1

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-12817. April 29, 1960.]
JULIO D. ENRIQUEZ, SR., representing the law firm of ENRIQUEZ &
ENRIQUEZ, Petitioner, v. HON. PEDRO M. GIMENEZ in his capacity as
AUDITOR GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINES,Respondent.
Julio D. Enriquez, Sr. for Petitioner.
Assistant Solicitor General Florencio Villamor and Solicitor Jorge R. Coquia
for Respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION; PROVINCIAL FISCAL; LEGAL ADVISER OF MUNICIPAL

MAYOR AND COUNCIL; WHEN DISQUALIFIED. Under the provision of Sections 2241,
1682 and 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code the provincial fiscal is the legal
adviser of the mayor and council of the various municipalities of a province and it is
his duty to represent the municipality in any court except when he is disqualified by
law. When he is disqualified to represent the municipality, the municipal council may
engage the services of a special attorney. The provincial fiscal is disqualified to
represent in court the municipality if and when original jurisdiction of the case
involving the municipality is vested in the Supreme Court; when the municipality is a
party adverse to the provincial government or to some other municipality in the same
province; and when in the case involving the municipality, he, or his wife, or child, is
pecuniarily involved as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise.
2. ID.; ID.; MUNICIPAL COUNCIL TO ENGAGE SERVICES OF SPECIAL COUNSEL;
PROVINCIAL FISCALS HOSTILE BELIEF ON THE CASE. The fact that the provincial
fiscal entertains a hostile belief and attitude on the theory involved in the litigation
and, therefore, would not be in a position to prosecute the case of the municipality
with earnestness and vigor, could not justify the act of the municipal council in
engaging the services of a special counsel. Bias or prejudice and animosity or
hostility on the part of a fiscal not based on any of the conditions enumerated in the
law and the Rules of Court do not constitute a legal and valid excuse for inhibition or
disqualification.
3. ID.; ID.; BOUND TO PERFORM HIS DUTIES. Unlike a practicing lawyer who has the
right to decline employment, a fiscal cannot refuse the performance of his functions
on grounds not provided for by law without violating his oath of office, where he
swore, among others, "that he will well and faithfully discharge to the best of his
ability the duties of the office or position upon which he is about to enter . . . .
4. ID.; ID.; REMEDY OF MUNICIPAL COUNCIL IF FISCAL DECLINES TO HANDLE CASE.
Instead of engaging the services of a special attorney, the municipal council should
have requested the Secretary of Justice to appoint an acting provincial fiscal in place
of the provincial fiscal who had declined to handle and prosecute its case in court
pursuant to Section 1679 of the Revised Administrative Code.

DECISION

PADILLA, J.:

This is a petition filed under the provisions of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and
section 2 (c) of Commonwealth Act No. 327 for a review of a decision of the Auditor
General dated 24 June 1957.
On 18 June 1955 Republic Act No. 1383 creating the National Waterworks and
Sewerage Authority as a public corporation and vesting in it the ownership,
jurisdiction, supervision and control over all territory embraced by the Metropolitan
Water District as well as all areas served by existing government-owned waterworks
and sewerage and drainage systems within the boundaries of cities, municipalities,
and municipal districts in the Philippines, and those served by the Waterworks and
Wells and Drills Section of the Bureau of Public Works, was passed. On 19 September
1955 the President of the Philippines promulgated Executive Order No. 127 providing,
among others, for the transfer to the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority of
all the records, properties, machinery, equipment, appropriations, assets, choses in
actions, liabilities, obligations, notes, bonds and all indebtedness of all governmentowned waterworks and sewerage systems in the provinces, cities, municipalities and
municipal districts (51 Off. Gaz. 4415-4417). On 31 March 1956 the municipal council
of Bauan, Batangas, adopted and passed Resolution No. 152 stating "that it is the
desire of this municipality in this present administration not to submit our local
Waterworks to the provisions of the said Republic Act No. 1383." (Annex A.) On 20
April 1956 the municipal mayor transmitted a copy of Resolution No. 152 to the
Provincial Fiscal through the Provincial Board requesting him to render an opinion on
the matter treated therein and to inform the municipal council whether he would
handle and prosecute its case in court should the council decide to question and test
judicially the legality of Republic Act No. 1383 and to prevent the National
Waterworks and Sewerage Authority from exercising its authority over the
waterworks system of the municipality (Annex B). On 2 May 1956 the provincial fiscal
rendered an opinion holding that Republic Act No. 1383 is valid and constitutional and
declined to represent the municipality of Bauan in an action to be brought against the
National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority to test the validity and constitutionality
of the Act creating it (Annex C). On 26 May 1956 the municipal council adopted and
passed Resolution No. 201 authorizing the municipal mayor to take steps to
commence an action or proceedings in court to challenge the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 1383 and to engage the services of a special counsel, and
appropriating the sum of P2,000 to defray the expenses of litigation and attorneys
fees (Annex D). On 2 June 1956 the municipal mayor wrote a letter to the petitioner
engaging his services as counsel for the municipality in its contemplated action
against the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority (Annex F.) On 27 June 1956
the Provincial Board of Batangas adopted and passed Resolution No. 1829 approving
Resolution No. 201 of the municipal council of Bauan (Annex E). On 28 June 1956 the
petitioner wrote to the municipal mayor accepting his offer in behalf of the
municipality under the following terms and conditions: that his professional services
shall commence from the filing of the complaint up to and including the appeal, if
any, to the appellate courts; that his professional fee shall be P1,500 and payable as
follows: P500 upon the filing of the complaint, P500 upon the termination of the
hearing of the case in the Court of First Instance, and P500 after judgment shall have
become final or, should the judgment be appealed, after the appeal shall have been
submitted for judgment to the appellate court; and that the municipality shall defray
all reasonable and necessary expenses for the prosecution of the case in the trial and

2
appellate courts including court and sheriff fees, transportation and subsistence of
counsel and witnesses and cost of transcripts of stenographic notes and other
documents (Annex G). On the same date, 28 June 1956, the petitioner filed the
necessary complaint in the Court of First Instance of Batangas (civil No. 542, Annex I).
On 9 July 1956 the municipal mayor wrote to the petitioner agreeing to the terms and
conditions set forth in his (the petitioners) letter of 28 June 1956 (Annex H). On 16
July 1956 the defendant filed its answer to the complaint (Annex J). On 24 July 1956
the petitioner wrote a letter to the municipal treasurer requesting reimbursement of
the sum of P40 paid by him to the Court as docket fee and payment of the sum of
P500 as initial attorneys fee. Attached to the letter were the pertinent supporting
papers (Annex K). The municipal treasurer forwarded the petitioners claim letter and
enclosures to the Auditor General through channels for pre-audit. On 24 June 1957
the Auditor General disallowed in audit the petitioners claim for initial attorneys fees
in the sum of P500, based upon an opinion rendered on 10 May 1957 by the
Secretary of Justice who held that the Provincial Fiscal was not disqualified to handle
and prosecute in court the case of the municipality of Bauan and that its municipal
council had no authority to engage the services of a special counsel (Annex L), but
offered no objection to the refund to the petitioner of the sum of P40 paid by him to
the Court as docket fee (Annex M). On 15 August 1957 the petitioner received notice
of the decision of the Auditor General and on 11 September 1957 he filed with the
Auditor General a notice of appeal from his decision under section 4, Rule 45, of the
Rules of Court (Annex N). On 13 September 1957 the petitioner filed this petition for
review in this Court.
The Revised Administrative Code provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
SEC. 2241. Submission of questions to provincial fiscal. When the council is
desirous of securing a legal opinion upon any question relative to its own powers or
the constitution or attributes of the municipal government, it shall frame such
question in writing and submit the same to the provincial fiscal for decision.
SEC. 1682. Duty of fiscal as legal adviser of province and provincial subdivisions.
The provincial fiscal shall be the legal adviser of the provincial government and its
officers, including district health officers, and of the mayor and council of the various
municipalities and municipal districts of the province. As such he shall, when so
requested, submit his opinion in writing upon any legal question submitted to him by
any such officer or body pertinent to the duties thereof.
SEC. 1683. Duty of fiscal to represent provinces and provincial subdivisions in
litigation. The provincial fiscal shall represent the province and any municipality or
municipal district thereof in any court, except in cases whereof original jurisdiction is
vested in the Supreme Court or in cases where the municipality or municipal district
in question is a party adverse to the provincial government or to some other
municipality or municipal district in the same province. When the interests of a
provincial government and of any political division thereof are opposed, the provincial
fiscal shall act on behalf of the province.
When the provincial fiscal is disqualified to serve any municipality or other political
subdivision of a province, a special attorney may be employed by its council.
Under the foregoing provisions of law, the Provincial Fiscal is the legal adviser of the
mayor and counsel of the various municipalities of a province and it is his duty to
represent the municipality in any court except when he is disqualified by law. When
he is disqualified to represent the municipality, the municipal council may engage the
services of a special attorney. The Provincial Fiscal is disqualified to represent in court

the municipality if and when original jurisdiction of the case involving the municipality
is vested in the Supreme Court; when the municipality is a party adverse to the
provincial government or to some other municipality in the same province; 1 and
when in the case involving the municipality, he, or his wife, or child, is pecuniarily
involved as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise. 2 The fact that the Provincial Fiscal in
the case at bar was of the opinion that Republic Act No. 1383 was valid and
constitutional, and, therefore, would not be in a position to prosecute the case of the
municipality with earnestness and vigor, could not justify the act of the municipal
council in engaging the services of a special counsel. Bias or prejudice and animosity
or hostility on the part of a fiscal not based on any of the conditions enumerated in
the law and the Rules of Court do not constitute a legal and valid excuse for inhibition
or disqualification. 3 And unlike a practising lawyer who has the right to decline
employment, 4 a fiscal cannot refuse the performance of his functions on grounds not
provided for by law without violating his oath of office, where he swore, among
others, "that he will well and faithfully discharge to the best of his ability the duties of
the office or position upon which he is about to enter . . . ." 5 Instead of engaging the
services of a special attorney, the municipal council should have requested the
Secretary of Justice to appoint an acting provincial fiscal in place of the provincial
fiscal who had declined to handle and prosecute its case in court, pursuant to section
1679 of the Revised Administrative Code. The petitioner claims that the municipal
council could not do this because the Secretary of Justice, who has executive
supervision over the Government Corporate Counsel, who represented the National
Waterworks and Sewerage Authority in the case filed against it by the municipality of
Bauan (civil No. 542, Annex J) and direct supervision and control over the Provincial
Fiscal, would be placed in an awkward and absurd position of having control of both
sides of the controversy. The petitioners contention is untenable. Section 83 of the
Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Executive Order No. 94, series of 1947
and further amended by Executive Order No. 392, series of 1950, 46 Off. Gaz., 5913,
5917, provides that the Secretary of Justice shall have executive supervision over the
Government Corporate Counsel and supervision and control over Provincial Fiscals. In
Mondano v. Silvosa, 97 Phil., 143; 51 Off. Gaz., 2884, 2888, this Court distinguished
supervision from control as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
. . . In administrative law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of
an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or
neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to
make them perform their duties. Control on the other hand, means the power of an
officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in
the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of
the latter. . . .
The fact that the Secretary of Justice had, on several occasions, upheld the validity
and constitutionality of Republic Act No. 1383 does not exempt the municipal council
of Bauan from requesting the Secretary of Justice to detail a provincial fiscal to
prosecute its case.
The services of the petitioner having been engaged by the municipal council and
mayor without authority of law, the Auditor General was correct in disallowing in audit
the petitioners claim for payment of attorneys fees.
The decision under review is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.
Bengzon, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Barrera and Gutierrez David, JJ.,
concur.

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Endnotes:

1. See Reyes v. Cornista, 92 Phil., 838; 49 Off. Gaz. 931; Municipality of Bocaue and
Province of Bulacan v. Manotok, 93 Phil., 173.
2. Section 13, Rule 115 and Section 1, Rule 126, Rules of Court.
3. Cf. Benusa v. Torres, 55 Phil., 7337; People v. Lopez, 78 Phil., 286.
4. Canon No. 31 of the Canons of Professional Ethics.
5. Section 23, Revised Administrative Code.

SECOND DIVISION
A.M. No. 1418 August 31, 1976
JOSE MISAMIN, complainant,
vs.
ATTORNEY MIGUEL A. SAN JUAN, respondent.
RESOLUTION

FERNANDO, J.:
It certainly fails to reflect credit on a captain in the Metro Manila Police Force and a
member of the bar, respondent Miguel A. San Juan, to be charged with being the legal
representative of certain establishments allegedly owned by Filipinos of Chinese
descent and, what is worse, with coercing an employee, complainant Jose Misamin, to
agree to drop the charges filed by him against his employer Tan Hua, owner of New
Cesar's Bakery, for the violation of the Minimum Wage Law. There was a denial on the
part of respondent. The matter was referred to the Office of the Solicitor-General for
investigation, report and recommendation. Thereafter, it would seem there was a
change of heart on the part of complainant. That could very well be the explanation
for the non- appearance of the lawyer employed by him at the scheduled hearings.
The efforts of the Solicitor General to get at the bottom of things were thus set at
naught. Under the circumstances, the outcome of such referral was to be expected.
For the law is rather exacting in its requirement that there be competent and
adequate proof to make out a case for malpractice. Necessarily, the recommendation
was one of the complaints being dismissed, This is one of those instances then where
this Court is left with hardly any choice. Respondent cannot be found guilty of
malpractice.

Respondent, as noted in the Report of the Solicitor-General, "admits having appeared

as counsel for the New Cesar's Bakery in the proceeding before the NLRC while he
held office as captain in the Manila Metropolitan Police. However, he contends that
the law did not prohibit him from such isolated exercise of his profession. He contends
that his appearance as counsel, while holding a government position, is not among
the grounds provided by the Rules of Court for the suspension or removal of
attorneys. The respondent also denies having conspired with the complainant
Misamin's attorney in the NLRC proceeding in order to trick the complainant into
signing an admission that he had been paid his separation pay. Likewise, the
respondent denies giving illegal protection to members of the Chinese community in
Sta. Cruz, Manila." 1
Then came a detailed account in such Report of the proceedings: "Pursuant to the
resolution of this Honorable Court of March 21, 1975, the Solicitor General's Office set
the case for investigation on July 2 and 3, 1975. The counsel for the complainant
failed to appear, and the investigation was reset to August 15, 1975. At the latter
date, the same counsel for complainant was absent. In both instances, the said
counsel did not file written motion for postponement but merely sent the complainant
to explain the reason for his absence. When the case was again called for hearing on
October 16, 1975, counsel for complainant failed once more to appear. The
complainant who was present explained that his lawyer was busy "preparing an
affidavit in the Court of First Instance of Manila." When asked if he was willing to
proceed with the hearing' in the absence of his counsel, the complainant declared,
apparently without any prodding, that he wished his complaint withdrawn. He
explained that he brought the present action in an outburst of anger believing that
the respondent San Juan took active part in the unjust dismissal of his complaint with
the NLRC. The complainant added that after reexamining his case, he believed the
respondent to be without fault and a truly good person." 2
The Report of the Solicitor-General did not take into account respondent's practice of
his profession notwithstanding his being a police official, as "this is not embraced in
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides the grounds for the
suspension or removal of an attorney. The respondent's appearance at the labor
proceeding notwithstanding that he was an incumbent police officer of the City of
Manila may appropriately be referred to the National Police Commission and the Civil
Service Commission." 3 As a matter of fact, separate complaints on this ground have
been filed and are under investigation by the Office of the Mayor of Manila and the
National Police Commission." As for the charges that respondent conspired with
complainant's counsel to mislead complainant to admitting having' received his
separation pay and for giving illegal protection to aliens, it is understandable why the
Report of the Solicitor-General recommended that they be dismissed for lack of
evidence.
The conclusion arrived at by the Solicitor-General that the complaint cannot prosper
is in accordance with the settled law. As far back as in re Tionko, 4 decided in 1922,
the authoritative doctrine was set forth by Justice Malcolm in this wise: "The serious
consequences of disbarment or suspension should follow only where there is a clear

4
preponderance of evidence against the respondent. The presumption is that the
attorney is innocent of the charges preferred and has performed his duty as an officer
of the court in accordance with his oath." 5 The Tionko doctrine has been
subsequently adhered to. 6
This resolution does not in any wise take into consideration whatever violations there
might have been of the Civil Service Law in view of respondent practicing his
profession while holding his position of Captain in the Metro Manila police force. That
is a matter to be decided in the administrative proceeding as noted in the
recommendation of the Solicitor-General. Nonetheless, while the charges have to be
dismissed, still it would not be inappropriate for respondent member of the bar to
avoid all appearances of impropriety. Certainly, the fact that the suspicion could be
entertained that far from living true to the concept of a public office being a public
trust, he did make use, not so much of whatever legal knowledge he possessed, but
the influence that laymen could assume was inherent in the office held not only to
frustrate the beneficent statutory scheme that labor be justly compensated but also
to be at the beck and call of what the complainant called alien interest, is a matter
that should not pass unnoticed. Respondent, in his future actuations as a member of
the bar. should refrain from laying himself open to such doubts and misgivings as to
his fitness not only for the position occupied by him but also for membership in the
bar. He is not worthy of membership in an honorable profession who does not even
take care that his honor remains unsullied
WHEREFORE, this administrative complaint against respondent Miguel A. San Juan is
dismissed for not having been duly proved. Let a copy of this resolution be spread on
his record.

September 19, 2008 of Commissioner Romualdo A. Din, Jr. of the IBP Commission on
Bar Discipline, are as follows:
On September 5, 2006 a certain David Edward Toze filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal before the Labor Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations
Commission against the members of the Board of Trustees of the International School,
Manila. The same was docketed as NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-07381-06 and raffled to
the sala of the respondent. Impleaded as among the party-respondents are the
complainants in the instant case.
On September 7, 2006, David Edward Toze filed a Verified Motion for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction Against the Respondents.
The said Motion was set for hearing on September 12, 2006 at 10:00 in the morning.
A day after, on September 8, 2006, the counsel for the complainants herein entered
its appearance and asked for additional time to oppose and make a comment to the
Verified Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary
Injunction Against the Respondents of David Edward Toze.
Thereafter, the respondent issued an Order dated September 14, 2006 that directs
the parties in the said case to maintain the status quo ante. The complainants herein
sought the reconsideration of the Order dated September 14, 200 [6] x x x.
xxxx
On account of the Order dated September 14, 2006, David Edward Toze was
immediately reinstated and assumed his former position as superintendent of the
International School Manila.
The pending incidents with the above-mentioned illegal dismissal case were not
resolved, however, the scheduled hearing for the issuance of a preliminary injunction
on September 20, 2006 and September 27, 2006 was postponed.
On January 19, 2007, the co-respondents of the complainants herein in the said illegal
dismissal case filed a motion for an early resolution of their motion to dismiss the said
case, but the respondent instead issued an Order dated February 6, 2007 requiring
the parties to appear in his Office on February 27, 2007 at 10:00 in the morning in
order to thresh out David Edward Toze claim of moral and exemplary damages.

SECOND DIVISION
[A.C. No. 7430 : February 15, 2012]
MARTIN LAHM III AND JAMES P. CONCEPCION, COMPLAINANTS, VS. LABOR
ARBITER JOVENCIO LL. MAYOR, JR., RESPONDENT.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
[1]

Before us is a verified complaint filed by Martin Lahm III and James P. Concepcion
(complainants) praying for the disbarment of Labor Arbiter Jovencio Ll. Mayor, Jr.
(respondent) for alleged gross misconduct and violation of lawyers oath.cralaw
On June 27, 2007, the respondent filed his Comment[2] to the complaint.
In a Resolution[3] dated July 18, 2007, the Court referred the case to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
The antecedent facts, as summarized in the Report and Recommendation [4] dated

xxxx
The respondent on the other maintains that the Order dated September 14, 2006 was
issued by him on account of [the] Verified Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction Against the Respondents that was
filed by David Edward Toze, and of the Entry of Appearance with Motion for Additional
Time to File Comment that was thereafter filed by the counsel for the herein
complainants in the illegal dismissal case pending before the respondent.
The respondent maintains that in order to prevent irreparable damage on the person
of David Edward Toze, and on account of the urgency of [the] Verified Motion for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction Against the
Respondents of David Edward Toze, and that the counsel for respondents in the illegal
dismissal case have asked for a relatively long period of fifteen days for a resetting,
he (respondent) found merit in issuing the Order dated September 14, 2006 that
requires the parties to maintain the status quo ante.

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xxx
The respondent argues that [the] instant case should be dismissed for being
premature since the aforementioned illegal dismissal case is still pending before the
Labor Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission, that the instant
case is a subterfuge in order to compel the respondent to inhibit himself in resolving
the said illegal dismissal case because the complainants did not assail the Order
dated September 14, 2006 before the Court of Appeals under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court.[5]
Based on the foregoing, the Investigating Commissioner concluded that: (1) the
grounds cited by the respondent to justify his issuance of the status quo ante order
lacks factual basis and is speculative; (2) the respondent does not have the authority
to issue a temporary restraining order and/or a preliminary injunction; and (3) the
inordinate delay in the resolution of the motion for reconsideration directed against
the September 14, 2006 Order showed an orchestrated effort to keep the status quo
ante until the expiration of David Edward Tozes employment contract.
Accordingly, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that the respondent be SUSPENDED for
a period of six (6) months with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar
incident will be dealt with more severe penalty.[6]
On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVIII-2008644[7] which adopted and approved the recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner. The said resolution further pointed out that the Board of Governors
had previously recommended the respondents suspension from the practice of law
for three years in Administrative Case (A.C.) No. 7314 entitled Mary Ann T. Flores v.
Atty. Jovencio Ll. Mayor, Jr..
The respondent sought to reconsider the foregoing disposition,[8] but it was denied by
the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution No. XIX-2011-476 dated June 26, 2011.
The case is now before us for confirmation. We agree with the IBP Board of Governors
that the respondent should be sanctioned.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that a lawyer may be removed or
suspended from the practice of law, inter alia, for gross misconduct and violation of
the lawyers oath. Thus:
Section 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. A
member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction
of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before the admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any
lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilful appearing as an attorney for
a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for
the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice. (emphasis supplied)
A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct showing any fault or
deficiency in his moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. [9] Gross
misconduct is any inexcusable, shameful or flagrant unlawful conduct on the part of a

person concerned with the administration of justice; i.e., conduct prejudicial to the
rights of the parties or to the right determination of the cause. The motive behind this
conduct is generally a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose. [10]
Intrinsically, the instant petition wants this Court to impose disciplinary sanction
against the respondent as a member of the bar. However, the grounds asserted by
the complainants in support of the administrative charges against the respondent are
intrinsically connected with the discharge of the respondents quasi-judicial functions.
Nonetheless, it cannot be discounted that the respondent, as a labor arbiter, is a
public officer entrusted to resolve labor controversies. It is well settled that the Court
may suspend or disbar a lawyer for any conduct on his part showing his unfitness for
the confidence and trust which characterize the attorney and client relations, and the
practice of law before the courts, or showing such a lack of personal honesty or of
good moral character as to render him unworthy of public confidence. [11]
Thus, the fact that the charges against the respondent were based on his acts
committed in the discharge of his functions as a labor arbiter would not hinder this
Court from imposing disciplinary sanctions against him.
The Code of Professional Responsibility does not cease to apply to a lawyer simply
because he has joined the government service. In fact, by the express provision of
Canon 6 thereof, the rules governing the conduct of lawyers shall apply to lawyers in
government service in the discharge of their official tasks. Thus, where a lawyers
misconduct as a government official is of such nature as to affect his qualification as
a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of
the bar on such grounds.[12]
In Atty. Vitriolo v. Atty. Dasig,[13] we stressed that:
Generally speaking, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined
as a member of the Bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government
official. However, if said misconduct as a government official also constitutes
a violation of his oath as a lawyer, then he may be disciplined by this Court
as a member of the Bar.
In this case, the record shows that the respondent, on various occasions, during her
tenure as OIC, Legal Services, CHED, attempted to extort from Betty C. Mangohon,
Rosalie B. Dela Torre, Rocella G. Eje, and Jacqueline N. Ng sums of money as
consideration for her favorable action on their pending applications or requests
before her office. The evidence remains unrefuted, given the respondents failure,
despite the opportunities afforded her by this Court and the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline to comment on the charges. We find that respondents misconduct as a
lawyer of the CHED is of such a character as to affect her qualification as a member
of the Bar, for as a lawyer, she ought to have known that it was patently unethical
and illegal for her to demand sums of money as consideration for the approval of
applications and requests awaiting action by her office.
xxx
A member of the Bar who assumes public office does not shed his
professional obligations. Hence, the Code of Professional Responsibility,
promulgated on June 21, 1988, was not meant to govern the conduct of
private practitioners alone, but of all lawyers including those in government
service. This is clear from Canon 6 of said Code. Lawyers in government are public

6
servants who owe the utmost fidelity to the public service. Thus, they should be more
sensitive in the performance of their professional obligations, as their conduct is
subject to the ever-constant scrutiny of the public.
For a lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or omission
which might tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government,
she must also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a
high standard of honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer in
government service is a keeper of the public faith and is burdened with
high degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than her brethren in
private practice.[14] (emphasis supplied and citations omitted)
In Tadlip v. Atty. Borres, Jr.,[15] we ruled that an administrative case against a lawyer
for acts committed in his capacity as provincial adjudicator of the Department of
Agrarian Reform Regional Arbitration Board may be likened to administrative cases
against judges considering that he is part of the quasi-judicial system of our
government.

Admittedly, under the 1990 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, the labor arbiter has, in
proper cases, the authority to issue writs of preliminary injunction and/or restraining
orders. Section 1, Rule XI of the 1990 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC provides that:
Section 1. Injunction in Ordinary Labor Disputes. A preliminary injunction or
restraining order may be granted by the Commission through its Divisions pursuant to
the provisions of paragraph (e) of Article 218 of the Labor Code, as amended, when it
is established on the basis of the sworn allegations in the petition that the acts
complained of involving or arising from any labor dispute before the Commission,
which, if not restrained or performed forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable
damage to any party or render ineffectual any decision in favor of such party.
If necessary, the Commission may require the petitioner to post a bond and writ of
preliminary injunction or restraining order shall become effective only upon the
approval of the bond which shall answer for any damage that may be suffered by the
party enjoined, if it is finally determined that the petitioner is not entitled thereto.

This Court made a similar pronouncement in Buehs v. Bacatan[16] where the

respondent-lawyer was suspended from the practice of law for acts he committed in
his capacity as an accredited Voluntary Arbitrator of the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board.

The foregoing ancillary power may be exercised by the Labor Arbiters only
as an incident to the cases pending before them in order to preserve the
rights of the parties during the pendency of the case, but excluding labor
disputes involving strike or lockout. (emphasis supplied)

Here, the respondent, being part of the quasi-judicial system of our government,
performs official functions that are akin to those of judges. Accordingly, the present
controversy may be approximated to administrative cases of judges whose decisions,
including the manner of rendering the same, were made subject of administrative
cases.

Nevertheless, under the 2005 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, the labor arbiters no
longer has the authority to issue writs of preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining orders. Under Section 1, Rule X of the 2005 Rules of Procedure of the
NLRC, only the NLRC, through its Divisions, may issue writs of preliminary injunction
and temporary restraining orders. Thus:

As a matter of public policy, not every error or mistake of a judge in the performance
of his official duties renders him liable. In the absence of fraud, dishonesty or
corruption, the acts of a judge in his official capacity do not always constitute
misconduct although the same acts may be erroneous. True, a judge may not be
disciplined for error of judgment absent proof that such error was made with a
conscious and deliberate intent to cause an injustice.[17]
While a judge may not always be held liable for ignorance of the law for every
erroneous order that he renders, it is also axiomatic that when the legal principle
involved is sufficiently basic, lack of conversance with it constitutes gross ignorance
of the law. Indeed, even though a judge may not always be subjected to disciplinary
action for every erroneous order or decision he renders, that relative immunity is not
a license to be negligent or abusive and arbitrary in performing his adjudicatory
prerogatives.[18]
When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to know and to simply
apply it. Anything less would be constitutive of gross ignorance of the law. [19]
In the case at bench, we find the respondent guilty of gross ignorance of the law.
Acting on the motion for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction, the respondent issued the September 14, 2006 Order
requiring the parties to maintain the status quo ante until the said motion had been
resolved. It should be stressed, however, that at the time the said motion was filed,
the 2005 Rules of Procedure of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) is
already in effect.

Section 1. Injunction in Ordinary Labor Disputes. - A preliminary injunction or

restraining order may be granted by the Commission through its
Divisionspursuant to the provisions of paragraph (e) of Article 218 of the Labor
Code, as amended, when it is established on the basis of the sworn allegations in the
petition that the acts complained of involving or arising from any labor dispute before
the Commission, which, if not restrained or performed forthwith, may cause grave or
irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual any decision in favor of such
party. (emphasis supplied)
The role of the labor arbiters, with regard to the issuance of writs of preliminary
injunctions and/or writ of preliminary injunction, at present, is limited to reception of
evidence as may be delegated by the NLRC. Thus, Section 4, Rule X of the 2005 Rules
of Procedure of the NLRC provides that:
Section 4. Reception of Evidence; Delegation. - The reception of evidence for the
application of a writ of injunction may be delegated by the Commission to
any of its Labor Arbiters who shall conduct such hearings in such places as he
may determine to be accessible to the parties and their witnesses, and shall
thereafter submit his report and recommendation to the Commission within fifteen
(15) days from such delegation. (emphasis supplied)
The foregoing rule is clear and leaves no room for interpretation. However, the
respondent, in violation of the said rule, vehemently insist that he has the authority
to issue writs of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order. On this
point, the Investigating Commissioner aptly ruled that:

7
The respondent should, in the first place, not entertained Edward Tozes Verified
Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary
Injunction Against the Respondents. He should have denied it outright on the basis of
Section 1, Rule X of the 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the National Labor
Relations Commission.

attention of this Commission. There appears an orchestrated effort to delay the

resolution of the reconsideration of the Order dated September 14, 2006 and keep
status quo ante until expiration of David Edward Tozes Employment Contract with
International School Manila come August 2007, thereby rendering the illegal dismissal
case moot and academic.

xxxx

xxxx

The respondent, being a Labor Arbiter of the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor
Relations Commission, should have been familiar with Sections 1 and 4 of the 2005
Revised Rules of procedure of the National Labor Relations Commission. The first,
states that it is the Commission of the [NLRC] that may grant a preliminary injunction
or restraining order. While the second, states [that] Labor Arbiters [may] conduct
hearings on the application of preliminary injunction or restraining order only in a
delegated capacity.[20]

Furthermore, the procrastination exhibited by the respondent in the resolution of

[the] assailed Order x x x should not be countenanced, specially, under the
circumstance that is attendant with the term of the Employment Contract between
David Edward Toze and International School Manila. The respondents lackadaisical
attitude in sitting over the pending incident before him for more than five (5) months
only to thereafter inhibit himself therefrom, shows the respondents disregard to
settled rules and jurisprudence. Failure to decide a case or resolve a motion within
the reglementary period constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of
administrative sanction against the erring magistrate x x x. The respondent, being a
Labor Arbiter, is akin to judges, and enjoined to decide a case with dispatch. Any
delay, no matter how short, in the disposition of cases undermine the peoples faith
and confidence in the judiciary x x x.[21]

What made matters worse is the unnecessary delay on the part of the respondent in
resolving the motion for reconsideration of the September 14, 2006 Order. The
unfounded insistence of the respondent on his supposed authority to issue writs of
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order, taken together with the
delay in the resolution of the said motion for reconsideration, would clearly show that
the respondent deliberately intended to cause prejudice to the complainants.
On this score, the Investigating Commissioner keenly observed that:
The Commission is very much disturbed with the effect of the Order dated September
14, 2006 and the delay in the resolution of the pending incidents in the illegal
dismissal case before the respondent.
Conspicuously, Section 3 (Term of Contract) of the Employment Contract between
David Edward Toze and International School Manila provides that David Edward Toze
will render work as a superintendent for the school years August 2005-July 2006 and
August 2006-July 2007.
The Order dated September 14, 2006 in effect reinstates David Edward Toze as
superintendent of International School of Manila until the resolution of the formers
Verified Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary
Injunction Against the Respondents.
Since the Employment Contract between David Edward Toze and International School
Manila is about to expire or end on August 2007, prudence dictates that the
respondent expediently resolved [sic] the merits of David Edward Tozes Verified
Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary
Injunction Against the Respondents because any delay in the resolution thereof would
result to undue benefit in favor of David Edward Toze and unwarranted prejudice to
International School Manila.
xxxx

Indubitably, the respondent failed to live up to his duties as a lawyer in consonance

with the strictures of the lawyers oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility,
thereby occasioning sanction from this Court.
In stubbornly insisting that he has the authority to issue writs of preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order contrary to the clear import of the 2005
Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, the respondent violated Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which mandates lawyers to obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and legal processes.
All told, we find the respondent to have committed gross ignorance of the law, his
acts as a labor arbiter in the case below being inexcusable thus unquestionably
resulting into prejudice to the rights of the parties therein.
Having established the foregoing, we now proceed to determine the appropriate
penalty to be imposed.
Under Rule 140[22] of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, gross
ignorance of the law is a serious charge,[23] punishable by a fine of more than
P20,000.00, but not exceeding P40,000.00, suspension from office without salary and
other benefits for more than three but not exceeding six months, or dismissal from
the service.[24]
In Tadlip v. Atty. Borres, Jr., the respondent-lawyer and provincial adjudicator, found
guilty of gross ignorance of the law, was suspended from the practice of law for six
months. Additionally, in parallel cases,[25] a judge found guilty of gross ignorance of
the law was meted the penalty of suspension for six months.

At the time the respondent inhibited himself from resolving the illegal dismissal case
before him, there are barely four (4) months left with the Employment Contract
between David Edward Toze and International School Manila.

Here, the IBP Board of Governors recommended that the respondent be suspended
from the practice of law for six months with a warning that a repetition of the same or
similar incident would be dealt with more severe penalty. We adopt the foregoing
recommendation.

From the foregoing, there is an inordinate delay in the resolution of the

reconsideration of the Order dated September 14, 2006 that does not escape the

This Court notes that the IBP Board of Governors had previously recommended the

8
respondents suspension from the practice of law for three years in A.C. No. 7314,
entitled Mary Ann T. Flores v. Atty. Jovencio Ll. Mayor, Jr.. This case, however, is still
pending.
It cannot be gainsaid that since public office is a public trust, the ethical conduct
demanded upon lawyers in the government service is more exacting than the
standards for those in private practice. Lawyers in the government service are
subject to constant public scrutiny under norms of public accountability. They also
bear the heavy burden of having to put aside their private interest in favor of the
interest of the public; their private activities should not interfere with the discharge of
their official functions.[26]
At this point, the respondent should be reminded of our exhortation in Republic of the
Philippines v. Judge Caguioa,[27] thus:
Ignorance of the law is the mainspring of injustice. Judges are called upon to exhibit
more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules. Basic rules
should be at the palm of their hands. Their inexcusable failure to observe basic laws
and rules will render them administratively liable. Where the law involved is simple
and elementary, lack of conversance with it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.
Verily, for transgressing the elementary jurisdictional limits of his court, respondent
should be administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law.
When the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and elemental a
rule, a law or a principle in the discharge of his functions, a judge is either too
incompetent and undeserving of the position and title he holds or he is too vicious
that the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse
of judicial authority.[28] (citations omitted)cralaw
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Jovencio Ll. Mayor, Jr. guilty of gross
ignorance of the law in violation of his lawyers oath and of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the Court resolved toSUSPEND respondent from the practice of law
for a period of six (6) months, with a WARNING that commission of the same or
similar offense in the future will result in the imposition of a more severe penalty.

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. TELESFORO S. CEDO, respondent.
RESOLUTION

BIDIN, J.:
In a verified letter-complaint dated August 15, 1991, complainant Philippine National
Bank charged respondent Atty. Telesforo S. Cedo, former Asst. Vice-President of the
Asset Management Group of complainant bank with violation of Canon 6, Rule 6.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, thus:
A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept
engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which
he had intervened while in said service.
by appearing as counsel for individuals who had transactions with complainant bank
in which respondent during his employment with aforesaid bank, had intervened.
Complainant averred that while respondent was still in its employ, he participated in
arranging the sale of steel sheets (denominated as Lots 54-M and 55-M) in favor of
Milagros Ong Siy for P200,000. He even "noted" the gate passes issued by his
subordinate, Mr. Emmanuel Elefan, in favor of Mrs. Ong Siy authorizing the pull-out of
the steel sheets from the DMC Man Division Compound. When a civil action arose out
of this transaction between Mrs. Ong Siy and complainant bank before the Regional
Trial Court of Makati, Branch 146, respondent who had since left the employ of
complainant bank, appeared as one of the counsels of Mrs. Ong Siy.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the IBP, as well as the Office of the Bar
Confidant and the Court Administrator who shall circulate it to all courts for their
information and guidance and likewise be entered in the record of the respondent as
attorney.

Similarly, when the same transaction became the subject of an administrative case
filed by complainant bank against his former subordinate Emmanuel Elefan, for grave
misconduct and dishonesty, respondent appeared as counsel for Elefan only to be
later disqualified by the Civil Service Commission.

SO ORDERED.

Moreover, while respondent was still the Asst. Vice President of complainants Asset
Management Group, he intervened in the handling of the loan account of the spouses
Ponciano and Eufemia Almeda with complainant bank by writing demand letters to
the couple. When a civil action ensued between complainant bank and the Almeda
spouses as a result of this loan account, the latter were represented by the law firm
"Cedo, Ferrer, Maynigo & Associates" of which respondent is one of the Senior
Partners.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Villarama, Jr., Perez, and Sereno, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

A.C. No. 3701 March 28, 1995

In his Comment on the complaint, respondent admitted that he appeared as counsel

for Mrs. Ong Siy but only with respect to the execution pending appeal of the RTC
decision. He alleged that he did not participate in the litigation of the case before the
trial court. With respect to the case of the Almeda spouses, respondent alleged that
he never appeared as counsel for them. He contended that while the law firm "Cedo
Ferrer, Maynigo & Associates" is designated as counsel of record, the case is actually

9
handled only by Atty. Pedro Ferrer. Respondent averred that he did not enter into a
general partnership with Atty. Pedro Ferrer nor with the other lawyers named therein.
They are only using the aforesaid name to designate a law firm maintained by
lawyers, who although not partners, maintain one office as well as one clerical and
supporting staff. Each one of them handles their own cases independently and
individually receives the revenues therefrom which are not shared among them.
In the resolution of this Court dated January 27, 1992, this case was referred to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), for investigation, report and recommendation.
During the investigation conducted by the IBP, it was discovered that respondent was
previously fined by this Court in the amount of P1,000.00 in connection with G.R. No.
94456 entitled "Milagros Ong Siy vs. Hon. Salvador Tensuan, et al." for forum
shopping, where respondent appeared as counsel for petitioner Milagros Ong Siy
"through the law firm of Cedo Ferrer Maynigo and Associates."
The IBP further found that the charges herein against respondent were fully
substantiated. Respondent's averment that the law firm handling the case of the
Almeda spouses is not a partnership deserves scant consideration in the light of the
attestation of complainant's counsel, Atty. Pedro Singson, that in one of the hearings
of the Almeda spouses' case, respondent attended the same with his partner Atty.
Ferrer, and although he did not enter his appearance, he was practically dictating to
Atty. Ferrer what to say and argue before the court. Furthermore, during the hearing
of the application for a writ of injunction in the same case, respondent impliedly
admitted being the partner of Atty. Ferrer, when it was made of record that
respondent was working in the same office as Atty. Ferrer.
Moreover, the IBP noted that assuming the alleged set-up of the firm is true, it is in
itself a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Rule 15.02) since the
clients secrets and confidential records and information are exposed to the other
lawyers and staff members at all times.
From the foregoing, the IBP found a deliberate intent on the part of respondent to
devise ways and means to attract as clients former borrowers of complainant bank
since he was in the best position to see the legal weaknesses of his former employer,
a convincing factor for the said clients to seek his professional service. In sum, the
IBP saw a deliberate sacrifice by respondent of his ethics in consideration of the
money he expected to earn.
The IBP thus recommended the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for
3 years.
The records show that after the Board of Governors of the IBP had, on October 4,
1994, submitted to this Court its Report and recommendation in this case, respondent
filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated October 25, 1994 of the recommendation
contained in the said Report with the IBP Board of Governors. On December 12, 1994,
respondent also filed another "Motion to Set Hearing" before this Court, the aforesaid
Motion for Reconsideration. In resolving this case, the Court took into consideration
the aforesaid pleadings.

In addition to the findings of the IBP, this Court finds this occasion appropriate to
emphasize the paramount importance of avoiding the representation of conflicting
interests. In the similar case of Pasay Law and Conscience Union, Inc. vs. Paz, (95
SCRA 24 [1980]) where a former Legal Officer and Legal Prosecutor of PARGO who
participated in the investigation of the Anti-Graft case against Mayor Pablo Cuneta
later on acted as counsel for the said Mayor in the same anti-graft case, this Court,
citing Nombrado vs. Hernandez (26 SCRA 13 119681) ruled:
The Solicitor General is of the opinion, and we find no reason to
disagree with him, that even if respondent did not use against his
client any information or evidence acquired by him as counsel it
cannot be denied that he did become privy to information regarding
the ownership of the parcel of land which was later litigated in the
forcible entry case, for it was the dispute over the land that
triggered the mauling incident which gave rise to the criminal
action for physical injuries. This Court's remarks in Hilado vs. David,
84 Phil. 571, are apropos:
"Communications between attorney and client are, in a great
number of litigations, a complicated affair, consisting of entangled
relevant and irrelevant, secret and well-known facts. In the
complexity of what is said in the course of dealings between an
attorney and client, inquiry of the nature suggested would lead to
the revelation, in advance of the trial, of other matters that might
only further prejudice the complainant's cause."
Whatever may be said as to whether or not respondent utilized
against his former client information given to him in a professional
capacity, the mere fact of their previous relationship should have
precluded him from appearing as counsel for the other side in the
forcible entry case. In the case ofHilado vs. David, supra, this
Tribunal further said:
Hence the necessity of setting the existence of the bare
relationship of attorney and client as the yardstick for testing
incompatibility of interests. This stern rule is designed not alone to
prevent the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent conduct, but as
well to protect the honest lawyer from unfounded suspicion of
unprofessional practice. . . . It is founded on principles of public
policy, of good taste. As has been said in another case, the question
is not necessarily one of the rights of the parties, but as to whether
the attorney has adhered to proper professional standard. With
these thoughts in mind, it behooves attorney, like Caesar's wife, not
only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the
appearance of treachery and double dealing. Only thus can
litigants. be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys
which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.
The foregoing disquisition on conflicting interest applies with equal force and effect to
respondent in the case at bar. Having been an executive of complainant bank,
respondent now seeks to litigate as counsel for the opposite side, a case against his
former employer involving a transaction which he formerly handled while still an

10
employee of complainant, in violation of Canon 6 of the Canons of Professional Ethics
on adverse influence and conflicting interests, to wit:
It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by
express conflicting consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning of this canon, a lawyer
represents conflicting interest when, in behalf on one client, it is his
duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires him
to oppose.
ACCORDINGLY, this Court resolves to SUSPEND respondent ATTY. TELESFORO S. CEDO
from the practice of law for THREE (3) YEARS, effective immediately.Let copies of this
resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in Metro
Manila. SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 5738

February 19, 2008

WILFREDO M. CATU, complainant, vs. ATTY. VICENTE G. RELLOSA, respondent.

their dispute and Regina and Antonio filed the ejectment case. It was then that
Elizabeth sought his legal assistance. He acceded to her request. He handled her
case for free because she was financially distressed and he wanted to prevent the
commission of a patent injustice against her.
The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation. As there was no factual issue to thresh
out, the IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) required the parties to submit their
respective position papers. After evaluating the contentions of the parties, the IBPCBD found sufficient ground to discipline respondent.7
According to the IBP-CBD, respondent admitted that, as punong barangay, he
presided over the conciliation proceedings and heard the complaint of Regina and
Antonio against Elizabeth and Pastor. Subsequently, however, he represented
Elizabeth and Pastor in the ejectment case filed against them by Regina and Antonio.
In the course thereof, he prepared and signed pleadings including the answer with
counterclaim, pre-trial brief, position paper and notice of appeal. By so doing,
respondent violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
Rule 6.03 - A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept
engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he
intervened while in said service.

RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
Complainant Wilfredo M. Catu is a co-owner of a lot1 and the building erected thereon
located at 959 San Andres Street, Malate, Manila. His mother and brother, Regina
Catu and Antonio Catu, contested the possession of Elizabeth C. Diaz-Catu 2 and
Antonio Pastor3 of one of the units in the building. The latter ignored demands for
them to vacate the premises. Thus, a complaint was initiated against them in
the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay 723, Zone 79 of the 5th District of
Manila4 where the parties reside.
Respondent, as punong barangay of Barangay 723, summoned the parties to
conciliation meetings.5 When the parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement,
respondent issued a certification for the filing of the appropriate action in court.
Thereafter, Regina and Antonio filed a complaint for ejectment against Elizabeth and
Pastor in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 11. Respondent entered his
appearance as counsel for the defendants in that case. Because of this, complainant
filed the instant administrative complaint,6 claiming that respondent committed an
act of impropriety as a lawyer and as a public officer when he stood as counsel for
the defendants despite the fact that he presided over the conciliation proceedings
between the litigants as punong barangay.
In his defense, respondent claimed that one of his duties as punong barangay was to
hear complaints referred to the barangay's Lupong Tagapamayapa. As such, he heard
the complaint of Regina and Antonio against Elizabeth and Pastor. As head of
the Lupon, he performed his task with utmost objectivity, without bias or partiality
towards any of the parties. The parties, however, were not able to amicably settle

Furthermore, as an elective official, respondent contravened the prohibition under

Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713:8
SEC. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. - In addition to acts and omissions
of public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and
existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions
of any public official ands employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. - Public officials
and employees during their incumbency shall not:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(2) Engage in the private practice of profession unless

authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such
practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official
functions; xxx (emphasis supplied)
According to the IBP-CBD, respondent's violation of this prohibition constituted a
breach of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS
OF THE LAND,PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
(emphasis supplied)

11
For these infractions, the IBP-CBD recommended the respondent's suspension from
the practice of law for one month with a stern warning that the commission of the
same or similar act will be dealt with more severely. 9 This was adopted and approved
by the IBP Board of Governors.10
We modify the foregoing findings regarding the transgression of respondent as well as
the recommendation on the imposable penalty.
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility Applies Only to Former
Government Lawyers
Respondent cannot be found liable for violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. As worded, that Rule applies only to a lawyer who has left
government service and in connection "with any matter in which he intervened while
in said service." In PCGG v. Sandiganbayan,11 we ruled that Rule 6.03 prohibits
former government lawyers from accepting "engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which [they] had intervened while in said service."
Respondent was an incumbent punong barangay at the time he committed the act
complained of. Therefore, he was not covered by that provision.
Section 90 of RA 7160, Not Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713, Governs The Practice
of Profession of Elective Local Government Officials
Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713 prohibits public officials and employees, during their
incumbency, from engaging in the private practice of their profession "unless
authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict or
tend to conflict with their official functions." This is the general law which applies to
all public officials and employees.
For elective local government officials, Section 90 of RA 7160 12 governs:
SEC. 90. Practice of Profession. - (a) All governors, city and municipal mayors
are prohibited from practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation
other than the exercise of their functions as local chief executives.
(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any
occupation, or teach in schools except during session hours: Provided,
That sanggunian members who are members of the Bar shall not:
(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a
local government unit or any office, agency, or instrumentality of
the government is the adverse party;
(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or
employee of the national or local government is accused of an
offense committed in relation to his office;

(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative

proceedings involving the local government unit of which he is an
official; and
(4) Use property and personnel of the Government except when
the sanggunian member concerned is defending the interest of the
Government.
(c) Doctors of medicine may practice their profession even during official
hours of work only on occasions of emergency: Provided, That the officials
concerned do not derive monetary compensation therefrom.
This is a special provision that applies specifically to the practice of profession by
elective local officials. As a special law with a definite scope (that is, the practice of
profession by elective local officials), it constitutes an exception to Section 7(b)(2) of
RA 6713, the general law on engaging in the private practice of profession by public
officials and employees. Lex specialibus derogat generalibus.13
Under RA 7160, elective local officials of provinces, cities, municipalities and
barangays are the following: the governor, the vice governor and members of
the sangguniang panlalawigan for provinces; the city mayor, the city vice mayor and
the members of the sangguniang panlungsod for cities; the municipal mayor, the
municipal vice mayor and the members of the sangguniang bayan for municipalities
and the punong barangay, the members of the sangguniang barangay and the
members of the sangguniang kabataan for barangays.
Of these elective local officials, governors, city mayors and municipal mayors are
prohibited from practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation other than
the exercise of their functions as local chief executives. This is because they are
required to render full time service. They should therefore devote all their time and
attention to the performance of their official duties.
On the other hand, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang
panlungsod or sangguniang bayanmay practice their professions, engage in any
occupation, or teach in schools except during session hours. In other words, they may
practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools outside their
session hours. Unlike governors, city mayors and municipal mayors, members of
the sangguniang panlalawigan,sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan are
required to hold regular sessions only at least once a week. 14 Since the law itself
grants them the authority to practice their professions, engage in any occupation or
teach in schools outside session hours, there is no longer any need for them to secure
prior permission or authorization from any other person or office for any of these
purposes.
While, as already discussed, certain local elective officials (like governors, mayors,
provincial board members and councilors) are expressly subjected to a total or partial
proscription to practice their profession or engage in any occupation, no such
interdiction is made on the punong barangay and the members of the sangguniang
barangay. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.15 Since they are excluded from any
prohibition, the presumption is that they are allowed to practice their profession. And
this stands to reason because they are not mandated to serve full time. In fact,
the sangguniang barangay is supposed to hold regular sessions only twice a month.16

12
Accordingly, as punong barangay, respondent was not forbidden to practice his
profession. However, he should have procured prior permission or authorization from
the head of his Department, as required by civil service regulations.

CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY

AND THE DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE
ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. (emphasis supplied)

A Lawyer In Government Service Who Is Not Prohibited To Practice Law

Must Secure Prior Authority From The Head Of His Department

Indeed, a lawyer who disobeys the law disrespects it. In so doing, he disregards legal
ethics and disgraces the dignity of the legal profession.

A civil service officer or employee whose responsibilities do not require his time to be
fully at the disposal of the government can engage in the private practice of law only
with the written permission of the head of the department concerned. 17 Section 12,
Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules provides:

Public confidence in the law and in lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and
improper conduct of a member of the bar.18 Every lawyer should act and comport
himself in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity of the legal
profession.19

Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private

business, vocation, or professionor be connected with any commercial,
credit, agricultural, or industrial undertaking without a written
permission from the head of the Department: Provided, That this
prohibition will be absolute in the case of those officers and employees
whose duties and responsibilities require that their entire time be at the
disposal of the Government; Provided, further, That if an employee is
granted permission to engage in outside activities, time so devoted outside
of office hours should be fixed by the agency to the end that it will not
impair in any way the efficiency of the officer or employee: And provided,
finally, that no permission is necessary in the case of investments, made by
an officer or employee, which do not involve real or apparent conflict
between his private interests and public duties, or in any way influence him
in the discharge of his duties, and he shall not take part in the management
of the enterprise or become an officer of the board of directors. (emphasis
supplied)

A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney
for violation of the lawyer's oath20 and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal
profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.

As punong barangay, respondent should have therefore obtained the prior written
permission of the Secretary of Interior and Local Government before he entered his
appearance as counsel for Elizabeth and Pastor. This he failed to do.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa is hereby found GUILTY of

professional misconduct for violating his oath as a lawyer and Canons 1 and 7 and
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is
therefore SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six months
effective from his receipt of this resolution. He is sternly WARNED that any repetition
of similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
Respondent is strongly advised to look up and take to heart the meaning of the
word delicadeza.
Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and entered
into the records of respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa. The Office of the Court
Administrator shall furnish copies to all the courts of the land for their information and
guidance.SO ORDERED
[G.R. Nos. 151809-12. April 12, 2005]

The failure of respondent to comply with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil
Service Rules constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer: to obey the laws.
Lawyers are servants of the law, vires legis, men of the law. Their paramount duty to
society is to obey the law and promote respect for it. To underscore the primacy and
importance of this duty, it is enshrined as the first canon of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
In acting as counsel for a party without first securing the required written permission,
respondent not only engaged in the unauthorized practice of law but also violated
civil service rules which is a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct. (emphasis supplied)
For not living up to his oath as well as for not complying with the exacting ethical
standards of the legal profession, respondent failed to comply with Canon 7 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility:

PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG), petitioner,

vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth Division), LUCIO C. TAN, CARMEN KHAO
TAN, FLORENCIO T. SANTOS, NATIVIDAD P. SANTOS, DOMINGO CHUA,
TAN HUI NEE, MARIANO TAN ENG LIAN, ESTATE OF BENITO TAN KEE
HIONG (represented by TARCIANA C. TAN), FLORENCIO N. SANTOS,
JR., HARRY C. TAN, TAN ENG CHAN, CHUNG POE KEE, MARIANO
KHOO, MANUEL KHOO, MIGUEL KHOO, JAIME KHOO, ELIZABETH
KHOO, CELSO RANOLA, WILLIAM T. WONG, ERNESTO B. LIM,
BENJAMIN T. ALBACITA, WILLY CO, ALLIED BANKING CORP., ALLIED
LEASING AND FINANCE CORPORATION, ASIA BREWERY, INC., BASIC
HOLDINGS CORP., FOREMOST FARMS, INC., FORTUNE TOBACCO
CORP., GRANDSPAN DEVELOPMENT CORP., HIMMEL INDUSTRIES, IRIS
HOLDINGS AND DEVELOPMENT CORP., JEWEL HOLDINGS, INC.,
MANUFACTURING SERVICES AND TRADE CORP., MARANAW HOTELS
AND RESORT CORP., NORTHERN TOBACCO REDRYING PLANT,
PROGRESSIVE FARMS, INC., SHAREHOLDINGS, INC., SIPALAY
TRADING CORP., VIRGO HOLDINGS & DEVELOPMENT CORP., and
ATTY. ESTELITO P. MENDOZA, respondents.

13
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This case is prima impressiones and it is weighted with significance for it
concerns on one hand, the efforts of the Bar to upgrade the ethics of lawyers in
government service and on the other, its effect on the right of government to recruit
competent counsel to defend its interests.
In 1976, General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial
difficulties. GENBANK had extended considerable financial support to Filcapital
Development Corporation causing it to incur daily overdrawings on its current
account with the Central Bank.[1] It was later found by the Central Bank that GENBANK
had approved various loans to directors, officers, stockholders and related interests
totaling P172.3 million, of which 59% was classified as doubtful and P0.505 million as
uncollectible.[2] As a bailout, the Central Bank extended emergency loans to
GENBANK which reached a total of P310 million.[3] Despite the mega loans,
GENBANK failed to recover from its financial woes. On March 25, 1977, the Central
Bank issued a resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent and unable to resume
business with safety to its depositors, creditors and the general public, and ordering
its liquidation.[4] A public bidding of GENBANKs assets was held from March 26
to 28, 1977, wherein the Lucio Tan group submitted the winning bid.
[5]
Subsequently, former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza filed a
petition with the then Court of First Instance praying for the assistance and
supervision of the court in GENBANKs liquidation as mandated by Section 29 of
Republic Act No. 265.
In February 1986, the EDSA I revolution toppled the Marcos government. One of
the first acts of President Corazon C. Aquino was to establish the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) to recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth of
former President Ferdinand Marcos, his family and his cronies. Pursuant to this
mandate, the PCGG, on July 17, 1987, filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint
for reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting and damages against
respondents Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Florencio T. Santos, Natividad P. Santos,
Domingo Chua, Tan Hui Nee, Mariano Tan Eng Lian, Estate of Benito Tan Kee Hiong,
Florencio N. Santos, Jr., Harry C. Tan, Tan Eng Chan, Chung Poe Kee, Mariano Khoo,
Manuel Khoo, Miguel Khoo, Jaime Khoo, Elizabeth Khoo, Celso Ranola, William T.
Wong, Ernesto B. Lim, Benjamin T. Albacita, Willy Co, Allied Banking Corporation
(Allied Bank), Allied Leasing and Finance Corporation, Asia Brewery, Inc., Basic
Holdings Corp., Foremost Farms, Inc., Fortune Tobacco Corporation, Grandspan
Development Corp., Himmel Industries, Iris Holdings and Development Corp., Jewel
Holdings, Inc., Manufacturing Services and Trade Corp., Maranaw Hotels and Resort
Corp., Northern Tobacco Redrying Plant, Progressive Farms, Inc., Shareholdings, Inc.,
Sipalay Trading Corp., Virgo Holdings & Development Corp., (collectively referred to
herein as respondents Tan, et al.), then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R.
Marcos, Panfilo O. Domingo, Cesar Zalamea, Don Ferry and Gregorio Licaros. The
case was docketed as Civil Case No. 0005 of the Second Division of
theSandiganbayan.[6] In connection therewith, the PCGG issued several writs of
sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by the above-named persons by
taking advantage of their close relationship and influence with former President
Marcos.
Respondents Tan, et al. repaired to this Court and filed petitions for certiorari,
prohibition and injunction to nullify, among others, the writs of sequestration issued
by the PCGG.[7] After the filing of the parties comments, this Court referred the cases
to the Sandiganbayan for proper disposition. These cases were docketed as Civil

Case Nos. 0096-0099. In all these cases, respondents Tan, et al. were represented
by their counsel, former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, who has then resumed
his private practice of law.
On February 5, 1991, the PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent
Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. with the Second Division of
the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos. 0005[8] and 0096-0099.[9] The motions alleged
that respondent Mendoza, as then Solicitor General [10] and counsel to Central
Bank, actively intervened in the liquidation of GENBANK, which was subsequently
acquired by respondents Tan, et al. and became Allied Banking Corporation.
Respondent Mendoza allegedly intervened in the acquisition of GENBANK by
respondents Tan, et al. when, in his capacity as then Solicitor General,
he advised the Central Banks officials on the procedure to bring about GENBANKs
liquidation and appeared as counsel for the Central Bank in connection with its
petition for assistance in the liquidation of GENBANK which he filed with the Court of
First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Manila and was docketed as Special
Proceeding No. 107812. The motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional
Responsibility. Rule
6.03 prohibits
former
government
lawyers from accepting engagement or employment in connection with any matter
in which he had intervened while in said service.
On April 22, 1991 the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan issued a
resolution denying PCGGs motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza in Civil Case No.
0005.[11] It found that the PCGG failed to prove the existence of an inconsistency
between respondent Mendozas former function as Solicitor General and his present
employment as counsel of the Lucio Tan group. It noted that respondent Mendoza did
not take a position adverse to that taken on behalf of the Central Bank during his
term as Solicitor General. [12] It further ruled that respondent Mendozas appearance as
counsel for respondents Tan, et al. was beyond the one-year prohibited period under
Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 6713 since he ceased to be Solicitor General in the
year 1986. The said section prohibits a former public official or employee from
practicing his profession in connection with any matter before the office he used to
be with within one year from his resignation, retirement or separation from public
office.[13] The PCGG did not seek any reconsideration of the ruling.[14]
It appears that Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 were transferred from
the Sandiganbayans Second Division to the Fifth Division. [15] In its resolution dated
July 11, 2001, the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan denied the other PCGGs
motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza. [16] It adopted the resolution of its Second
Division dated April 22, 1991, and observed that the arguments were the same in
substance as the motion to disqualify filed in Civil Case No. 0005. The PCGG sought
reconsideration of the ruling but its motion was denied in its resolution dated
December 5, 2001.[17]
Hence, the recourse to this Court by the PCGG assailing the resolutions dated
July
11,
2001
and
December
5,
2001
of
the Fifth
Division of
the Sandiganbayan via a petition forcertiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.[18] The PCGG alleged that the Fifth Division acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the
assailed resolutions contending that: 1) Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility prohibits a former government lawyer from accepting employment in
connection with any matter in which he intervened; 2) the prohibition in the Rule is
not time-bound; 3) that Central Bank could not waive the objection to respondent
Mendozas appearance on behalf of the PCGG; and 4) the resolution in Civil Case No.
0005 was interlocutory, thus res judicata does not apply.[19]

14
The petition at bar raises procedural and substantive issues of law. In view,
however, of the import and impact of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility to the legal profession and the government, we shall cut our way and
forthwith resolve the substantive issue.
I
Substantive Issue
The key issue is whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
applies to respondent Mendoza. Again, the prohibition states: A lawyer shall not, after
leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with
any matter in which he had intervened while in the said service.
I.A. The history of Rule 6.03
A proper resolution of this case necessitates that we trace the historical
lineage of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, ethical standards for lawyers
were pervasive in England and other parts of Europe. The early statements of
standards did not resemble modern codes of conduct. They were not detailed or
collected in one source but surprisingly were comprehensive for their time. The
principal thrust of the standards was directed towards the litigation conduct of
lawyers. It underscored the central duty of truth and fairness in litigation as superior
to any obligation to the client. The formulations of the litigation duties were at times
intricate, including specific pleading standards, an obligation to inform the court of
falsehoods and a duty to explore settlement alternatives. Most of the lawyer's other
basic duties -- competency, diligence, loyalty, confidentiality, reasonable fees and
service to the poor -- originated in the litigation context, but ultimately had broader
application to all aspects of a lawyer's practice.
The forms of lawyer regulation in colonial and early post-revolutionary
America did not differ markedly from those in England. The colonies and early states
used oaths, statutes, judicial oversight, and procedural rules to govern attorney
behavior. The difference from England was in the pervasiveness and continuity of
such regulation. The standards set in England varied over time, but the variation in
early America was far greater. The American regulation fluctuated within a single
colony and differed from colony to colony. Many regulations had the effect of setting
some standards of conduct, but the regulation was sporadic, leaving gaps in the
substantive standards. Only three of the traditional core duties can be fairly
characterized as pervasive in the formal, positive law of the colonial and postrevolutionary period: the duties of litigation fairness, competency and reasonable
fees.[20]
The nineteenth century has been termed the dark ages of legal ethics in
the United States. By mid-century, American legal reformers were filling the void in
two ways. First, David Dudley Field, the drafter of the highly influential New York Field
Code, introduced a new set of uniform standards of conduct for lawyers. This concise
statement of eight statutory duties became law in several states in the second half of
the nineteenth century. At the same time, legal educators, such as David Hoffman
and George Sharswood, and many other lawyers were working to flesh out the broad
outline of a lawyer's duties. These reformers wrote about legal ethics in

unprecedented detail and thus brought a new level of understanding to a lawyer's

duties. A number of mid-nineteenth century laws and statutes, other than the Field
Code, governed lawyer behavior. A few forms of colonial regulations e.g., the do no
falsehood oath and the deceit prohibitions -- persisted in some states. Procedural law
continued to directly, or indirectly, limit an attorney's litigation behavior. The
developing law of agency recognized basic duties of competence, loyalty and
safeguarding of client property. Evidence law started to recognize with less
equivocation the attorney-client privilege and its underlying theory of confidentiality.
Thus, all of the core duties, with the likely exception of service to the poor, had some
basis in formal law. Yet, as in the colonial and early post-revolutionary periods, these
standards were isolated and did not provide a comprehensive statement of a lawyer's
duties. The reformers, by contrast, were more comprehensive in their discussion of a
lawyer's duties, and they actually ushered a new era in American legal ethics. [21]
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, a new form of ethical standards
began to guide lawyers in their practice the bar association code of legal ethics. The
bar codes were detailed ethical standards formulated by lawyers for lawyers. They
combined the two primary sources of ethical guidance from the nineteenth century.
Like the academic discourses, the bar association codes gave detail to the statutory
statements of duty and the oaths of office. Unlike the academic lectures, however,
the bar association codes retained some of the official imprimatur of the statutes and
oaths. Over time, the bar association codes became extremely popular that states
adopted them as binding rules of law. Critical to the development of the new codes
was the re-emergence of bar associations themselves. Local bar associations formed
sporadically during the colonial period, but they disbanded by the early nineteenth
century. In the late nineteenth century, bar associations began to form again, picking
up where their colonial predecessors had left off. Many of the new bar associations,
most notably the Alabama State Bar Association and the American Bar Association,
assumed on the task of drafting substantive standards of conduct for their members.
[22]

In 1887, Alabama became the first state with a comprehensive bar association
code of ethics. The 1887 Alabama Code of Ethics was the model for several states
codes, and it was the foundation for the American Bar Association's (ABA) 1908
Canons of Ethics.[23]
In 1917, the Philippine Bar found that the oath and duties of a lawyer were
insufficient to attain the full measure of public respect to which the legal profession
was entitled. In that year, the Philippine Bar Association adopted as its own, Canons 1
to 32 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics. [24]
As early as 1924, some ABA members have questioned the form and function
of the canons. Among their concerns was the revolving door or the process by
which lawyers and others temporarily enter government service from private life and
then leave it for large fees in private practice, where they can exploit information,
contacts, and influence garnered in government service. [25] These concerns were
classified
as adverse-interest
conflicts and congruent-interest
conflicts. Adverse-interest conflicts exist where the matter in which the former
government lawyer represents a client in private practice is substantially related to a
matter that the lawyer dealt with while employed by the government and the
interests of the current and former are adverse. [26] On the other hand, congruentinterest representation conflicts are unique to government lawyers and apply
primarily to former government lawyers. [27] For several years, the ABA attempted to
correct and update the canons through new canons, individual amendments and
interpretative opinions. In 1928, the ABA amended one canon and added thirteen
new canons.[28] To deal with problems peculiar to former government lawyers, Canon

15
36 was minted which disqualified them both for adverse-interest conflicts and
congruent-interest representation conflicts. [29] The rationale for disqualification is
rooted in a concern that the government lawyers largely discretionary actions would
be influenced by the temptation to take action on behalf of the government client
that later could be to the advantage of parties who might later become private
practice clients.[30] Canon 36 provides, viz.:
36. Retirement from judicial position or public employment
A lawyer should not accept employment as an advocate in any matter upon the
merits of which he has previously acted in a judicial capacity.
A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the public employ
should not, after his retirement, accept employment in connection with any
matter he has investigated or passed upon while in such office or employ.
Over the next thirty years, the ABA continued to amend many of the canons and
added Canons 46 and 47 in 1933 and 1937, respectively. [31]
In 1946, the Philippine Bar Association again adopted as its own Canons 33
to 47 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics. [32]
By the middle of the twentieth century, there was growing consensus that
the ABA Canons needed more meaningful revision. In 1964, the ABA President-elect
Lewis Powell asked for the creation of a committee to study the adequacy and
effectiveness of the ABA Canons. The committee recommended that the canons
needed substantial revision, in part because the ABA Canons failed to distinguish
between the inspirational and the proscriptive and were thus unsuccessful in
enforcement. The legal profession in the United States likewise observed thatCanon
36 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics resulted in unnecessary disqualification
of lawyers for negligible participation in matters during their employment with the
government.
The unfairness of Canon 36 compelled ABA to replace it in the 1969
ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility.[33] The basic ethical principles in
the Code of Professional Responsibility were supplemented by Disciplinary Rules that
defined minimum rules of conduct to which the lawyer must adhere. [34] In the case of
Canon 9, DR 9-101(b)[35]became the applicable supplementary norm. The drafting
committee reformulated the canons into the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility, and, in August of 1969, the ABA House of Delegates approved
the Model Code.[36]
Despite these amendments, legal practitioners remained unsatisfied with the
results and indefinite standards set forth by DR 9-101(b) and the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility as a whole. Thus, in August 1983, the ABA adopted
new Model Rules of Professional Responsibility. The Model Rules used the
restatement format, where the conduct standards were set-out in rules, with
comments following each rule. The new format was intended to give better guidance
and clarity for enforcement because the only enforceable standards were the black
letter Rules. The Model Rules eliminated the broad canons altogether and reduced the
emphasis on narrative discussion, by placing comments after the rules and limiting
comment discussion to the content of the black letter rules. The Model Rules made a
number of substantive improvements particularly with regard to conflicts of interests.
[37]
In particular, the ABA did away with Canon 9, citing the hopeless

dependence of the concept of impropriety on the subjective views of

anxious clients as well as the norms indefinite nature. [38]
In cadence with these changes, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
adopted a proposed Code of Professional Responsibility in 1980 which it
submitted to this Court for approval. The Code was drafted to reflect the local
customs, traditions, and practices of the bar and to conform with new realities. On
June 21, 1988, this Court promulgated the Code of Professional
Responsibility.[39] Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility deals
particularly with former government lawyers, and provides, viz.:
Rule 6.03 A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in
said service.
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility retained the general
structure of paragraph 2, Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics
but replaced the expansive phraseinvestigated and passed upon with the
word intervened. It is, therefore, properly applicable to both adverse-interest
conflicts and congruent-interest conflicts.
The case at bar does not involve the adverse interest aspect of Rule
6.03. Respondent Mendoza, it is conceded, has no adverse interest problem when he
acted as Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 and later as counsel of respondents
Tan, et al. in Civil Case No. 0005 and Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 before
the Sandiganbayan. Nonetheless, there remains the issue of whether there
exists a congruent-interest conflict sufficient to disqualify respondent Mendoza
from representing respondents Tan, et al.
I.B. The congruent interest aspect of Rule 6.03
The key to unlock Rule 6.03 lies in comprehending first, the meaning
of matter referred to in the rule and, second, the metes and bounds of
the intervention made by the former government lawyer on the matter. The
American Bar Association in its Formal Opinion 342, defined matter as any discrete,
isolatable act as well as identifiable transaction or conduct involving a particular
situation and specific party, and not merely an act of drafting, enforcing or
interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing
abstract principles of law.
Firstly, it is critical that we pinpoint the matter which was the subject of
intervention by respondent Mendoza while he was the Solicitor General. The PCGG
relates the following acts of respondent Mendoza as constituting the matter where
he intervened as a Solicitor General, viz:[40]
The PCGGs Case for Atty. Mendozas Disqualification
The PCGG imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan (Fifth
Division) in issuing the assailed Resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5,
2001 denying the motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza as counsel for respondents
Tan, et al. The PCGG insists that Atty. Mendoza, as then Solicitor General, actively
intervened in the closure of GENBANK by advising the Central Bank on how to

16
proceed with the said banks liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation
with the CFI of Manila.
As proof thereof, the PCGG cites the Memorandum dated March 29, 1977 prepared by
certain key officials of the Central Bank, namely, then Senior Deputy Governor Amado
R. Brinas, then Deputy Governor Jaime C. Laya, then Deputy Governor and General
Counsel Gabriel C. Singson, then Special Assistant to the Governor Carlota P.
Valenzuela, then Asistant to the Governor Arnulfo B. Aurellano and then Director of
Department of Commercial and Savings Bank Antonio T. Castro, Jr., where they
averred that on March 28, 1977, they had a conference with the Solicitor General
(Atty. Mendoza), who advised them on how to proceed with the liquidation of
GENBANK. The pertinent portion of the said memorandum states:
Immediately after said meeting, we had a conference with the Solicitor General and
he advised that the following procedure should be taken:
1. Management should submit a memorandum to the Monetary Board
reporting that studies and evaluation had been made since the last
examination of the bank as of August 31, 1976 and it is believed that
the bank can not be reorganized or placed in a condition so that it may
be permitted to resume business with safety to its depositors and
creditors and the general public.
2. If the said report is confirmed by the Monetary Board, it shall order the
liquidation of the bank and indicate the manner of its liquidation and
approve a liquidation plan.

1. Memorandum of the Deputy Governor, Supervision and

Examination Sector, to the Monetary Board, dated March
25, 1977, containing a report on the current situation of
Genbank;
2. Aide Memoire on the Antecedent Facts Re: General Bank and
Trust Co., dated March 23, 1977;
3. Memorandum of the Director, Department of Commercial and
Savings Bank, to the Monetary Board, dated March 24,
1977, submitting, pursuant to Section 29 of R.A. No. 265,
as amended by P.D. No. 1007, a repot on the state of
insolvency of Genbank, together with its attachments; and
4. Such other documents as may be necessary or needed by the
Solicitor General for his use in then CFI-praying the
assistance of the Court in the liquidation of Genbank.
Beyond doubt, therefore, the matter or the act of respondent Mendoza as
Solicitor General involved in the case at bar is advising the Central Bank, on how to
proceed with the said banks liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation
with the CFI of Manila. In fine, the Court should resolve whether his act of advising
the Central Bank on the legal procedure to liquidate GENBANK is included within
the concept of matter under Rule 6.03. The procedure of liquidation is given in
black and white in Republic Act No. 265, section 29, viz:
The provision reads in part:

3. The Central Bank shall inform the principal stockholders of Genbank of

the foregoing decision to liquidate the bank and the liquidation plan
approved by the Monetary Board.
4. The Solicitor General shall then file a petition in the Court of First
Instance reciting the proceedings which had been taken and praying
the assistance of the Court in the liquidation of Genbank.
The PCGG further cites the Minutes No. 13 dated March 29, 1977 of the Monetary
Board where it was shown that Atty. Mendoza was furnished copies of pertinent
documents relating to GENBANK in order to aid him in filing with the court the petition
for assistance in the banks liquidation. The pertinent portion of the said minutes
reads:
The Board decided as follows:
...
E. To authorize Management to furnish the Solicitor General with a
copy of the subject memorandum of the Director, Department
of Commercial and Savings Bank dated March 29, 1977,
together with copies of:

SEC. 29. Proceedings upon insolvency. Whenever, upon

examination by the head of the appropriate supervising or examining
department or his examiners or agents into the condition of any bank or
non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions, it
shall be disclosed that the condition of the same is one of insolvency, or
that its continuance in business would involve probable loss to its
depositors or creditors, it shall be the duty of the department head
concerned forthwith, in writing, to inform the Monetary Board of the facts,
and the Board may, upon finding the statements of the department head
to be true, forbid the institution to do business in the Philippines and shall
designate an official of the Central Bank or a person of recognized
competence in banking or finance, as receiver to immediately take charge
of its assets and liabilities, as expeditiously as possible collect and gather
all the assets and administer the same for the benefit of its creditors,
exercising all the powers necessary for these purposes including, but not
limited to, bringing suits and foreclosing mortgages in the name of the
bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking
functions.
...
If the Monetary Board shall determine and confirm within the said
period that the bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-

17
banking functions is insolvent or cannot resume business with safety to its
depositors, creditors and the general public, it shall, if the public interest
requires, order its liquidation, indicate the manner of its liquidation and
approve a liquidation plan. The Central Bank shall, by the Solicitor General,
file a petition in the Court of First Instance reciting the proceedings which
have been taken and praying the assistance of the court in the liquidation
of such institution. The court shall have jurisdiction in the same
proceedings to adjudicate disputed claims against the bank or non-bank
financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions and enforce
individual liabilities of the stockholders and do all that is necessary to
preserve the assets of such institution and to implement the liquidation
plan approved by the Monetary Board. The Monetary Board shall designate
an official of the Central Bank, or a person of recognized competence in
banking or finance, as liquidator who shall take over the functions of the
receiver previously appointed by the Monetary Board under this Section.
The liquidator shall, with all convenient speed, convert the assets of the
banking institution or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasibanking functions to money or sell, assign or otherwise dispose of the
same to creditors and other parties for the purpose of paying the debts of
such institution and he may, in the name of the bank or non-bank financial
intermediary performing quasi-banking functions, institute such actions as
may be necessary in the appropriate court to collect and recover accounts
and assets of such institution.
The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, the
actions of the Monetary Board under this Section and the second
paragraph of Section 34 of this Act shall be final and executory, and can be
set aside by the court only if there is convincing proof that the action is
plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith. No restraining order or injunction
shall be issued by the court enjoining the Central Bank from implementing
its actions under this Section and the second paragraph of Section 34 of
this Act, unless there is convincing proof that the action of the Monetary
Board is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith and the petitioner or
plaintiff files with the clerk or judge of the court in which the action is
pending a bond executed in favor of the Central Bank, in an amount to be
fixed by the court. The restraining order or injunction shall be refused or, if
granted, shall be dissolved upon filing by the Central Bank of a bond,
which shall be in the form of cash or Central Bank cashier(s) check, in an
amount twice the amount of the bond of the petitioner or plaintiff
conditioned that it will pay the damages which the petitioner or plaintiff
may suffer by the refusal or the dissolution of the injunction. The
provisions of Rule 58 of the New Rules of Court insofar as they are
applicable and not inconsistent with the provisions of this Section shall
govern the issuance and dissolution of the restraining order or injunction
contemplated in this Section.
Insolvency, under this Act, shall be understood to mean the inability
of a bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking
functions to pay its liabilities as they fall due in the usual and ordinary
course of business. Provided, however, That this shall not include the
inability to pay of an otherwise non-insolvent bank or non-bank financial
intermediary performing quasi-banking functions caused by extraordinary
demands induced by financial panic commonly evidenced by a run on the

bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking

functions in the banking or financial community.
The appointment of a conservator under Section 28-A of this Act or
the appointment of a receiver under this Section shall be vested
exclusively with the Monetary Board, the provision of any law, general or
special, to the contrary notwithstanding. (As amended by PD Nos. 72,
1007, 1771 & 1827, Jan. 16, 1981)
We hold that this advice given by respondent Mendoza on the procedure to
liquidate GENBANK is not the matter contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. ABA Formal Opinion No. 342 is clear as daylight in
stressing that the drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency
procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law are acts
which do not fall within the scope of the term matter and cannot disqualify.
Secondly, it can even be conceded for the sake of argument that the above act
of respondent Mendoza falls within the definition of matter per ABA Formal Opinion
No. 342. Be that as it may, the said act of respondent Mendoza which is
the matter involved in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is entirely different from
the matter involved in Civil Case No. 0096. Again, the plain facts speak for
themselves. It is given that respondent Mendoza had nothing to do with the decision
of the Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK. It is also given that he did not participate
in the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. The matter where he got himself
involved was in informing Central Bank on the procedure provided by law to
liquidate GENBANK thru the courts and in filing the necessary petition in Sp. Proc. No.
107812 in the then Court of First Instance. The subject matter of Sp. Proc. No.
107812, therefore, is not the same nor is related to but is different from the
subject matter in Civil Case No. 0096. Civil Case No. 0096 involves
the sequestration of the stocks owned by respondents Tan, et al., in Allied Bank
on the alleged ground that they are ill-gotten. The case does not involve the
liquidation of GENBANK. Nor does it involve the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank.
Whether the shares of stock of the reorganized Allied Bank are ill-gotten is far
removed from the issue of the dissolution and liquidation of GENBANK. GENBANK
was liquidated by the Central Bank due, among others, to the alleged banking
malpractices of its owners and officers. In other words, the legality of the liquidation
of GENBANK is not an issue in the sequestration cases. Indeed, the jurisdiction of the
PCGG does not include the dissolution and liquidation of banks. It goes without saying
that Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility cannot apply to
respondent Mendoza because his alleged intervention while a Solicitor
General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is an intervention on a matter different
from the matter involved in Civil Case No. 0096.
Thirdly,
we
now
slide
to
the
metes
and
the intervention contemplated by Rule 6.03. Intervene means, viz.:

bounds

of

1: to enter or appear as an irrelevant or extraneous feature or circumstance . . . 2: to

occur, fall, or come in between points of time or events . . . 3: to come in or between
by way of hindrance or modification: INTERPOSE . . . 4: to occur or lie between two
things (Paris, where the same city lay on both sides of an intervening river . . .) [41]
On the other hand, intervention is defined as:

18
1: the act or fact of intervening: INTERPOSITION; 2: interference
that may affect the interests of others.[42]
There are, therefore, two possible interpretations of the word intervene. Under
the first interpretation, intervene includes participation in a proceeding even if the
intervention is irrelevant or has no effect or little influence. [43] Under the second
interpretation, intervene only includes an act of a person who has the power to
influence the subject proceedings.[44]We hold that this second meaning is more
appropriate to give to the word intervention under Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility in light of its history. The evils sought to be remedied by
the Rule do not exist where the government lawyer does an act which can be
considered as innocuous such as x x x drafting, enforcing or interpreting government
or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law.
In fine, the intervention cannot be insubstantial and insignificant.
Originally, Canon 36 provided that a former government lawyer should not, after his
retirement, accept employment in connection with any matter which he has
investigated or passed upon while in such office or employ. As aforediscussed, the
broad sweep of the phrase which he has investigated or passed upon resulted in
unjust disqualification of former government lawyers. The 1969 Code restricted its
latitude, hence, in DR 9-101(b), the prohibition extended only to a matter in which
the lawyer, while in the government service, had substantial responsibility. The
1983 Model Rules further constricted the reach of the rule. MR 1.11(a) provides that a
lawyer shall not represent a private client in connection with a matter in which the
lawyer participated personally and substantially as a public officer or employee.
It is, however, alleged that the intervention of respondent Mendoza in Sp. Proc.
No. 107812 is significant and substantial. We disagree. For one, the petition in the
special proceedings is an initiatory pleading, hence, it has to be signed by
respondent Mendoza as the then sitting Solicitor General. For another, the record is
arid as to the actual participation of respondent Mendoza in the subsequent
proceedings. Indeed, the case was in slumberville for a long number of years. None of
the parties pushed for its early termination. Moreover, we note that the petition filed
merely seeks the assistance of the court in the liquidation of GENBANK. The
principal role of the court in this type of proceedings is to assist the Central Bank in
determining claims of creditors against the GENBANK. The role of the court is not
strictly as a court of justice but as an agent to assist the Central Bank in determining
the claims of creditors. In such a proceeding, the participation of the Office of the
Solicitor General is not that of the usual court litigator protecting the interest of
government.
II
Balancing Policy Considerations
To be sure, Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional Responsibility represents a
commendable effort on the part of the IBP to upgrade the ethics of lawyers in the
government service. As aforestressed, it is a take-off from similar efforts especially by
the ABA which have not been without difficulties. To date, the legal profession in the
United States is still fine tuning its DR 9-101(b) rule.
In fathoming the depth and breadth of Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional
Responsibility, the Court took account of various policy considerations to
assure that its interpretation and application to the case at bar will achieve its end

without necessarily prejudicing other values of equal importance. Thus, the rule was
not interpreted to cause a chilling effect on government recruitment of able
legal talent. At present, it is already difficult for government to match compensation
offered by the private sector and it is unlikely that government will be able to reverse
that situation. The observation is not inaccurate that the only card that the
government may play to recruit lawyers is have them defer present income in return
for the experience and contacts that can later be exchanged for higher income in
private practice.[45] Rightly, Judge Kaufman warned that the sacrifice of entering
government service would be too great for most men to endure should ethical rules
prevent them from engaging in the practice of a technical specialty which they
devoted years in acquiring and cause the firm with which they become associated to
be disqualified.[46] Indeed, to make government service more difficult to exit can only
make it less appealing to enter.[47]
In interpreting Rule 6.03, the Court also cast a harsh eye on its use as
a litigation tactic to harass opposing counsel as well as deprive his client of
competent legal representation. The danger that the rule will be misused to bludgeon
an opposing counsel is not a mere guesswork. The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia has noted the tactical use of motions to disqualify counsel in order to delay
proceedings, deprive the opposing party of counsel of its choice, and harass and
embarrass the opponent, and observed that the tactic was so prevalent in large civil
cases in recent years as to prompt frequent judicial and academic commentary.
[48]
Even the United States Supreme Court found no quarrel with the Court of Appeals
description of disqualification motions as a dangerous game. [49] In the case at bar,
the new attempt to disqualify respondent Mendoza is difficult to divine. The
disqualification of respondent Mendoza has long been a dead issue. It was
resuscitated after the lapse of many years and only after PCGG has lost many legal
incidents in the hands of respondent Mendoza. For a fact, the recycled motion for
disqualification in the case at bar was filed more than four years after the filing of
the petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with the Supreme Court which
were subsequently remanded to the Sandiganbayan and docketed as Civil Case
Nos. 0096-0099.[50] At the very least, the circumstances under which the motion to
disqualify in the case at bar were refiled put petitioners motive as highly suspect.
Similarly, the Court in interpreting Rule 6.03 was not unconcerned with
the prejudice to the client which will be caused by its misapplication. It cannot be
doubted that granting a disqualification motion causes the client to lose not only the
law firm of choice, but probably an individual lawyer in whom the client has
confidence.[51] The client with a disqualified lawyer must start again often without the
benefit of the work done by the latter. [52] The effects of this prejudice to the right to
choose an effective counsel cannot be overstated for it can result in denial of due
process.
The Court has to consider also the possible adverse effect of a
truncated reading of the rule on the official independence of lawyers in the
government service. According to Prof. Morgan: An individual who has the security
of knowing he or she can find private employment upon leaving the government is
free to work vigorously, challenge official positions when he or she believes them to
be in error, and resist illegal demands by superiors. An employee who lacks this
assurance of private employment does not enjoy such freedom. [53] He adds: Any
system that affects the right to take a new job affects the ability to quit the old job
and any limit on the ability to quit inhibits official independence. [54] The case at bar
involves the position of Solicitor General, the office once occupied by
respondent Mendoza. It cannot be overly stressed that the position of Solicitor
General should be endowed with a great degree of independence. It is this
independence that allows the Solicitor General to recommend acquittal of the

19
innocent; it is this independence that gives him the right to refuse to defend officials
who violate the trust of their office. Any undue dimunition of the independence of the
Solicitor General will have a corrosive effect on the rule of law.

respondents Tan, et al. There is no switching of sides for no two sides are
involved.

It is also urged that the Court should consider that Rule 6.03 is intended to
avoid conflict of loyalties, i.e., that a government employee might be subject to a
conflict of loyalties while still in government service. [61] The example given by the
proponents of this argument is that a lawyer who plans to work for the company that
he or she is currently charged with prosecuting might be tempted to prosecute less
vigorously.[62] In the cautionary words of the Association of the Bar Committee in
1960: The greatest public risks arising from post employment conduct may well
It is, however, proffered that
occur during the
the mischief sought to be remedied
period
of
by Rule 6.03 of the Code of
employment through
Anne
"Ex-Parte Manifestation and Submission" dated December 1, 1995 in
Professional
Responsibility
is
the dampening of
x
Civil Case No. Q-95-25253, RTC, Br. 224, QC
the possible
appearance
of
aggressive
A......
impropriety and loss of public
administration
of
.confidence in government. But as
government policies.
[63]
well observed, the accuracy of
Prof.
Morgan,
gauging public perceptions is a
however,
considers
highly speculative exercise at
this
concern
as
best[56] which can lead to untoward
probably excessive.
[57]
[64]
Anne
"Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation Motion" dated November 13, 1996 in Sp.
results.
No
less
than
Judge
He opines x x x it
x
Proc. No. 95-030, RTC Br. 259 (not 257), Paraaque, MM
Kaufman doubts that the lessening
is hard to imagine
B......
of
restrictions
as
to former
that a private firm
.government attorneys will have
would feel secure
any detrimental effect on that free
hiding someone who
flow of information between the
had
just
been
government-client and its attorneys
disloyal to his or her
which the canons seek to protect.
last
client
the
[58]
Notably, the appearance of
Anne
"An Urgent and Respectful Plea for extension of Time to File Required
government.
impropriety theory has been
x
Comment and Opposition" dated January 17, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP
Interviews
with
rejected in the 1983 ABA Model
C......
(not Civil Case) No. 42286, CA 6th Div.
lawyers consistently
Rules
of
Professional
.confirm
that
law
Conduct[59]and some courts have
firms want the best
abandoned per se disqualification
government lawyers
based on Canons 4 and 9 when an
the ones who were hardest to beat not the least qualified or least vigorous advocates.
[65]
actual conflict of interest exists, and demand an evaluation of the interests of the
But again, this particular concern is a non factor in the case at bar. There is
defendant, government, the witnesses in the case, and the public. [60]
no charge against respondent Mendoza that he advised Central Bank on how to
liquidate GENBANK with an eye in later defending respondents Tan, et al. of Allied
It is also submitted that the Court should apply Rule 6.03 in all its strictness for
Bank. Indeed, he continues defending both the interests of Central Bank and
it correctly disfavors lawyers who switch sides. It is claimed that switching sides
respondents Tan, et al. in the above cases.
carries the danger that former government employee may compromise
confidential official information in the process. But this concern does not cast a
Likewise, the Court is nudged to consider the need to curtail what is perceived
shadow in the case at bar. As afore-discussed, the act of respondent Mendoza in
as the excessive influence of former officials or their clout.[66] Prof. Morgan
informing the Central Bank on the procedure how to liquidate GENBANK is
again warns against extending this concern too far. He explains the rationale for his
a different matter from the subject matter of Civil Case No. 0005 which is about the
warning, viz: Much of what appears to be an employees influence may actually be the
sequestration of the shares of respondents Tan, et al., in Allied Bank. Consequently,
power or authority of his or her position, power that evaporates quickly upon
the danger that confidential official information might be divulged is nil, if not
departure from government x x x.[67] More, he contends that the concern can
inexistent. To be sure, there are no inconsistent sides to be bothered about in the
be demeaning to those sitting in government. To quote him further: x x x The idea
case at bar. For there is no question that in lawyering for respondents Tan, et al.,
that, present officials make significant decisions based on friendship rather than on
respondent Mendoza is not working against the interest of Central Bank. On the
the merit says more about the present officials than about their former co-worker
contrary, he is indirectly defending the validity of the action of Central Bank in
friends. It implies a lack of will or talent, or both, in federal officials that does not
liquidating GENBANK and selling it later to Allied Bank. Their interests coincide
seem justified or intended, and it ignores the possibility that the officials will tend to
instead of colliding. It is for this reason that Central Bank offered no objection to
disfavor their friends in order to avoid even the appearance of favoritism. [68]
the lawyering of respondent Mendoza in Civil Case No. 0005 in defense of
No less significant a consideration is the deprivation of the former
government lawyer of the freedom to exercise his profession. Given the
current state of our law, the disqualification of a former government lawyer may
extend to all members of his law firm. [55] Former government lawyers stand in danger
of becoming the lepers of the legal profession.

20
III

The question of fairness

Mr. Justices Panganiban and Carpio are of the view, among others, that the
congruent interest prong of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
should be subject to a prescriptive period. Mr. Justice Tinga opines that the rule
cannot apply retroactively to respondent Mendoza. Obviously, and rightly so, they are
disquieted by the fact that (1) when respondent Mendoza was the Solicitor General,
Rule 6.03 has not yet adopted by the IBP and approved by this Court, and (2) the bid
to disqualify respondent Mendoza was made after the lapse of time whose length
cannot, by any standard, qualify as reasonable. At bottom, the point they make
relates to the unfairness of the rule if applied without any prescriptive period and
retroactively, at that. Their concern is legitimate and deserves to be initially
addressed by the IBP and our Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition assailing the resolutions dated July 11, 2001
and December 5, 2001 of the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos.
0096-0099 is denied.
No cost.
SO ORDERED.

This matter is being brought in the context of Rule 138, Section 1

which qualifies that only a duly admitted member of the bar "who is
in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law". There is
also Rule 139-A, Section 10 which provides that "default in the
payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of
membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for
one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the
delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys."
Among others, I seek clarification (e.g. a certification) and
appropriate action on the bar standing of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas
both with the Bar Confidant and with the IBP, especially its Rizal
Chapter of which Atty. Llamas purports to be a member. Jksm
Please note that while Atty. Llamas indicates "IBP Rizal 259060"
sometimes, he does not indicate any PTR for payment of
professional tax.
Under the Rules, particularly Rule 138, Sections 27 and 28,
suspension of an attorney may be done not only by the Supreme
Court but also by the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court
(thus, we are also copy furnishing some of these courts).
Finally, it is relevant to note the track record of Atty. Francisco R.
Llamas, as shown by:

[A.C No. 4749. January 20, 2000]

SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR., complainant, vs. ATTY. FRANCISCO R.
LLAMAS, respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues
filed against respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas.
In a letter-complaint to this Court dated February 8, 1997, complainant Soliman M.
Santos, Jr., himself a member of the bar, alleged that:
On my oath as an attorney, I wish to bring to your attention and
appropriate sanction the matter of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas who,
for a number of years now, has not indicated the proper PTR and
IBP O.R. Nos. and data (date & place of issuance) in his pleadings. If
at all, he only indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" but he has been using
this for at least three years already, as shown by the following
attached sample pleadings in various courts in 1995, 1996 and
1997: (originals available)

1........his dismissal as Pasay City Judge per Supreme Court Admin.

Matter No. 1037-CJ En Banc Decision on October 28, 1981 ( in SCRA
)
2........his conviction for estafa per Decision dated June 30, 1994 in
Crim. Case No. 11787, RTC Br. 66, Makati, MM (see attached copy of
the Order dated February 14, 1995 denying the motion for
reconsideration of the conviction which is purportedly on appeal in
the Court of Appeals).
Attached to the letter-complaint were the pleadings dated December 1, 1995,
November 13, 1996, and January 17, 1997 referred to by complainant, bearing, at the
end thereof, what appears to be respondents signature above his name, address and
the receipt number "IBP Rizal 259060."[1] Also attached was a copy of the order,
[2]
dated February 14, 1995, issued by Judge Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr. of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 66, Makati, denying respondents motion for reconsideration of his
conviction, in Criminal Case No. 11787, for violation of Art. 316, par. 2 of the Revised
Penal Code.
On April 18, 1997, complainant filed a certification[3] dated March 18, 1997, by the
then president of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Atty. Ida R. Macalinao-Javier,
that respondents "last payment of his IBP dues was in 1991. Since then he has not
paid or remitted any amount to cover his membership fees up to the present."

21
On July 7, 1997, respondent was required to comment on the complaint within ten
days from receipt of notice, after which the case was referred to the IBP for
investigation, report and recommendation. In his comment-memorandum, [4] dated
June 3, 1998, respondent alleged:[5]
3. That with respect to the complainants absurd claim that for using
in 1995, 1996 and 1997 the same O.R. No. 259060 of the Rizal IBP,
respondent is automatically no longer a member in good standing.
Precisely, as cited under the context of Rule 138, only an admitted
member of the bar who is in good standing is entitled to practice
law.
The complainants basis in claiming that the undersigned was no
longer in good standing, were as above cited, the October 28, 1981
Supreme Court decision of dismissal and the February 14, 1995
conviction for Violation of Article 316 RPC, concealment of
encumbrances. Chief
As above pointed out also, the Supreme Court dismissal decision
was set aside and reversed and respondent was even promoted
from City Judge of Pasay City to Regional Trial Court Judge of Makati,
Br. 150.
Also as pointed out, the February 14, 1995 decision in Crim. Case
No. 11787 was appealed to the Court of Appeals and is still
pending.
Complainant need not even file this complaint if indeed the decision
of dismissal as a Judge was never set aside and reversed, and also
had the decision of conviction for a light felony, been affirmed by
the Court of Appeals. Undersigned himself would surrender his right
or privilege to practice law.
4. That complainant capitalizes on the fact that respondent had
been delinquent in his dues.
Undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his Income
Tax Return, up to the present, that he had only a limited practice of
law. In fact, in his Income Tax Return, his principal occupation is a
farmer of which he is. His 30 hectares orchard and pineapple farm
is located at Calauan, Laguna.
Moreover, and more than anything else, respondent being a Senior
Citizen since 1992, is legally exempt under Section 4 of Rep. Act
7432 which took effect in 1992, in the payment of taxes, income
taxes as an example. Being thus exempt, he honestly believe in
view of his detachment from a total practice of law, but only in a
limited practice, the subsequent payment by him of dues with the
Integrated Bar is covered by such exemption. In fact, he never
exercised his rights as an IBP member to vote and be voted upon.

Nonetheless, if despite such honest belief of being covered by the

exemption and if only to show that he never in any manner wilfully
and deliberately failed and refused compliance with such dues, he
is willing at any time to fulfill and pay all past dues even with
interests, charges and surcharges and penalties. He is ready to
tender such fulfillment or payment, not for allegedly saving his skin
as again irrelevantly and frustratingly insinuated for vindictive
purposes by the complainant, but as an honest act of accepting
reality if indeed it is reality for him to pay such dues despite his
candor and honest belief in all food faith, to the contrary. Esmsc
On December 4, 1998, the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution [6] adopting and
approving the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner which
found respondent guilty, and recommended his suspension from the practice of law
for three months and until he pays his IBP dues. Respondent moved for a
reconsideration of the decision, but this was denied by the IBP in a resolution, [7] dated
April 22, 1999. Hence, pursuant to Rule 139-B, 12(b) of the Rules of Court, this case is
here for final action on the decision of the IBP ordering respondents suspension for
three months.
The findings of IBP Commissioner Alfredo Sanz are as follows:
On the first issue, Complainant has shown "respondents nonindication of the proper IBP O.R. and PTR numbers in his pleadings
(Annexes "A", "B" and "C" of the letter complaint, more particularly
his use of "IBP Rizal 259060 for at least three years."
The records also show a "Certification dated March 24, 1997 from
IBP Rizal Chapter President Ida R. Makahinud Javier that
respondents last payment of his IBP dues was in 1991."
While these allegations are neither denied nor categorically
admitted by respondent, he has invoked and cited that "being a
Senior Citizen since 1992, he is legally exempt under Section 4 of
Republic Act No. 7432 which took effect in 1992 in the payment of
taxes, income taxes as an example."
....
The above cited provision of law is not applicable in the present
case. In fact, respondent admitted that he is still in the practice of
law when he alleged that the "undersigned since 1992 have
publicly made it clear per his Income tax Return up to the present
time that he had only a limited practice of law." (par. 4 of
Respondents Memorandum).
Therefore respondent is not exempt from paying his yearly dues to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Esmmis
On the second issue, complainant claims that respondent has
misled the court about his standing in the IBP by using the same

22
IBP O.R. number in his pleadings of at least six years and therefore
liable for his actions. Respondent in his memorandum did not
discuss this issue.
First. Indeed, respondent admits that since 1992, he has engaged in law practice
without having paid his IBP dues. He likewise admits that, as appearing in the
pleadings submitted by complainant to this Court, he indicated "IBP-Rizal 259060" in
the pleadings he filed in court, at least for the years 1995, 1996, and 1997, thus
misrepresenting that such was his IBP chapter membership and receipt number for
the years in which those pleadings were filed. He claims, however, that he is only
engaged in a "limited" practice and that he believes in good faith that he is exempt
from the payment of taxes, such as income tax, under R.A. No. 7432, 4 as a senior
citizen since 1992.
Rule 139-A provides:
Sec. 9. Membership dues. - Every member of the Integrated Bar
shall pay such annual dues as the Board of Governors shall
determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. A fixed sum
equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the collections from each
Chapter shall be set aside as a Welfare Fund for disabled members
of the Chapter and the compulsory heirs of deceased members
thereof.
Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. - Subject to the provisions
of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for
six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the
Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a
ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from
the Roll of Attorneys.
In accordance with these provisions, respondent can engage in the practice of law
only by paying his dues, and it does not matter that his practice is "limited." While it
is true that R.A. No. 7432, 4 grants senior citizens "exemption from the payment of
individual income taxes: provided, that their annual taxable income does not exceed
the poverty level as determined by the National Economic and Development
Authority (NEDA) for that year," the exemption does not include payment of
membership or association dues.
Second. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby
misrepresenting to the public and the courts that he had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal
Chapter, respondent is guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility
which provides:
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY
AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, AND SUPPORT THE
ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. Esmso

CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH

TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be
misled by any artifice.
Respondents failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings he
filed in court indeed merit the most severe penalty. However, in view of respondents
advanced age, his express willingness to pay his dues and plea for a more temperate
application of the law,[8] we believe the penalty of one year suspension from the
practice of law or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later, is appropriate.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas is SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for ONE (1) YEAR, or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later. Let a
copy of this decision be attached to Atty. Llamas personal record in the Office of the
Bar Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and to all courts in the land.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

A.C. No. 2505 February 21, 1992

EVANGELINE LEDA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. TREBONIAN TABANG, respondent.

PER CURIAM:
Complainant, Evangeline Leda, squarely puts in issue respondent Atty. Trebonian
Tabang's good moral character, in two Complaints she had filed against him, one
docketed as Bar Matter No. 78 instituted on 6 January 1982, and the present
Administrative Case No. 2505, which is a Petition for Disbarment, filed on 14 February
1983.
It appears that on 3 October 1976, Respondent and Complainant contracted marriage
at Tigbauan, Iloilo. The marriage, solemnized by Judge Jose T. Tavarro of Tigbauan,
was performed under Article 76 of the Civil
Code 1 as one of exceptional character (Annex "A", Petition).

23
The parties agreed to keep the fact of marriage a secret until after Respondent had
finished his law studies (began in l977), and had taken the Bar examinations (in
1981), allegedly to ensure a stable future for them.Complainant admits, though, that
they had not lived together as husband and wife (Letter-Complaint, 6 January 1982).
Respondent finished his law studies in 1981 and thereafter applied to take the Bar. In
his application, he declared that he was "single." He then passed the examinations
but Complainant blocked him from taking his Oath by instituting Bar Matter No.
78, claiming that Respondent had acted fraudulently in filling out his application and,
thus, was unworthy to take the lawyer's Oath for lack of good moral
character. Complainant also alleged that after Respondent's law studies, he became
aloof and "abandoned" her (Petition, par. 5).
The Court deferred Respondent's Oath-taking and required him to answer the
Complaint.
Respondent filed his "Explanation," dated 26 May 1982 which was received on 7 June
1982. Said "Explanation" carries Complainant's conformity (Records, p. 6). Therein, he
admitted that he was "legally married" to Complainant on 3 October 1976 but that
the marriage "was not as yet made and declared public" so that he could proceed
with his law studies and until after he could take the Bar examinations "in order to
keep stable our future." He also admitted having indicated that he was "single" in his
application to take the Bar "for reason that to my honest belief, I have still to declare
my status as single since my marriage with the complainant was not as yet made and
declared public." He further averred that he and Complainant had reconciled as
shown by her conformity to the "Explanation," for which reason he prayed that the
Complaint be dismissed.
Respondent also filed a Motion to Dismiss, dated 2 June 1982. Attached to it was
Complainant's Affidavit of Desistance, which stated that Bar Matter No. 78 arose out
of a misunderstanding and communication gap and that she was refraining from
pursuing her Complaint against Respondent.
Acting on the aforesaid Motion and Comment, the Court dismissed Bar Matter No. 78
and allowed Respondent to take his Oath in a Resolution dated 20 August 1982.
On 14 February 1983, however, Complainant filed this Administrative Case, this time
praying for Respondent's disbarment based on the following grounds:
a. For having made use of his legal knowledge to contract
an invalid marriage with me assuming that our marriage is
not valid, and making a mockery of our marriage
institution.
b. For having misrepresented himself as single when in
truth he is already married in his application to take the
bar exam.
c. For being not of good moral character contrary to the
certification he submitted to the Supreme Court;

d. For (sic) guilty of deception for the reason that he

deceived me into signing of the affidavit ofdesistance and
the conformity to his explanation and later on the
comment to his motion to dismiss, when in truth and in
fact he is not sincere, for he only befriended me to resume
our marriage and introduced me to his family, friends and
relatives as his wife, for a bad motive that is he wanted me
to withdraw my complaint against him with the Supreme
Court.
Attached to Complainant's Petition for Disbarment, as Annex "F," is an undated and
unsigned letter addressed to Complainant, allegedly written by Respondent after he
had already taken his Oath stating, among others, that while he was grateful for
Complainant's help, he "could not force myself to be yours," did not love her anymore
and considered her only a friend. Their marriage contract was actually void for failure
to comply with the requisites of Article 76 of the Civil Code, among them the
minimum cohabitation for five (5) years before the celebration of the marriage, an
affidavit to that effect by the solemnizing officer, and that the parties must be at least
twenty-one (21) years of age, which they were not as they were both only twenty
years old at the time. He advised Complainant not to do anything more so as not to
put her family name "in shame." As for him, he had "attain(ed) my goal as a fullpledge (sic) professional and there is nothing you can do for it to take away from me
even (sic) you go to any court." According to Complainant, although the letter was
unsigned, Respondent's initials appear on the upper left-hand corner of the airmail
envelope (Exh. "8-A-1").
Respondent denied emphatically that he had sent such a letter contending that it
is Complainant who has been indulging in fantasy and fabrications.
In his Comment in the present case, Respondent avers that he and Complainant had
covenanted not to disclose the marriage not because he wanted to finish his studies
and take the Bar first but for the reason that said marriage was void from the
beginning in the absence of the requisites of Article 76 of the Civil Code that the
contracting parties shall have lived together as husband and wife for at least five (5)
years before the date of the marriage and that said parties shall state the same in an
affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. He could not have
abandoned Complainant because they had never lived together as husband and
wife. When he applied for the 1981 Bar examinations, he honestly believed that in
the eyes of the law, he was single.
On 7 May 1984, the Court referred the Complaint to the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation. On 5 March 1990, the Solicitor General
submitted his Report, with the recommendation that Respondent be exonerated from
the charges against him since Complainant failed to attend the hearings and to
substantiate her charges but that he be reprimanded for making inconsistent and
conflicting statements in the various pleadings he had filed before this Court.
On 26 March 1990, the Court referred the Solicitor General's Report to the Bar
Confidant for evaluation, report and recommendation. In an undated Report, the
latter recommended the indefinite suspension of Respondent until the status of his
marriage is settled.

24
Upon the facts on Record even without testimonial evidence from Complainant, we
find Respondent's lack of good moral character sufficiently established.
Firstly, his declaration in his application for Admission to the 1981 Bar Examinations
that he was "single" was a gross misrepresentation of a material fact made in utter
bad faith, for which he should be made answerable. Rule 7.01, Canon 7, Chapter II of
the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides: "A lawyer shall be
answerable for knowingly making a false statement or suppression of a material fact
in connection with his application for admission to the bar." That false statement, if it
had been known, would have disqualified him outright from taking the Bar
Examinations as it indubitably exhibits lack of good moral character.
Respondent's protestations that he had acted in good faith in declaring his status as
"single" not only because of his pact with Complainant to keep the marriage under
wraps but also because that marriage to the Complainant was void from the
beginning, are mere afterthoughts absolutely wanting of merit. Respondent can not
assume that his marriage to Complainant is void. The presumption is that all the
requisites and conditions of a marriage of an exceptional character under Article 76 of
the Civil Code have been met and that the Judge's official duty in connection
therewith has been regularly performed.
Secondly, Respondent's conduct in adopting conflicting positions in the various
pleadings submitted in Bar Matter No. 78 and in the case at bar is duplicitous and
deplorable.
The records show that in Bar Matter No. 78, Respondent had submitted an
"Explanation," in paragraph 1, page 1 of which he admits having been "legally
married" to Complainant. Yet, during the hearings before the Solicitor General, he
denied under oath that he had submitted any such pleading (t.s.n., p. 21) contending
instead that it is only the second page where his signature appears that he meant to
admit and not the averments on the first page which were merely of Complainant's
own making (ibid., pp. 59-60). However, in his Comment in this Administrative Case,
he admits and makes reference to such "Explanation" (pars. 3[f]) and [g]; 4[b]).
Again, while in said "Explanation" he admitted having been "legally married" to
Complainant (par. 1), in this case, however, he denies the legality of the marriage
and, instead, harps on its being void ab initio. He even denies his signature in the
marriage contract.
In Bar Matter No. 78, Respondent also averred that the fact of marriage was not to be
made public so as to allow him to finish his studies and take the Bar. In this case,
however, he contends that the reason it was kept a secret was because it was "not in
order from the beginning."
Thirdly, Respondent denies that he had sent the unsigned
letter (Annex "F," Petition) to Complainant. However, its very tenor coincides with the
reasons that he advances in his Comment why the marriage is void from the
beginning, that is, for failure to comply with the requisites of Article 76 of the Civil
Code.

Fourthly, the factual scenario gathered from the records shows that Respondent had
reconciled with Complainant and admitted the marriage to put a quick finish to Bar
Matter No. 78 to enable him to take the lawyer's Oath, which otherwise he would
have been unable to do. But after he had done so and had become a "full-pledge (sic)
lawyer," he again refused to honor his marriage to Complainant.
Respondent's lack of good moral character is only too evident. He has resorted to
conflicting submissions before this Court to suit himself. He has also engaged in
devious tactics with Complainant in order to serve his purpose.In so doing, he has
violated Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that "a
lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court" as well as Rule 1001 thereof
which states that "a lawyer should do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in
Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the court to be misled by any artifice." Courts are
entitled to expect only complete candor and honesty from the lawyers appearing and
pleading before them (Chavez v. Viola, Adm. Case No. 2152, 19 April 1991, 196 SCRA
10). Respondent, through his actuations, has been lacking in the candor required of
him not only as a member of the Bar but also as an officer of the Court.
It cannot be overemphasized that the requirement of good moral character is not only
a condition precedent toadmission to the practice of law; its continued possession
is also essential for remaining in the practice of law(People v. Tuanda, Adm. Case No.
3360, 30 January 1990, 181 SCRA 692). As so aptly put by Mr.
JusticeGeorge A. Malcolm: "As good character is an essential qualification for
admission of an attorney to practice, when the attorney's character is bad in such
respects as to show that he is unsafe and unfit to be entrusted with the powers of an
attorney, the courts retain the power to discipline him (Piatt v. Abordo, 58 Phil. 350
[1933]).
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Trebonian C. Tabang grossly unfit and unworthy to
continue to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of
an attorney, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law until further Orders,
the suspension to take effect immediately.
Copies of this Decision shall be entered in his personal record as an attorney and
served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Court Administrator who shall
circulate the same to all Courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

December 3, 1948
In re Investigation of ANGEL J. PARAZO for alleged leakage of questions in
some subjects in the 1948 Bar Examinations.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
The present case had its origin in a story or news item prepared and written by the
defendant, Angel J. Parazo, a duly accredited reporter of the Star Reporter, a local

25
daily of general circulation, that appeared on the front page of the issue of
September 14, 1948. The story was preceded by the headline in large letters
"CLAIM 'LEAK' IN LAST BAR TESTS," followed by another in slightly smaller letters
"Applicants In Uproar, Want Anomaly Probed; One School Favored," under the name
"By Angel J. Parazo of the Star Reporter Staff." For purposes of reference we quote
the news item in full:
Leakage in some subjects in the recent bar examinations were
denounced by some of the law graduates who took part in the
tests, to the Star Reporter this morning.
These examinees claim to have seen mimeograph copies of the
questions in one subject, days before the tests were given, in the
Philippine Normal School.
Only students of one private university in Sampaloc had those
mimeographed questions on said subject fully one week before the
tests.
The students who made the denunciation to the Star Reporter claim
that the tests actually given were similar in every respect to those
they had seen students of this private university holding proudly
around the city.
The students who claim to have seen the tests which leaked are
demanding that the Supreme Court institute an immediate probe
into the matter, to find out the source of the leakage, and annul the
test papers of the students of the particular university possessed of
those tests before the examinations.
The discovery of the alleged leakage in the tests of the bar
examinations came close on the heels of the revelations in
the Philippine Collegian, official organ of the student body of the
University of the Philippines, on recent government tests wherein
the questions had come into the possession of nearly all the
graduates of some private technical schools.
To the publication, evidently, the attention of the Supreme Court must have been
called, and Mr. Justice Padilla, who had previously been designated Chairman of the
Committee of Bar Examiners for this year, by authority of the Court, instructed Mr.
Jose de la Cruz as Commissioner with the assistance of Mr. E. Soriano, Clerk of Court
to cite Mr. Parazo for questioning and investigation. In this connection, and for
purposes of showing the interest of the Supreme Court in the news item and its
implications, it may here be stated that this Court is and for many years has been, in
charge of the Bar Examinations held every year, including that of this year, held in
August, 1948. Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution of the Philippines authorizes
this Court to promulgate rules concerning admission to the practice of law, and
pursuant to that authority, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court was promulgated, under
which rule, this Court conducts the Bar Examinations yearly, appoints a Committee of
Bar Examiners to be presided by one of the Justices, to serve for one year, acts on the
report of the committee and finally, admits to the Bar and to the practice of law, the
candidates and examinees who have passed the examinations.

The investigation of Mr. Parazo was conducted on September 18, 1948, on which
occasion he testified under oath and, answering questions directed to him by Messrs.
Cruz and Soriano admitted that he was the author of the news item; that he wrote up
the story and had it published, in good faith and in a spirit of public service; and that
he knew the persons who gave him the information which formed the basis of his
publication but that he declined to reveal their names because the information was
given to him in confidence and his informants did not wish to have their identities
revealed. The investigators informed Parazo that this was a serious matter involving
the confidence of the public in the regularity and cleanliness of the Bar Examinations
and also in the Supreme Court which conducted said examinations, and repeatedly
appealed to his civic spirit and sense of public service, pleading with and urging him
to reveal the names of his informants so that the Supreme Court may be in a position
to start and conduct the necessary investigation in order to verify their charge and
complaint and take action against the party or parties responsible for the alleged
irregularity and anomaly, if found true, but Parazo consistently refused to make the
revelation.
In the meantime, the writer of this opinion who was appointed to the Supreme Court
as associate Justice in the latter part of August, 1948, was designated to succeed Mr.
Justice Padilla as Chairman of the Committee of Bar Examiners when the said Justice
was appointed Secretary of Justice. The writer of this opinion was furnished a copy of
the transcript of the investigation conducted on September 18, 1948, and he made a
report thereof to the Court in banc, resulting in the issuance of the resolution of this
Court dated October 7, 1948, which reads as follows:
In relation with the news item that appeared in the front page of
the Star Reporter, issue of September 14, 1948, regarding alleged
leakage in some bar examination questions, which examinations
were held in August 1948, Mr. Jose de la Cruz, as Commissioner,
and Mr. E. Soriano, as Clerk of Court, were authorized by Mr. Justice
Sabino Padilla then chairman of the committee of bar examiners to
conduct an investigation thereof, particularly to receive the
testimony of Mr. Angel J. Parazo, the reporter responsible for and
author of said news item. An investigation was conducted on
September 18, 1948; stenographic notes were taken of the
testimony of Mr. Parazo, and Mr. Justice Marcelino R. Montemayor,
the new chairman of the committee of bar examiners, has
submitted the transcript of said notes for the consideration of this
Court.
From the record of said investigation, it is clear that Mr. Parazo has
deliberately and consistently declined and refused to reveal the
identity of the persons supposed to have given him the data and
information on which his news item was based, despite the
repeated appeals made to his civic spirit, and for his cooperations,
in order to enable this Court to conduct a thorough investigation of
the alleged bar examination anomaly, Resolved, to authorize Mr.
Justice Montemayor to cite Mr. Parazo before him, explain to him
that the interests of the State demand and so this Court requires
that he reveal the source or sources of his information and of his
news item, and to warn him that his refusal to make the revelation
demanded will be regarded as contempt of court and penalized
accordingly. Mr. Justice Montemayor will advise the Court of the
result.

26
Acting upon this resolution, the writer of this opinion cited Mr. Parazo to appear
before him on October 13, 1948. He appeared on the date set and it was clearly
explained to him that the interest of the State demands and this court requires that
he reveal the source of sources of his information and of his news item; that this was
a very serious matter involving the confidence of the people in general and the law
practitioners and bar examinees in particular, in the regularity and cleanliness of the
bar examinations; that it also involves the good name and reputation of the bar
examiners who are appointed by this Court to prepare the bar examinations
questions and later pass upon and correct the examinations questions and last but
not least, it also involves and is bound to affect the confidence of the whole country
in the very Supreme Court which is conducting the bar examinations. It was further
explained to him that the Supreme Court is keenly interested in investigating the
alleged anomaly and leakage of the examination questions and is determined to
punish the party or parties responsible therefor but that without his help, specially
the identities of the persons who furnished him the information and who could give
the court the necessary data and evidence, the Court could not even begin the
investigation because there would be no basis from which to start, not even a clue
from which to formulate a theory. Lastly, Parazo was told that under the law he could
be punished if he refused to make the revelation, punishment which may even
involve imprisonment.
Because of the seriousness of the matter, Parazo was advised to think it over and
consider the consequences, and if he need time within which to do this and so that he
might even consult the editor and publisher of his paper, the Star Reporter, he could
be given an extension of time, and at his request, the investigation was postponed to
October 15, 1948. On that date he appeared, accompanied by his counsel, Atty.
Felixberto M. Serrano. The writer of this opinion in the presence of his counsel,
several newspapermen, Clerk of Court Soriano, Deputy Clerk of Court Cruz, and Mr.
Chanliongco made a formal demand on Mr. Parazo to reveal the identities of his
informants, under oath, but he declined and refused to make the revelation. At the
request of his counsel, that before this Court take action upon his refusal to reveal, he
be accorded a hearing, with the consent of the Court first obtained, a public hearing
was held on the same day, October 15, 1948 in the course of which, Attorney Serrano
extensively and ably argued the case of his client, invoking the benefits of Republic
Act No. 53, the first section of which reads as follows:
SECTION 1. The publisher, editor or duly accredited reporter of any
newspaper, magazine or periodical of general circulation cannot be
compelled to reveal the source of any news-report or information
appearing in said publication which was related in confidence to
such publisher, editor or reporter, unless the court or a House or
committee of Congress finds that such revelation is demanded by
the interest of the state.
This Court has given this case prolonged, careful and mature consideration, involving
as it does interesting and important points of law as well as questions of national
importance. Counsel contends that the phrase "interest of the state" found at the end
of section 1 of Republic Act No. 53 means and refers only to the security of the state,
that is to say that only when National Security or public safety is involved, may this
Court compel the defendant to reveal the source or sources of his news report or
information. We confess that it was not easy to decide this legal question on which
the conviction or acquittal of Parazo hinges. As a matter of facts, the vote of the
Justice is not unanimous.

In an effort to determine the intent of the Legislature that passed Republic Act No. 53,
particularly the Senate were it originated, we examined the record of the proceedings
in said legislative body when this Act, then Senate Bill No. 6 was being discussed. We
gathered from the said record that the original bill prepared by Senator Sotto
provided that the immunity to be accorded a publisher, editor, or reporter of any
newspaper was absolute and that under no circumstance could he be compelled to
reveal the source of his information or news report. The committee, however, under
the chairmanship of Senator Cuenco inserted an amendment or change, by adding to
the end of section 1 of the clause "unless the court finds that such revelation is
demanded by the public interest."
When the bill as amended was recommended for approval on second reading,
Senator Sotto, the author of the original bill proposed an amendment by eliminating
the clause added by the committee "unless the court finds that such revelation is
demanded by the public interest," claiming that said clause would kill the purposed of
the bill. This amendment of Senator Sotto was discussed. Various Senators objected
to the elimination of the clause already referred to on the ground that without such
exception and by giving complete immunity to editors, reporters, etc., many abuses
may be committed. Senator Cuenco, Committee chairman, in advocating the
disapproval of the Sotto amendment, and in defending the exception embodied in the
amendment introduced by the Committee, consisting in the clause: "unless the court
finds that such revelation is demanded by the public interest," said that the
Committee could not accept the Sotto amendment because there may be cases,
perhaps few, in which the interest of the public or the interest of the state required
that the names of the informants be published or known. He gave as one example a
case of a newspaperman publishing information referring to a theft of the plans of
forts or fortifications. He argued that if the immunity accorded a newspaperman
should be absolute, as sought by the Sotto amendment, the author of the theft might
go scott-free. When the Sotto amendment was put to a vote, it was disapproved.
Finally, Senator Sotto proposed another amendment by changing the phrase "public
interest" at the end of section 1 as amended by the Committee be changed to and
substituted by the phrase "interest of the state," claiming that the phrase public
interest was too elastic. Without much discussion this last amendment was approved,
and this phrase is now found in the Act as finally approved.
In view of the contention now advanced, that the phrase "interest of the state" is
confined to cases involving the "security of the state" or "public safety," one might
wonder or speculate on why the last amendment proposed by Senator Sotto,
changing the phrase "public interest" to "interest of the state," was approved without
much discussion. But we notice from the records of the deliberations on and
discussion of the bill in the Senate that the phrase "public interest" was used
interchangeably by some Senators with the phrase "interest of the state." For
instance, although the bill, as amended by the Committee presided by Senator
Cuenco, used the words "public interest, "when Senator Cuenco sponsored the bill
before the Senate he used in his speech or remarks the phrase "interest of the State"
(interes del Estado). Again, although the bill, as sponsored by the Cuenco Committee
and discussed by the Senate, used the words "public interest, "Senator Sebastian
referred to the exception by using the phrase "interest of the state." This
understanding of at least two of the Senators, who took part in the discussion, about
the similarity or interchangeability of the two phrases "public interest" and "interest
of the estate," may account for the readiness or lack of objection on the part of the
Senate, after it had rejected the first Sotto amendment, to accept the second Sotto
amendment, changing the phrase "public interest" to "interest of the state."

27
In referring to a case wherein the security of the state or public safety was involved,
such as the theft of the plans of fortifications, Senator Cuenco was obviously giving it
only as an example of what he meant by "interest of the state;" it was not meant to
be the only case or example. We do not propose to define or fix the limits or scope of
the phrase "interest of the state;" but we can say that the phrase "interest of the
state" can not be confined and limited to the "security of the state" or to "public
safety" alone. These synonymous phrases, "security of the state" and "public
safety," are not uncommon terms and we can well presume that the legislators
were familiar with them. The phrase "public safety," is used in Article III, section 1(5)
of the Constitution of the Philippines, where it says that "the privacy of
communications and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of
the court or when public safety and order require otherwise;" and Article VII, section
10(2) of the same Constitution provided that the President may suspend the
privileges of the writ of habeas corpus, in case of invasion, insurrection, etc., when
the public safety requires it.
The phrase "National Security" is used at the beginning of Book II of the Revised
Penal Code, thus: Title I, Crimes against National Security and the law of Nations,
Chapter I, Crimes against National Security. Then, more recently, the phrase
"National Security" was used in section 2, and the phrase "public security" was
equally used in section 19, of Commonwealth Act No. 682 creating the People's Court,
promulgated on September 25, 1945. If, as contended, the Philippine Congress,
particularly the Philippine Senate, had meant to limit the exception to the immunity
of newspapermen only to cases where the "security of the state," i.e., "National
Security" is involved, it could easily and readily have used such phrase or any one of
similar phrases like "public safety," "National Security," or "public security" of which it
must have been familiar. Since it did not do so, there is valid reason to believe that
that was not in the mind and intent of the legislators, and that, in using the phrase
"interest of the state," it extended the scope and the limits of the exception when a
newspaperman or reporter may be compelled to reveal the sources of his
information.
The phrase "interest of the state" is quite broad and extensive. It is of course more
general and broader than "security of the state." Although not as broad and
comprehensive as "public interest" which may include most anything though of minor
importance, but affecting the public, such as for instance, the establishment and
maintenance of barrio roads, electric light and ice plants, parks, markets, etc., the
phrase "interest of the estate" even under a conservative interpretation, may and
does include cases and matters of national importance in which the whole state and
nations, not only a branch or instrumentality thereof such as a province, city or town,
or a part of the public, is interested or would be affected, such as the principal
functions of Government like administration of justice, public school system, and such
matters like social justice, scientific research, practice of law or of medicine,
impeachment of high Government officials, treaties with other nations, integrity of
the three coordinate branches of the Government, their relations to each other, and
the discharge of their functions, etc.
We are satisfied that the present case easily comes under the phrase "interest of the
state." Under constitutional provision, article VIII, section 13, Constitution of the
Philippines, the Supreme Court takes charge of the admission of members to the
Philippine Bar. By its Rules of Court, it has prescribed the qualifications of the
candidates to the Bar Examinations, and it has equally prescribed the subject of the
said Bar Examinations. Every year, the Supreme Court appoints the Bar examiners
who prepare the questions, then correct the examination papers submitted by the

examinees, and later make their report to the Supreme Court. Only those Bar
Examination candidates who are found to have obtained to passing grade are
admitted to the Bar and licensed to practice law. There are now thousands of
members of the Philippine Bar, scattered all over the Philippines, practicing law or
occupying important Government posts requiring membership in the Bar as a
prerequisite, and every year, quite a number, sometimes several hundreds, are
added to the legal fold. The Supreme Court and the Philippine Bar have always tried
to maintain a high standard for the legal profession, both in academic preparation
and legal training, as well as in honesty and fair dealing. The Court and the licensed
lawyers themselves are vitally interested in keeping this high standard; and one of
the ways of achieving this end is to admit to the practice of this noble profession only
those persons who are known to be honest, possess good moral character, and show
proficiency in and knowledge of the law by the standard set by this Court by passing
the Bar Examinations honestly and in the regular and usual manner. It is of public
knowledge that perhaps by general inclination or the conditions obtaining in this
country, or the great demand for the services of licensed lawyers, law as compared to
other professions, is the most popular in these islands. The predominantly greater
number of members of the Bar, schools and colleges of law as compared to those of
other learned professions, attest to this fact. And one important thing to bear in mind
is that the Judiciary, from the Supreme Court down to the Justice of the Peace Courts,
provincial fiscalships and other prosecuting attorneys, and the legal departments of
the Government, draw exclusively from the Bar to fill their positions. Consequently,
any charge or insinuation of anomaly in the conduct of Bar Examinations, of necessity
is imbued with wide and general interest and national importance.
If it is true that Bar Examination questions, for some reason or another, find their way
out and get into the hands of Bar examinees before the examinations are actually
given, and as a result thereof some examinees succeed in illegally and improperly
obtaining passing grades and are later admitted to the Bar and to the practice of law,
when otherwise they should not be, then the present members of the legal profession
would have reason to resent and be alarmed; and if this is continued it would not be
long before the legal profession will have fallen into disrepute. The public would
naturally lose confidence in the lawyers, specially in the new ones, because a person
contemplating to go to court to seek redress or to defend himself before it would not
know whether a particular lawyer to whom he is entrusting his case has legally
passed the Bar Examinations because of sufficient and adequate preparation and
training, and that he is honest, or whether he was one of those who had succeeded in
getting hold of Bar Examination questions in advance, passed the Bar Examinations
illegally, and then started his legal career with this act of dishonesty. Particularly, the
Bar examinees who, by intense study and conscientious preparations, have honestly
passed the Bar Examinations and are admitted to practice law, would be affected by
this anomaly, because they would ever be under a cloud of suspicion, since from the
point of view of the public, they might be among those who had made use of Bar
Examination questions obtained before hand. And, incidentally, the morale of the
hundreds of students and graduates of the different law schools, studying law and
later preparing for the Bar Examinations, would be affected, even disastrously, for in
them may be born the idea that there is no need of much law study and preparation
inasmuch as it is possible and not difficult to obtain copies of questions before the
examinations and pass them and be admitted to the Bar.
The cloud of suspicion would, equally, hang over the Bar examiners themselves, eight
eminent lawyers who in a spirit of public service and civic spirit, have consented to
serve on the Committee of Examiners at the request and designation of this Court.
They would be suspected, one or two or more of them that through negligence,

28
or connivance, or downright corruption, they have made possible the release if they
have not themselves actually released, before examination day, the questions they
had prepared. The employees of the Supreme Court in charge of the Bar
Examinations, specially those who copy or mimeograph the original copies furnished
by the Bar examiners, would all be under suspicion. And, lastly, and more important
still, the Supreme Court itself which has to overall supervision and control over the
examinations, would share the suspicion, as a result of which the confidence of the
people in this High Tribunal, which public confidence, the members of this Court like
to think and believe, it still enjoys, might be affected and shaken. All these
considerations of vital importance, in our opinion, can and will sufficiently cause the
present case to fall and be included within the meaning of the phrase "interest of the
state," involving as it does, not only the interests of students and graduates of the
law schools and colleges, and of the entire legal profession of this country as well as
the good name and reputation of the members of the Committee of Bar Examiners,
including the employees of the Supreme Court having charge of and connections with
said examinations, but also the highest Tribunal of the land itself which represents
one of the three coordinate and independent branches or departments of the
Philippine Government.
In support of if not in addition to the power granted by section 1 of Republic Act. No.
53 to this Court, we have the inherent power of courts in general, specially of the
Supreme Court as representative of the Judicial Department, to adopt proper and
adequate measures to preserve their integrity, and render possible and facilitate the
exercise of their functions, including, as in the present case, the investigation of
charges of error, abuse or misconduct of their officials and subordinates, including
lawyers, who are officers of the Court. (Province of Tarlac vs. Gale, 26 Phil., 350; 21
C.J.S. 41, 138.) As we have previously stated, the revelation demanded of the
respondent, of the identity of his informants, is essential and necessary to the
investigation of the charge contained in the publication already mentioned.
It will be noticed from Parazo's news item as quoted in the first part of this decision,
that, informants, law graduates and bar examinees, were denouncing the supposed
anomaly consisting of the alleged leakage of the Bar Examination questions to
the Supreme Court for due investigation. If those persons really meant and intended
to make a bona fide and effective denunciation, with expectation of results, the right
place to air their grievance was the Supreme Court itself, not a newspaper; and if
they truly wanted an investigation, they should have come forward and furnished or
stood ready to furnish the facts on which to base and from which to start an
investigation, instead of concealing themselves behind the curtain of press immunity.
Examining the news item in question, it is therein claimed and assured that Bar
Examination questions in at least one subject had been obtained and used by bar
examinees coming from a certain university, one week before the examinations were
actually held. Parazo in his statements and answers during the investigation said that
examination questions in several subjects were involved in the anomaly. But no copy
or copies of said examination questions were furnished us. No one is willing to testify
that he actually saw said alleged copies of examination questions; that they were
actually and carefully compared with the legitimate examination questions given out
on the day of the examination and found to be identical; no one is ready and willing
to reveal the identity of the persons or bar examinees said to have been seen with
the said Bar Examination questions, although they as well as the university where
they came from, was known; and even the law subjects to which the questions
pertained are not disclosed; and, lastly, we are not allowed to know even the identity
of respondent Parazo's informants who claim to have seen all these things.

In this connection it may be stated that in the las Bar Examinations held in August,
1948, approximately nine hundred candidates took them, each candidate writing his
answers in a book for each subject. There were eight subjects, each belonging to and
corresponding to each one of the eight bar examiners. There were therefore eight
sets of bar examination questions, and multiplying these eight sets of questions by
nine hundred candidates, gives a total of seven thousand two hundred (7,200)
examination papers involved, in the hand of eight different examiners. The
examination books or papers bear no names or identifications of their writers or
owners and said ownership and identification will not be known until the books or
papers are all corrected and graded. Without definite assurance based on reliable
witnesses under oath that the alleged anomaly had actually been committed,
evidence on the identity of the persons in possession of the alleged copies of
questions prematurely released or illegally obtained and made use of, the law
subjects or subjects involved, the university from which said persons come, this Court
does not feel capable of or warranted in taking any step, such as blindly and
desperately revising each and every one of the 7,200 examination books with the
fond but forlorn hope of finding any similarity or identity in the answers of any group
of examinees and basing thereon any definite finding or conclusion. Apart from the
enormity of the task and its hopelessness, this Court may not and cannot base its
findings and conclusions, especially in any serious and delicate matter as is the
present, on that kind of evidence. Under these circumstances, this Court, for lack of
basis, data and information, is unable to conduct, nay, even start, an investigation;
and, unless and until the respondent herein reveals the identities of his informants,
and those informants and or others with facts and reliable evidence, aid and
cooperate with the Court in its endeavor to further examine and probe into the
charges contained in the news items, said charges are considered and held to be
without basis, proof or foundation.
When the Supreme Court decided to demand of the respondent herein that he reveal
the names of his informants, it was not impelled or motivated by mere idle curiosity.
It truly wanted information on which to start an investigation because it is vitally
interested in keeping the Bar Examinations clean and above board and specially, not
only to protect the members of the Bar and those aspiring for membership therein
and the public dealing with the members thereof and the Bar Examiners who
cooperate with and act as agents of this Court in preparing the examination questions
and correcting the examination papers, but also, as already stated, to keep the
confidence of the people in this High Tribunal as regards the discharge of its function
relative to the admission to the practice of law. These, it can only do by investigating
any Bar Examination anomaly, fixing responsibility and punishing those found guilty,
even annulling examinations already held, or else declaring the charges as not
proven, if, as a result of the investigation, it is found that there is insufficiency or lack
of evidence. In demanding from the respondent that he reveal the sources of his
information, this Court did not intend to punish those informants or hold them liable.
It merely wanted their help and cooperation. In this Court's endeavor to probe
thoroughly the anomaly, or irregularity allegedly committed, it was its intention not
only to adopt the necessary measures to punish the guilty parties, if the charges are
found to be true, but also even to annul the examinations themselves, in justice to
the innocent parties who had taken but did not pass the examinations. We say this
because in every examination, whether conducted by the Government or by a private
institution, certain standards are unconsciously adopted on which to base the passing
grade. For instance, if, as a result of the correction of many or all of the examination
papers, it is found that only very few have passed it, the examiner might reasonably
think that the questions he gave were unduly difficult or hard to understand, or too
long, as a result of which he may be more liberal and be more lenient and make
allowances. On the hand, if too many obtain passing grade, the examiner may think

29
that the examination questions were too easy and constitute an inadequate measure
of the legal knowledge and training required to be a lawyer, and so he may raise his
standard and become more strict in his correction of the papers and his appreciation
of the answers. So, in a case where examinees, especially if many, succeed in getting
hold of questions long before examinations day, and study and prepare the answers
to those questions, it may result that when the examiner finds that many of the
examinees have easily and correctly answered the questions, he may think that said
questions were too easy, raise the standard by being strict in his correction of the
papers, thereby giving a grade below passing to a number of examinees who
otherwise would have validly passed the examinations.
In conclusion, we find that the interest of the state in the present case demands that
the respondent Angel J. Parazo reveal the source or sources of his information which
formed the basis of his news items or story in the September 14, 1948 issue of
the Star Reporter, quoted at the beginning of his decision, and that, in refusing to
make the revelation which this Court required of him, he committed contempt of
Court. The respondent repeatedly stated during the investigation that he knew the
names and identities of the persons who furnished him the information. In other
words, he omitted and still refuses to do an act commanded by this Court which is yet
in his power to perform. (Rule 64, section 7, Rules of Court.)Ordinarily, in such cases,
he can and should be imprisoned indefinitely until he complied with the demand.
However, considering that case like the present are not common or frequent, in this
jurisdiction, and that there is no reason and immediate necessity for imposing a
heavy penalty, as may be done in other cases where it is advisable or necessary to
mete out severe penalties to meet a situation of an alarming number of cases of a
certain offense or a crime wave, and, considering further the youthful age of the
respondent, the majority of the members of this Court have decided to order, as it
hereby orders, his immediate arrest and confinement in jail for a period of one (1)
month, unless, before the expiration of that period he makes to this Court the
revelation demanded of him. So ordered.

SYLLABUS

1. LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW; PETITION FOR

ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND TO BE ALLOWED TO SIGN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS;
DENIAL OF PETITION; CASE AT BAR. The evidence supports the charge of
unauthorized practice of law. He called himself "attorney" knowing fully well that he
was not yet admitted to the Bar. Oppositors evidence sufficiently shows that
respondent had held himself out as an "attorney" in the agrarian, civil and criminal
cases mentioned by said oppositors. Even if respondent appeared merely in
collaboration with Atty. Senen Angeles in the several cases, that collaboration could
only have been ostensibly as a lawyer. It may be that in the Court of a municipality,
even non-lawyers may appear (Sec. 34, Rule 138, Rules of Court). If respondent had
so manifested, no one could have challenged him. What he did, however, was to hold
himself out as a lawyer, and even to write the Station Commander of Roxas,
complaining of harassment to "our clients," when he could not but have known that
he could not yet engage in the practice of law. His argument that the term "client" is
a "dependent or person under the protection of another and not a person who
engages in the profession" is puerile.
2. ID.; ID., ID.; DEFENSE THAT THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS DOES NOT APPLY
TO PETITIONER; EVIDENCE OF UNFITNESS TO BE ADMITTED TO THE PROFESSION.
Respondents additional defense that the code of professional ethics does not apply
to him as he is not yet a member of the Bar proves him unfit to be admitted to the
profession that exacts the highest ethical conduct of all its members, and good moral
character even for applicants for admission to the Bar. He could at least have shown
his fitness for admission by showing adherence to and observance of the standards of
conduct required by all who aspire to profess the law. Accordingly, the petition of
Nicolas El. Sabandal to be allowed to take the oath as member of the Philippine Bar
and to sign the Roll of Attorneys in accordance with Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is
hereby denied.

Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, and Tuason, JJ., concur.
RESOLUTION
[B.M. No. 44. November 29, 1983.]

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

EUFROSINA YAP TAN, Complainant, v. NICOLAS EL. SABANDAL, Respondent.

[B.M. No. 59. November 29, 1983.]
BENJAMIN CABIGON, Complainant, v. NICOLAS EL. SABANDAL, Respondent.
[B.M. No. 624. November 29, 1983.]
CORNELIO AGNIS and DIOMEDES D. AGNIS, Complainants, v. NICOLAS EL.
SABANDAL,Respondent.
Nelbert T. Poculan for respondent Sabandal in BM 59.
Alberto Concha for oppositors in BM 44.

At issue in the above-entitled consolidated cases is the petition of respondent Nicolas

El. Sabandal, a successful Bar examinee in 1978, to be admitted to the Philippine Bar
and to be allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys.
Complainants-oppositors, namely, Eufrosina Y. Tan (Bar Matter No. 44, Eufrosina Y. Tan
v. Nicolas E. Sabandal); Benjamin Cabigon (Bar Matter No. 591, Benjamin Cabigon v.
Nicolas E. Sabandal); and Cornelio Agnis, Et. Al. (SBC-624, Cornelio Agnis, Et. Al. v.
Nicolas E. Sabandal), have opposed the petition. They have charged respondent with:
illegal practice of law for accepting clients and for his appearances as a lawyer even
if he has not yet been admitted to the Bar; dishonesty, for filling up daily time records
as an Investigator of the Bureau of Lands during those days that he appeared as
counsel; falsification of public documents; gross dishonesty in public service; and
violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

30
The above-entitled cases, upon respondents Motion, were ordered consolidated in
the Resolution of the Court dated November 12, 1982, and were referred to the Office
of the Chief Attorney for investigation, report and recommendation.
At the hearings conducted on March 23, 24 and 25, 1983, only complainantsoppositors Eufrosina Y. Tan and Benjamin Cabigon, complainants in Bar Matters 44
and 59, respectively, appeared with their respective counsel and presented their
evidence, oral and documentary. The other complainants-oppositors, namely,
Diomedes D. Agnis, Dr. Gabriel Catane, Hedy Catane, Antonio Agnis and Fe E. Agnis,
complainants in SBC-624, failed to appear at the hearings despite several notices
sent to them by registered mail at their addresses of record. Cornelio Agnis had died
in the meantime.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
Respondent Nicolas El. Sabandal waived his right to attend the investigations for
reasons of financial constraints and his belief that the evidence he had already
submitted together with his pleadings are sufficient to prove his case so that he felt it
unnecessary to submit additional evidence.
In support of her charge of deception by appearing as counsel and accepting clients,
Eufrosina Yap Tan, in Bar Matter No. 44, testified on and submitted the following
documentary evidence: (1) photostatic copies of transcripts of stenographic notes of
(a) the hearing in CAR Case No. 347 entitled Eufrosina Y. Tan v. Spouses Daniel Iman
and Rosa Carreon, et als., before the Court of Agrarian Relations, XVI Regional
District, Branch III, on June 23, 1981, wherein respondent manifested "Atty. Nicolas
Sabandal, appearing for the defendants, Your Honor" and alleged that Atty. Senen
Angeles, counsel of record, was sick (Exhibits "A" and "A-1"); (b) the hearings in Civil
Case No. 98 entitled Benjamin Cabigon, Et. Al. v. Florentina Buntoran, Et Al., for
Forcible Entry and Damages, before the Municipal Court of Roxas, Zamboanga del
Norte, on September 23, 1980, wherein one of the appearances recorded was that of
"Atty. Nicolas Sabandal: For the defendants", and where respondent manifested "Your
Honor please, appearing for the defendants in collaboration with Atty. Angeles"
(Exhibits "H", "H-1" and "H-3"), and on December 16, 1980 when respondent made a
manifestation for the defendants (Exhibits "I" and "I-2"); (2) xerox copy of a letter
dated June 21, 1981 written by respondent to the Station Commander of Rizal,
Zamboanga del Norte, Obdulio Villanueva, in which respondent wrote in part: "we are
informed that your office is being used by Mrs. Tan to harass our clients . . ." (Exhibits
"B and "B-1"); and (3) copy of the Order of Judge Nicanor M. Ilicito, Jr., in CAR Case
No. 326, entitled Sps. Daniel and Rosk Iman v. Eufrosina Yap Tan, stating in part that
"plaintiffs, through Atty. Nicolas Sabandal, informed the Court that plaintiffs counsel
on record, Atty. Cyril Ruiz, is in bed and could not come in todays hearing" (Exhibits
"G" and "G-1").
On the same issue, in Bar Matter No. 59, complainant Benjamin Cabigon testified on
and presented the following exhibits: (1) the appearance of respondent in Civil Case
No. 98, the Forcible Entry case entitled Cabigon v. Bonturan before the Municipal
Court of Roxas (Exhibit "B"), already mentioned by Eufrosina Tan in Bar Matter No. 44;
(2) a Certification by the Court Clerk, Interpreter I, of the Municipal Court of Roxas,
Zamboanga del Norte, that respondent had appeared before said Court on October 1,
1981 in Criminal Cases Nos. 606, 607, and 622; on October 16, 1981 and August 12,
1981 in Criminal Case No. 622; and on July 29, 1981 in Criminal Case No. 667 (Exhibit
"A"); (3) the preliminary investigation in Criminal Case No. 667 (People v. Florentina
Bonturan, et als.) for Qualified Theft of Forest Products wherein Felipe Inggo testified
that respondent was the lawyer of the Bonturans (Exhibit "D-3"), while accused
Bernardo Gatina declared that respondent was his lawyer (Exhibits "D-6" and "D-7");
so also with the accused, Antonio Ganuran, who gave the same declaration and

added that he used to pay respondent and Atty. Angeles for handling his cases
(Exhibits "D-8" and "D-9").
To prove her other charges as to the unfitness of respondent to be a member of the
Bar, Eufrosina Tan exhibited a Warrant of Arrest against respondent in Criminal Case
No. 667 entitled People v. Florentina Buntoran, Et. Al. for the crime of Qualified Theft
of Forest Products for having allegedly ordered the felling and sawing of a dao tree
(Exhibit "E"), and the Amended Complaint in the same case including respondent
among the accused (Exhibits "F" and "F-1"); and the administrative charge against
respondent in the Bureau of Lands and before the Tanod-bayan for falsification of
public documents.
For his part, Benjamin Cabigon (in Bar Matter No. 59) also presented a transcript of
proceedings during the preliminary investigation on July 6, 1981 in the same Criminal
Case No. 667 (People v. Florentina Buntoran, Et. Al.) before the Municipal Court for
Qualified Theft of Forest Products wherein the defense of three of the accused was
that it was respondent who had ordered the cutting of the dao tree (Exhibits "D-2",
"D-4" and "D-5").chanrobles law library : red
In his defense, respondent maintained that the charges against him were "baseless
and mere products of oppositors bedevilled mind, for the truth being that petitioners
admission to the Philippine Bar is a sharp thorn in the throat of oppositor Eufrosina
Tan, who had been waging a campaign of ejectment against her tenant-farmers some
of whom are relatives and friends of petitioners" ; and a scheme by Cabigon "to stifle
anybody who extends assistance to his opponents and to press the Subano settlers of
Gusa, Roxas, Zamboanga del Norte, to give up their ancestral lands to Cabigon" ; that
he was merely assisting his parents-in-law, Daniel Iman and Rosa Carreon, in CAR
cases Nos. 347 and 326 as allowed under Sec. 14(k) of PD 946, and that it was the
stenographer who had inadvertently entered his name as "Atty. Sabandal" in those
cases; that being an employee of the Bureau of Lands does not bar him from
attending to personal cases applying by analogy section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court, nor does he need any authority to appear from said Bureau since the cases are
not work connected; that insofar as Criminal Cases Nos. 606, 607 and 622 of the
Municipal Court of Roxas are concerned, it was Atty. Senen O. Angeles who was the
counsel of record as shown by the Notice of Hearing (Annex "3", Amended Comment);
that on the dates that those cases were set on hearing, he was on leave as shown by
a Certification of the District Land Officer (Annex "9", Amended Comment); that in
appearing in those cases he was merely helping distressed friends and relatives; that
if he had absented himself from office it was to attend to his personal needs and
procure materials for the nipa house that he was building and not to attend to the
case of Lito Dandoy, one of the accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 606 and 607; that the
term "client" should be construed as a "dependent or person under the protection of
another and not a person who engages in the profession" ; and that the Code of
Ethics does not apply to him but only to members of the Bar.
As his documentary evidence, respondent submitted: (1) a photostatic copy of a
subpoena for the first day of trial in Criminal Cases Nos. 606, 607 and 622 issued by
the Municipal Court of Roxas, Zamboanga del Norte, addressed to Atty. Senen O.
Angeles, Dipolog City and Atty. Benedicto O. Cainta, Dipolog City, dated September 3,
1980, to show that they, not respondent, were the counsel of record (Annex "3",
Amended Comment); (2) Certification from the Clerk of Court of the Municipal Court
of Roxas that the dates of respondents appearance in Criminal Cases Nos. 606, 607
and 622 was October 1, 1980 and not 1981; and in Criminal Case No. 622, the date
was October 16, 1980 and not October 16, 1981 (Annex "1", Comment); (3) a
certification by the District Lands Officer, Benjamin Cabading, of the District Land

31
Office No. IX-8, Bureau of Lands, Dipolog City, Zamboanga del Norte on the leaves of
absences of respondent on October 1, 1980, October 16, 1980 July 29, 1981 and
August 12, 1981 (Annex "3", Comment), together with Civil Service Form No. 48
(Annexes "6", "7", and "8", Amended Comment) wherein he recorded his leaves of
absences to prove that he applied for leave whenever he appeared either for a friend
or his parents-in-law, and to disprove dishonesty (Annex "3", Comment); (4) duplicate
copies of the reinvestigation report (Annex "A") and the Amended Information (Annex
"B") filed by Second Assistant Provincial Fiscal Rodolfo T. Mata, in the Court of First
Instance, 16th Judicial District, Dipolog City in Criminal Case No. 2734 for Qualified
Theft of Forest Products wherefrom respondents name was dropped as one of the
accused on the ground that his inclusion was based on hearsay evidence (Annex "A",
Motion to Submit Additional Counter Evidence); as well as the Order of the Court
dropping him from the Information (Annex "C", ibid.); (5) the dismissal of the charge
against him by the Director of Lands in Dagpin v. Sabandal, Et. Al. (Annex "1",
petitioners Motion to Dismiss); (6) the dismissal of the charge against him for
falsification of public document by the Tanodbayan (Annex "1", petitioners
Manifestation dated February 9, 1981; Annex "2", Reply); (7) Affidavit of Atty. Nelbert
T. Poculan, who had helped respondent prepare his original Comment, denying the
truth of the statement in the Comment that "respondent absented himself from his
work and appeared to protect the rights of Dandoy" alleging that respondents
purpose in absenting himself was "to procure materials for his nipa residence" (Annex
"1", Amended Comment); (8) Affidavit of Atty. Senen O. Angeles wherein Atty. Angeles
declared that he was the counsel of record in Criminal Cases Nos. 606, 607 and 622,
not the respondent who merely accompanied accused Lito Dandoy in Criminal Case
622 to the Court (Annex "4", Amended Comment); (9) an Affidavit of Lito Dandoy, one
of the accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 606 and 607 for Qualified Theft of Coconuts,
and the accused in Criminal Case No. 622 for Slight Physical Injuries, to the effect
that respondent was his intimate friend to whom he turned for help when a Warrant
of Arrest was issued against him; that it was upon his insistence that respondent
accompanied him to the Municipal Court of Roxas and that he gave no compensation,
in cash or kind, to respondent for the latters help (Annex "5", Amended
Comment).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

complaining of harassment to "our clients", when he could not but have known that
he could not yet engage in the practice of law. His argument that the term "client" is
a "dependent or person under the protection of another and not a person who
engages in the profession" is puerile.
Respondents additional defense that the code of professional ethics does not apply
to him as he is not yet a member of the Bar proves him unfit to be admitted to the
profession that exacts the highest ethical conduct of all its members, and good moral
character even for applicants for admission to the Bar. He could at least have shown
his fitness for admission by showing adherence to and observance of the standards of
conduct required by all who aspire to profess the law.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition of Nicolas El. Sabandal to be allowed to take the oath as
member of the Philippine Bar and to sign the Roll of Attorneys in accordance with
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is hereby denied.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
For failure of complainants-oppositors, namely, Diomedes D. Agnis, Dr. Gabriel
Catane, Hedy Catane, Antonio Agnis and Fe E. Agnis in SBC-624 to appear before the
Investigator of this Court, their oppositions to the petition of Nicolas El. Sabandal to
be admitted to the Philippine Bar and to be allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys are
hereby dismissed, with prejudice.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, Makasiar, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro, Plana, Escolin, Relova and
Gutierrez, Jr.,JJ., concur.
Fernando, C.J. and Aquino, J., took no part.
Concepcion, Jr., J., I reserve my vote.

From the array of evidence presented by the parties, it is evident that the charges of
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, gross dishonesty in public
service and falsification of public documents, have not been substantiated.
However, the evidence supports the charge of unauthorized practice of law. While
respondents infraction may be mitigated in that he appeared for his in-laws in CAR
Cases Nos. 347 and 326 where they were parties, it is clear from the proceedings in
CAR Case No. 347 that he clarified his position only after the opposing counsel had
objected to his appearance. Besides, he specifically manifested "Atty. Nicolas
Sabandal, appearing for the defendants, Your Honor" (Exhibit "A-1"). He called himself
"attorney" knowing full well that he was not yet admitted to the Bar. Oppositors
evidence sufficiently shows that respondent had held himself out as an "attorney" in
the agrarian, civil and criminal cases mentioned by said oppositors. Respondent
cannot shift the blame on the stenographer, for he could have easily asked for
rectification. Even if respondent appeared merely in collaboration with Atty. Senen
Angeles in the several cases, that collaboration could only have been ostensibly as a
lawyer. Oppositors had also presented evidence of proceedings wherein witnesses
testified as to respondents being their lawyer and their compensating him for his
services (Exhibits "D-8" and "D-9"). It may be that in the Court of a municipality, even
non-lawyers may appear (Sec. 34, Rule 138, Rules of Court). If respondent had so
manifested, no one could have challenged him. What he did, however, was to hold
himself out as a lawyer, and even to write the Station Commander of Roxas,

A. M. No. 2104 August 24, 1989

NARCISO MELENDREZ and ERLINDA DALMAN, complainants,
vs.ATTY. REYNERIO I. DECENA, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
In a sworn complaint 1 dated 25 September 1979, the spouses Erlinda Dalman and
Narciso Melendrez charged Reynerio I. Decena, a member of the Philippine Bar, with
malpractice and breach of trust. The complainant spouses alleged, among others,
that respondent had, by means of fraud and deceit, taken advantage of their
precarious financial situation and his knowledge of the law to their prejudice,

32
succeeded in divesting them of their only residential lot in Pagadian City; that
respondent, who was their counsel in an estafa case against one Reynaldo Pineda,
had compromised that case without their authority.
In his answer dated 18 March 1980, respondent denied all the charges levelled
against him and prayed for the dismissal of the complaint.
By resolution dated 14 April 1980, the administrative complaint was referred to the
Office of the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation.
Accordingly, the Solicitor General forthwith deputized the City Fiscal of Pagadian City,
Jorge T. Almonte, to conduct the necessary investigation, with instructions to submit
thereafter this report and recommendation thereon. Fiscal Almonte held several
hearings on the administrative case until 15 July 1982, when he requested the
Solicitor General to release him from the duty of investigating the case.
On 10 September 1982, the Solicitor General granted Fiscal Almonte's request and in
his stead appointed the Provincial Fiscal of Zamboanga del Sur, Pedro S. Jamero, who
resumed hearings on 15 June 1983.
Respondent filed with this Court on 9 June 1987, a motion seeking to inhibit Fiscal
Jamero from hearing the case followed by an urgent motion for indefinite
postponement of the investigation. Both motions were denied by the Court in a
Resolution dated 21 September 1987 with instructions to the Solicitor General to
complete the investigation of the administrative case and to render his report and
recommendation thereon within thirty (30) days from notice.
On 19 July 1988, the Solicitor General submitted his Report and
Recommendation 2 dated 21 June 1988. In as Report, after setting out the facts and
proceedings held in the present case, the Solicitor General presented the following:
FINDINGS
Complainants allege that on August 5, 1975, they obtained from
respondent a loan of P 4,000.00. This loan was secured by a real
estate mortgage (Annex C, Complainants' Complaint, p. 16,
records).lwph1.t In the said Real Estate Mortgage document,
however, it was made to appear that the amount borrowed by
complainants was P5,000.00. Confronted by this discrepancy,
respondent assured complainants that said document was a mere
formality, and upon such assurance, complainants signed the same.
The document was brought by complainant Narciso Melendres to a
Notary Public for notarization. After the same was notarized, he
gave the document to respondent. Despite the assurance,
respondent exacted from complainants P500.00 a month as
payment for what is beyond dispute usurious interest on the
P5,000.00 loan. Complainants religiously paid the obviously
usurious interest for three months: September, October and
November, 1975. Then they stopped paying due to financial
reverses. In view of their failure to pay said amounts as interest,
respondent prepared a new document on May 7, 1976, a Real

Estate Mortgage (Annex D, Complaint, p. 18, records) over the

same lot 3125-C, replacing the former real estate mortgage dated
August 5, 1975, but this time the sum indicated in said new
contract of mortgage is P 10,000.00, purportedly with interest at
19% per annum. In this new Real Estate Mortgage, a special power
of attorney in favor of respondent was inserted, authorizing him to
sell the mortgaged property at public auction in the event
complainants fail to pay their obligation on or before May 30, 1976.
Without explaining the provisions of the new contract to
complainants, respondent insisted that complainants sign the
same, again upon the assurance that the document was a mere
formality. Unsuspecting of the motive of respondent, complainants
signed the document. Complainants Narciso Melendres again
brought the same document to a Notary Public for notarization.
After the document was notarized, he brought the same to
respondent without getting a copy of it.
Complainants, relying on the assurance of the respondent that the
second Real Estate Mortgage was but a formality, neither bothered
to ask from respondent the status of their lot nor tried to pay their
obligation. For their failure to pay the obligation, the respondent on
October 12, 1976, applied for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the
second real estate mortgage (Exhibit 16, Respondent's Position
Paper). All the requirements of Act No. 3135, as amended, re
extrajudicial sale of mortgage were ostensibly complied with by
respondent. Hence, finally, title was transferred to him, and on June
20, 1979, respondent sold the involved property to Trinidad Ylanan
for P12,000.00.
When informed of the above by one Salud Australlado on the first
week of March 1979 (see Sworn Statement of complainant Narciso
Melendres, p. 6, Folder No. 2 of case), and not having known the
legal implications of the provisions of the second Real Estate
Mortgage which they had executed, complainants could not believe
that title to their lot had already been transferred to respondent
and that respondent had already sold the same to a third person.
Upon learning of the sale in March, 1979, complainants tried to
raise the amount of P10,000.00 and went to respondent's house on
May 30, 1979 to pay their obligation, hoping that they could
redeem their property, although three years had already lapsed
from the date of the mortgage.
Respondent did not accept the proffered P10,000.00, but instead
gave complainants a sheet of paper (Annex B, Complainants'
Position Paper), which indicated that the total indebtedness had
soared to P20,400.00. The computation was made in respondent's
own handwriting. Complainants went home with shattered hopes
and with grief in their hearts. Hence, the instant competent for
disbarment against respondent filed on October 5, 1979.
Respondent DENIES all the allegations of complainants. He
maintains that what appears on the two documents allegedly

33
executed by complainants, i.e., that they obtained a loan of
P5,000.00 on August 5, 1975 and another P10,000.00 on May
7,1976, is allegedly the truth, and claims that he in truth delivered
the alleged amount of P5,000.00 to complainants and not
P4,000.00. With respect to the second loan, respondent claims that
he delivered to complainants P8,000.00, plus the P2,000.00 loan
previously extended [to] complainants [by] one Regino Villanueva,
which loan had been indorsed to respondent for collection, thus
making a total of P10,000.00, as appearing on said document.
Respondent denies that he exacted usurious interest of 10% a
month or P500.00 from complainants. He asserts that the fact that
complainants were able to secure a loan from the Insular Bank of
Asia and America (IBAA) only proves the truth of his allegation that
the title of the property, at the time complainants obtained a loan
from IBAA on April 1976, was clear of any encumbrance, since
complainants had already paid the original loan of P5,000.00
obtained from respondent; that complainants knew fully well all the
conditions of said mortgage; and that his acquisition of the property
in question was in accordance with their contract and the law on
the matter. Thus, he denies that he has violated any right of the
complainants.
After weighing the evidence of both complainants and respondent,
we find against respondent.
While complainants are correct in their claim that they actually
obtained an actual cash of P4,000.00, they are only partly correct in
the claim that out of the P10,000.00 appearing in the second Real
Estate Mortgage, P6,000.00 was applied to interest considering that
not all the P6,000.00 but only P4,000.00 was applied to interest,
computed as follows: the first loan of P5,000.00 was supposedly
due on August 31, 1975. Complainants paid 10% monthly interest
or P500.00 on September 30, 1975, October 31, 1975 and
November 30, 1975. Consequently, beginning December 31, 1975
up to May 31, 1976 (the date of the execution of the second Real
Estate Mortgage) a total of six (6) months lapsed. Six (6) months at
P500.00 equals P 3,000.00, which amount plus the P2,000.00
complainants' loan to one Engr. Villanueva (indorsed to respondent
for collection) totals P5,000.00. Adding this amount to the previous
P5,000.00 indicated loan secured by the first mortgage results in
P10,000.00, the amount appearing in the second Real Estate
Mortgage. Section 7, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 7. Evidence of written agreements. When the terms of an
agreement have been reduced to writing, it is to be considered as
complaining all such terms, and, therefore, there can be, as
between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of
the terms of the agreement other than the contents of the writing,
except in the following cases:
(a) Where a mistake or imperfection of the writing, or its failure to
express the true intent and agreement of the parties, or the validity
of the agreement is put in issue by the pleadings;

(b) Where there is an intrinsic ambiguity in the writing. The term

"agreement" includes wills.
There is no dispute that the two documents denominated Real
Estate Mortgages covering the supposed original loan of P5,000.00
and the inflated P10,000.00, respectively, were voluntarily signed
by the complainants. The general rule is that when the parties have
reduced their agreement to writing, it is presumed that they have
made the writing the only repository and memorial of the truth, and
whatever is not found in the writing must be understood to have
been waived and abandoned.
However, the rule is not absolute as it admits of some exceptions,
as aforequoted. One of the exceptions, that is, failure to express the
true intent and agreement of the parties, applies in this case. From
the facts obtaining in the case, it is clear that the complainants
were induced to sign the Real Estate Mortgage documents by the
false and fraudulent representations of respondent that each of the
successive documents was a are formality.
While it may be true that complainants are not at all illiterate,
respondent, being a lawyer, should have at least explained to
complainants the legal implications of the provisions of the real
estate mortgage, particularly the provision appointing him as the
complainants' attorney-in-fact in the event of default in payments
on the part of complainants. While it may be conceded that it is
presumed that in practice the notary public apprises complainants
of the legal implications of the contract, it is of common knowledge
that most notaries public do not go through the desired practice.
Respondent at least could have informed the complainants by
sending a demand letter to them to pay their obligation as
otherwise he would proceed to sell the lot at public auction as per
their contract. This respondent failed to do, despite the fact that he
knew fully wen that complainants were trying their best to raise
money to be able to pay their obligation to him, as shown by the
loan obtained by complainants from the IBAA on April 8, 1976. In
this connection, it may be stated that complainants, per advice of
respondent himself, returned the proceeds of the IBAA loan to the
bank immediately on April 30, 1976, considering that the net
proceeds of the loan from said bank was only P4,300.00 and not
enough to pay the indicated loan from respondent of P5,000.00,
which per computation of respondent would already have earned
interest of P2,500.00 for five (5) months (December 1975 to April,
1976).
Respondent claims that complainants had paid him the original loan
of P5,000.00, and that this was the reason why complainants were
able to mortgage the lot to the bank free from any encumbrance.
This claim is incorrect. The reason why the title (T-2684) was free
from any encumbrance was simply because of the fact that the first
Real Estate Mortgage for the indicated loan of P5,000.00 (the actual
amount was only P 4,000.00) had not been annotated at the back
of the title (see Annex B, p. 14, rec.).

34
Respondent also denies that complainants offered to him the
amount of Pl0,000. 00 as payment of the loan, alleging that if the
offer were true, he could have readily accepted the same since he
sold the lot for almost the same amount, for only P12,000.00, a
difference of a few thousand pesos. Respondent's denial is
spacious.
Indeed, complainants made the offer, but respondent refused the
same for the simple reason that the offer was made on May
30,1979, three (3) years after the execution of the mortgage on
May 31, 1976. With its lapse of time, respondent demanded
obviously the payment of the accumulated substantial interest for
three years, as shown by his own computation in as own
handwriting on a sheet of paper (Annex C, Complainants' Position
Paper, Folder No. 2).lwph1.t
In view of all the foregoing, the observation made by the Hearing
Officer is worth quoting:
In the humble opinion of the undersigned the pivotal question with
respect to this particular charge is whose version is to be believed.
Is it the version of the complainants or the version of the
respondent.
In resolving this issue the possible motive on the part of the
complainants in filing the present complaint against the respondent
must be carefully examined and considered. At the beginning there
was a harmonious relationship between the complainants and the
respondent so much so that respondent was even engaged as
counsel of the complainants and it is but human nature that when
respondent extended a loan to the complainants the latter would be
grateful to the former. However, in the case at bar, complainants
filed a complaint against the respondent in spite of the great
disparity between the status of the complainants and the
respondent. Admittedly, respondent is in a better position
financially, socially and intellectually. To the mind of the
undersigned, complainants were only compelled to file the above
entitled complaint against the respondent because they felt that
they are so aggrieved of what the respondent has done to them. It
is for this reason therefore that the undersigned is inclined to
believe the version of the complainants rather than of the
respondent. In addition thereto, the respondent as a lawyer could
really see to it that the transaction between the complainants and
himself on papers appear legal and in order. Besides, there is ample
evidence in the records of its case that respondent is actually
engaged in lending money at least in a limited way and that the
interest at the rate of ten per cent a month is but common among
money lenders during the time of the transactions in question'
Going now into the second charge, complainants alleged that
respondent, who was their counsel (private prosecutor) in Criminal
Case No. 734, for estafa, against accused Reynaldo Pineda,
compromised the case with the accused without their consent and

received the amount of P500.00 as advance payment for the

amicable settlement, without however, giving to the complainants
the Id amount nor informing them of said settlement and payment.
Again, respondent denies the allegation and claims that the
amicable settlement was with the consent of complainant wife
Erlinda Dalman Melendre[z].
We are inclined to believe the version of the complainants.
It is admitted that complainants were not interested in putting the
accused Reynaldo Pineda to jail but rather in merely recovering
their money of P2,000.00. At this stage, relationship between
complainants and respondent was not yet strained, and
respondent, as counsel of the complainants in this case, knew that
complainants were merely interested in said recovery. Knowing this,
respondent on his own volition talked to accused and tried to settle
the case amicably for P2,000.00. He accepted the amount of
P500.00 as advance payment, being then the only amount carried
by the accused Pineda. A receipt was signed by both respondent
and accused Pineda (Annex M, p. 34, record). However, respondent
did not inform complainants about this advance payment, perhaps
because he was still waiting for the completion of the payment of
P2,000.00 before turning over the whole amount to complainants.
At any rate, complainants saw accused Pineda give the
abovementioned P500.00 to respondent, but they were ashamed
then to ask directly of respondent what the money was all about.
On June 27, 1979, barely a month after May 30, 1979, when the
complainants had already lost their trust and respect and/or
confidence in respondent upon knowing what happened to their lot
and, more so, upon respondent's refusal to accept the Pl0,000.00
offered by complainants to redeem the same, Narciso Melendre[z]
saw the accused Pineda on his way home and confronted him on
the P500.00 that had been given to respondent. Accused then
showed complainant Melendres the receipt (Annex M, Id.) showing
that the P500.00 was an advance payment for the supposed
settlement/dismissal of the case filed by complainants against him.
Sensing or feeling that respondent was fooling them, complainants
then filed a motion before the court which was trying the criminal
case and relieved respondent as their counsel.
The Investigating Fiscal, who heard the case and saw the demeanor
of the witnesses in testifying, had this to say:
With respect to the second charge, the fact that respondent
received P500.00 from Reynaldo Pineda is duly established. Both
the complainants and the respondent agreed that the said amount
was given to the respondent in connection with a criminal case

35
wherein the complainants were the private offended parties: that
Reynaldo Pineda is the accused and that the respondent is the
private prosecutor of the said case. The pivotal issue in this
particular charge is whether the respondent received the amount of
P500.00 from Reynaldo Pineda as an advance payment of an
amicable settlement entered into by the complainants and the
accused or the respondent received said amount from the accused
without the knowledge and consent of the complainants. If it is true
as alleged by the respondent that he only received it for and in
behalf of the complainants as advance payment of an amicable
settlement why is it that the same was questioned by the
complainants? Why is it that it was not the complainants who
signed the receipt for the said amount? How come that as soon as
complainants knew that the said amount was given to the
respondent, the former filed a motion in court to relieve respondent
as their counsel on the ground that they have lost faith and
confidence on him? If it is really true that complainants have
knowledge and have consented to this amicable settlement they
should be grateful to the efforts of their private prosecutor yet the
fact is that they resented the same and went to the extent of
disqualifying the respondent as their private prosecutor. Reynaldo
Pineda himself executed an affidavit belying the claim of the
respondent.'
Clearly, the complained acts as described and levelled against
respondent Decena are contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or
good morals for which he may be suspended. The moral turpitude
for which an attorney may be disbarred may consist of misconduct
in either his professional or non- professional attitude (Royong v.
Oblena, 7 SCRA 859). The complained acts of respondent imply
something immoral in themselves, regardless of the fact whether
they are punishable by law. The doing of the act itself, and not its
prohibition by statute, fixes the moral turpitude (Bartos vs. U.S.
Dist. Court for District of Nebraska C.C.C. Neb] 19 F [2d] 722).
A parting comment.
All the above is not to say that complainants themselves are
faultless.
Complainants should likewise be blamed for trusting the respondent
too much. They did not bother to keep a copy of the documents
they executed and considering that they admitted they did not
understand the contents of the documents, they did not bother to
have them explained by another lawyer or by any knowledgeable
person in their locality. Likewise, for a period of three years, they
did not bother to ask for respondent the status of their lot and/or
their obligation to him. Their complacency or apathy amounting
almost to negligence contributed to the expedient loss of their
property thru the legal manuevers employed by respondent. Hence,
respondent's liability merits mitigation. (Emphasis supplied)
and made the following recommendation:

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that Atty. Reynerio I.

Decena be suspended from the practice of law for a period of five
(5) years. 3
The Office of the Solicitor General, through Fiscals Almonte and Jamero, held several
hearings during the investigation of the present administrative case: City Fiscal Jorge
T. Almonte was able to hold six (6) actual hearings out of twenty-five (25)
resettings 4 While only five (5) actual hearings, out of forty (40) resettings 5 were held
under Provincial Fiscal Pedro S. Jamero. In those hearings, the complainants
presented a number of witnesses who, after their direct testimony, were crossexamined by the counsel for respondent; complainant Narciso Melendrez also
testified and was accordingly cross-examined. Considering the long delay incurred in
the investigation of the administrative case and having been pressed by the Solicitor
General immediately to complete the investigation, Fiscal Jamero posed a change of
procedure, from trial type proceedings to requiring the parties to submit their
respective position papers. The complainants immediately filed their position paper
which consisted of their separate sworn statements, (that of Narciso Melendrez was in
a question and answer form), their documentary exhibits and an affidavit of one
Jeorge G. Santos. Respondent also filed his counter-affidavit and affidavits of his
witnesses, with several annexes in support thereof In the healing of 28 October 1987,
which had been set for the cross examination of the complainants and their witnesses
by respondent, the complainants refused to submit themselves to cross-examination
on the ground that the order of the hearing officer dated 17 December 1986
declaring respondent's right of cross examination as having been waived, had
become final and executory. Respondent questions now the evidentiary value of the
complainants' position paper, not having passed through any cross-examination and
argues that the non-submission of the complainants and their witnesses to crossexamination constitutes a denial of his right to due process.
We do not think respondent's right to confront the complainants and their witnesses
against him has been violated, Respondent in fact cross-examined complainant
Narciso Melendrez and some of the witnesses which complainants had presented
earlier. As pointed out by the Solicitor General, the record of the proceedings shows
that respondent had all the opportunity to cross-examine the other witnesses of the
complainants (those whose affidavits were attached to complainants' position paper)
had he wanted to, but had forfeited such opportunity by asking for numerous
continuances which indicated a clear attempt on his part to delay the investigation
proceedings. Respondent had in fact requested a total of twenty three (23) resettings
during the investigation proceedings: he had eight (8) under Fiscal Almonte and
fifteen (15) under Fiscal Jamero. There were also instances where respondent asked
for postponement and at the same time reset the hearing to a specific date of his
choice on which neither he nor as counsel would appear. That attitude of respondent
eventually led the hearing officer to declare his (respondent's) right to cross-examine
the complainants and their witnesses as having been waived in his order of 17
December 1986. Respondent can not now claim that he had been deprived below of
the opportunity to confront the complainants and their witnesses.
After carefully going through the record of the proceedings as well as the evidence
presented by both parties, we agree with the findings and conclusions of the Solicitor
General.
The following acts of respondent:

36
1. making it appear on the 5 August 1975 real estate mortgage that
the amount loaned to complainants was P5,000.00 instead of
P4,000.00;
2. exacting grossly unreasonable and usurious interest;
3. making it appear in the second real estate mortgage of 7 May
1976 that the loan extended to complainants had escalated to
P10,000.00;
4. failing to inform complainants of the import of the real mortgage
documents and inducing them to sign those documents with
assurances that they were merely for purposes of "formality";
5. failing to demand or refraining from demanding payment from
complainants before effecting extrajudicial foreclosure of the
mortgaged property; and
6. failing to inform or refraining from informing complainants that
the real estate mortgage had already been foreclosed and that
complainants had a right to redeem the foreclosed property within
a certain period of time.
constitute deception and dishonesty and conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar.
We agree with the Solicitor General that the acts of respondent "imply something
immoral in themselves regardless of whether they are punishable by law" and that
these acts constitute moral turpitude, being "contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or
good morals." The standard required from members of the Bar is not, of course,
satisfied by conduct which merely avoids collision with our criminal law. Even so,
respondent's conduct, in fact, may be penalizable under at least one penal statute
the anti-usury law.
The second charge against respondent relates to acts done in his professional
capacity, that is, done at a time when he was counsel for the complainants in a
criminal case for estafa against accused Reynaldo Pineda. There are two (2) aspects
to this charge: the first is that respondent Decena effected a compromise agreement
concerning the civil liability of accused Reynaldo Pineda without the consent and
approval of the complainants; the second is that, having received the amount of
P500.00 as an advance payment on this "settlement," he failed to inform
complainants of that advance payment and moreover, did not turn over the P500.00
to the complainants. The facts show that respondent "settled" the estafa case
amicably for P2,000.00 without the knowledge and consent of complainants.
Respondent informed complainants of the amicable "settlement" and of the P500.00
advance payment only after petitioner Narciso Melendrez had confronted him about
these matters. And respondent never did turn over to complainants the P500.00.
Respondent is presumed to be aware of the rule that lawyers cannot "without special
authority, compromise their clients' litigation or receive anything in discharge of a
client's claim, but the full amount in cash. 6 Respondent's failure to turn over to
complainants the amount given by accused Pineda as partial "settlement" of the
estafa case underscores his lack of honesty and candor in dealing with his clients.

Generally, a lawyer should not be suspended or disbarred for misconduct committed

in his personal or non-professional capacity. Where however, misconduct outside his
professional dealings becomes so patent and so gross as to demonstrate moral
unfitness to remain in the legal profession, the Court must suspend or strike out the
lawyer's name from the Rollo of Attorneys. 7 The nature of the office of an attorney at
law requires that he shall be a person of good moral character. This qualification is
not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law; its continued
possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law, in the exercise of
privileges of members of the Bar. Gross misconduct on the part of a lawyer, although
not related to the discharge of professional duties as a member of the Bar, which puts
his moral character in serious doubt, renders him unfit to continue in the practice of
law. 8
In the instant case, the exploitative deception exercised by respondent attorney upon
the complainants in his private transactions with them, and the exacting of
unconscionable rates of interest, considered together with the acts of professional
misconduct committed by respondent attorney, compel this Court to the conviction
that he has lost that good moral character which is indispensable for continued
membership in the Bar.
WHEREFORE, respondent Reynerio I. Decena is hereby DISBARRED and his name
shall be stricken from the Rollo of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Resolution be
FURNISHED each to the Bar Confidant and spread on the personal records of
respondent attorney, and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
A.C. No. 6313

September 7, 2006

CATHERINE JOIE P. VITUG, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. DIOSDADO M. RONGCAL, respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
The allegations raised in this complaint for disbarment are more sordid, if not tawdry,
from the usual. As such, close scrutiny of these claims is called for. Disbarment and
suspension of a lawyer, being the most severe forms of disciplinary sanction, should
be imposed with great caution and only in those cases where the misconduct of the
lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar is established by clear,
convincing and satisfactory proof.1
Under consideration is the administrative complaint for disbarment filed by Catherine
Joie P. Vitug (complainant) against Atty. Diosdado M. Rongcal (respondent). A classic
case of "he said, she said," the parties' conflicting versions of the facts as culled from
the records are hereinafter presented.

37
Complainant narrates that she and respondent met sometime in December 2000
when she was looking for a lawyer to assist her in suing Arnulfo Aquino ("Aquino"),
the biological father of her minor daughter, for support. Her former classmate who
was then a Barangay Secretary referred her to respondent. After several meetings
with complainant, respondent sent a demand letter 2 in her behalf to Aquino wherein
he asked for the continuance of the monthly child support Aquino used to give, plus
no less than P300,000.00 for the surgical operation their daughter would need for her
congenital heart ailment.
At around this point, by complainant's own admission, she and respondent started
having a sexual relationship. She narrates that this twist in the events began after
respondent started calling on her shortly after he had sent the demand letter in her
behalf. Respondent allegedly started courting her, giving her financial aid. Soon he
had progressed to making sexual advances towards complainant, to the
accompaniment of sweet inducements such as the promise of a job, financial security
for her daughter, and his services as counsel for the prospective claim for support
against Aquino. Complainant acknowledges that she succumbed to these advances,
assured by respondent's claim that the lawyer was free to marry her, as his own
marriage had already been annulled.
On 9 February 2001, respondent allegedly convinced complainant to sign an Affidavit
of Disclaimer3 ("Affidavit") categorically stating that even as Aquino was denoted as
the father in the birth certificate4 of her daughter, he was, in truth, not the real father.
She was not allowed to read the contents of the Affidavit, she claims. Respondent
supposedly assured her that the document meant nothing, necessary as it was the
only way that Aquino would agree to give her daughter medical and educational
support. Respondent purportedly assured complainant that despite the Affidavit, she
could still pursue a case against Aquino in the future because the Affidavit is not a
public document. Because she completely trusted him at this point, she signed the
document "without even taking a glance at it."5
On 14 February 2001, respondent allegedly advised complainant that Aquino gave
him P150,000.00 cash andP58,000.00 in two (2) postdated checks to answer for the
medical expenses of her daughter. Instead of turning them over to her, respondent
handed her his personal check6 in the amount of P150,000.00 and promised to give
her the balance of P58,000.00 soon thereafter. However, sometime in April or May
2001, respondent informed her that he could not give her the said amount because
he used it for his political campaign as he was then running for the position of
Provincial Board Member of the 2nd District of Pampanga.
Complainant maintains that inspite of their sexual relationship and the fact that
respondent kept part of the money intended for her daughter, he still failed in his
promise to give her a job. Furthermore, he did not file the case against Aquino and
referred her instead to Atty. Federico S. Tolentino, Jr. ("Atty. Tolentino").
Sometime in 2002, assisted by Atty. Tolentino, complainant filed a criminal case for
child abuse as well as a civil case against Aquino. While the criminal case was
dismissed, the civil case was decided on 30 August 2004 by virtue of a compromise
agreement.7 It was only when said cases were filed that she finally understood the
import of the Affidavit.

Complainant avers that respondent failed to protect her interest when he personally
prepared the Affidavit and caused her to sign the same, which obviously worked to
her disadvantage. In making false promises that all her problems would be solved,
aggravated by his assurance that his marriage had already been annulled,
respondent allegedly deceived her into yielding to his sexual desires. Taking
advantage of the trust and confidence she had in him as her counsel and paramour,
her weak emotional state, and dire financial need at that time, respondent was able
to appropriate for himself money that rightfully belonged to her daughter. She argues
that respondent's aforementioned acts constitute a violation of his oath as a lawyer
as well as the Code of Professional Responsibility ("Code"), particularly Rule 1.01,
Rule 1.02, Rule 16.01, Rule 16.02, and Canon 7.8 Hence, she filed the instant
complaint9 dated 2 February 2004.
Expectedly, respondent presents a different version. According to him, complainant
needed a lawyer who would file the aforementioned action for support. Complainant's
former high school classmate Reinilda Bansil Morales, who was also his fellow
barangay official, referred her to him. He admits sending a demand letter to her
former lover, Aquino, to ask support for the child.10 Subsequently, he and Aquino
communicated through an emissary. He learned that because of Aquino's infidelity,
his relationship with his wife was strained so that in order to settle things the spouses
were willing to give complainant a lump sum provided she would execute an affidavit
to the effect that Aquino is not the father of her daughter.
Respondent relayed this proposal to complainant who asked for his advice. He then
advised her to study the proposal thoroughly and with a practical mindset. He also
explained to her the pros and cons of pursuing the case. After several days, she
requested that he negotiate for an out-of-court settlement of no less
thanP500,000.00. When Aquino rejected the amount, negotiations ensued until the
amount was lowered toP200,000.00. Aquino allegedly offered to issue four postdated
checks in equal amounts within four months. Complainant disagreed. Aquino then
proposed to rediscount the checks at an interest of 4% a month or a total
ofP12,000.00. The resulting amount was P188,000.00.
Complainant finally agreed to this arrangement and voluntarily signed the Affidavit
that respondent prepared, the same Affidavit adverted to by complainant. He denies
forcing her to sign the document and strongly refutes her allegation that she did not
know what the Affidavit was for and that she signed it without even reading it, as he
gave her the draft before the actual payment was made. He notes that complainant is
a college graduate and a former bank employee who speaks and understands
English. He likewise vehemently denies pocketingP58,000.00 of the settlement
proceeds. When complainant allegedly signed the Affidavit, the emissary handed to
her the sum of P150,000.00 in cash and she allegedly told respondent that he could
keep the remainingP38,000.00, not P58,000.00 as alleged in the complaint. Although
she did not say why, he assumed that it was for his attorney's fees.
As regards their illicit relationship, respondent admits of his sexual liaison with
complainant. He, however, denies luring her with sweet words and empty promises.
According to him, it was more of a "chemistry of (sic) two consensual (sic)
adults,"11 complainant then being in her thirties. He denies that he tricked her into
believing that his marriage was already annulled. Strangely, respondent devotes
considerable effort to demonstrate that complainant very well knew he was married
when they commenced what was to him, an extra-marital liaison. He points out that,
first, they had met through his colleague, Ms. Morales, a friend and former high

38
school classmate of hers. Second, they had allegedly first met at his residence where
she was actually introduced to his wife. Subsequently, complainant called his
residence several times and actually spoke to his wife, a circumstance so disturbing
to respondent that he had to beg complainant not to call him there. Third, he was the
Punong Barangay from 1994 to 2002, and was elected President of the Association of
Barangay Council ("ABC") and as such was an ex-officio member of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Guagua, Pampanga. He ran for the position of Provincial Board Member in
2001. Thus, he was known in his locality and it was impossible for complainant not to
have known of his marital status especially that she lived no more than three (3)
kilometers away from his house and even actively helped him in his campaign.
Respondent further alleges that while the demand for support from Aquino was being
worked out, complainant moved to a rented house in Olongapo City because a suitor
had promised her a job in the Subic Naval Base. But months passed and the promised
job never came so that she had to return to Lubao, Pampanga. As the money she
received from Aquino was about to be exhausted, she allegedly started to pester
respondent for financial assistance and urged him to file the Petition for Support
against Aquino. While respondent acceded to her pleas, he also advised her "to look
for the right man"12 and to stop depending on him for financial assistance. He also
informed her that he could not assist her in filing the case, as he was the one who
prepared and notarized the Affidavit. He, however, referred her to Atty. Tolentino.
In August 2002, respondent finally ended his relationship with complainant, but still
he agreed to give her monthly financial assistance of P6,000.00 for six (6) months.
Since then, they have ceased to meet and have communicated only through an
emissary or by cellphone. In 2003, complainant begged him to continue the
assistance until June when her alleged fianc from the United States would have
arrived. Respondent agreed. In July 2003, she again asked for financial assistance for
the last time, which he turned down. Since then he had stopped communicating to
her.
Sometime in January 2004, complainant allegedly went to see a friend of respondent.
She told him that she was in need of P5,000.00 for a sari-sari store she was putting
up and she wanted him to relay the message to respondent. According to this friend,
complainant showed him a prepared complaint against respondent that she would file
with the Supreme Court should the latter not accede to her request. Sensing that he
was being blackmailed, respondent ignored her demand. True enough, he alleges, she
filed the instant complaint.
On 21 July 2004, the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines ("IBP")
for investigation, report and recommendation.13 After the parties submitted their
respective position papers and supporting documents, the Investigating
Commissioner rendered his Report and Recommendation 14 dated 2 September 2005.
After presenting the parties' conflicting factual versions, the Investigating
Commissioner gave credence to that of complainant and concluded that respondent
clearly violated the Code, reporting in this wise, to wit:
Respondent, through the above mentioned acts, clearly showed that he is
wanting in good moral character, putting in doubt his professional reputation
as a member of the BAR and renders him unfit and unworthy of the
privileges which the law confers to him. From a lawyer, are (sic) expected
those qualities of truth-speaking, high sense of honor, full candor,
intellectual honesty and the strictest observance of fiduciary responsibility

all of which throughout the passage of time have been compendiously

described as MORAL CHARACTER.
Respondent, unfortunately took advantage and (sic) every opportunity to
entice complainant to his lascivious hungerness (sic). On several
occasions[,] respondent kept on calling complainant and dropped by her
house and gave P2,000.00 as aid while waiting allegedly for the reply of (sic)
their demand letter for support. It signals the numerous visits and regular
calls all because of [l]ewd design. He took advantage of her seeming
financial woes and emotional dependency.
xxxx
Without doubt, a violation of the high moral standards of the legal profession
justifies the impositions (sic) of the appropriate penalty, including
suspension and disbarment. x x x15
It was then recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for
six (6) months and that he be ordered to return to complainant the amount
of P58,000.00 within two months. The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved
the said Report and Recommendation in a Resolution16 dated 17 December 2005,
finding the same to be fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable
laws and rules, and "considering Respondent's obviously taking advantage of the
lawyer-client relationship and the financial and emotional problem of his client and
attempting to mislead the Commission,"17 respondent was meted out the penalty of
suspension for one (1) year with a stern warning that a repetition of similar acts will
merit severe sanctions. He was likewise ordered to return P58,000.00 to complainant.
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Set Case for
Clarificatory Questioning18 ("Motion") dated 9 March 2006 with the IBP and a Motion
to Reopen/Remand Case for Clarificatory Questioning dated 22 March 2006 with the
Supreme Court. He reiterates his own version of the facts, giving a more detailed
account of the events that transpired between him and complainant. Altogether, he
portrays complainant as a shrewd and manipulative woman who depends on men for
financial support and who would stop at nothing to get what she wants. Arguing that
the IBP based its Resolution solely on complainant's bare allegations that she failed to
prove by clear and convincing evidence, he posits the case should be re-opened for
clarificatory questioning in order to determine who between them is telling the truth.
In a Resolution19 dated 27 April 2006, the IBP denied the Motion on the ground that it
has no more jurisdiction over the case as the matter had already been endorsed to
the Supreme Court.
While we find respondent liable, we adjudicate the matter differently from what the
IBP has recommended.
On the charge of immorality, respondent does not deny that he had an extra-marital
affair with complainant, albeit brief and discreet, and which act is not "so corrupt and
false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high
degree"20 in order to merit disciplinary sanction. We disagree.

39
One of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an applicant must possess
good moral character. Said requirement persists as a continuing condition for the
enjoyment of the privilege of law practice, otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for
the revocation of such privilege.21 As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in
fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character
and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the
community.22 The Court has held that to justify suspension or disbarment the act
complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral.23 A grossly immoral act
is one that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or
disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree. 24 It is a willful, flagrant, or
shameless act that shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and
respectable members of the community.25
While it is has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of sexual relations
between two unmarried adults is not sufficient to warrant administrative sanction for
such illicit behavior,26 it is not so with respect to betrayals of the marital vow of
fidelity.27 Even if not all forms of extra-marital relations are punishable under penal
law, sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it
manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows
protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws. 28
By his own admission, respondent is obviously guilty of immorality in violation of Rule
1.01 of the Code which states that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct. The next question to consider is whether this act is
aggravated by his alleged deceitful conduct in luring complainant who was then in
low spirits and in dire financial need in order to satisfy his carnal desires. While the
IBP concluded the question in the affirmative, we find otherwise.
Complainant's allegations that she succumbed to respondent's sexual advances due
to his promises of financial security and because of her need for legal assistance in
filing a case against her former lover, are insufficient to conclude that complainant
deceived her into having sexual relations with her. Surely, an educated woman like
herself who was of sufficient age and discretion, being at that time in her thirties,
would not be easily fooled into sexual congress by promises of a job and of free legal
assistance, especially when there is no showing that she is suffering from any mental
or physical disability as to justify such recklessness and/or helplessness on her
part.29Respondent's numerous visits and regular calls to complainant do not
necessarily prove that he took advantage of her. At best, it proves that he courted her
despite being a married man, precisely the fact on which the finding of immorality is
rooted. Moreover, the circumstance that he gave her P2,000.00 as aid does not
induce belief that he fueled her financial dependence as she never denied pleading
with, if not badgering, him for financial support.
Neither does complainant's allegation that respondent lied to her about his marital
status inspire belief. We find credence in respondent's assertion that it was impossible
for her not to have known of his subsisting marriage. She herself admitted that they
were introduced by her friend and former classmate, Ms. Morales who was a fellow
barangay official of respondent. She admitted that she knew his residence phone
number and that she had called him there. She also knew that respondent is an
active barangay official who even ran as Provincial Board Member in 2001. Curiously,
she never refuted respondent's allegations that she had met and talked to his wife on
several occasions, that she lived near his residence, that she helped him in his
campaign, or that she knew a lot of his friends, so as not to have known of his marital

status. Considering that she previously had an affair with Aquino, who was also a
married man, it would be unnatural for her to have just plunged into a sexual
relationship with respondent whom she had known for only a short time without
verifying his background, if it were true that she preferred "to change [her] life for the
better,"30 as alleged in her complaint. We believe that her aforementioned allegations
of deceit were not established by clear preponderant evidence required in disbarment
cases.31 We are left with the most logical conclusion that she freely and wittingly
entered into an illicit and immoral relationship with respondent sans any
misrepresentation or deceit on his part.
Next, complainant charged respondent of taking advantage of his legal skills and
moral control over her to force her to sign the clearly disadvantageous Affidavit
without letting her read it and without explaining to her its repercussions. While
acting as her counsel, she alleged that he likewise acted as counsel for Aquino.
We find complainant's assertions dubious. She was clearly in need of financial support
from Aquino especially that her daughter was suffering from a heart ailment. We
cannot fathom how she could abandon all cares to respondent who she had met for
only a couple of months and thereby risk the welfare of her child by signing without
even reading a document she knew was related to the support case she intended to
file. The Affidavit consists of four short sentences contained in a single page. It is
unlikely she was not able to read it before she signed it.
Likewise obscure is her assertion that respondent did not fully explain to her the
contents of the Affidavit and the consequences of signing it. She alleged that
respondent even urged her "to use her head as Arnulfo Aquino will not give the
money for Alexandra's medical and educational support if she will not sign the said
Affidavit of Disclaimer."32 If her own allegation is to be believed, it shows that she was
aware of the on-going negotiation with Aquino for the settlement of her claim for
which the latter demanded the execution of the Affidavit. It also goes to show that
she was pondering on whether to sign the same. Furthermore, she does not deny
being a college graduate or that she knows and understands English. The Affidavit is
written in short and simple sentences that are understandable even to a layman. The
inevitable conclusion is that she signed the Affidavit voluntarily and without any
coercion whatsoever on the part of respondent.
The question remains as to whether his act of preparing and notarizing the Affidavit,
a document disadvantageous to his client, is a violation of the Code. We rule in the
negative.
It was not unlawful for respondent to assist his client in entering into a settlement
with Aquino after explaining all available options to her. The law encourages the
amicable settlement not only of pending cases but also of disputes which might
otherwise be filed in court.33 Moreover, there is no showing that he knew for sure that
Aquino is the father of complainant's daughter as paternity remains to be proven. As
complainant voluntarily and intelligently agreed to a settlement with Aquino, she
cannot later blame her counsel when she experiences a change of heart. Besides, the
record is bereft of evidence as to whether respondent also acted as Aquino's counsel
in the settlement of the case. Again, we only have complainant's bare allegations that
cannot be considered evidence.34 Suspicion, no matter how strong, is not enough. In
the absence of contrary evidence, what will prevail is the presumption that the
respondent has regularly performed his duty in accordance with his oath. 35

40
Complainant further charged respondent of misappropriating part of the money given
by Aquino to her daughter. Instead of turning over the whole amount, he allegedly
issued to her his personal check in the amount ofP150,000.00 and pocketed the
remaining P58,000.00 in violation of his fiduciary obligation to her as her counsel.
The IBP did not make any categorical finding on this matter but simply ordered
respondent to return the amount of P58,000.00 to complainant. We feel a discussion
is in order.
We note that there is no clear evidence as to how much Aquino actually gave in
settlement of complainant's claim for support. The parties are in agreement that
complainant received the amount of P150,000.00. However, complainant insists that
she should have received more as there were two postdated checks amounting
toP58,000.00 that respondent never turned over to her. Respondent essentially
agrees that the amount is in fact more than P150,000.00 but only P38,000.00 more
and complainant said he could have it and he assumed it was for his attorney's
fees.
We scrutinized the records and found not a single evidence to prove that there
existed two postdated checks issued by Aquino in the amount of P58,000.00. On the
other hand, respondent admits that there is actually an amount of P38,000.00 but
presented no evidence of an agreement for attorney's fees to justify his presumption
that he can keep the same. Curiously, there is on record a photocopy of a check
issued by respondent in favor of complainant for P150,000.00. It was only in his
Motion for Reconsideration where respondent belatedly proffers an explanation. He
avers that he cannot recall what the check was for but he supposes that complainant
requested for it as she did not want to travel all the way to Olongapo City with a huge
sum of money.
We find the circumstances rather suspicious but evidence is wanting to sustain a
finding in favor of either party in this respect. We cannot and should not rule on mere
conjectures. The IBP relied only on the written assertions of the parties, apparently
finding no need to subject the veracity of the assertions through the question and
answer modality. With the inconclusive state of the evidence, a more in-depth
investigation is called for to ascertain in whose favor the substantial evidence level
tilts. Hence, we are constrained to remand the case to the IBP for further reception of
evidence solely on this aspect.
We also are unable to grant complainant's prayer for respondent to be made liable for
the cost of her child's DNA test absent proof that he misappropriated funds
exclusively earmarked for the purpose.
Neither shall we entertain complainant's claim for moral damages and attorney's
fees. Suffice it to state that an administrative case against a lawyer is sui
generis, one that is distinct from a civil or a criminal action.36 It is an investigation by
the Court into the fitness of a lawyer to remain in the legal profession and be allowed
the privileges as such. Its primary objective is to protect the Court and the public
from the misconduct of its officers with the end in view of preserving the purity of the
legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by requiring that

those who exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable and reliable
men and women in whom courts and clients may repose confidence. 37 As such, it
involves no private interest and affords no redress for private grievance. 38 The
complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the lawyer's
alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the
outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of
justice.39
Respondent's misconduct is of considerable gravity. There is a string of cases where
the Court meted out the extreme penalty of disbarment on the ground of gross
immorality where the respondent contracted a bigamous marriage, 40 abandoned his
family to cohabit with his paramour,41 cohabited with a married woman,42 lured an
innocent woman into marriage,43 or was found to be a womanizer.44 The instant case
can be easily differentiated from the foregoing cases. We, therefore, heed the stern
injunction on decreeing disbarment where any lesser penalty, such as temporary
suspension, would accomplish the end desired. 45 In Zaguirre v. Castillo,46respondent
was found to have sired a child with another woman who knew he was married. He
therein sought understanding from the Court pointing out the polygamous nature of
men and that the illicit relationship was a product of mutual lust and desire. Appalled
at his reprehensible and amoral attitude, the Court suspended him indefinitely.
However, in Fr. Sinnott v. Judge Barte,47 where respondent judge consorted with a
woman not his wife, but there was no conclusive evidence that he sired a child with
her, he was fined P10,000.00 for his conduct unbecoming a magistrate despite his
retirement during the pendency of the case.
We note that from the very beginning of this case, herein respondent had expressed
remorse over his indiscretion and had in fact ended the brief illicit relationship years
ago. We take these as signs that his is not a character of such severe depravity and
thus should be taken as mitigating circumstances in his favor.48 Considering further
that this is his first offense, we believe that a fine of P15,000.00 would suffice. This, of
course, is without prejudice to the outcome of the aspect of this case involving the
alleged misappropriation of funds of the client.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we find Atty. Diosdado M. Rongcal GUILTY of
immorality and impose on him a FINE of P15,000.00 with a stern warning that a
repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.
The charge of misappropriation of funds of the client is REMANDED to the IBP for
further investigation, report and recommendation within ninety (90) days from receipt
of this Decision.
Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal record of respondent as an
attorney and as a member of the Bar, and furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the
country.
SO ORDERED.