which began with Khans employment at the European
uranium enrichment firm Urenco (which is now building a uranium enrichment plant in New Mexico) transferred sensitive nuclear technology to Iran, Libya, and other
countries, demonstrating the proliferation risks associated with civilian nuclear programs. Plutonium exists only in trace amounts in nature and it is generated as a
by-product of nuclear reactor operations as part of the spent fuel mix. Under normal operating conditions, reactors produce low concentrations of plutonium239, the isotope most useful for nuclear weapons. However, even if reactorgrade plutonium is not the most convenient isotope to effectively build a nuclear bomb, it can
nevertheless be used to make weapons. According to the DOE, Virtually any combination of plutonium isotopes can be used to make a nuclear
weapon. [] In short, reactor-grade plutonium is weapons-usable, whether by unsophisticated proliferators or by advanced nuclear weapon states.218 Plutonium can be
separated from the rest of the reactor spent fuel by a chemical process called reprocessing. This separated plutonium is then mixed with other transuranic waste in a
combination called mixedoxide fuel or MOX. This mix can then be used again in a reactor. But plutonium is also the preferred material to build a nuclear weapon and thus
separating it from the rest of the spent fuel increases the risks of proliferation . While plutonium reprocessing technology is simpler than uranium
enrichment (because it involves separating different elements rather than different isotopes of the same element), this process requires highly advanced technology as
remote-handling equipment because of the high radioactivity of the spent fuel. In contrast, separated plutonium is not highly radioactive and is an easy target for theft. As
noted by the MIT report, Radiation exposure from spent fuel that is not reprocessed is a strong, but not certain, barrier to theft and misuse.219 Some eight kilograms of
reactor grade plutonium are needed to make a bomb, while with weapons-grade plutonium that amount is reduced to five kilograms. The International Panel on Fissile
Materials (IPFM), a group of independent nuclear experts from 15 countries, estimates that there are roughly 1,700 tons of highly enriched uranium
(HEU) and 500 tons of separated plutonium in the world, enough for more than 100,000 nuclear weapons .220 Most of the HEU and about
half of the plutonium is a legacy of the Cold War nuclear arms race; the other half of the plutonium has been separated from spent nuclear power-reactor fuelmostly in
the UK, France and Russia. Two other countries, Japan and India, also have commercial reprocessing facilities. The IPFM acknowledges that one of the critical obstacles to
reducing these stocks is precisely the uncertainty regarding the amounts of these weapons-grade materials held by various countries. The planned nuclear
renaissance raises serious proliferation concerns in an age of terrorism . If 2,000 new nuclear power plants were built over the next
several decades, the stockpiles of commercial plutonium would increase to some 20,000 metric tons by 2050, presenting uncalculated
proliferation risks.221 Moreover, the Bush Administration plans to start developing a major international nuclear initiative, the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership
(GNEP), which involves the reprocessing of the spent fuel from nuclear reactors and thus the separation of plutonium from other nuclear waste contained in the spent fuel
mix. These plans should be regarded with extreme skepticism as they fly in the face of the conventional wisdom, as stated by the British Royal Society, that the chance
that the stocks of [civil] plutonium might, at some stage, be accessed for illicit weapons production is of extreme concern.222 Likewise, the IPFM, in its recently released
report, acknowledged that the growing global stockpile of civilian plutonium separated from power reactor spent fuel is a worsening problem because of the Bush
Administrations endorsement of reprocessing as part of the GNEP program, ending 30 years of US opposition to reprocessing because of proliferation concerns.223 There
are two main proliferation concerns regarding reprocessing and the separation of plutonium. On one hand, reprocessing increases the risk of plutonium being stolen by nonState agents and used for terrorism. On the other hand, States with access to reprocessing technology can use the separated plutonium to develop nuclear weapons in very
short time periods. The atomic test by North Korea in 2006 brought to nine the number of countries in the nuclear weapons club (US, Russia, UK, China and France are the
five recognized nuclear weapons states, and are also the permanent members of the Security Council; India, Pakistan and Israel also possess nuclear weapons and are the
only states which were never parties to the NPT). But, as the IAEAs Director General has restated just recently, it is believed that as many as 40 countries have the
capability to produce nuclear weapons.224 So how far has the technology spread? Nobody knows for sure, but the British counter intelligence agency identified over 360
private companies, university departments and government organizations in eight countries as having procured goods or technology for use in weapons programs. The MI5
report, entitled Companies and Organisations of Proliferation Concern , was compiled in an attempt to prevent British companies from
inadvertently exporting sensitive goods or expertise to organizations covertly involved in weapons of mass destruction programs and
identified connections with Iran, Pakistan, India, Israel, Syria, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates.225
95
Nuclear Power Increases Proliferation

Nuclear power directly spurs global proliferation
ISAB 8
[International Security Advisory Board which is composed of 8 US ambassadors, 2 senators, and 20 Foreign Policy Experts, April 7,
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/105587.pdf]
In addressing these tasks, we noted that the rise in nuclear power worldwide, and particularly within Third World nations, inevitably increases
the risks of proliferation. What the United States must do is to find ways to mitigate those risks. In our work to address these requests, we looked broadly and tried to
imagine the full set of possible U.S. actions: new international treaties, the imposition of new requirements on current signatories of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (referred to as the NPT), and a plethora of much lesser measures. However, as the discussion within the body of this report will show, we concluded that
to realistically make progress in strengthening proliferation protections it will be necessary to set our sights considerably lower than seeking a
new nonproliferation treaty. We concluded that the current international climate is quite unpropitious for gaining support from non-nuclear weapon states to accept stricter
measures against proliferation. While the root causes for this current condition can be debated, we believe that incremental measures, rather than either
revolutionary or comprehensive changes, will be far more likely to succeed in the near term.
96
Nuclear Power Expansion Causes Proliferation

Nuclear power expansion increases proliferation risks
One of the by-products of most nuclear reactors is plutonium-239, which can be used in nuclear weapons.
The international Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is supposed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons but a
number of countries with nuclear capabilities, including India, Pakistan and Israel, are not party in the NPT.
While most countries claim a strict delineation between nuclear power production and the military use of
plutonium, it cannot be ruled out that plutonium could be used in weapons proliferation. According to the
UN Climate Panel IPCC, the security threat would be "colossal" if nuclear power was used extensively to
tackle climate change. Within the Non Proliferation Treaty, it is completely legal to obtain all necessary
technology and material and then to withdraw from the treaty prior to deciding and announcing the wish
to make nuclear weapons.
HEU produced in reactors can be used for bombs

Fuel making involves two processes: uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing. Enrichment increases the
concentration of uranium-235, a uranium isotope that can easily fission inside a reactor or a bomb. Natural
uranium has too low a concentration of uranium-235 to fuel most commercial reactors. These reactors require
low-enriched uranium for fuel. Low-enriched uranium has too low a concentration of uranium-235 to power
nuclear weapons. But weapons-grade uranium can be produced by the same enrichment plant that made lowenriched uranium. Weapons-grade uranium is a special type of highly enriched uranium (HEU) with a
concentration of uranium-235 greater than 90 percent. Any type of HEU is considered weapons usable, although
the greater the concentration or enrichment of uranium-235, the better the material is for making bombs.
97

Reactors create fuel for bombs
Regardless of whether nuclear energy use expands, the United States and its partners face the daunting challenge
of preventing the diversion of nuclear explosive materials into weapons programs and controlling the spread of
potentially dangerous nuclear fuelmaking technologies and materials. Fuel-making technologies are dual use:
either for creating fuel for peaceful reactors or for producing explosive material for nuclear weapons. Thus, a
commercial fuel-making facility represents a latent nuclear bomb factory
Increasing plutonium increases the risks of proliferation and nuclear war
Karl S. Coplan , Associate Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law., Fordham Environmental Law Review, 2006,
As noted, spent nuclear fuel contains Plutonium 239. If nuclear fuel is recycled back into uranium, the
plutonium must be separated from the uranium. Plutonium 239 is fissionable material for a simple nuclear
bomb, requiring only nine pounds. Separating the uranium from the plutonium is the most challenging technical
aspect of developing a nuclear weapon. If more Plutonium 239 is made available, the more source material for
nuclear weapons will be at risk of diversion. In addition, the same technologies needed to enrich uranium to the
point where it is suitable for nuclear power generation can be used to enrich uranium to the point where it is
suitable for bomb-making as well. Like the risk of terrorism, this risk of proliferation is very difficult to
quantify, but in the long term can be assumed to reach a level of probability. One consequence of increased
nuclear power generation worldwide would be the increased availability of nuclear weapons and their likely use
in an international conflict at some time in the future.
98

Rapid nuclear expansion creates material for 1000s of bombs
The current nuclear fuel suppliers can more than meet present demand for fuel. But under many envisioned
growth scenarios, global nuclear fuel capacity would have to increase from two to six times from the present to
2050. But only 1 percent of these projected capacities could fuel hundreds of nuclear weapons annually. To date,
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has not applied inspections that are thorough enough to detect
diversion of this small fraction of nuclear material from a commercial-scale uranium enrichment or plutonium
reprocessing facility. Also, the safeguards system does not provide timely warning of a clandestine effort to use
diverted material in nuclear explosives. For example, according to the IAEA, only seven to ten days would be
needed to convert separated plutonium into bombs. But the IAEA goal for inspection frequency of a plutonium
reprocessing plant is only one month, and even that goal has not been met.
Nuclear power increases proliferation risks
A nuclear ramp up necessary to provide a wedge will not be some idealized future in which the problems are
solved before the plants are built. Massive construction commitments will have to be made long before
present waste and proliferation problems are resolved. Proliferation is a particularly troublesome prospect.
Aspects of civilian nuclear power programs have been implicated in every recent proliferation example,
but particularly India, Pakistan, and potentially, Iran. Given a trebling of worldwide nuclear capacity,
other countries of proliferation concern will have nuclear power programs. (For example, see Richard
Beeston's Times Online article, "Six Arab States Join Rush to Go Nuclear.") International Atomic Energy
Agency safeguards are not adequate for separated plutonium, which is directly useable in nuclear weapons. Two
Bush administration initiatives--the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership and the nuclear arrangement with India-contain elements that undermine aspects of the already strained nonproliferation regime.
99
AT: IAEA Solves Prolif

Increasing the facilities that produce uranium risk proliferation
New Republic, April 23, 2008, p. 20
The problem here, as any casual Ira watcher can tell you, is that the same technology that is used to produce
uranium fuel for nuclear reactors can be exploited to make the explosive core of a nuclear weapon. The danger
then lies not in the reactors themselves, but in the facilities that enrich uranium--as well as in the facilities that
reprocess spent uranium fuel into plutonium, which can also be used in both reactors and weapons. Of course, as
the number of nuclear reactors around the world increases, so will the demand for fuel and the opportunities for
nuclear mischief. According to Charles Ferguson of the Council on Foreign Relations, under certain scenarios
the fuel supply might need to double, triple, or even sextuple by 2050 to meet demand.
Spread of enrichment technology increases proliferation risks
At the moment, most of the countries considering commercial enrichment programs are friendly to the United
States, and there is little reason to expect they would not impose strict safeguards on the material they produce.
At the same time, even friendly countries with safeguards have been known to misplace nuclear material. Japan,
for instance, is unable to account for nearly 200 kilograms of plutonium--enough to make dozens of nuclear
weapons. Moreover, as nuclear power spreads, other less friendly states will inevitably decide they would rather
produce their own fuel than purchase it abroad--because they plan to build a bomb, or they worry their suppliers
may be fickle, or they simply think the ability to enrich uranium makes their country look technologically
advanced. Indeed, many states already chafe at the "nuclear apartheid" of the Nonproliferation Treaty, which
allows an elite few to possess nuclear weapons but denies them to the rest. A further division between states that
supply nuclear fuel and those that consume it would likely trigger resentment. And the spread of enrichment
technology to the Middle East--the Gulf Cooperation Council has already proposed establishing a uraniumenrichment consortium--could increase the threat of nuclear proliferation exponentially.
IAEA doesnt have the authority to prevent prolif
That means limiting the spread of enrichment and reprocessing facilities even as the demand for nuclear fuel
increases. Essentially, we would need to deny states the opportunity to develop such facilities, regardless of
whether they were doing so for purely commercial purposes (like Australia) or for malicious ones (like Iran).
Unfortunately, the current international regime doesn't give the International Atomic Energy Agency anything
close to that kind of power. Indeed, according to its institutional mandate, the IAEA cannot refuse nuclear
assistance to states that are complying with the Nonproliferation Treaty.
100
AT: New IAEA Protocol Solves

An additional IAEA protocol wont solve
Inside the Pentagon, July 3, 2008
In response, Robinson said the fourth page states that the United States proposed an additional protocol to the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty that would "require all member nations to grant the IAEA expanded rights of access to information and
sites regarding both declared and possible undeclared activities." The next page, he added, states that the additional protocol
itself is not comprehensive enough to block all of the paths to proliferation that are possible under the current
nonproliferation treaty. "Neither are the corresponding IAEA safeguard protections comprehensive enough," the report
says.
101
Nuclear Power Expansion Causes Proliferation Safeguards Wont Solve

Significant nuclear expansion will overwhelm the IAEA, triggering proliferation
The expansion of nuclear power could have cascading effects on the nuclear nonproliferation regime,
ranging from practical pressures to significant vulnerabilities. On the practical side, additional facilities
will mean additional safeguards effort by IAEA inspectors. Although reactors themselves require
relatively few inspection days, there will be significant work in helping prepare new nuclear states for
nuclear power programs. Already, the IAEA has conducted workshops on infrastructure requirements,
including energy needs and planning considerations; nuclear security and safeguards; physical infrastructure;
current and future reactor technology; experience in developing nuclear programs; human resource
requirements; and public perceptions.
Significant nuclear expansion will overwhelm safeguards
Should a nuclear renaissance result in more states with so-called bulk-handling facilities (enrichment and
reprocessing), the task of inspecting such facilities could place significant strain on the IAEA and the safeguards
system. Some critics of the IAEA suggest that current methods of inspection cannot provide timely warning of
diversion of a significant quantity of special nuclear material. Yet, the largest enrichment and reprocessing plants
under safeguards now are under EURATOM safeguards; the IAEA's role in verifying material balances in those
plants is limited by the IAEA-EURATOM agreement. The only experience in safeguarding commercial-scale
enrichment and reprocessing plants outside of EURATOM in a non-nuclear-weapon state is in Japan, where
incidents with significant material losses have raised questions.
Additional reprocessing or enrichment capabilities will strain the safeguards system
The nonproliferation risks of a nuclear renaissance clearly depend on the shape of nuclear expansion. More
LWRs pose essentially no new technical challenges to the safeguards system, but additional enrichment or
reprocessing capabilities in non-nuclear-weapon states could easily strain the system. A shift to fast reactors with
reprocessing will likely introduce further strains on the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Fleets of fast reactors
that burn plutonium could help diminish the size of civilian plutonium stockpiles eventually, but their cost
effectiveness is highly doubtful. The provision of "cradle to grave" fuel services, as foreseen by GNEP, could go
far toward limiting the spread of sensitive fuel-cycle technologies but awaits real decisions by key governments,
such as the United States and Russia, on spent fuel and waste disposition. Clearly, measures are needed to help
shape these potential developments to minimize the proliferation impact.
102
AT: U.S. Inspections Solve Prolif

U.S. inspections and verifications wont stop proliferation
Sokolski said it is "appalling" that the panel failed to address whether the United States can effectively inspect for or verify
the presence of dangerous nuclear materials. The track record suggests there is no capability to do the inspection and
verification mission very well, he said. "And if that's the case, getting pledges from folks that they won't get certain
materials or engage in certain nuclear activities might not buy you very much," he said.
103
Nuclear Undermines Global Development

Nuclear trades-off with funding for other development needs
Amory Lovins, the chairman and chief scientist of the Rocky Mountain Institute, June 2007, Bulletin of the
Nuclear power's market meltdown is good for global development: Saving electricity needs around 1,000
times less capital and repays it about 10 times faster than supplying more electricity. Shifting capital to saving
electricity can potentially turn the power sector (now gobbling one-fourth of global development capital)
into a net funder of other development needs. Further, an efficient, diverse, dispersed, and renewable energy
system can make major supply failures, whether caused by accident or malice, impossible by design rather than
(as now) inevitable by design.
104
Nuclear Power Expansion Increases Waste (1NC Module)

Nuclear expansion increase waste
More than fifty years of commercial nuclear energy use has left the world with a legacy of tens of thousands of
tons of highly radioactive waste that will last for tens of thousands of years. If nuclear power production
expands substantially in the coming decades, the amount of waste requiring safe and secure disposal will also
significantly increase. Although several countries are exploring various long-term disposal options, no country
has begun to store waste from commercial power plants in permanent repositories.
Nuclear waste will result in human extinction
Karl S. Coplan , Associate Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law., Fordham Environmental Law Review, 2006, p. 227
Sometime toward the end of the industrial revolution, western industrial countries discovered a new way to
power their steam engines, which had previously been powered by burning wood and coal. This energy source
promised to power the machines of civilization and progress far into the future. This energy source seemed at
the time to be cheap and limitless, and contained an energy density (energy potential per unit weight) far
exceeding those of fuels previously used to power steam engines. n1 Unfortunately for the generations that
would follow, the early proponents of this energy source simply ignored the waste by-product of this fuel
cycle. The wastes produced by this fuel will likely, at a minimum, render currently populated places in the
world uninhabitable, and, at worst, threaten the survival of the human species. These impacts will affect
generations far into the future. Although this paragraph could well describe the climate impacts of burning fossil
fuels, I am not talking about the carbon cycle and global warming. I am talking about the impacts of nuclear
energy production. Proponents of nuclear energy tout the energy source as the most promising offset to
greenhouse gases produced in electricity generation. These proponents eagerly await the additional direct and
indirect subsidies for new nuclear power plants that would flow from various carbon tax and emissions trading
schemes.
105
Accidents 1NC Module

Expanding nuclear power substantially expands accident risks. Cant solve climate with nukes without
causing accidents
Every operating nuclear power plant poses some risk of a severe accident, including an uncontrolled
nuclear reaction that leads to core meltdown and potentially huge releases of radioactivity into the
environment. The nuclear industry estimates the chances of a severe reactor accident to be about one out of
every 10,000 reactor years of operation. While this may sound like a small risk, it means that with 100
operating nuclear power plants in the United States, we can expect one severe accident every 100 years. If
these 100 plants keep operating indefinitely into the future, or are replaced in kind to mitigate global carbon
emissions, a severe reactor accident is virtually certain in this country in the future. Moreover, if we were to
construct the 200 additional nuclear power plants in this country necessary to meet the Phase I carbon
reductions contemplated by the Kyoto Protocol, that same one-in-ten thousand chance of a severe reactor
accident would turn into an expectation of one severe reactor accident every thirty years. Combined with
all the other nuclear reactors around the world - and assuming that all such reactors are at least as safe and well
operated as those in the United States - severe nuclear reactor accidents would be expected to occur every few
years.
Nuclear accident results in 100,000s deaths
The consequences of a severe nuclear reactor accident can be hard to predict. However, using the most
recent models and making optimistic assumptions about the success of evacuation efforts and evacuation
travel times, the Riverkeeper organization has estimated that a reactor meltdown at one of the Indian
Point nuclear power units fifty miles north of New York City would result in as many as 44,000 short term
fatalities from radiation exposure, 518,000 latent cancer fatalities, $ 2 trillion in property damage, and the
relocation of eleven million people. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission's 1982 report estimates the
consequences of a severe reactor accident at Indian Point as 46,000 Peak Early Fatalities, 141,000 Peak Early
Injuries, and 13,000 Peak Deaths from cancer, along with $ 274 billion (1982 dollars) in property damage.
106
Renewable Trade-Off Shell

A. Theres a market transition to renewable energy now
Henry Linden, Max McGraw Professor of Energy Management at Illinois IT, October 6, 19 97
http://ecolloq.gsfc.nasa.gov/archive/1997-Fall/announce.linden.html
ABSTRACT -- Political forces are again mobilizing to interfere with the rational development of the U.S. and global
energy systems. This time the nominal justification is anthropogenic climate change, but the ideological drivers are
the same as those which generated the fictitious "energy crisis" of the 1970s and early 1980s. Poverty is the most
pernicious environmental and social pollutant. Yet, energy abundance and the resulting economic, social, and
environmental benefits and physical mobility seem to offend certain intellectual and political elites. In this
presentation, it will be shown that the global energy system is moving steadily towards sustainability through
electrification, decarbonization, and efficiency improvements, thanks to cost-effective technological advances driven
by market forces. The outcome of these developments is now quite well defined -- electrification of most stationary
energy uses with high-tech renewable or essentially inexhaustible primary energy sources and the use of non-fossil
hydrogen as the dominant transportation fuel. During what is likely to be the 100-year transition, abundant global
natural gas supplies and ever more efficient power generation and end-use technologies will play an important role
in reducing the environmental impact of fossil fuel consumption. As a result of these parallel developments,
atmospheric carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gas concentrations are unlikely to reach levels that even under the
questionable climate sensitivity assumptions used by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) will
cause mean global surface temperature increases in excess of 1.5 degrees C. The major challenge will be to prevent
interference by governments of the industrialized world or intergovernmental bodies with the technical and
economic drivers that will ensure evolution to sustainability along least-cost pathways without impairment of human
social and economic well-being so closely related to adequate and affordable energy services. Another challenge will
be to assist the developing world, which is projected to be responsible for 66 percent of the increase in carbon
dioxide emission between 1995 and 2015, in adopting the more advanced energy supply, conversion, and end-use
technologies that often require larger hard-currency investments.
B. Nuclear power trades off with renewable energy

Rep. Lynn Woolsey, Science Subcommittee on Energy, and Rep. Roscoe Bartlett, 6-18-2001 [Roll Call]
Environmentalists have long known the truth that nuclear power is a bad deal. Recently, the nuclear industry has
been trying to jump on the environmental bandwagon by declaring nuclear energy "clean" and therefore "green."
They may claim nuclear power pollutes less than other non-renewable power sources, but the big drawback is that
the byproduct of nuclear power kills people, and a nuclear accident is the ultimate environmental polluter. Everyone
who works in government knows about scarce resources and trade-offs. This is why making nuclear power an
important part of our energy strategy is a misplaced priority. A strong argument for moving away from nuclear
energy is that the money and political capital needed to advance nuclear power inevitably means detracting from
measures to promote renewable energy sources. These
"smart energy" sources - such as solar, wind, geothermal and fuel cell technologies, as well as energy efficiency and conservation measures - must be
featured prominently in any future national energy policy. The House Science Committee's energy subcommittee, of which I am ranking member, has heard many witnesses speak about the increased role renewables and energy efficiency must play in meeting our nation's growing long-term
that we cannot continue to increase our dependence on fossil fuels and

nuclear energy, as the administration intends. This dependence is what helped lead us into an energy crisis in the
first place. Instead, we must invest in "smart energy" to prevent future energy crises. Renewable technologies have
progressed and are on the verge of mass commercialization. With a meaningful federal financial commitment, far more can be achieved in public benefits
energy demand. Scientists, economists and other experts have testified, and most Americans agree,
than we ever realized from nuclear energy. And unlike nuclear energy, these are energy sources that are embraced by mainstream Americans who want clean, renewable options that will protect
our environment.
107
Renewable Trade-Off Shell

C. Renewable energy sources like wind power is the only fuel that can accomplish grid stabilization its
better than nuclear power, which would take two days to solve a blackout
CSR Wire [Corporate Social Responsibility] 8-22-2003
http://www.csrwire.com/article.cgi/2063.html
As more than 50 million Americans and Canadians recover from the Blackout of 2003, conversations turn to the
future and how to avoid this kind of disaster from happening again. At the Renewable Energy for Wyoming
Conference beginning August 21, 2003 in Douglas, Wyoming, discussions will undoubtedly focus on how wind
power and other sustainable energy sources can play a larger role in the prevention of future catastrophic blackouts.
According to New York-based developer Arcadia Windpower, Ltd. and its Wyoming partner, HTH Wind Energy,
Inc., a featured conference participant, wind power can help solve some of the problems that contributed to the
blackout and can help reduce the likelihood of future blackouts. "This first ever renewable energy conference in the
state of Wyoming comes at a time of rising fossil fuel prices and concern about grid reliability. Wyoming Governor
Dave Freudenthal deserves credit for his focus on renewables and their benefits to his state," said Dan Leach, CEO
of HTH Wind Energy, Inc. "With 140 megawatts of wind electricity generators spinning, wind in Wyoming will
stimulate economic development, help stabilize electricity prices, and provide fuel diversity in the state's generation
mix." According to Peter D. Mandelstam, founder and president of Arcadia Windpower, "Wind power, which is
naturally clean, safe, and renewable, is also perfectly suited to strengthening the grid, which is what's important after
a blackout like the one we had last week. Wind power needs to be part of the short-term solution and long-term
reliability of the grid." Grid stability can be achieved through distributed generation -- placing generating facilities
throughout the region's grid so that when one section of the grid goes down, the distribution facilities are able to
keep the rest of the grid in operation. Wind farms are particularly suitable for this strategy because they are scalable
in nature and therefore can be sized according to local energy needs. Fossil fuel plants, on the other hand, can work
only as large-scale power plants. Additionally, wind farms, which can be plugged directly into a metropolitan area
like New York City or a local pocket such as Long Island, can also ease transmission bottlenecks. The transmission
bottlenecks north of New York City that likely contributed to the Blackout of 2003 could have been reduced had a
wind farm in close proximity been in place and operating -- such as the off-shore project currently proposed for the
south shore of Long Island. "One of the most attractive features of wind power and off-shore wind, in particular, is
the ability to site a plant close to where the electricity will be used," said Tom Gray, Deputy Executive Director of
the American Wind Energy Association. "The recent blackout makes a compelling case for a wind plant off of Long
Island that can deliver electricity directly to neighboring communities and the region." Another benefit of wind
power in a blackout situation is that as long as the grid is operating, a wind power facility can begin generating
electricity almost immediately. In contrast, nuclear and fossil fuel plants must go through long restart and warm-up
procedures of up to 48 hours. Time is also reduced in the development of wind power generating facilities, which
can be built in just six to nine months. A conventional power plant generally cannot be completed from design to
operation in less than two years.
108
Nuclear Energy Trades-Off With Renewable Energy

Nuclear investment trades-off with renewable energy investments
Spending hundreds of billions of dollarspotentially trillions worldwideon nuclear power would tie up
the capital necessary to implement the safe, sustainable energy future the climate crisis calls for, while
providing minimal carbon emissions reductions. Thats the fundamental issue. Our choice is stark: we can
effectively address the climate crisis, or we can choose nuclear power. We cant do both. Fortunately, the
choice is an easy one.
High costs of nuclear power means it trades-off with renewable energy
Six billion dollars for one reactor: thats more than four times the U.S. Department of Energys annual
spending on all renewable energy programsno wonder renewables continue to lag behind their potential
Moodys Investors Service is even less optimistic. Their October 2007 projection is that new U.S. reactors will
cost on the order of $5,000-6,000/kw. At those prices, even solar begins to look competitiveand its costs are
trending down worldwide, not up. Thats why Google and other Silicon Valley entrepreneurs see solar power as
the next Internet in terms of financial potential, and why theyre investing heavily in the technology. Even under
current inadequate federal energy policies, Steve notes that wind expects to reach 20 percent of U.S. electricity
generation by 2030the same percentage nuclear holds now. Taking the hundreds of billions of dollars we
could spend on nuclear power to achieve minor carbon emissions cuts and investing that in solar, wind
and energy efficiency would be far more effective, and ultimately cheaper. And the emissions cuts could
begin now, not in a decade or more.
Nuclear power will have to compete with renewable energy in the market
David Sang, science professor and published author, 1-18-2003 [New Scientist]
Nuclear power does have one huge advantage: unlike burning fossil fuels, it doesn't add to the concentration of
carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. As signatories to the Kyoto Protocol reduce their CO2 emissions, for example by
ensuring a proportion of electricity is generated without fossil fuels, there may be a future for nuclear power. It will
have to compete with renewable energy sources. But above all it will need to prove it can be cheap, clean -- and
safe.
109
Nuclear Energy Trades-Off With Renewable Energy

Nuclear investments divert resources from other technologies that solve climate change
Switching the entire world's electricity production to nuclear would still not solve the problem. Moreover,
by diverting the worlds resources from sustainable energy production to nuclear power, it would only
exacerbate the problem by diverting scare resources away from those technologies which offer real hope
for addressing climate change. This is partly because the production of electricity is only one of many human
activities that release greenhouse gases. Others include transport and heating, agriculture, the production of
cement and deforestation. The CO2 released worldwide through electricity production accounts for only
9% of total annual human greenhouse gas emissions.
Nuclear costs increasing, renewable costs decreasing
There are a lot of alternative energy sources. The costs of renewable sources are falling rapidly: in the last 10
years the cost per kWh of electricity from wind turbines fell by 50%, and that from photovoltaic cells fell by
30%. The costs of nuclear power are rising, despite the fact that nuclear power has been hugely subsidized over
the last half century. Some of the costs of nuclear energy have been excluded from the price.
110
Renewable, Not Nuclear Investments Now

Investment in renewable, not nuclear now
Amory Lovins, the chairman and chief scientist of the Rocky Mountain Institute, September 2007, Bulletin of
the Atomic Scientists, http://www.thebulletin.org/roundtable/nuclear-power-climate-change/
However, coal-versus-nuclear costs are irrelevant because both have proven grossly uncompetitive against
negawatts and micropower. In 2006, micropower surpassed nuclear power's total global output and added
roughly 34 GW of global net capacity, 15 GW of it from wind power. Why is micropower winning? Well, as
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory's 2007 wind review (PDF) found, the median price of power
provided by new U.S. wind farms added during 1999-2006 was 3.4 cents per kWh in 2004 dollars, while
the cheapest cost less than 2 cents. If you take the higher median price, "firm" that variable wind power to
make it fully dispatchable whether the wind is blowing or not, and take away its 0.86 cent Production Tax Credit
(far less than nuclear's subsidies), it still costs less than half of what Keystone found new nuclear plants
would cost. Wall Street understands this arithmetic.
In 2006, distributed renewable power sources worldwide got $56 billion of private risk capital; nuclear
projects got zero. As Peter Bradford rightly notes, recent industry efforts to entice the U.S. Treasury to give it
$50 billion are a desperate response to private capitalists' unwillingness to finance plants they consider too
costly and too risky.
111
Renewables Solve Better than Nuclear

Renewables are cheaper and can be deployed faster
Amory Lovins, the chairman and chief scientist of the Rocky Mountain Institute, September 2007, Bulletin of
the Atomic Scientists, http://www.thebulletin.org/roundtable/nuclear-power-climate-change/
My 2006 Royal Academy of Engineering lecture (PDF, 3.7MB) mentioned that from 1982 to 1985, when
California let all options compete fairly, its utilities bought or were firmly offered 23 GW of savings; 13 GW of
new capacity (mostly renewable) bought plus 8 GW more on firm offer ; and further such supplies increasing by
another 9 GW per year. Since the 1984 peak load was only 37 GW, this four-year experiment yielded low- or
no-carbon alternatives totaling 143 percent of total peak demand. Twenty years later, these alternatives are
even bigger, cheaper, and faster to deploy via their far more mature market structure.
112
Nuclear Energy Is Not Safe

Nuclear expansion dramatically expands safety problems
USA TODAY, December 12, 2007, p. 1A
Nearly two years ago, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission gave the operator of the Indian Point nuclear plant a
year to add backup power supplies to the plant's emergency warning sirens. Entergy paid a $130,000
government fine in April -- but still hasn't done the work at the plant 24 miles north of New York City. At the
Peach Bottom nuclear plant south of Harrisburg, Pa., security guards often took 15-minute "power naps,"
according to a letter from a former security manager to the NRC last March. The NRC began investigating after
CBS News aired video of the dozing guards in early September. Neither of the incidents amounted to an
"immediate" safety risk, the NRC says. But they -- and hundreds of other seemingly minor episodes at nuclear
power plants in recent years -- are drawing increased scrutiny as the USA prepares to launch a new generation of
nuclear reactors. Power companies are beginning to file applications to build up to 32 nuclear plants over the
next 20 years, the first since the 1979 accident at the Three Mile Island plant in Pennsylvania halted plans for
new reactors and led to sweeping changes in safety regulations. It's partly a reflection of how, amid concerns
about climate change, communities have become more open to nuclear power as a cleaner alternative to
pollution-belching coal-fired plants. Critics and advocates of nuclear power generally agree that improvements
in equipment and employee training have helped to make nuclear plants safer since the partial meltdown of a
reactor at Three Mile Island. Watchdog groups, however, say that unless nuclear safety and security improve, the
USA's expansion of its nuclear power industry -- which now involves 104 reactors that supply about 20% of the
nation's electricity -- could pose risks to nearby communities. "Serious safety problems" plague U.S. nuclear
plants because the NRC isn't adequately enforcing its standards and has cut back on inspections, according to a
report released Tuesday by the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS), a nuclear safety watchdog group.
113
Nuclear Energy Is Not Safe

Nuclear expansion dramatically expands safety problems
Nearly two years ago, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission gave the operator of the Indian Point nuclear plant a
year to add backup power supplies to the plant's emergency warning sirens. Entergy paid a $130,000
government fine in April -- but still hasn't done the work at the plant 24 miles north of New York City. At the
Peach Bottom nuclear plant south of Harrisburg, Pa., security guards often took 15-minute "power naps,"
according to a letter from a former security manager to the NRC last March. The NRC began investigating after
CBS News aired video of the dozing guards in early September. Neither of the incidents amounted to an
"immediate" safety risk, the NRC says. But they -- and hundreds of other seemingly minor episodes at nuclear
power plants in recent years -- are drawing increased scrutiny as the USA prepares to launch a new generation of
nuclear reactors. Power companies are beginning to file applications to build up to 32 nuclear plants over the
next 20 years, the first since the 1979 accident at the Three Mile Island plant in Pennsylvania halted plans for
new reactors and led to sweeping changes in safety regulations. It's partly a reflection of how, amid concerns
about climate change, communities have become more open to nuclear power as a cleaner alternative to
pollution-belching coal-fired plants. Critics and advocates of nuclear power generally agree that improvements
in equipment and employee training have helped to make nuclear plants safer since the partial meltdown of a
reactor at Three Mile Island. Watchdog groups, however, say that unless nuclear safety and security improve, the
USA's expansion of its nuclear power industry -- which now involves 104 reactors that supply about 20% of the
nation's electricity -- could pose risks to nearby communities. "Serious safety problems" plague U.S. nuclear
plants because the NRC isn't adequately enforcing its standards and has cut back on inspections, according to a
report released Tuesday by the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS), a nuclear safety watchdog group.
114
Nuclear Power Leads to Blackouts

Nuclear power promotes centralized energy that increases the risk of blackouts
Rose, U.S. Public Interest Research Group, 9-1-2003
WHILE we are still waiting to hear what triggered the most massive blackout in U.S. history, it was a predictable
consequence of our over-reliance on cumbersome centralized power sources largely based on polluting fossil - and
nuclear - powered plants. The electricity industry is already calling for weaker air pollution regulations and $ 100
billion in transmission expenditures. Industry and its allies in Congress are also calling for continued deregulation,
for construction of more transmission lines, and for Congress to pass the dirty and dangerous energy bill currently
under consideration. These proposals fail to provide the reliable, affordable and cleaner energy future that America
deserves. To prevent future blackouts, we should use our technological know-how to increase energy efficiency and
conservation, and shift to clean, renewable energy sources, especially smaller local power sources with more local
control.
Nuclear power is a unique blackout risk it has no effective backup generation

Hauter, Director of the Critical Mass Energy and Environment Program, 2004
http://www.citizen.org/documents/bigblackout.pdf
What exactly happens to a nuclear power plant when the power goes out? First, when a plant loses offsite electrical
supply, it automatically shuts down or scrams. (One engineer likened this to applying the clutch to a car moving
60 miles per hour.) It must then connect to another source of electricity to keep coolant circulating to prevent the
reactor core from overheating and causing a meltdown. All nuclear power plants maintain several diesel-powered
backup generators on site for use in the event of power loss, but sudden reliance on backup diesel generators is less
than reassuring, as the following case studies illustrate. In the past 12 monthsfrom September 2002 to August
2003there have been 15 reported instances in which emergency diesel generators have been declared inoperable.
In seven cases, when such a failure brought a plant below the required number of backups, a complete shutdown of
the plant was required; on four of these occasions, all backup generators failed at once. In April 2003, the Cook
nuclear power plant in western Michigan shut down when emergency water flow to all four diesel generators was
blocked by an influx of fish on the intake screens.iv Cook also shut down in January when one of its two
emergency generators was inoperable for over 72 hours.v In all, four of the nine plants affected by the blackout have
shut down in the past year because of problems with backup generators: New Jerseys Oyster Creek, situated
between New York City and Philadelphia; Nine Mile Point in New York state; Indian Point, located on the outskirts
of New York City and the subject of tremendous controversy over problematic evacuation plans; and Fermi, located
only 30 miles from Detroit. On February 1, 2003, all four backup generators at Fermi were simultaneously declared
inoperable when a diesel fuel spill caught fire. All four backup generators had similar fuel drain configurations,
making them equally prone to such leaks and fires. The generators had to remain off-line for several hours while
they were reconfigured to avert future catastrophes. Without emergency generators, steam and battery power provide
a last chance means to cool a reactor and stave off a meltdown. The batteries can operate for between two and
eight hours; but in the recent blackout, Detroit did not see full power returned until Saturday, August 16, over 36
hours after power first went out. Had the emergency generators failed during this timeframeas they did in the
aforementioned situationsa nuclear meltdown and widespread radioactive release is rendered not at all beyond
possibility.
115
Nuclear Energy is Costly

Nuclear is more expensive than other forms of energy
Nuclear energy's revival depends strongly on public sector support and financial backing. Even if it were true
that nuclear energy emits no carbon dioxide, that it is renewable, and that it will provide energy independenceall selling points made by President George W. Bush-the fact would remain that nuclear energy is more
expensive than alternative sources of electricity.
116
Fusion Fails
Fusion requires more energy than is produced
Minqi Li, Department of Economics, University of Utah, November 2007, "Peak oil, the rise of China and
India, and the global energy crisis.(Report). ." Journal of Contemporary Asia. 449(23).
Nuclear fusion is another proposed technology that could potentially provide a very large energy supply.
Nuclear fusion is the reaction that takes place in the Sun and has been achieved by human beings in the form of
hydrogen bombs. To use it for economic purposes, however, the reaction has to be controlled. To initiate a
fusion reaction, a temperature of more than 100 million [degrees]C has to be reached and no known materials
are capable of containing such temperatures. So far scientists have attempted to confine the reaction through
different processes. But each process requires more energy than the reaction itself generates and has succeeded
in sustaining the reaction for no more than a fraction of a second (Heinberg, 2003: 160).
117
Nuclear Power Increases Waste

Nuclear produces extensive wastes
Caldicott) http://www.beyondnuclear.org/nuclearpower.html
The entire nuclear fuel chain, from mining to milling, processing, enrichment, fuel fabrication, and fuel
irradiation in reactors, generates radioactive waste. Nuclear reactors produce large amounts of longlasting, deadly radioactive waste. This includes 20-30 tons of high-level radioactive waste per year per
reactor, plus so-called low level radioactive waste streams, and much of the entire contaminated
nuclear power plant site once closed. There is currently no acceptable solution for either storage or
disposal of this waste. New reactors would produce yet more radioactive waste which would be left
on site, threatening the region, or transported across the country, increasing the odds of disaster on site
and in transit. The only proposed deep geological dump in the U.S. is at the scientifically unsound
Yucca Mountain, virtually guaranteed to leak massive amounts of deadly radioactive waste over time.
The site would, if opened, soon be full with no room for newly-produced waste. Low-level
radioactive waste, a misnomer, is dumped into landfills or incinerated, contaminating our water and air.
Efforts to recycle it into consumer goods threaten our health.
118
Terrorism -- Nuclear Power Increases Terrorism Attack & Theft Risks

Expanding nuclear power expands nuclear terrorism risks
An expansion of nuclear power couldbut need notmake it more likely that

terrorists will acquire nuclear weapons. In any event, other sources of nuclear
weapons and weapons materials exist. Because it is difficult and expensive to
produce the fissile materials needed for nuclear weapons, terrorists are almost
certainly unable to do so themselves. However, several countries have large
military stockpiles of plutonium and HEU, or civil stockpiles of plutonium, which
terrorists could steal and use to produce nuclear weapons. Terrorists could also
steal a nuclear weapon, or purchase one that has been stolen.
Expanding nuclear increases risks of terrorists acquiring nuclear material
Caldicott, )http://www.beyondnuclear.org/nuclearpower.html
The opportunity for theft by terrorists of nuclear materials usable in even a "dirty bomb" would
substantially increase if nuclear power is expanded. This could result in a level of destruction hitherto
unenvisaged. Reactors are themselves terrorist targets and current ones are not even defended to the
level of the 9/11 assault 19 men in four teams, including air attack scenarios. Thirty-two U.S.
reactors have fuel pools on the upper levels of the reactor building, shielded only by sheet metal and an
open invitation to air attack.
119

Nuclear plants are terror targets
Seattle Post-Intelligencer, July 18, 2008, p. B6
Along with proliferation, there are terrorist threats to existing nuclear reactors, such as Entergy's controversial Indian Point
nuclear plant just 24 miles north of New York City. Lovins calls these "about as fat a terrorist target as you can
imagine. It is not necessary to fly a plane into a nuclear plant or storm a plant and take over a control room in order
to cause that material to be largely released. You can often do it from outside the site boundary with things the
terrorists would have readily available."
An attack on a nuclear plant will kill 500,000
Eben Kaplan, Council on Foreign Relations, 2006, Anti-Terror Measures at U.S. Nuclear Plants,
http://www.cfr.org/publication/10450/%20antiterror_measures_at_us_nuclear_plants.html
An attack on a nuclear plant could release a high level of radiation that would gravely endanger public
health. A 2004 study by the Union of Concerned Scientists says a successful attack on the Indian Point
nuclear facility thirty-five miles north of Manhattan could cause as many as 44,000 near-term
casualties, and 500,000 long-term deaths from cancer.
120

Nuclear facilities are terror targets
Nuclear generating facilities and their associated waste fuel storage facilities have been identified as potential
targets for attack by groups or individuals motivated by political purposes, insanity or both. The consequences
of such an attack, if successful, would be uniquely severe, as an attack could result in the release of large
amounts of radioactive material to the atmosphere. Such outcomes would make response and recovery
extremely difficult, and would result in environmental and health impacts over a much wider area than any other
type of electricity generating facility subject to such an attack.
Even a small nuclear power expansion increases terror risks

And with the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) insisting that
emissions be drastically reduced by 2050 to prevent the world from warming up by 2 degrees Celsius
(3.6 degrees Fahrenheit) the nuclear industry is finding an increasingly warm reception. But now a
leading British research group is arguing that any nuclear expansion would only be a drop in the ocean
in terms of future energy needs. More importantly, it would dangerously increase the risk of
proliferation and terrorist attacks. According to the Oxford Research Group, "Even a small expansion
in the use of nuclear power for electricity generation would have serious consequences for the spread
of nuclear weapons in countries that do not have them, and for nuclear terrorism."
Terrorists can use irradiated fuel to make dirty bombs
FBI director Robert S. Mueller testified before the Select Committee on Intelligence in the US Senate in
February 2005 stating, Another area we consider vulnerable and target rich is the energy sector, particularly
nuclear power plants. Al Qaeda planner Khalid Sheikh Mohammed had nuclear power plants as part of his target
set and we have no reason to believe that Al Qaeda has reconsidered. 145 Moreover, in October 2001, the Federal
Aviation Administration temporarily restricted all private aircraft from flying over 86 nuclear facilities due to
threats of terrorist attacks.146 Despite industry claims that concrete containment domes could withstand the
impact of low-flying aircraft, the Swiss nuclear regulatory authority has stated that Nuclear power plants
(worldwide) are not protected against the effects of warlike acts or terrorist attacks from the air [] one cannot
rule out the possibility that fuel elements in the fuel pool or the primary cooling system would be damaged and this would result in a
release of radioactive substances. German researchers have also used computer simulations for various jetliner crash scenarios
indicating potential for considerable chaos and radiation release.148 Many irradiated-fuel pools are located high above ground level or
above empty cavities and could be drained if their bottoms or sides were collapsed or punctured. Such an incident could result in a fire
which could not be extinguished and could contaminate up to 188 square miles. Moreover, according to a recent study by the National
Academy of Sciences, a terrorist attack on a fuel pool could lead to the release of large quantities of radioactive materials to the
environment. Therefore, the issue is paramount as a national security priority, but the majority of irradiated fuel has not been placed in
hardened on-site storage (HOSS) and is not any safer than on September 11, 2001 (see more detailed discussion in Chapter 7). Moreover,
the US is no closer to a solution
121
Terrorism Nuclear Power Increases terrorism and Theft Risks

Spent fuel rods vulnerable to terrorists
Spent fuel pools are highly vulnerable to terrorist attack. Unlike reactors, the
pools used to store spent fuel at reactor sites are not protected by containment
buildings, and thus are attractive targets for terrorist attacks. Such attacks could
lead to the release of large amounts of dangerous radioactive materials into the
environment.
122
Terrorism -- Terror Attacks Cause a Melt-down

Physical assault on a plant could melt the core
Indeed, if a team of well-trained terrorists forcibly entered a nuclear power plant,

within a matter of minutes it could do enough damage to cause a meltdown of
the core and a failure of the containment structure. Such an attack would have a
devastating and long-lasting impact on public health, the environment, and the
economy.
123
Terror Attack collapses the Nuclear Industry

Nuclear terror attack stops nuclear power development
Moreover, addressing the problems associated with nuclear power is simply

pragmatic: nothing will affect public acceptability of nuclear power as much as a
serious nuclear accident, a terrorist strike on a pool of spent fuel, or a terrorist
detonation of a nuclear weapon made from stolen nuclear reactor materials.
124
Terrorism AT: Terrorist Attack Wouldnt Cause An Explosion

It would cause a melt-down
Council on Foreign Relations, 2006, Targets for Terrorism: Nuclear Facilities,

January, http://www.cfr.org/publication/10213/targets_for_terrorism.html
Experts say that an attack on a nuclear power plant, all of which are guarded by private security forces
hired by the plants and supervised by the NRC, couldnt lead to a nuclear explosion. The danger, they
say, is that attackers could cause a meltdown or a fire or set off a major conventional explosion, all of
which could spew radiation into nearby cities and towns.
125
Terrorism -- AT: NRC Says Risk is Low

NRC underestimates attack risks
NRC assumptions about potential attackers are unrealistically modest. The NRCs
Design Basis Threat (DBT) defines the size and abilities of a group that might
attack a nuclear facility, and against which an owner must be able to defend.
Although not publicly available, before 9/11 the DBT was widely known to consist
of three attackers armed with nothing more sophisticated than handheld
automatic rifles, and working with a single insider whose role was limited to
providing information about the facility and its defenses. The DBT has been
upgraded post-9/11, but it still does not reflect real-world threats. For example, it
excludes the possibility that terrorist groups would use rocket-propelled grenades
a weapon widely used by insurgents around the world.
NRC underestimates attack risks
The NRC gives less consideration to attacks and deliberate acts of sabotage than
it does to accidents. This lack of attention is manifested in emergency plans that
do not take terrorist attacks into account, the agencys refusal to consider
terrorist attacks as part of the environmental assessments during licensing
proceedings, and its failure to adequately address the risk of an attack on spent
fuel pools at reactor sites.
126
Terrorism -- AT: Reactors Can Withstand Terror Attacks

No assurance reactors can withstand terror attacks
The NRC stages mock attacks to determine if plant owners can defend their
reactors against DBT-level attacks. Test results reveal poor performance, and the
integrity of the tests themselves is in question. The federal government is
responsible for defending against attacks more severe than the DBT, but it has no
mechanism for ensuring that it can provide such protection.
Reactor Designs prevent Chernobyl from happening here
Discover Magazine, May 2, 2008, http://discovermagazine.com/2008/may/02-is-nuclear-energy-our-besthope/article_view?b_start:int=1&-C=
Public concerns about nuclear power have traditionally centered on two issues: the risk of widespread
radioactive fallout from an accident and the hazards of nuclear waste. (Since 9/11, security risk has emerged as a
third major worry.) My research shows such fears are unfounded. A Chernobyl cannot happen herea survey
by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) established that our reactors are free of the design flaws
that permitted Chernobyl to explode, and in the United States a typical reactor core is surrounded by
multiple enclosures to block the escape of radioactive material even in the event of an accident. Chernobyl
had no such containment.
Multiple systems prevent a Three Mile Island style meltdown
Discover Magazine, May 2, 2008, http://discovermagazine.com/2008/may/02-is-nuclear-energy-our-besthope/article_view?b_start:int=1&-C=
Our worst commercial reactor accident, at Three Mile Island 2, was said to be successfully contained
despite a partial meltdown, according to the NRCs investigation. A minute quantity of radioactive gas was
intentionally vented from the reactor building, but several independent, peer-reviewed studies have not
ascertained any health effects attributable to exposure. Since then, U.S. regulations have instituted many
additional safety measures. The reactors that will be used by NRG in the South Texas Project are of a type
dubbed the Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (pdf), the latest iteration of a thoroughly vetted design that
has been safely used for a decades, the light water reactor. These reactors have the intriguing feature that
the water used to cool the core and run the generating turbine is also essential to maintaining a nuclear
chain reaction. Briefly, fissioning atoms in the nuclear reactors fuel emit neutrons that are traveling too fast to
efficiently cause other atoms to fission. The water slows the neutrons, allowing the chain reaction to continue at
a steady pace. In case of an accident, multiple systems would keep cooling water flowing to the core, and
control rods would quickly drop, automatically shutting down the nuclear reactions.
127
Terrorism -- AT: Plant Security Improvements

Plant security has not improved enough
The United States has one of the worlds most well-developed regulatory systems
for protecting nuclear power plants against sabotage and attack, and continues to
upgrade its standards. Nonetheless, nuclear plant security requirements have not
risen to the level needed to defend against credible threats comparable to the
9/11 attacks.67 Several problems stand in the way of addressing the risks of
reactor sabotage and attack. The NRC gives less consideration to attacks and
deliberate acts of sabotage than it does to accidents; the methodology for
determining credible threats to nuclear facilities is flawed; and the process for
determining whether reactor operators and the federal government can defend
against such threats is inadequate.
128
Terrorism -- AT: Low Risk of Terror Attack on Plants

NRC underestimates sabotage risks
One underlying problem is that the risk of sabotage and terrorist attack has never fit comfortably
into the NRCs regulatory framework, which focuses on preventing accidents. The NRC bases its
approach to security on the presumption thatlike catastrophic accidentsterrorist attacks are
low-probability events. And the NRC maintains that a catastrophic accident is very unlikely to
occur because multiple safety systems would have to fail simultaneously, and that the probability
of that happening is very low. However, this logic fails when one considers deliberate damage.
Saboteurs may be capable of disabling multiple safety systems simultaneously, quickly leading to
a meltdown and large release of radiationa sequence of events that would be highly improbable
if left to chance. In fact, severe releases resulting from the simultaneous failure of multiple safety
systems are precisely what terrorists are seeking, to maximize the impact of their attack.
Moreover, the engineering sophistication of the 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center suggests
that terrorists are fully capable of using the wealth of publicly available information on the
vulnerabilities of current and proposed nuclear plants to develop attack plans. Thus the least
likely accident sequences may well be the most likely sabotage sequences. The NRCs assumption
that a terrorist attack is a low-probability event has meant that it has paid far less attention than
justified to deliberate sabotage. For example, the NRC requires each nuclear plant to develop
emergency plans to protect the public in the event of an accident, and conducts biennial exercises
to determine whether plant owners working in conjunction with local, state, and federal entities
can carry out their plans. However, the NRC does not yet require plant owners to develop
emergency plans for sabotage or terrorist attacks, which could involve deliberate attempts to
interfere with emergency evacuations (though it does plan to do so). Even in the wake of the 9/11
attacks, the NRC has also universally dismissed terrorism from consideration in environmental
impact studies, on the grounds that terrorist acts are too remote and speculative. These studies
apply to licenses for expanding onsite spent fuel storage, 20-year extensions to operating licenses
for nuclear plants, and site permitting for new reactors.68 The NRC also continues to disregard the
risk of an attack on spent fuel pools at reactor sites. Spent fuel emits a large amount of heat as
well as radiation. After the fuel is removed from a reactor, it is stored in adjacent pools of water for
years. The water cools the fuel and shields personnel from radiation, and is replenished as
needed. If the pool is drained for even a matter of hours, or the active cooling system is
interrupted for a day or two, the zirconium cladding on the spent fuel rods could ignite
spontaneously in air and the spent fuel could melt. After about five years, the spent fuel is cool
enough to be transferred to dry casks, which are cooled by a flow of air. However, U.S. reactor
operators generally leave the spent fuel in the pools until they are full, and today they typically
contain five times as much fuel as the reactors. Unlike reactors, these pools are not protected by
containment buildings. As a recent National Academy of Sciences study on the risks of spent fuel
pools makes clear, a terrorist attack could, under some conditions, lead to the release of large
quantities of radioactive material. The report also concludes that the U.S. government does not
fully understand the risks posed by a terrorist attack on a spent fuel pool. Another independent
analysis found that a terrorist attack on such a pool could result in thousands of cancer deaths
and hundreds of billions of dollars in economic damages.70 These findings are consistent with
129

those of a 1997 study by Brookhaven National Laboratory of the results of damage to irradiated
fuel stored in pools
130
Terrorism -- AT: No Risk of Airplane Attack

NRC ignores the risks of airplane attacks on plants
The NRCs decision not to include aircraft attacks in the DBT is based partly on several studies conducted since
9/11 by the nuclear industry and the agency. These have basically considered two scenarios: (1) whether an
aircraft hitting the reinforced concrete containment structure would penetrate the structure and damage the
reactor vessel inside; and (2) whether an aircraft hitting the fuel-handling building would deposit enough
burning jet fuel on top of the spent fuel pool to evaporate the water and uncover the irradiated fuel. However,
neither of these scenarios accurately reflects the real problems posed by aircraft attacks. An aircraft need not
penetrate the containment structure to cause a meltdown. U.S. security regulations seek to prevent attackers
from destroying a target set of equipment whose destruction would trigger a reactor meltdown. A single plant
has many such target sets, some of which are entirely outside the containment structure. To cause a meltdown,
an aircraft need only destroy one target set through impact and fire.
131
Terrorism -- AT: Security Prevents An Attack

No guarantee security adequate to stop an attack
The NRC periodically stages mock DBT-level attacks to determine if plant owners
can defend against them (this is called force-on-force testing). At nearly half the
nuclear plants tested before 9/11, three mock attackers were able to enter quickly
and simulate the destruction of enough safety equipment to cause a meltdown
even though operators typically received six months advance notice of which day
the test would occur.78 The integrity of the tests themselves is also open to
question. The NRC awarded Wackenhut the contract to supply the mock
adversary team for all force-on-force tests, even though that company supplies
the security officers for nearly half of all U.S. nuclear power plants. This situation
represents a serious conflict of interest. In fact, the GAO found that one plants
security team performed better during a mock attack because it had obtained
advance information about the planned attack scenario.79 Moreover, there is no
mechanism to ensure that guards at nuclear power facilities have the skills they
need. Although the NRC sets basic training and performance standards, reactor
owners conduct their own training and certify their own security guards. The
federal government is responsible for defending against attacks of greater
severity than the DBT. However, it has not shown an ability to do so. Indeed, the
government has no mechanism for ensuring that it can provide such protection
when needed. For example, federal authorities do not conduct force-on-force
tests to assess whether they can defend against such attacks. Instead, the
government relies primarily on the intelligence community to provide advance
warning of a pending attack.
132
Terrorism -- AT: New Reactor Designs

New technologies make it harder to solve diversion
As Chapter 4 noted, a major expansion of nuclear energy worldwide could

increase the risks of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism. In response, the
DOE is developing new nuclear technologies including reprocessing techniques
and fast reactorsthat it claims will have better proliferation resistance.156
Designers of some Generation III+ reactors also claim that they will reduce the
threat of proliferation and terrorism. However, because this is a relative measure,
we need a standard for comparison. The most proliferation- and theft-resistant
nuclear power system is the once-through fuel cycle now used in the United
States, in which reactors are fueled with low-enriched uranium, and the spent fuel
is disposed of directly.157 However, this is not the standard used by the DOE, which
instead assesses proliferation resistance by comparing it to a fuel cycle using
PUREX reprocessing technology. In fact, no technical fix can remove the
proliferation risks associated with reprocessing and the use of plutonium-based
fuel. Once separated from highly radioactive fission products, the plutonium is
vulnerable to theft or diversion. New reprocessing technologies will leave the
plutonium in a mixture with other elements, but these are not radioactive enough
to provide theftresistance, and a nation seeking nuclear weapons could readily
separate the plutonium from the other elements by chemical means. And some of
these other elements are themselves usable in weapons. Finally, the use of these
proliferation-resistant technologies would reduce the ability of commercialscale reprocessing and fuel production facilities to accurately account for the
material they handlemaking the already formidable task of detecting the
diversion or theft of bomb-usable quantities of plutonium even harder.
133
Nuclear Power Expansion Triggers Accidents

Tripling nuclear power expansion will trigger 4 meltdowns we win 100% risk of 4 melt-downs
Proponents of nuclear energy, like Patrick Moore, cofounder of Greenpeace, and the former Argonne National
Laboratory adviser Steve Berry, say that new reactors will be safer than current onesmeltdown proof. Such safety
claims also are myths. Even the 2003 M.I.T. energy study predicted that tripling civilian nuclear reactors would lead
to about four core-melt accidents. The governments Sandia National Laboratory calculates that a nuclear accident
could cause casualties similar to those at Hiroshima or Nagasaki: 140,000 deaths.
Significantly expanding the number of accidents significantly expands accident risks

Probabilistic risk assessments conducted by U.S. reactor owners find that todays nuclear power
plants will have a core meltdown from an accidental malfunction during full-power operation every
20,000 years on average.108 Because about 100 reactors now operate in the United States, a
severe accident of this type is expected to occur every 200 years on average. That is, the
probability that such an accident will occur is about 0.5 percent each year. Of course, such
estimates entail many uncertainties. And they do not take into account external events such as
earthquakes and fires, or accidents occurring during shutdown. The probability of a core meltdown
from external events is roughly comparable to that from a plant malfunction.109 Thus, the overall
probability of a meltdown could be roughly double the cited estimate. This suggests that we can
expect a severe accident to occur within the existing fleet every 100 years on average. If the
United States were to significantly increase the number of reactors, vendors and owners would
have to reduce the average probability of a meltdown to merely maintain todays level of risk. For
example, if the number of U.S. reactors doubled or tripled, the probability of a meltdown would
need to fall by 5066 percent to break even. To reduce the risk of a meltdown in the larger fleet,
the average probability would need to fall by a factor of more than two or three. However, the
NRCs long-standing policy is not to require that.
More reactors increase the risk of melt-downs

Odds of a major nuclear accident are on the order of 1 in 10,000 reactor-years. Operation of some 2,000 reactors
(1500 new plus 440 existing) could result in a Chernobyl-scale nuclear accident as frequently as every five years
a price the world is not likely to be willing to pay. Reactors of similar designs likely would close following a
major accident, making nuclear power a risky proposition as a climate solution. And more reactors means more
potential terrorist targets.
134
Accident Impact Kills Nuclear

An accident will collapse the nuclear industry
Time South Pacific, 2008, February 21, p. 48-51 Forget Chernobyl
But even the most optimistic proponent of atomic energy knows that another accident could halt the industry's
growth. In 1974, President Richard Nixon predicted that the U.S. would have 1,000 plants in operation by the
end of the century. Then came the disasters at Three Mile Island in Pennsylvania in 1979 and Chernobyl in
1986. By the turn of the millennium, only 104 plants were operating in the U.S.
A nuclear accident will reverse any nuclear revival
The important thing to remember about safety is this: The entire nuclear power industry is vulnerable to the safety standards
of its worst performers, because an accident anywhere in the world would stoke another antinuclear backlash among the
public and investors. There's also the question of waste disposal. Proponents of nuclear power say disposal of the industry's
waste products is a political problem. That's true. But it doesn't make the problem any less real. California, for instance,
won't allow construction of more plants until the waste issue is resolved.
135
Accident Impact -- Deaths

Accident will kill 10s of thousands
An operating nuclear power plant contains a large amount of radioactive material,

and an accident that results in the release of this material could cause significant
harm to people and the environment. People exposed to high levels of radiation
will die or suffer other health consequences within days or weeks. Lower radiation
levels can cause cell damage that will eventually lead to cancer, which may not
appear for years or even decades. People may need to be permanently evacuated
from areas contaminated with radiation. The costs of evacuation and
environmental remediation, and those of the loss of usable land, could be
enormous. Radioactivity released by a severe accident could lead to the death of
tens of thousands of people, injure many thousands of others, contaminate large
areas of land, and cost billions of dollars.
Chernobyl has resulted in 40,000 cancer deaths
The worst nuclear power accident the world has seen was the 1986 explosion and
fire at the Chernobyl Unit 4 reactor in the Ukraine, and the resulting dispersal of
radioactive material over western areas of the Soviet Union and much of Europe. 10
The accident contaminated a region of 10,000 square kilometers (half the size of
New Jersey), and required the evacuation of more than 100,000 people and the
permanent relocation of 220,000 people. The accident has resulted in roughly
4,000 cases of thyroid cancers in people who were children or in utero during the
accident, and will cause an estimated 60,000 cancers and 40,000 cancer deaths
overall.
As Many as 90,000 died from Chernobyl
Devastating, experts say. When reactor number four at Chernobyl spewed radiation levels 100 times as
strong as Hiroshima's fallout, plans for new plants were shelved across the globe and many politicians,
particularly those in Europe, pushed to phase out nuclear power. Chernobyl was decommissioned,
but the health impactat least 4,000 deaths from radiation-related illnesses, the UN Chernobyl
Forum estimates, not including mental illnesses stemming from displacement, high divorce rates,
and depressionremains a serious concern twenty years later. Greenpeace, in a new report,
136
disputes the UN figures and puts the number of people who may die from Chernobyl-related
illnesses as high as 90,000.
137
Accidents - - High Risk

Many near-miss nuclear accidents
Nuclear power plants have experienced scores of more minor accidents and nearmisses. These include an accident in Japan in December 1995, when the Monju
reactor leaked sodium coolant, setting off a serious fire. Sodium burns fiercely
when in contact with air and reacts violently when added to water, making it
difficult to control. A recent example of a near-miss is the 2002 discovery that the
Davis-Besse reactor in Ohio had a sizable hole in its head: only a thin skin of
stainless steel kept radioactive materials from spreading within the plant.
Continued operation for a few more months would have led to a Three Mile Islandstyle core meltdown, or worse (see Box 1).12 In fact, the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) has reported four dozen abnormal occurrences to Congress
since 1986, and notified the International Atomic Energy Agency of 18 nuclear
events since reporting began in 1992.13 While no technology can be perfectly
safe, nuclear power is an inherently risky technology, and minimizing its risks
requires stringent safety standards and practices. The United States has relatively
strong safety standards for nuclear power. However, serious safety problems
continue to arise because the NRC does not adequately enforce those standards.
Of course, accidents are not the only measure of safety, and the absence of
accidents does not necessarily indicate that there are no safety problems. The
number of U.S. reactors shut down for a year or longer to address numerous
safety problems provides strong evidence of poor safety practices and inadequate
NRC enforcement. A weak safety culture within the NRC itself prevents effective
oversight. The agency also relies on flawed approaches to assessing risks and
inspecting nuclear facilities, and its standards for preventing and mitigating
severe accidents are too low.
20% risk of a meltdown, theyll never win a 20% of solvency
Kristin Shrader-Frechette , teaches biological sciences and philosophy at the University of Notre Dame, June 23,
2008, America, Five Myths About Nuclear Energy, p. 12
The governments own data show that U.S. nuclear reactors have more than a one-in-five lifetime probability of core
melt, and a nuclear accident could kill 140,000 people, contaminate an area the size of Pennsylvania, and destroy our
homes and health
138
Accidents High Risk

Accident imminent; 20 near misses
The fact that there has not been a Chernobylscale accident at a nuclear facility in the United States does not
mean that reactors here are accident-proof or even have strong safety records. In actuality, the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) has documented nearly 200 near misses to serious reactor accidents in the US
since 1986, eight of which involved a risk of a core meltdown that was greater than one in 1,000. 118 Most
alarmingly, only one of those eight reactors was on the NRCs regulatory radar prior to the problems occurring.
While US designs use water to slow and cool the atomic chain reaction in the reactor core rather than the
graphite absorption model of the infamous reactor at Chernobyl that exploded and burned in a radioactive fire
on April 26, 1986, many US reactors continue to operate with serious design flaws and in violation of federal
safety requirements today. One top safety concern is General Electrics 24 antiquated MARK I boiling water
reactors that store highly radioactive and thermally hot nuclear fuel in densely packed storage pools located six
to ten stories up in the reactor building outside and atop the primary containment structure for the reactor vessel.
The design feature makes the GE BWR design vulnerable to rupture by an accidental heavy load drop or
penetration by a deliberate terrorist strike. While nuclear power proponents argue that there is no comparison
between Chernobyl-style RBMK reactors and western reactors with the claim that the Soviet reactor had no
containment, the containment structure for the MARK I is known to be a fundamentally flawed design. In the
words of a former chief nuclear safety director for the NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Youll find
something like a 90 percent chance of failure of the Mark I containment if challenged by a significant
accident.119 The Mark I design was later back-fit to give operators the option to deliberately vent radiation from
the containment during an accident in order to save the reactor itself. However, despite these significant safety
issues, the NRC is extending the operating licenses for these fatally flawed designs and approving extensive
power increases for aged reactors under hasty and superficial technical reviews. Other known and long standing
design flaws make the boiling water reactor fleet and other US reactor designs prone to early containment
failure in the event of an accident or successful attack.
139
Accidents High Risk

Systemic accident risks
Fresno Bee, August 7, 2008, http://www.fresnobee.com/287/story/771043.html
The nuclear disaster at the Soviet Union's Chernobyl nuclear power plant in 1986 and the near-disaster at Three
Mile Island in Pennsylvania in 1979 are reasons enough to strike nuclear power from the list of acceptable nonfossil and carbon energy sources.
The nuclear power industry has done little to nothing to improve the safety records of their plants. Just
recently, Vermont's Yankee nuclear power plant, owned by Entergy, experienced a cooling problem that
forced it to shut down 50% of its power production.
That shutdown came after repeated safety violations by the plant and a lack of adequate safety inspections. The
same scenario has played out across the country due to the infiltration of the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission by nuclear industry boosters and lawyers who have spiked and censored nuclear safety
reports by the NRC's technical staff to favor the profits of the nuclear power plant operators over public
safety interests. In 2002, a hole due to corrosion developed in the reactor lid of the Davis-Besse nuclear
plant in northwestern Ohio. The plant's operator, FirstEnergy Corp., and the NRC agreed that the
reactor lid could have blown open in 60 days had the hole not been discovered.The near-catastrophe at
the Davis-Besse reactor could have rivaled that of Three Mile Island and the impact on Cleveland and
other northern Ohio cities and towns could have been disastrous. The poor nuclear safety record of
America's nuclear power plant operators, especially during the laissez-faire regulatory holiday of the
Bush administration, has not stopped GOP presumptive presidential candidate John McCain from
waving the nuclear flag. In 2004, the Palo Verde nuclear plant, 50 miles west of Phoenix, saw two of three
units shut down due to radiation leaks from aging equipment. The NRC saw fit to approve continued
operation of the faltering plant. In addition, radioactive water was found to have leaked into ground
water around Palo Verde. Similar leaks into the water supply have been discovered at the Braidwood
nuclear power plant near Chicago. The Union of Concerned Scientists' call for a major investigation of
such leaks was ignored.
140
Accidents AT: High Safety Standards
Serious safety problems despite high standards

The United States has strong nuclear power safety standards, but serious safety problems continue to arise at
U.S. nuclear power plants because the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is not adequately enforcing the
existing standards. The NRCs poor safety culture is the biggest barrier to consistently effective oversight, and
Congress should require the NRC to bring in managers from outside the agency to rectify this problem.
141
Accidents AT: Empirically Denied

Lack of an accident doesnt deny serious safety problems
A serious nuclear power accident has not occurred in the United States since
1979, when the Three Mile Island reactor in Pennsylvania experienced a partial
core meltdown. However, the absence of serious accidents does not necessarily
indicate that safety measures and oversight are adequate. Since 1979, there
have been 35 instances in which individual reactors have shut down to restore
safety standards, and the owner has taken a year or more to address dozens or
even hundreds of equipment impairments that had accumulated over a period of
years. The most recent such shutdown occurred in 2002. These year-plus closures
indicate that the NRC has been doing a poor job of regulating the safety of power
reactors. An effective regulator would be neither unaware nor passively tolerant
of safety problems so extensive that a year or more is needed to fix them. The
most significant barrier to consistently effective NRC oversight is a poor safety
culture at the agency itself. The poor safety culture at the NRC manifests itself in
several ways. The agency has failed to implement its own findings on how to
avoid safety problems at U.S. reactors. It has failed to enforce its own regulations,
with the result that safety problems have remained unresolved for years at
reactors that have continued to operate. And it has inappropriately emphasized
adhering to schedules rather than ensuring safety. A significant number of NRC
staff members have reported feeling unable to raise safety concerns without fear
of retaliation, and a large percentage of those staff members say they have
suffered harassment or intimidation
142
Accidents AT: NRC Solves

NRCs budget is inadequate
The NRCs budget is inadequate. Congress continues to pressure the NRC to cut
its budget, so it spends fewer resources on overseeing safety. The NRC does not
have enough funding to fulfill its mandate to ensure safety while also responding
to applications to extend the licenses of existing reactors and license new ones.
Price Anderson undermines safety incentives
The Price-Anderson Act lessens incentives to improve safety. The act, just
renewed for another 20 years, severely limits the liability of owners for accidents
at nuclear power plants. This protection lessens the financial incentives for
reactor vendors to increase safety measures, and for owners to improve operating
standards.
143
Accidents Impacts
70,000 plus casualties from Chernobyl
Renewable Energy World, 2004, http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/reinsider/story?id=19012
Trivializing the reactor catastrophe at Chernobyl is part of this strategy. In DIE ZEIT 31/2004, Gerd von
Randow wrote that there have been only 40 deaths and 2000 registered cases of thyroid cancer. These figures
have been provided by advocacy organizations. Independent studies, such as the report of the Munich
Radiation Institute, have identified 70,000 casualties that include desperate suicides and the tens of
thousands of long-term victims additionally projected.
144
AT: NRC Regulations Solve

NRC enforcement ignores safety violations
Continued lack of NRC enforcement action on long standing safety violations increases the risk of the occurrence of a
significant accident involving reactor core damage and a catastrophic release of radioactivity to the environment. The
example of long standing and widespread violations of fire protection law by a majority of nuclear power plant operators is
disturbing. A fire set by a worker checking for air leaks along electrical cable trays with an open candle flame at Alabamas
Browns Ferry nuclear power station on March 22, 1975 nearly caused a catastrophic radioactive accident. In just 15
minutes, the fire destroyed 1500 cables, more than 600 of which were vital to the control of the reactor and its shutdown.
As a result, in 1980 NRC promulgated new regulations for fire protection to assure that no single fire could knock out the
control rooms ability to safely shut the reactor down in the event of fire. The law now requires that for areas in the plant
where redundant safe shutdown electrical circuits appear in the same fire zone, qualified design features are required to
protect safe shutdown cable functionality through rated time/temperature fire barrier systems or minimum separation used
in conjunction with automated fire detection and suppression systems.120 In 1989, NRC was notified that the most widely
deployed fire barrier system for such purposes in US reactors, Thermo-Lag 330-1, could not be relied upon to protect safe
reactor shutdown in the event of a significant fire. By 1992, NRC declared the system inoperable for 89 reactor units.121
NRC staff and the nuclear industry engaged in a six-year dialogue of technical meetings to bring operators back into
compliance with fire protection law. By 1998, most of the industry had entered into agreements with NRC to upgrade
inoperable fire barrier systems. However, 17 operators for 24 reactor units that had failed to enter into timely resolution
were issued orders by the federal safety agency to bring their reactors into fire safety compliance by 2000. Subsequent
inspections from 2000 through 2002 revealed that a substantially large number of reactor operators ignored their agreedupon Corrective Action Programs. Instead many operators substituted unapproved and largely unanalyzed operator manual
actions rather than fix the bogus fire barriers. In the event of a significant fire, control room operators would instead allow
unprotected electrical cables to be destroyed by the fire and send station personnel to remote plant locations to manually
operate the end piece components (valves, circuit breakers, fuses, etc.) that were required by law to be protected for control
room operation. Many of these manual actions would require workers to run a potentially hazardous gauntlet (smoke, fire,
radiation, and possible attackers) with keys, tools, ladders and respirators in a heroic effort to save the reactor from
meltdown. While design features such as fire barriers or minimum cable separation requirements can be qualified and
inspected, manual actions raise a host of uncertainties on human reliability. There is unquestionably no equivalence
between maintaining qualified passive design fire protection features and human actions. The industry efforts have
undermined reasonable assurance that vital reactor safety functions can be achieved before a meltdown could occur. While
the agreements and orders for fire protection compliance are still in effect, NRC so far has refused to take any enforcement
action for safety violations going back to 1992. Instead, the nuclear industry and NRC are seeking to amend the fire
protection law to circumvent the requirement that prioritizes qualified physical fire protection features by substituting
wholesale exemptions that rely upon these dubious operator manual actions.122 Such regulatory maneuvers would codify a
significant reduction in the defense-in-depth philosophy and set back the fire protection code for nuclear power stations to
the days before the near catastrophic Browns Ferry fire. In fact, an investigation by Nuclear Information and Resource
Service (NIRS) found that the Browns Ferry-1 reactor restarted in May 2007, after a 22-year shutdown for a host of design
safety problemsstill does not comply with federal fire protection regulations put into place because of its nearcatastrophic fire in 1975. Despite spending nearly $2 billion to bring the reactor back on line, the Tennessee Valley
Authority ignored fixing violations for the protection of safe shutdown electrical circuits and instead adopted the dubious
operator manual actions. The NRC gave its OK for the restart of the reactor under enforcement discretion for more than
100 violations with the federal fire safety law that the reactor was responsible for creating.
145

NRC and industry lack an effective safety culture
The NRC has historically fallen into a mind-set described in the post-Three Mile Island reports to the President
as being a major contributor to the accident that occurred on March 28, 1979. As the Commission investigating
the TMI accident described, We find that the NRC is so preoccupied with the licensing of plants that it has not
given primary consideration to overall safety issues With its present organization, staff and attitudes, the NRC
is unable to fulfill its responsibility for providing an acceptable level of safety for nuclear power plants. 124 NRC
safety regulation and oversight reflects a bias which all too often factors the financial interests of the nuclear
industry at the expense of reduced safety and security margins at reactors. The prioritization of corporate profit
and production margins over public health and safety margins is clearly revealed by the failings of both the
industry safety culture and NRC safety oversight to capture a near-miss accident at Ohios Davis-Besse nuclear
power station, a Three Mile Island-style Babcox & Wilcox pressurized water reactor. For years, First Energy
Nuclear Operating Corporation (FENOC), the operator of the reactor just 20 miles from Toledo, Ohio, and the
NRC onsite resident inspectors ignored clear signs of serious and ongoing corrosion of the reactor vessel
component.125 The reactor pressure vessel is an essential safety component which houses the highly radioactive
reactor core under extreme pressure (over 2000 pounds per square inch) and high temperature (approximately
600 Fahrenheit). At one point, the reactor containment building air filters had to be changed out daily because
they became clogged with iron oxide particulate (rust) floating around inside the building. A dusting of fine rust
particles routinely settled and caked onto catwalks and stairways inside the reactor building. A photograph of the
reactor pressure vessel taken by FENOC and given to NRC inspectors in April 2000 at the end of a regularly
scheduled inspection, maintenance and refueling outage showed lava-like formations of red rust flowing off the
top of the reactor vessel head. In 2001, NRC staff became aware that inspections at six of the seven Babcox &
Wilcox reactors operating in the US had revealed age-related cracking of stainless steel penetration sleeves in
the reactor pressure vessel head where control rods pass through the 7-inch thick structure. Only Davis-Besse
had not been inspected for cracking of the sleeves. Fearing that if the crack were to go completely through the
sleeves wall that the intense internal pressure could eject a control rod like a missile, the staff determined that
this was an unacceptable safety risk and began drafting an Order for the early shutdown of the reactor for the
necessary inspections. FENOC objected vigorously to NRC effort for the early shutdown. Within just a matter of
days before the Order was to be issued to FENOC to anticipate the date of the refueling shutdown, a NRC senior
manager met with FENOCs president of operations. According to documents obtained by NIRS through the
Freedom of Information Act, NRC was asked to consider, among other things, the adverse impact on the
financial markets for FENOC and was requested not to issue the early shutdown Order.126 NRC withdrew the
Order for December shutdown in a compromise deal with FENOC to shutdown in February. When the company
conducted the NRC requested inspection, they not only discovered cracking in several of the control rod
penetration sleeves but severe corrosion of the vessel head from caustic borated reactor coolant leaking through
the cracks that had dripped down onto the vessel head over the course of several years. The concentrated and
molten boron had eaten a cavity completely through the 6 -inch steel outer carbon steel shell all the way down
to a thin corrosive-resistant stainless steel inner liner of the vessel. As the load bearing outer shell was eaten
away, the stainless steel liner was bulging out from the internal pressure like the inner tube on a bald bicycle tire,
ready to burst. Had the vessel burst, a jet of reactor coolant would have escaped out of the top with such force as
to create a significant debris field that would have clogged the reactor building sump systems designed to
recirculate the water for the emergency core cooling system. The result likely would have been a Loss of
Coolant Accident (LOCA) followed by the collapse of the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS), an
accident that would likely have surpassed the Three Mile Island Unit 2 partial meltdown in 1979. Investigative
146

reports by both the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) 127 and the NRC Office of the
Inspector General128 concluded that NRC had failed to maintain adequate safety oversight of the severely
damaged reactor in a number of critical aspects. NRC did not have complete and accurate information on the
condition of the reactor and completely misidentified Davis-Besse as a good performer. The agency did not
view years of accumulated evidence of a significant corrosion problem as an immediate safety concern.
Contrary to NRC safety goals, NRC allowed an at-risk reactor to continue to operate far beyond the need for
timely safety-related inspections and established reactor coolant leak rate requirements. Senior management at
NRC ignored the studied judgment of its technical staff to consider the financial impacts of early shutdown for
safety reasons. Moreover, NRC appears to have informally established an unreasonably high burden of
requiring absolute proof of a safety problem, versus lack of reasonable assurance of maintaining public health
and safety, before it will act to shut down a power plant. 129 According to an Argonne National Lab report issued
to the NRC in 2004, Davis-Besse came to within as close as two months but most certainly within the next 24
month operational cycle before bursting the all important reactor pressure vessel. 130 The near-accident at the
Davis-Besse reactor demonstrated the eroded safety culture at reactors when both the utility and the NRC
shunted aside warnings and opportunities to catch the advanced corrosion in the vessel-head that could have
caused a major accident.131 As a matter of practice, the NRC and nuclear utilities do not have measures in place
to learn from past accidents, nor do they maintain an effective and rigorous inspection regime. A recent report by
the Union of Concerned Scientists has shown that of the 104 nuclear power reactors in the United States, severe
problems have caused 41 to shut down for a year or longer, with some registering multiple shut-downs. 132 Such
extended shutdowns reveal the degree to which cumulative decay and unattended maintenance issues allow
safety margins to deteriorate to levels so low that reactor operations must cease altogether. Thus, industry
proposals to extend the operating licenses and increase power output represent serious and unacceptable safety
hazards. Further, a recent GAO report stated that despite industry assurances, oversight of safety procedures at
the nations 104 operating nuclear plants warrants aggressive attention from federal regulators, and described the
NRC as slow to react to the deteriorating conditions of some plants.133 Therefore, the evidence suggests that
safety and security efforts by the NRC and the industry should be the subject of serious Congressional oversight.
In fact, the NRCs predecessor, the AEC, was abolished and reorganized as the NRC for less egregious acts.
147

Reactors vulnerable to terrorist attacks
In the wake of September 11th, NRC has trivialized the vulnerability of nuclear power plants to deliberate and
malicious acts of sabotage. The findings of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States
(also known as the 9-11 Commission) revealed that the original Al-Qaeda plan was to hijack ten domestic
commercial aircraft and fly two of them into nuclear power stations. 134 Still, the NRC has entrenched itself in a
ruling and an order that domestic terrorism directed against US reactors is so remote and speculative that it
has disallowed any public licensing hearings on the vulnerabilities and consequences of such an attack. 135 This
posture resulted in a June 2006 decision in the Ninth Circuit where the court ruled that the NRC erred in its
determination that the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) does not mandate formal public hearings of
the potential impacts of a terrorist attack at nuclear facilities. 136 The Ninth Circuit decision to hold such hearings
under NEPA was upheld when the US Supreme Court refused to hear the appeal by the industry and NRC. 137
However, the Commission and the industry continue to oppose due process through public licensing hearings on
reactor vulnerabilities and consequences in other federal court districts. The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI)
continues to aggressively target policy makers in Washington and the general public alike with high-budget ad
campaigns declaring that nuclear facilities are secure. In 2002, NEI sponsored a series of ads in Washington,
D.C. which featured security officers standing guard outside of a nuclear facility with automatic weapons in
hand. Titles of these ads included Serious Business, Tough Enough? You Bet and Vigilant. All six of these
ads promoted the readiness of nuclear facilities in preventing terrorism. 138 However, according to the Project on
Government Oversight, guards at twentyfour reactors nationwide say that morale is very low and that they are
under-equipped, under-manned, and underpaid.139 Moreover, the report concludes that neither utilities nor the
NRC are making appropriate security modifications at reactors since September 11 th. In fact, a 1982 technical
memorandum published by Argonne National Laboratory, Evaluation of Aircraft Crash Hazards for Nuclear
Power Plants, which is now suppressed by NRC as sensitive information, concluded that the current fleet of
US nuclear power stations was never designed, constructed nor analyzed and evaluated for aircraft crash
hazards. US reactors were licensed on the low probability, given such factors as pilot actions to avoid a crash
into a nuclear power station, the location of nuclear power stations out of the direct take off and landing flight
paths and air traffic factors, that the risk of an accidental aircraft crash was acceptable. The agency and the
industry never considered a deliberate and malicious attack using aircraft of any sort. The technical report,
available in public document rooms around the country until shortly after the September 11th attacks, identified a
number of disturbing facts pertinent to national security: The major threats associated with an
aircraft crash are the impact loads resulting from the collision of the aircraft with power
plant structures and components and the thermal and/or overpressure effects which can
arise due to the ignition of the fuel carried by the aircraft. It appears that for all US
plants currently under construction it has been found that it is not necessary to require
containments designed to take the impact of a large commercial jet aircraft. This
practice is contrasted by the experience in the Federal Republic of Germany where it has
been found necessary to design essentially all nuclear containments to withstand the
crash of certain types of military and commercial aircraft. Based on the review of past
licensing experience, it appears that fire and explosion hazards have been treated with
less care than the direct aircraft impact and the resulting structural response. Therefore,
the claim that these fire/explosion effects do not represent a threat to nuclear power
plant facilities has not been clearly demonstrated. 140 The claim is often made by industry and
NRC that reactors are the best defended industrial facilities in the nations civilian infrastructure. However, prior
148

to September 11th, such claims were not supported by the evidence. NRC conducted site security evaluations
through mock terrorist attacks at nuclear plants only once every eight years to detect vulnerabilities. Utilities
were given six months advance notice of the mock attack and a night before review of table top exercises using
the attack scenarios to be acted out. Often, reactor operators temporarily bolstered their security forces in
anticipation of the exercise. Still, NRC inspectors found a significant weakness 46 percent of the time that
enabled a small team of mock attackers to infiltrate the reactors and successfully attack key components to cause
the core to melt with probable radioactive releasesthe equivalent of what the head of the NRC security
evaluation team described as an American Chernobyl. 141 These security deficiencies were largely correlated
with industry cost considerations for what was determined to be reasonably affordable security infrastructure.
The same security claims by NRC and industry that nuclear power stations are better defended following the
September 11th attacks are further unsubstantiated by a report to Congress in 2006 by the GAO. The GAO in its
report to the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations, US House
Committee on Government Reform, found that NRC staff recommendations to raise defense requirements
around nuclear power stations were watered down by the Commission after protests from the Nuclear Energy
Institute. While the NRC staff had recommended that nuclear power station security be augmented to defend
against such weapons as rocket propelled grenades, 50-caliber rifles using armorpiercing and incendiary
munitions and larger truck bombs, the industry rejected the increases because it would be prohibitively
expensive.142 According to interviews conducted in 2002 with 20 guards at 24 reactors, guards at only a quarter
of the plants believed they were adequately prepared to defend against a terrorist attack. 143 Even more troubling
than poor performance in the past, after the attacks of September 11th the NRC suspended force-on-force tests
until October 2004, and has declined to make results public under claims of national security protection. 144
Many reactors also remain vulnerable from the water, primarily through cooling water intake structures.
Available technologies, such as inflated cylinders of a rubber-coated textile, linked together or to a mooring
buoy to form a security barrier around an exclusion zone, could be used to thwart small-boat terrorist attacks and
are being deployed at several Naval bases, but have not been mandated for installation at vulnerable nuclear
plants. Despite claims of security improvements, the high degree to which nuclear plants are vulnerable to
terrorist attack is apparent.
NRC doesnt regulate it just protects the nuclear industry

Richard Webster, director, Environmental Law Center, July 16, 2008, Testimony,
http://www.nirs.org/reactorwatch/licensing/20080710testimonyrenrcreform.pdf
There is mounting evidence that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has forgotten its mandate to guard public
safety, and, like the Atomic Energy Commission before it, has become a promoter of the nuclear industry.
Flawed safety oversight at old nuclear facilities combined with very narrow scope relicensing reviews and
procedures and practices that hinder public participation are leading to a loss of confidence in the NRC
149

NRC safety review is a failure
A few dramatic recent events illustrate that the NRC`s current approach to safety has serious flaws. In 2002, severe
corrosion on the top of the reactor pressure vessel caused the Davis-Besse reactor near Cleveland to come within months of
a melt down. The NRC Office of the Inspector General (`ÒIG``) concluded that by allowing the plant to operate beyond a
deadline for fixing the problem, the agency had placed the economic interests of the plant owner above the safety of the
public. In addition, the OIG found that NRC had `ìnformally established an unreasonably high burden of requiring
absolute proof of a safety problem`` instead of acting when the licensee can no longer affirmatively show that safety is
reasonably assured. A 2002 survey showed that 47% of the NRC`s employees are afraid to speak out about safety issues
because they fear doing so would jeopardize their jobs, and that employees were concerned that pressure from industry is
greatly undermining the agency`s ability to oversee safety. In 2003, the Witt report regarding the evacuation plan at Indian
Point highlighted many flaws in that plan. In 2005, a National Academy of Sciences Report for Congress showed that the
NRC had failed to adequately assess the huge risk of storing spent fuel in elevated pools that are vulnerable to terrorist
attack. The consequences of a spent fuel pool fire would be enormous. For example, estimates show that one fuel pool fire
could cause 24,000 lung cancers and economic damage that would be three times that caused by hurricane Katrina. Even
though it is privy to safeguards information that the NRC claims has resolved this issue, the State of New Jersey has stated
that the spent fuel pool at the Oyster Creek plant is a ``major security concern.`` In August of last year, a cooling tower cell
at the Vermont Yankee plant completely collapsed. In October, a video showing sleeping guards at the Peach Bottom
nuclear plant aired on national television. Most recently, a GAO study showed that the NRC has failed to resolve fire safety
issues for over fifteen years. Because the NRC has failed to take decisive action, one NRC Commissioner believes the
current regulations fail to deal with fire safety in an appropriate manner. Two of the three relicensing proceedings that have
commenced to date have also revealed major flaws in the current oversight process. First, during the discovery process in
the Oyster Creek proceeding, the intervenors discovered that the thickness measurements that the NRC and the licensee had
used to show safety for ten years were systematically wrong so that the containment was thinner than those results showed.
Then, in August last year, the NRC Staff concluded that the containment at the Oyster Creek did not meet the required
safety standards, but instead of taking any action, they amended the testimony and attempted to waive the standard. This
was later found to be completely unjustified. AmerGen Energy Co. LLC (License Renewal for the Oyster Creek Nuclear
Generating Station), LBP-07-17, 66 NRC 327 at n. 20 (2007). Second, in April of this year, it became clear that the NRC
Staff had approved license renewal at nine plants based on non-conservative calculations regarding metal fatigue. This issue
only came to light because a citizens` group raised it in the Vermont Yankee relicensing proceeding. Multiple citizens`
groups have also shown that the NRC`s relicensing safety reviews rely excessively upon unchecked licensee summary
documents, and that the NRC Staff prematurely destroyed the working documents showing in detail how the safety review
at Oyster Creek was conducted. Furthermore, in a recent audit of the relicensing process, OIG highlighted that NRC`s
relicensing safety reviews suffered from a lack of quality control and were inconsistent in terms of thoroughness. In
addition, the safety review of the Oconee plant stated that Staff had verified adequate performance of the coating system,
when problems with coating failures were well known to the NRC. In a follow up memorandum, the OIG found that
because the Staff had destroyed their working papers after each review was complete, it is very difficult to verify in detail
how well the safety reviews were carried out.
150

Judicial rulings prove the NRC isnt protecting safety
Few NRC regulatory decisions are scrutinized by the adjudicatory arm of the NRC, the Atomic Safety
and Licensing Board (`ÀSLB``), but in the proceedings that have occurred, some judges within the
ASLB have been critical of the how the NRC Staff has been approaching safety issues. For example,
one judge recently raised questions about the safety culture of the NRC Staff stating that the approach
taken to two issues ``may be symptomatic of safety culture deficiencies, and thus raise a serious
question about a foundation of nuclear safety - the culture of the government organization responsible
for promoting it.`` Shaw Areva MOX Services (Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility, LBP-08-10 at
44 (Concurring Opinion of Judge Farrar, June 27, 2008). Although the judge stated that an alternative
explanation could be that the NRC Staff behavior in that proceeding was `àberrational,`` other
proceedings confirm that it was not. For example in the relicensing proceeding regarding the Oyster
Creek power plant in New Jersey the Staff announced that that the safety of the containment vessel
should not be judged by whether it meets the engineering code. In another recent case, the ASLB found
that the NRC Staff had exhibited a ``more than casual attitude`` regarding the safety of the public
living close to a site where piles of radioactive wastes had been left uncovered for ten years after the
plant stopped handling radioactive materials. Shieldalloy Metallurgical Group Corp. (Licensing
Amendment Request for Decommissioning of the Newfield, New Jersey Facility), LBP-08-08 at 13-14
(June 2, 2008). The Board found that residents who might be affected by groundwater contamination
were entitled to greater consideration. In yet another proceeding, the ASLB found ``many instances``
in which ``the technical portions of the Staff documents in the record (particularly the SER [safety
evaluation report] and to some degree, the EIS [environmental impact statement]) did not support a
finding that the Staff`s review supported its decisions.`` Exelon Generation Co., LLC (Early Site
Permit for Clinton ESP Site), LBP-06-28, 64 NRC 460, 474-75 (2006). It also noted that the Board`s
``confidence in the Staff`s judgment would have been materially improved had the more important of
those facts [the Staff`s factual findings] been checked.`` The ASLB stated that it did not conduct
further enquiries into these issues because it felt bound by a Commission instruction to defer to the
NRC Staff. Without that instruction from the Commission, the ASLB would have conducted `à much
more probing review`` into the quality of the review and reporting.
NRC supports the industry, doesnt regulate
"The NRC falls all over itself to facilitate the industry," says Ray Shadis, a consultant who has worked for both
environmental groups and on NRC panels and research projects. The Project on Government Oversight and
other watchdog groups point to a revolving door between the commission's staff and the nuclear industry. To
take just one example, in 2007 former commissioner Jeffrey Merrifield joined the Shaw Group after spending
his last months on the commission pushing to ease restrictions for precisely the type of construction activities
that were the Shaw Group's specialty.
151

NRC doesnt provide or require adequate safety
The Davis-Besse incident puts into sharp relief a history of regulatory neglect that goes back for
decades. The Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) has counted 47 incidents since 1979 in which the
NRC failed to adequately address issues at nuclear power plants--until the troubles got so bad the
plants had to be shut down for repairs. In some cases, "the NRC allowed reactors with known safety
problems to continue operating for months, sometimes years, without requiring owners to fix the
problems." There's evidence, too, that the commission has tolerated serious lapses in security, even
after 9/11. In March 2007, an anonymous whistleblower wrote a letter to the NRC claiming that guards
at Exelon's Peach Bottom plant in Pennsylvania were "coming into work exhausted after working
excessive overtime" and thus "sleeping on duty at an alarming rate." The NRC ignored the letter until a
guard videotaped the naps in progress and WCBS in New York aired the tape. The Project on
Government Oversight claims a skilled infiltrator would need just 45 seconds to penetrate the area
where Peach Bottom stores its spent fuel. The corporation that provides those sleepy guards,
Wackenhut, has also been accused of cheating on security exercises: One DOE inspector general's
report found that in 2003 guards had been tipped off in advance about security drills at a government
nuclear facility in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. The same year, Wackenhut was fired from Entergy's Indian
Point plant in New York after guards there admitted they had been improperly armed and trained.
152
AT: New NRC Says Reactors Are Safe

New plants are not safer or cheaper
A key component of the proposed nuclear renaissance involves the drive for what is being called Generation
IV reactor designs, which are purported to be inherently safer, less expensive to build and more fuel efficient.
However, it is important to note that these designs are unproven, making promised delivery time and cost
unfounded. In the case of one Generation IV design, promised cost advantages would be achieved by replacing
the steel-lined, reinforced-concrete containment structures currently employed at most US reactors with less
costly and a far less robust enclosure structure in spite of warnings from the NRCs own Advisory Committee on
Reactor Safeguards, which described this costadvantage as a major safety trade-off. 157 Proposed fast breeder
reactors have a history of monumental safety lapses, accidental releases of radiation, extended shut-downs and
exorbitant costs which has lead ultimately to the majority of them being forced into early closure. Most
concerning, these reactors also come with the increased possibility of prompt criticality accidents. 158
According to the US DOE, actual construction costs for reactors built between 1966 and 1977 were generally
three times higher than projected.159 Reactors that came later were even more expensive. Industry plans for
nuclear power expansion are staked on uncertain resources and technologies from the unknown availability of
high grade uranium ore reserves and fuel fabrication processes to reactor facilities and long term nuclear waste
disposition. There is no techno-fix for nuclear power, and promises of future developments are not a sound basis
for investment. The unavoidable truth is that nuclear technology is inherently dangerous. A sober look at the
course of nuclear technology reveals a history wrought with uncertainty, compound risk factors, unpredictable
accidents and ample opportunities for disaster. Billions have been invested in researching new, better, so called
safer nuclear technologies, and yet we have made scant progress toward accident risk abatement, waste
disposal and public health provision. No other energy source has such extreme and prevalent safety risks and
there are a wealth of renewable energy sources and efficiency innovations available without these attendant
dangers.
153

New reactors will burn unsafe fuel
New Scientist, April 12, 2008, p. 9 New Nuclear Fuel Becomes Too Hot to Handle
The next generation of nuclear plants will bring a further step-change. Applications for the
construction of 30 reactors in the US and 10 in the UK are expected over the next few years, and plans
for the two designs most likely to be built - Westinghouse's AP1000 and Areva's European Pressurised
Reactor - envisage burn-up rates of 60 GWd/tU or more. At these rates, uranium fuel rods should burn
for around a year longer than today's best burn-up fuel. Such gains may come at a price. Last month, at
conferences in Washington DC and Rockville, Maryland, organised by the US Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC), a team led by Michael Billone at Argonne National Laboratory in Illinois
presented findings on the behaviour of high burn-up fuel. They say that fuels with a burn-up above 45
GWd/tU cause previously unforeseen safety problems, and would break existing NRC safety rules
unless changes are made to the way fuel elements are packaged. The danger would come if there were
a sudden loss of cooling water - as in the accident that led to the partial meltdown of a reactor core at
Three Mile Island, Pennsylvania, in 1979. To contain the radioactivity in such an event, it is crucial
that the fuel rods and their zirconium alloy cladding maintain their integrity as they are doused with
cold water from the emergency cooling system. If the cladding has become brittle, the rods may split
open and leak plutonium and other radioactive material into the reactor building. Even during normal
operation, cooling water corrodes the surface of the cladding by reacting with zirconium to form
zirconium oxide. The NRC's rules require that the corroded layer must not amount to more than 17 per
cent of the thickness of the cladding. Billone and colleagues say that where high burn-up fuels are
used, this rule is not stringent enough. When they put different types of cladding used for fuel with a
burn-up above 45 GWd/tU through a series of tests designed to simulate a loss-of-coolant incident,
they found they all became brittle before oxidation had reached the 17 per cent limit. They attribute
this enhanced brittleness to the increased amounts of hydrogen released by high burn-up fuels during
normal reactor operation. The gas is gradually absorbed into the cladding, where it increases the
solubility of oxygen. Between 650 C and 1200 C, this can trigger "breakaway oxidation" of
zirconium, making it rapidly more brittle in an emergency. Fuels operating at 60 GWd/tU would
produce around 40 per cent more hydrogen than existing high burn-up fuels.
154

NRC allows reactors with known safety problems to operate
Thus, a particularly useful measure of nuclear power safety practices is the

duration of shutdowns used to address safety problems. A recent Union of
Concerned Scientists (UCS) report found 36 instances since 1979 in which the
NRC shut down reactors to restore minimal safety standards and the owner took a
year or more to address dozens or even hundreds of accumulated equipment
problems (see Figure 6).24 The most recent such instance was the 2002 outage at
the Davis-Besse plant in Ohio, which remained shut down for almost two years.
Had these relatively minor problems been addressed in a timely fashion, this
extensive shutdown could have been avoided. Case studies of year-plus outages
developed for this report found commendable NRC behavior, such as with the
Turkey Point Unit 3 outage in 1981, the Nine Mile Point Unit 1 outage in 1982, and
the Sequoyah Units 1 and 2 outages in 1985.25 In these cases, the NRC compelled
reactor operators to resolve safety problems in a timely manner. The NRCs worst
performance occurred in conjunction with the 1984 outage at San Onofre Unit 1 in
California, the 1993 outage at Indian Point Unit 3 in New York, the 1996 outages
at Millstone Units 2 and 3 in Connecticut, and the 2002 outage at Davis-Besse in
Ohio. In these cases, the NRC allowed reactors with known safety problems to
continue operating for months, sometimes years, without requiring owners to fix
the problems. On balance, these year-plus shutdowns indicate that the NRC has
been doing a poor job of regulating the safety of power reactors. An effective
regulator would be neither unaware nor passively tolerant of safety problems so
extensive that a year or more is needed to fix them.
155

NRC has a poor safety culture
According to the NRC, the safety culture of a nuclear plant reflects the willingness
of its staff to raise and document safety issues, resolve these issues promptly,
make conservative decisions, and conduct probing self-assessments.
However, the NRC itself lacks a strong safety culture, and that is the most
significant barrier to improving nuclear power oversight. The NRC will not permit a
nuclear reactor to run if it believes the staff operates in a poor safety culture. The
NRC usually requires plant owners to take remedial steps when surveys find that
10 percent or more of workers in a department are reluctant to raise safety
concerns. The NRC did not permit the Millstone and Davis-Besse reactors to
restart until their safety cultures had been restored to acceptable levels. At the
time, some 20 percent and 15 percent of the work force, respectively, was
reluctant to raise safety concerns.26 Yet the NRC has failed to remedy problems
with its own safety culture. For example, in a 2002 survey by the agencys Office
of the Inspector General, nearly 50 percent of NRC staffers reported feeling
unable to raise concerns about safety at nuclear power plants without fear of
retaliation.27 In the inspector generals 2005 survey, this unease remained a
significant problem.28 Since 2002, the NRC and Congress have focused on how to
better manage safety culture at nuclear plant sites but have paid little attention
to the poor safety culture afflicting the NRC. In fact, the NRC has stopped
conducting surveys of its own staff and making the results available.29 These
assessments of the NRC safety culture are consistent with the calls UCS has
received from NRC staffers. We have heard numerous accounts of NRC managers
instructing inspectors not to find any safety problems during upcoming visits to
nuclear plants, telling inspectors not to write up safety problems that they do
find, and ignoring the written objections of the agencys own experts when
making safety decisions.30
NRC doesnt implement its findings
One manifestation of the NRCs poor safety culture is its failure to implement its
own findings on how to avoid safety problems. The 2002 near-miss of a reactor
meltdown and containment breach at the Davis-Besse nuclear plant in Ohio
provides a striking example. After this regulatory breakdown, the NRC tabulated
156

lessons from regulatory breakdowns that led to year-plus outages at Indian Point (2000), Millstone (1997),
and South Texas Project (1995) that had not yet been implemented.31 The agency concluded that its failure
to implement these lessons contributed to the Davis-Besse breakdown. One such lesson was not to rely too
heavily on unverified commitments by plant owners to take specific steps. Yet as of January 2005, more than
two years after Davis-Besse, the NRC had not yet implemented nearly 25 percent of the high-priority
lessons from that incident.32 (All but one of the 49 recommendations have since been implemented.)
157

NRC doesnt enforce safety regulations
Another symptom of the NRCs poor safety culture is its failure to enforce its own
regulations, with the result that safety problems have remained unresolved for
years at reactors that have continued to operate. One example is the Hope Creek
nuclear plant in New Jersey.33 In 1996, the NRC fined PSEG, Hope Creeks owner,
$150,000 for failing to properly maintain and test the system for driving the
control rods. This system functions as the brakes on the reactor core, shutting
down the nuclear chain reaction during both routine and emergency situations.
PSEG did not fix the problem, and the NRC again fined the company for the same
problem in 1998. PSEG still did not fix the problems but continued to operate
Hope Creek. In 2004 an industry team brought in by PSEG concluded that staff
and management do not always demonstrate a healthy respect for reactor core
reactivity, and noted a number of significant reactivity vulnerabilities overall. 34
Finally, in fall 2005, PSEG extended an outage to resolve some of the problems
with the drive system. A second example of the NRC tolerating known safety
violations is the Shearon Harris nuclear plant in North Carolina. Beginning in 1997
and regularly thereafter, NRC inspectors found non-compliances with fire
protection regulations at the plant. After eight futile years of trying to restore
compliance, the company informed the NRC in 2005 that it would give up that
effort and instead attempt to bring the plant into compliance with alternate fire
protection regulations the NRC had adopted in 2004. The company informed the
agency that it might be able to meet these alternate regulations in 200912
years after the NRC first documented that Harris was in violation.
158

NRC has a flawed approach to addressing safety issues
Flawed Approach to Assessing the Risks of Generic Safety Issues When an

actual or potential safety problem affectsor could affectmore than a single
nuclear plant, the NRC labels it a generic safety issue, and, until it is resolved,
treats it separately from safety problems that are unique to individual plants. That
is, during this period, the NRC assesses the risk associated with the generic safety
issue by assuming that all other plant systems are fully functional and reliable. It
also assesses the safety risk at individual reactors by assuming that the generic
safety problem does not exist.40 The NRC usually has 6 to 10 generic safety issues
open at any given time, and often takes more than a decade to rectify these
problems. In the interim, these unresolved safety issues may increase the
likelihood of an accident, or worsen its consequences. Yet the NRCs approach
prevents it from accurately assessing the overall risk from an unresolved generic
safety issue that occurs along with another safety problem. A long-standing
generic safety problem related to the emergency pumps of U.S. pressurized-water
reactors (PWRs), a type of light-water reactor, illustrates the folly of this
approach.41 In 1979, the NRC determined that steam and water flowing through a
broken pipe during an accident could dislodge pipe insulation and equipment
coatings, which could clog the emergency pumps needed to cool the reactor core.
The NRC closed this issue in 1985 without requiring any operating PWR to fix, or
even assess, the problem. (It did require new reactors to address the safety
problem before operating.) In 1996, the NRC reopened the issue after several
nuclear plants in the United States and abroad actually experienced clogged
emergency pumps, as forecast nearly two decades earlier. Fortunately, none of
these situations occurred under accident conditions, where the consequences
could have been catastrophic. In 2001, the owner of the Oconee nuclear plant in
South Carolina notified the NRC that it had discovered cracked and leaking pipes
harbingers of the scenario in which debris could block emergency pumps during
an accident. This problem affected 69 operating U.S. power reactors. Yet the NRC
analyzed the emergency pump problem by assuming that there was a very low
probability that a pipe would crack, and analyzed the problem of cracked and
leaking pipes by assuming a very low probability that the emergency pump would
fail. Thus the NRC allowed the Oconee reactor to continue operating without
resolving how to prevent debris from blocking the emergency pumps, despite
knowing that the reactor had cracked pipes that could produce such debris. This
159
flawed decision making contributed to the near-disaster at Davis-Besse, a sister

plant of Oconee. Of the plants afflicted with cracked and leaking pipes, the NRC
staff determined Davis- Besse to be the most vulnerable, and drafted an order
requiring the plant to shut down. However, NRC managers decided not to issue
the order, largely based on the ability of emergency pumps to respond in the
event that cracked pipes triggered an accident. When Davis-Besse shut down for
refuelling, workers found significant damage to the reactor vessel head from the
cracked pipes and significant impairment of the emergency pumps. By evaluating
these two risks in isolation, the NRC underestimated the overall risk of continuing
to operate the reactor.
160

NRC uses flawed risk analysis
The NRC and the nuclear industry use probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs) for a
variety of purposes. PRAs are calculations first developed in the NRCs Reactor
Safety Study of 1975 (a.k.a. the Rasmussen report).46 For example, because
inspecting every inch of piping in a nuclear reactor is not feasible, PRAs are used
to determine which portions of pipe are at greatest risk of failure, or would cause
the most damage if a failure occurred, and hence should receive priority. PRAs are
also used to assess the possibility that multiple safety systems might fail and
cause a reactor meltdown. For example, when a safety problem is discovered, the
NRC and the nuclear industry use PRAs to assess the risk that a specific accident
(such as a pipe breaking or a power supply failing) would occur, and that safety
systems would fail to cool the reactor core in the event of such an accident. (If the
reactor core is not adequately cooled, the fuel will melt; the molten material can
lead to a rupture of the reactor vessel, a breach of the containment structure, and
a release of radioactivity into the environment.) In 1995 the NRC decided to base
its decisions on PRAs rather than safety regulations to the maximum extent
possible.47 Under this ruling, the NRC can allow reactors to continue operating
while in violation of regulations when a risk study concludes that the probability of
an accident is very low. For example, if regulations required periodic testing of a
certain component, and this componentby mistakehad not been tested during
the last inspection, regulations would require the owner to shut down the reactor
for the overdue test. However, under the new rule, if the component had
performed well during prior tests, and these tests confirmed that the backup
system would function if needed, PRAs could support a decision to allow the
reactor to continue to operate until the next planned shutdown. Used
appropriately, PRAs can be a valuable tool. However, the NRC, its inspector
general and Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS), the Government
Accountability Office (GAO), and UCS have documented serious problems with the
agencys risk assessments, including omission of key data, inconsistent
assumptions and methodology, and inadequate quality standards. 48 The ACRS
pointed out in 2003 that a survey of NRC staff found that most staff interviewees
believe that the reluctance of the industry to improve the scope and quality of the
PRAs is a major impediment to the advancement of riskinformed regulation. 49 A
seriously flawed risk assessment was at the core of the NRCs 2001 decision to
allow the Davis-Besse nuclear plant to continue operating for six weeks until a
161
scheduled refueling outage, despite numerous safety problems and regulatory

violations. A May 2004 GAO report concluded that the NRCs risk analysis for
Davis-Besse was poorly documented and inadequately understood by NRC staff,
and that a proper risk analysis would have provided clear guidance for prompt
shutdown. The GAO also found that the risks from continued operation were
likely unacceptably large, and that the NRCs use of these risk assessments is
ill-defined.50 The NRC has not yet resolved these documented problems.
162
AT: Safeguards Solve

Inadequate safeguards to protect against severe accidents
Inadequate Standards for Protection against Severe Accidents Todays

generation of nuclear reactors was designed and licensed according to their
ability to withstand design-basis accidents. The worst such accident as
defined by the NRCinvolves partial melting of the reactor core, but not rupture
of the reactor vessel or breach or bypass of the containment building. Thus
reactors that conform to the design basis may still be vulnerable to beyonddesign-basisor severeaccidents, in which substantial damage to the
reactor core and failure of the containment building lead to large releases of
radiation. The NRC has no regulatory criteria governing the maximum acceptable
risk of severe accidents. However, in 1986, the agency ruled in its Severe
Accident Policy Statement that the risk of such an accidentas determined by a
PRA for each plant was acceptably low for most operating plants, and that no
regulatory changes were required.51 Yet the uncertainties inherent in these PRAs
are great. They may not identify or analyze important accident sequences, and
many of the parameters they use, such as the failure frequency of a particular
component, are not known with any certainty. The NRC does require operators of
plants found to be vulnerable to severe accidents to fix their shortcomings.
However, they must do so only if a cost-benefit analysis shows that the financial
benefit of a safety backfitdetermined by assigning a dollar value to the number
of projected cancer deaths that would result from a severe accident outweighs
the cost of fixing the problem. Even when a fix is clearly cost-beneficial, the NRC
does not always require the change. For example, a detailed analysis by Sandia
National Laboratories recently showed that a class of pressurized- water reactors
with ice condenser containments was highly vulnerable to containment failure
from hydrogen explosions in the event of a total loss of electrical power. The
remedyinstalling more backup power supplieswas found to be cost-effective.
However, in the face of industry pressure, the NRC backed away from requiring
the added backup power. Instead of imposing regulatory requirements, the NRC
has dealt with the threat of severe accidents largely by encouraging the nuclear
industry to develop guidelines that would help each plant owner manage such an
accident. However, because these measures are voluntary, they are not
thoroughly vetted by the NRC to determine whether they would be feasible or
effective. The NRC also argues that its emergency planning requirements would
adequately protect the public in the event of a severe accident. The NRC requires
163
planning for evacuation, and distribution of potassium iodide (to reduce the risk of
thyroid cancer, especially in children), within an emergency planning zone extending 10
miles from a plant. However, if a severe accident occurred and the containment structure were breached,
people inside the 10-mile zone would likely receive enough radiation to immediately threaten their lives,
while people well outside the zone would be exposed to levels high enough to cause a significant risk of
cancer. These cancers could be kept to a minimum by expanding the emergency planning zone. For example,
if a severe accident occurred, it would be important to administer potassium iodide to children more than 100
miles downwind.
164
AT: New Reactors Are Safe

NRC doesnt ensure the safety of new reactors
In 1986 the NRC issued an Advanced Reactor Policy Statement holding that
advanced reactors need provide only the same level of protection as todays
generation of reactors.53 The NRC is loath to require stronger safety standards for
new reactors because that would imply that current reactors are not safe enough.
Thus its insistence that todays plants are safe is an obstacle to developing safer
ones. The NRC regulates where new nuclear power plants may be built. It bases
these regulations on limiting public exposure to radiation in the event of a designbasis accident, but does not consider the impact of severe accidents. NRC siting
regulations therefore do not take into account the consequences of a severe
accident at a plant built in a densely populated area.
165
AT: Safety Incentives Solve

Price Anderson limits liability, undermining safety incentives
Another barrier to improved safety measures and operating standards is the

Price-Anderson Act, which was enacted in 1957 to provide liability protection for
owners of nuclear power plants. The 2005 Energy Policy Act extended the PriceAnderson protections to reactors built during the next 20 years. Today each owner
must obtain at least $300 million in private insurance coverage for each nuclear
reactor. If an accident results in larger losses, the owners of other nuclear
reactors must contribute liability payouts of up to $100 million each, for a total of
about $10.4 billion. Beyond that amount, the U.S. government would presumably
establish a compensation fund to cover claims resulting from the accident, as it
does for uninsured losses resulting from natural disasters. The rationale for the
act was that private industry could not afford to operate commercial nuclear
power plants because of the unprecedented liability that could result from a
catastrophic accident. For example, the Wall Street Journal reported that the cost
of the 1986 Chernobyl accident significantly exceeded the total economic benefits
accrued from the dozens of Soviet nuclear power reactors operating between
1954 and 1986.57 In the United States, costs resulting from a large release of
radiation from a damaged nuclear reactor or spent fuel pool could exceed $100
billion, surpassing the Price-Anderson limit by a factor of 10 or more. 58 The
Institute for Nuclear Power Operations, an organization created and funded by the
nuclear industry, evaluates each plant periodically in areas such as operations,
maintenance, engineering, radiation protection, and training, and insurers use the
resulting ratings to set annual premiums. Safer, better-performing nuclear plants
pay less than those with problems. However, in 2005, the average annual
insurance premium for a single-unit reactor site was $400,000.59 That represented
only 0.2 percent of the average annual operating cost of $205 milliona drop in
the proverbial bucket.60 The Price-Anderson liability limit therefore serves as a
disincentive for industry to develop and use additional safety features, or to adopt
reactor designs that are safer but more expensive (see more on this in Chapter
6). Without Price-Andersonor with a higher liability limitthe added cost of
improved safety features would be offset by much lower annual premiums. This
could occur if the average insurance premium represented, say, 2050 percent of
annual operating costs rather than 0.2 percent. In recent congressional
testimony, the vice president of General Atomics, which makes nuclear reactors,
stated that its advanced high-temperature gas-cooled reactor will be so safe that
166
it will not need Price-Anderson protection.61 Aside from whether this particular
design would significantly improve safety (again, see Chapter 6), todays liability
policy should encourage all vendors to improve the safety of their reactors.
Eliminating liability protection entirely would provide the strongest incentive for
safety improvements, as well as end this government subsidy of nuclear power.
However, this step is probably politically infeasible. Raising the liability limit may
be a reasonable alternative, at least in the near term.
167
AT: Passive Safety Features

Passive features do not enhance safety
U.S. utilities have shown a great deal of interest in the Westinghouse AP1000 and
the General Electric Economic Simplified Boiling Water Reactor (ESBWR), which
are known as Generation III+ designs (see Box 7). About half of the letters that
the NRC has received from utilities stating their intent to apply for combined
operating licenses reference one of these designs. These reactors incorporate
simplified and passive approaches to reactor safety, such as relying on gravity
rather than motor-driven pumps to provide a backup water supply in the event of
a loss-of-coolant accident. However, because of greater uncertainties in how
these approaches would actually work in practice, they may not actually be safer
than existing designs.
168

No actual evidence of enhanced safety claims
These two reactors do fix some obvious safety problems inherent in todays
reactors. For example, the AP1000 is far less vulnerable than existing reactors to
a total loss of AC powerthat is, when both off-site power is lost and on-site
emergency generators fail to work. As a result, risk assessments by the designers
find that the probability that these reactors will experience a severe accident is
much lower. For example, these analyses show that the probability of a core
meltdown is 100 times lower than that for todays plants. However, little
experience with full-scale reactors operating at full power is available to validate
computer models of these safety systems, producing significant uncertainties.112
In its analysis of the AP600 designpredecessor of the AP1000the NRC
assumed that uncertainties could raise the probability of a meltdown by a factor
of 100. If that were also true for the AP1000, it would negate the cited 100-fold
improvement in meltdown probability, leaving the AP1000 as vulnerable to
meltdown as reactors in todays fleet. Reactor designs with passive safety
systems could use active systems as backups, but the NRC asserts that such an
approach would be inconsistent with the design objective. It would also be more
expensive. The designers of these reactors have also weakened defense-in-depth
presumably to cut costs. For example, these two designs have less robust
containment systems, less redundancy in safety systems, and fewer safety-grade
structures, systems, and components. A prime example of reduced defense-indepth is the AP1000 containment structure. Designers of that reactor project an
electricity cost about 25 percent lower than that of the AP600, because the
AP1000 nearly doubles the power output of the AP600 without a proportionate
increase in construction cost. However, many of the cost savings come from
scaling back the size of the containment building. The ratio of containment
volume to a reactors thermal power is a good measure of its containment
capacity, and the AP1000 has a ratio lower than that of most reactors now
operating.113 In addition, unlike todays reactors, the AP600 and AP1000 require a
cooling water system to protect the containment structure from rupturing after an
accident. Because this creates another potential failure mode, it increases the risk
that such a rupture would occur. Westinghouse considered using a more robust
containment structure, but rejected it as not cost-beneficial. Westinghouse also
apparently considered adding a core catchera structure designed to cool a
169
molten core after it breaks through the reactor vesselto the AP1000. However,
the company determined that this system, too, was not cost-beneficial, given that
external cooling of the reactor vessel is supposed to prevent the core from
melting through it.123 However, the French Commissariat lnergie Atomique is
reported to have independently studied whether the AP1000 would maintain
vessel integrity in a core-melt accident and did not arrive at a positive result. 124
Even if it were used, a core catcher is a novel feature with its own significant
uncertainties, and may not have much better than a 50 percent chance of
working.128 If the probability of a core meltdown is not reduced, the AP1000 may
actually be less safe than current plants, because its containment is less robust.
Other safety margins are also lower for the AP1000 than the AP600. According to
the NRC, The AP1000 design is less tolerant of equipment failures than the
AP600. During a significant lossof- coolant accident, the AP1000 requires that
two accumulatorswhich inject additional cooling water at a high ratework as
planned, whereas the AP600 requires only one.129 The higher power density of the
AP1000 core compared with the AP600 also significantly reduces the margin
between the operating temperature of the fuel cladding and the maximum limit of
2,200F, in the event that a large pipe break or other system failure produces a
loss of cooling water. As noted, Westinghouse used a standard costbenefit
analysis to evaluate the merits of adding features designed to reduce the risk of
severe accidents. The NRC criticized Westinghouses methods:130 The applicants
estimates of risk do not account for uncertainties either in the CDF [calculated risk of a
core meltdown] or in the offsite radiation exposures resulting from a core damage event.
The uncertainties . . . are fairly large because key safety features of the AP1000 are
unique and their reliability has been evaluated through analysis and testing programs
rather than through operating experience. Nevertheless, the NRC certified the
AP1000 design, on the grounds that the certification process for the AP600
whose risk analysis did include uncertaintiesfound that none of these safety
improvements would be cost-beneficial. However, because the AP1000 has lower
safety margins than the AP600, a measure that was not cost-beneficial for the
AP600 could well be for the AP1000. For instance, passive cooling of the reactor
vessel would likely be more effective for the AP600 because of its lower power
density, so it would have less need for a core catcher. Thus, an analysis showing
that a core catcher would not be cost-effective for the AP600 would not
necessarily apply to the AP1000. Questions about the safety of the ESBWR are
similar to those for the AP1000.
170

New reactor designs increase the risk of sabotage
No matter how safe a reactor design with regard to accidents, it remains

vulnerable to sabotage by adversaries with some knowledge of its weaknesses
and the ability to exploit them. Thus the NRC now withholds much information
about reactor vulnerabilities from the public. Given information now available,
only one new reactor designthe EPRcould be significantly more secure against
attack and sabotage than todays reactors, but this will only be the case if the
NRC requires that new reactors be able to withstand the impact of a commercial
aircraft. Efforts to protect reactors against sabotage and attack will always rely
largely on external measures: guns, guards, and gates. However, certain design
principles could reduce the vulnerability of the reactor core to sabotage. For
example, the larger the target set of subsystems that must be destroyed to
cause core damageand the more widely separated these targetsthe more
sabotage-resistant the design. The goal is to avoid designssuch as those of
some plants now operating where one properly placed explosive could disable
an entire target set and cause core damage. The NRC long ago developed
principles for reducing reactors vulnerability to sabotage, such as completely
separating redundant sets of safety equipment, and hardening heat-removal
systems against attack.145 Moreover, the NRCs official policy, at least since 1985,
has been to endorse such principles:146 The issue of both insider and outsider
sabotage threats will be carefully analyzed and, to the extent practicable, will be
emphasized as special considerations in the design and in the operating procedures for
new plants. However, in practice the NRC has not upheld its own policy. None of
the three new reactor designs certified by the NRC in the 1990s considered how
to minimize vulnerability to terrorist attack. Even after 9/11, the NRC agreed with
Westinghouse that security concerns did not have to be addressed during the
process for certifying the AP1000 design, but only when a utility applied for a
combined construction and operating license to actually build one. The NRC
recently reconsidered this position. In September 2005, it decided to develop a
new rule requiring applicants for design certification and other new reactor
licensing to submit a safety and security assessment addressing the NRCs
post-9/11 security requirements.147 A year later the NRC staff submitted a draft
proposed rule.148 However, the commission rejected the proposal in 2007. In any
event, the staff s proposal was flawed in several respects. First, it required
171
applicants to assess new plant designs only against the design-basis threat used
for todays plants, which was last updated in 2003 (and formally incorporated as a
change in NRC regulations in January 2007). The rationale was to be consistent
with Commission expectations that advanced reactor designs will provide at least
the same degree of protection of the public and the environment that is required
for the current generation of light-water reactors.149 However, any new plant
designs, if built, are likely to be operating for decades, during which time terrorist
capabilities will likely grow. New plants may therefore end up being even less
secure than todays generation. Second, the draft rule required applicants asking
the NRC to certify new designs to conduct a security assessmentbut to
incorporate only new features they consider practicable. This standard gives
applicants wide discretion to decide whether to add potentially costly security
features. Third, the rule would not have applied to designs already in the
certification process when the final rule took effect, projected by the staff to be
the end of FY 2007.150 Thus, more than half the reactors already chosen by utilities
planning to submit combined operating licensesincluding the Advanced Boiling
Water Reactor, AP1000, and ESBWRwould have been exempt from this
requirement. The EPR and PBMR designs, now scheduled to be submitted to the
NRC for certification in 2007, might have been exempt, depending on the
submission date. (And vendors would have had strong incentive to submit their
applications before the rule became effective.) Although the NRC would have
encouraged such vendors to voluntarily submit security assessments, they would
not have had to modify their designs. This imprudent approach would have
minimized the effectiveness and maximized the cost of nuclear plant security for
decades to come. The less resistant a design is to attack, the more extensive and
expensive will be the required security measures. This is particularly problematic
for designs with features that reduce capital costs but increase their vulnerability
to sabotage. For example, passive designs such as the AP1000 have less
redundancy in safety systems and lower tolerance for equipment failures, as
noted. Because the target sets are smaller, adversaries might find it easier to
cause significant core damage than in existing reactors. In fact, there is evidence
that the NRC recognizes the security deficiencies of these designs. According to
the draft rule,151 The Commission recognizes that developers of recent designs (such as
the AP1000 and ESBWR) have conducted some type of security assessment. Another
approach the Commission is considering is to require combined license applicants who
reference these designs to incorporate security design features (identified by those
reviews) into their combined license designs. This implies that the voluntary security
reviews conducted for the AP1000 and ESBWR have identified security features that are clearly practicable,
in the NRCs view. As flawed as the proposed rule was, the NRCs substitute language is even worse. It
requires applicants to assess only the effects of an impact of a large commercial aircraft, and a description
and evaluation of the design features, functional capabilities and strategies to avoid or mitigate the
effects.152 Applicants do not have to consider other types of attacks, or change the plant design, no matter
172

the outcome of the assessment. This would reduce the goal of making new plants less vulnerable to terrorist
attacks to an academic exercise. Unless commercial nuclear power plants have anti-aircraft weapons or other
active defenses, which is unlikely, passive structures such as containment buildings will continue to provide
the only means of preventing air attacks from causing core damage. If designers of new nuclear plants were
required to take such threats into account, they would have to build containment structures that are more
robust and protect more vital equipment than is the case today. Yet the opposite is true for the AP1000 and
PBMR designs. In contrast, the EPR was designed to meet French-German requirements that it withstand the
impact of a military aircraft, as noted. This is partly why it has a double-walled containment, four wellseparated safety trains, and hardened auxiliary and spent fuel buildings. Even so, the design for the EPR at
Olkiluoto had to be upgraded to comply with a post-9/11 Finnish requirement that the plant be able to
withstand the impact of a commercial aircraft.154 Without a similar NRC requirement, the U.S. EPR could
and most likely wouldbe based on the initial, less robust design. One NRC commissioner, Gregory Jaczko,
had strongly argued that the NRC should require new plants to be able to withstand the crash of a
commercial aircraft, not simply to evaluate such attacks and hope that the industry voluntarily makes
changes to reduce the risks.155 The Commissions rejection of his proposal in April 2007, unless reversed,
virtually guarantees that the next generation of nuclear plants in the United States, which could be in use
until the end of this century, will be unnecessarily vulnerable to 9/11-style
173
Nuclear Power Causes Cancer

New study proves nuclear increases cancer risks
New Scientist, May 24, 2008, p. 21
At last, a study which would appear to prove conclusively that living near nuclear power plants is a
hazard to human health, particularly where children are concerned.
For over 20 years government scientists have led the public to believe that clusters of leukaemia
around power stations were inexplicable, just coincidence, or perhaps a virus. Anything but radiation,
as the levels of radionuclides emitted were declared "too small". Nuclear power, nuclear weapons and,
more recently, the use of depleted uranium have all been so important to multinational corporations
and the military that their real impact has been constantly shrouded in deceit and half-truths. The
German government deserves congratulations for its acceptance of the findings of the new "KiKK"
studies of childhood cancer near nuclear power plants that Ian Fairlie reports. In the regions most
contaminated by the 1986 accident at Chernobyl in the Ukraine, thyroid cancer has risen a
hundredfold, a statistic which could not be ignored.But there are rises in many other cancers, immune
system diseases and in the numbers of children born with genetic disorders, which are long overdue for
more research.
Nuclear power causes childhood leukemia
New Scientist, May 21, 2008, p. online
At last, a study which would appear to prove conclusively that living near nuclear power plants is a hazard to
human health, particularly where children are concerned . For over 20 years government scientists have led the
public to believe that clusters of leukaemia around power stations were inexplicable, just coincidence, or
perhaps a virus. Anything but radiation, as the levels of radionuclides emitted were declared "too small".
Nuclear power, nuclear weapons and, more recently, the use of depleted uranium have all been so important to
multinational corporations and the military that their real impact has been constantly shrouded in deceit and
half-truths. The German government deserves congratulations for its acceptance of the findings of the new
"KiKK" studies of childhood cancer near nuclear power plants that Ian Fairlie reports. In the regions most
contaminated by the 1986 accident at Chernobyl in the Ukraine, thyroid cancer has risen a hundredfold, a
statistic which could not be ignored. But there are rises in many other cancers, immune system diseases and in
the numbers of children born with genetic disorders, which are long overdue for more research. The widespread
use of depleted uranium in the Iraq wars of 1990 and 2003 has left a deadly legacy of disease which is damaging
and killing children today and will continue to afflict the Iraqi people for many generations to come.
174

Nuclear power increases radiation and cancer
Although the nuclear industry asserts that levels of radiation emitted during normal reactor operations are not a
public health threat, scientific evidence shows that no level of radiation exposure is safe. For years, concerns
from the scientific community regarding the carcinogenic qualities and deleterious effects on chromosomes
inherent in radiation routinely released from nuclear facilities have been pushed aside and relevant studies
downplayed as anecdotal. However, the body of evidence has mounted to a point which is irrefutable. There is
strong evidence published in medical journals showing elevated cancer clusters around reactors, particularly
among children who are most vulnerable to the detrimental effects of radiation on cellular development. 233 In
fact, the risk from radiation exposure is now understood to have been initially underestimated by as much as ten
to one hundred times.234 The US National Academy of Sciences, charged to investigate the dangers of lowenergy, low dose radiation, has, after years of study, concluded there is no safe dose of ionizing radiation.
Radiation in any amount will have serious cumulative risks. 235 Further, the EPA in 2003 officially acknowledged
that accepted risk models which used average humans (adult males) functioned to diminish the severity of
exposure to children under the age of 16, who have a cancer risk three to ten times higher than adults. In general,
females are often more sensitive.236 The nuclear establishment purports that the science correlating cancer with
radiation from nuclear facilities is inconclusive and consistently dismisses statistically significant appearances.
However, over the past few decades there have been numerous studies which have enhanced our understanding
of the carcinogenic properties of radiation. One universal property is that children and fetuses are exponentially
more susceptible to its harmful effects and that low doses can cause serious cumulative effects. In 1990, the
National Cancer Institute conducted the only government sponsored study of cancer in areas surrounding
nuclear power stations, in which they revealed a significant increase in childhood leukemia in counties closest to
reactors in the years after operations began. 237 However, despite these findings, the claim is repeatedly made that
the health risks from small amounts of radiation, if any, are low relative to other health risks.
175

New studies prove nuclear is a health threat
Since the early 1990s, a new body of primary scientific study has been devoted to certain radiation effects not
previously recognized or accounted for in radiation regulation. These effects include the bystander effect and
genomic instability. Bystander effect describes a phenomenom where a cell not originally struck by radiation,
shows damage from that radiation exposure. Genomic instability occurs after a cell seems to repair itself
properly, but when the cell reproduces, its descendents nonetheless show damage from the radiation exposure of
the parent cell. Neither of these effects are accounted for in radiation exposure protection standards because they
were unknown until recently. Even now that they are known, accounting for their effects in radiation impacts is
tricky. These cell study findings suggest that the concern that radiation is permanently and unpredictably
mutating the gene pool should be taken seriously. The New Scientist quotes a report that calls genetic or
chromosomal instabilities caused by radiation exposure a plausible mechanism for explaining illnesses other
than cancer, including developmental deficiencies in the fetus, hereditary disease, accelerated aging and such
nonspecific effects as loss of immune competence. 256 Radiation regulations do not account for synergistic
effects between radiation and other chemicals and toxic substances released into the biosphere. Accounting for
this will be difficult because there are few studies on synergistic effects of radiation and other toxins such as
organochlorides, heavy metals and even common substances. True to form, the International Commission on
Radiological Protection (ICRP) does not account for any of these potential effects. There are some studies on
increased damage from synergistic effects of radiation and common substances such as caffeine, chlorine and
bacteria. Much more research is needed, but this need is no excuse for leaving the most vulnerable populations
unprotected now. Despite all of the unknowns of radiation exposure, and the sensitivity of certain populations
such as women and children, regulators do not require protective measures commensurate with potential
dangers, including permanent damage and contamination of the human gene pool. For these reasons,
precaution should be the default regulatory position, with the burden to prove safety clearly on industry. As
shown in a recent historical survey on the Precautionary Principle in public policy, regulatory and advisory
bodies on radiation health impacts have always been slow to react to [...] mounting incontrovertible evidence
where precaution has sometimes been lacking despite the clear warnings given... 257 We must act to protect the
most vulnerable; once releases of radioactivity and radiation exposures have occurred, there is no going back.
176
Nuclear Energy Causes Cancer

Ionized fuel rods create cancer risks
Nuclear power generation uses fuel rods composed of Uranium 235 and Uranium 238. The nuclear fission
process generates heat, which is transferred from the reactor vessel to generate steam to run turbines. The
fission process also creates radioactive byproducts in the fuel rods. After a period of time (about five years), the
fuel rods no longer generate enough heat for economical power generation, and must be removed and stored or
disposed. These "spent" fuel rods consist of 96% uranium and 4% other isotopes created by the fission process.
These isotopes include Cesium 137, Iodine 129, Cesium 137, and Plutonium 239. Some of these isotopes have
half lives running into the millions of years, such as Iodine 129, which has a half life of 17 million years.
Plutonium 239 has a half life of 24,360 years. An isotope is not "safe" at the end of its half life; rather, it has
become half as dangerous, and after another "half life" will become a quarter as dangerous. These radioactive
isotopes emit ionizing radiation. In addition, the spent fuel rods continue to generate heat for decades after
removal from the nuclear power plant, further complicating storage and disposal. Dangerous human exposure
can occur either by proximity to the spent fuel or by release of constituents into the biosphere, resulting in
human exposure through ingestion or respiration, or by simple proximity to places where these radionuclides
collect. Ionizing radiation causes human health effects by attacking human cells. In high doses, ionizing
radiation will kill human cells, causing internal organ failure and death. In low to moderate doses, ionizing
radiation causes cell mutation and disruption of DNA, which causes cancers, birth defects, and improper
development.
On-site storage increases the risk of heat-induced fire
As of 2003, there were 50,000 metric tons of spent nuclear fuel in the United States. The majority of this fuel is
stored in spent fuel pools at existing operating or decommissioned nuclear power plants n44 The spent fuel pools
hold the spent fuel rods under water. The water both carries off the continuing decay heat and shields workers
and the surrounding environment from escaping radiation. The spent fuel pools were originally designed to hold
spent nuclear fuel only until it cooled sufficiently to transport to a permanent disposal site or reprocessing
facility. As no permanent disposal site has opened and no commercial reprocessing industry was ever
developed, the spent fuel pools have ended up storing on-site most of the spent fuel generated during the entire
history of nuclear power generation. In order to make room for the extra fuel rods, nuclear power plants have
packed the spent fuel rods closer together than the original design contemplated, increasing the risk of a fuelheat induced fire should the spent fuel pools lose their cooling water.
177
Storage Fails Dry Casks Fail

Dry cask only provides short-term storage
As the spent fuel pools become full at the higher density configuration, power plant owners have begun to move
the older (and cooler) spent fuel rods out of the spent fuel pool and into "dry cask" storage. n50 These dry cask
storage containers consist of concrete and steel cylinders, which are vented to allow continued air-cooling of the
decay heat still produced by radioactive isotopes. n51 Currently, about 6,200 metric tons of spent fuel is stored in
these dry casks, mostly located at the sites that generated them. n52 The proportion of spent fuel stored in dry
casks is likely to increase, as spent fuel pools are filled to capacity and new spent fuel is generated at the rate of
2,000 metric tons per year in this country. n53 These dry cask storage units are only required to have a design life
of twenty years. n54 Dry cask storage represents a sort of limbo for spent nuclear fuel. Unless the United States
develops and opens a long term repository with sufficient capacity to accept the volume of waste generated, or
develops commercial fuel reprocessing capacity, the spent fuel pools and dry cask storage facilities are likely to
be the ultimate disposal sites for nuclear power generation wastes in this country. n55 As discussed below, neither
of these alternative disposal systems is likely to be developed adequately, so dry cask storage at the generation
sites is the most likely outcome. The generation sites are located throughout the United States, and many are
located in coastal and in metropolitan areas.
178
Storage Fails Yucca Storage Fails

Yucca can only handle current wastes
Nevertheless, the question of whether, when, and should Yucca Mountain open as a high-level nuclear waste
repository is somewhat academic to the question of long term disposal of the wastes from ongoing nuclear
energy production. Yucca Mountain is even more irrelevant to the question of disposal of wastes generated by
increased nuclear generation capacity constructed as a means to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. This is
because, as designed, Yucca Mountain will barely have the capacity to accept all of the civilian nuclear waste
that has already been generated and is sitting in limbo at nuclear power plant sites and it has no reserve capacity.
The statutory capacity of Yucca Mountain is 70,000 metric tons of high level nuclear waste. Ten percent of this
capacity is reserved for military nuclear wastes, leaving 63,000 metric tons of capacity. As of 2003, there were
already 50,000 metric tons of civilian nuclear waste in this country awaiting a disposal site, and we are
generating an additional 2,000 metric tons per year. n71 At that rate, the entire capacity of Yucca Mountain would
be used by the year 2009 - before any possible opening date of the facility.
Geological stability cant be predicted for 100,000s of years
Still, the volume of waste is not the main problem associated with nuclear waste. The main problem is that highlevel waste remains dangerously radioactive for 240,000 years or more (Greenpeace, 2004). After half a
century of research there are still no satisfactory solutions to this problem. The most commonly suggested
solution is to build underground waste repositories for long-term storage. In 1987, the U.S. Department of
Energy announced plans to build such a repository at Yucca Mountain in Nevada. According to the plan,
high-level radioactive waste will be buried deep in the ground where it will hopefully remain unexposed to
groundwater and unaffected by earthquakes (Cunningham et al, 2003). On a timescale of hundreds of
thousands of years, however, it is impossible to predict whether an area will remain dry or geologically
stable.
179
Transmutation of Waste Fails

Research to reduce the life cycle of waste will not succeed
There are many serious problems associated with nuclear power that have existed since its introduction
and are still not resolved. For the storage of high radioactive nuclear waste there are still no final
repositories in operation. In the last decades researchers have been working on the technology to reduce
radioactivity and the decay time of nuclear waste, the so-called transmutation process. There is no guarantee
that this expensive research will be successful, and these techniques can only be applied for future spent
fuel and not for the present amount of nuclear waste
Transmutation cant address current waste problems
In the last decades researchers have been working on the technology to reduce radioactivity and the decay time
of nuclear waste, the so-called transmutation process. This has often been optimistically heralded as the
future solution to the waste problem, however, there is no guarantee that this research will be successful,
and if it is the financial costs will be enormous. Nuclear waste contains many different types of radioactive
isotopes, which must all be partitioned separately and then transmutated separately. The aim is to decrease
the decay time of the radioactivity of these isotopes. This will not be possible for all isotopes and not all isotopes
can be partitioned. It will require new processing technologies and plants. At this moment only plutonium and
uranium are separated in reprocessing. The application of these new techniques will require a large-scale
introduction of fast breeder reactors or other new advanced reactor types, which will take billions of
dollars and many decades. And it is obvious that these techniques can only be applied for future spent fuel
and not for the present amount of nuclear waste (WISE, 1998).
180
Uranium Uranium Overshoot

Many new reactors will exhaust the worlds uranium supply
Assuming that electricity generation from nuclear power plants does indeed cause the indirect emission of
35g CO2-eq./kWh (ko, 1997), 72 new medium sized plants of 500MW each would be required in the EU15. (For an explanation of the calculations and assumptions please refer to appendix 1). These would have to be
built before the end of the first commitment period 2008-2012. Leaving aside the huge costs this would involve,
it is unlikely that it is technically feasible to build so many new plants in such a short time, given that only 15
new reactors have been built in the last 20 years (WISE, 2003). Furthermore, with so many new reactors, the
world supply of uranium would be exhausted very quickly (see section 4).
Extracting uranium from other sources is cost prohibitive

As pointed out by advocates of nuclear power, there are also vast amounts uranium in unconventional sources.
For example uranium is found in ocean water, but at a concentration of 0.0000002% (Storm van Leeuwen &
Smith, 2004). The costs of extracting this uranium for use in nuclear power generation would be huge.
Furthermore, the extraction and enrichment of this uranium would require more energy than could be produced
with it.
Doubling nuclear development means we run out of uranium in 25 years

If we replaced all electricity generated by burning fossil fuel with electricity from nuclear power today, there
would be enough economically viable uranium to fuel the reactors for between 3 and 4 years (O'Rourke, 2004;
Storm van Leeuwen & Smith, 2004). Even if we were to double world usage of nuclear energy, the life span of
uranium reserves would be just 25 years. Therefore any potential benefits to the climate are extremely
temporary.
181
Uranium No Uranium Demand Overshoot Now

Uranium resources can meet existing demand
Brice Smith, Institute for Energy and Environmental Risks, 2006,
Insurmountable Risks: The Dangers of Using Nuclear Power to Combat Global Climate Change,
http://www.ieer.org/reports/insurmountablerisks/
Global uranium resources are more than adequate to meet projected requirements, according to the latest edition
of a world reference guide on uranium resources published just recently. Uranium 2005: Resources, Production
and Demand - also called the "Red Book" - estimates the total identified amount of conventional uranium stock,
which can be mined for less than USD 130 per kg, to be about 4.7 million tonnes. Based on the 2004 nuclear
electricity generation rate of demand the amount is sufficient for 85 years, the study states. Fast reactor
technology would lengthen this period to over 2500 years.
200 near nuclear accidents since 1986
CNS News, September 28, 2007, http://www.cnsnews.com/ViewPolitics.asp?
Page=/Politics/archive/200709/POL20070928a.html
There have been 200 cases of "near" accidents at U.S. reactors since the Chernobyl explosion in 1986, according
to Greenpeace. Furthermore, in case of an accident, radioactive material could spread across 40,000 square
miles, the group claims.
China will meet its own nuclear needs no export potential
Stephen Thomas, lead author - Professor of Energy Policy, Public Services
International Research Unit, Business School, University of Greenwich, United Kingdom, et al, December 10,
2007, The Economics of Nuclear Power, http://www.greenpeace.org/international/press/reports/the-economicsof-nuclear-power
In September 2004, China invited bids for four nuclear units of about 1,000MW, two at Sanmen and two at
Yangjiang. At that time the Chinese government planned to construct a further 32 reactors by 2020, each with a
capacity of 1,000MW. It was then expected the orders would be placed in late 2005. One of the difficulties in the
negotiations was the extent of the technology transfer demanded. In March 2006, Nucleonics Week reported23:
Les Echos said in its March 15 edition that the French vendor had refused to match Westinghouses offer to sell
the Chinese the blueprints for the AP1000 design. Areva had submitted a seventh bid in early February that
featured more technology transfer, but was unwilling to go further, the sources said. Finally, in December 2006,
the Westinghouse AP1000 was chosen for these four orders. For the future, orders will probably continue to be
fewer than forecast by the Chinese Government and will be placed with Chinese companies where possible.
182
AT: China Export Market

China will not develop as a large market for Western nuclear vendors.
Stephen Thomas, lead author - Professor of Energy Policy, Public Services
International Research Unit, Business School, University of
Greenwich, United Kingdom, et al, December 10, 2007, The Economics of Nuclear Power,
http://www.greenpeace.org/international/press/reports/the-economics-of-nuclear-power
In September 2004, China invited bids for four nuclear units of about 1,000MW, two at Sanmen and two at
Yangjiang. At that time the Chinese government planned to construct a further 32 reactors by 2020, each with a
capacity of 1,000MW. It was then expected the orders would be placed in late 2005. One of the difficulties in
the negotiations was the extent of the technology transfer demanded. In March 2006, Nucleonics Week
reported23: Les Echos said in its March 15 edition that the French vendor had refused to match Westinghouses
offer to sell the Chinese the blueprints for the AP1000 design. Areva had submitted a seventh bid in early
February that featured more technology transfer, but was unwilling to go further, the sources said. Finally, in
December 2006, the Westinghouse AP1000 was chosen for these four orders. For the future, orders will
probably continue to be fewer than forecast by the Chinese Government and will be placed with Chinese
companies where possible. It is therefore unlikely that China will develop as a large market for Western nuclear
vendors.
183
Nuclear Energy Wont Reduce Oil Demand

Oil used in transportation, nuclear power wont replace it
The Washington Post, January 5, 2008, p. A16 (Thomas Lippman, The writer is an adjunct scholar with the
Middle East Institute)
Unfortunately, that is not true. The vast majority of the oil consumed in the United States is used for
transportation, not for electricity generation. No amount of nuclear power will make much difference in our
demand for oil because oil powers our cars and trucks, not our electricity plants. According to the Energy
Department's Energy Information Administration, less than 6 percent of U.S. electric generating capacity is oilfueled, and most of the generating plants that do run on oil are backup units operated only at times of highest
demand. Nuclear power could supplant coal, but not oil.
184
Nuclear Power Leads to Nuclear Subs

Resolving the issue of waste disposal is key to nuclear submarines
Deseret News 2-14-2001
What to do with nuclear waste has become a huge national problem, not just for the nation's nuclear power plants,
which provide 20 percent of the country's power, but for the federal government that needs a place to dispose of
waste from nuclear submarines, decommissioned nuclear missiles, nuclear testing laboratories (including two in
Utah) and thousands of fuel assemblies from nuclear power plants in foreign countries. In 1983, Congress passed
legislation committing the government to have a permanent repository for the nuclear waste in place by Jan. 31,
1998. Now the government is saying a permanent facility will not be ready before 2010 at the earliest. And no one
inside the industry believes the government will meet that deadline, either. Most agree a permanent nuclear waste
facility will someday be built deep inside Yucca Mountain in southern Nevada. Scientific tests on the suitability of
the site continue, but actual construction is years away.
185
Breeder Reactors Fail

Despite investments, breeder reactors fail
If we were to decide to replace all electricity generated by burning fossil fuel with electricity from nuclear
power today, there would be enough economically viable uranium to fuel the reactors for between 3 and 4 years.
With the use of fast breeder reactors a closed cycle could be reached that would end the dependency on limited
uranium resources. But despite huge investments and research over the last decades, breeder reactors have been
a technological and economic failure.
Despite investments, fast breeders have failed
For many years the nuclear industry has claimed that fast breeder reactors will vastly extend the life span of
nuclear power. Fast breeder reactors use plutonium from spent fuel as a fuel source. Plutonium is one of the
most poisonous elements known by mankind; it is not found in nature and can only be produced artificially.
With the use and 'breeding' of plutonium, a closed cycle could be reached that would end the dependency
on limited uranium resources. But despite huge investments and research over the last decades, breeder
reactors have been a technological and economic failure. Breeders in the UK, and the French Super
Phoenix, have been permanently closed down due to safety concerns and a serious 1995 accident at the
Monju Fast Breeder plant in Japan led to its permanent closure (FOE, 1998). Currently there are no
commercial fast breeder reactors in operation in the world and hopes of developing a successful fast
breeder program are fading quickly.
186
Nuclear Power Threatens Natives

Nuclear power is the driving force behind nuclear colonization and genocide of Native Americans
our disad turns your case
Nancy Collins, Professor of law at Richmond, and Andrea Hall, J.D. Richmond, 6-1994, p. 273-5
[12 Law & Ineq. J. 267]
Three interrelated paradoxes embody the legal, political, and ethical dilemmas of nuclear waste disposal in Indian country. First, the paradox of good and evil infuses most discussions of nuclear
power. Few topics generate as much angry political debate as nuclear energy. Proponents and opponents of military and civilian atomic energy are both entrenched and vociferous. Nuclear energy
provides a source of power of indescribable proportions, whether harnessed for civilian use or unleashed for military deterrence. Fear of a nuclear accident dominates the thinking of nuclear
opponents, who argue strongly that both use and disposal of nuclear materials are fraught with danger. Proponents of nuclear energy, on the other hand, consider these views alarmist. They argue
However, the potential for disaster from a nuclear

waste accident or long-term release is inestimable. Nuclear power at its best is positive and transformative. On the
other hand, its production is one of the most dangerous processes on earth. There are hazards involved in mining,
milling, power production, and waste disposal. The paradox of nuclear energy is heightened by the absence of any permanent means of disposing of massive
that nuclear energy is safe and that nuclear waste disposal will soon be among the nation's safest industries.
amounts of nuclear waste. 28 Perhaps the one [ thing nuclear opponents and proponents can agree on is that we need a safe, permanent storage space for the waste. Despite the consensus, after
over a decade of searching, the federal government still has not found anyone willing to accept this civilian nuclear waste. The second paradox involves the complex status of Indian tribes as
sovereign nations within the United States. Native American nations are both sovereign 29 and dependent, 30 both governors and governed, and both free of state control 31 and subject to it.
Recognized as sovereigns under Article I of the Constitution, tribes today retain their sovereignty. Indian nations, however, are considered "dependant sovereigns" and wards of the United States.
33 Congress has plenary power to limit tribal sovereignty and treaties made pursuant to it. 34 Congress also has the right to grant states power over aspects of Indian life. 35 When considering
Third, the nuclear waste trade presents

a pivotal paradox for Native American peoples: the clash between the nuclear waste trade's potential for economic
development and self-determination, and its antithetical potential for destruction of Indian land, harmony, values,
and even tribal existence. The essence of a tribe's sovereignty is land-based. 37 By contrast, dominant American society is essentially nomadic. If land is destroyed or devalued,
political decisions on Indian land, one must look at the complex relations of three separate sovereigns: federal, tribal, and state.
or if the economy of an area is weakened, other Americans simply move to greener pastures. For non-Indians, legal rights are not dependant upon the existence of a homeland. For a tribe to
survive, many of its members must remain on the reservation and the tribe must maintain enough jobs to employ the next generation on the reservation. 38 If Indian land is rendered uninhabitable
or economically unproductive, the tribe becomes homeless. 39 The land-based sovereignty of Indian nations is the key to both the need for economic development from the waste trade and the
countervailing potential for the destruction of sovereign lands and peoples. Compensation for accepting nuclear waste could provide an Indian nation with economic strength, income for
education and health-care, and jobs for the next generation. 40 These are tools for self-determination and are necessary for tribes to escape economic domination by the U.S. government, to
regain tribal power, and to preserve the tribe for future generations. Many see the nuclear waste trade as a basis for attracting industry and for strengthening the tribal infrastructure. Moreover,
Yet locating a nuclear storage facility on or near

an Indian reservation can have grave potential consequences to the viability of its culture. Accidents, releases, or
sabotage could turn the reservation into a vast wasteland and could threaten tribal destruction or genocide.
Ultimately, the issue turns on economic development: without income and jobs, the survival of the tribe is at risk.
However, the economically rich crop of nuclear waste carries with it a remote but real risk of annihilation of the
tribe. In the end, some believe that even the economic benefits will prove to be illusory. Many Native Americans are
extremely skeptical that accepting waste in Indian country will actually result in real economic advantage. Many
projects come and go, all accompanied by big promises, but few Indians have gotten richer from them. That history
is a powerful argument for Indian environmentalists. The reasoning goes like this: not only is the project in question
ecologically disastrous, but everyone knows we won't ever see a dime from it.
the government promises that the waste will be safe; 42 and promises that it will be removed in 40 years. 43
187
Waste is Radioactive
Waste sludge is highly radioactive
One of the most serious and persistent problems of nuclear power is what to do with radioactive waste.
Supporters argue that radioactive waste is actually not a major problem since the quantities are small.
While this may be true in relation to coal-fired power plants, there are still huge amounts of waste created
during the nuclear process. In fact the production of 1,000 tons of uranium fuel typically generates 100,000
tons of tailings and 3.5 million litres of liquid waste (Cunningham et al, 2003). The amount of sludge produced
is nearly the same as that of the ore milled. At a grade of 0.1% uranium, 99.9% of the material is left over. As
long-lived decay products such as thorium-230 and radium-226 are not removed, the sludge contains 85%
of the initial radioactivity of the ore. In addition, the sludge contains heavy metals and other
contaminants such as arsenic, and chemical reagents used during the milling process.
188
General Safety Extension

Human error risks cant be overcome
Apart from possible technical failures, the risk of human error can never be excluded. This risk will grow
now that the onset of privatization and deregulation of the electricity market has forced nuclear operators
to increase their efficiency and reduce costs. For nuclear energy, it is more difficult to reduce costs because it
has high fixed costs: building costs make up about 75% of the total costs (compared, for example, with only
25% for gas). All savings must therefore come from the 25% variable costs of the electricity price, notably from
efficiency increases and personnel reductions (Greenpeace & WISE, 2001). In the US significant reductions
have been made with an estimated 26,000 workers leaving the industry over the last eight years. The
reductions in the size of the workforce have led to concerns over safety.
189
A2: Nuclear Medicine

Nuclear medicine development is advancing without nuclear power in the status quo
Dick Kovan, International Editor, and Richard Michal, Senior Associate Editor, 1-2004 [Nuclear News]
He added, however, that there continues to be considerable development in the use of nuclear technology in
medicine. At the Texas Medical Center, a very aggressive program of focused-beam radiation therapy is taking
place. The technology has advanced light-years since radiotherapy began using cobalt sources, Wainerdi said.
Today, advanced focused proton beam facilities are being introduced throughout the United States. These facilities
provide tremendous precision with almost no damage to other tissues, he explained. His center is building one at a
cost of $ 125 million. Cyclotrons are also being used for fast neutron beam therapy. A use of nuclear technology on
the edge of medicine is forensic science. There is a great interest in developing better methods to identify materials
as to age and environment. The use of advanced neutron activation analysis combined with other techniques can
provide accurate trace matching for comparison purposes. It also has a growing role in supporting DNA
identification.
190
Nuclear Power Destroys the Environment

Nuclear power destroys the environment
The study finds that nuclear power, like other non renewable energy sources, is associated with severe
environmental impacts. Each stage of the nuclear energy production process generates large amounts of
uniquely difficult-to-manage wastes that will effectively require perpetual care, imposing costs and risks arising
from current energy consumption onto future generations. The process also has severe impacts on surface water
and groundwater water quality via a range of radioactive and hazardous pollutants, and results in releases to the
atmosphere of a wide range of criteria (i.e. smog and acid-rain causing), radioac-tive and hazardous pollutants
and greenhouse gases. Effluent from uranium mines and mills was found by Health Canada and Environment
Canada to be toxic for the purposes of the Canadian Environmental Protection Act in 2004.
Net combined negative externalities
While the greenhouse gas emissions associated with nuclear power are less than those that would be associated
with conventional fossil fuel energy use, no other energy source combines the generation of a range of
conventional pollutants and waste streams including heavy metals, smog and acid rain precursors, and water
contaminants with the generation of extremely large volumes of radioactive wastes that will require care and
management over hundreds of thousands of years. The combination of these environmental challenges, along with
security, accident and weapons proliferation risks that are simply not shared by any other energy source, place nuclear
energy in a unique category relative to all other energy supply options. In essence, reliance on nuclear power as a
response to climate change would involve trading one problem greenhouse gas emissions for which a wide range
of other solutions exist, for a series of other complex and difficult problems for which solutions are generally more
costly and difficult and for which the outcomes are much less certain.
191

Nuclear power generates tons of waste
Solid and Liquid Wastes
Uranium mining and milling
An estimated 575,000 tonnes of tailings per year, of which 90100,000 tonnes can be
attributed to uranium production for domestic energy purposes. Uranium mill tailings are
acidic or potentially acid generating, and contain a range of long-lived radionuclides,
heavy metals and other contaminants. Tailings generation would increase proportionally
with the use of lower grade uranium ores, as larger amounts of ore would have to be processed to produce the same amount of uranium concentrate.
Up to 18 million tonnes of waste rock, which may also contain radionuclides, heavy
metals, and be acid generating. Of this total, up to 2.9 million tonnes can be attributed to
uranium mining for domestic energy purposes.
It is estimated that there are more than 213 million tonnes of uranium mine tailings in
storage facilities in Canada, and 109 million tonnes of waste rock.
Refining and conversion operations
It is estimated that nearly 1,000 tonnes of solid wastes and 9,000 m3 of liquid wastes
are produced per year as a result of uranium refining, conversion and fuel production for
domestic energy generation purposes. Information on the precise character and fate of
these wastes could not be obtained.
Power Plant operation
Approximately 85,000 waste fuel bundles are generated by Canadian nuclear reactors
each year. As of 2003, 1.7 million bundles were in storage at reactor sites. It is estimated
that these wastes will have to be secured for approximately one million years for safety,
environmental and security reasons.
Approximately 6,000 cubic metres of lower level radioactive wastes are generated each
year in Ontario as a result of power plant operations, maintenance, and refurbishment.
Power plant maintenance and refurbishment also result in the generation of substantial
amounts of additional hazardous wastes, including heavy metals and asbestos.
192

Very large amounts of low-, intermediate- and high-level radioactive wastes will be
produced as a result of the eventual decommissioning of refining, conversion and
fabrication facilities as well as power plants.
193

Nuclear leads to extensive water pollution
Water
Severe contamination of groundwater with radionuclides, heavy metals, and other contaminants has occurred
at tailings management facilities and waste rock storage areas.
Uranium mining and milling facility surface water discharges have resulted in the contamination of the
receiving environment with radionuclides and heavy metals. Effluent from historic and operating uranium mines
and mills, particularly uranium discharges, have been determined to be toxic for the purposes of the Canadian
Environmental Protection Act.
Uranium mining operations are associated with the extensive removal of groundwater (in excess of 16 billion
litres per year).
Routine and accidental releases of radionuclides to surface waters occur in the course of power plant
operations, with tritium oxide and carbon-14 being key radioactive pollutants of concern. Groundwater
contamination with tritium has occurred at the Pickering generating facility in Ontario.
Ontarios nuclear power plants are found to be the leading source of discharges of hydrazine, an extremely
hazardous pollutant, to surface waters in Canada. Nuclear generating facilities have also been sources of
discharges of metals (copper, zinc, and chromium) and ammonia to surface waters.
Nuclear power is a major consumer of water. Uranium mining operations involve extensive dewatering, in the
range of at least 1617 billion litres per year, with the implication of impacts on groundwater and surface water
storage and flows.
Generating facilities require large amounts of cooling water. The Darlington and Pickering facilities in
Ontario are alone estimated to use approximately 8.9 trillion litres of water for cooling purposes per year
more than 19 times the annual water consumption of the City of Toronto. Adverse thermal impacts of cooling
water discharges on fish populations in the vicinity of nuclear power plants have been observed.
194

Nuclear produces air pollution
Atmospheric releases of a range of radionuclides occur at all stages of nuclear power production. Atmospheric
releases of radon gas result from mining and milling operations and from tailings management facilities.
Windblown dust from mine sites and tailings management facilities (TMFs) contains a range of radionuclides.
Atmospheric releases (principally uranium) also arise from refining and conversion activities.
Routine and accidental releases of radiation and radionuclides occur from power plant operations, including
tritium oxide, carbon-14, noble gases, iodine-131, radioactive particulate and elemental tritium.
The incineration of low and intermediate-level radioactive wastes from power plant operations and
maintenance in Ontario has resulted in further atmospheric releases of radionuclides, particularly tritium. A wide
range of hazardous air pollutants have been released by the Bruce Western Waste Management facility. A new
incinerator installed in 2003, has reduced emissions of hazardous, but not of radiological, pollutants .
Windblown dust from mine sites and TMFs contains a range of heavy metals. In addition, releases of a
number of hazardous air pollutants, including dioxins and furans, hexachlorobenzene, heavy metals (principally
lead) ammonia and hydrogen fluoride arise from uranium refining and conversion operations.
Ontario nuclear power plants are the only National Pollutant Release Inventory reported source of releases of
hydrazine to the air in Canada.
Uranium mining and milling operations are found to be significant sources of releases of sulphur dioxide
(SO2), volatile organic compounds (VOCs) and nitrogen oxides (NOx). Releases of NOx, particulate matter
(PM) and sulphuric acid arise from refining and conversion activities.
The road transportation of uranium from mill sites in northern Saskatchewan to the Blind River refinery in
Northern Ontario and then on to the Port Hope conversion facility in Southern Ontario produces additional
releases of NOx and PM. Further transportation related releases of criteria air pollutants would arise from the
long-term management of waste nuclear fuel and other radioactive wastes arising from facility operations,
maintenance and decommissioning, particularly if the management strategies for these materials require the
movement of wastes from reactor sites to centralized facilities.
195

Nuclear fuel production causes air pollution
Criteria air pollutants generated in uranium mining and milling, fuel production and nuclear power plant operations
include sulphur and nitrogen oxides (SOx and NOx), particulate matter (PM) and volatile organic compounds
(VOCs). SOx and NOx are important precursors for acid rain and smog. PM less than 10 m in diameter is commonly
referred to as inhalable or thoracic particles as it can penetrate into the thoracic compartment of the human respiratory
tract. Such particles are known to cause human health impacts. In addition, particles 10 m in diameter and smaller
can scatter light and therefore generate atmospheric haze. SOx, NOx, respirable PM, and PM containing metals from
certain sources are classified as toxic substances for the purposes of the Canadian Environmental Protection
Act.32
Nuclear produces volatile organic compounds
VOCs are smog precursors and can have significant hazardous properties of their own, including being recognized as
carcinogens. VOCs participate in atmospheric photochemical reactions and a number of individual VOCs such as
benzene, have been classified as toxic substances for the purposes of the Canadian Environmental Protection Act.
Nuclear power development is polluting

Huffington Post, August 12, 2008, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/alec-baldwin/the-misconception-ofnucl_b_118061.html
The answer is very dirty. The mining of uranium, like the excavation of any other resource that must be
discovered, torn out of the ground and carted away, along with the handling of excess rubble, by heavy
equipment, could not be any more polluting. The precious uranium must be taken, by truck, to facilities
that themselves require enormous amounts of power in order to process and enrich the radioactive ore
into the fissionable material that is used in the reactor that is operated by a utility as a "clean" source of
power. The retrieval of any energy resources, whether it be oil, coal or natural gas, requires enormous amounts
of energy itself. Even gasoline itself is delivered by trucks that are powered by gasoline. But, along with coal,
nothing compares to the mining and processing of uranium. It is an overwhelmingly dirty process on a carbon
footprint basis
196

Environmental impacts of uranium mining are substantial
The environmental impacts of uranium mining and milling are severe. They represent the most significant short-term environmental
impacts of nuclear energy production in Canada. A number of jurisdictions in Canada and Australia have adopted bans on the
establishment of new uranium mines due to concerns over the potential environmental and health impacts of such operations.
The key impacts of uranium mining and milling include the following:
The generation of large quantities of waste rock and mill tailings. These are typically acidic or potentially acid generating, comprise
long-lived radionuclides, heavy metals, and other contaminants.
Uranium mining milling to supply Canadian domestic power generation is estimated to result in the production of more than 90,000
tonnes of tailings, and up to 2.9 million tonnes of waste rock per year.
Canadian uranium mines and mills have an inventory of 109 million tonnes of waste rock, and 214 million tonnes of tailings.
There are major concerns regarding long-term integrity of tailings and waste rock containment facilities. These facilities will require
perpetual care. The adequacy of current financial assurances required by governments for the closure and long-term care of containment
facilities has been questioned.
Severe contamination of groundwater with radionuclides, heavy metals, and other contaminants has occurred at tailings management
facilities and waste rock storage areas.
Uranium mining and milling facility surface water discharges have resulted in the contamination of the receiving environment with
radionuclides and heavy metals. Effluent from historic and operating uranium mines and mills, particularly uranium discharges, have
been determined to be toxic for the purposes of the Canadian Environmental Protection Act by Environment Canada and Health
Canada.
Uranium mining operations are associated with the extensive removal of groundwater (in excess of 16 billion litres per year).
Uranium mines and tailings storage areas have been identified as significant sources of atmospheric releases of radon gas.
Major atmospheric releases of sulphur dioxide and VOCs are associated with the uranium milling process. In 2004, VOC emissions
from the sector were equivalent to the average annual emissions of more than 300,000 cars. The Rabbit Lake facility acid plant reported
releases of 43,000 tonnes of SO2 in 2004.
Atmospheric releases of NOx and PM result from the milling process and the operation of fossil fuel-powered machinery and
equipment.
Annual CO2 emissions resulting from uranium mining, milling and tailings management activities in Canada are estimated at between
160,000 and 250,000 tonnes.
The mining of lower grade ores would result in the generation of proportionally larger amounts of tailings, other wastes and emissions,
as larger amounts of ore would have to be processed to produce the same amount of uranium concentrate. Processing of ore that is 0.01%
uranium, for example, would generate approximately ten times the tailings of ore that is 0.1% uranium.
197

Uranium mining and milling produces air pollution
Atmospheric releases of contaminants arise from many sources during the uranium mining and milling process.
Dusts containing radionuclides, heavy metals and PM can be released from underground ventilation systems,
waste rock and tailings storage areas, surface mining operations and milling operations. Radon gas may also be
released from these sources. Milling operations produce releases of NOx, VOCs, CO 2 and PM. Acid plants
producing acid for milling operations release large amounts of SO2. The combustion of fossil fuels to operate
equipment and vehicles for earth moving, transportation, heat and steam production and electricity supply
generates releases of criteria air pollutants and GHGs.
2.3.2.1. Radionuclides
Radon gas is released as radium and thorium decay as part of the uranium decay chain. For underground mines,
the release of radon has been estimated to be between 1 and 2,000 GBq/t of U 3O8 produced, with a production
average of 300 GBq/t.33 Ventilation systems for underground mines have been identified as the leading source of
radon emissions from uranium mining operations. Active open pit operations also produce significant
atmospheric releases of radon.34 Releases from mills have been estimated to be 13 GBq/t of U 3O8 produced.35
Additional releases of radon occur from waste rock, tailings and ore storage areas.
Nuclear power pollutes water supplies
However, the NEI chose to ignore the warnings and continued with a new round of barely modified advertising
messages, and the case was referred to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). In December 1999, the FTC ruled
that because the discharge of hot water from cooling systems is known to harm the environment, and given the
unresolved issues surrounding disposal of radioactive waste, we think that NEI has failed to substantiate its
general environmental benefit claim. 110 The FTC also agreed with the NADs decision that NEI has not
substantiated its statement that the production of nuclear power does not pollute the water. 111 The FTC warned
the NEI that its advertising campaign, touting nuclear power as environmentally clean, was without
substantiation and recommended that the NEI take to heart the evaluation of its advertising that has been
rendered by its peers.
198

Nuclear destroys marine ecosystems
Noted scientists and oceanic experts agree that the health of the worlds oceans is in jeopardy. Yet, the nuclear
industry is still permitted to destroy significant areas of marine habitat through the daily operations of its oncethrough coolant reactors. In general, the commercial fishing industry is highly regulated as to the manner of
catch, quantity, and frequency. Conversely, the nuclear power industry is required to take very few precautions
to avoid impacts on fish stocks and the larvae of numerous near-shore species. Indeed, two very different
regulatory regimes control the environmental impacts of commercial fisheries and the nuclear power industry,
while both industries have significant impacts on the marine environment. Reactors that operate with oncethrough cooling systems typically use more than one billion gallons of water a day (500,000 gallons a minute).
This enormous water use can have large impacts on the environment trapping fish and other marine animals
in their intakes and changing the temperature of local waterways through the discharge of heated water.113 In
fact, fish, fish larvae, and fish eggs are harmed and destroyed upon entering the flow of reactor cooling water
where they are sucked into and impinged on the water intake screens. Smaller fish, fish larvae, spawn, and a
large number of other marine organisms are actually drawn into the reactor coolant system where up to 95
percent are scalded, killed and discharged as sediment. This indiscriminate killing can result in extensive
depletion of the affected species and cause the community of species around a reactor to lose their capacity to
sustain themselves. The once-through cooling system also discharges water that is much hotter than when it is
withdrawn. The hot discharge water damages and destroys fish and other marine life and dramatically alters the
immediate marine environment. Warmer waters have been found to cause a fatal disease, known as withering
syndrome, in black and red abalone, which have been virtually eliminated around the Diablo Canyon reactor in
California.
Nuclear collapses fish populations
In theory, nuclear power plants are required to use water intake systems that reflect the best technology
available for minimizing adverse environmental impacts, according to the Clean Water Act (CWA). However,
the site specific examples of environmental impacts are quite startling when examined. For example, the State of
New York estimates that the Indian Point reactors cause the mortality of more than one billion fish a year, and
that closed-cycle cooling would lead to at least a 98 percent reduction in fish mortality. In the case of the Oyster
Creek reactor in Toms River New Jersey, the State Department of Environmental Protection estimates that the
cooling system kills millions of small fish, shrimp and other aquatic creatures each year and that dead marine
life expelled from cooling systems back into the source stream create a shadow effect, blocking sunlight to
underwater organisms and limiting oxygen uptake.
199

Nuclear threatens endangered species
Four species of endangered and one threatened species of sea turtle present in US coastal waters are harmed and
killed by nuclear power station operations. Loggerhead, green, and Kemps Ridley sea turtles are the most
common victims at nuclear reactors and are often entrained into the large-diameter coolant intake pipes used by
coastal reactors. A 1990 National Academy of Sciences study, Decline of Sea Turtles, Causes and Prevention,
examined the impacts on worldwide sea turtle populations and recommended protective measures to prevent
their extinction.116 The academy, in its investigation of power plant impacts, found that death and injury can
occur in transit through a reactors once-through intake pipes. Sea turtles are also impinged by the force of the
intake water and become lodged on intake structures, barrier nets or against the power stations metal grate trash
racks. Thus, the marine impacts of nuclear power demonstrate that the nuclear industry and regulators value
profit over reduction of harm to the marine ecosystem. In fact, there are numerous examples of take limits for
endangered species being raised and adjusted in accordance with plant operating imperatives rather than species
population maintenance. The installation of cooling towers to once-through systems (which account for over
half of the nations 103) would reduce water intake by 96 percent and greatly reduce the potential for marine
species damage.117 The towers would also function to cool waste waters before discharge, thereby reducing
temperature induced ecosystem disruptions significantly. However, despite this proven and affordable mitigation
measure, utilities, which claim to act as stewards of our natural heritage, continue to exact a devastating toll that
in many cases may have no chance for reversal.
200

Uranium enrichment highly polluting
Moreover, uranium enrichment is a highly polluting process and data provided by the DOE shows that in 2001
the US enrichment plants alone produced 405.5 metric tons of CFC-114, the equivalent of five grams of CO 2 per
kWh.31 (CFCs are not only a potent GHG, but also a potent destroyer of the ozone layer.) The only operating
enrichment facility in the US, the Paducah enrichment facility in Kentucky, for example, consumes the power
output of two 1,000 megawatt coal plants, contributing heavily to the emission of carbon dioxide and other
pollutants.32 Although Paducah is an old and inefficient plant, new alternatives have yet to prove themselves and
could still be years away.
Nuclear power unreliable in a world of climate change
Electricity is largely provided by central plants that deliver power into a transmission grid that is comprised of a
patchwork network controlled by regional entities. It is a system that is increasingly strained. Large baseload
power additions increase this strain, where energy efficiency and some forms of distributed generation (DG)
ease burdens on the system. Further, nuclear reactors have a unique set of reliability issues tied to climate
variations and maintenance imperatives. Our present system is extremely inefficient, and by the time electricity
reaches the customer nearly two-thirds of the energy has been wasted through generation and transmission. 35
Moreover, analysis of the effects of power outages found that the US economy is estimated to be losing between
$104 and $164 billion annually because of power outages.36 Another $15 to $24 billion is lost because of power
quality related losses (voltage sags, surges, etc.). 37 Therefore, the wisdom of a large centralized system should be
questioned and in the near term, a combination of distributed generation and central station generation would be
a more prudent solution that could save transmission costs and grid strain. However, putting aside the debate
about the wisdom of the central generation paradigm, nuclear power is often cited as the only technology that
can provide large amounts of base load power that is carbon free. This argument is based on a common
misconception that renewable energy sources are unreliable due to uneven geographical distribution, weather
variations, or changes in the season, also known as variability and intermittency. However, there are a
number of strategies that can compensate for days when the sun doesnt shine or the wind doesnt blow. A recent
International Energy Agency (IEA) report concluded that intermittency is not a technical barrier to renewable
energy.38 One way to minimize intermittency is to integrate, or mix, sustainable energy sources by both type
and location so that they are mutually supportive. The IEA report noted that interconnection of renewable energy
sources over a wide area is an important way of dealing with intermittency issues. 39 Wind farms, for example,
can provide steadier and more reliable power when they are networked in areas with high average wind
speeds.40 In addition to centralized electricity generation, solar photovoltaics (PVs) can also produce electricity
on-site, making it harder to disrupt, more stable, and less brittle than full reliance on centrally generated
power.41 Furthermore, geothermal energy is unaffected by weather patterns and tidal patterns can be predicted
centuries into the future.
201
General Solvency Answers

Investors wont poney-up for nukes for safety reasons
The technological questions may eventually be answered. But so far, the biggest question -- who's going to pay
for it? -- remains unanswered. It's possible it never will be. In fact, many former advocates of nuclear power
now say nuclear is too expensive to be much of a solution to the country's long-term energy needs. The utility
industry seems eager to switch to nuclear -- the financial industry less so. Aside from the current credit crisis
contracting the flow of investments, many financiers have been scared off by the enormous risks involved in
building new reactors. The Wall Street Journal says the construction costs of a new reactor range from $5
billion to $12 billion. That will take a long time to pay back. Even with electric deregulation, when many
costs can be passed to consumers, that's a hefty burden. The high costs come from lack of skilled workers,
rising prices for concrete and copper, and the industry's inability to manage building costs. Cost overruns
are almost a given. In addition, bankers and investors are reluctant to put up that much money because of
nuclear's safety record. No matter how the overall industry fares, one serious accident or breech of
security will evaporate confidence. The investors then lose their money.
Costs block nuclear expansion, loan guarantees inadequate
Costs remain the biggest hurdle for the nuclear industry. The production of electricity from nuclear reactorsonce onlineis economically
competitive with other power generation types, says the World Nuclear Association. However, a 2003 Massachusetts Institute for Technology paper on nuclear power notes that high start-up costs, regulatory
. Projections for costs for building a single

nuclear power plant range from $5 billion to $12 billion (WSJ), with construction times estimated
at between six and ten years. The lower-end estimate alone is almost double the cost and the construction time of building a coal or gas plants. Heymar, of the Nuclear
uncertainty, and long-lead construction times put nuclear power at an investment disadvantage (PDF)
Energy Institute, says recent nuclear construction contracts were priced between $6 billion and $7 billion. Some experts say until some of these current projects are completed, including the TVA reactor,
. A reactor's price is estimated at "overnight costs" (as if the reactor

could be built tomorrow). Yet as construction stretches over several years to a decade, a number
of things can unpredictably raise the price tag. For example, prices for necessary commodities
such as steel, copper, and concretehave risen significantly in the past few years. The 2005
energy law sought to spur nuclear investment by providing loan guarantees for up to 80 percent
of project costs. However, the amount of loan guarantees each year must be approved by
Congress. So far the amounts have been a mere fraction (IHT) of the $50 billion the industry says
it needs to move forward in the next two years.
there is no way to know the full cost of nuclear construction
202

Construction bottlenecks block nuclear power plant expansion
Construction Bottlenecks. Another obstacle for getting new nuclear construction under way is the
capacity to make ultra-large forging. Pressure vesselsat the core of a nuclear reactorcan be made in
several pieces. However, most utilities now want vessels forged in a single piece. Welds can become brittle
and leak radiation (older reactors slated for U.S. license extensions have their welds rigorously checked before
approval). No welds can decrease the time a reactor is shut down for safety inspections, saving the reactor
money. Only one company in the world, Japan Steel Works, currently can forge reactor vessels this way
(Bloomberg). The company can only do about four to five a year, though it hopes to expand to eight per
year by 2010. The company's current order backlog is about three years. This requires utilities to place
orders well in advance of construction, plunking down about $100 million just to get in the queue.
Utilities are also considering using smaller forgings. Also on the table are more experimental reactors such as
pebble-bed modular reactors, which does not require a pressure vessel.
Worker shortage blocks nuclear expansion
Skilled Workers. Another issue both for construction and operation of reactors is lack of trained personnel. In
the United States, 35 percent of nuclear workers will reach retirement age (US News) within the next few years.
University majors and other educational programs supporting the industry have diminished in the past two
decades, as has the number of students going into such programs. Heymar said recent efforts to increase college
programs as well as to educate potential students about opportunities in the industry are starting to pay off.
203

Supply and personnel constraints block nuclear expansion
IEAs World Energy Outlook 2006 acknowledges several important challenges facing scale-up: the
expansion of nuclear capacity may, however, face several constraints, such as limits to global
capacity to build major components of nuclear power plants, for example pressure vessels and
valves, especially for very large reactors. Similar to other industries, short-term constraints that
may limit new construction include the cost of raw materials, the difficulty of finding
engineering, procurement, and construction contractors and the shortage of key personnel.
It takes at least 4-6 years to build a nuclear reactor
Interest during construction depends on several key factors duration of construction, shape of
outlays, the debt to equity ratio, and returns on both debt and equity. The US Energy Information
Administration assumes a six year construction period for a new reactor. Some vendors believe it
can be done in four years. The MIT base case was five years.
Government support wont attract investment in nuclear power
Should the United States continue to heavily subsidize nuclear technology? Or, as the distinguished physicist Amory
Lovins put it, is the nuclear industry dying of an incurable attack of market forces? Standard and Poors, the creditand investment-rating company, downgrades the rating of any utility that wants a nuclear plant. It claims that even
subsidies are unlikely to make nuclear investment wise. Forbes magazine recently called nuclear investment the
largest managerial disaster in business history, something pursued only by the blind or the biased.
204

Lack of forging capacity limits nuclear growth
Part of the reason for the rising cost estimates is the small number of vendors able to supply critical reactor components, as
well as a shortage of engineering and construction skills in the nuclear industry. Perhaps the biggest bottleneck is in the
huge reactor vessels that contain a plant's radioactive core. Only one plant in the world is capable of forging the huge
vessels in a single piece, and it can produce only a handful of the forgings a year. Though the plant intends to expand
capacity in the next couple of years, and China has said it plans to begin making the forgings, this key component is
expected to limit development for many years.
Quickly building a large number of plants massively increases costs as competition develops for scarce
materials
Congressional Budget Office, May 2008, Nuclear Powers Role in Generating Electricity,
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/91xx/doc9133/05-02-Nuclear.pdf
The cost of new nuclear capacity would probably be higher if utilities attempted to build a
large number of power plants over the next decade. For instance, building all of the 30
proposed nuclear plants over the next 10 to 15 yearsroughly the period of availability
for the production tax creditcould significantly increase construction costs for nuclear
power plants by increasing demand for scarce components that are necessary to build
reactors (for example, specialized steel forgings).
205

Lack of steel and personnel blocks a significant nuclear expansion
Replacing the 300,000 megawatts of existing coal capacity would require hundreds of
new nuclear plants. The capacity of the industry that builds nuclear plants and its
suppliers of components is currently constrained and unlikely to expand rapidly enough
for even tens of plants to be built in the next decade. For example, the Brattle Group (a
consulting firm) has pointed out that the skilled labor necessary to erect power plants is
in short supply and could be slow to expand if a surge in the demand for nuclear plants
occurred.2 Also, the supply of steel forgings necessary to build a reactors containment
vessela structure that prevents radiation from leaking into the atmosphereis limited.
States can provide incentives for nuclear development States and localities encourage investment in
new nuclear capacity through a variety of policies. Over half of the currently proposed
new nuclear plants are sited in southeastern states, where most electricity-generation
capacity is owned by utilities that charge regulated rates. To the extent that rate
regulation guarantees that customers will reimburse utilities for the cost of building a
new plant, financial risk is transferred from investors to customers, which leads to larger
reductions in the cost of capitalintense technologies such as nuclear. In several of those
states, additional incentives that could further reduce the cost of nuclear power are
under consideration. Those provisions include allowing higher rates of return for nuclear
power than for other technologies, allowing utilities to recover some construction costs
before plants begin operations, and tax incentives. State incentives for new nuclear
power plants are not limited to states with traditional regulation in place. For instance,
Texas, a state that allows markets a large role in setting electricity prices, has expanded
a tax incentive initially designed to encourage investment in renewable energy
technologies to apply to new nuclear capacity. Last, California and a number of eastern
states are considering legislation that would limit carbon dioxide emissions, which could
increase the competitiveness of nuclear and innovative fossil-fuel technologies. As of
2007, however, the only states in that group that had proposed sites for new nuclear
power plants were Maryland, Pennsylvania, and New York. States prohibiting the development of
new coal plants Other prohibitions apply to conventional coal technology. A California law
essentially prohibits the construction of any new coal-fired power plant that does not
employ CCS technology. In New England, utilities have been blocked from building new
coal-fired plants for over a decade.
206
Energy Prices/Spending Links

Nuclear costs 4x higher than reported
Washington Independent, June 12, 2008, http://www.washingtonindependent.com/view/nuclear-energy-an
The Wall Street Journal reports that cost estimates for new plants are up to four times higher than originally
anticipated, soaring to $12 billion and beyond for an individual unit.EnergyBiz says that rising costs could "put
an end to the nuclear renaissance before it ever gets started
Coal electricity is the cost of nuclear electricity
Eileen Clausen, president, Resources for the Future, 2007 (November 12, Reality Before the
Renaissance: Making Nuclear Power Part of the Climate Solution,
http://www.pewclimate.org/speeches/11.12.07/ec_ans)
Last but not least among the potential barriers to nuclear power is the issue of cost. The participants in
the Keystone Center discussions said a reasonable estimate for life-cycle costs of nuclear power is
between 8 and 11 cents per kilowatt-hour. Granted, this is higher than some industry and US DOE
estimates of 4 to 7 cents per kilowatt hour, but there is no denying that nuclear power, under
present-day circumstances, is expensive relative to its main competitor: coal. For comparisons
sake, a coal plant operating without carbon capture has life-cycle costs of around 4.8 cents per
kilowatt-hour. A conventional coal-fired plant, in other words, produces electricity at roughly half the
cost of a nuclear plant. This is a huge barrier to this industrys expansion, as all of you know very well.
Nuclear power costs increasing
Estimating new US reactor costs is a daunting exercise. Recent construction cost experience with
advanced reactors is confined to a small number of plants completed in Asia in the 1990s. Accounting
practices, labor rates, exchange rates, licensing and regulatory procedures differ from country to
country. There has been significant real escalation in worldwide materials costs since 2002, and a
growing nuclear industry faces key supply chain challenges.
207
Energy Prices/Spending Links

Nuclear industry underestimates capital costs

The nuclear industry has consistently underestimated its capital costs, often by
large factors, and then claimed its next low forecasts will be accurate. Of 75 U.S.
plants operating in 1986, the U.S. Energy Information Administration found twoyear-cohort-average cost overruns of 209381%.14 This bankrupted a New
Hampshire utility. In the Northwest, the Washington Public Power Supply System
(WPPSS) fiasco caused the biggest-ever U.S. municipal bond default ($2.25
billion), saddled the Bonneville Power Administration with a $6-billion debt, and
raised wholesale electric rates more than 500%. Seasoned investors still bear the
scars. As Mark Twain remarked, a cat that sits on a hot stove lid will not do so
again, but neither will it sit on a cold one. Yet some widely quoted recent studies
claim new-nuclear costs will match or beat the lowest ever observed in the United
States15assuming standardization and construction streamlining that so far are
not actually occurring.
208
Stealth K Links
Public Participation In Relicensing Is Inadequate
In 2004, the NRC reformed the procedural rules on public participation in nuclear power plant licensing and
relicensing to make it much harder for Citizens to raise concerns about safety issues. As a consequence, until
last year, no public hearings regarding relicensing of nuclear power plants had occurred, even though over 44
plants had renewed their licenses. Illustrating the positive effects of public participation, the intervention at
Vermont Yankee highlighted a safety issue with metal fatigue calculations that the NRC Staff had missed at nine
other reactors, but later acknowledged needed to be addressed. One fundamental problem is that the standards
which plants are supposed to meet are not clearly published for all to see and the NRC allows the standards to be
changed by plant operators without NRC approval. It is very difficult to locate problems with an application
when the standards are totally opaque and constantly changing. In addition, while applicants have many years to
prepare an application, intervenors only have 60 days to submit their proposed issues for adjudication. Shaw
Areva MOX Services (Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility, LBP-08-10 at 49 (Concurring Opinion of Judge
Farrar, June 27, 2008). Furthermore, because experts are an essential part of the process, intervenors must
quickly find and fund experts willing to testify against the nuclear industry. Even when a hearing is granted,
intervenors face formidable hurdles in obtaining a fair hearing. One judge noted that intervenors had brought
valuable issues to the Board`s attention, despite these disadvantages and wondered how much more the public
might contribute to nuclear safety, if the NRC`s procedural rules allowed them to. Id. at 49. For example, raising
new issues is very difficult and intervenors are forced to dissipate scarce resources on duplicative filings to try to
overcome very strict timing requirements.. Unless the judges are sympathetic, the proceeding turns into a shell
game ``with the usual street corner outcome: whatever guess petitioners make is wrong.`` See Id. Furthermore,
in nearly all proceedings intervenors must not only litigate against the applicants, they must also litigate against
the NRC Staff, who opt to become a party. In practice, rules which were supposed to generate a streamlined
process generate endless procedural motions.2 Because lawyers and experts cost money, the huge imbalance in
resources between citizens and plant operators hampers citizens` ability to get a fair hearing. This became
obvious at the Oyster Creek hearing when NRC and Exelon presented 21 expert witnesses to oppose the one
witness the citizens could afford. In addition, two public interest lawyers for the intervenors were opposed by
two lawyers for the NRC Staff and four lawyers for the applicant. The resource imbalance is made all the more
important because there is no cross-examination right at the hearing. This means there is no opportunity for the
intervenors to get the applicant`s experts to make the intervenor`s case. Furthermore, if citizens try to find out
what is going on at their local plant without resorting to litigation they face many obstacles in obtaining
information. For example, prior to our intervention, my clients tried to obtain measurements of the thickness of
the containment shell at Oyster Creek, but found the NRC did not possess the information and the licensee
refused to release it. Even during litigation, licensees may try to exclude citizens by refusing to release
information. For example, even though the NRC has recognized that there may be a problem with the metal
fatigue calculations at Oyster Creek, Exelon has refused to release these calculations. In addition, because the
information obtained is highly technical, citizens need experts to interpret it. In the wake of the 1979 accident at
Three Mile Island, all of the major accident reviews recommended that funding be made available to responsible
citizens` groups so that they could act as a deterrent to regulatory agency complacency. Congress has so far
failed to do this, but it is long overdue.
209
Stealth K Links
NRC doesnt allow public input in nuclear licensing decisions
The NRCs recent curtailment of the publics right to participate in reactor

licensing proceedings shuts the door to an important means of enhancing safety.
Public input has long played an important role in the NRCs process for licensing
power plants. The NRC itself has identified numerous examples where public
participation has improved safety. Despite this, the NRC recently removed the
publics right to discovery and cross-examination during hearings on renewals of
existing power plant licenses and applications for new ones, precluding
meaningful public participation.
NRC actively limits public participation in reactor licensing
The NRC has recently taken steps to limit public participation in the reactor
licensing process, even though past participation has led to improved safety.
Moreover, rather than raising the bar for new reactor designs, the NRC is relying
on existing standards, and federal limits on the liability of nuclear plant owners
reduce incentives to improve the safety of future reactors. The NRC also suffers
from an inadequate budget. These shortcomings indicate that the NRC needs to
greatly strengthen its approach to nuclear power safety.
210
Stealth K Links
NRC restricts public participation in licensing decisions
Public input on nuclear power plants has long played an important role in the
NRCs licensing process. The NRC itself has identified numerous examples where
public participation has led to enhanced safety levels. As members of the NRCs
former Appeal Board observed in 1974: Public participation in licensing proceedings
not only can provide valuable assistance to the adjudicatory process, but on frequent
occasions demonstrably has done so. It does no disservice to the diligence of either
applicants generally or the regulatory staff to note that many of the substantial safety
and environmental issues which have received the scrutiny of licensing boards and
appeal boards were raised in the first instance by an intervenor. 54 Yet the NRC has
recently withdrawn the publics right to request depositions and cross-examine

witnesses during hearings on license renewals for existing plants and license
applications for new plants. The attorneys general of five states formally opposed
this change, but the agency adopted it anyway.55 Under the guise of post-9/11
security, the NRC has also removed a significant amount of information from the
public domain, including basic licensing documents such as the Updated Final
Safety Analysis Report and probabilistic risk assessments used to assess the
safety vulnerabilities of a nuclear power plant. And the NRC has severely cut back
the resources it devotes to compliance with the Freedom of Information Act, and
appears to have no process for internal review of its decisions on disclosing
documents to the public. Finally, the NRC continues to give the public no right to
be heard regarding enforcement of its safety regulations, so public petitions on
such enforcement tend to languish before the agency. The NRCs actions have
severely compromised the publics ability to advocate rigorous regulation of
nuclear facilities, and to provide a counterweight to the industrys constant
pressure to reduce government oversight. This should be a matter of serious
concern to Congress and the public, given that the NRC faces significant
regulatory challenges, including overseeing an aging fleet of reactors, issuing the
first construction permits and operating licenses for new reactors since the Three
Mile Island accident, and licensing new facilities that pose proliferation risks
because they reprocess nuclear power plant fuel and handle plutonium.
211
Cant Solve Before 2015

No way to build a nuclear plant before 2015
Meserve points out that the U.S. is at least seven years away from any new plants getting built. "We might
have some eight plants in place by 2020," he said, "but there aren't going to be any by 2015, just because of the
delay in getting plants up and running."
212
Fast Nuclear Power Expansion Bad

Fast/Large Nuclear Power Expansion Leads to Accidents, Terrorism, Proliferation
Substantial expansion of nuclear power creates accidents, terrorism, and proliferation risks
Brice Smith, Institute for Energy and Environmental Risks, 2006,
Insurmountable Risks: The Dangers of Using Nuclear Power to Combat Global Climate Change,
http://www.ieer.org/reports/insurmountablerisks/
The first thing to note is that nuclear power is an expensive source of electricity, with projected costs for
electricity from new reactors in the range of six to seven cents per kWh. Given that both time and resources are
limited, a choice must be made as to which sources of electricity should be pursued aggressively and which
should not. In making this choice, the following should serve to help guide the selection: (1) the options must be
capable of making a significant contribution to a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions; (2) the options should
be economically competitive to facilitate their rapid entry into the market; and, (3) the options should minimize
other environmental and security impacts and should be compatible with a longer term vision for creating an
equitable and sustainable global energy system. It is within this context that the future of nuclear power must be
judged. Our analysis has found that nuclear power plants are a uniquely dangerous source of electricity
that will create serious risks, particularly if deployed on a large scale. The largest vulnerability
associated with such an expansion of nuclear power is likely to be its potential connection to the
proliferation of nuclear weapons. In order to fuel the global or steady-state growth scenarios, the world's
uranium enrichment capacity would have to increase by approximately two and half to six times. Just one
percent of the enrichment capacity required by the global growth scenario would be enough to supply the
highly-enriched uranium for nearly 210 nuclear weapons every year. Reprocessing the spent fuel would
add significantly to these security risks. The potential for a catastrophic reactor accident or well
coordinated terrorist attack to release a large amount of radiation is another unique danger of nuclear
power. Such a release could have extremely severe consequences for human health and the environment.
Even if a reactor's secondary containment was not breached, a serious accident would still be costly. As
summarized by Peter Bradford, a former commissioner of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
The abiding lesson that Three Mile Island taught Wall Street was that a group of N.R.C.-licensed reactor
operators, as good as any others, could turn a $2 billion asset into a $1 billion cleanup job in about 90 minutes.
Despite the importance of reactor safety, the risk assessments used to estimate the likelihood of accidents
have numerous methodological weaknesses that limit their usefulness. In light of the uncertainties
inherent in such risk assessments, William Ruckelshaus, the head of the EPA under both Presidents Nixon
and Reagan cautioned that,
213
Spending Links
Guaranteeing loans for even 45 reactors by 2030 will cost $45 billion
Sen. John McCain should consider a new Energy Department report before continuing his push for building as
many as 45 new nuclear power reactors by 2030.
The study says disposing of the nations nuclear waste will cost more than $96 billion and require a major
expansion of a controversial planned Nevada waste dump well beyond the limits imposed by Congress and
thats not taking into account the Republican presidential candidates proposed American nuclear renaissance.
The cost of the Yucca Mountain project has increased dramatically in recent years. The new estimate is nearly
$38.7 billion more than anticipated in 2001 when the overall cost of the program was set at $57.5 billion.
214
Subsidies Fail
Subsidies inadequate Wall Street wont finance nuclear power
"Wall street doesn't like nuclear power," says Arjun Makhijani of the Institute for Energy and Environmental
Research. The fundamental fact is that nuclear power is too expensive and risky to attract the necessary
commercial investors. Even with vast government subsidies, it is difficult or almost impossible to get proper
financing and insurance.
215
Massive Expansion Means More Waste

Adding even 45 reactors means a 2nd waste depository
Register Guard, August 11, 2008, http://www.registerguard.com/rg/EditorialsLetters/story.csp?
Sen. John McCain should consider a new Energy Department report before continuing his push for building as
many as 45 new nuclear power reactors by 2030. The study says disposing of the nations nuclear waste will
cost more than $96 billion and require a major expansion of a controversial planned Nevada waste dump well
beyond the limits imposed by Congress and thats not taking into account the Republican presidential
candidates proposed American nuclear renaissance. The cost of the Yucca Mountain project has increased
dramatically in recent years. The new estimate is nearly $38.7 billion more than anticipated in 2001 when the
overall cost of the program was set at $57.5 billion. The Energy Department has no idea how much McCains
proposal would increase the projects cost, although Ward Sproat, the lead official in charge of the federal
nuclear waste program, says it could require the creation of a second major nuclear repository. One can only
imagine how much a waste site would cost, where it would be located or, perhaps most importantly, how
many decades it would take before it actually is built.
216
CP Renewables Solve Climate Better

Renewables have a small fraction of the emissions of nuclear
Second, while it may be unfair to compare baseload sources such as nuclear to intermittent or non-dispatchable sources
such as wind and solar PV, if these numbers are correct, then offshore wind power has less than one-seventh the carbon
equivalent emissions of nuclear plants; large-scale hydropower, onshore wind, and biogas, about one-sixth the emissions;
small-scale hydroelectric and solar thermal one-fifth. This makes these renewable energy technologies seven-, six-, and
five-times more effective on a per kWh basis at fighting climate change.
Solar emits less CO2 than nuclear

Additionally, researchers in the United Kingdom conducted lifecycle analyses for 15 separate distributed generation and
renewable energy technologies found that all but one, solar photovoltaics (PV), emitted much less gCO2e/kWh than the
mean reported for nuclear plants. In an analysis using updated data on solar PV, researchers in the United States found that
current estimates on the greenhouse gas emissions for typical solar PV systems range from 29 to 35 gCO2/kWh.
217
CP Renewables More Cost Effective

Renewables cheaper than nuclear
More important, though, there are less-costly ways of weaning ourselves off these carbon-emitting energy sources. Evenif a
high price of carbon makes nuclear economic, the costs of renewable energy such as wind and solar power are cheaper, and
getting cheaper all the time. By contrast, nuclear is more expensive, and getting more expensive all the time. Solving a
Problem
218
CP -- Renewables Cheaper than Nuclear

Renewables are half the cost of nuclear
On all five counts they are wrong. Renewable energy sources are cleaner, cheaper, better able to address climate
change and proliferation risks, and safer. The governments own data show that wind energy now costs less than half
of nuclear power; that wind can supply far more energy, more quickly, than nuclear power; and that by 2015, solar
panels will be economically competitive with all other conventional energy technologies.
After energy-efficiency programs, wind is the most cost-effective

After energy-efficiency programs, wind is the most cost-effective way both to generate electricity and to reduce
greenhouse emissions It costs about half as much as atomic power. The only nearly finished nuclear plant in the
West, now being built in Finland by the French company Areva, will generate electricity costing 11 cents per
kilowatt-hour. Yet the U.S. governments Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory calculated actual costs of new wind
plants, over the last seven years, at 3.4 cents per kilowatthour. Although some groups say nuclear energy is
inexpensive, their misleading claims rely on trimming the data on cost. The 2003 M.I.T. study, for instance, included
neither the costs of reprocessing nuclear material, nor the full interest costs on nuclear-facility construction capital,
nor the total costs of waste storage. Once these omissionsfrom the entire nine-stage nuclear fuel cycleare
included, nuclear costs are about 11 cents per kilowatt-hour. The cost-effectiveness of wind power explains why in
2006 utility companies worldwide added 10 times more wind-generated, than nuclear, electricity capacity. It also
explains why small-scale sources of renewable energy, like wind and solar, received $56 billion in global private
investments in 2006, while nuclear energy received nothing. It explains why wind supplies 20 percent of Denmarks
electricity. It explains why, each year for the last several years, Germany, Spain and India have each, alone, added
more wind capacity than all countries in the world, taken together, have added in nuclear capacity
219
CP Renewables Nuclear Not More Reliable

Nuclear power is not reliable

Though micropowers unreliability is an unfounded myth, nuclear powers
unreliability is all too real. Nuclear plants are capital-intensive and run best at
constant power levels, so operators go to great pains to avoid technical failures.
These nonetheless occur occasionally, due to physical causes that tend to
increase with age due to corrosion, fatigue, and other wear and tear. Some
nuclear power failures are major and persistent: of the 132 U.S. nuclear units that
were built and licensed to operate (52% of the original 253 orders), 21% were
permanently shut down because of intractable reliability or cost issues (or in one
case a meltdown), while a further 27% have suffered one or more forced outages
of at least a year.98 When the remaining 68 units work well, their output is indeed
commendably steady and dependable, lately averaging ~90% capacity factor in
the United States. However, even these relatively successful nuclear plants also
present four unique reliability issues:
Routine refueling, usually coordinated with scheduled major maintenance,
shuts down the typical U.S. nuclear plant for 37 days every 17 months.
In both Europe and the United States, prolonged heat waves have shut down or
derated multiple nuclear plants when their sources of cooling water got too hot. 100
220
CP - Renewable Energy Counterplan Solves Energy Shortages

Solar thermal can provide baseload capacity
Tallahassean, July 24 ,2008, http://www.tallahassee.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?
The main argument for nuclear is that it is needed for "base load" power supply. Base power is what the industry
calls consistent dependable power, and it's the same thing solar energy has traditionally been criticized for not
providing. But solar thermal energy production is capable of supplying base power, and if the nine bucks
Progress Energy wants to charge its customers for this nuclear fantasy were properly used, we could take a
figure of $2 or $3 (the price of a six pack) and spread it around the entire rate-paying population.
221
CP -- Efficiency
Efficiency solves warming 7x as well as nuclear
Each dollar invested in electric efficiency in the US displaces nearly seven times as much carbon dioxide as a
dollar invested in nuclear power and nuclear power saves as little as half as much carbon per dollar as wind
power and cogeneration.93 Sustainable energy development boosts employment by 335,000
The sustainable energy sector promises to boost the American and international job market just as many
manufacturers and conventional energy providers are outsourcing or downsizing their workforces. The Union of
Concerned Scientists estimates that 355,000 new jobs in American manufacturing, construction, operation,
maintenance, and other industries can be created if the US obtained 20 percent of its energy from sustainable
sources by 2020.
222
CP -- Efficiency Solves CO2 Better than Nuclear

Efficiency counterplan solves CO2 better than nuclear
Nuclear power is even less clean when compared with energy-efficiency measures, such as using compact-fluorescent
bulbs and increasing home insulation. Whether in medicine or energy policy, preventing a problem is usually cheaper
than curing or solving it, and energy efficiency is the most cost-effective way to solve the problem of reducing
greenhouse gases. Department of Energy data show that one dollar invested in energy-efficiency programs displaces
about six times more carbon emissions than the same amount invested in nuclear power. Government figures also
show that energy-efficiency programs save $40 for every dollar invested in them. This is why the government says it
could immediately and cost effectively cut U.S. electricity consumption by 20 percent to 45 percent, using only
existing strategies, like time-of-use electricity pricing. (Higher prices for electricity used during daily peakconsumption timesroughly between 8 a.m. and 8 p.m.encourage consumers to shift their time of energy use. New
power plants are typically needed to handle only peak electricity demand.)
Improving efficiency solves climate change

Improving the efficiency with which fossil fuels are converted to usable energy
(supply-side efficiency), and the efficiency with which end-use applicationssuch
as appliances, lighting, and air conditioningconsume energy (demand-side
efficiency), can contribute greatly to reducing energy related greenhouse gas
emissions in the United States.
223
Nuclear Power Increasing Globally

33 new reactors
International Atomic Energy Agency, 2008, Nuclear Technology Review,
http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC52/GC52InfDocuments/English/gc52inf-3_en.pdf
The year 2007 saw signs of recent rising expectations for nuclear power starting to translate into increased
construction. There were seven construction starts, plus the resumption of active construction at Watts Bar 2 in
the USA, and a total of 33 reactors under construction at the end of the year. Watts Bar 2 is the first active
construction in the USA since 1996. The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) received four applications
for combined licences (COLs), the first applications for new nuclear reactors in the USA in nearly 30 years.
Construction also began at Flamanville 3, the first construction start in France since 1991.
New nuclear expansion centered in Asia now
Current expansion, as well as near-term and long-term growth prospects, however, remain
centred in Asia. Of the 33 reactors under construction, 19 were in Asia. By the end of the year, 28 of
the last 39 new reactors to have been connected to the grid were in Asia.
224
Nuclear Power Increasing Now -- Globally

Massive, global resurgence of nuclear power
National Post, July 12, 2008, p. FP15
I thought the (anti-every kind of energy) activists belonged to the Global Warming/Climate Change, fanatical (sky is
falling) crowd? I was very disappointed in Mr. Corcoran's lack of understanding and research on the subject of Nuclear
Energy. Nuclear is making a resurgence because its advantages have been weighed against all other options. Nuclear
Energy is now a major established industry over 50 years old in Canada and the U. S., with 121 Reactors combined.
There are worldwide, 440 reactors operating, with a surge of 35 reactors under construction and another 300+ in the
design/ proposal stage.Hundreds of billions of dollars are being invested and the construction costs are now well
established with production costs very competitive. These are not careless or ignorant investors.
1,000 new nuclear plants by 2050

Michael L. Green, July 11, 2008, Charleston Gazette, p. 5A
Moreover, the failure to provide adequate funds for GNEP shows an ignorance of nuclear power's importance globally. The
International Atomic Energy Agency forecasts as many as 1,000 nuclear plants operating by 2050, more than double
the number today. Egypt, Vietnam, Malaysia and Argentina are among the countries planning to build nuclear
plants.
Domestic, global nuclear power increasing

Spero News, July 5, 2008, Nicolas Loris is a Research Assistant and Jack Spencer is a research fellow in the
Thomas A. Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation,
http://www.speroforum.com/site/article.asp?id=15632&t=Nuclear+power+gaining+momentum+in+the+US
Nuclear power is gaining momentum in the United States as the nation seeks environmentally friendly and
affordable sources of energy that can meet growing demand. As the U.S. deliberates the possibility of building
new nuclear power plants, other nations have already begun the process.
36 plants under construction, 81 planned
Future Pundit, August, 9, 2008, http://www.futurepundit.com/archives/005430.html

The world has 439 nuclear power plants in operation, 36 under construction, and 81 planned. While
Russia, India, and China each have 6 nuclear power plants under construction Russia's 6 make a much
higher ratio of power plants under construction to people and so Russia's commitment to nuclear power
is much bigger.
225

Global growth in nuclear power now
Power, February 2008, p. 4 U.S. A Paper Tiger in Nuclear Power
The latest International Atomic Energy Agency report-Energy, Electricity and Nuclear Power Estimates
for the Period up to 2030-reveals the degree to which the world beyond the U.S. is newly embracing
nuclear power. The report projects firm growth of 77 GW between now and 2030 for plants that are
under construction or firmly committed. "Promising" projects push the prediction up to 300 GW.
The report notes that since 1986, worldwide nuclear generation capacity has remained essentially
constant at around 371 GW, or about 15% of total global electricity production. For comparison
purposes, the U.S. figure is about 20% of capacity, provided by 104 nuclear plants with a cumulative
rating of 100 GW. The top five list is rounded out by France's 59 plants (63 GW), Japan's 55 (48 GW),
Russia's 31 (22 GW), and Korea's 20 (17 GW). Today, 30 different countries have nuclear power
plants.
Here's where the data get interesting. At the end of November 2007, there were 435 operating nuclear
plants worldwide, with 27 units in the works (ignoring two Russian floating nuclear plants of 30-MW
capacity). The locations of those plants are enlightening:
Russia, with three plants under construction, plans to significantly increase its nuclear power
output.
India has seven plants under construction and hopes to increase its fleet capacity eight-fold by
2022.
China is installing four reactors and has announced plans to quintuple its nuclear power
production by 2020.
Japan, with just one reactor under construction, still wants to increase nuclear's share of its
capacity mix from 30% to 40% over the next decade.
Korea completed one reactor in 2006 and has three more under way.
Europe's schizophrenic approach to nuclear hasn't stopped the construction of six new reactors.
Nuclear power is now banned in Austria, Italy, Denmark, and Ireland; Germany and Belgium
say they intend to phase out their programs.
The remainder of the new units include one in France, one in Pakistan, and the resumption of
construction of Watts Bar 2 in Tennessee.
226
Nuclear Power Increasing Now Globally

Nuclear power expanding world-wide

A DECADE AGO, FINLAND--WITH ITS COLD climate, long distances between cities, and energyintensive industry--began looking for a way to meet its energy needs while living up to its Kyoto
commitments to reduce greenhouse gases. Coal was cheap but crammed with polluting carbon.
Thermal plants fueled by Russian gas seemed chancy given Finland's uneasy relationship with its
neighbor. Renewable-energy sources like hydropower and wind, though promising, could not meet
demand on their own. The debate kept circling back to the only other carbon-free option--nuclear. As
Mikko Elo, a former MP who helped secure Finland's 2002 decision to build the new Olkiluoto reactor,
recently put it: "If you worry about climate change there is no other economically or environmentally
stable alternative to nuclear power." That sentiment has quickly gained traction elsewhere in
Europe, even in regions that have been staunchly antinuclear since a partial meltdown at the
Chernobyl nuclear power station in Ukraine spewed a radioactive plume over the Continent 22
years ago. On Jan. 10, the British government reversed years of policy by proposing to
streamline planning applications for reactors in the hope of opening new stations as early as
2017. British Secretary of State for Business John Hutton declared that nuclear power is "safe
and secure" and that it's central to the country's goals for cutting greenhouse emissions. In
Sweden, which decided even before Chernobyl to phase out nuclear power, an opinion poll
released on Jan. 21 showed that almost half of voters now favor the technology. And even in
Germany, where atomic fears helped spawn the nation's formidable green movement, many
high-profile politicians, led by Chancellor Angela Merkel, are calling for the country's official
opposition to nuclear energy to be overturned. Outside Europe, the news is even brighter for the
nuclear industry: globally, 34 nuclear plants are now being built in places as far afield as India,
China, Russia and Argentina.
Global industrialization makes nuclear power plant expansion inevitable
Agence France Presse, May 22, 2008,
http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5i7T1eYiINfHi24IlQNQGxN9lUX7g
Author and nuclear engineer James Mahaffey said that a nuclear renaissance is "inevitable" because
"the world is becoming more industrialized, not less," but said Americans may not be ready for the
sticker shock. "Lately the cheap power is turning out to have secondary effects. The pollution aspects
of coal are beginning to have an impact and we are looking back at nuclear power," Mahaffey said.
227

Global popular support for nuclear power
Despite these concerns, environmentalists are losing the public-relations war over nuclear. A recent International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) poll of 18,000 people in 18 countries found that, after being reminded of
nuclear energy's low emissions of greenhouse gases, 53% of respondents said they would not oppose the
construction of nuclear reactors. And where the public and politicians do not stand in the way, nuclear reactors
will surely follow. Once considered uneconomical, reactors are increasingly being hailed as a sound investment.
The Nuclear Energy Agency, which studies the nuclear industry in OPEC countries, recently concluded that in
order for nuclear plants to compete with gas as an energy source, oil must cost more than $45 a barrel; with oil
now at twice that price, nuclear energy seems more viable than ever. And because nuclear power plants don't
emit CO2, they will be exempt from future carbon taxes or carbon-trading schemes, including one the European
Union recently pledged to implement, which will force utilities to buy permits to offset their emissions. "The
economics now clearly favor nuclear," says Julian Critchlow, head of the global utilities practice at Bain &
Company. "Between high commodity prices and prices on carbon, it's a very sound model."
35 reactors being built outside the U.S.
Since the most recent U.S. reactor began operating in 1996, 37 have started up in other countries, an
average of about four per year.13 Twenty-five reactors are currently under construction outside the
United States.
228

World nuclear capacity will grow
Electric Utility Week, June 30, 2008, p. 18
World nuclear power capacity is expected to grow by one-third by 2030 as more countries, especially China, India, Russia
and the US, add nuclear power plants and shift away from plants that burn fossil fuels, the Energy Information
Administration said in its 2008 outlook. World nuclear power capacity is expected to rise to 498 GW in 2030, up from 374
GW in 2005, EIA said. China is expected to add 45 GW of net nuclear power capacity by 2030, with Russia adding 18 GW,
India 17 GW and the US 15 GW.
Most new reactors being constructed in Asia

New reactors are on order elsewhere in the world, and several non-nuclear countries have announced
that they are considering the nuclear option. As Figure 1 shows, the vast majority of reactors currently
under construction are in Asia, with only a handful in the rest of the world.
Globally, 40 new reactors since 96
Unlike the United States, where active construction of new reactors ended in 1996, the rest of the
world has continued building nuclear plants, although at a modest pace. Since 1996, about 40
commercial reactors have started up, an average of about four per year. About 30 reactors were
permanently closed during that period, although many of them were smaller than the newly started
reactors.25
Countries that previously have not built nuclear plants are developing reactors
The renewed worldwide interest in nuclear power has led to a possible expansion of the technology to
currently non-nuclear nations. Six of the countries that are currently building or formally considering
reactor projects Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Malaysia, and Vietnam have never operated
nuclear power plants. Several other non-nuclear countries have also raised the possibility of building
nuclear power plants, including Belarus, Libya, Jordan, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Thailand,
and Turkey.
229

World nuclear capacity will grow by 1/3
Platts Oilgram Price Report, June 26, 2008, p. 13
World nuclear power capacity is expected to grow by one-third by 2030 as more countries, especially China,
India, Russia and the US, add nuclear power plants and shift away from plants that burn fossil fuels such as
coal, the EIA said.
Heavy investment in nuclear power now despite the risks
Investor Chronicle, June 5, 2008
Nuclear power lies in something of a no-man's land for most green investors. Although some climate-change
believers think that a massive increase in nuclear capacity is essential in order to wean us off oil dependency,
most green campaigners and free-marketeers think that it's a dangerous waste of time, with risky economics and
a poor safety record. That hasn't dampened investors' excitement over the nuclear sector and many western
governments have started to announce plans for a significant expansion in nuclear capacity.
Hundreds of nuclear power plants on the drawing board
Patrick Moore, former head of Greenpeace, Newsweek, May 26, 2008, p. online
There are 32 nuclear plants on the drawing boards right now. Last year four applied for their licenses and this
year we expect 10 or 11 more. That's just in the United States. There are hundreds of nuclear plants on the
drawing boards around the world. This is a completely new thing: the term "'nuclear renaissance" didn't exist
three years ago, and now it's a widely known term.
230
World Nuclear Power Increasing Gulf States

Gulf states looking to build nuclear plants
Petroleum Economist, June 2008, p. online
In recent weeks, Dubai and Kuwait have taken steps to make LNG part of their fuel mix, while the GCC as a
whole has, for some time, been discussing development of nuclear power. In recent months, the United Arab
Emirates (UAE) has gone as far as beginning preliminary negotiations with potential suppliers of both nuclear
technology and fuel.
231
Nuclear Power Increasing Now China

Nuclear power expanding in China now
Nuclear Power International, June 2008,
http://pepei.pennnet.com/display_article/332484/140/ARTCL/none/none/1/Powering-Up-a-GrowingNation/
According to the World Nuclear Association, China has 11 nuclear power reactors in operation, six under
construction, 15 that are about to start construction (2008 and 2009) and 18 more being planned for construction
in 2010 and 2011. These plants are forecast to add 40 GW by 2020.
China will quadruple its nuclear capacity by 2020
Planet Ark, February 26, 2006, http://www.planetark.com/dailynewsstory.cfm/newsid/35242/story.htm
China's ambitious nuclear power plans could tighten global supplies of uranium, leading the nation's power
developers to pursue designs that use less of the raw material, industry executives said on Tuesday. Beijing
plans to quadruple installed nuclear power capacity to 40 gigawatts by 2020, a plan which requires
developers to start construction of two or three 1,000 megawatt units each year.
232
Nuclear Power Increasing Middle East

Saudi Arabia and Japan developing new nuclear plants
The Economist, May 24, 2008, p. online
REDISCOVERING the charm of nuclear power throws up some odd results. America and Saudi Arabia have
just signed a deal that may mean that the world's biggest oil-producer imports American-made uranium fuel for
(as yet unbuilt) reactors. Japan's prickly relations with Russia did not stop Toshiba agreeing on joint reactorconstruction and fuel-production efforts with state-owned Atomenergoprom. Diplomats, engineers and
businessmen from Argentina, India, Pakistan, South Korea and elsewhere tout nuclear know-how around the
globe. Yet behind the potential profits is a danger: that the spread of the peaceful atom will, as in the past, fuel
military rivalry.
233
Nuclear Power Increasing Now -- England

Britain developing nukes
Reuters, July 22, 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/feedarticle/7669823
Britain wants to be the most attractive place in the world to build nuclear power plants and has
published draft rules for finding places in England and Wales to do it. All but one of the UK's existing
nuclear power plants is due to close by 2023 and the government wants potential investors to propose
sites that would be suitable for new build to start before 2025 to fill the looming power generation gap.
234
Nuclear Power Inevitable U.S.

NRC will approve three new reactors
Scientific American, March 28, 2008, http://www.sciam.com/article.cfm?id=us-will-approve-newnuclear-reactors

One of the U.K.'s top nuclear officials said today that she was told the U.S. will okay plans to
build the first nuclear power plants since the accident at Three Mile Island nearly three decades
ago. Lady Barbara Thomas Judge, chair of the U.K. Atomic Energy Authority, said that the chair of
the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission informed her that the NRC will approve three
applications for new nuclear reactors that it's currently considering. "Dale Klein told me that
those three nuclear applications will be approved," she told the State of the Planet conference at
Columbia University today, the 29th anniversary of the accident at Three Mile Island in Middletown,
Pa. (Subsequently, a reactor at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in the then Ukrainian Soviet
Republic melted down in April 1986 in what would become the worst nuclear power accident in
history, spreading radiation as far away as North America and leading to the evacuation and
resettlement of more than 336,000 people). "The politics is changing," she added, noting growing
enthusiasm for nuclear power as the clean alternative to coal-burning plants. Even some
environmentalists have begun to embrace nuclear power, because of its potential to reduce the
greenhouse emissions that are blamed for global warming.
Restrictions on new coal plant development have boosted nuclear power
Driven in large part by the run-up in natural gas prices, which have approximately quadrupled since 1999, and
the political challenges of building new coal plants (of the -150 new coal plants announced in the past five
years, only about one third have moved forward to a permit being issued or beginning construction), nuclear has
become increasingly attractive. This is particularly true with no scalable alternative technology currently
available
235
Nuclear Power Increasing U.S.

4-8 nuclear plants will be operational by 2015-16
Angela Neville, JD, July 2008, Power Magazine, p. 60
In his presentation, he mentioned that it's a new landscape for nuclear power. For example, in 2007 the South
Texas Project Nuclear Operating Co. submitted to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) the first license
application for a new nuclear power plant in 29 years. Zachary predicted that by either 2015 or 2016 four to
eight new nuclear power plants will be beginning commercial operation.
Push for domestic nuclear power expansion
Power, February 2008, p. 4 U.S. A Paper Tiger in Nuclear Power
There's no denying that the drumbeat for nuclear power in the U.S. is louder today than it has been in a quartercentury. In the past month alone, Duke Energy and PPL have announced their interest in building new plants,
joining a half-dozen other utilities, while Areva and Mitsubishi submitted their reactor designs to the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission for certification. Those two new designs join the Westinghouse/Toshiba AP-1000 and
GE's advanced boiling water reactor and economic simplified boiling water reactor designs, which are already
approved and being marketed
Generation III reactors coming in the U.S.
Power, April 2008, p. 44 Developing the Next Generation of Reactors
Dozens of intrinsically safe Generation III+ reactors are expected to be deployed in the U.S. in the coming
years. Today, scientists already are looking over the horizon to Generation IV reactors that will be capable of
producing hydrogen and process heat as well as electricity while generating much less radioactive waste.
License filings will double
Popular Mechanics, May 2008, p. 20
Nuclear power, which already supplies 20 percent of the electricity in the United States, is a leading option for
addressing the country's energy crunch. In 2007, operators filed license applications with the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission for seven new reactors; experts say double that number could be filed this year.
236

Rising electricity demand has spurred a nuclear renaissance
John J. Grossenbacher Laboratory Director Idaho National Laboratory, April 23, 2008, Testimony,
http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286-34357630_ITM
Rising demand for energy and electricity, pressure to reduce carbon emissions along with fair consideration of
the outstanding performance and economics associated with operating U.S. nuclear power plants have spurred a
nuclear energy renaissance in the U.S.
Nuclear resurgence
Rocky Mountain News, June 7, 2008, http://www.rockymountainnews.com/news/2008/jun/07/nukeinterest-resurges-in-state/

Nuclear power, long in public disfavor because of safety, waste and cost concerns, is muscling its way
back into the energy picture. While its return is most prominent internationally - where dozens of
countries are seeking nuclear generators as a source of new energy supplies - it's also getting a rethink
in Colorado and across the United States. Nationally, worries of pollution from coal-burning power
plants are spurring renewed interest. Meanwhile, the nuclear industry has launched a major public
relations campaign touting itself as "clean-air energy."
237

30 new nuclear plants coming
National Review, June 16, 2008, p. 32 Nuclear Power
Those high construction costs have led many to argue that nuclear power is intrinsically uneconomic without
subsidy. This is contradicted by the British governments recent analysis, which found that nuclear power is
viable without subsidies. The British government received confirmation from potential nuclear operators that
subsidy was neither needed nor desired. In the U.S., there have been 30 announcements of plans for new nuclear
plants, totaling 40,000 megawatts of capacity, which would power 32 million households.
27 plus countries building new nuclear plants
Business Line, July 8, 2008, p. A3
Chennai, July 5 At least 27 countries are building or planning to set up their first nuclear power plants as they try to address
their growing energy needs with lower carbon emissions, Japans Ministry of Foreign Affairs noted on Saturday.
311 new reactors being planned

Business Line, July 8, 2008, p. A3
While only 36 new nuclear reactors are under construction, another 311 are either on order or being planned, according to
the World Nuclear Association. The 439 reactors currently operational in 30 countries produce 16 per cent of the worlds
electricity, according to the Association.
New nuclear plants in the U.S., investment high

Agence France Presse, May 22, 2008,
http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5i7T1eYiINfHi24IlQNQGxN9lUX7g
Long considered a pariah by environmental activists, nuclear energy is making a comeback as the new
darling of the US "green" rush, as Americans cozy up to the idea of carbon-free power. The nuclear
drive underway caps nearly three decades of a freeze on reactor construction following the 1979
accident at Pennsylvania's Three Mile Island (TMI) plant, which sparked panic over the risk of
radiation, spills and contamination and inspired a generation of anti-nuclear activists. In the scramble
to grab billions of dollars in government perks, 19 companies have applied for regulatory approval of
their proposals for new nuclear reactor sites since 2007, and more are expected to follow.
238
Government Acting to Boost Nuclear Now

Subsidies and loan guarantees available now
Subsidies to the industry distort the financial picture further. In the U.S., Washington assumes liability for any catastrophic
damages above $10.5 billion for an accident, and has taken on responsibility for the disposal of nuclear waste. The 1995
federal Energy Policy Act also provides loan guarantees for as much as 80% of the cost of new reactors and additional
financial guarantees of up to $2 billion for costs arising from regulatory delays. The 1995 act saw subsidies as a way to
prime the pump of a nuclear-energy revival in the U.S.; increased demand and a stable regulatory environment would
ultimately reduce the cost of building new plants. However, the industry for 50 years has shown only a trend toward higher
costs, and there's no evidence that subsidies will spur any reduction in those costs.
Government working to boost nuclear now

Recognizing that all sources of energy will be needed to meet energy demand, the Department of Energy
launched the Nuclear Power 2010 program in 2002 as a joint government-industry cost- shared program to
identify sites for new nuclear power plants, develop and bring to market advanced nuclear plant technologies,
and evaluate the business case for building new nuclear power plants by demonstrating untested regulatory
processes. Together with incentives enacted through the Energy Policy Act of 2005 - federal loan guarantees for
low emission energy technologies, federal risk insurance and production tax credits - government and industry
are working together to address the last barriers associated with building new plants: the financial and regulatory
risks. These federal tools will allow first movers to address and manage the risks associated with building the
first few new nuclear power plants. This year`s budget request seeks to significantly increase the government`s
share in the NP 2010 program and to extend the period during which companies can seek loan guarantees by two
years. Industry has stated that loan guarantees are essential to ensuring the first new nuclear plants are ordered
and built.
Billions in nuclear industry tax credits available now
Such challenges aside, the debate over nuclear power has moved from whether new plants will be built to how
many, and where. In the U.S., where no new plants have come online since 1996, the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission expects applications for 27 new reactors over the next two years, and Congress has encouraged this
by offering the nuclear industry billions of dollars in tax credits
239
Government Acting to Boost Nuclear Now

Energy Policy Act of 2005 & DOE funding boosting nuclear now
In the United States, interest appears driven, in part, by provisions in the 2005 Energy Policy Act
authorizing streamlined licensing that combine construction and operating permits, and tax credits for
production from advanced nuclear power facilities. Moreover, the U.S. Department of Energy
proposes to spend billions of dollars to develop the next generation of nuclear power
technology.
U.S. conducting Generation IV reactor research now
For the long-term future, the Department is working on the next generation of nuclear energy systems,
technologies that represent enhancements in economics, sustainability, reduced waste intensity and
proliferation-resistance over today`s technologies through the Generation IV nuclear energy systems
program. Additionally, the U.S. is part of the Generation IV International Forum or GIF, a
multinational effort to work collaboratively on Generation IV technologies. GIF nations are exploring
six advanced systems of interest. Overall, the investment of 10 nations in collaborative R&D on
Generation IV technologies is over $100M per year on the first two systems. U.S. Generation IV
research is focused on reactor systems that operate at higher temperatures than today`s reactors to both
improve efficiency and provide a process heat source for a wide range of energy-intensive co-located
industrial processes. A mid- term version of the Generation IV Very High Temperature Reactor
concept, the High Temperature Gas Reactor (HTGR) nuclear system is being pursued in the U.S.
through the Next Generation Nuclear Plant (NGNP) demonstration, authorized by the Energy Policy
Act of 2005. The HTGR is an advanced nuclear technology that can provide hightemperature heat for
industrial processes at temperatures up to 950oC. Coupled with developmental high temperature
electrolytic or thermo-chemical technologies, this advanced HTGR technology can also be used in the
production of hydrogen and oxygen from water for existing markets such as refinery upgrading of
petroleum crude, chemical and fertilizer plants, as well as in processes such as coal-to-synthetic fuels
and hydrocarbon feedstocks. Using the HTGR nuclear heat source will reduce dependence for
producing process heat using fossil fuels such as natural gas and oil, for which the longterm prices are
increasing and the availability is uncertain. This is achieved without carbon emissions, thus reducing
the carbon footprint of these industrial processes.
240
Investor Support for Nuclear Now

Investors support the nuclear industry now
For all of these reasons, participants in the financial markets recognize that nuclear needs to become a
larger portion of the U.S. fuel mix in the decades ahead. Once they are built, new nuclear units are
expected to supply reliable power at all-in, hourly rates that are comparatively high by recent
standards, but more than competitive against the expected cost of power in the next 10-15 years.
Moreover, this cost advantage is expected to widen during the next decade, as the U.S. implements a
climate protection regime through a cap-and-trade system which would impose an explicit cost on
emitted carbon. This need for increased nuclear generation, as a comparatively inexpensive source of
non-emitting power, is also completely independent of the expected growth in energy conservation,
and in other sources of clean energy such as wind power or solar power. It is well understood in the
financial markets that the U.S. will be seriously challenged to reduce its national carbon footprint back
down to 20th Century levels, and that we will need every means available to meet this goal. Even in
the most ambitious yet plausible growth scenarios for conservation, wind and solar, the U.S. carbon
footprint would be further reduced to the extent there is significant growth in nuclear`s share of the
U.S. fuel mix. And this need would only be amplified to the extent that plug-in electric vehicles reach
commercial scale, thus creating the opportunity to use domestically produced electricity as a substitute
for imported petroleum. Hence, there is no trade-off between nuclear and wind or conservation. We
need all of them to the fullest extent possible.
241
Generation IV Solves Oil Dependence

Generation IV reactors support a hydrogen economy, solving oil dependence
Power, April 2008, p. 44 Developing the Next Generation of Reactors (James M. Hylko is an integrated
safety management specialist for Paducah Remediation Services LLC and a POWER contributing editor)
Another feature of many of Gen IV reactors is their ability to produce hydrogen as a by-product.
Realizing this potential could make the use of fuel cells for transportation and power generation more
economic and environmentally benign while reducing America's dependence on imported oil.
Sufficient quantities of hydrogen for commercial use would be produced during off-peak periods,
improving the operating economics of nuclear baseload plants. A long-term objective would require
dedicated Gen IV nuclear plants, operating at higher temperatures, to produce hydrogen at a steady rate
for storage and subsequent use by large (>1,000-MW) banks of fuel cells to address daily peak
demand.
242
Nuclear Reduces Pollution

Nuclear produces no pollution
National Conference of State Legislatures, March 2007,

http://www.ncsl.org/magazine/articles/2007/07SLMar07_Nuclear.htm
Nuclear energy is the worlds largest source of emission-free energy. It produces no controlled air
pollutants, such as sulfur and particulates, or greenhouse gases. The use of nuclear energy in place of
other energy sources helps keep the air clean, preserve the Earths climate, avoid ground-level ozone
formation and prevent acid rain. In 2005, U.S. nuclear power plants prevented 3.32 million tons of
sulfur dioxide, 1.05 million tons of nitrogen oxide, and 681.9 million metric tons of carbon dioxide
from entering the earths atmosphere.
Nuclear emits no air pollution
Department of Energy, 2005, Moving Forward With Nuclear,
http://www.seab.energy.gov/publications/NETF_Final_Draft_0105.pdf
The NETF is charged with identifying todays barriers to new construction and
determining how they might be overcome. Unlike electricity generated from coal
and natural gas which account, respectively, for about 51 percent and 16
percent of electricity generation nuclear generation results in no emissions
whatsoever of so-called conventional air pollutants, such as sulfur dioxide and
nitrogen oxides.
Nuclear will reduce emissions by 8%
To illustrate the difference that nuclear power (or any other carbon-free source
of electricity generation) could make, assume for the moment that nuclear
powers share of the present generation mix is 30 percent (rather than its
present 20 percent) and that this gain came entirely by displacing coal
generation. This change alone would result in a reduction in annual carbon
dioxide emissions of about 90 million metric tons of carbon equivalent, or about
8 percent of total annual U.S. emissions of carbon dioxide.
243
Nuclear Solves NOx Pollution

Nuclear power solves NOx pollution
Senator Kit Bond, Statement, June 23, 2008, p. online
Most importantly, nuclear energy is clean energy. Nuclear power prevents the emission of carbon dioxide
associated with global warming, sulfur dioxide that leads to acid rain, and nitrogen oxide that causes smog and
unhealthy air. According to a recent Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) study, nuclear power prevents 12,400 tons
per year of nitrogen oxide emissions. This prevents the same amount of nitrogen oxide created by 650,000 cars.
Nuclear power reduces NOx emissions
Marvin Fertle, Nuclear Energy Institute, 2004 (Testimony for the Record, March 4,
http://www.nei.org/newsandevents/speechesandtestimony/2004/energysubcmtefertelextended)
Nuclear power plants produce electricity that otherwise would be supplied by oil-, gas- or coal-fired
generating capacity, and thus avoid the emissions associated with that fossil-fueled capacity. The value
of the emissions avoided by U.S. nuclear power plants is essential in meeting clean air regulations. In
2002, U.S. nuclear power plants avoided the emission of about 3.4 million tons of sodium dioxide (SO2
) and about 1.4 million tons of nitrogen oxide (NOx ). To put these numbers in perspective, the
requirements imposed by the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments reduced SO2 emissions from the electric
power sector between 1990 and 2002 by 5.5 million tons per year and NOx emissions by 2.3 million
tons year. 3 Thus, in a single year, nuclear power plants avoid nearly as much in emissions as was
achieved over a 12-year period by other sources. The NOx emissions avoided by U.S. nuclear power
plants are equivalent to eliminating NOx emissions from six out of 10 passenger cars in the United
States. The carbon emissions avoided by U.S. nuclear power plants are equivalent to eliminating the
carbon emissions from nine out of 10 passenger cars in the United States. Nuclear energy helped
reduce NOx emissions in northeastern and mid Atlantic states, according to a report last year by the
Environmental Protection Agency and the Ozone Transport Commission (OTC).4 The 2003 EPA
assessment found that energy companies have been shifting electricity production from fossil-fueled
power plants to emission-free nuclear power plants to help comply with federal air pollution laws. In
Tennessee, for example, three nuclear reactors avoid the emission of approximately 170,000 tons of
SO2, 60,000 tons of NOx and 6.6 million metric tons of carbon every year. For perspective, 60,000 tons
of NOx , which is a precursor to ground-level ozone, is the amount released into the air by 3.1 million
passenger cars. There are 1.7 million passenger cars registered in Tennessee.
244
Competitiveness Advantage
Decaying nuclear infrastructure collapses U.S. competitiveness
Robert Rosner is director of Argonne National Laboratory and William E. Wrather Distinguished Service
Professor at the Enrico Fermi Institute of the University of Chicago, where he is a professor in both the physics
and the astronomy and astrophysics departments, March 2008, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
http://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/x2412nx56288j37g/fulltext.pdf
Lastly, the nuclear industrys own bad habits inhibit headway. If nuclear power is ever going to become
commercially viable, industry needs to take charge. The nuclear industry knows its problems, though it may not
have the personnel or the facilities to solve them. However, the U.S. nuclear industry funds very little
government research and development, whereas in France, for example, the Atomic Energy Commission
receives more than half its simulation funding from energy conglomerate Areva. This kind of industrygovernment relationship is typical of the French approach to nuclear projects, but it has traditionally not been
found in the United States. When discussing nuclear power in the United States, the same arguments against
building new plants repeatedly surface. It is useful to review these arguments and consider responses to them.
Some maintain that there is no need to rush ahead with plans for new nuclear power. But time is a luxury the
nuclear industry does not have. Existing plants must be replaced as they are decommissioned or as they need
refurbishing, and given the industrys poor condition, this will have to begin in the near future. Indeed, not
moving ahead very soon will guarantee mediocrity of the U.S. nuclear engineering community, ensure that the
United States is technically disadvantaged compared to foreign technology leaders, and assure that U.S. industry
will be unable to compete in the ongoing worldwide nuclear revival.
U.S. nuclear abilities have atrophied
The reality is that the United States has not ordered a new reactor since the mid-1970s and it does not have the
industrial infrastructure to build even one reactor today. Its industrial and intellectual base atrophied as the
nuclear industry declined over the past three decades. Large forging production, heavy manufacturing,
specialized piping, mining, fuel services, and skilled labor all must be reconstituted in massive quantities.
245
Collapse of U.S. nuclear infrastructure leads to the transfer of skills abroad
One additional, often overlooked, area in which policy leadership could make a
very beneficial difference is in reestablishing the technology and fabrication
capacity of the suppliers associated with the nuclear industry within the United
States. For example, the manufacture of pressure vessels, pumps, valves, and
other specialty nuclear components with its well-paying jobs and skills has
moved offshore because there has been little or no market within the United
States for nearly three decades. Government, business, educators, and labor
leaders should come together to address this potentially extremely significant
dividend from the revival of nuclear construction in America
Nuclear boosts energy efficiency, strengthening competitiveness
Spero News, July 5, 2008, Nicolas Loris is a Research Assistant and Jack Spencer is a research fellow in the
Thomas A. Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation,
http://www.speroforum.com/site/article.asp?id=15632&t=Nuclear+power+gaining+momentum+in+the+US
Affordable energy is critical to sustaining economic competitiveness in economies with high labor costs,
expensive environmental mandates, and other regulatory expenditures. This is especially true in economies that
depend on energy-intensive activities like manufacturing, such as the Finnish and U.S. economies. Finland
concluded that access to vast quantities of affordable energy should be a top national priority, and nuclear was
an obvious choice. These countries and others searching to expand their nuclear capacity have an opportunity to
fuel their respective economies through the thousands of jobs, both temporary and permanent, that nuclear
energy creates. A global nuclear renaissance will attract construction jobs as well as high-skill engineering jobs
to operate the plants. Thus, two of the greatest benefits of building more nuclear reactors, if done correctly, will
be more jobs and cleaner, cheaper energy. Countries that do not choose to produce clean energy in a carbon
constrained world will inevitably pay more to produce energy, resulting in higher input costs and higher prices
for consumers on the open market. As the economic consequences of higher fossil-fuel costs spread to countries
that do not produce nuclear power, many countries will likely increase imports of nuclear electricity from
foreign suppliers. While less expensive and more reliable than other non-nuclear, non-emitting sources, this
energy will surely cost more to import than it would have had to produce it domestically. In the end, the
countries that have barred nuclear power from being produced in their respective countries will ultimately rely
on nuclear power, albeit at a more expensive imported price.
246
Europe leads in nuclear power now
Senator Jim Demint, States News Service, July 21, 2008, http://demint.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?
FuseAction=PressReleases.Detail&PressRelease_id=468b15ef-da95-3a38-416a-b5a4b3caaa9c
While liberals have stalled American energy for decades, Europe has fully embraced nuclear energy and today has almost
twice as many nuclear reactors as the United States. Over the past 25 years, Europe has decreased its reliance on coal by
more than 25 percent, while the U.S. increased its use of coal by more than 60 percent. Today, France has used its nuclear
reactors to become energy-independent and a net exporter of energy to other parts of Europe.
247
Competitiveness Advantage France Leads Now

France developing nuclear
By about the middle of the century, if current trends are any indication, a worldwide shortage of uranium may arise. To
prevent that possibility, France is now doing the R&D on a new generation of advanced nuclear reactors, called breeders,
that can produce new fuel for itself or other reactors. Rather than burying its waste permanently and then facing a fuel
shortage, France will be in an enviable position of having a virtually unlimited supply of fuel.
France marketing nuclear tech globally

France, which gets nearly 80 percent of its electricity from nuclear reactors, has been particularly aggressive in
marketing its atomic expertise. Within the span of a few weeks in December and January, President Nicolas
Sarkozy visited Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Libya, Egypt, Algeria, and Morocco, peddling
French nuclear technology. And he is in hot pursuit of other markets as well. Late last year, Areva, which is
largely state-owned, inked a deal to build two reactors for China, at a cost of $12 billion. India is its next major
target; and Indonesia, Argentina, Chile, Vietnam, and Turkey are considering the company's wares, too.
France leads in nuclear technology now
Just as there are arguments against public investment in nuclear power, there are arguments for it--and one huge
living example. France shifted from oil-burning electric plants to nuclear during the oil crisis of the early '70s,
and over the past 20 years it has invested $160 billion in nuclear programs, making the country the largest
exporter of nuclear electricity in the European Union. Sixteen percent of the world's nuclear power is generated
in France. And where once the French were buying nuclear technology from the United States, now it's the other
way round: 6 of the 20 applications expected to be submitted to the NRC before 2010 are for the U.S.
Evolutionary Power Reactor (EPR) designed by the French conglomerate Areva.
French nuclear industry will expand now
French planners are also positioning its nuclear industry to take advantage of an expansion in the worlds generation of
nuclear power, which would greatly increase the demand for new reactors and reactor fuels.
248
Competitiveness Advantage France Leads Now

France is the leader in nuclear power now
The United States still has the largest number of reactors (104), which supply 20 percent of the nations electricity. It is still
the best in the world at operating nuclear power plantsuptime has risen from 60 percent in the 1980s to more than 90
percent today, adding 50 percent to nuclear-electricity generation capacity without building any new plants. But the United
States is no longer the leader in matters of policy, technology or manufacturing. France has assumed that role, and it is
positioned well for a future of green energy.
249
Accidents Answers
Technology stops Chernobyl-style meltdowns
A dozen or so other Chernobyl-era nuclear plants with aging equipment are still operatingand
expected to continue to operate for the next thirty yearswithin the former Soviet Union. Although
their design flaws have for the most part been addressed, some experts fear human error makes a future
meltdown, however remote, still a possibility. Elsewhere, Chernobyl-like meltdowns are becoming
unlikely, thanks mainly to developments in technology, IAEA Deputy Director Tomihiro
Taniguchi told the Associated Press. Others point to advanced technologies like pebble-bed
reactors, which use graphite pebbles and gases like helium as a coolant, and are safer, cheaper,
and more efficient but leave greater waste than traditional nuclear power plants. Plans for these
kinds of reactors are in place in South Africa and the United States.
New safety improvements since Chernobyl
But Chernobyl served as a wakeup call within the nuclear industry, experts say. The World Association
of Nuclear Operators was established shortly afterward to serve as the industry's self-policing
watchdog and to write confidential safety reviews on nuclear plants. The United States and other
Western countries have also spent hundreds of millions of dollars to improve the safety of the dozens
of other Chernobyl-era reactors in the former Soviet Union.
Chernobyl unique no containment building
Donald Miller, MD, 2004, Advantages of Nuclear Power, http://www.lewrockwell.com/miller/miller13.html
Chernobyl is unique. That kind of accident will not happen in any other nuclear power plants
because all the reactors currently in operation around the world are placed inside a containment
building (Chernobyl was not). The reactor core meltdown at Three Mile Island in 1979, which
happened when its core cooling system failed, also produced a lot of radiation; but the
containment building the reactor was housed in kept it from being released into the atmosphere,
and there were no injuries or deaths. All the nuclear power plants in the U.S. are second-generation
reactors, based on designs derived from those made for naval use. Third generation reactors,
with an output of 600 MW, are simpler, smaller, more rugged, and reduce substantially the
possibility of a core meltdown accident, from a likelihood of 1 in 20,000 to 1 in 800,000 per
reactor year. (Third generation reactors have, for example, 80 percent fewer control cables and 60
percent less piping.) They are standardized to expedite licensing and reduce construction time. Fourth
generation fusion reactors, one hopes, will be coming into operation in the foreseeable future.
250
Accidents Answers
Mining and coal have killed more than any nuclear accident
CBS 42, July 24, 2008, http://www.cbs42.com/news/local/25823164.html
However, Beasley says Browns Ferry, which is operated by the TVA, uses a small scale model to demonstrate
the countless safety measures in place. "The uranium is contained inside a reactor, which is inside a large
containment shell which is about two inches of carbon steel, and four to six feet of concrete surrounding the
reactor," said Beasley. In fact, those buildings are inside another structure called secondary containment. And as
for the inner-workings of a reactor, everyone involved receives regular training to handle any scenario that may
occur. Believe it or not, the industry is actually safer than other forms of creating power.
Better training and new practices eliminate accident risks, new plants even safer
The truth is that there's little doubt that in the U.S., at least, plants are much safer now than they were in the past. Those
accidents led regulators and the industry to bolster safety at U.S. nuclear plants. There are more safety features at the plants,
plant personnel are better trained, and reactors have been redesigned so that accidents are far less likely to occur. For
instance, every U.S. plant has an on-site control-room simulator where employees can hone their skills and handle
simulated emergencies, and plant workers spend one week out of every six in the simulator or in the classroom.
The next generation of plants is designed to be even safer, using fewer pumps and piping and relying more on gravity to
move water for cooling the hot nuclear core. This means fewer possible places where equipment failure could cause a
serious accident.
Plants stop a radiation release in the event of an accident

And even if a serious accident does occur, U.S. plants are designed to make sure that no radiation is released into the
environment. Reactors are contained inside a huge structure of reinforced concrete with walls that are as much as four feet
thick; the Chernobyl reactor lacked such a structure.
Generation III reactors have advanced passive safety features

The Gen III and Gen III+ systems began development in the 1990s by building on the operating experience of
the American, Japanese, and Western European LWR fleets. Perhaps their most significant improvement over
second-generation designs is the incorporation of "passive" safety features that do not require active controls or
operator intervention; instead, they rely on gravity or natural convection to mitigate the impact of abnormal
events. This feature, among others, will help expedite the reactor certification review process and thus shorten
construction schedules. Once plants using the Gen III and Gen III+ reactors come on-line, they are expected to
achieve higher fuel burn-up (reducing fuel consumption and waste production (see sidebar) and operate for up to
60 years.
251
Accidents Answers
All new reactor proposals are Generation III
All of the proposed reactor designs being scrutinized by the NRC are considered Generation III+ designs:
Areva's evolutionary pressurized water reactor or EPR, GE's enhanced simplified BWR or ESBWR,
Westinghouse's APR1000 as amended, and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries' advanced PWR or ABWR.
Not a single person has ever died from a nuclear accident in the U.S.
Record Searchlight, July 4, 2008, p. A6
Fact: All U.S. nuclear plants-for example, Indian Point Energy Center in Buchanan, N.Y.-are regulated by the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) and are designed with numerous safety systems, each with multiple, redundant
components-first to prevent accidents and second to minimize accidents should they occur. In the 40-year history of the
industry, there has never been a death or injury to any member of the public due to an accident at a U.S. nuclear power
plant.
Helium gas eliminates the risk of a melt-down

Energy Biz Journal, July 23, 2008, http://www.energycentral.com/centers/energybiz/ebi_detail.cfm?id=539
Meantime, the reactors are cooled by helium gas and not water. That means that the reactors rely on gravity and
not on mechanical instruments to flush water through the system in the event of emergency. Therefore, the odds
of any leaks and subsequent meltdowns are close to zero, say advocates of the design.
252
A2: Meltdowns/Safety
Three Mile Island proves containment averts meltdowns
Patrick Moore, co-founder of Greenpeace, is chairman and chief scientist of Greenspirit Strategies Ltd. He and
Christine Todd Whitman are co-chairs of a new industry-funded initiative, the Clean and Safe Energy Coalition,
April 16, 2006, Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/04/14/AR2006041401209.html
What nobody noticed at the time, though, was that Three Mile Island was in fact a success story: The
concrete containment structure did just what it was designed to do -- prevent radiation from escaping into
the environment. And although the reactor itself was crippled, there was no injury or death among
nuclear workers or nearby residents. Three Mile Island was the only serious accident in the history of nuclear
energy generation in the United States, but it was enough to scare us away from further developing the
technology: There hasn't been a nuclear plant ordered up since then.
Safety has been improved since Three Mile Island

In the accident at Three Mile Island seven years earlier, water cooling the core in one of the plant's two
reactors leaked through a partly open valve. The valve was closed enough to prevent an alarm from
sounding. Half the core melted, but the containment building stopped all but a small amount of radiation from
seeping into the environment. The incident led the U.S. government to require upgrades in piping, valves and
other equipment at all nuclear plants, and NRC inspections were increased. Today, "The U.S. operates not only
the biggest but probably the safest and most reliable fleet of reactors," says NEI Senior Vice President Marvin
Fertel.
Nuclear has killed fewer than hydro, coal, and gas
Daniel Rislove, Winter, 2007, Wisconsin International Law Journal p. 1082
Even including the Chernobyl disaster, nuclear power has resulted in significantly fewer deaths per billion watts
of energy than hydroelectric, coal, and natural gas power plants. Risk assessment analysis confirms this
253

conclusion. As for environmental impact, nuclear power produces a negligible amount of environmental
emissions relative to fossil fuels.
254
Nuclear plant safety has improved
Prices of alternative energy sources are just one factor in national energy policies. Improved safety and
efficiency, at least in U.S. reactors, also has contributed to more attention to nuclear energy, as well as to
regulatory streamlining and incentives for new nuclear power plants. Nuclear energy also is increasingly being
viewed as part of the solution to climate change and energy security.
No safety problems with U.S. reactors

Richmond Times - Dispatch (Virginia), December 10, 2007
The operation of U.S. nuclear plants without any accidents since and the nuclear industry's well-earned safety
record are factors in the resurgence of interest in nuclear power, said Dave Christian, chief nuclear officer of
Dominion Resources Inc., Dominion Virginia Power's parent company.
No nuclear accident in the U.S. has endangered health
Manila Bulletin, December 9, 2007
In the Three Mile Island nuclear plant accident in Pennsylvania in 1979, no one was injured. In fact, there has
not been any nuclear accident in the US that has endangered the health or welfare of the public, thanks to the
high standards in reactor design and plant operation.
255
Passive safety systems solve
Accidents can be a thing of the past because the new generation of nuclear power plant designs already being
built internationally, provides passive safety systems which simply shut down the plant automatically if there is
operator error or equipment failure.
Generation III reactors are safe

The earliest generation of reactors built in the 1950s and early 1960s were often of the same prototype.
Generation II reactors were advanced commercial designs built in large numbers from the late 1960s to the early
1990s. Generation III reactors have incorporated design improvements such as better fuel technology and
passive safety, so that in the case of an accident, the reactor shuts itself down without requiring the operators to
intervene. With these built-in safety factors in advanced designs of nuclear plants, the public can now be assured
of the reliability and safety of the use of nuclear energy.
256
A2: Chernobyl
Chernobyl comparison is false U.S. reactors are safe
Nuclear plants are not safe. Although Three Mile Island was a success story, the accident at Chernobyl, 20 years
ago this month, was not. But Chernobyl was an accident waiting to happen. This early model of Soviet reactor
had no containment vessel, was an inherently bad design and its operators literally blew it up. The multi-agency
U.N. Chernobyl Forum reported last year that 56 deaths could be directly attributed to the accident, most of
those from radiation or burns suffered while fighting the fire. Tragic as those deaths were, they pale in
comparison to the more than 5,000 coal-mining deaths that occur worldwide every year. No one has died of a
radiation-related accident in the history of the U.S. civilian nuclear reactor program. (And although hundreds of
uranium mine workers did die from radiation exposure underground in the early years of that industry, that
problem was long ago corrected.)
Chernobyl did not have safety systems
Dr. Patrick Moore, founder of Greenpeace, 2005, Testimony, April 28, http://www.greenspirit.com/logbook.cfm?
msid=70
As Stewart Brand and other forward-thinking environmentalists and scientists have made clear, technology has
now progressed to the point where the fear-mongering being spread by activists about the safety of nuclear
energy bears no semblance to reality. The Chernobyl and Three Mile Island reactors, often raised as examples of
nuclear catastrophe by activists, were very different from todays rigorously safe nuclear energy technology.
Today, approximately one-third of the cost of a nuclear reactor is dedicated to safety systems and infrastructure.
The Chernobyl reactor, for example, was not outfitted with the fully-automated, multiple levels of safety and
redundancy required for North American reactors. While the 1979 Three-Mile Island incident was the result of
a much older technology, the incident also demonstrated how American safety and containment strategies
worked to ensure no leakage from the reactor core. Nuclear fuel can be diverted to make nuclear weapons. This
is the most serious issue associated with nuclear energy and the most difficult to address, as the example of Iran
shows. But just because nuclear technology can be put to evil purposes is not an argument to ban its use. Over
the past 20 years, one of the simplest tools -- the machete -- has been used to kill more than a million people in
Africa, far more than were killed in the Hiroshima and Nagasaki nuclear bombings combined. What are car
bombs made of? Diesel oil, fertilizer and cars. If we banned everything that can be used to kill people, we would
never have harnessed fire. The only practical approach to the issue of nuclear weapons proliferation is to put it
257

higher on the international agenda and to use diplomacy and, where necessary, force to prevent countries or
terrorists from using nuclear materials for destructive ends. And new technologies such as the reprocessing
system recently introduced in Japan (in which the plutonium is never separated from the uranium) can make it
much more difficult for terrorists or rogue states to use civilian materials to manufacture weapons.
258
A2: Chernobyl
American reactors are sealed, Russians arent
Baltimore Sun, November 11, 2007, http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/ideas/balid.nuclear11nov11,0,7011505.story?track=rss
Cravens asserts that most of the damage from the Chernobyl meltdown in 1986 was caused by panic and
anxiety, not radiation. Both she and Links say a similar release of radiation would be impossible from American
reactors, which are sealed in containment buildings the Soviet reactor lacked.
Only 4,000 people died from Chernobyl
Despite projections of hundreds of thousands of deaths, only about 50 people were directly killed by
Chernobyl's explosion, with another 4,000 cancer deaths projected, Cravens writes.
A recent report by the Oxford Research Group, a British think tank, concluded that advocating nuclear power as
a global solution for climate change would create "massive security risks such as nuclear weapons proliferation
and nuclear terrorism."
Risks of radiation leaks from terrorist attacks or accidents are low
Fred Bosselman, Professor of Law Emeritus, Chicago-Kent College of Law, New York University
Environmental Law Journal, 2007, p. 44-5
Terrorists could not acquire bomb-making material from spent fuel in a nuclear power plant, because the
material would be too radioactive for them to handle. Nor would it be feasible to bomb an American reactor in a
way that would release deadly radiation. All reactors in American power plants are contained in structures made
of heavy steel and concrete three to four feet thick, and the reactor pressure vessel itself is further protected by
steel walls eight inches thick. n The robust construction of nuclear power plants would provide substantially more
protection against assault with airplanes or other types of weapons than exists at "other critical infrastructure
such as chemical plants, refineries, and fossil-fuel-fired electrical generating stations." Attacking a plant by
crashing an airplane into it would be difficult because the reactor is a small, low structure often surrounded by
large but harmless cooling towers. Even an attempt to hit a reactor with a large airliner would be unlikely to
succeed in releasing radiation, with success depending on the attacker's "unpredictable "good fortune.'"
Legitimate concerns have been raised that some (but not all) existing nuclear power plants have spent fuel
storage pools in locations that might be susceptible to a terrorist attack that could drain the water from the pool,
259

which might cause a release of radiation if the water was not quickly replaced. The Nuclear Regulatory
Commission has issued new regulations to protect against this possibility, and designers of newly-constructed
power plants are now aware of this potential problem and will avoid it. Insofar as the risk of accidents is
concerned, few industries - and certainly not the coal industry - have a safety record as exemplary as the nuclear
power industry. The operation of U.S. nuclear power plants has proven to be very safe; the National
Commission on Energy Policy has affirmed that "experience with nuclear power plants over the past decade and
more, in the United States and elsewhere, has demonstrated that these plants can be operated with high degrees
of reliability and safety and extremely low exposures of workers and public radiation." The same can be said of
power plants elsewhere in the world, except in the Soviet Union. University of Washington nuclear physicist
David Bodansky states that "for commercial reactors in the non-Soviet world, which account for the largest part
of the reactor experience, the safety record is excellent." n245 At no such power plant has an accident "caused the
known death of any nuclear plant worker from radiation exposure or ... exposed any member of the general
public to a substantial radiation dose."
260
A2: Chernobyl
Impacts of Chernobyl exaggerated
In 1986, an explosion at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in the Ukraine caused the release of large
amounts of radiation into the atmosphere. Initially, the Soviet government released little information about
the explosion and tried to play down its seriousness, but this secrecy caused great nervousness throughout
Europe, and fed the public's fears of nuclear power all over the world. Now a comprehensive analysis of the
event and its aftermath has been made: In 2005, a consortium of United Nations agencies called the
Chernobyl Forum released its analysis of the long-term effects of the Chernobyl explosion. The U.N. agencies'
study found that the explosion caused fewer deaths than had been expected. Although the Chernobyl
reactor was poorly designed and badly operated and lacked the basic safety protections found outside the
Soviet Union, fewer than seventy deaths so far have been attributed to the explosion, mostly plant
employees and firefighters who suffered acute radiation sickness. The Chernobyl reactor, like many Soviet
reactors, was in the open rather than in an American type of pressurizable containment structure, which would
have prevented the release of radiation to the environment if a similar accident had occurred. Perhaps the most
surprising finding of the U.N. agencies' study was that "the ecosystems around the Chernobyl site are now
flourishing. The [Chernobyl exclusion zone] has become a wildlife sanctuary, and it looks like the nature
park it has become." Jeffrey McNeely, the chief scientist of the World Conservation Union, has made similar
observations: Chernobyl has now become the world's first radioactive nature reserve... . 200 wolves are now
living in the nature reserve, which has also begun to support populations of reindeer, lynx and European bison,
species that previously were not found in the region. While the impact on humans was strongly negative, the
wildlife is adapting and even thriving on the site of one of the 20th century's worst environmental
disasters. Mary Mycio, the Kiev correspondent for the Los Angeles Times, has written a fascinating book based
on her many visits to the exclusion zone and interviews with people in the area. She notes that the fear that
radiation would produce permanent deformities in animal species has not been borne out after twenty
years; the population and diversity of animals in even some of the most heavily radiated parts of the
exclusion zone is similar to comparable places that are less radioactive.
261
A2: Chernobyl
No one will build another reactor like Chernobyl
Stephen Berry, the former Special Advisor to the Director of Argonne National Laboratory for National
Security, September 2007, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, http://www.thebulletin.org/roundtable/nuclearpower-climate-change/
Nuclear power is the safest by a significant margin. Plus, Chernobyl can be removed from the equation
because no one will build that type of reactor again, making it absolutely clear that nuclear power wins on
safety. To my knowledge, a study of accidents or mortality from micropower has yet to be done.
262
A2: Safety
Nuclear power plant safety increasing
Nuclear power has become more and more reliable and increasingly safe. While no energy source is risk-free,
nuclear power probably represents the safest electricity source in overall costs of human life--and also the most
reliable. Nuclear reactors now perform at about 90 percent of their theoretical limits; 20 years ago, it was
roughly 60 percent. New designs of conventional light water reactors will be safer still, because they'll have
inherent, gravity-driven self-quenching that won't require active steps by operators if something goes wrong.
263
A2: Nuclear Costly/Expensive

Technological advancements will reduce costs
Nuclear energy is expensive. It is in fact one of the least expensive energy sources. In 2004, the average cost of
producing nuclear energy in the United States was less than two cents per kilowatt-hour, comparable with coal
and hydroelectric. Advances in technology will bring the cost down further in the future.
Substantial cost reductions in nuclear power generation
World Nuclear Association, 2005, The New Economics of Nuclear Power, http://www.uic.com.au/nip08.htm
The increased economic competitiveness of 21st century nuclear power arises from cost reductions in
construction, financing, and plant operations, and a still further reduction in already low costs for waste
management and decommissioning. Construction costs per kW for nuclear plants have fallen considerably due
to standardized design, shorter construction times and more efficient generating technologies. Further gains are
expected a nuclear technology becomes even more standardized around a few globally-accepted designs.
Meanwhile, recent new-build experience has demonstrated that new plants can be built on time and on budget.
Financing costs for new nuclear plants, a critical component of nuclear economics, are expected to fall as new
approaches are developed and tested to increase certainty and to lower investor risk. Meanwhile, in many
countries, licence procedures are being streamlined a development facilitated by the nuclear industrys strong
worldwide safety performance. Streamlined licensing will retain rigorous standards but reduce regulatory cost
and uncertainty by establishing predictable technical parameters and timescales, from design certification
through to construction and operating licences. Operating costs of nuclear power plants have fallen steadily over
the past twenty years as capacity factors have increased, squeezing far more output from the same generating
capacity. (In the USA, operating costs per KWh shrank by 44% between 1990 and 2003.) As marginal costs of
generation from nuclear plants have fallen below prices of most other generating modes, owners have found it
worthwhile to invest in nuclear plant refurbishment and capacity up-rates. Nuclear powers low marginal cost
and its high degree of price stability and predictability have also encouraged nuclear plant owners to seek
operating licence extensions for nearly all reactors. Waste and decommissioning costs, which are included in the
operational costs of nuclear plants, represent a tiny fraction of the lifetime costs of a reactors operation. Nuclear
plant economics are thus largely insensitive to these costs and will become even less so as fuel efficiency
continues to increase and as waste and decommissioning costs are spread over reactor lifetimes that are
becoming even longer.
264
265
Nuclear cost declines will snowball

The direct cost of nuclear power now is indeed higher than that of coal-, oil-, or gas-generated electric power.
But this wouldn't be the case if the indirect costs of environmental damage from greenhouse gases were
formulated into the cost, which would happen if a carbon tax were introduced. Even without a carbon tax, at
least one extensive economic study found that the cost of nuclear reactors will drop after the first three or four
new nuclear reactors are built, making nuclear competitive with fossil-fueled generating plants.
266

Nuclear cheaper than coal
Dr. Charles Ferguson, physicist, April 2007, Fellow for Science & Technology, Council on Foreign Relations,
Nuclear Energy: Balancing Risks and Benefits, http://www.cfr.org/publication/13104/nuclear_energy.html
(He is also a assistant professor in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and an adjunct
lecturer at the Johns Hopkins University, s scientist-in-residence at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies of
the Monterey Institute of International Studies)
In the electricity production sector, nuclear power plants operating costs compete favorably with coal, natural
gas, hydro, oil, geothermal, wind, and solar energy sources, but its capital costs have difficulty competing
against them. Presently, according to the Energy Information Administration, the United States produces 52
percent of its electricity from coal-fired plants, 21 percent from nuclear power plants, 16 percent from natural
gas, 7 percent from hydro, 3 percent from oil, and 1 percent from geothermal, wind, and solar combined.3 Thus,
the vast majority of U.S. electricity comes from three sources: coal, nuclear, and natural gas. Tables 1 and 2,
based on two recent authoritative studies, show the estimated costs of these electricity sources
Nuclear power costs decreasing
Amory is correct that the sort of nuclear power last built in the United States is much more expensive than other
major sources of electric power. The construction costs of the most recent nuclear plants were about $10,000 per
kilowatt (kW). But this figure is misleading when considering the cost of future plants. For example, the
Japanese plant at Onagawa (completed in 2002) cost approximately $2,400/kW, and a Chinese plant built at
Yonggwang in 2004-2005 cost $1,800/kW, according to a May 2006 presentation given at the University of
Paris by Paul Joskow. The Keystone and MIT studies estimate the next plants built in the United States will
cost $3,600-$4,000/kW. These are "first-of-a-kind" reactors, too, meaning they're sure to be more
expensive than later plants. Much of the cost reduction comes from changes currently being made in the
regulatory structure. These changes will allow reactor licensing of a single design to be done almost in one
step. Previously, each new reactor had to undergo a full licensing procedure--regardless of whether similar
plants had been licensed. Significant improvement in reactor designs is also another important factor in
reducing capital costs, as new reactors are cheaper and easier to build.
267
Accidents Answers
New reactor designs have passive safety systems that solve
Alan Brown, professor of Mechanical Engineering, Spring 2006, Bent of Tau Peta,
http://www.tbp.org/pages/Publications/Bent/Features/Sp06Brown.pdf
The Three Mile Island partial core meltdown of 1979 and the Chernobyl reactor explosion in 1986 make
safety the primary issue in the nuclear debate. The newest reactors, referred to as Generation III+, speak to
many of these concerns. To understand why, look at nuclear operations. As uranium fuel decays, it emits
neutrons that split other uranium atoms that emit still more neutrons. This creates a chain reaction of
splitting neutrons that release enormous amounts of heat. This heats the cooling water, whose steam powers
the electrical generators. Stop the flow of water, and the reactor will overheat and begin to melt. Existing
Generation II plants use redundant pumps, chillers, generators, and pipes to ensure continuous water flow.
Utilities added many of these safety systems over time. They work, but the design is neither simple nor
elegant. In the 1970s, nuclear power plant designers such as General Electric Power and Westinghouse
began designing a new generation of reactors. After 30 years of experience, we started with a clean piece of
paper, explains Howard Bruschi, the former Westinghouse chief technology officer who oversaw the
development of the companys Generation III and III+ units. We invited plant operators into the design
process and used their recommendations to simplify piping, controls, constructability, and operability. The
result, he says, was a simpler, more economical plant. Yet only a handful have been built. One reason is that
Three Mile Island forced designers to reconsider nuclear safety. The result is Generation III+, a radical
departure in which safety measures require no human intervention. Generation III delivers water by rotating
machinery like pumps and back-up generators, explains Bruschi. Generation III+ uses passive safety
systems that depend on natural forces such as gravity, natural circulation, condensation, condensation, and
evaporation. There are no pumps, fans, chillers, or diesel generators and fewer associated mechanical and
electrical devices. Everything is much simpler and much less expensive. Both the new Westinghouse
AP1000 advanced pressurized reactor, which received Nuclear Regulatory Commission design approval in
December 2005, and GE Energys economic simplified boiling-water reactor (ESBWR ), which submitted its
design application in August 2005, use passive safety systems. The AP1000 reactor, says Bruschi, sits inside
a large containment vessel with no communication from outside the building [Fig. 3]. The containment vessel
also houses a spherical tank of pressurized water plus two additional pools of water. If an accident occurs, the
water-pressure drop automatically releases water from the pressurized tank. The two gravity tanks follow; the
second with 500,000 gallons, enough to submerge the reactor. Meanwhile, the mechanical system that holds
the control rods above the reactor releases, and they automatically drop into place. Over the course of
several days, they will absorb enough neutrons to stop the reactors chain reaction. Yet the reactor will
remain hot enough to boil the water covering it. The steam will rise to the roof of the containment vessel,
where air outside the vessel will cool it. It will then condense and return to the bottom of the vessel.
268
Radiation Answers
Coal produces more airborne radiation than nuclear power
Christian Science Monitor, January 23, 2008, p. 8 Make the Most of Nuclear Power
Coal produces more airborne radiation than nuclear energy because of the naturally occurring minerals
like uranium and radium in coal. And, while a 1,000-megawatt nuclear plant (enough to supply energy
to 1 million people) produces about 30 tons of waste per year, the same-sized coal plant produces
approximately 7 million tons of carbon dioxide per year, along with millions of tons of fly ash and air
pollutants.
Turn coal plants emit more radiation than nuclear plants
Compared to nuclear power, coal is a much less safe source of energy. In addition to the
pollutants and carcinogens coal delivers into the atmosphere when burned, 100 coal miners are
killed each year in the U.S. in coal mine accidents and another 100 die transporting it. Per
amount of electricity produced, hydropower causes 110 fold, coal, 45 fold, and natural gas, 10
fold more deaths than nuclear power. As Petr Beckmann, founding editor of Access to Energy,
shows in his book The Health Hazards of Not Going Nuclear, nuclear power is the safest source of
energy in all aspects, not excluding terrorism and sabotage, major accidents, and waste disposal.
In the U.S., coal is strip-mined (the way we get 60 percent of it) at a rate of more than 65,000 acres per
year, with over a million acres awaiting reclamation. Of the 8 million acres that overlie underground
mines (to obtain the other 40 percent), one-fourth of that acreage has subsided. When burned, the
carbon in coal combines with oxygen to form carbon dioxide (CO2) and carbon monoxide (CO). A
large coal-burning plant that produces as much electricity as a nuclear power plant burns 3
million tons of coal annually, which generates 11 million tons of CO2 (700 lbs. per second). Coal
contains sulfur, 0.5 to 3 percent by weight, which combines with oxygen to form sulfur dioxide,
the principal cause of acid rain; and the nitrogen in it produces nitrous oxide, a major pollutant
(a 1,000 megawatt coal plant produces as much nitrous oxide as 200,000 automobiles). It contains
health-damaging heavy metals like lead, mercury, arsenic, cadmium, and beryllium. Coal also has
uranium in it in a concentration of 1 to 2 parts per million. As a result, a coal-fired plant releases
up to 50 times more radioactivity than a nuclear plant, where the radiation emitted by
uranium and its byproducts is contained. (The EPA ignores this fact.)
269
Radiation Answers
24,000 die/year of coal-related health problems

Will a nuclear reactor operating under normal conditions give you cancer? It's a question that,
surprisingly, still hasn't been conclusively answered. A 1995 Greenpeace study found an increase in
breast-cancer mortality among women living near various U.S. and Canadian reactors in the Great
Lakes region. Yet peer-reviewed studies by the Ontario Cancer Treatment and Research Foundation as
well as the National Cancer Institute show no significant increase in cancer among people living near
reactors. An initiative called the Tooth Fairy Project is currently trying to prove that concentrations of
the radioactive isotope strontium-90 are higher in baby teeth from children who grow up near nuclear
plants. But those tests are not complete, and no one else has turned up persuasive evidence of such a
link. "Without a baseline study, we don't have any credibility" on the cancer issue, longtime Southern
California anti-nuclear activist Rochelle Becker once told me. "There ate so many things wrong with
the nuclear industry that ate confirmable that we try to stay away from that." We do know that nuclear
plants routinely release small amounts of radioactive gases, and that those releases expose nearby
residents to a small dose of radiation--one that the Health Physics Society, which governs radiation
measurements, says will probably not increase their risk of getting cancer. We know that elevated
levels of radioactive tritium--which gets into water and is easily ingested--have been found
downstream from nuclear facilities, and we know that the scientific consensus holds that no amount of
radiation is good for you. But we also know this: 24,000 Americans per year die of diseases related to
emissions from coal-fired power plants, which release sulfur dioxide, smog-forming nitrogen, toxic
soot, and mercury--not to mention 2.5 billion tons of carbon dioxide annually.
Nuclear has a smaller environmental footprint than coal
Nuclear energy (that uranium 235 and uranium 238-derived plutonium produce) emits no harmful
gases or toxic metals into the environment. And, unlike hydroelectric dams, it does not alter a
regions ecosystem. Furthermore, despite what activists and the media say, the wastes nuclear power
create are far less of a problem than those produced by coal, or the silt that builds up behind
dams. One pound of uranium produces 20,000 times more energy than one pound of coal. A
nuclear power plant generates (high-level) radioactive wastes the size of one aspirin tablet per
person per year (a plants yearly wastes fit comfortably under a dining room table). Coal-fired
plants generate 320 lbs. of ash and other poisons per person per year, of which 10 percent is
spewed into the atmosphere. Disposal personnel encapsulate nuclear waste in (fireproof, water-proof,
and earthquake-proof) boron-silicate glass or ceramic and then bury these now effectively nonradioactive artificial rocks. In the U.S., these "rocks" will (in 2010) be buried deep in extremely arid
ground in a remote part of Nevada, in a repository at Yucca Mountain (where nuclear weapons tests
were once conducted). The chance that this encapsulated waste will ever harm anyone is virtually zero
(especially given that the linear no-threshold hypothesis now disproved). Waste disposal is not a
disadvantage of nuclear power; it is one of its advantages.
270
Radiation Answers
People who live near nuclear plants are not exposed to significant radiation
Record Searchlight, July 4, 2008, p. A6
Fact: A little-known fact is that natural background radiation from rocks, soil and water is around us all the time. In fact, a
person living within 50 miles of a nuclear plant receives less radiation from it in a year than from eating one banana. In
addition, surveys have shown there is no increase in radiological-induced cancer in people living near nuclear facilities.
271
A2: Radiation/Cancer
Nuclear plants to do not admit harmful radiation
Larry Foulke, director of nuclear programs, University of Pittsburhg, December 23, 207,
In the scientific community, Dr. Sternglass is not so much considered an expert on radiation as he is an antinuclear agitator. If Dr. Sternglass has a problem with the nuclear power plant in Beaver County, he also must
have a problem with the sun. The sun is nuclear and background low-level radiation from its cosmic rays exists
everywhere. Radiation from all commercial nuclear power plants in the United States accounts for about onetenth of 1 percent of the radiation to which we are exposed annually. Dr. Sternglass has helped prejudice the
public against the facts by his "radiation hysteria." By overstating radiation risks, patients refuse lifesaving
nuclear medical procedures, research is constrained by limited availability of radioisotopes, food poisoning
continues to kill people who do not get irradiated food, and we give credibility to terrorists by making a minor
radiation release sound like a life-endangering need for panic. An enormous body of scientific data on radiation
effects demonstrates that radiation, like nearly every other assault on living organisms, can be deadly at high
levels but harmless and usually beneficial at low levels. This is true for chemicals, "nutrients," bacteria,
sunshine, exercise, wind and virtually everything else.
Germany doesnt prove that nuclear power causes leukemia
Brattleboro Reformer (Vermont), December 14, 2007
While no one can deny radiation exposure is not healthy for living organisms, studies conducted since nuclear
power became one of the major sources of electricity in the United States have concluded there is no link
between it and cancer. However, a study of childhood leukemia released this week by the German branch of the
International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War reported "there is a correlation between the distance
of the home from the nearest nuclear power plant and the risk of developing cancer before (the) fifth birthday."
The study's authors cautioned however, that "the present status of radiobiological and epidemiological
knowledge does not allow the conclusion that ionizing radiation emitted by German nuclear power plants during
normal operation is the cause. "There's a fair probability that the results they got were strictly by chance
association," said William Irwin, the radiological health chief with Vermont's Department of Health, who
admitted he hasn't yet read the whole study.
No cancer clusters around nuclear power plans
A study released a year later, conducted by the Connecticut Academy of Science and Engineering, concluded
there were "no meaningful associations among the cancers studied (pediatric leukemia, adult chronic leukemia,
multiple myeloma, and thyroid cancer) and proximity to Connecticut Yankee nuclear power plant (in Haddam
Neck)." Also in 2001, the American Cancer Society concluded that cancer clusters "do not occur more often
near nuclear plants than they do by chance elsewhere in the population."
272
Shields solve the cancer risks
When Vermont Yankee started producing power, said Irwin, Vermont was the regulatory body because the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission had not yet been established. At the time, regulators discovered radiation
emission levels were higher than acceptable. "They installed a special shield wall to reduce those radiation
levels," said Irwin. That level of cooperation is an indication of the desire of both state regulators and the
operators of Yankee to protect the public health, he said. The 2006 surveillance report of Vermont Yankee
released in June 2007 by Vermont's Department of Health would seem to support the conclusion that measures
taken to limit the public's exposure to radiation are working. The report stated that "cancer incidence and cancer
mortality rates in the communities around Vermont Yankee were found not to differ significantly from those in
the rest of Windham County, Vermont or the United States." Comparisons to long-term historical trends "show
no significant increased radiological exposures due to Vermont Yankee nuclear power station operations," stated
the report. "That's the whole basis for regulatory limits," said Irwin. "You attempt to establish them where you
will not see statistical significant differences (between those exposed to radiation and those not exposed)." Even
with an increase of power production by 20 percent in 2006, radiological readings around the plant "appear to
support the premise that the (newly installed) turbine shield negates the increased direct gamma radiation levels
of the extended power uprate," according to the surveillance report. "For all cancer types combined, the rate of
cancer incidence in the six towns near Vermont Yankee is lower compared to the rest of Vermont and the United
States as a whole," stated the report. "Characterizations that one population is at more risk or at less risk as
compared to another are not valid." As a whole, stated the report, cancer rates for white males and females in the
United States average 489 cases per 100,000 people. "In the six towns near Vermont Yankee, the all cancer
incidence rate is 434 cases per 100,000 persons." People in those six towns "were diagnosed with fewer cancers
between 1994 and 2003 than Vermont and the U.S." While it appears that deaths from leukemia in the six towns
"may be higher in Windham County the difference is not statistically significant." While the state average for
leukemia is 7.6 deaths per 100,000 people, that number is 8.33 per 100,000 in Windham County.
Coal fired plants emit more radiation than nuclear plants
The coal-fired power plants that Americans rely on to turn on their lights emit 100 times more radiation than
nuclear power plants. As it turns out, coal, like uranium, is radioactive. And burning coal spews radionuclides
into the atmosphere. But it's not a dangerous amount.
273
Bananas are more radioactive than nuclear plants
After all, the amount of radiation the average person receives from nuclear plants every year is about as much as
he or she gets from eating a banana. Tap water is also slightly radioactive. So are our own bodies and the walls
of our homes. Magazine editor and writer Gwyneth Cravens, a former anti-nuclear protester, presents these
facts in a fascinating but flawed new book, Power to Save the World: The Truth About Nuclear Energy.
274
Experts agree that coal plants emit more radiation than nuclear plants
Some of her conclusions are backed up by experts outside of the nuclear industry. For example, during an
interview with The Sun earlier this year, Jonathan Links, director of the Center for Public Health Preparedness at
the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, also made the point that coal-fired plants emit more
radiation than nuclear plants.
Cancer rates have not increased around nuclear plants
Links, like Cravens, said that studies have found no increased cancer rates around nuclear power plants. And
like Cravens, Links said that nuclear power in the U.S. carries a low risk of harm to the public.
Nuclear plants to do not admit harmful radiation
Larry Foulke, director of nuclear programs, University of Pittsburhg, December 23, 207,
In the scientific community, Dr. Sternglass is not so much considered an expert on radiation as he is an antinuclear agitator. If Dr. Sternglass has a problem with the nuclear power plant in Beaver County, he also must
have a problem with the sun. The sun is nuclear and background low-level radiation from its cosmic rays exists
everywhere. Radiation from all commercial nuclear power plants in the United States accounts for about onetenth of 1 percent of the radiation to which we are exposed annually. Dr. Sternglass has helped prejudice the
public against the facts by his "radiation hysteria." By overstating radiation risks, patients refuse lifesaving
nuclear medical procedures, research is constrained by limited availability of radioisotopes, food poisoning
continues to kill people who do not get irradiated food, and we give credibility to terrorists by making a minor
radiation release sound like a life-endangering need for panic. An enormous body of scientific data on radiation
effects demonstrates that radiation, like nearly every other assault on living organisms, can be deadly at high
levels but harmless and usually beneficial at low levels. This is true for chemicals, "nutrients," bacteria,
sunshine, exercise, wind and virtually everything else.
275
Germany doesnt prove that nuclear power causes leukemia
While no one can deny radiation exposure is not healthy for living organisms, studies conducted since nuclear
power became one of the major sources of electricity in the United States have concluded there is no link
between it and cancer. However, a study of childhood leukemia released this week by the German branch of the
International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War reported "there is a correlation between the distance
of the home from the nearest nuclear power plant and the risk of developing cancer before (the) fifth birthday."
The study's authors cautioned however, that "the present status of radiobiological and epidemiological
knowledge does not allow the conclusion that ionizing radiation emitted by German nuclear power plants during
normal operation is the cause. "There's a fair probability that the results they got were strictly by chance
association," said William Irwin, the radiological health chief with Vermont's Department of Health, who
admitted he hasn't yet read the whole study.
276
Shields solve the cancer risks
When Vermont Yankee started producing power, said Irwin, Vermont was the regulatory body because the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission had not yet been established. At the time, regulators discovered radiation
emission levels were higher than acceptable. "They installed a special shield wall to reduce those radiation
levels," said Irwin. That level of cooperation is an indication of the desire of both state regulators and the
operators of Yankee to protect the public health, he said. The 2006 surveillance report of Vermont Yankee
released in June 2007 by Vermont's Department of Health would seem to support the conclusion that measures
taken to limit the public's exposure to radiation are working. The report stated that "cancer incidence and cancer
mortality rates in the communities around Vermont Yankee were found not to differ significantly from those in
the rest of Windham County, Vermont or the United States." Comparisons to long-term historical trends "show
no significant increased radiological exposures due to Vermont Yankee nuclear power station operations," stated
the report. "That's the whole basis for regulatory limits," said Irwin. "You attempt to establish them where you
will not see statistical significant differences (between those exposed to radiation and those not exposed)." Even
with an increase of power production by 20 percent in 2006, radiological readings around the plant "appear to
support the premise that the (newly installed) turbine shield negates the increased direct gamma radiation levels
of the extended power uprate," according to the surveillance report. "For all cancer types combined, the rate of
cancer incidence in the six towns near Vermont Yankee is lower compared to the rest of Vermont and the United
States as a whole," stated the report. "Characterizations that one population is at more risk or at less risk as
compared to another are not valid." As a whole, stated the report, cancer rates for white males and females in the
United States average 489 cases per 100,000 people. "In the six towns near Vermont Yankee, the all cancer
incidence rate is 434 cases per 100,000 persons." People in those six towns "were diagnosed with fewer cancers
between 1994 and 2003 than Vermont and the U.S." While it appears that deaths from leukemia in the six towns
"may be higher in Windham County the difference is not statistically significant." While the state average for
leukemia is 7.6 deaths per 100,000 people, that number is 8.33 per 100,000 in Windham County.
No cancer clusters around nuclear power plans
A study released a year later, conducted by the Connecticut Academy of Science and Engineering, concluded
there were "no meaningful associations among the cancers studied (pediatric leukemia, adult chronic leukemia,
multiple myeloma, and thyroid cancer) and proximity to Connecticut Yankee nuclear power plant (in Haddam
Neck)." Also in 2001, the American Cancer Society concluded that cancer clusters "do not occur more often
near nuclear plants than they do by chance elsewhere in the population."
277
Nuclear Power Good for Your Health

Nuclear power advances cancer treatment
Successful treatment of cancer requires a comprehensive understanding of the complex interaction among the
various factors that lead to the growth of cancer. Understanding the specific properties of cancer in individuals
at the cellular, genetic and molecular level is the key for prescribing patient specific treatment with much higher
chances of cure. Molecular imaging in nuclear medicine through positron emission tomography (PET) has
redefined and modernized the medical approach to cancer patient management. Classifying a cancer just by its
anatomical location may be a reason why patients with what are thought to be the same cancers respond to
treatment in radically different ways. There are now tools leading to an understanding of the molecular reasons
for why patient responses can be so different. This is being translated into the selection of appropriate treatment
regimens for patients. It has been discovered that cancers found in distant parts of the body may be more alike
than two tumours originating in the same organ, depending on the type of the cancer-causing mutations they
harbour. Detailed knowledge of pathogenic processes provided by PET can also be exploited for rational drug
design leading to targeted therapy. 94. In the field of cancer therapy, haematologists, paediatricians and
oncologists are beginning to explore combined treatment approaches applying chemotherapy, immune
modulating or cellular signal transduction modulating agents in combination with targeted tumour-seeking
molecules (peptides, antibodies or oligonucleotides) to improve the healing chances of cancer patients. Isotopeenhanced radiotargeted treatment approaches have numerous advantages both for treating localized or
disseminated solid cancer and for treating blood-borne malignancies.
Nuclear power increases nutrition
The central role of nutrition to development has recently been re-emphasized by the World Bank in its
publication entitled Repositioning Nutrition as Central to Development; A Strategy for Large- Scale Action13.
The importance of investing in nutrition is highlighted by the growing international awareness that the
magnitude of malnutrition will prevent many countries from achieving the Millennium Development Goals and
by the growing evidence that there are solutions to the malnutrition problem. The excellent economic
investments of nutritional interventions to combat malnutrition were highlighted during the Copenhagen
Consensus14. According to the Consensus, the returns of investing in programmes to control infectious diseases,
such as HIV/AIDS and malaria, and to combat malnutrition represent six out of the top dozen proposed
interventions. 100. The role of nuclear techniques in the development and evaluation of nutritional interventions
is well established, and many Member States are now benefiting from increased access to technical capacity in
the use of stable isotope techniques in nutrition15. Recent trends indicate increased use of stable isotope
techniques to address priority areas such as nutrition and HIV/AIDS, infant and young child feeding and
micronutrient deficiencies. The use of a stable isotope technique, for example, to monitor changes in body
composition (body fat versus muscle mass) during nutritional interventions can contribute important information
to optimize care, treatment and support to people living with HIV/AIDS and is of particular relevance in the
context of increased access to antiretroviral treatment in resource-poor settings. 101. In addition, stable isotope
278

techniques are being used in several countries to estimate intake of human milk in breastfed infants and to assess
the time of introduction to other foods and fluids. It can therefore be used to monitor interventions to promote
exclusive breastfeeding for 6 months, followed by introduction of appropriate complementary foods and
continued breastfeeding, as recommended by the World Health Organization. 102. Stable isotope techniques are
also currently used to develop and evaluate strategies to combat micronutrient deficiencies. For example, stable
isotope techniques can be used to evaluate iron bioavailability from different compounds as an important step in
the development of a food fortification strategy and to monitor changes in vitamin A status in individuals
benefiting from vitamin A provided via food fortification and supplementation.
279
A2: Renewable Crowd-Out

Nuclear power investment does not crowd out renewable energy sources
Steve Kerekes, senior director of media relations at the Nuclear Energy Institute, debate the role of nuclear
power in climate change policy, November 10, 2007, Nuclear Power in Response To Climate Change,
Lastly, lets deal with the bizarre claim that renewable energy is being squeezed out of federal R&D [research
and development] funding because private-sector investment in new nuclear plants is substantial. First,
renewables received more than $1 billion in federal R&D funding in a single year as far back as 1979. Second,
even the Energy Policy Act of 2005 authorizes 37 percent more for renewable energy R&D than it does for
nuclear energy R&D. These numbers arent badthey simply reveal the truth that it can take considerable time
and money to jump-start the technologies that will help our nation.
280
Low Level Radiation Isnt Bad

Low level radiation prevents cancer
Artemus Ward, Mark Twains predecessor, once said: "It aint the things we don't know that gets us
into trouble. It's the things we know that just aint so." Regulators know that exposure to ionizing
radiation, even in very low doses, is harmful. They say that no amount of radiation can be proclaimed
safe. There is no threshold below which the deleterious effects of radiation cease to appear. This
"knowledge" has, indeed, caused us a lot of trouble, and it turns out not to be true. The actual truth is
this: Not only are low to moderate doses of ionizing radiation not harmful, low doses of radiation
are good for you. It stimulates the immune system and checks oxidation of DNA through a
process known as "radiation hormesis" and thereby prevents cancer. And irradiated mothers
bear children that have a reduced incidence of congenital deformities
Low level radiation doesnt cause genetic defects
Low dose radiation does not cause genetic defects, and fetuses exposed to radiation from Chernobyl
that were not aborted developed normally and did not have any increased incidence of congenital
abnormalities or genetic defects.
281
Cancer Answers
No evidence of cancer clusters
In Britain, much hay was made by Greenpeace and other organizations of the emergence of greater incidences of
leukemia in children living near the nuclear-reprocessing plant at Sellafield in the early 1990s. But such cancer
clusters appear all over the place, and are just as likely to appear next to an organic farmto borrow the
formulation of British environment writer Rob Johnstonas next to a nuclear facility. There does not appear to
be any greater incidence of leukemia in the children of those who work in the nuclear industry.
Coal fly ash kills more than 30,000 people/year, nuclear has killed zero
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, July 15, 2008, p. B4
In response to Don Grbac's July 6 letter, "Nix Nuclear Notions," I would like to point out two major issues. First, the waste
products from nuclear power plants have never killed, or even injured, a single U.S. citizen, including the events at Three
Mile Island. In contrast, the fly ash generated by coal power plants has more radiation than nuclear waste (Dec. 13, 2007,
Scientific American) and studies show that more than 30,000 people a year die from the fine particulates released
from coal-fired power plants.
282
Nuclear Good for the Environment

Nuclear power solves ocean acidification
107. Atmospheric levels of carbon dioxide (CO2) are increasing due to combustion of fossil fuels (petroleum,
gas, coal) and deforestation. Yet atmospheric CO2 levels would be even higher if it were not for the ocean,
which has absorbed about one-third of this human-produced CO2. As a result, ocean levels of CO2 are also
increasing, and because CO2 is an acid, ocean pH is dropping. This ocean acidification is likely to adversely
affect many marine organisms, particularly corals and shell builders, such as oysters, mussels, and molluscs, and
may affect entire marine food webs, impacting on natural biodiversity and aquaculture. The Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change has recently highlighted this as a critical gap in knowledge17. 108. Ocean
acidification may also affect solubility of pollutants, such as heavy metals, thereby affecting seafood safety.
Marine isotopes such as those for boron, have been used to determine past changes in ocean pH, and how they
differ from the present human-driven perturbation. Another isotope, calcium-45 has provided a key tool to
measure rates of calcification in corals whose reefs provide fish habitat and breeding grounds, defence against
storms and erosion, and the foundation of a multi-billion dollar tourism industry. The Agency is helping Member
States to use isotope studies and numerical models to better understand and project how ocean acidification will
alter marine resources. For example, applied radioecological studies are being conducted for expected levels of
high CO2 and low pH, using calcium-45 and other isotopes to help unravel the effects of ocean acidification on
commercially important organisms such as fish larvae and molluscs.
283
Nuclear Good for the Environment

Nuclear power improves groundwater treatment
Groundwater meets more than half of the worlds freshwater demands. This proportion is as high as 90% in
water scarce countries with arid or semi-arid climates, and in developing countries with large-scale irrigated
agriculture. The looming impacts of climate change on freshwater availability make groundwater an even more
critical resource and requires its judicious use. Observations over many years are required to assess and manage
aquifers used for groundwater development. Such information is scarce in most parts of the world. Isotope data
provide a window into the natural groundwater systems and a time and space integrated set of information on its
functioning, enabling groundwater assessment and management without significant investments of time and
resources. 110. Recognizing this important application of isotope data, a number of countries are taking steps to
broaden the availability of isotope data at a national scale. The Agency is producing a series of atlases with a
synthesis of isotope data collected from groundwater-related technical assistance in Member States over the past
fifty years. Most of these groundwater isotope data have not been easily available until now. 111. The first atlas
focuses on Africa and contains data from more than 10 000 isotope samples. As can be seen in the figure below,
the isotope data easily show the extent of old groundwater, presently non-renewable with ages in excess of about
10 000 years, in the northern Africa region. The low (more negative) _18O values indicate that recharge in many
parts of northern Africa occurred mainly under cooler climate conditions than exist in the present day. This
groundwater occurs in major transboundary aquifer systems such as the Nubian aquifer between Egypt, Libyan
Arab Jamahiriya, Chad, and Sudan and its shared management is critical for human development in this region.
284
Terrorism Answers
Terrorists cant get access to the fuel
Gwyneth Cravens, Brookings, 2002, Terrorism and Nuclear Energy: Understanding the Risks,
http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2002/spring_weapons_cravens.aspx
Could terrorists steal spent nuclear fuel? First they would have to get past multiple impediments:
guards, high double fences with concertina wire, floodlights, motion detectors, and cameras. Fuel rods
are so radioactive that anyone coming within a few feet of them would become extremely ill and die
within hours if not minutes. The more radioactive something is, the harder it is for someone to steal
and survive. Special equipment and thick lead shields are required for handling, and spent fuel for
transport must be placed in casks weighing about 90 tons that have been stringently tested (burned with
jet fuel, dropped from great heights onto steel spikes, and otherwise assaulted) and have remained
impervious.
Security upgraded since 9-11
Second, as a result of the experiences of 9/11, there is a need to provide the

country with confidence that nuclear power plants are adequately protected
against terrorist attacks. Significant security upgrades were introduced at all
nuclear plants in the period following 9/11, with the consequence that nuclear
power plants are more secure than most other elements of our civilian
infrastructure.
Plant vulnerability to terror attacks has been reduced
The nuclear industry has taken real strides in responding to its critics. After Three Mile Island, it retrofitted
plants to make them safer and more manageable. Their improved control shows clearly in their high and
rising capacity factor. Moreover, new designs are undoubtedly safer than existing reactors, and Yucca
Mountain is secure enough to push any real threat of contamination millennia into the future.
285
Terrorism Answers
Experts agree reactors are safe from terrorists
Council on Foreign Relations, 2006, Targets for Terrorism: Nuclear Facilities,

January, http://www.cfr.org/publication/10213/targets_for_terrorism.html
How vulnerable are U.S. nuclear weapons sites? Not very, most experts say. Nuclear weapons production and
storage sites are guarded by security forces supervised by the Department of Energy. John Gordon, the
administrator of the Department of Energys National Nuclear Security Administration, has called such sites
one of the last places a terrorist would think about attacking and having hopes of success; the security basically
bristles. But a watchdog organization, the Project on Government Oversight (POGO), charged that security at
U.S. nuclear weapons complexes was inadequate and that hundreds of tons of weapons-grade plutonium and
highly enriched uranium could be stolen, sabotaged, or even detonated. The Department of Energy dismisses
such criticism, adding that security has been stepped up since September 11. Experts note that a terrorist looking
to steal nuclear weapons or weapons-grade material would have a much easier time in Russia or Pakistan than in
the United States.
Terrorists cant make a bomb with commercial reactor fuel
Could terrorists make a nuclear weapon from commercial U.S. reactor fuel? Not easily. It is enriched
with uranium-235 but not nearly enough to make it weapons-grade. Extracting the enriched uranium235 would require a large, sophisticated chemical separation plant.
Terrorists couldnt simply build a bomb with stolen material
Could terrorists rob a weapons facility of weapons-grade plutonium or uranium? Mock raids of the kind used to
test nuclear power plants have been conducted to uncover weaknesses at weapons research sites. The exercises
have demonstrated the need for maximum protection and independent oversight of security forces as well as of
the network used to transport weapons materials. Since 10 a.m. on September 11, these sites have been placed
on highest security. Precautions at some nuclear weapons facilities abroad are almost certainly weaker than here
and international terrorists would seem more likely to make a run at those installations before challenging
ours. Terrorists with sufficient expertise and resources could in theory build a nuclear bomb but only with
enormous difficulty. Starting a chain reaction is not simple. Highly enriched uraniumvery problematic to
acquirewould have to be correctly contained to obtain an explosion. Terrorists stealing an American nuclear
weapon couldn't explode it without detailed knowledge of classified procedures that unlock numerous fail-safe
mechanisms. Nuclear weapons that have been accidentally dropped from aircraft or involved in plane crashes,
for instance, have not exploded. The reason: these devices are designed to blow up only when properly
detonated.
286
Terrorism Answers
Nuclear waste not at-risk of terrorist sabotage
More than 61 million people live within 50 miles of temporary military nuclear waste sites, many of
which holdin antiquated, leaky enclosures or pressurized tentsthe legacies of the Manhattan
Project, the Cold War, and disarmament treaties requiring the dismantling of nuclear weapons. If
politics do not interfere, within 10 years radioactive military waste will remain near 4 million people.
In the 1980s, the Energy Department began a massive cleanup, the world's largest public works project
ever. After a decade of delays and lawsuits by environmentalists, the WIPP opened in 1999. The
satellite-monitored trucks that transport the waste have been highly and redundantly engineered, and
their casks subjected to the same tests as those for commercial waste. Drivers are thoroughly vetted.
Most shipments consist of mildly radioactive trash like coveralls, paper cups, and sludge. The debris is
entombed half a mile underground in steel drums in a salt bed sandwiched between water-impermeable
rock strata. The salt, plastic at that depth, and impermeable to radionuclides, eventually encloses the
drums, providing another natural barrier An aircraft diving into an above-ground nuclear waste dump
could not cause a nuclear explosion. The materials are neither refined nor concentrated enough to start
a chain reaction. (Any material that could sustain one has been removed to be reused.) And because
most high-level waste is isolated on big reservations like Hanford and Savannah River, which are
fenced in and under heavy surveillance, casual access is highly unlikely. Recently considerable
apprehension has been expressed about nuclear materials being wrapped around conventional
explosives to make a "dirty" bomb. This relatively low-tech approach appears more feasible than other
threats and could induce widespread panic by appearing to expose a population to radiation. But how
radioactive could such a bomb be? Spent fuel would deliver the highest dose of radiation.
Contamination from such a bomb would be serious. But wrapping the conventional explosives with
spent fuel would be, as noted, a cumbersome operation and would promptly subject the perpetrators to
fatal exposure. Suicidal terrorists might nevertheless make the attempt, but it would be surprising
indeed if simpler projects that can also pack a big punch were not pursued first, even by fanatics who
are less than entirely rational. Last winter's "shoe bomber" tried to detonate not a nuclear device but
rather a relatively available, very dangerous chemical compound concealed in his shoes. Neither
medical nor WIPP-destined waste would provide much radioactivity because of the low concentration
of radionuclides. More accessible materials (syringes, fly ash, uranium mine tailings, smoke detectors)
could be included in a conventional bomb to make a Geiger counter tick a little faster, but physical
damage from an explosion would be limited to what the conventional blast could do. Radiological
harm would be negligible, if any occurred at all.
287
Terrorism Answers No Mobile Chernobyl

Terrorists couldnt turn a reactor into a mobile Chernobyl
Could terrorists turn any of our reactors into a Chernobyl? Again, extremely unlikely. American reactors have a completely
different design. All reactors require a medium around the fuel rods to slow down the neutrons given off by the controlled
chain reaction that ultimately produces heat to make steam to turn turbines that generate electricity. In the United States the
medium is water, which also acts as a coolant. In the Chernobyl reactor it was graphite. Water is not combustible, but
graphitepure carbonis combustible at high temperatures. Abysmal management, reckless errors, violation of basic
safety procedures, and poor engineering at Chernobyl caused the core to melt down through several floors. A subsequent
explosion involving steam and hydrogen blew off the roof (there was no containment structure) and ignited the graphite.
Most of the radioactive core spewed out. A similar meltdown at the Three Mile Island power plant in 1979one caused by
equipment malfunctions and human failure to grasp what was happening and respond appropriatelyinvolved no large
explosion, no breach. The reactor automatically shut down. Loss of coolant water caused half the core to melt, but its debris
was held by the containment vessel. Contaminated water flooded the reactor building, but no one was seriously injured. A
minute quantity of radioactive gases (insignificant, especially in comparison to the radionuclides routinely discharged from
coal-fired plants in the region) escaped through a charcoal-filtered stack and was dissipated by wind over the Atlantic,
never reaching the ground. The people and land around the plant were unharmed. In response, the NRC initiated more
safeguards at all plants, including improvements in equipment monitoring, redundancy (with two or more independent
systems for every safety-related function), personnel training, and emergency responsiveness. The commission also started
a safety rating system that can affect the price of plant owners' stock. The new science of probabilistic risk assessment,
developed to ensure the safety of the world's first permanent underground nuclear waste-disposal facility, has led to new
risk-informed regulation. In over two decades no meltdowns have occurred and minor mishaps at all nuclear plants have
decreased sharply. Cuts by Congress in the NRC's annual research budget over the past 20 yearsfrom $200 million to $43
millionmay have considerably compromised ongoing reforms and effectiveness, however. U.S. nuclear power plants,
which are subject to both federal and international regulation, are designed to withstand extreme events and are among the
sturdiest and most impenetrable structures on the planetsecond only to nuclear bunkers. Three nesting containment
barriers shield the fuel rods. First, metal cladding around the rods contains fission products during the life of the fuel. Then
a large steel vessel with walls about five inches thick surrounds the reactor and its coolant. And enclosing that is a large
building made of a shell of steel covered with reinforced concrete four to six feet thick. After the truck-bomb explosion at
the World Trade Center in 1993 and the crash of a station wagon driven by a mentally ill intruder into the turbine building
(not the reactor building) at Three Mile Island, plants multiplied vehicle and other barriers and stepped up detection
systems, access controls, and alarm stations. Plants also enhanced response strategies tested by mock raids by commandos
familiar with plant layouts. These staged intrusions have occasionally been successful, leading to further corrections. On
September 11, all nuclear facilities were put on highest alert indefinitely. Still more protective barriers are being erected.
The NRC, after completing a thorough review of all levels of plant security, has just mandated additional personnel
screening and access controls as well as closer cooperation with local law-enforcement agencies. Local governments have
posted state troopers or the National Guard around commercial plants, and military surveillance continues What if terrorists
gained access to a reactor? An attempt to melt down the core would activate multiple safeguards, including alternate means
of providing coolant as well as withdrawal of the fuel rods from the chain reaction process.
288
AT: Attack with an Airplane

Jumbo jet attack wont lead to a plant explosion, terrorists wont target plants
After 9/11, concerns arose over the security of the United States' 103 nuclear plants, particularly Indian
Point, located thirty miles north of New York City. According to a 2004 report by the Union of
Concerned Scientists, an attack on the plant could kill up to 44,000 people. But some nuclear experts
say the threat posed by terrorists may be exaggerated. "Even if a jumbo jet did crash into a
reactor and breach the containment, the reactor would not explode," wrote Greenpeace's Moore,
referring to nuclear plants' six-feet-thick exteriors. Ferguson does not see nuclear plants as likely
targets. "We don't see a lot of serious interest on the part of most terrorist groups to attack
nuclear targets," he says. "They tend to favor softer targets," like office buildings or embassies.
Even a successful air attack would result in a limited amount of radiation
And if a jetliner slammed into a reactor? Given what is now publicly known, one could predict that
earthquake sensors, required in all reactors, would trigger automatic shutdown to protect the core.
Scientists at the national labs are calculating whether containment structures could withstand a jumbo
jet, specifically the impact of its engines, which are heavier than the fuselage, and any subsequent fire.
Even the worst casea reactor vessel breachwould involve no nuclear explosion, only a limited
dispersal of radioactive materials. The extent of the plume would depend on many variables, especially
the weather. As a precaution, no-fly zones have been imposed over all nuclear power plants. Military
reactors used for weapons production have all been closed for a decade and are spaced miles apart on
isolated reservations hundreds of miles square. Any release of radioactivity would remain on site.
289
AT: Fuel Rods Radioactive

Fuel rods become less dangerous as they decay
Nuclear waste is a stickier problem, but one that can be safely managed. In most American reactors, fuel rods need to be
replaced every 18 months or so. When they are taken out, they contain large amounts of radioactive fission products and
produce enough heat that they need to be cooled in water. Radioactivity declines as the isotopes decay and the rods produce
less heat. It is the very nature of radioactivity that, as materials decay, they become less dangerous and easier to handle.
290
Nuclear Solves Oil Dependence

Nuclear supports hydrogen development needed to reduce oil dependence
For the rest of us, what we might do with it is the whole point we might increase human prosperity and welfare. If were
determined to price coal out of the energy market, then nuclear is it. If were determined to cure our addiction to oil, then
we will need nuclear facilities to power our plug-in hybrid electric cars or to make the hydrogen for our fuel cells. This is
not a green pipe dream. In fact, given the way automotive technology is developing, it is plausible that a majority of
vehicles sold in the U.S. by 2020 will use electric power trains, increasing our need for electricity. We might not even need
to close our coal mines, since we can get more energy from the uranium found in coal than from burning the coal itself.
291
HTRs Solve Oil Dependence

High Temperature Reactors (HTRs) support the transition to a hydrogen economy
Robert Fri, Resources for the Future, April 23, 2008, p. online
Economic benefits of early commercialization of high-temperature reactors (HTRs) and VHTRs based on
NGNP technology could be realized in four market segments where HTRs could make products at a lower cost
than competing technologies: base-load electricity, combined heat and power, high-temperature process heat,
and hydrogen. A long-term goal for the NGNP is to demonstrate hydrogen production as an energy carrier for a
hydrogen economy. However, in each of those four segments, there are specific applications where HTRs will
have near-term advantages. By directing NGNP and the Nuclear Hydrogen Initiative (NHI) R&D toward those
specific applications, stronger near-term industry interest and investment is more likely, which in turn will
support continued R&D investments for subsequent expansion of HTR technology into additional market
segments and, in the longer term, support the transition to a hydrogen economy.
292
Nuclear Provides Energy Grid Security

Nuclear power solves electric supply and price instability
Nuclear power is comparable in price to coal and hydroelectric energy. But unlike coal or natural gas, which must be
purchased daily, nuclear plants are not subject to large swings in fuel prices. And unlike wind or solar energy, nuclear
power can produce electricity at any time it is needed.
293
Medical Isotopes Advantage

Medical isotopes save thousands of lives per year and improve health care
Department of Energy, 2001, Report to Congress on the Extraction of Medical Isotopes,
http://www.nuclear.gov/pdfFiles/U233RptConMarch2001.pdf
Medical isotopes save lives and reduce health care costs. Some of the more frequent uses of medical
radioisotopes include diagnosis and treatment of several major diseases, sterilization of medical
products, tissue grafts, nutrition research, and biomedical research into cellular processes. The
Department of Energy supports the U.S. health care industry and medical research by producing these
isotopes and through the support of fundamental isotope research. A class of medical isotopes -- alphaemitting radioisotopes -- is of growing interest in the cure of cancer. To understand this interest, the
Department sponsored a workshop on Alpha-Emitters for Medical Therapy in May 1996. As a result
of the workshop, the Department, through the Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology,
undertook significant efforts and expended several million dollars in order to establish a domestic
supply of the alpha-emitting radioactive isotopes actinium-225 (Ac-225) and bismuth-213 (Bi-213).
Because of these efforts, researchers have made tremendous advances in the diagnosis and treatment of
cancerous tumors in the human body using monoclonal antibodies and their molecular subunits in
various forms as carriers for these radioactive isotopes. Specifically, because alpha-particles deposit
their energy over microscopic dimensions, antibodies tagged with this radioactive isotope deliver a
potent dose of radiation directly to the cancer with minimal or no exposure of healthy tissue. In June
2000, former Secretary of Energy Richardson directed the Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and
Technology to increase the supply of the isotopes Ac-225 and Bi-213 available to researchers through
the processing of more uranium-233 (U-233) currently in storage at the Department's Oak Ridge
National Laboratory (ORNL). This spring, the Department intends to further expand the supply of Ac225 and Bi-213 by issuing a request for proposals for a contract that will, among other things,
substantially increase the available supply of these isotopes to the research and medical community. In
addition, the Department intends to undertake long-term activities concerning the production of Ac225 and Bi-213. Medical isotopes used to treat hundreds of life-threatening diseases Nuclear medicine
offers one of the safest ways to diagnose and treat several types of cancer, leukemia, heart disease, and
other serious, life-threatening diseases. It does so without noticeable adverse effects on normal organs
and without the debilitating side effects and extended hospital stays associated with more common
treatments. Each year, about one-third of the 30 million Americans hospitalized are diagnosed or
treated with one or more nuclear medicine techniques, representing a $7-10 billion per year industry.
Radioisotopes and radiopharmaceuticals, which are at the heart of nuclear medicine, are used in the
United States alone for almost 40,000 procedures every day and in more than 100 million laboratory
tests each year. The use of medical isotopes also reduces health care costs by improving the quality,
efficiency, and effectiveness of patient care. Medical research using isotopes continues to promise new
applications for fighting other diseases such as Huntingtons and Alzheimers. Adequate supplies of
medical and research isotopes are essential to maintain U.S. effective diagnosis, treatment, and
research capabilities. U.S. can get radio isotopes from abroad Primarily due to the Departments support,
and in conjunction with the National Institutes of Health, the United States has become the world
leader in the application of radioisotopes and radiopharmaceuticals for biomedical research. As a
result, the benefits to patient healthcare have been immense. Despite our pioneering leadership,
however, we have recently become dependent upon sources outside the United States for all of the
294
technetium-99m and for many radionuclides necessary to advance research in the health sciences and
other areas. U.S. must develop its own nuclear power to lead in radio isotope development For the United
States to continue contributions in the application of radioactive materials for biomedical
investigations, it is essential that we establish a reliable source and supply of radioisotopes. Because of
the uncertain supply of radioisotopes in the United States, many nuclear medicine researchers have
become dissuaded from pursuing their ideas for new medical advances, threatening the future of
nuclear medicine in the United States. To correct this gradual decline, the Department must continue to
invest in dedicated, state-of-the-art facilities in order to reliably supply existing radioisotopes in use
and develop new radioisotopes in sufficient quantity and year-long availability to support clinical
research. Alpha-emitting radioisotopes are an example of this investment.
295
Medical Isotopes Advantage

Nuclear isotope medicine can be used to block HIV
Eketrina Dadachova, Albert Einstein Medical College, no date, http://medicine.plosjournals.org/perlserv/?
request=getdocument&doi=10.1371/journal.pmed.0030427&ct=1&SESSID=e5a04eee4114e37e24c620081f93690
Background
The HIV epidemic is a major threat to health in the developing and western worlds. A modality that targets and
kills HIV-1-infected cells could have a major impact on the treatment of acute exposure and the elimination of
persistent reservoirs of infected cells. The aim of this proof-of-principle study was to demonstrate the efficacy of
a therapeutic strategy of targeting and eliminating HIV-1-infected cells with radiolabeled antibodies specific to
viral proteins in vitro and in vivo. Methods and Findings Antibodies to HIV-1 envelope glycoproteins gp120
and gp41 labeled with radioisotopes bismuth 213 (213Bi) and rhenium 188 (188Re) selectively killed chronically
HIV-1-infected human T cells and acutely HIV-1-infected human peripheral blood mononuclear cells (hPBMCs)
in vitro. Treatment of severe combined immunodeficiency (SCID) mice harboring HIV-1-infected hPBMCs in
their spleens with a 213Bi- or 188Re-labeled monoclonal antibody (mAb) to gp41 resulted in a 57% injected dose
per gram uptake of radiolabeled mAb in the infected spleens and in a greater than 99% elimination of HIV-1infected cells in a dose-dependent manner. The number of HIV-1-infected thymocytes decreased 2.5-fold in the
human thymic implant grafts of SCID mice treated with the 188Re-labeled antibody to gp41 compared with those
treated with the 188Re-control mAb. The treatment did not cause acute hematologic toxicity in the treated mice.
Conclusions The current study demonstrates the effectiveness of HIV-targeted radioimmunotherapy and may
provide a novel treatment option in combination with highly active antiretroviral therapy for the eradication of
HIV.
Nuclear medicine makes AIDS treatment possible

International Conference on AIDS, August 7-12, 2004, http://gateway.nlm.nih.gov/MeetingAbstracts/ma?
f=102210010.html
Nuclear Medicine offered its contribution in the clinical evaluation of immunodeficiency patients since 1982.
Sensibility and specificity of these examinations were and remain variable according to the clinical question;
nevertheless we can confirm that they are now better than in the past. The improvement of the accuracy is due,
for the same tracers, to the technological evolution of gamma-cameras and the better knowledge of the tracer's
biodistribution. Very important results are due to the new radiopharmaceuticals that are disposable for detection
of various pathologies in HIV seropositive patients. Remarkable results were obtained in the evaluation of the
opportunistic infections in AIDS: the first experiences with Gallium were followed from an in vivo evaluation of
Human Immunoglobulin 99mTc marked that showed a good accuracy in the detection of pulmonary infections
and in their follow-up, giving important informations about differential diagnosis. Now are available a new
radiopharmaceutical: monoclonal antibodies against white cells (granulocytes), that allows to mark the
granulocytes in vivo, preventing from the manipulation of large quantity of infected blood. We will be able,
using this tracer, to give informations even on the abdominal infections that were difficultly detectable with
Nuclear Medicine techniques till now. The evaluation of infections is only one of the procedures available in
these patients, in fact every organ may be detected for his function with Nuclear Medicine examinations and we
296

remember that no preparation is requested, no adverse reactions are usually described and the scintigraphy may
be performed in every patient's clinical condition.
297
Accidents Answers Three Mile Island Specifics

No bad health effects from Three Mile Island
Forrest J. Remick, professor emeritus of nuclear engineering at Penn State University, is a former member of the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Patriot-News, July 8, 2008, p. A11
Myth: Nuclear plants are harmful to public health. Reality: Contrary to the claims of a vocal opponent of nuclear power,
who says that the 1979 Three Mile Island plant accident led to a minimum of 430 infant deaths, nothing of the sort
happened. A dozen major, independent studies of the accident, including a 13-year study of 32,000 people, refute the claim.
None have found any adverse health effects.
298
Accidents Answers
Only two safety incidents ever, minimal impact
Delaware Online, August 3, 2008, http://www.delawareonline.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?
The World Nuclear Association has determined that in over 12,700 cumulative reactor hours in 32 countries,
there have only been two major safety incidents. One was contained with no harm to anyone, and one was a
disaster. It found that analyses and testing after the 1979 meltdown of the Three Mile Island reactor made clear
that a possible accident in a conventional western nuclear power plant could not cause dramatic harm.
France receives 78 percent of its power from nuclear reactors, and Belgium receives 54 percent. Much of the
nuclear waste is recycled in modern plants, which cuts back further on the dangers.
Given that the technology continues to evolve and the facts about the safety of nuclear power, I cant see where
anyone could argue against its use.
299
Nuclear Plant Security Answers

Nuclear plant security has increased since 9/11
Marvin Fertel, Executive Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer at the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI),
February 28, 2008, Testimony,
http://www.nei.org/newsandevents/speechesandtestimony/2008_speeches_and_testimony/ferteltestimony/
Unique among the nations critical infrastructure, nuclear plants have, even prior to 9/11 had to meet security
requirements required by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Following the September 2001
attacks, the NRC has increased nuclear facility security requirements numerous times by issuing orders and
other formal requirements, and is now in the process of codifying additional requirements in rulemakings. Since
9/11 the industry has invested more than $2 billion in additional security at nuclear plant sites and has increased
the number of specially trained, well-armed security forces by more than 60 percent. These officers are better
trained, better equipped and armed, better led and better supported with stronger protective systems and barriers,
and better tested and evaluated by the industry and independently by the NRC.
Nuclear plant construction provides extensive security
Compared to other commercial facilities, nuclear power plants start with a clear advantage in the area of
security. The structures that house reactors and critical systems are built to withstand natural events such as
earthquakes, hurricanes, tornadoes, fires and floods. They are massive structures with thick, steel-reinforced
exterior walls and internal barriers of reinforced concrete. As such, the structures provide a large measure of
protection against potential attacks. In addition, the ``defense-in-depth`` philosophy used in nuclear facility
design means that plants have redundant systems to ensure safety. Many of these redundant safety systems are
separated physically so that if one area of the plant is compromised, backup systems in another part of the plant
can maintain safety. This redundancy provides a capability to withstand securely and safely a variety of events,
natural or man-made. The difficult-to-penetrate structures are just the first level of a multistage, integrated
security strategy. Nuclear power plant security is designed with concentric perimeters with increased security at
each level. Physical barriers protect against unauthorized personnel and vehicle intrusion, including truck
bombs. These security zones are protected by trained and armed professionals, who use hardened defensive
fighting positions located throughout the plant, if needed. In the innermost security zone, access to the vital
areas of our plants is strictly controlled using biometrics and other technologies. Critical areas are constantly
surveilled and monitored using state-of-the-art detection equipment. Strict access control is maintained using
biometrics and other technologies. Industry employees with unescorted access are subject to a systematic
fitness-for-duty program and a continual behavioral observation program and must undergo comprehensive
background checks.
300

Nuclear industry working to improve security
Certainly the industry recognizes - as does the NRC and U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) - that it
is possible that there could be threats to our plants greater than or less than what is defined by the DBT. Based
upon tabletop exercises done at all sites and additional simulations done at some sites, we would expect to be
successful against most credible threats even at higher levels. But with any fixed size protective force and the
inherent limitations of a private sector entity, on intelligence gathering, deadly force capabilities and authorities,
there is a limit to its capability by itself. Against a much larger force, plant paramilitary security forces would
certainly offer a significant degree of deterrence and a strong initial defense. But at some point such threats are
the responsibility of the federal government, which has full intelligence, interdiction and military response
capabilities. Since September 11, 2001, DHS, NRC, and the industry have recognized the importance of
coordinating federal, state and local authorities with the industry to best defend against such an attack. The
DHS, NRC and the industry established a program to integrate the response planning around nuclear plant sites.
The mechanism for this planning was called ``Comprehensive Review`` and brought together the full potential
of local, state and federal capability. Last year these Comprehensive Reviews were completed for every site well ahead of all other industrial sectors. The industry continues to work with DHS, FBI, NRC and other federal,
state, and local law enforcement agencies to enhance the integrated response of all entities in the event of an
attack at a nuclear power plant.
301

Old evidence irrelevant security has improved substantially
The industry has not only greatly improved its physical and operational security, but has also significantly
improved the testing of that security. Prior to the tragic events of September 11, 2001, NRC evaluated FOF
exercises occurred roughly once every eight years at each site and there were no NRC requirements for annual
exercises to be conducted at every site. Also, the pre-9/11 program did not have specific performance
requirements for the adversary force that participated in the evaluated exercises. Since 2004, each plant is
required to conduct FOF testing of its security several times each year, with each security shift being tested
every year as well as each site conducting an annual FOF exercise. NRC conducts annual baseline inspections to
validate the effectiveness of the overall site security training program, physical security efficiency and FOF
exercises. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 also mandates that one of these large-scale FOF exercises be formally
evaluated by the NRC every three years. In 2007 we completed the first three-year cycle of NRC evaluated FOF
security exercises - at every plant. The NRC has also established standards for the qualifications of the adversary
forces that participate in the FOF drills. While, the primary purpose of the FOF exercise is to test the defensive
capabilities of the plant, an effective exercise obviously requires high performance by the adversary.
Recognizing that the sites would be conducting as many as 15 drills and exercises in a three year period, the
industry decided that there was value in establishing a process by which site personnel could gain expertise in
performing as adversaries. To this end, the industry has established a Composite Adversary Force that is skilled
in offensive tactics and has the training and qualifications to meet the NRC standard. This force consists of fulltime, highly trained, security experts. The adversary team members are thoroughly trained, meet physical fitness
requirements and demonstrate weapons proficiency to standards, including expertise in the use of state-of-theart MILES laser based weaponry. The adversary force is used in the triennial NRC-evaluated exercises and thus
presents a state-of-the-art challenge to the plants. In addition to evaluating the defensive capabilities of the plant,
the NRC also evaluates the adversary force to ensure a robust exercise. Through this program, assurance is
further provided that our security forces can successfully respond to a dedicated adversary team. We are
unaware of any security forces for any private industry that are subjected to such rigorous testing that includes
FOF drills using a full-time dedicated team.
302

Extensive plant security measures have been upgraded
Even prior to the 9/11 attacks, nuclear plants had extensive security measures in place. Each
plant has a trained security force and a series of physical barriers. Security personnel undergo
thorough background checks and submit to lengthy personal searches when entering and exiting
the plant. The physical barriers consist of an "owner-controlled" buffer zone of land around the
facility, a restricted-access "protected area," and a further restricted "vital area." Double fences,
barbed wire, and surveillance systems are common. The containment vessels for nuclear reactors are
among the world's sturdiest man-made structures. The vessel at the Indian Point plant, for instance, is
made of three-and-a-half-foot thick concrete reinforced by three-inch thick steel bars. After 9/11, the
NRC began a top-to-bottom review of its security requirements, and in 2003, issued new orders
to tighten security. Some $1.25 billion was spent on these measures, which included adding
security barriers and detection equipment, creating more rigid access control, and increasing the
number of security personnel by 60 percent. The NRC also revised the DBT to include what it
claims is "the largest reasonable threat against which a regulated private guard force should be
expected to defend." While details are classified, experts say this covers an assault by multiple armed
attackers.
Reactors cant withstand attacks by large numbers of terrorists
"One of the critiques is that the DBT does not encompass a 9/11-scale threat," says CFR Science and
Technology Fellow Charles Ferguson. While the specifics of the DBT are classified, experts in the
field say nuclear plants are only required to withstand an attack by a handful of well-armed
terrorists, possibly working with one or two insiders. Critics say plants should be able to
withstand an attack by at least nineteen terrorists, the number of men who carried out the 9/11
attacks. Another point of contention is that the DBT does not require security personnel to
prepare for terrorists armed with rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) or .50 caliber sniper rifles
with armor-piercing rounds. Such sniper rifles are legally sold in many states, and RPGs can
easily be found on the black market.
303
AT: Terror Attacks with Airplanes

A jetliner could hit a nuclear plant at maximum speed with no impact
There is some concern that nuclear power plants present an attractive target for terrorists. After the attacks of Osama bin
Ladens impromptu air force in 2001, the Department of Energy commissioned a study into the effects of a fully fueled
jetliners hitting a reactor containment vessel at maximum speed. In none of the simulations was containment breached.
Given the massive investment that would be needed to compromise a nuclear power station, it is highly unlikely that
terrorists would seek to attack such a hard targetespecially when their revealed preference has been for soft targets
offering the maximum possible loss of civilian life.
Crashing a plane into a reactor wont destroy it
A 2002 report by the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association suggests a nuclear reactor would remain
intact if crashed into by an average private aircraft. Even a much larger commercial jet, such as a
Boeing 757, would not cause critical damage to a reactor, the report concluded. NRC studies have
reached similar conclusions.
304
Nuclear Proliferation Answers

Turn countries already have nukes, energy shortages increase the risk of use
The Canberra Times , July 19, 2008, p. B8
But perhaps the greatest flaw in the anti-nuclear platform is the assumption that the peaceful use of nuclear power
automatically leads to weapons proliferation, which in turn leads automatically to nuclear Armageddon. Serious war
requires the initiator to have not only the weapons but also the motivation. Many already have the weapons. Amongst
the most likely causes of motivation are resentment caused by being dispossessed of land (terrorism) or by serious
national shortages of food or energy. Desperate circumstances breed desperate actions. Excluding nuclear power
could actually increase the risk of catastrophic conflict.
Commercial nuclear power in the Western world does not drive proliferation
As for the problem of nuclear proliferation, the unpleasant fact is that every country that has been willing to
invest the time and effort required to make a nuclear weapon has succeeded. The existence of nuclear power
plants in Western countries has nothing to do with this. In fact, in order to keep plants economical, fuel rods are
kept in the reactor long enough that the weapons-grade plutonium, Pu-239, absorbs another neutron and
becomes the much less dangerous Pu-240. To be effective in a weapon, a given volume of plutonium must
contain no more than 7 percent Pu-240. Spent fuel from civilian nuclear plants is typically composed of about
26 percent Pu- 240. This makes it extremely difficult even for experts to use in the manufacture of nuclear
weaponsand well nigh impossible for amateurs.
U.S. global nuclear leadership has collapsed, loss of leadership collapses non-proliferation safeguards
Central to meeting U.S. non-proliferation goals is U.S. leadership in the very business it created.
But American leadership in the commercial international field is seriously threatened, reducing
our leverage with the rest of the nuclear world. In the early years, Russia and the United States
together controlled almost 90 percent of the global trade in peaceful nuclear products and
services. Today, although the United States has a healthy and thriving domestic nuclear
electricity generating structure, the rest of the U.S. nuclear enterprise is almost out of business.
As early as 1976, President Fords administration lamented the fact that the U.S. share (and
control) of the global trade in nuclear materials, hardware, and services had dwindled to 50
percent. Several countries have slowly weaned themselves of any need for U.S. support, goods,
or services. Virtually all U.S. fuel and hardware vendors have been absorbed into foreign
corporations. By 1996, 15 other countries had developed partial or complete nuclear fuel cycle
capabilities with limited, or no, U.S. or Russian involvement. Some of these countries (e.g., Japan,
China, South Korea, Argentina, India, and Brazil) could become very competitive nuclear
suppliers to the next growth era. Some have already established an independent multilateral
cooperative network. China, for example, has developed indigenous cradle-to-grave capabilities.
This means that other nations will reap the benefits of supplying nuclear goods and services to
support the industrialization of developing nations and global energy demand and, by default,
will have the capacity to define the character of the future global nuclear infrastructure. The
facts suggest that we could move into a new nuclear era that involves little or no participation by,
or benefit to, the United States. Other countries have announced aggressive growth plans for
commercial nuclear power and will move ahead swiftly, with or without the United States. If it
305

appears to them that we do not intend to participate in keeping nuclear power as a key energy
technology, those countries might decide to develop fuel cycle technologies and material
handling policies that meet lower non-proliferation standards. The influence of the United States
will be respected in this sphere only to the extent that we participate in the development and
deployment of nuclear technologies in the future
306

Nuclear fuel technology spreading now
Meanwhile, concerns over nuclear proliferation have steadily risen as ostensibly commercial uranium
enrichment and reprocessing technologies have been subverted for military purposes. In 2003 and
2004, it became evident that Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan sold sensitive technology and
equipment related to uranium enrichment a process that can be used to make fuel for nuclear power
and research reactors, or to make fissile material for nuclear weapons to states such as Libya, Iran,
and North Korea. Although Pakistans leaders maintain they did not acquiesce in or abet Khans
activities, Pakistan remains outside the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Nuclear
Suppliers Group (NSG). Iran has been a direct recipient of Pakistani enrichment technology.3 The
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)s Board of Governors found in 2005 that Irans breach of
its safeguards obligations constituted noncompliance with its safeguards agreement, and referred the
case to the UN Security Council in February 2006. Despite repeated calls by the UN Security Council
for Iran to halt enrichment and reprocessing-related activities, and imposition of sanctions, Iran
continues to develop enrichment capability at Natanz.4 Iran insists on its inalienable right to develop
the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, pursuant to Article IV of the NPT.
30 countries will get access to nuclear material in the status quo

According to the United Nations' International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), within 30-40 years at
least 30 countries are likely to have access to fissile materials from their civil nuclear power programs
that can be used for nuclear weapons," it warns. Potentially volatile countries including Saudi Arabia
and Syria are also expressing increasing interest in civilian nuclear power-- not to mention Iran, which
is currently the focus of a dispute with the West over its nuclear ambitions.
307

U.S.-North Korean nuclear reprocessing has undermined non-proliferation
Edwin Lyman is a senior staff scientist at the Union of Concerned Scientists Global Security
Program. Frank N. von Hippel is a professor of public and international affairs at Princeton
Universitys Program on Science and Global Security, April 2008, Arms Control Today,
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2008_04/LymanVonHippel
The steady increase in U.S. cooperation with South Korea on nuclear fuel-cycle technology over the
last several years is a prime example of the erosion of U.S. nonproliferation policy regarding
reprocessing. For decades, the United States has sought to discourage South Korean acquisition of a
reprocessing facility that could provide the capability to separate plutonium for nuclear weapons.
South Korea attempted to acquire a reprocessing plant in the mid-1970s after President Richard Nixon
decided to draw down the number of U.S. troops deployed in South Korea. This initiative included the
purchase of a heavy water research reactor from Canada (similar to the reactors that Israel and India
used to produce plutonium for their weapons programs) and a reprocessing plant from France. Both
orders were cancelled at the request of the United States. In 2004, South Korea revealed to the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that researchers at the Korean Atomic Energy Research
Institute (KAERI) had carried out laboratory-scale experiments in 1982 to recover plutonium from
irradiated uranium and in 2000 to enrich uranium using lasers, each time without informing the IAEA
first, as required by South Koreas safeguards agreement. Since at least 2005, however, the United
States has provided funding and expertise to South Korea in support of projects related to a type of
spent fuel reprocessing known as pyroprocessing. KAERI expects this cooperation to lead to a
prototype commercial pyroprocessing plant by 2025. The U.S. Department of Energy has been funding
the joint pyroprocessing projects with KAERI through its International Nuclear Energy Research
Initiative. One problem with this program is that, in 1992, North and South Korea agreed, in the Joint
Declaration of South and North Korea on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, that neither
would acquire nor use nuclear weapons and that neither would acquire nuclear reprocessing and
enrichment facilities. North Korea has violated this agreement, but South Korea still considers itself
bound by it and hopes that the agreements recently achieved in the six-party talks will restore North
Korea to compliance. Therefore, U.S. efforts to promote pyroprocessing in South Korea do not seem
consistent with the Korean peninsula denuclearization agreement. In October 2007, one of the authors
asked a pertinent Energy Department official how one could reconcile the departments collaboration
with KAERI on pyroprocessing with South Koreas commitment to comply with the denuclearization
agreement. His response was that the Department of State had decided that pyroprocessing is not
reprocessing.[3] Further inquiry established that this remains a contentious issue within the State
Department, which has not yet granted approval for South Korea to pyroprocess U.S.-origin spent fuel
in its domestic facilities. Nonetheless, even if it determines that pyroprocessing is a form of
reprocessing, the Bush administration may well be inclined to give South Korea a green light to
proceed because it is a close ally of the United States, has an advanced nuclear energy sector, and, in
recent years at least, has had a good nonproliferation record. This would be consistent with the Bush
administrations reasoning in exempting Argentina and Brazil from its stated opposition to countries
acquiring enrichment facilities if they do not already have a full-scale functioning plant. Meanwhile,
U.S. cooperation with South Korea on pyroprocessing has been developing in a stepwise fashion. In
2005, with U.S. technical assistance, South Korea built a laboratory-scale Advanced [Spent Fuel]
Conditioning Process Facility (ACPF) in KAERIs Irradiated Material Examination Facility. This
308
facility has been configured to convert oxide light-water reactor spent fuel into a metallic form.
Although it will not have cathodes to separate the transuranic elements from uranium and some fission
products, the ACPF should be considered a laboratory-scale reprocessing facility because it would
separate the transuranics from the fission product, cesium-137. This isotope provides the primary
radiation barrier for spent fuel 10 or more years after its discharge from a reactor. To date, South
Korea has only processed unirradiated uranium oxide in the ACPF. Under the terms of the South
Korea-U.S. nuclear cooperation agreement, before South Korea can treat U.S.-origin spent fuel in the
ACPF, it must obtain U.S. consent. This cannot happen until a plutonium safeguards system has been
designed for the process that meets the IAEAs criteria. In September 2007, a joint paper by KAERI
and Los Alamos National Laboratory experts reported that such a system had been developed and that
hot operation was scheduled to begin in 2008. As of February 2008, however, the United States had
not issued a Subsequent Arrangement authorizing the processing of U.S.-origin spent fuel in the ACPF,
and one State Department official has indicated privately that the State Department is backing away
from its previous positive attitude toward support for pyroprocessing facilities in South Korea. There is
no indication, however, that the United States will terminate the ongoing research and development
collaboration on pyroprocessing.
309
A2: Proliferation
Nuclear power promotes nonproliferation cooperation it boosts establishes new platforms
In introducing the "Nonproliferation Challenges in the 21st Century" panel, James Chapek of Sandia National
Laboratories noted that it took the Manhattan Project just three years to overcome the three major hurdles to produce
a nuclear weapon -- possessing the fissionable material, scientific knowledge, and technology. Concerns about
proliferation emerged even then, he said, and efforts were begun to prevent it. That took longer. Nonproliferation
was one of the principles guiding President Eisenhower in 1953, when he proposed his Atoms for Peace initiative.
This led to the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
More recently, the fall of the Soviet Union and the rise of the "threat matrix" of rogue states and terrorists has
significantly changed "the calculus for world peace," he said. The possibility of a country or other entity possessing nuclear weapons as a deterrent,
equalizer, or terrorist tool has taken on an increased importance. The first speaker, Victor Reis, senior vice president of Hicks Associates, where he leads the nuclear strategies project, a multiorganizational venture whose purpose is to help develop strategies for the international nuclear enterprise. Reis is a member of the strategic advisory group of the U.S. Strategic Command;
previously he led the DOE stockpile stewardship program and had been director of defense research and engineering at the Pentagon. Reis started with a different angle on the subject, explaining
that he was looking at nonproliferation opportunities, rather than challenges. Eisenhower's vision was large, said Reis. It included avoidance of nuclear war and the arms trade, containment of
Soviet expansion, and enhancing international cooperation. There were also domestic benefits, such as helping to keep the budget down. Under his Atoms for Peace deal, weapons states would
Looking ahead 50 years, Reis suggested

another vision, which includes: global expansion of electricity; reduction of carbon and other pollutant emissions;
international security (including the removal of rogue states), and international relations (leading to greater world
stability). They are all connected, he said. Nuclear power can contribute to this vision, he explained, by: 1.
Generating a lot of carbon/pollution-free electricity -- "producing a little is not going to get you very far," he said. 2.
Reducing the stockpile of weapons and eliminating excess material. 3. Providing a platform for international
cooperation, in terms of proliferation and fuel cycle management. Reis's vision also involves a new deal in which
there are two categories -- fuel states and reactor states -- where fuel states lease fuel cycle services to reactor states,
and all states accede to appropriate safeguards. An immediate benefit of this, he said, is that it would be a lot
cheaper. If a state only has reactors, a lot of safeguards are unnecessary, and from a proliferation point of view,
there are fewer states to worry about. In this way, there can be a substantial growth in nuclear power, without
making the proliferation issue any more difficult. It may even be better, said Reis, by encouraging nonweapons
states to forego any plans. This idea, he said, has been likened to the relationship that France and Germany forged
after World War II, built on their steel and coal industries. This cooperation led to a treaty involving other countries
that eventually became the European Community. The development of a large international nuclear industry, says
Reis, could also become an important "currency" for international relations, a potential that Eisenhower saw.
Everything is there already, said Reis, the resources, the technology, and the international relationships, as in the
IAEA. It is mainly a diplomatic issue, he said.
provide assistance to nonweapons states to avoid proliferation while also moving towards the elimination of their weapons.
310
A2: Proliferation
Proliferation measures exist in the status quo the international cooperation created by the plan
allow them to become effective
According to the police, explained Stratford, preventing crime requires either removing opportunity or changing
motivation, or, ideally, both. In the nonproliferation arena, he said, removing opportunity means keeping weaponsusable fissile material out of the hands of those who can't be trusted. The basic proliferation prevention measures
are: account for nuclear material; lock up and protect nuclear material; track down anybody who has illegitimate
possession; and deal as effectively as possible with those states that opt openly or clandestinely to pursue a weapons
program. Stratford provided an overview of several aspects: 1. Material accountancy -- Initially, IAEA safeguards
were primarily an accounting system designed to ensure that declared nuclear material remained where it was
supposed to be. The discovery of Iraq's nuclear weapons activities over a decade ago showed up the system's
inherent weaknesses and triggered an effort to upgrade it. This led to the creation of the Additional Protocol, whose
purpose is to be able to prove that a state is not engaging in undeclared nuclear production activities. That is what is
being called for in Iran, following the disclosures that it was secretly developing a centrifuge enrichment capacity. 2.
Physical protection -- This subject is getting a lot of attention. The IAEA is undertaking a large international
assistance program. The United States is also engaged in various activities, many in association with Russia. One
program is under way to assess physical security and fix problems in countries that receive U.S. enriched uranium,
another involves converting research reactors to the use of low-enriched uranium, and a third is intended to take
back U.S.-origin high-enriched uranium. Stratford also noted efforts by the Departments of Energy and Defense to
protect and secure material under the Cooperative Threat Reduction Act. 3. Methods to detect material if stolen and
prevent illicit trafficking -- Measures to find material after it is stolen include border controls, detection devices, the
DOE's second-line defense program, and customs efforts to inspect cargo containers for nuclear materials and other
weapons of mass destruction -- related items. 4. International cooperation -- All the above measures need
international cooperation, said Stratford. He also discussed efforts to upgrade the Convention on Physical
Protection of Nuclear Material. As it stands, the convention requires parties to apply physical protection to nuclear
materials in international transport: It does not require parties to protect material at home within national borders for
domestic use. It is a glaring omission, he said, but the United States could not get these provisions 20 years ago. In
1998, the U.S. initiated another effort to plug that loophole. "We are almost there," said Stratford, but there remains
some diplomatic work to resolve certain issues.
311
A2: Proliferation
New nuclear power development is necessary to sustain US-Russian cooperation on
nonproliferation initiatives and spills over to fuel purchasing with other countries
Nigel Hunt, correspondent for Reuters, 3-15-2004
http://www.contumacy.org/bbs/index-archive.pl?noframes;read=27532
Uranium extracted from Russian nuclear warheads helps supply about 10 percent of U.S. electricity, according to
USEC, which has charge of the "Megatons to Megawatts" project that has helped Russia reap profits from previously
loss-making nuclear disarmament. The Bethesda, Maryland-based company purchases uranium taken from dismantled
Russian nuclear warheads under a 1993 U.S.-Russian nonproliferation agreement. The treaty was designed to lower the
risk of the Russian uranium falling into the wrong hands and posing a security risk. The highly enriched mineral from
the warheads is diluted in Russia prior to shipment to the United States. USEC then sells the uranium to operators of
nuclear plants that supply about 20 percent of electricity in the United States. The company is the world's leading
supplier of uranium to nuclear power plants. The U.S. government created USEC in the early 1990s as part of its
restructuring of its uranium enrichment operation. Privatisation was completed in 1998. USEC sells the grade of
uranium used in power plants, known as low enriched uranium, in both the United States and overseas. Sales of its
Russian material are limited to the United States. Chief Executive William Timbers said about half of the uranium used
by U.S. nuclear plants currently comes from Russian warheads. The programme is scheduled to run for 20 years.
During the first decade, about 8,000 nuclear warheads were dismantled with the uranium extracted and used in U.S.
power plants. PROFITABLE DISARMAMENT "It has transformed the prior loss-making process of nuclear
disarmament into an economically effective one," Valeriy Govorukhin, Russia's deputy minister of atomic energy, said
in an interview earlier this year. "For Russia, this contract has not only contributed to an increase in international
security, but has also been an important source for economic growth," he added. USEC had 2003 revenue of $1.46
billion (810 million pounds). It reported a modest profit of $10.7 million last year, compared with a 2002 loss of $3.3
million, and its stock has been climbing during the last 12 months. The company's shares were trading around $8.10 on
the New York Stock Exchange on Friday, near the upper end of its 52-week range of $5.20 to $9. Timbers said
additional Russian uranium would probably be available when the programme is due to end, raising the possibility it
could be extended. Such a move would depend on the U.S. and Russian governments because the programme was
signed at a presidential level. With power plants' demand for this uranium roughly equal to the supply, the United
States would have to return to a method of electricity generation that has been out of favour for more than 20 years
to justify expanding the U.S.-Russian programme or developing similar ones. "If there are to be more similar
programmes with other countries, there needs to be an expansion of demand (for uranium)," Timbers said. "We need
additional nuclear power plants."
312
A2: Proliferation
Expanding on this framework of fuel purchasing to include other countries uniquely strengthens
the global nonproliferation regime it overcomes status quo strains like North Korea and Iran
Alexander Vershbow, U.S. Ambassador to Russia , 4-30-2004
http://www.cdi.org/russia/304-15.cfm
To be sure, the path has not always been smooth, as the inevitable complications of implementation have slowed progress in some areas. But these are resolvable issues, which should not deter us from
Regarding the pace of implementation and the flow of funds for Global Partnership projects, nothing breeds
success like success; as we clear away obstacles, our pace will quicken. And we must remember: it is concrete results that matter. Spending money fast
our broader goal.
is easy if you don't particularly care whether it is properly spent. But the money is there, pledges are increasing, and our diligence will ensure that we employ our resources wisely to achieve our ends.
Since other sessions of the conference will delve into the details of specific projects, I'd like to step back a bit to consider our achievement and our challenges from a broader perspective. It is in
stepping back that we are reminded of how far we have come and, more importantly, of what remains to be done. We should be encouraged that the Global Partnership, given birth by the G-8, has
been adopted by Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Switzerland, and Sweden, which already have committed over $200 million. Moreover, more nations have expressed an interest in joining
This reflects a growing international consensus, supported by resources and

institutional arrangements, that will prove critical in maintaining the momentum of our non-proliferation efforts. I have great
the cause, making our partnership even more truly global.
confidence that we will meet or exceed the $20-billion-over-ten-years pledge we made at Kananaskis, and that our efforts will go far toward securing or destroying materials of concern. Nonetheless,
even assuming our Global Partnership projects hit all of their targets, we must not grow complacent. I believe we should keep in mind Winston Churchill's dictum, "It is no use saying, 'We are doing
And the fullest measure of our success is not dollars spent, or chemical weapons
neutralized, or nuclear submarines dismantled, but whether we are effectively preventing the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction. Ultimately, we must judge our efforts by that criterion. And where we are at risk of falling short, we must, as Churchill said, do no less than what is necessary, for the
our best.' You have got to succeed in doing what is necessary."
stakes are that high. While we have worked closely with Russia to address the risks of bio-terrorism, we must do more. As the recent SARS epidemic and other outbreaks have demonstrated, exotic
diseases can wreak immense havoc even without any guiding hand. If terrorists were able to harness infectious pathogens, the impact of the attack could be felt around the world on the life and wellbeing of our citizens, on trade and travel, on national and international security. In recognition of this threat, my government has proposed a plan of action to other G-8 members. As a starting point,
we believe that we need to cooperate in enhanced surveillance of infectious diseases. We need a clearinghouse of emergency health response assets so we can quickly identify the tools available to us
in the case of a bioterror attack. We need to strengthen the protection of the food supply chain. And Russia, with its vast reservoir of scientific talent, has the potential to be an important partner in this
In the nuclear sphere, we have seen great progress here in Russia. Just last month, I visited the closed city of
Novouralsk, where I was greatly impressed by U.S.-Russian cooperation not only in safeguarding nuclear materials, but
also in downblending highly enriched uranium (HEU) for sale to the United States for use in civilian reactors. The HEU
effort.
recovered from demobilized Russian warheads will generate enough electricity to meet all the needs of the United States for three years. This remarkable program is fittingly called "Megatons to
Megawatts." Despite this stirring success story and progress on other critical programs here in Russia, events elsewhere have all-too-clearly demonstrated that the non-proliferation regime is under
strain. While we've been moving ahead here, albeit slowly, with plans to halt the production of weapons-grade plutonium, the North Koreans have declared they are reprocessing spent fuel rods, using
many technologies acquired or developed while the country was still a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and explicitly prohibited from such actions. While our governments have expended
over $150 million since 1999 here in Russia through the International Science and Technology Center to ensure there is no leakage of WMD technology or expertise to rogue nations, Iran has been
weapons program.
cynically manipulating the NPT to continue its 18-year clandestine effort to develop its own nuclear
Despite pressure from the United States, the European Union,
Russia and other members of the IAEA Board of Governors, continued Iranian deception clearly demonstrates that Iran has not changed its ways, and there is no evidence it has decided to abandon its
weapons program. Iran's failure to include information about advanced centrifuges in the so-called "complete centrifuge R&D chronology" that was part of its purportedly "full" disclosure in October,
and its incomprehensible suspension of inspections in response to the IAEA Board of Governors' call for greater cooperation, are but two of the latest examples of continued Iranian deceit. While we
have worked closely with Russia to develop material protection and control systems to guard against smuggling, we've uncovered a frighteningly sophisticated international smuggling network
coordinated by Pakistan's A. Q. Khan. Now that the demand of rogue states for weapons technologies has given rise to such supply networks, unless we eradicate them, it may be only a matter of time
before they seek out new pockets of demand, offering their services directly to terrorist organizations. So let us take pride in what we have done and will do under the Global Partnership, but let us also
On February 11, President Bush spoke before our National Defense

University outlining proposals for bolstering our non-proliferation regime. I would like to touch upon those ideas today.
First of all, as President Bush said, we need to expand the reach of the Global Partnership. From the outset, our
commitment was to begin in Russia, but to expand to include key states of the former Soviet Union. We believe that the
time has come to do that, and that Ukraine is a natural choice as the next recipient nation. Russia will remain our
priority, and widening the circle of recipient countries will not diminish or dilute Global Partnership efforts underway in
Russia. Yet we believe that a global problem requires an appropriately global approach.
take stock of what we must do differently to meet the evolving threat.
313
A2: Proliferation
Nuclear power is expanding to developing countries in the status quo robust domestic use of
nuclear power in the U.S. is critical to secure nonproliferation compliance
Dan E. Eastman et al., Director of the Argonne National Laboratory, 12-4- 97
http://www.osti.gov/bridge/servlets/purl/353334-RatEnj/webviewable/
Today nuclear power: Supplies more than 20% of the nations electricity. Reduces total U.S. carbon emissions
by 147 million tonnes (MtC) per year, roughly 10% of total U.S. carbon emissions. Is a domestically independent
and reliable energy source contributing directly to enhanced energy security. Is expected to be one of the
preferred choices for new electrical generating capacity by many developing nations, particularly in Asia. The
United States and the worlds energy markets are changing. Environmental concerns, such as growing carbon
emissions, economic growth of developing countries, and changing demographics, threaten the U.S. energy status
quo. Globally, even though the rates of population growth are uncertain, the increase in future electrical energy
demand is certain, and keen competition for energy resources is anticipated. There is a clear need to ensure
environmentally and economically acceptable energy options in the coming decades. Thus, vital U.S. national
interests, including securing the nations economic well-being and protecting environmental quality, require a blend
of energy sources that emit less carbon dioxide and other pollutants than are found in todays energy mix. This study
finds that there are unique challenges associated with nuclear energy and the U.S. role in future nuclear energy
activities. These challenges are Continuing global influence on international policy in such significant areas as
nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear safety, and nuclear materials management. Maintaining technical competencies
to ensure long-term expertise, capabilities, and vital infrastructures as well as leading-edge R&D in nuclear safety,
nuclear materials management, fuels, and advanced proliferation-resistant technologies. Ensuring a viable nuclear
energy option as an effective, economic alternative to address environmental and energy security issues. The
common denominator in each of these challenges is the need and role for a strong and comprehensive nuclear
energy R&D effort by the federal government. At present the U.S. government is at a crossroads regarding decisions
it must make with respect to the future U.S. role involving domestic and global nuclear power because of the
successful completion of the Advanced Light Water Reactor Program in fiscal year 1997 and the lack of
Congressional support for civilian nuclear energy R&D in fiscal year 1998. Ultimately, the decisions of the U.S.
government will have a direct impact on whether these challenges are met.
Peaceful development of nuclear power strengthens nonproliferation credibility

Dan E. Eastman et al., Director of the Argonne National Laboratory, 12-4- 97
http://www.osti.gov/bridge/servlets/purl/353334-RatEnj/webviewable/
The major modifications to DOEs responsibilities for nuclear power reflect the concerns of the times. The AEA
stressed the importance of developing safe atomic energy for peaceful uses and the need for international
cooperation. The
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968 and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 emphasized the growing concerns surrounding the threat of nuclear proliferation and the need for fissile materials safeguards. Concerns of proliferation and the increased needs for effective
safeguards and security were again emphasized in the recent Presidential Decision Directive (PDD-13) of 1993. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) of 1982 focused on the importance of effectively dealing with nuclear waste and spent nuclear fuel and obligated the government to accept
responsibility for commercial spent fuel disposition. The Energy Policy Act (EPACT) of 1992 reaffirmed the importance of dealing with waste and spent fuel issues, focused on long-term development of nuclear power options, and recognized the growing maturity of the U.S. nuclear industry
a balanced domestic
energy portfolio. According to the plan, the Administrations nuclear energy policy is: To maintain the safe
operation of existing nuclear plants in the United States and abroad, and To preserve the option to construct the
next generation of nuclear energy plants. This commitment to nuclear power as a viable option for the United States
is reaffirmed in the 1997 DOE Strategic Plan: By resolving nuclear waste disposal issues and developing advanced
nuclear technology, DOE will remove some concerns and may open the door to renewed consideration of nuclear
energy as an additional option for addressing air quality and greenhouse gas emissions. The 1997 DOE Strategic
Plan also reaffirms DOE commitments to international nuclear cooperation and markets, to nonproliferation, and to
defense applications of nuclear power technologies.
in requiring non-federal matching funds for a broad class of demonstration and commercial applications projects. Nuclear energy is specifically mentioned in the National Energy Policy Plan of 1995 as one of the elements of
314
315
A2: Proliferation
International safeguards will prevent nuclear power from causing proliferation a robust U.S.
nuclear industry can only work to curb the spread of nuclear weapons
Timothy Walsh, Georgetown University Law and former legislative assistant, fall, 2003
[16 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev. , p. 160-1
Another potential drawback of nuclear energy relates to the possibility of the proliferation of fissile materials
through the development of nuclear technologies. Many countries have developed nuclear weapons programs by
first developing peaceful nuclear capabilities. Through the development of peaceful nuclear applications, countries
can vastly increase their knowledge of nuclear technology that could potentially be applied in weapons production.
nIn addition, the spent nuclear reactor fuels from the peaceful nuclear energy fission process could be used to
produce weapons-grade fissile material. These proliferation concerns regarding nuclear energy are not new to the
international community, and many measures already exist to contain and address these concerns. Under the
auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the international community has set up an oversight
system to keep track of nuclear materials. n108 Through its Safeguards System, IAEA has since the 1970's focused
on verifying that countries had not used any of their declared nuclear materials for non-peaceful purposes. n109
Since the discovery in the early 1990's that Iraq had used previously peaceful nuclear materials for non-peaceful
means despite IAEA's verification program there, the IAEA has worked even harder to strengthen its verification
programs. The strengthening measures included increased access to information; an increase in the number of
inspectors; and the use of advanced monitoring technology, such as unattended monitoring systems. Therefore, the
international community is continuously working to address the non-proliferation concerns of those opposed to an
expanded use of peaceful nuclear technologies. In addition, the U.S. nuclear power industry currently addresses
some proliferation concerns through the peaceful disposition of weapons grade materials. Highly enriched uranium
from dismantled U.S. and Russian nuclear warheads is being converted into low-enriched uranium for use in nuclear
power plants. This "Megatons to Megawatts" bilateral agreement between the U.S. and Russian governments
literally converts nuclear warheads into electricity. Over 6,000 warheads have been eliminated already, and
approximately 20,000 warheads are expected to be converted by the time the program concludes in 2013. This is
enough fuel to meet all of the United States' electricity needs for two years. Today's nuclear power industry is
helping to solve the proliferation problem, not aggravating it.
316
A2: Proliferation
Only Generation IV technologies are capable of global expansion they dont risk proliferation
or theft AND nuclear fuel cant be used for weapons anyway
"Based on the feedback from stakeholders, including the most knowledgeable members of the French parliament,
CEA can assert that implementing partitioning and transmutation of actinides -- reducing the toxic lifetime of
ultimate high-level waste from tens of thousands to hundreds of years -- would certainly change political and public
attitudes toward the feasibility and acceptability of HLW [high-level waste] disposal," Bouchard said. "Public
acceptance is a prerequisite for nuclear energy development," he added. Despite the overall unsuitability for use
in nuclear weapons of plutonium from light-water reactors, the plutonium should nonetheless be burned as soon as
possible after its extraction from spent fuel, Bouchard said, as France has been doing. "We consider that from the
nonproliferation point of view, it is better to burn plutonium than to keep it in store," he said. Proliferation-resistance
for the so-called Generation IV technologies, which are in the infancy of design, will be critical to maintaining the
attractiveness of nuclear power. It comes down to simply designing systems that are as intrinsically unattractive as
possible, from a proliferator's perspective, Bouchard said. "Some characteristics [of Generation IV systems] are
certainly interesting regarding nonproliferation, such as high fuel burnup, the full actinides recycling process,"
Bouchard said. "These integrated systems -- with compact recycling technologies, remote handling, with
minimization of transports -- should obviously facilitate the implementation of external detection techniques and
controls, strengthen physical protection, and restrict the accessibility to the nuclear materials. The capacity for
safeguarding the systems should thus be taken into consideration." Such systems will continue to be in line with the
principles of President Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace speech, which called for an international agency to conduct
verifications to be sure no country is diverting knowledge or nuclear materials for the wrong use.
Expansion of nuclear power mandates strengthening of the nonproliferation regime

John Deutch, professor of chemistry at MIT, and Stephen Ansolabehere et al, professor of political science
at MIT, 6-29-2003 http://web.mit.edu/nuclearpower/
We conclude that the current non-proliferation regime must be strengthened by both technical and institutional
measures with particular attention to the connection between fuel cycle technology and safeguardability. Indeed,
if the nonproliferation regime is not strengthened, the option of significant global expansion of nuclear power
may be impossible, as various governments react to real or potential threat of nuclear weapons proliferation
facilitated by fuel cycle development. The U.S. in particular should recommit itself to strengthening the IAEA
and the NPT regime. The specific technical and institutional measures called for will depend upon the fuel cycle
technologies that account for growth in the global growth scenario. We have considered several representative
fuel cycles: light water reactors and more advanced thermal reactors and associated fuel forms, operated in an
open, once-through fuel cycle; closed cycle with Pu recycling in the PUREX/MOX fuel cycle; and closed fuel
cycles based on fast reactors and actinide burning. The priority concern is accounting and control of weaponusable material during normal operation and detection/prevention of process modification or diversion to
produce or acquire such material
317
GHT-MR Solves the Prolif Link
Development of GT-MHR reactors boosts U.S. nonproliferation leadership

Harry Bradley et al. Director of the American Nuclear Society, 3-13- 2000
http://www.ans.org/pi/media/releases/sd/954309600-resolution.html
In a speech1 at the June 1999 Annual Meeting of the American Nuclear Society, William Magwood, Director of
Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology at the Department of Energy, coined the term "Generation IV" nuclear
energy plants. These were defined as plants that were smaller, modular, cost-competitive, proliferation-resistant,
and with improved safety levels over current nuclear plants. Since that time, the Department of Energy has followed
up this initiative on an international level to engage international cooperation for its development. As a result of the
Nuclear Energy Research Initiative (NERI), a relatively low-funded but high-interest program of the Department of
Energy, numerous proposals for such plants have been developed. While the Department of Energy is proceeding
down the path of developing a Generation IV plant, the present schedules appear to be far too distant (15 years or
more), and the role of the Department of Energy is unclear in terms of supporting development, demonstration, and
deployment. The President's Committee of Advisors on Science and Technology, in its second report on research,
demonstration, development, and deployment of energy technologies,2 recommended a U.S. role not only in R&D,
but also in development and deployment of energy technologies. While nuclear energy did not have a demonstration
and deployment initiative due to concerns about non-proliferation, Generation IV plants address this concern, and
thus an important government role is also legitimate for nuclear energy demonstration and deployment. The early
timing of this initiative is particularly important for two reasons: U.S. leadership in nuclear energy technology. At
the present time, new nuclear development is taking place outside the United States. The ability of the United States
to affect future technologies is becoming less likely since the U.S. has no new nuclear technology initiative under
way that would set the new Generation IV standard. This loss of leadership can become, if it has not already
become, an impediment to U.S. foreign policy, particularly as it affects non-proliferation policy. U.S. university
infrastructure. At the present time, universities in the United States are having considerable difficulty recruiting
qualified U.S. nuclear engineering students. This is largely due to the perception that there is no future for nuclear
energy since no new nuclear plants are being built, and the future does not appear to be one in which a career in the
nuclear field is viewed as an exciting or challenging one. The outcome of this perception is that some universities
have shut down their research and training reactors, some have discontinued their nuclear engineering programs, and
others have merged their nuclear engineering programs into other departments. Since the United States is likely to
depend on nuclear energy through the use of existing plants for at least 25 years, there is a real question as to the
source of new people to support these plants. Also, if a new generation of nuclear plants is to be developed, who
will do the development work? Both of these problems call for action now to set in motion the development, design,
and construction of a Generation IV Reactor Research Facility to restore U.S. leadership in nuclear energy.
318
AT: U.S. Lacks Nuclear Infrastructure to Advance Nuclear Power

National labs sustaining science & technology infrastructure needed for nuclear development
While all of the programs I`ve highlighted for you individually and collectively do much to advance
the state of the art in nuclear science and technology, and enable the continued global expansion of
nuclear power, there is a great area of challenge confronting nuclear energy`s future. As with most
other technologically intensive U.S. industries - it has to do with human capital and sustaining critical
science and technology infrastructure. My laboratory, its fellow labs and the commercial nuclear power
sector all face a troubling reality - a significant portion of our work force is nearing retirement age and
the pipeline of qualified potential replacements is not sufficiently full. Since I`m well aware of this
committee`s interests in science education, I`d like to update you on what the Department and its labs
are doing to inspire our next generation of nuclear scientists, engineers and technicians.
Fundamentally, the Office of Nuclear Energy has made the decision to invite direct university
partnership in the shared execution of all its R&D programs and will set aside a significant amount of
its funds for that purpose. Already, nuclear science and engineering programs at U.S. universities are
involved in the Office of Nuclear Energy`s R&D, but this move will enable and encourage even greater
participation in DOE`s nuclear R&D programs. In addition, all NE-supported labs annually bring
hundreds of our nation`s best and brightest undergraduate and graduate students on as interns or
through other mechanisms to conduct real research. For example, at INL we offer internships,
fellowships, joint faculty appointments and summer workshops that focus on specific research topics
or issues that pertain to maintaining a qualified workforce. This year, we are offering a fuels and
materials workshop for researchers and a 10-week training course for engineers interested in the field
of reactor operations. Last year, DOE designated INL`s Advanced Test Reactor as a national scientific
user facility, enabling us to open the facility to greater use by universities and industry and to
supporting more educational opportunities. ATR is a unique test reactor that offers the ability to test
fuels and materials in nine different prototypic environments operated simultaneously. With this
initiative, we join other national labs such as Argonne National Laboratory and Oak Ridge National
Laboratory in offering nuclear science and engineering assets to universities, industry and the broader
nuclear energy research community. Finally, national laboratories face their own set of challenges in
sustaining nuclear science and technology infrastructure - the test reactors, hot cells, accelerators,
laboratories and other research facilities that were developed largely in support of prior missions. To
obtain a more complete understanding of the status of these assets, the Office of Nuclear Energy
commissioned a review by Battelle to examine the nuclear science and technology infrastructure at the
national laboratories and report back later this year on findings and recommendations on a strategy for
future resource allocation that will enable a balanced, yet sufficient approach to future investment in
infrastructure.
319
AT: Reprocessing Bad

U.S. is already committed to reprocessing
Robert Fri, Resources for the Future, April 23, 2008, p. online
Since 2002, the United States has been conducting a program for reprocessing spent fuel under the Advanced
Fuel Cycle Initiative (AFCI). Then, in February 2006, it announced a change in its nuclear energy programs.
Recycling would be developed under a new effort, GNEP, which would incorporate AFCI as one of its activities.
If the recycling R&D program is successful and leads to deployment, GNEP would eventually require the
United States to be an active participant in the community of nations that recycle fuel, because one aspect of the
partnership is that some nations recycle nuclear fuel for other user nations.
U.S. already backing the global spread of nuclear power
What makes abuse of the global arming rationale more likely is that the Bush administration itself has used it to
justify dangerous nuclear decisions. In the summer of 2005, President Bush reversed decades of precedent and
announced that the United States would aid India's civilian nuclear power program, even though doing so
violates international norms, requires changes to U.S. law, and frees indigenous uranium for use in India's
nuclear weapons program-- a development that will likely encourage Pakistan to augment its own arsenal.
Despite this, and despite the fact that the planned expansion of India's nuclear sector will do little to offset its
burgeoning coal industry, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice maintained that "providing India with an
environmentally friendly energy source like nuclear energy is an important goal." Worse, in 2006, the
administration announced the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership, or GNEP, whose goal is to encourage the
spread of nuclear power. GNEP is supposed to prevent nuclear proliferation by limiting the number of states that
supply nuclear fuel, but it does so by promoting the conversion of spent reactor fuel into plutonium--a process
that the United States has banned (and encouraged others to ban) since the Ford administration because it
increases stockpiles of bomb-ready material.
2009 budget has $301 million for reprocessing
In 1974, India made its first nuclear bomb with plutonium skimmed off reprocessed nuclear waste. For that
reason, President Gerald Ford placed a temporary hold on the technology in 1976, a hold President Carter turned
into a ban. Nevertheless, the 2009 federal budget request includes $301.5 million for research into reprocessing
technologies.
320
AT: Reprocessing Bad

U.S. DOE works with Korea on reprocessing now
Since GNEP was proposed in 2006, several countries that do not enrich uranium or reprocess -- including South Africa,
Argentina, South Korea and Canada -- have expressed interest in acquiring the technologies needed to do so to be
considered supplier states, she said. In the case of South Korea, the U.S. Energy Department is collaborating with South
Korea on research and development on reprocessing, she said.
321
Nuclear Cost-Competitive
Nuclear is cost-competitive once cap & trade is in effect
In all the hysteria about global warming, environmentalists have, for the most part, agreed on one thing above allthat the
use of fossil fuels must be made more expensive. Every proposal currently under consideration for the reduction of
greenhouse-gas emissions seeks to raise prices as a brake on emissions, through either a cap-and- trade system or a carbon
tax. Once this expense is included in the calculations, nuclear power becomes extremely competitive, and remains
considerably cheaper than wind power. The Congressional Budget Office found that nuclear power is the most attractive
source of electricity once the price of carbon emissions reaches $45 a ton.
Nuclear substantially cheaper than wind

If natural-gas prices increase as rapidly as they have done recently, then that figure will come down even further. The
British-government review found that nuclear provides economic benefit regardless of the carbon price. Moreover, it
provides carbon reductions much more cheaply than wind power does. Using nuclear power, it costs 60 cents to eliminate a
ton of CO2 emissions, as opposed to a staggering $100 per ton for onshore wind power.
322
Nuclear Solves Climate Better Than Renewables

Nuclear plants produce less carbon than solar
Nuclear plants are a big source of carbon dioxide emissions if one considers the plant's entire life-cycle (from uranium
mining through nuclear plant operation). Reality: During operation, nuclear plants emit essentially no carbon dioxide.
Further, during the entire life-cycle of nuclear plants, on a per kilowatt-hour basis the carbon dioxide emissions are roughly
comparable to hydro, geothermal and wind plants. They produce less than half the life-cycle carbon emissions of solar
photovoltaic plants, 61 times less than coal-fired power plants, and 36 times less than power plants that burn natural gas.
Reprocessing Leads to Terrorism

Reprocessing will produce materials terrorists could use
E&E News, December 11, 2007,
The Bush administration's nuclear fuel reprocessing effort would "almost certainly" heighten risks of a terrorist
acquiring radioactive material and should be stopped, according to a report released today by an advocacy
group. The Union of Concerned Scientists report urges the United States to turn all reprocessing and uranium
enrichment facilities to the International Atomic Energy Agency. At issue is the Global Nuclear Energy
Partnership that the administration launched two years ago with a goal of developing reprocessing technology
and decreasing the risks of nuclear proliferation. But the report says recycling fuel to reduce the amount of "hot"
material would also create more radioactive waste during production. Reprocessing would also produce more
material, mainly plutonium, that terrorists could use, it says.
Nuclear power expansion increases the risks that terrorists could access materials
The other major problem of limiting the spread of fuel-making technologies runs into the dilemma of dividing
the world into good guys and bad guys. In this view, there are two classes of countries: those that can be
trusted with these technologies and those that cannot. One problem with this view is that todays good guy can
become tomorrows bad guy and vice versa. Another problem is that even some of the good guys or trusted
countries cannot account for all of their nuclear materials. As noted earlier, Japan and the United Kingdom, for
example, cannot account for several bombs worth of plutonium. This type of problem could grow worse in a
world in which fuel making increases two to six times faster than present demands. While the security in most
trusted countries is arguably better than in potentially unstable countries, greater fuel-making activities in any
country could raise the risk of an insider threat, leading to possible diversion of nuclear materials to terrorists
323
Reprocessing Leads to Proliferation

Reprocessing increases the risks of plutonium diversion
A nuclear renaissance that embraces reprocessing as necessary to reduce spent fuel accumulation could result in
more plutonium in transit, providing more potential targets for diversion. A renaissance that includes widespread
installation of fast reactors would similarly increase targets for diversion. Further down the road, will the next
generation of reactors be more or less proliferation resistant than existing reactors? As of December 2002, the
Generation IV Forum had not yet adopted a standard methodology for evaluating proliferation resistance and
physical protection for the six systems under consideration.
Plutonium reprocessing produces material that can be used to make bombs
Plutonium reprocessing is a technique that extracts plutonium from spent nuclear fuel to create new fuel for
reactors. Reactor-grade plutonium can also power nuclear bombs. Currently, Britain, France, India, Japan, and
Russia are operating plutonium reprocessing facilities. These facilities have separated out from spent nuclear
fuel about 17 250 metric tons of plutonium, enough material to make thousands of nuclear bombs. (Spent
nuclear fuel provides a highly radioactive, and thus lethal, barrier against theft of plutonium. Separated
plutonium does not have that protective barrier.) This amount of civilian plutonium is comparable to the amount
of military plutonium and is increasing. The rate of reprocessing plutonium exceeds the rate of consumption as
reactor fuel and is projected to continue to do so at the rate of about five metric tons per year over the next four
years. Thus, by the end of 2010, the stockpile of civilian plutonium could increase to more than 270 metric tons,
enough material to make thousands of nuclear weapons.
324
Reprocessing Leads to Proliferation

Reprocessing material easily used for bombs
The nuclear material currently unaccounted for at plutonium reprocessing facilities could make many bombs.
For example, Japan cannot account for more than two hundred kilograms of plutonium at the Tokai-mura plant.
In Britain, the Sellafield plant cannot account for about thirty kilograms of plutonium. According to the IAEA,
only eight kilograms of plutonium are needed to make a bomb. But even less than that was used in the Nagasaki
bomb, which employed six kilograms. More advanced designs could use as little as one to three kilograms.
Reprocessing increases proliferation risks
Reprocessing poses its own set of political and moral risks. Plutonium is much more highly radioactive and
poisonous than uranium. n76 Plutonium is also the ideal fuel for atomic bomb construction; just a few pounds of it
in the wrong hands would allow the construction of a crude atomic weapon. n77 This weapons proliferation risk
led President Jimmy Carter to ban the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel into plutonium in 1977.
India and Pakistan went nuclear with reprocessing plants
But India used a reprocessing reactor to make an atomic bomb in 1974, and it was followed in the nuclear race
by neighboring Pakistan. More recently, North Korea built a reprocessing plant that it said was for civilian
nuclear power, then created what it claims are nuclear weapons. Similar technologies might be sought by Iran
and other countries.
325
Solvency Various Incentives

Examples of incentives that should be offered
Financing a new nuclear plant using the unregulated merchant generating

company model poses potentially greater challenges than for the regulated
utility model. A secured loan or Federal loan guarantee and Federal Power
Purchase Agreement (PPA) may have moderate to high value under this
approach, depending upon the size and asset composition of the company and
the availability of parent company support. Financing a new nuclear plant using
a non-recourse project finance structure poses the greatest challenge in
obtaining debt financing, but offers significant benefits to the project sponsor in
lowering financing costs, credit rating risk, and earnings-per-share dilution. A
secured loan or Federal loan guarantee will be required to obtain the debt
financing under this structure, and an 80 percent loan guarantee will provide
substantial benefits in the form of lower capital costs. As a means to provide the
most efficient financing, the Secretary of Energy should encourage a consortium
approach for developing the initial new nuclear plants, in combination with a
package of financial incentives that can be adjusted based on the circumstances.
The government should provide financial incentives to overcome the
uncertainties and economic hurdles that would otherwise prevent the first few
new nuclear plants from being built with legislative support and funding for the
following programs: A cost-sharing program for the First-of-a-Kind Engineering
(FOAKE) costs inherent in building the first facility of a new design, whereby
costs would be shared by the design vendor and the Federal government on a
50/50 basis, up to a maximum of $200 million (2004 dollars) of Federal
contribution for each of three major competing design types, with the Secretary
of Energy being given discretion to select the types to be supported. Each of the
subsequent 50 units using these designs would repay the government $12
million (2004 dollars). A basket of support programs for up to four each of the
supported designs, to provide efficient financial options for new construction in
different circumstances (regulated utilities, unregulated merchant generating
companies, and project-financed plants). This package of incentives would
consist of secured loans and Federal loan guarantees; accelerated depreciation;
investment tax credits, production tax credits, or both; and power purchase
agreements (PPAs). The power company would elect a package of support not to
exceed $250 million (2004 dollars) in cost to the government for each reactor.6
The total cost to the government would be spread over a period, likely of at least
10 years, when these first units would be built.
326
Solvency Cap & Trade

Subsidies trigger a backlash, cap & trade best to expand nuclear power
Eileen Clausen, president, Resources for the Future, 2007 (November 12, Reality Before the
Renaissance: Making Nuclear Power Part of the Climate Solution,
http://www.pewclimate.org/speeches/11.12.07/ec_ans)
The only caution I will offer is this: you need to focus on the big picture in this debate. And that is the
competitive advantage this industry gains from a comprehensive climate policy that once and for all
puts a price on carbon. More nuclear subsidies are not the answer; they are short term, ephemeral, and
they may well scuttle the chances for this bill (and others) by emboldening (or simply ticking off)
your opponents. Right now, the best subsidy for nuclear power is a comprehensive climate
policy. Because the sooner we have a cap-and-trade program in place, the sooner we will be able
to determine in a reasoned way which energy options make the most sense, both for the economy
and for the environment. And the sooner this industry can get past the cost issue and have a real
discussion about the potential of expanded nuclear power as a solution to our energy and
environmental needs.
327
Solvency Various Incentives

The government should provide financial incentives, including demonstration projects, to boost nuclear
power in the U.S.
Because the licensing process needs to develop further and evolve with new designs, and because it is in the
national interest to ensure our energy security and reap the environmental benefit arising from the absence of
carbon emissions by nuclear power generation, the NETF believes there should be government-supported
demonstration programs and financial incentives to overcome the uncertainties and economic hurdles that would
otherwise prevent the first few new plants from being built. The NETF thus recommends legislative support and
funding for the following programs: Early Site Permit and combined Construction and Operating License
demonstration programs jointly funded by the Department and industry. A cost-sharing program for the Firstof-a-Kind Engineering (FOAKE) costs inherent in building the first facility of a new design. FOAKE costs
would be shared by the design vendor and the Federal government on a 50/50 basis, up to a maximum of $200
million (2004 dollars) of Federal contribution for each of three major competing design types, with the Secretary
of Energy being given discretion to select the types to be supported. Each of the subsequent 50 units using these
designs would repay the government $12 million (2004 dollars). A basket of support programs for the first
few reactors (up to four) of each new supported design to provide efficient financial options for new
construction in different circumstances (regulated utilities, unregulated merchant generating companies, and
project-financed plants). This package of incentives would consist of secured loans or Federal loan guarantees;
accelerated depreciation; investment tax credits, production tax credits, or both; and power purchase agreements.
The generating company would elect a package of support not to exceed $250 million (2004 dollars) for each
reactor in cost to the government. The total cost to the government would be spread over a period, probably at
least 10 years, when these first units would be built.
328
Solvency Pro Nuclear Regulatory Environment

The federal government needs to establish a pro-nuclear regulatory infrastructure to support nuclear
power
The public sector must help create the conditions that will spur investment in Americas energy
infrastructure, including new nuclear power plants. The passage of comprehensive energy legislation
that addresses the business and regulatory risks of building new plants is an important step. The federal
government also must continue to support efforts that encourage the industry to continue pursuing new
plants, such as Nuclear Power 2010. Finally, Congress must enact policies that recognize nuclear
energys contributions to meeting our growing energy demands, ensuring our nations energy security
and protecting our environment.
329
Solvency Incentives to Expand

The following incentives should be expanded
Nuclear power would be a competitive technology for a few new power plants, however,
if those plants received the maximum benefits that could be provided under EPAct. Most
of the reductions in the cost for those plants would come from the production tax credit
and loan guarantees. Other incentivessuch as preferential tax treatment for
decommissioning funds and limited liability protectionwould have a relatively small
effect on the cost of nuclear capacity. 13 Incentives covering first-of-akind (FOAK) costs
could be crucial for attracting financing for the first nuclear plants of each advanced
reactor design, although those incentives might not directly affect the cost of subsequent
plants. The investment tax credit and loan guarantees for innovative coal plants with CCS
and loan guarantees for innovative natural gas power plants with CCS reduce the
utilities costs for those technologies but not by enough to make them less expensive
than nuclear power plants that qualify for EPAct incentives or conventional fossil-fuel
power plants.
330
Solvency Need to Boost Capital

Action must be taken to address capital costs to boost nuclear
The information provided to the NETF has confirmed that there is an interest in
the private sector in new plant construction, although some additional
government actions must take place before the first plants will be constructed.
In this connection, the electricity industry must clarify its needs and prioritize its
requests. In particular, the nuclear industry must also convey information to
Federal policy makers in clear, sharply defined terms with specific
recommendations for dealing with both the problems and the opportunities
presented. The industry must recognize that the Federal government should not
and cannot eliminate all the risks and vagaries of the energy markets for them.
The utilities must develop a reasonable consensus position and present those
needs clearly to the Administration and Congress for action. In this connection,
we believe the most critical needs include some assistance to offset the higher
capital costs associated with the first few nuclear plants, and establishment of
regulatory and economic conditions that will make the first few projects viable
and attractive to potential investors in both the equity and the debt markets,
along with conditions that allow participants in those markets to finance the
plants.
Failure to access capital collapses nuclear development
The first major challenge is to create the conditions under which the first few projects
will be attractive to the investors providing the debt and equity capital needed to
finance construction of the initial plants. Discussions with the financial community
suggest that financing approaches must be found that will produce reasonable
assurance of equity returns in the 12 to 15 percent range and yield a cost of debt in the
7 to 8 percent range typical of investment-grade securities (assuming normalized longterm interest rates). The second challenge is to provide sufficient financial support to
offset the higher capital costs associated with the first few new nuclear plants (FOAKE
costs) to ensure that the electricity produced by these plants will be competitive with
other available baseload generating sources. And, the third major challenge is to create
the conditions under which the first few nuclear projects can achieve a balanced capital
structure, with appropriate amounts of debt and equity. (As discussed below, the
appropriate balance between debt and equity will vary depending upon the financing
model.) This balanced capital structure is essential to produce a project with an average
cost of capital approximately comparable to other baseload generating projects that
could be undertaken. Inability to access the debt capital markets for a substantial
331

portion of the financing would force a project sponsor to finance entirely with
shareholder equity, which would seriously impair the economic potential and
competitive position of a new nuclear power project.
332
Solvency Need to Boost Capital

Financial incentives necessary for new nuclear energy development
The NETF has received detailed briefings on the issues and challenges
associated with new nuclear power plant construction and financing from a
diverse array of interests, including nuclear reactor suppliers, nuclear
generating companies, large electricity consumers, the financial community, and
other interested stakeholders. The following conclusions and recommendations
have emerged from these briefings and the NETFs deliberations regarding
financing considerations: The need for financial incentives for the first in a series
of new nuclear power plants should be viewed as a short-term requirement
limited both in time and in the number of plants that will need support. The
objective should be to provide a package of financial incentives sufficient to
ensure the availability of the required debt and equity financing, and to make
the initial new nuclear plants competitive on a levelized cost basis with other
available baseload generation alternatives, including clean coal technologies,
combined cycle gas-fired generation, and renewable energy resources. When the
first few plants have been built, when capital costs have been reduced to the
expected competitive levels, and when sufficient experience has been gained for
the industry and the financial community to conclude that the new NRC
licensing process is functioning as intended, then large-scale follow-on
development of new nuclear plants should occur without further direct
government financial incentives. The only encouragement necessary after
development and licensing of the initial series of plants would be continued
recognition that nuclear energy plays an essential role in U.S. energy policy. No
single incentive will stimulate construction of the first in a series of new nuclear
power plants in the United States. Financing and building a new nuclear plant is
a complex undertaking involving a number of discrete financing challenges and
companies in differing business circumstances, and the relative value of various
financing incentives is likely to vary depending upon the financing model. The
package of financial incentives available to the Secretary of Energy should be
sufficiently broad to permit debt and equity financing with a balanced capital
structure under all three potential financing models: regulated utility,
unregulated merchant generating company, and non-recourse project finance
structure. The Secretary of Energy should seek, and the Congress should
authorize, a package of financial incentives sufficient to make all three financing
approaches achievable. Financing a new nuclear plant under the regulated
utility model is achievable with the highest level of certainty and the least need
for secured loans or loan guarantees, but also poses potentially significant credit
and equity risk for the sponsor. (Further, this financing model is unlikely to be
available in the deregulated markets.) A package of incentives consisting of a
333
sharing mechanism for FOAKE costs, accelerated depreciation, an investment

tax credit, and/or a production tax credit appear to provide the greatest benefit
in achieving a workable financing plan for the regulated utility model. The NETF
recommends that the Secretary of Energy engage governors and state rate
regulators in discussions of possible regulatory approaches for advance approval
of recovery of construction costs for a new nuclear plant similar to those in place
in some states for new coal-fired generation to further facilitate the financing of
a new nuclear plant under this model. Financing a new nuclear plant using the
unregulated merchant generating company model poses potentially greater
challenges than is the case for the regulated utility model. A similar combination
of incentives, including the sharing of FOAKE costs, accelerated depreciation, an
investment tax credit, and/or a production tax credit, has high value in providing
the needed debt and equity financing under this model. In addition, a secured
loan or Federal loan guarantee and Federal PPA may have moderate to high
value under this approach as well, depending upon the size and asset
composition of the company and the availability of parent company support.
Financing a new nuclear plant using a non-recourse project finance structure
poses the greatest challenge in obtaining debt financing, but offers significant
benefits to the project sponsor in lowering financing costs, credit rating risk, and
earnings-per-share dilution. A secured loan or Federal loan guarantee will be
required to obtain the debt financing under this structure, and an 80 percent
loan guarantee will provide substantial benefits in the form of lower capital
costs. In addition to the secured loan or Federal loan guarantee, this financing
structure would also receive high value from the sharing mechanism for FOAKE
costs, and a production tax credit, and some, but lesser, value from accelerated
depreciation and the investment tax credit. A consortium approach for
developing the initial new nuclear plants, in combination with a package of
financial incentives, can help reduce the credit rating and equity risk to
individual sponsors, and should be encouraged by the Secretary of Energy as a
means to provide the most efficient financing mechanism at the lowest possible
cost to the Federal government.
Lack of capital blocks nuclear expansion now
Rocky Mountain News, June 7, 2008, http://www.rockymountainnews.com/news/2008/jun/07/nukeinterest-resurges-in-state/

And skeptics remain unconvinced of nuclear's future, citing the enormous expense - several billions of
dollars - needed to build a nuclear plant and the unresolved problem of where to put nuclear waste
when highly radioactive fuel rods are spent. "The private capital market isn't investing in new nuclear
plants, and without financing, capitalist utilities aren't buying," wrote Snowmass-based renewable
energy expert Amory Lovins and two others in a paper this spring called "Forget Nuclear," outlining
the industry's many challenges. "The few purchases, nearly all in Asia, are all made by central planners
with a draw on the public purse. In the United States, even government subsidies approaching or
exceeding new nuclear power's total cost have failed to entice Wall Street."
334
335
Solvency Loan Guarantees Current Guarantees Inadequate

Current loan guarantees only enough to build 4 reactors 2/$4 billion
Three features of the program diminish its value: first, the government backed debt cannot be stripped
from the total debt; second, the non-guaranteed fraction of debt is subordinated to the covered piece;
and finally, DOEs fiscal 2008 budget proposes $9 billion in total loan guarantees of which $4
billion would be allocated to nuclear plants and coal with carbon sequestration. A banker
contacted by the trade journal Nucleonics Week commented that the first two features devalue
the debt from a possible AAA rating to single B or double D.13 Four billion dollars in loan
guarantees also might cover one or two new units.
336
Solvency Loan Guarantees

Loan guarantees must be expanded to gain investor support for nuclear plant construction
In order to move forward today, we believe the construction risk of each project must be shared among several
constituencies, including project sponsors, investors, lenders, suppliers, construction contractors, the rate-payers
who would be served, and the federal government. In this regard, the Title 17 loan guarantee program is
essential to restarting the nuclear build cycle in the United States. We want to commend the DOE staff for their
work in launching this program, and adapting it to the complexities of the U.S. power industry. However, we
note that this program, too, is undersized in relation to the need and the opportunity. The current size of $18.5
billion in guarantee authority will be enough to support, possibly, 3 new projects. There are quite a few very
credible and capable nuclear operators, who are ready to pursue similar projects, but only if they qualify for a
Title 17 guarantee. LICENSING AND OVERSIGHT Investors and lenders see the NRC as a significant
contributor to the industry turnaround described above, especially to the notable improvements in the safety and
reliability of the existing fleet. As it relates to new-build, they also see the licensing process as a potential source
of timing uncertainty. It has been decades since the NRC has awarded a completely new license to construct and
operate a nuclear generating station. Investors are encouraged by the streamlined nature of the COL process.
However, this process has not yet been tested in the current new-build cycle, and markets are still wary of the
potential for intervention and prolonged delay. The best remedy for this concern will be an actual review
experience that is both timely and rigorous. As new licenses are granted, investors will pay close attention to the
length of time from start to finish, and to how this timeline improves from one applicant to the next. The
markets will expect the NRC to incorporate its own process improvements in order to meet current timing
expectations, and if possible to shorten this time period in subsequent applications, while maintaining the rigor
of its decisions, with safety as always being the highest priority.
Lenders wont support nuclear power now, loan guarantees critical
But that's misleading on a number of levels. One reason it's so expensive at this point is that no new plant has been started
in the U.S. since the last one to begin construction in 1977. Lenders -- uncertain how long any new plant would take
because of political and regulatory delays -- are wary of financing the first new ones. So financing costs are unusually high.
As we build more, the timing will be more predictable, and financing costs will no doubt come down as lenders become
more comfortable. Loan guarantees and other federal incentives are needed to get us over this hump. They are not
permanent subsidies for uneconomical ventures. Instead, they're limited to the first half dozen of plants as a way to reassure
investors that regulatory delays won't needlessly hold up construction. It's important to remember that although nuclear
energy has been around a while, it's hardly a "mature" industry, as some critics say. Because of the lack of new plants in so
many years, nuclear in many ways is more like an emerging technology, and so subsidies make sense to get it going. It's
also true that a shortage of parts and skills is raising the cost of new plants. But if we start building more plants, the number
of companies supplying parts will increase to meet the demand, lowering the price.
337

Loan guarantees key to solve
Congressional Research Service, 2007 (March, Nuclear Power: Outlook for New Reactors,
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33442.pdf)
Because it is generally believed that Wall Street continues to view new commercial reactors as
financially risky, the availability of federal loan guarantees could be a key element in attracting
funding for such projects and reducing financing costs. The federal government would bear most of the
risk, facing potentially large losses if borrowers defaulted on reactor projects that could not be
salvaged. Loan guarantees may be especially important for nuclear projects undertaken by deregulated
generating companies as opposed to traditionally regulated utilities, which can recover their regulatorapproved capital costs from ratepayers. Even for regulated utilities, loan guarantees are critically
important to new nuclear plant financing, the Nuclear Energy Institute contended in September 2006
testimony.
Reprocessing still creates radioactive waste
Removing uranium from spent nuclear fuel through reprocessing would eliminate most of the volume
of radioactive material requiring disposal in a deep geologic repository. In addition, the removal of
plutonium and conversion to shorterlived fission products would eliminate most of the long-term (post1,000 years) radioactivity in nuclear waste. But the waste resulting from reprocessing would have
nearly the same short-term radioactivity and heat as the original spent fuel, because the reprocessing
waste consists primarily of fission products, which generate most of the radioactivity and heat in spent
fuel. Because heat is the main limiting factor on repository capacity, conventional reprocessing would
not provide major disposal benefits in the near term. UREX+ does not reduce proliferation risks However,
critics see the potential nonproliferation benefits of UREX+ over PUREX as minimal. Richard Garwin
suggested in testimony to Congress in 2006 that Urex+ fuel fails the proliferation-resistance test. Since
it contains 90% plutonium, it could be far more attractive to divert than current spent fuel, which
contains 1% plutonium. In other words, a terrorist would only have to reprocess 11 kg of Urex+ fuel to
obtain roughly 10 kg of plutonium, in contrast to reprocessing 1,000 kg of highly radioactive spent fuel
to get the same amount from light water reactor fuel.
338

Investment in nuclear will occur once successful demonstration projects are launched
Equity investors also focus on both a return of and a return on capital, where the
pricing of the underlying equity is a function of the predictability of a companys
projected earnings and cash flows and the dividends paid to the investor. The
resulting share price, as evidenced by the forward price/earnings multiple,
measures the relative risk (versus other similarly situated companies) that
investors place on whether a particular company will meet its financial
projections and directly indicates how well management has executed its
strategic goals. This assessment ultimately dictates the tactical and strategic
options available to a company. Because investment in a nuclear power plant
would likely be viewed by equity investors as quite risky, the equity markets
would probably demand very high returns. These items, taken individually or
together, will likely be a deterrent to management and investors who are
contemplating undertaking a large nuclear construction project in the absence
of some form of initial governmental backstop during at least the construction
phase of the earliest new reactors. Although various structures are contemplated
that could reduce the risk to debt investors and equity investors (see below),
both types of investors are unlikely to be willing to assume risks associated with
new technology, potential delays in the regulatory and licensing process, or
delays in the construction process. It is these risks, combined with the decision
to authorize an equity issuance and face its dilutive effects (as well as the
resulting share price erosion), that may be one of the more important hurdles a
corporate board faces when deciding whether to proceed with the development
of a new nuclear facility. However, current experience demonstrates that
managements are willing to assume the risk associated with nuclear plants once
the plants are operational.2 We believe that both debt investors and equity
investors will similarly be prepared to assume the risks of new nuclear
construction once the first several projects have been successfully completed.
The challenge is to find appropriate means to enable the first several
construction projects to take place.
339

The federal government should provide First of a Kinde (FOAKE) design incentives for nuclear
One obstacle to expanding the nuclear power option in the United States is the
extra costs associated with the first units of a design family for engineering work
that will then be reused for building subsequent units. A vendor who can have
confidence that many more units of a particular reactor design will be ordered
and built could invest funds in FOAKE costs and spread those charges over
multiple future units. In the current environment, however, there is reasonable
uncertainty surrounding the actual number of future orders that would follow,
leading some vendors to plan to load all of the FOAKE costs on the first few units
ordered, driving the price for the first plants to an unacceptably noncompetitive
level. Estimates of the FOAKE costs range from $300 million to $500 million for
first units. As it does routinely for new technologies, the Federal government can
reduce the capital cost of the first few plants by sharing with industry some
portion of the first-of-a-kind design and engineering expense as part of a national
energy research and development portfolio. DOE has committed to this approach
under its Nuclear Power 2010 program (although the minimal funding provided
to date is substantially short of actual needs). The Department provides similar
research and development (R&D) support to commercialize clean coal
technologies. Given the current projections of electricity demand, it is estimated
that as many as 50 new nuclear plants would need to be constructed by 2030 if
nuclear power is to continue to provide 20 percent of our electricity supply. If
the Federal government were to assume the risk for half of the FOAKE costs,
subject to recovery from the next 50 units to be built, and the reactor vendors
would be responsible for an equal amount, the repayment to the government by
power companies using uneconomical. A cost-sharing mechanism for FOAKE
costs would have a high benefit for all three possible financing models for a new
nuclear plant. From a Congressional Budget Office (CBO) scoring perspective, a
subsidy of FOAKE costs could result in relatively high cost-scoring based upon
the high probability of Federal funding within a relatively short budget horizon.
But, the royalty payment mechanism that we propose for recovery of the initial
Federal government costs from the subsequent 50 units using the designs could
mitigate that impact. Therefore, the NETF concludes that a sharing mechanism
for FOAKE costs for the initial designs is likely to offer high value for all of the
financing models with possibly medium CBO scoring costs. The NETF
recommends that FOAKE costs be shared by the design vendor and the Federal
government on a 50/50 basis, up to a maximum of $200 million (2004 dollars) of
Federal contribution for each of three major competing design types, with the
Secretary of Energy being given discretion to select the types to be supported.
Each of the subsequent 50 units would repay the government $12 million.
340
341

The federal government should provide secured loans and loan guarantees
The relatively higher risks associated with nuclear power, manifested through
higher interest rates or the unavailability of debt capital under certain financing
approaches, as discussed previously, can be mitigated through Federal
government secured loans and loan guarantees. A secured loan or Federal loan
guarantee can help ensure the availability of debt financing at attractive costs by
providing lenders protection against the risk of the projects default due to
certain specified causes, such as regulatory and litigation risks. Of course, a
secured loan or Federal loan guarantee provides default protection only for the
debt component of the capital structure and not for the sponsors equity
investment. A secured loan or Federal loan guarantee could be sized to cover a
debt component of 50 percent, consistent with the capital structure for a
regulated utility or unregulated merchant generating company, or of 80 percent,
consistent with a non-recourse project finance capital structure. In addition, a
secured loan or Federal loan guarantee should result in a lower cost of debt
financing due to the effects of Federal credit support. A reasonable assumption
is that a secured loan or Federal loan guarantee would result in about a 0.5
percent to 1.0 percent spread savings in debt costs under the regulated utility
financing model and a somewhat larger spread savings under the other two
financing approaches. Such secured loans or Federal loan guarantees are
common and can be structured with reasonable underwriting criteria to
minimize the probability and amount of Federal payout. (A discussion of possible
underwriting criteria can be found in Appendix A.) A secured loan or Federal
loan guarantee appears to have relatively low value for regulated utility
financing, medium to high value for the unregulated merchant generating
company, and high value for non-recourse project financing. From a CBO-scoring
perspective, previous legislative proposals for secured loans or Federal loan
guarantees for new nuclear plants have received relatively high cost scores,
based upon the assumption that there is a high likelihood of default on the loans.
However, the NETF believes that underwriting criteria could reduce the
perceived default risk and should thereby achieve a low CBO cost score.
342

The U.S. government must deal with nuclear waste in order to support the expansion of nuclear power
The nations reactors have generated an inventory of highly radioactive spent

fuel from past operations, and this inventory will grow as operations continue in
the future. The U.S. government is obligated by Federal law to accept the spent
fuel from these operations and to dispose of it using funds that are now being
collected from ratepayers. But the government has not yet fulfilled its obligation
to accept spent fuel and has not established a licensed repository. As a result,
spent fuel is accumulating at reactor sites, where it is stored in spent fuel pools
or in licensed dry casks. Many point to the absence of a safe, established
pathway for the disposition of spent fuel as a significant vulnerability of nuclear
power, and some oppose an expanded reliance on nuclear power until such a
pathway is established. Surface storage of spent fuel can certainly be
undertaken with adequate safety for many decades. The scientific and technical
community is generally in agreement that disposal in a deep geologic repository
is achievable and that such disposal provides an effective long-term means of
isolating spent fuel from the human environment.5 Moreover, other options (not
examined by the NETF) may be feasible. Accordingly, the NETF concludes that
the absence of a licensed repository is not a valid reason for postponing
additional nuclear construction. Indeed, the issues associated with the
disposition of spent fuel can and must be resolved even if there is no increased
reliance on nuclear power. Nonetheless, the NETF believes it is essential for the
U.S. government to ensure that issues associated with the disposition of spent
fuel are expeditiously addressed and resolved.
343

Loan guarantees boost power plant construction
The relatively higher risks associated with nuclear power, manifested through
higher interest rates or the unavailability of debt capital under certain financing
approaches, as discussed above, can be mitigated through Federal government
secured loans or loan guarantees. A secured loan or Federal loan guarantee can
help ensure the availability of debt financing at attractive costs by providing
lenders protection against the risk of the projects default due to regulatory and
litigation risks. A secured loan or Federal loan guarantee provides default
protection only for the debt component of the capital structure, not for the
sponsors equity investment. A secured loan or Federal loan guarantee could be
sized to cover a debt component of 50 percent, consistent with the capital
structure for a regulated utility or unregulated merchant generating company, or
of 80 percent, consistent with a non-recourse project finance capital structure,
thereby allowing for greater leverage to finance the plant than would otherwise
be available. In addition, a secured loan or Federal loan guarantee should result
in a lower cost of debt financing due to the effects of Federal credit support. A
reasonable assumption is that a secured loan or Federal loan guarantee would
result in about a 0.5percent to 1.0 percent spread savings over the debt costs
under the regulated utility financing model, and a somewhat larger spread
savings under the other two financing approaches, than without the secured loan
or loan guarantee. Such secured loan or Federal loan guarantees are common
and can be structured with reasonable underwriting criteria to minimize the
probability and amount of Federal payout.
344
Solvency Subsidies
Federal subsidies key to nuclear development
Washington Independent, June 12, 2008, http://www.washingtonindependent.com/view/nuclearenergy-an
Cost estimates have only gone up -- and by a whole lot -- since the MIT report was released, so federal subsidies
could play an even bigger role in keeping new nuclear plants afloat in the coming years. The 2005 energy bill
offers $13 billion in subsidies and tax breaks, in addition to loan guarantees and other incentives, something
which might concern taxpayers. That actually might not be enough, though, to support fledgling plants.
345
Solvency Production Tax Credit

A production tax credit equivalent to wind should be established for nuclear
Ernest Moniz, physics professor and director of environmental studies, MIT, 2007, Nuclear Power
& Climate Change An Overview, http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/Moniz.pdf
If nuclear power is to be deployed at mid-century on the scale being discussed, substantial
construction of new plants must be underway within ten to fifteen years. Both the economics and
new regulatory procedures need to be demonstrated. We recommend, for the United States, that
production tax credits be offered to first mover nuclear plants at a rate set by that for wind. This is
currently 1.8 cents/kWh, which can be thought of as about $75/tonne [4] of avoided carbon from a
coal plant (and with the public benefit of carbon avoidance for decades following expiration of the
credit). A production tax credit has the advantages of fundamentally keeping the risk with the
private sector and of being applicable to any carbon-free option. Because of the very different
natures of nuclear power and wind with respect to baseload characteristics, we recommended
limiting the credit to 10 GWe of first mover capacity and to a total of about $200/kW.
A production tax credit will facilitate capital availability for initial construction
Nuclear power plants, like coal-fired power plants, are capital-intensive projects. A company building a
new nuclear power plant will invest between $1.5 billion and $2 billion, including interest, during
construction. During construction, a company would be investing substantial amounts of equity capital
in the project, and this equity would be tied up for a four-to-five year construction period without
generating any return to the company. Raising the equity capital required would dilute shareholders
equity and earnings per share. This could lead to lower stock prices, reducing the companys
attractiveness to the financial community. The $18-per-megawatt-hour production tax credit provided
in the conference report for H.R. 6 is an important step toward making investment in the first few new
nuclear plants attractive to the private sector. This tax credit is comparable to that provided for other
sources of new, emission-free electricity generation. The production tax credit would provide an
acceptable return on equity, even to a project financed entirely with equity capital. It does not,
however, appear to protect the private sector investment against potential regulatory risk, and the
industry is continuing to work with the executive branch and Congress to create the financial
mechanisms necessary to do that.
346
Solvency Federal Support Critical

Federal support for nuclear power needed to spur capital investment in the electricity infrastructure
NEI believes that lack of investment in our nations critical energy and electric power infrastructure is a major problem. Our country is
not investing enough in new baseload coal and nuclear plants, and we are not investing enough in new electricity transmission. NEIs
assessment shows that approximately 183,000 megawatts of electricity generating capacity is 30-40 years old; approximately 104,000
MW is 40-50 years old. That represents about one-third of U.S. installed electric generating capacity, and is clear evidence that we are
underinvesting for our energy futurerelying too much on old, less efficient generating capacity and not investing in new, more efficient
and cleaner facilities. Investment in our countrys electricity transmission system has fallen by $115 million per year for the last 25
years, and investment in this area in 1999 was less than one-half of the level 20 years earlierdespite dramatic increases in the volumes
of electricity being moved to market. One analysis 7 shows that simply maintaining transmission adequacy at its current level (which is
widely acknowledged to be inadequate) would require a capital investment of $56 billion by 2010, equal to the book value of the existing
transmission system. Given these facts, we strongly encourage the passage of energy policy legislation to provide broad-based stimulus
for investment in new energy infrastructure, including new nuclear plant construction, deployment of clean coal technologies, new
electricity transmission and other energy sources. Passage of legislation that provides such investment stimulus is essential if we hope to
preserve the diversity of fuels and technologies that represent the core strength of our energy supply and delivery system. That stimulus
can come through shorter depreciation periods, investment tax credits and production tax credits, loans or loan guarantees, or research
and development support, depending on the conditions and requirements of each energy source. In addition, renewal of the PriceAnderson Act, which provides insurance for the public in the case of a nuclear reactor incident, is a necessary step in paving the way
toward new nuclear power plants. NEI believes that more appropriate tax treatment of energy investment must be a central feature of
energy policy legislation. As a general rule, the electric industry suffers from depreciation treatment that may have been appropriate for
another era, when regulated companies with stable long-term cash flows had a reasonable assurance of investment recovery through rates.
But 15- to 20-year depreciation periods for investments in generation and transmission assets are unacceptable for an industry operating
in a competitive commodity market, where cash flows are highly volatile and there is no guarantee of investment recovery. Current
depreciation treatment acts like a brake on new capital investment. Energy policy legislation should also address another significant
factor that could inhibit capital investment: Regulatory uncertainty. This uncertainty has a chilling effect on capital formation and capital
investment. Regulatory uncertainty and perceived risks over the licensing process for new nuclear power plants could inhibit capital
investment in new nuclear facilities. In the coal industry, uncertainty over environmental requirements, including possible future
limitations on criteria pollutants and carbon dioxide, has slowed capital investment in new coal-fired generating capacity or in upgrading
existing capacity. Public policy must recognize the impact of these uncertainties and develop mechanisms to address them. NEI believes
that policymakers must recognize the risks and uncertainties in our economic and regulatory systems and also recognize that
policymakers have a responsibility to establish mechanisms to contain those uncertainties.
347
Solvency - -Federal Support Critical

The nuclear industry wants a federal fiscal stimulus
The nuclear energy industry has a high level of confidence that new nuclear power plants can be built
for an overnight capital cost8 of $1,000-$1,200 per kilowatt of capacity for subsequent plants.9 At
this cost, which can be achieved after the first several new plants have been built, new nuclear power
units are fully competitive with other baseload electricity production. The financial stimulus sought
from the federal government is intended, in part, to jump start construction of the first few new
nuclear power plants, thereby allowing the nuclear industry to reach a cost level of $1,000-$1,200 per
kilowatt for successive plants of that kind.
348
Solvency Support Stimulates Private Sector Investment

Future reactors will not need federal support once the first are built
Although the specific numbers are proprietary, the overnight capital cost for building the first two
AP1000 reactors at one site is less than $1,400 per kilowatt. This includes all the first-time costs for
completing design, engineering and licensing of the first project. After the first few projects have been
completed, the capital cost for later plants will be approximately $1,000 per kilowatt, which is
competitive with other sources of baseload electricity. Once those first reactors are built and capital
costs reach the $1,000-per-kilowatt range, all future plants would be financed and built without federal
government financial assistance.
349
Solvency AT: We Dont Have the Technical Know How

U.S. has the scientific and technological expertise to expand nuclear power
America has the capacity and technical expertise needed to expand nuclear energy development and begin recycling nuclear
waste. It would be wise to use this talent instead of encouraging our scientists go to other countries that are not afraid to do
what is right. technologies we haven't yet discovered.
Universities reinstating nuclear programs

One reactor in the offing, the Next Generation Nuclear Plant, can be cooled with helium instead of
water and might be capable of producing industrial hydrogen to power emission-free cars and other
power plants. Another, the Advanced Fast Reactor, can burn up the radioactive elements that remain
behind in a light-water reactor. Other countries--India, China, South Africa--are working on their own
prototypes. "There's also a great deal of interest in designing smaller reactors for developing nations,"
McFarlane says, "anywhere from 20 megawatts to 600 megawatts, to provide distributed power to
outlying areas." McFarlane has noticed that nuclear engineering has become a hot major in college
again. "We're seeing a fantastic increase in undergraduate enrollment," he says. "A lot of universities
are reinstating nuclear engineering programs they dropped back in the '80s and '90s."
U.S. nuclear expertise increasing
Prospective future growth, recent initiatives in technology innovation (see Section B), increased government
funding, accelerating nuclear programmes in countries like China and India and renewed nuclear programmes in
other countries are also attracting new students, e.g. dedicated government funding in the US has led to a
quadrupling, from 2000 to 2007, in undergraduate enrolment in nuclear fields (from 500 to 2000).
350
Solvency AT: We Dont Have the Technical Know How

Nuclear industry can reinvent itself with help from the DOE
I have also heard people claim that industry would not be able to get the job done, or that the labs only want to
get their hands on new funds. The presumptions herethat the nuclear industry is damaged beyond saving, and
that the national labs are more interested in building (or protecting) their existing research programs without
seriously engaging industry are false. The nuclear industry can renew itself, and the national labs can help. I
cannot speak for the past behavior of industry and the labs, but I can speak to what has happened within the past
few years, certainly since Ive been director at Argonne. We have seen very clearly that U.S. industry knows
exactly what it wants and that it needs to partner with those who have the required expertise and who truly want
to collaborate in order to reach industrys goalsand this is broadly recognized within the industry. At the same
time, I have seen laboratories such as Argonne start to focus on specific, industry-defined goals, instead of
simply focusing on basic research topics disconnected from industry needs. In order to get to the point where we
can replace nuclear power plants as needed, several things must happen, both technologically and culturally.
Nuclear engineering must adapt twenty-first century analytic tools that are based on a scientific dialectic, that is,
on a transformational approach that connects advanced simulations and basic scientific understanding with
engineering design decisions. In this way, the exchange of design proposals and counterproposals can result in a
transparent transformation in the course of the design process. High-fidelity ( science-based) integrated
simulations must form the core of design efforts, allowing for rapid prototyping that minimizes the need to
experiment. And science-based, validated modeling at both the small-scale and systems- level must be part of
the core capabilities, so that scientists can achieve realistic design optimizations. Must act now to boost nuclear
development To move nuclear power to a more publicly acceptable position to meet future U.S. energy needs, it
is absolutely necessary to use all the instruments in our scientific toolbox to buttress the engineering decisions
for a future nuclear energy economy. We know we can do it after all, this would be a transition from
phenomenology- based to science-based research and development, which has been done before. Our national
labs hold the necessary expertise right now. What is needed, above all, is the will to proceed.
DOE has the needed nuclear scientists
The Energy Departments national laboratories remain the principal U.S. reservoir of top nuclear designers (in areas as diverse as
reactors, fuels, recycling/ reprocessing, and waste management); this is a field that Energy has managed to preserve, despite the vagaries
of fortune of nuclear power outside the protective confines of the department. Furthermore, beginning with the Manhattan Project and in
collaboration with the computation community, the national labs have always led the United States in high-performance computing. And
through the Advanced Simulation and Computing program and the Scientific Discovery Through Advanced Computing program, Energy
has demonstrated that large collaborations between physicists, chemists, applied mathematicians, and computer scientists can effectively
produce world-leading simulations for complex systems, ranging from fusion plasma tokomaks to nuclear weapons. In these projects, it
was realized early on that three highly interconnected methodologies would lead to results experiment/phenomenology, theory, and
simulations. Modern technical inquiry entails these three critical axes of investigation, which together provide as complete a picture as
possible of the relevant physics and engineering phenomena. 6
351
Solvency AT: Uranium Shortage

Plenty of uranium left
Myth: Uranium supplies are limited. Reality: There is ample nuclear fuel in the world to last for centuries. Fifty percent of
the electricity produced by U.S. nuclear plants is being generated from enriched uranium that's being removed from 20,000
Russian nuclear weapons. There is enough depleted natural uranium stored in canisters at uranium enrichment plants in
Paducah, Ky., and Portsmouth, Ohio, to fuel breeder reactors for up to 1,000 years. And, thorium, which can be converted
to nuclear fuel, exists in great abundance.
352
Solvency AT: Takes Too Long To Build

70s prove reactors can be built quickly
Jack Spencer, Heritage, March 20, 2008 Nuclear Power Critical to Meeting Presidents
Greenhouse Objectives,
The best way to mitigate the economic consequences of CO2 restrictions may well be to construct new nuclear power
plants. The challenge is how to build enough of them quickly enough to meet growing electricity demands. But while
daunting, the problem is not unprecedented. Most of the 104 reactors in operation today were brought on-line in the 1970s
and 1980s. Indeed, 37 of the reactors currently operating were connected to the electricity grid between 1970 and 1975.
353
Solvency Can Build Quickly

We could build 150 reactors/year
Some experts believe that while daunting, it is possible to achieve that level of building even with the current
lack of construction capacity. Ray Ganther of the French nuclear company Areva said in 2007 the industry
managed to start building 150 nuclear reactors within a decade of inception. A 2007 report written by a number
of nuclear experts concludes that to reach 700 gigawatts the industry would need to return to nuclear power's
"most rapid period of growth" and sustain this rate of growth for the next fifty years (PDF).
354
Solvency Solves Climate

Nuclear emits 1/100 of the emissions of coal
IOL Business Report, August 12, 2008, http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?
set_id=1&click_id=139&art_id=vn20080812114753186C526082
Nuclear power emits proportionately the same quantity of greenhouse gases as renewable energy forms like
wind and solar power, and only about 100th of the average emissions of power generated by coal, oil and natural
gas.
The inclusion of this statement is one of the changes made in the final scoping report for a new conventional
nuclear power station of up to 4 000 megawatts (MW) that Eskom wants to build.
Scoping is the initial stage of the environmental impact assessment (EIA) process where all potential impacts of
a project are identified.
The final scoping report, just completed and sent to the national environment department and released to the
public, has incorporated changes in the light of comments received on the initial draft version.
355
Energy Prices DA Link Answers

Nuclear cost-competitive with coal
In 2007, the average production cost of nuclear-generated electricity at 104 U.S. nuclear plants was 1.7 cents per kilowatthour, compared to 2.4 cents for coal, 6.8 cents for natural gas and 10.2 cents for oil.
High natural gas prices make nuclear competitive

Other factors will also be important in the commercial decision to invest in new nuclear plants, such as
fossil fuel prices and the regulatory environment for both nuclear power and future fossil fuel-fired
generation. If natural gas prices remain at historically high levels, future nuclear plants will be more
likely to be competitive without federal tax credits.
356
Free Market DA Answers

Liberalized energy markets wont support nuclear power
Fabian Roques, Judge Business School, Cambridge, Stephen Connors, MIT, Nuclear Power: A Hedge
Against Uncertain Gas & Carbon Prices, http://ardent.mit.edu/real_options/Real_opts_papers/Roques
%20Energy%20Journal%20final.pdf
In liberalized markets investments are profit motivated, with the choice of technology left to the market. The redistribution
of risk among the different stakeholders is likely to make nuclear generation unattractive for an investor, even when its
levelized costs are similar to the levelized costs of the dominant technology, for several reasons. First, investors have a
strong preference for a shorter payback period, which makes investments with short lead time more attractive. Nuclear lead
times (5 years in the most optimistic scenario given the historical record in Table 2) are, for engineering and licensing
reasons, much longer than CCGT lead times (2 years). Second, construction costs for nuclear plant are two to four times
greater than for a CCGT (about $400 to $800 per kWe installed). Of the three major components of nuclear generation cost
capital, fuel, and operation and maintenance the capital cost component makes up approximately 70% of the total, while
it only represents about 20% of total costs for a CCGT (see Table 3). In addition, the size of a typical nuclear unit is much
larger than the size of a typical gas turbine: recent nuclear technologies range from 1000MWe (AP1000 from BNFL) to
1600MWe (EPR from Areva), while CCGTs units are only of about 100 to 650 MWe (although it is common to build
several on one site). This implies that the required minimum upfront capital investment for a nuclear plant can be ten to
fifteen times greater than the smallest investment required for a CCGT.7 Third, the lack of recent experience with new build
makes it difficult to get reliable cost estimates. The traditional optimism of nuclear vendors reinforces investors distrust of
vendors assessments. The history of nuclear electricity includes a list of seriously delayed construction and cost overruns
(Nuttall, 2004). Besides, investors must confront the regulatory and political challenges associated with obtaining a license
to build and operate a plant on a specific site. Fourth, the greater size of nuclear technology exposes investors to greater
downside risks, as for the next decade only large-scale Generation III plants are commercially attractive.8 Small
(approximately 200MW) modular reactor systems are under development in various countries, but none are likely to be
ready for commercial deployment on the timescales considered here.
Deregulation has undermined capital investment in nuclear power

There are other important reasons for a thorough review of the future prospects
for nuclear power. For instance, nuclear plant construction is underway in other
countries, raising issues associated with the loss of U.S. leadership and business
opportunities if the U.S. does not similarly commit to new construction. Also, the
(at least partial) deregulation of electricity generation in the United States has
made for a much more difficult environment for investment in any highly
capitalintensive form of electricity generation namely nuclear power and, to a
lesser extent, clean coal plants because of the high front-end costs. For
this reason alone, some believe that the government should share in the costs of,
or in
357
Answers to PICs
All incentives needed PICING out of one reduces solvency
The need for financial incentives for the first few in a series of new nuclear
power plants should be viewed as a short-term requirement, limited both in time
and in the number of plants that will need support. When the first few plants
have been built, when capital costs have been reduced to the expected
competitive levels, and when sufficient experience has been gained for the
industry and the financial community to conclude that the new NRC licensing
process is functioning as intended, then large-scale follow-on development of
new nuclear plants should occur without further direct government financial
incentives. No single incentive will stimulate construction of the first few in a
series of new nuclear power plants in the United States. The relative value of
various financing incentives is likely to vary depending upon the financing
model, so the package of financial incentives should be sufficiently broad to
permit debt and equity financing with a balanced capital structure under all
three circumstances: new construction by a regulated utility, by an unregulated
merchant generating company, or through a non-recourse project finance
structure.
358
Renewables Wont Solve Grid Security

Renewables inadequate to provide base load energy
AT A time when America is paying $1.5 billion a day for imported oil, it seems incomprehensible that something isn't being
done to remove the albatross around the neck of nuclear power. For that we can thank Congress. It is supporting
renewable energy, everything from solar and wind power to biofuels and other green sources. While renewable
sources might help meet peak energy demand, they simply can't provide the "base-load" electricity that our nation
needs to drive the economy.
359
*** Politics ***
360
Politics Nuclear Popular With the Public

Public supports nuclear energy development
But reducing emissions from the electricity sector presents a major challenge. And, if we can be assured that
new technologies help to produce nuclear energy safely and cleanly, then I think we have to take a look at it." In
a 2006 poll by the Los Angeles Times and Bloomberg, 61 percent of respondents said they supported building
more reactors "to prevent global warming."
Environmentalists now support nuclear power
All the major environmental groups oppose nuclear power. But the campaign is having some impact at the
grassroots: the online environmental journal Grist found that 54 percent of its readers are ready to give atomic
energy a second look; 59 percent of Treehugger.com readers feel the same way. In other words, people who
understand climate change are feeling downright desperate.
No longer public opposition to nuclear power
Washington Post, August 5, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/08/03/AR2008080301642.html
As Maryland regulators begin hearings tonight on a proposed third nuclear reactor in Calvert County, one
element in the historically raucous debate over nuclear power is notably absent: widespread opposition. The
passionate anti-nuclear protests of the 1970s and '80s have largely yielded in Washington and its suburbs
to alarm over rising fuel prices, global warming and a lack of quick, easy solutions to quench the thirst
for power.
Political support for nuclear power increasing
Washington Post, August 5, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/08/03/AR2008080301642.html
Some environmental groups adamantly oppose the new reactors, but the plants are receiving growing political
support from citizen groups and officials wary of their states' dependence on coal. Nuclear plants do not emit the
carbon gases that contribute to global warming. With little new electricity being generated in Maryland in recent
years, state regulators predict rolling blackouts as soon as 2011 unless capacity is added.
361
Politics Congressional Opposition

Congressional opposition to nuclear power

Nuclear power achieves several goals: One, it's a renewable source of energy; two, it's a domestic
source of energy; and three, it would help us meet our obligations to clean air requirements.
Unfortunately, it's an issue that's hard to get through our Congress. I mean, there are a lot of people still
fearful of nuclear power, and it's a debate I've engaged in, said President Bush during a recent trip to
Europe. Without Congressional support though, the US nuclear power industry could remain dormant.
362
Politics Public Opposes

Public opposes nuclear power
May 2007 poll conducted by RBC Capital Markets found that 83 percent of respondents would oppose the
construction or re-commissioning of a closed reactor near their homes, while 60 percent would support
construction of a solar power plant and 57 percent would support a wind power plant near their homes. 270
Polling conducted by Yale University in 2005 found that 86 percent of Americans support greater funding for
renewable energy research and development and only 36 percent favor constructing new nuclear power
plants.271 A poll conducted by ABC News/Washington Post in June 2005 shows that 64 percent of Americans
oppose the building of more nuclear power plants.272 A survey by the Bloomberg/Los Angeles Times from
363
Politics Political Support for Nuclear

Political support for nuclear power increasing
MarketWatch, July 17, 2008, p. online
Nuclear power has been gaining serious attention as the replacement energy source of fossil fuels: coal and petroleum. As
the price of oil skyrockets and there is a global cry about the carbon emissions from coal-fired power plants, nuclear is
increasingly taking center stage. Vice President Dick Cheney is lobbying for more nuclear power plants to be built. Funding
for nuclear has increased 79% in the current federal budget, and it extends loan guarantees for nuclear power programs. It
also increased federal funds for nuclear waste research. Even some environmentalists have embraced nuclear as a better
choice than fossil fuels because it's ostensibly a "cleaner" source of energy.
364
Politics Nuclear Plan Would Be Pushed By Bush

Normal means means Bush pushes a nuclear plan
Monthly Review, February 2008, http://www.monthlyreview.org/080201furber-warf-plotkin.php
The Bush administration is now providing additional subsidies to the nuclear industry, and applications are
being filed for the construction of up to thirty-two new nuclear facilities in the United States over the next
twenty years.
365
** Other ***
Global enrichment market incredibly small
States that did not already have enrichment and reprocessing technology might blanch at being forbidden from
ever developing it. But those states would have a guaranteed supply of fuel from an international organization,
and they could console themselves with the fact that every other country was in the same boat. For enrichmentcapable countries, too, the plan would pose challenges. What would it take, for example, to buy out the private
elements of existing uranium-enrichment companies? In the United States, any whiff of "nationalization"--let
alone internationalization--would provoke industrial and ideological opposition. But the enrichment industry is
small: There is only a single uranium-enrichment facility currently operating in the United States, and it is
leased from the U.S. government by the United States Enrichment Corporation, a private company with a
market capitalization of less than $1 billion. Internationalizing a venture that size seems a small price to pay for
strengthening the nonproliferation regime. Indeed, globally, the enrichment industry yields only $5 billion in
revenue per year--hardly enough for any country to justify undermining nonproliferation efforts.
366
*** Reprocessing Bad ***
367
Reprocessing FYI
How reprocessing works
Steve Fetter is a professor and dean of the School of Public Policy at the University of Maryland and Frank
N. von Hippel is a professor of public and international affairs at Princeton University, 2005, Arms Control
Today, September, Is U.S. Reprocessing Worth the Risk?, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_09/fettervonhippel.asp
Reprocessing is the generic term for the chemical processing of spent nuclear fuel. The method
currently used is the PUREX (plutonium-uranium extraction) process, which was originally developed
by the United States in the early 1950s to separate plutonium for nuclear weapons. The spent fuel
assemblies are chopped into pieces, the fuel is dissolved in nitric acid, and organic solvents are used to
separate the plutonium and uranium from the fission products (such as cesium-137 and strontium-90)
and minor transuranic elements (neptunium, americium, and curium). The plutonium and uranium are
then separated from each other and purified for use in fresh reactor fuel. The fission products and
minor transuranics are mixed into glass and stored in a surface facility pending the availability of an
underground repository. Commercial reprocessing programs originated in the 1960s and 1970s when
power reactor operators worldwide expected that plutonium would be needed to make start-up fuel for
plutonium breeder reactors. These reactors would then fuel themselves and other reactors with the
plutonium that reactors produce by transmuting the abundant non-chain-reacting uranium-238 isotope.
It was believed that production of nuclear energy based on the much less abundant chain-reacting
uranium-235 isotope would increase so rapidly that the worlds high-grade uranium ores would quickly
be depleted, making a transition to the more uranium-efficient breeder reactors economical.
368
AT: Pyroprocessing Good

Pyro-processing nowhere close to viable

The waste in the new reactors would be treated by new pyro-processing separation techniques. The
transuranics, or heavy long-lasting waste components of uranium and heavier elements, would be
separated from the lighter and shorter-lived isotopes such as cesium-137 and strontium-90. With half
lives of about 30 years, the effective period during which these shorter-lived isotopes pose a danger is
on the order of 300 to 600 years, depending on ones point of view. Because the heavier isotopes are
only a few percent of the waste stockpile, there are a few problems the industry tries to sweep under
the rug. The transuranic separation requires a molten cadmium bath at high temperature. That is the
origin of the term pyro-processing. This very toxic separation process, like that of any electroplating
approach, is not perfect, and the separation is something less than 100 percent efficient. The industry
plans for building new nuclear power reactors will add to the problems that exist. In the end, we have
the original disposal problem. The new pyro-processing techniques have only been achieved in
laboratory apparatus at present. As engineers are well aware, there is a big jump much of the time
between theoretical and experimental successes and the final commercially manufactured version.
369
Uniqueness Limited Reprocessing Now

Only 4 countries currently operate breeder reactors
Scientific America, July 17, 2006, http://www.sciam.com/article.cfm?id=how-do-fast-breeder-react
The U.S. constructed two experimental breeder reactors, neither of which produced power commercially. The
Enrico Fermi Nuclear Generating Station in Michigan was the first American fast breeder reactor but operated
only from 1963 until 1972 before engineering problems led to a failed license renewal and subsequent
decommissioning. Construction of the only other commercial fast breeder reactor in the U.S., the Clinch River
plant in Tennessee, was halted in 1983 when Congress cut funding. Elsewhere in the world, only India, Russia,
Japan and China currently have operational fast breeder reactor programs; the U.K., France and
Germany have effectively shut down theirs.
370
Uniqueness CP U.S. Should Pursue a Reprocessing Moratorium

The U.S. should pursue an international moratorium on reprocessing
The United States should reinstate a ban on reprocessing U.S. spent fuel, and
actively discourage other nations from pursuing reprocessing. The security risks
associated with current and near-term reprocessing technologies are too great.
The United States should take the lead in forging an indefinite global moratorium
on operating existing reprocessing plants and building or starting up new ones.
Reprocessing is not necessary for any current nuclear energy program, and the
security risks associated with running reprocessing plants and stockpiling
plutonium are unacceptable in todays threat environment, and are likely to
remain so for the foreseeable future. A U.S. moratorium will facilitate a global
moratorium.
Counterplan U.S. should ban domestic reprocessing
The extent to which an expansion of nuclear power increases the risk that more nations or terrorists will acquire
nuclear weapons depends largely on whether reprocessing is included in the fuel cycle, and whether uranium
enrichment comes under effective international control. A global prohibition on reprocessing, and international
ownership of all enrichment facilities, would greatly reduce these risks. The United States should reinstate a ban
on reprocessing U.S. spent fuel and take the lead in forging an indefinite global moratorium on reprocessing.
The administration should also pursue a regime to place all uranium enrichment facilities under international
control.
371
U.S. Reprocessing Leads Nuclear Proliferation

Reprocessing triggers proliferation, U.S. anti-reprocessing leadership retards the spread of the technology
globally
For a government, the possession of a reprocessing plant would provide a quick route to a nuclearweapon capability. Every country that has embarked on commercial reprocessing has
accumulated a huge stockpile of separated plutonium. Plutonium separation by the civilian
reprocessing industry has gotten so far ahead of plutonium recycling that the world stockpile of
separated civilian plutonium has reached 250 tons and is still growing. Using the IAEAs conservative
assumption that 8 kilograms is required to produce a first-generation nuclear bomb, this material
represents more than 30,000 bomb equivalentsan enormous potential threat. This is why the Ford
and Carter administrations turned against commercial reprocessing. Given that the United
States had been the leading promoter of reprocessing and plutonium breeder reactors for years,
it was believed that the only way to turn other countries around would be to be able to say to
them, Reprocessing is neither necessary nor economic. We dont do it. You dont need to,
either. In the years after Indias 1974 test, the United States was relatively successful in
preventing or at least delaying the proliferation of reprocessing technology. France was
persuaded not to complete the transfer of reprocessing plants to South Korea and Pakistan. A
deal under which Germany would have transferred reprocessing and enrichment technologies to
Brazil collapsed before the reprocessing technology was transferred. Further, the Nuclear
Suppliers Group (NSG) was established, whose members agreed to exercise restraint in the
transfer of reprocessing technology. The only transfer of reprocessing technology after 1974 was to
Japan, after Japans prime minister insisted that reprocessing was a life or death issue. Today, Japan
is the only non-nuclear-armed state that has an active civilian reprocessing program. Japans neighbors,
China and South Korea, are concerned that this program would allow Japan to acquire and deploy
nuclear weapons quickly if it ever decides that they are needed. In his talk at the National Defense
University on February 11, 2004, President George W. Bush called on the NSG to deny enrichment and
reprocessing technologies to any state that does not already possess full-scale, functioning enrichment
and reprocessing plants. Many countries have denounced this proposal as a new form of
discrimination by the nuclear-weapon states. A continued U.S. stance that reprocessing is neither
necessary nor economic is likely to be more influential than a policy of Do as I say, not as I do.
372

Resuming reprocessing in the U.S. increases the interest of other countries in nuclear technology
"The shift to resume reprocessing in the United States and encourage the expansion of nuclear energy worldwide has
resulted in many more countries becoming interested in these dangerous technologies, and may result in many more
countries acquiring a nuclear weapons capability," Tomero warned. Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control
Association, told ITP the recommendation to resume reprocessing is the part of the report he disagrees with the most. This
approach was abandoned in the 1970s and should remain off the table, he argued.
Other countries have followed the U.S. non-reprocessing policy

Sokolski said the report makes an incorrect assertion that no nation has followed United States in its decision during the
1970s to stop reprocessing nuclear waste, noting that Germany, Great Britain and Belgium have all followed. Russia does
not turn weapons-grade plutonium into mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel, though it would like to, he said.
GNEP stimulates global reprocessing and increases terror risks

GNEP itself marks a departure from a U.S. policy of not encouraging the use of plutonium in civil
nuclear fuel cycles. Supporters suggest that the U.S. policy developed in the late 1970s did not
envision a recycling process that would not separate pure plutonium, and therefore question the
underlying assumptions of that longstanding policy. Critics of GNEP have suggested that even though
many nations did not agree with the United States in the 1970s on the dangers of having stockpiles of
separated plutonium, the message that the United States conveyed was that reprocessing was
unnecessary to reap the benefits of nuclear power and that GNEP conveys the opposite message now.
Moreover, some critics point to the accumulation since the 1970s of separated plutonium as a particular
threat, given the potential for terrorist interest in acquiring nuclear material.
373

U.S. MOX development/reprocessing facilitates international MOX development/reprocessing
An important role for advanced fuel cycles well into the future cannot be excluded, although
significant economic and technical barriers must be overcome. The MIT study recommends a
program of analysis, simulation tool development, and basic science and engineering of advanced
concepts, and eventually appropriate project demonstrations. Cochran argues that such a program is
in itself a proliferation risk. We concur that such a program carries risk. However, the U.S. approach
of rejecting plutonium recycle and cutting off research and international cooperation on fuel cycles
demonstrably proved ineffective, since other countries have moved forward anyway. Rejection of
the civilian MOX option should continue. Our recommendation is one of U.S. engagement to shape
international advanced fuel cycle R&D properly, with an open mind to its eventual outcome, even
while pursuing and advocating the open fuel cycle with thermal reactors as the basis for growth over
the next decades. We also recommend that the U.S. government offices responsible for
nonproliferation have an explicit management role in defining the scope, scale and location of such
international R&D programs.
Countries interested in GNEP
The GNEP proposal has attracted some international interest, at least among potential supplier states.
Officials from China, France, Japan, Russia, and the United States met in Washington, DC, on May 21,
2007, to discuss GNEP and its goals. According to a joint statement issued after the meeting, The
participants believe in order to implement the GNEP without prejudice to other corresponding
initiatives, a number of near- and long-term technical challenges must be met. They include
development of advanced, more proliferation resistant fuel cycle approaches and reactor technologies
that will preserve existing international market regulations.
374

Reprocessing increases prolif
After Indias 1974 test of a nuclear weapon derived from commercial reprocessing technology, the US declared
a moratorium on commercial reprocessing, citing unjustifiable proliferation risks from the generation of
separated plutonium in such quantities. While there has been negligible modification to the fuel separation
process, referred to as PUREX, since the Cold War, industry proponents are declaring that new technologies will
be proliferation-resistant. Once plutonium is separated from irradiated reactor fuel, it loses what experts have
termed its self- protecting quality, meaning that the significantly lower temperature and radiation dose of
separated plutonium allows for it to be safely carried on ones person in an airtight container.210 Due to the high
volume of fuel being handled at reprocessing facilities, it is virtually impossible to account for total plutonium
output to within tens or even hundreds of kilograms, making it feasible for stolen plutonium to go undetected. 211
This is of concern because a simple nuclear device requires only six kilograms of plutonium, making the
uncertainty in stockpile accounting of utmost concern. According to figures released from the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), seizures of illicit radioactive material have doubled over the past four years,
with more than 300 incidents worldwide of smugglers being intercepted in that time period. 212 Recommencing
reprocessing in the United States would send a dangerous message to the rest of the world, negating any
legitimacy in attempts to bar other countries from operating or obtaining this very technology in the name of
non-proliferation.
Reprocessed plutonium isnt irradiated, increasing theft risks
Plutonium can be separated from the rest of the reactor spent fuel by a chemical process called reprocessing.
This separated plutonium is then mixed with other transuranic waste in a combination called mixedoxide fuel or
MOX. This mix can then be used again in a reactor. But plutonium is also the preferred material to build a
nuclear weapon and thus separating it from the rest of the spent fuel increases the risks of proliferation. While
plutonium reprocessing technology is simpler than uranium enrichment (because it involves separating different
elements rather than different isotopes of the same element), this process requires highly advanced technology
as remote-handling equipment because of the high radioactivity of the spent fuel. In contrast, separated
plutonium is not highly radioactive and is an easy target for theft. As noted by the MIT report, Radiation
exposure from spent fuel that is not reprocessed is a strong, but not certain, barrier to theft and misuse. 219
375

Global trend against reprocessing, plan reverses
This change in the U.S. attitude toward reprocessing is at odds with the welcome, recent global trend
of countries abandoning reprocessing because it is costly and complicates waste disposal rather than
facilitating it. The net result of even a partial success of the Bush administrations policy would be a
reversal in the decline in the number of countries with stockpiles of separated plutonium, thereby
undermining the nonproliferation regime.
U.S. abandonment of reprocessing reduced global reprocessing
Given the loss of all of its foreign customers, the United Kingdom plans to shut down its reprocessing
plants. After this, only China, France, India, Japan, and Russia will operate reprocessing facilities.
China does not have an operating reprocessing plant today, but it is building a pilot reprocessing plant
and is negotiating with France to purchase a full-scale plant. Belgium, Germany, and Italy have shut
down their pilot-scale reprocessing plants. Thus, three decades after the United States adopted an antireprocessing policy, one nuclear-weapon state is quitting, another is starting, three non-nuclear-weapon
states have quit, and 12 non-nuclear-weapon states that were having their spent fuel reprocessed abroad
have quit or will quit soon. Japan, which had completed a pilot reprocessing plant in 1974 before the
United States reversed its pro-reprocessing policy, remains the only non-nuclear-weapon state that
reprocesses. Its reprocessing program has been a major source of suspicion and envy in South Korea.
376

Reprocessing makes it possible to develop nukes quickly
Finally, the stockpiling of large quantities of separated plutonium in a fuel cycle involving reprocessing
would result in a breakout time for nuclear weapons production far shorter than for the once-through
fuel cycle case. The same would be true for a pyroprocessing plant. Indeed, a 1992 study
commissioned jointly by the Departments of Energy and State showed a variety of ways to use a
pyroprocessing plant to produce relatively pure plutonium.
Global reprocessing increases proliferation risks
For decades, the United States had opposed the ambitions of South Korea and several other nonnuclear-weapon states to begin civil spent fuel reprocessing programs. Washington rightly feared that
allowing these states to separate plutonium from highly radioactive spent fuel would destabilize the
nonproliferation regime by drastically reducing the time between a decision to acquire nuclear
weapons and having a large nuclear arsenal. This would make both internal and external constraints on
proliferation much less effective.
Reprocessing means more plutonium in transit, increasing proliferation risks

A nuclear renaissance that embraces reprocessing as necessary to reduce spent fuel accumulation could result in
more plutonium in transit, providing more potential targets for diversion. A renaissance that includes widespread
installation of fast reactors would similarly increase targets for diversion. Further down the road, will the next
generation of reactors be more or less proliferation resistant than existing reactors? As of December 2002, the
Generation IV Forum had not yet adopted a standard methodology for evaluating proliferation resistance and
physical protection for the six systems under consideration
377
U.S. Reprocessing Leads to Proliferation

GNEP encourages non-nuclear states to reprocess
As of February 29, 2008, 20 countries in addition to the United States had signed up as GNEP partners.
Of these, 16 are non-nuclear-weapon states of which one-half do not yet have nuclear power plants. Of
those partners that are non-nuclear-weapon states and do have nuclear power plants, all but one (Japan)
have never reprocessed or have ended their reprocessing contracts with Russia. It is difficult to see any
nonproliferation rationale in the United States persuading 15 non-nuclear-weapon states to choose
reprocessing over a once-through fuel cycle.
Reprocessing enables quick proliferation and increases waste
Hopefully, Congress has learned as a result of its temporary enthusiasm and then disillusionment with
GNEP that there are much worse alternatives to interim storage of spent fuel at U.S. nuclear power
plants. Reprocessing, whether PUREX, UREX+, or pyroprocessing, would cost many times more and
would convert one relatively simple and stable waste form into a variety of waste streams that must be
managed, including contaminated equipment and materials from the reprocessing plant itself when it is
decommissioned. It also creates a vast stockpile of separated plutonium that would make it possible for
countries to deploy weapons quickly and massively in a time shorter than required to mobilize
domestic and international opposition. These plutonium stockpiles could also become targets of theft
for would-be nuclear terrorists.
378
AT: Sending Fuel Abroad for Reprocessing Solves the Prolif Link
Attempts to get countries to reprocess abroad fails
As already noted, however, sending spent fuel abroad to be reprocessed has proven unattractive unless
the reprocessing country keeps the radioactive waste. France and the United Kingdom have found that
to be politically impossible; the United States almost certainly would as well. The White House
therefore hoped that Russia would be able to reprocess the spent fuel and keep the nuclear wastes of
countries without reprocessing plants. Several years ago, the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy was
interested in doing just this and succeeded, despite massive public opposition, in getting the Russian
Duma to pass a law making it legal. In November 2005, however, the helm of Russias nuclear
establishment, now called Rosatom, was taken over by Sergey Kirienko, a former prime minister, who
proved to be less willing to ignore public opinion on this matter. Two months after the Energy
Department unveiled GNEP, a Rosatom spokesperson indicated that, apart from a continuing
willingness to take back spent fuel produced from nuclear fuel and nuclear reactors that it had
supplied, Rosatom was no longer interested in taking other countries spent fuel.
379
AT: Sending Fuel Abroad for Reprocessing Solves the Prolif Link
External reprocessing undermines the NPT
However, this proposal, made in response to the Iranian situation and other
challenges to the NPT regime, is problematic for three reasons. First, it directly
contravenes the NPT requirement that signatories have access to peaceful
nuclear technologies, including enrichment and reprocessing technologies.
Second, nations with nuclear weapons ambitions are unlikely to accept a
prohibition on producing nuclear fuels. And third, the proposal would widen the
gulf between nuclear haves and have-nots already embedded in the NPT,
further undermining an already wobbly regime. After all, a non-nuclear weapons
state could well persuade itself that it should share in the presumably profitable
business of supplying enrichment services, or a least keep the jobs and the funds
required to enrich uranium in the domestic economy, rather than depending on
foreign suppliers. In any event, President Bushs proposal received little
international support. Indeed, the drive by some policy makers in the United
States and elsewhere to expand the use of nuclear power plants by more
countrieswhich would also require more enrichment facilities would
exacerbate the tension between fuel-cycle haves and have-nots.
380
AT: Fuel Cycle Assurances Solve

Back-end fuel cycle assurances cannot be maintained
A separate set of questions focuses on how effective GNEP will be in achieving its goals. As the only
proposal currently that offers incentives for the back-end of the fuel cycle, it may hold more promise of
attracting states to participate in the fuel supply assurances part of the framework. However, back-end
fuel cycle assurances will require significant changes in policies and laws, as well as efforts to
commercialize technologies. Further, it is far from clear that all suppliers will be able to offer the full
range of fuel cycle assurances, raising the question of the relative competitiveness of suppliers. These
critics do not argue that the overall vision of GNEP is misplaced, but instead are skeptical that its
vision can be achieved, particularly in the timeframe proposed.
381
AT: IAEA Protocols Solve

IAEA protocols have no enforcement ability
In July 2005, the member states of the International Atomic Energy Agency voted
to extend the scope of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear
Material to cover security at domestic facilities (it previously covered only the
security of nuclear materials transported between countries). However, the
agreement includes only principles to which each country must commit. It does
not set specific, mandatory standards for physically protecting nuclear materials,
require peer review of national approaches to such protection, or include any
enforcement mechanisms. In fact, the amended convention will allow most
signatories to continue to operate nuclear facilities with little or no change to
their security protocols. For example, France does not require security personnel
at nuclear power plants to carry weapons, and it will not have to change its policy.
This international response to the enormity of the post-9/11 terrorist threat is
insufficient.
Countries that possess enrichment and reprocessing technologies will have an easy time going nuclear
Some of the technologies used for nuclear power are dual-use, meaning that they
can also be used to produce the materials needed to make nuclear weapons
highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium.81 In particular, facilities for
enriching uranium for use in power plant fuel can be used to make HEU, while
facilities that reprocess spent reactor fuel produce plutonium. Nations that
possess those technologies would find it easier to build nuclear weapons, and
terrorists could acquire plutonium from reprocessing facilities. An expansion of
nuclear energy could well increase these twin threats to U.S. and world security.
Reprocessing massively expands terrorism risks
Some countries produce plutoniumand, to a lesser extent, HEUfor use in civil reactors, and
some have accumulated large stockpiles of plutonium in facilities that are not well-guarded,
leaving it vulnerable to theft.83 The degree to which an expansion of nuclear power would
increase the risk of nuclear terrorism depends largely on whether reprocessingwhich produces
plutoniumis part of the fuel cycle. Reprocessing changes plutonium from a form in which it is
382

highly radioactive and nearly impossible to steal to one in which it is not radioactive and could be
stolen by an insider, or by force during routine transportation.
383
AT: New Reprocessing Technology is Proliferation Resistent

No reprocessing technology is proliferation resistant
Today U.S. R&D is focusing on reprocessing technologies billed as more proliferation-resistant than
conventional reprocessing. However, there is no convincing evidence that new designs will address the inherent
proliferation problems of reprocessing (see Chapter 6). Only the once-through cyclein which spent nuclear
fuel is stored and eventually disposed of in a geologic repositoryis proliferation-resistant enough to warrant
consideration in the next 50 years.
Countries have abandoned breeders now
Besides using plutonium in nuclear weapons, some countries use it as fuel for
light-water reactors in the form of a mixture of plutonium and uranium oxides
known as MOX, for mixed oxide. Another use for plutonium is in breeder
reactors, which in theory can produce as much or more fissile material than they
consume. Breeder reactors must be fueled with plutonium or HEU. However, most
countries have abandoned work on such reactors because they are much more
expensive and less reliable than light-water reactors.
PUREX reprocessing makes it easy for terrorists to steal nuclear material
The only reprocessing method used commercially today is PUREX (plutoniumuranium recovery by extraction). In this process, plutonium and the remaining
uranium are separated from other elements in the spent fuel, and then from each
other. The remaining highly radioactive waste is then storedeither in bulk tanks
with active cooling systems, or melted with glass (vitrified) and cast into stainless
steel canistersbefore its final disposal. (Chapter 6 discusses other reprocessing
processes proposed for commercial use in the United States.) As noted,
reprocessing changes plutonium from a form in which it is highly radioactive and
nearly impossible to steal to one in which it is not radioactive and could be stolen
by an insider, or by force during routine transportation. Expanding the number of
facilities that reprocess spent fuel would provide terrorists with more potential
sources of plutonium, and perhaps with easier access than at existing facilities.
384
Thus, the degree to which expanded nuclear power would increase the risk of
nuclear terrorism depends largely on whether reprocessing is part of the nuclear
fuel cycle internationally or in the United States.
385
AT: IAEA Safeguards Solve

IAEA safeguards wont solve proliferation
The cornerstone of international efforts to prevent the further proliferation of

nuclear weapons is the 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which
prohibits all but five signatories (Britain, China, France, Russia, and the United
States) from acquiring nuclear weapons, while facilitating the access of nonnuclear weapons states to nuclear technologies for peaceful uses. Because some
nuclear technology such as reprocessing is dual-use, there is some tension
between these two goals. The NPT requires signatories without nuclear weapons
to accept safeguards on certain materials and facilities that could be used as
part of a weapons program. These safeguards are not designed to prevent
misuse; nor are they capable of doing so. Instead, safeguards are designed to (1)
detect actions that may indicate that a nation has a nuclear weapons program,
giving the international community some advance warning and time to respond,
and (2) deter such actions by threat of detection. The International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) monitors compliance with these safeguards. However, the NPT
does not address two major problems: latent proliferation, in which a nations
nuclear power facilities give it the capability to quickly make nuclear weapons,
and the lack of timely detection of theft or diversion of materials for weapons.
While the IAEA safeguards budget has long been inadequate, simply providing
morefunding will not solve these problems, as they are due to the fundamental
dual-use nature of nuclear technology. The Challenge of Latent Proliferation Acquiring
nuclear power technology may allow a nation that is in full compliance with the
NPT to shorten the lead time to acquiring nuclear weapons while not revealing its
intentions to the international community. North Koreas nuclear weapons
program is a perfect illustration of this problem. When it was still party to the NPT,
North Korea built a reactor and small-scale reprocessing facility nominally for civil purposes. In
1992, IAEA inspectors discovered that North Korea had not been forthright about its reprocessing
record, and suspected the country of having a nuclear weapons program. In March 1993, North
Korea gave the required 90-day notice of its intent to withdraw from the NPT. The plutonium
available to the country for building nuclear weaponsestimated to be some 3545 kilograms,
enough for six to eight nuclear weaponscomes from these facilities.90 The case of Iran, which is
now developing the ability to enrich uranium, has also highlighted this problem. While Iran asserts
that its enrichment facility will provide fuel for a small number of domestic nuclear reactors and
for export, suspicions persist that Iran is actually seeking nuclear weapons. The fear is that Iran
intends to use the facility to produce HEU for weapons, or to illicitly transfer centrifuge technology
and equipment to clandestine facilities. Detecting clandestine centrifuge enrichment plants is
difficult because they are compact, do not use large amounts of electricity, and do not produce
386

easily observable signs that they are operating, such as radiation, heat, or chemical emissions
(unless there is an accidental release of uranium hexafluoride gas). To address this problem of
latent proliferation, President Bush has proposed that some countries be denied access to dualuse fuel cycle technologies, such as enrichment and reprocessing, even if they are NPT members
in good standing. In exchange, those nations would have guaranteed access to foreign supplies of
nuclear reactor fuel.
387
AT: IAEA Safeguards Solve

Expanded reprocessing overwhelms IAEA safeguards
Should a nuclear renaissance result in more states with so-called bulk-handling facilities (enrichment and
reprocessing), the task of inspecting such facilities could place significant strain on the IAEA and the safeguards
system. Some critics of the IAEA suggest that current methods of inspection cannot provide timely warning of
diversion of a significant quantity of special nuclear material. Yet, the largest enrichment and reprocessing plants
under safeguards now are under EURATOM safeguards; the IAEAs role in verifying material balances in those
plants is limited by the IAEA-EURATOM agreement. The only experience in safeguarding commercial-scale
enrichment and reprocessing plants outside of EURATOM in a non-nuclear-weapon state is in Japan, where
incidents with significant material losses have raised questions.
388
AT: External Reprocessing

Detection not fast enough
Current safeguards are also inadequate to detect the diversion or covert theft of
nuclear weapons materials in a timely manner. This is the case for commercialscale facilities used to reprocess spent fuel and fabricate MOX fuel, which
annually handle between several tons and many tens of tons of separated
plutonium in solution or powder form. (Such facilities are referred to as bulkhandling facilities, as they handle materials in bulk rather than discrete, easily
countable items.) Accounting for the plutonium moving through such facilities to
within tens or even hundreds of kilograms is virtually impossible, allowing theft or
diversion of this amount to go undetected for many years. Because a relatively
simple implosion nuclear weapon can be made with roughly six kilograms of
plutonium, any uncertainty in accounting for the annual amount of plutonium a
facility processes is significant. Several striking examples of this problem have
come to light over the last decade. For example, in 1994 Japan revealed that
during five years of operation, the total amount of plutonium unaccounted for at
its Plutonium Fuel Production Facility in Tokai-mura had grown to 70 kilograms
enough for some 10 nuclear weapons. Japan insisted the missing material was
holdupdust that accumulates on equipment inside a facility. However, this
could not be verified until the plant was shut down and flushed out, which did
not occur until 1996. Similar problems occurred at the reprocessing plant in Tokaimura, which started operating in 1977. Japanese officials acknowledged in
January 2003 that accounting for a more than 200-kilogram shortfall in plutonium
at the plant had required a 15-year investigation. 91 This amount was about 3
percent of the total plutonium separated by the plant during its 25 years of
operation. In 2005, a large leak of dissolved spent fuel at the Thorp reprocessing
plant in the United Kingdom went undetected for more than eight months. The
leaked solution contained some 19 metric tons of uranium and 190 kilograms of
plutonium. 92 The fact that a shortfall in the amount of plutonium produced at the
plantenough for some 30 nuclear bombsdid not arouse concern for many
months suggests that the theft of a significant amount could also go undetected.
389

IAEA cant solve terrorism
As noted, todays nonproliferation regime does not adequately address the acquisition of
a nuclear weapon by a subnational group. Terrorists could try to acquire a nuclear
warhead from an existing arsenal or build one themselves. For terrorists seeking to build
a nuclear weapon, the largest barrier is acquiring the fissile material needed to make one
either plutonium or HEU. Under normal operations, commercial facilities for enriching
uranium and fabricating uranium fuel do not handle HEU. Thus, while enrichment
facilities present proliferation risks, their impact on the risk of nuclear terrorism is
relatively small. The same cannot be said of facilities that reprocess spent fuel and make
MOX. Because they handle material that is directly usable for weapons, such facilities
greatly increase the potential for nuclear terrorism. Separated plutonium at civilian
facilities should be protected to the same degree as nuclear weapons. However, doing so
would be costly, because conducting complete inventories would require frequent
shutdowns. The NRC does not require nuclear power facilities to protect nuclear weapons
material as carefully as the DOE requires weapons facilities to do, as documented in a
recent GAO report. The NRC and DOE also lack a common design-basis threat, largely
because the NRC takes into account the threats against which a private force can
reasonably be expected to defend. The GAO recommended that the level of protection be
the same for materials that can be used to build nuclear weapons regardless of their
location, but the two agencies rejected that recommendation. They did agree with the
recommendation that NRC licensees be given the same legal authority as DOE sites to
acquire heavier weaponry and use deadly force to protect weapons-usable material, as
authorized by the Energy Policy Act of 2005.93 As noted, some countries use separated
plutonium in MOX as fuel for light-water reactors (in what is termed a closed fuel
cycle). While it is unlikely that MOX can be used directly to make nuclear weapons, the
plutonium can be separated from the uranium in a straightforward chemical process.
Moreover, MOX does not contain the highly radioactive components that make spent fuel
difficult and dangerous to handle and reprocess. Thus the manufacture, transportation,
and storage of MOX presents almost as great a terrorist risk as plutonium itself. The IAEA
therefore regards MOX as direct-use material, and inspects it as often as it does pure
plutonium. However, the United States and several other countries do not consider MOX
as big a threat as separated plutonium, and do not protect it as vigorously. In a oncethrough fuel cycle, in contrast, spent fuel is left intact and simply stored once it is
removed from the reactor, for ultimate disposal in a permanent repository. In this case
the plutonium remains imbedded in the highly radioactive spent fuel. Spent fuel contains
cesium-137, which emits deadly gamma rays that can penetrate the human body.
Someone standing one meter away from a typical spent fuel assembly that has been out
of the reactor for a few years could receive a lethal dose in a matter of minutes. Because
390

cesium-137 has a half-life of 30 years, this high dose rate persists for decades.94
Plutonium in spent fuel is therefore considered self-protecting for many decades after
discharge.95 Even terrorists willing to die for their cause would have little time to handle
such highly radioactive material before becoming acutely ill. The size and weight of a
spent fuel assembly from a light-water reactortypically 15 feet long and 700 kilograms
(1,500 pounds) in weightalso make it difficult to steal. Accounting for the number of
fuel assemblies is also straightforward. (Accounting for the spent fuel from heavy-water
reactors such as CANDUs, which are used in Canada and a few other countries, is
somewhat more difficult, because they are refueled while the reactor is operating.)
391

Reprocessing massively expands nuclear terrorism risks
The bottom line is that a closed nuclear fuel cycle entails handling, processing,
and transporting large amounts of material that is usable in nuclear bombs and
often readily accessible and concealable. This gives terrorists numerous
opportunities to acquire material for building a nuclear weapon. And during much
of this process, the material cannot be accounted for precisely enough to ensure
that an amount needed for one or more nuclear weapons has not been stolen.
Moreover, once plutonium is separated from spent fuel, it can be handled with
little risk as long as care is taken to not breathe in any particles, because it does
not emit body-penetrating gamma rays. Plutonium-oxide particles can become
imbedded in the lining of the lungs, where very small quantities can cause cancer
many years later. However, it would be difficult to inhale enough plutonium dust
to cause prompt symptoms. Commercial reprocessing programs have also
produced a glut of separated and vulnerable plutonium. Global stockpiles of
separated civil plutonium totalled roughly 250 metric tons as of the end of 2005
enough for 40,000 nuclear weapons. The risk that terrorists will acquire separated
plutonium is compounded by the lack of a verified international standard for
protecting nuclear facilities, as Chapter 3 notes.
392
AT: Fuel Cycle Limits

GNEP does not put limits on domestic fuel cycle programs
Proposals offering countries access to nuclear power and thus the fuel cycle have ranged from a formal
commitment by these countries to forswear enrichment and reprocessing technology, to a de facto
approach in which a state does not operate fuel cycle facilities but makes no explicit commitment, to
no restrictions at all. The most recent proposal under the U.S. Global Nuclear Energy Partnership
(GNEP) represents a shift in U.S. policy by not requiring participants to forgo domestic fuel cycle
programs.
393
AT: Longer Burning Reduces Proliferation Risks

False longer burning does not reduce proliferation risks
The authors of a DOE-sponsored report also claim that reprocessing fuel from
reactors with long-lived cores would entail fewer proliferation and terrorism risks,
because the longer the fuel is burned, the less desirable the mixture of plutonium
isotopes for making nuclear weapons.163 However, this argument is incorrect, as
made clear in an authoritative statement from the DOE itself in 1998.164 Nearly all
isotopic mixtures of plutonium can be used in nuclear weapons, and there is no
meaningful difference in the ease with which someone could make a nuclear
bomb from plutonium produced in a long-life core reactor like IRIS and that
produced in a conventional light-water reactor. This is true for both advanced
nuclear weapons states and unsophisticated terrorist groups. It is astonishing that
some continue to use this argument, and that it appeared in a DOEsponsored
document
GNEP facilities increase proliferation risks
At the center of the GNEP plan are a nuclear fuel recycling center, a large
reprocessing facility that can handle 2,0003,000 metric tons of spent fuel each
year, and many advanced recycling reactors: large, fast neutron reactors with a
power rating of 100800 MW that would be fueled with plutonium from
reprocessed spent fuel. At first, the recycling center would use a PUREXlike
reprocessing technology. These facilities would increase the risks of proliferation
and nuclear terrorism, as they would not meet the once-through standard of
protection provided when plutonium remains embedded in large, highly
radioactive spent fuel rods until disposed of in a geologic repository.
394
AT: Longer Burning Reduces Proliferation Risks

GNEP reprocessing technologies are not proliferation-resistant
GNEP also includes an R&D program to develop proliferation-resistant

reprocessing technologies that will be less vulnerable to diversion or theft than
the PUREX technology. This program will focus on a group of aqueous separation
technologies known as UREX+ and a non-aqueous separation technology known
as pyroprocessing, or electrometallurgical treatment. UREX+ would be used
to reprocess light-water reactor fuel, and could also be used to reprocess oxidebased spent fuel from fast reactors. Pyroprocessing would be used for either oxide
or metal spent fuel from fast reactors. The DOE claims that these technologies are
proliferation-resistant because, unlike PUREX, they do not separate the plutonium
from the rest of the spent fuel. As Secretary of Energy Samuel Bodman said in
November 2005, In addressing reprocessing . . . we are guided by one
overarching goal: to seek a global norm of no separated plutonium. I think
everyone would agree that the stores of plutonium that have built up as a result
of conventional reprocessing technologies pose a growing proliferation risk that
requires vigilant attention.166 However, although Secretary Bodmans concerns
are justified, the DOEs proposed solution is problematic. One variant the DOE is
pursuing, UREX+1a, would keep plutonium in a mixture with other actinides
(neptunium, americium, and curium) and lanthanides (such as cerium and
europium), which are more radioactive than plutonium. Similarly, pyroprocessing
can be used to extract a mixture of plutonium, other actinides, uranium, and
some lanthanides (primarily cerium-144). However, these approaches would
provide no meaningful advantage over PUREX, because the properties of the
mixed products would be very similar to those of plutonium alone. This material
would therefore be neither more difficult to steal than plutonium produced by
PUREX nor more difficult to process for use in a nuclear weapon. While
neptunium, americium, and curium are more radioactive than plutonium, these
elements generate a dose rate of less than one rad per hour at a distance of one
meter.167 This dose rate is a hundred times less than that required for spent fuel to
be self-protecting, and a thousand times less than that generated by spent fuel
50 years after it has been discharged from the reactor. (The selfprotection
standard is 100 rads per hour at one meter, which would be lethal to anyone at a
distance of one meter in less than an hour.) As is the case for pure plutonium, this
plutonium mixture would emit far too little radiation to cause immediate harm to
anyone who stole it, and could be handled without heavy shielding or robotic
395
tools. The plutonium could be separated from the other elements in the mixture
using conventional chemical techniques, and then used to make nuclear
weapons. However, there might be no need to do so. According to a report from a
1999 workshop at the DOEs Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), the
transuranic elements or other actinides in spent fuel could be used to build
nuclear weapons: Examination of various cycles and the opinions of weapons-design
experts lead to the conclusion that there is no proliferation-proof nuclear power cycle.
Explosive Fissionable Material (EFM) includes most of the actinides and their oxides. 168
Dr. Bruce Goodwin of LLNL also maintained at the workshop that as nuclear
weapons design and engineering expertise combined with sufficient technical
capability become more common in the world, it becomes possible to make
nuclear weapons out of an increasing number of technically challenging explosive
fissionable materials.169 In other words, it is unwarranted to assume that
terrorists could not acquire the ability to build nuclear weapons with the mixture
of plutonium and other actinides produced by UREX+. Of course, none of these
reprocessing technologies meet the once-through standard for resistance to
proliferation and nuclear terrorism. As the DOE declared in response to questions
from Congressman Edward Markey in 2006, The plutonium mix from UREX+
would not meet the self-protection standard of spent fuel and, therefore, the
physical protection measures and safeguards associated with the process will
need to be stringent. The fact that highly radioactive neptunium- 237 and
americium isotopes would be part of the mix would not mean that it would require
less protection than pure plutonium, because these materials can also be used to
make nuclear weapons. According to DOE guidelines, separated neptunium- 237
and americium must be protected, controlled and accounted for as if they were
SNM [special nuclear material]in this case, as if they were highly enriched
uranium.
396
AT: Plutonium Tracking Under GNEP

Plutonium is too difficult to track
While the reprocessing modifications proposed under GNEP would not

significantly increase the theft resistance of plutonium, they would likely reduce
the accuracy with which plant operators and international inspectors would be
able to track the plutoniumwhich is the most important means of safeguarding
against diversion. In a reprocessing facility, operators account for the amount of
plutonium they are handling in two ways. First, they do so indirectly, by
measuring alpha and neutron emissions from the mixtures being handled.
However, the other actinides in GNEP plutonium mixtures also emit alpha
particles and neutrons, making it difficult to determine the precise amount of
plutonium. Second, operators take samples of some in-process materials to
measure the amount of plutonium directly. Including highly radioactive material in
the plutonium mixture, as proposed, would increase the hazards and complexities
of collecting these samples.172 Recent DOE guidance also requires operators to
track the amounts of the minor actinides neptunium and americium as stringently
as weapons- usable uranium-235. Because the precision of standard
measurement techniques is expected to be much lower for the minor actinides
than for plutonium, the overall measurement precision of weapons-usable
isotopes will decrease.173 The many fuel separation cycles and fuel fabrication
plants contemplated under the proposed GNEP scheme would compound these
challenges. In one version of the fuel cycle circulated by Argonne officials, spent
fuel from light-water reactors would be reprocessed at large, centralized UREX+
plants to extract a product containing plutonium, minor actinides, and
lanthanides. The product would then be shipped as oxide around the country to
multiple fast reactors (advanced recycling reactors), each with its own metallic
spent fuel pyroprocessing and fuel fabrication plant. (The lanthanides, cerium-144
and europium-154, would remain in the product for transport because the
radiation barrier provided by the actinides alone would not protect the mixture
from theft or diversion.) At each site, the lanthanides would be removed at small
aqueous separation plants, and the remaining product fed into the fuel fabrication
plant, along with the plutonium and actinides recovered by pyroprocessing. Thus
each advanced recycling reactor would also have an aqueous separations plant, a
pyroprocessing plant, and a fuel fabrication plant. About three advanced recycling
reactors would be required to use the annual production of plutonium and
actinides from about four light-water reactors of the same power rating (about 1
397
MT). Thus, if total U.S. generating capacity of lightwater reactors remained at 100
GWe, some 75 1-GWe light-water reactors would be needed. Even if four reactors
were located at one site, some 20 sites would contain multiple facilities requiring
398
AT: GNEP Tech is Prolif-Resistant

No such thing as a proliferation-resistant reprocessing technology
It is possible to develop a reprocessing technology that would keep enough highly radioactive fission products
in the plutonium mixture to provide a radioactive barrier comparable to that of spent fuel, thus making the
mixture theft-resistant. However, developing a reprocessing technology that would not also make it easier for
nations to produce material for nuclear weapons is far more difficult. Previous attempts to develop such a
technology have failed. In 1978, U.S. and U.K. scientists announced the development of Civex, a method of
reprocessing spent fuel from atomic power plants that would not produce pure plutonium, which could be used
to make atomic bombs.174 Unlike UREX+ or pyroprocessing, Civex was designed to keep a significant fraction
of the highly radioactive fission product cesium-137 with the plutonium. According to the developers, In the
Civex process, spent fuel would be treated so that it could be reused as fuel . . . but the plutonium in it would not
at any stage be purified to the extent that it could be used for a bomb . . . the fuel, at every stage of the process,
would be so highly radioactive that it could not be handled directly by human beings, a fact that would
presumably deter terrorists from attempting to steal the material. 175 Even so, the General Accounting Office
(now the Government Accountability Office) found that while Civex and similar approaches might help protect
the plutonium against terrorist theft, they would have little impact on diversion by states. After separating
plutonium and uranium, the Rokkasho-mura reprocessing plant in Japan mixes the two streams together again to
produce a 50/50 mixture of plutonium and uranium. However, this mixture is no more self-protecting than pure
plutonium, and the plutonium is readily separated from the mixture using benchtype fume-hood facilities.
Moreover, according to recent research at the DOEs Oak Ridge National Laboratory, including highly
radioactive fission products with the plutonium would increase significantly the costs of fuel fabrication and
transportation. 176 Such a mixture would also be more dangerous to handle and process into new reactor fuel.
Thus the material would probably need to be purified later before it could be used to make new fuel, which
would again make it vulnerable to theft and diversion.
399
AT: Pyroprocessing Solves the Proliferation Link

Pyroprocessing does not reduce proliferation risks
Thus, although pyroprocessing does produce a mixture that is more radioactive than the pure
plutonium produced by PUREX, the difference is not great enough to justify claims that it is
significantly more proliferation resistant and certainly not great enough to justify assertions by some
U.S. officials that pyroprocessing is not reprocessing. In any case, PUREX is the wrong standard for
comparison. For the United States and South Korea, which are jointly pursuing pyroprocessing
research and development, pyroprocessing should be compared with their current practice of simply
storing the spent fuel. In that context, pyroprocessing appears anything but proliferation resistant.
Pyroprocessing is designed to treat metal fuel for liquid sodium-cooled reactors and is not optimal for
the ceramic uranium-oxide fuel used by LWRs that are standard in the world today. Consequently, the
Energy Departments reprocessing research and development program has focused instead on a family
of technologies related to PUREX that are more suited for reprocessing uranium-oxide fuel. They are
called UREX+ (uranium extraction-plus). As with pyroprocessing, the plutonium would be mixed with
various other transuranic elements. The departments current preference is to use a UREX+ variant
that keeps plutonium mixed only with uranium and neptunium. Neptunium is a weapons-usable isotope
that is less radioactive than plutonium. Adding it to plutonium therefore would not decrease at all the
attractiveness of the mixture for weapon purposes. Also, the uranium dilutant could be separated out
with very simple chemical processing.
400
AT: GNEP Doesnt Include PUREX

GNEP no longer includes opposition to PUREX
When GNEP was first announced, the Energy Department planned to build an engineering-scale
facility to demonstrate the UREX+ technology. However, UREX+ was not ready for deployment on
the departments ambitious schedule. As a result of industry feedback, department officials eliminated
the demonstration step and decided instead to seek proposals from industry to construct a more
conventional, commercial-scale plant large enough to reprocess the 2,000 tons of spent fuel being
discharged annually by U.S. power reactors and perhaps start digging into the backlog. It was to be the
largest reprocessing plant in the world and cost at least $20 billion. In May 2007, the United States
withdrew its opposition to the indefinite continued use of PUREX reprocessing by other countries. In
an August 3, 2006, telephone press conference, scheduled to answer questions about the Energy
Departments request for expressions of interest in building a reprocessing plant, Spurgeon indicated
that he was willing to consider any proposal to build a reprocessing plant in the United States as long
as it did not involve the separation of pure plutonium. In response to a follow-up question, he indicated
that he was specifically willing to consider a minor variant of PUREX known as COEX (co-extraction)
that was being offered by Frances nuclear conglomerate, Areva. With COEX, the plutonium would be
left mixed with an equal amount of uranium. This product would be little different from pure
plutonium, however, with regard to the length of time required to convert it to nuclear weapons use. As
a recent Argonne National Laboratory report has acknowledged, the plutonium could be separated out
using a well-known chemical process.
401
AT: GNEP Supply Restrictions Solve

Countries resist supplier state restrictions
Congressional Research Service, 2007, Managing the Nuclear Cycle,

http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34234.pdf
The willingness of fuel recipient states to participate in international enrichment centers rather than
develop indigenous enrichment capabilities, and confidence in fuel supply assurance mechanisms such
as an international fuel bank, will largely determine the success of the overall policy goal to prevent
further spread of enrichment and reprocessing technologies. So far, proposals addressing this challenge
have originated in the supplier states, with many recipient states continuing to voice concern that their
right to peaceful nuclear energy technology under the NPT is in jeopardy.
Developing countries will not accept supply-side restrictions

Some observers believe that further restrictions on non-nuclear weapon states party to the NPT are
untenable in the absence of substantial disarmament commitments by nuclear weapon states. In
particular, a January 4, 2007, Wall Street Journal op-ed by George Schultz, Bill Perry, Henry Kissinger,
and Sam Nunn, entitled A World Free of Nuclear Weapons, noted that non-nuclear weapon states
have grown increasingly skeptical of the sincerity of nuclear weapon states in this regard. Some
observers have asserted that non-nuclear weapon states will not tolerate limits on NPT Article IV rights
(right to pursue peaceful uses of nuclear energy) without progress under Article VI of the NPT
(disarmament). Amending the NPT is seen by most observers as unattainable.
Not possible to define suppliers and recipients

It may be difficult for the United States and others to define which states are suppliers and which are
recipients. Informally, U.S. policy currently recognizes 10 states as having enrichment capability
the five nuclear weapon states (U.S., U.K., France, China, Russia) plus Japan, Argentina, Brazil, the
Netherlands, and Germany. While Argentina has a plant (Pilcaniyeu) under safeguards, this plant has
never operated commercially and it is doubtful that it will be cost-effective, since it uses outdated
gaseous diffusion technology. Brazils centrifuge enrichment plant at Resende is still in the early stages
of commissioning and wont produce at a commercial scale for several years. States such as Australia,
Canada, South Africa, and Ukraine have stated they would be interested in developing enrichment
capability for export. On the reprocessing side, South Korea has expressed interest in becoming a
GNEP supplier state through development of a pyroprocessing technique that does not separate
402
plutonium from uranium. In the past, the United States for proliferation reasons has rejected requests
from South Korea to reprocess U.S.-origin spent fuel.
403
AT: GNEP Supply Restrictions Solve

Turn -- GNEP supply restrictions generate nationalist hostility to the NPT
Space Daily, July 10, 2008,
http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/The_Nuclear_Cycle_And_The_Cycle_Of_Hostility_Part_Three_999.
html
The recommendation of a State Department advisory panel that the United States band together with
other existing nuclear powers to build safeguards into the growing market for reactor capacity risks
fanning nationalistic hostility in the Third World to global anti-proliferation regimes, say some
critics."The construction period is when a new nuclear project most needs credit support," he said.
"Unfortunately, the [DOE] interim guidelines published last year were developed without input from
companies with financial expertise and are not optimal for large power projects. So we must continue
to work cooperatively with the agency as it moves forward. Constructive input from credible
organizations and institutions, including the financial community, will be essential to making this
program a success." Properly implemented, the loan guarantee program will reduce financing costs
and thus reduce the consumer cost of electricity from the project, Bowman said. The industry's
average production costs - including expenses for uranium fuel and operations and maintenance - were
an all-time low of 1.66 cents/kW in 2006, according to preliminary NEI figures. Average production
costs have been below 2 cents/kW for the past eight years, making nuclear power plants cost
competitive with other electricity sources, particularly those capable of reliably producing large
amounts of electricity. A task force of the International Security Advisory Board -- chaired by former
Pentagon and World Bank official Paul Wolfowitz -- produced the report, titled "Proliferation
Implications of the Global Expansion of Civil Nuclear Power," in response to a request from
Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Robert Joseph. The report says the
United States must embrace a coming large expansion in global nuclear power generation -- despite the
proliferation risks it poses -- to ensure that nuclear supplier nations work together to build tough new
safeguards into the growing market. But critics charge this kind of thinking only exacerbates suspicion
about the role of the United States and its First World allies among less developed aspirant nuclear
powers. The suggestion that existing nuclear powers should monopolize production to stop the
proliferation of fuel processing technologies that also can be used to make weapons material "causes
nostrils to flair in the Third World," said Brian Finlay of the Stimson Center. Finlay, a proliferation
expert who has worked with Third World governments on proliferation issues, said there was "a
longstanding sensitivity (among aspirant nuclear nations) to any policy that appears to be trying to
restrict technology transfer." Finlay's main criticism of the advisory panel's report is that it "fails to
create a pathway we can move down towards ending this adversarial relationship with the Third
World." He called for "out-of-the-box and innovative thinking about the regulation of nuclear
technology" to break what he called "the cycle of hostility" of non-nuclear but aspirant nations toward
their perceived "big brothers" who already have the technology to process and reprocess nuclear fuel.
The tough restrictions to which the report recommends aspirant nuclear nations must sign up as the
quid pro quo for getting guaranteed fuel and technology could "provoke something of a backlash"
among them, Finlay added. But the former U.S. nuclear negotiator and government scientist who led
the task force that wrote the report told United Press International the real cycle was one of fear -- bred
by the prospect of uncontrolled nuclear proliferation. "Iran is saying, 'You can't infringe on our
404
sovereign rights as a nation'" to develop nuclear power and fuel production, said C. Paul Robinson. But
its neighbors have rights, too. "They are worried. They're saying, 'If they have the right (to a nuclear
program), we have the right to defend ourselves'" and develop their own nuclear programs. "Somebody
has to do something, or they (the neighbors) are going to take matters into their own hands," Robinson
concluded. "The world seems headed in a very bad set of directions," acknowledged Robinson. He
added a lot of work is still required to implement the kind of safeguards regimen the report
recommends. For starters, most of the supplier nations have no equivalent to the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Robinson said, which reviews and must approve all exports of nuclear technology by
U.S. firms. Supplier nations need "some mechanism that would bind their (commercial) nuclear
suppliers to their national policies. ... There's got to be national enforcement" of any deals among
supplier nations. "There are no easy solutions," said Robinson, but he added he is still "sanguine about
the prospects" for success.
405
AT: GNEP Provides Nuclear Tech, Solves Motivation for Proliferation

Providing nuclear tech is not enough to prevent reprocessing

Another factor that will shape the success of these proposals is the possible addition of other
incentives. Simply making nuclear energy cost-effective may not induce countries to forgo indigenous
enrichment and reprocessing. Such decisions may require other incentives, perhaps even outside the
nuclear realm, to make them palatable. The experience of Iran may be instructive here. Russias offer
to provide assured enrichment services on Russian soil has gone nowhere; instead, other, broader trade
incentives may be necessary. While the case of Iran may illustrate the extreme end of the spectrum, in
terms of a country determined to develop a capability for a weapons program, non-nuclear weapon
states will clearly take notice of how a solution develops for Iran.
406
Reprocessing Increases Nuclear Terrorism Risks

Reprocessing increases the risk of materials theft by terrorists; new so-called proliferation resistant
processes dont solve
Plutonium is much more difficult than highly enriched uranium to make into a nuclear explosive, but it
would not be impossible for terrorists to do so. Terrorists could more easily use plutonium to make
potent radiological weapons. The dispersal of 10 kilograms of plutonium-oxide aerosol 32
kilometers upwind from downtown Seattle would cause hundreds to thousands of additional
cancer deaths as plutonium is deadly when inhaled. The plutonium in spent fuel is relatively
inaccessible to terrorists because it is mixed with fission products, some of whichnotably 30-year
half-life cesium-137emit penetrating gamma rays when they decay. The radiation dose rate one
meter from a 50-year-old spent fuel assembly would be high enough to deliver a fatal dose within half
an hour. As a result, a spent fuel assembly, which contains about 4 kilograms of plutonium, will
be self-protecting by the standards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for
more than 100 years. In contrast, the penetrating-radiation dose rate from separated plutonium is so
low that it can be safely carried in a light airtight container. Reprocessing separates plutonium from
the fission products, making it far more vulnerable to theft. Separated plutonium could be stolen
from reprocessing or MOX fuel fabrication facilities or in transit between them. In addition, fresh
MOX fuel could be stolen in transit or from dispersed nuclear reactor sites, and the plutonium could be
separated from the uranium using straightforward chemical processes. As already noted, the PUREX
process was originally developed to separate pure plutonium for weapons. The current Bush
administration therefore established an Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative (AFCI) within the
Energy Department to come up with a more proliferation-resistant reprocessing and recycle
system in which pure plutonium would never be separated. The AFCI program has developed
the UREX+ process, which would separate a mix of plutonium and neptunium. However, in a
March 2005 hearing before Hobsons subcommittee, AFCI Director William Magwood
volunteered that were not sure that its possible to use this chemical technology to separate the
plutonium, in combination with a few other things, in a fashion that will make it both
proliferation resistant and economically viable. The reason is quite obvious: neptunium is much less radioactive than plutonium and is itself a directly
useable nuclear-weapon material. In fact, even if all of the other transuranic isotopes in spent fuel were separated and mixed with the plutonium, the gamma radiation dose rate from the mixture still would be
only about 0.0001 of that from a 20-year-old spent fuel assembly and 0.001 the dose rate required to meet the IAEAs self-protection standard
407
Reprocessing Increases Nuclear Terrorism Risks

Reprocessing increases the amount of plutonium available for terrorists
Further, the new reprocessing technologies being examined by the Energy Department, if adopted, would
make huge additional quantities of plutonium accessible for diversion by terrorist groups and would
undercut the ability of the United States to oppose the spread of plutonium-separation technology to
additional countries.
MOX fuel at greater risk of terror theft
Countries that reprocess spent fuel stockpile the plutonium in interim storage
facilities. Some of these countries, including Great Britain, have no plans for this
material. Other countries have used some of the plutonium as MOX fuel in
reactors, or plan to do so. However, separating the plutonium for potential use
does not eliminate its hazardsit greatly aggravates them, as the stockpiles are
much more vulnerable to release from an accident or a terrorist attack than if
they were immobilized in a stable matrix such as glass and placed in a permanent
repository. Transporting, processing, and irradiating the plutonium also increase
the risk that it will be released into the environment. If the plutonium is used in
MOX fuel, the spent MOX fuel contains more long-lived transuranics than spent
uranium fuel. No country has reprocessed the plutonium in spent MOX fuel and
then reused it, because the costs and safety risks rise with each reprocessing
cycle. In fact, although France has a policy of reusing the plutonium in spent MOX
fuel, it has not done so, and ultimately may not (see Box 5, p. 50). Thus, spent
MOX fuel must also be placed in a permanent geologic repository, further
diminishing the benefits of the repository.
Large scale breeder development substantially increases terrorism risks
Stuart White is the director of the Institute for Sustainable Futures at the University of Technology, 2005, The
Nuclear Option Expensive, Ineffective, and Unnecessary, http://www.smh.com.au/news/Opinion/The-nuclearpower-optionexpensive-ineffective-and-unnecessary/2005/06/12/1118514925517.html
Second, if there was such a large-scale deployment of nuclear power, the only means by which it could become
sustainable in the long term is through the use of breeder reactors, which create their own fuel in the form of
plutonium. These reactors have never shown their ability to generate sufficient new fuel. Even if breeders could
operate as intended, this would mean that plutonium, a highly hazardous radioactive material, would be
408

transported in increasing quantities around the globe. The potential diversion of even a small fraction of this
material would significantly increase the threat of nuclear terrorism
409
Energy Price Links

Reprocessing raises energy costs by billions
Reprocessing also would be very expensive, increasing the costs of nuclear power in the United States by
billions of dollars a year. Yet, the House vote took place without hearings being held. Given the high stakes
involved, Congress owes the American people the opportunity for an open and informed debate on the issues
involved.
Reprocessing dramatically increases nuclear energy costs
There is widespread agreement in the United States and abroad that reprocessing and recycling
is significantly more expensive than storing spent fuel in an underground repository and buying
fresh low-enriched uranium (LEU). This is because reprocessing is an expensive process and also
because fabricating mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel containing the recovered plutonium mixed with
depleted uranium is more expensive than buying the alternative, fresh LEU fuel. Thus far, the
only country to implement a comprehensive reprocessing and recycling program is France. However,
in 2000, the French government concluded that even with the initial costs of its reprocessing and MOX
fuel fabrication plants paid for, if France were to stop reprocessing in 2010, it would save $4-5 billion
over the remaining life-time of its current fleet of power reactors. A study by Japans New Nuclear
Policy-Planning Council recently estimated that the total extra cost for reprocessing 32,000 tons of
Japans spent fuel (about half as much as U.S. reactors have discharged thus far) and recycling the
plutonium would be about $60 billion. Three recent U.S. academic studies find that reprocessing
and recycling would also be more expensive in the United States than directly disposing of spent
fuel.
410
Energy Price Links

Reprocessing to eliminate waste would raise costs even more
Substantial reductions in repository requirements could be achieved only if all the long-lived
transuranic elements in the spent fuel were separated and recycled repeatedly in reactors until they
were fissioned. This separation-and-transmutation system would be even more expensive, however,
than traditional reprocessing and single recycle as currently practiced in France. If fast-neutron
reactors or accelerators were used to transmute the long-lived radionuclides more efficiently, the cost
would be even higher.
No one knows how expensive a complete separation-and-transmutation system would be, because
the technology has not been fully developed and demonstrated, but, in the early 1990s, the Energy
Department commissioned the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) to do a thorough study of the
benefits and costs of separating and fissioning the long-lived transuranic elements in spent fuel. The
1996 report found that the benefits if any would be small, while the costs would be very high. The
excess cost for a [separation and transmutation] disposal system over once-through disposal for the
62,000 [metric tons] of [light-water reactor] spent fuel [approximately the amount currently slated for
Yucca Mountain] is uncertain but is likely to be no less than $50 billion and easily could be more than
$100 billion if adopted by the United States.
411
Energy Price Links Expanding Reprocessing Wont Solve Cost Issues

Expanding reprocessing wont lower the costs
It is sometimes argued that reprocessing will become economically attractive as the cost of reprocessing
decreases or as nuclear power expands and uranium prices increase. At the average uranium price paid by
U.S. reactor operators in 2004 ($33 per kilogram), our calculations indicate that reprocessing would have to cost
less than $400 per kilogram of spent fuel in order to be competitive with direct disposal. Yet, if the cost of
building a new U.S. reprocessing facility were similar to those of facilities in France and the United Kingdom,
the cost of reprocessing would be more than $2,000 per kilogram. Even if reprocessing costs could somehow
be cut in half to $1,000 per kilogram of spent fuel, the price of uranium would have to rise to nearly $400
per kilogram in order for reprocessing to be cost effective. It is extremely unlikely that world uranium
prices will rise to this level in the next 50 years, even if nuclear power expands dramatically.
Advanced reprocessing techniques even more expensive
The PUREX process has been in use for more than five decades, and it seems unlikely that
dramatic cost reductions could be achieved using this or the new more elaborate UREX+
reprocessing technology currently favored by the Energy Department. Indeed, increasingly
stringent environmental and safety regulations could be expected to put upward pressures on costs.
The experience at the new Rokkasho-mura reprocessing facility in Japan, where initial capital
cost estimates more than tripled to about $20 billion, serves as a cautionary example. A range of
alternative chemical separation processes have been proposed over the decades. One that attracted
support from the 2001 energy commission chaired by Vice President Dick Cheney is
electrometallurgical processing, or pyroprocessing. Recent official reviews have concluded,
however, that such techniques are likely to be substantially more expensive than PUREX. Thus,
there is no reason to believe that economics will favor reprocessing.
412
Spending Links
GNEP has undermined the Generation IV focus
From 2002 to 2005, the primary goal of the U.S. Generation IV program was to develop the Next Generation
Nuclear Plant (NGNP), focusing on high-temperature process heat (850C-1000C) and innovative approaches
to making energy products, such as hydrogen, that might benefit the transportation industry or the chemical
industry. At the end of 2005, DOE shifted the fundamental emphasis of the overall Generation IV program,
making spent fuel management using a closed fuel cycle the main goal of the NE program. This new GNEP
priority led to reduced funding for the NGNP programs; phasing out of the SCWR, GFR, MSR, and LFR R&D
programs, and refocusing of the SFR concept to nearterm demonstration. With these changes, NGNPs VHTR
remains the only major reactor concept that is not integrated into the GNEP program.
GNEP will cost billions

If executed as envisioned by its advocates, GNEP would result in the construction of commercial
scale facilities for spent fuel reprocessing and disposal by burning the resultant plutonium and
minor actinides together in advanced burner reactors, thereby reducing the radioactive burden on
the waste repository. As proposed, GNEP would cost billions of dollars over several decades.
An effective GNEP costs $100-$200 billion
Lionel Beehner, Council on Foreign Relations, 2006 (Chernobyl, Nuclear Power, and Foreign
Policy, http://www.cfr.org/publication/10534/chernobyl_nuclear_power_and_foreign_policy.html)
The Bush administration's Global Nuclear Energy Partnership, announced in February, includes
a $120 million plan to remove radioactive material with long half lives, such as plutonium, via
chemical processing in favor of storing nuclear fuel with shorter half-lives, which as Ferguson points
out, "may only need a few hundred years before it decays to relatively safe levels," as opposed to tens
of thousands of years. Some experts say for such a plan to be effective it may require between $100
billion and $200 billion over the next twenty to thirty years.
413
Spending Links
Reprocessing 2X uranium reactor costs
While these price increases are dramatic, they do not justify reprocessing to recover plutonium from spent fuel for subsequent recycling as mixed oxide fuel (MOx) in light water reactors. The 2003 MIT
study compared this choice with $13.60/lb uranium and $100/kgSWU enrichment prices. This yielded a 5 mill/kWh fuel price; using very conservative estimates for reprocessing and mixed oxide fuel
. With $2000/ton reprocessing and $1500/kg mixed oxide

fuel prices, a closed fuel cycle costs about twice the MIT value, or 4.3 cents/kWh.
fabrication yielded closed cycle fuel costs that were more than a factor of four higher
414
Reprocessing Wont Solve Waste

GNEP provides no short-term waste solutions
The domestic need for waste management, security, and fuel supply is not great enough to justify
early deployment of commercial-scale reprocessing and fast reactor facilities. In particular, the
near-term need for deployment of advanced fuel cycle infrastructure to avoid a second repository
for spent fuel is far from clear. Even if a second repository were to be required in the near term,
the committee does not believe that GNEP would provide short-term answers.
Reprocessing creates massive quantities of medium-grade waste

He also slammed the report for holding out the carrot that the United States might take in foreign-spent fuel. "There have
been many studies showing it is foolish to think that reprocessing buys you anything with regard to waste management for
geological disposition," Sokolski said. "You create vast quantities of medium-level waste that you didn't have before. . . .
What you end up doing is leaving stuff above ground longer that you would otherwise put directly in. So it's a very
technical topic and the treatment they gave this here . . . reads like something from the Nuclear Energy Institute or
somebody promoting Yucca Mountain. It's not really a complete discussion." -- Christopher J. Castelli
Reprocessing doesnt eliminate the need for disposal of current wastes

In fact, reprocessing does not eliminate the need for a repository, and there is no urgent need for additional
repository capacity.
415

Reprocessing still requires waste storage
Greg Turk is vice president at Ventyx in Columbus, Ohio, July 2008, Public Utilities Fortnightly, p. 50
The Bush administration has encouraged reprocessing as part of the 2006 Global Nuclear Energy Partnership
(GNEP). The stated objectives of GNEP include furthering national security, transitioning the United States
from an open-cycle to closed-cycle nuclear industry in order to exploit theoretical Generation IV nuclearsystems technology, provide fuel and technology to developing countries and to aid in nuclear-waste disposal. In
spite of a current membership of 19 countries, GNEP has been controversial. On economic grounds, the
Congressional Budget Office determined that this reprocessing path would be much more costly than waste
disposal. On a national security basis, the Union of Concerned Scientists and others have implored Congress to
reject the program because it would proliferate plutonium. Finally, from a nuclear-waste management
standpoint, the technologies envisioned, while producing a lower volume of HLW, still requires eventual
disposal in a Yucca-like repository.
416

GNEP will not reduce nuclear waste
The proposed GNEP system of fast burner reactors will not result in more efficient
use of waste repositories. While the proposed GNEP system could, in principle,
significantly reduce the amount of heat-producing actinides that would need
disposal in a geologic repository, thus allowing it to accept more waste, this
potential cannot be realized in practice. As the National Academy of Sciences and
the U.S. Department of Energy have found, reducing the actinides by a
meaningful amount would require operating a large system of nuclear facilities
over a period of centuries, and cost hundreds of billions of dollars more than
disposing of spent fuel directly.
Reprocessing doesnt solve waste
The claim is often made that radioactive waste still contains 95 percent of its useable content and can be
recycled as fuel for new, proliferation-proof reactors. This recycling, or reprocessing, would supposedly
reduce the need for long-term storage and the associated quagmire of the Yucca Mountain site. However, these
claims are being made outside the bounds of historical experience with reprocessing or the attendant economic
considerations, technical barriers and geo-political realities. The notion of reprocessing irradiated nuclear fuel is
not a new one. The separation of plutonium and uranium from irradiated fuel was launched in the 1970s as part
of a plan to make breeder reactors the dominant technology by 2000. However, this plan never materialized due
to exorbitant costs, unmanageable pollution and the proliferation of weapons-useable nuclear materials as well
as the unfulfilled promise of waste eradication. Falling far short of the promised boom, worldwide only a
handful of reprocessing facilities were ever built and even fewer have been able to remain operational. The only
private commercial reprocessing facility to operate in the US, at West Valley, New York, was such an
environmental and fiscal disaster that only one years worth of fuel was reprocessed in six years of operation.
The mess this activity left behind is estimated to eventually cost at least $5.2 billion 206 to clean up. The three
federal reprocessing facilities which were used to separate plutonium for the US nuclear weapons program, the
Hanford Reservation in Washington State, Idaho National Laboratories and the Savannah River Site in South
Carolina, are often characterized as among the most toxic locales on the planet. Just as no country has been able
to engineer a solution for radioactive waste, no country has been able to safely or economically reprocess waste
and achieve a closedloop fuel cycle. Japans Rokkasho reprocessing plant took 12 years to build and cost three
times more than estimated to build.207 A study commissioned by the French government found that reprocessing
is indubitably uneconomical, having cost around $25 billion in excess of a typical once-through cycle, and
cannot make even a meager contribution to the reduction of long-lived radionuclides in waste. 208 In fact, the
reverse happens since the same radioactivity is spread out over a larger volumeresulting in massive increases in
lowlevel waste. In low-level dumps these wastes are not sequestered from our environment, likely
increasing the overall long term environmental impact.
417
418

Reprocessing changes the fuel in a way that undermines the safety of geological storgage
Some argue that reprocessing spent fuel will reduce the volume of high-level
waste needing disposal in a geologic repository. Because spent fuel from lightwater reactors is mainly uranium, these proponents of reprocessing maintain that
removing it would result in a smaller quantity of waste. However, it is the level of
heat generated by the wastenot the volumethat determines how much waste
a repository can store. If the waste is packed too densely in the tunnels, and the
heat output is high enough that the temperature exceeds the boiling point of
water, permanent changes could occur in the chemical, mechanical, and
hydrological properties of the surrounding rock. Such changes could compromise
the ability of the repository to isolate the waste from the environment over the
required time period
PUREX reprocessing does not significantly reduce wastes
As Chapter 4 noted, some countries have used the PUREX method to reprocess
spent fuel over the past several decades (or contracted with other countries to do
so). This process separates both plutonium and uranium from spent reactor fuel,
and then from each other. The transuranic elements plutonium, americium and
curium are the main sources of heat in spent fuel after a few hundred years;
americium and curium remain in the waste stream and would require disposal in a
permanent repository. Thus, the PUREX process does not significantly reduce the
heat output, or the size of the required repository. 103
419

Reprocessing generates additional waste streams
As noted, reprocessing also generates additional waste streams. When spent fuel
is chopped and dissolved for reprocessing, volatile fission products such as the
noble gases and the halogensare released as gases. These radioactive gases
are either vented through smokestacks or trapped on filters. If released, the gases
contribute to both near-term and long-term radiological exposure. If captured, the
spent filters must be disposed of as radioactive waste. (Whether they are
considered low-level or transuranic waste depends on the concentrations and
types of radionuclidessee Box 6.) Besides the high-level liquid waste from the
first extraction cycle, reprocessing plants have also generated large volumes of
liquid wastes. For example, liquids used to clean solvents and flush pipes become
radioactive. After some radionuclides are removed, their volume can be reduced
through evaporation; the water vapor is vented out the smokestack. The
remaining concentrated waste will be low-level or transuranic waste, depending
on its composition. But there is a trade-off between reducing or eliminating liquid
waste and increasing the volume of solid low-level and transuranic wastes that
require disposal beneath the earths surface. Reprocessing also generates large
amounts of solid wastes ranging from the cladding removed from spent fuel to
contaminated clothing. When a reprocessing plant is eventually deactivated and
decommissioned, it also must be disposed of in a waste facility (the type of
facility will again depend on the type and quantity of contamination).
420

GNEPs fast rectors wont reduce waste
A major selling point of the proposed GNEP is that it will use fast reactors to burn
up highly radioactive actinides, thus greatly reducing the amount of nuclear
waste requiring disposal in a geologic repository. Supporters of this approach say
one of the goals is to optimize the use of the first repository and reduce the
need for, or avoid a second repository.177 In fact, Deputy Secretary of Energy Clay
Sell has repeatedly testified that unless the U.S. implements the GNEP program, it
will need nine geologic repositories the size of Yucca Mountain to dispose of the
spent fuel that will be generated by the year 2100, assuming that U.S. nuclear
capacity rises from about 100 reactors today to about 600 in 2100. 178 The DOE
has argued that such an actinide recycle system could ultimately increase
repository capacity by a factor of 50 to 100.179 This could potentially enable the
United States not only to dispose of high-level waste from a greatly expanded
domestic nuclear energy program, but also to dispose of high-level waste from
other countries that have leased U.S. fuel under GNEP, according to Assistant
Secretary of Energy Dennis Spurgeon.180 In addition to capacity, there is also the
issue of how long any geologic repository must remain intact. As noted, the EPA
was expected at press time to issue revised standards that would require
regulating the radiation dose to the public for 1 million years after Yucca Mountain
closesa standard that simply may be impossible to meet, given limits in todays
modeling techniques. In response, the DOE has claimed that an actinideburning
system would reduce the toxicity of the waste in a repository, so the peak
radiation dose would occur within a thousand years rather than within a million,
which could simplify licensing.181 Various claims made by proponents about the
potential of GNEP to increase the capacity of Yucca Mountain by 10 to 100 times
appear to stem from a single article by a group of Argonne scientists headed by
Roald Wigeland, published in the April 2006 issue of Nuclear Technology.182 These
scientists calculated the increase in waste density that could be achieved by
removing highly radioactive actinides, which generate a lot of heat, based on how
efficiently the actinides could be separated from the other waste. Scientists now
believe there are two limits on the amount of heat the waste placed in a geologic
repository can generate: one short-term (hundreds of years) and one longer-term
(thousands of years). The longer-term limit is less restrictive. To achieve the
greatest gains and stay below the longer-term limit, the actinides plutonium,
americium, and curium must be removed from the waste with high separation
421
efficiency. To achieve further gains without exceeding the short-term limit, the
relatively short-lived fission products cesium-137 and strontium- 90 (which have a
30-year half-life) must also be removed. Neptunium-237 is not a major heatgenerating radionuclide. However, it, too, would have to be removed from the
waste in a more densely packed repository to ensure that the peak radiation dose
occurs within a thousand years, as it would contribute the most radiation to the
dose received by someone exposed to the waste after 10,000 years. Clearly, if
heat-generating radionuclides can be extracted from spent fuel, then more
residual waste can be packed into a heat-limited repository. However, simply
removing cesium, strontium, and actinides from spent fuel will accomplish
nothing unless these materials are also safely stored. Because cesium-137 and
strontium-90 produce most of the decay heat from spent fuel in the short run,
they must be actively cooled for two or three centuries, or provided with passive
coolinglike that provided by the dry casks now used to store spent fuel. Because
the amount of waste in dry casks is also limited by the amount of heat the waste
generates, dry-cask storage for cesium-137 and strontium-90 would be similar to
that for spent fuel. The DOE argues that cesium-137 and strontium- 90 can be
placed in 300-year decay storage. However, simply storing intact spent fuel for
300 years before disposal would be far less expensive and risky than removing
cesium-137 and strontium- 90 and storing them separately. (Although intact spent
fuel would not remain highly radioactive, and thus self-protective, for 300 years,
very large and heavy spent fuel assemblies would still restrict access to the
plutonium.) Furthermore, to achieve the DOEs goal of an increase in repository
capacity by a factor of 50 to 100, the plutonium, neptunium, and other longlived
actinides in reactor fuel must be almost completely fissioned. Yet each reactor
cycle consumes only a small fraction of these elements. To reduce them by a
meaningful amount, the spent fuel must be reprocessed and reused repeatedly
over many years. If this system shuts down at some point, the remaining
actinides will have to be disposed of in a repository anyway. An enormous amount
of money would have been spent for a relatively modest benefit. A
comprehensive 1996 study by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) has shown
that an actinide recycle system that would employ fast reactors would not be able
to attain this goal in a reasonable period of time. The study also found that to
have even a chance of meeting its goals, an actinide recycle system would
require an extraordinary engineering effort.183 But even if such a transmutation
system could be built, coordinated, and operated, it would be very expensive, and
have to run for a long time. Under a scenario in which the amount of U.S. nuclear
power falls, and the total inventory of spent fuel is 62,000 metric tons (compared
with about 60,000 metric tons in 2007), the NAS concluded that a fast reactor
system (with a 0.65 breeding ratio184) would cost some $500 billion and require
about 150 years. If the amount of nuclear power remained constant, the NAS
422
found that: The . . . operating time required to reduce the inventory of residual TRUs
[transuranic elements] to even 1% of the inventory of the . . . LWR once-through fuel
cycle would be unrealistically long, on the order of many millenia. The first century of
constant-power transmutation could only reduce the inventory fraction to about 14%.
The NAS did not evaluate a scenario in which the amount of nuclear power rises.
However, the DOE recently assessed the economics of its GNEP plan given a
roughly six-fold increase in U.S. nuclear energy by 2100.185 In that case (which
used the same breeding ratio assumed by the NAS), the system reduced the
amount of transuranics by only about 50 percent after 100 years, compared with
the direct-disposal fuel cycle.186 And the DOE study found that the cost of
achieving this reduction would be more than twice the cost of direct disposal
alonetranslating to an additional cost of more than $750 billion. 187 But the DOE
study does not compare apples to apples, because it charges the direct-disposal
scenario with the full cost of 12 large geologic repositories, but does not charge
the GNEP scenario with the cost of disposing of the 51 percent of the actinide
inventory that remains in the fuel cycle. The DOE also assumes that 100 years
from now, institutions will be in place to ensure that the GNEP system will remain
fully functional. Without that guarantee, there can be no assurance that the
remaining heat-bearing actinides could be managed safely. And the only way to
provide such assurance would be to dispose of those elements in six geologic
repositories. This would cost another several hundred billion dollarsfor a total
cost of more than $1 trillion (undiscounted) for the GNEP option, compared with
direct disposal. This last challenge underscores the fact that the GNEP proposal
does not satisfy a fundamental ethical principle for the disposal of nuclear waste:
intergenerational equity. This principle can be summarized as follows:188 The
liabilities of waste management should be considered when undertaking new
projects. Those who generate the wastes should take responsibility, and provide
the resources, for managing these materials in a way that will not impose undue
burdens on future generations. Wastes should be managed in a way that
secures an acceptable level of protection for human health and the environment,
and affords to future generations at least the level of safety acceptable today. A
waste management strategy should not assume a stable social structure in the
indefinite future, nor technological advances. Rather, it should aim to bequeath a
passively safe situation: that is, one that does not rely on active institutional
controls to maintain safety and security. Direct disposal of spent fuel in a geologic
repository that can contain the waste without active intervention is the epitome
of a system that meets the principle of intergenerational equity. Although such a
repository has not yet been licensed, the scientific consensus is that it is feasible.
In contrast, GNEP requires a complex system of dangerous facilities that must be
operated and repeatedly rebuilt for centuries. These facilities include those that
allow aboveground decay storage of short-lived fission products, and a host of
423
added facilities needed to reprocess and fission highly radioactive actinides. This
system clearly fails to meet fundamental criteria for responsible waste
management.
424
Politics Links
GNEP caught in budget fights
International Security Advisory Board, April 7, 2008, Report on the Proliferation Implications of the Global
Expansion of Civil Nuclear Power, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/105587.pdf
However, the GNEP initiative has moved slowly because its budget plan has been caught up in the
Continuing Budget Resolution for federal expenditures, which does not allow for new starts. The
GNEP current budget of $167.5M arises through allowed redirections of related programs, whereas the
request for 2008 was for $395M.
Congress opposes substantial GNEP expansion

Congress has itself raised concerns about GNEP. In the Consolidated Appropriations Act FY2008 (P.L.
110-161), Congress provided $181 million out of $395 million requested by the administration. Of this
amount, $151 million is for research, development, and design activities, with no funds for
constructing facilities for technology demonstration or commercialization.92 The additional $30 million
is for upgrades to existing facilities. The administration had proposed that technology demonstration
facilities be built and begin operating in the period FY2008-FY2020. In its press release, the House
Energy and Water Appropriations Committee said that the budget cuts were made because it is
unnecessary to rush into a plan that continues to raise concerns among scientists and has only weak
support from industry given that there are reasonable options available for short term storage of
nuclear waste and that this project will cost tens of billions of dollars and last for decades.
425
Politics Links
Congressional opposition to GNEP
In 2007, Congress became alarmed about the Energy Departments proposal to commit quickly tens of
billions of dollars to the construction of a huge reprocessing plant in the United States. The House
Appropriations energy and water development subcommittee was particularly concerned and stated
bluntly in the report on its proposed fiscal year 2008 energy and water appropriations bill that the
aggressive program proposed by the Department is at best premature and that before the
Department can expect the Committee to support funding for a major new initiative, the Department
must provide a complete and credible estimate of the life-cycle costs of the program. A few months
later, a review of the Energy Departments nuclear energy research and development program by the
National Academy of Sciences National Research Council came to a similar conclusion when it
reported that [a]ll committee members agree that the GNEP program should not go forward and
should be replaced by a less aggressive research program. Finally, in the House-Senate conference
report that accompanied the consolidated appropriations act for fiscal year 2008, Congress instructed
the Energy Department that no funds are provided for facility construction for technology
demonstration or commercialization. Accordingly, in its fiscal year 2009 budget request, submitted in
February 2008, the Bush administration postponed plans to select sites for construction of a
commercial-scale reprocessing plant and a fast-neutron reactor and only sought funds for research and
development. It still proposes, however, to build a smaller facility at a national lab site to develop
reprocessing techniques on a pilot-plant scale. The decision on whether to push forward beyond the
research and development stage will be left to the next administration and Congress.
No political support for reprocessing
Meanwhile, the movement towards reprocessing is meeting firm opposition, including a 2008 GNEP budget set
at one-half requested levels and with no support for demonstration projects.
426
*** Reprocessing Good ***
427
Plan Remove Reprocessing Restrictions

Restrictions on reprocessing should be removed
http://www.heritage.org/Research/EnergyandEnvironment/wm1898.cfm Remove any political and legal barriers to
nuclear fuel reprocessing. Congress and the Administration should state that they recognize the potential benefit that
reprocessing spent nuclear fuel can bring to spent fuel management. This does not mean that the Department of Energy
should build a reprocessing plant; it means that it should rethink how the nation deals with spent nuclear fuel. The current
method of taking the fuel directly from the reactor to Yucca is not sustainable. All options should be considered, including
private-sector spent fuel management and reprocessing.
428
Domestic Reprocessing Inadequate Now

Congress has provided little money for reprocessing
President Bush's Global Nuclear Energy Partnership - known as GNEP - calls for construction of a recycling plant that
would be ready by 2020. GNEP's goal is to encourage the use of nuclear power worldwide, while preventing the loss or
misuse of plutonium. The idea is to persuade countries that are planning to build their first nuclear power plants to forego
recycling and instead obtain reactor fuel from the United States or a few other countries that already possess recycling
capability. The administration has asked Congress for funds needed to establish a nuclear recycling center, which would
include the recycling plant, an advanced "fast reactor" capable of using the recycled fuel and a research facility to develop
new technologies for recycling that would make it more difficult to convert plutonium into a bomb. But Congress has
provided little money for GNEP. Some members of the House and Senate are reluctant to acknowledge that nuclear nonproliferation safeguards are more likely to be observed by countries if they're given an opportunity to obtain nuclear fuel for
electricity production.
Reprocessing funding cut now

Congress has been skeptical of the efforts to promote GNEP and reprocessing and cut over 50 percent of the funding
request last year, Tomero said, noting Capitol Hill will likely cut the funding again this year.
U.S. nuclear policy doesnt influence other nations
Indeed, there is not much evidence that U.S. domestic policies have much influence on the internal behavior of
other nations, and it is for this reason that I strongly doubt that U.S. domestic reprocessing has any effect on
international nuclear proliferation. However, appropriate international steps to place barriers to countries
seeking their own reprocessing and enrichment capabilities, coupled with economic incentives, can result in
constraining and even eliminating proliferation risks.
429
Global Reprocessing Inevitable

European countries reprocess now
Outside of the United States, countries including the U.K., France and most recently Japan, reprocess spent
nuclear fuel in a closed cycle as an integral part of their nuclear programs. As a consequence, these countries
have created far less HLW per unit of electricity produced, yet they have developed a large amount of very high
level waste in the form of plutonium. In this processed form, plutonium is far less toxic and is more easily used
to create a fission reaction; thus it is more prone to theft and more desirable to steal than if left in the postreactor spent state. This has contributed to general concerns over proliferation of weapons-grade nuclear
materials and more specifically over rogue nations or terrorists acquiring these materials to build a nuclear
bomb.
430
Reprocessing Solves Electricity Shortages

Breeders generate an unlimited supply of electricity
Defense Watch, no date, Nuclear Waste & Breeder ReactorsMyth & Promise,
http://www.argee.net/DefenseWatch/Nuclear%20Waste%20and%20Breeder%20Reactors.htm
This type of reactor, called a Breeder Reactor, actually produces more fuel than it consumes. A reactor
designed to use a mixed Plutonium fuel is basically the same as the Uranium reactor we have already discussed.
However, the neutrons that sustain the reaction contain more energy - they are commonly known as
"fast" neutrons. In order to regulate the internal neutron flux, the primary coolant typically is one of the light
metals like Sodium. Since Uranium-238 is one of the more abundant elements in the Earth's crust, Breeder
Reactors make it possible to have an essentially unlimited source of fuel for nuclear reactors - which
means an unlimited supply of electricity.
431
Breeders Solve Waste

Breeders do not generate nuclear waste
At its best, the Breeder Reactor system produces no nuclear waste whatever - literally everything
eventually gets used. In the real world, there actually may be some residual material that could be
considered waste, but its half-life - the period of time it takes for half the radioactivity to dissipate - is on
the order of thirty to forty years. By contrast, the half-life for the stuff we presently consider nuclear
waste is over 25,000 years!
432
GNEP Doesnt Causes Prolif/Terrorism

GNEP develops recycling and protects fuel cycle security
GNEP would:
develop and deploy advanced means for recycling spent fuel (without separating out the plutonium);
develop and deploy advanced reactors that consume transuranics from recycled spent fuel;
establish supply arrangements among nations to provide reliable fuel services worldwide, and taking
back spent fuel for recycling, without further spreading of enrichment and reprocessing technologies;
and
cooperate with the IAEA to develop enhanced nuclear safeguards to monitor nuclear materials and
facilities to ensure they are only used for peaceful purposes.
GNEP erects proliferation barriers
GNEP would favor only those reprocessing methods that keep the plutonium and uranium fuels mixed
together rather than being separated prior to their re-introduction into reactors. The rationale for this
approach is to erect an additional barrier that potential proliferators would have to overcome should
they attempt to construct a nuclear weapon. They would first have to develop a means to separate the
uranium and plutonium metals. Whether or not this new thinking by the United States can convince
other nations to change their own reprocessing approaches is not known, but the costs for the changes
are low in comparison to the benefits for nonproliferation.
Participation in GNEP stimulates global cooperation on waste and strengthens global non-proliferation
Opening up the U.S. plans to consider reprocessing of spent fuel can put us in an improved position to partner with the
other leading nuclear power nations to collaborate in developing more acceptable solutions worldwide. Already Russia, the
United Kingdom, France, China, and Japan have indicated interest in such joint efforts. U.S. participation in global
cooperation with the nuclear power supplier states to jointly solve and implement solutions to the current problems of
the tail-end of the nuclear fuel cycle can be a motivator to simultaneously strengthen nonproliferation protections as
well. Past U.S. opposition to reprocessing has left us isolated from being a stronger player in the development of common
solutions to these problems and lessened our influence in emphasizing proliferation concerns as this work proceeds.
433

GNEP no longer restricts PUREX reprocessing
Yet only two years after Bushs speech, spurred by the fear that the inability to remove spent nuclear
fuel piling up at reactor sites in the United States and many other countries would threaten a nuclear
renaissance, the Bush administration subsumed its initial proposal into a new scheme known as the
Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP). One of the chief objectives of GNEP was to promote the
virtues of spent nuclear fuel reprocessing and the civil use of plutonium as a nuclear waste
management strategy. Although GNEP represented a reversal of previous U.S. policies that opposed
the spread of reprocessing, the Bush administration billed GNEP as a nonproliferation initiative
because it would still limit reprocessing facilities to the nuclear-weapons states and Japan and would
use reprocessing technologies that would not separate pure plutonium, unlike the PUREX (plutonium
and uranium extraction) technology in use today. GNEP member states without reprocessing plants
would be encouraged to send their spent fuel to other countries for reprocessing. Today, GNEP no
longer adheres to these constraints. Eager for support from reprocessing states such as France, Japan,
and Russia, the Bush administration has stopped warning about the dangers of separated plutonium. It
now advocates the quick deployment of a minor variant of PUREX for reprocessing U.S. power
reactor fuel, even though this modification would produce a mixture of uranium and plutonium that
would be as vulnerable to theft or diversion as plutonium alone. For the longer term, the Bush
administration champions liquid sodium-cooled fast-neutron reactors and pyroprocessing, a form of
reprocessing that it describes as proliferation resistant although it falls far short of any commonsense definition of this standard.
GNEP encourages global reprocessing
At U.S. urging, 20 other countries, including South Korea, have now joined the United States in
signing a GNEP Statement of Principles that embraces the development and use of reprocessing
technology and contains no commitments on the part of its members to limit the spread of sensitive
fuel cycle facilities such as reprocessing plants. In promoting the development of pyroprocessing and
other experimental separations technologies, the Bush administration says it hopes to persuade those
countries that currently use conventional PUREX reprocessing to switch to these other technologies
eventually, thereby ending the production of pure plutonium. Yet through GNEP, the administration is
promoting reprocessing primarily to countries that do not reprocess at all but rather store their spent
fuel. Spent fuel storage is a far more proliferation-resistant management strategy than any form of
reprocessing.
434

Reprocessing expands nuclear terrorism risks
The degree to which an expansion of nuclear power would increase the risk of
nuclear terrorism depends largely on whether reprocessing is part of the fuel
cycleinternationally or in the United States. Reprocessing changes plutonium
from a form in which it is highly radioactive and nearly impossible to steal to one
in which it is not radioactive and could be stolen surreptitiously by an insider or
taken by force during routine transportation. Building more facilities for
reprocessing spent fuel and making plutonium-based reactor fuel would provide
terrorists with more potential sources of plutonium, and perhaps with greater
ease of access. U.S. nuclear power does not now pose a risk that terrorists will
acquire material for nuclear weapons. However, the U.S. reprocessing program
now being pursued by the administration would change that. None of the
proposed new reprocessing technologies would provide meaningful protection
against nuclear terrorism or proliferation.
435
No Proliferation Leadership Now

U.S. dominance in nuclear power and global non-proliferation has collapsed
This paper traces the history of the United States in leading the production and commercialization of
nuclear power plants while also enjoying a dominant position in the nuclear supply market for several
decades. The United States exercised a leadership role in shaping a global nonproliferation regime, in
parallel with its civilian (non-defense) nuclear power efforts. Today the United States no longer enjoys
such a dominant position, having not ordered a new U.S. nuclear power plant for more than 30 years.
In the emerging expansion of civil nuclear power around the world, the United States is far from being
a dominant supplier of plants, equipment, or fuel, and has no real international role in the reprocessing
or spent fuel storage industries.
The world has not abandoned reprocessing because the U.S. has
The administration argued then that even though the possibility for stealing the separated plutonium
and uranium was not very likely within the United States, the risk for theft of such materials would be
substantially greater within foreign nations. The United States ultimately fell back to a posture of
attempting to set an example for the rest of the world by abolishing all reprocessing of our nuclear
spent-fuel wastes. At the time, the United States believed that by making such a pronouncement
against separation and reuse of fuels on proliferation grounds, both the European nations and Japan
would abandon their reprocessing plans a notion that history has proven to be nave. Now, after
nearly 30 years since those U.S. decisions, the fact is that no other nation has chosen to follow the U.S.
lead in this regard. Instead, the other industrial powers around the world have elected to reprocess their
fuel. Faced with this result and little likelihood that others will abandon their current course, different
alternatives for disposal of wastes are being examined within the Department of Energy and by the
nuclear industry. A key premise is that the United States should once again pursue reprocessing yet
maintain current emphases on controls to prevent theft of uranium and plutonium. Only those
technologies that do not result in separated plutonium are being considered
436
Reprocessing Solves Waste

New breeders will destroy waste
Breeders, of course, are not new. They were first developed 20 years ago in the United States, but shelved for fear that the
plutonium they create would cause problems in disposal and proliferation. The breeder technology that France expects to
have ready for commercialization in 30 years addresses these concerns. The reactors could be used to destroy the long-lived
radioactive components of spent reactor fuel, creating a new way of disposing of this hazardous material more effectively
and safely than is now possible. Waste treated by an advanced breeder would need to be buried only for a thousand years,
greatly simplifying the safeguards needed in a repository.
Reprocessing solves waste

If the spent fuel were to be saved for recycling, it could provide electricity for decades, extend uranium supplies and
significantly reduce the amount of nuclear waste. Experts say recycling in the United States poses no proliferation risk, and
its revival would enable our country to make good use of a valuable energy resource. Essentially, the only nuclear waste
that would need to be shipped to the Nevada repository for permanent disposal is a relatively small amount of spent fuel
that can't be recycled.
437
*** States Counterplan ***
438
States Counterplan Solvency

States provide nuclear incentives
Nuclear Energy Institute, February 21, 2008,

http://www.nei.org/newsandevents/newsreleases/wallstreet/
Analyses from several sources show that, with debt-financing support from the federal government in
the form of loan guarantees or helpful rate policies at the state level that support investment recovery,
new nuclear power plants will be competitive with the nations other large energy sources coal-fired
and natural gas-fired power plants. Implementation of the federal loan guarantee program is going
well. And a number of states in the South and Southeast have passed legislation providing companies
with incentives to build new nuclear capacity and providing assurance of investment recovery,
Bowman said
DOE cooperating with the states to pursue advanced nuclear power now
The U.S. Department of Energy considers nuclear power as the only proven technology that can
provide abundant supplies of base-load electricity reliably and without air pollution or emissions of
greenhouse gases.2 The National Energy Policy Development Group recommended in 2001 that
President Bush support the expansion of nuclear energy in the United States as a major component of
our national energy policy. About the same time, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) created the
Generation IV International Forum to collaborate with 10 other states in investigating innovative
nuclear energy system concepts for meeting future energy challenges. The Bush Administration
requested millions of dollars from Congress in 2003 to support several programs related to the
development of new nuclear power plants in the United States, including the Advanced Fuel Cycle
Initiative, and Generation IV. In passing the Energy Policy Act of 2005, Congress created certain
incentives and streamlined license application procedures for new nuclear power plants. In
States can provide nuclear incentives
Levelized cost, a construct frequently used in analyzing investment in electricity
generation, is the minimum price of electricity at which a technology generates enough
revenue to pay all of the utilities costs, including a sufficient return to investors. 10
Federal, state, and local policies can change the costs incurred by utilities by providing
incentives, which shift costs or financial risk to the public, or by levying taxes on the
utilities, which increases their costs.
439
CP States Ban Nuclear Power

Kentucky proves the states can ban nuclear power
Power Engineering, April 2008, p. 20
The article reports on the plan of legislators in Kentucky to remove the state ban on nuclear power plants.
According to sponsors of a state senate bill, storage of nuclear wastes on site at nuclear power plants would be
more safe. Under the moratorium on nuclear power plants, a long-term federal disposal site is needed before a
nuclear power plant can be constructed in the state
440
*** Waste Disposal/Storage ***
441
Topicality Incentives
Waste disposal is an incentive for advanced nuclear development
Nuclear Energy Institute, 2007, Government Must Meet Fuel Responsibility,
http://www.nei.org/keyissues/nuclearwastedisposal/policybriefs/govtmustmeetusedfuelresponsibility/
Reassessment of the nations used fuel management policies, together with the expansion of nuclear
power, has spurred new interest in recycling used nuclear fuel. The industry fully supports the
development of advanced nuclear fuel cycles, including advanced reprocessing technology, and
considers a successful repository program an essential step toward achieving these
goals. Even advanced fuel cycles will produce radioactive byproducts that will require disposal in a
repository. The development of advanced nuclear fuel cycles should not delay progress on the Yucca
Mountain repository. Advanced fuel cycles will require significant investment. To make that
investment with confidence, the federal government must progress further toward managing the
byproducts of todays fuel cycle. In reality, DOE will modify the repository many times to
accommodate future developments over the 50- to 300-year period that it is expected to be open. DOE
has said the license application will include methods for disposing of waste from advanced recycling
technology in the repository. But the disposal of todays byproducts must not be put on hold while we
develop new technologies. Completion of the Yucca Mountain project therefore should remain a
national priority.
442
Waste Disposal/Storage Increases Nuclear

Six states block nuclear power if no waste disposal option exists
Congressional Research Service, 2007 (March, Nuclear Power: Outlook for New Reactors,
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33442.pdf)
Six states California, Connecticut, Kentucky, New Jersey, West Virginia, and Wisconsin have
specific laws that link approval for new nuclear power plants to adequate waste disposal capacity.
Kansas forbids cost recovery for excess nuclear power capacity if no technology or means for
disposal of high-level nuclear waste is available.
Companies wont build more nuclear plants unless the waste problem is resolved
New York Times, June 4, 2001, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?
res=9F0DE4DA153FF937A35755C0A9679C8B63&n=Top/Reference/Times%20Topics/Subjects/W/Waste
%20Materials%20and%20Disposal
But it costs more than $1 million for enough casks to store a year's worth of fuel for one reactor. So
Peach Bottom's operator, at the time the parent company of the Philadelphia Electric Power Company,
was one of 12 utilities to sue the Energy Department to recoup its costs after the 1998 deadline; Peach
Bottom, like other reactors, had been paying the government a tenth of a cent per kilowatt-hour
generated, in exchange for a government promise, now broken, to take the fuel. Peach Bottom settled,
with the department agreeing that the plant could skip payments equal to the price of the casks. But
this has not placated Exelon, which is highly likely to be a builder of new plants if any are ever ordered
in this country. The company, like other utilities, would like the waste problem solved first.
Nuclear waste disposal critical to revival
Nuclear-waste management is a multi-billion dollar problem wrapped in a complex web of politics, public
opinion and technology choices. Embracing a greater future role for nuclear energy requires, in part, resolving
the perennially deferred problem of managing and ultimately disposing of the high-level waste (HLW) from this
nation's current and proposed nuclear power reactors.
443
Waste Disposal/Storage Increases Nuclear

Waste disposal critical to nuclear revival
Clearly, establishing the validity of long-term secure spent fuel and/or high-level waste geological
isolation is a critical step for responsible growth of nuclear power in response to electricity supply
and climate change imperatives.
Solving the waste problem leads to nuclear power expansion
Dorner says the nuclear industry's future depends "entirely" on federal subsidies. "The real reason that we
haven't had a new nuclear plant built in really 20 years or longer is not because people were too afraid or
because the industry has not found a way to solve its waste problem," he said. "They haven't been built because
they're super-expensive andnobody's been willing to put up the money to build them." Applications for new
plants are only starting to appear, he says, because of subsidies offered by the 2005 energy bill.
444
Inadequate Storage Now

Waste piles up, but no storage is available
With that settled, the Department of Energy announced in 2006 that Yucca Mountain would open for business in
2017. But later that year, when Harry Reid was chosen as Senate majority leader, he announced, Yucca
Mountain is dead. Itll never happen. The projects budget has been slashed. As a result, the question of storing
Americas nuclear waste remains open, even as more and more of that waste piles up around the country.
Massive expansion in waste and localized storage now
Marvin Fertel, Executive Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer at the Nuclear Energy Institute
(NEI), July 15, 2008, p. online
While it is important to note that new nuclear plants will be developed based on electricity market
fundamentals, the industry recognizes that the issue of safe and secure used fuel management is
important to all stakeholders as they look at the benefits of nuclear energy towards meeting our
electricity supply requirements and its environmental goals. In this regard, consistent with satisfying
the regulations imposed by the NRC and the oversight provided by the NRC, industry has achieved an
excellent record of safety in the management of used nuclear fuel. At present, there are 58,000 metric
tons of used reactor fuel rods currently in storage; most are located in steel and concrete vault-like
pools at nuclear plant sites. As these on- site storage facilities reach capacity, the oldest fuel rods are
moved to specially-designed steel and concrete dry containers. The industry has safely loaded 11,000
metric tons of fuel into 960 containers at 40 sites. As other nuclear plants reach capacity in their
storage vaults, the number of dry containers used for storage is expected to nearly double by 2020.
Waste piling up at reactor sites now
Charleston Post & Courier, June 9, 2008,
http://www.charleston.net/news/2008/jun/09/toward_safe_nuclear_waste_disposal43892/
Ultimately, the biggest long-term impediment may be a court ruling that could require proof of safe storage for
up to a million years, according to the AP. It's hard to fathom how such a long-term goal can be reasonably met.
Unless the standard is revised by Congress, it will prove troublesome in the permitting process and in the courts.
Meanwhile, the federal government already is about 10 years beyond its own deadline for providing for a safe
waste disposal site for commercial nuclear plants. Currently, the growing volume of waste is being stored on site
at numerous locations nationwide.
445
Inadequate Storage Now

Tens of thousands of tons of waste are stored at numerous locations throughout the U.S.
Discover Magazine, September 2002, http://discovermagazine.com/2002/sep/featyucca
Nuclear waste disposal is America's longest-running environmental headache. Tens of thousands of tons of
fiercely radioactive by-products of our nuclear power stations and nuclear weapons plants are stored at 131
separate locations. If packed in containers and brought together, the spent fuel rods and toxic liquids would
cover approximately 17 football fields. And the volume grows daily.
446
Solvency NRC Action

NRC can act on waste
Congress should have continued confidence that the industry`s demonstrated ability to safely and securely
manage these materials on-site provides a solid underpinning for the continued and expanded use of nuclear
energy. NRC`s existing ``Waste Confidence Rule`` provides a basis for addressing this issue in licensing
proceeding. Absent the passage of legislation that codifies waste confidence from a national policy perspective,
the basis for the existing NRC rule could be strengthened. Therefore, the industry believes that it is appropriate
for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to update its waste confidence finding through rulemaking. In this
regard, we look forward to the NRC expediting a rulemaking on this issue beginning this year.
447
Solvency Geological Storage

A U.S. geological depository will be modeled
However, no nation has come as far as the United States. The Department of Energy`s license application to the
NRC for the Yucca Mountain repository represents more progress than any other international project to build a
geologic disposal facility. The United States must continue to exercise the leadership that we have displayed in
getting to this point, as other nations look to follow our example.
Deep geological storage solves
While a number of countries ultimately will use their own repositories, the approach especially has appeal for
countries with smaller nuclear programs and that lack the correct geology for repository siting. The
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and others have proposed the use of deep boreholes, thousands of
meters inside the earth's mantle, as a possible future disposal technology. n3 The geology needed to support this
approach is found in many places around the world. The benefits of this method include a very stable resting
place well below the water table and possibly the ability to rely on the waste's thermal energy to create a melt
zone that eventually cools and further encapsulates the nuclear waste inside solid rock.
448
Solvency Geological Storage

Waste will last for millions of years
The careful analysis of Furber, Warf, and Plotkin thus points to the irrationality of current proposals to resort
massively to nuclear power as an answer to global warming. In order for nuclear power to make a dent in the
global warming problem it would be necessary to build hundreds of nuclear power plants around the world, each
one taking ten years to construct, and each an enormous hazard to the earth, generating radioactive wastes
lasting for hundreds or thousands or millions of years.
Deep geological storage solves waste problems
Challenges regarding subterranean disposal have already been solved. Because of breakthrough
methodologies evolved during construction (by the Energy Department) and certification (by the EPA),
New Mexico's Waste Isolation Pilot Plant is the world's first successful deep geologic repository for the
permanent isolation of federal (as opposed to commercial) nuclear waste. It is a model for other
nations. For political reasons, WIPP is permitted by Congress and the state of New Mexico to accept
only certain military waste. But nearly 1,000 detailed studies, as well as an innovation in probabilistic
risk assessment invented by WIPP's scientists, have demonstrated that its remoteness, size, and stable
geological and climatological features make it the safest place to store any type of waste. In fact, if
enlarged or annexed, the WIPP could hold all U.S. nuclear waste generated for decades to come.
Successful geological disposal is critical for a nuclear revival
Long-term storage of spent fuel prior to geological emplacement, specifically including international
spent fuel storage, should be systematically incorporated into waste management strategies. The
scope of waste management research and development (R&D) should be expanded significantly; an
extensive program on deep borehole disposal is an example. Successful operation of geological
disposal facilities and public acceptance of the soundness of this approach are essential for large-scale
new nuclear power deployment.
449
Solvency No Safe Way to Store

No safe way to dispose of wastes
Another facet of nuclear reactor operation, perhaps the major impediment, is the high-level waste
created, and the associated disposal problem. After some length of time, several months to several
years, the major components are the shorter-lived cesium-137 and strontium-90. Both have half-lives
of about thirty years, and the longer-lived transuranics, i.e., uranium and heavier species, last many
thousands of years. These waste components are mixed together within the fuel rods along with the
non-fissioning uranium-238, the most prevalent isotope. To date no acceptable technique has evolved
or been developed to handle properly these ionizing radioactive waste components. At present they
have to be stored, monitored, and repackaged when necessary. This inability to satisfactorily dispose of
the high-level waste from power reactors has stopped all construction in the United States. All U.S.
nuclear plants are protected by the Price-Anderson Act, which forces the taxpayer to be responsible for
any large-scale accident. Utility companies cannot afford the insurance for full coverage and would
have to shut down operation if Congress rescinded the Price-Anderson coverage.
No geologically safe way to dispose of wastes
Most of the 103 U.S. nuclear power reactors today are of the pressurized light water typethey use control rods
and build up high-level radioactive waste in them. The spent fuel rods are stored in what are called swimming
pools. Water is used for cooling the physically hot radioactive materials. So, now that these storage areas are
pretty full, the problem of what is to be done needs to be faced. Building more and larger swimming pools only
delays the day for carrying out a decision of what the long-term future will be for the troublesome material. A
multitude of geological burial techniques has been proposed, but all have been found to have significant
problems, and do not yet meet long-term engineering standards.
The federal government has not acted on nuclear waste disposal

Edward Fadeley of Creswell is ex-president of the Oregon Senate and a former state Supreme Court justice,
Register Guard, July 14, 2008, http://www.registerguard.com/csp/cms/sites/dt.cms.support.viewStory.cls?
The federal government has promised again and again to provide a safe, permanent, contained waste
storage site. In the 1970s, before the Three Mile Island disaster and the Chernobyl plant explosion and
while I was chairman of the Oregon Senate Energy and Environment Committee, the federal
government said it would have such a permanent waste storage site by 1982. It doesnt. Twenty-six
years later, the storage problem remains.
450
Solvency Dry Cask Storage

Dry cask storage can continue for 50 years
Fortunately, there is plenty of time to look before we leap. As the American Physical Societys Panel
on Public Affairs recently pointed out: Even though Yucca Mountain may be delayed considerably,
interim storage of spent fuel in dry casks, either at current reactor sites, or in a few regional
facilities, or at a single national facility, is safe and affordable for a period of at least 50 years
No way to neutralize waste dangers
Radioactive waste remains dangerous for millions of years, presenting an enormous challenge to health and
environment provisions for future generations. There are multiple threats from atomic waste: ionizing
radiation,18 toxic elements, and heavy metals, many of which are fissile (most of these could be used to make
nuclear weapons). Storage and handling of the waste is complicated for centuries by ambient radiation doses at
lethal levels, and the waste itself is a significant thermal heat source. Further, in every storage and transport step,
the possibility of unplanned criticality (nuclear chain reaction) is real. All claims of neutralizing this complex
material are fictitious; most are processes that would only serve to break up the heaviest elements, reducing the
concern that the waste could be mined for nuclear weapons materials; nonetheless, these processes multiply
the potential health hazards by multiplying the mutagenic, ionizing radiation manifold.
Yucca not big enough to solve most waste
The so-called solution to the irradiated fuel problem, the proposed high-level waste site at Yucca Mountain,
Nevada, is riddled with technical, geological, administrative and legal problems. The assumption that it will ever
open is no longer a reasonable one. Even if Yucca Mountain were to open, its storage capacity would be reached
with existing waste production by 2010194 (the current schedule for the site assumes opening in 2017, which is
increasingly unlikely), underscoring the fact that any further radioactive waste production will simply be
overflow with no new solution in sight.
451
Solvency Dry Cask Storage

Single mountain site is better than scattered storage across the U.S.
Charleston Post & Courier, June 9, 2008,
http://www.charleston.net/news/2008/jun/09/toward_safe_nuclear_waste_disposal43892/
The absence of a single, safe disposal site is a shortcoming in national security and national energy policy. The
interior of a mountain in a desert location is a better solution for radioactive waste than scattered temporary sites
across the nation. Dale Klein, chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, promised "an independent,
rigorous and thorough examination to determine whether the repository can safely house the nation's high level
waste." He stated that the agency's review will be "entirely on technical merits" a welcome departure from
the politics that have nearly derailed the process in recent years.
452
Solvency Interim Storage

Interim storage
In response to perpetual uncertainty and industry pressure to do something to address radioactive waste policy,
Congress perennially considers interim storage of high-level atomic waste. This rush to consolidate the
irradiated fuel in a single site is really a rush to get the waste off the utility sitesand to put ownership of and
liability for the waste onto taxpayers. This plan would precipitate the transport of commercial irradiated nuclear
fuel on roads, rails, and waterways. In the current version of this idea, the DOE would gain the authority to site a
waste dump within a state over the objections of state and local governments. Thus, in the absence of a viable
plan for moving the waste somewhere else, interim storage sites would become long-term overflow parking
for high-level radioactive wastes with nowhere else to go. Historically, as well as presently, the nuclear industry
and the federal government consistently promote waste storage options which unnecessarily compromise public
health and security. The most widely supported method for radioactive waste management is hardened on-site
storage that has security and accountability measures built into the design. 195 Key to the centralized interim
storage concept is the idea that it is better to put the waste in one temporary place. The result, however, would
be that one of the worst burdens ever created would be temporarily placed in a single congressional district
without prior agreement on a permanent solution. Once moved somewhere, the likelihood that the US Congress
would allocate time, interest, and most importantly funds to finding a real resolution to this problem would be
greatly decreased.
453
Solvency Deep Ocean Storage

Deep ocean storage solves nuclear waste
The final irony is that there is a much better way to dispose of spent nuclear fuel if we really don't want to keep
it around. We tend to think of the solid earth as just that, although anybody San Francisco or Los Angeles can
tell you that it just isn't so. Our planet's crust consists of a multitude of individual large pieces called
tectonic plates. These plates are constantly moving around the surface of the planet, jostling and rubbing
one another, and sliding over and under each other. For example, when the plate upon which the Indian subcontinent rests bumped into the Asian plate, the resultant crumpling formed the Himalayan mountain chain. The
Western Pacific plate slides under the Asian plate, forming the Marianas Trench, the deepest spot in the
ocean. These forces are enormous, surpassing by orders of magnitude anything else on this planet. As one
plate subducts under another, the entire plate edge is forced deep into the bowels of the Earth where it,
and everything on and in it, is totally transformed into the stuff that makes up the Earth's mantle. This
transformation results from tremendous pressure and from heat, caused in part by the pressure and by
radioactive substances contained within the Earth. The Challenger Deep in the Marianas Trench in the
Pacific is nearly 36,000 feet deep, over seven miles of water. If we were to drop the thousands of borated
glass encased drums of so-called nuclear waste into the Challenger Deep or some other fast-moving
subduction zone, within a few hundreds or thousands of years the material would be pulled deep within
the Earth's interior where it would be completely and utterly dissipated and destroyed.
454
Spending Disadvantage Answers

$30 billion already set aside for waste disposal
Nuclear Energy Institute, 2007, Government Must Meet Fuel Responsibility,
http://www.nei.org/keyissues/nuclearwastedisposal/policybriefs/govtmustmeetusedfuelresponsibility/
Electricity consumer payments to the Nuclear Waste Fund, plus interest, total $30 billion. The fund is growing
by about $1 billion per year. The fund, if used as intended, will pay for disposal of the nations commercial used
nuclear fuel. The industry supports revisions to the Nuclear Waste Funds budgetary treatment to help DOE plan
for the future.
455
Dry Cask Storage Now

Absent a new disposal solution, dry cask storage is inevitable
More than $ 9 billion later, the debate over Yucca Mountain as a waste repository is at a stalemate. Despite
DOE's recent license application to the Nuclear Regulatotry Commission, the site is at least eight years from
receiving the first shipment of spent nuclear fuel. Meanwhile, many of the storage pools located at nuclear
plants throughout the country are nearing capacity, increasingly requiring the spent fuel to be stored in dry
casks. The Bush administration appears to want to reverse the 30-year policy of storing nuclear waste, by
instead encouraging new design of power plants that can reprocess the spent fuel.
Dry storage cask storage will increase given the lack of an alternative waste disposal site
In the meantime, utilization of on-site dry casks as an interim solution apparently will increase, as the creation
of one or more government-sponsored interim facilities appears unlikely. The national cost of storing spent fuel
in dry casks is estimated at $ 300 million to $ 500 million per year. The federal government likely will continue
to pay the bill for this dry-cask storage because of a pact with utilities that the government has not fulfilled: The
government was to "take title" of HLW by 1998.
456
Dry Cask Storage Good

Dry cask storage is safe
In comparison, dry-cask storage of spent fuel, which is being used at U.S. nuclear power plants to
handle the overflow from spent fuel storage pools that have reached capacity, is benign. Ninety-five
percent of all U.S. spent fuel is at nuclear power plants that will operate for decades longer. At such
sites, the added risk from the spent fuel is small in comparison to that from the fuel in the reactor cores
and the spent fuel pools. If cooling water is lost to a reactor core, it will begin releasing vaporized
fission products within minutes. If cooling water is lost from a spent fuel pond, recently discharged
fuel would heat up to ignition temperature with hours. In contrast, the heat from several-year-old spent
fuel in dry casks is carried away passively by the convection of the surrounding air. Also, because each
dry cask contains only a small fraction of the radioactive material contained in a reactor core or spent
fuel pool, even a successful terrorist attack on a dry cask would have a relatively limited impact.
457
Dry Cask Storage Bad Terrorism

Rocket Propelled Grenades threaten Dry Cask Storage
Although the dry casks would present less of a hazard than spent fuel pools if
attacked, they remain vulnerable to weapons such as rocket-propelled grenades.
These weapons could penetrate most dry casks and their vaults, igniting a
zirconium fire and resulting in the release of significant amounts of radioactive
material.
458
Politics Links General Waste

Spending funds on nuclear waste disposal sets of giant political fights
Another complication is that Congress has not approved the appropriation of the Nuclear Waste Fund
for such uses. (This Fund has been collected from nuclear electricity suppliers since 1983 and currently
totals more than $27 billion. The tax is collected at a rate of 0.1 cents per kilowatt-hour.) The funds
have been mixed into the general Federal budget, rather than being sequestered into a separate fund for
its originally intended purposes. (After the original bill had established the Waste Fund, the Congress
had later made the availability of these funds dependent on other appropriation ceilings being met, in
effect mixing these collected funds within the general government treasury.) Both political parties are
hesitant to allow any uses of this fund in the near term for fear that it would break the bank of federal
expenditures.
459
Politics Link Yucca

Democrats opposes opening Yucca
What to do with used nuclear fuel is a technical and political conundrum that is getting new attention as the
Bush administration pushes for a greater role for nuclear power, while Senate Democrats say they will not agree
to the longstanding plan to bury the waste at the Yucca Mountain site in Nevada.
460
Plan Open Yucca

The Yucca repository should be opened
Open the Yucca Mountain spent nuclear fuel repository. The Administration and Congress should commit to opening
Yucca Mountain as soon as possible, and this political commitment should be paired with adequate funding. It is simply
untenable for America's political leaders to lay a burden such as CO2 reduction on U.S. citizens and then stand in the way
of the best path forward to meeting that objective. Keeping Yucca Mountain closed runs counter to this objective. This
commitment should be paired with a commitment by the government and industry to make Nevada the nuclear fuel capital
of the world instead of the waste capital of the country. Some of the other high-tech nuclear technology facilities that will
be required to support an American nuclear renaissance could be co-located at Yucca, providing a significant economic
impact for the region.
461
Yucca good Transportation Safe

Only 10 accidents transporting fuel, no deaths
Myth: Transporting spent-nuclear fuel to a central waste repository would imperil millions of Americans. Reality: Over the
past 45 years, there have been more than 20,000 shipments of spent fuel. Some 3,000 of the shipments, covering 1.7 million
miles, contained 10,000 fuel assemblies from U.S. nuclear power plants. During that entire time, there have been 10
accidents involving trucks carrying spent fuel canisters, without any resulting release of radiation, related injuries or deaths.
Waste shipment is safe
This confidence is based on the exemplary record of transportation safety and security that has been established
over the past four decades - including 3,000 U.S. shipments over 1.7 million miles, and more than 24,000
shipments internationally. All told, more than 73,000 metric tons of used nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive
waste have been transported with no injuries, fatalities or environmental damage as a result of the radioactive
nature of the cargo.
462
Yucca Good AT: Radiation Leaks in Transport

No radiation leak in 30 years of transport
Further, concerns over the safety of nuclear workers and the public are based on speculation, not the facts. Even with the
Three Mile Island incident in 1979, no one has ever died in the U.S. from a radiation-related accident in domestic nuclear
power programs. And the false notion that we cannot handle or transport this material safely or securely is not supported by
the facts. Over the past 30 years, more than 3,000 shipments of commercial nuclear fuel have covered more than 1.7 million
miles of America's roads and railway without a single radiological leak.
No release during French of UK shipments
Environmentalists also worry that nuclear shipments could derail or fail in a traffic accident, spewing waste
into the environment. Kessler is sanguine. Both France and the United Kingdom shipped spent fuel every
day. There have been a few accidents, but there has never been a release during shipment, he says. In fact,
shipping canisters are designed to resist failure. Their inner containers consist of huge metal casks about 6-7
feet in diameter and 15 feet long. They fit into steel overpack containers shaped like enormous dumbbells
that come in two sizes: 125 tons for railroads and 40 tons for trucks. Both designs were tested to survive a
30-foot drop onto an unyielding surface and 30 minutes at 800 C in a fully engulfing fire.
463
Yucca Good AT: Radiation Leaks

No significant radiation leaks from Yucca
The story of Yucca Mountain is well-knownit has become a political football as pro- and anti-nuclear forces try to
accelerate or delay (or even stop) the facilitys commissioning. Legal challenges have focused on the question of how much
radiation will escape to the public from the facilityover a timeline of a million years. The Department of Energy has
calculated that exposure will be no more than 0.98 mrem per year, up to a million years into the future. Even those who
hold to the stringent LNT view of radiation should be satisfied.
Elaborate safeguards prevent leakage @ Yucca

Yucca Mountain is located in a remote desert on federally protected land within the secure boundaries
of the Nevada Test Site in Nye County, Nevada and is approximately 100 miles northwest of Las
Vegas. This area is still actively used by the US military and has had more than 100 nuclear bombs
detonated on site over the past 50 years. Six billion dollars have been spent on scientific studies in
order to ensure that Yucca Mountain is an appropriate site to store the nations nuclear waste. If built,
the casks holding spent fuel rods will be buried about 1,500 feet underground, further preventing the
waste from escaping, and will be surrounded by lead and other elaborate safeguards (Gold, 2005).
464
Yucca Good AT: Radiation Leaks

Radiation release from Yucca would not be above natural levels
Discover Magazine, September 2002, http://discovermagazine.com/2002/sep/featyucca
The question is, how much radiation and when does it occur? The Environmental Protection Agency has set
standards for the maximum dose that the nearest human may absorb from a nuclear waste repository. If,
according to the diverse simulations of the future, a person's exposure does not exceed the standard, the
repository may be licensed and built. The performance model shows that the repository meets the radiation
standards handily, accommodating just about any scenario that is thrown at it. Rowe looked over toward
Lathrop Wells. The Environmental Protection Agency's Reasonably Maximally Exposed Individuals were
presumed to live there, now and for the next 10,000 years. "Today eight people reside at the compliance point,"
Rowe remarked."If everything goes well and we have the natural failure, the peak mean dose will be .00004
millirems per year." This amount of radiation is less than negligible. Even one millirem is next to nothing. The
average person walking around receives several hundred millirems of radiation per year from a combination of
natural, medical, and industrial sources. Faint, waterborne releases over many centuries are called the nominal
scenario. Also analyzed are intrusive scenarios, in which misfortune strikes Yucca Mountain all at once. For
example, a strong earthquake could be hazardous if it breaks the repository and spills its contents. Nevada
experiences frequent earthquakes. But it's agreed that the force of an earthquake would be much weaker at the
depth of the repository than at the surface, lessening the danger. Plus, the odds are low that the quake would be
centered right here. The two faults flanking Yucca Mountain do show a six-foot displacement, proof of past
movements, but Rowe said "they haven't moved in millions of years." So the model generates earthquake threats
that are insignificant.
465
Yucca Good Yucca Generally Safe

Scientific consensus that Yucca is safe for 10,000 years
Nuclear Management company, no date, http://www.nmcco.com/education/facts/waste/yucca_science.htm
There is strong international scientific consensus in favor of deep geologic disposal, such as that envisioned at
Yucca Mountain. This con-census emerged in the 1950s and was reaffirmed in 2001 by the National Academy of
Sciences, which concluded that geologic disposal is the "only credible solution." The U.S. government has had a
legal responsibility to dispose of used fuel from nuclear power plants since the passage of the Atomic Energy
Act in 1954. Scientific investigations as part of site characterization at Yucca Mountain include studies of the
geological, hydrologic and geochemical environment, and a detailed evaluation of how conditions might evolve
over thousands of years. The site has been scientifically analyzed to account for the safe operation of a
repository over 10,000 years.
466
Yucca Good Central Depository Safest

Central depository consolidates security
The motive for centralized interim storage is largely political: it would provide a
place for utilities to send their spent fuel in the event that a geologic repository is
further delayed, thus satisfying the DOEs legal obligations. Consolidating spent
fuel at one or more sites could also cut security costs and hence improve security.
467
Yucca Good Stops Reprocessing

Lack of a permanent repository encourages reprocessing
Spurgeons view, however, reflects the belief of GNEP supporters in the need to bypass the political
logjams that block permanent spent fuel storage, which they see as a chief impediment to a major
global increase in nuclear power. In the absence of geological repositories, reprocessing plants provide
an alternative destination for the spent fuel accumulating at nuclear power plants.
468
Yucca Good AT: Terrorism

Waste currently sets in compacted pools that are vulnerable to terrorism
Robert Alvarez,
Senior Policy Advisor to the US Secretary of Energy 1993-1999, May 2008,

False Promises, http://www.nirs.org/falsepromises.pdf
Right now, the waste continues to sit in densely compacted pools which the National Academy of Sciences
warned are vulnerable to terrorism and might lead to a catastrophic radiological fire.
Turn terrorist risks to storage at current plants
According to IAEA, the incidents underscore terrorist interest in acquiring radioactive materials. While only
highlevel nuclear waste can be used to make atomic bombs, lowlevel waste is ideal for dirty bombs. While a
dirty bomb is unlikely to kill anyone more than a few yards from the blast, the cost of cleaning up the
radioactive material it broadcasts could cost billions. Hijacking such large canisters would not be easy.
Multiple layers of security ranging from biometric sensors and global positioning systems to armed guards
surround them. Because they are so large, they would be difficult to remove from the crime scene. Despite
concerns, a closed, guarded, underground storage facility appears safer than current practice. Today, says
Steven Kraft, senior director of used fuel management at the Nuclear Energy Institute, an industry trade
group, we store nuclear wastes at more than 30 different power plants around the country. Spent fuel
removed from a reactor is far too hot to put in any container. Instead, plants store fuel rods [Fig. 5] in 40-footdeep pools filled with water. Some pools are located in the ground, others in the containment buildings. All
are seismic designs made from reinforced concrete. It takes at least 10 years for fuel rods to cool. Many are
then stored in vertical steel and concrete containers on outdoor pads. According to an EPRI study done
shortly after 9/11, the outdoor casks could survive a direct crash from a Boeing 767 jetliner. The casks would
maybe fall over and bounce around a bit, but they would not break open, says Kraft. He also says classified
studies show that spent fuel in pools would remain cool even if terrorists took over a reactor.
469
Yucca Bad Shipment Accidents

Opening Yucca means 40-50 shipment accidents
Yet the D.O.E. predicts harm even in this generation. The department says that if 70,000 tons of the existing U.S.
waste were shipped to Yucca Mountain, the transfer would require 24 years of dozens of daily rail or truck shipments.
Assuming low accident rates and discounting the possibility of terrorist attacks on these lethal shipments, the D.O.E.
says this radioactive-waste transport likely would lead to 50 to 310 shipment accidents. According to the D.O.E., each
of these accidents could contaminate 42 square miles, and each could require a 462-day cleanup that would cost $620
million, not counting medical expenses.
470
Yucca Bad Dry Cask Storage Safer

Dry cask storage is safer than Yucca
''Their ulterior motive is to say that there is no solution,'' said Marvin S. Fertel, senior vice president at
the Nuclear Energy Institute. But storing the fuel in casks is ''not a pressing problem,'' said Dr. Arjun
Makhijani, the president of the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, a nonprofit group
often critical of the Energy Department. Assuming proper regulation, Dr. Makhijani said, cask storage
is quite safe, probably safer than Yucca. ''So long as the reactors are operating -- and this is not a plug
for relicensing -- the waste should be stored on site,'' he said.
471
Transmutation Generally Bad

Many more effective alternatives to transmutation
Partitioning of the spent fuel to remove plutonium and possibly other actinides unquestionably
reduces long-term radioactivity and toxicity of the waste. Nevertheless, the MIT study group did not
find the benefits of partitioning and transmutation to be compelling on the basis of waste
management. There are several reasons. First, although successful implementation has not yet been
demonstrated, the scientific basis for long-term geological isolation appears sound. Partitioning leads
to a large volume and mass reduction, but these are not terribly important criteria for repository
design. Heat and radioactivity, which are far more important criteria, are only marginally reduced on
the century time scale, since the fission products remain with the waste. In addition, the trade-off of
benefits possibly of small consequence to human health - in the millennium time scale against nearterm increases in waste streams, occupational exposure, and safety concerns is not clear. There is
certainly little evidence that the public is more concerned with the millennium rather than the
generational time scale. Finally, other approaches may yield even greater confidence in long-term
isolation and may do so more economically and simply. This would include advanced engineered
barriers and other disposal approaches, such as deep boreholes. These are modest diameter holes
drilled 4 to 5 kilometers deep into stable crystalline rock. The approach looks promising and
economical because of drilling advances, because the geochemical environment (highly reducing) is
favorable, and because the emplacement is not subject to surface vagaries. This is not to say that deep
boreholes will prove to be the best approach, since major uncertainties exist. The point is that
important alternatives to partitioning exist for adding even greater confidence to long-term waste
isolation and these should be explored vigorously through new R&D programs.
472
*** Nuclear Power DA Links ***
473
Carbon Tax Link Answers

Carbon tax wont boost nuclear its carbon content is too high
First, due to the greenhouse-gas intensity of its lifecycle, nuclear power plants would not benefit directly from a global
carbon tax or a carbon cap-and-trade system. While the nuclear industry would certainly be penalized less than fossil-fueled
generators, the carbon equivalent emissions from uranium mining operations, enrichment facilities, plant construction,
decommissioning, and spent fuel storage are significant. Any type of cost for carbon emissions would absolutely increase
the price of these elements of the nuclear fuel cycle, and would thus make nuclear power more expensive.
$10-$30/ton carbon tax inadequate to trigger sequestration or nuclear power development

For example, at 0.1-0.5 metric tonnes of oil per tonne of CO2 injected, the credit would range from
$30-160 per tonne of CO2, substantially diminishing, and perhaps offsetting entirely, costs for capture,
transport, and storage Finally, if carbon is taxed or credits are available for $10-30/ton in national
or international markets, coal and gas plant developers may pursue projects without
sequestration. It is important to add that costs for all these technologies can vary widely from nation
to nation, based on market structure, degree of government involvement (e.g., subsidies or nationalized
grid), and access to gas or wind resources. In summary, at foreseeable levels of carbon taxes or capand-trade credit approaches ($10-30 per ton of CO2), nuclear power may be advantaged, but not
to the point where it is a compelling choice.
$30/ton carbon tax inadequate to trigger a nuclear resurgence
This report estimates costs of 9-12 cents per kilowatt-hour (in 2007 discounted levelized life cycle
costs) for new reactors. Other traditional alternatives, including wind, coal, and gas combined cycles,
have also risen in cost. Even with carbon taxes of $30/ton of CO2, or requirements for sequestration,
nuclear power does not show an economic advantage that would lead to substantial near term
worldwide growth a renaissance.
474
Carbon Tax Links

Carbon tax will boost nuclear development
However, MIT says that a carbon tax or an equivalent cap-and-trade system could push costs down. If Congress
votes on new climate change legislation next year, CO2-emitting industries are likely to be hit with such a
measure. Since nuclear energy does not release CO2, it would benefit greatly from such government action.
Future of the nuclear industry depends on a carbon tax
Financial Post, July 3, 2008, p. P11
Loan guarantees, state ownership, government-regulated insurance liability limits -- if it isn't one thing it's another and
another and another. And now it's this: a carbon tax. The nuclear industry and its supporters now have their hopes pinned on
a carbon tax on fossil fuels, especially coal, to kill off the competition. The alleged "nuclear renaissance" touted by
proponents is actually nothing more than murder story without the mystery. The murder weapon, a carbon tax of maybe $40
or $50 a tonne, would supposedly do the trick by knocking coal out of the market. Then North American would begin a
massive subsidized building campaign that would dwarf any mega-project blitz ever undertaken in human history. The Wall
Street Journal report said that to have any significant impact on stabilizing the carbon atmosphere, the U. S. alone would
have to build 21 new 1,000 megawatt nuclear reactors each year over the next 50 years. At the top price of $6,000 per
kilowatt, that would work out to $120-billion a year over 50 years.
Carbon charges above $45 stimulate nuclear development

Carbon dioxide charges of about $45 per metric ton would probably make nuclear
generation competitive with conventional fossil-fuel technologies as a source of new
capacity, even without EPAct incentives. At charges below that threshold, conventional
gas technology would probably be a more economic source of base-load capacity than
coal technology.
$50-1$100/ton carbon tax makes nuclear competitive
The second major factor is the uncertainty surrounding internalization of carbon emission costs. Table
3 shows the impact of a carbon tax on the levelized costs for coal and gas. Clearly, the
competitiveness of nuclear power would be enhanced significantly if carbon emission costs are
internalized at $50 to $100 per tonne, which is considerably less than the cost of carbon dioxide
capture and sequestration using todays technologies for either pulverized coal or natural gas
475
Carbon Tax Links

$45/ton leads carbon to replace nuclear
Also at roughly $45 per metric ton, carbon dioxide charges would probably make nuclear
generation competitive with existing coal power plants and could lead utilities in a
position to do so to build new nuclear plants that would eventually replace existing coal
power plants.
A carbon tax is a huge subsidy for nuclear power
Using nuclear power, it costs 60 cents to eliminate a ton of CO2 emissions, as opposed to a staggering $100 per ton for
onshore wind power. It is true that a carbon tax amounts to a subsidy for nuclear power. But if carbon emissions are to be
taxed, then that is the only subsidy that nuclear power will ever need.
Nuclear financially viable at a $40/ton carbon tax

For example, with a natural gas price of $ 9/MMBtu and a CO[2] cost of $ 20 a ton, nuclear is economically
attractive up to overnight capital costs of $ 4,400/kW of capacity. However, at a CO[2] cost of $ 40/ton, nuclear
remains viable up to overnight capital costs approaching $ 6,000/kW (see Figure 2).
$50/ton carbon tax makes nuclear competitive with coal
It's estimated that a carbon "price" of between $25 and $50 a ton makes nuclear power economically competitive with coal.
That should be enough to ease investor concerns about utilities that build new nuclear plants. Even without a carbon tax,
rising natural-gas prices are beginning to make nuclear power more competitive. That's true even in some deregulated
markets, such as Texas. NRG Energy Inc., based in Princeton, N.J., has filed an application to build a reactor adjacent to an
existing plant in Texas. Though it's too early to know how much the plant will eventually cost -- or even if it ultimately will
get built -- high natural-gas prices alone are enough to justify construction, according to NRG.
476
Carbon Tax Links

Carbon tax causes nuclear power
The only alternative would be enormous government subsidies or something akin to a tax on carbon use
so heavy that nuclear construction costs look cheap. It's doubtful taxpayers will accept that when so many
other energy alternatives show promise. Nuclear power should be in the nation's portfolio. And the industry
should strive to improve its safety and disposal systems. But until it solves those challenges as well as the
financing question, nuclear's use will be limited.
477
Carbon Tax Links

Need $60/ton tax for nuclear to be competitive with coal
The only way to make nuclear power economically competitive would be the imposition of steep "prices" on carbonemitting power sources. Nobody knows precisely how high those prices would have to go -- there are too many variables to
consider. But estimates range as high as $60 a ton of carbon dioxide. This imposes an unacceptably high price on
consumers.
Cap & trade will boost nuclear development

This reappraisal of nuclear power is motivated in large part by the expectation that
market-based approaches to
limit greenhouse-gas emissions could be put in place in the near future. Several options
currently being considered by the Congressincluding cap-and-trade programs
would impose a price on emissions of carbon dioxide, the most common greenhouse
gas.1 If implemented, such limits would encourage the use of nuclear technology by
increasing the cost of generating electricity with conventional fossil-fuel technologies.
478
Tradable Permits Links Mccain Lieberman

The only way McCain Lieberman wont hurt the economy is if nuclear power expands
Although many supporters of LiebermanWarner are quick to call attention to conclusions that show the least
negative economic impact, they often fail to mention that the results depend on a massive expansion of nuclear
power. For example, as noted by the Environmental Defense Fund, an Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
analysis concludes that economic growth would be minimally affected by LiebermanWarner but makes no
mention of the fact that this conclusion depends on a broad expansion of nuclear energy.
479
Tradable Permits Links

Freezing cap & trade collapses nuclear power investment
EPAct incentives would probably make nuclear generation a competitive technology for
limited additions to base-load capacity, even in the absence of carbon dioxide charges.
However, because some of those incentives are backed by a fixed amount of funding,
they would be diluted as the number of nuclear projects increased; consequently, CBO
anticipates that only a few of the 30 plants currently being proposed would be built if
utilities did not expect carbon dioxide charges to be imposed.
Investors uncertain now, cap & trade legislation triggers nuclear power development
Under the provisions of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, it is probable that at least a few
nuclear power plants will be built over the next decade, most likely in markets where
electricity usage and the corresponding demand for additional base-load capacity are
expected to grow significantly. Ultimately, however, the longer-term competitiveness of
nuclear technology as a source of electricity is likely to depend on policymakers
decisions regarding carbon dioxide constraints. If such constraints are implemented,
nuclear power will probably enjoy a cost advantage over conventional fossil-fuel
alternatives as a source of electricity-generating capacity. Today, even the anticipation
that carbon dioxide emissions will be priced is a factor being weighed in investors
decisions about new base-load capacity. Those conclusions are tentative, though,
because the electricity industry faces numerous uncertainties. If expectations related to
future market conditionsespecially those pertaining to construction costs or fuel prices
shift before investors commit to the construction of new base-load capacity, the
prospects for new nuclear capacity could change dramatically. In the Congressional
Budget Offices reference scenario, the estimated levelized costs of new capacity based
on conventional coal or conventional natural gas technology are roughly equivalent. By
comparison, the levelized costs of the other options under consideration are much higher.
Specifically, the levelized costs for building and operating a new nuclear power plant are
estimated to be about 30 percent more than the cost of either a conventional coal or
natural gas plant. The costs for innovative coal and natural gas plants that capture and
store carbon dioxide are even greater, exceeding those of the lowestcost conventional
fossil-fuel options by 50 percent. Accordingly, in the absence of carbon dioxide
constraints and without the incentives of EPAct, utilities would probably continue to build
power plants relying on conventional fossil-fuel technologies to meet increases in baseload electricity demand.
480
481
Carbon Tax Links -- $45

Additional incentives not needed if carbon is $45/ton
In the absence of both emission charges and EPAct incentives, conventional fossil-fuel
technology would dominate nuclear technology. But, even without EPAct incentives, if
lawmakers enacted legislation that resulted in a carbon dioxide charge of about $45 per
metric ton, nuclear generation would most likely become a more attractive investment
for new capacity than conventional fossil-fuel generation (see the left panel of Figure 13). If the cost of emitting carbon dioxide was between $20 and $45 per metric ton,
nuclear generation as an option for new capacity would probably be preferred over coal
but not natural gas.
482
*** Other ***
483
Uranium Shortages Now

Uranium demand will outstrip supply now
Investors Chronicle , June 11, 2008
Dr Youngson cautions that it is too soon to tell how significant this nuclear resurgence will be in the longer run,
but the surge in the price of uranium in recent years suggests that demand is likely to continue to outstrip supply.
The price of uranium increased by more than 1,000 per cent from 2002 to 2007, driven by a perception of tight
supply and market speculation. Ambrian's research shows that uranium supply from mining has consistently
failed to meet demand since the early 1990s, one of the main reasons being the very long lead times of
developing uranium mines. And renewed interest in nuclear power provides investment opportunities in
uranium production, particularly early in the value chain. Canada, Australia and Kazakhstan are the world's
leading uranium producers, followed by Niger, Russia and Namibia.
Uranium prices increasing now due to forecasted nuclear demand
Planet Ark, February 26, 2006, http://www.planetark.com/dailynewsstory.cfm/newsid/35242/story.htm
World uranium prices have more than tripled since 2004 to about $35 a pound, as nations trying to cut
pollution take another look at nuclear power. China's plan to build as many as 30 new reactors has
galvanized new exploration and investments. Fast-breeder reactors, a concept under development since the
1960s, are designed to produce more nuclear fuel than they consume. China could consider joint ventures to
explore for and mine uranium in countries like Australia, said Shen Wenquan, a vice chairman at China National
Nuclear Corp, without providing further details. "Uranium prices are up a lot and given current
developments, they are likely to continue to rise. But they are still low in comparison with fuel prices for oilfired plants," Shen said.
484
Amory Lovins Quals

Physicist Amory Lovins, a 45-year student of this subject, is Cofounder, Chairman, and Chief Scientist of Rocky
Mountain Institute (www.rmi.org) and Cofounder and Chairman Emeritus of Fiberforge, Inc. Published in 29
books and hundreds of papers, his work has been recognized by the Volvo, Right Livelihood, Blue Planet,
Onassis, Nissan, Shingo, and Mitchell Prizes, a MacArthur Fellowship, the Benjamin Franklin and Happold
Medals, ten honorary doctorates, Foreign Membership of the Royal Swedish Academy of Engineering Sciences,
honorary membership of the American Institute of Architects, Life Fellowship of the Royal Society of Arts, and
the Heinz, Lindbergh, Jean Meyer, World Technology, and Time Hero for the Planet Awards. He has
consulted for more than three decades for major firms and governments (including the U.S. Departments of
Energy and Defense) on advanced energy and resource efficiency in ~50 countries, has advised scores of electric
utilities (many of them nuclear operators), and has led the technical redesign of >$30 billion worth of facilities
in ~29 sectors to achieve very large energy savings at typically lower capital costs (www.rmi.org/stanford,
encapsulating his 2007 MAP/Ming Professorship in Stanford Universitys School of Engineering). Engineer
Imran Sheikh, who provided extensive graphical and analytic support for this paper as an RMI Research
Analyst, is now a graduate student at the Energy and Resources Group of the University of California at
Berkeley.
485
*** Specific Reactors ***
486
Generation III Reactors Best

Generation III reactors produce more power for less money
Economics Passive design simplifies plant construction. The AP1000, for example, requires 50 percent fewer
valves, 83 percent less piping, 87 percent less control cable, 35 percent fewer pumps, and 50 percent less
seismic building volume than its predecessors. That makes a big bottom line difference. Generation III plants
also produce about 25 percent more power than Generation II units. More power for less money sounds like
icing on the cake. After all, Entergy Corp., a major utility and the nations second largest nuclear plant
operator, earned 31 percent of its total profits from just five deregulated nuclear power plants; its five
regulated nuclear plants and 75 fossil fuel units accounted for the rest. Dan Keuter, Entergys vice president
of nuclear business development, expects those five plants to provide half of the companys profits in 2006.
487
EPR Best
Only the Evolutionary Power Reactor is safer than current reactors
Of all the new reactor designs, only onethe Evolutionary Power Reactor (EPR)
appears to have the potential to be significantly less vulnerable to severe
accidents than todays reactors. The Pebble Bed Modular Reactor has several
attractive safety features, but outstanding safety issues must be resolved to
determine whether it is likely to be safer than existing reactors. Other designs
either offer no potential for significant safety improvements, or are too early in
the design phase to allow informed judgment.
Only the EPR is less vulnerable to terror attack
Of all the new reactor designs, only onethe EPRappears to have the potential
to be significantly less vulnerable to attack than todays reactors. However, this
may only remain the case if the NRC requires that new reactors be able to
withstand the impact of a commercial aircraft, thus ensuring that U.S. EPRs will
include the double containment structure that is part of EPRs built in Europe. No
technical fixsuch as those incorporated in new reprocessing technologiescan
remove the proliferation risks associated with nuclear fuel cycles that include
reprocessing and the use of plutoniumbased fuel. Once separated from highly
radioactive fission products, the plutonium is vulnerable to theft or diversion. New
reprocessing technologies under consideration will leave the plutonium in a
mixture with other elements, but these are not radioactive enough to provide
theft resistance, and a nation seeking nuclear weapons could readily separate the
plutonium from these elements by chemical means.
488
EPR Best
The Evolutionary Power Reactor (EPR) is safer
In contrast to the AP1000 and the ESBWR, the Evolutionary Power Reactor (EPR)
developed by the French company Areva has features that may make it safer than
todays U.S. reactors. The EPR has four independent safety trains, each of which
is a complete set of safety systems designed to mitigate an accident, including
backup power supplies. The French and German governments have also required
Areva to enable the reactors safety systems and spent fuel building to withstand
the crash of a military aircraft. And in the event of an accident or sabotage, the
EPRs double-walled containment structure would hold up better than the
standard single-walled one. The EPR is also designed with a core catcher to
prevent the core from melting through the reactor vessel during a severe
accident. (As noted, the core catcher is a novel feature, and may not have much
better than a 50 percent chance of working.) However, the design for the EPR at
Olkiluoto, Finland, had to be upgraded to comply with a post-9/11 requirement
that the plant be able to withstand the impact of a commercial aircraft. 131 Without
a similar NRC requirement, the U.S. EPR could, and most likely would, be based on
the initial, less robust design. The question remains, however, as to whether the
manufacturer will strip down the EPR to meet less rigorous NRC standards to
better compete in the U.S. market. Areva has said that the EPR is a global
product that will retain the full set of design features wherever it is built,
including the United States.132 But unless the NRC imposes stricter standards for
new reactors, the EPR and other designs with greater safety margins will be at an
economic disadvantage.
489
HPBWRS Best
HPBWRs solve the problems of High Pressure Reactors and Boiling Water Reactors
F. Reisch, Department of Nuclear Power Safety, KTH, Royal Institute of Technology, 2007, Concept of a Future
High Pressure Boiling Water Reactor, http://www.euronuclear.org/e-news/e-news-18/HP-BWR.htm
Since the 1950s several hundred Boiling Water and Pressurized Water Reactors (BWRs and PWRs) in
use. There is a wealth of operating experience. During this have been time many difficulties occurred
with a number of important components. This concept, the High Pressure Boiling Water Reactor
(HP-BWR) offers a solution to use the best parts from each type (BWR and PWR) and leave out the
troublesome components. This means an important increase of safety. As an extra benefit, also
increased efficiency attained beneficial for the environment as less cooling water is released per
produced kWh. The HP-BWR is using with some modifications- currently manufactured parts
making this a cost effective, realistic concept. The High Pressure Boiling Water Reactor (HP-BWR)
offers improved nuclear safety and less damage to the environment. The HP-BWR is an
environmentally friendly, effective alternative. The HP-BWR uses a modified PWR reactor vessel and
BWR type fuel and control rods. However, here the cruciform control rods are gravity operated with
ample space between the crosses and the fuel boxes. The control roads are manoeuvred
electromagnetically, which means that they will drop into the core when there is a loss of electrical
power as in the PWRs. The traditional PWR control rods are finger shaped and are surrounded by a
tube with a minimum of clearance. The traditional BWR control rods are operated from below with
hydraulic pressure. Therefore, at the bottom of the traditional BWR reactor vessel there are a great
number of penetration points for the control rods. Directly below the reactor vessel there is an
elaborate system of numerous high pressure hydraulic pipes to actuate the control rods. Taking the best
fro and leaving out the drawbacks of both the traditional BWR and PWR systems is a substantial safety
improvement. All the pipe connections to the reactor vessel are well above the reactor core. This
allows the omission of core spray. The moisture separators and steam dryers are outside the reactor
vessel, leaving free space for the control rods. Internal circulation pumps. These allow the use of
orifices at the inlet of the fuel boxes so that the one-phase pressure drop will predominate over the twophase pressure drop. This reduces the risk of hydrodynamic oscillations. However, if suitable methods
are found to facilitate natural circulation even the circulation pumps can be left out. The use of the
HP-BWR means improved Carnot cycle thermal efficiency up to about ~40% instead of about ~30%.
The reason is that the HP-BWR steam temperature corresponds to 15MPa while the traditional BWRs
steam temperature corresponds to 7MPa and the traditional PWRs steam temperature corresponds to
6MPa. The HP-BWR is lenient to the environment as less damaging cooling water is released per
produced kWh to the recipient, sea or river or to the air via a cooling tower. Using direct cycle the
system is simplified. Still, the usual PWR steam lines can be used through the containment wall to the
turbine. A great advantage is that the complicated and costly steam generators are left out. The
moisture separators and the steam dryers are outside the reactor vessel in the containment instead of
the huge troublesome steam generators. Simple dry containment is used instead of the complicated,
inert, pressure suppression.
490
BWRs Bad
BWRs lack effective containment structures in the event of an accident
Nuclear Information Resource Service, 1996 Hazards of Boiling Water Reactors in the United
States, http://www.nirs.org/factsheets/bwrfact.htm
The purpose of a reactor containment system is to create a barrier against the release of radioactivity
generated during nuclear power operations from certain "design basis" accidents, such as increased
pressure from a single pipe break. It is important to understand that nuclear power plants are not
required by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to remain intact as a barrier to all possible
accidents or "non-design basis" accidents, such as the melting of reactor fuel. All nuclear
reactors can have accidents which can exceed the design basis of their containment.
But even basic questions about the the GE containment design remain unanswered and its integrity in
serious doubt. For example, eighteen of these BWRs use a smaller GE Mark I pressure
suppression containment conceived as a cost-saving alternative to the larger reinforced concrete
containments marketed by competitors. A large inverted light-bulb-shaped steel structure called
"the drywell" is constructed of a steel liner and a concrete drywell shield wall enclosing the
reactor vessel. The atmosphere of the drywell is connected through large diameter pipes to a large
hollow doughnut-shaped pressure suppression pool called "the torus", or wetwell, which is half-filled
with water. In the event of a loss-of-coolant-accident (LOCA), steam would be released into the
drywell and directed underwater in the torus where it is supposed to condense, thus suppressing a
pressure buildup in the containment. However, as early as 1972, Dr. Stephen Hanuaer, an Atomic
Energy Commission safety official, recommended that the pressure suppression system be
discontinued and any further designs not be accepted for construction permits. Shortly
thereafter, three General Electric nuclear engineers publicly resigned their prestigious positions
citing dangerous shortcomings in the GE design. An NRC analysis of the potential failure of the
Mark I under accident conditions concluded in a 1985 report that Mark I failure within the first few hours
following core melt would appear rather likely." In 1986, Harold Denton, then the NRC's top safety official, told an industry trade group
that the "Mark I containment, especially being smaller with lower design pressure, in spite of the suppression pool, if you look at the
WASH 1400 safety study, you'll find something like a 90% probability of that containment failing." In order to protect the Mark I
containment from a total rupture it was determined necessary to vent any high pressure buildup. As a result, an industry workgroup
designed and installed the "direct torus vent system" at all Mark I reactors. Operated from the control room, the vent is a reinforced pipe
installed in the torus and designed to release radioactive high pressure steam generated in a severe accident by allowing the unfiltered
release directly to the atmosphere through the 300 foot vent stack. Reactor operators now have the option by direct action to expose the
public and the environment to unknown amounts of harmful radiation in order to "save containment." As a result of GE's
design deficiency, the original idea for a passive containment system has been dangerously
compromised and given over to human control with all its associated risks of error and technical
failure.
491
PMBR Isnt Safe

The PBMR is not inherently safe
The Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR) is distinctly different from todays
commercial lightwater reactors. It uses helium gas as a coolant, a graphite
moderator, and fuel consisting of very small uranium-oxide spheres coated with a
corrosion- resistant material and embedded in tennisball- sized graphite
pebbles. These pebbles travel from the top to the bottom of the reactor vessel
as the reactor operates. The PBMR has been promoted as a meltdown- proof
reactor that would be free of the safety concerns typical of todays plants.133
However, while the PBMR does have some attractive safety features, several
serious issues remain unresolved. Until they are, it is not possible to support
claims that the PBMR design would be significantly safer overall than light-water
reactors. And gaining a better understanding of these issues will likely take time.
The most significant unresolved issue involves how the PBMRs fuel would hold up
during an accident, which is the key to the reactors safety. The coating of PBMR
fuel can maintain its integrity to temperatures of about 1,600Cseveral hundred
degrees higher than the temperature at which conventional reactor fuel would
begin to degrade in a loss-of-coolant accident.134 The claim that the reactor is
meltdown-proof rests on the assertion that fuel temperatures would not exceed
1,600C, even if the reactor loses coolant. (When reactor fuel degrades, it
releases highly radioactive fission products.) However, computer models are used
to predict peak fuel temperatures during an accident. Modeling the movement of
the fuel pebbles in the reactorand hence accurately predicting the peak
temperaturehas proven extremely difficult. This is significant; as the fuel
temperature exceeds 1,600C, the ability of the fuel to retain fission products
rapidly diminishes.135 Thus the safety case for the PBMR depends largely on an
ability that does not yet existnamely, to accurately predict peak fuel
temperatures during accidents. Because designers maintain that fuel
performance will prevent a meltdown, the PBMR does not have a containment
vessel. However, the reactor does need a containment structure to ensure safety,
given the uncertainty concerning the fuel performance. A second unresolved
safety issue concerns the reactors graphite coolant and fuel pebbles. When
exposed to air, graphite burns at a temperature of 400C, and the reaction can
become self-sustaining at 550Cwell below the typical operating temperature of
492
the PBMR. Graphite also burns in the presence of water. Thus extraordinary
measures would be needed to prevent air and water from entering the core. Yet
according to one expert, air ingress cannot be eliminated by design.136
493
IRIS Not Safe

The IRIS is not safe
The IRIS (International Reactor Innovative and Secure), a design with a relatively
low power rating of 325 MWe, is being developed by an international consortium
headed by Westinghouse. IRIS differs from conventional reactor designs in that
the pressure vessel would contain all the primary components, such as coolant
pumps and steam generators, along with the reactor core. Because of its passive
safety features, the IRIS incorporates only a pressure-suppression containment
a thin spherical steel shellinstead of a large steel-reinforced concrete
structure as in conventional reactors. Based on their claim that the IRIS design is
inherently safe because of its passive safety features, its designers also plan to
seek an exemption from the NRCs off-site emergency planning requirements.
Eliminating the containment structure and emergency planning will likely
decrease the overall safety of the design.
494
4S Not Safe
The 4S reactor is not safe
The 4S (Super Safe, Small, and Simple) reactor may be small and simple, but
there is no reason to believe it is super safe. This 10 MWe reactor is designed to
operate without routine maintenance, as the core would have a lifetime of 30
years, and is intended for use in remote regions. To minimize the need for
security personnel, the reactor would sit inside a sealed vault 30 meters
underground. However, the inability to conduct routine maintenance creates the
potential for severe problems. A former NRC regional administrator framed this
issue well: If we look at the problems at existing plants, the most expensive
problems have been the ones that no one ever imagined would have to be
fixed.137 Another problem is that the coolant for the 4S reactor is sodium, which is
highly reactive and burns if exposed to water or air. In the event of an accident, it
could produce a more powerful explosion than is likely with todays reactors.
Toshibas proposal to supply a 4S reactor to Galena, Alaskaan isolated
community with no industrial infrastructurehighlights the danger of such
schemes. If an unexpected problem were to develop, the community would have
no resources on hand to deal with it.
495
Generation IV Not Safer

Generation IV reactors are not safer
In addition to the Generation III+ designs of commercial reactor vendors, the DOE
is sponsoring R&D on advanced reactor systems at national laboratories and
universities (see Box 8, p. 59). Two are thermal reactors and three are fast
reactors that would use plutonium-based fuels. One goal of these designsknown
as Generation IVis greater safety. However, there is no basis for assuming that
any of the five designs now under study would be significantly safer than todays
nuclear power plants. First, Generation IV designs have little or no operating
experience, so detailed computer models would be needed to accurately predict
their vulnerability to catastrophic accidents. However, this project is still in its
infancy, so developing and extensively validating computer models for each
design will be a formidable task. Second, all the designs use coolants that are
highly corrosive under normal operating conditions, and will therefore require
advanced structural materials that can perform well in extreme environments.
This is true even for the Very High Temperature Reactor (VHTR), which uses inert
helium gas as a coolant, as low levels of impurities in the coolant would be highly
corrosive at the operating temperature of 1,000C. 138 Development of these
advanced materials is speculative, and failure to meet the performance goals
would translate into lower safety margins and higher operating costs. Third, to
reduce costs, Generation IV designs aim to reduce safety margins wherever
possible. This is at odds with the fundamental concept of defense-in-depth, in
which backup safety systems compensate for uncertainties in the performance of
the main safety systems. For example, one Generation IV goal is to eliminate the
need for off-site emergency response plans, which are a critical component of
defensein- depth strategy. The confidence to take such an unprecedented step
can come only from a wealth of operating experience, which is lacking for the
new designs. And any new design will have to undergo the break-in phase of
the aging curve, according to which higher failure rates are expected at the
beginning and end of a plants lifetime. Accidents at U.S. reactors have
conformed to this curve.139 Fourth, the Sodium-cooled Fast Reactor (SFR) and
Lead-cooled Fast Reactor (LFR) have inherent safety problems because of their
coolants. Leadbismuth coolant is less reactive and has a higher boiling point than
sodium coolant. However, it is extremely corrosive, and when irradiated produces
highly volatile radioisotopes (polonium-210 in particular) that would be a
challenge to contain even under normal operating conditions. As noted, the use of
496
liquid sodium as a coolant presents serious safety challenges. According to a

2002 Department of Energy report,140 It is also true that sodium as a reactor coolant
has two major drawbacks: its chemical reactivity, and its positive void coefficient of
reactivity in most plutonium-fueled applications. . . . There have been small sodium leaks
(and small fires) at essentially every sodium-cooled reactor plant built; in some cases,
several of them. These incidents, though, do not disqualify the coolant from further use.
The void coefficient of reactivity indicates how the reactors power output would
change if steam bubbles (or voids) form in the coolant. Power increases if the
coefficient is positive. Thus, if the core overheats and the liquid metal coolant
boils, the reactors reactivity and power will rise rapidly. This intrinsic positive
feedback can lead to a rapid increase in power and disrupt the core, while
reducing the amount of time operators have to take mitigating action. The NRC
requires that reactors have a prompt negative feedback response to any increase
in reactivity. 141 Therefore, the NRC could not license an SFR with a positive sodium
void coefficient under todays guidelines. Nonetheless, the NRC could make an
exception. NRC staff concluded in the 1990s that a positive void coefficient
should not necessarily disqualify a reactor design, provided the risk to the public
remained low.142 Scientists at Argonne National Laboratory often argue that the
EBRII an experimental SFR in Idaho that operated from 1961 to 1994was a
passively safe reactor that shut itself down after a safety test, despite its
positive void coefficient. However, the shutdown relied on expansion of the
reactors metal fuel elements as they heated, which is not prompt inherent
nuclear feedback, and cannot be relied on to compensate for increases in
reactivity. Design changes can reduce or eliminate the positive void coefficient in
fast reactors. For instance, the 4S is designed to maintain a negative void
coefficient over its entire operating cycle. However, such changes usually
increase the amount of reactivity in control systems, and therefore raise the
severity of other types of reactivity accidents.143 Whether there is an optimal
design for fast reactors that can make their overall risk acceptable is far from
clear. Perhaps even more serious than the positive void coefficient is that, unlike
most light-water reactors, fast reactors are not in their most reactive
configuration under normal operating conditions. This means that an event that
causes the core to become more compactsuch as a core meltdown could
substantially raise reactivity, resulting in a rapid power increase that could
vaporize the fuel and blow the core apart.144 Such an explosion dubbed a
hypothetical core disruptive accidentwould be similar to the explosion of a
very small nuclear fission weapon, with a yield comparable to that produced by a
ton of TNT. These problems are already severe for SFRs that use only mixtures of
plutonium and uranium. However, the DOE ultimately plans to adapt its advanced
recycling reactor to use fuels that also contain the highly radioactive actinides
neptunium, americium, and curium (see p. 69), which tend to increase the
497
severity of these reactivity problems. Designing cores for such reactors that can
both effectively fission these actinides and be acceptably safe will be a major
challenge. Some new reactor designs represent the next evolutionary step for
nuclear power, incorporating features intended to make the plants safer and more
economical. These features, however, are largely untested in the field or have
very limited operating experience. Other new reactor designs have operated only
in cyberspace and have never experienced the trials and tribulations of real-world
operation. The gremlins hiding in their designs have not yet been exposed, let
alone exorcised.
498
A2: Nuclear Triggers Proliferation

Case outweighs proliferation risks are not a reason to reject nuclear power
499
A2: Uranium Shortages

Substantially more uranium available
IAEA, 2006, Global Uranium Resources to Meet Projected Demand,
http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/2006/uranium_resources.html
However, world uranium resources in total are considered to be much higher. Based on geological evidence and
knowledge of uranium in phosphates the study considers more than 35 million tonnes is available for
exploitation. The spot price of uranium has also increased fivefold since 2001, fuelling major new initiatives and
investment in exploration. Worldwide exploration expenditures in 2004 totalled over US$ 130 million, an
increase of almost 40% compared to 2002, and close to US$ 200 million in 2005. This can be expected to lead
to further additions to the uranium resource base. A significant number of new mining projects have also been
announced that could substantially boost the worlds uranium production capacity.
New reactors will use uranium more efficiently
IAEA, 2006, Global Uranium Resources to Meet Projected Demand,
http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/2006/uranium_resources.html
In the longer term, continuing advances in nuclear technology will allow a substantially better utilisation of the
uranium resources. Reactor designs are being developed and tested that are capable of extracting more than 30
times the energy from the uranium than todays reactors. By 2025, world nuclear energy capacity is expected to
grow to between 450 GWe (+22%) and 530 GWe (+44%) from the present generating capacity of about 370
GWe. This will raise annual uranium requirements to between 80 000 tonnes and 100 000 tonnes. The currently
identified resources are adequate to meet this expansion.
500
A2: Terrorist Attacks

Reactors can withstand terror attacks
Nuclear reactors are vulnerable to terrorist attack. The six-feet-thick reinforced concrete containment vessel
protects the contents from the outside as well as the inside. And even if a jumbo jet did crash into a
reactor and breach the containment, the reactor would not explode. There are many types of facilities that
are far more vulnerable, including liquid natural gas plants, chemical plants and numerous political
targets
501
A2: Nuclear Waste

Reprocessing solves waste concerns
Nuclear waste will be dangerous for thousands of years. Within 40 years, used fuel has less than one-thousandth
of the radioactivity it had when it was removed from the reactor. And it is incorrect to call it waste, because 95
percent of the potential energy is still contained in the used fuel after the first cycle. Now that the United States
has removed the ban on recycling used fuel, it will be possible to use that energy and to greatly reduce the
amount of waste that needs treatment and disposal. Last month, Japan joined France, Britain and Russia in the
nuclear-fuel-recycling business. The United States will not be far behind.
Waste volumes low
The volume of waste is also orders of magnitude smaller than the waste due to fossil fuels and is entirely in solid
form, which can be easily segregated from the environment. In fact, the entire volume of nuclear waste
generated up to the year 2004 in the United States would only fill a football field five yards deep.
Global warming will spread current wastes globally
And even if these casks are left undisturbed by political strife, environmental factors will claim them eventually.
Many of these waste repositories are located in coastal areas subject to rises in global sea levels. Many of these
waste repositories are also located in areas covered by continental glaciers in the last glacial period, which ended
around eighteen thousand years ago. Either eventuality would be sufficient to cause widespread dispersal of the
radioactive inventories of these nuclear wastes, rendering thousands of square miles uninhabitable. And given
the vast time periods involved - up to millions of years for some radionuclides - both global warming and global
cooling are possible before these wastes have naturally decayed to the point where they no longer pose a threat.
502
A2: Waste RD&D

Research and development can solve waste concerns
In light of these conclusions, we believe that the following actions would both benefit current waste management
efforts and help to lay the foundation for a possible future expansion of the nuclear power industry. First, the U.S.
Department of Energy should augment its current focus on Yucca Mountain with a balanced, longterm waste
management R&D program. The broad goals of this program should be to investigate and develop waste
management and disposal technologies that would offer improved short and/or long term performance. The program
should encompass a balanced portfolio of technologies, including both incremental improvements to the current
mainstream approach and more far-reaching innovations. The program should include the characterization and
investigation of alternative engineered barriers and geochemical and hydrological environments for waste
repositories, as well as alternatives to the repository concept itself. Among alternatives to mined repositories, the
deep borehole disposal approach has the potential to reduce significantly the already low risk of long-term radiation
exposure and merits a significant research and development program, with the goal of determining operational,
safety, and regulatory viability within a decade. This program should investigate methods for detailed site
characterization at depth, mechanisms for possible radionuclide transport to the surface, alternative approaches to
monitoring and retrieval of emplaced material, plugging and sealing techniques, site suitability criteria, and overall
system optimization. Parallel investigations by regulatory and standard-setting bodies should also be undertaken.
503
A2: Waste Interim Storage

Interim storage solves waste concerns
Extended interim storage of spent fuel Although most spent fuel destined for direct disposal will in practice be
stored above ground for many years because of the protracted process of developing high level waste repositories,
storage arrangements so far have mostly been ad hoc and incremental. We believe that a period of several decades of
interim storage should be incorporated into the design of the spent fuel management system as an integral part of the
system architecture.4 Such a storage capability would: provide greater flexibility in the event of delays in
repository development; allow a deliberate approach to disposal and create opportunities to benefit from future
advances in relevant science and technology; provide greater logistical flexibility, with centralized buffer storage
capacity facilitating the balancing of short and long-term storage requirements, and enabling the optimization of
logistics, pre- processing, and packaging operations; allow countries that want to keep open the option to
reprocess their spent fuel to do so without actually having to reprocess; create additional flexibility in repository
design, since the spent fuel would be older and cooler at the time of emplacement in the repository; and
potentially reduce the total number of repositories required. At-reactor storage will be feasible for some spent fuel,
even for several decades. For the remainder, centralized storage facilities will be required. Internationally, a network
of safeguarded, well protected central storage facilities will also yield important non-proliferation benefits (see
Chapter 8). The siting of temporary storage facilities will likely be difficult. Although the technical issues involved
are more straightforward than for geologic repositories, the task of persuading affected communities to accept such
facilities may be no less challenging. Nevertheless, making provision for several decades of temporary spent fuel
storage would make for a more robust waste management system overall, and could be cost effective too, if the
result was to postpone the onset of major spending on repository construction and operation.
504
A2: Waste Deep Borehole

Deep borehole storage solves
Alternative disposal technologies: The deep borehole approach An alternative to building geologic repositories a few
hundred meters below the earths surface is to place waste canisters in boreholes drilled into stable crystalline rock
several kilometers deep. Canisters containing spent fuel or high-level waste would be lowered into the bottom
section of the borehole, and the upper section several hundred meters or more in height would be filled with
sealant materials such as clay, asphalt, or concrete. At depths of several kilometers, vast areas of crystalline
basement rock are known to be extremely stable, having experienced no tectonic, volcanic or seismic activity for
billions of years. The main advantages of the deep borehole concept relative to mined geologic repositories include:
(a) a much longer migration pathway from the waste location to the biosphere; (b) the low water content, low
porosity and low permeability of crystalline rock at multi-kilometer depths; (c) the typically very high salinity of
any water that is present (because of its higher density, the saline water could not rise convectively into an overlying
layer of fresh water even if heated); and (d) the ubiquity of potentially suitable sites. An initial screening suggests
that most of the countries that are likely to employ nuclear power in our global growth scenario may have geology
appropriate for deep waste boreholes.
505
A2: Storage
Dry cask storage is safe
In the United States, one of the most common arguments against nuclear power relates to the current proposal
to bury spent fuel from power plants in a permanent storage facility at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. In my opinion,
resolution of this debate is really unnecessary for the construction of new nuclear power plants because recent
studies have shown that dry cask storage is a safe and secure method of handling spent fuel for the next century.
Dry casks are designed to cool the spent fuel to prevent temperature elevation from radioactive decay and to
shield the cask's surroundings from radiation without the use of water or mechanical systems. Heat is released
by conduction through the solid walls of the cask (typically made of concrete, lead, steel, polyethylene, and
boron-impregnated metals or resins) and by natural convection or thermal radiation. The cask walls also shield
the surroundings from radiation. Spent fuel is usually kept in pools for five years before storage in dry casks in
order to reduce decay heat and inventories of radionuclides. As the bipartisan National Commission on Energy
Policy recently explained, dry cask storage "is a proven, safe, inexpensive waste-sequestering technology that
would be good for 100 years or more, providing an interim, back-up solution against the possibility that Yucca
Mountain is further delayed or derailed - or cannot be adequately expanded before a further geologic repository
can be ready." At present, most spent fuel is initially stored in water-filled pools on each nuclear power plant
site. After five years, the fuel has cooled enough to be transferred to dry casks for storage, and many plants have
built such casks onsite. The National Research Council has pointed out that the temporary storage of spent fuel
in a retrievable form, such as dry cask storage, might provide opportunities for re-use of the material if new
ways of using it were developed in the future. n232 In any event, the current availability of dry cask storage means
that the problem of spent fuel no longer appears to be an insurmountable barrier to building new nuclear plants.
506
A2: Proliferation
Many barriers to nuclear weapons development from nuclear energy
Both the plutonium and uranium routes to nuclear weapons development involve significant capital and
technical costs: uranium weapons require a large, expensive isotope separation plant while plutonium weapons
require an existing nuclear reactor. Once weapons-grade material becomes available, the actual construction of
the weapon is relatively straightforward, requiring nothing more than an advanced degree in engineering or
physics and access to high explosives. A uranium bomb using the gun-barrel design of "Little Boy" is simplest
of all - in fact, the Los Alamos scientists were so certain this design would work they never bothered to test it
before the bombing of Hiroshima. A "Fat Man" implosive design using plutonium requires precision shaping of
a high explosive charge but is not beyond the technical ability of a state-sponsored program or possibly even a
well-funded NGO, such as a terrorist group. In short, denying nuclear weapons to NGOs primarily involves
limiting their access to weapons-grade materials. For this reason, the IAEA maintains an account of the
worldwide supply of nuclear materials. Since many states are capable of initiating their own domestic fuel
processing programs, n140 simply denying them access to fissile material is pointless at best and counterproductive
at worst.
Nuclear power doesnt increase proliferation risks
Daniel Rislove, Winter, 2007, Wisconsin International Law Journal p. 1091-2
A natural question to ask is how the presence of a peaceful nuclear energy program changes the factors involved
in deciding whether or not to seek nuclear weapons. First, the presence of a nuclear energy program may
negatively affect the sense of security felt by neighboring states if they believe it is a front for a clandestine
weapons program. However, a strict IAEA inspection regime can help to mitigate such concerns. It should also
be noted that building additional nuclear power plants in states with existing nuclear energy programs will not
significantly affect the security interests of other non-nuclear states. Second, the presence of a domestic nuclear
energy program may actually enhance a state's self-perception as "developed" and increase its desire to behave
as a responsible state, e.g., to comply with the NPT. It has been suggested that in every case, states that did
develop nuclear weapons acquired nuclear technology for the express purpose of developing those weapons. A
few, like Argentina, Brazil, and South Africa, gave up their nuclear weapons ambitions with the implementation
of the NPT. Still others, most of Europe for example, have opted for purely civilian nuclear programs. Although
it is difficult to find direct evidence of motive in the secretive world of nuclear weapons programs, the historical
record shows very little evidence of peaceful nuclear energy programs resulting in later decisions to pursue
nuclear weapons. The final factor affecting the probability of converting nuclear energy programs into nuclear
weapons programs is the economic cost involved. The IAEA inspection regime requires determined pre-nuclear
weapons states to operate expensive clandestine reactors and processing facilities. In addition, the NSG export
507

controls force such states to seek technology and materials from non-NSG members or the black market, thus
increasing the cost of the program. As mentioned in Part IV.A., the essential elements of a nuclear weapons
program - namely, fissile material, a nuclear reactor, and a processing plant - are the same elements found in
full-fledged peaceful nuclear energy programs. Thus it would seem that conversion of a nuclear energy program
into a weapons program should involve significantly less cost. However, nations subject to the NPT will almost
certainly have to construct a secret and largely redundant nuclear program entailing very little cost savings.
Diverting peaceful technology directly to military use would almost certainly result in discovery through regular
IAEA inspections.
508
A2: Terrorism
Materials acquisition, assembly make terrorism unlikely
Michael Levi, USA Today, January 8, 2008, p. 12A (Michael Levi, a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations,
is author of the new book On Nuclear Terrorism)
But it would be tougher for terrorists to pull off a nuclear attack than many people assume. (A dirty bomb
would be easier to make and deliver, but its impact would be far less severe.) Many intelligence professionals
know that, but our political culture doesn't do moderation. The first step to getting smart about defense, then, is
to bust some popular myths about nuclear terrorism. The long road Start at the beginning: To pull off a plot, a
terrorist group needs to get its hands on a bomb or on the materials it needs to make one. It would
probably target a nuclear facility directly, maybe a military base in the former Soviet Union or a civilian reactor
in an obscure corner of the world. That's a big reason why we need to do a much better job of securing those
sites. Our imagination, though, tends to focus just as much on a shadowy black market where nuclear
materials from the former Soviet Union are bought and sold so long as the price is right. That fear is fueled by
regular reports of intercepted nuclear materials and by the success of Pakistani engineer A.Q. Khan in building a
genuine worldwide black market in nuclear technology -- but not in nuclear materials like uranium and
plutonium. Indeed when it comes to loose nukes, the black market image is misleading, since underground
deals are hard for terrorists to engineer. Buyers and sellers need to worry about being turned in -- many
illicit transactions have actually been stings. Terrorists should also be nervous about getting ripped off.
When drug smugglers work with people they don't already know and trust, they tend to keep deals small, about
$10,000 or less. A nuclear weapon or the materials for it would be worth millions. If a group got its hands on
nuclear materials, it would still need to build a bomb. To the Internet! The place is littered with tutorials
on how to build nuclear weapons, and while a lot of what's out there is nonsense, there are places that get
the basics right. (Suggestion for policymakers: Hire students who failed physics to make as many instructional
websites as they can.) The problem for terrorists is that, as anyone who has ever tried programming a VCR can
tell you, instructions are the easy part. 'The dirty work' When it comes to nukes, it's the engineering and the
dirty work -- machining, metalworking, electronics -- that's tough, something that the Ph.D. physicists
who think about terrorism often forget. Let's not kid ourselves : With the right team, a terrorist group might
pull the job off. But we have a lot more leverage here than a lot of people think. A group that made it this far
would also need to get its bomb into the USA. Here the doom and gloom is a bit more justified. The United
States has long, porous borders, and right now it only inspects a fraction of the cargo that comes in through its
ports. Still, not everything is as bad as it looks. In 2006, U.S. government agents tried to smuggle weaponsgrade uranium across the Canadian border. They made it through on three of four tries. Border security must be
pretty useless, right? Not necessarily. Those odds of failing seem terrible from where we sit. But put yourself in
the shoes of a terrorist leader contemplating a nuclear strike, add up all the other ways you might fail,
and you might easily come to a different conclusion -- and perhaps not even start a plot in the first place.
509
A2: Environmental Hazards

Ecological systems have adapted to radiation levels
Natural radiation is a slow and steady process. How can it be that an explosion that speeds up and magnifies
this process immensely can have had so little long-range impact on ecological systems and processes?
Ecologists today recognize that disturbance is a natural part of ecological processes. Ecological change caused
by disturbance is not only inevitable but, within limits, necessary if ecological processes are to be maintained.
This current view is a departure from much of the earlier ecological thinking, which assumed that each part of
the world had a "climax" condition that in the aggregate created a static "balance of nature." University of
Illinois wildlife law expert Eric Freyfogle summarizes the importance of this change: "Ecologists now realize
that the whole concept of community climax is misleading, for climaxes are always tentative and subject to
being upset by a wide variety of natural forces, including fire, disease, and weather." My colleague, Dan
Tarlock, has chronicled how the science of "nonequilibrium" ecology emphasizes the important role that
disturbance, such as wildfire, flood, or epidemic, plays in ecological processes. Things our society has called
"disasters" are not external to the ecological system but a vital part of it. Disturbance can be seen as an
inevitable ecological process and a stabilizing factor that needs to be understood, and "efforts to freeze or
restore a static, pristine state" of nature are inappropriate "irrespective of whether the motive is to conserve
nature, to exploit a resource for economic gain, to sustain recreation, or to facilitate development." From an
ecological point of view, is Chernobyl really different than a "natural disaster"? I am certainly not trying to make
excuses for the gross negligence that led to Chernobyl, nor to minimize the enormous economic cost and human
disruption caused by the accident, but I doubt that natural systems really react differently because the
disturbance is caused by humans rather than a naturally-occurring hurricane or forest fire. Science has not found
some perceptive ability of natural systems to distinguish disturbance caused by humans from natural
disturbance: "Human activity not only causes new disturbances and disturbances that mimic and/or modify the
effects of natural disturbance, but it also alters the frequency, intensity, and duration of "natural' disturbance to
the point that the dichotomy becomes artificial."
510
A2: Environmental Hazards

Coal combustion is a greater risk to the environment than coal production
Environmental Law Journal, 2007, p. 51
The study of the ecological impact of the Chernobyl experience should cause us to compare that terrible
disturbance to the more gradual and less dramatic changes that humans are causing by burning coal. Explosions,
even huge ones, are one-time events. Ecological processes have a long history of adapting to such events and
recovering, as they have in the area around Chernobyl. But incremental changes of a unidirectional nature,
which go on and on at rates faster than the kinds of change to which ecological processes have adapted, such as
acid rain, mercury emissions, and climate change, may be the most serious threat to ecological systems and
processes. Ecological systems can be "metastable" if irregular disturbances at a particular scale are within the
level of resilience of the system, thus allowing the system to remain relatively stable at a larger scale. But
disturbances that are continually pushing ecological systems in the same direction, as in the case of the
disturbances that cause climate change, are likely to exceed the boundaries of metastability. The "excess carbon
dioxide we put in the atmosphere today is removed exceedingly slowly, meaning that the carbon dioxide we
emit in the next half-century will alter the climate for millennia to come."
511
U.S. Influence Solvency

The U.S. has substantial influence on global nuclear development
To better inform the debate that is under way in the United States about nuclear energy use, this Council Special
Report provides a clear examination of the benefits and risks and then lays out a set of recommendations for
U.S. nuclear energy policy, distinguishing between domestic and international use. The United States has
considerably more leverage influencing domestic nuclear energy production than international use; however, the
United States can help shape nuclear policies abroad through leading by example and through making use of
existing bilateral partnerships and multilateral institutions, including the International Atomic Energy Agency,
the International Energy Agency, and the Nuclear Suppliers Group. An effective policy needs to address climate
change, energy security, safety and security of nuclear power plants and radioactive waste storage, and
proliferation of nuclear technologies that can produce nuclear bombs.
The U.S. is a leader in nuclear safety
The United States has been a leader in improving the safety of nuclear plant operations. For instance, U.S.
nuclear engineers, working with their counterparts in other countries, created the World Association of Nuclear
Operators (WANO) after the 1986 Chernobyl accident. Headquartered in Atlanta, WANO serves as a
nongovernmental organization that conducts confidential peer reviews of nuclear power plant safety around the
world.
512
Oil Disadvantage Links

Nuclear power expansion can reduce oil consumption
Nuclear power can provide greater energy security by reducing reliance on fossil fuels acquired from unstable
regions. In recent years, the United States imported about two-thirds of its oil and one-fifth of its natural gas.
Most of the oil the United States uses fuels transportation needs with only a small portion (about 3 percent) used
for generating electricity. Electricity generation from all sources comprises about 40 percent of total U.S. energy
consumption. Of this total, nuclear comprises only about 8 percent. Currently, nuclear power, which solely
generates electricity, offers some relief in use of foreign sources of oil and natural gas and could, over the long
term (many decades), power cars and trucks through production of hydrogen for fuel cells or electricity for plugin hybrid vehicles.
Next Generation Nuclear project produces energy in a way that reduces oil consumption
Washington Post, January 8, 2008, Pg. A18 ((PER F. PETERSON is a professor of nuclear engineering at the
University of California at Berkeley. Some of his research, including into high-temperature reactor technology,
has been funded by the Energy Department.)
In his Jan. 5 letter, Thomas W. Lippman stated that nuclear power could supplant coal but not oil. The Energy
Department's Next Generation Nuclear Plant aims precisely at this point. This high-temperature reactor
technology will generate heat and hydrogen to help produce low-carbon liquid fuels from alternative
hydrocarbon feed stocks abundant in North America, including biomass, coal and tar sands. Nuclear can and
should play a major role in reducing our reliance on imported oil and liquefied natural gas.
513
Nuclear Better than Renewables

Nuclear, not renewable power, can meet base load capacity
Steve Kerekes, senior director of media relations at the Nuclear Energy Institute, debate the role of nuclear
power in climate change policy, November 10, 2007, Nuclear Power in Response To Climate Change,
So its a complete myth that Michaels preferred technologies havent gotten the money. They have. In fact,
nuclear and renewables make a nice, emission-free combination. Of course, renewables cannot meet baseload,
24-hour a day, seven-day a week electricity demand. Nuclear power can. Our industry average capacity factor
which measures actual electricity production relative to theoretical production non-stop for a full yearhas
been right around 90 percent for the past seven years. By comparison, the Department of Energy pegs the
average capacity for state-of-the-art wind projects at 36 percent, with older projects lagging at 30 percent or
lower.
514
Nuclear Power Net-Beneficial Compared to Coal
Nuclear power is less damaging to the environment than coal

Like coal, nuclear power is made from a mineral substance that comes from a mine, is transported to the power
plant and removed from the plant when its usefulness has ended. The uranium used in nuclear power plants,
however, has only a small fraction of the ecological impact of coal at any stage of its cycle, both in total effect
and per unit of power produced. The nuclear industry claims that: Nuclear energy has perhaps the lowest impact
on the environment - including air, land, water, and wildlife - of any energy source, because it does not emit
harmful gases, isolates its waste from the environment, and requires less area to produce the same amount of
electricity as other sources.
The evidence supports these claims, as will be shown below. Moreover, the risk of a serious accident or terrorist
attack on the next generation of nuclear plants will be slight.
1. The Amount of Uranium Used Is a Tiny Fraction of the Coal Used
The mining of uranium admittedly can create some of the same adverse ecological impacts as the mining of
coal. The difference, however, is that while the coal-fired power plants in the United States used slightly over a
billion tons of coal in 2005, nuclear power plants used only 66 million pounds of uranium oxide. Thus the scale
of the impact from uranium mining is not in the same ball park as the impact of coal mining. Virtually all
uranium mines currently operating in the United States are underground mines or use the in situ leaching
method, which both have much less impact on the environment than open pit uranium mining. Moreover, coalfired power plants produce half the electricity in the United States while nuclear power plants produce onefifth. In addition, unlike coal, uranium used in power plants can be recycled and used again. At the present time,
the United States does not reprocess its nuclear fuel, but countries such as Great Britain, France, Japan, and
Russia do so on a regular basis. The policy issues related to reprocessing are beyond the scope of this article, but
it should be noted that the possibility of future reprocessing further reduces the slim risk that supplies of
uranium will run out, despite the fact that the known uranium resources would provide enough fuel to support
four times the current amount of worldwide nuclear electricity generation for the next 80 years. Furthermore,
uranium is not the only element that can be used as nuclear fuel; India is producing nuclear fuel from thorium,
of which it has ample supplies. n
515
2. Nuclear Power Plants Cause No Air or Radiation Pollution
Whereas coal burning creates large amounts of sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides, nuclear power generation
emits none. The reason that nuclear power plants produce no air pollutants when generating power is that in a
nuclear power plant, nothing is burned; the heat used to spin the turbines and drive the generators comes from
the natural decay of the radionuclides in the fuel. It is the burning of fossil fuels, and particularly coal, that
causes air pollution from electric power plants.
Nor does a nuclear power plant pollute its surroundings with dangerous radiation, as its opponents often imply.
The population exposure from the normal operation of nuclear power plants is far lower than exposure from
natural sources. "The civilian nuclear power fuel cycle, involving mining, fuel fabrication, and reactor operation,
contributes a negligible dose [of radiation] to the general public." Life cycle air pollutant emissions from nuclear
plants are comparable to those of the wind, solar, and hydro facilities - in other words, minimal. Concern is
sometimes raised about the possibility of releases of large amounts of radiation from an accident at a nuclear
power plant. In the four decades of commercial power plant operation in the United States, such a release has
never occurred. The only serious accident at a commercial nuclear reactor in the United States caused no
radiation damage to people outside the plant and little environmental damage. n
\
3. No Greenhouse Gases Are Emitted by Nuclear Power Plants
The use of nuclear fuel to generate electricity causes no emissions of greenhouse gases. As of 2003, nuclear
power accounted for 69% of the carbon-free generation in the United States. Even if the full life cycle of a
nuclear power plant is calculated, the emissions of greenhouse gases are negligible. The avoidance of
greenhouse gas emissions has been a major factor in converting some prominent environmentalists to the
support of new nuclear reactor construction. Many companies in the United States now recognize the need to
factor in the potential cost of complying with future greenhouse gas regulations in evaluating power plant
proposals, n and some of the countries that have agreed to comply with the Kyoto protocol on the reduction of
greenhouse gas emissions are looking at nuclear power as a way to facilitate compliance.
516
Open Cycle Good - Expansion

Open fuel cycles are key to widespread deployment of nuclear power
A critical factor for the future of an expanded nuclear power industry is the choice of the fuel cycle what type of
fuel is used, what types of reactors burn the fuel, and the method of disposal of the spent fuel. This choice affects
all four key problems that confront nuclear power costs, safety, proliferation risk, and waste disposal. For this
study, we examined three representative nuclear fuel cycle deployments: conventional thermal reactors operating
in a oncethrough mode, in which discharged spent fuel is sent directly to disposal; thermal reactors with
reprocessing in a closed fuel cycle, which means that waste products are separated from unused fissionable
material that is re-cycled as fuel into reactors. This includes the fuel cycle currently used in some countries in which
plutonium is separated from spent fuel, fabricated into a mixed plutonium and uranium oxide fuel, and recycled to
reactors for one pass1; fast reactors2 with reprocessing in a balanced closed fuel cycle, which means thermal
reactors operated world-wide in once-through mode and a balanced number of fast reactors that destroy the
actinides separated from thermal reactor spent fuel. The fast reactors, reprocessing, and fuel fabrication facilities
would be co-located in secure nuclear energy parks in industrial countries. Closed fuel cycles extend fuel supplies.
The viability of the once-through alternative in a global growth scenario depends upon the amount of uranium
resource that is available at economically attractive prices. We believe that the world-wide supply of uranium ore is
sufficient to fuel the deployment of 1000 reactors over the next half century and to maintain this level of deployment
over a 40 year lifetime of this fleet. This is an important foundation of our study, based upon currently available
information and the history of natural resource supply. The result of our detailed analysis of the relative merits of
these representative fuel cycles with respect to key evaluation criteria can be summarized as follows: The once
through cycle has advantages in cost, proliferation, and fuel cycle safety, and is disadvantageous only in respect to
long-term waste disposal; the two closed cycles have clear advantages only in long-term aspects of waste disposal,
and disadvantages in cost, short-term waste issues, proliferation risk, and fuel cycle safety. (See Table.) Cost and
waste criteria are likely to be the most crucial for determining nuclear powers future. We have not found, and based
on current knowledge do not believe it is realistic to expect, that there are new reactor and fuel cycle technologies
that simultaneously overcome the problems of cost, safety, waste, and proliferation. Our analysis leads to a
significant conclusion: The once-through fuel cycle best meets the criteria of low costs and proliferation resistance.
Closed fuel cycles may have an advantage from the point of view of long-term waste disposal and, if it ever
becomes relevant, resource extension. But closed fuel cycles will be more expensive than once-through cycles, until
ore resources become very scarce. This is unlikely to happen, even with significant growth in nuclear power, until at
least the second half of this century, and probably considerably later still. Thus our most important recommendation
is: For the next decades, government and industry in the U.S. and elsewhere should give priority to the deployment
of the once-through fuel cycle, rather than the development of more expensive closed fuel cycle technology
involving reprocessing and new advanced thermal or fast reactor technologies.
517
Open Cycle Good Economy

Open-cycle is economically dominant
Our global growth scenario envisions an open fuel cycle architecture at least until mid-century or so, with the
advanced closed fuel cycles possibly deployed later, but only if significant improvements are realized through
research. The principal driver of this conclusion is our judgment that natural uranium ore is available at reasonable
prices to support the open cycle at least to late in the century in a scenario of substantial expansion. This gives the
open cycle clear economic advantage with proliferation resistance an important additional feature. The DOE should
undertake a global uranium resource evaluation program to determine with greater confidence the uranium resource
base around the world. Accordingly, we recommend: The U.S. Department of Energy should focus its R&D program
on the once-through fuel cycle; The U.S. Department of Energy should establish a Nuclear System Modeling project
to carryout the analysis, research, simulation, and collection of engineering data needed to evaluate all fuel cycles
from the viewpoint of cost, safety, waste management, and proliferation resistance; The U.S. Department of Energy
should undertake an international uranium resource evaluation program; The U.S. Department of Energy should
broaden its waste management R&D program; The U.S. Department of Energy should support R&D that reduces
Light Water Reactor (LWR) costs and for development of the HTGR for electricity application. We believe that the
ARD&D program proposed here is aligned with the strategic objective of enabling a credible growth scenario over
the next several decades. Such a ARD&D program requires incremental budgets of almost $400 million per year
over the next 5 years, and at least $460 million per year for the 5-10 year period.
518
Open Cycle Good A2: Waste

Open cycle solves waste disposal adequately
These schemes would separate or partition plutonium and other actinides and possibly certain fission products
from the spent fuel and transmute them into shorter-lived and more benign species. The goals would be to reduce the
thermal load from radioactive decay of the waste on the repository, thereby increasing its storage capacity, and to
shorten the time for which the waste must be isolated from the biosphere. We have analyzed the waste management
implications of both once-through and closed fuel cycles, taking into account each stage of the fuel cycle and the
risks of radiation exposure in both the short and long-term.We do not believe that a convincing case can be made on
the basis of waste management considerations alone that the benefits of partitioning and transmutation will outweigh
the attendant safety, environmental, and security risks and economic costs. Future technology developments could
change the balance of expected costs, risks, and benefits. For our fundamental conclusion to change, however, not
only would the expected long term risks from geologic repositories have to be significantly higher than those
indicated in current assessments, but the incremental costs and short-term safety and environmental risks would
have to be greatly reduced relative to current expectations and experience. We further conclude that waste
management strategies in the once-through fuel cycle are potentially available that could yield long-term risk
reductions at least as great as those claimed for waste partitioning and transmutation, with fewer short-term risks and
lower development and deployment costs. These include both incremental improvements to the current mainstream
mined repositories approach and more far-reaching innovations such as deep borehole disposal. Finally, replacing
the current ad hoc approach to spent fuel storage at reactor sites with an explicit strategy to store spent fuel for a
period of several decades will create additional flexibility in the waste management system. Our principal
recommendations on waste management are: The DOE should augment its current focus on Yucca Mountain with a
balanced long-term waste management R&D program. A research program should be launched to determine the
viability of geologic disposal in deep boreholes within a decade. A network of centralized facilities for storing spent
fuel for several decades should be established in the U.S. and internationally.
519
Nuclear System Modeling

Nuclear system modeling is good
Every industry in the United States develops basic analytical models and tools such as spreadsheets that allow firms,
investors, policy makers, and regulators to understand how changes in the parameters of a process will affect the
performance and cost of that process. But we have been struck throughout our study by the absence of such models
and simulation tools that permit in depth, quantitative analysis of trade-offs between different reactor and fuel cycle
choices, with respect to all key criteria. The analysis we have seen is based on point designs and does not
incorporate information about the cost and performance of operating commercial nuclear facilities. Such modeling
and analysis under a wide variety of scenarios, for both open and closed fuel cycles, will be useful to the industry
and investors, as well as to international discussions about the desirability about different fuel cycle paths. We call
on the Department of Energy, perhaps in collaboration with other countries, to establish a major project for the
modeling, analysis, and simulation of commercial nuclear power systems The Nuclear System Modeling Project.
This project should provide a foundation for the accumulation of information about how variations in the operation
of plants and other parts of the fuel cycle affect costs, safety, waste, and proliferation resistance characteristics. The
models and analysis should be based on real engineering data and, wherever possible, practical experience. This
project is technically demanding and will require many years and considerable resources to be carried out
successfully. We believe that development of advanced nuclear technologies either fast reactors or advanced fuel
cycles employing reprocessing should await the results of the Nuclear System Modeling Project we have proposed
above. Our analysis makes clear that there is ample time for the project to compile the necessary engineering and
economic analyses and data before undertaking expensive development programs, even if the project should take a
decade to complete. Expensive programs that plan for the development or deployment of commercial reprocessing
based on any existing advanced fuel cycle technologies are simply not justified on the basis of cost, or the unproven
safety, proliferation risk, and waste properties of a closed cycle compared to the once-through cycle. Reactor
concept evaluation should be part of the Nuclear System Modeling Project. On the other hand, we support a modest
laboratory scale research and analysis program on new separation methods and associated fuel forms, with the
objective of learning about approaches that emphasize lower cost and more proliferation resistance. These data can
be important inputs to advanced fuel cycle analysis and simulation and thus help prioritize future development
programs.
520

Nuclear Power Strategy Guide

Încărcat de

Informații document

Drepturi de autor

Formate disponibile

Partajați acest document

Partajați sau inserați document

Opțiuni de partajare

Vi se pare util acest document?

Este necorespunzător acest conținut?

Drepturi de autor:

Formate disponibile

Nuclear Power Strategy Guide

Încărcat de

Drepturi de autor:

Formate disponibile

Nuclear Power Strategy Guide

Nuclear Power is Not Inevitable..........................................................................................................................24